Handcuffed Hegemony: International Restraint in Unbalanced Systems
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Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports 2005 Handcuffed hegemony: International restraint in unbalanced systems Mark E. Schaefer West Virginia University Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd Recommended Citation Schaefer, Mark E., "Handcuffed hegemony: International restraint in unbalanced systems" (2005). Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 2330. https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/2330 This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Handcuffed Hegemony: International Restraint in Unbalanced Systems Mark E. Schaefer Dissertation submitted to the Eberly College of Arts and Sciences at West Virginia University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science Approval by Joe Hagan, Ph.D., Committee Co-Chairperson Jamie Elizabeth Jacobs, Ph.D., Committee Co-Chairperson Scott R. Crichlow, Ph.D. John C. Kilwein, Ph.D. Jason Parker, Ph.D. (Department of History) Department of Political Science Morgantown, West Virginia 2005 Key Words: Hegemony, International Regimes, Domestic Politics, and Restraint Copyright: 2005 Mark E. Schaefer Abstract Handcuffed Hegemony: International Restraint in Unbalanced Systems Mark E. Schaefer This work contends that the current systemic view of hegemonic systems is incorrect. On one hand hegemonic actors are conceptualized as omnipotent actors that can mold the system to best reflect its goals. Still, others illustrate that such unipolar systems can never be achieved, or at best exist for a short time as other powers move to rebalance the international system. Mearsheimer illustrates a more realistic approach, that unbalanced multipolar systems can exist, in which a larger state is present in a traditional multipolar system, not a traditional vertical authority structure. He contends that such a system is transient, for this larger power will eventually be reined in by other actors. This piece contends that these unbalanced systems are reality, and that current thought relies only on systemic notions and does not realize other constraints that can maintain system stability for significant durations of time. The theory developed in this work is based upon a series of three hegemonic constraints: international regime constraints, domestic political constraints, and the degree of hegemonic power concentration. This work maintains that these “hegemonic handcuffs” can restrain the actions of the dominant state in the international system so as to preclude traditional balancing behavior by the remaining great powers in the system, until a point in time in which the hegemonic actor begins to cast off its shackles. It is at this point in a hegemons life that the remaining great powers begin to balance the power of the dominant state, hence signaling the end of the hegemonic actor’s supremacy. The work utilizes the cases of Spain under Philip II, France under Napoleon III, and Germany under Bismarck in a structured focus framework to delve in to the theory in question. iii Acknowledgements As my graduate career draws to a close there are many individuals that I must thank for their support and comfort throughout this process. First, I would like to express my eternal thanks to my wife Natalie Schaefer whose love, kindness, and support kept me on this path. Truly without her I would never have reached this point. I must next thank the Schaefer family, my father Paul E. Schaefer, my mother Nancy Schaefer, my grandmother Sally “Bay” Beatty, as well as my brother Todd E. Schaefer and his family for all of their support. I must also thank the Chapin family for their support and for accepting me into the fold: Dr. Charles Chapin, Carol Ann Chapin, and Charlie Chapin. Finally, I would be remiss not to thank our cat, Kitty, who provided numerous distractions during the writing of this dissertation. I also need to thank my departmental family for all of their assistance and support. First, I must thank my dissertation committee co-chairs: Dr. Joe Hagan and Dr. Jamie Elizabeth Jacobs. They have no idea how much their council and friendship have meant to me as well as how much they have shaped my life, not merely this dissertation. I must also thank the other members of my dissertation committee for their aid and for shaping such a monstrous work: Dr. Scott R. Crichlow, Dr. John C. Kilwein, and Dr. Jason Parker. I would also like to thank the professors in the West Virginia University Department of Political Science who have provided me with an invaluable education: Dr. Robert E. DiClerico, Dr. Robert D. Duval, Dr. Allan S. Hammock, Dr. Susan Hunter, Dr. Kevin M. Leyden, Dr. Donley T. Studlar, and Dr. Jeffrey S. Worsham. Additionally, I need to thank the other bosses of the WVU Department of Political Science for their assistance and support: Rebecca Digman, Lee Ann Greathouse, and Donna MacIsaac. Donna must also be thanked for expertise in scheduling as well as her formatting skills. I must also express my thanks to Dr. Neil Berch and the members of the WVU Debate Team. Dr. Berch helped put me on this path and was their as a friend throughout. My friends on the Debate Team provided me with argument partners, helped Natalie and I find each other, and gave me places to rest as a began my life as a commuting teacher. Finally, I must thank my students at both West Virginia University and Marietta College. You all have taught me more than I could ever teach you. Finally, the author must thank his beloved West Virginia University Mountaineers and Chicago Cubs for providing needed diversions. Nevertheless, all mistakes and omissions in this work are solely my own. iv Table of Contents Chapter One: Handcuffing the Hegemon....................................................................................1 Traditional Views of Hegemony and their Limitations .............................................................3 Handcuffed Hegemony -- A New Theory ...............................................................................13 Chapter Two: The Thoughts behind the Handcuffs.................................................................20 The System (Dependent Variable)...........................................................................................21 International Regimes ..............................................................................................................24 Domestic Politics.....................................................................................................................37 Concentration of Hegemonic Power........................................................................................44 Research Design.......................................................................................................................53 Gazing into the Crystal Ball.....................................................................................................63 Chapter Three: The Accidental Hegemon: the Case of Spain.................................................66 International Regimes – If Only Spain had Some Self-Restraint ............................................69 The Impact of Spain’s International Regimes .........................................................................77 The Handcuff of Domestic Politics (or the Key to Hegemonic Failure) .................................78 The Impact of Spain’s Domestic Politics.................................................................................97 The Handcuff of Hegemonic Power Concentration (or Did Spain Really Borrow Power) ....98 The Impact of Spain’s Hegemonic Power .............................................................................117 The Dependent Variable – The Balancing of Spain ..............................................................118 The Impact of Balancing on Spain.........................................................................................123 Answering the Questions .......................................................................................................124 When Hegemony Goes Wrong ..............................................................................................143 Chapter Four: France under Napoleon III – Hoping to be Handcuffed ..............................145 International Regimes and France – The Hope for a Restraining Hand................................148 The Impact of International Regimes ....................................................................................164 Domestic Politics – A More Complex State..........................................................................165 The Impact of French Domestic Politics ...............................................................................178 The Handcuff of Hegemonic Power Concentration (Being in the Right Place at the Right Time).......................................................................179