APPENDIX SURVEY OF WEST POINT GRADUATES An initial survey (Part One) of West Point graduates from six classes (1989, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2001, and 2004) was conducted between late August through mid-September of 2010 using an online survey website.1 An email solicitation was sent to members of each class from the class scribe/president. A total of 250 individuals responded by completing the survey. Of the respondents 78 (31 percent) were on active duty at the time. A follow-up survey (Part Two) was created based on comments and feedback, sent to the initial 250 respondents in mid-September, and completed by 126 of them by the October deadline. Note that in most cases, percentages are reported as whole num- bers, which may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. Percentages for each result are calculated based on the number of responses to individual questions. PART ONE Th e instructions to the survey respondents included a few sentences defi ning key terminology as follows: “For the purpose of the survey, defi ne ‘entrepreneurial’ as (1) independent, (2) creative/unorthodox, and (3) willing to take risks. Th ese are traits the US armed forces rec- ognize as vital for success in many fi elds. Th erefore, do not think of entrepreneurial as irresponsible, disobedient, etc.” Th e fi rst question (tables A.1 and A.2) asks whether the best offi cers leave the military early rather than serving a full career, and by design does not defi ne “best” or “early.” Th is decision was made in an eff ort 218 | BLEEDING TALENT Table A.1 Do the best offi cers leave the military early rather than serving a full career? Active Total Duty Total Count Percent Percent (N=248) (N=78) Yes, almost all of the best leave 3 8 1 Yes, MOST of the best leave, some stay 45 111 33 Partly, about half the best leave 45 111 47 No, a FEW of the best leave, most stay 7 17 17 No, the second best leave 0 1 1 Table A.2 Results by class 1989 1991 1995 2000 2001 2004 Yes, almost all of the best leave (%) 3 2 5 0 5 17 Yes, MOST of the best leave, some stay (%) 39 41 42 67 48 42 Partly, about half the best leave (%) 48 47 50 30 43 42 No, a FEW of the best leave, most stay (%) 9 9 3 4 5 0 No, the second best leave (%) 0 1 0 0 0 0 Number of respondents 34 109 39 27 21 12 to ensure that respondents would not bracket the question in terms of entrepreneurial leadership or any other defi ned criteria. Only 7 percent of West Point graduates believe that most of the best offi cers stay in the military. Among the active-duty respondents (78), only 17 percent believe that most of the best offi cers are stay- ing in the military. Younger graduates were less optimistic, as seen in the responses from the 27 members of the class of 2000 (of which 13 remain on active duty). Still, nearly half of the respondents took the middle option recogniz- ing that “about half” of the best offi cers leave and half stay. And respond- ents reported in comments that the army retains some great leaders. Comments from Respondents • “Good leaders, those with entrepreneurial tendencies, are crushed by the military in spirit and in deed. I think this type of leader is attracted to the military, and during their personal growth stage, do well. But they soon ‘outsmart’ the norm and become frustrated by the confi nes of their senior leaderships’ boundaries.” APPENDIX | 219 • “I believe that a lot of quality/best offi cers have departed earlier for a variety of reasons; however, many quality offi cers willing to make daily sacrifi ces continue to serve. Th is has always been the case.” • “Th e best junior offi cers have spent 8 years doing more work for the same pay as their peers who contribute only the bare minimum. Th ere is no system to reward the best offi cers prior to the BZ Major board at 8 years of service.” Responses in table A.3 suggest a perception that the military is far less meritocratic than the private sector, and more pointedly that the military is not a meritocracy at all. Two-thirds of the full panel reported that the military leans more toward seniority than merit, and the aver- age score (with 10 representing a promotion system based 100 percent on seniority) is 6.8. For the private sector, the average score is 4.0. Th is view holds, albeit less strongly, when the sample is limited to active-duty offi cers. Younger cohorts tend to view the military as less of a meritoc- racy, but all cohorts give the private sector similar scores on average. Comments from Respondents • “Because promotions are based on a strict timetable and because they are near-automatic given the high rates through LTC [lieutenant colonel], it’s almost solely based on seniority. Anymore, it’s not ‘good’ merit that gets you promoted but it’s ‘bad’ merit that will not get you promoted.” Table A.3 Any promotion system balances seniority against merit. If 1 is all merit and 10 is all seniority, how do you rate the US military’s promotion system in comparison to the private sector? US Military (%) Private Sector (%) 10 2 23 16 37 26 49 20 58 17 68 10 718 5 826 3 919 1 10 2 0 220 | BLEEDING TALENT • “I feel the military strongly promotes based on merit and ability; however, the military in the past few years has suff ered a loss of offi cers at the junior level so therefore have had to increase their promotion rates regardless of merit and performance to fi ll the higher ranks.” • “In the civilian world, my performance is all that matters. Th ere are no year groups. For the most part, a promotion is based on talent, not seniority. Th e year group system is one of the most asinine things the Army uses.” • “Th ere is a third, hidden factor in the offi cer promotion system, that of demonstrated personal loyalty to the rater, the Commander and the US Army as a whole. It is entirely possible to be a highly motivated offi cer who achieves excellent results yet still receives average ratings and relatively slow promotions.” Th e question shown in table A.4 asks respondents to assign let- ter grades to 14 diff erent aspects of the military in terms of fostering Table A.4 Grade the following aspects of the military at fostering innovative and entrepreneurial leadership (A = excellent, C = neutral, F = fail) A & B A B C D F (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Experience in the fi eld 89 43 46 7 4 4 Service academies 86 42 44 8 5 2 Junior offi cer training 58 9 48 27 15 6 (years 3–10) Recruiting talented 55 12 42 28 17 7 people War colleges 53 19 35 44 3 22 Military doctrine 49 11 38 31 19 9 Senior offi cer training 48 11 36 43 10 24 (years 11+) Initial training (year 1) 45 10 35 30 25 10 Evaluation system 32 5 27 36 33 18 Job assignment system 28 4 24 35 37 18 Promotion system 27 4 22 33 41 21 Retirement structure 26 11 14 44 30 15 Hierarchical culture 25 7 19 31 43 16 Compensation system 20 3 17 35 45 34 APPENDIX | 221 “innovative and entrepreneurial” leadership. As a benchmark, the raw talent (recruitment) received 55 percent As and Bs, the fourth high- est. Th e other aspects can be understood in terms of this ratio as either improving or degrading the initial entrepreneurial talent. In general, formal training programs received average marks, including everything from service academies and war colleges to initial through senior offi cer training. Even doctrine received good marks. Th e weaknesses in fostering innovative and entrepreneurial lead- ership according to West Point graduates falls heavily on the per- sonnel system: evaluations (with a letter grade ratio AB/DF of 0.6), job assignments (0.5), promotions (0.4), and compensation (0.3). For example, only 8 out of 250 respondents gave the job assignment sys- tem an A grade, compared to 39 who gave it an F. While these various personnel systems may serve other army missions, they are perceived as failing to promote entrepreneurial leadership. Comments from Respondents • “We need leaders that are balanced between the art and science of actually sending bullets down range and the art and science of leadership, global economy, global security, and leadership. Our eval and promotion system are heavily weighted toward ‘experience in the fi eld.’ [Many noncombat commanders] develop skills and abilities that commanders of traditional O6/Colonel level commands never achieve. Yet, the ‘experience on the “battlefi eld” ’ is outweighing the ‘experience in the management fi eld’ and they are leaving at the end of their commands.” • “Gov and military greatest benefi t are job security and retirement pension. Th e way to jeopardize that is to rock the boat. Th at philosophy retards military innovation.” • “I feel like before I separated in 2007, the Army was in the midst of a cultural shift, particularly with its company and junior fi eld grade offi cers, due to gained experience from multiple deployments in OIF/OEF [Operation Iraqi Freedom/ Operation Enduring Freedom]. From a doctrinal and educational perspective, I felt the Army was starting to become more entrepreneurial, but like any large bureaucracy, it takes time for innovations to diff use.” 222 | BLEEDING TALENT Table A.5 Agree or disagree: Creative thinking and new ideas are (were) valued in your military units.