Modern Ireland: Structured Essays

PART 4: POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN , 1949–93

Structured Essay 4

What moves were made towards finding a peaceful resolution of the ‘Troubles’, 1973–1993?

Introduction From the outbreak of the ‘Troubles’ in 1969, successive British and Irish governments were committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland, but such efforts were frequently thwarted by republican and loyalist violence and difficulties pertaining to power-sharing between nationalists and unionists. Significant landmarks on the road towards a peaceful settlement included the Sunningdale Agreement, the New Ireland Forum, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Hume–Adams talks, and the Downing Street Declaration.

The Sunningdale Agreement After the abolition of the parliament in Stormont in 1972 and the introduction of direct rule, successive British governments made it clear that they would only restore power to Northern Ireland politicians if a power-sharing arrangement between unionists and nationalists was in place: the Sunningdale Agreement (1973), signed by the British and Irish governments, provided the first such arrangement in the form of a power-sharing executive. The agreement was weakened from the outset by the failure of the republican and loyalist paramilitaries to stop their campaigns of violence, and collapsed in May 1974 as a result of the Ulster Workers’ Council Strike. Although various efforts during the 1970s and 1980s to restore power-sharing in the North were to be frustrated by ongoing paramilitary violence and the opposition of many unionists, Sunningdale had pointed the way for progress in the future.

The Peace Movement Founded in 1976 by Betty Williams and Máiréad Corrigan, the Peace Movement enjoyed widespread support in both Catholic and Protestant communities, with up to 20,000 people attending some of their rallies. However, it failed in its objective as the paramilitary groups refused to end their campaigns of violence. The plea for peace made by Pope John Paul II in Drogheda during his visit to Ireland in 1979 was ignored by the paramilitaries.

Margaret Thatcher’s Early Years as Prime Minister When Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979 she appointed Humphrey Atkins as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. While adopting a hardline approach to paramilitary violence, her government also sought a political solution to the ‘Troubles’. Atkins attempted to bring together the political parties in Northern Ireland but his efforts were in vain – the two unionist leaders, James Molyneaux and , would not contemplate power-sharing, while the SDLP objected to the absence of an Irish dimension in Atkins’ proposals. Efforts to find a political solution were frustrated by the IRA hunger strikes and the response of the Thatcher government.

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Initiatives in the Republic of Ireland Following the meeting of Margaret Thatcher and Charles Haughey in 1980, an agreement to examine the ‘totality of the relationships’ between both countries began a process of deeper involvement by the Irish government in the process of finding a peaceful solution in Northern Ireland. The New Ireland Forum (1983–84), involving peaceful nationalists from North and South, called for a form of agreed Irish unity. Thatcher’s rejection of its final report was followed by talks with the Irish government: the result was the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985).

The Anglo-Irish Agreement This was a very important step towards a settlement in Northern Ireland. While it reassured nationalists by giving the Irish government an advisory role in relation to Northern Ireland, it was bitterly opposed by most unionists, who saw it as a betrayal by the British government. The Agreement strengthened the position of the SDLP under John Hume, who continually called for peace and equality in Northern Ireland.

The Hume–Adams Talks Secret talks between John Hume, leader of the SDLP, and Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Féin, began in 1988: Hume’s aim was to persuade the IRA to abandon violence and concentrate completely on political activity. Although no agreement was reached, contact was maintained between the two sides. The British government also maintained secret contacts with Sinn Féin: Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, admitted in speeches in 1989 and 1990 that talks with Sinn Féin would have to take place and declared that Britain had no selfish, strategic or economic reason for remaining in Northern Ireland.

The Downing Street Declaration Representing a significant development, this was issued by the British Prime Minister, John Major, and the Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, in December 1993. It embodied the concept of consent: both sides agreed that it was for the people of Ireland, North and South, to decide on their future; the British government agreed that if in the future a majority in Northern Ireland voted for a , they would support that decision. The Declaration was a prelude to peace because eight months later, on 31 August 1994, the IRA decided to call a ceasefire.

Conclusion From the Sunningdale Agreement (1974) to the Downing Street Declaration (1993) the road towards finding a peaceful settlement of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland had been a long and protracted one, with many obstacles along the way. Key concepts such as power-sharing, the principle of consent and the ‘totality of relationships’ emerged as a result of the various political efforts during the years and were to feature predominantly in the settlement which was to bring the ‘Troubles’ to a peaceful resolution.

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