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0-262-53085-6Churchland , Patricia S.Neu Roph I Losophy Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind‑Brain Patricia Smith Churchland MITPress ~~~~Churchland,Neu0-262-53085-6rophilosophy Patricia S. Eleventhprinting, 2000 First MIT Presspaperback edition, 1989 @ 1986by The MassachusettsInstitute of Technology All rights reserved . No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means ( including photocopying , recording , or information storage and retrieval ) without permission in writing from the publisher . Printed and bound in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging - in - Publication Data Churchland , Patricia Smith . Neurophilosophy : toward a unified science of the mind - brain . ( Computational models of cognition and perception ) " A Bradford book ." Bibliography : p . Includes index . 1 . Neuropsychology - Philosophy . 2 . Mind - brain identity theory . 3 . Neurology - Philosophy . I . Title . II . Series . [ DNLM : 1 . Neurology . 2 . Neuropsychology . WL 100 C562n ] QP360 . C49 1986 152 85 - 23706 ISBN 0-262-03116-7 (hardcover) 0-262-53085-6 (paperback) Chapter 7 Reduction and the Mind -Body Problem . [metaphysical systems] are the only means at our disposal for examining those parts of our knou1ledgewhich have already become observational and are therefore inaccessible to a criticism lion the basis of observation. II Paul K. Feyerabend, 1963 7.1 Introduction In concluding the last chapter, I foreshadowed the implications for philosophy of mind of the major revisions in the platform features of logical empiricism . These changes permitted the development of a naturalistic conception that envisioned research on the mind -brain as an empiricalinvestigation of the nature of mental states and processes, their causes, and their effects. Naturalism follows hard upon the heels of the understanding that there is no first philosophy . Inevit - ably the naturalistic approach leads us to inquire into the possibility of a unified theory of the mind -brain, wherein psychological states and processes are explained in terms of neuronal states and pro- cesses. A fundamental question concerning this possibility can be put as follows : Can mental states and processes be reducedto brain states and processes? Can one be a reductionist ? Not everyone expects mental states to reduce to brain states. On the contrary , it has been my' observation that many philosophers and cognitive scientists, most of the artificial intelligentsia , not a few neuroscientists and biologists, and theologians generally, reject the possibility as unlikely - and not merely as unlikely , but as flatly pre- posterous. But what , precisely, are they denying , and what is reduc- tion ? The aim of this and the subsequent two chapters will be to understand and evaluate the objections to reductionist strategies. This is central to my program , for obviously , if reductionism is a hopeless cause, then it would be foolish to search for an explanation of mental states and processes in terms of brain states and processes. 278 ThePhilosophy of Science Indeed , if reductionist strategies really are absurd , then it may well be wondered how neuroscience can be relevant to research in psychol - ogy , let alone to philosophical questions . In chapter 8 I consider objections posed by dualists and by tho :se who consider there to be an irreducible set of properties distin - guishing mental states from any sort of physical state . In chapter 9 I consider antireductionist arguments formulated by contemporary philosophers who are part of the functionalist movement . Here I lay the groundwork for those chapters by offering an account of what reduction is , and what it is not . 7 . 2 Intertheoretic Reduction The word " reduction " has a bewildering range of applications in the literature . " Reductionism " has come in some quarters to be used as a general term of insult and abuse . Sometimes it is used as a synonym for " behaviorism " ( which is a case of the vague hounding the vague ), or as a synonym for such diverse sins as " materialism , " " bourgeois capitalism , " " experimentalism , " " vivisectionism , " " communism ," " militarism , " " sociobiology , " and " atheism . " With such diversity , equivocation is inevitable , and often as not opposing sides in a debate on reductionism go right by each other because they have not agreed upon what they disagree about . How " reductionism " came to acquire such indiscriminate uses is beyond my ken , and perhaps it would be best to drop the word altogether and so avoid the inappropriate con - notations . The dilemma is , however , that for the subject matter under consideration , " reduction , " in the sense to be specified , is the right word . It is the word traditionally used in the relevant literature in science and in the philosophy of science , and there is no other word that begins to be appropriate . Therefore , I have decided to take my chances with " reduction " and to guard against misunderstanding by specifying the meaning I intend . In the sense of " reduction " that is relevant here , reduction is first and foremost a relation between theories . Most simply , one theory , the reduced theory T R , stands in a certain relation ( specified below ) to another more basic theory T B . Statements that a phenomenon PR reduces to another phenomenon PB are derivative upon the more basic claim that the theory that characterizes the first reduces to the theory that characterizes the second . Before I amplify and illustrate these points , a word about tactics . In order to clarify the nature of intertheoretic reduction and to begin to assess the prospects for reduction of psychological theories to neuro - science , it will be wisest not to focus on the very case at issue , namely Reduction and the Mind -Body Problem 279 neurobiological theories and psychological theories, but on cases at some remove from what is contentious . Otherwise , we not only lose clarity but also run the risk of begging all the important questions. The account of intertheoretic reduction should not be tailored to suit the specific case at issue but should be adequate to reduction in the sciences generally . Moreover , there do not yet exist fleshed-out neurobiological theories with reductive pretensions, let alone reduc- tive success, and to introduce neuroscientific fiction in the analysis stage would only be confusing . By contrast, physics, chemistry , and genetics provide well -studied examples of theories that have reduced to other theories. Therefore, it will be most efficient to draw upon those examples in the history of science where two theories have eventually enjoyed an intertheoretic reduction and where the exam- ples have been analyzed by historians and philosophers of science. Hence, examples from physics, chemistry , and biochemistry will figure prominently in illustrating the analysis of reduction . With an account of the intertheoretic relations and dynamics of reduction in hand, we can reopen the question of the ultimate reducibility of psy- chological theories to neurobiological theories. To return to the issue, reduction is a relation between theories, and one phenomenon is said to reduce to another in virtue of the reduc- tion of the relevant theories. For example, the claim that light has been reduced to electromagnetic radiation means (a) that the theory of optics has been reduced to the theory of electromagnetic radiation and (b) that the theory of optics is reduced in such a way that it is appropriate to identify light with electromagnetic radiation . Similarly , when we entertain the question of whether light is reducible to elec- tromagnetic radiation , the fundamental question really is whether the theory of optics is reducible to the theory of electromagnetic radia- tion . Hence, when we raise the question of whether mental states are reducible to brain states, this question must be posed first in terms of whether some theory concerning the nature of mental states is reduc- ible to a theory describing how neuronal ensembles work, and second in terms of whether it reduces in such a way that the mental states of TR can be identified with the neuronal states of T B. A good deal of muddle concerning reduction can be avoided with this initial clarification regarding reductive relations . A consequence of intertheoretic reduction is explanatory uni - fication , and in the sciences such unification is considered a good thing . If one theory can be explained by another and thus reduced to it , then our understanding of the phenomena described by the theory is greatly enhanced. For example, as a result of the reduction of the theory of optics to the theory of electromagnetism we came to under - 280 ThePhilosophy of Science stand why the laws of optics are as they are, and to this extent our understanding of how light behaves and what it is was enhanced. Another important consequence of intertheoretic reduction is on- tological simplification . Ontology pertains to what entities and prop - erties exist, and in the event of intertheoretic reduction it may turn out that where we had thought there existed two different kinds of phenomena characterized by the laws of two different theories, there is in fact but one kind of phenomenon that is described by both theories. For example, in the mid -nineteenth century it was widely sup- posed that light was one sort of phenomenon , and electromagnetic effects quite another . By the turn of the century the laws of optics had been reduced to the laws of electromagnetic theory , and
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