Airpower Journal: Fall 1994, Volume VIII, No. 3

Secretary of the Air Force Dr Sheila E. Widnall

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak

Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Henry Viccellio, Jr.

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley

Commander, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Leroy Barnidge, Jr.

Editor Lt Col Richard B. Clark

Associate Editor Maj Gwendolyn D. Fayne

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst, Director ofArt and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Thomas L. Howell, Prepress Production Manager

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open fórum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of De- fense, the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line.

JOURNAL Fali 1994, Vol. VIII, No. 3 AFRP 10 1

Editorial______2 Valuing Leadership in an Era of Prophets, Politicians, and Pugilists Capt Charles T. Barco, USAF 4

The Evolution of Air Force Targeting Capt John R. Glock, USAF 14

A Situational Leadership Model for Military Leaders Col Donald E. Waddell III, USAF 2 9

Disabling Systems and the Air Force Maj Roger C. Hunter, USAF 4 3

What Does Chãos Theory Mean for Warfare? Maj David Nicholls, USAF Maj Todor D. Tagarev, Bulgarian Air Force 4 8

The Airborne Laser: Pie in the Sky or Vision of Future Theater Missile Defense? Lt Col Stephen A. Coulombe, USAF 5 8

Ricochets 3 Letters Net Assessment 7 4 Reviews of Current Literature Contributors 9 5

For paid subscription information, see page 42. For basis of issue and official distribution information, see page 70. EDITORIAL Becoming A Citizen-Soldier: A Perspective on Country

My Very Dear Sarah The indications are very strong xve shall move in a few days—perhaps tomorrow. Lest I should not be able to write again, I feel impelled to write a few Unes that may fali under your eye when I shall be no more. . . . I have no misgivings about or lack o f confidence in the cause in which I am engaged, and my courage does not halt or falter. I know how strongly American civiliza- tion now leans on the triumph o f the Government, and how great a debt we owe to those who went before us through the blood and suffering o f the Revolution. And I am willing, perfectly willing, to lay down all my joys in this life to help maintain this Gov- ernment and to pay that debt. Sarah, my love for you is deathless: it seems to bind me with mighty cables, that nothing but Omnipotence could break, and yet my love for country comes over me like a strong wind and bears me irresistibly on, with all these chains to the battlefield. —Maj Sullivan Bailou, Union Army, July 1861

HIS PASSAGE appears in a letter Major civilian lives—eating, drinking, and consum- TBailou wrote to his wife a week before ing the pleasures our country provides, he died in the battle of Bull Run. Although blithely unconcemed about the cost of those I was moved strongly by his words, I think it pleasures. Clearly, good military officers fre- is difficult for most of us in today's Air quently aren't very good citizens. Force to identify completely with his feel- Yes, being a good Citizen means obeying ings, perhaps because our society uses words the law, helping with the local scout troop, such as love so glibly that their full impact is and so forth. But good citizens are also lost. Or perhaps we simply go through the good stewards. All too often we are merely busy details of everyday life so frantically good consumers. We enjoy our spacious that we don't have time to think about or skies and amber waves of grain as we drive understand such strong, uncomfortable on abundant roads-our only thought a fleet- emotions. ing irritation at the farm tractor that gets in The opening scene of the movie Patton, our way or the road construction that slows where George C. Scott delivers Patton's fa- us down. We go to state-of-the-art supermar- mous speech, is almost a cultural icon. kets and fill our carts with bread and milk, Standing in • front of an enormous flag, fresh produce, and convenience foods, but Scott's gravelly voice, combined with the we complain because only one register is historie words, evokes powerful emotions in open and we have to stand in line an extra us. At that moment, we truly seem to under- 10 minutes. We send our children to public stand what "love of country" means: the schools, play in public parks, and rely on the willingness to give our lives in battle. So we protection of community police and fire pat ourselves on the back for being willing forces—usually without much thought about to do such a fine thing. But when the lights their cost. go up and the VCR rewinds, that gut-wrench- Major Bailou spoke of his willingness to ing, heart-stopping passion usually dims. lay down all his earthly joys to pay the debt We return to tripping happily through our he owed for living in his society. We too

2 may one day need to be willing to make the us has a responsibility to do something to ultimate sacrifice. Meanwhile, modem soci- help people less fortunate than we. ety requires that we sacrifice our daily joys I've heard that love isn't an emotion-it's for the pleasures and privileges our country a decision. That argument transfers love gives us. Apart from our military Service from the heart and its fleeting passion to the and the sacrifice it exacts, we have to get in- head—the center of surviving will. On this volved as concerned citizens. We have to levei, if we decide to love our country, we ac- vote more often than once every four years. cept the responsibilities that love entails, in We have to attend local school board meet- spite of how tired we are or how we feel. We ings even if it means missing our favorite TV may never have to give the ultimate sacrifice show. We have to recycle. We need to be on the bloody field of battle, but there are aware of what is being debated in our legisla- battles all around us every day. Someone tive houses of government, and we need to has to fight them. We, like Major Bailou, take time to write our local and national have a debt to pay. GDF representatives with our views. Also, each of

Letters to the editor are encouraged. All correspon- general, to be credible, a journal should indicate dence should be addressed to the Editor, Airpower authorship of all articles. Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. We reserve the right to edit the mate- Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr., USAFR, Retired rial for overall length. Durham, North Carolina I enjoyed very much "A New Defense Industrial AUTHOR ANONYMITY Strategy" in your Fali 1993 issue. I applaud your decision to publish this article with the author's 1 am concerned about the failure to indicate the name withheld and hope that you continue to do author of the excellent article "A New Defense In- so in the future. Some may argue that withhold- dustrial Strategy" in the Fali 1993 issue. The arti- ing a name goes against the spirit of academic cle was thoughtful and valuable, but one is left freedom, but realistically, if the article is "politi- with a nagging concern that no one is taking re- cally incorrect" or if the author holds a particu- sponsibility for authorship. larly sensitive position, then printing the name I can see both pros and cons on this matter. may actually constrain the author's true view. If we banned all unsigned articles entirely, On the other hand, I would urge that letters to we might deprive the journal of some excel- the editor remain accountable to ensure that any lent articles that would otherwise not be pub- "potshots" be held to a minimum. lished. One can appreciate that high-ranking But as much as I liked the article and agreed with officers might be reluctant to sign an article the majority of the conclusions, I do have some if they felt it could unduly influence subordi- points of contention. First, I was surprised to see no nates when in fact they simply wanted to list of references. Although the figures provided an float a provocative idea for discussion. But ability to follow the author^ arguments, I was at a there are dangers in unsigned articles in that loss to substantiate some of the conclusions. they can lead to lack of responsibility. In continued on page 71

3 VALU1NG LEADERSHIP in an Era of Prophets, Politicians, and Pugilists

C apt Char l es T. Bar co, USAF

HE MOVE TO a quality culture is a ing effort to build quality teams, we may be refreshing and courageous concept sacrificing the development of our future that, in the long term, can only leaders and creating a generation of soft- make the Air Force more capable of skilled quality bureaucrats focused on poli- performingT its wartime mission. However, tics and group process. Such people would in our feverish rush to implement quality, lack the personal courage, vision, and situ- we run the very real risk of changing a war- ationally driven read-and-act skills3 required rior culture whose values were once embed- to take definitive and timely action in a ded in the art of personal mastery1 and coup manner consistent with our great leaders of d'oeil2 (see below) to a culture that empha- the past. sizes scientific models and broadbrushed, To successfully implement quality in the committee-based compromise and consen- USAF, one must first comprehend the over- sus. Further, in a parallel and equally blind- riding attributes associated with nurturing VALUING LEADERSHIP 5 our most important characteristic—leader- age (both moral ["courage to accept respon- ship. Few writers have defined the essence sibility"] and physical ("courage in the face of our calling more succinctly than Gen of personal danger"]) and (2) power of intel- Douglas MacArthur, who wrote, "Duty, lect ("War is . . . wrapped in a fog of greater honor, country: Those three hallowed words or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and dis- reverently dictate what you ought to be, criminating judgment is called for").6 From what you can be, what you will be."4 Mac- these characteristics, Clausewitz derived two Arthur clearly suggested that these were the others: (1) coup d'oeil (the inner eye or the virtues by which our military careers should "quick recognition of a truth that the mind be measured. would ordinarily miss or would perceive If duty, honor, and country provide the only after long study and reflection")7 and long-term direction or Vision for our traveis, (2) determination ("the capacity, having then what innate force should keep us on taken a decision, to stick to it").8 that path? Gen Ira Eaker suggested that a Clausewitz links these concepts by saying leader possesses strength of integrity, wis- that leaders must have "first, an intellect that, dom, and courage and that these charac- even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmer- teristics alone provide the focus to keep one ings ofthe inner light which leads to the truth; on the proper course in life.5 Carl von and second, the courage to follow this faint Clausewitz also struggled with the attributes light, wherever it may lead" (emphasis in of leadership before outlining the qualities original).9 Regardless of how we might de- consistent with a military genius: (1) cour- scribe it, the art of leadership is best built on 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 the danger of tasking teams to wrestle with problems simply because our leaders are not adequately prepared to do so. Though this situation is expected and acceptable in complex situations, it must not become the norm. Clearly, the Air Force is rapidly moving away from what Peter Senge calls personal mastery, mentioned above, into what I call the pseudosynergy of everyday quality teams. As we strive to cut costs and manpower, we spread our responsibilities over a wider spectrum of areas, robbing leaders and subordinates alike of the ability to develop and sustain personal mastery. Without personal mastery, we are collectively and insidi- ously transformed into a diluted intellectual pool that may or may not produce the tough answers required. If the resultant teams are overused and ill led, the individuais on those teams gradually lose both the power of independent thought and the Creative courage associated with risk taking. The litmus test for team formation should be, Is the challenge so timely, complex, and criticai that only the diverse skills of a team can be employed to solve it? If the answer is yes, then a sponsoring leader should not simply launch and forget the team but tether and nurture it to produce a true high- performance unit that develops coup d'oeiI along the same lines as its individual members. Gen Douglas MacArihur defined our profession when Leadership doesn't end with the forma- he wrote, “Duty, honor, country: Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you tion of quality teams; it is the heart of qual- can be, what you will be." ity teams. Bureaucrats who use team formation as a numerical metric have yet to wisdom and honor, focused on Service to appreciate that individual leadership and country, and fueled by the desire to develop quality are-and always have been—one and coup d'oeil. Our professional military edu- the same. Throughout history, our greatest cation (PME) schools reinforce these tenets, leaders implicitly appreciated the tenets of but does our emerging quality culture do quality long before W. Edwards Deming or the same? J. M. Juran made them explicit. To answer this question, one must not Yet, if bureaucrats and quality teams seem battle the conceptual foundation of quality, to work well in corporate America, why but the reality of its implementation in the shouldn't they work in the Air Force? First, USAF. Years ago, leaders emerged who pos- quality-based process action teams (PAT) and sessed the wisdom to see and tackle abstract developmental teams are ideal in the USAF problems in minimal time. Today, we run for specific cross-functional problems but VALUING LEADERSHIP 7 should be employed as an exception—not as quality-based definition totally ignores the a rule. Developing individual leadership in the role of the leader.) As members of a warrior- work center for future use with these teams based culture, we should learn from our should be the rule. Unlike an employee of PME schools and expand this definition so Xerox Corporation, an officer or noncom- that it reflects the attributes of truly high- missioned officer must hone his or her lead- performance teams by including ership skill and judgment, always with a focus on the battlefield. Though the team is 1. a leader with well-defined read-and-act historically a criticai war-fighting element of skills (coup d'oeil); battle, the leader is and always has been the 2. dynamic followers who without hesita- focal point from which the team draws its tion aid the leader; power and intellect when the fog of war de- 3. well-defined task and maintenance scends. In our passion for creating numer- skills by all members of the team; and ous quality teams, let us not forget that 4. a sense of purpose, unity, and camara- leadership is nurtured with the focus on derie.12 combat. There is no acceptable parallel to the battlefield at Xerox; hence, corporate If these elements are present, highly suc- teams may perpetually work without consid- cessful teams eventually emerge and begin eration for nurturing the read-and-act skills exhibiting real synergy, whereby the output needed to independently and quickly over- of the whole team exceeds that of the sum of come the unknown factors that emerge the individual parts or individual members. when troops and materiel clash. We simply The developmental and subsequent bonding must not overuse or abuse teams to the process that successful teams go through in point of creating impotent leaders unable to reaching synergy is described in the Cog's develop/nurture coup d'oeil in peace or em- Ladder Group Development Model and is ploy it in war. When we either employ a similar to the process each of us goes team or are employed as members of a team, through to reach synergy with our own de- we must prevent such a problem by veloping values, as reflected in KrathwohLs Affective Leveis of Leaming (fig. 1). 1. continually striving to develop the in- Though by no means equivalent, the two ner light or coup d'oeil in ourselves and the models share the understanding that both people around us; teams and individuais grow experientially 2. occasionally placing our subordinates and in stages. Teams move through the in leaming environments that demand com- stages of Cog's Ladder at their own speeds. plex decisions under difficult conditions;10 Some operate effectively at the polite stage 3. using quality as yet another intellec- for years; others spiral up and down with fe- tual springboard to attain wisdom on our verish regularity. Despite this movement, lifetime journey to personal mastery and the teams that remain at the top the longest value-driven leadership; and demonstrate the effective and efficient results associated with synergy. A teanTs de- 4. ensuring that our personnel under- velopment, like an individuaLs, is dependent stand their roles as teachers, learners, and upon environment. Many leaders—including leaders. Col Russell V. Ritchey, the formulator and I do not make the indictment "pseudo- first commandant of Squadron Officer synergy of everyday quality teams" without School—have found that effective combat considerable deliberation. The Team Hand- teams mature best when they are nurtured book defines a team simply as "a group of in peacetime with a diet occasionally spiced people pooling their skills, talents, and with fear, frustration, and fatigue. Without knowledge."I 11 (One should note that this these catalysts, teams will vacillate at the 8 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

COG S LADDER GROUP KRATHWOHLS AFFECT1VE DEVELOPMENT MODEL LEVELS OF LEARNING

i i ESPRIT STAGE ^ CHARACTERIZING

CONSTRUCTIVE STAGE ------ORGANIZING

TIME TIME BID FOR POWER STAGE ------VALUING

WHY ARE WE HERE STAGE ------RESPONDING

POLITE STAGE ------RECEIVING

Figure 1. Reaching Synergy (from Squadron Officer School Curriculum [Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1988], 3200 R-1 through R-4; and David P. Krathwohl, Benjamin S. Bloom, and Bertram B. Masia, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives [White Plains, N.Y.: Longman Press, 1964], 37) lower end of Cog's Ladder and never truly and forms the basis of the uncertainty of our reach maturity or the team's equivalent of own administrative battles; coup d'oeil. The fact that our quality teams 4. requiring zero-defect potential for do not mimic wartime conditions does not products versus using mistakes and risk tak- make them pseudosynergistic; however, the ing as valuable lessons learned for the fu- environment in which we place some of our ture; teams is often counterproductive to the 5. holding expensive, week-long, off-site peacetime development of our future warri- meetings to escape the pressures of the Of- ors. The following are just a few of the mat- fice versus enabling a leader to develop im- ters that teams must contend with as we attempt to overlay a corporate quality cul- plicit "act" skills to use in any given ture on a leadership culture that is evolving situation; from the values of battle: 6. insisting that customer expectations drive our processes versus ensuring that our 1. hiring facilitators to work team dy- documented processes contribute to enlight- namic issues versus using team leaders who ened customer expectations; practice team dynamics based on their own implicit read-and-act skills; 7. using demands exclusively focused on 2. using signed contracts/charters to en- criticai process identification versus placing sure responsibilities versus using implicit equal-4f not greater—importance on the in- frastructures that must support and main- contracts based on honor and communication; tain the processes; 3. managing by fact to ensure proper 8. mandating the 10 quality tools and quantification and qualification of all data techniques for quality use versus teaching versus realizing that much data is unknown values and behaviors that enable practition- VALUTNG LEADERSHIP 9 ers to use any tools or techniques in their toolbox to get the job done; 9. insisting on statistically evoluated products versus employing processes with a basis in statistical thought; and 10. rigorously following corporate-based Plan, Do, Study, Act (PDSA) models versus using more predictive judgment-based hv- pothesis tools such as the Question, Theo- rize, Test, and Reflect leaming model.13 We must fight as we train. The infusion of explicit, qualitv-based techniques into a leadership culture, however, mav not enhance the way we want to fight. Our future

Cot fíussen V Rttcney. formutator and first commanaant of Squadroc Officer Scnooi (SOS beneved tnat effec- ove comüat leams mature Dest Mm) nurtured in peace- üme #rth a úm occastonally spced with fear frus- traoon and taOgue.' Partiopaõon m the SOS leaoership course netps modem Air Force otbcers oe.etop both leadership and teamwork. 10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 leaders should be learning read-and-act skills and cooperation in mission accomplish- as an art that allows them to apply all the ment").14 Perhaps a twentieth-century above functions implicitly through leader- prophet, Wakin suggests that the "transfor- ship values instead of explicitly as scientific mational leader sets the moral tone for his tasks or psychological tools. The first choice subordinates by the example of integrity he in each of the above 10 pairs of options is a provides."15 Integrity can't be instilled via constraint to aspiring value-based leaders contracts or charters. Yet, in quality we find these politically based concepts becoming and the war-fighting teams they are respon- the basis of all we do. Collectively, con- sible for. The only winner is the military bu- tracts, management by fact, zero-based de- reaucrat, who—untethered by long-term values— fects, off-sites, and so forth seem to fly in stymies the emerging risk takers in an envi- the face of every attribute to which we need ronment increasingly void of coup d'oeil to expose future warriors. As a litmus test and ripe with short-term reward. for quality, we should simply ask, Do the This trend is further clarified by Malham quality tools, techniques, or concepts being M. Wakin, who divides leaders into two ba- presented add to or detract from our institu- sic types: (1) transactional (contract-based tional values on leadership? Some of these, leadership "encouraging adversary relation- such as imagineering, benchmarking, con- ships between the leader and those led") and tinuous improvement, self-assessments, and (2) transformational (moral-based leadership strategic planning may blend in beautifully "stressing the role of education, persuasion, with our values if they are integrated at the proper pace and time; others simply do not. A young lieutenant whose training focused If the Air Force is to be prepared for future combat situations, it must develop transformational leaders now, exclusively on management by fact and zero- within a quality environment. based defects may be ill prepared to solve a VALUING LEADERSHIP 11 maintenance problem during a Chemical the balance, who continues the forward mo- bombardment with casualties mounting and tion of a large and complex structure by uni- airframes idled on the tarmac. fying and appreciating the diverse contribution of the Prophet, Barbarian, Builder, Ex- We are dangerously close to tolerating plorer, and Administrator.16 and—perhaps worse—sponsoring a generation of transactionalists instead of the trans- Clearly, given its focus on quality and formationalists that an evolving fighting leadership, the USAF should strive to de- force needs. By not creating and rewarding velop synergists who possess coup d'oeil and transformational leaders in conjunction with thus perform as transformational leaders. our quality culture, we are slipping into a We need to teach our people to think in transactional, contract-based mind-set that, peace as we hope they will think in war. Or- if given a foothold, will rob our future ganizations leam and evolve, as do individuais— prophets and pugilists of the judgment they only slower. This process doesn't necessarily need to realize coup d'oeil, both in peace require the lock-step implementation of qual- and war. Hopefully, the ultimate transforma- ity tools and techniques previously noted; it tional leader is also the synergist, a term simply requires value-based leadership. used by M. Lawrence Miller in his brilliant This type of leadership is rooted in what book, Barbarians to Bureaucrats. The syner- Stephen Covey calls the natural laws that gist embodies but one of seven leadership show us "true north."17 A return to value- styles, which—according to Miller—typically based leadership must be the first step in our are found in most organizations. Because quality journey and our development of the Air Force mirrors society, it too has its coup d'oeil. In search of these natural laws, limited share of synergists, as well as the I embarked on a philosophical journey based other six types: primarily on the concept of profound knowledge articulated by Deming and Barbara 1. The Prophet: The visionary who creates Lawton, whose basic construct of "profound the breakthrough and the human energy to knowledge" includes propel the [unit] forward. 1. Application of psychology (motiva- 2. The Barbarian: The leader of crisis and tion) in the workplace. conquest who commands the [unit] on the 2. Appreciation of systems and processes. march of rapid growth. 3. Understanding of variation within 3. The Builder and Explorer: The developers processes (common and special causes). of the specialized skills and structures re- 4. Understanding the theory of knowl- quired for growth, who shift from command edge (developing hypothesis-based thought).18 to collaboration. 4. The Administrator: The creator of the in- Though brilliant, this construct lacks any tegrating system and structure, who shifts the explicit reference to leadership or environ- focus from expansion to security. ment. Alternatively, I offer a parallel con- 5. The Bureaucrat: The imposer of a tight struct, wherein profound knowledge is an art grip of control, who crucifies and exiles new whose evolution occurs along three conver- prophets and barbarians, assuring the loss of gent veins symbolized by the acronym ASK: creativity and expansion. 6. The Aristocrat: The inheritor of wealth, 1. arête: Greek word loosely translated alienated from those who do productive work, as duty to oneself (i.e., turning a philosophi- who is the cause of rebellion and disintegra- cal Vision into action through personal lead- tion. ership).19 7. The Synergist: The leader who maintains 2. systems thought: Essence of Deming's 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

message on systems/processes and the vari- profound knowledge, one successfully builds ation associated with each.20 quality into organizations and restores syn- 3. kaizen: Japanese term meaning "grad- ergy to both quality teams and individuais ual improvement in the status qu o... . Every- while developing coup d'oeil in transforma- thing in life deserves to be improved."21 tional leaders. Arête is the primary pathway by which knowledge and values intertwine Profound knowledge doesn't just happen, and then mesh with a warrior's evolution to nor is it quickly taught. It evolves over time, developing the inner eye or coup d'oeil. as does any value. Simply put, value-based Most appropriately, the arête cycle (fig. 2) profound knowledge is a desire for gradual im- ends with a clear and observable change in provement, fQcused on systems and the vari- behavior.22 ations within them and motivated by a If one seeks leadership, coup d'oeil, and po- commitment through personal leadership to tential war-fighting teams, one must become turn a quality Vision into action. the synergist and develop or allow the develop- Though Lawton and Deming's construct of ment of processes that support arête and coup profound knowledge differs from my own, d'oeil in peace. Our profession is too impor- this type of knowledge-once nurtured— feeds tant to be caught up in an increasingly narrow the synergist and becomes the moral spring- quality Vision without thought or consideration board for the lifetime transformationalist. for its wartime impact on our emerging leaders. By mixing quality-based, value-centered Deming succinctly States that "quality leadership with a lifetime commitment to cannot be shouted!"23 Yet, the Air Force is VALUING LEADERSHIP 13 currently screaming quality as if it has un- teams which defy our intellect and feed only earthed the Holy Grail. As a value, quality is the bureaucrats. simply an awareness that grows from a gradual Regardless, quality is here to stay; we change in the way we see ourselves and the must now simply implement it in harmony world around us. For a war-fighting force, with the other leadership values unique to quality must have deeper meaning than a pre- our profession. It is my hope that the qual- approved, scientific listing of specific tools, ity philosophy succeeds tenfold and in the techniques, or methodologies (training-based process creates a generation of exceptionally curricula) that are to be blindly used in ac- wise leaders. The springboard to our institu- cordance with some requirement without en- tional transformation lies in education and gaging the guiding intellect (education-based in the subsequent development of value- curricula) that should truly define our culture. based synergists from the prophets, pugilists, If the prophet properly employs his Vision, the builders, explorers, and administrators who pugilist can employ his weapon system with a currently fill positions in our organizations. natural synergy that is the essence of quality. With these leaders instructed on value-based If this artistic synergy is obstructed by the profound knowledge (in whatever form) and politician, we become slaves to quality, en- learned in the art of coup d'oeil, we have an trapping ourselves and absolving ourselves of opportunity to dramatically transform not the very judgment the quality culture is trying only govemment, but war fighting for gen- to nurture. As a value, quality fits beautifully erations to come. If, however, we take the into our lifetime pursuit o f intellect and coup road of the shortsighted military bureaucrat, d'oeil as outlined by Clausewitz. Used alone as a we are doomed, for "only the dead have seen tool, it becomes an isolated câncer that erodes the end of the war."24 □ coup d'oeil and increases pseudosynergistic

Notes 1. Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice o f the Leaming Organization (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., Leaming Organization (New York; Doubleday Press, 1990), 37. 1991) , 27. 2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael 14. Malham M. Wakin, "The Ethics of Leadership II," in Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University AU-24, 55. Press, 1976), 102. 15. Ibid., 59. 3. The read-and-act skllls model was developed by Dr Gus 16. M. Lawrence Miller, Barbarians to Bureaucrats: Corporate Economos, who suggests that great leaders need to be able to Life Cycle Strategies: Lessons from the Rise and Fali o f Civilizations properly read situations and people and then act by using the (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., 1989), 2. appropriate methods and resources. 17. Stephen R. Covey, Principle-Centered Leadership (New 4. Gen Douglas MacArthur, "Duty, Honor, Country,” ín York: Summit Books, 1991), 140. AU-24, Concepts for Air Force Leadership, ed. Richard I. Lester and 18. W. Edwards Deming, The New Economics for Industry, A. Glenn Morton (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1990), 370. Government, Education (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), 50. 5. Ira C. Eaker, "Anatomy of Leadership; Images and 19. Lessem, 6-7. Reflections—The Pattem of Air Leadership," in AU-24, 317. 20. Deming, 98-103. 6. Clausewitz, 101. 21. Masaaki Imai, Kaizerv. The Key to lapan's Competitive 7. Ibid., 102. Success (New York: Random House Business Division, 1986), 3-7. 8. Michael Howard, Clausewitz (New York: Oxford 22. Charles T. Barco, "Search for Profound Knowledge," in University Press, 1983), 27. QAF Symposiurn Proceedings (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 9. Clausewitz, 102. 1993), 729. The arête pathway was designed to be used with a 10. Russell V. Ritchey, Tear o f the Tiger (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: judgment/hypothesis-based learning cycle such as LessenTs Air University, 1974), 67. Question, Theorize, Test, and Reflect model. Lessem, 27. 11. Peter Scholtes et al„ The Team Handbook: How to Use 23. Quoted in Federal Quality Institute, TQM in the Federal Teams to Improve Quality (Madison, Wis.: Joiner Associates, Government (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 2-7. 1992) , iii. 12. Squadron Officer School Curriculum (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 24. Plato, quoted in MacArthur, 372. Air University, 1987), 3130 R-l through R-2 and 3160 R-l through R-2. 13. Ronnie Lessem, Total Quality Learning: Building a THE EVOLUTION OF AIR FORCE TARGETING C apt John R. Glock, U S A F The choice of enemy targets is the most delicate operation of aerial warfare. —Giulio Douhet, 1921 The key to air power is targeting and the key to targeting is intelligence. —Col John Warden, 1990 EVOLUTION OFAF TARGETING IS

ROM THE ALPHA to the omega, tar- mine these targets, airmen systematically geting has been the essence of air analyzed criticai enemy industrial centers and power.1 People who have written LOCs to ascertain which should become tar- about or employed aerospace power gets.4 However, the war ended before the AEF F could fully execute the plan.5 The [World War have long recognized the importance of targeting. They have understood that success- I] US Bombing Survey concluded that the Air ful application of air power depends on Service needed to identify criticai targets to targeting. This article examines three support a systematic plan for air operations. themes. First, it traces the evolution of Air The survey stated that Force targeting. Second, it shows that Air the greatest criticism to be brought against Force targeting has been a driving force in aerial bombardment . . . as carried out in the the development of air intelligence. The fi- war of 1914-1918 is the lack of a predeter- nal theme is the Air Force's leadership in air mined program carefully calculated to destroy targeting. . . . those industries most vital in maintaining Germany's fighting force.6

It recommended that World War I a careful study should be made of the different kinds of industries and the different From their earliest days, aerospace plan- factories of each. This study should ascertain ners have pursued the idea of the "strategic" how one industry is dependent on another application of air power. German Zeppelin and what the most important factories of each raids on London in 1917 are probably the are. A decision should be reached as to just what factories if destroyed would do the first known uses of air forces beyond direct greatest damage to the enemy's military support of ground operations.2 While the organization as a whole.7 material effects of these raids were minimal, the effects on the conceptual role of air Another lesson from the war was that power were tremendous. During this pe- dedicated, trained individuais (knowledge- riod, the US developed its concept for strate- able of air power) are needed to undertake gic bombing against commercial centers and this careful study. The Intelligence Section lines of Communications. In November of the General Staff (G-2) created an Air In- 1918, then-Maj Edgar S. Gorrell de- telligence (A-7) subsection. Then-lst Lt Al- veloped (and had approved) the fred T. Bellinger, a G-2/A-7 staff officer, first strategic bombard- reported that there were some who believed ment plan for the Air that the "work of air intelligence belonged Service, American Ex- properly to the Air Service. . . . Supporters of peditionary Forces this theory [believed] it was necessary for an (AEF). intelligence officer to have technical knowl- GorrelPs objec- edge of aviation for the proper performance tive was to "drop of his duties."8 Immediately following aerial bombs upon World War I, Gen William ("Billy") Mitchell commercial centers identified the need for (target) intelligence and the lines of Com- officers at the staff and unit levei. He saw munications (LOC) in such quanti- the need for these officers "to compile and ties as will wreck the points aimed at maintain all information of value in the and cut off the necessary supplies with- preparation of bombing missions, an in- out which the armies in the field can- dexed file of photographs, and a stock of not exist."3 To achieve this result, maps and charts showing bombing targets planners required targets. To deter- and intelligence concerning them."9 16 A1RP0WER JOURNAL FALL 1994

Immediately following World War I, Gen William (“Billy") enemy's will and war-sustaining capability. Mitchell (first row, center) identified the need for target Achieving this goal requires systematic intelligence officers at the staff and unit levei. analysis to determine which targets if destroyed would do the greatest damage to the enemy. An organization with a constant fo- World War I taught us that successful ap- cus on air targeting is needed to undertake plication of air power requires a predeter- this kind of systematic study. This organiza- mined plan calculated to destroy the tion needs to maintain files of information EVOLUTION OFAF TARGETING 17 about potential targets as well as requisite velop the concept of strategic bombing. The target materiais. From the beginning, the instructors recognized targeting as an inte- Air Service took the lead in air targeting. It gral part of bombardment.10 By 1926 many not only developed the first concepts for the airmen considered bombardment the most offensive use of air forces, but also for the important role for air power. The predomi- intelligence support required. nance of bombardment led to an increasing emphasis on targeting. Then-Maj Donald Wilson, an instructor at the ACTS, believed that attacking a few criticai targets would Interwar Years disrupt an enemy's economy. These targets, As a result of the lessons from World War if successfully destroyed, would have a two- I, the Air Service (later the Air Corps) recog- fold effect. First, the enemy's industrial nized it needed to more fully develop its complex could not sustain its fielded forces. concepts for the employment of air power. Second, the effect on the day-to-day lives of Through the interwar period, the Air Service the civilian population would be so dismp- Tactical School (ASTS)—later the Air Corps tive that they would lose faith with their Tactical School (ACTS)—continued to de- government and military and force the national leadership to sue for peace.11 Accord- ing to then-Lt Haywood Hansell (one of two Through the interwar period, the Air Corps Tactical School continued to develop the concept of strategic officers assigned to help Major Wilson), one bombing and recognized that targeting was an integral of the principal tenets upon which the part of bombardment. school based its strategic doctrine stated: AIRPO WER JOURNAL FALL 1994

Prior to World War II, the Air Corps made no provision for air intelligence training. Gen Ira C. Eaker, commander, Eighth Air Force, reported that “intelligence represents the section of activity in which we are weakest." EVOLUTION OFAF TARGETING 19

Proper selection of vital targets in the industrial/ economic/social structure of a modern indus- World War II trialized nation, and their subsequent destruc- On the eve of World War II, the Army Air tion by air attack, can lead to fatal weakening Corps had a well-developed doctrine, but of an industrialized enemy nation and to vic- Army G-2 was not providing the intelligence tory through airpower.'; support needed to turn doctrine into operations. By the 1930s the Air Corps had developed a doctrine based on the belief that air power The American airman entered the war with a could achieve victory by breaking the en- rather well-developed body of doctrine on how the airplane should be employed . . . but emy's will and capability to fight. It would it was evident from an early date that the AAF accomplish this by [Army Air Forces were] poorly prepared for waging a strategic campaign against Germany, destroying organic industrial systems in the or any other enemy, because of the paucity of enemy interior that provided for the enemy's organized intelligence on the target itself.17 armed forces in the field; and paralyzing the organic industrial, economic, and civic Sys- In 1940 Gen H. H. Arnold recognized that tems that maintained the life of the enemy na- the Air Corps was not receiving the intelli- tion itself.13 gence it needed to establish requirements or to plan operations. He requested and re- This doctrine led to an even greater need ceived permission to establish an air intelli- for target intelligence. According to Hansell, gence organization under the chief of the Air the ACTS believed strategic intelligence was Corps. Then-Major Hansell was the first "vital to the planning and conduct of strate- chief of the Strategic Air Intelligence Section, gic air warfare."14 He continues, A-2. His section performed economic-indus- Much of the value of the bombing offensive, trial-social analyses. It analyzed and de- should there be one, would of necessity rest scribed the vital and vulnerable systems, on intelligence data and the conclusions selected targets, and prepared target fold- planners gleaned from it. In truth these ers.18 In July 1941 General Arnold assigned specific questions were beyond the compe- Major Hansell to the new Air War Plans Divi- tence of the Tactical School. Strategic air intel- sion (AWPD). The initial effort of the divi- ligence on the major world powers would de- sion was to prepare the Army air section of mand an intelligence organization and analytical competence of considerable scope and the "Joint Board Estimate of United States intelligence and complexity.15 Over-All Production Requirements."19 However, when war began, the Army Air Yet during the lean years of the "all-pilot Forces (AAF) still had inadequate intelli- Air Corps," when the Air Corps was strug- gence to plan and conduct combat opera- gling for its survival, there was no time or tions and lacked a systematic method for inclination to train officers in combat intel- selecting targets. Prior to World War II, the ligence.16 Despite the clear lessons of Air Corps made no provision for air intelli- World War I, the Air Corps entered the Sec- gence training.20 Gen Ira C. Eaker, com- ond World War without an intelligence or- mander of the Eighth Air Force, reported in ganization capable of conducting sys- March 1942 that "intelligence represents the tematic studies of potential enemies and section of activity in which we are weak- recommending vital targets whose sub- est."21 Then-Col George C. McDonald, chief sequent destruction would lead to victory. of Eighth Air Force intelligence, recalled that The Air Corps still relied on Army G-2 to no one provided intelligence "in any useful maintain sufficient data and target materi- form at the beginning of the war—we went ais to support both the planning and con- into the field empty handed in this re- duct of air operations. spect."22 While there was an Air Intelligence 20 AJRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 Section, there was still no organization capa- General McDonald, USAF director of intelli- ble of doing the systematic analysis required gence, was even more specific about what for proper targeting. There were no trained type of intelligence when he said that "target target intelligence officers. Just as impor- intelligence is the basic requirement because tant, we still had not developed the data a Strategic Air Force is nothing more than a base of potential targets and built the target large collection of airplanes unless it has a materiais needed to support our air forces. clear conception of what to use its planes During the fali of 1942, AWPD-42, Re- against."26 Just as the (World War I) bomb- quirements for Air Ascendancy, was under ing survey had done, the United States Stra- discussion at the highest levei, and as the tegic Bombing Surveys (USSBS) emphasized discussion progressed, the plan's limitations the importance of target selection to the in the field of target analysis became the planning and conduct of operations. The more readily apparent. The AAF had accu- USSBS stated: mulated a vast amount of data on Germany. The importance of careful selection of targets However, no rational system for target selec- for air attack is emphasized by [our] experi- tion existed. General Arnold established the ence. Our strategic intelligence . . . at the out- Committee of Operations Analysts (COA) in set of the war was highly inadequate. . . . [I] f a December 1942 to overcome this shortfall. comparable lack of intelligence should exist at For the first time the United States had a sin- the start of a future national emergency, it gle organization responsible for the collec- might prove disastrous. . . . The present short- tion and analysis of intelligence for the age of trained and competent intelligence per- purpose of air target selection.23 Air planners sonnel give[s] cause for alarm and require[s] correction.27 used the target selection done by the COA as the basis for the Combined Bomber Offen- Two world wars showed that the proper sive against Germany and for the strategic selection of vital targets is criticai to the suc- campaign against Japan. This group eventu- cessful application of air power. Selection of ally evolved into the first Joint Target Group. targets is dependent on a systematic study of The deputy assistant chief of the Air Staff for available intelligence. Without such intelli- targeting headed this organization. Also in gence and its systematic analysis there can 1942, the AAF created a school to train air be no rational planning for the application intelligence officers. Another outgrowth of of air power. An organization with a high the attempt to find a systematic approach to degree of analytical competence is required target selection was the creation of a data to perform this targeting function. It re- base of potential targets. It was called the quires competent, trained personnel who Bombing Encyclopedia,24 and was the fore- understand the capabilities and limitations runner of the Basic Encyclopedia (discussed of intelligence as well as aerospace forces. later) that we use today. These individuais must have access to a cur- By 1944, most planners in the AAF recog- rent data base and the knowledge to use it. nized the importance of intelligence to air Finally, as the USSBS States, the lack of this operations. General Hansell, in his mem- ability at the beginning of a future national oirs, stated:I emergency might prove disastrous!

I believed foreign industrial analysis and targeting was the sine qua non of strategic air warfare. Without such intelligence and Korean War analy-sis there could be no rational planning for the application of airpower. Douhet's Five years after World War II, the pro- statement to [the] effect that the selection of phetic words of the USSBS were realized. objectives and targets was the essence of air Despite the lessons of two world wars and strategy was patently true.25 the warnings contained in the [World War 1] EVOLUTION OF AF TARGETING 21

Bombing Survey and the USSBS, we did not functions. As late as July 1952, the FEAF possess the organization, intelligence per- Bomber Command "lacked sufficient personnel, data base, or target materiais needed sonnel to handle any large day-to-day quan- to support the application of aerospace tity of targets."31 The FEAF report States that forces on the Korean península.28 We were the Korean campaign provided more than even less prepared to target North Korea in enough evidence to bolster the contention the opening moments of the Korean con- that neglect of intelligence training during flict—the precise time when air power may peacetime is a serious mistake, if that point have proven most decisive—than we were for had not already been made powerfully clear at Germany before World War II. the outset of World War II. The FEAF was Prior to the outbreak of war, there was no or- woefully lacking in competent Combat ganization in the Air Force maintaining and Intelligence Officers.32 analyzing the North Korean target base. The ex- General Headquarters Far East Command isting data base on North Korea was inadequate. (GHQ FEC) assumed responsibility for target- In part, this was due to the Far East Command's ing. The chief of staff established the GHQ (FEC) lack of contingency plans for war with North Korea.29 A Far East Air Forces' (FEAF) re- Target Group on 14 July 1950 and made it report highlights these shortfalls: sponsible for target nominations. However, the GHQ Target Group was not capable of per- The probability of fighting in Korea largely forming this task. The work of this group was had been overlooked in the years following neither systematic nor thorough. It resulted in World War H. As a result, we had practically no ready target intelligence. . . . [We] found information of questionable value. Of the 220 [ourselves] without a targeting system capable primary and secondary targets that the group of fulfilling the requirements. .. . However, an nominated, 20 percent did not even exist.33 even more serious deficiency was the small The remaining targets were often unsuitable amount of Korean targeting which had been accomplished. . . . The latter stemmed from for attack by aircraft. Finally, of the targets several basic causes, the most obvious of that did exist and that were suitable for attack which was the small number of intelligence by aircraft, many were not supported with personnel who had been assigned to FEAF.30 adequate imagery or information. Eventually, Orüy 53 targets in North Korea had target FEAF took on a greater portion of the target- folders, and these were out of date. In addi- nomination process, and gradually became the tion, there were no current target materiais theater-targeting body. It was responsible for on Korean targets. There was even a lack of nominating targets that were the basis for air basic imagery products. The FEAF Bomber campaigns meeting the needs of the FEC.34 Command stated that the available imagery, However, it was two years before there was a when it did exist, was of poor quality. fully integrated joint targeting effort. The problem of inadequate numbers of The lack of trained analysts affected two trained intelligence personnel to support the additional areas: combat assessment and targeting function continued throughout weapon recommendations. The FEAF Report the war. Two separate studies were con- on the Korean War indicates that there were ducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the very few studies conducted on the results ob- Air Force in Korea. Both reports indicated tained from our bombing. It States, "If a that the outbreak of the war had created an more extensive effort had been devoted to immediate shortage of intelligence person- [combat assessment], a more accurate ap- nel. They also pointed out that inadequate praisal of the value of [our] target plans training made these shortages more acute. would have resulted."35 The report also indi- The shortage was so acute that FEAF had to cates that there was little effort made to draft flying officers to perform intelligence make weapon recommendations. Just 10 22 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 days before the armistice, the FEAF director the adequacy of air targeting materiais. The of intelligence was finally able to establish a Air Force's ability to do targeting had made Vulnerability Division. great progress since the days of Gorrell. The mission of this Division was to provide effective and economical weapon recommendations. If this Division had been established earlier it undoubtedly would have contributed Vietnam Conflict to a more efficient accomplishment of FEAF's Unfortunately, much of the progress the mission in the Korean War.36 Air Force made in the fifties was lost in the FEAF lessons learned stated: early sixties. One of President John F. Ken- nedy's first acts was to restructure the DOD. Although we had failed to stockpile targeting Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert S. materiais on Korea prior to the outbreak of McNamara wanted to make the department hostilities, a greater initial deficiency was a more efficient and flexible. One way of do- lack of a targeting system. . . . Our hastily improvised targeting program . . . suffered ing this was to centralize functions that were from a lack of trained and experienced not service-specific. One of these functions intelligence officers. . . . [This] resulted in a was intelligence. In 1962 the Defense Intelli- lack of sufficient enemy reaction studies, and gence Agency (DIA) took over much of the an inability to provide complete weapon intelligence work previously done by the recommendations. . . . The inability to Services. One of these areas was the mainte- perform these vital targeting functions caused nance of the targeting data base. DIA also us to over-estimate the results of several air became responsible for the ATMP and the campaigns.37 Tactical Target Materials Program (TTMP). It went on to say that Unfortunately DIA (and the Air Force) largely ignored conventional targeting appli- good target research must include physical cations in the nuclear age. The Air Force vulnerability studies and weapons selection would soon feel the results of both the cen- recommendations [and that] a truly effective targeting program must. . . be initiated before tralization of intelligence and the neglect of fighting starts.38 conventional operations. Some believe the centralization of the tar- Our experiences gained during the Korean geting functions within a national agency conflict reinforced the lessons learned in was imprudent. Maj Gen George Keegan, the both world wars. Once again we saw that Seventh Air Force deputy chief of staff for the proper selection of vital targets is criticai intelligence in 1968-69, said, "Years ago, the to the successful application of air power. Selecting these targets requires an organiza- mission of targeting was taken away from tion with trained, experienced personnel, the Department of the Air Force and passed who must be familiar with both the opera- to the Defense Intelligence Agency, where it tions and intelligence worlds. In an effort to simply died."39 At the beginning of our incorrect deficiencies existing at the start of volvement in Vietnam, the Air Force did not the Korean conflict, the Air Force created the have an adequate targeting organization to targeting officer career field in 1954. It also support our combat operations. As one les- enlarged the scope of the data base of poten- son learned States: tial targets to include many more potential The targeting function is an essential element enemies. Also, at the request of the Joint in the effective employment of fighting Chiefs of Staff, the Air Force became the ex- forces. . . . [T]he Second Air Division intelli- ecutive agency for the Department of De- gence organization could not provide ade- fense's (DOD) Air Target Materials Program quate planning and execution support to the (ATMP) in 1953. This was done to ensure rapidly escalating air operations.40 EVOLUTION OFAF TARGETING 23

The situation was very similar to that of Although the Air Force had been in SEA the Korean conflict. The Basic Encyclopedia [Southeast Asia] since late 1961, adequate intelligence personnel resources were still unavail- provided targeteers and planners with basic able when the rapid buildup began. . . . The infrastructure and industrial installations. buildup began at a time when the Air Force Pacific Command (PACOM) planners were was actually reducing manpower resources in able to identify 94 targets in North Vietnam. response to budgetary and gold flow con- PACOM Operation Plan 37-64 contained a straints. . . . [T]he lack of adequate formal and technical training for intelligence personnel Strike Plan Target List with these targets ar- adversely affected the intelligence missions in ranged into four attack options. Each op- SEA.44 tion provided for escalation of the conflict. There were many positive lessons from The objectives of the war being constrained Vietnam. Air Force doctrine recognized that as they were, the US was forced to attack "in- target intelligence is essential to aerospace country" targets. Because the Air Force did operations. not have a targeting organization capable of supporting this, "MACV [Military Assistance The role of intelligence support in the effec- Command, Vietnam] J-2 developed its own tive employment of tactical air forces is of criticai importance. Targeting is the key func- organization, the Target Research and Analy- tion and includes exploitation of all intelli- sis Center (later renamed the Combined In- gence sources for target development, material telligence Center, Vietnam [CICV]), to ac- production, target analysis, recommendations complish the in-country targeting task."41 for strike and strike assessment.45 During the battle for Khe Sanh (Operation Sixty-three percent of the intelligence chap- Niagara), MACV relinquished control of tar- ter in AFM 2-1 is devoted to targeting. Air geting. The Air Force created an ad hoc tar- Force intelligence also learned criticai target- geting organization to effectively use air ing lessons. It realized that it was not suffi- assets. The Seventh Air Force deputy chief cient to just assign intelligence officers to of staff for intelligence (DCS/I), augmented targeting positions. Intelligence officers by TDY personnel, established an intelli- needed formal targeting training. In 1974 gence control center. This center repre- the Air Force again took the lead by estab- sented the first major Air Force contribution lishing the Armed Forces Target Intelligence to the in-country targeting effort. In March Training Course. This course trained Army, 1968 the Air Force recalled the TDY person- Navy, and Air Force officers in the capabilities and limitations of all Services' weapons nel. This recall terminated the operation of systems supporting air operations. It also the intelligence control center, effectively trained students in analytical methodologies conceding de facto control of targeting back for selecting, prioritizing, and recommend- to MACV. This again limited the Air Force to ing targets meeting the commander's objec- providing on-call fire support to the ground tives and guidance. Graduates of this course forces in Vietnam, just as we had in Korea.42 were unique because they possessed an un- "The Air Force quickly found itself woefully derstanding of air operations, as well as in- short of targeting personnel. By 1969 [the] telligence operations. They provided the \ir Force had just about exhausted its cadre criticai link between the two communities. of experienced targeteers fighting the war. The void was filled with 'CBPO' targeteers with little or no experience."43 The war effort was negatively impacted by The Gulf War a shortage of intelligence personnel and The Gulf War was the first operational test their lack of training. of this link. Building on nearly eight de- 24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 cades of history and lessons learned, the Air such as construction data and identification Force entered the Gulf War more prepared to of criticai components. Unfortunately, apply aerospace forces than at any time in many of the AIF records fell far short of pro- the past. Even with these preparations there viding the information necessary for accu- were problems. Air Force targeting officers rate targeting.47 did not provide the support that decision The second problem that the 9th TIS tar- makers, planners, and aircrews required. geting staff encountered was the lack of nec- Some of these problems were institutional, essary imagery and supporting target materiais. Of the 218 targets that the 9th TIS some resulted from changing concepts of air identified, there was imagery of only 90. Of power employment, and others were sys- these 90, only 30 had target materiais. At the temic within the intelligence bureaucracy. initiation of the crisis 24 percent of the in- We will examine a few of these. The pur- stallations identified in Iraq had target mate- pose is not to provide apologies or to lay riais. Of the targets actually struck during blame. Rather, it is to identify the unique the war, only 11 percent had target materiais capability trained targeting officers can on 2 August 1990. In a 29 August 1990 DIA bring to the application of aerospace forces. memo to the deputy director for foreign in- In 1990 an Air Force targeting element sup- telligence, the DIA chief of targets acknowl- ported each unified command. In February edged that DIA had "issues to resolve and 1990 Central Command (USCENTCOM) di- problems to fix [with availability of target rected its Air Force component (Ninth Air materiais] after the crisis."48 In addition to Force/CENTAF [US Air Forces, Central Com- the basic shortage of target materiais at the mand]) to update the air plan for Operational beginning of the crisis, many were of ques- Plan (OPLAN) 1002-90. In support of this re- tionable utility due to their currency.49 The quest, the 9th Tactical Intelligence Squadron average date of production was 1982, with (TIS) Target Intelligence Division46 began tar- the oldest produced in June 1973—17 years get development for the draft OPLAN. Air before the crisis.50 Force targeting officers took the objectives Despite these problems, the contributions that the air planners provided and identified of Air Force targeteers should be apparent. target systems to meet them. These targeting Ninety-seven percent of the targets in the officers researched known installations and 9th TIS Iraqi Target Study (produced a month developed lists of potential targets. They used and a half prior to the Iraqi invasion) were these lists to produce the Iraqi Target Study, struck during Desert Storm. By comparison, which was published on 15 June 1990. 93 percent of the 12 August 1990 Air Staff Twro recurring problems hampered these target list and only 30 percent of the targets targeting officers. First was the inadequacy in the July 1990 CENTCOM Joint Target List of the installation data base. DIA maintains were struck during the war.51 More than four a worldwide installation data base known as months prior to the invasion, the 9th TIS the Automated Installation File (AIF). This identified information and imagery short- file is a system used to store, manipulate, falls that would impact combat operations if and retrieve target intelligence. Ideally it has not satisfied. information on every installation or place of Air Force targeting officers were also potential military significance. However, 40 available to support planners in the area of percent of the targets struck during the Gulf weapon recommendations and criticai ele- War were not in this data base in July 1990. ment analysis. They recommended the opti- The number of targets in some criticai cate- mum mix and number of weapons, fuzing, gories grew by several hundred percent. In and criticai elements throughout the war. In addition to listing installations, the AIF some cases, strategic planners chose to disre- should contain vital targeting information gard this information. The planners often EVOLUTION OFAF TARGETING 25

Following the strike by CBU-89S and CBU-87S against Watch, this same target was struck using the mobile Scuds (above) recommended by a targeting offi- number of weapons recommended by the cer. there was a significant break in time before another mass launch. We will never know whether or not this targeting staff. The result this time was the hiatus was the result of the strike since planners re- functional destruction of the facility.) Fi- tumed to the use of PGMs. nally, on 19 January 1991, a targeting officer recommended using CBU-89s and CBU-87s against mobile Scuds. Following the recom- thought the recommendations were too con- mended strike, there was a break of 60 hours servative. Three examples should illustrate before the Iraqis launched another Scud this point.S2 In August 1990 CENTAF target- against Israel and more than five days before ing personnel recommended that bridges there was another mass launch. We will only be attacked by aircraft using precision never know if this was a result of this strike guided munitions (PGM). Initially, this ad- or not. Planners switched back to PGMs in vice was ignored. Based on unacceptable rean effort to achieve physical destruction in- sults, planners shifted to using PGMs against stead of using an area denial strategy to bridges. Also in August, targeting officers achieve a functional kill. estimated that a particular target would re- Targeting officers were not as successful quire more PGMs than planners thought it in providing essential combat assessment in- should. This target type was struck but formation. One reason for this was a lack of never penetrated during the war. At the end training. The former Armed Forces Target- of the war it was fully functional. (In Janu- ing Course provided only five hours of in- ary 1993, as part of Operation Southern struction on combat assessment. Exercises 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 also provided little training. Usually there failed to see how greater precision requires was no poststrike imagery to work with; even greater and more detailed target analy- scripting cells had no model to generate sis. In each conflict we have seen our weap- combat assessments; and briefers failed to re- ons accuracy improve. We have gone from alistically account for limited collection as- Saint-Mihiel, France, to Ploesti, Rumania, to sets( weather, and the general fog of war. the Wonsan locomotive shops in North Ko- Desert Storm raises fundamental ques- rea, to the Paul Doumer Bridge in North Viet- tions about the effectiveness of targeting. nam, to the ventilation shaft of the Iraqi air Were targeting officers always right? No. force headquarters. An enduring lesson Did they provide the best support possible? learned about delivery accuracy during the No. Is there significant room for improve- last eight decades is that the greater the accu- ment before the next war? Emphatically racy of our weapons, the more accurate we yes! Vietnam helped forge targeting as the need our targeting to be. criticai link between operations and intelli- In 1992 Congress encouraged the Secre- gence. The lessons from Desert Storm tary of Defense, heads of military Services, should be used to further temper and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and strengthen this vital linkage. the director of the DIA to make resources available for a Joint Target Training Program. For the first time since 1918, the Air Force has not taken the lead in a targeting pro- Today gram. Although the Air Force has the great- Unfortunately, the prevailing trend is not est experience in joint air targeting and the to strengthen this linkage, but to eliminate preponderance of air assets, it has taken a it. The global geopolitical situation has backseat in the future of joint targeting. The changed. One result is the downsizing and Navy is the executive agent for the new Joint restructuring of the military Services. The Target Training Program, which is located at Air Force decided, after much thought, to the Navy and Marine Intelligence Training eliminate the targeting officer career field. Center. This decision was based on budgetary and manpower constraints. Part of the rationale was that it appears more cost-effective to maintain general ists at the expense of Conclusion trained specialists. One question may remain unanswered until the next war: Is it This article has presented three themes. First, air targeting is fundamental to the ap- more effective? The Navy has reached far plication of aerospace forces. Second, the different conclusions about the need for targeting. The Navy, which prior to the Gulf evolution of Air Force targeting has in part driven the development of air intelligence. War did not teach targeting at its intelligence Finally, the Air Force has historically taken school, now teaches more hours on targeting than does the Air Force. the lead in air targeting. We have seen that from the very begin- Since the end of the Gulf War, many have ning of aerospace planning, there was a need written about the war's lessons. Most authors have addressed how precision weap- to systematically identify criticai targets ons and stealth platforms have altered the based on the wartime objectives. World War nature of warfare. This masks another more II validated the views of the Air Corps Tacti- criticai lesson—the importance of targeting. cal School and led to the creation of a single, Not only have most authors failed to address wartime organization responsible for the col- the significance of targeting, they have also lection and analysis of intelligence for the EVOLUTION OFAF TARGETING 27 purpose of air target selection. The Korean sources before the first weapon is commit- War dramatically emphasized that a truly ef- ted.54 Yet the Air Force is in danger of forget- fective targeting program must be initiated ting that targeting is a unique, criticai before the fíghting starts. It also reinforced function. It has already eliminated the only the lesson that the requirement is not for ge- comprehensive course in the DOD dedicated to neric intelligence personnel but for trained air targeting and relinquished the lead in the and experienced professionals capable of mak- development of the Joint Target Training Pro- ing target and weapon recommendations and gram.^ Future application of aerospace power then analyzing the results of these strikes. Af- will likely suffer. As we draw down, these deter the Korean War, Air Force intelligence cre- cisions will have a negative impact on our ated the target intelligence career field, and the countr/s ability to respond to regional con- DOD made the Air Force the executive agent flicts in a timely and decisive manner. The infor the ATMP. The Vietnam conflict recon- herent range and speed of aerospace forces firmed the lessons of previous vvars. Further, it provide "global reach"; however, without highlighted the need for specialized training ",global targeting," we will greatly reduce our in targeting functions. Following the Vietnam "global power!" conflict, the Air Force took the lead in target We stand at a crossroads in the develop- training by establishing the Armed Forces Tar- ment of aerospace power. The path we get Intelligence Course—the first course ever de- choose will have as profound an effect on its veloped to train personnel in essential future as did the early debates on the funda- targeting functions. mental roles of aerospace power. We can The Air Force offers the quickest, longest- continue to build on the lessons of the past ranged, and most flexible force available to the and reestablish Air Force targeting before nation. As we continue to draw down, our our current expertise fully erodes. Or we can ignore these lessons, only to leam them power-projection capabilities will become again at the expense of aircrew lives. We even more vital in protecting US interests.53 need only look to our predecessors—the Gor- While efficiency may be a peacetime measure rells, Mitchells, Arnolds, Hansells, Strate- of merit, effective targeting remains crucial to meyers, Momyers, and Glossons to find the applying aerospace power. Targeting remains direction we should go at the operational one of the easiest and most cost-effective levei. "AIR POWER IS TARGETING AND TAR- means of preserving our diminishing re- GETING IS INTELLIGENCE/"“ □

Notes

1. The contnbutions of ail the Services are included in the 5. Between 12 June 1918 and 11 November 1918, US collective terms air power and aerospace power. bombers dropped 275,000 pounds of bombs on railyards, 2. The first military use of powered aircraft for bombing factories, bridges, command posts, troop concentrations, lines of was in 1911. Italian pilots threw 4.4-pound bomblets from their communication (LOC), and so forth aircraft against Ubyan forces. Besides resulting in the first claim 6. "U.S. Bombing Survey," in Maurer, vol. 4, 501. of coliaterai damage to a hospital, the need for better bombs 7. Ibid., 502. and target materiais was identified. Robin Higham, Air Power: A 8. Ibid., vol. 3, 215. Concise History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), 21-23. 9. "Mitchell: Provisional Manual of Operations," in ibid., 3. Edgar S. Gorrell, “Early History of the Strategical Section," vol. 2, 279. ed. Maurer Maurer, in The U.5. Air Service in World War I, vol. 2 10. Maj T. D. Milling, “The Air Service Tactical School: Its (Washington. D.C: Government Printing Office, 1978), 143. Function and Operation," (Langley Field, Va.: Air Service 4 Given the accuracy of bombing at this point, only Tactical School, 1924). installations needed to be identified. The ability to identify 11. Robert T. Finney, History o f the Air Corps Tactical School, criticai elements at installations would not be needed until the 1920-1940 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1955), 31. Vietnam War. 12. Haywood Hansell, The Strategic Air War against Germany 28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 and lapan (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 36. Ibid., 146. 10. 37. Ibid., 147. 13. Ibid., 11. 38. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 39. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic 15. Ibid., 19. Thinking in the United States Air Force, vol. 2, 1961-1984 16. Harold B. Hinton, Air Victory: The Men and the (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1989), 304. Machines, with a foreword by Barton K. Yount (New York: 40. USAF Intelligence Activities in Support o f Operations in Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1948), 145-46. Southeast Asia, 1 January 1965-31 March 1968 (Maxwell AFB, 17. William A. Goss, "The AAF," in Wesley Frank Craven Ala.: Air University, 1972), 8. and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, 41. Ibid. vol. 6, Men and Planes (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force 42. Ibid. History, 1983), 40. 43. Thomas E. Lee and Samuel M. Taylor, “Air Force 18. HanselI, 21-22. Intelligence Enhancement Program," technical note, Bolling 19. The AWPD input was known simply as AWPD-1. While AFB, Washington, D.C., Air Force Intelligence Service, 1985, 4. technically a requirements document, it was really a blueprint 44. Ibid., 29-31. for our air operations plan against Germany. 45. Air Force Manual (AFM) 2-1, Tactical Air Operations— 20. Thomas H. Greer, "Other Training Programs," in Craven CounterAir, Close Air Support, and Air Interdiction, 1969, 8-1. and Cate, vol. 6, 687. 46. In wartime, 9th TIS (now the 609th AIS) became 21. Alfred Goldberg, "Establishment of the Eighth Air Force CENTAF Intelligence. in the United Kingdom," in ibid., vol. 1, Plans & Early 47. John Heidrick, "9TIS/1NT Planning Procedures for Operations, lanuary 1939 to August 1942, 624. Internai Look-90 and Operation Desert Shield," undated paper 22. Robert Frank Futrell, "US Army Air Forces Intelligence provided to the author for the Gulf War Air Power Survey in the Second World War," in Horst Boog, ed., The Conduct of (GWAPS); and memorandum for record, Col James R. Blackburn, the Air War in the Second World War (New York: St. Martin's USAF/INT, subject: Targeting/MC&G Support to DESERT Press, 1988), 539. SHIELD (U), 17 October 1990. (Secret) Information extracted is 23. Arthur B. Ferguson, “The CBO Plan," in Craven and unclassified. Cate, vol. 2, Europe: TORCH to POÍNTBLANK, August 1942 to 48. DIA memo from chief, Target Intelligence Directorate, Decernber 1943, 352-54. to deputy director, Foreign Intelligence, subject: Overall 24. The Bombing Encyclopedia was the first effort to Perspective on Target Materials Available at Crisis Initiation, 29 automate the handling of the vast amount of information August 1990. needed to provide target recommendations for every country in 49. The ATTG was the basic target material at this time. the world. See James Lowe, "Intelligence in the Selection of Figures taken from CENTAF, 15 June 1990, and CENTCOM, 27 Strategic Target Systems," lecture, Air War College, Maxwell June 1990, target list and the Consolidated Tactical Target Field, Ala., 1946, 13-15. Materials Catalog. 25. HanselI, 22. 50. Consolidated Tactical Target Materials Catalog (TTMC) 26. George C. McDonald, “The U.S. Air Force Intelligence (Langley AFB, Va.: 480th Tactical Intelligence Group, 1990). Prior to and During World War II and Today,” lecture, Air War 51. Looking at the issue from the standpoint of what College, Maxwell Field, Ala., 1947, 5. percentage of the total targets struck was identified in various 27. The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (European lists prior to the war, one finds that the percentages for 9th TIS, War) (Pacific War) (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, CENCOM, and the Air Staff were 43, 22, and 19, respectively. 1987), 39, 117. 52. All examples are based on the author’s experiences. The 28. The advent of nuclear weapons led many to believe that second example is corroborated by Col David Deptula, one of targeting was not a required discipline. There was no need to the air campaign planners for Desert Storm, in an interview analyze the enemy target sets when we were going to bomb conducted by Dr Barry Watts, and the third is recounted in whole cities. According to Futrell, there was a belief in the USAF DOD's Final Report to Congress on the Conduct o f the Persian Gulf Directorate of Intelligence during the late 1940s that "targets War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), should be working for the Directorate of Plans." Much of the 166. intimate relationship of air intelligence and air operations was 53. Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice, The Air Force lost during the rapid demobilization of the wartime intelligence and U.S. National Security: Global Reach—Global Power, white force. Futrell, "US Army Air Forces Intelligence in the Second paper (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, June World War," 547^18. 1990). 29. United States Air Operations in the Korean Conflict, 25 54. Thomas E. Lee, "Targeting—The Key to Effective Air June-1 November 1950 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1952), Power" (Thesis, Armed Forces Staff College, 1975), 47. 84. 55. According to the draft memorandum of agreement for 30. FEAF Report on the Korean War, Far East Air Forces the Joint Target Training Program (JTTP), it is intended to report, 26 March 1954, vol. 2, 141. ensure that all DOD targeting personnel serving in joint and 31. United States Air Operations in the Korean Conflict, 25 Service targeting positions will have a common knowledge base lune-1 November 1950, 52-53. reflecting current joint targeting terms, tactics, techniques. and 32. FEAF Report on the Korean War, vol. 2, 142. procedures. It is not intended to train targeteers. 33. United States Air Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 fuly 56. Buster C. Glosson, "Impact of Precision Weapons on Air 1952-27 /uly 1953 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1956), 10. Combat Operations," Airpower Journal 7, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 8. 34. FEAF Report on the Korean War, vol. 2, 142. 35. Ibid., 144. A SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP MODEL FOR MILITARY LEADERS

C ol Donald E. W addel l 111, USAF

Leadership remains the most baffling of HE ART OF leadership that Stokes- arts . . . as long as we do not kttow exactly bury alludes to is a subject studied what makes men get up out o fa hole in the more seriously in military schools ground and go forward in the face ofdeath than in civilian institutions. Given at a word from another man, then leadership will retnain one ofth e highest theT life-and-death nature of our business and most elusive ofqualities. It will retnain and the importance of the military to a na- an art. tion's survival, this should surprise no one. —James L. Stokesbury What is surprising, however, is that most Air 30 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 Force professional military education (PME) erations include the levei at which leader- schools rely almost exclusively on the civil- ship is exercised; different styles that may be ian-oriented Hersey and Blanchard Situ- required because of the demands of combat; ational Leadership model to help teach staff versus operational leadership; or the military leadership and management. differing styles appropriate to Service, joint, The Air University Leadership and Man- or combined leadership. The purpose of this agement Program Advisory Group (LMPAG) article is to suggest another leadership recently discussed the Hersey and Blanchard model that is helpful in modeling leadership Situational Leadership model used exten- situations unique to the military. While this sively by the Reserve Officer Training Corps model will be used in the Air War College (ROTC), the Officer Training School (OTS), curriculum next year, it has numerous appli- the Squadron Officer School (SOS), and the cations and is particularly appropriate for Sênior Noncommissioned Officer Academy midcareer officers faced with transitioning (SNCOA). While most were happy with the from unit-level to leadership positions in- model as presented in the various schools, volving more people and more complex mis- the group decided to review other models to sions. see if they might better portray military leadership. At the same time, Air War College was looking for a model to use in studying leadership in its academic program. Evolution of The general feeling was that the Hersey Leadership Theory and Blanchard model is useful but has some significant limitations. Specifically, the As a backdrop, we should first review the model does a good job of highlighting the evolution of leadership theory in this cen- appropriate leadership style based on the tury. Almost all leadership theory is based "maturity" or "development levei" of the on the relative importance assigned to the followers but does not adequately address leader versus the follower in mission accom- other military considerations. These consid- plishment. Those who believe that leaders are sufficiently enlightened or heroic1 (to use Morris Janowitz's term) cite examples of bold leaders such as Napoléon, Alexander, and Frederick the Great, and they favor the authoritarian model of leadership. Those who have greater confidence in the followers' maturity, capability, and insights favor the democratic model. Our perspective of leadership with regard to the respective roles played by the leader and follower has changed dramatically in this century. In the nineteenth century, the industrial revolution pulled many Ameri- cans out of rural areas into the City where industry was producing unprecedented wealth at the expense of the worker. Work- ing conditions were appalling as management ruled, tyrannically enjoying enormous Nineteenth-century management ruled tyrannically, power to hire, fire, and generally dictate often employing children for backbreaking work under appalling conditions, as witnessed by this girl hauling working conditions for the worker. We be- coaI from a mine. gan the twentieth century focused almost SITUA TIONAL LEADERSHIP MODEL 31

exclusively on a leader-dominant theory of Hersey and Blanchard describe how lead- leadership that assumed a low opinion of the ership theory has evolved beginning with followers' motivation, maturity, and abili- Frederick Winslow Taylor, whose scientific ties. In the early part of the twentieth cen- management movement in the early 1900s tury, child labor laws and unions helped sought to improve production by increasing improve working conditions of America's worker productivity through time and mo- workers but also exacerbated the divisive re- tion studies. In their book, Hersey and lationship between management and labor, Blanchard observe that leader and follower. The military, long a bas- the function of the leader under scientific tion for authoritarian leaders, also main- management or classical theory was obviously tained a predominantly authoritarian leader- to set up and enforce performance criteria to ship style. meet organizational goals. The main focus of a At the turn of the century, however, social leader was on the needs of the organization scientists began to be interested in the and not on the needs of the individual.3 worker as a means to improve production. In Management o f Organizational Behavior: Elton Mayo shifted the emphasis to the human relations movement in the 1920s. Utilizing Human Resources, Paul Hersey and This movement sought to examine employee Kenneth Blanchard do an excellent job of needs and motivation to increase output. tracing the evolution of leadership theory during the twentieth century. They use Mayo's best-known work was the Hawthorne Robert Tannenbaum and Warren Schmidt's Study conducted at the Western Electric "Continuum of Leader Behavior" diagram to Company. In this study, lighting was varied illustrate how all leadership theory is based to observe its effect on productivity. Surpris- on the relative emphasis placed on either the ingly, worker productivity was less sensitive follower or the leader.2 I have adapted this to changing lighting conditions than it was diagram (fig. 1) by flipping it over so that to the perception on the behalf of employees the continuum evolves from leader-domi- that management was interested in studying nant to follower-dominant. their behavior. Hersey and Blanchard observed:

The function of the leader under human rela- TASK ORIENTED------► RELATIONSHIP ORIENTED tions theory was to facilitate cooperative goal attainment among followers while providing opportunities for their personal growth and development. The main focus, contrary to scientific management theory, was on individual needs and not on the needs of organization. In essence, then, the scientific management movement emphasized a concern for task (output), while the human relations movement stressed a concern for relationships (people). The recognition of these two concerns

LEADER MAKES LEADER PRESENTS LEAOER PRESENTS LEADER PERMITS has characterized the writings on leadership AífKHJNCES IDEAS ASKS FOR PR081EMS GETS SUBORDINATES ever since the conflict between the scientific DÉCISION QUESTIONS SUGGESTIONS TO FUNCTION MAKES DÉCISION WfTHIN LIMITS management and the human relations schools SET BY LEADER of thought became apparent.4 Figure 1. Continuum of Leader Behavior (adapted The depression and World War II resulted from Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard, Management in a gap in organizational leadership scholar- of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Re- ship, but immediately after World War II sources [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., and into the 1960s, others began to seri- 1982], 92) ously examine the leader-follower interac- 32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 tion. Studies conducted at Ohio State Univer- where, in contrast to the predominantly sity, the University of Michigan, and the authoritarian style in 1900, our leadership University of Iowa all addressed the leader's style today is substantially follower-domi- role in balancing the competing demands of nant as witnessed by the development of to- mission (task orientation) and employee (re- tal quality management (TQM) within the lationship behavior). Each study developed Department of Defense. new terms to describe its particular orienta- Hersey and Blanchard conclude that no tion, but the fundamental issue in each case one theory of leadership is wholly correct was the relative authority given to the em- and therefore developed the situational lead- ployee or the follower. ership model. This model holds that the One of the more recent studies, Douglas leadership style used depends primarily on McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y, provides the maturity of the follower. They depicted a useful framework for analyzing a leader's their model with the diagram shown in fig- attitude concerning his or her followers. ure 3.5 Theory X leaders assume followers are not sufficiently mature or motivated to be al- lowed much autonomy. Theory Y, in con- STYLE OF LEADER trast, assumes just the opposite. Figure 2 depicts a composite of these theories as they relate to leader-dominant and follower-dominant leadership styles and situations. Note the generalized chronology beginning at 1900 and ending at 1990. This illustrates how leadership theory has evolved since the turn of the century to the point

THEORY X ♦ ------► THEORY Y AUTHORITARIAN ◄------► DEMOCRATIC INITIATING STRUCTURE-^-CONSIDERATlON STRUCTURE 9-1 ♦ ------► 1-9 PRODUCTION ORIENTATION ♦EMPLOYEE ORIENTATION TASK ORIENTED ♦ ------► RELATIONSHIP ORIENTED

Figure 3. Hersey and Blanchard’s Situational Leadership Model (adapted from Hersey and Blanchard, 169)

900 tMHUW hHlNO ^ iaau In sum, the substance of these studies and theories reflects a gradual evolution from an authoritarian leadership style based on a Theory X orientation to a democratic orientation that seeks to motivate the employee to TAYIORMM MAYO OHIO ST . MCGREGOR. TQM STUDIES HAWTHORNE U. OFMICH.. feel that he or she is a contributing part of STUDIES IOWA STUDIES the organization. That evolution has culmi- Figure 2. Leader-Dominant and Follower-Dominant nated recently with the development of Styles and Chronology TQM and a quality Air Force (QAF) that seek SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP MODEL 33 to further empower the employee. According QAF environment, "No one in my organiza- to the total quality philosophy, "the chal- tion is more important than anyone else."7 lenge of our leaders is to invert the organizational pyramid and change the role of the leader or manager to a more supportive and empowering one."6 Compared to the decid- The Air War College edly autocratic model of the US military in Model the past, the TQ approach to leadership is The AWC model is designed to describe si- just about as follower-oriented as a system tuational leadership in a military context, can be. Gen John M. Loh, commander of Air though it can be applied to a variety of other Combat Command (ACC) and QAF advocate, circumstances. We can begin to build this articulated just how far we have come since model with a review of the definition of the turn of the century when he said of the leadership. According to Air Force Pamphlet

By the midtwentieth century, factory conditions had improved significantly. The depression and World War II, however, saw a hiatus in the study of leadership theory. 34 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 (AFP) 35-49, Air Force Leadership, "leadership is the mission. For that reason, among others, the art of influencing and directing people communication between leader and follower (followers) to accomplish the mission."8 I needs to be free-flowing, unencumbered as would add "to accomplish the mission in a much as possible by administrative obstacles particular sitiiation or environment." In their and psychological barriers. book, Management o f Organizational Behavior, The bidirectional arrow between leader Hersey and Blanchard suggested the above and followers makes this point. Communica- modification to the Air Force definition might tion between the leader and the followers be appropriate. They note that "there is no must be in the form of a dialogue, not a best leadership style or stimulus. Any leader- monologue. Many scholars have suggested ship style can be effective or ineffective de- that the criticai factor in determining the ef- pending on the response that style gets in a fectiveness of this relationship is communi- particular situation."9 They concluded that cation. "Congress can make a general," "empirical studies tend to show that there is Ornar Bradley once observed, "but only com- no normative (best) style of leadership. Effec- munication can make him a commander."12 tive leaders adapt their leader behavior to meet the needs of their followers and the particular John Kline notes that environment" (emphasis added).10 the importance of effective communication In his introduction to The Mask of Com- by leaders is demonstrated daily in all or- mand, John Keegan alludes to a similar ganizations. Indeed, since 1938 when Chester thought when he speaks of "the particularity Barnard concluded that communication was of leadership" or the necessity for studying the main task of managers and executives, and understanding leadership in "context."11 emphasis has been placed on improving The following model stresses the compo- Communications in organizations. . . . Not nents of leadership identified in the AFP 35- only is communication down the chain of command important, subordinates need to 49 definition (leader, follower, mission) as keep each other and their supervisors in- they are influenced by the situation or con- formed. In other words, to be effective, text in which leadership is exercised. Thus, communication channels need to be open the AWC model looks like this: down, up and throughout the organization.13

That's why the arrow between the leader and |— SITUATION ------1 the followers points both ways. LEADER - * - ► FOLLOWERS —► MISSION As outlined in the previous discussion, a (INTERACTION) major consideration in the understanding of leadership is the relationship between the Figure 4. The AWC Leadership Model leader and follower. The other major variable component (given that the mission remains a fixed component for a specific situation) is A few observations can be made about the the situation, the environment, or the components of the model and the relation- context in which leadership is exercised. ship of these components. First, note that This is where I think the AWC leadership the arrow from followers to mission is unidi- model is most useful since it helps us rectional. That suggests that it is the follow- understand how the dynamics of the ers, not the leader, who actually do the work leadership relationship change as the and accomplish the mission. While the situation changes. For this reason, the leader may get his or her "hands dirty" occa- "situation" component of the AWC model sionally, the followers do the work. It is also includes all the other components under its the followers who provide feedback to the bracket (fig. 5). The various situations we leader on their progress in accomplishing will examine are: SITUA TIONAL LEADERSHIP MODEL 3 5 1. The leveis at which leadership is exer- On the other hand, higher leveis of lead- cised. ership have broader missions. An excellent 2. Peacetime leadership as compared to example of broader mission tasking at the wartime operations. operational levei was the Operation Overlord 3. A comparison of Service, joint, and directive given Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower combined leadership. by the Combined Chiefs of Staff: "You will 4. Staff leadership as opposed to enter the continent of Europe and, in con- leadership of operational units. junction with the other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her Armed |— SITUATION ------1 Forces."14 The model helps us see that as the leadership situation changes from tactical to LEADER FOLLOWERS —► MISSION (INTERACTION) operational and higher, mission tasking should become less specific. 1 LEVELS The model allows us to visualize changes 2. COMBAT/PEACE in the interaction between the leader and the 3. JOINT/COMBINED 4. STAFF/OPERATIONAL followers as leveis of leadership change. As the leader rises above the tactical levei, the Figure 5. Situation Component of the AWC Leader number of people for whom the leader is re- ship Model sponsible increases. Consequently, the interaction with the "troops" becomes less and Figure 6 reveals a number of relevant ob- less direct. For instance, the relatively small servations about how the leadership equa- number of people in a squadron allows the tion varies as the levei of leadership rises flight commander and even the squadron from the tactical to the operational levei and commander to have frequent, direct interaction with his or her people. To discuss an is- above. Look first at the column under "mis- sue, the leader need only use the intercom sion." The mission is very specific at the tac- or walk down the hall to talk to the person tical levei but becomes broader at the higher who will actually do the work. leveis of leadership. For instance, junior offi- However, as an officer becomes a group cers operate primarily at the tactical levei. or wing commander or above, he or she in- Their missions are specific: bomb a target, evitably becomes insulated, and communi- seize and hold terrain, provide support for a cation is now less direct and more through specific operation, and so forth. intermediaries. Most successful leaders have attempted to reduce the effect of this isolat- ing phenomenon by visiting their troops in SITUATION the field as often as possible. Robert E. Lee was able to maintain extraordinary rapport | LEVELS LEADER FOLLOWERS —► MISSION (INTERACTION) with his troops even while serving as an operational commander. Likewise, Ornar GENERAUST NOIRECT MANY BROAD Bradley and George Patton made their pres- NATKJNAl ence felt among the soldiers they led. Even st r at egc the aloof Napoléon went out of his way to be visible to his followers by presenting oper at ional awards and visiting the troops in the field. The same principie practiced by these sên- tactical ior leaders applies to lower leveis as well. The most effective leaders today are highly Figure 6. Leveis of Leadership visible. 36 A1RP0WER JOURNAL FALL 1994 On the other hand, leaders who, as they 1. Your leadership style should probably rise above the lower and more direct leader- change as you move from company grade to ship leveis, attempt to maintain the same in- field grade and above. We can see this by ex- teraction with their followers and the same amining the Hersey and Blanchard Situ- control over mission accomplishment are ational Leadership model shown in figure 7. called micromanagers. "Micromanagementi- It is safe to say that the dominant leadership tis" may be the most pernicious disease style for midcareer officers is a combination common to leaders above the tactical levei. of "telling," "selling," or "participating" de- Instead of micromanaging, the leader pending on the maturity of the followers. It needs to become an expert at what I would is also correct to note that the leadership call "climate control." The effective sênior styles of selling and telling are less common leader Controls the climate of the organiza- today due to the empowering effects of QAF. tion by ensuring that his or her Vision, val- As we include our youngest airmen on proc- ues, and vitality permeate the organization. ess action teams (PAT) and solicit their input This is achieved by defining the leader's Vi- in production and operations decisions, the sion for the organization, packaging it so SI and S2 leadership styles will become everyone can understand it, and then com- more or less limited to basic training and municating that message repeatedly through a variety of means. The concept of climate other highly structured, routine tasks. control includes delegating work and em- As you rise to higher leadership positions, powering subordinates to accomplish the the "maturity of your followers" (bottom mission. horizontal line) will increase. The increased As illustrated in figure 6, the changes in maturity of followers is associated with mission and followers associated with the lower task behavior. That is, above the unit rise above the tactical levei force certain levei you are less involved in "tasking" peo- changes upon the leader as well. The leader at the tactical levei is primarily a technician, STYLE OF LEADER a practitioner, who actually participates in an operation. For instance, at the tactical levei a flight commander or squadron commander flies an aircraft, a submarine officer directs the navigation and employment of his weapons system, and a battalion commander leads his men into combat. As leadership is exercised at the higher leveis, the technician becomes a generalist, less concerned about operations at the tactical levei and more concerned about the broader application of military power at the strategic leveis.

The Situation: Tactical Levei and Above

What does all this mean to the military leader? On the basis of the discussion above, Figure 7. Hersey and Blanchards Situational we can make five generalizations about lead- Leadership Model (adapted from Hersey and ership at the tactical levei and above. Blanchard, 169) SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP MODEL 37

ple to do things and more dependent on book Taking Charge, Gen Perry Smith refers them to get the job done with less supervi- to this as the "60 percent rule," which sion. means a leader makes a decision when only As task behavior decreases there is an as- 60 percent of the relevant information is sociated decrease in the sênior leader's inter- available.16 This is often a difficult step for the rising leader to take because it involves action (or "relationship behavior") with risk. It is, in many respects, a step of faith, followers. According to Hersey and but a step that must be taken because the Blanchard, all this means that your leader- consequence of not taking that step is ineffi- ship style should evolve from "participat- ciency at best, paralysis at worst. ing" (the style most common at the unit 5. Above the tactical levei, Vision be- levei) to "delegating" (the style leaders comes more essential. Vision is essentially above the squadron should adopt).15 the ability to see into the future. According 2. Because of the greater number of fol- to Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus: lowers who work for leaders above the tactical levei, these leaders will have less direct To choose a direction, a leader must first have contact with the majority of them. For in- developed a mental image of a possible and stance, the officer in charge of a mainte- desirable future State of the organization. This nance squadron has 50 to 100 people image, which we call Vision, may be as vague as a dream or as precise as a goal or a mission working for him or her. These subordinates statement. The criticai point is that a Vision ar- have frequent, direct contact with the leader. ticulates a view of a realistic, credible, alterna- As a result, it is relatively easy to communi- tive future for the organization, a condition cate values, goals, and guidance. On the that is better in some ways than what now ex- other hand, as the midcareer officer today ists. A Vision is a target that beckons.17 becomes the sênior leader of tomorrow, the greater number of subordinates will make The midcareer leader's Vision is near frequent, direct contact difficult and eventu- term. At one extreme, a sênior captain or ally impossible. As a consequence, a signifi- major in combat may be required to focus cant responsibility of the sênior leader is to 100 percent of his or her attention on the create the appropriate operational and ethi- next mission. Under normal circumstances, cal atmosphere in which everyone knows the outer limits of the Vision of a leader at what is expected of him or her—"climate the unit levei probably doesn't extend much control." beyond the fiscal year. As leaders rise above 3. Leadership above the unit levei must the tactical levei, however, the time frame become less hands-on, less technical. The leader must remain firmly in touch with the for which they must plan increases consider- mission the unit performs, but he or she is ably. In his article "Building Strategic Lead- now more of a generalist who leaves the de- ership for the 21 st Century," Maj Roderick tails of the operation in the hands of those Magee notes that most familiar with the day-to-day opera- one of the primary responsibilities of the stra- tions. tegic leader is to look ahead 10 to 20 years and 4. As the individual rises in leadership determine what the Army will be required to above the unit levei, he or she is removed do and thus how it must be structured to sat- farther from where the organization's activ- isfy national objectives. There is universal ity takes place, and therefore is more out of agreement that Vision is a key factor for organ- touch with what is actually going on. Conse- izational success and survival. Of course, it is quently, decisions made above the tactical the strategic leader who is responsible for establishing the Vision.18 levei are frequently made with less than 100 percent of the required information. In his Creating a long-range, strategic Vision for 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 the leadership equation changes as the leader moves from tactical leadership to higher leveis. The model can also be used to examine other leadership situations. For instance, we can use the model depicted in figure 8 to observe how the wartime environment affects the dynamics of leadership. As a general rule, the wartime mission is more criticai and the result of failure takes on potentially tragic consequences. For this reason, the arrow under the "mission" column is substantially larger than the other arrows. A unit that fails to meet its peacetime tasking may bust an operational readiness inspection (ORI) or get a commander fired. On the other hand, Desert One, Gallipoli, Gen J. E. B. Stuart's absence at Get- tysburg, and the disaster at Kasserine Pass are examples of the tragic consequences of not ac- The climate of QAF challenges the leader to empower complishing a wartime mission. the junior members of his or her organization to seek new ways of dealing with problems or work methods. |— S1TUATION------1 the organization requires the leader to deal | LEVELS | LEADER »» FOLLOWERS —► MISSION with issues that are more complex, concep- 1------(INTERACTION) tual, and abstract than the tactical concerns of a unit commander. In this respect, leader- DEMOCRATIC EASIER RELAXED FLEXIBLE ship is a more intellectual activity. Clause- witz expressed a similar thought when he said, "Every levei of leadership of command has its own intellectual standard."19 Maj Magee refers to the Jacques and Jacob Strati- AUTHORITARIAN OIFRCULT AFRAID IMPERATIVE fied Systems Theory (SST) to make this (PERHAPS) point. He notes that Figure 8. The Situation: Peace or War? one basis of their model (SST) is that cognitive complexity increases hierarchically as you go up the organization and that the leader's cog- In time of war, the mental State of follow- nitive complexity must match what is required by the organizational levei. According ers takes on greater significance since fear to SST, cognitive complexity can be thought complicates their ability to perform. Leaders of in terms of "differentiation and integra- must take this factor into consideration tion." The complexity associated with the or- when transitioning from peace to war. To ganizational levei, or organizational strata, is compensate for fear and the greater impor- based on the time span of the role the leader is tance of mission accomplishment, leaders in.20 may understandably become more authoritarian. The movie Twelve 0'Clock High studied at various PME schools illustrates this The Sitiiation: Peace and War point. As you'11 recall, General Savage as- The foregoing discussion was concerned pri- sumed command of a World War II bomber marily with helping leaders understand how group whose aircrews were suffering from SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP MODEL 39

low morale due to combat losses. To turn the transfer power from the leader to subordi- situation around, the new commander nates and to solicit ideas and insights from adopted a very authoritarian leadership followers in a very friendly, benign environ- style. The renewed emphasis on strict disci- ment. How will the thoroughly indoctri- pline and the resulting antagonism toward nated and empowered QAF follower respond the demanding boss led to improved mis- if the unit's leadership takes on a more auto- sion accomplishment and ultimately higher cratic style during combat? This is an issue morale. that future leaders, particularly at the unit Lest we infer too much from the above levei, need to address. example, I would suggest that an authoritarian style is not an automatic response to a SITUATION combat environment. Under normal circumstances, a leader's style won't change simply LEADER FOLLOWERS —► MISSION because the bullets are flying. It depends on (INTERACTION) the situation and the leader. COMBINED NATIONAL SBJSmVITIES Looking again at the model, we can make HISTORIO AL 4 DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES some observations about the interaction be- JOINT SERVICE SENSITIVRIES tween leader and follower in a combat envi- DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES ronment. During peacetime operations, this interaction is complex and difficult. During SERVICE MORE MISUNDERSTANDING war, this interaction is even more difficult COLLEGIAL PERCEIVED PREJUDICE AND BI AS DOCTRINAL since it is exacerbated by the fog and friction AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES of war. Clausewitz's familiar observation is relevant: Figure 9. Joint and Combined Leadership If one has never personally experienced war, one cannot understand in what the difficulties The Situation: constantly mentioned really consist, nor why Joint and Combined Leadership a commander should need any brilliance and exceptional ability. . . . Everything in war is Another variation in the leadership equation simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The that will become increasingly important in difficulties accumulate and end by producing today's environment involves the composi- a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless tion of friendly forces. A single-service op- one has experienced war.21 eration is relatively easy to coordinate since A final "war versus peace" related issue like-minded individuais are involved in ac- should be addressed at this point. As we complishing the mission. Their interaction transition to a more follower-oriented, "em- is facilitated by a common lexicon and a powering" leadership model in peace such as common orientation to their particular way TQM, there are potential pitfalls for us when of fighting. Once we include members of an- engaged in combat operations. The funda- other Service, however, additional considera- mental purpose of basic training over the tions and sensitivities need to be addressed. years has been to break down the individ- Differences in Service doctrine and opera- ual's civilian mind-set that is naturally resis- tional methods not only frustrate working tant to following potentially life-threatening together but can have a deleterious, even fa- battlefield orders. In place of the civilian tal effect on operations. You might, for ex- mind-set, we substitute military discipline ample, consider the difficulties that arose during basic training, a reflexive obedience due to doctrinal disagreements between to an authoritarian leadership style. The in- Army ground and air commanders in North tent of QAF is just the opposite. It seeks to África during World War II. 40 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 In addition, interservice rivalries have On the coalition staff, as is the case with any complicated and will continue to complicate new leadership position . . . my primary mis- mission accomplishment. The competition sion was to coordinate the activities of the between Gen Douglas MacArthur and admi- staff. ... In addition to what you might nor- rais Ernest J. King/Chester W. Nimitz in the mally expect that to entail, 1 found that I also World War II Pacific theater led to a less than had to be a negotiator, diplomat, taskmaster, optimum coordination of operations. On and cheerleader. I learned also that on the the other hand, Army general Omar Bradley SHAPE staff (as well as on most coalition and Air Force general Elwood R. Quesada staffs), some of the most important factors to be considered were appreciating inherent dif- worked well together. ferences in culture and language and possess- The situation becomes even more coming a solid sense of history.23 plex when allies are involved. In addition to doctrinal and Service differences, cultural The Axis alliance in World War II pro- and historical differences compound efforts vides an example of the liabilities of coali- to coordinate combined operations. In his tion warfare. Germany found itself dragged Airpower Journal article "The 'Staff Experi- into a North African campaign and into ence' and Leadership Development," Gen combat in Greece by its Italian allies who, John Shaud noted that "the likelihood of according to German generais Albert Kessel- your participation in a joint coalition staff ring and Erwin Rommel, failed to perform in this post-cold war world has increased by effectively.24 On the other hand, Eisen- an order of magnitude."22 He served as chief hower's collegial, accommodating leadership of staff for the Supreme Allied Commander, style was a key to the success of Operation Europe (SACEUR) until recently and from Overlord. It is doubtful that a Patton-type that experience made the following observa- leadership style would have been successful. tion: Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf's sensitivity to Arab culture, acquired as a child growing up in Iran, was an important factor in forg- ing the coalition during the Persian Gulf Junior officers operate primarily at the tactical levei with War. "Storm'n Norman" may be the con- specific missions such as bombing a target. summate practitioner of adaptive, situ- SITUA TIONAL LEADERSHIP MODEL 41

ational coalition leadership in the recent away from the flight line, the greater be- past. In Crusade, Rick Atkinson describes comes the Ieader's challenge to keep follow- Schwarzkopf as a tyrant, a bellowing auto- ers focused on flying and fighting and to crat who was abusive to US members of the promote institutional, as opposed to occu- coalition. At the same time, he was diplo- pational, values. matic and accommodating to most allies. One has to wonder if this wasn't precisely |— SITUATION------J the leadership style that was necessary to keep the coalition together. As Atkinson ob- LEADER FOLLOWERS —► MISSION (INTERACTION) served,

BUREAUCRATIC FORMAL SOPHIST1CATED POUCY In a curious way, Schwarzkopfs temper also WRITTEN helped quell interservice squabbles by STAFF unifying natural rivais beneath a common fear. Moreover, he prudently spared the allies his wrath. Here he showed himself most competent at that for which he was presumed least prepared by training and constitution: m OPERATIONS HEROIC INFORMAL LESS SORTIES the muster and master of a huge coalition VERBAL SOPHISTICATED drawn from three dozen nations.25 Figure 10. Staff versus Operational Leadership

The Situation: Staffand Operational Leadership James Stokesbury called leadership the most baffling of arts, and those of us in the A final leadership situation we can exam- military would certainly agree. At the same ine is the difference between the staff and time, our PME curricula are designed to operations environment—a key issue for make the art of leadership less baffling for midcareer officers moving above unit levei the military practitioner. The AWC situ- for the first time. As illustrated in figure 10, ational leadership model described above is, leaders in operational units are probably I think, a useful framework to assess leaders more effective if they conform to the heroic and their leadership in context. In a rapidly leader style, while a staff leader's style is changing world, this view of leadership can more appropriately bureaucratic and partici- also help you adapt your leadership style to pative. The interaction between leader and the situation as you find yourself in more followers is primarily verbal and informal in sênior leadership positions. In light of unan operational environment but in the staff precedented technological developments, environment is written and more formal. rapidly changing world events, and com- Likewise, the followers are more sophisti- pressed cycles of social change, the need for cated in the staff environment and the mis- adaptive, flexible, empowering leadership sion is more in the arena of policy and has never been greater. □ plans. In the Air Force, the further you get

Notes

1. In his article "The User of Leadership Theory" (Michigan Burns noted that charismatic leadership may mean "an emo- Business Review, January 1973), James Owen defines bureaucratic tional bond between leader and led; popular assumption that a leadership style in terms we can all understand. Heroic or char- leader is powerful, omniscient, and virtuous, imputation of ismatic leadership Is more difficult to pln down. In his book enormous supernatural power to leaders (or secular or both); Leadership (New York: Harper Collins, 1982), James MacGregor and simply popular support for a leader that verges on love." 42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

The sense in which I use heroic or charismatic leadership implies 24, Concepts for Air Force Leadership, Richard I. Lester and A. a leadership style that reflects a strong personality that inspires Glenn Morton, eds. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1990) and energizes followers to accomplish extraordinary feats. In 261. this sense, it is very similar to Morris Janowitz's definition in 14. Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1-1, Campaigning, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: 1990, 42. Free Press, 1964), which calls the heroic leader a perpetuation of 15. Richard H. Kohn, ed., The United States Military under the warrior type, the mounted officer who embodies the martial the Constitution o f the United States, 1789-1989 (New York: New spirit and the theme of personal valor. York University Press, c. 1991), 220. 2. Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of 16. Perry M. Smith, Taking Charge: A Practical Cuide for Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources (Englewood Leaders (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982), 86. 1986), 108. 3. lbid., 85. 17. Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, Leaders: The Strategies 4. lbid. for Taking Charge (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), 89. 5. lbid., 152. Depending on the edition of their book, you 18. Maj Roderick R. Magee, "Building Strategic Leadership may see different terms used to describe the Hersey and for the 21st Century," Military Review, February 1993, 39. Blanchard model. Nevertheless, the meanings are essentially the 19. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael same. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 6. The Quality Approach, published by the Air Force Quality Press, 1976), 111. Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 11-7. 20. Magee, 37. 7. Speech by Gen Mike Loh, National Quality Month Kick- 21. Clausewitz, 117. off, Hampton Roads Quality Council, Hampton, Va., 1 October 22. Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired, "The 'Staff Experi- 1992. ence' and Leadership Development," Airpower Journal 7, no. 1 8. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 35-49, Air Force Leadership, 1 (Spring 1993): 9. September 1985, 2. 23. lbid. 9. Hersey and Blanchard, 102. 24. Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, World War II: 10. lbid., 103. America at War, 1941-1945 (New York: Random House, 1991), 11. John Keegan, The Mask of Command (Middlesex, Eng- 537. land: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1987), 1^4. 25. Rick Atkinson, "Desert Storm's Angry Caesar," Washing- 12. Ornar Bradley, A SoldiePs Story (New York: Henry Holt ton Post National Weekly, 4-10 October 1993. and Co., 1951), 474. 13. John A. Kline, "Communications for the Leader," in AU-

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M aj Roger C. H ünter , USAF

UN TZU said nearly 2,500 years ago that "the acme of skill is not winning a hundred victories in a hundred battles but to subdue the armies of the enemy withoutS fighting."1 It seems oxymoronic—to win a war without fighting. Despite that apparent contradiction, the professional war- rioi^s goal to achieve Sun Tzu's objective has been constant. Recently the media has given considerable coverage to some "weapons" to further the doctrine, policy, and opera- that make Sun Tzu's proposition seem some- tional employment concepts for their use. what more attainable. Sometimes they are referred to in the press as "nonlethal" or "low-lethal" weapons, but the Department of What Are Disabling Defense (DOD) has adopted the term disabling systems for this class of weaponry. In Novem- Systems? ber 1991, the Air Force vice chief of staff ap- The Office of the Secretary of Defense's proved a position paper that stated, inter alia, (OSD) Non-Lethal Strategy Group chose the that "the Air Force has an interest in pursuing term disabling weapon (system) to designate the conceptual maturation and operational "any instrument which is intended to disable exploitation of disabling strategies and tech- personnel and equipment while avoiding kill- nologies, and should pursue a lead role in an ing personnel or doing catastrophic physical integrated DOD systems' development ef- damage to equipment." The Army has distrib- fort."2 As the Air Force develops its force struc- uted a draft of an operations concept for dis- ture for the developing "new world order," it abling "measures" that defines disabling may be instructive at this time to understand measures as a "collection of capabilities em- what "disabling systems" are, why they are ployed with the intent to disable human or becoming more important, and why we need materiel system capabilities."3 In other words, 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

disabling measures are the strategic, operational, fort, with leaflets and loudspeakers. Tomor- and tactical application of disabling Systems row we may supplement leaflet dropping (weapons) to achieve stated politico-military ob- and sonic messages with holographic images jectives, albeit with a complementary objective and low-frequency generators to influence to preserve life and property. or disorient opposing forces. Disabling systems are not new. We saw Today the Air Force possesses and employs several examples of their use in Operation several disabling systems. Newer "weapons" Desert Storm. The use of electromagnetic in this class are being developed that can warfare against Iraqi radars and communica- supplement those we have. Although the tion nodes sometimes obviated the need to possession and use of disabling systems in destroy those assets. Coalition forces also the Air Force are not new, the appropriate in- employed a psychological operations cam- corporation of additional capabilities in this paign against Iraqi forces by dropping leaf- class will permit enhancement of a particu- lets instead of bombs on enemy positions. lar dimension of military operations. For The leaflets provided directions on how that and perhaps more profound reasons, Iraqis could surrender to coalition forces. the dimension of "disabling warfare" (or For surrendering Iraqis this proved less "nonlethal warfare" as the more romantic deadly than the cluster bombs they could would call it) is becoming more important. have faced. Precision guided munitions (PGM) perhaps represent a class of disabling weapons, though they have the potential to kill and maim personnel and to destroy Why Are Disabling property. Yet, an intention behind the em- Systems Becoming More ployment of PGMs is to lessen the collateral damage to innocent life and property. Important? If leaflet dropping, electronic warfare, and Containment of a monolithic communist PGMs are not new, then what is? Many tech- threat dominated US strategic and military nologies are maturing that provide more tools strategies for most of the post-World War II for the disabling weapons kit. Advancements in era. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Un- such areas as electromagnetics (e.g., lasers, ion, the US has adopted a regional focus for high-powered microwave systems, conductors); its national security strategy. This is largely materiais (e.g., adhesives, acids, lubricants); bio- due to the realization that the world is be- engineering; robotics; and other Sciences are coming more polycentric with the US as the yielding instruments that can make war more lone remaining superpower. Some have ar- "humane." Today F-4G "Wild Weasel" aircraft gued that in such a polycentric world, US carry high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARM) strategic doctrine should change and that it that are used to impact and destroy enemy ra- "must be based on the containment of bar- dars by detonation. Tomorrow perhaps a differ- barism [vice communism]."4 Despite that as- ent platform might carry a pod housing a sertion, the US must continue to ensure its high-powered microwave system that would strategic nuclear deterrence capability. Yet, we "fry" the enem/s electronics, rendering the Sys- also must continue to plan for US force em- tem useless with less violence. Today cluster ployment at lower leveis of conflict. The reali- bombs might be used to stop a convoy in its ties of a polycentric world mandate that the US tracks. Tomorrow a special caustic substance, (and the Air Force) be prepared to operate safe for organic material, might be dispersed on within those realities. We have probably seen the convoy's path to "melt" away the convo/s the characteristics of those realities in opera- inorganic tires and treads. Today we conduct tions Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert psychological operations, another disabling ef- Storm. These operations and many that we DISABUNG SYSTEMS 45

Although the leaflets we dropped during the Gulf War resulted in the surrender of many Iraqi troops, psychological operations as a disabling technique is not a new idea. In this World War ll-era picture, German soldiers surrender to American troops as a result of leaflets fired by light artillery into German-held areas. will conduct in the future will likely have deterrence may not prevent situations like the following characteristics: those in the Persian Gulf or in the former Yugoslavia. As Miguel Walsh puts it, • Be limited in objective and duration. "Threatening to throw sophisticated capa- • Involve coalition warfare. bilities into lower-level contingency situ- • Be aimed at restoring or ensuring re- ations may have just the opposite effect—that gional stability. of rendering such means incredible, unbe- • Take place in conflicts short of the lievable, at least in terms of employment."5 This threshold of general conventional war. would create a dilemma for the West: if present As this multipolar, polycentric world de- US and allied arsenais, and their implied threat velops, the US and its allies may find deter- of use, carry no weight with an adversary, how rence more difficult to enforce in a do we protect our national interests if they are regionally focused security environment. threatened by an adversary who, on paper, ap- Strategic nuclear or conventional destructive pears militarily weaker than we? The Western 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 sense of morality and the growing access to forces to place military equipment he near-instantaneous information may be con- wished to preserve for future use near reli- tributing factors to this dilemma. The gious buildings. Fearing damage to the holy bombing of the camouflaged Al Firdos com- places—and the rupturing of allied-Arab rela- mand bunker during Desert Storm and the tions—coalition forces did not attack these errant impact of a Tomahawk cruise missile "protected" forces. Such incidents may fore- into Baghdad's Al Rashid Hotel two years bode the constraints US and allied forces later during an attack on Iraq's Zaafaraniyah will face in future operations. As a result, industrial complex raised concems around we may have to further increase our empha- the world over the regrettable deaths of civil- sis on limiting collateral damage and casual- ians in these incidents. In another Desert ties, perhaps to the point-near-zero toler- Storm incident, Saddam Hussein directed his ance. Proportionate response and deliberate damage limitation—two important principies Disabling Systems will become even more important in of the intemational law of war—are becom- future wars, especially if they lessen the danger to civil- ing more important as technology appar- ian populations. An errant Tomahawk cruise missile, ently increases capabilities. Ironically, it will such as this one being fired from the USS Merrill, hit Bagdad's Al Rashid Hotel rather than its targeted Iraqi be the law-abiding nations of the polycentric industrial complex, raising much concern around the world who must be careful how they apply world about collateral civilian deaths. force to avoid being held hostage to their own sense of law and morality.

What Are the Policy and Doctrinal Impacts of Disabling Systems? Disabling systems represent another evolution in warfare, not a revolution. Though the cold war is over, deterrence remains a cornerstone of our national defense strategy. Doctrines and capabilities we possess today should not be discarded cavalierly. Yet, we must be objective in assessing our current capabilities in determining which ones will serve us well tomorrow. Consequently, US national security thinking is moving away from scenarios dominated by strategic nuclear confrontations to an era where the flexible response doctrine is becoming more flexible. Though this process may be complicated by the downsizing of our forces, we can help the process by establishing coher- ent policy and doctrine. One policy implication may be derived from the military success of Desert Shield and Desert Storm: traditional, lethal weaponry and disabling systems are not necessar- DISABLING SYSTEMS 47

ily stand-alone systems. During Desert systems. Some systems in this class may not Storm, combinations of disabling systems have the effect of influencing an adversar/s and lethal weaponry were used synergisti- capability and will and therefore should cally to achieve military objectives. It would bear serious consideration before proceeding be foolish to think that one can supplant the to production and deployment. Some dis- other. Still, that does not imply that there abling systems are not precise in the terms may be no situations in which one class of of the precision guided munitions used dur- weapons could be used exclusively. ing Desert Storm. Yet, these systems still re- The US aJso can adopt a policy that dispels quire precise intelligence and effective com- the notion that the adoption of disabling sys- mand and control to be employed effectively tems into our arsenal implies vveakness or a in a military operation. lack of will to use more lethal weaponry when Finally, as we consider the policy and doc- necessary. Making weapons more "humane" trinal impacts of assimilating disabling sys- should not mean we would be more free- tems into the inventory, we should review wheeling with the application of American Carl von Clausewitz's words: military power either. The US will continue to take seriously its obligations as a superpower If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him and the leadership role that comes with that in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hard- position. Yet, the addition of another class of ships must not of course be merely transient-at weaponry into the arsenal to make war less least not in appearance. Otherwise the enemy bloody and less destructive does not necessar- would not give in but would wait for things to ily mean we should be more willing to be- improve.6 come the world's policeman. Technology sometimes forces a change in a Despite what some may think, disabling sys- militar/s doctrine. Although the US Air Force tems do not represent a panacea for curing the updated Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aero- horrors normally associated with the conduct of space Doctrine o f the United States Air Force, in war. Nor does the incorporation of disabling March 1992, we should revisit that doctrine to systems into our armed forces represent a ratifi- decide if it adequately addresses the potential cation of the strategy of gradual response, a doctrinal changes that disabling systems might strategy that failed miserably in Vietnam. Im- bring. For example, paragraph 2-3b of AFM 1-1, posing our will on the enemy is still the objec- vol. 1, States, "Weapons should be selected tive. Disabling systems merely represent based on their ability to influence an adver- another tool that military strategists can use to sar/s capability and will," and paragraph 2-3c reach that end. Hopefully, that end can be States, "Precision weaponry requires precise in- achieved as Sun Tzu envisioned it—"without telligence and effective command and control." fighting." □ Both paragraphs have importance for disabling

Notes

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith Nonlethality. A New Paradigrn for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 77. US Global Strategy Council, 1992), 1. 2. Headquarters USAF, Special Technical Plans Division, 5. Miguel Walsh, "New Technology, War and International "Position Paper on the Air Force Role in Development of Law" (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 14 Disabling Systems/Strategy,” 13 September 1991, 4. June 1991), 5. 3. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard Pamphlet 52S-XX, "Operations Concept for Disabling and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), Measures," draft, 4 September 1992, 3. 77. 4. janet Morris and Chris Morris, Creating an Office of WHAT DOES CHÃOS THEORY MEAN FOR WARFARE?

M aj David Nicholls, USAF M aj Todor D. Tag ar ev, B ul gar ian Ajr For ce*

OR THE LAST 30 years, the study of chãos has intrigued investigators, prompt- ing many to see a great future for the study and application of chãos theory. In FScience and engineering, chãos theory has significantly improved our understanding of phenomena ranging from turbulence to weather to structural dynamics.1 Chãos theory has even been used to drastically improve our ability to control some dynamic systems.2 In the social Sciences, there has been considerable interest in whether social phenomena, previously thought to be random, have an underlying chaotic order. Several mathematical tests for chaotic behavior have been applied to historical data from both the stock market and cotton prices. These tests indicate that these economic phenomena are chaotic and so have a deterministic basis (i.e., are govemed by mies) as opposed to being random. Naturally, this has received some business attention, and at least two firms are now using chãos theory to guide their financial advice.3 There is evidence that vvarfare might also be chaotic. First; strategic decision making, an integral part of war, has been found to be chaotic.4 Second, nonlinearity, which is a requirement for chaotic behavior, appears to be a natural result of Clausevvitzian friction.5 Third, some Computer war games6 and arms race simulations7 have been found to exhibit

*We would also like to acknowledge the significant contribution of Maj Peter Axup to the preparation of this article. CHÃOS THEORY 49

chaotic behavior. Fourth, previous work by the not periodic because their behavior never re- current authors applied several tests for chãos to peats. historical data related to war. Those tests dem- Chaotic systems never repeat exactly be- onstrated that warfare is chaotic at the grand cause their future behavior is extremely sensi- strategic, strategic, and operational leveis.8 tive to initial conditions. Thus, infinitesimal differences in initial conditions eventually cause large changes in system behavior. An An OverView of Chãos Theory often-used example of this sensitivity is weather. Weather is so sensitive to initial con- In this paper, we will discuss some important ditions that there is a belief that the flap of a implications of chãos theory in the context of butterfly's wings in America could eventually warfare. First, however, we will briefly summa- cause a typhoon in China.9 It is inconceivable rize some important aspects of chãos theory. that conditions on the earth could ever duplicate an earlier time to the point where even all Nonlinearity butterfly flights are duplicated. Therefore, the If a system is linear, it means that the output earth's weather will never be periodic. of the system is linearly related to the input. In addition to making chaotic systems ape- In other words, if the input is doubled, the riodic, extreme sensitivity to initial conditions output will be doubled; if the input is tripled, means that it is not possible to determine the the output will be tripled, and so on. In non- present conditions exactly enough to fully linear Systems, however, the predict the future. Figure 1 illustrates this output might be related to the point. In figure 1, successive values for x are jgsquare or the cube of the in- plotted resulting from the nonlinear equation ^ p u t. Such systems are often Xi+i = 4x\ - 4xí2. For one plot the initial value ^very sensitive to input. All cha- of x was 0.7. For the other plot it was 0.70001. F otic systems are nonlinear. Initially, they are indistinguishable from one another, but as time goes on, even such a small difference between the two is magnified M Predictability of Chaotic Systems until their behavior appears totally unrelated. y Dynamic systems can differ from one Short-term predictions are still possible be- another in how they change with cause small influences will not have had time time. In random systems, future be- to grow into large ones. However, what is havior is independent of the initial short-term depends on how sensitive the sys- State of the system and can be charac- tem is to small changes at that point in time. terized only in terms of probabilities. The importance of this concept is that it ex- For example, unless the dice are plains how a system can be govemed by a set of loaded, the next roll of the dice is to- equations and yet still be unpredictable. We tally independent of the previous roll. cannot know the initial value of a system, such On the other hand, periodic systems reas that illustrated in figure 1, precisely enough tum regularly to the same conditions, as to predict which path the system will follow. If exemplified by the pendulum clock. Such warfare is chaotic, this tells us that we cannot systems are totally predictable because make perfect predictions even if we could re- once one period is known, all others must duce war to a mechanistic set of equations. For- be identical. Chaotic systems are neither tunately, as is also illustrated by figure 1, there random nor periodic. They are not random are bounds to the unpredictability of a cha- because the future of a chaotic system is de- otic system. Furthermore, chãos theory pro- pendem upon initial conditions. They are vides tools that can predict patterns of 50 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

Figure 1. Oivergence from Nearly Identical Conditions for a Chaotic System system behavior and can define bounds phase space plot is a plot of the parameters within which the behavior is unpredictable. that describe system behavior. It is useful because it provides a pictorial perspective for examining the system. An example of a Phase Space phase space plot for a simple pendulum is The construction of a phase space plot is often shown in figure 2. At point A in figure 2, used to better understand chaotic behavior. A the pendulum is the maximum positive dis-

Figure 2. Illustration of Phase Space for a Pendulum CHÃOS THEORY 51

Figure 3. Illustration of a Strange Attractor and the Associated Poincaré Map (from James Gieick, Chãos: Making a New Science [New York: Pengin Books 1987], 143) tance from the bob's neutral point but its ve- tractor. Although there are still constraints as locity is zero. This is shown as point A on the to how the system behaves, there are a lot phase space diagram. At B the distance of the more possible States for the system. It is im- bob from its neutral position is zero, but its portant to note that the phase space paths of a velocity is at a maximum (in a negative sense). chaotic system will never coincide. If this The other points of the phase space plot show were to happen, the system would become pe- the relation between the velocity and position riodic. The longer a chaotic system is ob- for other pendulum positions. In this case, served the more paths are taken and the where there is no friction, the motion of the messier the phase space plot of the attractor pendulum is constrained to remain on the el- appears. Superficially, the attractor may ap- liptical path shown in the phase space plot. pear to be completely disorganized. Closer The technical term for this ellipse is the attrac- examination of the phase space, however, re- tor for the system. One can see that this at- veals that the attractor is organized but in an tractor is periodic because the path of the unconventional manner. system exactly repeats itself in each orbit It is possible to simplify the portrayal of around the origin. the attractor by taking a two-dimensional In contrast, figure 3 shows an attractor for a slice through it (shown in the lower half of chaotic system. This attractor is a tangled figure 3). This also makes the structure of mess of trajectories. The complexity of this at- the attractor more obvious. This two-dimen- tractor has led to its being dubbed a strange at- sional section is called a Poincaré map.10 52 A1RP0WER JOURNAL FALL 1994

Fractals length is infinite. Second, Benoit Mandel- We generally define things dimensionally in brot calculated that the dimension of the perimeter of the Koch snowflake is 1.26.11 This terms of integers. Lines are one-dimensional, means that the perimeter is between a line and planes are two-dimensional, and solids are three- a plane. Third, the shape of the perimeter of a dimensional. Fractals are objects with fractional Koch snowflake is self-scaling. That is, the pe- dimensions. This concept appears at first sight to rimeter would look the same whether you be nonsense. An object with a fractional dimen- looked at it with the naked eye or with a pow- sion of 1.5, for example, would be more than a erful microscope. line but somehow less than a plane. Nevertheless, These geometries are pertinent to chãos be- such things are not only thought to exist, but cause strange attractors are fractal. Strange at- such geometries are central to chãos theory. One tractors, like the Koch snowflake, are infinite example of such a geometry, although it is not curves that never intersect within a finite area chaotic, is the Koch snowflake. or volume. If a system is chaotic, it will have a The Koch snowflake starts as an equilateral strange attractor and the Poincaré map will triangle. A one-third scale equilateral triangle show fractal characteristics. That is, the Poin- is added to each side. A one-third scale trian- caré map will remain similar regardless of gle (of the new, smaller triangle) is then added scale.12 Thus, Poincaré maps can be used to to each side of the resulting figure. This process is continued ad infinitum as illustrated in determine if a system is chaotic by visually de- figure 4. The perimeter of this shape has sev- picting the nature of the attractor. The dimen- eral unique features. First, although it is a sin- sion of the attractor can also be calculated. If gle, continuous loop that does not intersect an attractor's dimension is not an integer, then itself and that circumscribes a finite area, its the system is chaotic.

Figure 4. The Koch Snowflake (from Gleick, 99) CHÃOS THEORY 53

must contain some nonlinear relationships Implications of the Presence between system variables so that the Com- of Chãos in Warfare puter model is chaotic and thus reflects the Previous work examined historical data asso- chaotic nature of warfare. This may actually prove to be advantageous since the fractal ciated with the grand strategic, strategic, and op- nature of chaotic systems may allow rela- erational leveis of war. That work showed that tively small and simple war games to accu- war is chaotic on all of these leveis. If war is rately simulate warfare. Realistic war games chaotic, then it must have the characteristics of that could be mn on a desktop Computer a chaotic system. We will now describe some of would have significant educational and op- the characteristics of chaotic systems and define erational advantages. Finally, the rate of in- what they mean in the context of warfare. formation loss can be calculated for a chaotic system. This quantity is related to how far into the future predictions can rea- Computer Simulation Can Enhance Understanding sonably be made. The ways in which computers have been used Computer numerical modeling or simulation to understand chaotic behavior in physical sys- has greatly increased our understanding of tems also suggest ways to use the Computer to physical chaotic systems. The reason for this model warfare. For example, although chãos the- is that the equations that govem chaotic Sys- ory explains some aspect of the weather, the tems are nonlinear and therefore are generally reader has probably noted that weather forecast- not analytically soluble. Chãos theory, how- ing has not become perfect. This criticism, ever, cannot be used by itself to derive a the- however, misses one of the most important con- ory of warfare. As with any other theory that tributions that chãos theory has made to weather describes a phenomenon, a theory of warfare prediction— chãos has given weather forecasters must be based upon observation, hypothesis, a means to determine if their forecasts are likely and testing. Specifically, development of a to be accurate. Chaotic systems are highly de- model of warfare wrould require the develop- pendent upon initial conditions but they are not ment of the structure of the model, the deter- always equally so. If a chaotic system is in a por- mination of the number and type of variables, tion of its phase space where the initial condi- and the determination of the form of the tions are criticai, then uncertainty in equations. In addition, system parameters and determining the initial conditions makes a large control factors, as well as sources for noise, number of outcomes possible. If a chaotic sys- would have to be identified. This is a very dif- tem is in a region of its phase space where the ficult task for any particular situation that is initial conditions are not criticai, then only one complicated by the possibility that different outcome (prediction) is likely. In practice, models might apply for different antagonists. weather forecasters use this behavior by input- Chãos theory can help us by suggesting ways ting small changes in initial conditions into to develop our model and ways to use the their model. If the small changes produce small model once it is developed. For example, obser- variations in the prediction, they have shown vation of a chaotic system can be used to deter- that the system is in a portion of phase space mine the dimension of the system. The where the initial conditions are not criticai and number of variables needed to describe the sys- their prediction is likely to be true. If the minor tem must at least equal the dimension of the changes in initial conditions produce large de- system. Therefore, chãos theory can be used to viations in future behavior, forecasters know define the minimum number of variables re- that their prediction is likely to be in error. quired in our Computer model. Chãos theory The same approach could be taken to un- also suggests that Computer models of warfare derstand when predictions in warfare are 54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

Chaotic Systems never repeat exactly because their future behavior is extremely sensitive to initial conditions. Chãos theory has made important contributions to weather prediction, however, and has enabled forecasters to determine whether or not their weather predictions— clear, stormy, or bitter cold—will be correct. CHÃOS THEORY 55

likely to be accurate. This in itself would be paign is the feedback that attrition rates give a valuable contribution of Computer simula- to an air commander. High attrition rates tion to understanding warfare. There are, couid force a commander to change his tac- however, two additional reasons why this tics. For example, the loss rates of 16 per- approach may be even more applicable to cent experienced by the US in the daylight warfare than it is to weather. First, unlike bombing raids over Schweinfurt were wreather forecasters, we have some ability to enough to stop the bombing raids for four change the initial conditions. Specifically, if we months until a long-range fighter was devel- find ourselves in a region of great uncertainty, oped. Col John A. Warden used this and we couid determine which conditions would other historical examples to argue that the have to be changed to move the system to a po- maximum acceptable rate was about 10 per- sition where the outcome was predictable and cent.13 He continued, however, by pointing out desirable. The quantity and type of forces are that the effect of one mission with a 10 percent examples of initial conditions that we might be attrition rate and nine missions with negligible able to change. Second, we couid use our casualties was much greater than a steady 1 per- model to determine wiiich initial conditions cent attrition rate over 10 missions. In a linear and which variables had the most profound ef- system there would be no difference between fect on our predictions. This would aid in iden- the two—the additive effects would be the same. tifying centers of gravity (COG) and infor- The fact that there is a difference shows that the mation that we needed to know precisely. That feedback is nonlinear. When Warden suggested is, it would tell us where to concentrate our at- that massing for a few devastating blows is tack and what intelligence Information was more effective than many minor blows, he de- most criticai. scribed how to exploit the nonlinearity in the system. A second source for nonlinearity in warfare Chaotic Systems Are Nontínear is the psychology associated with interpreting All chaotic systems are nonlinear. Among enemy actions. This nonlinearity caused other things, nonlinearity means that a small Clausewitz to State, "Thus, then, in strategy effort can have a disproportionate effect. If everything is very simple, but not on that ac- warfare is chaotic, then chãos theory suggests count very easy."14 He later amplified by saying COGs may be found where there is a non- that while maneuvers such as a flanking move- linear process in the enem/s system. In fact, ment are simple in concept, they are difficult to nonlinearity is implicit in the concept of a actually accomplish because there is always the COG. Because you can't predict future behav- danger of what the enemy might be doing. In ior of a chaotic system based on initial condi- this environment, small actions on the part of tions, chãos theory suggests that the campaign the enemy often assume larger significance in a planner should concentrate on processes in an commanderis mind than they deserve. Accord- enemy system rather than data on its current ing to B. H. Liddell Hart, this nonlinear effect condition. It also suggests that identification occurred in World War I before the first Battle of nonlinear processes is an essential ingredi- of the Mame.15 The Germans, aware; of a possi- ent in understanding warfare and being able ble seam in their dispositions, had been or- to manipulate the outcome with the least ef- dered to retreat if the British Army advanced fort. The following paragraphs will discuss over the Mame. As it happened, a British divi- some of the many sources for nonlinearity in sion sent out a reconnaissance patrol. The Ger- warfare. mans, misinterpreting this as a general advance, Feedback loops are one process that can in- retreated when the way lay open for victory. troduce nonlinear effects in many systems. A A third source for nonlinearity in warfare is feedback loop that is important to the air cam- that there are a number of processes within 56 AJRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 warfare that appear to be inherently non- Second, behaviors at the tactical, opera- linear. The role of mass is an important ex- tional, and strategic leveis are linked. If a ample. Warden showed that for air power, technique is successful at one levei, we can losses vary disproportionately with the ratio expect it to be successful at all leveis. This of the forces involved.16 In 1944, for exam- suggests that we should, when possible, try ple, 287 American aircraft attacked a target de- out strategies on a small scale when the con- fended by 207 German fighters. The sequences of losing are inconsequential. It Americans lost 34 aircraft. A month later, also suggests that analysis techniques that when 1,641 American aircraft were opposed are useful on one levei may be useful on by 250 German fighters, America lost 21 air- others. An example of this is the observe- craft—a lower percentage and a lower absolute orient-decide-act (OODA) loop that was number. originallv proposed for tactical levei fighter A fourth source of nonlinearity in warfare is combat. The OODA loop, however, has since Clausewitzian friction.17 Basically, there will be been applied successfully to operational levei events in war, perhaps as a result of chance, that concepts such as information dominance. have an effect out of all proportion to their ap- Third, if the small scale is similar in behavior to parent importance. This is an exceedingly diffi- the large scale, then we can use observation of cult form of nonlinearity to anticipate, but it the small scale to predict the behavior of the can be taken advantage of once it happens. The large scale. For example, Adm Isoroku German doctrine of Auftragstaktik, which al- Yamamoto was fond of playing Shogi. In his bi- lowed initiative on the part of junior command- ography of Admirai Yamamoto, 0 Hiroyuki ers, was designed to do precisely this. Agawa noted that Yamamoto's style of playing Finally, the process of decision making it- this game was to risk everything on a bold, self can be a source for nonlinearity. Some- early stroke. If that failed, he would often lose times the decision is clear-cut. Often, how- the game. Agawa suggests that this philosophy ever, the decision can depend upon relatively was behind the way in which Admirai minor circumstances at the time. One source Yamamoto planned his large campaigns such as suggests that the steam engine lost out to the Pearl Harbor and Midway. gasoline internai combustion engine largely as The fractal nature of war may also have im- a result of an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth dis- plications for the way we should organize for ease.18 Because of this outbreak, many horse war. Sun Tzu implied a fractal nature of war troughs, which steam engines had used to top when he said, "Generally, management of many off their water supply, were removed. Once is the same as management of few."21 This indi- the decision is made, it is often irreversible be- cates that he thought that the principies of or- cause of the drive for standardization. Any ganizing to fight were essentially the same major decision, including those made in war- regardless of the scale of the fight. Some princi- time, can be nonlinearly based on such rela- pies such as span of control appear to be similar tively minor factors. regardless of organizational levei. Although research on the implications of chãos for organizational stmctures has started, conclusions are Fractal Geometries Apply far from certain. If warfare is chaotic, then aspects of it must be fractal. This has implications for the analysis of Multiple Attractors Are Possible an enemy system. First, the attractor for a chaotic system is fractal and so is infínitely com- Multiple attractors are possible in a chaotic sys- plex. Therefore, efforts to analyze every aspect tem. This statement means that chaotic systems of an enem/s system are bound to be in vain as can have multiple quasi-stable States. The there will aíways be some finer levei to analyze. earth's climate is a good example of this sort of CHÃOS THEORY 57

behavior. Our current climate appears to be own system's State to counter the enemy relatively stable. There is some variation in strategy. Chãos theory also wams us that the the climate, but it falis within a general transition from one State to another can be range for a number of years. On the other very fast. hand, vve know that the earth's climate was significantly different during the ice ages, when it fell within a very different range for Conclusions a long period. Our current climate and the • Computer simulation can be used to bet- ice age climate are both quasi-stable States ter understand warfare. While chãos theory for the earth's climate. The causes of chang- tells us that warfare will never be completely ing climates for an ice age are still not unpredictable, it also tells us that simulations derstood and might be quite insignificant, could be used to identify COGs. which further highlights the nonlinearity of • Warfare is nonlinear. This implies an ex- chaotic systems. treme sensitivity to initial conditions, which Ln an analogous fashion, armed forces can means that the campaign planner should con- drastically change their organization and means centrate on processes in an enem/s system. At- of fighting a war. The People's War of Mao Tse- tacking nonlinear processes offers the best tung is an example of this. Mao divided the promise of the most effect for the least effort. phases of war into different stages. In some There are several sources for nonlinearity in stages, his army fought a guerrilla war as small warfare. units. Only later, when conditions were right • Fractal geometries apply. This suggests (i.e., the opposing armies had been sufficiently that analytical techniques and participant be- weakened), did he combine his units into a conventional force. If warfare is chaotic, then haviors should be translated to the various leveis of war. chãos theory wams us that enemy systems can exist in different States. The implications are • Multiple attractors are possible, which that we must be aware of these possible States suggests a way of viewing transitions from con- and, if necessary, be capable of changing our ventional war to guerrilla war and vice versa.

Notes

1. James Gleick, Chãos: Making a New Science (New York: 11. Ibid., 102. Penguin Books, 1987), 241. 12. Ibid., 144. 2. Troy Shinbrot et al., "Using Small Perturbations to 13. Col John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Control Chãos," Nature, 3 June 1993, 411-15. Combat (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), 59-62. 3. Jim Jubak, “Can Chãos Beat the Market," Worth, March 14. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (New 1993, 66-70; and Gary Weiss, "Chãos Hits Wall Street-The York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1982), 243. Theory That Is," Business Week, 2 November 1992, 138-40. 15. B. H. Liddell Hart, The Real War, Nineteen Fourteen to 4. Diana Richards, "Is Strategic Decision Making Chaotic?" Nineteen Eigliteen (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), Behavioral Science, 3July 1990, 219-32. 61-63. 5. Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the 16. Warden, 61-63. Unpredictability of War," International Security, Wlnter 17. Beyerchen, 59-90. 1992/1993, 59-90. 18. M. Mitchel Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science 6. J. A. Dewar, J. J. Gillogly, and M. L. Juncosa, Non- at the Edge of Order and Chãos (New York: Simon and Schuster, Monotonicity; Chãos, and Combat Models, Rand Report R-3995-RC 1992), 40-41. (Santa Momca, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1991), 6. 19. John R. Boyd, A Discourse on Winning and Losing 7. Siegfried Grossmann and Gottfried Mayer-Kress, "Chãos (Unpublished paper, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell in the International Arms Race," Nature, February 1989, 701 -4. AFB, Ala., August 1987). 8- T. Tagarev and D. Nicholls, Identification o f Chaotic Behavior 20. Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admirai: Yamamoto and in War, to be published in the 1994 Annual Con/erence of the the Imperial Navy (New York: Kodansha International, 1979), Society for Chãos Theory in Psychology and the Ufe Sciences. 85-86. 9. Gleick. 20. 21. Sun Tzu, TheArt ofWar, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New 10. Ibid., 143. York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 90. THE AIRBORNE LASER PIE IN THE SKY OR VISION OF FUTURE THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE?

Lt Col Stephen A. Coulombe, USAF

The time will come, when thou shaJt lift thine eyes The development of Air Power in its broadest To watch a long-drawn battle iti the skies, sense, and ittcluding the development ofall While aged peasants, too amazed for words, means o f combating missiles tliat travei tlirough Stare at the flying fleets o f wondrous birds. the air, whether fired or dropped, is the first essential to our survival in war. —Thomas Gray, 1737 —Viscount Hugh M. Trenchard, 1946

EW IDEAS OFTEN meet with skepti- Defense, insofar as the airbome laser (ABL) cism and sometimes ridicule. How- may just be an idea whose time has come. ever, they also challenge us to In the days before powered flight, when bal- reconsider preconceived notions loons and dirigibles occupied the imagination Nand to question conventional wisdom. Al- and seemed to be the only way to sail aloft, peo- though the airbome high energy laser (HEL) is ple laughed at attempts to build heavier-than-air not a new idea within the laser development flying machines. In 1807 Robert Fulton's steam- community, it now demands renewed atten- boat was considered a folly but later became tion from the Air Force and the Department of one of the most successful modes of commer- dal transportation. Gen William ("Billy") kinds. Aerial vehicles are generally highly Mitchell's early attempts to sink naval vessels by stressed and vulnerable due to their con- aerial bombing also were ridiculed. But he struction from lightweight materiais and the proved the critics wrong in July 1921 when he high performance continually demanded of led the lst Provisional Air Brigade in an air them. The potential of a silent, very long bombing exerdse off the Atlantic coast and range, speed-of-light weapon in the aerial sank the battleship Ostfriesland. Finally, the first warfare environment is staggering. ABL battle tanks were not very successful until tech- promises to make that potential a reality by nology matured and—perhaps even more im- providing defense against theater missiles portantly—until doctrine and tadics caught up suffidently to make the tank truly effective. such as Scuds, which caused a large share of In the early days of military aviation, casualties in the Gulf War and occupied a bombs and aircraft were combined in the con- significant number of coalition air sorties. cept of long-range strategic bombing, and bit- Theater missile defense (TMD) is now at a ter debate broke out over its merits.1 stage similar to that of early aerial bombing. Interpretations of World War II events favor However, disagreements within and among the both sides of that debate, while questions lin- Services over roles and missions in the theater I ger over the effectiveness of the bombing. The battle arena are impeding TMD progress. ] true promise of aerial bombing in a conven- What is the best way to kill theater ballistic tíonal war seems to have been realized only missiles (TBM), and who should have that mis- recently—in the Gulf War. Never in the history sion? This article will not settle that question of aerial warfare had the world witnessed in but hopefully will stimulate discussion on the such graphic detail the effects of aerial bom- impact that HEL technology could have on fu- bardment, communicated by the almost in- ture aerial warfare and the ways such a stantaneous replay of these scenes on weapon might be employed, particularly as a television. It was stunning testimony to ad- solution to a daunting TMD challenge. I vances in modem weapons technology. Further, technology and doctrine have not The precise delivery of weapons, an im- yet come together to make ABL a viable TMD Iportant element of effective aerial bombing, weapon system. Technology alone cannot was missing during Giulio Douhet's and make ABLs work. Complex ABL technologies MitchelTs day, although they foresaw its po- (e.g., uncooled optics, deformable mirrors, tential. The successes of the F-15E, F-117A, atmospheric compensation, and lightweight and A-10 in the Gulf War were due to the marriage of capable aerial platforms—featur- ling sensors and accurate navigation—with < • . \‘ / Iprecision guided bombs and missiles. Early '• ? « t-: , W ó ' - ,f-: , % jskepticism of long-range aerial bombardment has finally been laid to rest. Too bad it Itook so long. This seems to be a case of tech- - ^ ... jnology finally catching up with doctrine. The combination of aerial platform, sensors, the ultraprecision inherent in HEL weapons >romises to extend the success of predsion air- -ground weapon delivery enjoyed in the Gulf /ar to future air-to-air engagements of all

m 60 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

Chemical laser devices) may be sufficiently come, then what impact will HEL have on mature today, but doctrine for aerial HEL future aerial warfare? warfare is virtually nonexistent. There is no base of experience for these weapons. If ABL Research, Development, and Testing is to become a successful weapon, the development of doctrine must progress apace The main parts of an airbome HEL system are with the evolution of technology. the platform (airplane), the sensor system ("eyes"), the HEL device ("photon faucet"), and a pointing and tracking system ("beam control"). Of course, other ground and airbome as- Is Technology the Answer? sets are required to support such a system, but ABL technology is reaching maturity. Air- they are not the pacing technical challenge. craft platforms now exist that can carry the Many of these elements, in earlier forms, have necessary crews, fuels, and equipment consti- already been demonstrated on an airbome plat- tuting a laser weapon system with potentially form. The first airbome HEL system was the Air high operational effectiveness. This means Force's Airbome Laser Laboratory (ALL), which ABLs could be used in a variety of missions, flew its last laser test mission in 1983 (and now including TBM kills at ranges of 400+ kilome- resides at the Air Force Museum, Wright-Patter- ters (km), counterair and anti-cruise-missile son AFB, Ohio). However, ALL was a laboratory— kills at 100+ km range, and defense of airbome not a weapon system.2 Scientists used it to leam high-value assets against air-to-air and surface- about propagating lasers through an aircraffs to-air missiles (SAM). They could also perform turbulent boundary layer and through the inter- surveillance, command and control (C2), and vening atmosphere to a target. With 1970s tech- battle management tasks yet maintain an ef- nology, ALL demonstrated half-megawatt-class fective self-defense capability. These missions laser power; tens-of-microradians jitter leveis could cover wide areas by capitalizing on the (unwanted motion due to aircraft vibration flexibility and responsiveness inherent to air sources and atmospheric turbulence) of the in- power, while leveraging ABL's precision into a tense laser beam; and accurate, safe beam con- potent force multiplier for boost-phase missile trol. In demonstrations of potential future intercepts. This Vision of future ABL effective- applications, ALL successfully conducted laser ness is possible because of our investment in beam tests using towed diagnostic targets, en- many years of HEL system development, in- gaged and defeated AIM-9B air-to-air missiles, cluding a significant amount of airbome HEL and shot down sea-skimming target drones work in the late 1970s and early 1980s. simulating maritime cruise missiles.3 Certainly, questions remain. How effec- In spite of those dramatic successes, ALL tive-and expensive—would such a weapon was not suitable for fielding as a weapon sys- system be? Can it be built with the opera- tem in 1983, nor is it a candidate for today's tional availability, reliability, and robustness TBM mission. After all, it was a test bed—not a needed in wartime? Would this specialized fully developed weapon system. Its long, 10.6- technology—new to the Air Force opera- micron-wavelength gas dynamic laser, com- tional world—be maintainable and sustain- bined with limited optical component di- able in the field? Would it take more decades mensions, led to poor laser beam propagation of development, missteps, and refinement to over distances greater than 10 km. Just as im- realize the full potential of such weapons? Is portantly, the system was not designed to be it worth the added investment? We must operated or maintained by a war fighter. How- find out, since the potential payoff is so ever, it did give us a glimpse of the kind of high. If the technological and programmatic devastating damage HELs could produce when (i.e., cost and schedule) hurdles can be over- operated from an airplane and coupled with THE A1RB0RNE LASER 61

the inherent flexibility and mobility of air power. The ALL system tracked and burned holes in high-speed aerial targets withln sec- onds, causing them to lose control and crash. In short, this firepower was awesome! The experience gained from ALL now moti- vates many ABL proponents to press the case for these weapons for TMD. In the time since the ALL flights, the elements of a conceptual airborne HEL weapon system have continued to evolve. Aircraft technology has steadily advanced to the point that wide-body aircraft such as the 747 series—incorporating sophisticated wing designs and newer, more powerful engines— can now lift heavy payloads to high altitudes for extended periods of time. Sensors developed for the satellite community and for tactical applications are smaller, more sensitive, of higher resolution, and cheaper than ever before. It is possible to electro- optically detect and track missile plumes out to many hundreds of kilometers from a high- altitude airbome platform. Active and passive At a time when balloons seemed the only way to fly (above), people laughed at the idea of heavier-than- radar techniques can detect many kinds of mov- air flying machines, even though Leonardo da Vinci had ing airbome objects, including ballistic missiles, sketched several designs for such craft centuries earlier SAMs, aircraft, and cruise missiles. (below). 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

Lasers have attained megawatt power leveis ments has rekindled intense interest in the in ground-based systems and hundreds of kilo- ABL weapon. What was lacking in 1983 be- watts in airborne experiments. Chemical oxy- sides the right technology for the ALL dem- gen-iodine lasers offer much improved beam onstrations was a mission and the support of shape, are scalable to very high powers, oper- a user. The mission was thrust into the spot- ate at benign temperatures and pressures, and light by the Gulf War and the terror pro- are much safer than many other types of la- duced by Scud attacks, while Air Combat Command (ACC) later provided the all-im- sers. As with all lasers, though, one must exer- portant user support. This series of events cise extreme care with the lethal photon beam led to the start of the ABL project in 1992. output. Moreover, operating wavelengths for Defense against Scuds and other types of airborne applications have decreased—with an TBMs is now a high priority.5 For example, attendant reduction in required optical system ACC is developing ABL requirement thresholds size and weight—while still maintaining high and objectives, and Phillips Laboratory^ ABL overall system performance leveis. System Program Office at Kirtland AFB has pre- The beam control subsystem is one of the pared initial technical requirements for ABL.6 most challenging elements of the HEL system. Developments over the years have focused on The ABL Concept reducing beam jitter, maintaining beam shape, precisely pointing the beam within incredibly What is ABL? Notionally, it will be a large, small angular tolerances, and keeping a stable wide-body aircraft modified to carry a laser target track long enough for HEL to burn a weapon system payload to high altitudes hole in a criticai spot on the target. Today, Sys- (above 40,000 feet) and will be able to spend tems often achieve submicroradian jitter lev- a significant time on station, battle ready. eis, which is like saying at a distance of 200 With data from onboard and off-board sen- miles, the beam will jump around no more sors, it will detect, track, and engage boost- than the width of a basketball! Uncooled mir- ing TBMs at long ranges (i.e., hundreds of rors have played an important role in reducing kilometers). HEL beam jitter. Many formerly liquid-cooled ABL will be capable of autonomous opera- mirrors can now be left uncooled, due to the tion, particularly in the early stages of a excellent and durable coatings routinely ap- theater conflict when C2 may well be handed plied to them. This improvement translates down to lower execution leveis. Cockpit and into lower weight, along with much less vibra- mission crew members will work together to tion induced into mirror surfaces by the flow position ABL in a flight pattern that provides of water or other coolants. The other ex- the best protection for troops and equip- tremely significant development in recent ment entering the theater or for civilian years is our ability to compensate for the ef- population centers. Onboard surveillance fects of turbulence in the atmosphere, which sensors, operating in a 360-degree sweep degrade the beam as it traveis to the target. about the aircraft, will be capable of detect- This "adaptive optics" technology, recently ing a variety of air vehicles. Coordination declassified for the astronomer community, with ground-, ship-, and aircraft-based radars has been demonstrated at Starfire Optical will complete the air picture. Previously es- Range at Kirtland AFB, New México, and at the tablished rules of engagement will allow the M1T Lincoln Laboratory Firepond facility in ABL mission commander to react to and en- Massachusetts. It is an enabling technology gage threats. that will sustain the very long range perform- Laser fuels carried by ABL will sustain en- ance of laser weapons.4 gagements of more than 20 targets, depend- A confluence of recent events and developing on target type/hardness, range to target, THE AIRBORNE LASER 63

LASER

The first airborne high-energy laser system was the Air Force's Airborne Laser Laboratory, tested in the 1980s and now housed in the Air Force Museum at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. atmospheric conditions, aircraft altitude, and development efforts indicate that Solu- and other factors. These fuels will be ther- tions are close at hand. mally and chemically managed to maintain Mirrors are key to beam control. First, jit- their potency and to minimize weight. ter is suppressed by using precision, iner- When combined in the laser device, they tially stabilized references for the laser will produce multimegawatt power looking beam, similar to aligning the whole system for a place to go. The beam control system to something immobile-such as a star. Fast- must take all that energy and direct it to the steering mirrors, which move even faster right place—namely, a target. than most vibration sources, are then used If the laser beam were simply pointed to- to correct for vibration-induced motion of ward the target, just as one points a flash- the beam. Another class of mirror is used to light, the beam would easily wander off its correct the phase (path length) distortions of intended target because of aircraft vibration the beam, whether caused by the laser device and atmospheric-induced jitter. The beam itself or by the turbulence in the atmos- would spread out and become diffuse due to phere. This so-called deformable mirror atmospheric turbulence and likely would not changes its shape in response to Computer inflict sufficient damage on the target mis- commands. Wave-front sensors and Com- sile. These technical challenges must be puter phase-reconstruction algorithms, cou- overcome for ABL to work. Current research pled to deformable mirrors, now routinely 64 A1RP0WER JOURNAL FALL 1994 take the twinkle out of stars for astrono- as very fast, long-range missiles). Indeed, mers.7 We know they work from the ground some current Air Force modeling and simu- to space; we must now be sure they work lation efforts simplify an ABL weapon by using from airplanes to missiles. existing missile models and making them fly ex- Tying all this together is a fire control system tremely fast. But thinking of a photon as a fast with human beings in control. Crew coordina- missile can lead to constricted thinking about tion will still be as important as ever when the ABL doctrine. Some initial thoughts to encour- battle starts and hostile missiles and aircraft fill age ABL doctrine development by more astute the air. The mission crew will use decision sup- "doctrinaires" should be considered. port systems to cope with a complex air picture The key to air power is flexibility, which can and select which targets to engage, all the while be defined as the ability to rapidly reconfigure trying to stay alive themselves. forces for the tasks at hand, deploy those forces The technology is indeed sophisticated and quickly, position them to greatest advantage, fascinating. But we stand the risk of becoming concentrate individually weak elements into su- too fascinated with the technology and not im- perior masses (even if only for short periods of mersed enough in the war-fighting doctrine time), and redirect their goals in real time. ABLs, required to support the use of that technology. by virtue of being airbome, are potentially very flexible forces. Yet, this attribute could be lost if they are not specifically designed to exploit Need for ABL Doctrine flexibility (i.e., to deploy very quickly, stand alert, be efficiently maintained and supported, As is often the case, technology has outpaced be serviced [tumed] quickly in the theater of the development of doctrine for ABL. Frequently, battle, and be tightly woven into the theater C2 it takes time and battlefield experience to fully architecture). ABL aircraft must retain an effec- appreciate the capabilities of a new system and tive maneuvering capability in spite of high op- to appreciate additional ways of exploiting those erating weights and altitudes. The platforms capabilities. Wartime effectiveness is reduced must operate over great distances and for long when doctrine outpaces technology, as was the periods of time, which means they must be air case with aerial bombing for many years. Unfor- refuelable and should accommodate augmented tunately, a weapon system developed in a doc- aircrews and provide rest facilities on board. trinal void also may fali far short of the ABLs must be ready to take up battle stations im- effectiveness it might otherwise enjoy early in mediately upon arrival in a theater and must be its application. It is time to think about warfare able to fight their way into a theater, if necessary. doctrine for ABL. Given the fact that ABL systems must main- This article makes no attempt to rewrite Air tain flexibility, what else can be said? Con- Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doc- cerning doctrine and technology, Air Force trine o f thè United States Air Force, or to define historian Dr Richard P. Hallion writes that tenets of basic, operational, or tactical doctrine.8 Nor does it enter the debate over whether doctrine must function in the present, be doctrine should be defined as fundamental, en- appropriate for the near-fntnre, possess flexibility and adaptability to meet changing vironmental, or organizational.9 Some readers conditions, and be rooted in the past, in will see parallels with the development of space military history and experience. It must reflect doctrine and all its attendant controversy.10 the complete climate in which it is framed, a Some will look at the ABL weapon as merely an climate including existing political and extension of other conventional weapons (i.e., economic realities. (Emphasis in original)11 THE AJRBORNE LASER 65

In the airbome laser, the Air Force stands Io gain a silent, very long range, speed-of-light weapon. These contractor versions of ABL weapon system platforms are pari of an Air Force Advanced Technology Transition Demonstrator program to develop and demonstrate technologies for tracking and killing theater ballistic missiles during boost phase. 66 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

Since there are no bases of operational experi- tablished to assure proper target identifica- ence, lessons leamed, or "rooting in the past" tion and to avoid fratricide. for HEL weapons, one must build upon other proven lessons of air power application, just as Centralize Control space doctrine now builds on proven principies and Decentralize Execution of employment.12 One might argue that the ABL would be designed to operate somewhat classical principies of air power are more appro- autonomously in early stages of the theater priate for offensive than for defensive opera- conflict, when ground-based C2 assets may not tions. However, ACCs current emphasis on "ac- yet be in place. Yet, ABL may be the best plat- tive defense" (i.e., pushing the defensive theater form from which to direct the active TMD bat- missile fight back over to the enem/s territory) tle during the early stages and could play an mandates consideration of a more active/offen- important role in centralizing control for air- sive role for "defensive" elements like ABL. Thus, borne kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) missile inter- the same principies may apply equally well to ac- ceptors, if they are part of TMD architecture.13 tive defense in the TMD arena and could be used as a surrogate experience base for ABL. Seize the Initiative

Consider Offensive Action versus This principie can be interpreted in tempo- Defensive Action ral terms: getting inside the enem/s short- Although the notion seems contradictory, a de- launch and missile-flight time lines and fensive system such as ABL could play a vital keeping control of the tempo of battle. role in the offensive against the enemy's theater Speed-of-light transit of lethal laser energy missile forces. ABL's wide-area coverage could means that ABL could meet many of the be used to force enemy launch points into TBM-reaction time lines, perhaps uniquely. smaller and smaller zones to make missiles more vulnerable to attack. Precision tracking Execute Constant and Persistent Attacks and target identification by ABL could backtrack ABLs would be capable of maintaining con- missile launch points for immediate counter- stant, round-the-clock surveillance; launch de- force attacks. The laser weapon in a counterair tection; and engagements of single and multiple and counter-SAM mode of operation could po- missile boosters and could rapidly retarget from tentially support offensive strike packages. In- one missile to the next. Precision, even beyond deed, the psychological impact of an effective that achieved by smart bombs or missiles, long-range laser weapon, "silent but deadly," would allow application of lethal force at the could itself be wielded as a weapon. desired point of vulnerability. Careful application of laser fluency and real-time kill assess- Gain and Maintain Control ofAirspace ment would allow termination of track/kill after ABL would be capable of exchanging air picture only the necessary amount of energy has been information with the Air Force's airbome wam- delivered to the target, thereby conserving re- ing and control system (AWACS), the Navy's air- sources and extending the number of targets bome early waming/ground environment engaged. Based on threat assessments, ABLs integration segment (AEGIS), and the Arm/s would be deployed to effective orbit locations, area and point defense systems. It would also be with deep laser-fuel magazines and with high able to operate in a cooperative mode with operational availability. Resupply, replenish- other ABLs, assigning target priorities and fields ment of fuels and crew, maintenance, and air- of fire where their coverages overlap. Positive craft tum procedures must be incorporated human-in-the-loop control, laser engagement into the conceptual design of the system in floors, and safe corridors would have to be es- order to maintain that high availability. THE A1RBORNE LASER 6 7

Maintain Sufficient Reserves control over military operations. . . . Given the high stakes involved with world opinion and The ABL fleet would have to be sized to pro- the sensitivity of political relations, the vide sufficient coverage in the expected thea- perceived need for such tight civilian control ters of battle and to sustain sufficient mainte- will not diminish.14 nance and attrition reserves. Required num- Some implications of these constraints for ABL bers of aircraft must be determined through are as follows: careful analysis since total program cost is a 1. The value of ABL's ultraprecision will in- direct function of the ABL fleet size. crease in the future. In keeping with Dr Hallion's comment that 2. Retuming the responsibility for coilateral doctrine "must reflect. .. existing political and damage to the aggressor will be possible with economic realities," the changing political and economic environments in which we live must boost-phase intercepts by lasers, which do not launch residual (friendly) hardware over—or be accommodated in the transition of ABL tech- leave it on—enemy territory. nology to an operational weapon system. The budgetary environment at present is not good 3. ABL can remain outside the political boundaries of a hostile nation, not overtly for boost-phase intercept, and ABL must survive provoking but posing an instant response to the current decrease in available funding for an outbreak of hostilities (or a TBM launch). new systems. If it does survive in the near Lack of—or delay in receiving—border Crossing term, ABL may have the chance to demonstrate authority is not a factor in the face of a its payback in economy. ABL has significant po- launch. Required leveis of civilian control can tential for lower cost per kill, insofar as each be maintained. shot expends only laser fuel and the hardware itself stays put. ABL also has the potential to Finally, considering the international political environment, a difficult problem is save money in the design and employment of what to do about TBMs carrying Chemical, other TMD tiers, since it would reduce the mis- biological, or nuclear warheads. Certainly, it sile-load threat presented to post-boost-phase, is desirable to keep them from being defensive systems. Ongoing studies of concept launched in the first place. What will it take design and analyses of cost- and operational ef- to do that? Are we willing to threaten to use fectiveness are addressing these issues. and then actually use the same kinds of Politics are more difficult to fathom. Sum- nasty weapons that a Saddam Hussein might marizing the limits likely to be imposed by launch? Would our threat to employ such Congress and the public on military action, weapons be credible in tomorrow's world? Phillip Meilinger writes,1 2345 These questions delve into the possible role 1. We will seldom [use] conventional . . . of ABLs in providing deterrence to the use of ground troops. Instead, we will use special TBMs, a subject clearly beyond the scope of operations forces.... this article yet an interesting topic for future 2. The draft will not be reintroduced.. . . discussion. 3. There will be great pressure to extract [troops] quickly. The American public is monumentally impatient with long wars and has a low threshold of pain regarding casualty figures___ Conclusion 4. If we apply air power in lieu of ground ABL boost-phase intercept meets the re- forces, we must do it with precision and quirements for effective TBM defense and minimal coilateral damage.. . . offers the potential for high operational ef- 5. Civilian leaders will maintain extremely close fectiveness. ABL is perhaps the only viable 68 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

candidate for the boost-phase job. Further These and other doctrinal inputs must be concept definition, system design analysis, factored into ABL operational requirements and continuing research should answer many of and, ultimately, into system technical re- the questions about technology and cost by quirements. A timely discussion of ABL doc- 1997. A working operational prototype could be trine will complement the evolution of this built by the year 2000. impressive technology. □

Notes 1. See Edward Meade Earle, ed., MHitary Strategy (Wash- 7. C. A. Primmerman et al., "Compensation of Atmospheric ington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1983), 47-61. Optical Distortions Using a Synthetic Beacon," Nature 353 (12 2. For a description of the early ALL program, see Maj September 1991): 141; and R. Q. Fugate et al., "Measurement of Thomas J. Dyble, "Peace through Light: The Airborne Laser Atmospheric Wavefront Using Scattered Light from a Laser Laboratory," Student Report 83-0615 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Guide Star," Nature 353 (12 September 1991): 144. Command and Staff College, February 1983). 8. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine o f the United States Air 3. The author was a beam-control-system crew member on Force, 16 March 1984, v-vi. the ALL from 1982 to 1983 and a test director for turret 9. Lt Col Dennis M. Drew, "Of Trees and Leaves: A New aero-optics experiments in 1984. A complete history of the ALL View of Doctrine," Air University Review 33, no. 2 program is being assembled by the Phillips Laboratory historian (January-February 1982): 43. at Kirtland AFB, New México. 10. Col Kenneth A. Myers and Lt Col John G. Tockston, 4. For an excellent introduction to the principies of adaptive "Real Tenets of Military Space Doctrine," Airpower lournal 2, no. optics, see MIT Lincoln Laboratory lournal 5, no. 1 (Spring 1992). 4 (Winter 1988): 54-68. 5. “The FY 92-97 Defense Planning Guidance, 24 Jan 90, 11. Dr Richard P. Hallion, "Doctrine, Technology, and Air and the FY 91 Appropriations Conference Committee Report, H. Warfare: A Late Twentieth-Century Perspective," Airpower lournal Rep. 101-938, Title IV, 24 Oct 90, directed the Strategic Defense 1, no. 2 (Fali 1987): 26. Initiative Organization (SDIO) and Department of Defense 12. Capt James R. Wolf discusses AFM 2-25, Space (DoD) to commit resources to TMD programs and accelerate Operations, in "Toward Operational-Level Doctrine for Space: A research and development for systems to be fielded as soon as Progress Report," Airpower lournal 5, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 39. technologically and fiscaliy feasible. To expedite TMD efforts, 13. KKVs are also proposed as weapons to combat TBMs, the Warner-Nunn amendment, FY 92 Defense Appropriation although the current technology only supports intercepts high in Bill, required an improved capability by the mid-1990s. The the atmosphere, after the threat booster bums out and the warhead National Defense Act for FY 93 Consolidated all theater defense is on a ballistic path toward its target. Extremely stressing time projects under a DoD-wide Theater Missile Defense Initiative lines for the KKVs' flyout and intercept may ultimately limit their (TMDI), assigned by the Secretary of Defense, and transferred application to the postboost, ascent phase of TBMs. Even so, they the management of several technology programs from SDIO to may prove complementary to the ABL in the TMD arena. Studies the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).” Program are in progress (e.g., by Phillips Laboratory/XP) that examine the Management Plan for the Theater Missile Defense Program within potential for synergy between the ABL and KKV concepts. Theater Air Defense (Los Angeles AFB, Calif.: Space and Missile 14. Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger, "The Air Force in the Systems Center, 5 December 1993), 1. Twenty-first Century: Challenge and Response," Airpower lournal 6. "Airborne Laser Technical Requirements Document” (U) 4, no. 4 (Winter 1990): 40. (Kirtland AFB, N.Mex.: Phillips Laboratory, June 1993). (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

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IRA C. EAKER AWARD W INNER

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British Air Control: A M odel for the Application of Air Power in Low-lntensity Conflict?

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70 RICOCHETS 71

Ricochets 84G, while the bottom picture shows an F-86D, continued from page 3 the air defense variant of the F-86. Note the rockets being fired from the lowerable package that Second, in my opinion the general tone of the holds the 2.75-inch rockets. As soon as the rock- article suffered from an inability to fully appreci- ets were fired, the empty rocket package was re- ate changing national priorities. Statements such tracted back up into the bottom of the fuselage. as "We need an improved fighter such as the F-22 Further, the caption States that the F-86 and to ensure that we maintain air superiority" may the F-84 could not operate in Korea but that both actually backfire and work against the USAR It is played roles in the defense of Japan after the Ko- not clear how much of an improvement is "good rean War. I must differ with the article on this enough" in this new world order, and simply re- point. I was stationed at K-55 at Osan, Korea, lying on projected technological threats and past during the war, and we flew F-86Es and F-86Fs rates of foreign advancements can no longer jus- against the North Koreans. In addition, many of tify the enormous expenditures demanded for my fellow fighter pilots flew F-84Gs out of K-8 new weapon systems. and K-2 during the same time period. The USAF lias never existed during peacetime; On page 26, the article shows two C-47s from we must leam how to do so. The attitude and the Korean War era. I have spent hours hitching mind-set that successfully won the cold war must C-47 rides, riding on top of the cargo, freezing change to accommodate the nation's new priori- while trying to get to or from Japan or Korea. ties, for if the USAF does not do so voluntarily, However, there were no fixed-wing gunships at all then Congress and the public will dictate the in the Korean War. Had we had them, the war change. Outdated rationale will be the first casu- might have gone easier for many of our ground alty in the budget battle. troops. No, Sir. The first fixed-wing gunships I personally believe the expenditures are justi- were developed in December 1964 when side-fac- fied, but not for the reasons given by the author. ing miniguns were mounted at the open Windows While I agree with the majority of the article and of some C-47s and some C-119s during the Viet- hope that most of its recommendations will be nam War. They were first referred to as "Puff the adopted, only a deeper analysis will result in Magic Dragon" and then by other more up-to- more thorough arguments and stronger rationale that are less likely to fail in the next round of date names. budget hearings. Those debates will occur, and Someone goofed to let these errors slip by. My the USAF will fail in those hearings unless it is cadets have always held your journal up as the willing to push ahead with insightful justifica- authority, or as source material. I hope the good tion. And if so, then the nation may once again captain who wrote the article doesn't get too dis- leam the hard lesson of being ill prepared for couraged because he is dead-on when he States war. that the Air Force regularly forgets to remember any of its combat history, and thereby loses some Lt Col J. Douglas Beason, USAF lives while it relearns how to do the job. Colorado Springs, Colorado Keep up the good work anyway. This is the first time I can ever remember you guys making any mistakes!

CAPTION CALAMITY Lt Col Thom as A. Varble, USAF, Retired Biloxi, Mississippi My more astute Junior ROTC cadets (frustrated fighter pilots), who are well informed on aircraft and the Air Force, pointed out to me that your journal made some statements in Capt Scott A. Fedorchak's article "Close Air Support: Repeating EDITOR'S NOTE: You caught us with our captions the Past . . . Again?" (Spring 1994) that were not down. The photos on page 25 were switched. It is in agreement with what I had said about the Ko- indeed the F-84 above and the F-86 below. On page rean War. 26 the caption should have read “The Air Force Captions for the pictures on page 25 are helped solve shortfalls in close air support in the Viet- switched around. The picture at the top is an F- nam War [not the Korean War] by converting the 72 AJRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

World War II-vintage C-47 into the heavily armed Today's modern air power can be likened very AC-47." The author says it correctly toward the bot- closely to the cavalry of yesteryear. Both are swift tom o f the left colurnn on page 27. We goofed, but and powerful elements on the battlefield; both we'll do better in the future. Please thank your ca- strike decisively, often from unexpected posi- dets for pointing out our error. tions, with devastating results; and, most impor- Concerning whether F-84s and F-86s operated tant, both are totally incapable of taking and from unimproved Korean airstrips, you should holding territory. This taking and holding of ter- know—you were there. However, we find ourselves in ritory has been universally accepted throughout good cornpany by holding this widely held belief. For the ages as the only means to ensure defeat of the exarnple, others o f no less stature than Dr Robert F. enemy. A military force must take the enemy's territory to defeat both his will and capability to Futrell, the esteemed air power historian, have un- fight. derstood that jets couldn't operate from Korea. In While Colonel Bingham makes several excel- The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, lent observations about the capabilities of air Futrell States, "Whatever glimmer ofhope there was power, it is entirely wrong to suggest that air that jet fighters could be based in Korea was extin- power can win a war by itself. Desert Storm pro- guished as heavily loaded transport planes tore up vided a very unusual set of circumstances: the the lightly surfaced runway at Pusan. Now it was terrain was flat, providing optimum conditions clear that all o f the jets would have to be based on for detecting enemy forces; the enemy was a third Kyushu, at Itazuke, and Ashiya" (page 67). world power, clearly no match for a superpower; and the levei of training on the part of the Iraqi military was such that neither their air forces nor their ground forces were effective against the US military. They lacked both the determination CAS KUDOS and the means to mount an effective fight. Using this short engagement to draw such extensive I salute author Capt Scott Fedorchak, USA, for his conclusions is very unwise. comprehensive article. Somebody has to keep re- I would like to see an analysis of our air power minding the Air Force that doing whifferdills is in all other theaters before such broad conclu- not the same as winning wars! sions are drawn. A case in point is the Vietnam Maj Gen John C. Toomay, USAF, Retired War. Extensive studies have shown that air power Carlsbad, Califórnia was decisive when the enemy could be pinned down, but inconclusive otherwise. That is much different than the observations drawn from De- sert Storm. How will JSTARS [joint surveillance TERRITORY AND TRIUMPH target attack radar system] do in a mountainous Lt Col Price Bingham's article "The United States European theater like Bosnia? Are F-15Es as effec- Needs to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage" (Fali tive under extensive hostile fire in threat environ- 1993) was to me both a stimulating and contro- ments where using radar for target acquisition versial article. As a student of military history and strategy, 1 am reminded time and time again makes them more of a target than the enemy? that the more things change, the more they re- And how will this use of air power stop a deter- main the same. In the nineteenth century, exten- mined and capable enemy from launching an of- sive research was performed that was exclusively fensive? geared toward designing the perfect cavalry force. It is my contention that the basis for our mili- Theorists believed that an optimum mix of cav- tary must be the basic grunt in the field and that alry, supplanted with line soldiers and artillery, we should build our force structure around mak- would provide the most powerful punch to defeat ing his job easier. In the spirit of TQM [total the enemy. No soldier could face down the threat quality management], we must identify who our of hundreds of pounding hooves charging di- customer is and how we can provide the best rectly in their face, nor could any soldier match Service possible to that customer. Using this ap- the mobility of the cavalry. It was obviously the proach, the Army becomes the focus of our mili- most modem and powerful force available. tary structure. Why? Because neither the Navy R1C0CHETS 73 or the Air Force can occupy territory, which is the by itself. Meilinger's review of Alan J. Levine's fundamental tenet to winning a war! Both the The Strategic Bombing o f Germany, 1940-1945 is an Navy and the Air Force perform important func- excellent example of his faith. The next to last tions in fighting the war, but these functions are paragraph of the colonel's review is, if you'll par- subordinate to getting the grunt to the right place don a pun, "on target" whether you judge him as at the right time with the right fire support. This a historian or as an airman. That paragraph, in should become the foundation for analyzing our my view, is one of the wisest I have ever read. successes and should provide the guidance we Meilinger's ideas should be heard in the very need to get us into and through the twenty-first highest defense councils. century. Lt Col Timothy G. Murphy's critique of Col John A. Warden's The Air Campaign is worth wait- Capt James P. Pfarr, USAF ing for. Colonel Warden might well have been Peterson AFB, Colorado embarrassed by the praise given the work when it carne out. While the work is a "holistic theory of air war," Warden's theoretical contributions to ISSUE FNSPIRATION Desert Storm, rooted in that book, are not to be dismissed. Warden's work is a useful addition to Occasionally, one of the journals to which 1 subscribe sends me an especially stimulating and the theories of warfare. Alfred Thayer Mahan is my personal touchstone on the theories of war- seminal issue that contains a number of essays and observations of profound interest to me. The fare. He wrote when they had only the sea and Spring 1994 edition is such an issue. land dimensions. He is to be read with caution. The editorial essay on honor addresses a topic We need, it seems to me, an author with the Vi- that has been of great philosophical importance sion to integrate the six dimensions of military over the millennia. My good friend, the late Dr theory into a whole: land, sea, subsurface, air, John D. Kelly, and I spent a great deal of time dis- space, and electronic. cussing honor as Jack wrestled with the concept Too, Capt Judy M. Graffis's review of Maj Gen in an attempt to write a discussion of it worthy of Jeanne Holm's Wornen in the Military: An Unfin- its meaning. Unfortunately, Jack passed away at ished Revolution is fair. It is still the best we have. the height of his powers and never completed his Coincidentally, yesterday I sent off a review of treatise. Jean Ebbert and Marie-Beth Hall's Crossed Cur- The only motto that hangs on my walls con- rents: Women in the Navy frorn WWI to Tailhook. It is a model of scholarship and an even-handed cems the Peloponnesian War and quotes the treatment of the developments. There is a high Alhenians saying to the Spartans, "We do these degree of probability that I will teach military things out of the three highest motives: Fear, history next academic year. I will use Ebbert and Honor and Interest." Hall's book as one of the required texts. Capt Scott A. Fedorchak's discussion of close As you might guess, my evening has been air support is cogent, perhaps seminal and very spent reading and thoroughly enjoying the important. Despite Col Phil Meilinger's unshak- Spring 1994 edition of Airpower Journal and writ- able faith in air power's ability to single-hand- ing this letter. Thanks for your consistently fine edly win wars by itself, the ground-pounders efforts and for making this issue so stimulating need CAS. for me. One of my great pleasures in life is poking fun at Colonel Meilinger's unabashed faith in strate- Dr Lawrence Carroll Allin gic bombing and air power's ability to win wars Norman, Oklahorna 0 0 N E T A S S\E/S S M E N T

AUTOBIOGRAPHY, BIOGRAPUY, of an entire 36-page chapter and four pages of AND MEMOIRS notes related to externai relations. As the editors speculate, this chapter probably dealt with the General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of CIA's relations with foreign intelligence Services. Central Intelligence, October 1950—Febru- The book begins by providing "the essential ary 1953 by Ludwell Lee Montague. Pennsyl- background" needed to place the material in vania State University Press, 820 N. context. We are treated to brief biographical University Dr., Suite C, Barbara Bldg., Univer- sketches of the three major figures in the CIA sity Park, Pennsylvania 16802, 1992, 500 during this period (General Smith, William Jack- pages, $45.00. son—Smith's deputy—and Allen Dulles, deputy director for plans). We find out, for example, I approached this book with great expecta- that General Smith was the fourth director of tions only to find the title had misled me. Per- Central Intelligence (DCI), being preceded by haps I should have read the title a little more Adm Sidney W. Souers, who served for only five carefully. Instead of being a book about Gen months; Gen Hoyt Vandenberg, who served for Walter Bedell Smith, this book turns out to be a 11 months; and Adm Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, detailed account of the organizational growing who reaped "the whirlwind left by General Van- pains of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) denberg" and served until General Smith took during General Smith's tenure as director. In- over in October 1950. The background informa- sights about and references to General Smith are tion continues by reviewing the multitude of unhappily few and, for the most part, shallow. studies, reports, and plans for reforming the This book is the second in a series of pre- post-World War II intelligence structure for the viously classified internai CIA historical studies. United States government. We are then taken The first was The Central Intelligence Agency: An through an account of General Smith's reign as Instrument o f Government, to 1950 by Arthur B. DCI, which, unfortunately, includes excruciat- Darling (Pennsylvania State University Press, ingly detailed descriptions of the organization 1990). The present work was first published as a and reorganization of the CIA. secret internai document by the CIA in 1971 and declassified in 1990 under the CIA Historical Re- The book highlights what the author consid- view Program (an outgrowth of the CIA Informa- ers General Smith's three major achievements as tion Act of 1984). The editors of this book state DCI: his development of a cooperative relation- in the preface that "practically speaking, the ma- ship with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, terial missing from the present text does not, in his reorganization of the Deputy Director of In- our opinion, diminish the value of what has telligence offices pursuant to National Security been released." They also note in the text exactly Council Directive 50, and his organization of the where and how much of the original was deleted. Clandestine Services. It also confirms the edi- 1 found the fact that material had been excised tors' assertions that General Smith's term as DCI annoying at best and downright puzzling at is significant and deserves study for at least three times. Certainly, some material needs to remain reasons. First, he was the first "successful" DCI classified to protect sources and methods. How- and thereby established the role and responsibili- ever, it is hard to believe that revealing the num- ties of that Office. Second, it was under his reign ber of people assigned to the Office of National that many of the enduring institutions of the US Estimates in November 1950, an example of ex- national intelligence community, such as the Na- cised material highlighted by the editors, would tional Intelligence Estimate, were established. Fi- endanger sources, methods, or national security nally, he was responsible for putting life into the in any way. Particularly vexing was the deletion CIA itself.

74 NET ASSESSMENT 75

In spite of the book's focus, we are treated to Orion Books, 225 Park Avenue South, New a few insights regarding General Smith. He came York 10003, 1992, 384 pages, $23.00. to the CIA with a reputation as an acerbic, de- Military memoirs need to be read with cau- manding, and impatient personality who tended tion. At their best, they are well written and shed to haze the members of his personal staff un- valuable light on historical events. At their worst, mercifully. Based on his performance as General they are boring and tend to muddy the historical Eisenhower's chief of staff in the Mediterranean waters. and European theaters during World War II, he was considered one of the most disliked sênior Siegfried Knappe's Soldat is not one of the officers of his time. As a result, even William best memoirs of the Wehrmacht, but it is quite Jackson, who was reluctant to expose himself to readable and provides some useful insight into the ravings of a "tyrannical soldier" and referred the history of the Third Reich. Knappe, from a to General Smith as "the Ogre of SHAPE," agreed middle-class, conservative German family, to come to the CIA for six months on three con- planned to go to a university but was drafted ditions, one of which included "no bawling into the army in 1936 and found he had a real out." In day-to-day dealings, General Smith liked aptitude for army life. He volunteered for train- to work out differences of opinion based on oral ing as an artillery officer and graduated from the agreements, preferring to "assert his authority in officers' academy in Potsdam in 1938 with top practice rather than attempt to define it in writ- honors. ing, Iest the formulation of a text provoke con- Knappe received his baptism of fire as a bat- troversy and result in some undesirable limi- tery commander in France in 1940 and was tation through compromise." Apparently, this wounded late in the campaign. Like most of the approach worked well for him as he deftly German army of 1940, Knappe's artillery unit treaded the murky waters of the Washington bu- was horse-drawn. Indeed, Knappe's memoir is a reaucracy. good reminder of what blitzkrieg warfare was for most of the Wehrmacht in 1940—a slow plod far This book is definitely not for the casual behind the mechanized troops, with only occa- reader. Its tedious use of unfamiliar (at least out- sional action to break the tedium and exhaus- side of the intelligence community) abbrevia- tion. Soldat provides a good view of the 1940 tions and acronyms makes the text difficult to campaign and the campaign in the Soviet Union read and often confusing. I often had to refer from the point of view of the company-level of- back to previous material in order to decipher ficer. what was being said. An example of one such "clear as mud" passage was the following: "Al- The author served as a line artillery and staff though ORR was administratively the continu- officer on the Eastern Front for most of 1941^13. ation of ORE, OIR (and ONE) came to realize Involved in much hard action, he was decorated that ORE had actually survived in OCI." This for bravery and was wounded at the gates of Mos- book is also not for those interested in an under- cow. He was lucky enough to be ordered to standing of General Smith, the individual and France in 1943 just after the collapse of the Ger- military leader. For that, you would be well man Southern flank. In 1943 and 1944, Knappe served by reading D. K. R. CrosswelTs The Chief served in France and Italy—working for a short o f Staff: The Military Career o f General Walter Be- time on Field Marshal Albert Kesselring's staff— dell Smith (Greenwood Press, 1991). On the other and was promoted to major. His performance in hand, if you are researching the origins of the combat and on the staff earned him a place at United States's intelligence apparatus and are the prestigious General Staff Academy. willing to deal with a dry, frequently excised Major Knappe graduated from the abbreviated text, this book will likely provide valuable in- General Staff course in early 1945 and was sights. rushed to the Eastern Front that had already pushed into Germany. In April 1945 he was ap- Lt Col William F. Furr, USAF, Retired pointed as the operations officer for the 56th Montgomery, Alabama Panzer Corps and thus became the chief of staff for the final defense of Berlin. This part of the book provides a valuable new account of the last Soldat: Reflections of a German Soldier, 1936- great battle of the European war. The 56th Corps 1949 by Siegfried Knappe and Ted Brusaw. retreated to the west as the Soviets broke the last 76 AÍRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

major defense line before Berlin on 19 April She Went to War: The Rhonda Comum Story 1945. The 56th Corps and its parent unit, the by Rhonda Cornum as told to Peter Copeland. Ninth Army, intended to avoid fighting in Berlin. Presidio Press, 505 San Marin Drive, Suite However, a chance visit by General Weidling, 300B, Novato, Califórnia 94945-1309, 1992, commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, to the 203 pages, $19.95. Army High Command in Berlin resulted in an order for his corps to take over the defense of Unlike the exciting media account of how Berlin on 24 April. Maj Rhonda Cornum (USA) was shot down and Soldat provides one of the most memorable taken prisoner in Iraq during the Persian Gulf accounts of the Battle of Berlin now available. As War, Major Cornum's own version in She Went General Weidling's chief of staff, Knappe was to War is calm and straightforward. Further, her able to have a close-up view of Hitler and his story reflects her belief that gender is an inciden- sênior officers during the final collapse of the tal factor in serving one's country. Third Reich. Major Cornum, a flight surgeon, begins her Unfortunately, memoirs are often plagued by narrative on the day she was shot down—the an author's selective memory, and memoirs of fourth day of the ground war. Her technique of the Third Reich tend to suffer exceedingly from alternating between wartime events and those this failing. Despite his honest reporting in most which led to her participation in the Gulf (e.g., of the book, Knappe insists that in his two years details of her childhood, her college years, and of Service in the line and on the staff in the her family) gives us a clear picture of her strong character and high standards. These impressions USSR, he saw no deliberate cruelty inflicted by the Wehrmacht upon Soviet prisoners or civil- are reinforced as we read about her performance during the eight days she was held as a prisoner ians. Further on in the book, when Knappe ac- of war (POW). Shot down while trying to rescue knowledges that such things must have an Air Force pilot, she was badly injured, cap- happened, he insists that crimes could have oc- tured, and molested by an enemy soldier: curred only under the jurisdiction of fanatical Nazi party officials sent out from Germany. Of We had heard the stories of what the Iraqi soldiers course, Knappe never knew of any death camps. had done to women in Kuwait, so I had thought What nonsense! Atrocities by line units of the about the probability that I would be sexually army and Luftwaffe (not just the SS) were a com- abused if 1 were captured. 1 had never considered mon occurrence on the Eastem Front-as other that 1 would be so badly injured, though. When I really was shot down, I was thinking of myself as a Germans who served there have related to me. soldier, and a POW, and a very severely injured The author would have had to have been stupid person. I was not thinking of myself as a woman. I or blind not to see some very ugly things-and was amazed that this Iraqi soldier could only see me General Staff officers were not stupid. as a woman. (Page 50) Soldat provides a good illustration of the The fact that the Iraqi was incapable of seeing largely unsuccessful effort of Germans to come her as anything other than a female raises the to grips with the history of the Third Reich. I do much-discussed question of women in combat. not believe that the author is intentionally lying. Major Cornum answers this question herself by After 50 years, he probably now firmly believes noting that "sexual abuse was one form of tor- the account that he has presented. However, that ture, just like being beaten or wired" (page 173). part of the book is bad history, and it is unpleas- Further, she likens the experience of being a ant to see Germans explaining away history POW to the humiliation of rape: rather than explaining it. Being a prisoner of war is the ultimate loss of Despite its numerous flaws, Soldat ought to control. . . . The best analogy I can think of is rape, be on the reading list of anyone interested in the and both experiences have the potential to be German army. Knappe provides a good account devastating. . . . But what I learned . . . is that the of many less-researched aspects of the German experience doesn't have to be devastating, that it army, such as the peacetime training, the war- depends on you. . . . You still have control as long time General Staff course, and the horse-ar- as you can think. (Page 203) tilleryman's view of the war's major campaigns. Despite her experience, Major Cornum main- Dr James S. Corum tains a sense of balance in her story, observing Maxwell AFB, A labam a that many of the Iraqi soldiers and citizens she NET ASSESSMENT 77

met were professional and that others were cour- the intricacies of strafing. In every case, the nar- teous and kind. Through her frank-sometimes rative is informative and interesting. wryly humorous—appraisal, she presents a clear Some readers may dislike the fact that there image of a diverse people—snapshots of individu- are no dates and times to help them determine ais in a time of stress and war. Her story, like that when events occurred. This omission may irri- of other POWs, is a testimony to the amazing tate people who are expecting a history book in- will and potential of the individual and a re- stead of Colgan's recollections, but it does not minder that gender is not a determinant of one's significantly detract from the book's historical courage and strength. value. Capt Elise A. Rowe, USAf As the introduction indicates, the focus is on USAF Academy, Colorado three tasks of fighter-bombers: (1) air superiority, (2) interdiction, and (3) direct support of friendly forces in battle. However, Colgan thor- World War II Fighter-Bom ber Pilot, 2d ed., by oughly covers the second and third tasks but Bill Colgan. Sunflower University Press, 1531 barely touches the first; furthermore, interdic- Yuma, Box 1009, Manhattan, Kansas 66502- tion is the subject of most of the book's 100 4228, 1988, 209 pages, $9.95. black-and-white photographs. Most books on World War II air operations Colgan's single most remarkable anecdote is fali into one of three categories: strategic bom- about the "highway of hell," which relates his bardment, air-to-air combat, or carrier operations part in the destruction of over 2,000 German vein the Pacific. As author Bill Colgan States in the hicles on a 30-mile stretch of road in the Rhone preface, however, World War II Fighter-Bomber Pi- Valley (centered around the town of Montélimar) lot is a personal account of the fighter-bomber's in 1944. The most interesting chapter was about role during the war. his job as a FAC; unfortunately, that chapter pre- Colgan's credentials are impressive. One of sents only one anecdote. our most experienced and highly decorated Colgan's recollections are very readable and World War II fighter-bomber pilots, Colgan flew are accompanied by photos that enhance the two combat tours (208 combat missions—116 story. Even though the author could not do jus- into Italy and, after some leave at home, 92 into tice to his experiences in just 209 pages, his an- France, Germany, Áustria, and northern Italy) ecdotes offer insight into criticai factors such as and served as a forward air controller (FAC) in di- combat training and logistics, both of which rect support of British forces near Bologna, Italy. contributed to America's aerial dominance in The book begins in the fali of 1941, when Europe. Colgan was a 21-year-old minor league baseball player and an apprentice locomotive fireman. It World War II Fighter-Bomber Pilot would have ends in mid-1945 with Major Colgan, US Army been superb if the editor had done a better job Air Forces (USAAF), commanding a squadron of of eliciting details from Colgan and proofing the P-47s. copy that went to print. This reader was left wishing that Colgan had expanded this second As expected, the book's autobiographical ele- edition with more detail. In any case, even ments stand out. The most powerful passages left though Colgan did not write a World War II his- me with a lasting impression of the crusading tory of fighter-bombers, his book fills a void in mood in Geórgia before and during the war that category and merits a place in your library. when Colgan retumed home for 30 days' leave. However, my interests lay more in the war fight- Lt Col Ricardo G. Cuadros, USAF ing. Norfolk, Virgínia The book touches on a multitude of topics. Some are humorous, such as USAAF pilot salaries compared to those of pilots in the Brazilian Ex- Captain Hook: A Pilot's Tragedy and Triumph peditionary Air Force. Others are professional is- in the Vietnam War by Capt Wynn F. Foster. sues of general interest, such as deploying a Naval Institute Press, Preble Hall, 118 Mary- squadron forward without interrupting combat land Avenue, Annapolis, Maryland 21402- operations. The rest are technical issues, such as 5035, 1992, 242 pages, $26.95. 78 A1RP0WER JOURNAL FALL 1994

What makes this memoir of a Navy attack pi- defended targets deep in enemy territory to Iot's experience in the Vietnam War unique and truck-hunting missions at night, Foster's descrip- interesting enough to set it apart from the doz- tions are terse and powerful. He was also a first- ens of other memoirs that have appeared? Al- hand participant in gradually evolving tactics, though Captain Hook lacks the righteous which included the ill-fated decision to avoid indignation of Jack Broughton's Thud Ridge or SAMs by flying low and the development of the hard-edged introspection of Robert Mason's techniques for attacking from higher altitudes Chickenhawk, it is an entertaining but narrow and angles in order to survive in an increasingly look at the Navy's early air war in Southeast Asia hostile environment. Foster also saw his friends (SEA). shot down and then killed or captured (e.g., he A career naval aviator with over 200 combat was on James Stockdale's wing when Stockdale missions in Korea and Vietnam, Wynn Foster was shot down on 9 September 1965). Later that was in a good position to view naval aviation year, as commander of the VA-163, Foster became during the early years of Vietnam. In some ways a participant in the "sortie war," which reduced this book is schizophrenic, dealing with both the combat effectiveness to counting the number of air war and the author's nearly career-ending missions flown. He details the results: expanded loss of an arm following an antiaircraft artillery (AAA) hit on his A-4 Skyhawk. The story of his duty days, lowered morale, and ineffective mis- recuperation and fight to remain on active duty sions. Like other people who have written about is inspiring, but the most interesting part of the their experiences in SEA's air war, Foster refers book is found in chapters 3 through 12, which often to his frustration with both civilian and deal with Foster's first two rotations in Vietnam military leaders and their conduct of the war. and provide an interesting look at a Navy attack Following his successful effort to remain on squadron’s life from the inside. active duty, Foster was promoted to captain and As the executive officer and—later—the com- served on two more rotations to Vietnam. But he mander of Squadron 163 (VA-163) aboard the does not dwell on that sort of thing, just as he USS Oriskany, Foster viewed firsthand the initial spends little time on his Korean War experi- blooding of his squadron in SEA. In readying it- ences. Rather, the strength of Captain Hook is the self for combat, the squadron had to upgrade air- author's detailed account of his experiences in craft (from the A-4B to the A-4E) and shift the the Navy's early efforts at fighting the air war in emphasis in training from the delivery of nu- Vietnam. Anyone interested in the men who flew clear weapons to the delivery of conventional in that war—who they were and what they did— weapons. Squadron leaders found themselves in will like this book. the dark with regard to tactics and rules of engagement until their arrival on station. Indeed, Maj Budd Jones, USAF Durham, North Carolina even the Pacific Fleet's sênior leaders seemed un- aware of the type of war to be fought—witness their scheduling a massive amphibious assault as the last exercise before the Oriskany sailed for the My Father's Son: Memories of War and Peace South China Sea. The book contains intimate by Farley Mowat. Houghton Mifflin, 215 Park portraits of everyone from junior pilots to flight Avenue South, New York 10003, 1993, 340 surgeons; both amusing and serious vignettes of pages, $24.95. the hectic, cramped life aboard an aircraft carrier; and accounts of camaraderie and competi- At first glance and after reading the cover tion between pilots and squadrons. flaps of Farley Mowat's My Father's Son, I was a Foster characterizes his first combat e*peri- bit dispirited. A Canadian poet's World War II ence as a "calm," in-country mission to provide recollections? A "world famous writer's" war- tactical support in South Vietnam. Later, the time experiences including yams about his oft- Oriskany moved to the Tonkin Gulf, and the VA- published dad? How much ancillary research and 163's war became earnest as the squadron began other study would be needed for a robust- to fly missions in support of Operation Rolling enough "assessment" pleasing to even the ama- Thunder. Flying over North Vietnam entailed a teur military historians or poetry buffs? A greater threat from AAA and-later-surface-to-air charlatan I'd be if I dared consume these mem- missiles (SAM). From "Alfa strikes" on heavily oirs without even a minimal background check NET ASSESSMENT 79

on the author and his times. Dam, if only I had Mowat. Readers can derive humor and empathy picked up Canadian poetry and prose in college. from the frustration that Angus Mowat experi- The prejudgments about this pleasant book ences when he deals with the homefront bureau- might seem ominous and scare off most disciples crats at Defence Headquarters. After seeing his of Tom Clancy or William Shirer. They should request for books to send overseas repeatedly not. Mowat's memories create a story that comes lost or mischanneled, he walks his "staff sum- full circle although still piquing your interest for mary sheet" through the nine offices it takes to those ancillary items—some of which are in the get to the brigadier. Writing about his betters, book. MowaCs summary of his book as a story the sênior staff, the sênior Mowat expresses "about coming of age in a world gone mad" "mirth caused by the perfectly obvious fact that would inform you that there is much more in- they were scared stiff of it [his request] and were volved here. Granted, Mowat's biographical squirming in terror lest someone would offer a sketch is a prerequisite for a fuller understanding motion committing them to agreement." Even and transition into his wartime chronicles. Ex- discounting the Mowats' military experience, pect also a little family history, a little romance, they were surely prophets when detailing the hu- and-through his eyes-a look at post-Victorian man nature behind military thinking. and pre-World War II Canada and his country's Near midbook, Farley Mowat highlights the effort in maintaining a standing militia. The serious and touching side of their relationship. main plot here is a chain of letters between a Included is the sênior Mowat's motivational young Farley and his parents—most often his fa- stanzas providing the necessary feedback for a ther. soldier's doubts on the battlefield. "It's the sol- Mowat describes his father, Angus, as one of diers raped of their spirit by war," claimed Angus the "last and by no means least of the great prac- Mowat, that were "the most unfortunate people. titioners of an admirable but vanishing skill. He The beer parlours and the gutters are still full of was a superb letter writer." The younger Mowat them, poor bastards, and nobody understands." is wrongly modest in denying that the same leg- Farley Mowat is further counseled to keep "that acy was passed down to him also. Their transat- little spark of something or other that's in you lantic communiqués make up the meat of the inviolate from war." most enjoyable reading. Farley Mowat is right Over the war and Farley Mowat's time in Italy, when he laments the erosion of letter-writing the frequency of letters varies greatly. The qual- skills caused by the advent of telephones, faxes, ity of text here is not affected. Even under bom- videomail, and whatever Japan is next sending bardment or when near the smell of death, the our way. Mowat wit, maturing since 1940, remains un- Mowat's military life begins at 18 with his scathed: "Can't tell where we are or what weTe failure to enter the Royal Canadian Air Force due up to. The matter is so hush-hush that I expect to his small stature and boyish looks. He then only the Germans know for sure." Even when the enlists in the nearby army regiment and soon re- writers are withering away and feeble due to ill- ceives a commission as a provisional second lieu- ness, the letters are still full of life. The trium- tenant. This period included a telling apprentice- phant spark will not die: "Mother, if this is a ship under the sênior Mowat. One of Farley judgement in answer to one of your prayers, Mowat's memories includes the "special consid- please lay off." eration" he received from his father: '"You may The spark that remained luminescent inside be my son,' he told me one day after I had been Farley Mowat was further fueled by his vivid especially sloppy on parade. Tn fact, I am fairly memories and strong respect for the Canadian confident you are, but in this regiment you're outdoors. These flashbacks or tangents are not another snotty-nosed little subaltern who has to distracting. Rather, they detail the full and mel- be taught to change his diapers and respect his ancholy perspective that keeps this soldier-poet betters'!" The two Mowat men did not prove to sane among the muddy and morbid environs. be as competitive in the military arena as they Even though Mowat's metamorphosis as a were in the literary arena. New writings, re- young man occurred in a very structured and or- tumed transcripts, and critiques made up this derly military world, he resisted it every step of amicable rivalry. the way. The freethinking (not dissenting) atti- These "betters" are often the subject of relent- tude of this artist was surely balanced by his pa- less ridicule and satire by both junior and sênior triotism and laudatory wartime Service. This 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 balance also makes his slant on World War II life in our own country, but Fulcrum leaves no doubt insightful and keeps the reading upbeat and that this is indeed the'd^se. amusing. Although the book deals mainly with the Lt Michel C. Escudie, USAF poor State of Soviet society, there is still plenty Castle AFB, Califórnia of action and plenty of discussion about the technical side of aviation. Readers who are curious about Soviet aircraft capabilities and combat Fulcrum : A Top Gun Pilot's Escape from the techniques will not be disappointed. Zuyev's picture of Soviet society is not entirely gloomy: Soviet Empire by Alexander Zuyev with Mal- colm McConnell. Warner Books, Inc., 75 there are scenes of loyalty and love, as well as pride and camaraderie. Rockefeller Plaza, New York 10020, 1992, 358 pages, $19.95. Fulcrum is required reading for any Air Force officer who wants more information on what So- The full title of Fulcrum might lead readers to viet society was really like before the recent po- believe that this book contains nothing more litical upheaval. US pilots (especially those who than descriptions of fast-paced air-to-air combat have the notion that Soviet pilots are inferior and stories of the "there I was" genre. Nothing and rely on ground controllers for guidance) will could be farther from the truth. Although Alex- be interested in Zuyev's description of Sovipt pi- ander Zuyev does give us some fairly specific de- lots and their aircraft. Fulcrum is a real eye- scriptions of flying, his assessment of Soviet opener and will amaze its readers. culture and his condemnation of Soviet bureauc- Capt Erick D. McCroskey, USAF racy and graft make up the bulk of the book. USAF Academy, Colorado An especially disturbing manifestation of So- viet governmental corruption was the downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007 in 1983. Captain Zuyev appeared on TV's "60 Minutes" and EUROPEAN HISTORY "Good Morning America" to tell the truth about this tragedy. In Fulcrum, Zuyev explains this inci- Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian dent in depth and describes many other unfortu- Army, 1861-1914 by Bruce W. Menning. Indi- nate and tragic events caused by the corruption ana University Press, 601 N. Morton Street, and greed inherent in the Soviet political system. Bloomington, Indiana 47404, 1992, 334 pages, In fact, these aspects of the system comprise the $35.00. main theme of the book. By following Zuyev With Bayonets before Bullets, Bruce Menning through his childhood, school years, and mili- has produced an in-depth, thought-provoking tary experience, we gain insight into the beliefs look at the organization and military art of the of the average Soviet Citizen. Even more, we Russian army from the start of D. A. Miliutin's come to understand—as Zuyev finally does—how term as war minister in 1861 to the eve of the corrupt the old Soviet system was and how much First World War. Menning, currently an analyst the poor worker really suffered. Readers may at for Slavic and East European military affairs at times find themselves depressed by the terrible the US Army Command and General Staff Col- living conditions and economic hardships the lege, has selected an excellent format for his Soviet people .were/are forced to endure. Exam- book. Chapters discussing the changes facing the ples abound throughout the book: a Soviet gen- Russians in strategic and tactical thinking, or- eral and his family live in a three-bedroom ganization, armament, and training come be- apartment; a retired lieutenant colonel must save fore—and complement nicely—the chapters that a full 10 months of his retirement pension to deal with the two wars the Russians fought in buy a winter overcoat; and many of the lower- the period under scrutiny (the Russo-Turkish grade officers in the Soviet air force live with War in 1877-78 and the Russo-Japanese War in their families in apartments that don’t even have 1904-5). Only after establishing how the Rus- working toilets or running water. It is sometimes sians prepared for war does Menning critique the hard for us to believe that living conditions in perfoiínance of the Russian army. This format alan "industrialized" country can be so different lowsThe reader to understand not only how the from (and in Zuyev's opinion, inferior to) those battles were fought but how the prewar decisions NET ASSESSMENT 81

of the Russian military thinkers sharply affected tionary—not revolutionary—nature. Such change, the outcome of both conflicts. even if diligently pressed, was not enough to Menning gives much credit for the improve- overcome several problems inherent in the Rus- ment of the Russian army after the Crimean de- sian military experience. The army did improve bacle to Miliutin, the reform-minded minister of after 1861, but the type and pace of the change war. He suggests that the victory over the Turks was not enough to forestall disaster in the First was reiatively easy because the Russian army of World War. 1877 was larger, better organized, and better One problem with Bayonets before Bullets is trained than its 1855 counterpart. Without Mili- that the chapters dealing with the wars of the pe- utin, such changes would have been problematic riod are written exclusively from the Russian at best. Menning does point out that the Russian point of view. At least some inkling of how the army of 1877 was still transitional in nature and Japanese and Turkish armies viewed the fighting that it needed more reform-especially in the ar- would have been helpful. eas of command and control and strategic and Nevertheless, Bayonets before Bullets is thor- technical thinking—to make the Russian military oughly enjoyable, and its excellent notes and the equal of the top European powers. lengthy bibliography attest to its having been The main problem facing Russian military carefully researched. The book gives the reader thinkers after 1878 was "the danger inherent in insight into the wars fought by the Russians be- partial success" (page 85). Menning harshly criti- tween 1861 and 1914, as well as various changes cizes the work of the leading figures of the pe- in Russian thinking and organization. Any spe- riod—Mikhail I. Dragomirov in tactical doctrine cialist in military or Russian affairs would do and G. A. Leer in strategic thinking. Dragomirov well to read this book. is rightly criticized for continuing to propose closed formations during an attack to ensure Lt Todd R. Laughman, USAF Minot AFB, North Dakota that a sufficient mass was maintained in the final assault. His thinking-as late as the tactical regu- lation of 1900—that a bayonet charge was the final goal of any attack was to have serious GULF WAR implications for Russian soldiers facing disci- plined and concentrated Japanese rifle fire in The Gulf War Assessed by John Pimlott and 1904. Menning does point out that all modern Stephen Badsey, editors. Sterling Publishing armies of the period were struggling with the is- Company, 387 Park Avenue, New York 10016- sue of mass versus concentration and that none 8810, 1992, 287 pages, $27.50. were overly successful in finding the right answer. Dragomirov, however, clearly failed to The Gulf War Assessed chronicles the events move quickly enough to overcome traditional and associated details of the Gulf War. Each Russian reluctance to allow the ordinary soldier chapter covers one major aspect of the war in de- to operate in an open formation. tail: Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi army, world Also detrimental to the Russians was General politics, doctrines of the coalition forces, the lo- Leer's "devotion to Napoleon" (page 126) and gistics buildup, the air war, the naval war, the his Jominian desire for a climactic battle which land war, the failure of Iraqi forces, international would encompass several days, a 60-kilometer ramifications, the media war, environmental im- front, and million-men armies. By advocating pacts, and a conclusion. The book ends with a such simplistic thinking, Leer gave Russian op- chronology of the major events of the war from ponents a great advantage in flexibility on the- August 1990 through January 1992. While each ater and operational leveis. The Japanese chapter is written by a different author (all carefully exploited this advantage by outmaneu- members of the Department of War Studies, vering the Russians at the Battle of Mukden. Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst), the book re- One of the strengths of this book is that Men- tains a high degree of continuity in style and ning understands the nature of the change the flow. Russian army underwent after it lost the Cri- The book begins with a very brief background mean War. Even when the reformers held power history of the Iraqi State beginning in the early in the Ministry of War (and this was only until twentieth century. It outlines Saddam Hussein's 1881), the change in thinking was of an evolu- rise to power and highlights the state's overall 82 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 weakness as a prime reason for Saddam's ascen- mass destruction, creation of a regional develop- dancy. The net result of his war with Iran, other ment bank for the Middle East, and an end to the than insignificant territorial gains, was to leave Arab-lsraeli conflict. Most of its attention is on Iraq with a huge debt and a very large army. the attempts made, with mixed results, to work Iraq's territorial claims to Kuwait, while not new, an Arab-lsraeli settlement. In recounting the me- are dismissed in favor of more immediate rea- dia war, the author underscores the mutual mis- sons like the massive debt caused by the Iranian trust between the military and the media. He war. The American-led political activity up to makes the point that, on the whole, the military the coalition attack is assessed in two ways. First, in the Gulf War demonstrated a better under- it is acclaimed as an American triumph, leaving standing of the media rather than the other way Iraq so isolated as to virtually guarantee victory around. In evaluating the environmental effects in the eventual war. The other view sees the of the Gulf War, the author describes the damage United States as being more concerned with ex- to the environment according to the global catas- ercising power than with maintaining peace in trophe (extremist) theory and the local effects order to exorcise the ghost of Vietnam or to flex (conservative) theory. Not surprisingly, the ex- the muscles it was denied during the cold war. tremists were predominantly antiwar, and the The chapter on the coalition doctrine concen- conservatives were prowar. While discussing the trates on the evolution of the American AirLand much publicized oil slicks and burning oil wells, Battle doctrine. While making brief mention of the author also devotes a section to the environ- the doctrines of Britain, France, Israel, Syria, and mental damage in Iraq, highlighting the acute Egypt, it concludes that the real US challenge clean drinking water problem. The conclusion at- was fashioning a form of war and strategy that tempts to place the war in perspective against the would exploit the strengths of each member. The new world order, the future of Middle East rela- book then provides a brief recounting of the US tions, and the nature of future warfare. strategic airlift and sea-lift operations with a Overall, the book provides a good basic re- short synopsis of the British deployment efforts. counting of the war and surrounding events The air war is covered next in very broad- from a wide range of perspectives. It serves more brush fashion. The chapter addresses the coali- as a faithful history rather than as an assessment tion air defense, the air balance, air war or analysis. Its tone is evenhanded, and it pre- planning, and air tasking during the war. How- sents both sides of contentious issues, often rais- ever, the chapter's focus is on the four main ing more points for further research and analysis phases of the air war: gaining air supremacy, hit- than it answers. The organization of the book is ting strategic targets, conducting air interdiction, excellent, with each chapter flowing logically and performing close air support. into the next, but each being able to stand on its The vital role that the naval forces played in the own. The entire book is very readable and Gulf War is examined next. The US Navy is cred- should appeal to the general public as well as to ited with providing the first deterrent to Iraqi ag- those more versed in political-military affairs. gression, effectively enforcing the trade embargo, Maj Wayne Davidson, USAF shipping 95 percent of all Stores used to fight the Maxwell AFB, Alabama war, providing 30 percent of the air assets, and posing a credible seaward flank and threat to the Iraqis among others. The ground war is seen as the result of excellent planning, training, maneuver, and HISTORICAL overall operational superiority. It was also the beneficiary of the effective air campaign. In dis- The American Military Tradition from Colo- cussing the failure of the Iraqi forces, the point is nial Times to the Present edited by John M. raised that since the Iraqi army was so totally out- Carroll and Colin F. Baxter. SR Books, 104 classed in every aspect of operational warfare, why Greenhill Avenue, Wilmington, Delaware did the West so completely overestimate the capa- 19805-1897, 1993, 246 pages, $15.95. bilities of these forces? The chapter on the international ramifica- T. S. Eliot wrote that "tTadition by itself is not tions focuses on President George Bush's four enough." That maxim is clearly understood byjohn strands of postwar aspirations: the future secu- Carroll and Colin Baxter, editors of The American rity of the Gulf region, control of weapons of Military Tradition. They have collected 11 original NET ASSESSMENT 83

essays that broadly trace "issues and events" in 105 Madison Avenue, New York 10016, 1993, American military history from colonial days to 180 pages, $20.00. 1992. Their aim is to provide college students a supplementary text on the US military. Carroll The Confident Decision Maker provides a tool and Baxter hit their mark by accurately-and to identify personal decision-making styles and sometimes vividly-recounting major events, how to make the best decisions. Roger Dawson is along with discussing the evolution of American well known in the business world as an expert in warriors from dtizen-soldiers to professional the art of negotiating and is a full-time profes- soldiers. The>’ also provide a brief history of the sional speaker on the topics of negotiating, per- racial composition of our combat forces. suasion, and decision making. This book is part of the Nightingale-Conant program, which pub- Altempting to cover the entire history of the lishes personal development and self-improve- American military in one volume has its draw- backs. Although the book is not brief enough to be ment programs. called an abridgment, neither is it expansive. For Roger Dawson attempts to show the reader example, the Battle of Midway is fought in two how to consistently make better decisions. He at- paragraphs, and Gettysburg in five. Truthfully, the tempts to change the reader's perception of deci- same material has been handled better by Russell F. sion making from typically focusing on the Weigley in his The American Way o f War. A History decision to focusing on the decision-making o f United States Military Strategy and Policy. Indeed, process. What’s important—the decision itself or almost half of the contributors to American Military making the best possible decision? He believes Tradition include Weigley's book in their "Sources that once a person relies on the decision-making and Suggested Readings." process, he or she will be confident of always Although Carroll and Baxter encouraged their making the best choice. contributors to "express opinions and take He starts with some interesting points. After stands on criticai issues," there is little evidence having interviewed successful business people, of their having done so. The essays shed almost he found that almost nobody understands how no new light and provide little in the way of his- they make decisions. He also quotes an American torical analysis. The reader yearns for fresh in- Management Association survey that States that sights into famous battles, but most of the business people only make the right decisions 50 writers only serve up such offerings as "bloody" percent of the time. His book goes on to present narratives of the US Civil War and references to the characteristics of a good decision maker and "godless communism." the nine traits he has found in great decision The writing varies from a staid recitation of makers whom he has studied. Civil War casualties to a brilliant explication of Does a decision need to be made? Emphasizing strategic doctrine. In the latter essay, Joseph the importance of apportioning time based on the Cernik traces the continuity of such doctrine significance of the decision, he offers methods for from massive retaliation to "Star Wars" defenses. sorting types of decisions and their consequences. His contribution and a few others in the same First he presents processes to determine if a deci- vein make The American Military Tradition worth sion needs to be made, and the majority of the keeping—or, at least, worth sending to a college- book then presents a variety of decision-making bound friend. processes. His examples go from scientific ap- Lt Col Louis W. Buckner, USAF proaches such as reaction tables utilizing theories Offutt AFB, Nebraska of probabilities and decision trees to techniques for improving intuition. Dawson believes that people have lost the ability to successfully use their intuition, which he blames on two factors: the first is LEADERSHIR MANAGEMENT, the information age brought in by the Computer, TOTAL QUALITY, PERSONAL and the second is the move in business to larger AFFAIRS corporations that want facts and reasons to back up decisions. The Confident Decision Maker: How to Make Naturally there are obstacles to decision mak- the Right Business and Personal Decisions ing. He discusses these barriers and proposes Every Time by Roger Dawson. W. W. Morrow, ways to overcome them. 84 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

Dawson's fast reading style presents system- prove his knowledge. I really liked the fact that atic approaches to decision making that make in Warriors o f God, high-tech gizmos don't work this book worthwhile. Using many real-world ex- all the time, as other books in this genre would amples to illustrate the importance of right deci- lead us to believe. sions, he emphasizes that the particular decision Readers looking for good political-military is not as important as the key factor in the deci- fiction will certainly get their money's worth sion-making process that led to that decision. from Warriors o f God. More importantly, I think Capt David Nissen, USAF there's a new voice on the scene. No doubt, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma Christie's book is the first of many, and I'd wager that his next one will be a best-seller. lst Lt Tim Kane, USAF LITERATURE AND THE ARTS Yokoto AB, Japan

The Warriors of God by William Christie. Ly- ford Books (Presidio Press), 505B San Marin Aggressor by Nick Cook. St. Martin's Press, 175 Drive, Suite 300, Novato, Califórnia 94945- Fifth Avenue, New York 10010, 1993, 322 1340, 1992, 272 pages, $19.95. pages, $19.95. William Christie makes a noble attempt at The Middle East during the post-Gulf War pe- writing a technothriller with his first novel, War- riod is the central setting for this novel. The Rus- riors o f God. He has a good feel for dialogue and sian minister of gas-petrochemical industriali- technical details, and his research is excellent. zation and his staff are visiting Syria to tour a In the spirit of Tom Clancy adventures, War- natural gas pumping station, which was engi- riors o f God focuses on a frustrated and heroic neered and built with the aid of the Russians. protagonist, Richard Welsh. This model is old While they are at the station, it is attacked and and tired—and isn't presented with much spice. destroyed and the minister and his staff are kid- In fact, the description of Welsh bears more than napped. Next, an airliner is hijacked from Dubai a passing similarity to Christie himself. Neither International Airport. Among the airline passen- is the theme (old guard won't listen to maverick gers are the US ambassador to Saudi Arabia and bureaucrat) anything new. You'd think the old his staff, who are involved in the Gulf peace in- guard would have gotten smarter by now. itiatives. Two common threads link these two terrorist events: both groups of hostages vanish In Christie's world, the Iranians are upset be- without a trace, and no terrorist organization cause, after the recent war with Iraq, the US has claims responsibility for the kidnappings. West- made itself a permanent presence in the Persian ern intelligence agencies are without a clue as to Gulf. In that regard, Warriors o f God is surpris- who committed these terrorist acts and where ingly relevant. The Iranians respond to our the hostages are being held. hegemonic presence with a late-night sneak attack on one of our ships anchored near Dubai, A British weekly magazine publishes a story and we respond by bombing Kharg island. Does identifying the perpetrators as a group pre- this lead to an intricate plan for a terrorist attack viously unknown to Western intelligence agen- in Washington, D.C. (not that it's predictable)? cies. The group, calling themselves the "Angels Christie's strength isn't in complexity of plot of Judgement," has power and plans unlike any- or in making the plot believable but in spinning thing seen in the Middle East before. The leader a good yam. Even if the story is simplistic, it of the group is an individual known as "the keeps the reader's interest. Christie has a com- Sword." As the world attempts to determine the mendable feel for action and pacing. Further, identity of the Sword and the Angels of Judge- anybody who has worked in the Pentagon will ment and their cause and motivation, the British enjoy his fine command of detail. Pentagon life weekly news magazine's Middle Eastern corre- is just one of many areas where Christie has spondem who had identified the Angels of Judge- done his homework, including the intricacies of ment disappears from Cairo. Middle East politics and the stereotypes of D. C. Thrust into this tenuous situation are three policymakers. The author also knows his weapon different men. First, Col Elliot Ulm, commander Systems and goes to extraordinary lengths to of "the Pathfinders," a US Air Force special op- NET ASSESSMENT 85

erations counterterrorist unit. Second, Col Ro- against the Kurds, Israelis, or coalition members. man Makhmadzhanovich Sabanov, commander His defection leads to a special operations mis- of an elite Russian Spetsnaz special antiterrorist sion to destroy the biological agents and the squad. These two men command units that are Iraqi laboratory. However, a special operations brought together by a secret high-level agree- low-level C-141 crashes, and most of the spe- ment known as the Romeo Protocol. Their mis- cially trained crew members die or are injured. sion is to rescue the hostages and punish the Col Will Westermann, mission planner, must terrorists. To accomplish this task, the command- then fly the mission with an untrained and un- ers and their men must overcome decades of ani- initiated crew. mosity and distrust to build the cohesion A1I goes well for the mission until the discov- required to successfully execute a rescue. The ery that two canisters of the deadly virus are third man thrust into the situation is Tom Gir- missing from the laboratory. Dr Abbas bolts ling, the Science and technology correspondent from the Special Forces team and escapes into for the British news magazine that identified the the desert in hopes of finding the two missing Angels of Judgement. Girling's past is linked canisters before they can be unleashed on the with that of the missing Middle Eastern corre- world. He finds the first with relative ease and spondent and with terrorist incidents of other fa- buries it in the desert for lack of a suitable facil- natical groups. He must overcome his past to ity to destroy it. assist the missing correspondent and to charac- On takeoff after the raid, the C-141 suffers terize, understand, and locate the Angels of damage when a wingtip impacts the ground. Judgement and the Sword. His drive and determi- Limping into the air, the C-141 catches fire and nation ultimately lead his path to cross the paths must crash-land in the desert. While the surviv- of Ulm, Sabanov, the Angels of Judgement, and ing special operations team members escape in the Sword. their vehicles, the two pilots, a female flight en- Nick Cook constructs a story with numerous gineer, and an injured loadmaster head south to- plot twists and turns that captivate, tempt, and ward freedom and safety. As they make their way, surprise the reader. From the training camps of they miraculously find a broken-down military the special counterterrorist forces to the cockpits truck that they are able to repair and a single- of high-tech fighters and helicopters, Cook puts engined observation plane. By coincidence, Sandra, the reader in the combat boots of the military the flight engineer, also happens to be a private specialist. pilot and is able to take the plane and the injured loadmaster to safety. The two C-141 pilots are The story is extremely entertaining; however, not so lucky and are captured within sight of al- 1 was disappointed in the ending, which rein- lied lines and returned to Baghdad for interroga- forces the timewom East-West conflict ideology. tion. I also perceived a technical flaw in the application of military hardware to the story line. Given Dr Abbas soon finds the Iraqi general who was these negatives, I still highly recommend this about to employ the weapon, believing it to be novel for its entertainment value. of little harm other than to make people sick. Upon hearing the truth, the general quickly Maj David K. Swafford, USAF changes allegiances and supplies Dr Abbas with Kirtlami AFB, New México safe-passage papers to try to rescue the two captured pilots. Dr Abbas rescues the two pilots and, en route to pick up his family in Baghdad, Scorpion Strike by John L. Nance. Crown Pub- comes across two Hind helicopters. Despite the lishers, Inc., 201 East 50th Street, New York fact that neither of the pilots has had any experi- 10022, 1992, 317 pages, $21.00. ence in flying helicopters, the two quickly for- mulate a plan to steal them and fly to safety. Scorpion Strike is a novel about post-Desert Once aboard the helicopters, and even though Storm Iraq and the attempt to neutralize biologi- unable to read any of the switches or dials, they cal weapons not discovered until after the cease- get the aircraft started just as Dr Abbas and his fire. Dr Shakir Abbas, Iraqi scientist in charge of family arrive, followed by Iraqi soldiers. With the program, escapes from Iraq in an attempt to great difficulty, they manage to get the aircraft warn the West of the terrible potential of this airborne, and shortly thereafter are proficient weapon and Saddam Hussein's plans to use it enough to shoot down a pursuing MiG-21 in a 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

dogfight. Losing their ability once more, they time to reconsider the war in all its dimensions" have trouble landing the helicopter. (page 176). Much of the action throughout the book is Noble sets out to make some distinctions be- melodramatic and the dialog contrived and mor- tween the fantasy of these Hollywood produc- alistic. The author, a reserve C-141 pilot and ci- tions and the reality of battlefield sketches vilian airline pilot, loves using jargon from both drawn by combat artists actually working on lo- worlds, but explaining it as he goes along dis- cation in Vietnam. Noble uses this artwork to tracts from the story line. Other than the help show the effects of extended combat and author's experience in C-141s, there is insuffi- maneuvers in the field, the effects of combat on cient reason given for using C-141s instead of the soldiers, and the sense of close companion- MC-130s, which are designed for this type of ship that developed between Service members. mission. John Nance pushes too hard to create Artwork in the first three chapters depicts technical accuracy and stretches the reader's scenes of the lone warrior on patrol, soldiers working in support positions, and combatants imagination to the breaking point with too dealing with the terrain and weather conditions. many coincidences, strokes of luck, and improb- A common thread runs throughout these pic- able skills of his heroes. While generally enter- tures: the pervasive loneliness. taining and easy reading, Scorpion Strike fails to Noble has included the pencil sketches of live up to its potential. Henry C. Casselli, Jr., which demand attention Maj James Marshall, USAF for their powerful focus on the lone marine. Few San Antonio, Texas faces are emphasized, and figures are nonspecific players within a larger scenario. The artist's narrative, then, becomes part of the appeal of these Forgotten Warriors: Combat Art from Vietnam paintings and drawings. by Dennis L. Noble. Praeger Publishers, 88 Noble has also included reproductions that Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881, are highly emotive portraits of individual sol- 1992, 198 pages, $29.95. diers. These paintings do not focus on the setting but rather on the mood of the individual Dennis Noble's study of the "grunt," or the subject and on faces that show the effects of soldier in the field, redefines the Vietnam con- combat on young men who are no longer young. flict using combat art, letters from the field, po- There is a stoic resignation to the confusion and etry, and anecdotes from American Service chãos of war that is evident in many of these members. For these Americans, the conflict was portraits. much different than the war that was edited and Mood is also created by depictions of actual televised to the family back home, many miles battle scenes. These compositions make the from the action. For the grunts, the war meant viewer aware of an underlying tension. Like the dealing with harsh, extreme conditions, confus- soldiers in these environments, viewers cannot ing alliances, and the realization that the ulti- be comfortable. mate sacrifice on the field meant little to the Powerful visual expression is not only rele- American public. They were forgotten warriors, gated to human portraiture. The author satisfies and Americans were all but content to forget the the American public's fascination with the ma- chinery of war by including a generous collec- conflict and. the Service members who partici- tion of reproductions of paintings of the aircraft, pated in it. tanks, and naval vessels in action in Vietnam. No- After four years of denial, 1973-1977, unan- ble reserves a special place for art that depicts the swered concerns surfaced via the médium most helicopter, the aircraft most often associated with associated with American society—the Holly- the Vietnam conflict. wood film. Noble includes an appendix written Another special feature is the chapter contain- by William Palmer that discusses the plethora of ing art that depicts the Vietnamese people, cul- Vietnam war films that carne out after 1977. ture, and country. A diverse presentation of "Though they did not always accurately portray drawings of architecture, religious shrines, and Vietnam . . . or the war fought there, they did Street scenes gives further insight into the aliena- catch the attention of American culture and con- tion felt by US Service members in Vietnam. Sev- vince the American people that it was finally eral beautiful pictures of the children of NETASSESSMENT 87

Vietnam are portrayed by combat artist Trella people behind the scenes have other ideas. The Koczwara, one of the two female combat artists other edge of the sword is Major McCalTs real in Vietnam. mission—to expose the black marketeers ped- The serious and profound role of the combat dling US materiais intended for the French mili- artist becomes the main point of Noble's book. tary. Heath skillfully twists the two missions Combat art provides society with a visual record together, creating a novel full of anticipation. of war from a unique perspective. Noble has ac- What comes out is that personal greed and igno- complished an admirable task with this book. rance were the downfall of Colonial French Viet- Not only has he provided an insightful account nam rather than the lack of military power of combat art during the Vietnam era, but he has against the Vietminh forces. done so in a way that does not trivialize the art- The characters begin to come alive and work represented. through their relationships, Heath creates one of If we are ever to fully reconcile ourselves to the major themes of the book: the realization our country's role in the Vietnam conflict, that the gray world can be stronger than the re- Americans must first be willing to let go of the alities of a black and white world. The gray myths and try to understand some of the reali- world is the reality of politics, power, and the ties of this undeclared war that, unlike any other strength and weakness of friendships. Hanoi is singular event in contemporary history, divided the center for this world in The Blue Deep. The and fragmented American society. Noble's book author uses the mystique of Colonial French visually shapes some of these realities in an im- Hanoi to draw out the intrigue of the novel, the portant volume that is totally engaging. relationships between the characters, and the locations of deals and decisions. He paints a vivid Capt Pamela J. Chadick, USAF picture of three locations where the power of Colorado Springs, Colorado French Hanoi resides: the neutral cafe and bar, where enemies hang their hats; Lam Du, the French air base where American Army aviators The Blue Deep by Layne Heath. William Morrow and black marketeering are found; and the seedy and Co., Inc., 1350 Avenue of the Américas, Blue Deep dogfight arena, where deals deter- New York 10019, 1993, 382 pages, $20.00. mine the real fate of French Vietnam. Layne Heath's The Blue Deep is a refreshing Another theme Heath brings out is the paral- story about American military involvement in lels between the French and American involve- Indochina. What makes the book fresh and ex- ment in maintaining the status quo in citing is the fact that Heath sets the stage for Indochina. An aspect of this theme involves de- American participation in 1954 Vietnam, when cision makers who weave their plans without the French govemment requests increased US consideration for the young men who have to military assistance for aircraft and supplies to make the sacrifices. In line with this is the tradi- fight Ho Chi Minh and General Giap for control tional ingenuity of the American warrior, who of North Vietnam. survives by being dedicated, keeping the faith, and continuing with a mission, even when the The basis of the book is France's military ac- chances of success are slim. The tactics used by tions before the battle for Dien Bien Phu, the the Vietminh against the French army embody corruption of the Colonial French Vietnam gov- another interesting parallel because these tactics ernment, and the untold reality that France is are repeated a decade later against the American slowly losing control of its pre-World War II co- military. lonial empire. Heath brings out the despair of tired French military personnel, the expatriates The Blue Deep is a winner. Layne Heath pro- living in Vietnam, and the ethnic Vietnamese of vides the action and suspense of a mystery, while Hanoi. giving the reader a detailed account of Army The author sets the stage for US military sup- helicopter use early on in Vietnam. I recommend port with a double-edged sword. On one edge, this book to anyone who enjoys an action- the noveTs main character, Army major Marsh packed military novel without hi-tech toys and McCall, arrives in Vietnam to train French pilots Rambos. This is one novel you'11 want to finish. to fly American OH-13 medivac helicopters. Maj Thomas A. Torgerson, USAF Once McCall and his team arrive in Vietnam, Peterson AFB, Colorado 88 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

SPECIALIZED INTEREST space launch vehicles used today. Perhaps more interesting, Oberth gave a teenager named Wem- Space Age by William J. Walter. Random House, her von Braun his first job in the art of rocketry. 201 East 50th Street, New York 10022, 1992, If there is any chapter that shows the broad- 333 pages, $30.00. brush treatment of the subject by the author, it is chapter 2. Entitled "The Explorers," the chapter Man will not always remain on Earth. The pursuit takes the reader rapidly from V-2 rockets to nu- of light and space will lead him to penetrate the clear weapons to Apollo and finally to a discus- bounds of the atmosphere, timidly at first, but in sion of innovative space propulsion systems. If the end to conquer the entire solar system. one is looking for a serious history of space, this —K. E. Tsiolkovsky, 1911 is not the chapter to read. Filled with nearly 40 pictures, the chapter causes one to wonder You probably would agree that such a state- whether it was meant to be visually exciting or ment in 1911 would have seemed quite bold for informative. However, the reader must keep in the time. However, it is such a smattering of an- mind that the book is meant to be a companion ecdotes and quotes that makes Space Age a some- to a television series as he or she rapidly turns what interesting read despite its "mile-wide, the pages looking for something new that has inch-deep" treatment of the subject. Author Wil- not been said about the subject elsewhere. liam Walter presents the companion book to the Perhaps the finest parts of Space Age are the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) television se- two chapters entitled "Mission to Planet Earth" ries bearing the same name. The book faithfully and "Celestial Sentinels." They are more repre- parallels the six-part series closely with six chap- sentative of the journeyman approach to space ters and an epilogue. Walter, whom the book exploration, which uses space to explore earth flap describes as a journalist and filmmaker, rather than the other way around. "Mission to "takes readers on an exciting and unexpected Planet Earth" is Space Age's attempt to make the journey into the past and maps out strange and reader more environmentally aware. The author amazing possibilities for the future." uses photos of earth taken from space that relate The book begins by telling the stories of some the blight man can inflict on his home through early space pioneers, including Konstantin Tsi- pollution and abuse of the earth's resources. But olkovsky, Robert Goddard, and Hermann Oberth. as the author is quick to point out, it is man who Tsiolkovsky, was a deaf, small-town Russian is the danger, not the earth. It is we who need schoolteacher who in 1898 first calculated how the earth and not the other way around. And we to launch a rocket beyond earth. By the end of can use space to help improve the human condi- his life in the early 1900s, he had predicted space tion on earth. In "Celestial Sentinels," Walter re- stations, multistage rockets, space suits, and arti- lates the growth in the number of satellites and ficial gravity. Considering the times, when many how they have come to Service the communica- thought a trip to the moon was pure lunacy (no tion and information needs of man. From spy pun intended), Tsiolkovsky's predictions were satellites to navigation to communication satel- rather mind-boggling. Walter further tells how lites, the book asserts that space technology has some of Robert Goddard's work was met with helped make the world become more of a global great skepticism. After being painted by the me- community than any other technology. When dia as a modern-day Jules Verne, Goddard was one considers the global resources of news net- flooded with offers by adventure seekers who works such as the Cable News NetWork (CNN), wanted to fly on one of Goddard's machines. perhaps the author makes a valid point. One brave soul, a captain in the Army Air Corps Overall, Space Age meets the requirement for a during World War I, volunteered to not only fly companion book. It closely parallels the televi- to the moon but to Mars as well, so long as God- sion series without diverging from the latter’s dard provided a $10,000 life insurance policy. In message. The book, however, only scratches the the 1920s, Oberth was a Transylvanian high surface if the reader is looking for more histori- school math teacher who was commissioned to cal depth. That is not a criticism; it is an observa- build a space rocket for an early German Science tion. Like all television series companion books, fiction movie entitled The Woman in the Moon. Space Age is meant to faithfully mimic the televi- Oberth's attempt failed, but his effort revealed a sion series in book form. The book offers the model rocket strikingly similar to a number of reader an opportunity to revisit a topic he or she NET ASSESSMENT 89

found interesting on the show. But if you are their political utility." Four scenarios illustrate looking for a more in-depth treatment of the how Rússia and other newly independem States topic, you must continue to read elsewhere. may interact in the future on issues of economic development, national sovereignty, and nuclear Maj Roger C. Hunter, USAf Washington, D.C. weapons. As a bottom line, the authors postulate that "the main threat to US security in the 1990s and early 21st century will be the attempted nuclear coercion of US policy" by independem nu- STRATEGY, POL1CY, A N D clear powers both within and outside the CIS. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS For this reason, the Lockwoods build a strong case for strategic defense, power projection, and The Russian View of U.S. Strategy: Its Past, Its phased arms control as the key components of Future by Jonathan Samuel Lockwood and future US strategic doctrine. Kathleen 0'Brien Lockwood. Transaction Pub- For all its good qualities, the book effectively by- lishers, Rutgers—The State University, New passes an issue of importance to both US and Russian Brunswick, New Jersey 08903, 1993, 233 strategists in the post-cold war era. The process of pages, $28.95. compromise and consensus-building in the US policy-making community will influence long-term US With their respective skills in military intelli- strategy as much in the future as it did in the past. gence and military history, Jonathan and Kath- Russian reformists will increasingly face a similar leen Lockwood analyze the strategic perceptions process where policymakers are openly beholden to of former Soviet leaders and their contemporary competing constituencies. To achieve a viable con- Russian counterparts. In doing so, they update sensus as a prelude to developing associated strategic and expand Mr Lockwood's 1983 work, The So- capabilities, US policymakers will find themselves in viet View ofUS Strategic Doctrine: Implications for the unenviable position of a boxer who must tele- Decisionmaking, in which he supported the US graph his punches, or a chess master who must pub- Strategic Defense Initiative as a vital impetus for lish his game plan before playing his opening gambit. change in Soviet military strategy. Now the Lock- US strategy, open as it is to public scrutiny, can be as woods trace evolving superpower strategies over much a product of marketing as of military expertise. the past four decades to reaffirm their compel- Future Russian strategy, unlike its Soviet precursor, ling case for ballistic missile defense (BMD). will likely be subject to similar influence. The authors first review major benchmarks in The Lockwoods' arguments represent a corol- US and Soviet strategic doctrine from 1954 to the lary to this on the US side in terms of how a greater aftermath of Operation Desert Storm. They com- understanding of foreign views might influence pare key changes in US strategy against the de- the development of US strategy. Surprisingly, they velopment of strategic concepts in the former do not reference debates over the 1982 work in Soviet Union and the new Commonwealth of In- which former Chief of the Soviet General Staff N. dependent States (CIS). Two appendices support V. Ogarkov prefigured the high-tech battlefield of the Lockwoods' comparison of competing su- Desert Storm. Neither do they reference associated perpower strategies, while a third argues the im- Soviet and Russian debates on lessons to be learned pact of BMD on operational warfare. from the US experience in the Persian Gulf. Their comparative analysis clearly distin- Overall, though, their points are well taken. If guishes two sides of the issue in a long-term per- the essence of our strategy is to deter attack, spective. On one hand, they describe ersatz views then perceptions on the part of potential foes articulated under a "declaratory deterrence strat- can be nearly as crucial as those of domestic egy to mislead Western analysts." On the other constituents. The feasibility of our strategy is hand, they detail the actual views of former So- negotiated at home, but its efficacy is proven viet authorities from Joseph Stalin through Mik- abroad. Moreover, balancing domestic concerns hail Gorbachev as evidenced through foreign against foreign perceptions was difficult enough policy behavior and military programs. Under- when we faced one hostile superpower and its standing these views in the post-Soviet era, the supporting alliance system. But we now face an Lockwoods contend, is "vitally important in pre- even greater challenge in the form of a much-dif- dicting the likely attitudes and behavior of the fused threat environment; and US strategy can- separate republics toward nuclear weapons and not be all things to all people. As the Lockwoods 90 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 point out, however, "What is convincing ... is lacking. Pursuing his Vision of the American whether there is a concerted effort to match ca- warrior, Sheppard leads his force into the canais pability to doctrine, and not mere sham declara- and onto the islands of the area. These operations of a change in strategy." tions evidently hurt the Vietcong's supply ef- Maj L. Keith Haney, USAF forts—witness the fact that they reportedly offer Maxwell AFB, Alabama a 25,000-piaster reward for Sheppard’s head. In this intensely personal story, the author shares his thoughts and fears of command, decision making, death, and courage: VIETNAM The man who said that command is a lonely Riverine: A Brown-W ater Sailor in the Delta, profession knew what he was talking about. Sometimes I became so lonely for a friend that 1 1967 by Don Sheppard. Presidio Press, 505 could scream with the pain.. . . San Marin Drive, Suite 300B, Novato, Califór- nia 94945-1309, 1992, 326 pages, $22.95. I found out what war is: responsibility-a grinding, constant, day in and day out responsibility that just In 1966 the US Navy estabiished a force didn't go away. A responsibility that ate at my (code-named Operation Game Warden) whose self-confidence like a câncer, making me question purpose was to deny the use of the Bassac River every decision, every action I contemplated, exhausting me to the very marrow of my bones. and Mekong River to the Vietcong. Game War- den's boats—31-foot, dark green, fiberglass, civil- To tell this story, Sheppard takes the reader ian cabin cruisers—were armed with twin not only through the fear, confusion, and blood .50-caliber machine guns forward and a single of combat, but also through the daily grind of .50-caliber machine gun aft. Powered by two routine patrols, sampan searches, and the op- high-performance 220-horsepower General Mo- pressive, inescapable heat and humidity. He de- tors truck diesels driving Jacuzzi jet water pumps, scribes his first uneventful patrols, his building these unarmored patrol boats depended on their "obsession with getting into a firefight," his fear speed and firepower for survival. that he would not live up to his self-imposed Riverine is not just another entry in the seem- standard once he did get into combat, and his ingly endless series of memoirs about the Viet- development of the tactics which got him nick- nam War. It is the first account from a member named "interdictor" by his commander. of the brown-water Navy. This tale gives the A fast-paced, first-person account, this book is reader much more than just a glimpse into the a quick read, easily flowing through the events life and thoughts of a man who is entering the of the author's year in Vietnam. Told in a con- first combat of his life. It captures the essence of versational style, Riverine gives us a glimpse of what it's like to be a combat commander. Don just what it was like to fight on the Bassac. Shep- Sheppard, the commander of River Division 51 pard's book is not blindly patriotic; it tells what on the Bassac River from February 1967 to Janu- the war was like—warts and all. 1 recommend it ary 1968, reveals his agonies of command, his not only for the view it provides of a little- doubts about his courage, and his often miser- known part of the Vietnam War, but also for its able existence on the river. insight into the heart and mind of a man who, Riverine recounts the development of a com- under fire, learns what it means to command bat commander, beginning with the thoughts of men in combat. an eager, blue-water sailor who wants to make his Maj M ichael J. Petersen, USAF mark: "The navy never let me get close to the Maxwell AFB, A labam a Korean War, so they owed me this one. I hoped that I could measure up to my envisioned standard." Arriving on the Bassac, Sheppard finds that WORLD WAR II his predecessors "have only one doctrine . . . and that is to stay in the middle of the river, keep out Flying the Hump: Memories of an Air War by of trouble, and don't get your men hurt or your Otha C. Spencer. Texas A&M University Press, boats damaged." Needless to say, in his opinion, Drawer C, College Station, Texas 77843, 1992, their efforts at interdicting the Vietcong were 240 pages, $24.50. NET ASSESSMENT 91

If you like your military history spiced with Hardin Day" during which they set a record for lots of war stories, this book is for you. It is fuil Hump flights in one 24-hour period. of interesting vignettes, each attributed to a spe- Brig Gen William H. Tunner, who replaced cific source, that bring the history alive by let- Colonel Hardin and served as the Hump com- ting the reader share in the experiences of the mander until the end of the war, was initially people who actually lived it. The author, profes- troubled by this assignment and felt it was the sor emeritus of journalism at East Texas Univer- "equivalent to military exile." Overcoming these sity, was perfectly suited to write this story since personal concerns, he quickly moved to rescind for over a year he flew B-25 weather reconnais- the "no-weather" rule and institute other sance missions over the Bay of Bengal and across changes to reduce the accident rate. Demanding the Hump into China. He also flew C-46 and C- that his airmen "live like Americans and be 47 missions taking supplies, equipment, and per- proud they were Americans," he ordered a gen- sonnel to weather stations throughout China, eral cleanup of living conditions and daily full- Burma, and índia. dress inspections. While these and other Probably to most people, the World War II directives (such as "Production Line Mainte- China, Burma, índia (CBI) theater of operations nance") were initially unpopular, morale and the brings to mind Gen Claire Lee Chennault's Fly- efficiency of Hump operations soon improved. ing Tigers or Gen Frank D. MerrilLs Marauders. Interested readers should note that General Tun- But the exploits of these well-known and genu- ner has captured his airlift experiences during inely deserving heroes, would not have been the Hump operations and afterward (in the Ber- possible if it had not been for the brave crews of lin airlift, in Korea, in the United States Air the Air Transport Command and others who Forces in Europe [USAFE], and in the Military Air challenged the Himalayas to bring personnel and Transport Service [MATS] in a book titled Over supplies to the war front. Indeed, they paved an the Hump, which was reprinted by the Office of "aluminum trail" at the cost of over 3,000 Air Force History in 1985). deaths and 500 bailouts. As Spencer puts it, "The As insightful as the leadership lessons are, the inexperienced Allied Hump pilots, flying un- most interesting parts of this book are the tested aircraft, with uncertain leadership, paid a vignettes that illustrate each aspect of the Hump heavy toll. Japanese Zeros shot them out of the being discussed. Some of my favorite involved sky, the violent weather brought them down, or the different types of cargo being flown. While their planes crashed for unknown reasons, and most of the cargo was directly war-related, flights they parachuted into headhunter country. Still also carried "whiskey (ten thousand pounds of the planes kept flying from índia to China and Canadian whiskey zealously guarded by the Brit- back to índia for another load of vital war sup- ish), mules (four mules per plane with four Chi- plies." nese 'cowboys'), a load of catsup for the fighter While focusing on the personal, human side squadrons in Kweilin, and money, bales and of flying the Hump, this book is also about lead- bales of Chinese paper money, printed by the ership. By the summer of 1943, the Hump had American Bank Note Company." On three suc- become "a purgatory for military commanders." cessive flights in a C-47, pilot Robert B. L. Taylor After a series of investigations, Col (later Brig carried first a load of grain in burlap bags that Gen) Thomas O. Hardin took command of the leaked, then a load of goats, and finally a load of Hump operations. Colonel Hardin "brought or- Chinese soldiers who couldn't figure out how to der to the loose operations of the airlift, pushed use the relief tube. As a result, he States, "So, Hump crews to their limits, and dramatically in- now, we have fermenting grain, goat do-do, and creased the flow of supplies to China," but his Chinese wee-wee, all in the belly of the ship. The success carne at a high price in terms of men and old Gooney was ready for the depot for sure." aircraft lost and lower morale. His "There is no Was the Hump worth the sacrifice? The weather over the Hump" edict is often cited as author contends that even if the experts say it the primary cause for weather-related accidents, failed in relationship to the overall war effort, it including "Black Friday," when at least 18 aircraft was a success on a personal levei. "If war is inevi- and 42 crewmen and passengers were lost during table, as it seems to be; if men must fight, as the worst storm in Hump history. Nevertheless, they always have; then it was best that young Colonel Hardin was genuinely liked by his airmen, and women, who were called on to fight men, who at the end of his tour staged "Tom the war and fly the missions of supply were 92 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994 taught a skill [regular air travei] that would help its inception up through the Vietnam War. The mankind, and themselves, in future years of peace." volume, edited by Alfred Hurley and Robert While this book cannot be considered a definitive Ehrhart, provides a transnational analysis of air history of the Hump, it is a valuable addition to power vis-à-vis doctrine, leadership, organiza- Hump-related literature and is worth reading. tion, and technology. But like the previous text, Lt Col Wiiliam F. Furr, USAF, Retired Air Power and Warfare reflects the biases and as- Montgomery, Alabama sumptions of a particular age to include those of American airmen. (The latter defend the air strategy and tactics they used in Vietnam and reas- sert the continued validity of US strategic The Conduct of the Air War in the Second bombardment doctrine.) World War: An International Comparison In contrast, The Conduct ofthe Air War in the Sec- edited by Horst Boog. Berg Publishers, 165 Ta- ond World War is a dispassionate work of genuine ber Avenue, Providence, Rhode Island 02906, scholarship. Boog organizes its contents under the 1992, 784 pages, $79.95. following rubrics: "Air Warfare and Modemity"; Encyclopedic in scope and exhaustive in de- "The Air Forces and the Armaments Industry"; "The tail, The Conduct o f the Air War in the Second Military, Research, Technology"; "Doctrine, Tech- World War is a major contribution to air power nology, Logistics"; "Air Warfare and Humanity"; history in English. The text contains the pro- "Tactical and Strategic Air Warfare"; "Intelligence ceedings of the first international conference of and Air Warfare"; and "Airpower, Air Policy, High historians held in Freiburg, Germany, from 29 Command." Each section contains thought-provok- August to 2 September 1988. Under the able leading essays and commentaries that both challenge ership of Horst Boog, the former sênior director and reaffirm previous interpretations of air warfare of research at the Militàrgeschichtliches For- during World War II. R. J. Overy, for example, re- schungsamt, the Freiburg conference gathered minds us that Allied air power was largely a tactical tool used in combined arms operations. Its primary together a veritable who's who of air power his- focus was to defeat enemy forces in the field, not to torians, 34 of whom presented papers and com- destroy civilian morale or an enemy's infrastruc- mentaries on air warfare from 1914 to 1945. (The ture. Overy further argues that the success of Allied title of this volume is a misnomer in that the air operations depended on various factors that re- role of air power in the interwar years receives main important today. These factors include a na- extensive coverage.) As a result, the text is the tion's strategic conceptions, its economic strength third major collection of essays on air warfare and capacity for scientific and technological mobili- now available in English. Eugene Emme, former zation, its political and social receptivity to air professor of international politics at Air Univer- power, and the combat effectiveness of its air forces. sity, first edited The Impact ofAir Power: National John Morrow subsequently demonstrates that disin- Security and World Politics (1959), a seminal cold terest, ineptitude, or misplaced priorities in any one war survey that focuses on the history of air of these areas can lead to disaster. The Allied air power, its revolutionary impact on modern war- forces, for example, won a war of materiel in part fare, and the role it plays as an instrument of na- because their leaders had a commercial, "produc- tional policy. The survey includes 118 brief tivist" vision of warfare. In contrast, technologically essays that focus on historical and policy- conservative Nazi bureaucrats generated more in- oriented themes to include the Soviet aerial trigue than aircraft, and the results were fatal. threat, the balance of terror, and the indivisibil- (World War II occurred at a historical point where ity of aerospace power. As a result, The Impact of the mass production of airplanes was technologi- Air Power is a comprehensive collection of cally possible and therefore important; a war fought authoritative readings, but it also reflects the bi- five years sooner would have resembled the limited ases and assumptions of a rigid bipolar world. air combat of World War I, while a war fought 10 Equal in scope is Air Power and Warfare: The years later would have produced aircraft too com- Proceedings o f the 8th Military History Symposium plex and expensive for large-scale use.) Lastly, the le- (1978), the USAF Academy’s proceedings of the gal and moral thinking of the time failed to delimit Eighth Military History Symposium. It, too, is the impact of "productivism" on air warfare. As W. an important compendium of papers, panei dis- Hays Parks illustrates, law and morality were often cussions, and commentaries on air power from one and the same thing to Allied air leaders, and the NETASSESSMENT 93

State of intemational lavv, particularly in relation firsthand experience, supplemented by advice to strategic bombing, was Iargely chaotic. Aside from people who helped him master the big from vague prohibitions against indiscriminate bomber. bombardment, there were no rules then in force Besides giving the reader a wealth of detail on B- that applied to air warfare and thus none that ap- 24 flying characteristics and technical advice on plied to the issue of noncombatant immunity. checldist interpretation, Carigan spends consider- Mr Parks’s essay is an early version of his monu- able time on the responsibilities of various crew mental "Air War and the Law of War," a 225-page members from preflight to postmission shutdown. article that appeared in The Air Force Law Review The book provides a two-page photo of the cockpit, in 1990. The article should be required reading for but—because of the emphasis on checklists—blow- any officer interested in the legal/moral dimensions ups of the cockpit's instmmentation would have of air warfare. Further, it is shameful that the US Air been more helpful. Force has not produced an authority equal to Mr In any case, the most interesting part of the Parks, a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve! book is the last chapter, where Carigan discusses The above themes are but a minute sample of his own views of the responsibilities of an air- those raised in The Conduct of the Air War in the craft commander, the value of crew interchange- Second World War. The volume also covers topics ability, and the importance of courage. He also that still receive short shrift in English: the Italian comments on combat flying in World War II but air arm and aircraft industry; French air policy in spends fewer than 10 pages doing so. the interwar period; the role of Japanese air forces, and so forth. However, there are small problems. Carigan passes up the opportunity to compare The book is overwhelmingly Eurocentric and, as the B-24 to the B-17, although making such a com- one would expect, some essays are more original parison was not his intention. Had he—a pilot with and exhaustively documented than others. Ger- considerable experience in both aircraft—done this, hard Krebs's essay on Japanese air forces, for exam- the book would be much more appealing. Cari- ple, is too brief, while Manfred Messerschmidt's gan's passing comments (see pages 73 and 96) lead piece on strategic air war and intemational law me to believe that he preferred the Liberator. pales in comparison with Parks's essay. These ob- If you ever want to get a sense of what it might servations are mere quibbles, however. Given the have been like to preflight a B-24 or fly one in intellectual treasure found in The Conduct o f the Air combat, Adlib may be just the book to read. War in the Second World War, the volume is worth the mouth-dropping price. Lt Col Ricardo G. Cuadros, USAF Norfolk, Virgínia Maj Pete Faber, USAF Colorado Springs, Colorado Lightning Strikes: The 475th Fighter Group in the Pacific War, 1943-1945 by Ronald W. Yoshino. Adlib: Flying the B-24 Liberator in World War Sunflower University Press, 1531 Yuma, Manhat- II by William Carigan. Sunflower University tan, Kansas 66502-4228, 1992, 164 pages, $22.95. Press, 1531 Yuma, Box 1009, Manhattan, Kan- sas 66502-4228, 1988, 100 pages, $17.00. Not only is Lightning Strikes the combat account of the highly successful P-38 unit that de- Ever wondered about how to preflight a B-24 or stroyed 594 Japanese enemy aircraft, it also what it was like to fly this aircraft? These subjects chronicles triumph over numerous adversities. are covered in Adlib by William Carigan, a man The latter include the fact that the group was who had extensive experience as a B-24 instructor formed in Australia at the distant end of US lo- and who completed 50 combat missions as a mem- gistics and was never fully equipped or ade- ber of the Fifteenth Air Force in 1944. Most of the quately supplied. Further, it was manned by book's information and checklists are derived from malnourished airmen who frequently suffered Technical Order AN 01-5EE, "Pilot's Operating In- from fever and disease. To make things worse, structions for B-24G, H, and J" (30 November the group relocated a dozen times to miserable, 1944) and from the Pilot Training Manual for the desolate locations in Australia, New Guinea, and Liberator, B-24 (1944). However, Carigan's advice the Philippines. More pilots lost their lives be- about dealing with the B-24's quirks is based on his cause of bad weather than air combat (33 versus 27). 94 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1994

Ronald W. Yoshino's very readable chronology Yoshino expands on several interesting as- of the birth, maturation, and combat prowess of pects of the 475th's combat history—for example, the 475th makes for a good, historical story that is the group's relationship with legendary civilian spiced with anecdotes (but not heavy on statistics). pilot Charles A. Lindbergh. Originally dispatched He opens with an exciting account of a sortie to the Pacific as a factory liaison for F-4U Cor- flown by Capt Thomas B. ("Mac") McGuire, Jr.( on sairs, Lindbergh not only increased the 475th's 26 December 1943, when McGuire shot down four effectiveness by training its pilots in long-range Japanese bombers. Having gained the reader's at- cruise techniques but actually shot down a Japa- tention, Yoshino craftily outlines the 475th's role nese fighter in aerial combat. Also carefully in theater and campaign strategy but is careful not chronicled are the exploits and ultimate demise to dwell on the high-level decisions of Gen of Mac McGuire, who at the time of his death Douglas MacArthur, Adm Chester Nimitz, and the was the group's leading ace with 38 aerial kills. Pentagon. Finally, three factors contribute to Yoshino's Yoshino's account of the 475th also includes a effectiveness. First, he develops a sense of "being skillful comparison of the P-38 and Japanese there" by not succumbing to "politically cor- fighter aircraft. Although the P-38 had long- rect" English (e.g., he writes of "officers and range, high-speed, and high-altitude capabilities— men"). Second, he provides vivid accounts of as well as massive firepower and twin-engine suffering, struggles, and victories. Third, he re- survivability—its size prevented it from turning frains from filling the gaps in current research inside the flight path of the smaller, more nim- with subjective personal conclusions even ble Japanese Zero. Yoshino then turns to the tac- though he probably was tempted to do so. tics of air combat, especially the Zero's high- Lt Col Dion W. Johnson, USAF, Retired speed, slashing, dive-and-run gun attack. Lebanon, New jersey

I Can Write Better than That!

OK, then do it! Airpower Journal is always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you've got something to say, send it to us. We'll be happy to consider it for publication. The Journal focuses on the operational levei of war—that broad area between grand strategy and tactics. We are interested in articles that will stimulate thought on how warfare is conducted. This includes not only the actual conduct of war at the operational levei, but also the impact of leadership, training, and support functions on operations. We need two typed, double-spaced draft copies of your work. We encourage you to supply graphics and photos to support your article, but don't let the lack of those keep you from writing! We are looking for articles from 2,500 to 5,000 words in length-about 15 to 25 pages. As the professional journal of the Air Force, APJ strives to expand the horizons and professional knowledge of Air Force personnel. To do this, we seek and encourage challenging articles. We look forward to your submissions. Send them to the Editor, Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. C □ N T T ü R S

Capt Charla T. Barco 6A Humingdon Capt John R Glock h cuxtentiy a coaunand Col Donald t. W addell III (BA. Unlversity ot Coiiegr. MA. 1'mveruty oi Alabanui is ac cargcting otficer at Au Combat Coaunand Loutsvllle; MA, Troy State Unlversity) ts educacional consultam at the Air Force lACCl He has üeen setected as a targctmg prolessor of leadership studies at Air War Qualtty Im ntuie. Maxweii AfB. AiaCama. He insuuctot tor the new Joint Target Trauung Collegc A torm er wing com m andct and has i erved in a variety ol education. Program. and at ptesent is wotking on course numbercd au lorce vice-comnundrr. he has Irarirtship. and tntelhgencg-related posm ons des eiopmenr Pixu to his ptesent aasignment served as a hghtrr pilot lor most ol his career. at Hcadquartcrs Strategu. Air Coaunand. be was a targeting otôcer at the wing. gtoup Coloncl W addell is a dislinguished graduate Offutt AFB NeOraska; Squadron Ofhcer m aior com m and. and th caicr leveis. WhUe m ol Air Command and Staif Col lege and a Jclusoi. Ceuta tcx Protesucnai Deveioptneni. Korêa. he w tote the ACC Au Targenng Plaa graduate ot the Industna! College of the arai Coilege oi Aetotpate D octnnr Research Dcinng the Guit W at. he ptovided targeung Armed Forces. and fcducan on ai Majraeii and Srvcnth Au juppon to the C im paign Plans Dtvision «the Fort ui Kocea Black Hoée! In the rwo veats loliowing the CuilW ar. he aotaed on the Gulf Wiar Au ftm er iu n n and was a pnnapal contnbutot to volume 1, ‘ Planmng the Au Campaign ' Captam Glock ts a graduate ot Srjuadion Ofhcrr SchooL

95 Maj Roger C. Hunter (BS, University of Maj David Nicholls (BS, Rensselaer Lt Col Stephen A. Coulombe (BSEE, MEE, Geórgia; MS, Air Force lnstitute of Polytechnic Institute; MS, University of Comell University; MBA, Boston University) Technology) is a member of the Operational Dayton; DPhil, University of Oxford) is a is chief, Airbome Laser Test and Integration, Issues Group. Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans student at Air Command and Staff College. He Phillips Laboratory, Kirtland AFB, New and Operations, Headquarters USAF. Previous has served as an engineer at the Air Force México. He has previously served as exchange assignments include space operations crew Materials Laboratory and as an associate officer with Canadian Defence Headquarters commander, staff officer at Headquarters Air professor at the US Air Force Academy. At the and the German Flight Test Center; chief Force Space Command, and action officer at Academy he recelved the Outstanding engineer with a classified flight test program; Headquarters Air Force Space Division. Major Military Educator Award in Engineering and test director with the Airbome Laser Hunter is a graduate of Squadron Officer Mechanics and the Dow Outstanding Young Laboratory. Colonel Coulombe is a graduate School, Air Command and Staff College, and Faculty Award from the American Sodety for of Squadron Officer School and Canadian the School of Advanced Airpower Studies. Engineering Education. He has IS technical Forces Command and Staff College. publications to his credit.

Maj Todor D. Tagarev (BS and MS, Bulgarian Air Force Academy; PhD, N. E. Joukovsky Air Force Engineering Academy in Moscow) is a student at the Air Command and Staff College. He has served as a weapon systems maintenance specialist, as a lecturer and deputy head of the Scientific Research Department at the Bulgarian Air Force Academy, and as a military education specialist for the Personnel Department of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense. Major Tagarev has written over 20 publications on systems control.

Please W Recycle

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Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF, Retired, Kapos Associates Lt Col Donald R. Baucom, USAF, Retired Brig Gen James L. Cole, Jr., USAF, Chief o f Safety, Headquarters USAF Col Keith W. Geiger, USAF, Retired Dr Richard P. Hallion, Air Force Historian Col Raymond A. Hamilton, Jr., USAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University

The Airpower Journal (ISSN 0897-0823), Air Force Recurring Publication 10-1, is published quarterly. Subscriptions may be ordered from New Orders, Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954. Annual rates are $13.00 domestic and $16.25 outside the United States. The GPO stock number is 708-007-00000-5. The Journal welcomes unsolicited manuscripts. Address them to Editor, Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. Submit double-spaced, typed manuscripts in duplicate. AH submissions will be edited in accordance with the standards set forth in the Air University Press Style Guide. Journal telephone listings are DSN 493-5322 and commercial (205) 953-5322. fft Winter 1994 JOURNAL