UNASSIFIED Copy 2 6 of 75'copies I IDA PAPER P-1903 THE RELATIONSHIP OF BATTLE DAMAGE U 0T~O UNIT COMBAT PERFORMANCE 5 74 DTIC L r Leonard Wainstein - April 1986 DISRMU7ONSTATEMENT A Approved for public releassi INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES W 1801 N. Beauregard Street, Alexandria, VA 22311. UNCLASSIFIED IDA Log No. HO 85-30721 The work reported In this document was conducted under IDA's In- dependent Research Program. Its publication does not Imply endorse- ment by the Department of Defense or any other government agency, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official posl- tion of any government agency. This paper has been reviewed by IDA to assure that it meets high methodologystandards of and thoroughness, that the conclusions objectivity, stm fromand thesound methodology. analytical This document is unclassified and suitable for public release. .. -'A. - *1 U. "' :1I .. ' . ,, ., , ,- ,,-,, - - -..- .- ,-.- . -. ,,.- , ,.,..-..- ...- , -.. ,- . -. -..- < ,. ...... -..-..- ; ..-. -. - -, -. -,. .. ...- , ., . -I.- UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Il. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS UNCLASSIFIED 2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY . DISTSIBUTIOIAVAILABIUTY OF REPORT MDA 903 84C 0031 "d 2b. DECLASriICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE This document is Unclassified and suitable for public release "% N/A 4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER (5) L MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER (5) IDA Paper P-1903 . NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Sb. OFFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Institute for Defense Anayses f applicble) OSD, OUSDRE (DoD-IDA Management Office) S. ADDRESS (City, State, and Zip Code) 7b. ADDRESS (CITY, STATE, ANUD ZIP CODE) 1801 North Beauregard Street 1801 North Beauregard Street Alexandria, Virginia 22311 Alexandria, VA 22311 NGOFFICE SYMBOL L. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ORGANIZATION (if applicable) Sc. ADORESS (City, Stale, aid Zip Cod 15, SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM PROJECT TASK NO. ACCESSION NO. ELEMENT NO. WORK UNIT 11. TITLE (lnclhde Security Clasllfictlon) The Relationship of Batlde Damage to Unit Combat Performance 12. PERSONAL AUTHOR (5). Leonard Wainstein 13. TYPE OF REPORT 3b. TIME COVERED 14. DATE OF REPORT (Year. Month. Day) 15. PAGE COUNT FINAL FROM TO APRIL 1986 94 1. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION IDA INDEPENDENT RESEARCH 17. COSATI CODES Is. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on revarm IInecaa.y and Identify by block number) FIELD GROUP SUS•GROUP Battle damage, Casualties, Combat effectiveness, Morale, World War I,World War II, Infantry, Armored formations i. ASSTRACT (Centinue on reveme If neceay and Identify by block number) The purpose of this study is to investigate the historical basis for the assumption that a military formation will cease to be effective after having ost a pro-ordained percentage of itsstrength. Batles from the First World War to the 1982 Falklands campaign we reviewed for Insight Into the validity of ts assumption. The effect of heavy batfle damage on units has been both variable and unpredictable., There is a relationship between losses and the continued willingness to fight, but It defies precise definition. So long as some men In the formation continue to fight as an organized entity, either in atack or defense, for whatever reason, ft formation they represent cannot be termed 'Ineffective. 20. DISTRIBUTIONAVAILASIUTY OF A5TRACT I1. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION M UNCLASSIFIEDIUNLIMITED [ SAME AS RPT. 03 DuO USERS UNCLASSIFIED 22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 2. OFFICE SYMBOL DODFOM 1471 . MAR "4 APR edition my be used until elmuled. All other odillone we ofeoele UNCLASSIFIEDUCLSIFE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE :. .-':" . UNCLASSIFIED IDA PAPER P-1903 THE RELATIONSHIP OF BATTLE DAMAGE TO UNIT COMBAT PERFORMANCE Leonard Wainstein April 1986 V.o, IDA i INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA Independent Research Program UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PREFACE This study was conducted as part of the Independent Research Program of the Institute for Defense Analyses, under which significant issues of general interest to the defense research community are investigated. Accesion For N'TIS CRAMI *DTIC TAB El U. Or C; -.ce d By...... Di-t ib.tio 4 Avijla, inty Codes IAVr1: a Glor Oil UNCLASSIFIED - '. - '.'- .7 i UNCLASSIFIED CONTENTS PREFACE .............................................. ii SUMMARY............... ..... ............... ................. 1.I I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 6 Earlier Studies ............................................................. 11 A. The ORO Clark Report of 1954 .................................................... 11 B. The RAC Best Report of 1966 ................................................ 12 II. MORALE AND MOTIVATION ................................................... 14 III. CASUALTIES AND RESPONSE IN THE FIRST W ORLD W AR ...................................................................... 27 IV. CASUALTIES AND RESPONSE IN THE SECOND, WORLD WAR AND KOREA ..................................................... 36 A. Terminology and Analysis .................................................... 36 B. Unequal Distribution of Casualties ............................................. 43 C. Variability and Unpredictability of the Impact of Casualties ...........48 V. ARMORED FORMATIONS ..................................................... 63 VI. SOME DATA AGGREGATIONS .............................. 78 REFRENCES ........................................................................ 87 V UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ISUMMARY The purpose of this study is to investigate the historical basis for the assumption that a military formation will cease to be effective after having lost a certain pre-ordained percentage of its strength. Battles from the First World War to the 1982 Falklands War have been reviewed for insight into the validity of this assumption. The battle cases cited run from army level to battalion level, from single day engagements to those lasting several months. The title of this study was deliberately chosen to avoid use of the terms "casualties" and "unit effectiveness." The historical examples discussed should make the reason obvious. The word "casualties" must comprehend much more than a simple body count of killed, wounded, and missing. I have chosen to use the term "combat performance" rather than effectiveness because it is looser and does not pretend to precision. Robert Best in his ORO Report uses the term "operability" that expresses better the points that have been illustrated in this paper. A unit remains operable so long as its surviving personnel continue to fight, and while it is still operable it may or may not be able to achieve any specific objective. Some 54 actions are mentioned in this report, these being cases where data were available both on losses or initial attrited strength and results of the action. These data are given in Chapter VI. Of the 54 actions, only 11 represent cases where a formation collapsed, surrendered, was repulsed, was stalemated, or had to be taken out of the line after suffering some degree of damage. The losses incurred by these formations covered a spectrum from virtually none to 56 percent, the heaviest being suffered by a unit that was moving ahead when it was relieved. The 11 cases were divided equally between defending and attacking forces. However, there is no discernible pattern here. 'a'. The other 43 cases represent formations that continued to attack or defend despite losses of some degree of severity, from heavy to appalling. Eleven of these formations were in defense, 33 in attack, but this ratio probably does not represent a pattern but rather choice of actions. In fact, it is likely that more examples can be found of decimated units U L- 1 FE, UNCLASSIFIED , ' 4 " t. W" %, V" •- :' .- " * - . * . " - " " . .. * - ' " " - " " " "~. " - * : \ UNCLASSIFIED successfully defending than attacking, since the advantages of the defense can compensate to some extent for reduced strength. There are five elements the loss of which can "put a unit out of action:" 1. Loss of personnel; 2. Loss of equipment, combat and support, through destruction by the enemy or by maintenance failure; 3. Failure of supply--POL and ammunition; 4. Collapse of the command structure--death of commanders, loss of communications; 5. Loss of morale. The "operability" of a formation is a function of the interrelationship of these elements. Of the five the last would seem to be the most important. Only the morale factor d can explain the not uncommon pattern of heavily attrited units continuing to display good combat performance. Where morale has been high, even very heavy losses will not put a formation out of action. On the other hand, failure of morale can lead to panic or resignation in which defeat can occur wit little accompanying battle damage. That morale is composed of many complex elements and is affected by an equal range, from simple lack of sleep to the way battle damage is suffered. Victory in battle is dependent upon the possession of two capabilities in greater degree than the enemy, namely, the ability to endure and the ability to injure. The former is primarily a function of morale and of the imponderables of leadership, training and fighting style and capacity. There are, to be sure, material factors like replacement flow, logistic supply, and medical services, but above all else is morale.