TFPD Paper, October 2005, 95 Pages

SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Hannes Adomeit / Anders Åslund (Eds.) Russia versus the United States and Europe—or “Strategic Triangle”? Developments in Russian Domestic and Foreign Policy, Western Responses, and Prospects for Policy Coordination October 2005 Berlin © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2005 All rights reserved SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] Table of Contents 5 Introduction Russian Domestic Politics 13 Russia on the Eve of Regime Change Nikolay Petrov 2 1 The Logic of Backsliding Lilia Shevtsova 29 Centralization Is Central Eberhard Schneider 35 Western Theories: What Is Their Explanatory Value? Hans-Joachim Spanger Russian, US, and European Interaction on Post-Soviet Territory 43 Ukraine: Implications and Repercussions of the Orange Revolution Anders Åslund 48 Belarus: Coping with the Effects of Color “Revolutions” Rainer Lindner 53 The Caucasus: Coping with the Complexities of Conflict Jörg Himmelreich 59 Central Asia: A New “Great Game”? Uwe Halbach Energy and Its “Strategic” Significance 65 US–Russia Energy Dialogue: Policy, Projects, or Photo Op? Edward C. Chow 73 Russia and the Energy Supply of Europe Roland Götz How Should We Deal with Russia? 8 1 Interests versus Interests in US Policy towards Russia Andrew C. Kuchins 85 The Specific Character of EU–Russia Relations Katrin Bastian / Rolf Schuette 90 Prospects for Coordination of Western Policies Heinrich Vogel 95 Abbreviations Introduction Introduction Russia’s domestic and foreign policies have again become a matter of concern in both Europe and the United States. During Putin’s second term in office, as academic specialists and policy makers by now largely agree, authoritarian tendencies under the slogan of “managed democracy” have been on the rise. Its features include the absence of effective opposition to the presidential administration; manipulation of the legislature and the judiciary by the presidential apparatus; increase in the power and influence of the security services; reassertion of central control over the regions; limitation of the freedom of the media; intimidation of journal- ists and academic researchers; termination of military reforms; and the continuation of repression in Chechnya. In foreign policy, the concern emanates from Putin’s declared goal of re- establishing Russia as a “great power” in world affairs. This may be per- ceived as quite legitimate. However, one of the forms this quest has taken is Moscow’s attempt to extend the reassertion of domestic controls to the post-Soviet geopolitical space or at least to hold on tooth and nail to the influence it still has—and no matter what the make-up of the regime. The manifestations of such an approach are the continuing support for the Lukashenko regime in Belarus; the ill-fated support for the both anti- Western and antidemocratic but pro-Russian presidential candidate in Ukraine; continued attacks on Latvian and Estonian minority policies; economic pressures and interference in the internal affairs of these two countries and Lithuania; the presence of Russian troops and bases in Georgia and Moldova; support for separatist regimes in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Yavakhetia, and Transnistria; and attempts to create regional groupings in competition with the EU and NATO such as the Common Economic Space (CES) and the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty (OCST). These developments raise the question as to whether Russia, contrary to the declared intentions of its president, is rejecting the idea of “Euro- peanization”, turning away from European norms, and abandoning the idea of integration into Western institutions—and, if so, what consequences this may have for Western policies. In July 2004 a working group was formed to look at these questions. Its core consisted of research analysts of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., and the Carnegie Moscow Center. Its stated purpose was (1) to analyze Russian domestic and foreign policies; (2) address their significance for Russia’s relations with the United States and Europe; (3) evaluate current European and American reactions to developments in Russia; and (4) assess the problems and prospects for coordination of SWP Berlin Russia versus the United States and Europe—or “Strategic Triangle”? October 2005 5 Introduction Western policies. The corresponding papers presented here reflect the effort of two meetings, one held in Washington, D.C., in September 2004 at the Carnegie Endowment, the other in Berlin in May 2005 at the Stiftung. The working group was part of a larger project entitled: “Diverging Views on World Order? Transatlantic Foreign Policy Discourse (TFPD) in a Globalizing World.” The overarching project is made possible by a gener- ous grant from the German Marshall Fund of the United States, an Ameri- can institution that stimulates the exchange of ideas and promotes cooper- ation between the United States and Europe in the spirit of the post-war Marshall-Plan. The aim of the TFPD, at a time of manifest differences in US and European perceptions and policies on a number of international issues, is to engage decision-makers and opinion-leaders from both sides of the Atlantic in discussion with a view to examining the reasons for the differences and to look for ways to narrow or overcome them. Our thanks go to the Marshall Fund for making the Russia project possible. We are also grateful to TFPD project director Jens van Scherpenberg for advice and consent; project coordinator Eugene Whitlock and the staff of both the Carnegie Endowment and the Stiftung for helping to organize the two conferences; and to Jana Dorband (SWP) and, above all, to Matthew Gibson (Carnegie Endowment) for their editorial work. The first meeting of the working group was devoted primarily to stock- taking on a wide variety of issues, including the interaction of European, American, and Russian policies on international terrorism; the non-pro- liferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles; Iran’s purported attempt at developing not only a civilian but also a military nuclear program; and divergent and common perceptions and policies on Nato and the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The consensus that emerged at the conference was that the focus of the workshop should be narrowed and that it should be directed toward the importance of three dimensions for transatlantic relations: (1) Russian domestic politics, (2) Russian policies on post-Soviet territory, and (3) Rus- sian policies on energy, notably oil and gas. Domestic Politics: Stability or Emerging Crisis? Despite growing authoritarianism in Russia, the workshop agreed, Putin’s second term in office has been rife with crises and failures reflective of an actual lack of control and inability to predict disadvantageous consequences of decisions. The most important examples are (1) the arrest and conviction of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, chief executive of the thriving Yukos oil empire, the enforced bankruptcy of the corporation, and the transfer of its major assets to state ownership; (2) the ill-conceived and counterproduc- tive interference in the elections in Ukraine on behalf of Viktor Yanukovich, the representative of the “old guard”; (3) the ill-planned and poorly explained monetarization of social benefits, leading to wide-spread demonstrations in Moscow and other Russian cities; and (4) the persistent inability to achieve normalization and stabilization in Chechnya and SWP Berlin Russia versus the United States and Europe—or “Strategic Triangle”? October 2005 6 Introduction beyond in the Northern Caucasus as witnessed by the tragedy in Beslan. The system has become so highly centralized that everyone is waiting for Putin to make decisions. But this makes the management of crises inef- fective. In fact, a vicious cycle can be observed: the centralization of power after crises, which constrains the ability to solve them, which in turn leads to further attempts at centralization. There was consensus in the working group about an increase in internal conflicts in the “Putin system” and that the “stability” of that system is more apparent than real. But differences pertained to the extent and the consequences of that instability. By and large, both the workshop members of the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, D.C, and of the Moscow Center were more firm in their assessment that the Putin system had ossified beyond redemption and that its demise was more or less a fore- gone conclusion. The opposite view was held by most of the European participants in the workshop who argued that the regime had retained sufficient flexibility and that predictions as to the disintegration of the Putin regime were premature given that there are many weak authoritarian regimes that embody dysfunctional features but which have neverthe- less endured. Post-Soviet Space: Competitive Russian and Western Policies As reflected in the discussion and the papers on Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, democratization and modernization while maintaining stability is the main challenge facing the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union. But that process, it seems, is more helped than hindered by Putin’s

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