Jihad and the Islamic Law of War
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Sunni – Shi`A Relations and the Implications for Belgium and Europe
FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’ SUNNI – SHI`A RELATIONS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR BELGIUM AND EUROPE EGMONT PAPER 35 FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’ Sunni – Shi`a relations and the implications for Belgium and Europe JELLE PUELINGS January 2010 The Egmont Papers are published by Academia Press for Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations. Founded in 1947 by eminent Belgian political leaders, Egmont is an independent think-tank based in Brussels. Its interdisciplinary research is conducted in a spirit of total academic freedom. A platform of quality information, a forum for debate and analysis, a melting pot of ideas in the field of international politics, Egmont’s ambition – through its publications, seminars and recommendations – is to make a useful contribution to the decision- making process. *** President: Viscount Etienne DAVIGNON Director-General: Marc TRENTESEAU Series Editor: Prof. Dr. Sven BISCOP *** Egmont - The Royal Institute for International Relations Address Naamsestraat / Rue de Namur 69, 1000 Brussels, Belgium Phone 00-32-(0)2.223.41.14 Fax 00-32-(0)2.223.41.16 E-mail [email protected] Website: www.egmontinstitute.be © Academia Press Eekhout 2 9000 Gent Tel. 09/233 80 88 Fax 09/233 14 09 [email protected] www.academiapress.be J. Story-Scientia NV Wetenschappelijke Boekhandel Sint-Kwintensberg 87 B-9000 Gent Tel. 09/225 57 57 Fax 09/233 14 09 [email protected] www.story.be All authors write in a personal capacity. Lay-out: proxess.be ISBN 978 90 382 1538 9 D/2010/4804/17 U 1384 NUR1 754 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the permission of the publishers. -
Violent Jihad in the Netherlands
Violent Jihad in the Netherlands Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat Violent Jihad in the Netherlands Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat 2 Contents Foreword 5 Introduction 7 The murder of Theo van Gogh: consequences and effects 7 General trends in the development of jihadism 9 Framework of terms and definitions 10 1 From exogenous threat to home-grown terrorism 13 1.1 What is a jihadist network? 13 1.2 Historical development of network formation 15 1.2.1 The traditional phase: migration of jihadists 15 1.2.2 The proliferation phase: recruitment 16 1.2.3 The ‘home-grown’ phase: radicalisation and jihadisation 17 1.3 Three types of jihadist networks 17 2 Decentralisation and local implantation of international jihad19 2.1Al-Qaeda: from ‘network of gynetworks’ 19 to trademark and ideolo 2.2 Ideology of global violent jihad 21 2.3 Decentralisation of international jihad 22 2.4 Local implantation of international jihad 26 3 Radicalisation and the emergence of local networks 29 3.1Radicalisation, recruitment and jihadisation 29 3.2 The religious context of radicalisation 30 3.3 The socio-political context of radicalisation 33 3.4 The cultural and socio-psychological context of radicalisation 35 3.5 Emergence of local autonomous cells and networks 37 3.6 Backgrounds and functioning of local autonomous networks 38 3.7 The significance of the Hofstad network 39 4 Virtualisation of jihad 43 4.1The Internet as a propulsion of the jihad movement 43 4.2 Al-Qaeda as a virtual database (top-down) 44 4.3 The virtual umma (grass -
Religious and Social Leadership As the Tribesmen of Arabia, the Jews Of
CHAPTER ONE RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL LEADERSHIP As the tribesmen of Arabia, the Jews of Medina drew their leadership from the more dominant clans among them. Their community leaders were judges, military commanders, and those who ruled on halakhic matters. A study of “the occasions of revelation” (asbāb al-nuzūl) in Islamic literature reveals that the Jewish leaders in Medina often provoked Muḥammad with questions on religious issues. As a result, they were referred to as the “people of the question” (aṣḥāb al-masʾala).1 A reflection of the numer- ous questions that the Jewish sages in Medina asked Muḥammad exists in the following saying, which indirectly presents the Jews as a trigger for the revelation of many verses of the Qurʾān: “[Much of] the Qurʾān was revealed because of the questions they (i.e., the Jewish leaders in Medina) posed to him (i.e., Muḥammad)” (kāna al-Qurʾān yanzilu fīhim fīmā yasʾalūna ʿanhu).2 1. The Leaders of the Jewish Tribes of Medina ʿAbd al-Malik b. Hishām (d. 833 CE) records a list of the Medinan Jew- ish leaders of every Jewish tribe in Medina.3 Many of these leaders are reported to have been killed during the Muslim-Jewish conflicts in Med- ina and Khaybar. The leaders of the strongest Jewish tribe in Medina, the Banū al-Naḍīr, were the brothers from the Abū al-Ḥuqayq family: Sallām, the richest merchant in the Ḥijāz, and al-Rabīʿ together with the three brothers from the Banū Akhṭab family: Ḥuyayy, Judayy and Abū Yāsir. In 625 CE, after the Banū al-Naḍīr surrendered to the Muslims, these two families along with others, moved to Khaybar where their relatives lived. -
Women in Islamic State: from Caliphate to Camps
ICCT Policy Brief October 2019 DOI: 10.19165/2019.03.9 ISSN: 2468-0656 Women in Islamic State: From Caliphate to Camps Author: Gina Vale Within the territorial boundaries of the Islamic State’s (IS) ‘caliphate’, women were largely confined to the domestic sphere. Their roles centred on support to militant husbands and the ideological upbringing of children. The physical collapse of IS’ proto-state marks a significant turning point in women’s commitment and activism for the group. Many IS-affiliated women are now indefinitely detained within Kurdish-run camps in North-eastern Syria. The harsh living conditions therein have fostered ideological divides. While some show signs of disillusionment with IS’ ‘caliphate’ dream, others have sought to re-impose its strictures. This paper contributes to the understanding of women’s roles across the lifespan of the Islamic State, and the efficacy of independent female activism to facilitate the group’s physical recovery. It argues that IS’ post-territorial phase has brought greater autonomy and ideological authority to individual hard-line detainees. However, beyond the camps, women’s influence and ability to realise IS’ physical resurgence remains practically limited and dependent on male leadership. Keywords: Islamic State, al-Hol, Women, Gender, Propaganda, Children, Indoctrination Women in Islamic State: From Caliphate to Camps Introduction The loss of Baghouz in March 2019 marked the long-awaited territorial collapse of Islamic State’s (IS, or ISIS) ‘caliphate’.1 As a result, Kurdish forces in Syria captured thousands of its remaining fighters and supporters, with many occupying camps such as al-Hol.2 Though once effective to initially detain and process IS-affiliated persons, the population of such camps now far exceeds maximum capacity. -
The Concept of Jihad in Islam
IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS) Volume 21, Issue 9, Ver. 7 (Sep. 2016) PP 35-42 e-ISSN: 2279-0837, p-ISSN: 2279-0845. www.iosrjournals.org The Concept of Jihad In Islam Ramlan TengkuErwinsyahbana Nurul Hakim Abstract.:-It is an undisputable fact that jihad is an Islamic teaching that is explicitly mentioned in Quran, Hadith, ijma'as well as various fiqh literature from classical time to the contemporary time. Jihad term often used for things that are destructive by western scholars and society. For them, jihad is synonymous with terrorism. The similarization of the word Jihad with the word terrorism in the Western perception is strongly reinforced by a series of terror committed by Muslims in the name of jihad. These acts have been increasingly affecting the interpretation of the word jihad in a negative way although in reality that is not the case in a contemporary context. Jihad in contemporary understanding is not just a war against visible enemies but also a war against the devil and carnality. Even a war against visible enemies that are written in classical fiqh books has now replaced by a contemporary interpretation of jihad against the enemies, as was done by Dr. ZakirNaik. KEYWORDS:Concept, Jihad and Islam I. INTRODUCTION When the 9/11 attack hit the United States more than a decade ago, the term jihad became a trending topic worldwide. The US and other Western countries in general claim that the perpetrators of the 9/11 attack were following the doctrine of Jihad in Islam in order to fight against America and its allies around the world. -
Journal of Religion & Society
Journal of Religion & Society Volume 9 (2007) The Kripke Center ISSN 1522-5658 Muhammad’s Jewish Wives Rayhana bint Zayd and Safiya bint Huyayy in the Classic Islamic Tradition Ronen Yitzhak, Western Galilee College, Israel Abstract During his life, the Prophet Muhammad (570-632) married 12 different wives among whom were two Jewish women: Rayhana bint Zayd and Safiya bint Huyayy. These two women were widows whose husbands had been killed in wars with Muslims in Arabia. While Rayhana refused to convert to Islam at first and did so only after massive pressure, Safiya converted to Islam immediately after being asked. Rayhana died a few years before Muhammad, but Safiya lived on after his death. Classic Islamic sources claim that the Muslims did not like Rayhana because of her beauty and so made an issue of her Jewish origin, with Muhammad being the only one to treat her well. After Muhammad’s death, Safiya lived among his other wives in Mecca, but did not take part in the political intrigues at the beginning of Islam, in contrast to the other wives, especially the most dominant and favorite wife, Aisha. Introduction [1] According to Islamic tradition, the Prophet Muhammad married 12 different wives and had even more concubines. The custom of taking concubines was widespread in ancient times and therefore also was practiced in Arabia. Concubines were often taken in the context of war booty, and it seems that this is the reason for including in the Qur’an: “(you are forbidden) the married women, but not the concubines you, own” (Q 4:24; al-Qurtubi: 5.106). -
Justifying Relations with an Apostate During a Jihād a Salafi-Jihādist Group’S Relations with Turkey in Syria
JUSTIFYING RELATIONS WITH AN APOSTATE DURING A JIHĀD A SALAFI-JIHĀDIST GROUP’S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY IN SYRIA BAILEY ULBRICHT MARCH 2019 POLICY PAPER 2019-6 CONTENTS * SUMMARY * 1 INTRODUCTION * 3 DEFINITIONS * 4 THE CREED AND PRINCIPLES OF HTS * 6 THE CASE OF TURKEY * 13 CONCLUSION * 14 U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS © The Middle East Institute The Middle East Institute 1319 18th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 SUMMARY Several months after formally breaking with al-Qaeda in January 2017, the Salafi-Jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) deviated significantly from its prior methodology when it gave the Turkish Army access to portions of territory it controlled in Syria. Though HTS was careful to avoid direct military collaboration with Turkey, it welcomed the Turkish Army’s presence as an additional force against the Syrian regime and secular opposition groups. This caused a significant rift among the group’s supporters and the al-Qaeda community, who accused HTS of thwarting its own jihād by forming relations with Turkey, considered by Salafi-Jihadists to be an apostate. This analysis aims to explain how HTS has legally justified its relations with Turkey. After outlining key legal terms and the group’s creed, I argue that under the doctrine of loyalty and disavowal and the doctrine of necessity, HTS is in fact able to legally justify relations with an apostate during jihād. However in doing so, the group is unable to reconcile its own methodological deviance, in which forgoing doctrinal purity for military pragmatism appears to be undermining the objective of its own jihād. -
Islamic Law, Jihad and Violence
UCLA UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law Title Islamic Law, Jihad and Violence Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1sj0m31p Journal UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law, 16(1) Author Abou El Fadl, Khaled Publication Date 2017 DOI 10.5070/N4161038734 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California ISLAMIC LAW, JIHAD AND VIOLENCE Khaled Abou El Fadl TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1 I. MORAL OBLIGATION AND LEGAL INDETERMINACY IN THE ISLAMIC JURISTIC TRADITION ..........................................................................................................5 II. THE MEANING OF JIHAD ......................................................................................9 A. Peace as a Moral Imperative ................................................................10 B. The Qur’anic Discourse on Jihad ........................................................12 C. The Challenge of War and the Balancing of Moral Imperatives ..........13 III� JUS AD BELLUM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION���������������������������������������������������������15 IV� JUS IN BELLO IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION.............................................................20 INTRODUCTION To what extent are justifications of violence in Islamic law based on scriptural prescriptions and commands? The challenge of answering this question, in part, is the sheer breadth of the Islamic experience. -
The Islamic State the Islamic State
The Islamic State The Islamic State The Islamic State By: Taqiuddin an-Nabhani Hizb ut-Tahrir Start of Dowla m.p65 1 09/08/00, 15:33 The Islamic State Al-Khilafah Publications Suite 298 56 Gloucester Road London SW7 4UB email: [email protected] website: http://www.khilafah.com 1419 AH / 1998 CE ISBN 1 899574 00X AH - After Hijrah CE - Christian Era Translation of the Qur’an The scholars of Islam are agreed that the Qur’an is only authentic in its original language, Arabic. Since perfect translation of the Qur’an is impossible, the term “Translation of the Meaning of the Qur’an (TMQ) has been used throughout the book, as the English wording presented is only a crude meaning of the Arabic text. Qur’anic ayat and the Arabic words have been italicised Printed and Bound by- De-Luxe Printers, London NW10 7NR. website: http://www.de-luxe.com email: [email protected] ii Start of Dowla m.p65 2 09/08/00, 15:33 The Islamic State iii Start of Dowla m.p65 3 09/08/00, 15:33 The Islamic State Contents Introduction 1 The Starting Point 4 Building the Sahabah 6 The Launching of the Da’wah 8 Hostility Against the Da’wah 10 The Interaction of the Da’wah 17 The Two Stages of the Da’wah 22 The Expansion of the Da’wah 26 The First Pledge of Al-Aqabah 28 The Da’wah in Madinah 29 The Second Pledge of Al-Aqabah 33 Establishing the Islamic State 41 Building the Society 43 The Preparation for Jihad 48 The Jihad Begins 51 Life in Madinah 55 Debating the Jews and the Christians 57 The Battle of Badr 62 Dealing with Banu Qaynuqa’ 65 Managing the Dissension 66 The -
Jihadist Website Posts Al-Libi's 'Guidance on the Ruling of the Muslim Spy' GMP20090708342001 Jihadist Websites -- OSC Summary in Arabic 30 Jun 09
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY This product may contain copyrighted material; authorized use is for national security purposes of the United States Government only. Any reproduction, dissemination, or use is subject to the OSC usage policy and the original copyright. Show Full Version Jihadist Website Posts Al-Libi's 'Guidance on the Ruling of the Muslim Spy' GMP20090708342001 Jihadist Websites -- OSC Summary in Arabic 30 Jun 09 [Corrected version: removed multiple hyperlinks from text] Terrorism: Jihadist Website Posts Al-Libi's 'Guidance on the Ruling of the Muslim Spy' On 30 June, "Murasil al-Fajr" posted to the Islamic Al-Fallujah Forums website several links to a 149-page book entitled "Guidance on the Ruling of the Muslim Spy." The book discusses in detail the religious rulings concerning Muslim spies working for "the vicious Crusader campaign that is launched by the United States and its allies against Muslims and Islamic countries." The book contains an introduction by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qa'ida's second in command, who emphasizes the importance of the topic of the book and praises Al-Libi's "valuable, serious, scientific, and practical research on the Islamic judgment on spying." In the book, Al- Libi discusses in extensive detail all religious rulings concerning Muslim spies, emphasizing that they are "apostates" and therefore should be killed as they disclose "the shortcomings of Muslims." He also warns of their danger, saying: "One single piece of information transmitted to them, by one of their spies, is able to exasperate spirits, honor, and possessions in a way that thousands of their mobilized soldiers cannot do." The book was released and published by the Al-Fajr Media Center. -
Anti-Shia Hostility in Malaysia
ISSUE: 2021 No. 81 ISSN 2335-6677 RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS Singapore | 16 June 2021 Rethinking Extremism Beyond Physical Violence: Anti-Shia Hostility in Malaysia Norshahril Saat, Nur Syafiqah Mohd Taufek, and Afra Alatas* Malaysia has been referred to as a “moderate” Muslim country for a long time. However, it is now no longer a stranger to religious extremism. In this picture, Muslim devotees exercise social distancing, as a preventive measure to combat the spread of the Covid-19 coronavirus, on the first Friday of the holy month of Ramadan at the Putra Mosque in Putrajaya on April 16, 2021. Photo: Mohd RASFAN / AFP. *Norshahril Saat is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Nur Syafiqah and Afra Alatas are research officers under the same programme at the Institute. 1 ISSUE: 2021 No. 81 ISSN 2335-6677 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • Academic studies on extremism have tended to view the issue through a security lens. Recent attacks on churches in Indonesia and Malaysia would have reinforced the popularity of this approach. • However, violent extremism does not exist in a vacuum. Acts of terror are driven by ideas and discourse that motivate and justify terrorist acts. • This article examines the impact of non-physically violent extremism on Muslims. Drawing on the case of the Shi’as in Malaysia, it explores how extreme ideas are espoused by some people in power, including popular preachers, religious elites, and bureaucrats. • It analyses the Malaysian experience and demonstrates how labels such as “deviant” or “liberal” can lead to distress among Muslims advocating different points of view and inhibit their constructive participation in society at large. -
Political Islam and the New Global Economy
CR5-1 05 05/02/05 11:44 AM Page 111 Political Islam and the New Global Economy The Political Economy of an Egyptian Social Movement J OEL B EININ Stanford University, Stanford, California Since September 11th, 2001, much ink has been spilled dis- cussing “Islamic fundamentalism” or, ostensibly more authoritatively but not necessarily more precisely, “Wahhabism” and its threat to U.S. national security and Western civilization. The armed radicals of al-Qa‘ida and sim- ilar groups, while they have received the lion’s share of public attention, are only one relatively small component of a broad movement of political Islam that has emerged since the mid-1970s. Proponents of “political Islam” or “Islamists” or “Islamic activists”—I use these terms interchangeably—are Muslims who do not necessarily accept received understandings of the Islamic tradition as the ultimate determinants of contemporary Muslim identity and practice. Rather, they self-consciously seek to refashion that tradition in response to the challenges—however defined—faced by their community and to mobilize Muslim sentiment and identity in support of their vision of a proper Islamic society (White 2002, 23; Wiktorowicz 2004b, 3). Even if that vision is presented as a return to an ideal past, it addresses modern political, economic, and cultural problems. The term “fundamentalism” is inadequate to describe this phenomenon because it ● 111 CR5-1 05 05/02/05 11:44 AM Page 112 112 ● Political Islam and the New Global Economy suggests a Protestant literalist reading of the Bible that has no analog in Islam and because it implies a backward-looking rather than a modern social movement.