UNDERSTANDING CHANGE IN THE LANDMI@JEREGIME

Carolyn E. Lloyd

Submitted in partial Wientof the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia August, 1997

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1 wouid like to dedicate this thesis to Tun Channereth who inspired me. Table of Contents

Abstract

Chapter One Introduction .

Cha~terTwo

The Interest Variable: Military and Economic Rationales of Landmines .

Cha~terThree

The Knowledge Variable: A Mine of Information?

Cha~terFour

The Power Variable: The Players and Process of the Landmine Regime .

Cha~terFive

Conclusion .

Works Cited . Abstract

There is today a global landmine crisis. One hundred million uncleared launmines currently lie in the ground. They rnaim or küI indiscrirninately, sometimes long after hostilities have ceased. Civilians are the leadhg victims, and not soldiers. The Iist of mine-infésted places in some sixty-four states reads like the history of recent co~cts: Angola, Bosnia-Henegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and others. The list also reads like the roll cdof the developing world. The accumulation of mines has special consequences for areas lacking resources to cope with the additionai burden of landmines. Efforts such as mine clearance and victim rehabilitation are currently underway to cope with the problem. However, a growing number of inâividuals in the international community believe that these actions are not enough. Solutions are needed that will arrest the problem at its root This thesis explores the prospects for an international regime to ban landmines.

Three variables -- interest, knowledge, and power - influence the process of regime formation. In a chapter devoted to the interest variable, it is seen that many states will be reluctant to cooperate in a regime because they will not want to forego their military and economic interests in landmines. However, if the regime is perceived by states to meet three criteria in a satisfactory manner, namely, enforcement, participation, and solution-salience, the future of that regime is brighter. Secondly, a chapter dedicated to the knowledge variable reveals that sufficient awareness of the crisis wiil lead states to alter their understanding of what their interests are. They will lem that the crisis is dire and that global action is required for the good of humanity. The successful realization of a regime depends, in part, on the abiiity of groups of experts and other relevant parties to disseminate information about the negative consequences of landmines. Finally, a chapter that concems itself with the power variable shows that inertia will govern the issue in the absence of strong and committed leadership. Sorne state or states must be willing to take the initiative in a given area for a regime to emerge. These variables teil us what to expect, as weli as what is needed for international cooperation to occur. Although it remains to be seen whether an enduring and effective regime wilI actualiy corne into existence, the conclusion notes that there are promising signs of change. The conclusion also draws on the explanatory power of the variables involved in regime formation to suggest ways in which this momentum cm be sustained. Acknowledgements

1 would like to aclmowledge my thesis advisor, Professor Gilbert Winham for his invaluable advice, his tirne, and his enthusiasm. Many thanlcs go to Professors Denis Stairs and Danford Middlemiss for their careful readings of the text. 1 wish also to thank my family. CEiAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

"Likea deadly disease long absent and assumed conquered, the land mine,

that scourge of the battlefield of World War 1, has reemerged on a scale

unimagined and with hideous, unanticipated effects" wrote former Secretary

General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1994. He added that

"there is today a global land mine crisis."l This thesis attempts to explain what

is necessary for change to stem the crisis. More precisely, it wiU examine the

prospects for the creation of an international regime in the issue-area of

antipersonnel landmines. Since the earliest studies on regimes were stimdated by cails for pragmatic solutions to global problems2, it is fitting to place this particular issue within that body of literature. For many, the scourge of landmines tops the list of global problerns.

Before entering into a discussion on the literature of regimes, it is helpful to set the stage for the chapters to corne. Our introduction serves as a primer on landmines, the problem, and some of the solutions. It will later define regime and

lBoutros Boutros-Ghali, 'TheLand Mine Crisis: A Humanitarian Disaster," Foreimi Mairs 735 (September-October 1994). 8. Hereafter cited as Boutros-Ghali, "Land Mine

'Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, "Regime Theory and the English School International Relations: A Cornparison." Miliennium 2 1:3 (1992). 329. Hereafter cited Evans and Wilson, "RegimeTheory and English School." the variables that determine whether or not a regime will be fod.

First of all, what is a landmine? The accepted legal definition is "a

munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed

to be exploded by the presence. proximity or contact of a person or vehicle."' The

fuse may comprise a tripwire, an anti-handling device or a form of electronic

sensor. Two broad categories of landmines exist: hti-perso~d(AP) and ami-

tank (AT). The former, as the name implies, are targeted at persons, and the latter

are designed to be detonated by vehicles. AT mines contain between two and nine

kilograms of explosive (compared to the ten to 250 grams of explosive in AP

mines). They require a greater pressure to detonate them than AP mines (usudy

100 kilograms or more). While uiis thesis focuses on AP mines, the distinction

between the two is not always transparent. Some modified dual-purpose anti-tank

mines can be detonated by only seven kiiograms of pressure. In addition, anti-tank

mines are unable to distinguish between tank-drivers, and the civilian drivers of

tractors and relief trucks, a criticism leveiIed at AP mines4.

31ntemationalCornmittee of the Red Cross, ICRC Overview: Anti-Personnel Mines -1996 (Geneva, Switzerland: ICRC Publications, 1996). 3. Hereafter cited as ICRC,Overview -1996. 'United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Land Mines: From Words to Action DHA Issues on Focus Series: No. 3. (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations 3

Of the 360 or so types of AP mines, produced in approximately 55 countries5, two distinct groups emerge. Both are purposely caiculated to maim, or kill the victim. The most common is the blast mine, which is surface or sub- surface laid. Activated by direct pressure, it relies primarily on its explosive blast to be effective. The blasting of the mine casing, dia, gravel, surroundhg vegetation and even the victim's footwear causes secondary injury. Popular models are the Soviet-made PMN, PMN-2and the United States-made M14.

The second group of AP mines is the hgmentation mine. The majority of fragmentation mines are laid above ground, supported on stakes or attached with mounting brackets :O man-made structures, trees and undergrowth. In rnost cases, they are triggered by a tripwire. When the mine is set off, fragmentation is scattered over a radius of roughly 20 meters. Directional fragmentation mines hold pre-formed metal fragments located in an explosive charge that are projected in a pre-determined arc of about 50 meters. A much-imitated directional mine is the US.-made Ml8 and M18A1 CIayrnore. Bounding mines also rely on strewn fragments to be harmful. A propehg charge elevates the mine to stomach height before the main charge explodes, permithg a wide area to be covered by its contents. They are particularly lethal. An example of the bounding mine is the

. - . . .-. . . .. -

Department of Humanitarian Mairs, 1995). 4. Hereafter cited as UNDHA, Words to Action.

%RC, Overview 1996,3. Italian-produced Valmara 6g6.

AP mines can be categorized in another way: rnanufactured and

improvised. The manufactureci mine is readily identifiable by its general

appearance and, on occasion, the markings of the producer. The improvised mine,

an abundant item in less-developed nations. is typically made from explosives or

from dud-fied ordnance. It ranges fiom a pound to several hundred pounds, and

may be modined to suit the user's need7.

New technologies, concentrathg on the means of delivery and fushg

systems, have altered the makeup of mines. Remotely deliverable mines, dso

called scatterables, were used widely for the esttime in Vietnam. Rather than

being deployed by hand or mechanical means, the mines are distributed on a

large scale by artillery, rocket and mortar dispensers. The dispensers are attached

to helicopters, fïxed-wing aircraft and land vehicles. The mines lie in a visible

state on the ground, until their inevitable concealment by nature. A helicopter-

mounted system has the capacity to drop over 2000 AP mines in three to sixteen

minutes.

A nurnber of AP mines, such as the Chinese Type 72, are now equipped

'Human Rights Watch, Landmines: A Deadv Le~acv(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993). 18-20. Hereafter cited as Human Rights Watch, Deadly Legacy.

'Richard H. Johnson, Why Mines? A Military Perspective," in Kevin M. Cahill, ed., Clearinn the Fields: Solutions to the Global Land Mines Crisis (New York: Basic Books and the CounciI on Foreign Relations, 1995). 3 1. Hereafter cited as Johnson, "Why Mines?". 5 with anti-hanclhg or aati-disturbance devices, devices fomerly reserved for AT mines. The tilt switches which cause the mines to explode if they are disturbed in any way, are devised to prevent the enemy from deactivating or removing the mine. The hazards they pose for mine clearance are obvious.

Other techndogy has added self-neutralization (SN) and selfaestruction

(SD) mechanisrns to the fusing systems of mines. The fuse self-neutralizes or self- destructs after a predetemllned amount of time. The mechanisms qualifv a mine as "srnad' and set it apart fiom the traditional stockpile of conventional or

"dumb" mines. Many regard "smart"mines, if proven reliable, as an alternative to the mapping and fencing of minefields, since their iifecycle is known8.

Unless othennrise specined, the te- "landmine"or "mine" in this thesis will be used with referen~eto AP mines, and not AT mines.

The Problem

At fïrst glance, it appears that landmines differ little fkom other classical munitions. Designed to complement AT mines as weapons of war, they are viewed as relatively low-tech, easy and inexpensive to produce, easy to deploy

'Chris Smith, The Military Utility of Landmines . . ? (London:NorthSouth Defence and Security Programme, Centre for Defence Studies, King's Coilege, 1996). 23-24. Hereafter cited as Smith, Militarv Utility. 6 and militarily usefulg. Furthemore, they do not evoke the "nighbnarish vision^"'^ of warfare conducted with chernical or biological weapons. Do they pose a problem at all? Was former Secretary General Boutros-Ghali misguided in pronouncing a global landmine crisis? A crisis exists when there is: (1) perception of grave threat; (2) perception of limited tirne to make a decision or response and; (3) perception of disastrous consequences fkom inaction". An increasing number of individuals in the international community agree that landmines now pose a "grave threat," that there is a limited time to respond to the threat and that inaction WUresult in disastrous consequences.

The AmProject of Human Rights Watch has cited several reasons why the use of landmines has reached cnsis proportions. The overarching reason is that landmines are "bbld weapons" that cannot discem between the footfall of a soldier and any other footfall. Unlike a bomb or artiilery sheil which explodes when it hits its target, a landmine lies in wait, sometimes long after the fighting has ceased. In their uiability to distinguish civilian and miiitary targets, landmines are not far removed fkom chernical or biological weapons. Other similarities include the numerous deaths and gruesome injuries they cause, as wefl as their

gWilliamMaiey, ed., Dealine With Mines: Stratedes for Peacekeepers. Aid Agencies and the International Community (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994), 1. Hereafter cited as Maley, Dealing With Mines.

'OHuman Rights Watch, Deadl~Legacv, 12.

llK.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Anaivsis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hal, 1992)- 350. Hereafter cited as Holsti, International Poiitics. 7 potentîd for long-term devastation. They are weapons of mass desmetion in slow motion. The gradual accumulation of mines leads to the possibility of mass destru~tion'~.One Pentagon official cornrnented. "war is by nature tough. "13 But this comment, said with a shrug, loses its hard-nosed legitimacy when one considers the victims most commonly afflicted, in a place and time often miles and decades away fkom war. They are children at play, women gathering firewood, and farmers in their fields.

The six main reasons why the use of landmines is now perceived as a grave threat that should be acted upon as soon as possible are as follows.

i) Growing number of producers und exporters

The number of producers and exporters has mushroomed over the past few decades, especiaily fiom the Third World. For instance, Singapore and Pakistan recentiy joined the ranks of aggressive producers and exporters. In the last five years, China has surfaced as one of the Ieading exporters of mines.

iiJShijtfrorndefensive to offensive use of mines

Mines have changed in their role as a predominately defensive, tactical battlefieId weapon to an offensive, strategic weapon. Frequently aimed at

12HumanRights Watch, Deadly Legac~,1 1 - 12.

I3Pentagon official, interview by author, Notes, Arlington, Virginia, May 16 1997. 8 civiüans, their goal is to vacate temtory, destroy food sources, create refugee flows and to spread terror.

iii)Chging nature of warfare

Many wars today are aptly described as low-intensive, long-ninning, and internai. Wtaries with modest resources opt for light arms Like land mines since they can rarely a£ford or gain access to major weapons systems. Writes one author,

. . . the conflicts the United Nations is "actually dealing with" represents a major shift in global priorities. During the cold war, most world leaders were understandabiy preoccupied with the potential threat of nuclear war or an East-West conflict in Europe. Today policy-makers are more concerned about the immediate threat of ethnic and sectarian warfare. This inevitably leads . . . to a concem with small am,land mines, and other light munition^'^.

Anned combat between established States is generally aimed at the defeat of the opponent's military forces but the objective of interna1 warfare is oftentimes the slaughter and intimidation of members of the other side, as well as their forced abandonment of homes and villages. Landmines are suited to the task. Entire nations become theatres of war as confiicts seldom occur on conventional

14Michael T. EUare, "The New Arms Race: Light Weapons and International Security," Cment Histoq 96:609 (April 1997)- 173. Hereafter cited as Klare, "New Arms Race. " iv)Newly sophisticated mine technology

Mïnes are deadlier than ever. The introduction of plastic mines with little or no metal content aggravates the process of detection and removd. Anti- handling devices that contain microchips and electronic sensors heighten the ri& posed to demining personnel. And, of course, scatterable mines deploy in minutes what would have taken a World War II banalion ali day to do1'. Their imprecise placement over vast tracts of land makes recording the location of the mines nearly impossible. Self-destruchg and self-neutrabhg mines, however fail-sate, do not assuage the fears of villagers retuming to their homes, nor give deminers the leeway to be les rigorous in their job. Fear and uncertainty are just as debilitating as mines themselves. In brief, aithough Little money has been devoted to research on demining, "many millions of dollars have been spent making mines more effective, more wounding per unit cos&and more difncuit to clear."16

%ee Peter J. Ec kberg, "Remotely Delivered Land Mines and International Law," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 33: 1 (1995) for a detailed anaiysis on the remotely delivered, or scatterable mine as a technological development that poses a grave problem. Hereafter cited as Eckberg, "Remotely Delivered."

16PaûickBlagden, "The Use of Mines and the Impact of Technology," in Kevin M. Cahill, ed., Clearing the Fields: Solutions to the Global Land Mines Cnsis (New York: Basic Books and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 113. Hereafter cited as Blagden, "The Use of Mines." v)Inexpensive cost of mines

Mines may be deadlier, but their price remains astoundingly cheap. The

U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency States that the use of mines is costeffective on three counts:

-When compared with its intended target, the price of a landmine can

escaiate significantly before losing its cost-effectiveness;

-the cost of technological improvements in landmines is, in general, less

than the cost of the technologies needed to counter them;

-recent developrnents in mine technoIogy, such as rapid delivery systems,

while resulting in a higher-priced landmine, cm also result in a more

economical minefield".

Most mines are priced at less than twenty-five dollars, some as iittle as three dollarsI8. A positive evduation of their cost-effectiveness naturaliy precludes the cost incurred in dealing with their aftermath. Cleaning up mines

17U.S.Defense Inteiligency Agency and U.S. Amy Foreign Science and Technology Center, quoted in Human Rights Watch, Deadlv Leeac~,11.

laBoutros-Ghali, "Land Mine Crisis," 11. 11 amounts to 300 to 1OOO dollars per mine, using local deminerdg. If the use of mines were halted immediately, it would stiU take 1,100 years and 33 billion dollars to clear, at current rates, those already in place. As it is, as many as five million nav mines are planted in countries like Angola and Bosnia each year.

vi)Sheer accumulation of mines

The new mines king planted contribute to what has been caiIed one of the most '"long-lasting forms of pollution' the world has ever known. "'O The world's earth holds 110 million active mines. Every month, the lives of over 2000 individuals are intempted by death or injury as a result of landmines. Their accumulation underlines the character of mines as a legacy -- a deadly one. In

September of 1994, three people were Uedin the Fraolcfurter Allee of Berlin when a World War II bomb dropped by the fies unexpectedly exploded on a building site. The few thousand live bombs that remain as an unpleasant reminder of the world wu, however troubling, do not stand up to the danger posed by landmines, numbering in the millions, waiting for their victims2'. For example,

lgShridath S. Ramphal and Ingvar Carlsson, Our Global Neighbourhood: The Rewrt of the Commission on Global Govemance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 130. Hereafter cited as Ramphal and Carlsson, Global Neiphbourhood.

201ntemationalCornmittee of the Red Cross, Anti-Personnel Landmines: Fnend or Foe? (Geneva: International Cornmittee of the Red Cross, 1996). 7. Hereafter cited as ICRC, Friend or Foe?

21Maley,DeaIinrr With Mines, i. 12

Jerry White, CO-founderof the Landmine Suwivors Networlc, can test* to the fact that "a cheap little piece of pink or yellow plastic can keep a war going for decades afier the ink dries on a peace treatyOnnAn American student attending

Hebrew University in Israel in the mid-eighties, he recalIed how "the earth exploded around ml"upon encountering a landmine. He wrote, "my right foot had been blown off and a bone was hanging out of my left leg."* The mine was a relic of the 1967 Middle East war. Lancimines continue to cause casualties in

Vietnam, twenty years after U.S. withdrawal and in Europe and North Afkica. To add to the wars of the past, the list of mine-uifested places in some 64 states

"reads Like the history of recent c~nflicts:"~~Angola, Afghanistan, Bosnia-

Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia,

Sudan, and others.

The list also reads like the roil cd of the developing world. The accumulation of mines has special consequences for areas plagued with medical, social, econornic and environmental difficulties. Such states lack resources to cope with the additional burden of landmines. The effects of landmines are felt at all levels of society: individual, family, community, and nation2? Individuals

"Mariiyn Greene, "Victims of Land Mines Raise a Blood-Red Hag," USA Todav (1994). 1A. Hereafter cited as Greene, "Victirnsof Land Mines,"

23JerryWhite in Greene, "Victims of Land Mines,"Al.

241CRC,Friend or Foe?, 9.

2SHumanRights Watch, Deadlv Le~acv,4. 13 who survive mine explosions experîence extreme physical pain. Thirty per cent of survivors undergo amputation. In numerous cases, their means of livelihood is taken away fkom them. A ten-year-old victim with a Me expectancy of fifty to sixty years wiU need approximately twenty-five protheses, at the prohibitive cost of $125 each, or $3,125 in his or her Metirne. in addition to fees for long hospital stays and rehabilitative services26. Children are especially vulnerable to the scourge of landmines because they have a natural curiosity to roam nom well- marked paths, they often mistake colourful landmines for toys, their bodies are smalIer and closer to the centre of the blasf2' and should one or both of their parents be injured or killed by a landmine, they. as dependents, wilI suffer.

Families carry the emotional and financial burden of the loss or injury of their loved one. In mine-ridden areas, the rnembers of a village must leam to work the fields in the best possible capacity, imperhg their lives every day, or else Ieave their homes to live somewhere else. Communities grow strained and have been known to dissolve entire1y. Nations face the daunting task of pst-confîict peace- building with crippled transport, communication. power and irrigation systems.

The swift repatriation of refugees is prevented by the prevaience of mines. Not only tbat, livestock fall prey to the carnage; large tracts of fertile land are rendered

26Boutros-Ghali, "Land Mine Crisis," 10.

27MaryA. Ferrer, "Affirrning Our Common Hurnanity: Regulating Landmines to Protect Civilians and Children in the Developing World," Hastings International and Com~arativeLaw Review 20: 135 (1996), 166- 168. Hereafter cited as Ferrer, 'Our Common Hurnanity. " 14

unusable, resulting in food shortages; and medicd and public health teams are

over~helmed~.In Cambodia, for instance, where eighty-five per cent of the

population eams its living hmthe land, the results are devastating. Four million

mines are littered across the coune- one mine per two Cambodians. It is home

to the world's largest number of amputees: one out of every 236 citizens has been

maimed. In 1990, six thousand citizens needed amputations nom mine blasts;

close to that many died fiom shock and loss of blood. The slow progress of mine

clearance --and its high cost- has Ied one exasperated development worker to

declare that Cambodia is in fact being cleared of mines "an arm and a leg at a

tirne-1i3O

The laadmine problem has thus become an urgent one in a world in which

one out of three countries is mined, in which hundreds of millions of lives are

innuenced each day by their nefarious presence, in which hapless inhabitants are

drawn hto countless connicts, and in which the bitter harvest of mines grows

28HumanRights Watch, Deadv Legacv, 4.

2gCambodiafsuuwelcome legacy is a product of the U.S. Air Force's scattering of mines dong Vietcong supply Lines, the large-scde emplacement of mines by Khmer Rouge rebels and Vietnarnese forces in the mid-to-late seventies, and the more recent deployment of mines by the Wmer Rouge and their Cambodian opponents.

'OJack H. McCd, Jr. "Infernal Machines and Hidden Death: International Law and Limits on the Indiscriminate Use of Land Mine Warfare," Georgia Journal of International and Comaarative Law 24:229 (1994). Hereafter cited as McCaII, "Infernal Machines. " 15 more abundant each year. "Every other weapon gets put away after war,"" comments the leader of the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, but landmines remain, frequently forgotten by local warlords and military professionais alike. They present a unique horror.

Solutions

Fortunately, the crisis is not without its potential solutions. Less positively, opinion is polarized among members of the international community on the best way to proceed. A multifaceted problem wiil inevitably suggest a varied set of remedies. The following is a summary of proposals that are aimed at solving the crisis at the national, regional and multilateral levels.

Before proceeding, it is important to note that, while some of the proposals complement each other and others rival each other, they ail attempt to arrest the problem at its root. Such a narxowing of focus is not designed to diminish the efforts of individuals, groups and policy-makers in providing resources for humanitarian dernining, as weil as victim rehabilitation and assistance. These efforts are valiant and urgently-needed. However, coping with the problem is not the same as solving it. A consensus is growing that the use, production,

"Bobby Muller, quoted in "Banishing Land Mines," New York Times (August 12, 1997). 16 stockpihg and export of anti-personnel mines must be addressed as soon ar possible. Peter Hansen, Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under Secretary

General for Humanitarian Affairs has written that ". . .we fail in our responsibility if we limit our efforts to offering assistance after the fa~t."~~Maiy

Wareham, leader of the U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines, has cornmented that to move forward without implementing "front-end or "supply- ide")^ proposds, that is, proposds that deal with landmines before they inflict damage, is to "feel like the ambulance at the bottom of the cli£ft""

a)National Solutions

In November 1996, a United Nations Generai Assembly resolution cailed upon govements to implernent "bans, rnoratoria or other restrictions" on the production, stockpiling, expoa and use of antipersonnel mines "at the earliest date possible." "Bansttare official prohibitions, "moratoria" are agreed suspensions of activity, and "restrictions" are conditions that impose constraints on activity.

The most effective and permanent of national measures consist of laws

32PeterHansen in UNDHA, From Words to Action, 2.

33Ke~ethAnderson and Monica Schurtman, "The United Nations Response to the Crisis of Landmines in the Developing World," Harvard International Law Journal 36:2 (Spring 1995) 365. Hereafter cited as Anderson and Schurtman, l'United Nations Response."

"Mary Wareham, interview by author, Notes, U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines Headquarters, Washington D.C., May 12,1997. 17 prohibithg the production, stockpiling, export and use of AP mines. It is thought that a critical mass of states pursuing these steps will produce a dnfmo ban. Such a hope may be meatistic when one considers the discrepancies in the degree of commitment fiom one state to the next. Unilateral measures in the form of moratoria, national policy dedarations and administrative orders, while positive, indicate a lesser degree of commitment towards a total ban. Furthemore, some states steadfastly refuse to impose limits on landmuies in any capacity?

b)Regional Solutions

Regional initiatives are helpful in encouraging the decisions of national governments. The Report of the Commission on Global Govemance notes that

"there is no single model" of regional CO-operation."Between the world of nation- states and the global comrnunity of people lie the various manifestations of regionalism. . . experience has borne out that strengthening regional integration takes fime and demands strong political commitment and an adequate legal and institutionai frame~ork."~~One manSestation of regionalism is the anti-personnel mine fiee zone. The first such zone was created by the six Central American states

351nternationaICommittee of the Red Cross, Sto~dngthe Landmines Eoidernic: From Ne~otiationto Action (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1996), 4. Hereafter cited as ICRC,Stomin9: the Epidemic.

36Carlssonand Ramphal, Global Neighbourhood, 286-287. 18 in September 1996. The CARKOM (Caribh) states foI.Iowed suit in December

1996. Findy, the Organization of Amencan States adopted a resolution in June

1996 to establïsh a hemispheric mine fkee zone3'.

Regional cooperation has taken other forms. The Orgauization of African

Unity (OAU) endorsed a total ban, initiaily with a Resolution of the 62nd Council of Ministers in June 1995 and again in 1996. Afncan sub-regional organizations were wged to launch initiatives against the use of anti-personnel mines. In May of 1996, the European Parliament caüed upon member states to unilaterdy ban the production and use of mines and to destroy existing stocks3*.

c)MuZtiIateral Solutions

Endeavours initiated at the national and regional levels should be considered within the con- of multilateralism. Multilateraiism is "thepractice of coordinathg national policies in groups of three or more ~tates."~~The definition --by implication -- incorporates the efforts of nations and regions.

Moratoria and mine free zones are interim steps towards a larger goal. The buk of this thesis' attention is devoted to solutions at the multilateral levei in the belief

37HuumanRights Watch, Stiil Kiiling, 18 1.

381CRC, Stop~inn the E~idemic,4-5.

3gRobertKeohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research," International Journal 45 (Autumn 1990), 731. that a tnùy global problem requlres a global solution.

International Law and Landmines

One marner in which landmines are regulated at the multilateral level is through international law. The world's legal order governs the use and effect of anti-personnel mines in two ways: custornary law and treaty law?

i)Customary Law

As the "civilized opinion of mankind", customary law is the product of state practice and is generally binding on all states4'. Four basic principles of customary law govem military tactics and weaponry during armed conflicts. First, the principle of discrimination states that the tactic or weapon should discriminate between civilian and military targets. Second, the principle of proportionality 9 states that the tactic or weapon should merely inflict harrn that is proportionate to the ritary objective. Third, the principle of necessity requires that the milihry

40Paul Cornish, Anti-Personnel Mines: Controllin& the Plamie of "Butterflies" (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), 23. Hereafter cited as Cornish, Plamie of "Butterflies".

*lLouis Henkin, "Influence, Marginality, and Centrality in the International Legai System," in Steven L. Spiegel, ed., At Issue: Politics in the World Arena (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 396. Hereafter cited as Henkin, "Influence, Marginality, and Centrality." 20 tactic or weapon inflict harm ody as is necessary and relevant to the prompt realization of the legitimate military goal. Fourth, the p~cipleof humanity states that the tactic or weapon should not cause injury or death in ways that cause cruel or gratuitous suffering, particulary with respect to ci~ilians~~.The above principles are codifiecl in the Protocol 1Additional to the Geneva Conventions of

1949, which was signed in 1977.

ii) Treao Law

Treaties are made by agreement and are binding ody on states that are parties to it.

Convention on Certain Conventional Weaoons

A need was recognized to specifically impose regdations on landmines in the Landmine Protocol (Protocol II) to the 1980 United Nations Convention on

Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventionai Weapons Which

May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

42Ferrer,"Our Common Humanity," 14 1- 142. 21

(cm". However, the Landmine ProtocoI has, to date, clearly not protected civitians fiom the danger posed by landmines in an adequate manner. .At Ieast sixty-five million landmines have been deployed since the Convention's development. A Review Conference in May of 1996 did Weto hait the crisis."

The participants endorsed self-neutralizing, selfaeactivating and detectable mines4s. Such exceptions are viewed by Human Rights Watch as "technicalfixes" that sanction, not stigmatize mines. It is feared that the revised Protocol will spark a new phase of armament, particularly if increased numbers of smart mines are laid to compensate for their short Me-span, or if users mistakenly believe that smart and detectable mines do not pose a threat to civilians? The disappointing results of the Convention have led critics to refer to its complex rules and discretionary language as a "moralistic charade," not to be "taken seriously in the

43Sixty-twostates, including the United States, China, France, the United Kingdom and Bosnia-Herzegovina have ratifed the Convention. Two states, Benin and Jordan, have ratified the Convention but do not accept the Landmine Protocol.

44JodyWilliams, "Landmines: A Global Socioeconornic Crisis," Social Justice 22:4 (1995), 99. Herea£ter cited as Williams, "Global Socioeconomic Crisis."

45Partiesare fiee to use mines as they wish so long as they follow the guidelines of the revised Protocol which prohibit the use of aii undetectable "dumb"mines; requires that remotely-delivered AP mines be designed to self-destnict within thirty days with ninety per cent reliability; requires that detectable but non-self-neutralizing mines be used in areas that are fenced off, marked and guarded and that the party that lays the mines is responsible for clearing them; and outlaws the expoa and import of undetectable mines which are prohibited under its rules.

46BarbaraJean, quoted in Ferrer, "Our Common Humanity," 155. 22

context of weapons design, military planning, or belligerent practice. W47 ~n

Professor Richard Falk's words, "the patterns of disregard are so pronounced and

widespread as to invite the most cynical view" of the role of the treaty

C~nvention.~

Whether the CCW is a charade or not, anti-landmine advocates believe

that the Land Mines Protocol should conform with customary law?The case of

anti-personnel mines raises serious questions about the principles of

discrimination and proportionality, and to some extent, necessity and humanity.

"[Slurely," R.J. Araujo has argue& "there is sufncient evidence to meet the

burden of proclaiming the nom that any Meruse of anti-personnel mines, as

they now exist and are used, is prohibited under the most fundamental, necessary,

and incontestable principles of internarionai la^."^

47RichardFalk, quoted in Kevin M. Cahill, ed., Clearing the Fields: Solutions to the Global Land Mines Crisis (New York: Basic Books and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 9. Hereafter cited as Cahill, Clearinn the Fields.

OgStephenGoose, "International Law and Anti-Personnel Land Mines," ILSA Journal of International and Com~arativeLaw 2:601 (1996), 602-603. Hereafter cited as Goose, "International Law."

50R.J. Araujo, "Anti-Personnel Mines and Peremptory Nom of htemational Law: Argument and Catalyst," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 30: 1 (January 1997),30. Hereafter cited as Araujo, "Peremptory Nom of International Law." The Conference on Disarmament

Unlike the Landmine ProtocoI, which neither nrmly restricts the use of mines, nor bans them outright, the Conference on Disannament (CD) is a multilateral process with promise because it potentially aims to do just that: place stringeut controls on landmines and/or prohibit the class of weapon. The CD is a permanent sixty-one member symposium that negotiates disarmament treaties.

Meetings are held in Geneva between January and September in a series of three six-to-eight week sessions. While not technicdy a United Nations body, the CD

\ is closely linked to the international organization. It is fïnanced by the U.N. budget and serviced by the U.N. Secretatiat. Participants report annualiy to the

General Assembly. They also take into consideration the General Assembly's recomrnendations when deciding the CD's work program at the beginning of each yedl. The overail agenda, which has not changed since the Conference's inception in 1978, is composed of items that tackle issues related to disarmament referred to as "The Decaiogue". The CD, and the cornmittees that preceded it, negotiated the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Outer Space Treaty (1 967), The

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the Sea-Bed Treaty (1971), the

SISpecialNGO Committee for Disarmament, Disarmament: The Unfished Disarrnament Agenda (Geneva: United Nations, 1995), 8. Hereafter cited as Special NGO Committee, Disarrnament: Unfinished Agenda. 24

Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972) and the Chemical

Weapons Convention (1993).5' How might we expect a landmine treaty to be negotiated? State parties work by consensus. They will have to agree to form an ad hoc cornmittee for this purpose, name a speciai coordinator to chair the committee and include the issue in the CD's work program. Choosing what issue in the work program should gamer the most attention has been the source of many quarrels in the CD. Although UN.General Assembly resolutions have served in

ùie past as cues to arrange these priorities, the importance of addressing nuclear as opposed to conventional arms control and vice versa is frequently in contest.

A linkage tactic is ofien employed by which certain delegations or groups make their approval to establish one cornmittee contingent on the agreement to establish another committee based on what issue is seen to be deserving of emphasis.

Recumhg deadock over the CD's priorities is a product of its structure. Each of the sixty-one parties is armed with veto power. The chance that any one member, such as Australia, Canada, Brazil, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, Germany, India,

Iran, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, or the United States, will reject a given proposal is great?. As one analyst has said, "If you want [the

*'Sean Howard, ed., "The CD Agenda: A Summary," Disannament Di~lomacv5 (May 1996), 1-44. Hereafter cited as Howard, "CDAgenda."

S3RebeccaJohnson, "The CD: Crisis and Opportunity," Disarmament Di~lomacy 8 (September 1996), 4-10. Hereafter cited as Johnson, ''Crisis and Oppominity." 25 landmine issue] to go nowhere, put it in the CD."" On the other hand, the CD's merit is thaî it is geographicaily representative and provides a pladorm for open deiiberations to occur between a wide range of states with varying interests.

Pursuing the landmine issue through this venue WU ensure that "those countries which shodd be there are there. They can't escape the issue."" It remains to be seen whether the Conference has the capacity to arrive at a comprehensive an& personnel landmine treaty in the near future.

Ottawa Process

A second multilateral proposal with promise is the "Ottawa Process," springing fkom a strategy conference, "Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Perso~el

Mines,'' held in that city in October, 1996. During the conference, fïfty states and a number of international and non-govemmental organizations (NGOs) agreed to work together to ensure signature of a legaily binding treaty to ban landmines as soon as possible. Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's foreign minister, announced that

Canada would again cdstates to Ottawa.,this thefor the signing of an accord in December, 1997, which would iikely corne into force by the year 2000. As the

54Jo-A~eVelin, "Diplomacy After the Negotiation: Protocol II and the Anti-Per~o~elLandmine Ban." Disarmament Divlomacy 5 (May 1996), 19. Hereafter cited as Velin, "Diplomacy." "father of the Ottawa Process," Axworthy had been stnick, as he says,

. . .by the "enormous cornmitment and energy" from the foreign officiais and international aid workers who attended [the Ottawa strategy conference]. But he womed that it would all dissipate once they left because "there was no logical step to dockthe energies there." So, with what an aide recded as a "spontaneous gesture that was a political take on the mood in the room," Axworthy invited everyone to return to Ottawa . . . to swear off antipersonnel land mines cold turkeJ6.

The Ottawa Process is a fast-track diplomatic initiative. It first builds upon a

declaration that was produced at the conference (the declaration recognizes "that

the extreme humanitarian and socio-economic costs associated with the use of

anti-personnel mines requires urgent action on the part of the international

commun.@ to ban and eliminate this type of weapontt). Next, it is guided by an

"Agenda For Action" that details concrete measures for the international

community to take in order to channel the political will of States (for example, engaging mifitary experts in the study of the military utility and humanitarian costs of AP mine use, developing and publishing a global data-base on national

AP mine policies, and encouraging regional initiatives such as the establishment of AP mine-free zones)? Lastly, an intense flurry of diplomatic and poiiticai

56BruceWaiiace, "The Battie to Ban Land Mines: Support Grows for Canada's Crusade."Maclean's(July 1, 1997). 34. Hereafter cited as Wallace, "Battle to Ban."

57Letternom Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to author, January 15,1997. 27 activity centred on the formal aspects of preparing a lannmine treaty is underway.

Conferences in Vie~a,(where the treaty was drafted) and Brussels (a foliow-on meeting that sec& the commitment of states) and Oslo (where the final stages of negotiation will occur) are key destones dong the road to Ottawa. A total of over ten global, regional and sub-regional meetings have additiondy been held or will be held fiom Maputo to Stockholm to Winnipeg to New Delhi, each combinhg state-led activism and NGO-led advocacy, and each stressing the necessity of an immediate ban. Sceptics surmise that any gathering of like- minded states, or a "coalition of angels" like the pro-ban participants of the

Ottawa Process will have minimal practicd effect on the crisiss8. So, while there is little doubt that the Ottawa Process will carry through with its promise, what remains in question is the degree of its effectivenessSg.

SBBobLawson, "Towards a New Multilateralism: Canada and the Landmine Ban." Behind the Headlines 54:4 (Sumrner 1997), 18-22. Hereafter cited as Lawson, "Towards New MultilateraLism."

s9"Pro-LancimineBan States Meet in Ottawa; Set Strategy for Global Effort," Arms Control Todav (October 1W6), 2 1. As previously stated this thesis seeks to investigate what is needed for change in solving the landmine crisis. The proposed solutions, if they meet with success, would likely produce a regime, which cm be defined as "a set of implicit or explicit principles, nom, des, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue-area'". When principles, nom, rules and decision-making procedures are applied to landmines, they form the definition of a "landmine regime."

Let us look at the term more closely before expanding on the theory behind it Susan Strange criticized the concept of "regimes" for its "~oolliness"~'.

She pointed out that "principles", "nom", "rules" and "decision-making procedures" are open to disparate interpretations. A simple yet adequate way to overcome the words' perceived "woolliness" is to follow Ernst B. Haas's guidelines: Principles and nomtell us why States collaborate on a given issue; destell us, in a substantive sense, what the collaboration is about; and decision- making procedures explain how the collaboration is to be carried ouf2. "Issue-

600ran R. Young, "International Regimes: Toward A New Theory of Institutions," World Politics (October 1986). 105. Hereafter cited as Young. "International Regimes."

%usan Strange, "Cave! hic dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," International Organization 36: 3 (S pring 1982). 484-485. Hereafter cited as Srrange, "Cave! hic dragones. "

62ErnstB. Haas, "Why Coilaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," World Politics (1980). 397. Hereafter cited as Haas, "Why Collaborate?" 29 areas" are thought of as concerns that appear on the agendas of policy-rnaker~~~.

With this is mind, how do we know an international regime when we see one? A recognizable feature is the explicit nature of the principles, norms, des and decision-making procedures. A regime cannot rest on the implicit convergence of actor expectations alone. If this were the case, almost any sign of cooperation among States would qualifv as a regime. Regimes are examples of cooperative behaviour, and asist in cooperation, but stand apart from cooperation by demanding more than a consensus reached by states? A formai component to regimes is essential. In most cases, regimes are embodied in treaties or conventions6' hice the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) and the

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (1979). On the other hand, regimes are not so narrow as to be confused with international organizations

Like the United Nations and the International Labour Organization. Unlike regimes, organizations are physical entities possessing administrative apparatus such as offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets. Regimes have been created in the absence of organizations, however compatible they may be.

The term "regime" is useful because it evokes a nch body of Iiterature that

64StephenHaggard and Beth A. Simrnons, "Theones of International Regimes," International Oreanization 41:3 (Summer 1987), 494-495. Hereafter cited as Haggard and Simmons, 'Theories of International Regimes." 5Yo~ng,"International Regimes," 122. 30 has emerged since the mid-seventies that is relevant to the pattemed behaviour of

States. No longer thought to be a passing fad, regime theory continues to "arouse strong intere~t"~~in International Relations. Theorists have successfblly collaborateci with experts in international security, international political economy and other areas. The integrative capacity of regime analysis, with its comrnon core concept, appeals to scholars fkom diverse backgrounds. Indeed, its appeal to scholars addressing the landmine issue is based on its explanatory power to bridge the subfields impücated by the issue. In addition, because "new and genuinely global problem~"~'stimulated the earliest studies on regimes, those seeking solutions to the macro problem of landmines are particularly receptive to what the theory has to offer.

At the same time, Oran Young wams against using the concept of regimes as a research tool without tying it into a "larger system of idea~."~He suggests that in order to "reach dennite conclusions about the persuasiveness of the vision of the world embedded in the literature on regimes . . . we must examine our assumptions about the behaviour of the actors in international arenas more carefu~y.""This thesis attempts to heed Young's warning by establishing a

66VolkerRittberger, ed., Rede Theorv and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), xii-xiii. Hereafter cited as Rittberger, ReeeTheorv.

67Evansand Wilson, "Regime Theory and English School."

68Yo~ng,"International Regimes," 106. 31 system of ideas based on the understanding of international society. Regime thwry has "made considerable progress in its own right" but could "now benefit kom being reconnected to the older tradition of international s~ciety."~~When using international society to form assumptions about the behaviour of actors in the global arena, one has the advantage of remaining aloof from the traditional battlegrounds of International Relations, namely the not-always-compatible liberalism, cognitivisrn and realism. Elements of each cmbe combined.

Hedley Bull, a leader in the scholarship on international society, believes that international society differs fkom an international system in that the former is closely connected with order, or the respecthl coexistence of states. A system void of order results in relations between states that are "analogous to those of a madhouse: idiosyncratic, unpredictable, only weakly mediateci by communication

. . . easily moved to violence."71By contrast, states in an international society generally share interests and values, are bound by a cornmon set of rules in their relations with one another, and cooperate with institutional, diplornatic and legal procedures. The forces of society, at times in peril, nevertheless iduence the

''Barry Buzan, "From International System to International Society: Structural Realisrn and Regime Theory Meet the English School." International Oraanization 47:3 (Summer 1993), 328. Hereafier cited as Buzan, "International System to International Society. " 32

practice of states todayn. As rnight be expected, an international society is host

to a greater number of regimes adhered to by a greater number of participants

with a greater degree of intensity than an orderless systern. It is not inaccurate to

state that international society acts as the legal and political foundation on which

the concept of regimes re~ts'~.

With this is mind, what hopes exist for the creation of a landmine regime?

An analysis of regime formation charts whether or not the efforts of those

involved succeed or fail, the length of time it will take, and the degree to which

the crisis is s01ved'~. The determinants of success or failure are three-fold.

a)The Interest Variable

The first is self-interest The premise of this variable, detailed in Chapter

Two, is that social institutions, and regimes in particular, WU be created when

self-interested participants seek to coordinate their efforts to achieve joint gains.

Actors offset the costs of establishing a regime with the advantages expected fiom

it. In the case of landmines, states calculate that they will lose valued rnilitaxy

utility as well as economic revenue should landmines be banned. To establish a

72HedleyBuil, The Anarchicai Society: A Studv of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan Education, 1977), 42-43. Hereafter cited as Bull, Anarchical Society

73Buzan,"International System to International Society," 350-351.

740ranR. Young and Gai1 Osherenko, Polar Politics: Creatina International Environmentai Regimes (Ithaca: Comeil University Press, 1993), 2. Hereafter cited as Young and Osherenko, Polar Politics. 33

regime through self-interest, they must balance these losses with the collective

good of a ban for Iarger, humanitarian reasons. It is unlürely that the majority of

States wiii choose the altruistic option unless they feel buund to participate in the

regime, unless they are certain that other major players are also participating, and

dessthe proposed treaty itseif is salient or appealing. Therefore, Chapter Two

devotes itself to evaluating the availability of effective enforcement mechanisms,

the ability to secure universal participation and the intuitive appeaIs of the CD and

the Ottawa Process. The liberal school of thought in International Relations,

drawing kom econornic theories on transaction costs, favours this approach as

an explanatory variable in regime formation7s.

b)The Knowledge Variable

The second deterrninant of regime formation is knowledge, or "the sum of

technical information and of theories about that information which commands

suficient consensus at a given tirne among interested actors to serve as a guide

to public policy designed to achieve some social Chapter Three studies how howledge is a contributhg factor to regime formation once it "has seeped into the consciousness of policy makers and other influentid groups and

75AndreasHasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Voiker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," Mershon International Studies Review 40 (1996), 183. Hereafier cited as Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge." 34

individuals."" The International Carnpaign to Ban Landmines, composed of over

1,000 human rights, humanitarian, cMdrents, peace, veterans, medical, development, arms control, religious, environmental and women's groups, launched in 1992, in over 50 countries, is the chief generator of information on the chilling reality of landmines in the developing world. Its impact is far- reaching in a manner unprecedented by non-govemmental organizations. The

Campaign, dong with experts in the field, have helped create an epistemic cornmunity on landmines. The extent of the Campaign's infiuence can be measured by changes in state opinion towards the Ottawa Process, since it clearly favours this option over the CD. Cognitivists emphasize the howledge variable by highlighting the role of normative and causal beliefs of decision-rnakers in regime formation.

c)The Power Variable

The final determinant of regime formation is power. Chapter Four studies how dominant members in international society assume a role in the creation of regimes. A case is made that the presence of a hegemon is a necessary condition for a regime to emerge. Indeed, the world is watching as the United States decides what role to assume in the issue-area of Iandrnines. Few doubt that the U.S.'s ment decision to opt for the Ottawa Process WUcause a number of middle and

"Ibid., 369. 35

lesser powers to follow suit At the same tirne, Canada's impact as the instigator of the Ottawa process shodd not be ignored Its Mique strength lies is its fervent political determination to ban landmines. Realists. due to their sensitivity to the centrai role of states in international society, and their concem for relative power capabilities, consider this vanable a crucial determinant in regime formation78.

In conclusion, the landmine crisis is pressing. To understand change in the landmine regime is to enter uncharteci terrain for reasons beyond the simple fact that "the wheel's still in spin." Light weapons -and landmines - are featured more prominently in contemporary contlicts than ever before. However, analysts and policy-makers are ody gradually beginning to adjust their international security agendas to include them alongside major conventional systems like tanks, heavy aaery, jet planes as well as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

Efforts to reduce stockpiles or curb the arms trade have not been directed at the ver- munitions that are responsible for the most deaths in cument wars.

Furthemore, the unique repercussions of landmines demand kesh interest fiom those working outside the inilitary sphere. Landmines are as much a threat to human security - ifnot more- than ~tio~lsecuity. In the words of one author, One might view the land mine crisis in the same way as the derin The King and I saw the confushg challenges of change - as a "puzzlement" that no single approach and no single actor can solve. Certainly, no amount of ranting will help any longer, and a piecemeal approach is obviously hadequate for the growing disaster. Yet, the problem was created by man's ingenuity - perverse, to be sure - and uitimately WUhave to be solved by the combined, cooperative, and coordinated efforts of many people. The solutions wiu depend on technical and military experts with innovative technological ideas. They will depend on lawyers who are willing to grapple with the elusive and fiustrating verbal nuances that must be overcome if new, enforceable conventions, regimes, and agreements are to be fashioned. They will depend on doctors and humanitarian workers who cmcreate models that may solve some of the most pressing problems posed by land mine injuries. And they wiil depend on diplomats and politicians who are willuig to move beyond the boundaries of Cold War power politics to forge new treaties and provide innovative leadership, rather than merely repeat the slogans of the past7'.

One might also view the land mine crisis in the Chinese sense of the word for

"crisis" which consists of two characters, the first (wei), meaning danger, the second (ji), meaning opportunity. This thesis is an attempt to explore one opportunity that responds to the serious danger of landmines: politicai action in the form of an international regime. No one knows if the Conference on

Disarmament or the Ottawa Process, or both, WU become reality in the form envisioned by its proponents. Wi landmines be banned? In the following chapters, we will do our best to predict the prospects for change using the three variables -- interest, howledge and power --that determine regime formation.

-- --

7gCahiil,Clearing The Fields, 5-6. CHAPTERTWO

The Interest Variable: Militarg and Economic Rationales

of Landmines

Theorists wishing to understand regime formation using interest-based logic ofien employ the Ianguage of economics. Common terms that appear in the literanire are "payoff," 'profit," "cost-benefit," and "optimal" or "suboptirnal" resdts. Robert Keohane writes that states are rational utility-maximizers (or

"political entrepreneurs") that are kstand foremost guided by the profit motive when organizing collaboration." In other words, they exhibit consistent tendencies to adjust to extemal changes in a rnanner that is calculated to increase the value of their expected outcornes. In its purest form, liberalism, the school of thought in International Relations that spawns interest-based theories, dictates that the behaviour of political entrepreneurs in world politics -- Iike actors in a weU- run market -- arrive at their optimal profit without regimes at da'.

In accordance with this line of thought, it is Iess profitable for states to

8oRobertO. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, New York: Comeil University Press, 1982), 154. Hereafter cited as Keohane, "Demand for International Regimes."

*lArthu.rA. Stein, Whv Nations Coomrate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca: Comeil University Press, 1990), 25. Hereafer cited as Stein, WbNations Coowrate. 38 cooperate with others than it is for them to act according to seIfIfinterest.

However, even in a perféctly cornpetitive market, each fïrm cannot make decisions without considering the expectations of other fïrms' potential behaviour and responses. International society presumes the existence of interdependence - that choices made by an actor are a function of choices of others as well as its od.There are occasions when rational self-interested calculation leads state actors to relinquish independent decision-making in favour of joint decision- making, proving wrong the proposition "that there simply will not be joint gains for which it is feasible for actors to cooperate."" As we know, states at times do cooperate and participate in regimes.

Acknowledging the possibility of regime formation does not mean that memhof the Liberal school of thought hold particularly optimîstic assumptions about the motivations of states. Cooperation in world politics is not easy, nor should it be imagined as a desirable process for aIIw. As Oran Young notes,

"actors in international society succeed in forming institutionai arrangements or regimes to cope with some transboundq problems but fail to do so in comection with other, seerningly similar, proble~ns."~~The ahof this chapter is to

83Yo~ng,International Reames, 118.

84Keohane,"Demand for hternational Regimes," 142.

850ranYoung, "The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Naturd Resources and the Environment," International Organization 42:3 39

investigate whether the landmine crisis is one area for which it will be feasible for

actors to cooperate.

How is a particular regimets chance for success investigated? The interest

variable is different fiom the other two variables discussed in this thesis because

it intrinsically rests on the strength of the proposed regime itself as its source of

explanatory power (as opposed to factors in the international environment, like

the proliferation of knowledge and the innuence of power). If the regime is

perceived by states to meet three criteria in a satisfactory manner. namely,

enforcement, participation, and solution-salience, the future of that regime is

brighter.

a) Enforcement

Enforcement is a concern for many states when deciding whether or not

to participate in a regime. Dilemmas with collective action, popularly expressed

in the form of prisoner's dilemmasS6,the tragedy of the c~mmons~~or Jean-

Jacques Rousseau's parable of the stag hunt, revolve around the fear that one or

(Summer 1989), 349. Hereafter ci ted as Young, "Politics of Regirne Formation."

%ee Duncan Snidai, "Coordination versus Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperations and Regimes," The American Political Science Review 79 (1985), 923-942. Hereafter cited as Snidal, "Coordination versus Prisoner's Dilemma."

87SeeGarett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," in Garett Hardin and John Baden, eds., Managina the Cornmons (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1977). Hereafter cited as Hardin, "Tragedy of Cornmons." more participants will fail to carry out their cornmitment In Rousseau's parable,

for example, the hunger of five men will each be satisfied by one fifth of a stag.

They "agree"to cooperate in a plan to capture one. However, the hunger of a

single hunter will also be satisfied by a hare. If a hare cornes into reach, it can

easily be grabbed. The defector obtains the means of satisfying his hunger but in

doing so allows the stag to escape. His short-term interest prevails over

consideration for his fellow men. Kenneth Waltz wrïtes, "the story is simple; the

implications are tremendous. In cooperative action, even when all agree on the

goal and have an equal interest in the project, one cannot rely on th ers."^^ States

with mixed interests fail to create a regime if they foresee temptations to cheat

and for others to cheatS9.The dilemma is solved, in part, with the availability of

an effective mechanism to enforce cornpliance. Knowing that their behaviour is

monitored, and knowing that defecting, or coaatnitting a violation, will raise a

"hue and cryVg0by others, govemments are more likely to comply. Enforcement

gives states an incentive to cooperate in regimes. It alleviates fears that the goal

of cooperation wiU be hampered by defectors. It alters states' calculations of

88KennethWaltz in Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, "1 Get By With A Little Help From My Friends," World Politics XMII: 1 (October 1970), 106. Hereafter cited as Frohlich and Oppenheimer, "A Little Help From My Friends."

89AmericanPolitical Science Review, "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," 87:3 (September 1993), 729.

goYoung.Polar Politics. 18. States may furthemore be concerned about preserving their credibility generalIy, so that it is not eroded in relation to other issues or issue-areas. b)Participation

States are also concerneci with participation before entering into a regime according to interest-based hypotheses. The parties implicated in the problem or issue-area must participate in the process of regime formation for the regime to succexd In other words, the perceived value of the regime is undermined if "key parties" are missing from the negotiating tableg2.Furthexmore, equity arnong the members is at issue. Participation will not be secured if inequitable distribution of the "payoffs" results, in which some members wiU benefit more than othersg3.

c)SrJience of Solutions

Finally, the salience of solutions is a detenninant of success in regime creation. States weigh the benefits of cooperation by examining "the ability of those formuiating proposais to draft simple formulas thaî are intuitively appealkig or to borrow formulas or approaches fiom prior cases with which negotiators may already be familiar."% It takes a solution that is easy to grasp, and that is

glHasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge, " 184.

92Young,Polar Politics, 16- 17.

93Yo~ng,"Politics of International Regime Formation," 368.

g4Young,Polar Politics, 14. appeahg, to defeat narrow state self-interest.

The Interest of Landmines

Before verifjmg whether or not proposed solutions to the landmine crisis meet the above criteria. it is meaningful to outhe why cooperation in the issue- area of landrnines is not a given. In two leading ways - military and economic -- the production, export and use of landmines is in the interest of States. It is seen that these are powerful rationales. And it wiU becorne clear why it is ail the more important that the Ottawa Process andor the Conference on Disarmament respond to the criteria so that they may have a cornpliance pull of their own in the face of countervailing state interest. This chapter retums to a discussion of the criteria once the rationales of landmines are outlined in detail.

a)Military Rationales in Support of Landmines

First, mines produce military results that are in the interest of States. A component of neariy every army's armoury world-wide, AP mines have been involved in a wide range of types of warfme, including the Cold War confkontation between Warsaw Pact and NATO nations, interstate conflicts of a 43 smaller size, and intemal disputes in Angola, Croatia, Rwanda, and Nicaragua9'

They are wholly assimilated weapons? So few analyses on the military effectiveness of mines exist however, that their utility is largely assumed, rather than proven. One way to tentatively prove that the assumptions are in fact valid is through historical example, that is, to examine their long-standing role over time.

The History of Landmine Use

The conduct of warfme has changed, and will continue to change, but strategists should not be mesmerized by these transformations?' Land combat under Napoleon Bonaparte, Generds Ulysses S. Grant, John J. Pershing, Patton,

Maxwell R. Thurman, Cari W. Stiner, H. Norman Schwarzkopf, and Colin L.

Powell has been surprisingiy ~irnilar:~just as the tactical function of landmines has evolved without completely breaking fiom the pa~t.~~

The origins of mines can be traced to medievai siege warfare. The need to compel an opponent into a disadvantageous position by controliing the land and

96Smith,"Military Utility of Landmines . . ,?" 10.

97GordonR. Suihan and James M. Dubik, "Land Warfare in the 21st Century," Militaw Review LXXIIk9 (September 1993), 30. Hereafter cited as Sullivan and Dubik. the situation on the battlefield, at minimal cost to the defender, led to the development and application of devices such as the four-pointed caltrop, potholes, explosive charges and wooden stakes. The appearance of gunpowder -a Iture of charcoal, sulphur and saltpetre- in 1250 made mines more effective. English archers supplemented their fire arms with mines to repel enemy horsernen during the Crécy Campaign of 1346, and at the battle of Agincourt, in 141SLm.Later, the technique of tunnelling, or the building of channels beneath the scarp of a fortress nom which mines could be constnicted, was successfully adopted by the Turks at the Seige of Candia in 1657. In 1729, the Nouvelle théorie de la science des mines was published, explorhg the possibilities of increased charges in countermines that could destroy the mines of besiegers at a distanceLoL.Naval mines were used by the Russians in the Crimean War (1853 to 1856).

Confederates in the American Civil War relied on buried artillery projectiles and other fabricated mines. Their victory at Petersburg in 1864 was in part attributed to a move which was considered tacticaily brilliant and flawlessly executed. An underground chamber was nIled with explosive, which was then detonated, resulting in thousands of dead and wounded on the Union sideLo2.

'O0Richard H. Johnson, "Why Mines? A Military Perspective," in Cahill, Clearing the Fields, 24-25. Hereafter cited as Johnson, "Why Mines?"

'O1Andre Corvisier, ed., A Diction- of Military Histow (Oxford: Basil Blackweil, 1994). 520-521. Hereafter cited as Corvisier, Dictionarv of Müitarv Historv.

102Johnson."Why Mines?" 36-37. 45

The earliest precursors to modem landmines were generated by the introduction of the arxnoured vehicle in World War 1. A demand for measures to counter the tank was met. By 1918, pressure-activated and remote control anti- tank mines were available but normally converteci fkom artillery munitions. It was discovered that such mines could be neutralized with relative ease by the enemy by lifting or de-hzing hem, and re-used with hostile intent. Thus, the commensurate need for both anti-Iift devices and anti-personnel mines was recognized. The Second World War witnessed the development of light, portable and above-sufface AP mines. Over 300 million were used in the six years of the conflict At the close of World War II, AP mines were considered not only valuable as defensive measures on antitank fields, but also as force multipliers, or as "sentries which never sleep". They could take the place of personnel by guarding borders and providing warning when troops encroachedIo3.The power of landmines in slowing the advance of soldiers was expressed well by the

German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel:

Shortly after passing the eastern boundary of our own minefields, our troops came up against an extremely strong and hitherto unsuspected British mine belt, which was stubbody defended. Under intensely heavy deryfke, the sappers and infantry eventualiy succeeded in clearing lanes through the British barrier, although at the cost of very heavy casualties and a great deal of time - in many cases it needed three attempts. The minefields, which contahed an extraordinary number of mines

103Smith,"Military Utility?" 14-15. (according to our estimate there were 150, 000 in the sector where we attacked), were of great depth and protected by numerous booby-trap~.'~

It did not take long before a "second generaîion" of Iancirnines was born,

the progeny of the battles of Korea and Vietnam In particular, Vietnam was as

much a tuming point in the history of the AP mine as the Second World War, as

this conflict saw the fkst exhaustive use of scatterable mines'? Scatterable mines were dropped on Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam by U.S. forces to "haras and demoralize the enemy and deny logistical resupply route^."'^ btiperso~el mines were used against Amencan soldiers, idicting mine casualties as high as one-third of the total, bearing witness to the uüity of mines and booby traps in insurgency situations.'"

Landmine Use Toda~

Landmines today represent a "third generation." Devices with electronic timers that permit self-destruction after a predetermined period of time were developed in the 1980's and rehed in the 1990's. "Smart"technology is applied

'04Erwin Rommel in B. H. Liddel Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers (London: Collins, 1953), 276. Hereafier cited as Rommel, Rommel Pa~ers.

106UnitedStates Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines (Washington D.C: U.S. Department of State, 1993), 12.

107Johnson,"Why Mines?" 37. 47

to mines that are distriiuted by artillery, aircraft, ground vehicles and by manuai

means. The chance that a seIf-destruct mine will remain alive afier its designated

time of expiration is a slim one-in-10,ûûû.'~ dramaticdy reducing the post-

conflict risk to civilians. Many consider smart technology a breakthrough since

it presumably avoids the humanitarian disaster of unexploded ordnance at the same time as it meets with the military expectations of combat. Also significant is the proliferation of "non-detectable" low-or-no-metallic content mines constructed with plastic or ceramic materials that are longer-Iasting and lighter in weight than first and second generation mines1? This technology, of course, does not decrease the hazards to noncombatants, and, in particular, deminers. It is a terrorist tactic favoured by insurgent gro~ps"~.The case of the former Yugoslavia is typical in that parties to the conillict have employed what are referred to as

"antimagnetic"weapons, most of hem l~calJy-made'~~.Scatterable but detectable landmines were successfidly used in Operation Desert Storm. Remotely-delivered

Gator mines (a combined APlAT system) limited enemy movement, as in the

loBPentagonofficial, interview by author, Notes, Department of Defense Arlington, Virginia, May 11, 1997.

logMaryWareham, "Clearingthe Fields and Negotiating Controls on Anti-Per~o~el Landmines: New Zealand's Role," ~ttp:llwww.vuw.ac.nz/css~e~/muies- txthttp://~~~.vuw.ac.Z1Z/css/MineS/mines-txt),3. Hereafer cited as Wareham, "Clearingthe Fields. " Johnson, "Why Mines?" 35.

'l11CRC, Friend or Foe? 38. 48 instance when two Iraqi divisions were forced to stay in place on the right-hand flank of the W Corps attack, while coalition troops intmded into enemy temt~ry"~.The Persian Gulf example, and the historicai examples that preceded it, demonstrate that mines are usefid instruments of wa..

Circumstances of Utility

The degree of their usefulness, as is the case for most weapons, depends on the circumstances of their use: the types of mines deployed, the terrain, tactics, the character of contingency, and the numericai balance of forces113.

As an Uustration, the balance of advantage wiil Vary with combinations of mine type and density. Block minefields are intended to deny the enemy a portion of land and halt enemy movement (in conjunction with fie-power), using a mix of AT and AP mines with antihandling devices. Mine density is high.

Tuming minefields are intended to persuade the enemy to bypass a portion of land and guide them in a certain direction. AT mines without antifianciling devices are needed in densities that will destroy approximately eighty per cent of vehicles entering the area. Disruption minefields are intended to break up the opponents' formations, confound the timing and coordination of the attack, and compel the enemy to improvise under fire. AT with antihandling devices are required in

r12Johnson, "Why Mines?" 33.

lnStephen D. Biddie, Landmine Arms Control (Alexandna, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1996), 33. Hereafter cited as Biddle, Landmine Arms Control. 49

densities capable of destroying about 50 per cent of the incoming vehicles. The

minefields need only cover a portion of the likely approach route. Fixing

minefields are designed to delay, but not halt, the attacker in a prearranged

engagement area in order to induce a breaching operation. The fields need not

appear impenetrable. Like disruption fields, they require antitank mines at densities that will destroy fifty per cent of approaching tanks, but without antihmdhg devices. Finally, protective minefields are laid by unit personnel, instead of combat engineers, and are intended for "close-in, last-ditch" defense of deployed forces to avoid ovemm in the last stages of an assault. A mk of AT and

AP mines is needed, without antihandling devices, in densities that will depend on local unit fiontages and mine availability. As seen, AP mines are critical in block and protective fields114.If AT mines are used by themselves, that is, without

AP mines, the chances that dismounted troops WU cross the fields while removing the mines increases. In some cases, aibeit less commonly, strategists support the application of AP mines on their ownH5.

The distinction between AT and AP mines is important when evaluating the balance of advantages of mines. Landmines are customarily addressed as an

'14Stephen D. Biddle, Julia L. Klare and Jaeson Rosenfeld, The Militarv UtiIitv of Landmines: ImDlications for Arms Control (Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1994), 30-3 1. Hereafter cited as Biddle, Klare and Rosenfeld, Militam Utihtv.

ll'Johnson, "Why Mines?" 34. undifferentiated whole.' '' One should not overlook a unique trait possessed by AP mines that sets them apart fiom AT mines. A brochure fkom a Pakistan ordnance factory underlines the fact that AP mines wound, not end the lives, of over seventy per cent of the victims. The AP mine

has been designed with a view to disable personnel. Operating research has shown that it is better to disable a man than to kU him, A wounded man requires attention, conveyance and evacuation to the rear, thus causes disturbances in the tr&c lines of the combat areâ Also, a wounded person has a detrimentai psychological effect on his fellow soldiers"'.

A chief strategy of this weapon, then, is rnaiming, in addition to serving as a protective counterpart to AT mines.

The character of contingency is another circumstance of utility. The value of AP mines is greatest in high intensity warfare1l8.Neveaheless, AP mines have proven effective in confîict situations that ciiffer fkom the high intensive prototype: humanitanan aid operations in a hostile environment (like Operations

Restore Codoa and Provide Hope), peacekeeping, non-combatant evacuation,

IL6Biddle,Klare and Rosenfeld, "Military Utility," 23.

117Human Rights Watch, Exwsin~the Source: US. Com~aniesand the Production Human Rights Watch Project Report 9:2 (April 1997), 6. Hereafter cited as Human Rights Watch, "Exposing the Source. "

=l8Biddle,Klare and Rosenfeld, Militarv Utilitv, 69-70. and low intensity warfare such as counterin~urgenc~~~~.Furthermore, the strength of mines is usually associated with tactical defense, rather than offense. But it is rare that campaigns are exclusively defensive in type and although it "takes greater imagination to integrate [mines] into fast-paced manoeuvre warfare, given the traditional association of mines with static sit~ations,"'~the use of mines in offensive strategy is ascendent.

The circumstances of mine use not only dictate their level of utility but the level of cornpliance with accepted desof conduct. It is true that the orchestrators of low intensity conflicts are usudy less scrupulous in the fencing, muking, recording and mapping of mines. As weU, the offensive use of mines, particularly by air-delivery, implies that attack occurs in territory not under the control of one's own forces, and therefore presents difficulties in the accurate recording of individual locations of minesl2'. Nevertheless, proponents of mines emphasize that standards do exist, and that they are generally followed by disciplined amies1". Even lawless guerilla groups have a vested interest in mapping and recording mines, "fïrst and foremost because of the hazard they present to [those]

120Johnson,"Why Mines?" 33.

lZIFrancoiseJ. Hampson, The Long Shadow: Landmines and the Law of Armed Conflicts, Papers in the Theory and Practice of Human Rights, no. 12 (Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, 1995). 4. Hereafter cited as Hampson, The Long Shadow.

lZ21CRC,Friend or Foe? 17. 52 who laid them."'" At a minimum, it is possible to mark the boundaries of scatterable minefields and to indicate the expected self-destnrct times in map notationslt4. An example of the existence of codined standards is STAGNAG

2036 -Minefield Laying and Recording -- developed by the armies of the North

Atlantic Treaty Orghtion, which includes, among other stipulations, a "plan of removal," or the clearing of fields once the mines have served their p~rpose'~.

Main Utilitv Arguments

In sum, three rationdes for landmines in battle are cited most often: protection, diversion and denial. Mines "protect military bases and key installations," "charme1 or divert the enemy forces" and "deny routes and strategic positions to the enemy."lt6 Because these reasons are most often found in textbooks and scholarly articles, an overhead slide used by the U.S. Army to educate soldiers on the reality of fighting without anti-personnel mines is possibly more revealing of their perceived value. It lists the following disadvantages:

"More difficult to kül him [the enemy]; Less time to kill him; More of them to

124Johnson,"Why Mines?" 34.

12SICRC,Friend or Foe? 17.

26RaeMcGrath, "The Reality of the Present Use of Mines by Military Forces," in ICRC, Report of the Svmwsium on Anti-Per~o~dMines (Geneva: ICRC, 1993)- 8. kill, More of them will shoot at us more often; More vuherability; More difncult to overwheh enemy; Less flexibility in planning and attack; Less 'stopping power;' More difncult to disrupt or deter aitack" and "The bottom line: More U.S. soldiers 10st."'~The above effectively answers the question: "Take mines away, and what is the res~lt?"'~~

Land warfare is designed to meet national objectives. Taking away £Yom the coordinated use of miktary resources at a nation's disposa^'^^ may inhibit the successful attainment of national objectives. The UN Charter assigns States the inherent right to self-defense, and consequently the right to acquire arrns for their securiîy.

In an informal survey of United States senators who voted against a 1995 amendment to limit the use of land mines in three years, a concem for national securiîy surfaced as the overarchhg rationale. Thad Cochran (R-Mississippi) wrote, "1do believe that there are certain situations in which the use of Iand mine is in our national intere~t?~Bob Smith (R-New Hampshire) sirnilady wrote that he "cannot suppoa efforts to prohibit Our military forces from using landmines in

1270verheadslide obtained by author f'rom Pentagon, Washington D.C., (May 12, 1997).

128Johnson,"Why Mines?" 38.

ngFranklin D. Margiotta, ed., "Land Warfare," in Brassey's Encvclo~ediaof Military History and Biomauhy (Washington: Brassey's, 1994), 599. Hereafter cited as Margiotta, "Land Warfare."

130Letterhm Thad Cochran, U.S. Senate, to author, May 8, 1997. 54 combat The men and women who serve in our military forces assume tremendous risk in defense of our security." Smith, like others, recognizes "the temble human suffering" against civilians caused by landmines "in certain civil conflicts," but maintains that landmines with a self-destnict mechanism rectify the situation131.

Rod Gram (R-Minesota) suggests that the U.S. should "push for an international agreement mandating inclusion of automatic self-destruct rnechanisms in all

132 John McCain (R-Arizona) argues that "a restrained and responsible use of modem landmines can continue to play a role in protecting U.S. forces in times of conflict." He cites General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of his viewl". Finally, Larry Craig @-Idaho) believes that arms control in this area would t'jeopardizeU.S. troops" and pose a threat to national security.

"A country not causing the problem" would dîsarm, whüe rogue States would notL".

The United States is not done in articulahg the rationale of national security as a factor in the calculation of advantages of mines. Although Canada has forfeited the use of mines, a senior military officer referred to the move, in

"'Letter from Bob Smith, U.S. Senate, to author, May 6, 1997.

132Letterfrom Rod Grams, US.Senate, to author, April23, 1997.

13%etter fiom John McCain, U.S. Senate, to author, May 1, 1997.

u4Letter fiom Larry Craig, U.S. Senate, to author, May 5, 1997. 55 confidence, as "irrespon~ible".~~~Finland stresses that, although its sec- pohy is not motivated by a specinc enemy or threaî, the length of its border with

Russia does not permit the surveillance of every armoured crossing point by trops. Finland values AP mines, given its size and lack of resources, as a defense by other rnea~s'~~.States like Pakistan, India and China also value mines as a means of border protection, and as a way to ensure national security.

Taken together, these arguments present a strong case for the military utility of mines. As one author commented, "it is not beneficid to daim mines are no good- to Say so is irrele~ant."'~'

b)Economic Rationales in Support of Lundmines

It is also beside the point to Say that there are no economic incentives to produce, seil, purchase and use landmines. Two arguments explain why parties are loathe to forego the weapon: the cost-effectiveness of mines and the profitability of mine production and trade.

135Confidentialsource, interview by author, Notes, May 15, 1997.

13'Smith, "Military Utility?" 32-33.

13'Johnson, "Why Mines?" 43. Cost-Effectiveness

The ktargument is inexorably linked to military interest. No militariiy effective substitute exists that is as cost-effective as the landmine. Proposais to use ditches, Iights, spikes, slippery surfaces, foam, barbed-wire entangiements and protective fences in place of mines do not convince strategists. Comrnand- detonated munitions are a possibility, but expensive. In addition, remote surveillance methods such as electronic sensing devices, real-time satellite intelligence and drone aircraft are limited to those countries or groups that can afford them138. Until a viable alternative emerges, military establishments will remain strongly attached to landmines, partïcularly in the present perïod of declining defense budgets13'.

Profitabilitv

It is admittedly difficult to evduate the profitability of the global landmine industry because of the absence of reliable data Sketchy information is offered by military trade publications.'" Governments are currently not obliged to publicize information on the production and trade of light weapons and landmines are absent nom the U.N. AmRegister. As a starting point, it is helpful to

1381CRC,Friend or Foe? 65-67.

l3 James Miskel, "Domestic Industry and National Security," Stratenic Review XTX:4 (Fail 1994), 23. Hereafter cited as Miskel, "Domestic Industry."

140HumanRights Watch, Deadiv Leaacv, 35. 57

understand the mechanics of an arms sale. State arsends and the industry's

defense sector design lannmines in answer to the operational requirements branch of an army. Manufacturers attempt to recoup costs incurred by research, design and development by seeking buyers outside the home market. Buyers obtain weapons by overt and legal means, such as sales to states and state-sanctioned agencies, and covert and ficit means, such as sales to insurgents, ethnic militias and other nonstate bodies14'. LegaLly, there are two types of trmsfers: foreign miIitary sales and direct commercial sales. Foreign müitary sales are government- to-govemment exchanges in which defense departments procure the requested weapons system for the foreign purchaser. Direct commercial sales are arranged between a foreign government and a private defense companyl".

In a report issued by Human Rigbts Watch entitled, "Exposing the Source:

U.S. Companies and the Production of Antipersomel Mines," a number of known producers and component-producers are said to have denied involvement in the production of landmines. For example, the U.S-based Company Lockheed wrote,

"A review of our records indicates that we do not produce landmines and have not since the Vietnam era."143Astonishingly, it was revealed that Lockheed Martin

New Jersey was awarded Department of Defense landmine production contracts

14'Klare, "New Arms Race."

142Councilfor a Livable World Education Fund, Conventional Arms Transfers (May 1995), 1. Hereafter cited as Council for a Livable World, Conventional Anns.

143HumanRights Watch, Ex~osingthe Source, 7. 58

worth $52,444,000 fkom 1985 to 1990 and Lockheed Martin California was

awarded DoD landmine production contracts of $850,000 in 1990'". In a

telephone interview, a representative fiom Nomura Enterprise in Rock Island,

Illinois said that his corporation is "not involved with anti-personnel landmine

prod~ction."'~~However, records show that Normura is a leading manufacturer

of the Volcano multiple delivery system. The Volcano launcher rack holds up to

forty canisters, each containhg six antitank mines and one antipersomel mine.

Company profits earned kom landmine production contracts were worth

$21,453,000 between 1985 and 1995~~~.The rationale for landmine production, according to companies that are willing to tak, is that the industry boosts the local economy. Stephen Gurba, president of Bulova Technologies, a Company that produces fuses and other component parts for landmines and cluster bombs, States that the landmine industry creates jobs in Pemsylvania's Lancaster County where

Bulova is located. Gurba, who is also the national chainnan of the Mines/Counter-

Mine and Dernolitions Section, an information-sharing group representing both government and industry, adds that the landmine industry contributes to the growth of businesses nation-wide in the defense sector, and that banning exports

145Representativeof Nomura Enterprise, Inc., Rock Island, Illinois, in conversation with author, August 21, 1997.

146HumanRights Watch, Exposine the Source, 2. would hurt taxbases that fund the nation's social service^'^?

As seen, the economic interest in landmines is not usualiy advertised. In practice, however, forty-eight nations are estimated to have produced them, and twenty-nine countries have engaged in export China., the United States, and the former Soviet Union have been leaders in both production and export. Global production is valued at approximately $100 million to $200 million per year.

These figures do not include weapon packages which incorporate AP and AT components and advanced ground and air-based delivery systems'". In the

1970ts,the production of conventional dumb mines entered a period of decline as

"billions of dollars were poured into corporate research and development laborat~ries"'~~to develop smart mine technology. This burgeoning and potentidy very lucrative market in smart mine systems has made the 1970's and onwards a propitious time for the landmine indu~try'~.The conventionai mine market continues to suit developing countries. Little money and technical sophistication is required, and a cornpetitive advantage in labour is expl~ited.'~'

147EmiiyWiU, "Mennonites, Industry Differ in Views on Anti-Personnel Weapon Production" Mennonite Central Cornmittee News Service (March 22, 1996), 1-3.

148HurnanRights Watch, Deadlv Laacy, 36.

149HumanRights Watch, Ex~osingthe Source, 8.

lSIHumanRights Watch, Deadlv Leeacv, 38. 60

In recent years, mine design and production has been placed more squarely in the hands of industry, leading to a rate of development that may soon outstrip the needs of the military lS2.

Interests and Repimes

It is obvious that the military rationales for landmines are monumental and that the economic rationales are substantid, although less imposing. It is now equaiIy obvious, following the logic of interest-based theories. that most states will not consider changing course and working towards a common goal unless certain stringent criteria are met (specificaiiy, enforcement, participation and solution-salience, as outlined earlier) that will optimize the expected value of a regime. Any sign of a defect in the CD or Ottawa Process will predictably be used by states as an excuse not to participate.

a)Strengths and Weaknesses of the CD

Enforcement by the CD

States in a stag hunt, or a collective arrangement, cheat What provisions wili a treaty negotiated at the Conference on Disamament contain to prevent

lS2ICRC,Fnend or Foe?, 62-63. 61

cheating? Let us first consider what are most often viewed as elements of a

credible enforcement scheme. Usually the regime rquires each signatory nation

to enact legislation that would make it Uegal for their own citizens to violate the

treaty. Second, the regime demdsthat nations compile detailed records of past

production and stockpiling. Third, signatories permit routine as weIi as

unexpected inspections of relevant sites. Fourth, military sanctions take effect

should a violation become knownl?

Other treaties negotiated in the forum of the CD have shown mixed resuits in tackiing the problem of enforcement. A sceptic on the effectiveness of the

Chernical Weapons Convention made the foliowing comment:

Verification is an insurmountable problem, and no one- not even the treaty's most ardent supporters - will promise that the treaty can be enforced. In the W.S.] Administration's obfuscatùig phrase, the CWC cm be "effectively verXed." Yet if chernical weapons are easy to hide, as A- 232 proves. they are also easy to make. The sarin used in the poison-gas attack on the Tokyo subway was created not in a fancy lab but in a srnail, ordinary room used by Aum Shimi Kyots amateur chemists. The treaty provides for snap inspections of companies that make chemicals, not of religious cults that decide to cook up some sarin in the back office. The CWC wouldn't make a whit of differen~e'~'?

lS3CalebRossiter, "Preventing Wtarily Signiricant Cheating in a Landmines Regime: A Cornparison of the U.S. Proposal for Verification and Cornpliance with the Chernical Weapons Convention Summary." (April26, 1996), @ttp://m.cdi.org ...nnminesesRegime.txt). Hereafter cited as Rossiter, "Preventing Cheating."

lS4"ADangerous Treaty," Wail Street Journal (February 19, 1997). 62

One has to be careful, however, to make the distinction between the impossibility of achieving a totaiiy effective scheme and what is still both possible and useful

("the world isn't perfect," comments U.S. Congressman Lane Evans on this point'55). To what degree must states be assured that other parties will not engage in the production, export and use of landmioes? There are many problems associated with the enforcement of landmines that lie in the hazy distinction between impossible and possible cornpliance. For instance, like chernical weapons, the ease with which landmines can be produced and transported, given their size, and the presence of a highly cornpetitive black market, lends itself weil to their continued use by a rebel warrior in Bratislava or Mogadishu or even by a combat personnel in a disciplined army who hds a way to jury-rig a hand- grenade in the event of a surprise attacklS6. One wonders whether it is possible to rely on viilagers and other eyewitnesses to know which combatants laid a particular minefield, especidy in Light of the fact that millions of pre-treaty iegally-sown mines in undisciosed locations will CO-existwith a newer crop of mines'". Furthemore, the route is circuitous between who supplies mines, who buys hem, and who actuaily uses them, so that "the weapons used in Afghanistan

lS5LaneEvans, interview by author, Notes, Capitol Hill, Washington D.C., May 13, 1997.

Is6Janne E. Nolan, "Land Mines: The Amis Control Dimension," in Cahill, Clearine the Fields, 91. Hereafter cited as Nolan, "Arms Control."

Is7Biddle,Landmine Arms Control, 23. 63 and suppiied by the Soviet Union, the United States or China, show up in

Vietnam, are perhaps routed to Thailand and end up somewhere in Rwanda or

~urundi."'~~Export-violahg govemments could evade the export licensing provisions in a treaty by choosing not to enforce their own customs regulations.

Export-violating firms could circumvent the treaty by shifting manufacture to non-signatory States, or by smuggling a shipment of over 10, 000 mines (for example) the size of a Valsella VS-50 in a few dozen ordinary four-by-four-by- three foot crates, like those that pass through major seaports every dayLSg.As for the LikeIihood of clandestine production, the component parts (casings, explosive fillings and fuses or detonators) of mines are so similar to common commercial products that one Italian Company until recentiy owned an operation that served ioterchangeably as a plant for car dashboard parts and for landmine casings.

Producers bent on violating the treaty can assemble their equipment in virtually any building or warehouse without extemaily observable evidence1?

In addition to the challenges posed by the above problems in any landmine regime, the CD proposai possesses merpotential weaknesses in its enforcement capability. Here is why. Even a singe opponent of a cornprehensive ban is able to exercise veto power. A large nurnber of countnes within the CD do

158SwadeshRana, "LightWeapons and Current Conflicts," Dismament WC:2 (1996),41. Hereafter cited as Rana, "Light Weapons." 64

at present oppose a total ban on landmines. Among them is the United States, a

country that wishes to press for exceptions. One such exception would caU for the

separation of conventional mines and smart mines. Another exception hoped for

is the continuai legal use of mixed mine systerns, such as the Volcano or the

Gator, which combine AP and AT mines16'. With countries iike the United States,

as weU as anti-ban States like China, Russia and Vietnam on board, it cm

reasonably be expected that at least one state will attempt to weaken the language

of the treaty so that it meets the lowest common denominator. It is widely

recognized that a ban with exceptions is more dBicuIt to monitor and enforce

than a total ban. In particular, a ban that mandates ceilings, partial limits, or

specifïcations on "good" and "bad" AP mines WU require more information to

substantiate a violation in the area of stockpile veriticatiun. Rare is it that the

chance discovery of one or two hidden caches suffices in itself. Furthemore, landmine production monitoring is "something of a catch-22: to obtain evidence requires access to the faciiity, but access to the key (undeclared) facilities no&y requires prior e~idence."'~~A ban with compiicated exceptions does not share the advantage of a total ban in this regard; for the latter, the discovery of any clearly identifiable stockpile or any evidence of production establishes

161"U.S.Stresses Support for U.N. Treaty on Land Mines," (http:i/ www .nando.net/newsroodntn/wotid/O82 197lworld1 9-1 8 37hW). Hereafter cited as "US. Stresses Suppoa."

I6'Biddle, Landmine Arms Control, 13. violation L63.

The CD's potential ability to address the enforcernent dilemma lies in the

fact that the members of the forum are not tirne-bound They have ample

opportunity to work out what are deemed to be the most appropriate measures to prevent states from cheating, like provisions for sanctions. Proponents of the CD

like to point out that the process in which states work by consensus is a

"painstaking, Iargely thankless and always protracted business" but it "[gets]

international agreements right." 16'

Partici~ationin the CD

We noted earlier that states will not readily forego their military and economic interests if others do not. A regirne is deemed more viable if the participation of leading producers, exporters and users is secured. Membership in the CD counts recalcitrant players on the world stage among its sixty-one members. A treaty wiu not emerge without their approval. As weIl, the CD admits other UN member states as observers, and offen invites states with a strong interest in a pdcular treaty to participate in the work of the negotiation16'. On

164Centrefor Secunty Policy, "Don't Fall For Tt, Mr. President: Landmine Ban is Seductive, But a Bad Public Poiicy and A Formula for Killing U.S. Personnel," Decision Brief, (August 13, 1997). Hereafter cited as Centre for Security Poiicy, "Don't Fali For It, Mr. President."

'65SpecialNGO Committee for Disarmament, Disarmament, 8. this point, praise for the strength of a regime negotiated in the firamework of the

CD is farflung. Universality is its most fkquently-iterated selling-point. Ralph

Ede, Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disannament Agency, said in a recent address to the members of the CD:

The value of negotiating an APL ban in the CD cmbe confirmed simply by looking around this chamber. As of June 27 more than half of the CD members, including the United States, has not associated themeIves [with the Ottawa Process.] As the distinguished Representative of Ukraine pointed out in his speech this past Tuesday, these countries make up hal€ or more of the worId's population and economic output and half or more of the world's historical activity with regard to anti-personnel landmines. Many of them have security concerns about eIiminating their landmines in the near future. We believe negotiations in the CD cm take these concems, including our own, into account Thus, while the CD's tasks will take longer to accomplish than the Ottawa Process, the resulting treaty WU,unlike the Ottawa Process. extend the reach of an APL ban to the major producers, stockpiler and exporters of APL'~~

There is another issue related to participation that is of significance: the issue of equity among potential members. For instance, critics of a limited landmine ban that would permit self-destmct mines assert that a two-tiered world system would result: those who can afford to produce and manufacture advanced technology and those who cannot Furthemore, a source of perceived inequity is that al1 amies are asked to restnct mine use, whereas ouiy some are guiity of

166"Addressof Deputy Ralph Earle of Amis Control & Disarmament Agency 3 1 July, 1997" (http://www.usia.gov/currentlnewsllatest/93 10 1.plt.html?/productsl washnle/newsitem.shtml). Hereafler cited as "Address of Deputy Earle". 67 indiscriminate use in the £ktplace. The decision to remove landmines fiom a country that foilows the rules of conduct, such as mapping, fencing, and clearing, is viewed in the same way as "taking firearms away fkom policemen because a criminal has used one for an illegal p~rpose."~~'Without a draft treaty in our hands, however, we wiU have to wait and see how the CD responds to these queries.

Salience of the CD Solution

An additional selling-point of the CD is its ability to "borrow formulas or approaches fkom prior cases with which negotiators may already be familiar."The

CD is, after dl, the only permanent multilateral negotiating body in the disarmament field. 1s its experience in arms control salient? In traditional arms control, states are called upon to reduce their own miIitary capabilities in retum for comesponding reductions by hostile rnilitii~yforces that may directly threaten them. The aim is reciprocal threat reduction. In the issue-area of land mines, what is given up and what is gained is not analogous. A country is asked to reduce a rnilitary capability to help tackle a humanitarian probled". Thus, questions are

=='Centre for Security Policy, "Hold That Line: JCS Objections Appear Crucial to Retaining Amencan Right to Use Landmines to Save U.S. Troops* Lives," Decision Brief June 18, 1997, (http://www.secdty-policy.org/papen/97-D1 .html). Hereafter cited as Centre for Security Policy, "Hold That Line."

16'Biddle, mare and Rosenfeld, Militam Utilitv, 8. 68

raised on whether an arms control venue is appropriate to produce a landmine regime.

a1Strength.s and Weaknesses of the Ottawa Process

Enforcement by the Ottawa Process

The strength of the treaty created by the Ottawa Process to provide credible enforcernent has been the source of fervent debate in diplornatic and policy-making circles. On one hand, enforcement is easy. The stated goal of the

Ottawa Process, as it is speiled out in the final declaration of the Brussels -

Conference, is to ban landmines outright. The treaty will be "comprehensive."

Those states wishing to pursue exceptions are unwelcome at the bargaining table.

Jody Williams, the coordinator of the International Carnpaign to Ban Landmines told states to "go home!" if they do not wish to "negotiate a complete ban of al1

APMs with no exceptions, no reservations and no lo~pholes."'~~It appears that complicated verifkation schemes for special conditions will not be required. In any case, the tirnetable of the negotiating process (which is fourteen months and which has been referred to as a '%listering Pace for an international treaty"'70 )

169JodyWilliams, "Urgent: U.S. to Oslo in Bad Faith," U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines brief (August 18,1997), 2.

170ColùiNickerson, "Mine Ban Gains Ground: Canada Destroys Weapons, Seeks Global Action," Boston Globe (March 7, 1997). 7. Hereafter cited as Nickerson, will most likely prevent their inclusion.

Enforcement may be relatively easy, but wilI it work? Proponents of the

Ottawa Rocess believe that the mere negotiation of a ban is enough to change the way mines, as a class of weapon, are perceived, and by implication, the way they are used. A representative from Foreign AffaUs in Ottawa - asked to expand on the role of verifkation in the treaty - said that the treaty wodd have "mord effect." She added that deviants wodd be "constrained by new norms.""' As might be expected, critics have labelied supporters of the Ottawa Process

"idealists", or simply naive, for placing credence in the sway of stigmatization as the source of deterrence for wodd-be chesters. The foIIowing quotation explains why stigmatization may work, but it is still a gamble:

. . . a treaty might so stigmatize mine use as to cause potential users to forgo minelaying, even if it codd not impose signifïcant direct costs. Some States would comply with a treaty voluntarily in any event; others might succumb to political pressures and comply so as to avoid violahg an international nom, No evidence has yet been advanced, however, to show that this wodd be a widespread resdt. The assumption by many landmine opponents that stigmatization will radically reduce &laying is just that - an assumptionl'*.

The short span of time in which to negotiate hinders senous discussion on

"Mine Ban."

n'Officiai of Department of Foreign Affairs, interview by author, Notes, Ottawa, Ontario, July 14, 1997.

172Biddle,Landmine Arms Control, 48. 70 mechanismi over and above the assumption of stigmatization. But the U.S.'s recent entry into the negotiating process may help to generate some headway. A

Department of State official has said that the United States would "be seeking to improve the treaty's verification provision^."^" So Iong as the product of the

Ottawa Process significantly increases the cost and difncuity of evading the treaty's terms and imposes additionai costs through the threat of sanctions - states' concerns about cheating will be alleviated.

Participation in the Ottawa Process

The ability of the CD to include trouble-maker states in the folds of a lmdmine regime is in this case a problem, given the voluntary nature of the regime. Attacks launched at Ottawa on this count are numerous. An editorial published by the Centre for Security Policy warns nations not to be tempted by the "instant gratification" of the Ottawa Process, which is seen as nothing more than a "signing ~erernony."~'~A spokesperson for the Joint Chiefs of Staff has said that the Ottawa Process "WUnot get us a global ban which will have a positive impact on the humanitarian problem, but rather a feel-good ban among like- minded states who have no intention of using AP landmiaes."" The catch-phrase.

173JamesRubin, "Landmines: U.S. to Participate in Ottawa Process." US. Department of State Daily Press Briefing (August 18, 1997).

l7%entre for Security Policy, "Dont Faii For It, Mr. President."

175"MineTreaty ClarSed," Defense News (July 1997). 36. "if you build it, they will does not Rng me, says a Pentagon official in charge of land mine policy. In fa& when Ottawa officids kst "built" the treaty, they expected only a couple dozen nations to corne. To their surprise, nfty attended the strategy conference (plus twenty-four observers). Since then, the number of states wiIling to give up their military and economic interests in landmines has contùiued to grow. Orchestrators of the ueaty seem unniftled by the attacks on the Process, and by concems that China, Russia and other key states show no sign of joining. "What we're trying to do here is not capture the entire world, but establish a moral authorïty" says Robert Lawson a leading Canadian disarmament ~fficial'~?Solving the crisis as soon as possible is the priority outlined in the Agenda for Action of the Ottawa Process. "First we want to get the treaty signed, then we want to globalise it," explains Ralph Lysyshyn, the

Canadian Director-GeneraI for International ~ecurity'~'.The ability of the Ottawa

Process to meet the criterium of universal participation is thus perceived to be mixed. On the one hand, the treaty proposal WU be sady deficient until the Last of the countries that contribute to the crisis decide to cooperate, which they may never do. On the other hand, the Ottawa Process does not pretend to aim for

17=Pentagonofficial, intewiew by author, Notes, Department of Defense, Arlington, Virginia, May 12, 1997.

L77RobertLawson. quoted in Dana Priest, "U.S.Holds Key to Ban of Mines: Clinton Set to Decide on Options for Taiks," Washineton Post (January 2, 1997), Al.

178GeertDe Clercq, "Belgium Hopes 60 Countries WU Ban Mines," (http://biz.yahoo.com/finance197/06/23/z~9~124-4.hd). 72 universal participation at once. It prefers a treaty with less-than-universai participation to a treaty that would contain exceptions suited to countries with resewations 17'.

Salience of the Ottawa Process Solution

The very fact that a new track of action has taken place outside the

"normal ~hannels"~"of the CD implies that the alternative route is seen by those involved to possess greater salience. The "open tune" for negotiations allotted to the CD and the '%losedthe" for negotiations in the Ottawa Process indicates one difference in perspective. It has been observed of diplornatic negotiations that

if parties see the situation as running out of hand, requiring some solution, then there will be great pressure to focus on immediate issues and reduce the amount of careful probing of intentions and evaluation of each of the opponentts statements.There may be a feeling that uny solution is better than letting "events take their course or permitting oneself the luxury of the to think matters overIS1.

It would not be inaccurate to Say that those states that favour the CD as an approach view landmines as a "problem" and those states that favour the Ottawa

17gCelinaTuttie, coordinator of Mines Action Canada, interview by author, Notes, Ottawa, July 14, 1997.

180Waliace,"Battle to Ban," 34.

lBIHolsti,International Politics, 146. 73

Process see them as a "crisis." Decision-making in crisis situations is most often reached in a maMer that is ad hoc, as opposed to a rnanner that strïves to be fair by building consensus and by according the decisional units a veto - a reflection of the Ottawa Process. Perhaps more irnportantly, whether an international problem is considered primariiy political, economic, military, social, or cultural wiU have implications for how ît is to be handled and by whom'". The Ottawa

Process strives to take into consideration those who are affected by the day-to- day crisis as much as those who will have to relinquish their interests. In consequence, a nurnber of states have been repeiled by, and "shared suspicions of, the process and its strategic alliance with the NGO coin~nunity."'~~The public style of diplomacy that includes working together with representatives of civil society (as suggested in the Agenda For Action) has "expanded dramatically the

'diplomatic tool kit' avaüable for use in lobbying decision-makers at state, regional, and global ievels,"'" but its novelty may be a problem for states debating whether or not to join - states that are resisting change on the landmine front, and are resistant of change in generd.

la2JamesE. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contendhg Theories of International Relations: A Com~rehensiveSurvev, 2nd. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 198 l), 468-493. Hereafter cited as Dougherty and Pfdtzgraff, Contendinn Theories. lB3Lawson,"Towards a New Multilateralisrn," 2 1. Conclusion

In s-, the interest variable in regime formation shows that one should not be overly optimistic about the motivations of states. Understandably, the potent rationales for landmines - they protect state borders, they deny areas to enemies in war, they are largely irreplaceable for militaries with low budgets, to name just a few - make it difficult for states to cooperate towards a goal that not aIl will benefit fkom directly, or equally. Unless a regime forces states to give up a valuable weapon, unless other states are also giving up the weapon, and unless the fhmework in which the "giving-up"occurs is an acceptable one, an effective landmine regime WUnot be formecl. 'Weak agreements, iike weak laws, invite cynicism and fatali~rn."'~Fortunately, the strengths and wealmesses of the

CD and Ottawa Process play off each other in a manner that provides hope that one or both holds the answer - and that landmines wiU one &y be gone fkom the earth. CELAPTER-

KNOWLEXIGE VARIABLE: A MïNE OF INFORMATION?

This chapter WU explore the role of knowledge in the formation of a landmine regime. Knowledge has traditionally been overshadowed by the other two variables in this thesis, interest and power, owing to the prominence of their corresponding schools of thought in International Relations. Cognitivism, an approach that interprets the behaviour of actors in terms of howledge, is a narrower, and less frequently discussed way of thinking abut state interaction.

There are four reasons why cognitive thinking should be brought to the fore when examuüng the creation of a landmine regime, and regimes in general.

a)The Implication of Cognitive Thinking in the Definition of Regime

It is helpful to recall the manner in which regimes are dehed. A central provision of regimes is that actor expectatiom converge in a given issue-= The convergence of expectations lies in the reaim of the cognitive, or of the subjective, rather than an "objective" Expectations are not facts. They depend on individual cognitions. In a setting as uncertain as the international arena, there is an absence of authoritative interpretations of meaning. Unlike a sport or game, where uncertainty is govemed by rulebooks and referees, or in

186ChristerJonsson, "Cognitive Factors in Regime Dynamics," in Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory, 9. Hereafter cited as Jonsson, "Cognitive Factors." 76

domestic society, with its buiding courts of Iaw, global actors must Look beyond

the facts of overt behaviour to intersubjective meanings'". That the Soviet Union withdrew nom, and agreed to the neutralization of Austria in 1955 is, for example, a fact At the same time, this decision raised the expectations of Eastern

Europeans and Americans about the motives of the Soviets. It was perceived as a conciliatory gesture and caused other countries to reciprocate acc~rdingly'~~.

Likewise, the subjective interpretation of expectations is important in instances that go Merthan cooperation and entd the creation of a regime. Without the convergence of expectations, a landmine regime will not corne into existence.

b)Growing Deference to Knowledge

Scholars interested in cognitive processes stress that knowledge shapes expectations. As previously stated in the introduction, knowledge is the sum of information and of theories about that information that garners sufncient consensus at a given time among interested actors. If knowledge regarding a specific issue-area like landmines is shared, states expect other states to act in a certain way. Deference to knowledge in the 1990's is reflected in the proliferation of bureaucracies of ail kinds world-wide. The number of ministries and

Ia7FriedrichKratochwil, "Regimes, Interpretation and the 'Science of Politics: A Reappraisal," Millennium 17:2 (1988), 277. Hereafter cited as Kratchowil, "Regimes, Interpretation."

lB8Jonsson, "Cognitive Factors," 207. 77 specialized agencies at the national and international Ievels has grown, as well as the practice of stafnng them with professionals holding second or third University degrees. The increasingly technical nature of problems conhibutes to the deference to knowledge, and to those with the expertise to handle the problems '".

c)The Possibility of Operationalizing Knowledge

What makes cognitive theory appealing is that it is possible to operationalize lmowledge in terms of bodies of experts. Shared knowledge does not emerge spontaneously. Rather, an epistemic community, or a "network of professionals with recognized expertise and cornpetence in a particuiar domain and an authoritative clah to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain" creates and promulgates the inforniaton'? Episternic cornrnunities are channels thorough which new ideas are circdaîed between society and government as well as across borders. They are distinct from other knowledge-based groups as, for example, disciplines, professions, and bureaucratic coalitions, due to the principled uniformity of the members' ideas. Because the sets of ideas are more or less consistent, the operationabation of howledge is far frorn impractical.

One has only to conduct interviews or to study the materials of such communities

189PeterM. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," international Organization 46: 1 (Winter 1992), 10- 11. Hereafter cited as Haas, "Epistemic Communities."

fgOHasenclever,Mayer and Rittberger, "Interests,Power, Knowledge," 209. (e-g., their officiai publications, testhnonies before legislative bodies, transcripts fkom intergovenunentai meetings, speeches and biographical accounts) to identify and analyze knowledge as a variablelg'.

d)Kmwledge as a Complernent to Other Variables

Most cognitive theorists realize that they done carmot explain regime formation, but that their choice of knowledge as an explanatory variable fills a lacuna in the literature. For instance, cognitivists criticize scholars of interest- based theories for falsely presuming that the interests of states are static. An obvious way in which national interests are altered is through a domestic shift in power. An election or coup d'etat cm produce leaders with perceptions of interest that differ radically fiom their predecessors. As well, an evolution in state interests that is normative in nature occurs when the practices of one period are downgraded or become unacceptable in a later period, as with slavery and colonialism. A finai source of change and the one that concerns us here is the

lglHaas, "Epistemic Communities," 35. Haas makes the following important comment about the nature and composition of epistemic communities: "The tem epistemic community has been defined or used in a variety of ways, most frequently to refer to scientSc communities. . . we stress [as this thesis does] that epistemic communities need not be made up of natural scientists or of professionals applying the same methodology that natural scientists do. . . By Our defuiition, what bonds members of an epistemic community is their shared belief or faith in the verity and the appiicability of particular forms of knowledge or specific tniths. Our notion of "epistemic community" somewhat resembles Fleck's notion of a "thought collective"- a sociological group with a cornmon style of thinking." Epistemic communities may include international interest groups and a variety of experts with a common style of thinking. introduction of new and compelling knowledge in an issue-area that leads to the miefinition of state interests. Cognitive change widens the opportunities for the creation of a regime if one is seen to be neededlg2.

An insight borrowed fkom cognitive psychology is that the reception of new information wiI.I depend on the strength of prior beliefs. Cognitive dissonance is a word used to describe an uncomfortable mental state resulting fiom new beliefs conflicting with the ~ld"~.Scholars outside the field of psychology have expanded on this concept, employing different terminology.

Thomas S. Kuhn wrote of a "revolution" with reference to the sciences. He stated,

"Because the old must be revdued and reordered when assimilating the new, discovery and invention in the sciences are usuaiIy intrinsically revolutionary." Ig4

Sally Weaver, an expert in Canadian public poiicy, asserts that "turbulence" is inevitable when "old ways of thinking gradudy give way to the ne^."^^^ Finaily,

lg2JosephS. Nye, Jr. "Nuclear Learning and U.S .-Soviet Security Regimes," International Or~anization41:3 (Surnmer 1987), 378. Hereafter cited as Nye, "Nuclear Learning. "

Lg3JohnP. Houston, Motivation (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1985), 226. Hereafter cited as Houston, Motivation. See ais0 Leon Festinger, A Theorv of Comiitive Dissonance (Evanston, Illinois: Row and Peterson, 1957).

'g4ThomasS. Kuhn, "The Essentiai Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research" in Bernard Susser, ed., Aoproaches to the Studv of Politics (New York: Macmillan hiblishing, l992), 167. Hereafter cited as Kuhn, "The Essential Tension."

lg5SallyWeaver in Michael Howlett, "Policy Paradigms and Policy Change: Lessons from the Old and New Canadian Policies Towards Aboriginal Peoples." PoIicv Studies Journal 22:4 (1994), 635. Hereafter cited as Howlett, "Policy Paradigrns." 80

"uncertainties and disagreement" surface when a set of expectations about the world are challengeci, writes Joseph S. Nye, a scholar in International Relations.'%

In turn, psychologists argue that individuals are driven to aileviate their mental discornfort, that is, eliminate inconsistencies in thought. Kuhn, Weaver and Nye have recognized such a phenornenon in their respective fields. Both Kuhn and

Weaver have labelied the reconciliation of inconsistencies as a "SMin paradigms."For Nye, the acceptance of new priorities and trade-offs is achieved with "learning.""The extent and accuracy of learning depends upon the strength of the prior beliefs and quantity and quality of new

In sum, cognitive theory functions as a useful supplement to other theories in regime theory. Cognitivists have beady pointed out that knowledge has served as an explanatory vaxiable in a varied set of cases. For example, evidence on the threat posed by chlorofluorocarbons led to the realization of the 1987 Montreal

Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone ~ayer;"~a consensus on how to contain cholera and other communicable diseases made possible the formation of an international public heaith regi~ne;'~~in global finance, a cognitive shifi

lg6Nye,"Nuclear Leaming," 379.

lg7Nye,"Nuclear Leaming, " 380.

lg8SeeRichard Eliiot Benedick. Ozone Di~lomacv(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 199 1). Hereafter cited as Benedick, Ozone.

lg9SeeRichard N. Cooper, "International Cooperation in hiblic Health as a Prologue to Macroeconomic Cooperation" in Richard N. Cooper, Barry Eichengreen, C. Randall Henning, Gerald HoItham and Robert D. Putuam., eds., Cm Nations Aaee?: 81

occurred from postwar Keynsianism to neoclassicism due to the persistent

infiuence of an epistemic community centred on the Bank for International

Settlement~;~and the introduction of the nuclear winter thesis enhanced the fear

of mutually assured destruction and had an impact on secwity regimes like the

1982 Strategic Arms Reduction Talk~~~'.

It rernains to be seen whether the influence of knowledge wiU lead to the creation of a landmine regime. Now that the importance of cognitive thinking has been explained, this chapter will describe the epistemic community of landmines, and then consider whether the knowledge generated by the community will translate into action.

An E~istemicCornmunitv of Landmines a)The Members

Who belongs to the epistemic community of lancimines? Narrowly dehed, this community would include ody those who are professionals and technical

Issues in International Economic Coo-=ration (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1989). Hereafter cited as Cooper, "International Cooperation."

200SeeEric Helleiner, States and the Reemer~enceof Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, New York: Comeil University Press, 1994) and Benjamin J. Cohen, "Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Fiance," World Poiitics 48 (January 1996). Hereafter cited as Cohen, "Phoenix."

201SeeFrancis P. Hoeber and Robert K. Squire, "The 'Nuclear Winter' Hypothesis: Some Policy Imphcations," Strateeic Review (Summer 1990), and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Nuclear Winter and Policy Choices" Survival XXVIE2 (March-April 1986). 82 experts in the field. Conceived more broadly (in the way that Haas conceives it, much like a "thought coilective"), however, it embraces a much wider array of individuals and organizations. Arnong them are academics, scientists, environmentalists, physicians, human rights activists, children's advocates, joumalists, lannmine survivors, development economists, philanthropists, diplomats, clergy members, international legai authorities, members of nongovenunental orgmhtions (NGûs), governinent officids, veterans, security analysts, and arms controllers. Jody WiIliams, coordinator of the International

Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) leads the largely NGO-inspired movernent to ban landmines. She meets regularly with a steering cornmittee of nine organizations: the Vietnam Veterans of Amenca Foundation based in Washington

D.C., the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines in Islamabad, Pakistan,, the

Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Handicap

International in Paris. France, Human Rights Watch Arms Project in Washington

D.C., medico international in Fra.Germany, the Mines Advisory Group in

Cumbria, United Kingdom, Physicians for Human Rights in Boston,

Massachusetts, and Radda BamedSwedish Save the Children in Stockholm,

Sweden. Many nations have organized their own campaigns under the umbrella of the ICBL. To dustrate, Mines Action Canada is supported by a Long list of agencies in its home country, including the Anglican Church of Canada, the

Mennonite Central Cornmittee, CAR& Lawyers for Socid Responsibility, Oxfam, Project Ploughshares, Science for Peace and the Working Group on

Refugee Resettlement. It simuitaneously strives to meet national objectives

(through public outreach programs, research, policy development, and dialogues with the government and other parties) as it strives towards international objectives by working closely with the ICBL. In total, the international network brings together more than 1,000 NGOs in over 50 corntries, Ieading one observer to describe the Campaign as "the single most effective exercise of civil society since World War

Although the momentum for a ban began with NGOs, the epistemic community encompasses other howledgable supporters. Actors at the United

Nations, includùig the Secretary Generd and senior executives in the department of Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Mairs, the High Commission on Refugees and

UNICEF, have forthrightly addressed the need to take action on the landmine epidemicm3.The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Mysupports the process of a ba#"' and has made the promotion of awareness of the tragedy

202StephenLewis, quoted in Human Rights Watch, Stili Kiiling, 177.

203Ke~ethAnderson and Monica Schurtman, "The United Nations Response to the Crisis of Landmines in the Developing World." Harvard International Law Journal 36:2 (Spring 1995), 359. Hereafter cited as Anderson and Schurtman, "UN Response."

'04Urs Boegli, "Statement of Urs Boegli, Head of the Department of Communication, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva," Washington D.C.: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997). Hereafter cited as Boegli, "Statement." 84 a priority. It has kept the public, military circles, and decision-makers abreast of the latest figures on the human tell. Like the ICRC, with its long history and special interest in the management of war-wounded, physicians are tahg a stand against 1ancIrnines. They, too, have witnessed first-hand the physical devastation inflicted on victims in the developing world A case could be made that the information presented by the medical profession alone has the power to sway

States into imrnediately calling a landmine ban. Articles written by concerned physicians have discussed the egregious injuries resulting fÎom mine hgmentation on soldiers and civilians alikem. Govemment legislators who form part of the epistemic community have often been touched by the crisis in some dimension themselves. Keith Martin, a Reform Member of Parliament for

Esquimalt-Juan de Fuca in British Columbia, submitted a private member's bill in March 1996 to amend the CNninaI Code to prohibit the sale, offer for sale, purchase, possession, giving, barter, manufacture, assembly, import or export of landmines. He is a doctor who treated landmine victims on the Mozambique-

South Africa bordex? Patrick Leahy, a Democratic senator fkom Vermont became vocal in the movement after he visited prosthetic clinics he had helped

205SeeJames C. Cobey, Eric Stover and Jonathon Fine, "Civilian Injuries due to War Mines," Techniques in Ortho~aedics10:3 (Fall 1995) and R. M. Coupland, The Effects of Weapons: Surgical Challenge and Medical Dilemma," Journal of the Roval College of Surgeons of Edinburrrh 4 1 (April 1996).

206KeithMartin, "Land Mines Exact an Enormous Human Toii,"The Financial -Post (May 2 1, 1996). Hereafter cited as Martin, "Land Mines." 85 estabiish with the Leahy War Victims Fund in Central America and Mkica. Most recently, he and Senator Chuck Hagel a Republican from Nebraska and a Viet

Nam combat veteran, introduced a bill to stop the hture use of AP mine by U.S. forces2'". A growing number of individuals in military circles, particularly researchers in laboratories at the U.S. Department of Defence (DOD),NASA, and the Canadian Department of National Defense @ND) are in the process of developing means to mitigate the impacts of landmines, and to improve demining technologJ08. Members of influentid media like The New York Times and The

Economist have taken sides and joined the neîwork of professionals with recognized expertise. Finally, the Feinstein International Famine Center at Tufts

University notes that academic circles have been slow to produce information on landmines. However, since Uiat observation was made, the Canadian Landmine

Research Network, a multi-disciplinary group of academics headquartered at

McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, has sprung to Me. As well, one should not overlook the vast body of scholarly literature contributed by the legal community. Articles appea~gin the Fordham International Law Jouai, the

Georgia Joumal of International and Comparative Law, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, the

207Ch~~kHagel, "Weapons We Do Not Need," Washington Post (June 18, 1997), A17. Hereafter cited as Hagel, "Weapons."

208JohnHarnrnock and David O'Brian, Destroyin~Lives. Landmines: An OveMew (Tufts University: Feinstein International Famine Center, April 1997), 26. Hereafter cited as Hammock and OBrian, Destroving Lives. 86

Catifornia Westem International Law Journal, the Columbia Journal of

Transnational Law and others generaily emphasize the need for a ban by promothg the idea that the way in which AP mines are used already renders them

Uegalm. The membership list of the epistemic community does not end there. It is clear that the multidimensional nature of the landmine crisis bas attracted an eclectic set of experts.

b)The Message

What is the message of the epistemic community? Aside nom a call for increased resources for demining and victim assistance, there is only one. A total ban "without exceptions, reservations or lo~pholes"~'~on the production, use, stockpiüng, and export of anti-personnel mines is needed. That the message is simple and singular in scope has aided the community in the transfer of knowledge.

Of questionable ment is the practice of selecting or concealing information

209SeePaul J. Lightfoot, 'The Land Mine Review Conference: Will the Revised Land Mine Protocol Protect Civilians?" Fordham International Law Journal 18:4 (April 1995), McCaU, "Infernal Machines," Ferrer, "Affirming Our Common Humanity," Araujo, "PeremptoryNom of International Law," Janet E. Lord, "Legal Restraints in the Use of Landmines: Humanitarian and Environmentai Crisis," California Westem International Law Journal 25 (1 995). Ekberg, "Remotely Delivered. "

210JodyWilliams, quoted in Ceha Tuttle, "Action Aiert: Canada Must Stand Firm for a Total Ban," (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, July 8, 1997). 87

that may advance or retard the goals of the group. Cognitivists refer to this

phenornenon as selective exposure: Generally speaking, we do not seek out

information that might be contrary to our existing views. Seleetive exposure

explains why anti-smoking advocates find it difncult to reach their intended

audience. people who smoke do not typically read anti-smoking literature.)211

Applied to the issue of landmines, it is unclear whether withholding certain ideas,

and projecting others, is a conscious effort made by the experts. These experts

may in fact believe what they project, even if it is erroneous. Knowledge, like

knowledge about the landmine crisis, is accepted belief and not necessady

correct belief. But it is more likely, especially in cases when "evidence is

ambiguous and the experts thernselves are spht into contending factions, [for]

issues . . . to be resolved less on their technical merits than on their political

~nes."~'*For example, the Daily Telegraph published the following comment by

a former mine-clearer who believes that the estimates of sown AP mines are

politicdy manipulated: "The figures being bandied about have been arrived at by

methods of which the general public know Little. These figures are then written

up in briehg sheets and passed on to journalists who accept them without

2'1Angela Hiil, "Teen Smokers Say Ad Blitz Won't Make Any Daerence," Tri- Valley Herald (Danville, California), Feb 24, 1993, 1. Hereafter cited as HiII, "Teen Smokers."

212Haas,"Epistemic Communities," 11. 88 q~estion."~"Another writer wrote that truthful facts are "at risk of king altogether Iost in the fkenzy of hype, do-goodism and political correctness associated with the effort to prohibit these ~eapons."~"

The inflation of figures Iike the nurnber of sown mines, if indeed they are exaggerated, is of minimal consequence. One has only to travel to Cambodia,

Mozambique or Croatia to witness the devastation characteristic of mine-infested areas to believe that there is a crisis. On a more profound level, and at a greater risk to the credibility of the campaigners, is the reconfiguration of arguments contrived to pack the maximum punch. The most widely-observed instance of selective exposure is the refusal by sorne members to admit to evidence on the miIitary utility of landmines. The 75-page ICRC booklet Friend or Foe? A Studv of the Militarv Use and Effectiveness on Anti-Personnel Mines, chronicles twenty-six conflicts in which mines were deployed, from World War II to the brief armed conflict between Ecuador and Peru in 1995. Each confiict is said to have scarcely, or not at alI, benefitted fiom the use of mines. One grudging concession is made: "At best, these weapons had a marginal tactical value under certain specific but demanding conditions . . ."215 Friend or Foe? is footnoted in the majority of works on landmines, and has been labeiied "the bible of the

-- p.-

213Pa~1Jefferson, quoted in Centre for Security Policy, "Hold That Line. "

'14Centre for Security Policy, "Hold That Line."

21SICRC,Fnend or Foe? 7. 89

~~0s."~'~In addition, "An Open Letter to Resident Clinton," published in the

May 3,1996 Nèw York Times and signed by fifteen hi&-ranking retired military officers, including General H. Nomian Schwankopf, States that "banning

[antipersomel mines] wodd not undermine the military effectiveness or safety of ow forces, nor those of other nations." What is rarely achowledged is that

"before they signed it, they only got part of the ~tory,"~"according to one

Pentagon source, adding that the officiais were unaware that the statements in the letter would apply to self-destnict mines in addition to dumb mines. This letter is frequently found framed in the offices of campaigners. To a lesser degree, members of the epistemic community misrepresent arguments on the economic interest of landmines by emphasizing the small nurnber of companies that rely on landmine production for their financial well-being, and de-emphasizing the lucrative possibilities of scatterable mines and delivery system acces~ories~'~.

A select number of experts have donated a body of knowledge that is informed and reasoned. The members of the epistemic community at large are wise to join forces with this group if they wish to preserve some semblance of believability. Once again drawing on the aaalogy of the anti-smoking campaign,

"I6Department of National Defence official, interview by author, Notes, Ottawa, Ontario, July 15, 1997.

217Pentagonofncial, interview by author, Department of Defense, Notes, Arlington, Virginia, May 12, 1997.

Z181CRC,Anti-Personnel Mines: An Overview 1996 (Geneva: ICRC, 1996). 90 a majority of advocates have abandoued the strategy that tells smokers that they receive no benefits fiom their addiction. They know that such a denial is fdse, as many smokers experience a sense of enjoyment or relaxation fiom the intake of tobac~o~'~.A more effective carnpaign features the threat of lung cancer as a drawback that looms large in smokers' futures. The thought process that is provoked is evaiuative: 1s the balance of benefits in favour of today's enjoyment or the avoidance of a likely early death? The analogy offers two lessons for those wishing to reach a ban on landmines. First, little is gained by attempting to deny the military and economic interests of landmines. Militaries, defense ministries, landmine producers, and low-incorne weapons buyers, me smokers. know better.

Constructive debates have focused on whether landmines are essential, rather than simply useN, and if military rewards outweigh the potentiai of mines used against the troops that laid them? Second, stigmatin'ng mines by depicting their howing effects and indiscriminate nature is a powerful tool of persuasion. It gives policy-makers and the public pause. 1s the balance of benefits in favour of short-term rnilitary and economic gain or in halting a humanitarian crisis?

Tempered minds of the episternic community have successfidly issued their message without having to exploit counter-factual arguments.

-

219Hill,"Teen Smokers," 1.

220HumanRights Watch, Deady Leeacv, 2 1-22. An array of public awareness activities mounted by individuals. non-

govermnental organizations and institutions has caught the attention of the media

and the generai public. As just a few examples, Anel Brugger, a resident of

Charleston, New Hampshire. led a three-month, 1,300 mile walk through cities like Milwaukee, Chicago, Cleveland and Pittsburgh to spread knowledge on the effects of landmines in the summer of 1996. The intedaith pilgrimage reached out to community and church groups dong the way? Chris Moon, a former British amyofficer who lost an ann and a leg while clearing mines in Mozambique in

1995, recently ran 124 miles fiom Bathurst to Sydney in order to raise money and galvanize support for fellow victims. In 1996, he completed an 89-mile stretch across the Sahara Desert, also for charïty?

Testimony by landmine survivors adds a human dimension to the campaign. In conjunction with the ICBL, The Women's Commission on Refugee

Women and Chiidren organized a 1996 Landmines Awareness Speaking Tour in which four survivors, aged fourteen to fifty-six, spoke to the US public, the media, the governent and UN officiais in New York, Minneapolis and

221UnitedStates Campaign to Ban Landmines, "InterfaithPilgrimage Ends in Washington DC,"Landmines Bulletin 4 (September 1996), 3.

222 "Mine Victirn Completes Long-Dist ance Run, " (http ://yahoo.com/ hea~es/970720/sports/stones/runner~1.html). 92

Washington DCm. One landmine shvor, Tun Channereth, is a famiIiar name in community circles due to his tireless campaigning. His legs were tom off by a mine while fighting in Cambodia. A designer of wheelchairs adapted to the needs of the disabled with the Jesuit Service wheelchair team, and one of four initial authors of a worldwide petition to ban landmines which has received over 1.7 million signatures, he urges the necessity of a ban. Tun has met with Cambodia's

King Norodom Sihanouk, the Pope, the Queen of Spain, the President of Ireland, and has addressed the British Parliament as weII as those present at the UN

Review Conference on the Landmines Protocol in Vien~~a~~~.The ICBL's poster child is an eleven-year-old narned Elsa Armindo Chela. While picking mangoes in the Angolan central highlands, a country no longer at war, Chela lost an eye, a leg and her cousin. Her face, and the story behind it, have become a symbol of the suffering of children caused by landmines".

Anti-landrnine demonstrations are a popular means of delivering the message of a ban. Demonstrations have taken place outside Aliiant Tech Systems, the largest producer of landmines in the United States in Hopkins, Minnesota, at

223UnitedStates Carnpaign to Ban Landmines, "Landmine Awareness Tour." Landmines Bulletin 4 (September 1996), 3.

"'Tun Channereth, in conversation with author, Capitol Hill, Washington D.C.,May 14, 1997.

22 =UnitedStates Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Elsa'sS tory," Landmines Bulletin 6 (July 1997), 5. 93

Lafayette Peace Park opposite the White ous se,^'^ in fiont of the Parliament buildings in Ottawa, and at the Parvis du Trocadero in Paris, among other locationsm. Organizers of the protests erect piles of shoes in remembrance of the

26,000 people across the world who have lost a limb or a Meto landmines every year.

Furthemore, documentaries like David Feingold's Crucial Steps:

Landmines in Carnbodia (July 1995). Silent Sentinek, Cowardr War (October

1995), Terror in the Mine Fields (January 1996) and Small Targets: Landmines and Children in Mozambique (May 1997) have brought the reality of life with landmines in developing countries home to the NO&? A public advocacy campaign designed to shock was launched by the ICRC, its first ever since its inception. Public service announcements mnning on national medias (for instance, daily broadcasts on Russia's three national television stations, billboard advertising in Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and poster campaigns in close to twenty countries), have reached a potential audience of over 600 million2t9.One print advertisement produced by the ICRC shows a iine-up of

226UnitedStates Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Local Campaign Updates," Landmines Bulletin 4 (September 1996), 4.

"'Handicap International, "Duplex France-Canada Pour La "Deuxième Pyramide de Chaussures Pour Interdire Les Mines," (Communiquéde Presse, August 12, 1997).

22eUnitedStates Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Biographies of Key Speakers," hand-out at fiim presentation ,Capitol Hili, May 15, 1997.

Z291CRC,"Anti-Personnel Mines: An Overview 1996," 22. cmtches and prosthetic legs and reads: "Forget London, Paris and Rome. This is

What the Women in Phnom Penh are Wearing." Other chilling slogans read:

"Civilized Countries Are Supposed to Lock Away Child Killers, Not Export

Them," and "Activating a Landmine Takes Pressure. So Does Stopping One." The

ICBL credits itself as the fhtgroup of international-based activists to effectively employ electronic mail to spread information23o.In a single instance, a wide circulation of readers receive late-breaking campaign communiqu6s and action derts across the world. Internet resources such as the Centre for Defense

Information Arms Trade Database, and various homepages devoted to landmines offer up- to-date material (news articles, statements, speeches, govemment documents, case studies, statistics, bibliographies), and oppominities to participates in regular ongoing discussions on solutions to the cri si^^^'. These resources show a remarkable consensus that landmines must be banned.

FinaUy, a number of hi&-profile personalities have lent their name to the cause. An ever-present paparazzi followed the Princess of Waies to Angola this year, capturing her nimb1y stepping through a minefield and speaking with

"ppled victims. "My purpose," she has saki, "was to draw world attention to this vital but hitherto largely neglected issue. Anyone would be drawn to this human

230MaryWareham, interview by author, U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines Headquarters, Washington D.C., May 12, 1997.

231Seefor example Centre for Defense Information Arms Trade Database @ttp://www.cdi.org/atdb),ICRC (http://www.icrc.org/icrcnews/2bce.htm), and Land Mines Special Report ~ttp://www,oneworld.org/iancGnines/~dex.h~). 95 tragedy and therefore 1 hope you will understand why 1 wanted to play my part in working towards a woddwide ban on these weap~ns."~~William Kennedy

Smith, a staff member at the Veteran Affairs Hospital in Chicago, is president of

Physicians Against Land Mines. U.S. Congressman Lane Evans @-Illinois), a leader in the House of Representatives to ban landmines, has said about Kennedy,

"1 think he's living up to the family's reputation to use his name and position and clout" to help othersZ3. Prominent Canadian musician Bruce Cockbum has contributed royalties from his record Company Ryodisc towards the cause and has penned a stining Song entitled "Mines of Mozambique." Last, Nobel Peace

Lai-reates, Mairead Maguire of Northem Ireland, Lech Walesa of Poland,

Reverend Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, Oscar Aria Sanchez of

Costa Rica, Elie Wiesel of the United States, the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Aung San

Suu Kyi of Bunna and Rigoberta Menchu Tum of Guatemela have endorsed the rnovement to ban landmines.

23 'Roxane Roberts, "From London, a Blitz With Glitz." Washington Post (June 18, 1997), DI.

233LaoeEvans, quoted in "Another Notable Name in the War on Land Mines," Washington Post (June 24, 1997), B3. From ICnowIedee to Action

Regime theorist Peter Haas writes:

. , . it often takes a crisis or shock to overcome institutionai inertia and habit and spur them to seek help fkom an epistemic community. In some cases, information generated by an epistemic community may in fact create a shock, as often occurs with scientinc advances or reports that make their way into the news, simultaneously capturing the attention of the public and policymakers and pressuring them into actionm.

There has been no one revelation or event that has precipitated a crisis in the issue-area of landmines (Iike the discovery of the "ozone hole" over Antarctica in 1985 which became a driving force in negotiations to ban substances that deplete the ozone laye?'). Has the epistemic community succeeded in creating a shock? We know that the body of experts has captured the attention of the public, but has it captured the attention of policymakers to the degree that they will take action in the form of a global ban?

One way to determine the above is to examine the political progress made to date. At the national level, over thirty-five governments have suspended or * bamed the use of AP mines, including the goveniments of Australia, Norway,

Portugal, France, Germany, South Afiica, Mozambique, Swaziland and, just

23 4Haas, "Epistemic Comrnunities," 14.

23SBenedick,"Ozone Diplomacy," 18- 19. recently, the United Kingdom. More than twenty nations have forbidden the production of antiperso~elmines, among them, Italy, a country that was once a leader in production. Over Nty countnes have prohibited export of AP mines, including South Mca and Zimbabwe, two chief exporters in the south of

~fnCa~~~.Canada declared a moratorium on the production, expoa and operational use of AP mines in January of 1996. The moratorium perrnïts the retention of mines for training purposes, viewed as necessary to prepare Canadian

Forces in mine clearance and peacekeeping ope ration^.^^'

At the international level, members of the Conference on Disarmament recently appointeci a special coordinator to seek consensus to launch negotiaîions on a landmine ban. But no one is rooting for the CD to succeed except for its members (not even aiI of them - a pro-Ottawa Mexico attempted to impede progress within the forum). And Ottawa possesses the advantage of having the bdk of the members of the epistemic community on its side. The Process has convened conferences in Viema and Brussels, which will be discussed in the next chapter, leading up to the negotiation and signature of a legaily binding treaty -- a show of progress that is dramatic. That over a hundred countnes have expressed willingness to sign the treaty in Ottawa is attributable, in large part, to

236HumanRights Watch Arms Project, Still Killinp: Landmines in Southern Afnca (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997), 13. Hereafter cited as Human Rights Watch, Still Kihg.

237HandicapInternational, "The Manufacture and Trade of Anti-Personnel Mines," (http://193.210.156 ...icaplconf0l .htm#AA). 98 the efforts of members of the epistemic community, who have thrown their weight behind the Process believing that "it [solvhg the crisis] cornes down to time.""8

Mozambique's foreign minister said in March, 1997:

The government took its decision [to join Ottawa] because of the mobilization work undertaken by the Mozambican Campaign Against Lannmines. The campaign coilected 100,000 signatures fkom citizens who think that antiperso~elmines should be banned throughout the world. They spoke with me. The head of state received them. They were received by other rnembers of govemment. They told us what the aims of the campaign were, and we thought we should support hemz9.

On at least one occasion, a shifi in interests occurred through a change in govemment. Britain's announcement to work vigorously towards a worldwide ban came after the Conservatives, opponents of a ban, were replaced by the Labour

~artf? Elsewhere, it appears that a growing number of states have learned that a ban is in their interest.

As predicted, new information about Landmines that confiicts with the

23aMaryWareham, interview by author, Notes, U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines Headquarters, Washington D.C., May 12, 1997. Another reason cited by Wareham for the ICBL's choice to back the Ottawa Process is that the Carnpaign feared that non-state actors would be "locked outside the doors of the CD" - a closed-door, states-only negotiating body.

239ForeignMinister Leonardo Simiïo, quoted in Human Rights Watch, StiU Killing, 1O 1.

240TimButcher, "Labour Bans Landmines fiom 2005," Electronic Telemph 727 (May 1997). 99

older view of landmines as legitimate weapons of war has produced a sense of

mental discodort, or cognitive dissonance in state leaders. Russia is not yet

prepared to accept a complete ban. It instead prefers a "step-by-step approach"

which calls for the graduai acceptance of an export ban. then a ban on production,

foIlowed by the eventual destruction of its mine stockpilesZ4'.The United States'

moratorium on the use of AP mines contains an exemption clause, such that the

military "shall not use antipersonnel landmines except dong intemationaily

recognized national borders or in demilitarized zones within a perimeter rnarked

area that is monitored by military personnel and protected by adequate means to

ensure the exclusion of ~ivilians.''~~~China's leaders are unwilling to give up

landmines. A number of other States, like Japan and Australia, are wavering in

their decisions on a total global ban. It is thus concluded that the quantity and quaLity of new information has failed, in strength, to ease inconsistencies in thought for those with staunchly-held prior beiiefs. The aiteration of the cognitive landscape of actors' expectations is incornpiete --at ieast for now.

241'RussiaConsiders 'Step-By-Step Approach' on Mines," (http://www.web.apc . . . pages/ldms972.htm). 242LeahyAmendment, Moratorium on the Use of Antipersomel Landmines (February 12, 1996). 100

Conclusion

While proponents of the interest variable suggest that states may alter their strategies by which they pursue their interests if they are assured that the rewards for cooperation are great (that no other states will cheat, that they cooperate on equitable te=, and that the soIution is viewed as salient), cognitivists understand that perceptions of interests may change in and of themselves. The knowledge variable advanced by the cognitive school is instrumental in explaining regime formation. CHAPTF,R FOUR

TEE POWER VARIABLE: THE PUYERS AND PROCESS OF

TEE LAND- REGIME

Understanding change in the landmine regime requires looking at the dynamics of power in international society. Realism, realpofitik, or the school of

"power politics" has shaped the thinking of vimially every statesman and foreign policy professional since the mid-cene3,and as early as 400~~~''~.According to many realists, the presence of a hegemon - a single, dominant state -- is a precondition of regime formation. Even if a number of individual governent leaders decide that a regime is in their interest, and those leaders are infused with a sense of urgency to solve a given problem through knowledge generated by an episternic cornmunity, inertia will govem the issue-area without a hegemon. Does a leader exist with the necessary resources and determination to coordinate the energies of those committed to a landmine ban and to compel non-committed parties to foUow suit? Before answering that question, this chapter will funiish the necessary background knowledge to anticipate state behaviour through "realist

243FrancisFukuyama, The End of Histow and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992), 246. Hereafter cited as Fukuyama, End of Historv.

244SeeThucydides, Historv of the Pe1o~~onesia.nWar (London: Penguin Books, 1972). a)Realtmr as a General Ekplunation of State Behaviour

In Realism, the state is the interacting unit in a system of states. States are not and have never been the only actors in the international arena. Should the impact of nonstate actors on transnational activities one day surpass the impact of states, then the system will be redrawn. However, so long as major states are the major players, the system wiU necessarily be dehed in terms of them, "Men the crunch cornes," writes Kenneth Waltz, "states . . .rnake the des by which other actors ~perate."~'~.Furthemore, realism (or at least some accounts) consciously ignores perturbing factors, like domestic politics, that might cloud its view -- it is the study of "high politics." It does not matter that one state is totalitarian, democratic, experiencing civil strife, peaceful, poorly populated, rich in culture, cold in climate, or has a prime minister instead of a president.

According to reaiism, these intemal matters complicate the process of predicting the behaviour of states with other states, and are more often irrelevant than they are relevant. By treating states as similar so long as they are sovereign, realism focuses on the single category that matters most. It is this category --the distribution of power -- that sets states apart in a meaningful way. States are consumed with the gains and losses of power and naturaIiy seek to rnaximize their

245Ke~ethWaltz. Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 94. Hereafter cited as Waltz, International Poiitics. 103 own. Their preoccupation with who has what stems fkom a sense of insecurity in a hostile environment Small states know that they are at the perd of large states; large states know that their strength wïII eventually decline orbe challenged; both srnail and large states recognize that they have only themselves to rely upon in order to survive. Insecwity is somewhat alleviateci with the formation of a balance of power which restrains the aggressive tendencies of each state. Drawing on these general principles, one can reasonabiy rely on states to behave in expected ways in certain situations. Power is a clear-cut currency for the measurement of a state's

b)ïïze Theory of Hegemonic Stability

One realist contribution to regime literature is the theory of hegemonic stability. From the above principles, one might assume that regimes and realism are incompatible. Why? Uaits that worry about their survival, and engage in self- help bctics, that is, tactics designed to protect themselves against others, do not readily relinquish their independence. The survival instinct works against cooperation. States fear that joint gains received fiom cooperation di favour one state over another, and increase the capability of that state to the detriment of

Other~'~~.

2461bid.,79-129. See also Robert G. Giipin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Reaiism," International Ormzation 38:2 (Spring 1984). 104

On the other hand, what if cooperation is not a choice? What if the regime is irnposed on other states? In some realist circles, regimes are viewed as structures in which dominant international actors promote and maintain the des that promote and maintain their p~wei?~!Nothing in the definition of a regime specifies that the set of principles, nom, niles, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge are voluntary in nature. A subtle ciifference in shade of meaning this is, to be certain, but it makes aLI the ciifference when applying the power variable to regime formation.

Put simply, the hegemonic stability theory argues that collective behaviour is ordered by the strongest state and is reflective of the hegemon's concems. A malign view of the theory sees the leadership as coercive. A hegemon creates and enforces deswith positive and negative sanctions. It may also extract payments fiom smalier states to maintai. the regime. The benevolent view understands the hegemon as a charitable despot that willingly supplies the regime to a "privileged" group of states regardless of their contributions249.Either way, stability is achieved through the provision of the regime. And although the dominant leader profits fiom the arrangement, smaller states gain from it too.

They need not bear the costs of provision. If they contribute minimaily, the costs

248Evansand Wilson, "RegimeTheory," 330.

24gHaggardand Simmons, "Theones of International Regimes," 502-503. 105 of their contributions do not outweigh the larger benefits of the regimem.

c)The Applicability of the Theory and the Clarijiution of Concepts

When the theory of hegemonic stability was fïrst formdated by Charles

Kindleberger, it offered a cogent interpretation of the creation of fiee trade regirnes in the mid-19th and mid-20th centuries during the Par Brirannica and

Par Americana, respectively? The singular impact of Great Britain and the

United States on the development and enforcement of a set of monetary des, institutions and procedures was helped by the fact that they were both, in their tirne, the undisputed economic heavyweights. Not ody were they strong, they were willing to assume the leadership role, possessing as they did an invested interest in the proliferation of classical liberalism, a system that relies first and foremost on a fiee market with the minimum of barriers to the fiow of private trade and capital252.Duncan Snidai writes in his article, "The Limits of

Hegemonic Stability Theory,"

2SoDuncanSnidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability," International Organization 39:4 (Autumn 1985), 581. Hereafter cited as Snidal, "Limits."

2S1RobertGilpin, The Political Economv of International Relations (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987). 74. Hereafter cited as Gilpin, Political Economv.

252JoanE. Spero and Jeffiey A. Hart, The Politics of International Economic Relations, 5th ed. (New York: St. Maain's Press, 1997). 848,379. If the theory could be taken at face value, it would be among the most powerful and general in all of international relations. Yet its widespread use seems more closely associated with an equdy widespread sloppiness in "applying"the theory than with any general or fiuidamental validity . . the range of the theory is limited to very special conditions. While some international issue-areas may possibly meet these conditions, they do so far less frequently than the wide application of the theory might suggesp.

One of the basic conditions, which the international issue-area of landmines

meets, is the seeming impossibility of collective action without a hegemon. Snidal

himseif has said that it is feasible to extend the theory fiom the Kindleberger

example to landmines.* Even so, problems bedevil the scholar in any issue-area

wishing to make use of the theory. He or she must address the ambiguity

swounding the qualincation of a hegemon and the quantification of the power the

hegemon is assumed to possess". The lkst source of ambiguity stems fkom the

fact that there is more than one way to determine a hegemon. World hegemony

and issue-specific hegemony are posts which are often, but not always fUed by

the same state. The United States is normally declared the world hegemon.

Despite challenges by sceptics that it has lost its ability to lead, this thesis will not call into question the dominant status of the United States since no other country's

Snidal, in conversation with author, August 1, 1997.

255BarryEichengreen, "Hegemonic Stability Theones of the International Monetary System" in Cooper et ai., eds., Can Nations Aaee?, 256. Hereafter cited as Eichengreen, "Hegemonic Stabiiity." 107 policies - diplornatic, commercial and milîtary - have a comparabIe capacity to create reverberations beyond its borde#. It shouid be recognized, however, that the vast number of issues on the global agenda precludes the worid hegemon fiom extending its influence over every one. In addition, there are instances in which the innuence of the United States in the process of regime creation is largely immaterial. The regime to control pollution in the Mediterranean Basin and the

Treaty of Tlateloco which established a nuclear weapon fkee zone in Latin

America are cases in point France's regional dominance at the tirne of treaty negotiations dowed it to pressure States to join the Meditemanean Action ~1a.n~.

Sirnilarly, Mexico played a central role in bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco to life2''. These examples and others in which the relative power structure of the parties involveci is different fkom the power structure of the international system as a whole, illustrate that it is (sometimes) of greater value to turn to issue- specific hegemons (as opposed to a world hegemon) in order to predict state behaviour. In the words of Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "the strong

256SusanS trange, Casino Ca~italism(Oxford: Basil Blackweil, 1986). 17 1. Hereafter cited as Strange, Casino.

257PeterM. Haas, "Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International Environmental Co-operation," in Rittberger, ed. Reeime Theorv, 192. Hereafter cited as Haas, "Epistemic Communities and Environmental Co-operation."

258"TlatelolcoTreaty Marks 30th Anniversary," IAEA Newsbriefs 12: 1 (January-February 1997). 108 make the des; but it is strength within the issue area that c~unts."~

The second source of ambiguity is the many ways in which the strength, or power, of the hegemon is measured. Like hegemony, power is situationally- specific. This chapter accepts a wide def'inition of power -the ability of one actor to induce others to act in a desired fa~h.îod~~-with two caveats. One, the actor must possess tangible capabilities and two, the actor must be wihg to mobilize its capabilities in support of a specinc goal. Without superior capabilities (like economic wealth, ownership and control over resources and technology, and military rnight), as well as genuine political interest,"' the actor will have little effect on the behaviour of States.

We are now equipped to test the theory of hegemonic stability. The remainder of the chapter WUbe devoted to looking for signs of leadership in the landmine issue and then chhgthe iduence of the potential leader or leaders on the creation of a global ban.

259RobertO. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and hterdemndence (Boston: Harper Collins, 1989). 137.

260Doughertyand Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, 87.

'%.J. Holsti, International Politics, 120- 12 1. Landmine Leadership

Depending on whom one speaks to, there is no strong contender for the role of state leadership in the movement to ban landmines; there are IWO leaders in the movement to ban Iandmines; or there is one, the United States, or Canada

The difference in opinion appears to validate the fïrst contention. If the domhance of a single state is not readily apparent, the concept of hegemonic leadership is inherently undermined. However, the weight of the other contentions leads us not to abandon the investigation of the theory of hegemonic stability outnght.

a)The United States as a Potential Leader

Let us begin by asking: is the United States qualified to Iead other states towards a ban?262 The world hegemon's interest in the issue is relevant.

Wstorically, the US. has been of the world's foremost proponents of landmine wdare doctrine as weIl as one of the world's largest landmine producers and exporters. Over forty-seven Arnerican companies have at one theengaged in the

2620nemust inevitably turn to observations in the domestic realm of the would-be hegemon to find the answer. Doing so is an apparent breach of the realist principle in International Relations that treats the intemal matters of nation-states as unimportant. We wish only to highlight the factors relevant to the power variable at the national level that play out at the international level. 110

production of landmines or lannmine components. Between 1969 and 1992, the

country exported 4.4 million AP mines2? Furthermore, there is linle doubt about

the wealth and military might of the United States, as well as its expert control

over landmine technology? Arguably, these capabilities are matched with a

wilhgness to support a landmine ban. The President of the United States - eager

to convey to concemed audiences that the landmine issue is a priority - told one

contingent fiom the Vietnam Veterans of Amenca that he keeps a landmine on his

263AshaliVarma, "A Hundred Million Explosive Situations Imperil Third World."Earth Times (July 18, 1997). 1. Hereafter cited as Varma, "Hundred Million."

264Forexample, U.S. expertise is established by the following agencies: the U.S . Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency @ARPA), which oversees the Defense Sciences Office, and which identifies the most portentous new ideas within the basic science and engineering community and develops those ideas into new DoD capabilities; the Information Systems Office, which provides technologies aad systems to allow the commander dominant battlefield awareness and superb force management; the Information Technology Office, which is at the fiontier of computing systems, information technology, and software to insure that DoD has the technologies needed for the fiiture; the Sensor Technology Office, which investigates application of advanced sensor technology in civil and strategic environments, as well as technology to counter military tbreats in the tactical environment; the Tactical Technology Office, which engages in high-risk, high- payoff advanced military research, emphasizing the "system" and "subsystem" approach to the development of land technologies and the Advanced Information Technology Services-Joint Program Office with the Defense Information Systems Office, which facilitates the trmsfer of advanced technology into the Defense Information Infrastructure and provides leading-edge data (see http://www.darpa. miVorganization.html). As well, the United States is a leader in derniniog technologies fiom the simple to the sophisticated, including in-situ (in-place) neutralization systems which safely neutralize mines where they are found. Support tools are behg tested in Bosnia and Laos. (see http://www .deminin.. .stpIan/testsum. hm). 111 desk as a constant reminder of the weapon's tragic toUm. On May 16, 1996, he promised that the United States would lead a global effort to eliminate these weapons and to stop the enormous loss of human life? "We fhink that we are showing leadership on this", a senior White House official said at a press conference in January, admonishing a journalist for suggesting othenvise?'

Indeed, U.S. resolve is demonstrable in a number of ways. Aside kom the exploration of research into alternatives to landmines, the development of tactics and doctrine to eliminate the need for landmines, and the expansion of operational humanitarian demining programs, it was the Americans who initiated a resolution at the United Nations which cas for the negotiation of a ban. The resolution passed with a vote of 155 to 02? In the hope that less-inclined countries will foilow by example, the United States has contributed to the world-wide eradication of mines through a series of regulatory rnoves at the unilateral level.

The Landmine Elimination Act, which supersedes weaker legislation si@ed into law in 1995, halts the deployment of anti-personnel landmines by U.S. forces

265CalebS. Rossiter, "Clinton's Minefield," The Nation (July 1, 1996), 5. Hereafter cited as Rossiter, "Clinton's Minefield. "

266Bi.iIClinton, "New U.S. Land Mine Poiicy," Defense Issues 11:40 (May 16, 1996), 1. Hereafter cited as Clinton, "New Policy."

267BobBell, Senior Director for Defense Poiicy on Amis Control, "White House Statement," (January 17 1997),Washington D.C.

Z68Harnmockand OBrïan, "Destroying Lives," 17. beginnuig on January 1, 2m6'.

A less rosy portrait of Amerïcan landmine leadership is painted by critics of U.S. policy. Clinton's promise is perceived as shdow so long as he fails to accept unequivocally a mine-kee America and by extension, a mine-free world.

Kt is no secret that he is under pressure nom the Joint Chiefs of SîafT. "Because

Clinton didn't serve, because of his deference to the military, he's a coward when it cornes to standing up to the Pentagon," comments Bobby Muller, the head of

Vietnam Veterans of Amerka. "1 was in meetings where he told retired generals:

'1 can't fiord a break with the Joint Chiefs.' So he promiseci them he would get rid of this weapon in a time fiame they could live ~ith."~'Not every enthusiast of American leadership is aware that the Elimination Act fdsshort of a total ban.

It contains a crucial exemption clause.n1 Due to perceived military obligations in the Korean peninsuia, the United States dows for the continued use of landmines in that part of the world. Eliminating anti-personnel mines is in conflict with one of the nation's critical war plans: the defence of Seoul against a mass assault. The military believes that if AP mines are removed, North Korea codd conceivably ovemin the city and cause the loss of life of tens of thousands of soldiers and

269Federationof American Scientists, "Landmines Action Alert," (August 4, 1997) http://w.fas.org. .~nine-6 1797.htm#top.

270BobbyMuller, quoted in Wallace, "Battle to Ban," 36.

"Landmine Elimination Act of 1997," (http://www.fas.org.. .mineebill-text. htm) 113 possibly hundreds of thousands of civilians - an unacceptable risp. Mriitary

"caution" is interpreted as "lack of dedication to the cause" by concemed critics.

Their worry is that the United States wiU press for a Korea exception in multilateral treaty negotiations, thereby signalling to other States, partïcularly those with tense borders, like India and Pakistan, and Israel and Syria, that exceptions are acceptable. The permissive use of landmines for specifïc operations spoils the plan of pro-ban strategists to stigmatize the entire class of weapon. A comment by Stephen Goose of Human Rights Watch is typical of those dissatisfied with the progress made to date by the United States. He asserts that the U.S. is "completely out of touch" with the growing sentiment to ban landmines world-wide, adding that

President Clinton has missed a golden opportunity to assert leadership on what his administration has acknowledged as one of the most important humanitarian issues facing the international community. The US has in effect opted not to play a meaningfûi role in global efforts to eradicate this weapon. President Clinton's failure to recognize his moral responsibility to ovemde the US military's flimsy rationale for this weapon is tragi~~'~.

272PressBriefing by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense William Perry, and U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Aibright, (Washington, May 16, 1996).

273Stephen Goose, quoted in U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Same Old Song: Clinton Backs Pentagon." Landmines Bulletin 4 (September 1996), 1. 114

Goose and others suggest that the United States would immediately take advantage of its extraordinary weight in international circles if the country were directly affected by the negative consequences of unexploded ordnance. They remind audiences that mines kill American soldiers and peacekeepers who accept to take that nsk in Bosnia, Somalia, and other far-away locations, and not U.S. civilians at home. If the 110 million mines of the worId were hidden in American soit, it is doubtful - they Say - that the U.S. govemment would engage in protracted debate on the appropriate course to take. A letter to the President from a sixth-grader in Portland is quoted in ICBL Literature: "What if you planted

[mines] in Maine for a war, and after the war some of my friends were waiking to school and one of them stepped on one and was killed? Then what would you do?'274This argument is purely speculative in nature, and possibly wrong. (A number of nations that are deeply aMicted by the crisis wish to retain the right to use mines, like Iraq and Somalia. Furthemore, South Korea is not opposed to

U.S. mines on its temtory. A South Korean foreign ministry spokesperson said that he "welcomed" the US'S determination to fight for a Korea exception in the negotiation of a treaty. "That's what we want to hear," he said." South Korea must be recognized as an exception because we face an imminent threat."''')

'"Student quoted in International Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Cd1 for Posters" (Washington D.C), 6.

275"So~thKorea Welcomes U.S. Landmines Support" (http://biz.yahoo.com/ upi/97/08/20/internation~ews/koreauslaJ 115

Nevertheless, exasperation with U.S. "f~otdragging"~~is widespead, revealing that the public is not convincecl the U.S. is taking a firm stand. In sum, the United

States shows promise as a leader. Its one notable shortcoming is compromised political interest

b)CaIMda as a Potential Leader

Like that of the United States, Canada's involvement is relevant to the issue. The country is a long-tirne adherent to landmine warfare, a one-time producer of the plastic conicai-shaped C3A1 AP mine. nichamed the "Eisie", and a former exporter of mines2? In contrast with the United States, Canada's cornmitment to solving the landmine crisis is unwavering, even zealous. For this reason, the country has emerged as a potential leader, albeit an issue-specific one.

It first tumed its attention to its own landmine activities by implementing a moratorium on the production, export, and operational use of AP mines on

January 17, 1996. The majority of AP mine stockpiles have been de~troyed~'~.

276Patri~kLeahy, "Canadian Efforts to Introduce a World Ban on Landmines Are Bearing Results, Despite Foot-dragging by the U.S." Montreal Gazette (January 22, 1997).

277HurnanRights Watch, Deadl~Legacv, Appendix 17.

278ColhNickerson, "Mine Ban Gains Ground: Canada Destroys Weapons, Seeks Global Action," Boston Globe (March 7, 1997), Al. Hereafter cited as 116

Canada has not exported AP mines since 1987. To reduce the impact of AP mines that have already been deployed, Canada plays a role in international mine clearance operations. Canadian hedForces help in developing indigenous mine clearance capabilities in Angoia and Cambodia. An initial contribution of

$200,000 was provided to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for

Assistance in Mine Clearance. Through the Canadian International Development

Agency, over $8.5 million was donated to UN.- sponsored mine clearance activities in Angola, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Laos, and Cambodia in addition to donations to the International Red Cross for medical treatment to landmine victi~ns~'~.Additionally, Canada not only supports a ban on landmines at the multilaterd level without reservations, but the country's foreign minister has issued a challenge to negotiate one, the ultimate conlïrmation of political WU.

American leaders are sensitive to accusations that their commitment pales in cornparison to the commitment of their northem neighbours. They like to point out that Canada cm afford to be viauously impatient in the movement to ban landmines. Certainly Canada does not Lose much by assuming leadership. The burden carried by Canada and the United States to foster peace through preventive defense abroad is widely divergent in scaie. The 1st time mines were deployed by Canadian Forces was in Korea. Canadian peacekeepers carried mines with

Nickerson, "Mïne Ban."

279Letterfrom Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs to author, January 15, 1997. 117

them to Cypms, bur did not use hem2? "It took five years to sway DND," says

an official at the Department of Foreign Affairs2". Today, milim officiais do not

generally admit that they are unhappy with the decision to remove the weapon

kom their arsenals. If dissension exists between minisiries, it has not proved to

be a formidable obstacle. In tum, leadership offers a number of rewards. The

prestige associated with hegemonic power in an international issue iike landmines

is coveted by lesser powers. Canada is currently being deluged with praise by pro-

ban advocates like Senator Patrick Leahy, who has called Canada the "giant to the

North."282Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy is a nominee for the Nobel Peace

Prize for his work to eliminate landmines on behalf of Canada Looking on, the

Belgians were angry that Canada "stolet1the leadership kom them. A jedous

Belgian foreign minister told one source, "1 hate ~xworthy."~~

While some States may be disappointed over "stolen" leadership, stU others doubt that Canada can lead at all. Are good intentions good enough? As a midde power, it Iacks the needed military and economic capabilities that confer

280Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Paul Chabot, Section Head, Director of Nuclear and Arms Control Policy, interview with author, July 15, 1997 (National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Ontario).

2810ffkialof Department of Foreign Affairs, interview with author, July 14, 1997 (Ottawa: Ontario).

282PatriCkLeahy, "Land Mines: Nothing Less Than a Ban," The Washington -Post (January 19, 1997). Hereafter cited as Leahy, "NothhgLess." 283JodyWilliams, quoted in Wdlace, "Battle to Ban Mines." 35. 118

clout Issue-specific hegemons are the most successful when the world hegemon

has no role to play. In this case, recaicitrant states are additiondy presented with

the United States, a hegemon that is indeed implicated in the issue, as a mode1 of appropriate behaviour, making it difficult for Canada to compete. In brief, the weakness of Canada (Iimited tangible capabilities) is the strength of the United

States; the strength of Canada (a clear willingness to act) is the weahess of the

United States.

Chartine the Influence of the United States

It is in part possible to predict the way in which the power of the United

States WU play out during the negotiating stages of a landmine treaty at the

Conference on Disarmament once formal talks on a mandate begin. In his address to the Conference on Disarmament in January of this year, Secretxy-General Kofi

Aman said that "while it is for the international community to decide the best venue for the negotiating process, it would seem Iogical for the Conference on

Disarmament to play a role"? The U,ted States wholeheartedly agrees that the

CD must play a role --a central one- and for good reason. There is a greater chance that criticai players of the world will abide by its rules, that the time fhne

2B4KofiAnnan, "Address of the Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament 30 January 1997," Disarmament W(:3 (1996), 5. Hereafter cited as han,"Address. " 119 wiiI suit its needs, and that the substantive content of a potential treaty WUmirror the U.S.'s image of what a landmine regime should be tha.for any other venue, particularly one with a pre-determined agenda Exarnining each of these factors reveals the subtie motivations behind United States thinking. Its leaders have inautively understood that a regime ernerging nom their forum of choice will be shaped by the distribution of power in the world rather than the unique distribution of power ordered by Canada and its daim to moral authority.

a)Support by Critical Players

The first reason why the United States so ardently extolis the merits of the

CD as a negotiating forum is that proceedings wili include the major producers, stockpilers and exporters of AP mines. A nurnber of these countries, like China,

Russia, Cuba, Iran and Libya are resisting a ban. If, or when a consensus is reached, the outcome will be deemed more meaningfd than an agreement to ban landmines by a group of similar-thinking States. According to the US., it is unwise to renunciate the use of mines without similar renunciations by critical players. One sign of pre-negotiation consensus (admittedly made possible only aller intense wrangling) has been the appointment of Austraiia's John Campbell as a Special Co-ordinator who wiil consult with delegations on the landmine question2?

b)Time Frame

The second reason why the United States is a champion of the CD is its go-slow approach. Debate that is not rushed will give the United States enough time to find alternatives to landmines, and make suitable changes in war doctrine286. In less neutral te-, the CD route provides the best way for the

United States to "buy tirne" and to ensure that it can continue to use mines for as long as possible281.

c)Substantive Content

The third reason why the United States prefers the CD is that it allows its special security concems to be addressed. The U.S. Department of State believes that "the CD will provide a forum in which the U.S. cm make the case for specifïed uses of detectable mines and the use of dumb mines in situations where the fields can be madred and m~nitored."~Furthemore, it is thought that the CD

285RebeccaJohnson, "Summary,"Disarmament Di~lomacy16 (July 7, 1997), 1.

286JohnHolum, "Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Address to Conference on Disarmament,"(May 15, 1997).

2B7"TheSlow Way to Ban Mines," New York Times (January 22, 1997).

288U.S.Department of State, "A Comprehensive Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines: Pros and Cons," statement (July 28, 1997). 121

WUdevote considerable attention to the problem of enforcement, which, again

according to the Department of State, is "the rock upon which many arms control

negotiations have foundered in the past, 'r289 a point addressed in Chapter Two.

Again, it is too early to Say whether a US.-led solution will be achieved through an agreement produced by the Conference. One source interpreted the country's intense lobbying for the appointment of a special coordinator as a sign of panic that its leadership was in danger of being derailed by the ~anadians~?

Whether or not the U.S. is panicking, it is has Iost a number of would-be converts.

They have turned to Canada to provide them with an alternative, and perhaps complementary, solution to the crisis. By the United States' own admission, the

CD has made insignificant progress. The country remains nrmly committed to pursing a ban in the CD,and is not committed to signhg whatever treaty emerges from the Ottawa ~rocess."' However, its decision on August 18, 1997 to join the

Canadians shows that the United States itseif may believe that Canada has something to offer that it cannot.

291"U.S-Stresses Support for U.N Treaty on Land Mines," (http://www.nando.netlnewsrooII1/ntn/worl~). Chartin~the Influence of Canada

How did Canada's landmine leadership begin? In early 1996, at the same time that signatories of the UN Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) were reviewing the provisions of the Landmines Protocol and making oniy incremental improvements to a treaty that legitunized mines,2x Canada came to the conclusion that anything less than a weapons ban was of little value. Officiais discretely met with NGO representatives and other interested countrîes to explore the potentials of a new diplornatic avenue that would Iead the world to a solution.

At the close of the CCW, the head of the Canadian delegation, Mark Moher, announced that Canada would hold a strategy session that fall for those states interested in a comprehensive ban. His announcement did not cause ripples in the news"'. The news that caught the world's attention was made at the strategy session, when Foreign Minister Axworthy startled even the parties that attended with a daring final speech asking states to reconvene in Ottawa in December,

1997 to sign a treaty on landmines. That, said the minister's aide, "is where divisions began. t'294 For although he received a standing ovation ("you had the

292SeeChapter One for a discussion of the shortcomlligs of the CCW.

293Lawson,"Towards A New Multilateralism," 20-22.

2g4Wailace,"Battle to Ban," 34. 123 courage to cdthe que~tion,"~said Jody Williams, the leader of the international coalition of NGOs to ban landmines), not aIl parties were equaily pleased. Many states would not have sent delegations to the session ifthey had known in advance that the final declaration would include a tirnetable for estabiishing a ban. The

American representative would only Say that "clearly, all of us attending this conference feel stmngly about the subject "296 However, the subsequent surge in interest by the United States in the CD was telling. Although Canada's approach grew out of dissatisfaction with the CCW, it has also corne to stand for what are perceived to be the problerns with the CD,particularly its slowness. Fmstration with the CD is not confîned to Canada and its supporters, nor even to those involved with the issue of landxnines. The Representative of Russia to the CD and the Chairman of its Ad Hoc Cornmittee on Chemicai Weapons fiom 1991 to 1992 had this to Say about the Conference:

The negotiation which led to the CWC (Chemicai Weapons Convention) and to the establishment in due course of its' new international organization were certauily a signifïcant success. But it is hardly a way that should be foilowed - going into so much detail with regard to future arms control, disarmament and security arrangements. The world cannot afford waiting another 20 plus years in order to have another militarily signincant global arms control treaty-The agenda is both wide and urgent. One could envisage a number of agreements without so much detail king

295M~rrayCampbeii, "Axworthy Sets Landmine Treaty Date: Surprise Move Challenges Countries Reluctant to Endorse Tirnetable on Banning the Explosives7" Globe and Mail (October 7, 1996). Hereafter cited as Campbeii, "Axworthy Sets Date." worked out in advance but with flexible and imaginative machinery for i~npiementation~~?

Furthennore, it has been questioned whether landmines fit into the disannament

agenda since the most severe problems posed by the weapons are not military in nature. They are humanitarian. A treaty that tackles the effects of mines in their entirety is thought to be appropriate. Canada is respected world-wide for its humanitarian contributions, thereby enhancing its level of leverage. The possession of strong miiitary capabilïties may in fact be a detriment to contending hegemons in areas which affect health, human rights and the environment, when seen in this light. Canada's influence is growing as the enthusiasm for their version of a ban, based on remarkably undiluted principles, (summarized in the

ICBL's pro-Ottawa mantra "no exceptions, no reservations, no loopholes") expands and unfolds through a series of conferences that lead to the final end of a legally-binding treaty.

a) Vienna

It is me that Canada catalyzed the practical effort to ban land mine^:^^ but the hosts of the follow-up conferences, as weil as other involved States have

297SergueiB. Batsanov, "Some Observations on the Chernical Weapons Convention." Disarmament XVI: 1 (1993), 39.

298TheEconomist , "Dual Track." (January 25, 1997). Hereafter cited as Econornist, "Dual Track." 125

shared in its leadership. A global coalition of %ore states" was formed in Viema

They included Austna, Belgium, Columbia, Germany, Ireland, Mexico, the

Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, South Anica and ~witzerland~~?From

February 12 to 14,1997, discussion of a variety of draff treaties ensued, including

a proposeci text by Austria and by the ICBL. A draft by Belgium was not formally

submitted but was considered as "suggested principles" in that country's

negotiating position. There was disagreement on whether the definition of a landmine should include the word "primarily"as in "a mine primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or conflict of a person and that wiU incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons." "Primarily" was tentatively added at the behest of less-progressive states to exempt weapons like anti-tank mines fit with anti-handling devices, which act like AP mines but are not designed to be AP mines. This issue was expected to be revisited. The only exception to the use of AP mines that was considered was the possession of a smaii number of mines for training and research (the suggested number was

2.000). a figure deemed Iow enough to prevent abuses of the treaVm.

299Eri~Walsh, Department of Foreign Affairs, in telephone conversation with author, August 8,1997.

300NicoIaShort, "International Efforts to Ban Landmines: The Vie~aConkence," Centre for European Security and Disannament, Bnefmg Notes, March 4, 1997. The second conference was held kom June 24 to June 27 in Brussels to

"count the heads and see who is with us."M' Over the course of the first two days of closed meetings, the participants produced a document, the Brussels

Dedaration, that would serve as the "leitm~tif'~for the negotiations to corne. In the declaration, the participating nations wrote that they were convinced that the solution to the humanitarian crisis

must include the early conclusion of a comprehensive ban on anti- personnel landmines.. .they a£fïrrn that the essential elements of such an agreement should include: a comprehensive ban on the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines; the destruction of stockpiled and removed landmines; international cooperation and assistance in the field of mine clearance in affected co~ntries~~~.

A series of panels raised the profile of the fomrn in the remainder of the penod.

The core group expanded with the addition of Brazil, France, Malaysia, New

Zealand, Portugal, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe. In his closing address, Foreign Minister Eric Derycke of Brussels noted that

301BelgiumForeign Minister Eric Derycke, quoted in Geert De Clercq, Belgium Hopes 60 Countries Will Ban Mines," (http://biz.yahoo.com/fmance/97/ O6/xûûû9- 1244. htrnl) . "2Foreign Minister Eric Derycke, "For A Generai Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines: Closing Address," Brussels Conference, June 27, 1997. Hereafter cited as Derycke, "Closing Address."

303"Declarationof the Brussels Conference on Anti-Personnel Landmines," Brussels, June 27, 1997. . . . there has been a genuine snowball effect! With great pride I am able to Somyou that no fewer than 155 corntries medup in Brussels. In Brussels, 113 countnes chose to participate as titular participants. Up to 97 countries have signed the Brussels Declaration, whereby they WUbe entering into a cornmitment to sign the treaty for a complete ban - this year. Unblushing, 1 venture to assert that this conference in Brussels has been a genuine milestone on the road to a complete ban3? c)Oslo

The last stop before Ottawa wiu be remembered as the moment in truth in landmine history. Between September 1 to September 21,1997, the formai treaty is to be negotiated. However, just days before the preparatory conference was to open, President Chton made an announcment that his country would attend.

Even at this late hour, the United States declared that it would press for a geographical exception for the contuiued use of non self-destruct mines in the

Korean Peninsula. The country may aiso press for the continued use of "smart mines," most of which would self-destmct in forty-eight heurs?'. How wiii the previously-accepted principles of "no loopholes, no exceptions, no reservations" be reconciled with the demands of the world hegemon? The leader of the ICBL said that, in her view, the United States wiLI attempt to "rarn"existing poiicy

04Derycke,"Closing Address. "

305BradleyGraham., "U.S.Dispatches Team to Discuss Mine Treaty: Door May Be Opened to Canadian Alternative.'' WashinHon Post (August 17, 1997), A23. Hereafter cited as Graham, "U.S.Dispatches Team." "domthe throats of the coUective w0r1d"~Other critics made the comment that

American influence will "weakenWmor even "gut the core purposeltMSof the treaty. Wï the participants compromise their original goals? One analyst predicts that "the United States might have been able to rewrite things had it decided to participate earher. But at this point, there are more than 100 countries on board, and they're not eager to hear talc of exceptions."30gWhat is certain is

)06JodyWilliams, "Urgent: US. to Oslo in Bad Faith," Press Release (August 18, 1997). The foilowing correspondence is revealing of the intensity of emotion caused by the U.S. decision to job Ottawa in the landmine community. On August 20, Mark Thompson of Time Magazine asked Williams through electronic mail to explain her interpretation of the events. Her response is as follows. 'The w.S.'s] contention that they're going to Oslo to help other countries 'get rid of the mines that cause ail the problems' is bull. The rest of the 1IO+ countries going to Oslo are going precisely for that reason, plur making no distinction between dumb and smart mines. Thus. U.S. participation doesn't 'help' anything, in fact, it potentiaily opens a can of worms and once this 6,000-pound gorilla goes in with its demands, what other demands won't suddenly corne up? . . .1 do not think they are going in good faith. They don't give a whit about the integrity of the treaty. Clinton didn't have the courage to not go, so he's agreed to aUow the negotiating team to go and try to bend the world to existing U.S. policy. Sad day for the Campaign. We've worked very hard to have the US.go as an honest participant in the negotiations. And by 'honest' 1mean fUy accepting the premise of the Bmssels Declaration. which is a true ban treaty to take effect as soon as possible. True ban treaty does not mean what the US. is saying in both the DoD briefing and the q and a's. . . A treaty with loopholes, exceptions and ahce-in-wonderland AP mine definitions to make the Jouit Chiefs happy is not a true ban treaty. We wanted the U.S.on board if it had made a senous policy change after its 'fundamental policy review.' Clearly, even in the way the announcement was made, that is not the case. . . 1 certainly recognize that [there is] some hope they WU go there and be beaten back and have to accept what the majority of the world clearly has been ready to negotiate. But they've also made it clear that if they don't get wht they want in the treaty, they won't sign. Again, not a happy day."

307JamesBennet, "U.S.Will Take Part in Negotiations on Land Mines," New York Times (August 19, 1997).

308CalebRossiter, "U.S.to Join Ban Negotiations, But With Unacceptable Conditions," Press Release (August 19, 1997). 129

that taiks in Oslo wiU be much more heated than expected. Canada has so far been

sportsmanlike about having to share the stage with a superpower that will surely

change the outcorne of events in some way, for better or for worse. A Canadian

official comniented that the United States would add momenturn to the Process.

Furthemore, its diplornatic clout may encourage other States to join that might

not have other~ise."~

Conclusion

Hans Morgenthau once said, "we think that statesmen think and act in

terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that

assumption out. That assumption ailows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were,

the steps of a statesmen - past, present, or future - has taken or will take on the

political ~cene."~"The same assumption, in this particular case, has allowed us

to anticipate whether a stable regime wiü be formed in the issue-area of

landmines. Whether the leader is benevolent or coercive, world hegemonic or

issue-hegemonic, American or Canadian rnakes a difference. It appears that

neither power fulnlls the role completely. Given the dual track of Iandmine

1°Edward McWhinney, quoted in Michael Kranish, "Clinton Shifts Position on Land Mines To Join Talks on a Voluntary Ban," Boston Globe (August 18, 1997). McWhimey cailed Clinton's decision "good news for Canada and the world community."

311HansMorgenthau, quoted in Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdemndence, 43. 13O negotiations that are actuaiIy underway and the joining of forces in Ottawa, dual leadership is a genuine possibility. CaAPTERFnTE

CONCLUSION

Like Noah's flood, which signdkd the promise of a new start to the world, there are signais of change in the landmine community. The rain that fell in

Noah's time took hold; it swirled around trees; it rose above mountains; and it washed the earth clean. The earth is presentiy being cleared of unexploded ordnance through demining efforts -- an inch at a cime. These efforts are costly, dangerous but most of all, slow. Last year, more than 2,000,000mines were laid, and oniy 100,000 were cleared. Political action is further required for the crisis to abate. This thesis has investigated the prospects for chunge at the politicul level in the form of an intemutional regime. Drawing from the findings in the body of the thesis, a set of conditions emerge that are necessary to ensure that the momentum is sustained, and that the political will to arrive at, and implement, an appropriate remedy does not dissipate. Briefly, these include (1) ensuring that policy-makers do not lose sight of the severity and dimensions of the problem in human terms ("Remember the Reality"); (2) taking pause to reflect on the role of interest, knowledge and power in world cooperation so that we how better what to expect fkom state behaviour and what we can realistically hope for

('Zisten to the Lessons"); and (3) maintaining a clear focus on the primary 132 objective ("Keep Your Eyes on the Prize"). U1timately. these conditions need not be limited in scope to landmines and may prove useful as a pattern for success in other as-yet-to-be-realized cooperative endeavours.

Remernber the Realitv

In Chapter One, we surveyed the damage that has resulted, and is contiming to result fcom the crisis. Keeping in mind the very real nature of the problem at aU times is essential if political action is to be mobilized at an urgent pace. Complacency WUensue if one "forgets" or loses sight of the devastating consequences of landmines. At a press conference convened by landmine swivors during talks at the Convention on Conventional Weapons, several state delegates asked security guards to "keep the noise down." Apparently, they did not want to be bothered by rowdy victims in the corndors as they pursued landmine negotiations which --in the end-- would permit the development and transfer of new anti-personnel mines. One cannot read into the episode too much, nevertheless, it highlights the important fact that the voices of individuals touched by landmines should not be silenced. Rather, they need to be heard loud and clear.

It wiil be remembered kom the Introduction that the &is is intensifjing as a result of the rising number of producers and exporters, a shift fkom defensive to offensive use of mines, the changing nature of warfare, increasingly sophisticated 133 technology, the inexpensiveness of mines, and their sheer accumulation in developing countries. It wiLl be recalled, as these quotations illustrate, that civilians -and children- are the Ieading victirns, that landmines pose a specid dilemma for the repatriation of refbgees after a war, that the use of mines as a terror tactic against civilians is not unheard of, and that the deminer's job is assuredly the rnost hazardous in the world.

Our doctors and nurses every single day have to look into the eyes of children wrîthing in pain fkom a limb tumed into a bloody tangle of blood, dirt, plastic bits, bone fiagrnents and flesh. Eyes which ask us, "Why? Why? Why?"; to which we have no answe812.

. . . after intensive fighting in and around the Afghan capital, Kabul, during the winter of 1994-95, there was a dramatic upsurge in antipersomel mine casualties when refbgees trekked back in the spring to reclairn neighbourhoods which, unknown to them, were booby-trapped and strewn with landmine- Fifteen hundred civilians were killed and wounded in the month of April 199~~'~.

The destruction of the Croat village of Lovas in October 199 1 at the hands of Serb paramilitaries is a case in point [of mines directly employed against civilians]. After being rounded up and taken to a clover field, "[fifty local men] were made to advance through the field, holding each other by the hand. At this point they reaüzed they were being driven through a minefield. When they caught sight of a taut wire, they stopped. They were then ordered to pull it with their han& At that moment, one of

312CornelioSommamga, "Landmines: From Global Negotiations to National and Regional Initiatives," Disarmament XIX:2 (1996), 19.

313HumanRights Watch, "Exposing the Source," 7. them stumbled on a trip-wire mine; a series of explosions followed, intersperseci with machine-gut shots fkom behind. .. some of the men were so badly wounded that they begged to be Wed. Seventeen men were killed by mines or shot in the bd4.

1 looked back at my partner and there wasn't much left of him. His arms and legs were gone. Blown away to nothing. I looked down and 1 was bleeding pretty well nom my left thigh. The rescue te. came out, wonMg their way across the clean part of the mine field toward my buddy and me, and my buddy was still talking out loud. Even with his limbs gone, he was coherent, making sense. The downed-man team had to hold his head down., so he couldn't look up and see what happened. They got us into a med-evac chopper fast, and my buddy stayed alive for three more hours3Is.

It WU be recognized that the unique and indiscriminate horror of landmines sets them apm fiom other classical munitions. We were able to arrive at thïs conclusion based on a close examination of how the casualties are caused, and who the casualties are. The debates that surrounded weapons that were banned in the pasPt6,such as biological toxins, asphyxiating gas and the dum-dum

315DonovanWebster, "One Leg, One Lie at a Tirne," New York Times Magazine (1996). 42.

316Examples of international agreements that have banned whole categones of weapons area as follows. The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 banaed the use of certain explosive or inflammable projectiles; the Hague Agreements of 1899 banned the use of "dum-dum" bullets, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibited the use of asphyxiating gases and bacteriological warfare; the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention banned the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of biological and toxin weapons; and the 1992 Chernicd Weapons Convention banned the development, production, possession and use of chemicd weapons. bullet, centred on similar "details:" the degree to which they were capable of inflicting painful, long-term and destructive injuries, without regard to the identity of the injured person. mer studying the full impact of mine warfare, there appears to be no reason why landmines should not receive a comparable legd treatment to, for instance, the dum-dum bullet and other outlawed weapons.

1s there any danger in dwehg for too long on the reality of landmines?

One observer worries that there is - that by doing so, policy-makers will be led into a "moral minefield". To make his case, he sarcastically says:

1 never realised 1 had such a soft spot for landmines until [the Princess of Wales, who has linked herself with the cause] spoke out about them as she always does, so moving, so photogenically, those baby-eyes wehgwith perfectly shaped tears as they swivel obliquely for that perfect canera angle. She is the world's greatest photopath, a womm who can imitate the symptoms of genuine emotions or feeling at the &op of a camera-shutter. . . a photopathic monster like Diana addles wit on any topic she turns her eyes on. Brains cease when she massages the hand of an AIDS victim, or strokes the forehead of a doomed infant, or hugs legless sisters in Bosnia. That is the gift of the true photopath; one picture with her stunning eyes inevitably administer cot-death to any nascent questions about the reality behind the picture3".

But this line of thinking is wrong. Paying attention to the moving side of landmines does not automatically administer cot-death to pragmatic concems, nor place the debate into the "region of soupy, dewy-eyed ~entimentality.""~There

-- -- 317KevinMyers, "Irishman's Diary," The Irish Times (August 13, 1997). 3181bid. 136 is no fear of that. The reverse is true. Compassion fatigue is a common phenornenon in problem areas, like landmines, that extend over a long period of tirne. Pausing to recollect the gniesome facts of landmines gives leaders a much- needed jolt to get things done.

Listen to the Lessons

Those wishing to solve the landmine crisis are wise to pay attention to the explanatory variables of interest, knowledge and power in regime formation.

Regime theorists have used these variables when asking the question: What does it take for the world to agree? Here are their lessons.

i)lnterest: Cooperation will more likely occur if the proposed solution is as air- tight and compelling as possible to reassure states thaî changing their interests will be worthwhile.

Cooperation, according to this thesis' second chapter, is not a given in international relations. Even if it hown ihat a crisis is dire, and that the world would benefit fkom cooperation, a number of states wili continue to attach importance to the rnaxifnization of their own interests. Landmines are in the niilitary interest of numerous countries. They have battle-tested value in that they protect key installations, divert enemy forces, and deny strategic positions to the 137 enemy. Furthemore, landmines are in the economic înterests of many states as a cost-effective and profitable weapon. States wavering in their decision to forego these interests must be convinced that the proposed agreement will prevent other states fiom cheatiing, that key players have signed on, and that the regime is intuitively appealing. In this critical time of regime-building for landmines, it is suggested that policy-makers devote considerable energies to working towards enduring and effective enforcement schemes in the proposed treaties, to securing as close to universal participation as possible, and to enhancing the salience of the solutions.

ii)Knowledge: Cuoperation will more likely occur ifthere &sts a community of experts andhr NGOs, sharing a cornmon set of ideas about the problem, and employing effective means to spread information.

In the third chapter, it was revealed that the impact of a community of professionals with recognized expertise and an authoritative claim to policy- relevant knowledge, working together with chic-minded non-governmental organizations, should not be underestimated. It was predicted that state actors will experience an uncomfortable mental state referred to as cognitive dissonance when presented with new information by the community that challenges the premises of existing policies or positions. If the message that is delivered by the community is characterized by principled uniformity, there is a greater chance 13 8

that state actors will leam that cooperation is in their interest NGOs cm assist in

chamelLing new ideas between society and govemment as well as across borders

by mounting public awareness activities. In the case of landmines, experts and

members of NGOs were able to join forces because they shared a belief that a

cornprehensive ban on the production, use, stockpiling and export of AP mines

was needed. Interfaith pilgrimages, testimony by landmine survivors, anti-

landmine demonstrations, public service announcements, and the aggressive,

rapid transfer of knowledge through cornputer and other resources (the Internet,

electronic mail, videos, conference calls, and faxes) have succeeded in capturing

the attention of the public. Although no single revelation or event has precipitated

a crisis in the issue-area of landmines, members of the community have

nevertheIess begun to attract the notice of policy-makers. In effect, they have

"created a shock. Now is the time for policy-maken to transform what they have

leamed into action.

iü)Powec Cuoperation will more likely occur ifa major country has the will to

make it happen, or if a middle-sized country assumes the responsibility of the

task.

The fourth chapter showed that power matters. How the world hegemon aligns itself in a particular issue will Muence the behaviour of lesser-power

States. Taken to the extreme. this translates into the failure of any global 139 cooperative endeavour not supported by the United States. However, parîicularly since the end of the cold war, new possibilities have presented themselves to middle-shed powers with a "home-field ad~antage,""~that is, the possession of sources of innuence that are issue-specifk, such as experience in humiuiitarian or environmental fields, and the desire to make things happen. What happas if both a world hegemonic and an issue-hegemonic state vie for influence in a single domain? The power dynamics in the landmine issue could not be described as a contest per se. However, in charting the influence of the United States as weil as

Canada, a country that sits at the helm of a coalition of governments, and which has taken the initiative to achieve an international agreement to ban landmines, two distinct spheres of innuence emerge. As a de, practitioners should be prepared to expect a growing number of lesser-power States to attract a growing number of interested parties in a wide swathe of cooperative endeavours - but the last word will continue to depend on the superpower, if that power is impiicated in the issue. For this issue, both Canada and the United States must not take their obligations as leaders lightly.

Should a single lesson be heeded more than another? 1s there one variable

--interest, knowledge, or power - that is more persuasive than the others? For us to answer that question requires that we pass judgment on the three schools of thought in International Relations that generated the variables: liberalism,

- --

3'gLawson, "Towards A New Multilateralism." 140 cognitivism and realism. These schools encompass much broader considerations than the formation of regimes in international society. Therefore, the task of judging them is beyond the scope of this thesis. We can. however, tentatively touch on their strengths in understanding the area that concems us here - cooperative behaviour. Liberal or interest-based theories "have been extraordinady influentid in the past decade and have corne to represent the mainstream approach to analyzing international institution^."^^ Those involved in the process of regirne formation in the issue-are of landmines have to a great degree focused on efforts to negotiate the "te- of the package", or acceptable provisions to be set forth in the CD or Ottawa Process. That this is true substantiates the insight offered by interest-based theorists that States. as rational utility-maximizers or political entrepreneurs, optimize theK outcornes at every chance. Furthemore, it has been said that cognitive approaches, or knowledge- based theones, "have a dynamic other theoreticaï approaches la~k."~~'There is no doubt that without the proiiferation of knowledge, landmines would not even be on the agenda of policy-makers. However, it is unclear at what point consensual values or knowledge transforms into cooperation. As weli, it is impossible to enter into the mïnds of policy-makers to detect changed thinking, although we do not wish to equate the difnculty in proving the veracity of knowledge-based theories

"OHasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge," 183.

32'Haggard and Simmons, "Theorïes of International Regimes," 5 10. 141

with explanatory weakness. It is argueci that "a realist perspective stresshg power

and the concem for relative gains can account, to a large extent, for both the

content and the ~uccess"'~of regimes. The very fact that the United States'

decision to join the Ottawa Process made headlines, and provoked excited

speculation about how the content of that treaty wodd change, corroborates the

explanatory weight the power variabIe carries. The short answer to our question

is that alI thee variables are essential to the outcome. Conversely, "none of these

schools alone can capture all the essentid dimensions of regimes."" A

multivariate synthesis is suggested because it Mts together the diverse forces that

corne into play in the formation of any regime. Unlike a univariate analysis, the

picture that will emerge will more likely resemble a coherent whole. State leaders

wiII benefit if they lend an ear to each of the lessons provided here to guide the landmine regime forward.

Keep Your Eves on the Prize

The aim of this thesis to examine the prospects for change in the landmine regime was made difncdt because the end has not amiveci. But do we know where we want to go? 1s the aim of change a world without mines? A world without

""eter Mayer, Volker Rittberger and Michael Zum, "RegimeTheory: State of the Art and Perspectives," in Rittberger, RemeTheorv and International Relations, 408.

323HasencIever,Mayer and Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge," 2 17. 142 mines except dong a lonely demilitarized zone in northeast Asia? A world with mines, but only the ones that self-destnict? As the waters of Noah's flood rise, and the prospects seem real, witnessed by a treaty in Ottawa neariy in place, by mass recognition across the globe that the crisis is imminent, and by govemments one by one boarding the ark, leaders may need to find the answers to these questions faster than they thought. It was argued that for those who want a piecemeal version of a treaty, but wish to ensnare the more reprehensible and shadowy users of the world, a regime yielded by the Conference on Disarmament is the prize. For those who are willing to take the gambIe of weak implementation, but want mines banned now -- with gusto - a regime available in December is the prize. As legal experts scramble to soa out the complicated challenges that will present themselves if both agreements go thtough, and as negotiating teams are briefed on what exceptions they should press for, it is becoming clear that leaders must look beyond the treaties themselves, and the rnere exercise of reaching an agreement. They must ask themselves in earnest what future they think is best. -Books

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. ICRC Overview: Anti-Personnel Mines 1996. Geneva, Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1996.

. Stov~ingthe Landmines Epidemic: From Negotiation to Action. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1996.

Maley, William, ed. Dealing With Mines: Strategies for Peacekeeoers. Aid Aeencies and the International Communiw. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies, 1994.

McGrath, Rae. "TheReport of the Present Use of Mines by Military Forces." In ~nternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, Re~ortof the Svm~osium on Anti-Personnel Mines. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1993.

Ramphai, Shridath S. and Ingvar Carlsson. Our Global Nei~hbourhood:The Report of the Commission on Global Governance. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Short, Nicola 1nternationa.I Efforts to Ban Landmines: The Viema Conference. Briefing Notes Centre for European Security and Disarmament. March 4, 1997.

Smith, Chris. The Militarv Utiiitv of Landmines . . ? London: North-South Defence and Security Programme, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, 1996.

Special NGO Cornmittee for Disarmament. Disarmament: The Unfinished Agenda Geneva: United Nations, 1995.

United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Land Mines: From Words to Action. Issues on Focus Series: No. 3. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1995.

United States Department of State. Hidden Kiilers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines. Washington, D.C: United States Department of Sate, 1993. Bell, Bob, Senior Director for Defense Policy on Arms Control. "White House Statement." January 17, 1997.

Boegli, Urs. "Statement of Urs Boegli, Head of the Department of Communication, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva" Washington D.C., International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997.

Christopher, Warren, Secretary of State, William Perry, Secretary of Defense and Madeleine Albright, U.N. Ambassador. "Press Briefing." Washington D.C., May 16, 1997.

"Declaration of the Brussels Conference on Anti-Personnel Landmines." Bmssels. June 27, 1997.

Derycke, Eric, Belgian Foreign Minister. "For a General Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines: Closing Address. " Bmssels Conference. June 27, 1997.

Handicap International, "Duplex-Canada Pour la Deuxième Pyramide de Chaussures Pour Interdire Les Mines." Communiqué de Presse. August 12, 1997.

Holum, John. "Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Address to Conference on Dismament." May 15 1997.

Rossiter, Caleb. "U.S. to Join Ban Negotiations, But With Unacceptable Conditions." United States Campaign to Ban Landmines Press Release. August 19, 1997.

Rubin, James. "Landmines: U.S. to Participate in Ottawa Process." U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing. August 18, 1997.

Tunle, Celina. "Action Alert: Canada Must Stand Firm for a Total Ban." Mines Action Canada, July 18, 1997.

United States Campaign to Ban Landmines. "Biographies of Key Speakers. " Hand-out at film presentation, Capitol Hill. May 15, 1997.

. "Cdfor Posters." Washington D.C. United States Department of State. "A Comprehensive Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines: Pros and Cons." Statement. July 28, 1997.

Williams, Jody. Electronic Mail correspondence to Mark Thompson of Time Magazine. August 20, 1997.

. "Urgent: U.S. to Oslo in Bad Faith." United States Campaign to Ban Landmines brief. August 18, 1997.

Internet Resources

"Address of Deputy Ralph Earle of Arms Control & Disarmament Agency" July 3 1, 1997. (hnp://~.usiagov/cment/news/latest/970731O 1- plt .html?/products/w as hfile/new sitem.s htm).

Centre for Security Policy. "Hold That Line: JCS Objections Appear Crucial to Retaining Amencan Right to Use Landmines to Save U.S. Troops' Lives." Decision Bnef June 18, 1997 @ttp://m.secunty-policy.org/ papersl97-D8 l .html)

Centre for Defence Information Database. @ttp://www.cdi.org/atdb).

De Clercq, Geert. "Belgium Hopes 60 Countries WiU Ban Mines." (http://biz. yahoo.com/finance/97/06/23/zûûû991244.htmi).

Federation of Amencan Scientists. "Landmines Action Alert." August 4, 1997. (http://www.fas.org ... mine-6 1797.htm#top.)

Handicap International, "The Manufacture and Trade of Anti-Personnel Mines." (http://193.21O.156 ... icap/confül.htrn#AA).

"Landmine Elimination Act of 1997". (http://www .fa. org.. .mine-bwext. hm).

Land Mines Speciai Report. (http:l/www,oneworId.org/landmines/index.h~).

"Mine Victim Completes Long-Distance Run." (http://yahoo.comfheadlines/ 970720/sports/stories/ninner~l.html). Rossiter, Caleb. "Preventing Militarily Significant Cheating in a Landmines Regime: A Cornparison of the U.S. Proposa1 for Verifkation and Cornpliance with the Chernical Weapons Convention Summary." April26, 1996. ~ttp:llwww.cdi.org...n~es-Regime.txt)*

"Russia Considers 'Step-by-Step Approach' on Mines." (http://www.web. apc.. .pagedl drus972.htm).

"South Korea Welcomes U.S. Landmines Support" (http:/lbiz.yahoo.com/ upi/97/08/20/intemational_newslkoreausla~l.html).

United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (http://www. darpamil/organization.html.)

United States Department of State Landmine Database. (http://www.deminin. ...stpian/testsum.htm).

"U.S.Stresses Support for U.N. Treaty on Land Mines." (http:llwww.nando. net~newsroom/ntn/world/082197/world19918 137.html).

Wareham, Mary. "Clearing the Fields and Negotiating Controls on Anti-

Perso~elLandmines: New Zealand's Role. " (http:l/www .vuw.ac.nz/ csslMines/&es-brthttp:l/~.~~w.ac.nz/t).

Primarv Resources

Axworthy, Lloyd, Minister of Foreign Affaïrs. Letter to author. January 15, 1997.

Chabot, Jean-Paul, Lieutenant-Colonel, Section Head, Director of Nuclear and Arrns Control Policy. Interview by author. July 15, 1997. Ottawa, Ontario. Notes. Department of National Defence.

Cochran, Thad, U.S. Senator. Letter to author. May 8, 1997.

Craig, Larry. U.S.Senator. Letter to author. May 5, 1997.

Department of Foreign Affairs official. Interview by author. July 14, 1997. Ottawa, Ontario. Notes. Department of Foreign Affairs. Department of National Defence official, Interview by author. July 15, 1997. Ottawa, Ontario. Notes. Department of National Defense.

Evans, Laue. U.S. Congressman. Interview by author. May 13, 1997. Washington D.C., Notes. Capitol Hill.

Gram, Rod, U.S. Senator. Letter to author. April23, 1997.

McCain, John. U.S. Senator. Letter to author. May 1, 1997.

Normura Enterprise Inc. representative. In telephone conversation with author. Rock Island, Illinois. August 21, 1997.

Pentagon officiai. Inte~ewby author, May 12, 1997. Arlington, Virginia. Notes. U.S. Department of Defence.

Pentagon overhead slide. Obtained by author, May 12, 1997. U.S. Department of Defence.

Smith, Bob., U.S. Senator. Letter to author. May 6, 1997.

Snidal, Duncan. In telephone conversation with author. University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. August 1, 1997.

Tuttle, Celina. Interview by author, July 14, 1997. Ottawa, Ontario. Notes. Mines Action Canada Headquarters.

Tun Channereth. In conversation with author. Capitoi HU.May 14, 1997.

Walsh, Eric. In telephone conversation with author. Department of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario. August 8, 1997.

Wareham, Mary. Interview by author, May 12, 1997. Washington D.C. Notes. U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines Headquarters. TEST TARGET- (QA-3)

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