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INR6938 Lecture 1

University of North Florida Master of Public Administration program Course syllabus 2019 INR6938 Field experience in International Affairs: Introduction

* The logic of the course * "Thinking without comparisons is unthinkable. And, in the absence of comparisons, so is all scientific thought and all scientific research." (Swanson 1971, p. 145)

Parochialism "afflicts too much of the study or science of public administration. Much of what purports to be universalistic is actually highly culture bound and idiosyncratic. Probably Americans are the worst offenders. Too many, ignorant of the world outside of the , merely generalize about American public administration, not recognizing that American ideas and practices are idiosyncratic and the exception rather than the rule." (Caiden 1994. p. 46)

I cribbed the two quotes above from the opening of my Comparative Public Administration class (PAD6836) because INR6938 seeks to do much the same thing: broaden the perspectives of UNF graduate students by giving them exposure to another society.

The book: Montero’s Brazil: Reversal of Fortune, published in 2014. It is hard to find a good, general introduction to Brazil. After all, it is only the fifth most populous country in the world. I read a previous book (more narrowly on Brazilian politics) of his that I thought was well done, and so assigned this. The major (and I’d call it a minor) limitation of the book is that it was published prior to the upward (Brazi↑ on the cover) trend of the previous twenty years turning in to a Brazi↓. Still, this pre-slump perspective may give us context for what has happened since.

The U.S. and Brazil

I began studying Brazil largely because I was learning Portuguese (to do research in southern Africa) and, in reading about Brazil, became attracted to it. As well, as an American who had lived and studied in Australia, and done research on Canada, it seemed like a good addition to my teaching. Australia, Brazil and Canada are useful comparators for the United States, as all

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INR6938 Lecture 1 continent-sized settler societies. Australia and Canada may be the two countries in the world most like the US; while Brazil differs in significant ways.

Comparison = science. The logic of comparison is, as suggested in the opening quotes, central to science and/or policy analysis. We do comparison a lot in Jacksonville, comparing ourselves to other communities. In the social sciences in the United States, though ‘comparative’ political science, or comparative sociology, or comparative public administration is often shorthand for the study of countries other than the United States. This class will look at Brazil not just to understand it better, but also for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of human governance in the United States.

Settler societies. As an example, in a 1964 book that gets far less attention than it should, Louis Hartz (1964) argued that European 'settler societies' constitute a distinct subset of human society, and we could learn a great deal about these places by remembering this history. Hartz's thesis was broadly twofold.1 First, a number of countries in the world today are essentially European societies that were transplanted to other places. So Chile, predominately European in culture in terms of the origins of its people, is a European settler society (the pre-contact people were largely wiped out). Neighbouring Peru, even though it has long been dominated by an elite of Spanish origin, remains a strongly indigenous society (making up a majority of the population) and so wouldn't necessarily be classed as a European settler society in Hartz's terms. Hartz's settler societies, then, are most strongly Chile, , Uruguay, Australia, New Zealand, the US, Canada and Quebec. Like most scholars, Hartz was inconsistent, squeezing into his pool of cases white South Africa. I say inconsistent because if largely Indian Peru is excluded, then certainly largely African South Africa should have been, too. Brazil is also an awkward case for Hartz, because of the large African population.2

These definitional quibbles aside, the second part of Hartz's thesis is that these societies are 'fragments' of Europe, and brought with them the European culture dominant in the home country at the time of settlement. So Quebec, Brazil and the three 'southern cone' countries of South America were settled by largely feudal, 16/17th century France, Portugal and Spain, respectively. Elements of this feudalism can be found to this day. This is certainly so for Brazil, where scholars continue to refer to this feudal legacy in the clientelism and that characterizes government, especially at the state and local level (if you read Portuguese, see Freyre 1978,19; Leal 1948; Torres 1978, 44-5; Prado 1928; and Sodre 1944, 73-104). This notion is also common in histories of Quebec, where the 'Quiet Revolution' began to fight the power of the church and landholders from about the 1950s.

The English settlers of North America, on the contrary, brought with them a different culture. Unlike feudal France and Spain, England was in in the early stages of the 'Age of Revolution' (to quote another classic work, see Hobsbawm 1962), in which scientific progress, political freedoms, and individualism were all growing. The United States got an extra dollop of individualism because about half of the original colonies were settled by private individuals, not

1 A third component was that he argued these historical inheritances were very rigid, and so changed little through the centuries. I’m skeptical, and anyhow it isn’t central to how he is used for our purposes. 2 Although a proposed Texas history textbook characterized African immigrants to Texas as laborers seeking plantation work (source), early African immigration to the Americas didn’t work quite like that.

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INR6938 Lecture 1 by the British state; while 'The Frontier' to the west reinforced this American individualism. Annoyed by your neighbors? Go west, young man! Finally, by the time Australia and New Zealand were settled by the British (largely in the 19th century), England had undergone considerable political development. While the English of the period when North America was settled saw the still feudal English government as something to avoid, by the time Australia and New Zealand were settled, government was increasingly being seen as a solution to social problems, rather than a source of them. Table 1 (following page) sums up these differences.

Table 1 -- Settler societies -- broad political culture

Brazil Canada Australia USA Indigenous Disorganized, poor Organized, strong Disorganized, poor Organized, strong people material culture material culture material culture material culture 'Discovered' c. 1500 c. 1500 1750s c. 1500 Settled 1520 1605 1788 1620 King of France, State (?) and Settled by King of Portugal British state, and British state individuals American 'loyalists' Independence 1822 1867 1901 1776 'Democratic' 1985? 1848 c. 1820 early 1600s Colonial Democratic, Democratic, Feudal, statist Democratic, statist legacy statist/individualist individualist Source: Instructor winged it.

So to sum up: Hartz argues that these societies were defined, to a large extent, by the nature of their historical settlement and, in the case of the (North and South) American countries, three and four centuries later this historical legacy still explains a great deal about these societies. So Canada and Australia are very much like the US, while Brazil, for me, provides a useful cautionary tale: for all the hysterical, fear-mongering paranoia in contemporary American politics, Brazil reminds us how fortunate the US is.

But not ! The Brazilian characterization above does not apply to our primary site: Santa Catarina. North American settlement differed greatly between the southern, slave states of Georgia through at least Virginia, and the small farmer settlements of New England. The same applied in Brazil, with slave-based plantation dominant in the northeast, and the three southern states, especially, characterized by small farms. These states were also settled much later, from industrializing Germany, Italy, and other European countries (including Portugal).

Government reform -- In looking at these three countries, I've especially focused on the issue of government reform. The idea here has been to respond to widespread perceptions in the 1970s that both the size of government, and its regulatory reach, had gotten too extensive. Table 2 (on the next page) provides some data on this.

By way of a potted introduction to Brazilian government:  Feudalism. As indicated above, on initial settlement Brazil was feudal. Belmiro Castor especially discusses this in the chapter of his I’ve asked you to read.

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 The Emperor arrives. The first major change occurred when the Portuguese royal family (and myriad hangers on) fled Portugal in the face of invasion by Napoleon (further reading). For the first time, Brazil’s government was located in Brazil, rather than nearly 5000 miles away in Portugal. Despite some long overdue development, and an opening of trade, though, politically little changed. The Emperor still ruled, and all important officials were Portuguese.  Independent empire. When Napoleon was safely disposed of, the Portuguese Emperor returned to Lisbon, leaving his son (Pedro) in charge in Brazil. He eventually revolted, and Brazil became independent under Dom Pedro I. His son Dom Pedro II then succeeded him. The chapter by Fernando Henrique Cardoso provides some of the flavor of this era3. Compared to what came before, he was very progressive, but he ruled for half a century and exhausted his new ideas in a decade or so. Worse, he was reluctant to abolish slavery, which was not done until 1889 (yes, a quarter century after the US), and led to his being toppled in a coup. Those angered by emancipation, though, did not reinstate slavery (for a link on ).

Table 2 -- Descriptive statistics, Brazil and others4 GDPpc Demo- Corrup- Econ. Gini Area People GDP ($1000) cracy tion freedom Index USA 96293 3163 16,2451 51,749 8.1119 7417 75.5 41.1 Canada 99852 35 178011 51,206 9.087 8110 80.2 33.7 Australia 76926 23 153212 67,442 9.019 8011 82.0 34.0 Brazil 85155 1985 22537 11,340 7.38 43 56.9 52.7

Other rich Japan 378 12610 59613 46,731 8.0820 7615 72.4 32.1 Germany 358 8216 34284 45,625 8.6413 7912 73.4 30.6 UK 243 63 24766 38,920 8.3116 7814 74.9 38.0 France 552 64 26135 39,772 8.04 69 63.5 31.7 Sweden 450 10 524 55,040 9.732 874 73.1 26.1

Others China 95974 13541 82272 6090 3.00 36 52.5 37.0 India 32877 12582 185910 1500 7.92 38 55.7 33.6 Russia 17,0981 1439 20158 14,040 3.39 27 51.9 39.7 Nigeria 924 1677 263 1560 3.76 27 54.3 43.0 Indonesia 191115 2454 87816 3560 6.95 34 58.5 38.1 Mexico 196414 11611 117814 9750 6.68 35 66.8 48.1

3 As an aside, Florianopolis is named after , Brazil’s second President and who features in Cardoso’s first chapter. 4 Rankings are presented in superscript. Notes and sources: Area (1000 miles2), People (millions), GDP (Gross Domestic Producty, $USb, 2012), GDPpc (GDP per capita, in US dollars); and Economic Freedom (a 0-100 index, with higher scores indicating more economic freedom, or less government intervention): all from The Economist (2015). Corruption: from Transparency International's 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index. This is a 0-100 scale, with higher being less corrupt. Democracy: from the Economist Intelligence Unit. The EIU's democracy index reports scores from 0-10, with higher being more democratic. Gini index: from the Human Development Report 2015, pages 216-19 of the Statistical Annex. The Gini Index is a measure of inequality, with higher scores indicating more inequality.

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 Republican stagnation. Not much happened for some time, with a highly stunted form of democracy (restricted to a narrow elite, see Cardoso 2006, p. 26). Cardoso also identifies the great inequality that has long prevented Brazilian growth: “The problem was unchanged: Brazil’s elite had displayed an appalling unwillingness to assimilate those at the bottom rungs of society. Those at the top continued to live the good life, failing to commit the to the education, health care, and that would produce a more equal nation. Until this imbalance was addressed, neither stability not progress would be possible” (2006, p. 27). Eakin also points out (in the third page of his interview) that elections during this period involved a very small portion of the population: 1% according to him.  The Vargas ‘Novo Estado’: Getúlio Vargas dominated Brazil from the 1930s to 1950s, ruling essentially as a dictator through much of this period. For all his faults, he did promote especially government reform, and sought to dramatically change Brazil through his “Novo Estado,” or New State. Indeed, Brazil’s national school of public and business administration (Escola Brasileira de Administração Publica e de Empresas -- EBAPE) is housed in the Getúlio Vargas Foundation. From the 1950s, as well, the US funded academic outreach programs to major Brazilian universities. I (at a conference at EBAPE, see link, and elsewhere) have criticized these for being one-way (“In America we do it this way!”) programs. But the country did begin a long road of development and administrative reform during the ‘’.  and . It is generally conceded that a defining characteristic of this reform was its ‘statist’ (it relied on government – The State – to lead the process, as Castor’s chapter discusses) nature, with this especially so under , who famously sought to deliver fifty years of development in five years. Conservative elements in Brazil feared Kubitschek was a Communist on the Soviet/Cuban model, and the armed forces overthrew government in 1964. The US supported this anti-democratic coup.5 As I have put it, Elio Gaspari, in a widely lauded, four volume history of the 1964-85 military government in Brazil, notes that while the U.S. was not responsible for the 1964 coup it was aware that it was likely to take place (Gaspari, 2002a, pp. 62-64), encouraged it rather than tried to stop it, and certainly supported the subsequent military government (pp. 97-102, 115- 116; 2002b, pp. 283-286, 329-334; 2003, pp. 542-546). According to Gaspari, “press censorship and torture of political prisoners” (2002a, p. 36; see also 2004, pp. 371-337) were pillars of this regime that exiled Alberto Guerreiro Ramos. Despite this, American public administrators continued to work on technical assistance projects in the country. (Candler 2006, p. 554)  Skipping a lot of history, a major, new bout of reform was introduced in the 1990s (with some roots in the 1980s). A social democratic President (Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ably assisted by, among others, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, and click for his website, and English language articles) is credited with bringing in these reforms, which were bitterly opposed by the quasi-socialist Partido dos Trabalhistas (PT -- Worker’s Party) opposition at the time. Cardoso's PT successor Luiz Inacio da Silva kept these reforms largely intact. Cato Institute data shows a dramatic increase in economic freedom, from a score of 3.87 in 1985 to a still fairly 'shackled' 6.00 today. The Cato/Fraser data also shows that the country has made

5 For a good discussion, see link.

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improvements in the soundness of its currency, and in opening to global trade, but has failed to reform its legal system, and remains highly regulated. As a result Brazil has experienced rapid economic growth, earning it global recognition as a 'large emerging ', but a two decade boom has recently reversed, and the country is undergoing great unrest (an example). Corruption has played a large role.

Becoming Brazilian!

A special interest of mine has been the development of national identity and, more narrowly, how countries develop systems of administration, and public policy. On the former (national identity) the Hartz discussion from pages 2-3 of these ‘lecture notes’ is part of this, and the Castor article gets at it (perhaps a bit too stereotypically) as well. Eakin especially notes the differences in ‘settler societies’ in that they are essentially a tabula rasa, lacking the ‘primordial’ histories of older societies (Hartz, of course disagrees). So in normal societies: “…they tended to focus much more on ethnicity they could trace back for a century if not millennia. Whereas what you tend to see in the Americas is something very different. Here are peoples who arrive, conquer, colonise, bring in millions of Africans, and so when these nations become independent and no longer are colonies, they have the same sort of problem but they can’t turn to a discussion of national identity that goes back to some primordial ethnicity. So then it becomes a question of what is it that you construct here? What is it that makes us who we are” (p. 2)?

African influences. There is a lot going on here.  Distribution. Brazil’s 2010 census got a lot of global attention (example) when it showed that Black or mixed-race people made up 50.7% of the population, the first time they were in a majority relative to the 47.7% who self-identify as White. Keep in mind, too, that ‘White’ includes what in the US we would define as Latino.  Slavery. As indicated earlier, slavery began in Brazil long before it did in the US, and especially relative to population, more slaves were sent to Brazil. If you haven’t seen this, click on this graphic of slave ships going from Africa to the Americas over a quarter century (click).  Race and inequality. Eakin might simplify too much in his discussion of race, inequality and poverty (for example: “to be black means to be at the bottom,” p. 10). Race and poverty certainly correlate strongly. A cliché I have often heard in Brazil, though, is that while very few afro-brasileiros are rich, there are many poor whites along with the afro-brasileiros.  Affirmative action... programs have begun in some areas.  Yet… In the US, it always takes me aback to remember that if the average generation is 25 years, it has been only six generations since slaves were emancipated, and entered ‘free’ life with no assets. So an African American today would be the grandchild of the grandchild of the grandchild of a slave. That is not necessarily a lot of time for a family to accumulate assets (financial, educational, and social), especially given a century or so of post- emancipation ‘Jim Crow’ laws (source). As a result, American wealth inequality (assets) is even greater than American income inequality (source). In Brazil the situation is even worse, as today’s afro-brasileiros are one fewer generation from slavery.

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 The myth of racial equality. Eakin touches on this a bit. To quote myself (Ventriss and Candler 2005, p. 348) again: “For many , the intermingling of the races during carnaval has long been a metaphor for race relations in the country on the whole: That is, it has been widely believed that race relations are quite good, especially when compared to the United States, that other large, late slave-owning country in the Americas. This Brazilian myth of racial democracy persists even today (Jones 2002; Reichmann 1995; Santos 1998, 119– 22; Twine 1998, 6–7). Especially if North American criteria are applied to the issue, great racial inequality and racial discrimination are clear. Although they constitute a larger percentage of the Brazilian population than the American population, descendants of Africans are less represented in economic and political circles in Brazil than in America. As in America, they do not fare as well on a range of socioeconomic indicators (Fry 2000, 90–94; Twine 1998, 65–86). Guerreiro Ramos’s daughter, Eliana Guerreiro Ramos Bennett, perhaps put it best: “The picture of Brazil as a ‘racial paradise’ is a Jungian exercise in collective fantasy in the sense that Brazil presents itself as it would like to be seen, even perhaps as it would like to be, but this fantasy is far from the shadowy reality of ethnic relations in Brazil. The truth—or the shadow, to use Jung’s term to describe our inner reality—of Brazilian interethnic relations is that Brazil is more similar to the old South Africa than to any racial paradise” (1999, 227). As for what was to be done in terms of conceptualizing the problem, to quote myself again (the stuff I cite is all in Portuguese, below is my take on Alberto Guerreiro Ramos’s Patologia social do “branco” brasileiro): “The central problem is stated early: ‘Whiteness’ remains society’s aesthetic reference in a country where people of nonwhite origins predominate (1955, p. 3). Brazilian social science regarding race has reinforced this, treating “blackness” as a subject of study rather than whiteness (p. 25) and often stereotyping white as good and black as bad, thus providing a psychological support for racism (p. 7). In Patologia social Guerreiro Ramos inverted this, instead treating whiteness as the subject of study (1995, 172). His conclusion: the dominant white race, through its neocolonial fixation on Europe (1955, 8–9) inhibited the development of an authentic Brazilian national sense of identity (p. 24). As a result, for Guerreiro Ramos the racial problem in Brazil was one of the white race, not of the black” (p. 28).  Casa Grande e Senzala! Finally on race, Eakin (p. 5) discusses Gilberto Freyre’s seminal Casa grande e senzala, with its claim that Brazilians were, well, developing a new nation from the main Portuguese and African founding elements. This is true culturally: afro- brasileiros are prominent in sport and culture, much like in the US, and there are African influences in broader culture. Beyond that, though, Freyre implied that the good elements of all races would fuse into something better. Instead a good portion of the bad seems to have survived.

Indigenous (‘Indian’) influences. For all the horror of slavery in Brazil, the plight of the country’s indigenous people was even worse. Indeed, my understanding is that the first Brazilian slaves were the native tribes, which were effectively wiped out as (source) swept the countryside in search of slaves for the plantations.

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Inequality. Eakin especially emphasizes inequality. Some salient points:  High! The last column in Table 2 presents a Gini Coefficient, which is a measure of inequality. It is a 0-1 scale (or 0-100 in our Table 2), with 0 a situation in which everyone is equal, and 1 (or 100) a hypothetical situation in which one person earns all the income. Brazil has the highest figure in our table (and the US the highest among rich countries, another way the US and Brazil are similar). A few other countries (not in the table) are less equal than Brazil, but the US is the least equal rich country, even after others are included.  Manifests in other areas. The figure at right is copied from my doctoral dissertation (Candler 1998, p. 41). The table shows inequality not just in income (the measure used here is a different one from the Gini), but also in life expectancy, infant mortality, and education. This was the mid- 1990s, and to give some cross-national context, another source I have in the office (World 1994) gives Brazil’s life expectancy as 66 years. For the US it was 77. Infant mortality (again the World Bank reports a somewhat different figure for Brazil: 57) in the US was 9 per 1000 live births, the highest in the rich world (see also). Note the jaw dropping difference: 1 out of 100 births result in infant mortality in the US, while in Brazil the figure is closer to 1 out of 20. But the real shocker is the education indicator. Note how this is measured: male households with no (no! zero years!) of formal schooling. In Northeast Brazil this figure was over 40%!  Maps geographically. You can get a sense of the geographic nature of Brazilian inequality in the table above, as well. Note how the South (and Santa Catarina) does better than the Brazilian average, and much better than the Northeast (and , the other research site in this study). This regional difference in Brazil is very high when compared to other countries, as shown in the Table below, also from my doctoral dissertation (p. 42). The table presents levels of regional inequality between the richest and poorest regions in a number of countries, including Italy, which famously has very high

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inequality between the modern, industrialised north, and the poorer, mafia-ridden south. The ratio in the last column is the poorer region’s income as a percentage of the richer region’s income. Brazilian regional income inequality is higher even than that of Italy. So the income in Calabria, Italy’s poorest region, is only 44% that of Lombardia, its richest. In Brazil, Piauí (poorest) is only 15% as rich as Brasília.

 ‘Elites’. Inequality implies lots of folks at the bottom, and a smaller group at the top. These elites Table 3 -- Inequality compared are mentioned by Eakin on a few occasions. In an Brazil US excellent (but kind of dated) 1998 history, Eakin Abject poverty 30% n/a (1998, p. 105) describes Brazil’s class divisions as Poor 30 20% shown in Table 3. There is also a 1% that are über Middle class 20 70% wealthy, and some of you will have noticed that Upper class 10% 10% Eakin’s numbers don’t add up to 100. But that gives the general idea. We will see, as this class progresses, that the income distribution has improved dramatically in Brazil (while worsening in the US!).

European influences. Needless to say, and as Table 1 notes, Brazil was settled by the Portuguese, and the cultural inheritance of that settlement persists to this day. Without making too much out of this (Brazil is not still ‘slavocratic’ or feudal), Brazilians occasionally lament that they got a raw deal in having been settled by the Portuguese, a third rate European power.  Looked to France. Eakin also notes that because of the cultural desert that was medieval Portugal, the colonial elite looked to France for culture, rather than Lisbon.  …but American pull was strong. After 1776, especially, the American example inspired much of the rest of the Americas. Brazil was no exception. There is still the occasional expression of regret that Brazil has not emulated the American experience of becoming a great power: it has the people, has the land, but culturally it just hasn’t happened (an example). While Brazil is still unabashedly a ‘Lusophone’ (Portuguese-speaking) country, and there are pockets of Francophiles in the country,6 the United States is now far more looked to as cultural and policy influence.7

Becoming Brazilian? Sure, this is a unique, vibrant country, as exceptional as the US is, maybe more so as the only Portuguese ‘settler society’ in the world. But some concluding points:

Zero sum thinking. Resource scarcity means that life is tenuous for many, and programs to benefit the poor are seen by many middle class and rich folks as inevitably coming out of their share of the national wealth.

Brasileiros? One of the more intriguing things I’ve read about Brazil is an article that points out that the title Brazilians give themselves in Portuguese – brasileiros – implies that they ‘work’ Brazil, like a trucker (truck = caminhão, truck driver = caminhoneiro, one who works trucks). Instead, the author (link, but it is in Portuguese) argues, they should be brasilianos: citizens of Brazil. For what this interesting semantic discussion is worth, I tend to see the issue as more the

6 Including two of my closest friends in the country, who we should meet in Florianopolis. 7 This is not to the liking of many Brazilians. Indeed a good part of my career has focused on the research of Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, who was very critical of the unthinking adoption of foreign models, including that of the US.

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INR6938 Lecture 1 zero-sum thinking described above: it is hard to be generous to ‘promote the general welfare’ when you fear your own welfare is threatened. Coincidentally, The Economist newsmagazine had a recent article that pointed to the same tensions in the US (source).

Brazil in global governance. Brazil was a founding member of the League of Nations, as well as the successor United Nations. Despite being one of the largest countries in the world (5th in both population and land area), it has been a relatively minor player in the world, though not for lack of trying. Brazil has taken leadership positions in working for a global trading system that the developing world sees as more fair. This is from former President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva: "Protectionist barriers and other obstacles to balanced trade, aggravated by the concentration of investments, knowledge and technology, have followed colonial domination. A powerful and all-encompassing invisible cogwheel runs the system from afar. It often revokes democratic decisions, shrivels the sovereignty of States, and imposes itself to elected governments. It demands that legitimate national development projects be renounced. The perverse logic of draining the needy to irrigate the bountiful still stands... Brazil is at work in multilateral negotiations with a view to reaching just and equitable agreements. At the last meeting of the World Trade Organization, we took a fundamental step towards the elimination of abusive restrictions that hamper developing countries."

Brazil as BRIC. In Table 2 you can get some sense of why the United States is considered a ‘superpower’: it’s big! The US is also the world’s only superpower.8 Below that level, though, there are a number of other major powers: think Japan, Germany, maybe the UK and France, then also China, India, Russia and Brazil. A former Goldman Sachs economist is credited with having coined the term BRIC to describe the four major emerging of Brazil, Russia, India and China. These economies have been going through a rough patch (source), after 20 years of strong growth, but despite this have emerged as significant global players. The US has also been in relative decline (for a discussion) simply because the rest of the world has been catching up: for rich countries, growth means developing new technologies. For poor countries, growth means just adopting existing technologies. The latter is easier.

Of these four BRICs, Brazil (and India) are essential to global order simply because they lack the expansionist, disruptive tendencies of China and especially Russia. I’ve argued that Brazil is worth studying because a viable future for America requires a viable, constructive Brazil. America can’t go it alone, nor can it hide from the world, and so it needs strong allies that share its ‘liberal democratic’9 values.

Democracy has been consolidating! Worldwide, the so-called Arab Spring led to a recent upsurge in democratization, the fourth (I think it is) such ‘wave’ over the last century or so. As Table 4 shows, the world is now, though, more democratic than ever, or certainly in modern history.

8 I argue that this isn’t due to our exceptional nature, or because God loves us more than other countries. It is just because we are the most populous rich country (and spend more on defense than any other large country). 9 This term is woefully misunderstood in the US. As an illustration, see the link to an article in the conservative US publication The American Conservative, and the link to the left-leaning British newspaper The Guardian. Both argue pretty much the same thing.

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Table 4 -- Global trends in democracy Year under review Free countries Partly free countries Not free countries 1974 41 (27%) 48 (32%) 63 (41%) 1984 53 (32%) 59 (35%) 55 (33%) 1994 76 (40%) 61 (32%) 54 (28%) 2004 89 (46%) 54 (28%) 49 (26%) 2014 89 (46%) 55 (28%) 51 (26%) Source: Freedom in the World 2015

Brazil has been part of that trend. As you may be aware, recently the country’s President () was impeached. My understanding of the issue is that this was essentially an anti- democratic coup. It was Constitutional, as the proceedings took place in accordance with the Constitution, and she did, indeed, break a law that was subject to impeachment. By most accounts, though, the law was at best a technicality that has been widely ignored. As a result, the country’s first female President, head of the party that has had the most support from the lower rungs of the income distribution, and recently re-elected, has been removed from power by (it should be added!) a Vice President and Congress with far more serious corruption problems.

So that’s the general idea: in this course we will learn more about Brazil, more broadly we will learn about the United States through comparison, and we will learn about governance in human society. * References:

Anuário Estatístico do Brasil 1994. : Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. Caiden, Gerald (1994). "Globalizing the theory and practice of public administration." In Jean- Claude Garcia-Zamor and Renu Khator, Public Administration in the Global Village, Westport, CT: Praeger. Candler, G.G. (1998). Civil Society and Development -- the Role of the Third Sector in the Public Policy Process in Santa Catarina and Sergipe, Brazil. Dissertation, Bloomington: Indiana University. Candler, GG (2006). “Linguistic diglossia and parochialism in American public administration: The missing half of Guerreiro Ramos’s Redução Sociológica.” Administrative Theory & Praxis 28(4), 2006. The Economist (2015). Pocket World in Figures, London. Fry, Peter. 2000. “Politics, Nationality, and the Meanings of ‘Race’ in Brazil.” Daedalus 129(2): 83–118 Castor, Belmiro Valverde Jobim (2002). Brazil is not for Amateurs. Xlibris. Gaspari, E. (2002a). A ditadura envergonhada. : Editora Schwarz. Gaspari, E. (2002b). A ditadura escancarada. São Paulo: Editora Schwarz. Gaspari, E. (2003). A ditadura derrotada. São Paulo: Editora Schwarz. Gaspari, E. (2004). A ditadura encurralada. São Paulo: Editora Schwarz. Guerreiro Ramos, Alberto (1955). Patologia social do “branco” brasileiro. Rio de Janeiro: Journal co Commércio.

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Guerreiro Ramos, Alberto (1995). Interview, in Lucia Lippi Oliveira (editor), A sociologia do Guerreiro, Rio de Janeiro: Editora UFRJ. Guerreiro Ramos Bennett, Eliana. 1994. Plato’s Ideal of Reason and the Liberal Vision of Reason and Politics in the -Centered Society. Los Angeles: University of Southern California, Department of Political Science. Hartz, Louis (1964). The Founding of New Societies. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Hobsbawm, Eric (1962). The Age of Revolution. Cleveland: World Publishers. Jones, Patrice. 2002. “Affirmative Action Debate Grips Brazil.” Detroit Free Press, January 2, 14a. Lavinas, Lena, Eduardo Henrique Garcia and Marcelo Rubens do Amaral (1996). “Desigualdades regionais: indicadores sócio-econômicos nos anos 90,” in Revista Econômica do Nordeste, 27(4), pp. 607-32. Leal, Victor Nunes. 1948. Coronelismo, Enxada e Voto: O Municipio e o Regime Representivo no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro. Prado, Paulo. 1928. Retrato do Brasil: Ensaio Sobre a Tristeza Brasileira. Sao Paulo. Reichmann, Rebecca. 1995. “Brazil’s Denial of Race.” NACLA Report on the Americas 28(6): 35–43. Santos, Jocélio Teles dos. 1998. “A Mixed-Race Nation.” Translated by Hendrik Kraay. In Afro- Brazilian Culture and Politics, edited by Hendrik Kraay, 117–33. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Sodre, Nelson Werneck. 1944. Formacao da Sociedade Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Jose Olympio Editora. Swanson, Guy (1971). "Comparisons for comparative research: structural anthropology and the theory of action." In Ivan Vallier (ed.) Comparative Methods in Sociology, Berkeley: University of California Press. Torres, Alberto. 1978. O Problema Nacional Brasileiro. Sao Paulo: Companha Editora Nacional. Twine, Winddance. 1998. Racism in a Racial Democracy. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. World Bank (1994). World Development Report 1994. Washington.

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