Afghanistan's Altercation

AFGHANISTAN’S ALTERCATION Media Influence in Western Conflict Interventions

By Nicole Dirksen

Radboud University Nijmegen Master's programme in Human Geography Conflicts, Territories and Identities 1

Abstract

Summary in English

Is the pen still mightier than the sword in the globalised era of mass communication? To find an answer to this question this thesis looks into the critical decision-making process of international military interventions. The case analysed is the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. The decision-making processes from 2013 until 2018 of two contributing nations, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, are analysed. The dynamics of the interrelationship between the policy- maker, the media and the conflict context itself are thoroughly examined and the findings reflect on classical media theories. In the end it is concluded that media did not have a direct influence on the policy-making process, but nonetheless several findings were made about the relationship between media and policy-makers. Moreover, several classical views on media and media influence could not be confirmed in this research. On the contrary, some key assumptions on media coverage in a conflict context did not fit with the reality in Afghanistan. It also became apparent that there were differences between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Though relatively similar in culture and democratic traditions, their unique aspects in decision-making and media traditions did have their impact on the policy process. This research gives new insight in many aspects of the complicated game between media, conflict and politics. Yet, in the end it must be concluded that sword nor pen won the battle in Afghanistan.

Samenvatting in het Nederlands

Is de pen nog steeds machtiger dan het zwaard in een wereld van globalisering en massacommunicatie? Om deze vraag te beantwoorden kijkt dit onderzoek naar het kritieke besluitvormingsproces inzake internationale militaire interventies. De case die hier wordt geanalyseerd is de Resolute Support missie in Afghanistan. De besluitvormingsprocessen tussen 2013 en 2018 van twee deelnemende staten, Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk, zijn geanalyseerd. De onderlinge dynamiek van de beleidsmaker, de media en de conflictcontext worden grondig bestudeerd en de bevindingen reflecteren op de klassieke mediatheorieën. Uiteindelijk bleek het dat media geen directe invloed heeft uitgeoefend op het besluitvormingsproces. Desondanks zijn er verschillende bevindingen over de relatie tussen de media en de beleidsmaker. Daarbij werden sommige klassieke aannames over media en media- invloed niet bevestigd in de data. Sterker nog, sommige basisveronderstellingen over mediaberichtgeving in een conflictcontext kwamen niet overeen met de werkelijkheid van Afghanistan. Daarbij waren er verschillen tussen Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Hoewel deze landen vergelijkbaar zijn wat betreft cultuur en bestuurlijke tradities, hebben hun eigen unieke ontwikkelingen op het gebied van besluitvorming en mediatradities impact op het besluitvormingsproces. Samenvattend geeft dit onderzoek nieuwe inzichten in verschillende aspecten van het gecompliceerde spel tussen media, conflict en politiek. Desalniettemin, uiteindelijk moet worden geconcludeerd dat het zwaard, noch de pen, de veldslag van Afghanistan heeft gewonnen.

Acknowledgements

I started my journey in Conflict Studies without actually realising it. It started when I was still studying Public Administration and had chosen several extra courses, which turned out to be all part of the dialogue about conflict and peace. It started when I chose to study in South Africa, witnessed the scars, injuries, and wounds this land still suffered from its violent past. It started when our prime minister declared we were at war with ISIS after the Charlie Hebdo attacks. It started when I became consciously aware of the two-minute silence at the fourth of May every year. It started at many points, and will continue even after I receive my degree.

While I grew up in a time of peace and freedom, a time of open borders and unlimited opportunities, the scars of the past are still visible. Unfortunately, for many of my generation, the notion of conflict is not a yearly moment of remembrance. People my age born and raised in Afghanistan have not known a stable and positive peace. While I won’t be able to change that here, I do want to use this opportunity to address how lucky we are to grow up without this fear. To take freedom and peace for granted, or at least for now. We must never forget what we have and how we got it. This is why I also want to use this opportunity to acknowledge how lucky I have been with the people supporting me through every step of my way. Every public servant and soldier that took the time to share their insights in the incredible complex dynamics of the policy process of military operations has shown me ever more so-called ‘unknown unknowns’ of a student seeing a conflict only through her books. Nevertheless, of every insight I received, most gratitude goes to my supervisor dr. H.W. Bomert. While I was being occupied with my internship abroad and took my fair share doing anything but working on my thesis, he replied rapidly to any question I had. Taking time and effort to help me cut through a maze of vague ideas and incomprehensible chapters with his honest opinions. Yet giving me my space to learn and enjoy my time at the PR OECD as well. I am ever grateful to his swift and lasting support through this whole process. Last but not least, I want to thank my family and partner, as they might not always have had the vaguest clue of which tiresome theory I was rambling on about, but supported me with all their positivity anyways. Because of their support, help and encouragement I can present you the research laying before you.

Nicole Dirksen

24 March 2019

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... 3 Acknowledgements ...... 4 Table of Contents ...... 5 List of abbreviations ...... 7 List of maps, tables, and figures ...... 8 Chapter 1. Introduction ...... 10 1.1 Scientific relevance ...... 10 1.2 Societal relevance ...... 11 1.3 Research objective...... 12 1.4 Reading guide ...... 13 Chapter 2. Theoretical framework...... 14 2.1 The policy-maker ...... 14 2.2 The conflict context ...... 21 2.3 Media influence...... 25 2.4 Conclusion and conceptualisation ...... 34 Chapter 3. Methodology ...... 36 3.1 Method and research design ...... 36 3.2 Case and data selection ...... 37 3.3 Trustworthiness and validity...... 41 Chapter 4. Case description ...... 43 4.1 Afghanistan: a history of conflict ...... 43 4.2 War on Terror ...... 46 4.3 Conclusion ...... 52 Chapter 5. Content analysis ...... 53 5.1 Resolute Support ...... 54 5.2 Variable 1: Elite dissensus ...... 57 5.3 Variable 2: Policy uncertainty ...... 59 5.4 Variable 3: Negative coverage ...... 61 5.5 Variable 4: Providing solution ...... 63 5.4 Media influence...... 65

Chapter 6. Comparative analysis ...... 71 6.1 Comparing content ...... 71 6.2 Comparing coverage ...... 73 6.3 Conclusion ...... 76 Chapter 7. Conclusion ...... 77 7.1 Theoretical approach ...... 78 7.2 Methodological approach ...... 79 7.3 Answering the research questions ...... 80 7.4 Theoretical reflection ...... 81 7.5 Recommendations for follow-up research ...... 82 7.6 Conclusion ...... 83 References ...... 84

List of abbreviations

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

ANDSF Afghan National Defence and Security Forces

BZ Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

CDS Commandant der Strijdkrachten (Chief of Defence)

Def Ministerie van Defensie (Ministry of Defence)

DFID Department for International Development

DGCB Directorate-General for Consular Affairs and Operational Management

DGIS The Directorate-General for International Cooperation

DGPZ Directorate-General for Political Affairs

ExCo Executive Committee

EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

HoC House of Commons

HoR House of Representatives

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

MIVD Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (Military Intelligence and Security Service)

MOD Ministry of Defence

MP Member of Parliament

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NED Kingdom of the Netherlands

UK United Kingdom

USA United States of America

QCA Qualitative Content Analysis

RS Resolute Support (mission)

List of maps, tables, and figures

Maps

Map 1: The Silk Road p. 43

Map 2: Afghanistan and Pakistan Ethnic Groups p. 44

Map 3: ISAF mission outlay p. 49

Map 4: Resolute Support mission outlay p. 50

Map 5: Combined map of Afghanistan p. 52

Tables

Table 1: General influence of political elites during the phases p. 20 of the military policy-making process

Table 2: Effects of policy uncertainty and elite dissensus on policy p. 27

Table 3: General influence during the phases of the military policy-making p. 35 process

Table 4: Total amount of media reports data gathered p. 39

Table 5: Total amount of usable media data p. 40

Table 6: Total amount of governmental data p. 40

Table 7: Human conditions in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2017 p. 51

Table 8: Analysis overview p. 53

Table 9: Media influence in the United Kingdom p. 68

Table 10: Media influence in the Netherlands p. 69

Figures

Figure 1: The policy cycle p. 16

Figure 2: Necessary conditions for media influence on the policy-making process p. 28

Figure 3: CNN-Effect p. 30

Figure 4: Islamist Militancy, c. 2006 p. 47

Figure 5: Total fatalities in Afghanistan by Western Coalition soldiers p. 48

Figure 6: National troops contributing to the Resolute Support mission p. 66

Figure 7: Comparing variables p. 71

Figure 8: Comparing papers p. 72

Figure 9: Coverage and policy decisions p. 73

Figure 10: UK Coverage and casualties p. 74

Figure 11: Casualties and coverage p. 75

Chapter 1. Introduction

Afghanistan has known a violent past, which did not change with the start of the new millennium. The infamous 9/11 disaster preluded the era of the War on Terror and shaped the world as we know it today. Yet, various states and intergovernmental organisations have initiated multiple missions, trying to restore and rebuild peace in Afghanistan. The latest international mission aims to advise and train the security forces of an independent democratic Afghanistan. This mission, Resolute Support, has been in place since 2015 (Ministerie van Defensie, 2015). Though NATO- led, the contributions to this mission rest on the shoulders of various sovereign nations. These all contribute the amount of aid as they see fit within the context of their own political system, interests and developments. While many question the results of international interventions for a variety of moral and practical reasons, I particularly find it interesting to look into the development of policies of individual nations in combined interventions of the global community.

The new millennium did not only introduce the War on Terror, but also a rapid change of technological developments; it created the possibility to give and find information all around the globe. Media and policy-making are closely linked, as explained by the so-called ‘CNN effect’; media coverage not only being influenced by policy-making, but also the other way around. This connection can seriously influence policy-making through military interventions (Livingston, 1997). Unfortunately, this influence does not necessarily result in resolute policy-making based on an increase of information. Evidence shows that media might even have a negative effect on policy-making processes by focussing on particular ‘interesting’ aspects of the conflict, asking for immediate attention and not on the quality or long-term necessities (Jakobsen, 2000). Over the years media coverage of conflict has increased and has found multiple ways to find its audience. The increasing use of internet as a news source is a new phenomenon, not encountered in history before (McCombs & Shaw, 1972); nowadays mass media increasingly have the opportunity to set the agenda, influencing the salience of attitudes toward political issues. This connection between a conflict situation, national policy-making and media, might explain the shaping of international interventions even when certain actions do not necessarily seem logical. But how do these three concepts of conflict, policy-making and media relate to each other? Do they mutually influence each other when examining the case of Afghanistan? By analysing the developments of the conflict context, media coverage, shaping of policy and the actions of national political elites within the Resolute Support mission, we might find a pattern between these concepts and give insight in the decision-making process of a nation dealing with another nation’s conflict situation.

1.1 Scientific relevance This research provides knowledge and insights about influencing factors of national policy- making in an international conflict context. The influence of mass media on military interventions has been researched before and a connection has been established. Yet, these theories came to be before the year 2000. Mass media has developed since and communication platforms have rapidly grown. The part mass media plays in policy-making might change with these developments. This research looks into the critical policy-making process; high-stakes decisions made by policy- makers concerned with (the aftermath of) a crisis, safety or security issue (Boin et al., 2010). The outcome of the critical policy-making process could be lifesaving or life-threatening for the civilians involved. Since military intervention is a type of critical policy-making, yet might be influenced by an undemocratic power, which is difficult to appoint checks and balances to, it is worth researching its mechanisms for two reasons. Firstly, the scientific relevance. During the

previous decennia, the academic debate of mass media influence on policy-making and the public opinion has been lively, especially considering the rise of the internet as a worldwide communication platform. What this influence actually means – does it become easier to steer the policy-makers in a certain direction with an increase in communication platforms? – is more difficult to pin down, however. The academic debate involving its implications has not come to a conclusion yet. It is very well possible that this differs from nation to nation, or depends on the type of policy or even type of media. The how and the why of media influence has also sparked different theories. Yet, most of these, especially the evidence used to develop measuring models, is based on the system of the United States of America (Jakobsen, 1996; Livingston, 1997; Robinson, 2001). It might very well be that another political system and another way of policy- making is influenced differently. This is why this research compares the critical policy-making processes of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

The scientific relevance is based on various reasons. The first is that with the rapid development of mass media reach, it is evidently necessary to gain more knowledge of its influence in this day and age. The second reason is that there is no specific knowledge of mass media influence on critical policy-making in different political systems. The third is that this research will look into the specific case of Afghanistan, a case in which the United Kingdom and the Netherlands both participate. To apply the theories of mass media influence on policy-making in a conflict case might give us more insight in the mechanisms of this influence in critical policy-making.

1.2 Societal relevance Not only scientifically, but also societally this research is of relevance. Considering the many critical responses from academics directed at peace- and state-building missions in post-conflict settings, it is necessary to know why these policies do not always establish their intended effects. Media plays a role, especially during the first phase of the policy cycle; the decision-making phase. This phase consists of agenda-making, policy preparation and policy decision-making. To phrase it differently, media influences which topics are subjected to the policy-making process and are also able to influence the approach and definition of the problem (Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2008). How influential the role of media is in the decision-making processes of critical policy-making in different nations is unknown. Yet, we do know that the critical decision-making process of these individual nations results in global interventions in (post-) conflict cases. National media sources are therefore part of global interventions and might (partly) explain why international interventions do or do not reach their full potential. As shown by the case of Afghanistan, the interventions have not yet established a positive peace (Smith, 2017; Oxfam, 2018). One can critically reflect on the approaches chosen, on liberal values that arguably do not fit well with the state intervened (Van Leeuwen, Verkoren & Boedeltje, 2012), the state intervened is not interested in stabilising the situation (Verkoren & Kamphuis, 2013) or question the motivations of the participants altogether (Chandler, 2006; Chandler, 2010). Yet, regardless if these are the main reasons, the policy-making process, the decisions made and the motivations to intervene are still established during this first phase wherein media have an unambiguous influence. A power that is hard to pin down and difficult to apply a mechanism of checks and balances to without risking the dangers of censorship. Yet, in order to improve global interventions in post-conflict territories, one ought to start understanding how these policies came to be in the first place. Media contains one piece of this puzzle. How big this piece is in different historical societal systems, I try to discover in this research.

1.3 Research objective The aim of the research is to examine the connection between the policy made and the media coverage within the context of a conflict. The main question of this research is therefore: To what extent do national media influence national policy-making in international conflict cases?

Considering that this research compares multiple variables, two different nations and different types of media outlets, it is necessary to separate the main question into several theoretical and empirical sub-questions:

1.3.1 Theoretical sub-questions The theoretical sub-questions are used to build the theoretical framework of the thesis; to grasp the variables used and to define the concepts that will be measured in the analysis. The theoretical sub-questions focus on the three key-concepts of this research: policy-makers, conflict context, and media influence.

1. How is policy developed in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands? The first thing we have to do is to understand the systems that are analysed in this research. Even though the United Kingdom and the Netherlands both have a parliamentary representative democracy and a constitutional monarchy, their decision- making processes differ. Not only the formal process as such, but also the political parties creating the policies arose from a nation-specific socio-historical context (Tilly, 1985). It is therefore necessary to describe the policy process for both nations and point out the (subtle) differences between them.

2. How can international military interventions effect a post-conflict situation? To understand the gravity of the results of the policy-making process, it is necessary to understand what types of international military interventions are used and what they contain. The academic discussion on whether international military interventions can or will likely not improve the situation at hand, will be observed in this theoretical sub- question.

3. What does media influence imply in the policy-making process? Media have a role in the policy-making process. But where in this process does the true potential of media influence lay? This question will examine the role of media as a policy- making actor in the policy cycle and under what conditions media have the possibility to influence policy. Moreover, it will be described how media can influence and describe the various variables necessary to effectively influence policy. It will also describe the possible dangers of media influence and the theoretical knowledge we already have about the relationship between political elites and media coverage.

1.3.2 Empirical sub-questions The empirical sub-questions provide structure to the analysis of the thesis. Based on the knowledge gained in the theoretical sub-questions, these questions examine the different variables in the Resolute Support mission and eventually answer the main question of this thesis.

1. How did the context of the conflict, the media coverage and the policy-making develop? The first empirical sub-question will analyse the different developments of the conflict context, the policy-making and the media coverage of the Resolute Support mission separately in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. By making the movements of these variables clear in both nations, it is possible to analyse the different actions and compare possible patterns of these movements to each other.

2. Did the media influence policy in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands? As will be explained in the theoretical sub-questions, certain variables need to be in place for the media to influence policy. In this sub-question it will be examined, based on the findings of the first empirical sub-question, if these conditions are in place and if the media showed any signs of actively wanting to influence the policy. Or there might be another explanation for the movement of media coverage in the specific case.

3. Is there a difference between coverage and political positions in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands? The next step in the analysis is to compare the findings to each other. It is possible that the policy-makers responded differently to the conflict context or the media coverage in the United Kingdom compared to responses from policy-makers in the Netherlands. If this is the case, it is interesting to look into possible explanations for this phenomenon. If this is not the case and policy-makers reacted the same to comparable media coverage of the conflict context, there is arguably a pattern discovered which might answer the main question of the research.

1.4 Reading guide This research starts with an extensive theoretical framework. As various academic disciplines are combined in this research, it is necessary to thoroughly examine the different theoretical approaches. Additionally, a conceptual model explaining the relationship between the conflict context, media coverage and policy-makers based on the theoretical foundations accompanies the theoretical framework. In this theoretical chapter the three theoretical sub-questions are guiding the reader. Chapter 3 explains the methodology of this research. The analysis is based on the Qualitative Content Analysis and all the data is gathered through analysing documents. This analysis is based on the principles as described in the codebook (Appendix B). This chapter also includes the case and data selection. Chapter 4 describes the conflict case. The recent history of Afghanistan and the conflict developments are examined and paint a clearer picture of the context in which this research has been executed. After this, Chapter 5 starts with the first part of the analysis. The findings of the Qualitative Content Analysis are presented in the content analysis and divided by year and by variable. In the conclusion of this chapter the first two empirical sub- questions are answered. It also reflects on the theoretical knowledge and compares it to the findings as to find an explanation for the data results. The second part of the analysis is done in the comparative analysis in Chapter 6. This chapter looks into the differences between the media coverage in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. It also reflects on the theoretical knowledge as to why media report on the conflict in Afghanistan. Finally, the last chapter answers the main question of the research.

Chapter 2. Theoretical framework

To start our journey into media influence on the policy-making process, it is important to elaborate on the existing assumptions of previous research. The three main components in this research are policy-makers, conflict context and media influence, all of which have been thoroughly examined in the past. The existing theories will therefore help to improve our understanding of these concepts and eventually lead to a theoretical relationship between them. Starting with the descriptions of policy-makers in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Next, the importance of the relationship between this policy and its effects on the conflict context is debated. The third section deals with media influence and its relationship with the previous variables. This chapter ends with the basic assumptions of this research and the conceptual framework.

2.1 The policy-maker In this research the policy-making process of two nations is compared. Therefore, it is necessary to look into the specifics of the policy-making process of each. The policy-making process of most Western states is quite similar, as they are all representative democracies. The citizens of the nation-state therefore (indirectly) choose the policy-makers. Looking more specific at the policy- making process of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, one will notice a specific element for these two nations. Both are a monarchy, making either state a parliamentary representative democracy and a constitutional monarchy. Yet, there are also differences between the policy processes in these two nations. To classify a system by these two elements would not do justice to its user, as a regime never fits neatly in a categorised box (Huntington, 1991). Though similar, the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands have created their own system with unique features based of different socio-historical developments (Tilly, 1985). This section therefore elaborates upon both systems and distinguishes the political elites relevant for the military policy-making process in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, respectively.

Firstly, the key concepts concerning policy-making are analysed as well as the policy cycle applicable for both systems. This is followed by the policy-making process in the United Kingdom, including a broad sketch of its relevant history and political parties. Thirdly, the Netherlands will be examined similarly. Combined these descriptions will answer the first theoretical sub- question: How does policy develop in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands?

2.1.1 Key concepts of policy-making Before the two systems are compared, it is necessary to elaborate upon a few key concepts concerning policy-making. Every society has a particular government style, which relates to its society and fluctuates over time with this society. Government is therefore merely a reflection of the values of its environment (Raadschelders, 2003). However, these key concepts are applicable two both nations, as they do share a similar regime type.

The first concept is politics. A common understanding of politics is “the activity or process by which groups reach and enforce binding decisions affecting the collectivity as a whole” (Hague & Harrop, 2010, p. 4). Politics is a broad concept and is performed regardless of the political nature of a state. It is a collective activity within or between groups, in which decisions are made on matters affecting these groups. The decisions made in this process, the political decisions, are

enforced on the group as a whole and are binding the members of the group to the decisions made. The making of these political decisions, the definition of the problem until the actual implementation of the policy, is called the policy-making process, commonly defined as “the process in which it is decided whether or not demands and support will be translated to governmental policies” (Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2008, p. 25). Policy-making often takes place according to a certain pattern, commonly known as the policy cycle. Many authors have designed a systematic display of the policy-making process. These cycles all display some similar features, yet it is necessary for this research to choose one particular conceptualisation. Arguably, the policy cycle of Hoogerwerf and Herweijer is best qualified, since it is applicable to both cases and illustrates the decision-making process from the conceptualisation of the problem until the feedback phase.

The six phases of the policy cycle (Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2008, p. 25)

1. Agenda-setting phase In this phase, problems in society can be put on the political agenda. Addressing a problem can be done by members of society itself. Researchers, journalists or activists can bring certain problems to the attention of the policy-makers. 2. Policy preparation phase Data will be collected and analysed by the policy-makers. Defining the problem, its causes and solutions are important assets in this phase that will steer the outcome of the final decision. 3. Policy decision phase Decisions on how to approach the defined problem are made. Specifying the goal, the instruments and the time span of the policy is done by the political elites during this phase. 4. Policy implementation phase This phase formally implements the policy. All the instruments supposedly necessary to perform the task are set in place. 5. Policy enforcement phase This phase enforces the task in practice. Upholding and maintaining the policy is a key asset of this phase. 6. Policy evaluation phase The policy, the process and its effects will be evaluated and based on the evaluation the policy might need some correction or perhaps be terminated.

Different actors have different roles within these various phases. An external actor like the media, a lobby group or other organisations can influence the cycle in all stages, formally as well as informally, although they do have different objectives during the different phases. Media have an important role to play, especially in the agenda-setting phase. They provide a platform for groups that want to reach this agenda-setting phase. Traditionally, media are seen as the gatekeepers of this phase. Of course, it is possible to offer these platforms also during other phases. In the preparation phase, for example, it is still possible to steer the public opinion in a certain direction, address other causes and define the problem from a different perspective. Yet, the later this is done in the process, the less likely (theoretically) the policy definition will change. Policy-makers normally have the most influence during the third, fourth and fifth phase. In the sixth phase, it is again more likely that non-political elites influence the phase, although this influence will more likely focus on the performance of the policy and not define the policy right away. Nevertheless,

the process is a cycle and the outcome of the sixth phase is likely to define the first phase of further policy within the same domain. This continuation of policy development is therefore best to be presented in a cycle, as the figure below shows.

Phase 1 Agenda-setting

Phase 2 Phase 6 Policy Policy evaluation preparation

Phase 5 Phase 3 Policy Policy decision enforcement

Phase 4 Policy Figure 1: The policy cycle implementation

The formal decisions made within this process are made by the government of the nation, “institutions responsible for making collective decisions for society” (Hague & Harrop, 2010, p. 5). Government is a broad concept, as it can include different branches, types and levels of government. Some would say that government is inherent to society, as it is as old as the human race (Raadschelders, 2003). Yet, in this research the term government only applies to the highest level of political appointment as the arena for resolving political issues (Hague & Harrop, 2010). The individuals belonging to these levels of government are defined as political elites. These political elites are in theory broadly defined as, for example, prime ministers, members of the cabinet, monarchs, ruling parties and opposition parties (Robinson, 2001). However, taking the analysed nations and their respective decision-making traditions into account, it would be most appropriate to define the Members of Parliament as the political elites. Moreover, in this research political elites and policy-makers are used as synonymous. Influence and authority are essential characteristics in this research; it is the ‘currency’ with which political decisions are made within the different political arenas. Influence is a key political resource which enforces political decisions. Although influence is an ambiguous notion with many possible conceptualisations, this research uses the broad definition of Hague and Harrop, being “the capacity to bring about intended effects” (2010, p. 10). Influence of the government is based on authority. Authority narrows down the concept of influence. Whereas influence gives someone the power to act, authority is about the right to act. As Weber notes, there are several kinds of authority: traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational authority. The authority of the government is based on the legal-rational classification, while arguably the power of the ruling monarch in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is based on traditional authority. This authority formalizes the influence or power of the one acting accordingly (Weber, 1922). The possibility for the media to act by influencing the decision-making process of the political elites, is not based on its formal authority. This raises some questions about the legitimacy and desirability of media influence on the process altogether, as will be addressed in Section 2.3.4.

2.1.2 The United Kingdom The United Kingdom, formally the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, can be classified as a liberal democracy with a largely ceremonial monarchy. It comprises Great Britain, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Though all separate entities, they do also share a centralised government. The House of Commons and the House of Lords fulfil the legislative function. The House of Commons is elected by the single-member plurality method, whereas the House of Lords is appointed. The House of Commons chooses the prime minister. Normally this is the political leader of the party with the most seats in the House. The prime minister chooses the Cabinet, the executive power and the top decision-ratifying body. The prime minister has the power to select and dismiss Cabinet members. The political landscape of the United Kingdom has seen some changes during the past decennia. At the beginning of the century, although multiple small parties took part in the elections, the competition for the prime minister position was essentially between two parties: The Conservative party and the Labour party. Recently, in 2010, the centre-left Liberal Democrats have changed this landscape (Hague & Harrop, 2010). Another major change deals with its relationship with the European Union, in which the United Kingdom always has had some special position. The referendum of 2016 revoking its EU membership resulted in turbulent political times which have not stabilised yet. Nevertheless, while the members with the legal-rational authority might have changed over time, the traditional authority has not. Queen Elizabeth, the monarch of the United Kingdom, has reigned for over 75 years. Though her powers are mostly ceremonial, Her Majesty does need to formally approve the policy as proposed by the policy- makers (Government Digital Service, n.d.A).

Military policy-making process The previous paragraphs broadly explain how in general policy is made. Yet, within the policy- making process concerning critical decisions about security and defence policies, it is important to know by whom and how exactly policy is made regarding these matters. In a post-conflict intervention, there is often a collaboration between the ministerial department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department of International Development and the Ministry of Defence. The Department for International Development (DFID) usually does providing aid and organisation around development projects (Department for International Development, 2014):

“The DFID leads the UK’s work to end extreme poverty. We are tackling the global challenges of our time including poverty and disease, mass migration, insecurity and conflict. Our work is building a safer, healthier, more prosperous world for people in developing countries and in the UK too.” (Government Digital Service, n.d.C)

DFID is represented in the cabinet by the Secretary of State for International Development. However, when military forces are sent abroad, the DFID does not operate alone. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for the operation. The official Defence motto is: “To defend the United Kingdom and its interests, strengthen international peace and stability, and act as a force for good in the world.” (Government Digital Service, n.d.B). The Ministry of Defence concerns itself with all the military actions of the United Kingdom. As summed up by the Ministry of Defence itself:

“We protect the security, independence and interests of our country at home and abroad. We work with our allies and partners whenever possible. Our aim is to ensure that the armed forces have the training, equipment and support necessary for their work, and that we keep within budget.” (Government Digital Service, n.d.B)

The execution of these responsibilities by the Ministry of Defence takes place through three institutional bodies: The Defence Board, the Defence Council, and the Executive Committee. As (the change of) a bill is proposed, Parliament has the opportunity to debate the matter and cast votes to agree or disagree. Normally, both the House of Commons and the House of Lords need to agree on bills and possible changes of the proposal by either party. In the case of military interventions, the Government decides to participate or not. However, Parliament does annually approve the budgets and therefore decides on the resources of the Ministry of Defence. Parliament has moreover the task to control the Government by the regularly planned Parliamentary Questions. The House of Commons has the power to withdraw its confidence in the Government as a whole, possibly resulting in new elections (United Kingdom Parliament, n.d.).

To summarise, the political elites included in the military policy-making in the United Kingdom are the prime minister and his/her Cabinet, the members of Parliament, and the various members of the Defence Board, the Defence Council and the Executive Committee. Even though the Queen has a formal role in this process, her position is mostly seen to be symbolic and will therefore not be considered as a formal actor in the process.

2.1.3 The Kingdom of the Netherlands The Kingdom of the Netherlands consists of the Netherlands, Aruba, Curacao and St. Maarten, headed by the reigning monarch, since 2013 King Willem-Alexander. However, Aruba, Curacao and St. Maarten do not fulfil a relevant role as actor. Even though these entities do have their own parliament, they do not influence the international military interventions of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In this research, the government of the Netherlands therefore is synonymous with the policy-makers of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The government in the Netherlands consists of the King and his ministers. The kingship has become, like in the United Kingdom, mostly a symbolic function. Unlike the United Kingdom however, the Netherlands does not have a history of a two-party system. Never has one party managed to gain the majority of the votes and therefore it has always been necessary to form a coalition government of at least two parties. Like in the United Kingdom, the prime minister is normally the leader of the party with the most votes (Breeman, Van Noort, Rutgers, 2012). Another common feature is the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer) and the Senate (Eerste Kamer), which can to some extent be compared to the House of Commons and the House of Lords in tasks and influence. (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, n.d.). Similarly, during the duration of the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, elections have been held and the political balance has shifted. However, the position of the prime minister has not changed to another political leader and in general the political climate has been relatively stable, as it has been the first time in almost two decades a cabinet did not have to end its reign before the end of its official four-year term.

Military policy-making process Military interventions are normally the territory of the Ministry of Defence (Ministerie van Defensie, Def.) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, BZ), the latter being also important in the military policy-making process. It provides the political context of the intervention by consulting, negotiating, advising and informing the Dutch political elites and representing their interests abroad:

“The Netherlands has close links with the world around us. This brings us benefits, including economic prosperity, but also involves risks. Because what happens far away – like terrorism, refugee flows and climate change – often affects us at home too. Through international cooperation we can tackle such problems and strengthen our economy.” (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2018)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is tasked with a broad range of duties. For this research, only a specific part of this Ministry is of interest. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the implementation of governmental policies and cooperates with the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. BZ is the soft power in interventions abroad, relying on diplomatic expertise. However, a military operation will not take place without the Ministry of Defence. Whereas BZ has relative low participation in the enforcement phase, mainly monitoring and informing, Defence plays a prominent role in the practical execution of the policy. The Ministry of Defence’s vision of its task is described as:

“We are the Ministry of Defence. We are indispensable in a world of turmoil. We protect all that we as a nation cherish. We fight for a world of freedom and security, because we believe that everyone has the right to live in such a world. This is our mission, and it’s also the reason we participate in missions.’’ (Ministerie van Defensie, 2016)

The Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State of Defence are in charge of the ministry. They are directly supported in their tasks by, amongst others, the Commandant der Strijdkrachten (CDS) (Breeman, Van Noort, Rutgers, 2012). When the cabinet decides to use military force, it is required by the Dutch Constitution to inform the members of parliament by a so-called ‘Art. 100 letter’ of this decision. Interestingly, the House of Representatives does not have to vote on this policy (Art. 100 GW). This might have some impact on its influence on the policy-making process. However, in practice the House of Representatives does debate the matter and (symbolically) agrees to interventions. While it is not formally needed to approve foreign intervention, it is common to do so and the approval of the House of Representatives is a political necessity for the intervention in practice.

To recap, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have to a great extent comparable political elite participating in the policy-making process. The political elites concerning military policy-making in the Kingdom of the Netherlands are the prime minister and the cabinet, the members of parliament, top civil servants and the CDS. The king has mainly a symbolic function and will therefore not be classified as a political elite in the Dutch policy-making process.

2.1.4 Conclusion The United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands share some similarities in the policy- making process and the political elites. However, there are some nuances in their respective roles. Of course, the political influence in a phase might fluctuate depending on numerous factors, like the political environment, the intervention, or even finances. Yet, the possibilities to influence are more likely to surface in specific phases. This section has provided insights in the authority of political elites to formally influence the military policy-making process of the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. However, anyone with the slightest insight in the policy-making process can see that the table beneath is limited. As Hoogerwerf and Herweijer address, the policy- making process is a constant changing process and their actors are dynamically moving from one phase to another. This table shows only the most likely places where the official political powers have formal influence. Though examining relatively transparent nations, it is impossible to map all the informal streams of power at play. Moreover, the ministers leading the ministries are also members of the Cabinet. This means that if a ministry has influence in a phase, the Cabinet has direct and indirect influence as well. Another remark is that in the UK, the policy-makers have a majority among the members who represent the electorate, and the policy-making process is therefore by some seen as an elective dictatorship. In the Netherlands, there is not one single party that has the majority. Though in the Netherlands the representing members of the electorate do not have formal voting rights in the military intervention. Yet, the likeliness of a military intervention without the approval of the House of Representatives is virtually non-existent.

Phases Main task Political elites United The Kingdom Netherlands 1. Agenda-setting Problems in society can be put on the political agenda Cabinet Cabinet in this phase. Addressing the problem can be done by Parliament Parliament members of society itself. Researchers, journalists or MOD BZ activists can bring certain problems to the attention of Def. the policy-makers

2. Policy Data will be collected and analysed by the policy- DFID BZ preparation makers. Defining the problem, its causes and its MOD Def. solutions are important assets in this phase that will steer the outcome of the final decision

3. Policy decision Decisions on how to approach the defined problem are Cabinet Cabinet made. Specifying the goal, the instruments and the time Parliament Parliament span of the policy is done by the political elites in this DFID BZ phase MOD Def.

4. Policy This phase executes the formerly made decisions in DFID BZ implementation practice MOD Def.

5. Policy The policy as implemented needs to be enforced and DFID Def. enforcement made sure to be upheld MOD

6. Policy The policy, the process and its effects will be evaluated Parliament Parliament evaluation and based on the evaluation the policy might need DFID BZ some correction or perhaps be concluded. MOD Def.

Table 1: General influence of political elites during the phases of the military policy-making process

2.2 The conflict context The previous section looked into the making of military policy, this section reflects upon the international context. This part looks specifically into the meaning of ‘conflict context’. This part of the theory will help in broadening the understanding of the complexity of an international military intervention and explain the overall debate on it. After this, the second theoretical question is answered: How can international military interventions effect a post-conflict situation? Conflict is a by definition a broad concept with many layers. This also holds true for the case of the Resolute Support mission, a ‘stabilisation’ mission in a ‘post-conflict’ territory. These concepts as such are too vague to analyse. What does external intervention mean for the case itself? When is something classified as a post-conflict case? This part will not focus on Afghanistan as the conflict case, however, since this issue is reserved for the case description in a following chapter. The conflict context will be described in the theoretical conceptualisation from an overall perspective, with a focus on concepts relevant for this particular case. A critical reflection on international interventions in conflict territories concludes this section.

2.2.1 Key concepts of post-conflict interventions Conflict is as old as humans themselves and can arise in many different shapes, sizes and with numerous consequences. Conflict and its nature can fluctuate, as shown by the developments of violent conflicts during the previous century. Moreover, how conflicts are addressed and approached in an increasingly globalizing world, defines the conflict through the eyes of billions. The discipline of conflict studies has come a long way in defining and explaining conflicts. However interesting these developments in the nature of conflicts and their actors have been, this research will only look into their lore after the 2000s. Not because the history would be irrelevant for this study – on the contrary –, but because this would provide enough information to publish several books. With this disclaimer in mind, this section addresses the key concepts relevant for post-conflict territories and international interventions. To start with the main objective: peace. The end goal of an international peace- or state- building intervention in a post-conflict territory is to create a situation of long-term positive peace (Galtung, 1990). The actions of peace- and state-building interventions in a post-conflict territory are therefore aimed to sustain peace and prevent any future outbreak of conflict (Murithi, 2008). State-building will therefore be defined here according to Hampson and Mendeloff’s conceptualisation: “Actions not just directed at ending political violence, but at restoring political order and laying the foundations for democracy in war-torn societies” (2007, p. 679). This definition seems to imply that even though a society is deemed ‘post-conflict’, peace has not yet prevailed. Yet, the situation is at the same time not considered a conflict anymore. This makes the conceptualisation of ‘post-conflict’ quite ambiguous. Arguably, not every academic would agree with classifying Afghanistan as a post-conflict case (Muggah, 2007). Nevertheless, the peacebuilding initiative of this case does approach Afghanistan as a post-conflict case. It is not aimed to end a conflict, but rather to rebuild a stable society, although ending violence is still an objective within the strategy. A post-conflict case seems to be some sort of a hybrid type between conflict and peace. While the intervention strategies and management policies focus on rebuilding, at the time the threat of a new (or perhaps continuation of) violent conflict is not unrealistic. ‘Post-conflict’ is therefore a collective conceptualisation of societies in the transition from an (official) violent conflict or war towards a positive peace. Nations in transition can be highly unstable even after a war has officially ended. As Harris adds, a change of governance or governmental system, does not guarantee the end of political violence, human rights violations and socio-economic disasters (Harris, 1999).

2.2.2 International intervention The conflict examined in this research is not only a domestic conflict. Through the years, the international community initiated several interventions to deescalate the Afghan situation. Yet, not all had the same objective, goals or instruments. Global interventions have changed after the so-called War on Terror started. The consequences of the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have changed the global arena. The goals and critiques regarding the humanitarian interventions and peace-making missions of the 1990s are now accompanied by questions about democracy and state-building in territories worn-out by violence and unstable regimes. The interventions of the United States have raised critical responses towards their intentions and effects. The debate on strategic approaches towards management in post-conflict territories and their effectiveness on the transformation from war to peace has far from ended (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 2007). In addition to new threats to global security, the attitudes towards leading security organisations, like NATO, in the international system has changed, as will be elaborated upon in the next section. Nevertheless, international interventions in post-conflict societies are still actively pursued today. What is international intervention in a (post-)conflict territory? After the end of the Cold War, the international community has repeatedly intervened in societies emerging from conflict. These interventions have been costly in lives and finances. Yet, these interventions are not all unanimously seen as successful. Serwer and Thompson refer to these aims to build a long-term peace as ‘Peacefare’, a notion not even officially acknowledged by Word itself, possibly because of the following reason:

“‘Peacefare’ is not as developed as warfare. Military organizations worldwide organize, plan, train and fight within clearly established objectives, doctrine, and even internationally established laws of war. But once major fighting ends, the civilians and their military counterparts operate without common doctrine, shared frameworks for planning, or joint training.” (Serwer & Thomson, 2007, p. 369)

Peacefare refers to a complex and interdependent international conflict management system (De Coning, 2008). It might include several governments, intergovernmental organizations, regional organizations, individual actors and many more. As mentioned in the quote above, military operations might have prepared for years to go to war, yet the operations to manage an international intervention in post-conflict territories often do not have this luxury. Moreover, peacefare missions do not have a standardized framework. Admittedly, conflict resolution cannot exist in a framework that fits all conflict cases. Nevertheless, because of this, international interventions often lack structures and clear goals, which makes collaboration between different parties harder and it also makes it difficult to measure and evaluate the (lack of) success of the process (Serwer & Thomson, 2007). To create more structure, the ‘international community’ has agreed upon a few main values which should be the basis of an international intervention. While actors and institutions might approach and define these values differently, they broadly cover the dimensions of safety and security, rule of law, stable democracy and governance, human rights and social well-being, as well as a sustainable economy (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; De Coning, 2008; Nettling, 2012; Serwer & Thomson, 2007). These five ambitions describe the (desired) end-state of a society emerging from violent conflict. But what part has the implementer to fulfil in order to reach these objectives? These end goals do not include agreed upon means for successfully accomplishing them. While there are multiple means, instruments and approaches, these are not discussed in this section, as the nature of the approach itself will not be analysed. What is interesting about these end goals is that they are seen as international standards that define the meaning of the rule

of law in particular (Kritz, 2007). They are linked to the legitimacy of an international intervention. To overly simplify it, when these end goals are not met in a society, it gives the perception of an illegitimate intervention in a sovereign nation. This is based on a moral legitimacy that has found its support in international rule of law. Yet, many of these moral legitimizations are based on values mainly supported by one particular school of thought, mostly the domain of Western political conservatives, advocating democracy in a Cold War context (Kritz, 2007). While this has affected the framework of peacefare, it does not neglect the major role international interventions have on a post-conflict society. One of the relevant actors in this respect is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO in short. NATO is the main international body through which the Resolute Support mission is established. NATO is an important actor within the making of defence policies of member states like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. During the first years of the Cold War, several European nations, the United States and Canada created a political and military motivated alliance. This alliance linked the security of the United States to the participating European nations and acted as a strong signal towards opposing nations (Breeman, Van Noort, Rutgers, 2012). After the Cold War, new threats arose, not necessarily bounded by the borders of a nation state. Military forces, once effective on the traditional battlefield, cannot always provide the answer to these new threats (Urquhart, 2007) This is why after the Cold War ended, NATO felt the need to reinvent itself: transforming from a collective defensive treaty into a more ‘peacekeeping’ role. The alliance started to include Central and Eastern European countries and formed a Partnership for Peace programme with former enemies. Art. 5 of the NATO Treaty is arguably the most famous: “an armed attack against one or more of them [member states] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1949). This collective defence arrangement does not necessarily refer to military action. This article has only been invoked once, although not during the Cold War era. In response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001, the collective defence mechanism was practised for the first time in an official operation. This was also the first time NATO actively engaged outside the Euro-Atlantic area and into the territory of Afghanistan (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2017). Moreover, NATO officially added a new task to its Strategic Concept after military operations in (former) Yugoslavia and Serbia. It became possible for NATO to intervene in situations that are not necessarily covered by art. 5. The successor mission in Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Force or ISAF, is for example made possible by this construction (Breeman, Van Noort, Rutgers, 2012). This mission is a formal mission led by NATO, in order to stabilise the situation in Afghanistan. This mission has been in place between 2003 and 2014, afterwards being replaced by the non-combat Resolute Support mission (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2015a). However, this shift in focus and the intentions of post-Cold War state-building, have also given rise to critique within academic circles.

2.2.3 Dangers of intervention State-building does not only address post-Cold War interventions, but has roots going all the way back to the seventeenth century. State-building, its purposes, legitimacy, goals and effectiveness are critically addressed – for many different reasons. Arguably, the critiques touch upon the fundamentals of our understanding about the requirements for political order and democracy and their importance within state-building itself (Hampson & Mendeloff, 2007). Yet, this part focuses on critiques of post-Cold War state-building. One of the often heard critiques is the assumption of universal values, often inspired by Western values (Chandler, 2010). These assumptions do seem to hold some water, looking at the

main dimensions of peacebuilding as described in Section 2.2.2. These dimensions, safety and security, rule of law, stable democracy and governance, human rights and social well-being, and a sustainable economy, respectively, do indeed have roots in liberal or Western values (Kritz, 2007). The assumption that these values are necessary to create a stable, peaceful nation, is an assumption of superiority towards other alternative approaches (Van Leeuwen, Verkoren & Boedeltje, 2012). Yet, the increase of democracy does not guarantee a decrease of violence, nor are all autocracies unstable, violent territories (Gleditsch & Hegre, 2014). Moreover, it is very well possible that a strategy of applying policies and structures based on Western values to a nation with different (governing) mechanisms, will have negative consequences (Chandler, 2010). As Tilly argues, Western nations themselves came to be within their own socio-historic context. Within this context they developed mechanisms that build their society and governmental system. The values connected to their society developed from centuries of war and peace and are in essence unique for their society (Tilly, 1985). In other words, what works for one nation might not work for another. Yet, Western values still dominate state-building policies and do not leave much room for alternative approaches. Another cause for failure, addressed by some, is not the essence of the approach, but the weak government of the nations where an intervention takes place (Chandler, 2006). Yet again, state-building has in essence the task to recreate political and governmental order. That is why this argument is quite paradoxical, as the problem why the intervention is not working is at least partially the reason to intervene in the first place. This is very likely linked to the approach itself. Nevertheless, the role of the government of the state intervened does seem to play a role in the success of an intervention. Regional and local power structures determine the possibilities for interventions. Corrupt government officials or undemocratic rulers like warlords have the possibility to harm the process. Yet again, for moral reasons state-building programmes have the tendency to neglect these power structures already in place. This tendency itself might harm the process effectiveness. Moral considerations are in place, as local power structures might not hold democracy and human rights in high regards, possibly even going against the core values of the intervening actors. However, modelling governmental institutions in Western images, while neglecting local power structures, could cause frictions and blind spots. According to some, this is also the main reason why a state-building mission can cause a high aid-dependent recipient instead of an independent stable government (Mazzer, 2014). This aid-dependency is problematic and results in a difficulty for intervening nations to pull back from their activities. While aiming to create a stable territory, it does so by taking over and executing main governmental tasks of the intervened nation. This makes the government of the intervened nation itself increasingly dependent on funds, knowledge and skills from the intervening actors (Verkoren & Kamphuis, 2013). It also results in a flawed ‘social contract’. Normally the state depends on its citizens’ participation in its economy, and in turn citizens can hold their government responsible for performing its governmental responsibilities (Tilly, 1985). The leverage of citizens is decreasing with the dependency of their government towards a foreign donor. As far as the value of democracy goes, these citizens do not only hardly have any leverage over their own government, they subsequently do not have a voice in the policy-making process of the intervening nations, even though the intervention does directly influence their lives (Verkoren & Kamphuis, 2013). Arguably, some core elements of international interventions go against the dimensions of peace and state-building. Some would argue therefore that the official goal of state-building, actions directed at ending political violence, restoring political order and laying the foundations for democracy in war-torn societies, might not be the main reason for intervention, but rather

merely an excuse to pursue imperialistic tendencies or to gain political and/or economic power over the territory (Chandler, 2006; Mazzer, 2014). Another possibility is that the approach takes place in such a complex field, that it is hard to navigate through. As mentioned before, measuring the impact of policies in an unstable field consisting of multidimensional actors, is quite difficult (De Coning, 2008). The feedback phase for these kinds of policies is complicated, as well as learning and improving before implementing new policies; especially given the problem of preparation time in an unstable field and the increasing dependency of the receivers (Serwer & Thomson, 2007). In observing these critical perspectives on international state-building interventions, a depressing picture of post-conflict peacefare surfaces. Indeed, these critiques do address realistic dangers of international military operations. These dangers and difficulties should be taken into account in researching this topic, as they do not only affect the conflict context itself, but also the complexity and time pressure within conflict cases and the core values of the organisation are likely to influence the policy-makers in their decision-making process.

2.2.5 Conclusion Conflict is a complicated, multidimensional concept and the approaches towards solving conflicts have cahnged over time. A new conflict era demanded a new form of collective action and cooperation, answered by a shift of focus from NATO. NATO is one of the actors that aims to restore and keep a positive peace and at the turn of the millennium, NATO has shifted from its traditional role in cooperative defence towards a role of active peacefare operator. Recognising post-conflict state-building as being an essential part of preserving peace and fighting terrorism (Urquhart, 2007). Peace- and state-building interventions are, like conflict itself, a complex interdependent international system in which many different actors with their own particular interests are active. To create one framework for peace- and state-building operations is therefore impossible. Every case in itself is unique and intervening actors should therefore pay attention to the individual context of the case itself (Paris, 2010). Moreover, it is necessary to be aware of the underlying causes of post-conflict cases, to research them and learn from success and failures (Newman, 2014). This is a major issue for policy-makers. Because of the complexity of the conflict context and the pressure of having to make critical decisions within a short amount of time, it is hard to evaluate policies and gain enough information and resources to address all the dimensions of the post-conflict situation.

2.3 Media influence It is possible that this information gap and the complexity of the situation opens a window of opportunity for another type of actor to influence the policy-making process. Specialised in gaining and sharing information, this ‘other’ actor has been a part of the policy-making process from the beginning, and its influential reach has possibly grown during the previous decades with the increase of communication techniques: the mass media. What role do the mass media play in the policy-making process of foreign state-building interventions? This section aims to explain the role of mass media and the implications it can have on the policy-makers and the conflict context. ‘Mass media’ is a concept used for technological means of communication that provide a link between many individuals. They have played a major role in the development of modern societies, cultural identities and political formations. Western media systems, in particular media in North-American and West-European countries, are very similar. However, like the political systems of the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, some differences in media systems might be visible on a national level. To a significant degree, media is influenced by the

state. National broadcasts dominate prime-time schedules on mass channels; some of these channels are made available and financed by the state and the freedom of press is influenced by state behaviour (Hardy, 2010). For example, press freedom within a nation might differ, giving national media different opportunities to scrutinise their policy-makers’ behaviour. Looking at the Press Freedom Index, this seems to be the case for the nations compared. Whereas the Kingdom of the Netherlands is number 3 on the index list, making it one of the most press free nations in the world, the United Kingdom is merely number 40 on this list (Reporters Without Borders, 2018). Bearing these possible differences in mind, Western media systems are comparable in their overall patterns of economic development and political history. Moreover, media seem to develop and operate more and more on a global scale, making the stream of information more fused with each other (Hardy, 2010).

2.3.1 Mass media and policy-makers In Western media systems, a strong vertical connection between national governments and media is assumed. Traditionally, a clear dominant national media is the leading provider of information in most Western states. While many researchers have aimed to map media in their national context as to compare their systems on an international level, it turns out that the influence of media is a complicated game,1 depending on complex interactions between economic and political powers (Hardy, 2010). Influencing policy is therefore case-dependent and it would be futile for this research to map the systems of media within both nations. However, what is interesting for this research are the patterns found in the relationship between the mass media and policy- makers, from here on referred to as the political elites. It is more likely that the political elites and the political process influence the media, rather than the other way around. This is because the political culture of a society has a major influence on how news media cover conflict. Because political realities often determine the use of news media to achieve political goals and because political decisions have a major influence on the operation of media, media are more likely to react to an event than to initiate them (Wolfsfeld, 1997). However, this does not mean it is impossible for the media to influence the political elites. Negative news coverage increases the chances that public opinion might change accordingly, could possibly damage the credibility of the government and might raise doubts among political elites themselves (Robinson, 2001). Moreover, as the policy cycle has shown, media play a fundamental role in the agenda-setting phase, as media is a very important source of information and communication intermediary between political elites and their citizens (Beunders & Muller, 2005). Media help in setting the political agenda, can accelerate and magnify political successes and failures, serve as advocates for minorities, mobilize groups into conflict and are essential in constructing social and political frames (Wolfsfeld, 1997). Nevertheless, according to Robinson, the access to these possibilities is related to the position of the political elites. The position of political elites towards the policy is a fundamental variable in the possibility for media to influence policy. Generally speaking, it is assumed that political elites try to motivate journalists to positively report their preferred perspective on policies (Robinson, 1999), resulting in media coverage fitting the elites’ framework. To report according to the elites’ framework, there needs to be consensus among the political elites about this framework. If there is elite consensus, media

1 Becoming even more complicated to comprehend with the rapid rise of social media and their alternative revenue models in the past years, paving a way for non-traditional actors to participate in the political arena. While the theoretic framework is based on classic to relatively new media theories, the conclusion will refer to the newest age of media and steps for future research on this matter.

manufacture consent for official policy. Only when members of the elite do not agree on the policy framework, media have the possibility to influence the policy. Elite dissensus is therefore a necessary condition for media influence. If elite dissensus is present, the media will likely operate within a sphere of legitimate controversy and reflect the dissensus (Robinson, 2001). When elite dissensus is present, a second condition might increase the chances of media influence. This condition occurs if there is uncertainty within the government about the policy- making itself. When it is unclear how to define a particular problem or which instruments to use, this policy uncertainty can increase the possibilities for media influence on the policy-making process. Policy uncertainty can come to the surface when there are multiple policy alternatives provided, making it more likely that different political elites prefer different options (Robinson, 2001). Looking closer at policy theories, there is indeed an established relationship between policy uncertainty and policy formation. It is, however, necessary to separate the uncertainty about the policy itself from political elite dissensus about goals and instruments of the policy, as they do influence policies differently. The type of policy that covers the Resolute Support mission might provide testimony to this finding later on in this research. Hague and Harrop address the effects of policy uncertainty and dissensus on the type of policy, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Effects of policy uncertainty and elite dissensus on policy (Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2008, p. 126)

When elite dissensus and policy uncertainty are present, a third condition is likely to surface: critically framed media coverage. The media have multiple instruments of power, of which framing is probably one of the best known, as the next section will further elaborate upon. Negative frames can influence the policy made or the policy options available. It can also influence public opinion and pressure policy-makers (Robinson, 1999). As there is no defined strategic framework for how to approach the problem, nor a clear agenda provided by the elites, possibilities for influencing how a problem is perceived by society increases when the media provides a negative framework (Robinson, 2001). However, to influence policy, media cannot just be critical towards policy options provided. They also need to bring attention to a particular solution or approach. When the political elites are in disagreement or uncertain about the policy,

media can positively report on one policy alternative or address a new solution altogether (Robinson, 1999). In this case media takes sides in the political debate and becomes an active participant in the policy-making process. The policy-media interaction model of Robinson creates the following conceptual model:

Elite dissensus

Policy uncertainty

Negative coverage

Presenting solution

Policy-making process

Figure 2: Necessary conditions for media influence on the policy-making process

As straightforward as this model is, it does leave us with some questions. For one, the role of the type of problem addressed is not taken into consideration. It is very well possible that decisions about foreign military matters are influenced by media in a different way, indirectly changing the possibility of influencing altogether. The international character of state-building operations, including its multidisciplinary complexity is also left out. Moreover, media are approached as one body with one agenda, whereas media is of course as diverse as the political landscape itself. Just like the already addressed struggle of political powers within political arenas, so have media a power struggle to reach their audience, to inform and convince them, to be heard and to compete with other media. This theory is therefore too narrow to grasp the complex system of media influence on policy processes. Hence, the next paragraph will explain the role of the conflict context itself.

2.3.2 Mass media coverage and the conflict context The dynamics between media and political elites has already been elaborated upon. Yet, it is assumed that media influences are a vertical system, a consequence of the activities of the political elites. This interpretation does not grasp the full story. As the policy cycle already showed, multiple actors in different stadia could influence the policy process. It is a dynamic arena, defined uniquely by every case and its players. The context in which policy is made, in our case the context of a foreign military intervention in a post-conflict setting, will likely be of influence on the policy process itself and consequently on its actors. As already described in Section 2.2, an international intervention is very complicated given its dynamic, unclear and time-limited character. Having many different actors with differently defined means and goals, operating in an unclear setting,

does indicate a connection between the character of the conflict context and the variables of elite dissensus and policy uncertainty. It also indicates an unnecessary vertical relationship between elite dissensus and policy uncertainty. As Table 2 shows, it is possible to have policy uncertainty while there is elite consensus. The conflict context provides the framework in which the policy process takes places. But where do media fit in this conceptualisation? Firstly, it is safe to assume that media are influenced by the conflict context as well, though its role varies over time and circumstances; or, as Wolfsfeld describes, ‘The role of news media in conflicts varies along with such factors as the political context of the conflict, the resources, skills and political power of the players involved. The relationship between the press and each antagonist, the state of public opinion, the ability of the journalist to gain access to the conflict events and last but certainly not least, what is happening in the field. Thus, not only does the role of the news media vary across conflicts, it also can change within the course of a single conflict.” (1997, p. 4) The role of media can change during the course of the Resolute Support mission. This broader issue is not only addressed by Wolfsfeld, but also by Hoogerwerf and Herweijer, as the policy process creates opportunities for influence during different stages of the policy cycle. Media and their opportunities to influence policy seem to be moved by different external variables, but is it possible for media to do this the other way around? Thus far, it has been described which conditions are necessary for media to influence policy and which actors allow these consequences to take place. Yet, it is unlikely that media are merely dependent actors in this process, only allowed to move within the arena when other actors provide the opportunity for this movement. While admittedly political elites do have an advantage as to which frame is presented, it is not impossible for the media to present a different story without their consent (Wolfsfeld, 1997). Especially in the case of foreign interventions, media are suspected to play a dubious role. Whereas academics do not agree on the actual extent of the influence of media on foreign policy-making, it is generally accepted that media have an opportunity to influence the agenda-setting, preparation, decision and evaluation phase (Jakobsen, 2000). This opportunity does not necessarily have to be under the conditions as mentioned in Robinsons theoretical framework. The agenda-setting phase can be influenced by the decision of media to whether or not report on a conflict. This decision is likely to be a consideration extending the agenda of the political elites. Moreover, as shown by Hawkins’ (2002) study, there are several cases that clearly contradict the assumption that media cover according to the agenda of the political elites. The relationships between the political elites and mass media are an interplay between variables rather than merely a vertical relationship. Yet, this interplay between variables does not end here. The possibility to independently function as gatekeepers of the agenda also provides the opportunity for the media to (indirectly) influence the conflict context. There is a major imbalance in the media’s coverage of conflict, creating the possibility for one or two conflicts to overshadow others and therefore shifting the attention of policy-makers away from others in need of help. This affects the agenda of the policy- making process and possibly the policy decisions made. In other words, a lack of coverage can create a lack of policy (Hawkins, 2002). Nevertheless, when media does decide to cover a conflict, as is the case for Afghanistan, it has the possibility to affect the type of policy process, indirectly effecting the conflict case by influencing its policy.

When a violent outburst, a disaster or other ‘spectacular’ events take place, in a matter of seconds this can be transferred all over the world. Technological developments have increased the influence of media over politics. This effect is commonly known as the CNN effect (Livingston, 1997). This effect can be systematically described by the following mechanism:

Media coverage of suffering

Journalists demand action of political elites

Increasing public pressure

Policy-making process

Figure 3: CNN Effect (Jakobsen, 2000)

However, this CNN effect assumes that media attention is mostly given during the peak of a conflict, which means that when a post-conflict case as Afghanistan is addressed, media supposedly have fewer interesting events to report on and therefore are less influential on the policy-making process. If the context is (relatively) stable, media attention will likely decrease. Or, as Livingston himself explains, “Media interest will rise in direct proportion to the sense of potential instability. Put another way, the more fragile the peace the peacekeepers are there to protect, the greater will be media and public interest” (1997, p. 13). Only when Western civilians or troops are harmed, it is possible to sustain media coverage of the conflict. The coverage that does occur is mostly negative and concerned with mismanagement, corruption and long-term effects of state-building interventions (Jakobsen, 2000). Moreover, the type of intervention accordingly changes the type of coverage of the media. The conflict context itself therefore determines the likelihood of media coverage and in turn the likelihood to influence policy. To summarize, the mass media are the gatekeepers of the policy cycle. They can decide which subjects are interesting enough to become news and which aspects of the conflict make it in the final story. This decision is not only made within a context of policy uncertainty and elite dissensus, but also by the competition in the media industry itself (Hawkins, 2002). The decision whether or not and/or how to cover an event is therefore not merely a decision that can be made within elite dissensus. It can be a conscious decision made by the media industry itself, giving the possibility to influence the policy process from the beginning of the policy cycle. The variables of negative coverage and presenting solutions are therefore possibly encouraged by the variables of elite dissensus and policy uncertainty, though not necessarily conditionally related. This makes it possible that, in researching the case of Afghanistan, the variables of negative coverage and/or

providing solution are present, while elite dissensus and/or policy uncertainty are not. These findings change the previously provided conceptual framework of Robinson and also add to our knowledge of media influence during different stages of the policy cycle. However, it is hard to define why media decide to cover certain conflicts while ignoring others. The phase of the conflict, pre-conflict, conflict or post-conflict does seem to correlate with the amount of coverage. Therefore, the conflict phase does influence media coverage, but is no guarantee for coverage. In this research, however, the reasons for coverage are irrelevant, although they could provide substance for a whole new research altogether. For the final theoretical conceptualisation, it suffices to accept that the conflict phase and number of violent outbursts, especially directed at Western civilians and troops, influences the amount of media coverage.

The conceptual model of this research is shown at the end of this segment. However, while it is explained how and when the variables can affect each other, it still leaves us with the question by what means media can influence policy. The means of mass media influence is the final piece of the puzzle that we must understand in order to analyse media coverage. That is why the next section will dive into the subject of framing.

2.3.3 Strategic reporting Media increase their chances to influence policy by negative coverage and presenting a different approach towards an issue. Moreover, media can act as gatekeepers by presenting (and therefore defining) problems to the policy-making process. The primary means of media are reporting, presenting a story about an event to a wider public. However, the truth is always more complicated than one story can tell. So, in telling a story, one has no choice but to only tell parts of the reality. Leaving out or including certain details can be unconsciously or consciously done and eventually leads to the framework of the story through which the audience can see parts of reality. Media construct the perspective of their audiences by providing the framework trough which they can perceive the story. Frames are therefore an essential and powerful tool of influencing the approach to an event.

“Frames shape our views on what counts as a problem (for example, the illegal exploitation of mining resources) and what does not (for instance, land conflicts). Frames also affect which events will be noticed (sexual violence) and which will not (non-sexual torture), as well as how they will be interpreted (as worthy of international response or as domestic problems). Thus, frames and narratives do not cause action. Instead, they make action possible.” (Autesserre, 2012, p. 207)

This quote shows that the connections between the previously mentioned variables are once again acknowledged. Media can give attention to a problem, define it and steer the policy process towards a preferred approach. By doing so, media can directly influence the policy process and indirectly influence the conflict context. However, some frames seem to stick more than others do. A possible explanation for the media to pay more attention to the conflict phase rather than the post-conflict phase, is that the conflict phase might seem to be better suitable for a framework. A frame seems to be more effective to influence action when (1) the cause of the problem is assigned as a deliberate action of identifiable individuals, (2) violence is done to vulnerable individuals, preferably with a clear causal chain assigning responsibility, (3) a simple solution is provided, and (4) the story fits a pre-existing framework (Autesserre, 2012). Elements of this line of reasoning do indeed fit the influencing framework of Robinson. When framing is done well, it can influence the policy process. Six assumptions of framing are therefore upheld in this thesis (De Bruijn, 2010):

1. Frames influence our perspective towards reality 2. Frames represent and create a (version of) reality 3. Frames can create positive and negative associations towards an event and its actors 4. Frames can encourage action 5. Frames can influence our normative understanding of an event 6. Frames can create interest in an event or deliberately ignore it.

When the frames consciously aim to achieve the opportunities mentioned above, one can speak of a formal strategy to influence: a strategic endgame. So, in looking into the reporting of the media about an event, it is necessary to recognise the framework used.

Features of a frame Frames, in particular news frames, are constructed by and embodied in keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols and visual images emphasized in a news narrative. Depending on the medium, the use of these features might differ (Entman, 1991). While broadcasting, visual images can be more explored than a newspaper often can; this, however, does not change the possibility to frame. After all, a selection has to be made regarding the features one wants to represent. In creating a narrative of a conflict situation, you can choose to focus on the soldiers, heroically in action saving innocent civilians, or you can choose to tell a story of the soldiers, destroying civilians’ houses. It is very well possible that either story represents the truth, though does not grasp the full truth. Which version of the truth will eventually be victorious, depends on a few elements (Keep in mind, though, that this victory hardly ever means that everyone accepts the framework as truth.) To be victorious as a frame, it is important to provide, repeat and thereby reinforce words and visual images that reference certain ideas and exclude others. A frame does not eliminate all inconsistent information, but through repetition, placement and reinforcing associations with each other, one interpretation becomes more visible, understandable and memorable compared to others (Entman, 1991). This principle is of course not only the case for news frames, also for other types of frames like political frames. When the public comes in contact with a frame, its understanding of the event guides the interpretation based on the initial information given. The interpretation of future information is also influenced by this first mental representation of the event. While media proceeds in creating frames that fit the perception of their public, this process also influences the political elites. While not all media will use the same frame during the reporting and inconsistent information will surface and be challenged, a frame is difficult to break through for the majority. Often the public is inexperienced with the subject reported on and opposing information becomes harder to find when it is not reported. Again, a victorious frame is not necessarily a frame that everyone uses, but the dominant frame in society. For media to influence the policy process, it is not necessary that everyone interprets an event in the same way, but that significant majorities do. A dominant framework is more likely to affect the process as it steers the public opinion of the majority. And, as we all know, public opinion does influence the position of elective political elites. The link between media and political elites is the power of having the dominant frame, steering society in its normative conceptualisation of the world around them. To recognise and analyse frames, it is important to know the political context, current policy agendas and disagreements, as it is likely that the political frame will try to complement the majority (Entman, 1991). However, becoming the dominant frame is more complicated than merely repetition.

Successful frames Autesserre mentions four characteristics of a victorious frame. Indeed, these do seem to return in other theories concerning framing. As mentioned, a frame is more likely to be dominant when we already agree with the frame, when the frame fits pre-existing frameworks (Autesserre, 2012). Moreover, a frame often expresses a perspective hardly anyone disagrees with. ‘We want our people to be safe’, ‘Criminals should pay’, ‘We want terrorism to end’, to name just a few examples. Hardly anyone would disagree with just these sentences (De Bruijn, 2010). However, none of these statements expresses where they are coming from or what exactly their solutions are. Yet, when first hearing these statements, we do agree with them. As Entman (1991) describes, this first impression can change later perceptions of events. A second characteristic of a good frame is its simplicity and easy-to-understand character. This can be done by repeating the frame, but also by phrasing. A simple presentation of the situation is more likely to be memorised than a more complicated one. Comparing humanitarian aid and cooperation to the situation of giving a man a fish rather than a fishing rod is a frame that is memorable. It is easy and gives a translation of the situation that can simply be reused by the public to present their perspective. This simplification of reality is an asset of power of the frame, as we have seen previously and will see in the other characteristics. For example, a good frame also has a ‘bad guy’. There must be someone or some party that can be blamed for the problem. This party has for some reason the intention to undermine obvious normative agreed upon values. A good framework has, as previously stated, a message you wouldn’t normally disagree with. Every good person wants terrorism to end, so why didn’t we get rid of terrorism already? Policy-makers, for example, can be blamed for this, arguing that they do not care enough for their citizens or they are not smart enough to counter terrorist threats. This characteristic is powerful, as it forces the blamed party, often the opponent, to defend itself (De Bruijn, 2010). Being forced to defend yourself in a frame is quite hard. The majority already have formed an opinion within this framework and the line of argumentation is in its simplification hard to conquer with other perspectives on reality (that the majority might have never received). By creating a framing that touches upon important values of an actor, you increase the chances he or she will step into the frame. Moreover, the framework does hold some truth. It represents a problem or at least the perception of a problem (De Bruijn, 2010). By touching values or the security of a society, it is more likely that the framework will dominate, especially when the final characteristic of a successful frame is included: providing a solution (Autesserre, 2012; Robinson, 1999).

In conclusion, a successful frame provides the problem while at the same time presenting a, preferably simple, solution. These characteristics can all contribute to the success of a frame and can perhaps lead to a better understanding of the motivation within the media’s reporting in our particular case. After all, the sub-variables of negative coverage and presenting a solution are the conceptualisation of an alternative framework competing with that of the political elites.

2.4 Conclusion and conceptualisation The theory provides this research with a lot of information, though also with a scientific puzzle as how the variables might influence each other. The theories examined seem to be too narrow to be appropriated for the complexity of the policy process of international military interventions. Therefore, it is necessary to examine their findings and compare similarities within the theories. The schematically representation of this is shown beneath.

Although this model will undoubtedly not grasp the full mechanisms at work in reality, it does show how the separate dimensions and their variables relate to each other and help this research in conceptualising the variables that will be taken into account regarding the issue of media influence. However, this mechanism does not work exactly in the same way in every phase of the

policy cycle. Just like the various political elites throughout this process have different opportunities to influence the cycle, so do the mass media and the conflict context. Political elites have influence based on their formal authority and are categorized accordingly. This is not the case for the mass media or the conflict context. Yet, they do have increased opportunities in the cycle where it is more likely that influence will take place. Based on the previous sections, the following table of influence in different phases of the policy cycle is presented.

Influential actors Political elites Mass Media Conflict Context Phases United Kingdom Kingdom of the Netherlands

1. Agenda-setting Cabinet Cabinet Parliament Parliament X X MOD BZ Def. 2. Policy preparation DFID BZ X MOD Def. 3. Policy decision Cabinet Cabinet Parliament Parliament DFID BZ X MOD Def. 4. Policy implementation DFID BZ X MOD Def. 5. Policy enforcement DFID Def. X MOD 6. Policy evaluation Parliament Parliament DFID BZ X X MOD Def. Table 3: General likeliness of influence during the phases of the military policy-making process

The ‘X’ shows the opportunities and therefore the likeliness of influence of mass media and the conflict context. It does not show the formal opportunity to influence the process. This also means it is very well possible that these actors can influences the process in other phases of the cycle. For example, the influence of conflict in the second and third stage of the policy cycle is by no means proven absent. It is only theoretically speaking that the second and third phase create less opportunities to have impact on policy and it is generally speaking likely that the conflict has the most impact before the problem is defined and after the decision to intervene is made. Whether or not this is also the case for the Resolute Support mission can only be determined after thorough research. For the mass media, their traditional roles and manners give them the highest chances to influence the policy-making process in the beginning phases and possibly in the evaluation phase. Moreover, for all actors the opportunity to influence the process does depend on the case itself and external influences. This research tries to explore what process and which influences play a part in the Resolute Support mission. This theoretical chapter has made the first step into this journey. The next step is to translate the theory to practical measurable units. As now all relevant concepts for the analysis are thoroughly examined, the next chapter will look at the methodological components of this research.

Chapter 3. Methodology

This chapter explains the methodologies used in the analysis. It also gives an overview of the data. The operationalisation of concepts is added in the codebook in Appendix B. This chapter provides insights in the reliability and weaknesses of these methods as well.

3.1 Method and research design This research analyses large portions of literature from sources that might be more biased than the average scientific sources. Framing and influencing a decision-making process is a practice in which a situation will be pictured within a context most fitting the direction of the influencer. To analyse these perspectives as neutral as possible, it is necessary to develop a tool which allows the researcher to categorise the large amount of source material in a structural manner. The Qualitative Content Analysis makes it possible to do this within different time periods and between different sources and settings (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). This is a qualitative research type. While this kind of research consists of numerical based datasets, the aim of this research is to interpret different frames and compare them with real-life events. This information gained qualitatively indicates if the sources aimed to influence the decision-making process and provides insights in the applicability of the theoretical models (Bleijenberg, 2013). However, this research does not aim to prove or disprove theoretical explanations for media influence and is therefore not a fundamental research.

3.1.1 Qualitative Content Analysis The design of this research is the Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA). QCA can be used in a deductive or an inductive manner. This research is a deductive content analysis as the eligible sources are reviewed for content, based on the corresponding codebook which contains identifiable categories (Elo et al., 2014). This categorisation is explained in the codebook (Appendix B). QCA consists of three main phases; preparation, organization and reporting. The preparation phase concerns itself with the data collection method, the sampling strategy and selecting the unit of analysis. The method of data collection, strategy and unit should all be based on the key concepts of trustworthiness. What sources are represented and within which time period are they measured? Section 3.2 elaborates more on the choices of collection, sampling and the unit of analysis. The organization phase is the second phase of QCA. The codebook has to be developed and the researcher needs to establish how concepts and categories will be created, ensure that the interpretive data can be analysed objectively and exclude overlap between categories. The codebook provides all the codes, their definition and instructions how to execute the QCA. With this codebook it is possible to link the subjective reports of events to categories. This will reduce personal biases and create an objective interpretation of the provided data. (Elo et al., 2014) As the codebook provides an extensive operationalisation of all-important concepts, this methodological chapter does not include a separate operationalisation. The last phase is usually the reporting phase, though this research included a testing phase first. As only one researcher established the definitions and the interpretation of the data, it is necessary to exclude possible biases before the actual analysis. Therefore, three additional individuals tested the codebook by analysing five randomly selected documents. This allowed to determine if certain categories can be interpreted in different manners or if there is any unclarity in the operationalisation. If so, these categories were changed before the actual analysis was executed. This test reduced subjectivity and increased the research replicability. After the testing phase, the

actual analysis was performed. All coding was done in consistent time slots, as this increased the trustworthiness of the coding. Microsoft Excel was used to make the dataset. This program gives a comprehensive overview of all the analysed material and is adaptable to most devices, which makes the dataset transparent. After coding, a comparative analysis between the movements of the variables within the different nations was possible and the empirical questions of this research were answered.

3.2 Case and data selection The case selected to analyse is the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. This paragraph elaborates on why this case has been selected and how the data was gathered.

3.2.1 Case selection The case is the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. This mission was chosen because it is the most appropriate case for this research. The aim of this research is to provide insights about influencing traits of the media in national policy-making. The first reason is the policy type. The national policy-making type is narrowed down to the critical decision-making process of military interventions in a foreign state. The chosen case had to be a military intervention approved by a formal national government, even though establishing the mission might go through an international body. Secondly, the national governments compared are not randomly picked. The policy-making processes of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were chosen to be analysed for a few reasons. As stated in the relevance of this research, quite some research on media influence has been based on the United States of America. However, it is not certain if media have the same effects in countries with different policy-making traditions. To test this, other nations than the United States need to be analysed. Nevertheless, the systems have to be comparable and information on governmental decisions needs to be transparent to be analysed. Finally, the researcher needs to be fluent in understanding the language of the analysed documents. These requirements narrowed down the possible candidates and made the United Kingdom and the Netherlands the most likely nations to be analysed. Furthermore, this research aims to analyse a case that is as recent as possible, given these restrictions. The visibility of mass media has increased in the last decennia, yet most theoretical frameworks are based on knowledge gathered from before the turn of the millennium. Therefore, a recent case is the most important requirement. The Resolute Support mission is the most recent example of a military intervention in which the United Kingdom and the Netherlands both participate. This makes the Resolute Support mission the most appropriate candidate for this research.

3.2.2 Data selection The case is analysed by coding selected documents. These documents provide the data for this research. All documents selected are published between January 1, 2013 and January 1, 2019. To get insight in the movements of mass media and the political elites, multiple types of documents were analysed. The position of the media is determined through six newspapers: The Times (published by News Corporation), Daily Telegraph (published by The Press Holdings), the Guardian (published by Guardian Media Group), de Telegraaf (published by Telegraaf Media Groep), Algemeen Dagblad (published by De Persgroep Nederland) and NRC Handelsblad (published by Mediahuis). The choice to select only newspapers is a practical one. As only one researcher performed the analysis, timewise it would not have been possible to analyse broadcast and/or radio transcripts. The inclusion of broadcasts was initially planned, but a limitation in the

number of sources had to be made. Analysing the different types of media documents, it became clear that newspapers included the most information and were the most applicable for a QCA. It was estimated that taking out the broadcast transcripts did not change the results in their essence. Broadcasts have the possibility to create a frame through words, sounds and visual effects. By coding the transcripts of broadcasts, two of their vital instruments to present issues would be taken away. This decreases the value of the presented information, whereas newspapers do not share this same problem. As the goal is to get a clear picture of patterns in the complete decision- making process, limiting the number of years would not have been an option. This is why the choice was made to only use newspapers in the final analysis. However, if in the future this research would be replicated or a follow-up analysis would be done, the codebook would also be applicable to other types of media sources. The chosen newspapers were selected based on their representation of different political views and different publishers. This way a general perspective of the position of media could be determined. Yet, they are comparable as they all have a nationwide reach, all are paid newspapers and all publish news on a daily basis. However, while analysing articles it is possible some documents might not be useful for the study. First and foremost, for an article to be considered, it must be related to the conflict in Afghanistan. Opinion articles, published reviews or columns are included, unless it was stated that the opinion of the writer does not necessarily reflect that of the newspaper. Duplicated articles were only taken into account once. The second data source is made up by governmental sources. As addressed in the theoretical framework, political elites can be broadly defined. However, in both nations the elected representatives of the public were the likeliest party to analyse. Their decisions are made public and their representative function is closely connected with the mass media coverage, be it at elections, as opposition or as sitting government. Media coverage can change the public opinion, address issues, define problems to debate and damage the credibility of the representatives. Therefore, the political elites in this research are narrowed down to the sitting members of the House of Representatives, the Prime Minister, the ministers and state secretaries. To do so, the databases of the governmental institutions were used. For the United Kingdom this was the database of ‘parliament.uk’ and for the Netherlands ‘tweedekamer.nl’. The goal was to gain insight in the formal decisions made and the information provided to the members of the House of Representatives. There is a divide in the databases of the respective nations. To gain the required information from the United Kingdom, it was necessary to select research briefings and statements, while only including the House of Commons. The name of the mission ‘Resolute Support’ was not a fitting search phrase here, as it also referred to quite some information that was of no relevance to this research. Therefore, the documents have been selected based on the phrase ‘Afghanistan’. For the Netherlands it sufficed to only select ‘brieven van de regering’ [letters from the government] based on the phrase ‘Resolute Support’. As this phrase is not commonly used in Dutch, it provided only information about the Resolute Support mission. While the documents have been selected in different systems based on different criteria, it did not change the applicability of the data, nor are there any indications that it diminished the reliability of the research. Analysing two different nations based on their respective institutional databases and within their own languages, there are bound to be differences. It is the responsibility of the research to take these differences into account and to make the analysis adaptable without hindering the reliability. Last but not least, in this research the different data sources have been separated in media sources and government sources. However, in reality the actors, political elite or not, were using media sources to voice their position. This means that the sources could not be limited to their respective actors.

3.2.3 Collected data The amount of data collected is shown in this paragraph. The time period researched is between the 1st of January 2013 and the 1st of January 2019. Even though the mission only started on January 1, 2015, words of a follow-up mission (Resolute Support) have been picked up by news sources as early as September 2013. As this research also looks into the policy process and the developments after the implementation, it is vital to look into the developments surrounding this policy process from the very beginning. To understand the history of the conflict context itself, the news sources and official documents were only used to add to the information gathered. The main sources to describe the developments in and around Afghanistan (Chapter 4) are based on academic articles and databanks researching developments around the world. In the QCA itself, the datasets are separated annually. More detailed information is added in the codebook. To start with the amount of media sources, Table 4 shows the total amount of articles from the selected media sources from 2013 till 2018. For every media outlet the search term ‘Resolute Support’ has been used. However, in 2013 and 2014, the name Resolute Support was not commonly used by most, as they often referred to the mission as the ‘follow-up’ mission. Therefore, added to the search within the British news is the term ‘Operation Herrick’.2 This is the name used in the United Kingdom to address UK forces in Afghanistan. Added to the Dutch newspapers is the search term ‘ISAF’, as the name of the mission before Resolute Support was still commonly used. Media documents The Daily Guardian Total Telegraaf NRC AD Total Total Year Times Telegraph UK Dutch 2013 14 1 4 19 15 14 6 35 54 2014 8 4 6 18 23 19 13 55 73 2015 3 13 24 40 7 7 0 14 54 2016 4 5 6 15 2 3 1 6 21 2017 10 7 4 21 3 9 5 17 38 2018 3 15 5 23 14 4 3 21 44 Total 42 45 49 136 64 56 28 148 284 Table 4: Total amount of media reports data gathered

However, not all data gathered was useful for this research. This research excludes items stated not to reflect the views of the publisher and, of course, the news item has to be linked to the Resolute Support mission. For example, some articles did include the combination of words ‘resolute support’, though this has nothing to do with a military intervention in Afghanistan. Moreover, when there is no reference to the mission itself in the paper, for example when only ISAF is mentioned without any reference to a future mission or future interventions in Afghanistan, it has been excluded from the analysis. Another possibility is that source itself is incorrect. After analysing all the sources, a correction of the amount of useable data gives us the following amount of media sources used in this research. The total amount of data coded is listed in Table 5. A detailed list of the sources is included in Appendix A2. Less than half of the articles selected fulfilled the requirements to be relevant. However, this does not make the articles not coded useless or not insightful at all. A gradual rise of relevance is clearly seen and easily explained by the fact that in the beginning of the analysed period media were more focused on the ISAF

2 In later years this name changed to Operation Toral. However, this concept has not been used in the data collection. The term Operation Herrick was merely used to get information on the starting phases of the Resolute Support mission. The phrase ‘Resolute Support’ served its purpose completely after 2015.

mission. While several ISAF-focused articles were coded, as some did mention the future of the process, some articles had to be excluded for only reviewing past policies. The total amount of totally irrelevant articles (i.e. articles nothing to do with Afghanistan whatsoever) is relatively low and, like the number of duplicated articles, steadily spread over the years and newspapers. Another note to the determining of relevance is that the media did not always make a strict separation between the Resolute Support missions and other operations in Afghanistan. While it is necessary to address this observation in this chapter, this did not create problems for the coding. Additionally, addressing the specific documents where this observation has been made, it would be deemed unlikely to create a relevant change in the visualisation of the case for the general public.

Media documents The Daily Guardian Total Telegraaf NRC AD Total Total Year Times Telegraph UK Dutch

2013 0 0 1 1 5 6 2 13 14 2014 6 2 1 9 4 5 8 17 26 2015 1 3 9 13 3 5 0 8 21 2016 2 1 4 7 1 2 0 3 10 2017 5 0 1 6 2 5 4 11 17 2018 1 6 4 11 7 2 2 11 22 Total 15 12 20 47 22 25 15 62 110 Table 5: Total amount of usable media data

The data provided by the governments of the analysed nations is shown in Table 6. The same time period as the media sources has been used. This data is provided by the archives of the respective governments themselves. For the United Kingdom the database on ‘parliament.uk’ was used to analyse ‘briefings’ and ‘statements’ from the House of Commons. The mission’s name of ‘Resolute Support’ was not an appropriate search term and therefore the phrase ‘Afghanistan’ was used. ‘Afghanistan’ was mentioned in many documents that were not of relevance to this research and explains the difference in the relevance of the documents between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The Dutch data came from the database on ‘tweedekamer.nl’, section ‘brieven van de regering’. The search phrase ‘Resolute Support’ was used for the Dutch documents. Even though there the data was based on different search criteria, the information gathered does correspond with each other.

UK NL Year Total Relevant Total Relevant Total published Total relevant

2013 1 1 7 6 8 7 2014 7 5 16 14 23 19 2015 17 8 13 12 30 20 2016 14 5 17 15 31 20 2017 12 6 14 10 26 16 2018 22 3 12 10 34 13 Total 73 28 79 67 152 95 Table 6: Total amount of governmental data

3.3 Reliability and validity The final paragraph of this chapter elaborates on the reliability and the validity of this research. This will be done by looking back at the theoretical framework and the methodological strategy used.

3.3.1 Reliability This research is a Qualitative Content Analysis and the importance of reliability when performing the QCA has been highlighted in Section 3.1. When analysing, personal biases of the researcher might weaken the reliability of the research. In this research the content of the data emerging from the documents is interpreted by one researcher. Interpretation runs the risk of being reliant on the subjectivity of the researcher. As only one researcher analysed all the data content, this research design has a weakness in its objectivity. This is why some precautions had to be taken to guarantee an objective analysis as humanly possible. The codebook helped in guarding the objectivity. In the codebook all interpretations of the data were assigned a code and defined to keep the possibility of different interpretations as low as possible. Moreover, the codebook makes it possible to repeat the research by others and increases the likelihood of finding the same results. The codebook was tested before the actual analysis on three individuals to see if there were indeed no difficulties in interpreting the data according to the definitions of the codebook. Also, the actual analysis could not be done within one day, which is why all the data analysed was spread over multiple days and all the analysing was done in similar timeslots (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). The data itself is transparent and can be easily accessed by others. Moreover, the data came from multiple sources and the media sources were selected to cover the political spectrum. While this research acknowledges media not to be objective, with the selection of sources it gives this research insight in multiple subjectivities. Given the nature of this research, the subjectivity of the media is not to be considered a negative aspect for this research, but rather an opportunity for gaining interesting knowledge about different media frames. However, the methodological strategy is not the only way of decreasing subjectivity. The construction of this research started with the theoretical framework. The conceptual model that resulted from this framework is the basis for structuring the codebook and the analysis. It determines the factors and actors that are needed to take into consideration while researching this subject. The conceptual model is not based on just one theory, but on multiple theories and also on multiple scientific disciplines. This research is familiar with research methods and theories of Public Administration and Human Geography. It is aware of their weaknesses and blind spots and combines their strengths to tackle their individual vulnerabilities.

3.3.2 Internal and external validity The reliability of this study is of vital importance for a solid research. However, it is not the only important aspect. The internal and external validity both need to be carefully considered. The internal validity ensures that the methodological approach measures what the research wants to explore. Systematic errors need to be excluded to uphold internal validity (Bleijenbergh, 2013). By basing the operationalisation of the influencing factors on multiple theoretical sources, the internal validity can be increased. The measures taken to avoid personal biases are also of importance for the internal validity. It is not possible that the different sources or time periods will be analysed differently. The codebook ensures all data analysed is measured and valued through the same approach. Thirdly, a structural approach when analysing the data helps to limit the number of errors. The codebook was again of great help in structuring the data and the data analysis.

The external validity is based on the degree to which the study can generalize its results and their applicability to other cases (Bleijenbergh, 2013). While the research looked into the specific case of the Resolute Support mission, the variable of the conflict context cannot be generalized. Looking into the movements and instruments of the political elites and the mass media, it is possible to generalize the results to a certain extent. Media, politics and its actors are all dependent on the time period they live in, the context in which they have to make decisions and reports and the power they possess. These aspects are not the same in past cases nor will they be so in the future. After all, one of the reasons to select this specific case is because it is the most recent case this research is able to analyse. Looking at the theoretical framework, the theories are based on the influence of mass media in the past. It is very well possible that media influence has changed with the technological developments of the past decennia. However, this does not mean the external validity is non-existent. This research provides knowledge about possible influential reporting that can change the decision-making processes concerning military interventions of two different nations. There is already a broad theoretical knowledge of the relationship between the conflict context, media influence and political elites. There is no indication that influencing politics by reporting strategies and the basic mechanisms between politics and media have changed. How they exactly perform within the specific case, provides not just knowledge on the specific case, but also general knowledge on the relationship between these three variables in this day and age. Moreover, the methodological approach increases the general ability of this research. By basing the gained knowledge on multiple sources and on two political systems, the results are more likely to be applicable to other cases as well. Finally, the codebook is structured in such a way that its basis can be applied to different cases. After all, strategies of media influence and the decision- making process of the political elites remain the same in other military interventions. The conceptual model that is the basis for the code book (Section 2.4) can be used for research of other decision-making processes in a conflict context. Only case-specific codes, for example the different solutions to the specific problem given, are case-based. That media can highlight a solution to influence policy is a universal tactic. The external validity is therefore best valued in the variables of the mass media and the political elites, the different sources and political systems and finally in the universality of the codebook.

This chapter explained how the analysis has been performed. However, the next chapter, is not this anticipated analysis yet. Before coding and interpreting, it is first necessary to get a good grasp of the conflict context. This is why the next chapter contains the case description. The conflict’s history, relevant military missions and political actions are made clear in the following pages.

Chapter 4. Case description

To grasp the context of the conflict case, this chapter will elaborate on Afghanistan and its turbulent past. While there have been many violent events and geo-political theories as to how the country ended up the way it did, writing all of this down would make for several books at least. The history presented here is but a brief overview of developments in the previous century, a closer look at the first decade of this century and finally a more detailed description of the years covered by the Resolute Support mission.

4.1 Afghanistan: a history of conflict Afghanistan has had a turbulent past; or a more accurate statement: the territory now defined on world maps as Afghanistan has had a turbulent past. The map below shows the Afghan territory, right between four civilisations, as defined by Huntington, and at the heart of the Silk Road.

Map 1: The Silk Road (National Geographic, 2013)

According to Huntington, Afghanistan is part of the Islamic world and its neighbour civilisations are the Orthodox, Sinic and Hindu (Huntington, 1996). This location has been a catalyst for foreign invasions and within the territory there is a broad spectrum of cultural identities that hardly mingle with one another. However, it would be an injustice not to address the Western civilisation in the defining of Afghanistan’s borders. At the end of the 19th century, the territory was trapped between the Russian Empire and British India. These two major political players declared the territory as a so-called buffer state, which would become neutral territory between them.3 However, the borders that were drawn give an unnatural presence based on strategic political decisions of the two powerful empires. The first head of state of these newly defined borders, Abdul Rahman Khan, managed to conquer the territory by bloody fights, iron rule, forced migration and the support of the British Empire. According to Wagemaker (2012, p.65), Khan created a governmental system based on dependency and submission to its neighbours, creating the fundament for the modern Afghan state. Afghanistan has held a political strategic role between the Russian Empire and the British Empire, and later between the United States and the Soviet Union. This continual struggle for Afghanistan’s existence did not establish one Afghan community, united by a shared goal. The internal social dynamic is based on heterogenic communities and, within these communities, strong cultural defined identities. The following map gives a general overview of these groups.

3 This process has known its own bloody history and was not settled overnight. This research cannot elaborate on this part of Afghanistan’s history, but the reader is recommended to take notice of this interesting though violent part of Afghanistan’s past.

Map 2: Afghanistan and Pakistan Ethnic Groups (National Geographic, 2013)

This map shows the different ethnolinguistic groups spread across Afghanistan and their neighbour country Pakistan.4 These communities are hard to reach on a social and geographical level. Nevertheless, these cultural divides within the state are not the only divides. Warlords claiming their own territories play a part in these divides as well, just as the socio-economic differences between the rural and the urban areas. One of the few-shared features of the Afghans is Islam. Islam provides some shared values and has a role in the rule of law. Nevertheless, not all groups interpret the Islamic teachings the same and this results in another dividing factor (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 82). These different communities play a part in the present conflict and in the strategic choices made by the interventions. Moreover, when the Taliban gained power, these communities played their own bloody part. However, this research looks into the choices made by foreign actors and therefore focuses on the geopolitical dimension. Maps showing Afghanistan and its neighbours in detail before the Soviet invasion are included in Appendix A1. The next part will explain the time period from the Soviet-Afghan war until September 11, 2001.

4.1.1 Proxy wars and the Taliban The very name of the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-89) seems to describe a war between these two nations. In reality however, this was a fighting stage of the Cold War, making it a proxy war. Starting as an effort of the Soviet Union to sustain a satellite regime, it resulted in a proxy war after the United States ‘indirectly’ took part in the conflict. As it funded and equipped Afghan insurgents to rise against the Soviet forces, backed by several European and Islamic countries, the Soviet-Afghan war included more than its name would tell.

“In the end, the Soviets were defeated by three factors they could not effectively equal or counter: American technology, Saudi money, and Muslim demographics and zeal.” (Huntington, 1996, p. 247)

This coalition of Western and Islamic states did not result in a long-term friendship. Islamist organizations, promoting Islam against non-Muslim forces, thrived on the Muslim victory over one of the world’s superpowers. In this narrative, Western interventions in the Islamic world were disapproved of as Western imperialism (Huntington, 1996, p. 248). For Afghanistan itself this war resulted in the fall of its government, creating a power vacuum and opportunities for the rise of warlords. Seizing these opportunities became even more fruitful by the self-sufficient, yet closed geographical locations of the different territories within Afghanistan, the socially closed communities and the flight of middleclass households. A period of the mudjahedin began (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 105). Within this period of destruction, migration, and lack of official governmental institutions, the cry for order and unity was answered by one of the few common characteristics of the Afghan citizens: the Islam. The rise of the Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic movement with Pakistani support, began in 1994. Its theocratic rule ended the anarchistic period in Afghanistan and aimed to create a pure fundamentalist Islamic regime. They were strongly supported by the Pakistani government, as it believed the Taliban was an organisation it could strategically manoeuvre in its favour. One of the Taliban’s leader, Mullah Omar’s infamous supporters was Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organisation. The Taliban managed to create a somewhat stable situation; however,

4 Afghanistan’s relations with Pakistan regarding safety and security issues could provide enough content for another book. The shared ethnographical communities do play a part in this too, but are in this map first and foremost an illustration of the differences between borders that are drawn on paper based on geopolitical strategic interests of foreign empires and the ethnographical boundaries that show the internal dynamics of the Afghan society.

their way of doing this was trough a suppressing regime based on a fundamentalist interpretation of the Islam; an interpretation many Afghans did not share. Nevertheless, their regime has been tolerated by their neighbours (by some even actively supported) as the world did feel the need for stability in the region. Years of violent conquering followed, where large parts of Afghan territory became part of the Taliban regime. By 2001, while fighting for the North of Afghanistan, national and international criticism of the Taliban changed the discourse and the support. Al Qaeda had been established as a threat and the West did not appreciate the Taliban providing shelter. The inhumane regime and the provided shelter for terrorist movements angered the international community and gave rise to multiple resolutions by the United Nations Security Council. While most countries agreed that the situation in Afghanistan asked for an intervention, they could not agree on the best approach. Moreover, it became more difficult to strategically rebuild Afghanistan, while many groups were fighting with each other. The international community did not argue if an intervention was needed, but how this intervention had to be executed. The intervention had to include a carefully laid strategic approach with clear goals and the aim to create a positive peace. However, time of careful planning was cut short at September 11 (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 121).

4.2 War on Terror The second part of this chapter looks into the events after the 9/11 attacks. The previous section showed that Western nations had intervened in the territory before. However, 9/11 is of direct influence in how the decision-making process of the missions was carried out and therefore how the missions were moulded in their final form. The military missions were not only carried out by Western nations, but as the focus of this research is on two Western nations, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the focus of this case description is also on Afghanistan’s relations with this part of the world. 9/11 dramatically changed the US military approach to international conflict. Before the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration viewed its armed forces as a preparation for serious threats, like China and possibly North Korea or Iraq. The power of its troops was not to be wasted on activities seen as humanitarian interventions. After the 9/11 attacks its attitude changed from a reluctant intervenor to the torchbearer of the military intervention in Afghanistan. No longer did the United States focus on exit strategies, but on mobilizing massive forces and the acceptance of the sacrifices this war would claim. In the ‘War on Terror’, the symbolic name for the war against a new age of Islamist militancy, legitimacy was derived from the principle of self-defence (Freedman, 2007). Islamist militancy was not bound to a specific nation, nor is there consensus on the goals of Islamic militant groups, as classified by Stares and Yacoubain in Figure 4. The Al Qaeda movement, which claimed responsibility for the 9/11 attacks, is defined as a transnational Islamist-Militant Group with a global agenda. This type can provide threats to the international community without being a state actor itself. Yet, these nonstate actors can wield extraordinary power while having much greater latitude to operate across borders. Their trans-border identity can be difficult to adapt a traditional military strategy to, especially for one nation. To address the Islamist militant threat, the United States did therefore not act alone. Another important advantage of collectively addressing the Islamic fundamentalist threat, is that it generates international legitimacy (Stares & Yacoubain, 2007, p. 426).

Figure 4: Islamist Militancy, c. 2006 (Stares & Yacoubain, 2007, p. 426) 4.2.1 Operation Enduring Freedom The war against terrorism would be carried out by a coalition of the willing, backed by art. 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and by invoking NATO’s art. 5 for the first time (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 127). Afghanistan was a fairly uncontroversial target (Freedman, 2007). The Taliban and Al Qaeda were ideologically and financially affiliated and by the time of the 9/11 attacks isolated from the rest of the international community. The goals of the intervention were not neatly defined and it was unclear which support would be provided by their coalition partners. It was however clear that the United States was in control of the military preparations and hardly, if at all, involved its coalition partners in the political strategic planning of the intervention. The United States was only in need of its allies’ military forces and technical capacities, preferably with as little constraints as possible. The British government was willing to support the United States unconditionally and on October 7, 2001, the decision of a military operation in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), was officially made (Directie VeiligheidsBeleid, 2002, p. 13). This operation did not include future state-building initiatives. After fall of Kabul on November 13, president Bush stated that the United States would not be intervening in the governmental reconstruction of Afghanistan (Wagemaker, 2012, p.136).

“The United States and Russia do not intend to, and cannot, create the future government of Afghanistan. It is up to the Afghans themselves to determine their future.” (Joint statement by President Putin and President Bush, November 13, 2001)

While the United States never aimed to have a long-term peacebuilding presence in Afghanistan, it had little choice but to get involved with nation building (Freedman, 2007). The defeat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda was established as the mission’s goal. However, this goal gave rise to a new question; when can we claim this mission to be successfully completed? New signs that the Taliban had strategically retired from the field to strike back another day, made it clear for the United States that a stable and secure environment was needed to prevent future retaliation. However, many coalition partners were not as willing to support the aftermath of the US intervention anymore. Their interests in the region were limited and the small involvement in the initial planning of the operation decreased the massive support given directly after the 9/11 attacks (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 151). Regardless of this slight decrease of support by the international community, they could not turn their back on Afghanistan.

4.2.2 International Security and Assistance Force Operation Enduring Freedom was an operation led by the United States and supported by NATO and the UN. The focus of the mission was on the defeat of the Al Qaeda movement, a short-term goal instead of creating a stable state. While they managed to chase away the Taliban at the end of 2001, it seems wrong to call the operation a success. Without stability, an economy and working governmental institutions, Afghanistan once again became a state ruled by anarchy and warlords. Moreover, the Taliban was not defeated, but only temporarily chased away to retaliate later. The Bonn Agreement addressed these issues and installed a new interim-government, led by Hamid Karzai. It also added two new military operations in addition to OEF, which would stay in place until 2014 and to be replaced with Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. These two missions were the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

While these missions are all intertwined, this section will only describe the ISAF mission as this is the formal predecessor of the Resolute Support mission. ISAF is formally a NATO operation, made up of NATO members and several other allies. ISAF’s role was to supervise the transition to a new, stable government and to provide security for redevelopment in Afghanistan. ISAF did initially not have the goal to enforce law and order or to take on the warlords. However, ISAF started to take over some of the military operations led by OEF in 2004 (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 147). Though ISAF was not led by the United States, the United States played an important part in the decision- making process and was the largest contributor to the mission. Moreover, through the years the United States has also suffered most military fatalities in Afghanistan.

Total fatalities in Afghanistan by Western coalition soldiers 800

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0 01 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

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Figure 5: Total fatalities in Afghanistan by Western Coalition soldiers (Data on fatalities gathered by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2018a)

However, that does not mean that the mission had no impact on the United Kingdom and the Netherlands as well. 25 Dutch soldiers and 455 soldiers of the United Kingdom were killed during the last 18 years, the period between 2006 and 2013 being the most hard-fought years. After the United States, the United Kingdom contributed the most soldiers to the mission and suffered the most fatalities. Dutch soldiers fought together with British soldiers in the south of Afghanistan and the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, located in the Netherlands, was ISAF’s superior headquarter. The following map shows the outlay of the ISAF mission.

Map 3: The ISAF mission outlay (UN Dispatch, n.d)

During the ISAF mission the Taliban retaliated again and setting up a stable regime became a difficult task. In 2011, US Special Forces managed to kill Osama bin Laden; later that year the USA announced the withdrawal of troops. Other nations followed and the ISAF mission was planned to be gradually reduced. In the Netherlands specifically, NATO’s request to extend its contribution to the ISAF mission became a topic of fierce political debate in the beginning of 2010 and eventually even resulted in the fall of the Dutch cabinet (PDC, n.d). Nations withdrew their troops from Afghanistan from 2010 on, to finalise the ISAF mission in 2014. During this time the transition to the Resolute Support mission was made. The Resolute Support mission became known as ISAF’s successor. However, this mission had a very different approach. The number of deployed forces was decreased and it was no longer a combat mission. The Resolute Support mission will be described in detail during the analysis in the next chapter, but the next section provides a short summary.

4.2.3 Resolute Support The Resolute Support mission (RS from here on) was launched on January 1, 2015. In the beginning of 2019, the mission consists of around 17,000 troops from 39 countries: all NATO allies and ten NATO partners. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have been invited to attend as well and are planning to finalise their contribution to the mission in 2019 (NATO, 2019). RS is directed at training, advising and assisting the Afghan security forces (ANSF or ANDSF) and institutions. It also funds the Afghan security forces as part of a broader international effort (NATO, 2018a).

“Our aim is to strengthen the Afghan security forces so they can create the conditions for a peaceful solution. An Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process is essential to a long term, inclusive political settlement.” (Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, NATO, n.d)

The mission aims to give the Afghans more ownership of the protection of their nation by including them more in the process. This is mainly done by training, advising and funding citizens and institutions to increase the effectiveness and accountability of the national security forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, RS also focusses on the development of leadership, fighting capabilities, unity of command, budgetary development and the decrease of corruption (NATO, n.d). RS operates with one hub in Kabul and four spokes in Mazar-e-Sharif (Balkh), Herat, Kandahar and Laghman. RS is stationed in all corners of Afghanistan (see Map 4). RS troops work primarily with security related ministries, air forces and army forces, special operations and of course police forces (NATO, 2018a).

Map 4: The Resolute Support mission outlay (NATO, n.d)

The United States has once again a prominent role in this mission. It provides more than half of the troops (8,475) and has important leadership positions. For example, the RS commanders have always been American. Of the five deputy commanders, three have been from the United Kingdom. In June 2018 it was announced that the number of troops would be increased from around 13,000 to 16,000. This latest increase resulted in a total of 16,229 in November 2018, of which 650 troops from the United Kingdom (increasing to 1,100 in 2019) and 160 from the Netherlands (NATO, 2018c). At the NATO Brussels Summit in July 2018, when it was decided to increase the number of troops, it was also agreed upon to extend the commitment of the participating nations. This commitment is tied to supporting the financial sustainment of the Afghan security forces throughout 2024. While no official end date for the mission has been determined, NATO did report on some interim successes of the missions in Afghanistan up until 2017. These successes were based on data from the World Bank, domestic reporting’s and the CIA.

Factors 2001 2017 Gross Domestic Product $2,460,000,000 $19,500,000,000 GDP per capita $118 $596 Life expectancy 46,2 years 60,72 years Literacy 31.5% 38.4% Girls in primary school 0% 39% Electricity 1% 43% Clean water 32% 55.3% Healthcare facilities 496 2400 Internet users 0% 8.3% Mobile phone users 0% 61.6% Population 20,100,000 34,700,000 Population in Kabul 500,000 5,000,000 Table 7: Humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2017 (NATO, n.d)

While these numbers seem promising, the problems in Afghanistan cannot be classified as solved just yet. Terrorist attacks are still a serious threat to the Afghan citizens and the foreign troops. Over 1.1 million Afghans were internally displaced due to conflict between 2016 and 2017. The Taliban has not been completely defeated yet and was able to launch several attacks, even managing to conquer some cities during the course of the RS mission. Furthermore, Afghanistan is not only threatened by fundamental Islamists from the Taliban, but also by other terrorist movement, Islamic State (IS) being an infamous example. During the first half of 2018, 1,692 civilian casualties were recorded. According to the World Bank, this is more than at any comparable time over the last decade. The Taliban were responsible for 40% of these casualties and IS for 52% (more on this in the next chapter). While the mission aims to make a stable and secure Afghanistan, the nation still faces numerous political challenges (World Bank, 2018). The Presidential elections in April 2019 might be an indicator on the progress up until then. The next chapter will analyse the RS mission on a yearly basis and includes more details about events that caught international attention.

4.3 Conclusion Afghanistan has a long history of conflict. As a nation located along the Silk Road and between various spheres of influence of nations that tended to see Afghan land as a strategic buffer or battleground, the territory has been the scene of violence for ages. Laying the different maps upon each other, illustrates the complicated reality of historical international interest trough trade routes, a divided population separated in communities and the rather artificially drawn borders of foreign military interventions. Recent history shows how the Resolute Support mission fits into the broader picture of Afghanistan and the international political climate.

Map 5: Combined map of Afghanistan

One could describe the Resolute Support mission as a very watered-down version of the ISAF mission. However, we should not forget that in 2018 the international community has decided to once again increase its number of troops in Afghanistan. The United States has played a most prominent role in the Afghan conflict in recent history and it is impossible to describe the steps taken from 2001 on without mentioning it. However, we should not forget that the United Kingdom has also historical ties with Afghanistan; just, to some extent, as the Netherlands, where recently the conflict has had damaging effects on ruling political elites.

While the media have not been described in a historical context, as their role will be analysed in the next chapter, media have played a role in introducing the conflict to a broader public. Before 1997, the Taliban and Al Qaeda were fairly unfamiliar for the average person. Only after members of an important international committee and several foreign journalists were arrested, Western media started to pick up on the Afghan situation. This would be an important catalyst for the negative international public opinion of the Taliban regimen (Wagemaker, 2012, p. 122).

Chapter 5. Content analysis

In this chapter the contents of the selected sources are analysed. The analysis consists of the four main variables, describing their developments from 2013 until 2018. This chapter starts with a general description of what took place in Afghanistan in these years and whether or not there were any relevant developments for the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. This chapter will answer two of the three empirical sub-questions. The first question, ‘How did the context of the conflict, the media coverage and the policy-making develop?’, is described through the analysed years based on the coded documents. This chapter refers to these documents only by their ID number; a complete list of the documents and their corresponding ID numbers is included in Appendix A2. Every variable has its own paragraph. Multiple actors (N) can have voices in one document, which means that in every year the N is higher than the number of documents. As there are 23 different actor types, it will sometimes be necessary to group the actors. For example, the group ‘Dutch Government’ comprises Dutch cabinet members and Dutch governmental representatives. The contents of the groups can differ through the years, depending on their relevance, and are described in more detail in the codebook’s analysis data (Appendix B5). Nevertheless, a brief summary of the data through the years is provided beneath.

Analysis overview Year Documents N

2013 21 37 2014 45 99 2015 41 134 2016 30 74 2017 33 99 2018 35 115 Total 205 558 Table 8: Analysis overview

The presence of the main variables is determined by their average scores. Note that the highest score a main variable can have is 1, and the lowest is -1. The total average is determined by calculating the total average in Excel, divided by 2. The resulting number will be defined as the variable being negatively present (-1 to -0.01), neutral (0) or positively present (0.01 to 1). Within the positive or negative presence classification, the variable can be dominantly, highly, moderately or slightly present. The exact calculations for this classification are presented in Appendix B6. Besides measuring the main variables, some additional information was coded as well. These additional variables can provide more in-depth information on media influence. They can measure the addressing of media influence by the political elites and the provided solutions of the actors altogether. The conclusion of the content analyses will answer the second empirical sub- question, ‘Did the media influence policy in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands?’ Based on the patterns found in the analyses, it can be estimated whether or not media influence could have taken place. Additionally, based on the theoretical knowledge and the empirical findings, an explanation for the findings on media influence is given. The comparative analyses in the following chapter will compare the content of the analysed documents from both nations and determine if there are some similarities in coverage.

5.1 Resolute Support Before analysing the four main variables, it is important to be aware of the events in the arenas in which these variables are measured. The variables are all measured within the context of the conflict context, which will therefore be described by year in this paragraph.

2013 In 2013, the ISAF mission was still in place. The Bilateral Security Agreement was needed to create the legal framework of the Resolute Support mission. The USA demanded this agreement to be signed before the end of 2013, otherwise threatened to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. However, Afghan president Karzai refused to sign this treaty, arguing that it was necessary to wait until the Afghan elections in 2014 (i.e. ID11). It was not clear if there would be a follow-up mission, even though NATO kept pressuring the allies to keep on preparing while at the same time urging Karzai to sign the treaty (ID11). The UK committed to the new NATO non-combat mission in 2013, but participating was not yet discussed by the Dutch Cabinet. One document (ID17) stated that there was no operation plan, as several ‘important allies’ had yet to decide on their participation; indicating the participation of other allies as a decision-making factor. The Dutch media did refer more to the future of Afghanistan compared to their UK counterparts. Multiple media sources indicated Afghan citizens concerned about the withdrawal of combat troops in 2014 (ID6).

2014 NATO combat operations were to end by the end of 2014, as Resolute Support would take over in 2015 (ID26). However, the Taliban took the decrease of troops and targeting operations as a chance to retaliate and the Afghan troops took hard blows (ID48). Moreover, the rural areas were far from stabilised as rebel groups increased their influence (ID55). On September 1, the Netherlands decided to take part in the Resolute Support mission (ID61) in coordination with Germany (ID55), even though the Bilateral Security Agreement had not been signed at the time (ID35). Minister Hammond (UK) did warn that, if the Status of Force Agreement was not signed, every British soldier would be returning before December 31, 2014 (ID51). Even though in the end the treaty was signed, it did result in a faster retreat of British ISAF troops than initially planned. The British newspapers doubted that the retreat of combat troops would contribute to an independent Afghan national security force (ID29). The Dutch papers seem to share some of their colleagues’ critiques, but focused more on president Karzai and the USA (ID30). The eventual signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement in September 2014 gave rise to some confidence in the process. The Afghan government however, was not able to form a cabinet (ID29). This resulted in political decisions to be put on hold, as widespread rumours of fraud during the elections delayed the overall process (ID65).

2015 As the security agreements were signed, the Resolute Support mission was formally set in place on January 1, 2015. The United Kingdom initially contributed 470 troops and the Netherlands 83, though these numbers changed regularly (NATO, 2015b). While the premise was a non-combat mission, 2015 was not without victims. Among the British troops two men died in a helicopter crash (ID76). Taliban forces intensified their attacks after NATO’s fighting troops left at the end of 2014, taking significant territories in outlying areas of provinces. According to the UN, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than at any point since 2001 (ID77). Their attacks became even worse after the announcement of the death of the Taliban leader Mullah Omar (ID74). Moreover, IS managed to seize territory in areas where the Taliban and government forces were fighting over control. The USA reacted by stepping up the airstrikes. Unfortunately, the rising number of

civilian casualties (according to the UN higher than at any point during the war in Afghanistan (ID73)) took an even harder blow after the USA accidentally attacked a Doctors Without Borders hospital, resulting in the death of 42 and 37 wounded citizens and doctors (ID105). Another setback were the casualties among the ANSF, which were far higher than when they still fought with NATO support. As it became clear that the goal of the Resolute Support mission would not be met before 2016, president Obama announced he would not withdraw his troops just yet (ID77). Soon after the announcement of the US President, the British and Dutch governments decided to extend their stay in Afghanistan as well (ID92 and ID98). Policy-makers from both nations, experts and the Afghan president all agreed that, while the goal was to eventually have an independent Afghanistan, a gradual decrease of the number of troops would be preferable over an abrupt pull- out (ID92 and ID102).

2016 During 2015 and into 2016 it became clear that the mission’s goals could not be reached in the pace initially intended. This is why NATO decided not to end the mission just yet, but to extend the first phase of Resolute Support to 2017 (ID122). The UK reduced its troops to 352 at the beginning of 2016, to increase the number again to 450 in June. The Netherlands increased its troops to 100 in June as well (NATO, 2016). The USA reversed its plan to decrease troops and promised support until at least 2020, confident that the succeeding administration would not change this engagement (ID132). The UN released a report wherein the Ghani government and aligned troops were responsible for 47% of the casualties (ID111). Moreover, the 2015 hospital incident was not investigated independently, as requested by the UN. The UN also reported a US drone strike, killing 15 civilians, while the USA insisted only IS fighters were killed. This allegedly strained the relationship between the UN and the USA (ID112). The popularity of the Afghan government decreased through the reduced security situation and governmental incompetence. The reforms of the electoral system were turned down and the 2016 parliamentary elections were delayed (initially to July 2018). Other blows for the peace process were the refusal of the Taliban to take part in negotiations and the increase of insurgents. The Taliban seemed to increase its power and IS was active in the Eastern provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Logar, though these two groups fought each other ferociously as well (ID122). Overall, the conflict context seemed to get increasingly more dangerous and the Taliban seized the opportunity to grow, whereas the international community seemed to shift its attention to Iraq and ISIS.

2017 The conflict context did not seem to improve, as reports stated that the rate in which Afghan police officers and soldiers were killed worsened throughout this year. Levels of violence in Afghanistan were rising, the Afghan government only controlled about half of the national territory and UN agencies were struggling to raise enough money (ID153). Another setback was the deadlock between the Taliban and the Afghan forces in Sangin (ID136). In the international arena, a shift in dynamics was felt as the new US president seemed to take a different approach to Afghanistan (ID137). The ‘time-based withdrawal’ plan of president Obama was changed to a ‘condition-based’ commitment (ID140). The British government addressed a contradiction in the US policy, as it seemed to want to spend less, but also wanted to score decisive victories. Only after a long delay would this issue be addressed by the new president, as “We are not nation-building again, we’re killing terrorists” (ID153). Moreover, Russia was accused of funding Taliban military operations against NATO through a covert programme of laundered US fuel sales. The Times addressed this move as “a revived proxy war strategy, which stretches across battlefields from the Ukraine to

Syria” (ID139). Meanwhile, Pakistan had been accused of a deliberate campaign to force the 600,000 Afghan refugees out of the country. It seemed that as the USA and NATO wanted to decrease their presence, neighbouring countries like Iran, Russia, Pakistan and India aimed to increase their influence (ID153).

2018 The final year of this analysis continued to be turbulent. The Afghan parliamentary elections, which were postponed in 2016, were finally held in October of 2018 (ID176). The elections themselves went, according to the Dutch government, relatively well, though the campaign pre- election period was characterized by bloodshed (ID197). Election-related attacks by the Taliban on candidates and citizens taking part in election rallies caused many casualties (ID174). Eventually, at the end of 2018, it would be announced that the Presidential elections of April 2019 were postponed to July that same year as to fix the problems that surfaced during the parliamentary elections (ID184). NATO troops increased in numbers again, as the conflict context became even more challenging. Since 2015, the number of districts under insurgents’ control had doubled; civilian casualties were still on the rise (with an average of 28 civilian casualties per day) and the number of US airstrikes grew rapidly (ID192, ID180). The UK and the Netherlands increased their troops. Both seemed to be pressured to do so by the USA, as European allies feared the US president would cancel NATO exercises (for example in Eastern Europe) in frustration about their modest defence spending (ID170 and ID179). The goal of the Resolute Support mission seemed ever more difficult to reach, as the number of deadly victims grew faster than the security troops themselves did (ID185). Especially the USA seemed to get frustrated with the lack of progress (ID176). To make matters worse, at the end of 2018 the US president announced to withdraw half of the troops. This decision shook European and Afghan officials alike. Dutch officials openly disapproved and were unsure about the consequences of this move for their own policy (ID187). Leaving too early (again), would worsen the situation even more, according to several government and military sources (i.e. ID185 and ID187).

And with that, a summary of the events during the analysed years is concluded. The next paragraphs will make an in-depth analysis for every main variable related to media influence. The events as described in this paragraph are the context in which these variables are present and need to be taken into account reading the coming paragraphs.

Outline Elite dissensus

5.2 Variable 1: Elite dissensus Elite dissensus is the first main variable which theoretically needs to be UK NL present for the media to influence policy. During the analysis it became 2013 N/A -0.05 clear that the UK did hardly ever report on the position of its political 2014 0.00 -0,20 elites towards the Afghan case. Especially in 2013, the UK did provide 0.00 0.00 little information to make a generalisation and is therefore excluded 2015 from the 2013 analysis. In the Netherlands the government documents 2016 0.00 -0,10 paid more attention to the policy process and the position of the political 2017 0.00 -0,05 elites in comparison to the UK; the latter focussing more on the conflict 2018 0.08 -0,08 context. The data below is all based on Dutch sources and can therefore (the operationalisation of this data is in Appendix B) only speak for the presence of this variable in the Dutch policy-making process, with the exception of 2018. Overall, it has to be concluded that the presence of this variable has a negative effect on media influence in the Dutch policy-making process.

2013 2013 In 2013 elite dissensus was hardly measured, as the media did hardly Dissensus high report on domestic elite dissensus or consensus. On an international 3% level there certainly was mention of elite dissensus between the United Dissensus moderate States and Afghanistan concerning the Bilateral Security Agreement. Consensus However, international elite dissensus is not measured in this research, moderate Consensus high even though it did seem to influence the variables of policy uncertainty 97% and negative coverage. This variable was on a domestic level only No mention of measured in the Netherlands and it was slightly negatively present (i.e. position elites slight elite consensus).

2014 2014 Like in 2013, actors from the UK did hardly mention the position of the Dissensus high 3% political elites. The Dutch media sources, the Dutch government and the 5% Dutch representatives did, all indicating elite consensus. Even though Dissensus moderate 12% there was some moderate dissensus between the members of the Consensus cabinet and the opposition parties, on average the Dutch political elite moderate seemed to agree. One of the reasons for this is that the representative Consensus high actors interviewed by the media were often (supporting) coalition No mention of 80% parties. To summarise, in the UK this variable was not present, while in position elites the Netherlands it was moderately negatively present.

2015 2015

There was no elite dissensus or consensus measured in 2015. The Dissensus high political elite from both nations seemed to be united, as it became clear that the retreat of NATO troops correlated with the rise of the Taliban. Dissensus moderate Regions previously liberated by Dutch and British troops now fell under Consensus the rule of the Taliban once again, though often only for a short while. moderate 100% After a rise in the number of civilian deaths and the US error of attacking Consensus high a hospital, the political elite did not seem to feel the need to argue about No mention of extending the presence of their troops (ID98). position elites

2016 2016 Only elite consensus has been measured. As is tradition by now, there is no information of the political elites in the UK. The data showing Dissensus high moderate consensus was only deduced from the Netherlands. The 12% Dissensus variable elite dissensus is therefore classified as negatively moderately moderate present in the Netherlands and absent in the United Kingdom. The Dutch Consensus moderate political elite seemed not to disagree about any aspects of the Resolute Consensus high Support mission and the House of Representatives has not made itself heard in any way that would hint at dissensus or consensus for that No mention of 88% matter. Their decision to keep supporting the mission was partly based position elites on the notion of being a reliable ally, cooperating with Germany, and partly on the idea that a stable Afghanistan would decrease terrorism and illegal migration (ID121).

2017 2017 Once again, the variable of elite dissensus was only measured in the Dissensus high Netherlands. This variable is classified as ‘moderate consensus’. Even 4% though the Dutch Cabinet was in a transitional period, overall there was 2% Dissensus 4% 5% consensus among the political elites. The Netherlands found it difficult moderate to commit itself to an increase with an interim cabinet, somewhat Consensus increasing the policy uncertainty and elite dissensus (ID142). By the end moderate Consensus high of the year, no increase of troops would be implemented, but only an extension of the mission. This decision was not a surprise, as a clear No mention of 85% majority of the House of Representatives supported this extension and position elites increased the consensus among the policy-makers (ID146).

2018 2018 Dissensus and consensus have been found equally in 2018. For the first Dissensus high 9% time this variable has been found in the United Kingdom. It seems that 9% it is not common, or at least not in this case, to go in-depth into the views Dissensus moderate of the political elites in the UK. That dissensus was found because Consensus several House of Commons members did not agree with the extension moderate of the mission as presented. They used the media to voice this message. Consensus high In the UK slight elite dissensus has been measured. In the Netherlands, No mention of 82% on the other hand, slight elite consensus became apparent. This was position elites mainly because the Dutch Government kept mentioning elite consensus.

Yet, the media sources did pick up on some elite dissensus. Overall, the presence of this variable in the two nations mirrored each other, although in the Netherlands it was slightly negatively present and the UK it was slightly positively present.

Conclusion The first necessary variable for media influence was only present in the UK in 2018 and in the Netherlands always negatively present except for 2015, where it was not present at all. Elite dissensus is a key variable for media to influence the policy process. This would mean that theoretically speaking the opportunity to influence policy is already relatively low in both nations.

Outline Policy uncertainty

5.3 Variable 2: Policy uncertainty

The second main variable needed for media to influence policy is policy UK NL uncertainty. Overall, this variable is almost always slightly to 2013 N/A 0.27 moderately present in the Netherlands. However, when present in the 2014 0.35 0.09 UK, it is slightly to highly present. This increases the chances of the 0.05 0.09 media to influence the domestic policy-making process. Analysing this 2015 variable, it became clear that the international arena has a significant 2016 -0.09 0.11 influence on the domestic policy process as well. Policy uncertainty was 2017 -0.03 0.26 almost always linked to the position of the United States. This 2018 0.42 -0,01 international uncertainty increased the domestic policy uncertainty. (the operationalisation of this data is in Appendix B)

2013 2013 The international dissensus between the US and Karzai about the security agreements seemed to have affected the policy certainty of the Symbolic policy mission, as participating countries were unsure about their contribution Experimental 33% after 2014 (i.e. ID12). It was not clear if there would be a follow-up policy 35% mission, even though NATO kept pressuring the allies to continue Policy certainty preparations while at the same time urging Karzai to sign the treaty (ID11). This uncertainty on an international level is assumed to Policy effect certainty 16% 16% correlate with the policy uncertainty on a domestic level. However, the Neutral or no gravity uncertainty differs among the actor groups. The UK government, mention of policy experts and the Afghan government mentioned high uncertainty levels, whereas this level was significantly lower regarded by the Dutch media sources and the Dutch public servants. 2014 2014

The USA gave a contradictory message in 2014. President Obama Symbolic policy wanted all US troops out by the end of 2016, yet tried to motivate allies 36% 13% to send more troops (ID30), as the mission did not have an official end Experimental date (ID32). In the UK the policy uncertainty is higher than in the policy Policy certainty Netherlands. The difference here might be explained by the focus on the 30% unsure retreat of British troops if the security agreements were not met. Policy effect Only twice did British sources mention policy certainty. The Dutch certainty media sources are showing an odd pattern here. Where the political Neutral or no 21% elites do acknowledge policy uncertainty, the Dutch media reports on mention of policy policy certainty.

2015 2015 For a while it was not certain if the approach chosen would provide the Symbolic policy required results. With the USA promising to leave Afghanistan in 2016, 8% the future design of the mission was not clear. Policy-makers from the Experimental 9% policy UK and the Netherlands all seemed to agree that leaving Afghanistan 5% would not be an option, but the extension of the mission depended on Policy certainty 3% the US presence. This created some moderate policy uncertainty in both Policy effect nations. This uncertainty was taken away after the USA decided to certainty 75% extend its stay in Afghanistan, for some even creating certainty about Neutral or no the effects of the policy. In 2015 this variable was moderately present in mention of policy both nations.

2016 2016 In the United Kingdom there was moderate policy certainty, while in the Netherlands there was moderate policy uncertainty. The overall Symbolic policy 12% presence of this variable in both nations was oddly similar, were it not Experimental 4% that one has its presence in a negative, the other in a positive manner. policy Yet, the UK did change the number of troops by first decreasing the total Policy certainty number from 470 to 352, later increasing it again to 450. No attention 19% was paid to this decrease and increase by the media or the government Policy effect documents. Another oddity is the fact that the Dutch media reported certainty 64% about policy certainty, while the Dutch government did not. This pattern Neutral or no 1% mention of policy cannot be directly explained.

2017 2017 The UK government made notice of media reporting European nations not to be too keen to commit as long as the USA had not indicated its Symbolic policy own numbers (ID153). This was indeed the case for the Netherlands (ID142). While some British media claimed uncertainty, mostly due the Experimental policy 18% ambiguity of the necessary number of troops, the government did not Policy certainty seem to really doubt its decision to increase the support. In the 10% Netherlands, both the media and the government noticed policy Policy effect 16% certainty uncertainty. The cause for this uncertainty was mostly because of the 56% fact that the Cabinet was not too keen on taking a position in a Neutral or no mention of policy transitional period and that it thought not to have the financial means to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan. Interestingly, this uncertainty was not reflected in the vote on the extension of the mission in the House of Representatives. One paper even reported on policy certainty before the actual voting (ID146).

2018 2018 Policy uncertainty is overall moderately present, but again differs Symbolic policy greatly if looked at either nation specifically. With over a quarter of the 27% total found actors addressing symbolic policy, it is to no one’s surprise Experimental that this variable is at least moderately present. Nevertheless, this policy graphic is quite deceptive. In the Netherlands, symbolic policy is not Policy certainty mentioned more often than policy effect certainty; leaving the total 51% Policy effect 7% score for this variable in the Netherlands to be defined as ‘slight certainty certainty’. This also means that the score for this variable in the UK is a 11% Neutral or no lot higher than can be seen in this graph; indeed, the policy uncertainty mention of policy 4% in the UK is estimated as highly uncertain, having the highest counting uncertainty score taken into account in this analysis.

Conclusion This variable was present in every year. Interestingly, when negatively present in one nation, it was positively present the other and vice versa. This ‘pattern’ cannot be clearly explained, as the policy makers did relate the policy uncertainty to the international arena.

Outline Negative coverage

5.4 Variable 3: Negative coverage UK NL The third variable looked into how the actors viewed the conflict context 2013 N/A 0.27 and how this was reported. This variable is strongly present in both 2014 0.21 0.06 nations. However, he UK is clearly the most negative of the two nations, 2015 0.43 0.24 ranging from moderately to highly negative. The Netherlands range 2016 0.48 0.16 from slightly present to moderately present. While most actors are 0.36 0.06 negative about the conflict context, UK and Dutch media sources, 2017 2018 0.48 0.05 experts, UK citizens and Afghan citizens are the most negative. In addition, most of the time the UK government is negative as well. (the operationalisation of this data is in Appendix B)

2013 2013 The variable negative coverage has been found in both nations, although Active negative no generalisation can be made for the UK in this year. A moderate negative description was used the most by the actors, meaning that in Negative context 19% most cases the mission or policy itself was not directly negatively 35% Positive context addressed. Interestingly, at the end of 2013, a trend became visible. The (highly) positive and neutral reporting increased. As from the end of Active positive 5% November, no negative coverage has been found. 35% Neutral or no coverage 5% 2014

Most actors were unsure of what to expect of RS just yet and spoke about the negative conflict context of Afghanistan. British newspapers were 2014 critical at the early retreat of the soldiers and the accomplishments of Operation Herrick (ID22, 24 and 25). This was summed up quite well in Active negative 8% the headlines: ‘Flawed victory won with great courage and loss of 432 Negative context lives; Britain has paid dearly for limited success’ (ID24) or ‘Britain ends 19% its Afghan war; After 13 bloody years and the loss of 435 lives, the flag Positive context finally comes down; Country may never be safe’ (ID25). The Times in Active positive particular gives the impression that Afghanistan is not ready to carry the 5% responsibilities itself, although the international community wants a Neutral or no 2% way out. With this, a frame of the fruitlessness of years of war without coverage 62% securing a future is presented (ID27). The UK governmental sources covered the conflict negative as well, while the Dutch governmental sources tended to be more positive, mirroring their national papers. 2015 2015 In 2015, the context has been addressed as negative by 61% of the Active negative 23% actors. 24% even argued the mission to have no effect or believing the Negative context RS mission to have a negative influence. The negative coverage in the UK 24% was calculated as highly negative, and in the Netherlands as moderately Positive context negative. The UK media linked the downscaling of troops to the rise of 2% the Taliban and reported much about the conflict context itself instead Active positive 14% 37% of the processes surrounding it (i.e. ID77); “The losers, once again, are Neutral or no the Afghan people, trapped between frantic incompetence and fanatical coverage intolerance.” Not surprisingly, the death of two British soldiers gave cause to critical articles as well. The Dutch newspapers were sceptical too, arguing that the bright future of Afghanistan as promised by the international community was clearly not the reality (ID86).

2016 2016 The coverage of the conflict was largely negative. Especially in the UK, where this variable was once again highly present. The UK media Active negative 39% specifically addressed this variable even as dominantly present. This negative coverage was largely addressed to the USA. According to the Negative context 18% Guardian, the USA wanted to control the public information about the Positive context Afghan war. This would result in strained relations with Western 28% organisations offering different versions of events (ID112). This could Active positive be seen as an example of the political agenda influencing media, as 1% described by the traditional media theories. While not measuring the Neutral or no relationship between the USA and the media, the British media sources coverage 14% were remarkably critical towards the US role in Afghanistan. The Dutch sources were more moderate in their view of the mission. Nevertheless, the Dutch political elites were moderately negative, whereas the UK government was moderately positive.

2017 2017 Few were positive about the direction Afghanistan was heading. The Active negative Times even reported; “Put another way, more Afghan soldiers and 12% policemen are currently being killed every 6 months than the 3,407 Negative context coalition troops lost in the entire 16 years they have been deployed in 31% Afghanistan” (ID140). Most critical were the UK media sources, the Positive context 40% Dutch representatives, experts, intergovernmental organisations and the Afghans themselves. The UK media are even considered to be highly Active positive negative this year, presenting a perspective of hopelessness in finding Neutral or no an acceptable solution for the dire circumstances. The only one that did coverage 3% 14% seem moderately positive was the Dutch government.

2018 2018 Both nations had problems fulfilling NATO’s requested increase, as budget cuts had affected their military capacities and morale. The Dutch Active negative commission of Defence asked the MoD for a response on article ID194, Negative context which reviewed the low morale of the Dutch military. Although no 23% related shifts in policy (ID195), they did mention that increased media Positive context attention for Dutch troops in Afghanistan could change the perceived 42% threat in the Netherlands (ID201). In the UK, a letter was signed by Active positive 22% several HoC members, activists and citizens, demanding a change of Neutral or no policy; “Like all the other recent western military adventures, the war coverage 13% on Afghanistan has been a costly disaster, deepening the country's crisis and helping to spread violence across the region and beyond. We demand that the UK government withdraws its military and instead concentrates on helping to bring stability and peace to Afghanistan.”

(ID180). Almost half of all UK actors were actively negative.

Conclusion This variable was more present in the UK compared to the Netherlands, but nevertheless exclusively positively present in both nations during the course of this analysis, increasing the influence opportunities.

Outline Proving solution

5.5 Variable 4: Providing solution The provided solution is the final step in influencing the policy-making UK NL process. Only media actors were taken into account in this variable, as 2013 N/A 0.00 they need to provide the alternative course of action to be the influencer. 2014 0.00 0.02 During the analysis it became clear that this variable is hardly ever 2015 0.00 0.01 present. Therefore, the diagrams are not referring to the amount of 2016 0.02 0.00 provided solutions, as they would not provide much information. The -0.13 -0.03 circles are the indicated courses of action offered by all the actors. These 2017 are not always direct ‘solutions’, but rather their view on which direction 2018 0.00 0.00 the RS mission should take. A more detailed description is provided in B.5 (the operationalisation of this data is in Appendix B

2013 2013 Not once did a media source provide a solution for the case and only five actors made any mention of a preferred solution: a Dutch cabinet Pro mission member, believing that a decrease of troops would increase Afghans’ 11% Against independence; and both a NATO and UK official, advocating full support. mission 3% The other two were a US soldier and a Dutch military member advocating No solution to keep a mission in place. presented

2014 86% This variable was not present in the UK and only once in the Netherlands. On June 24, a Dutch journalist and a Dutch opposition member came up with the same approach on the same day in the same paper (ID42 and ID43). It cannot be determined if the statements are related to each other, 2014 and if so, who would have influenced whom. Nor did they seem to change the policy decision. Most actors preferred NATO’s solution (keeping Pro mission support) or conditional support (in most cases the condition was the signing of the BSA). The US changed its approach over the year, stating Against mission ‘not leave Afghanistan to fight on its own’ while declaring to get all troops 23% No solution back in 2014; advocating for ‘full support’, ‘conditional support’, presented ’temporal support’, ’ending support’ and ‘keeping support’. 4% 73% 2015 One UK and one Dutch paper approached the conflict with a new perspective. The Guardian focused on unexploded bombs after the retreat of the NATO troops and offered a new solution to this problem. 2015 The NRC highlighted the mental problems as one of the causes of violence in Afghanistan (ID84, ID85). Afghan officials believed Western Pro mission governments to become more aware through these kind of critical media reports (ID71). Their solutions did not support the set agenda of the Against political elites, yet there are no signs that the solutions were picked up by mission No solution 36% the political elites either. Overall, more actors called for an alternative. presented While this call was shared by many, it was not answered by any change in policy. The alternative solutions or approaches mentioned by the other 55% 9% actors did not share the sentiment of the Guardian or the NRC. The mentioning of Afghan officials about the influence of media on Western policies (ID71) is not supported by the data either.

2016 2016 Pro mission The Dutch paper NRC used the same frame as the Guardian in 2015 (ID114). It came the closest to a policy alternative, but it did not provide Against a solution (ID114). The political elites did not take this article into mission account either. Compared to 2015, the percentage of solutions offered No solution 35% presented in favour of the current mission have decreased. The dynamics within 46% solutions have changed as well. Before, most pro arguments were to keep support, whereas the ‘contra’ team was mostly advocating for a 19% different solution. Even though both of these positions are still large, ‘keeping support’ has been surpassed by the call to increase support. Although all actors advocating for the participating nations to increase the number of troops, were nations not contributing to the Resolute Support mission. The actors calling to scale down the mission, increased as well and were all voiced by Dutch Cabinet members. Perhaps partly explaining the policy uncertainty measured in the Netherlands. 2017 2017 This variable is present in both nations, though only once in each. Pro mission Interestingly, the UK media advocated to extend the mission, believing Against that a boost in numbers could increase the effect of the mission. mission No solution Although not addressing a political elite, it did report accordingly to the 35% decision of the UK government and the provided solution by the USA and presented NATO. This story is similar to the Dutch article, which supported the decision to stay in Afghanistan, debating its critics. In 2017, just one 1% actor believed in an alternative solution; all others believed in extending 64% or increasing their support. Arguably, more British sources advocated for the increase of troops compared to just extending the mission. Several media sources noted that there was no clear solution and even that no one was talking about winning anymore. In addition, the UK government addressed the media twice in its documents, although no link can be found to any changes in the policy.

2018 2018 No solutions were offered by either nation’s media sources. Yet a strong increase in opposing views were measured. While a majority of the Pro mission presented solutions is still in favour of the NATO mission, it is only by a Against margin of 4%. This is because the most provided solution was ‘ending mission support’. Interestingly, the solution ‘increasing support’ has only been No solution 32% mentioned one time less than the call to end the support. These presented conflicting solutions might seem odd, but can be explained by the 40% difference in nations. All the calls to end the support are from the UK, 28% while the ones calling for an increase are mostly from the Netherlands.

Conclusion If the media does not provide a solution or different direction of policy, theoretically speaking, the media cannot change policy. As it became clear that media rarely offered a solution or a policy direction, the chances to influence the policy process have decreased dramatically.

5.4 Media influence Every year has been thoroughly reviewed; combined this leads to answers on the first two empirical sub-questions. All data presented here are based on the previous analysis or can be found in Appendix A3 and A4. The calculations itself are explained in the codebook B6. The third and final empirical sub-question will be reviewed in the comparative analysis in the next chapter.

5.4.1 Empirical sub-question 1 The first empirical sub-question is, ‘How did the context of the conflict, the media coverage and the policy-making develop?’ This empirical sub-question cannot be answered in a simple way, but has rather been described in the previous paragraphs. Therefore, the developments during the last six years will only be summarised here briefly. The conflict context itself seems to have ups and downs. Afghanistan has a reformed electoral system and children going to school have quadrupled, compared to 2001. During the Resolute Support mission, child mortality has been brought back by sixty percent. Presently more than half of the Afghan citizens have access to clean water and there are 2,400 functioning healthcare centres (ID201 and Table 7). However, the conflict itself has not been resolved and the security situation is still a main reason for concern. Since the start of the Resolute Support mission, or perhaps since the end of ISAF and the presence of combat troops, the Taliban has retaliated and grown. This growth has slowed down in the second half of 2017 (ID201), as the NATO allies increased their troop numbers. However, at the end of 2018, US president Trump announced to decrease the number of troops again. This makes these developments all but secure, as is the future of Afghanistan. The Resolute Support mission has been described at first as a ‘follow-up’, non-combat mission to finally give the Afghan government back its responsibilities. The media did initially not take too much interest in the mission. However, when the conflict context worsened, their interest seemed to increase. The Resolute Support mission would go from being described as ‘a small mission’ or even ‘not sexy’ mission, to an interesting (political) struggle in itself. This is partly because of the decreased security situation in Afghanistan, as the Taliban came back with the retreat of the international combat troops; later on to be challenged by IS and other insurgents. The mission is also interesting because of the Afghan politics causing NATO allies some headaches in their careful planning and legal necessities. And of course, it became more and more newsworthy as the USA, who plays its own unique and large role in this conflict, seemed to change its approach. The international context of the conflict is as relevant. While this analysis is only based on the period from 2013 to 2018, it is all but certain that this case is far from over. Looking specifically at the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, a few differences in policy can be found. The most obvious is the number of troops send, although that is not surprising when looking at the differences in population (the numbers provided are approximately 0.001% of the total population in both nations). With the exception of the decrease in troops from the UK in 2015, a similar trend can be spotted where both nations gradually increase their total number of troops (as can be seen in the table on the next page). Throughout the years the United Kingdom increased its troops from 470 to 650. The UK Government also declared to deploy an additional 440 troops in 2019, bringing their total number at 1,100 (ID192). The Netherlands doubled its troops from 80 in 2015 to 160 by the end of 2018. The Netherlands did not mention an increase in troops, but rather that it would ‘intensify’ their support. It also committed its support until December 31, 2021 (ID201).

Resolute Support troops 700 18000

16000 600 14000 500 12000

400 10000

300 8000 Total troops

National troops 6000 200 4000 100 2000

0 0 2015 2016 2017 2018 Years

UK NL Total troops

Figure 6: National troops contributing to the Resolute Support mission

The final policy decisions made regarding the Resolute Support mission are partly summed up in the graph above. However, this graph does not show the actual finances or the nuanced approaches per individual nation. After analysing the media’s approach through the years, these parts of the decision-making process or detailed descriptions do not seem too relevant. To keep a comprehensible summary of the decisions made, only the practical deployments and commitments are shown. More details of the policy-making process by nations can be found in the yearly descriptions of this analysis. Of course, this graph does not include the first stages of the policy-making process either, as the Resolute Support mission was not yet in place. The decisions made in these two years by the UK and the Netherlands were similar, albeit not in the same pace. The UK committed to the Resolute Support mission in 2013, whereas the Netherlands waited until 2014. The Netherlands seemingly wanted to wait for more allies to contribute. This period was one of uncertainty, as the security agreements were not yet signed and this threatened to cancel the new mission altogether. When these agreements were finally signed, the Resolute Support mission could be set in place, although with some delays in the scheduling. The media are the final component of this question. However, this component is already described in the previous paragraphs and their developments will be more thoroughly described in the coming sub-questions. To avoid repetition in this summary, the developments of the media will not be thoroughly described here. It suffices to say that at the beginning of the process the media on average did not seem to find the mission very interesting. ISAF was still in place and their focus would be more on this mission than on the future Resolute Support mission. It was only later, with the increase of troops and the setbacks during the mission, that Resolute Support gained more attention by the media. Especially in the United Kingdom the media became relatively negative about the mission, whereas in the Netherlands this negativity was not as present. The differences between the media sources per nation will be described in more detail in the next chapter. But first the second sub-question will be answered in the next paragraph.

5.4.2 Empirical sub-question 2 The second sub-question looks into the relationship between the policy-making process and media coverage. This was done by analysing the variables which theoretically need to be present for media to influence the policy-making process. According to the theoretical framework, four variables should be present to create a window of opportunity for the media to influence the policy. These variables are elite dissensus, policy uncertainty, negative coverage and providing a solution. In reality, these variables are not always visibly present or at least not all perceived as being present. This analysis is based on statements of actors, and their descriptions of reality are based on their perceptions of the events in this case. For example, elite dissensus is a variable not all actors would make mention of. Which actors are given a chance to express their view on the case, is determined by the media and the government in this research. The dynamic between the media and the government has been analysed here. One important adjustment has been made, however. The theoretical approach only mentions the presence of these variables, but in reality, these obviously also have a ‘negative’ counterpart. These negative counterparts arguably decrease the chances for media influence. For example, elite dissensus’ negative counterpart is elite consensus. Theoretically, all variables need to be positively present. Yet, in reality, one can argue that a variable ‘not being measured’ is not the same as ‘not being present’. This is why this analysis used the negative counterparts of the variables as well. If the variable is negatively present, it would make sense – theoretically speaking – that no media influence can take place. However, in the years where a variable is not present or not measured, this does not automatically lead to the conclusion that it is not be possible for the media to influence policy. While theoretically all variables need to be present, it is here assumed that the absence of one will decrease the chances to influence, not to entirely annul the possibility. This is done because it is possible that the variable is present, but simply not measured in the documents. For example, UK media hardly ever elaborated upon the standpoints of the political elites. In the theories it is assumed that if there is no elite dissensus, there is consensus. This might seem to be a matter of semantics, but in the analysis the nuances in semantics become apparent. Thus, the analysis does not assume that when there is no mention of elite dissensus, there automatically is consensus – which would indicate no possibility for the media to influence. It is rather assumed that when there is no mention of elite dissensus, this variable is not present in a positive nor in a negative way; not annulling but rather decreasing the changes of media influence.

The second empirical sub-question is, ‘Did the media influence policy in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands?’ The answer to this question is a clear ‘no’. No decisive evidence of media influence in the policy-making process in the UK or the Netherlands has been found. Or, to put it in a different way, no solution or approach presented by the media has changed the policy decisions. This does not mean, however, that there is no connection between the media and the government. The reason why media did not influence the process can be answered as well. This will be done separately for the UK and the Netherlands. By combining what is known about the policy decisions and the theoretical knowledge of media influences, it can be explained why no media influence has taken place in the Resolute Support case. It also shows more clearly the process and the presence of the variables in either nation. This gives a better view of the story of media influence in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

Media influence in the United Kingdom The figure below shows the presence of the variables in the United Kingdom, on a year-to-year basis, combined with the findings of whether or not the media could influence policy, as well as with the final policy decisions made in the United Kingdom. These decisions are of interest when a solution is provided by the media. If the solutions correspond with the (changes in) policy directions – or vice versa – media might have influenced the decision-making process. However, this has not happened during the years from 2013 to 2018. Media influence in the United Kingdom

Year Variables of influence Media influence Policy decision

Elites Policy Coverage Solution 20135 No No No No solution No opportunity to Committed to RS dissensus uncertainty coverage influence 2014 No Moderate Moderate No solution Unlikely to No changes dissensus uncertainty negative influence 2015 No Moderate Highly Slight Small possibility Extended dissensus uncertainty negative presentation to influence deployment 2016 No Slight Highly No solution No opportunity to Decreasing dissensus certainty negative influence troops 2017 No Slight Moderate Supporting No opportunity to Increasing dissensus certainty negative policy agenda influence troops 2018 Slight High Highly No solution Unlikely to Increasing dissensus uncertainty negative influence troops Table 9: Media influence in the United Kingdom

The first finding is the lack of the ‘elite dissensus’ variable. Hardly ever was the political elite in the United Kingdom mentioned. This only changed in 2018, as ‘slight dissensus’ was estimated. Overall, the variable ‘policy uncertainty’ was moderately present, albeit high in 2018. Yet, in 2016 and 2017, policy seemed to be somewhat certain, which leads to the conclusion that no media influence would have been possible. The ‘coverage of the conflict context’ became increasingly negative, with the exception of 2017, an odd year out in the overall picture. In the UK and in the Netherlands the national media seemed to support the policy approach provided by the political elites. There were particular moments the UK media could have influenced policy: in 2014, 2015 and 2018. 2015 was the most likely moment, as this was the only moment a solution was presented by the media. Yet, as it was only one article, the change to influence would be very small. The particular solution provided asked a different approach to certain aspects of the mission. This solution was not visibly reflected in the policy decisions made that year, or in later years. 2018 was an interesting year, for a different reason. Based on the analysis, this year offered the highest potential to influence, were it not for the fact that no (alternative) solution was provided. Members of the opposition spoke in the media about their disagreement with the current policy; policy uncertainty was very high due to the uncertain approach of the USA. Finally, the conflict context had been covered in a negative manner, especially by the media. Yet, the UK media did not have a clear and sensible solution for the situation many saw as hopeless. When no alternative approach is presented by the media, they are very unlikely to change the decision-making process. One can argue that covering the policy in a negative way could eventually result in a decrease or cancellation of that particular policy, indicating some media influence. Yet, as the policy decision was to increase the troops, this argumentation is not relevant here.

5 The data available of the UK in 2013 was not enough to make reasonable deductions.

Media influence in the Netherlands While having similar policy results, the variables are present in a different way compared to the UK. The calculations and setup are the same as that of the UK. These calculations are described in more detail in Appendix A3. Just like in the UK, the media in the Netherlands did not influence the policy-making process. The major difference, however, is that the Dutch media had even less opportunity to do so, as illustrated below.

Media influence in the Netherlands

Year Variables of influence Media influence Policy decision

Elites Policy Coverage Solution 2013 Slight Moderate Moderate No solution No opportunity No decision consensus uncertainty negative to influence made 2014 Moderate Slight Moderate Slight No opportunity Committed to RS consensus uncertainty negative presentation to influence 2015 No Slight Moderate Slight Small possibility Extended dissensus uncertainty negative presentation to influence deployment 2016 Moderate Moderate Moderate No solution No opportunity Increasing consensus uncertainty negative to influence troops 2017 Slight Moderate Moderate Supporting No opportunity Extended consensus uncertainty negative policy agenda to influence deployment 2018 Slight Slight Slightly No solution No opportunity Increasing consensus certainty negative to influence troops

Table 10: Media influence in the Netherlands

The main reason for this lacking opportunity is found in the almost entirely red column beneath the variable of ‘elites dissensus’. The political elites in the Netherlands and their viewpoints were openly discussed, but overall seemed to agree with one another. Still, in 2014 and 2015 the media did offer a solution. In 2014 the media advocated an alternative approach to the conflict, which was very similar to that of a member of the political elite voicing his view the same day and in the same paper. However, in the end the opposition member nor the newspaper succeeded in turning this alternative approach into policy. Similar to the UK, 2015 was the year in which the media had the greatest chance to influence policy. This is also the first and only time no elite consensus had been estimated during the process in the Netherlands. The solution presented was a shift in focus of the policy, though this shift had not taken place in the final policy decision. Also similar to the UK, 2017 was the year in which the media was in favour of the approach of the political elites. In both nations, media and policy makers agreed that pulling out of Afghanistan would make matters worse. Not an alternative approach, rather extending the mission was seen as the most reasonable option. While not advocating for this solution in the following year, supporting an alternative solution did not take place either. It seems that in both nations by the end of 2018 the political elites and the media agreed on one thing: they were not satisfied with the results of the Resolute Support mission, but no one knew of a better approach to the conflict either. The Dutch government did acknowledge that the media could have an influence in the future, although this was more directed at the Dutch perception of the threat than at direct policy changes (ID201). However, the perception of an increasing threat is a mechanism that could increase public pressure as well. If the Dutch media manage to change this perception, this can be used as an instrument to influence policy as well.

5.4.3 Conclusion In conclusion, there was no influence by the media on the policy-making process in either nation. While the opportunity might have been there, by not proposing an alternative direction of policy it was not possible to direct the policy in any different direction. Another finding is that the moments the necessary variables to influence policy were present, they were not in favour of the media’s traditional window of opportunity. The media seems to have missed their chance, as they only started to actively and seriously take up the mission after it was already in place. The media have traditionally the biggest chance of changing policy during the first phases of the process (Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2008, p. 25), which would be in 2013 and 2014. As this policy process is an ongoing cycle, it is still possible to influence policy already in place, but it less likely. Considering that the moments when a change of policy was proposed by the media were scarce, it is not surprising that the media could not influence the policy-making process. This conclusion is supported by Jakobsen’s theoretical framework. The link between the media coverage of negative developments and actually influencing the policy process, is the journalist that demands action from the political elites to increase public pressure (Jakobsen, 2000). This demand to take action or the offering of an alternative direction, were hardly present and therefore the media did not have any influence on the policy process. Arguably, this could change in the future. For example, in the United Kingdom the public pressure seems to have increased. However, this pressure was more voiced through the media, rather than mobilised by the media. From that perspective, it might be worth to analyse the Resolute Support mission in 2021 again. The conclusion that media influence has not taken place because they simply did not take the opportunity to do so, leaves us with another question: why didn’t media aim to provide a solution? Analysing the media sources, this question could partially be answered by the assumption that the media did not know an alternative approach to the conflict. However, the theoretical framework itself offers additional insights. Although the conflict itself was covered, especially during the recent years, it is of course the question if this conflict – compared to other conflicts or (inter)national events – was covered enough to really spark public pressure. It became apparent, especially in 2013 and 2014, that the peak of the conflict had presumably already passed. Media is more likely to give its attention during a peak of the conflict, which explains the relative limited coverage during the first years of the analysis. Afghanistan was seen as a post- conflict case and media have fewer interesting events to report on, which in turn makes them less influential on the policy-making process (Livingston, 1997, p. 13). This pattern is applicable to Afghanistan. When tensions increased, the amount of coverage seemed to increase as well. However, this finding is more nuanced than presented here and differs among the respective nations as well. This finding will therefore be analysed in more detail in the next chapter.

Chapter 6. Comparative analysis

The second part of the analysis of this research is not as broad as the first one, as it only analyses one empirical sub-question. The third and final sub-question of this research is, ‘Is there a difference between coverage and political positions in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands?’ In the previous chapter it became clear that there are no serious differences between the policy decisions between the two nations. However, there were differences between the British and the Dutch media. Therefore, the focus of this part of the analysis is on the media sources. The content analysis is only taking the data from media sources into account, as the government sources are only relevant as far as the – already established – decisions made in the overall process.

6.1 Comparing content In the previous chapter it became clear that the media did not influence the policy-making process, as they did not seem to seize the opportunity when they could have influenced decisions. This conclusion is related to both the media in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. If we look at the media sources separately, however, it becomes clear they did not all take the same path to this conclusion. The following graph shows how the two nations addressed the four main variables throughout the years. This graph also includes the data gathered by actors mentioned in the media sources, as their perspectives are part of the articles themselves. A journalist can choose to colour a frame by choosing the perspectives he or she will cover. While separated by actor in the previous chapter, this chapter is looking purely at the messages of the articles, not the individual speakers. Another difference in calculations is that this graph does not include the total average anymore, but the total sum of coded variables. This is done because the total amount of coverage is also relevant in creating a frame. For example, it is very well possible that in the construction of a particular frame multiple moderately negative articles or perspectives have a stronger presence than a just few highly negative articles. Yet, their overall average would be lower. This is why this analysis uses the total sum of all the data from the media sources.

Figure 7: Comparing variables

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

UK elite dissensus NL elite dissensus UK policy uncertainty NL policy uncertainty UK negative coverage NL negative coverage UK provided solutions NL provided solutions

The most obvious difference is the amount of negative perspectives presented in the UK papers. Whereas the Netherlands began with perspectives that were more negative in 2013, the UK increased its negative coverage in 2014 and excessively surpassed the former by 2015. This decreased again from 2015 to 2017, but 2018 was the most negative year for the UK media. Another excessive result is the policy uncertainty in the UK. This variable has not been very actively present until 2018, whereas in the Netherlands this variable decreased. It does of course make sense that a variable about national policy certainty, even if it is dependable on the same international context, does differ when compared. However, the media reports deal with the same conflict context. This makes this difference in reporting an interesting result. Another finding, already noted in the previous chapter, is the little to no mentioning of the policy-makers in the United Kingdom. Only in 2018, there was an indication of elite dissensus. Why this differs so much from the reports in the Netherlands cannot be determined by only analysing one case. It could be that this difference in reporting on policy-makers by the media is a case-specific oddity or perhaps a general cultural difference. When looking more closely at the various newspapers, it is clear that there are indeed differences among the papers. Six newspapers were chosen as they represent different parts of the political spectrum. Traditionally, The Times and The Daily Telegraph are more conservative than The Guardian, which is on average more left-wing. While this spread in the political representation is also present in the Dutch papers, the papers seem to have fewer differences among them. The only noticeable difference concerns the coverage of the policy-makers. NRC covered elite dissensus more often than the other papers. The Telegraaf also covered the position of the political elites extensively. However, throughout the years this paper covered dissensus and consensus in the same amount, which explains its low score on this variable. To explain the extreme difference in the UK papers, in future research one might look at the link between the represented political background by the papers and the ruling policy-makers. It might be that, as the Conservative party led the policy process in this case, there is a link between the more negative coverage of The Guardian compared to the two more conservative papers. In the Netherlands, the leading parties were based on a coalition of a centre-right and a centre-left party. This might explain the conformity among the various Dutch papers. This is, however, just a suggestion of a possibility, which cannot be proven by this research in any way.

Figure 8: Comparing papers

The Times The Daily The Guardian De Telegraaf NRC Handelsblad Algemeen Dagblad Telegraph

Elites Policy Coverage Solutions

6.2 Comparing coverage The section paragraph compared the content and offered a possible explanation for the differences and similarities among the media sources. This paragraph analyses the amount of coverage and is therefore based on a quantitative analysis, instead of a qualitative one. This part of the comparative analysis tests and compares the knowledge provided by the theoretical framework with the quantity of published articles. Theoretically speaking, the amount of coverage should increase as the conflict becomes more interesting to publish about (Livingston, 1997). As to how and why a conflict is more interesting, is arguably subjective. However, the theoretical framework does provide insights in this categorisation for media coverage. While categorising the amount of coverage throughout the years, an interesting theoretical puzzle is presented. The amount of coverage is likely to increase when the conflict becomes more negative, when the conflict is intertwined with domestic policies or when citizens from the respective nations are being negatively affected by the conflict. According to Jakobsen, it is to be expected that in a post-conflict context the coverage is mostly negative and focused on (mis)management, corruption and long-term effects. This tendency to negative coverage seems to be applicable to this case as well. Moreover, Jakobsen also claims that only if Western civilians or troops are harmed, sustained media coverage of the conflict is to be expected (2000). He gives three explanations for the amount of media coverage: domestic politics, national casualties, and an increasingly negative conflict context.

Domestic politics The Dutch media sources covered the Resolute Support mission in the year 2013 and 2014 a lot more than their British colleagues. According to the theory, this could be explained by political variables. As the policy-makers are working towards a new policy approach, especially policy concerning delicate subjects, domestic politics can cause an increase in media coverage.

Commited

No decision Extended

Extended Increased

No alterations Extended Decreased Increased

Increased

Commited

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Dutch media coverage UK media coverage

Figure 9: Coverage and policy decisions

In 2013, the UK policy-makers had a more active role as they decided to join the Resolute Support mission, while the Dutch policy-makers were less active, some even classifying the possibility irrelevant for the time being. Yet, the coverage was very low in 2013 and only increased in 2014, even though the UK policy-makers did not change their decision. It could be that the UK media were more focused on the ending of ISAF than their Dutch counterparts were, even though the Dutch papers did cover ISAF thoroughly as well. If this were the case, a clear reason can only be suggested but not directly proven with evidence in this research. The Dutch pattern is not particularly logical either, as the amount of coverage increases when no policy changes are made, yet stays the same when it is decided to increase the troop numbers. It seems that domestic policies are not the explanatory variable in this case.

Compatriot casualties Another factor that could explain the increase of media coverage, is the conflict context itself. When the instability of the conflict increases and in turn the safety of the peacekeepers, soldiers or civilians decreases, it is theoretically speaking rational for the national media to increase the coverage of the conflict; preferably focussing on citizens and soldiers of their own nationality or to approach the conflict out of a humanitarian perspective focussing on the citizens and refugees of the conflict. As domestic policy does not seem to explain the pattern, the passing away of fellow citizens might. This could only be the case for the UK, as no Dutch lives were taken during the Resolute Support mission. According to Jakobsen, this is the most explanatory variable for the amount of media coverage. 10 14

9 12 8 7 10 6 8 5 6 4

3 4 2 2 1

0 0 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

UK media coverage UK causalities

Figure 10: UK coverage and casualties

Yet, in reality, the fatalities do not correlate with the media coverage in the United Kingdom. On the contrary, UK media sources go directly against the theoretical knowledge of media coverage. The oddness of the pattern is in the years of 2013 through 2015. The conflict context itself determines the likelihood of media coverage and in turn the likelihood to influence policy. Yet, when we look at the number of British soldiers that were killed in Afghanistan during the Resolute Support mission, we see media coverage increasing while the amount of British fatalities decreased. This is rather strange, considering that the death of a British soldier is expected to lead to more stories about Afghanistan and the mission. It is possible that the number of fatalities in the years before this chart has affected the pattern. The number of British fatalities was

significantly higher during ISAF, as shown in Chapter 4. However, this explanation contradicts the increase in coverage after 2015. The total sum of the collected data, which includes more articles only concerned with ISAF, does not change the pattern significantly either. Otherwise, the criteria of the data selection could explain the oddity.

Citizens casualties The third explanation for the amount of media coverage, is the conflict context itself. During the analysed years, Afghanistan was still unstable. However, this in itself does not explain the amount of media coverage, as media attention is likely to decrease when the situation is unstable for a longer period, unless a peak of instability and violence comes to surface, or if, as mentioned before, the safety of a nations’ own citizens and soldiers is threatened.

4.500 18

4.000 16

3.500 14

3.000 12 NL media coverage 2.500 10 UK media coverage 2.000 8

1.500 6 Number of civilian casualties 1.000 4

500 2

0 0 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Figure 11: Casualties and coverage (Data on Afghan civilian casualties6 from 2013 until 2018 are from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2018b)

A rapid increase of violence against innocent citizens could explain the pattern of media coverage. Indeed, a rapid increase of civilian fatalities, a peak of violence, took place in the years 2013 and 2014, followed by a somewhat slower decrease of fatalities in 2015 through 2017 and finally, in 2018, showing another increase. There are some similarities between the increase of civilian casualties and amount of media coverage. In the years 2013-14, both nations reporting’s increased. With the slower decrease in 2015-2017, the total coverage decreased as well; although in 2015 the UK’s coverage still increased compared to the previous years and the Dutch reports increased while the casualties still decreased. 2018 is also odd in this explanation, as the sharp increase in casualties did not lead to an increase in coverage by the Dutch media. This increase might have become more apparent in the coverage of 2019, however.

6 Measuring civilian fatalities and their causes in a conflict context seems to be challenging and NATO provides different information about the causes than UNAMA. NATO explains this difference in their publication ‘Civilian Casualties: Making sense of the numbers’. The total number of casualties in 2018 is measured by Action on Armed Violence, as this data was not available at UNAMA yet (AOAV, 2019).

6.3 Conclusion In conclusion, there are several differences between the content and the coverage of the media in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The most obvious difference is the way in which the policy-maker and the policy process is covered. The Dutch media cover the political elites from different parties and their points of view on the case. The British media did only once cover the domestic political elites, although this was only by an active approach of oppositional House of Commons members. Another finding is that the Dutch media tend to cover the policy process in itself and predict what the political elites might do. The British papers do not speculate about the possible movements of the policy-makers. Interestingly, the coverage of the international arena is quite similar. Another finding is that through the whole process, the Dutch and British media do not cover the conflict in the same manner. While both approach the conflict in a negative light, the British media were more actively negative compared to their Dutch counterparts. The reason for these differences could be related to different media traditions. The differences in conflict coverage might also be related to the policy-makers and the paper’s place in the political spectrum. It would be interesting to compare the content of different papers to policy processes guided by different cabinets. When the amount of coverage was compared, it became apparent that the theoretical knowledge of media coverage was not very well reflected this case. The most significant reason to sustain media coverage in a post-conflict case, compatriot casualties, did not seem to relate to reality. It might be that the explanation for this ‘irrational’ coverage in the UK is the political dimension or (media) traditions of the nation itself. It is possible that British media have different principles in covering conflicts, even though their media code is very similar to that of the Netherlands. It is also interesting to look into the Word Press Freedom index. The Netherlands rank number 3 out of 180 countries and the United Kingdom at number 40. With a score of 23.25, the press freedom in the United Kingdom is a lot closer to be classified as ‘problematic’ than ‘good’ (RFS, 2018). The only theoretical explanation that seems to correlate with the amount of coverage was the negative increase of the conflict, measured here by peaks in violence against citizens. However, the amount of coverage did not correspond entirely logical with the increase of conflict. The ‘increase of conflict’ can be measured by more criteria, which might give alternative findings. However, it is also possible that the media coverage correlates with the perceived instability of the conflict context. If domestic actors perceive the conflict increasingly negative, an interplay between policy-makers and media could explain the pattern. The oddities are the UK media in 2015 and the Dutch media in 2017 and 2018. The increase of coverage by the UK can be explained by several setbacks to the NATO allies. The Taliban and IS took significant stretches of territory, the USA accidentally attacked a hospital and according to the UN, casualties were still rising compared to the previous years, instead of decreasing as shown in the graph. The Dutch coverage increase in 2017 could perhaps be explained by domestic politics. While the decision itself was not ground-breaking, it was difficult for the interim cabinet to commit to the request of NATO to increase their troops, giving ground to elite dissensus and policy uncertainty. In 2018, the Dutch media did not increase their reporting, which is against the expectations, as there was a clear peak of violence. With the first two oddities, a suggestion of an explanation can be found in the analysed years themselves. However, 2018 does not provide a clear suggestion. While the Dutch government did mention the Afghan elections going relatively well, the violence increased, the number of Dutch troops increased, the international uncertainties raised and Dutch politicians were openly rejecting the USA’s approach to the conflict.

Chapter 7. Conclusion

The world has recently gone through a lot of changes; in knowledge and communication, in globalisation, in political systems and in types of conflict. The start of the new millennium was accompanied by the start of the War on Terror, introducing a new era of conflict. Afghanistan has held a political strategic role between different empires and civilisations, which resulted in a continuous struggle for Afghanistan. Many international actors have become involved in the conflict over the years. As a result, international policy-making and peacebuilding has been implemented in the Afghan territory. The international intervention analysed in this thesis is the Resolute Support mission. This mission’s aim is based on state-building principles with the goal to make the Afghan government responsible for the territory known as Afghanistan. However, the situation in Afghanistan is far from peaceful and Resolute Support has not accomplished its goal yet. This mission was supposed to be a ‘wrap up’ mission after years of conflict. After all, the international community could not just leave Afghanistan in ruins. Nevertheless, this mission was not able to easily wrap up the conflict by training the Afghan Security Forces to be independent and give the Afghan government its necessary monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. On the contrary, it seemed that violence has increased after the international combat troops retreated and the Resolute Support mission has been increased and extended to at least 2021. Considering the many critical responses from academics directed at peace- and state- building missions in post-conflict cases, it is necessary to know why these policies do not always establish their intended effects. Many theories and reasons have been presented, all (partly) explaining the disappointing record. This research has chosen to look into the policy-making process itself. More specifically, into the role of the mass media; an actor that plays an interesting role in the decision-making process of policy-makers and one that has the possibility to give and find information all around the globe. Media have the ability to influence the public opinion and the political agenda itself. They can influence the topics policy is going to affect, the approach and the problem definitions. It is also possible to actively advocate for policy approaches and solutions, which gives the mass media the potential to influence the approach to an international conflict and intervention. Nevertheless, mass media and their influence are difficult issues to research and might differ depending on the objected policy-making process and corresponding nation. Yet, we do know that the critical decision-making process of individual nations results in global interventions in (post-) conflict cases. National media sources are therefore part of global interventions and might explain (partly) why international interventions do or do not reach their full potential. But before we can determine what part the mass media played in the international policy-making process of the not yet finished Resolute Support mission, it is first necessary to analyse if they took part at all and to what degree. To do so and to acknowledge that the relationship between mass media and the policy-making process differs from nation to nation, two nations’ policy-making processes between 2013 and 2018 have been analysed: the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. This research explores the first steps of the potential role of mass media in the 21st century and gives insights in the influencing factors of national policy-making in an international conflict context. This final chapter first summarises the theoretical framework and methodological approach, followed by answering the question: ‘to what extent does national media influence national policy-making in international conflict cases?’ The chapter concludes with a theoretical reflection and recommendations of future research.

7.1 Theoretical approach This research combined insights and knowledge from various academic disciplines, resulting in a wide-ranging theoretical framework. Three theoretical sub-questions, based on the three researched subjects, structure the framework. The first is the policy-maker, followed by the conflict context and finally the mass media. The policy-maker is analysed within the context of the policy-making process of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, respectively. The conflict context theories are based on conflicts with international interventions, similar to Afghanistan. Finally, the mass media is analysed based on the knowledge of the previous two subjects.

1. How does policy develop in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands? The United Kingdom and the Netherlands both have a parliamentary representative democracy and a constitutional monarchy, yet their decision-making processes differ. The difference becomes most apparent in the Cabinet of both nations. In the United Kingdom, the policy-makers have a majority among the members who represent the electorate, and the policy-making process is therefore by some described as an ‘elective dictatorship’. In the Netherlands, there is no single party that has the majority. The Cabinet is made up of a coalition of parties and makes policies through a so-called ‘poldermodel’. Moreover, in the Netherlands the members of parliament do not have formal voting rights in a decision on military intervention. However, the likeliness of a military intervention taking place without the approval of the House of Representatives is virtually non-existent. Despite the differences, the policy cycle of Hoogerwerf and Herweijer (2008) is applicable to both nations and functions as a guideline throughout this thesis.

2. How can international military interventions effect a post-conflict situation? ‘Conflict’ as a multidimensional concept and the approaches towards solving them, have changed over time. After the Cold War, a new era of conflicts came to be and demanded new approaches of collective action. As new threats arose, not necessarily bounded by the borders of a nation state, international peacekeepers and peacebuilders reinvented themselves as well. NATO is one of the actors and shifted its traditional role in cooperative defence towards a role of active peacefare operator. Peace- and state-building interventions are, like conflict itself, a complex, interdependent international system in which many different actors with their own particular interests are active. The complexity of present international conflicts is a major issue for policy- makers. As the complexity of a conflict context and the pressure of having to make critical decisions within a short amount of time grows, it becomes harder to evaluate policies and gain enough information and resources to address all the conflicts dimensions. Concluding that an international intervention might not always have a fast or positive effect on the conflict context.

3. What does media influence imply in the policy-making process? ‘Mass media’ is a concept used for technological means of communication that provide a link between individuals. They are the gatekeepers of the policy cycle, decide which subjects are interesting enough to become news and which aspects of the conflict make it in the final story. This can be a conscious decision made by the media industry itself or steered by the political elites. The final result of the coverage is a frame through which the reader can observe the conflict. Based on Robinsons (2001) conceptual model, four variables need to be present to influence policy: elite dissensus, policy uncertainty, negative coverage, and presenting a solution. The conflict itself correlates with the amount of coverage. It is assumed that most media attention is given during the peak of a conflict. A post-conflict case as Afghanistan supposedly gives media less material to report on, making them less influential on the policy-making process and media attention will likely decrease. This lack of coverage could create a lack of policy as well.

7.2 Methodological approach The research method used in this analysis is based on the Qualitative Content Analysis. The research itself is a deductive content analysis and has a qualitative research type. To analyse the documents as neutral as possible, it is necessary to develop a tool which allows the researcher to categorise the large amount of source material in a structured way. This kind of research consist of numerical-based datasets and allows the interpretation of different frames. The eligible sources are reviewed for content based on the corresponding codebook (Appendix B). The case analysed is the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. This mission is chosen because it is the most recent decision-making process of military interventions in a foreign state by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The policy-making process of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are specifically chosen to enhance the existing theories, which are mostly based on the USA, yet comparable and transparent enough to analyse. Media and government documents provide the data for this research. All documents selected are published between January 1, 2013, and January 1, 2019. The position of the media has been determined through six newspapers. The chosen newspapers have been selected based on their representation of different political views and different publishers. This way a general perspective of the position of media is determined. They are comparable as they all have a nationwide reach, all are paid newspapers and publish news on a daily basis. The government sources are gathered from the national government databases of the UK and the Netherlands. The trustworthiness and validity of the research are guarded through multiple measures, the most important being the codebook. The codebook is based on the conceptual model and therefore based on multiple theories and academic disciplines. This research is familiar with research methods and theories of Public Administration and Human Geography, acknowledging their weaknesses and blind spots and combining their strengths to tackle their individual vulnerabilities. By basing the operationalisation of the influencing factors on multiple theoretical sources, the internal validity has increased. The codebook guards the objectivity and makes the research replicable. It was additionally tested by multiple individuals before the actual analyses, so as to decrease possible bias. The data sources themselves are transparent and can be easily accessed by others. Moreover, the data comes from multiple sources and the media sources are selected to cover the political spectrum. While this research acknowledges the subjectivity of the sources, this is, given the nature of this research, considered to be an opportunity to gain knowledge about different frames. As the research looks into the specific case of the Resolute Support mission, the variable of the conflict context cannot be generalized. However, looking into the movements and instruments of the political elites and the mass media, it is possible to generalize the results, at least to a certain extent. There is no indication that influencing politics by reporting strategies and the basic mechanisms in the relationship between politics and media have changed. Their performance within the specific case provides not just knowledge of the specific case, but also general knowledge on the relationship between these three variables in this day and age. By using multiple sources within two political systems, the results are more likely to be applicable to other cases as well. Finally, the codebook is structured in such a way that its basis could be applied to different cases. The analysis itself is divided in a content and a comparative analysis, structured by three empirical sub-questions. The content analysis looks specifically in the four main variables of media influence and their presence throughout the years. This analysis also includes an actor analysis and answers the first two empirical sub-questions. The third empirical sub-question is answered by the comparative analysis. Both analyses use the data gathered through coding to come to their conclusions. Their findings and conclusions are interpreted in the next paragraph.

7.3 Answering the research questions The aim of the research is to examine the connection between policy and media coverage within the context of a conflict, or, as summarised in the research question:

To what extent do national media influence national policy-making in international conflict cases?

To find an answer to this main question of this research, three empirical sub-questions were analysed.

1. How did the context of the conflict, the media coverage and the policy-making develop? This question is answered in the content analysis. By thoroughly examining all the relevant documents and coding them accordingly, a detailed year-to-year description of the developments in the Resolute Support case was provided. To summarise it as briefly and general as possible: The conflict context itself had its ups and downs, although the overall violence increased; the media did not take too much interest during the first years, but their interest increased later on; and finally, the two analysed nations policy-making processes were quite similar but were initially not in the same pace. With the scope of the individual variables made clear, an overall picture of their interconnectedness became apparent. Which brings us to the next empirical sub-question.

2. Did the media influence policy in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, respectively? By analysing the variables, the (theoretically) essential variables, elite dissensus, policy uncertainty, negative coverage, and providing a solution, this question could be answered as well. No solution or approach presented by the media has changed the policy decisions, making the answer to this question: ‘No, media did not influence the Resolute Support mission’s policy process in the United Kingdom or the Netherlands’. This does not mean there is no connection between the media and the government. In addition to this answer, the reason why media did not influence the process can most likely be given as well. When the opportunity to influence was present, by not proposing an alternative direction of policy, it was not possible to direct the policy in any different direction. Theoretically the media would have the biggest chance to influence policy during the first phases of the process. As they only started to actively cover the mission after it was already in place, the media seemed to have missed their chance.

3. Is there a difference between coverage and political positions in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands? There are several differences between the content and the coverage of the media in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The Dutch media covered the political elites quite often compared to the British media. Also, Dutch media tended to cover the policy process in itself more and added predictions to it. The British papers did not speculate about the possible movements of the policy- makers. Interestingly, the coverage of the international arena was quite similar, though they did not cover the conflict in the same way. Comparing the individual papers, a new pattern indicates some connection between the papers’ place in the political spectrum and their conflict coverage. The theoretical explanations for the amount of coverage did not seem to fit well with the findings. Only the negative increase of the conflict correlated with the amount of coverage. Therefore, the next paragraph critically reflects on the established theoretical knowledge of media influence.

7.4 Theoretical reflection The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on multiple theories, the foundation of the analysis itself. Although this is not a fundamental research, it did find some inconsistencies between the theoretical knowledge and the insights gathered in this particular case. This does not mean that the theoretical knowledge is not valid, but rather that it seems not to reflect the complete story of the dynamics between conflict coverage and policy-making.

The relationship between political elites and media Robinson and Hawkins While it cannot be proven if elite dissensus is necessary for media influence, as no media influence has been measured in the Resolute Support case, the reasoning of this assumption seems to be applicable to this case. According to Robinson (2001), media coverage is generally based on the political agenda. His theory claims that only when the elite disagrees among itself, media coverage can differ from the political agenda. In this case it became clear that the media’s reporting can differ from the political agenda, whether or not there is elite dissensus. This finding is supporting Hawkins’ (2002) research, in which several cases have been found contradicting Robinsons assumption. The relationship between media and political elites seems more an interplay between the two powers than a complete domination of the elites over the media. In addition, this conclusion might be related to another finding. There seems to be a possible connection between the represented political spectrum of the newspapers and their coverage of the conflict. Elite dissensus within the different political school of thoughts instead of dissensus among the different groups, might explain these findings. It is very well possible that Robinson’s assumption is still valid, but should be nuanced to dissensus within the elite groups in the political spectrum and the targeted audience of the newspapers.

Sustaining media coverage in a post-conflict case Livingston and Jakobsen It is assumed that media attention will likely decrease as a conflict becomes more stable (Livingston, 1997). This assumption seems to reflect the pattern of media coverage at the end of ISAF and the beginning of Resolute Support. Whereas the corresponding assumption, media interest rising with an increased conflict context, is reflected in the later years of the Resolute Support mission and has to be somewhat nuanced. This nuance is directed at Jakobsen’s description of the connection between the increase of conflict and media coverage (2000). According to Jakobsen, media coverage will only endure in a post-conflict case if Western civilians or troops are harmed. In reality this was not the case in either nation. In the Netherlands no connection between domestic casualties and media coverage could be found, while in the United Kingdom the amount of coverage even increased even if the number of fatalities decreased. The increase of coverage seemed to be linked rather to the increase of (perceived) violence.

Lack of coverage creates lack of policy (influence) Hoogerwerf, Herweijer and Hawkins According to Hawkins, lack of coverage creates lack of policy (2002). In this research no pattern was found between the amount of coverage and the ‘amount’ or direction of policy. Policy and coverage did not seem to affect each other in any quantitative manner. The assumption that media have the most influence in the beginning of the policy cycle by Hoogerwerf and Herweijer (2008) cannot be proven. However, there might be some clues for a possible relationship between the lack of media coverage during the first years of the case and the lack of media influence during the case. Media could have simply missed their opportunity to influence the policy in 2013 and 2014.

7.5 Recommendations for follow-up research This research has shown that there is a dynamic interplay of variables in conflict coverage and policy-making. In addition, this research has found some possible explanatory variables. As this research cannot cover all aspects of these variables and still leaves us with several questions about the underlying mechanics of media influence, additional research would be welcomed in the future. It has become clear that the theoretical framework on media influence is not complete and analysing more recent conflict cases could provide the missing links. Technological developments on information and communication services are still increasing rapidly. It would be desirable to have more scientific knowledge on media and their possibilities to influence conflict context in this day and age. Moreover, it is clear that the theoretical explanations for media coverage in a post-conflict case are not reflecting reality anymore. In addition to analysing more recent cases, it would also be advised to specifically look into post-conflict cases, as the theoretical explanations for coverage do not hold. Of course, speaking of rapid technological developments, it would also be natural to advise to analyse new media sources; for example, online (social) media sources. Another aspect that needs future research is the political context of the analysed nations. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands showed different quantitative ánd qualitative patterns in their coverage. In this research it is suggested that these differences can be linked to different media traditions or perhaps to the political systems of these nations. The connection with the political system is hinted at by the connection between the political demographic of the newspapers and their coverage of the conflict approach. In the Netherlands, a so-called ‘poldermodel’ is in place. This means that not one party has the majority and a Cabinet is made up of members from several parties. According to this logic, it would be more likely that the policy- makers are somewhat spread over the political spectrum and therefore have a broader reach among media sources connecting with the same audience. This would make it more likely that the different media sources cover the conflict more similar to each other compared to the political system of the United Kingdom. This is because in the United Kingdom, one party has the majority. Following this reasoning, one political party is suspected to have a less broad connection to media sources with different political views than a system where several political parties are combined. This of course is only a possible explanation for the different findings, extended with a reasoned hypothesis. To test this hypothesis, it would be necessary to compare more systems to each other and compare more papers and their demographics within these systems. It would not be necessary to specifically target post-conflict cases, but it would be advised to choose comparable policy decisions with generalizable effects on the corresponding nations. When targeting the national policy-making process in an international setting, one would do well to actively engage the international players as a variable. The international arena did seem to affect the media and the policy-makers more than they seemed to affect each other. The final recommendation for a follow-up study would be aimed at a research after the official end of the Resolute Support mission. This research could not analyse the complete policy cycle of the Resolute Support mission as it is still in place. A study to evaluate the mission and its (intended) effects after the mission would certainly serve in gaining more perspective of international interventions. Moreover, it would be interesting to compare the developments in Afghanistan to the decisions made by the alliance and to the media coverage in the corresponding nations. Perhaps we can find an answer if the increase in violence is correlating with media coverage on a level of factual peaks and increases of violence or rather linked to the perceived increases of violence. In addition, to increase the validity and generalizability, it would do well to follow this research up with another critical view at the gathered data and codebook before examining the coming years of Resolute Support.

7.6 Conclusion In conclusion it has become clear that the media of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands did not influence the policy-making process of the Resolute Support mission. However, what we did know about media influencing policy, has been partly debunked as well. In addition, the lack of influence does by no means imply a lack of connection between the media, government and the conflict context. Looking in the coverage within the specific nations, several differences in media culture become apparent as well. The Dutch often cover the movement of political elites, the policy-making process and its possible direction. Their British counterparts do not speculate about the direction the policy-making process could take, nor do they report on their political elites. The national coverage of the conflict itself is different as well, yet they do seem to cover the international arena in a similar manner. In both nations the media only took interest in the Resolute Support mission in 2015 and, while at the start not in the same pace, the compared governments have similar policy-making processes as well. Yet, despite the increased intensity of the Resolute Support mission, the overall violence has sadly increased in Afghanistan.

This research voices no opinion on the sensibility of policies or military successes, as this research does not aim to evaluate or to advise the decisions made. However, while diving into the history of Afghanistan and foreign interventions, one cannot help but wonder about the lessons learned in the past. Starting in 2001, the international interventions were first and foremost focused on defeating the Taliban and only got a more state-building like character later on. Several academics have wondered about the subject of creating a lasting positive peace. It could be argued that by not focussing on security and social capital from the beginning, the Afghan state-building process has been damaged and became unsecure. Others might argue that a state-building process based on foreign systems does not fit the domestic mechanisms altogether. Afghanistan is a place with countless identities, created by its place is space and by its place in time. It’s created by its own separated population, its history, its convenience for merchants and by the presence of foreign actors. All of the actors perceive the territory defined as Afghanistan in a different manner. The meaning of the land differs for every actor, as does their intended future for Afghanistan. If this future eventually will know a lasting positive peace and through what means, one can only wonder. Yet a dim scenario has been presented by the uncanny and for this case oddly unanimously shared opinion of all participants and eyewitnesses spoken to:

‘We cannot leave and we cannot tell how long we have to stay.’

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