STANOVNIŠTVO, 2019, 57(1), 97-111 https://doi.org/10.2298/STNV1901097R © by the Demographic Research Centre of the UDK 314.7+2-67(470) Institute of Social Sciences & the Association Research paper of Demographers of Serbia Submitted: 16 May 2019 | First Online: 04 Dec 2019

Migrants and Conflicts within the Local Ummah of the : A Playing Card or a Social Actor?

SVETLANA VLADIMIROVNA RIAZANOVA 1

ABSTRACT whether they could change the religious habits of the locals and the status of the This paper aims to demonstrate the role Islamic community in the region. The re- played by newly arriving Muslims in the search is based on two series of semi- life of the local Islamic community in the structured interviews with Islamic leaders, Perm Krai of . This region is char- observing participants during official acterised by the following important fea- events, and expert interviews. The author tures: the Perm Krai is a permanent Is- examines three indicators of the migrants’ lamic community consisting of local eth- growing influence. First, migrant believers nic groups, as well as an Islamic diaspora prevail during religious services in all consisting of various newcomers. There mosques within the River region. are three kinds of migrants here: labour The second indicator is participation in Is- migrants, students, and those who intend lamic social events and projects. The third to apply for citizenship. Permanent con- is the migrants’ attempts to establish a flict takes place between the two Muslim special organisation to communicate with communities that occupy this territory. In the authorities. Today, the migrants play this case, migrants are accused of attempt- no critical role in the Perm Ummah. ing to seize power within the local Islamic community. In this paper, the author in- KEY WORDS tends to explore whether there are genuine causes and foundations for local religious Muslim migrants | Kama River region | di- conflicts, whether migrants could take asporas | religious communities | social over local Islamic communities, and role

1 Perm Federal Research Center of Division of Russian Academy of Sciences, Perm (Russia) |  [email protected] 98 S. Riazanova

INTRODUCTION of the Nizhniy Syp settlement, June 10, 2011), which includes any new com- This paper aims to demonstrate the role munity members and innovations. played by newly arriving Muslims in The Perm Krai also has an Islamic the life of the local Islamic community diaspora consisting of various new- in the Perm Krai of Russia (the Kama comers. Although 2011 marked a peak River region). This region is character- in internal and external migration, the ised by the following important fea- Perm Krai is still an attractive destina- tures. First, there is a permanent Is- tion for people from other countries. lamic community (Кобищанов 2002). One part of this stream are the so-called It consists of two parts: local ethnic internal migrants from North Cauca- groups (, , Slavic con- sus, while the others are newcomers verts, etc.) and people born and raised from the post-Soviet republics of Cen- in the North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Uz- tral Asia and Turkey. bekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Perm Krai also has illegal newcom- Tajikistan. There are 115 local organi- ers who act as a part of the diaspora or sations for Muslims registered in the ummah. Most migrants tend to settle in Perm Krai. All local Muslim organisa- Perm and some regional centres (Kras- tions belong to the Hanafi Madhhab of nokamsk, , , Dobry- Sunni Islam. anka, Usolye) to find a job with a good For local Muslims, faith is actually salary. They are typically involved in only a part of their traditional lifestyle trade, the timber industry, construction, and culture. At the same time, local be- and road making throughout the whole lievers perceive Islam as an important region. However, there are some places part of the Perm Krai’s cultural and his- with mono-ethnic migrant settlements torical heritage. The rulers of the local (for example Chechen villages in the communities are confident that the Karagay and Bolshaya Sosnova dis- Hanafi Madhhab is the best option for tricts; Azerbaijani settlements in the the Ural Muslim population and that villages of Nerdva and Rozh- any spiritual quest in the Ural region destvenskoe). Nowadays, these are leads to the local madhhab and the local compact communities with their own mosque. cultural and religious spaces. It is interesting to note that the local Muslims from other states are usu- imams are very poorly educated. They ally included into their own diaspora, are typically self-taught in religious so there are some certain national com- matters and have graduated only from munities with Islamic elements in the short courses in the Perm Muftiate. Perm Krai. They belong to different They organise their religious activities madhhabs (Shafi’iyah, Khanbali’iyah) on the basis of private relations and the and sometimes to a different branch of principle of spiritual prestige. An Islam – Shiite Islam (Кобищанов imam’s personal skills have a great ef- 2002). Very often some of them have fect on the religious life of each local enough money to support the local um- community (interview with the imam mah and to change some aspects of

https://doi.org/10.2298/STNV1901097R Migrants and Conflicts within the Local Ummah of the Perm Krai 99 religious life. As a rule, Muslim new- Perm Krai (who have obtained citizen- comers have a higher level of religious ship), but also by those who have come education than Perm Muslims. It is in- for a short period. This causes frequent teresting to note that the level of mi- change among religious leaders, who grants’ Islamic education is a sticking are identified by family circumstances, point for local religious workers. Most individual plans, and the laws of the of them are confident that newcomers’ Russian Federation. Obviously that re- religious knowledge is not better than ligious affiliation to newcomers is very that of the local Muslims. However, the contextual and can be changed depend- locals seem to harbour a kind of jeal- ing on the situation. More often than ousy towards the migrants. Foreign be- not, they choose the most-comfortable lievers are more active in religious life, conditions for religious life and near- they take part in a number of sacral hol- religious communication. Imams and idays, and they are more likely to make other religious leaders organise reli- donations to mosques and support edu- gious education for children in Uzbek cational projects. and Tajik diasporas, showing them the It appears that the imam of Kuyeda ropes of Islam and teaching them to settlement and the now-deceased mufti read the Koran. of the Cathedral Mosque are more hon- Rural migrant communities don’t est in recognising that newcomers from use special organisational structures Uzbekistan and Tajikistan read the Ko- with legal registration, but always have ran very well during their religious ser- a religious leader for Sabbatical vices (interview with the imam of the “Namaz” prayers and family rites. Kueda settlement, June 9, 2011; inter- They meet for these purposes in one of view with the mufti of the Cathedral the local farmhouses and rent big Mosque, July 07, 2011). It becomes es- houses for important holidays. One of pecially clear when a newcomer starts the members of the collective takes on to play the role of organising routine re- the role of the spiritual leader and leads ligious activities. There’s also evidence prayers during weekdays. of migrant Muslim communities proac- Sometimes, the most-influential tively organising themselves. All leaders are not official migrant imams workplaces where migrants are in- but Sufi teachers, who have a status volved have special houses or rooms within the mosques that’s on par with for praying. These prayer spots are religious leaders. This is due to the in- open to all believers, but actually most fluence of North Caucasus Islam con- of the visitors are Tajiks and Uzbeks nected with a huge network of Sufi or- who elect religious workers (imams) ders, which are more powerful in this from their community. The leaders of region. Sufi teachers play the role of these communities are literate Tajiks the power behind the throne in the local who have received Islamic education at Muslim community; they determine home. where money goes and oversee Mus- Imams are elected not only from lims’ participation in social events. Mi- among permanent inhabitants of the grant religious leaders and Sufi

2019, 57(1), 97-111 100 S. Riazanova teachers influence a range of Islamic religious workers and without a well- organisations and the Perm Ummah in educated laity. For Perm muftis and general. imams, TZDUM was only a formal Second, there is a permanent conflict leader. That’s why subgroups within between two Muslim communities the Islamic community made moves to within this territory. This is related to a enhance local religious practices and situation in the ummah of the Russian consolidate the number of believers. Federation. There are some central or- In 1992, a new community was cre- ganisations that lead Muslims in the ated in the Cathedral Mosque. This new European part of Russia: the Central organisation wasn’t subordinate to the Spiritual Administration of Muslims traditional Perm Muftiate. Ravshan (TZDUM), which has existed since So- Akhmedov became its head in 1995. viet times; the Spiritual Administration He was very effective in organising the of Muslims of the European Part of mosque’s reconstruction and ensuring Russia (DUMER), created after the de- that regular religious services took cline of the , and; the Rus- place. Mukhametgaly Khuzin was ap- sian Association of Muslim Agreement pointed the leader of Perm Muftiate by (RAIS), a contextual organisation cre- the head of TZDUM – Talgat Tajuddin ated as an alternative to other religious – in 1997. This date marked the begin- structures (Лебедева 2008). The exist- ning of the opposition between the two ence of all these organisations at the communities. The main sticking points same time doesn’t contradict the Mus- were the principles of ummah manage- lim tradition of having no hierarchy ment and the main directions of com- within religious spaces. Membership in munity development. the ummah assumes the equality of all The increase in the number of mi- believers in theological and routine grants was used by both organisations matters, and only spiritual authority as a reason for activity, but in different can be more powerful. However, Rus- ways. The community of the Cathedral sian Islam has been seriously influ- Mosque was ready to include all new- enced by Orthodox traditions in terms comers. New members helped solve of its religious structure. All Islamic or- some financial problems by building ganisations wanted to identify main- houses for Arabic classes, making re- stream tendencies in the Russian Um- pairs, and helping poor believers. At mah. the same time (1999), M. Khuzin in- This applies to local religious spaces spired the extreme Mejlis (Council) of and has led to divisions in communi- the Perm region1 to forbid newcomers ties, especially in Perm Muslims. In the from leading any Muslim communi- post-Soviet period, the local Perm Um- ties. mah was a weak and ill-structured The second sticking point was the community with a number of ignorant construction of the Cathedral Mosque,

1 The Perm region became the Perm Krai in 2005 when Komy-Permyak Autonomous was united. https://doi.org/10.2298/STNV1901097R Migrants and Conflicts within the Local Ummah of the Perm Krai 101 as members of the Perm Muftiate had his permanent self-presentation no place to pray. M. Khuzin used (Открытое письмо совета махалля heavy-handed methods like encroach- Чернушки Т. Таджуддину, March 21, ing on the building and wrecking the 2006). This led to the secession of the Sabbatical Namaz, but these didn’t ummahs of Chernushka, Dobryanka, yield any results. After a long chain of Barda, Osa, and Zakamsk from the conflicts, the mufti lost access to the Perm Muftiate to subordination under mosque, which was then transferred to TZDUM (Дискуссионная записка TZDUM directly by T. Tajuddin. №3 махалля Добрянки, December 17, In the early 2000s, the community of 2006). As a result, M. Khuzin was re- the Cathedral Mosque withdrew from placed by Maulyudin Mustozyap (in- TZDUM and opened a regional office terview with the mufti of the Cathedral of DUMER. M. Khuzin requested that mosque, July 07, 2011; Декрет ЦДУМ all Muslim organisations be reregis- №04-06, January 21, 2006). tered under the ruling of the Perm In 2006, both Muslim Spiritual Ad- Muftiate (Телеграмма муфтия ministrations appointed new leaders. In общине Бардабашки, February 17, November, Ch. M. Galautdinov was 2000).2 As a result, most small groups appointed by Ravil’ Gainutdin, the of believers became formally con- head of DUMER, to the position of nected with the Perm mufti. However, mufti of the community of the Cathe- the question of where they would pray dral Mosque (Декрет ДУМЕР №033- remained unsolved because the Cathe- ДУ, November 22, 2006). At the end of dral Mosque had been officially the same year, B. M. Tazitdinov be- handed over to the DUMER commu- came a plenipotentiary representative nity in 2001. M. Khuzin began to col- of TZDUM (Декрет о назначениях lect money for the construction of a ЦДУМ, December 31, 2006). In the new mosque. This was his undoing. In wake of these changes, the Perm Mufti- spite of all the finances he collected, ate became a very strange organisation construction was not begun and no- without any connection to the central body could explain why. At the same Spiritual Administrations, but with a time, the heads of some rural commu- number of subordinated local com- nities repeatedly wrote letters to T. munes. The ex-mufti lost the support of Tajuddin about Mufti Khuzin’s poor high authorities and concentrated on and unprincipled behaviour, including media spots to push his idea that any the interdiction against leading the new religious structures destroy the Namaz for local spiritual authorities; unity of local Muslims. He accused abuses (Письмо имам-хатыба Осы А. other religious leaders and members of Н. Мустакимова шейх-уль-исламу); the Cathedral Mosque community of his disregard for believers; ineffective- spreading the ideas of Wahhabism ness against financial problems; and (Скрипов 2011) and false Islam. Using

2 This document and some subsequent papers references or URLs. They are used as a part of (decrees of Muslim organisations, telegrams the authors’ archive. etc.) were sent only in paper form and have no

2019, 57(1), 97-111 102 S. Riazanova his ruling experience, he founded a new trying to improve his position through all-Russian organisation: the Russian close communication with the laity. Association of Muslim Agreement Today, this imam-khatib – Anvar (RAIS). Ironically, he seemed to have Ablaev – has only one material project: forgotten his own words about the de- the construction of a new mosque. He structive nature of any new Islamic relies upon native Muslims – Tatars communities in the Kama River region and Bashkirs – but has the unofficial (Сергеев 2011). support of secular authorities. Thus, Perm Muslims were faced The other head – the imam of the with three independent religious lead- DUMER community, Il’kham Bi- ers who were involved in planning reli- barsov – has very close relative con- gious and near-religious activities. This nections with the Muslim elite of the problem was partially solved in 2013. Federal District and a good reli- The heads of religious communities ac- gious education. He is oriented towards cused M. Khuzin of damaging Islam’s active partnerships with newcomers image, creating conflicts, and behaving and regularly visits other Muslim coun- in an autocratic matter, so they offered tries. However, he doesn’t have the ap- to convene the Regional Conference of proval of the local authorities and offi- Muslims. The Special Majlice of Mus- cially oversees just a few communes lims of the Perm Krai accepted a new within the Perm Krai. Perhaps this sit- statute for the Spiritual Administration, uation inspires him to make public under which the Perm Muftiate once statements against Anvar Ablaev ac- again became subordinate to TZDUM. cusing him of splitting the local Um- M. Khuzin was removed from his post mah. as the head of the Perm Muftiate, which This small war was complemented he used to hold simultaneously with his in 2016 by the creation of the Union of position as the head of RAIS. the Kama River Region Muslims, After Khuzin’s removal, the com- whose goal was to educate local fol- munities belonging to TZDUM and lowers. This union united the leaders of DUMER enjoyed good relations for ethnic diasporas who had lost their po- some time. The heads of two Spiritual sitions due to neither having serious Administrations took part in public political programs, nor being supported events together and exchanged con- by the majority of people. This is con- gratulations on religious holidays. venient for the local authorities; it gives However, these pleasantries were them the option of supporting a more purely for the sake of external observ- loyal leader. ers. After a short period of ceasefire, There is an obvious clash between the new leaders are now ready to begin those who work to unite only local a new battle. The head of the TZDUM Muslims and those who support the in- community is struggling for believers tensive integration of migrants. In this and regularly visits Muslim communes situation, migrants are accused of at- in small towns and rural settlements. tempting to seize power in the local Is- He has a low level of education and is lamic community. As such, it’s

https://doi.org/10.2298/STNV1901097R Migrants and Conflicts within the Local Ummah of the Perm Krai 103 necessary to analyse the actual poten- Today, religion represents a social tial of migrant groups to change any- phenomenon with huge potential to thing in the local religious space. cause conflicts (Fox 2004: 58-59). Re- Are there any real foundations for lo- sources, power, and status form the po- cal religious conflicts? Could migrants tential base for conflict, and all three of take over local Islamic communities, these factors are strong in religions. change the religious habits of the lo- There are two main variants in deter- cals, and alter the status of the Islamic mining religious conflicts. The first is community in the region? These are the based on the spread of religious ele- questions the author intends to address ments of conflict among all spheres of in this paper. social life (Fox 2004: 24) because reli- gion legitimises economic and social distinctions, influences political life, THEORETICAL and takes part in organising the compo- BACKGROUND sition of ideologies. The second variant Religious conflict has never been seri- of typology is connected with conflict ously considered as a theory thanks to development and the way to resolve the secularization approach and the So- conflicts (Nielsen and Fultz 1995). viet idea of the disappearance of reli- Different classifications of social gion (Fox 2004: 55-56). It was de- conflicts are indicative of the “exter- scribed only as a variant of social con- nal,” theatrical role of religious ele- flict. The leading theories of social con- ments in so-called religious conflicts. flict are applicable in determining the According to K. Boulding’s theory place of religious conflict in the system (Boulding 1962), this kind of conflict of social interaction. The psychological can be considered replaceable (an ob- definition of conflict – “a collision of served occurrence of the latent con- trends opposite directed, incompatible flict), which is based on bad knowledge with each other, a single episode in and is false. Within the boundaries of consciousness, in the interpersonal in- Bisno’s typology (Bisno 1988: 175), teractions or interpersonal relations of which uses the varieties of human per- individuals or groups of people, con- ception as the basis for research, reli- nected with negative emotional experi- gious elements can be found in each ences” (Карпенко 1985: 152) – was type of conflict: the conflict of objec- coined by L. Coser and his followers. tives, enforced with corrupted goals; They add to the understanding of con- conflicts where behaviour, reasons, and flict a reference to the three universal content are falsely attributed; illusive sticking points: resources, power, and conflicts, based on communication status (Козер 1996). Obviously, each failure; expressional conflicts with the conflict can be resolved only once both desire to demonstrate belligerence. sides learn to coexist closely and make Thus, religious conflicts usually exist a commitment to successfully settling because of the negative perception of their differences. individuals and groups as a result of the situation being corrupted.

2019, 57(1), 97-111 104 S. Riazanova

The application of classification the- specific mythology. The religiousness ories to religious conflicts shows that, of vernacular believers is often invisi- actually, these conflicts bear all the ble and even contextual, meaning they same features as non-religious con- only show their faith during holidays. flicts. Religion itself plays a role only We insist that migrant Muslim commu- insofar as it divides people’s opinions nities have a high potential to contrib- and leads to arguments, which eventu- ute to religious life, which can be inde- ally become larger social disputes. In- pendent or connected with their envi- stitutional affiliations, social environ- ronment. Migrant labourers and poten- ments, and the subjective perception of tial citizens visibly demonstrate their religious people in the dispute don’t ac- religiosity and attract a lot of attention tually change the nature of the conflict from local Muslims, authorities, jour- itself and how it plays out. As such, re- nalists, and non-Islamic residents. ligious conflicts usually have nothing to Some features of the local Muslim do with religion. communities serve as the basis for the Perm Krai Ummah’s conservative po- sition. The first factor is the aloofness METHOD of Perm Islamic believers and their The research is based on two series of spiritual leaders. Most Perm Muslims semi-structured interviews with Is- have no opinion on the opposition be- lamic leaders (2011, 2017) (see list of tween the two Spiritual Administra- questions in appendix), participants’ tions or the relevant circumstances in- observation of official events (meeting volving internal and external migrants. of the City Duma Council on Interfaith They have a habit of placing confi- Relations, the Annual Regional Forum dence in the head of a religious com- “Muslim world”), and experts’ inter- munity, especially in a representative views with local authorities. All inter- of the Perm Muftiate. Believers from views were conducted by the author but rural and small town communes have have not been published, as the inter- never heard about the struggle for reli- viewees gave only tentative consent. gious and social power between the fol- lowers of TZDUM and DUMER. Even RESULTS after the replacement of M. Khuzin, imams at the local level said: “We are There are two factors that can deter- subordinated to the mufti” (interview mine the success of any innovations in with the imam of Chaikovskiy, June 9, the social and religious space. The first 2011). There was only one matter when and perhaps most important is the spec- the ummah of the Sulmash settlement ificity of the local Ural Islam. This var- had a conflict with the head of Perm iant of the Islamic religious system is Muftiate and wanted to change its affil- very specific. Faith is regarded as a part iation (interview with the imam of of national tradition, which influences Chaikovskiy, June 9, 2011), but this religious practices and social behav- situation was resolved by preserving iour, engendering, at the same time, a the settlement’s membership. As a rule,

https://doi.org/10.2298/STNV1901097R Migrants and Conflicts within the Local Ummah of the Perm Krai 105 only highly educated and involved be- trouble answering questions about the lievers refused to visit the mosque in subordination of their communities the presence of Mufti Khuzin (inter- during their interviews. Only one imam view with the imam of Chaikovskiy, mentioned the new all-Russian Mufti- June 9, 2011). ate (RAIS) and added that he had no This aloofness is closely connected desire “to tamper with the life of the with the routine life of most local com- communities’ heads” (interview with munities. Each imam has to solve a lot the imam of Chaikovskiy, June 9, of problems: economic matters (warm- 2011). Even after an explanation of ex- ing the mosque, repairing the roof), the isting structures, the heads of local um- construction of new religious build- mahs insisted that they didn’t want to ings, the collection of donations etc. take part in religious business on an all- The laity leads a normal life without Russian level (interview with the imam everyday questions about faith, reli- of Chaikovskiy, June 9, 2011). Accord- gious services, and spiritual authorities. ing to Perm spiritual leaders, the atti- Each local commune is usually self- tude of a true Muslim believer is to be contained and has very weak inter- patient (interview with the imam of communal relations. Perm believers re- Chaikovskiy, June 9, 2011). This is spect Muslims from other cities and true for Perm Muslims even in situa- settlements, but very seldom travel to tions when high authorities limit local other districts (interview with the imam communities’ religious and social prac- of the Nizhniy Syp settlement, June 10, tices. To some extent, this opinion is in- 2011). Occasionally, local Muslims are spired by the repressive policy of the willing to visit holy places within the Soviet power against all religious or- Perm Krai (for example the town of ganisations, and especially against Bulgur) or other cities to find sponsor- spiritual leaders. ship (for example, some believers from This aloofness and unwillingness to Chaikovskiy helped followers from potentially create additional problems some villages in the Uinskiy district). influences the attitude toward outsid- Obviously, the system of interactions ers. Many locals believe newcomers for Perm Muslims is based on so-called have no right to live in the Kama River “short relations”, with sympathy and region. As such, these people call mi- confidence paying a significant role. grants by pejorative names like “azer” This system assumes the preservation or “churka.” Perm residents are sure of long-standing traditions and close- that outsiders have no spiritual author- ness for all newcomers. ity in principle. This is the case with Routine problems give rise to igno- newcomers from within Russia, too. rance of the situation in the region and One migrant wanted to build a new in the country in general. Even imams mosque in Chaikovskiy, an initiative – who are the local religious elite – lack that was interpreted as an attempt to knowledge about the central Muslim create an alternative Muslim commu- organisations and all of their contradic- nity. Local Muslims successfully pro- tions. As a rule, religious leaders had hibited this construction even though

2019, 57(1), 97-111 106 S. Riazanova they themselves didn’t have enough change local Islamic practices, or at places to pray. The imam of Chaikov- least add some innovations. However, skiy’s long-standing community said we can see that there are many factors he and his followers believed in strictly that influence this process. controlling all newcomers and making Some changes in religious life con- them accept special sanctions. Local nected to migrants do actually take Muslims feel a closer connection with place. Muslim migrants visit the Sab- the followers of other religions who batical Namaz cheerfully. They prevail were born in the area than they do with during religious services in all the Muslim outsiders, which is why they mosques of the Kama River region, deny those outsiders the chance to be while the local Islamic tradition per- spiritual leaders. The most-popular ex- mits making Namaz (Islamic daily planation of such an attitude is the prayers) at home. The lack of believers statement that a newcomer imam can at religious services in some settle- inspire displeasure among the believers ments is connected with the absence of of native nationalities (interview with newcomers (interview with the imam the imam of the Kueda settlement, June of the Kueda settlement, June 9, 2011). 9, 2011). The heads of local communi- Migrants attend mosques on days other ties are ready to invite outsiders to read than Friday and sometimes make gen- the Koran only in the case of a force erous financial contributions. Tradi- majeure (the illness or absence of the tionally, the Sabbatical service in- local imam) (interview with the imam cludes a sermon in the Tatar or Bashkir of the Barda settlement, June 18, 2011). languages, because there are few na- As such, local Islam appears to be a tives who know Arabic very well. long-standing but aloof institution that However, some newcomers who only is oriented towards natives and against speak Russian also attend Namaz. As outsiders. It supports innovations only such, Russian is the most-effective lan- under pressure from external factors. guage of international communication Obviously, the issue here is not about in local mosques. special religious contradictions. No- Muslim newcomers bring new ele- body among the migrants actually aims ments to near-religious life. The most- to take real power or destroy traditional popular innovations are new Islamic religious life. But by denying them, lo- fashions and the changing of the reli- cal imams keep their religious status, gious calendar. These external revi- so-called resources, and formal power, sions are, however, immaterial for lo- all of which could potentially be expro- cal Islam and its religious workers. The priated by outsiders, according to imams of the Perm Krai insisted that all Coser’s theory. variations in believers’ appearance or The vigourous religious practices of the mosque’s interior have only prag- the migrants (both foreign and domes- matic causes and are not connected tic) contrast sharply with the behaviour with any great reforms in religious be- of non-practising local Muslims. It havior. For example, one change was looks like newcomers are ready to the substitution of the namazlyck (a

https://doi.org/10.2298/STNV1901097R Migrants and Conflicts within the Local Ummah of the Perm Krai 107 special mat for praying) for big modern is also critical to underscore that the carpets. The now-deceased mufti of the migrant community is not united. Each Cathedral Mosque said the carpets diaspora has its own ambitions. Che- were more comfortable and useful. He chens and Dagestani people prefer described their religious importance as mono-ethnic communication and make like candy wrappers, in that they didn’t profitable business ventures. They are affect the substance of the religion it- ready to intervene in the management self (interview with the mufti of the Ca- of Muslim communities only when thedral mosque, July 7, 2011). Efforts there are commercial interests in- to maintain and expand the local um- volved. Chechens were very active in mah are more important than preserv- the Perm Muftiate during Khuzin’s rule ing old-fashioned rules. As such, we because they had one common busi- can see a lot of religious elements in lo- ness. After Anvar Ablaev’s order, they cal disputes (Busno), but other things accused him of “irtidad” (apostasy) and have become the basis of both the con- called him a “murtad” (renegade) be- flicts and the ways they get resolved. cause Ablaev had no truck with them. Sometimes newcomers try to use the The local authorities preferred not to be religious practices of other madhhabs involved in this conflict. during Namaz. Local believers pro- However, in general, diasporas exist nounce “Amen” calmly, but migrants separately, especially those that don’t want to do it very loudly, thus destroy- confess the Khanifi’iya madhhab. As ing the customary atmosphere of the such, their influence on the social space service. In such cases, religious work- of the Perm Krai is not significant. ers make a caveat or inform new mem- There aren’t many believers of the bers that all believers must follow the Hanbal or Shafi’iya madhhabs in the long-standing traditions of the Ural (in- West Ural region. terview with the imam of the Kueda The second way to gain influence is settlement, June 9, 2011). A similar is- to participate in Islamic social events sue arose in the Cathedral Mosque; and projects, like religious holidays or Muslim migrants insisted on creating a charity initiatives. The administration separate entrance to the building for of the Perm Krai organises only two women but allowing them to pray in the major events for Muslims: the celebra- same room. Local religious activists re- tion of Eid al-Adha (Kurban-bairam) jected this idea because the Cathedral and the annual inter-regional forum Mosque was a cultural heritage site that “The Muslim World” (since 2009). The couldn’t be rebuilt, and because it was second event includes a range of activ- traditional for women to pray behind a ities such as a table-top sale, scientific curtain. round tables, and the worship of Mus- Some local Islamic leaders suggest lim relics. Though both migrants and that financing the mosque is a way of locals say their Islamic values are the gaining leadership. But, of course, most important thing, most are in fact newcomers must contribute financially more interested in the commercial as- to groups they want to participate in. It pect of these events (fairs, popular non-

2019, 57(1), 97-111 108 S. Riazanova religious holidays etc.). As such, this source of money for the ummah, an ar- aspect of Islamic life has become, in gument in favour of constructing new many ways, declarative for both mosques, and a potential source of sup- groups. Religion only serves as win- port during regular conflicts between dow dressing for people to lobby for Spiritual Administrations. They are a their own interests. This is the case for playing card used by the heads of Spir- both local believers and newcomers. In itual Administrations and the local au- this situation, the institutional affilia- thorities. tion of the believer becomes formal. Thus it can be argued that the fea- The social status of an individual is tures of religious community and reli- more heavily influenced by their eco- gion as a part of society don’t actually nomic position than their religious one. play into the interaction between local And subjective perception of religious believers and newcomers. Although Is- people is more vulnerable to pressure lam and the principles of Islamic soci- from economic and political circum- ety are very important for each Muslim, stances. in the modern, multi-confessional Thus, it can be argued that the reli- world, they are often less important gious conflict in the Perm Ummah has than economic, political, and ethnic nothing to do with religion and is in conditions and circumstances. Reli- fact only a kind of social conflict. As gious traditions and prescriptions are such, it is reasonable not to highlight relegated to the background and often this situation as special subject matter become only private business. for the modern theory of conflict. At the same time, religion as a sys- tem of social consolidation appears rel- evant when it comes to social choices CONCLUSION for individuals and groups. As for local The author suggests that partnering Islamic communities and migrants, us- with the local Muslim Spiritual Admin- ing religious “tools” – terms and argu- istrations is the most-effective way for ments – helps them find common lan- migrants to influence local religious guage and maintain an image of fidelity communities. In these departments, mi- to traditional Islamic teachings. Cur- grants sometimes occupy the positions rently, migrant communities cannot be of imams; they often study at the re- very effective actors in the new social gion’s two Muslim colleges and help space, but they nevertheless play their build new mosques by providing both own game to keep their identity as money and labour. Muslims. Today, migrants play no critical role in the inner life of the regional ummah. REFERENCES Local Muslims outnumber and some- times dislike them, and the local au- Bisno, H. (1988). Managing conflict. Newbury thorities prefer to cooperate with the Park, Calif.: Sage Publ. Spiritual Administrations. Migrant be- Boulding, K. E. (1962). Conflict and Defence: lievers are, at the moment, only a A General Theory. New York: Harper & Bros.

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Fox, J. (2004). Religion and State Failure: An социологическая мысль (pp. 542-556). Examination of the Extent and Magnitude of Москва: Изд. Международного ун-та Биз- Religious Conflict from 1950 to 1996. Inter- неса и Управления. national Political Science Review, 25(1), 55- Лебедева, Н. (2008). Централизованные му- 76. сульманские организации в современной Nielsen, M. E., & Fultz, J. (1995). Further Ex- России и анализ позиций их лидеров. amination of the Relationships of Religious Вестник Волгоградского государствен- Orientation to Religious Conflict. Review of ного университета, 7(2), 219-223. Religious Research, 36(4), 369-381. Сергеев, И. (2011, January 08) Президент Ис- Карпенко, Л. А. (1985) Краткий психологи- ламского культурного центра АБДУЛ- ческий словарь. Под общ. ред. А. В. Пет- ВАХЕД НИЯЗОВ об «исламофобском за- ровского, М. Г. Ярошевского. Москва: По- кулисье Кремля» и необходимости объ- литиздат. единении вокруг муфтия Равиля Гайнут- Кобищанов, Ю. М. (2002). Мусульмане Рос- дина. Портал-Credo.RU. сии, коренные российские мусульмане и https://credo.press/117377/ русские-мусульмане. In Ю. М. Кобищанов Скрипов, А. С. (2011, January 12) Охота за et al., Мусульмане изменяющейся России ведьмами в Аргаяшском районе. Сетевое (pp. 61-105). Москва: Росспэн. издание МК-Урал. https://chel.mk.ru/arti- Козер, Л. (1996). Функции социального кон- cles/2011/01/12/557199-ohota-na-vedm-v- фликта. In В. И Добреньков Американская argayashskom-rayone.html

APPENDIX

LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR MUSLIM LEADERS Life background

When and where were you born?

What was the parenting system in your family?

Were your parents practising Muslims?

Who influenced your outlook when you were young? Who influences your view of life today?

What is your education?

Do you have any non-Muslim friends?

Who has helped you keep your folk tradition and religious background?

For how long have you lived in the Perm region? What attracted you to this region?

2019, 57(1), 97-111 110 S. Riazanova

Strategy of religious behaviour

Do you have any religious education? Where would you like to receive an education?

What do you think about religious education abroad?

What is your role in the local ummah?

What does your membership of the ummah mean to you?

Must your relatives and friends become Muslims if they are not already?

How can you help your friends become Muslim?

Are there any fake Muslims?

Do you consider yourself to be a true Muslim?

Social position and role in the ummah

Must Muslims help poor people?

Must Muslims take part in public works in the mosque?

What are your duties in the mosque?

What is the main problem in your community?

Is there any difference between local Muslims and newcomers?

What is the age structure of your community?

How often do you and your like-minded acquaintances visit other regions?

Do you have any conflicts in your community? What are the causes of these conflicts?

What is the role of migrants in your community?

Do you know of any central Muslim organisations?

Do you know anything about the conflict in the Perm Ummah?

https://doi.org/10.2298/STNV1901097R Migrants and Conflicts within the Local Ummah of the Perm Krai 111

Migranti i sukobi u lokalnoj umi permskog regiona: Pioni ili stvarni društveni akteri?

SVETLANA VLADIMIROVNA RIAZANOVA 1

REZIME Podaci iz istraživanja, koji su predmet ovog teksta, zasnivaju se na dve serije polu-struk- U permskom regionu postoji stabilna musli- turisanih intervjua sa muslimanskim lide- manska zajednica koju čine mesne musli- rima (2011. i 2017.) uključujući zapažanja manske etničke grupe i migranti. Za lokalne tokom zvaničnih verskih događaja i ekspert- muslimane vera je deo tradicionalnog načina skih intervjua sa lokalnim vlastima. Identifi- života i kulture. U postsovjetskom periodu, kovana su dva faktora koja bi mogla da lokalna permska uma je oslabljena i to zbog odrede uspešnost inovacija u verskom pro- prisustva velikog broja verski nepismenih storu. Prvi faktor se odnosi na specifičnost vernika i nedostatka obrazovanih veroučite- lokalnog uralskog islama u kojem se vera lja. Migranti su u ovom periodu formirali doživljava kao deo nacionalne tradicije. Re- svoj sociokulturni prostor koji karakteriše ligioznost tradicionalnog vernika vrlo često prisustvo raznih medžlisa, dostupnost do- je nevidljiva i kontekstualna. Lokalna verzija voljnih sredstava za podršku lokalnoj umi i islama izgleda kao zatvoreni, stabilan visok nivo verskih znanja vernika. U nizu sistem, fokusiran na stanovnike regiona i slučajeva ulogu nastavnika u njima imaju su- suprotstavljen strancima. Zbog toga se ino- fijski učitelji. vacije realizuju samo pod pritiskom spoljnih Jedna od specifičnosti muslimanske za- faktora. Verske prakse migranata u tom jednice u Permu jeste neprestani sukob pogledu stvaraju oštar kontrast. između dve lokalne verske uprave u regionu. Migranti su voljni da izmene ustaljene Ovaj raskol u zajednici izazvan je prisus- verske prakse islama i da uvedu inovacije u tvom nekoliko centralizovanih musliman- bogosluženju, finansiranju i nezavisnosti u skih organizacija u Ruskoj Federaciji. Obe odnosu na lokalnu vlast. Međutim, migranti mesne organizacije od 1992. godine su u sta- ne igraju kritičnu ulogu u unutrašnjem ži- lnoj konfrontaciji. Kamen spoticanja među votu regionalne ume. Lokalni muslimani njima bio je u principima kontrole lokalne koji ih svojom brojnošću premašuju i pone- ume i izbora pravca njenog razvoja. Permski ne vole, imaju veliku podršku lokalnih muslimani bili su primorani da se suoče sa sekularnih vlasti. Religiozni migranti deluju tri nezavisne verske vođe koji su zastupali samo kao izvor novca za umu, kao argument različite aspekte religioznih i verskih aktiv- za izgradnju džamija i kao potencijalna nosti. To je rezultiralo pojavom protivureč- snaga u tekućem sukobu lokalnih verskih nosti između onih koji su bili orijentisani vođa. prema konsolidaciji lokalnih muslimana i o- nih koji su bili zainteresovani za intenzivnu KLJUČNE REČI integraciju migranata u lokalnu zajednicu. Imajući u vidu trenutnu situaciju, pose- muslimani – migranti | permski region | dija- bno je aktuelna analiza potencijala grupa spora | religijske zajednice | društvena uloga migranata za promene u životu lokalne ume.

1 Federalni istraživački centar Ruske akademije nauka, Perm (Rusija) |  [email protected]

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