2021

AND ESTONIA INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INTERNATIONAL

EESTI RAHVUSVAHELISES JULGEOLEKUKESKKONNAS 2021 Translation by Margus Elings, Refiner Translations OÜ Editing by Scott Abel, Tekstikoda OÜ Design: Taivo Org Illustrations: Joosep Maripuu, Taivo Org, Bigstock, Shutterstock, Scanpix

ISSN 2613-3261 (print) ISSN 2613-327X (online) CONTENTS

Foreword ...... 2

Russia’s foreign policy ...... 4 From crisis to crisis:

30 years of Russian policy in its ‘Near Abroad’ ...... 6 The standoff between the Belarusian government

and its people ...... 10 Lukashenka’s departure is a prerequisite for

economic reforms ...... 12

Russia in search of a new head of state for Belarus ...... 14

Russia continues its aggression against Ukraine ...... 16

Violent upheaval in the Caucasus ...... 20

Russia in Africa: ambitions and reality ...... 24

Russia’s domestic politics and economy ...... 30

2020 constitutional amendments ...... 31

Increasing domestic tensions and the Kremlin’s response . . . 35

Russia’s socio-economic downturn ...... 40

The Russian Armed Forces ...... 45

‘New type’ of airborne assault units ...... 50 The ‘Belarus military district’ – military cooperation

between Russia and Belarus ...... 53

Russian special services ...... 59

GRU psychological operations ...... 60

Russian special services’ influence operations in cyberspace . . . . 65

Growing pressure from China ...... 69

Chinese influence operations move to the West...... 73

Sinicising Chinese technology ...... 76

China and Russia – a practical partnership ...... 78 2 Foreword

FOREWORD

his is the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service’s sixth Tannual report . The reason why we continue with this tradition remains the same – to offer the public both in Estonia and abroad an expert view of the security environment and the threats our service deals with . Consid- ering Estonia’s geopolitical situation, the range of topics should not come as a surprise . MIKK MARRAN Director General of the Estonian The year 2020 was a good lesson for Foreign Intelligence Service anyone making predictions . Like every- one else, when finalising last year’s report in January, we failed to predict cultivated image of derzhava (a great how strong an impact the pandemic power), both at home and abroad, the would have on global developments . past year once again showed us the Although we have lived in a changed fragility and controversy of Russia’s world for the last 12 months in many influence in its neighbouring region . It ways, the security environment around is clear that the dictatorship in Bela- us has largely remained the same . rus, nurtured by its eastern neighbour, National interests and patterns of be- has no long-term perspective, and we haviour do not change overnight . Still, must be prepared for another year of the coronavirus crisis offered new op- unexpected developments . The events portunities for authoritarian regimes to in the South Caucasus have signifi- exert influence and accelerated already cantly increased Russia’s influence in existing trends . We could say that in a the region, but have also cast doubt time of universal mask-wearing, some on Russia’s ability – and motivation masks also fell off . – to guarantee stability . A disparity In this report, we take a closer look between image building and actual at Moscow’s view of international influence is also visible in Russia’s trends . Despite the Kremlin’s carefully activities in Africa . Foreword 3

THE CORONAVIRUS

Over the last year, Russia’s most sig- CRISIS OFFERED NEW nificant domestic developments along- OPPORTUNITIES FOR side the coronavirus crisis included constitutional amendments introduced AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES by executing a mediocre maskirovka, TO EXERT INFLUENCE . IN A as well as growing tensions in the re- gions and an assassination attempt on TIME OF UNIVERSAL MASK- the opposition leader Alexei Navalny . WEARING, SOME MASKS Dramatic fluctuations in oil prices in ALSO FELL OFF . the first half of the year and ongoing international sanctions have in turn raised questions about the sustaina- bility of Russia’s economic model . In but a topical issue . We also take a look a situation where the average Russian at the Russian special services’ “best has experienced falling living standards practices” in cyberwarfare against for years, widespread protests should democracies . not be ruled out . At any rate, we are As always in recent years, we cannot seeing increasing signs of disapproval . ignore China, whose activities raise This report also delves into the military new security issues every year . We talk exercise Zapad, where the Russian and about China’s increasingly confron- Belarusian armed forces train for large- tational foreign policy, as well as its scale war against NATO in the Baltic influence operations and the threats and Far North region . We also look at of ‘sinicising’ Chinese technology . Like key developments within the Russian our partners, we, too, keep a close eye armed forces, such as efforts to mod- on China’s tightening co-operation ernise the airborne forces . The crisis in with Russia, a relationship mostly Belarus led us to analyse the co-opera- dominated by Beijing . tion between the Russian and Belaru- While we live in a complex security en- sian Union State’s armed forces – the vironment, I remain confident that the area where Minsk and Moscow have Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, achieved the greatest level of integra- with its domestic and international tion over the decades . As concerns the partners, will be able to provide deci- Russian special services, this time we sion-makers with the necessary aware- focus on GRU psychological opera- ness and sufficient early warning . tions – well-forgotten old practices, rather than anything completely new, Bonne lecture! 4 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY  Foreign policy during the pandemic: the Eurasian SOURCE: KREMLIN .RU, CC BY 4 0. Economic Union Summit in May 2020

Russia expects the COVID-19 pandemic to weaken Western unity.

espite creating some limita- Russia acknowledges that the trend tions, the COVID-19 pandemic towards multipolarity leads to a great- Dhas not changed Russia’s long- er risk of conflict, as the major powers term strategic goals . On the contrary, increasingly compete for resources and the Kremlin believes that the pandemic spheres of influence . will accelerate two trends that Russia Regardless, Russia expects to benefit itself is working to promote: a transi- from this trend, as it sees multipolar- tion towards multipolarity in interna- ity as an opportunity to increase its tional relations and declining Western room for geopolitical manoeuvring, influence on the global stage . RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 5

 An example of the Russian-initiated smear campaign on social media against the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine especially at the expense of Western powers .

The Russian leadership believes that the global epidemic will force the West to focus on domestic policy and economic problems, cause populist and extremist movements to emerge, and ultimately undermine the values-based and institutional unity of Western so- In the longer term, Russia’s goal with cieties . For its part, Russia is prepared the EU is to get the sanctions relaxed to add fuel to the flames to encourage or lifted without making any conces- these trends . Therefore, 2021 will sions in return . However, Russia’s again see Russian influence operations behaviour remains cynical, as illustrated designed to create and deepen divides by its response to the poisoning of within and between Western socie- Alexei Navalny, the investigation into ties, including at the EU level . This will the downing of flight MH17, cyber- include attempts to discredit West- attacks on Western institutions and ern-produced COVID-19 vaccines, as assassinations associated with the with the Oxford–AstraZeneca vaccine, Russian special services in European which Russian propaganda labelled cities in recent years . as a “monkey vaccine”, followed by attempts to spread this information in The inauguration of President Joe Western media . With these smear cam- ­Biden will not significantly change paigns, Russia hopes, on the one hand, Russia’s agenda towards the US – it to create a more favourable position for will remain largely confrontational . Still, its own vaccines on the world market Russia will likely try to take advantage and, on the other hand, to promote of arms control negotiations and the its strategic ambition to show itself as extension of the New START treaty to being the first among the major powers appear as a constructive partner while to provide a solution to the COVID-19 retaining its massive superiority in crisis . non-strategic nuclear weapons . 6 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: 30 YEARS OF RUSSIAN POLICY IN ITS ‘NEAR ABROAD’

While Russia seeks to undermine Western influence on the international stage, it is important to keep an eye on Russia’s neighbouring region, where the Kremlin’s policy is aimed at establishing itself as the dominant force.

The Kremlin’s strategic priority is its A major power’s desire to establish neighbouring region, where Ukraine itself as a leader in its neighbouring and Belarus are the priority countries region is understandable, especially if in maintaining Russia’s sphere of influ- aimed at promoting stability and eco- ence . Since the collapse of the Soviet nomic development . However, looking Union, Russia has strived to secure at the regional situation in Russia’s economic and military dominance in neighbourhood 30 years after the the region and deflect any interference collapse of the Soviet Union – except by competing international powers . At for the Baltic States – a legitimate the same time, the Nagorno-Karabakh question arises: Where are the stability conflict, which escalated in September and economic development? Almost all 2020 and claimed thousands of lives, the countries in the region are weighed showed that multipolarity will inevita- down by territorial conflict or internal bly reach Russia’s own backyard, as it crisis (see map on pages 8-9) . Whence has happened in the South Caucasus this drastic difference from the Eastern with Turkey firmly asserting itself in European and Baltic countries now the region’s balance of power . Also, integrated into the EU and NATO? China has stepped up its political influ- ence in Central Asia, as a side effect of A proverb perfectly characterises economic investment . Russia’s activities in its immediate

THE SIDE EFFECTS OF MULTIPOLARITY: RUSSIA MUST ACKNOWLEDGE GROWING TURKISH AND CHINESE INFLUENCE IN ITS NEIGHBOURING REGION . RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 7  South Ossetia is separated from Georgia by Russian-installed SOURCE: SERGEI BOBYLEV / TASS barbed wire fences neighbourhood – you reap what you territorial disputes, ethnic confronta- sow . Russia has consistently sought to tions and domestic crises, posing a use its political, economic and military major obstacle to socio-economic and leverage to impede these countries’ in- political development . And this trend tegrating and developing relations with appears to be deteriorating – in 2020 Euro-Atlantic organisations . To this alone, we saw the Nagorno-Karabakh end, Russia works against establishing conflict as well as the domestic crises the rule of law, civil society and free in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan escalate . elections in its neighbouring countries, Considering that Russia’s policies fearing that democratic ideas might in the neighbouring region remain also catch on among the Russian pop- unchanged and do not contribute to ulation . Russia’s ruling elite sees these establishing democratic principles and ideas as an existential threat to the free elections, the coming years will survival of its “power vertical” . highly likely bring new crises in the region, creating both direct and indirect As a result, much of Russia’s neigh- security threats for Estonia and more bouring region is still plagued by broadly for Europe . 8 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS AND CRISES IN RUSSIA’S NEIGHBOURING REGION

VBelarusalgevene UlatuslikudWidespread p protestsrotestid andja a riigisisenedomestic crisiskriis jõhkfollowingralt the Aleksanderflagrantly fraudulent Lukašenk apresidential election rigged in favour of kasuks võltsitud Abhaasia pAlyaksandrresidendivalimi Lukashenkaste järel. . Georgia territoorium, mis on de facto Venemaa kontrolli all. Territooriumil Venemaa avalik DonDonbassbass sõjaline kohalolek. UkUkrainianraina terri territorytoorium, under mis theon Vene okupacontroltsioonijõudude of Russian occupying kontrolli all. Tforceserritooriumil . Covert VRussianenemaa military varjatud sõjalinepresence k ohalolek.in the territory .

Lõuna-Osseetia Georgia territoorium, mis on Kõrgõzstan de facto Venemaa kontrolli Riigisisene kriis 4. oktoobril 2020 all. Territooriumil Venemaa toimunud presidendivalimiste järel, avalik sõjaline kohalolek. võimuerakondi süüdistati ulatuslikus häälte ostmises.

Mägi-Karabahh Transnistria Crimea Transnistria Krimm Armeenia ja Aserbaidžaani vaidlusalune Moldovan territory under de Ukrainian territory occupied territoorium, lahendamata territoriaalse Moldova territoorium, mis on Venemaa poolt annekteeritud facto Russian control . Overt by Russia and used as a staatusega. Alates november 2020 de facto Venemaa kontrolli all. Ukraina territoorium, mida Russian military presence in military bridgehead in the Venemaa sõjaline kohalolek rahuvalve Territooriumil Venemaa avalik Venemaa kasutab sõjalise the territory . Black Sea . egiidi all. sõjaline kohalolek. sillapeana Mustal merel. RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 9

‘CONTROLLED INSTABILITY’

It is in Russia’s interests to keep its neighbouring » limited relations with the West region in a state of fragile balance . Therefore, » territorial conflict, with Russia as the kingpin Russia wants to see the following features in its » Russian troop presence in the form of a neighbouring countries and seeks to maintain or military base or otherwise help instigate them: These conditions allow Russia to manipulate the » limited development of the rule of law regional level of escalation as it deems necessary » absence of free elections but consequently create a permanent risk of Valgevene » repressed civil society conflict in the region . Ulatuslikud protestid ja riigisisene kriis jõhkralt Aleksander Lukašenka kasuks võltsitud AbkhaziaAbhaasia presidendivalimiste järel. GeorgianGeorgia t territoryerritoorium, under mis de on factode fa ctRussiano Venemaa control kont . Overtrolli all. RussianTerritooriumil military Venemaa presence a vinalik the Donbass territorysõjaline .kohalolek. Ukraina territoorium, mis on Vene okupatsioonijõudude kontrolli all. Territooriumil Venemaa varjatud sõjaline kohalolek.

SouthLõuna-O Ossetiasseetia Georgian territory under de Kyrgyzstan Georgia territoorium, mis on Kõrgõzstan Domestic crisis following the 4 October factode fa Russiancto Venemaa control kont . Overtrolli Riigisisene kriis 4. oktoobril 2020 Russianall. Terri militarytooriumil presence Venemaa in 2020toimunud presidential presidendi electionvalimi leadingste järel, to theavalik territory sõjaline . kohalolek. allegationsvõimuerak ondiof extensive süüdist ativote-buying by theulatuslikus political partieshäälte o instmis poweres. .

Nagorno-Karabakh Mägi-Karabahh Territorial dispute between Armenia Krimm Armeenia ja Aserbaidžaani vaidlusalune Transnistria and Azerbaijan . Russian military territoorium, lahendamata territoriaalse Moldova territoorium, mis on Venemaa poolt annekteeritud presence since November 2020, staatusega. Alates november 2020 de facto Venemaa kontrolli all. Ukraina territoorium, mida under the auspices of a peacekeeping Venemaa sõjaline kohalolek rahuvalve Territooriumil Venemaa avalik Venemaa kasutab sõjalise missionegiidi all. . sõjaline kohalolek. sillapeana Mustal merel.

SOURCE: ESTONIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 10 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

THE STANDOFF BETWEEN THE BELARUSIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS PEOPLE Unprecedented protests in Belarus are eroding the regime’s foundations.

In 2020, Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s voters mainly in the rural areas, was the plans for a smooth transition to his first to be arrested . Next was Babaryka, sixth presidency failed . Already unhappy the preferred candidate among voters in with the low standard of living, Belaru- the cities, who managed to gather four sians had grown weary with Lukashen- times the required 100,000 support ka after his 26 years in office . In the signatures, which is the registration spring, the president’s indifference to- threshold for a presidential candidate . wards the COVID-19 crisis caused public Tsapkala left the country, realising that dissatisfaction to escalate further . his arrest was imminent .

The presidential election saw Lukashen- Representatives of the regime as- ka’s hitherto seemingly unshakable po- sumed that eliminating the competition sition threatened by the emergence of would pave the way for Lukashenka’s three main rivals: Viktar Babaryka, the re-election . They did not expect that former head of Belgazprombank, Valery the nomination of Tsikhanouski’s wife, Tsapkala, a former diplomat and leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, would cause of the Belarus High Tech Park, and a large portion of the support for the Siarhei Tsikhanouski, a popular blogger . ousted candidates to unite behind her They gave people hope that change was candidacy . The authorities’ repressive possible in Belarus, despite the country actions against the people involved in having remained in Lukashenka’s iron her campaign, her supporters, and the grip for over two decades . This was un- journalists who covered their activities derlined by the fact that both Babaryka had the unexpected effect of boosting and Tsapkala belong in the country’s Tsikhanouskaya’s popularity . elite and represent dissatisfaction with- The politically heated summer culmi- in Lukashenka’s own camp . nated in the presidential election on 9 Lukashenka’s decision to eliminate August, as Lukashenka declared him- the three rivals from the competition self the winner with 80 .2% of the votes . before the election betrayed a fear for Due to massive vote-rigging at the his dictatorship’s survival . Tsikhanouski, polling stations, even the Central Elec- who became popular with Lukashenka’s tion Commission could not know the RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 11

 Belarusian women play a key role in anti-government protests

SOURCE: EPA / STRINGER

actual support figures for Lukashenka themselves from the elite and power and Tsikhanouskaya . Belarusians, who structures to join the protesters . There had attended or seen footage from have been strikes in state-owned enter- Tsikhanouskaya’s crowded campaign prises . Indeed, more than the protests, events, felt more clearly than ever that Lukashenka feared workers’ strikes, as their votes had not counted . They came these would hit the regime’s reputation to the streets in numbers unseen in as well as the country’s economy . the country’s recent history . Protests Lukashenka is not one to relinquish became a new daily reality in Belarus . power voluntarily . He quickly recovers The irresponsible behaviour of the after each setback . His competitors are authorities towards human health behind bars . The well-financed power during the first wave of the coronavirus structures received generous bonuses outbreak intensified the politicisation of for suppressing the protests . The civil the population . While the demonstra- service does not want to risk uncer- tions seen in recent years have tended tainty and therefore, remain loyal to to avoid politics, this time there was a Lukashenka . clear demand for Lukashenka’s resigna- The People’s Assembly in February tion and a new election . 2021 was Lukashenka’s attempt to put The election events showed that on a spectacle of a social dialogue on Belarusian society is changing, and the the country’s future and to bide his time authorities are unable to adapt . The to regain control . However, in the eyes regime is struggling to find the means of a significant part of the population, to quell dissent, save for NKVD-style Lukashenka has lost his legitimacy intimidation, brutal violence and mass as president and Belarus has turned arrests . Such methods create more towards change . Even if the protests dissatisfaction, even in the “pow- subside, Belarusians will not calm down er vertical”; officials have distanced until Lukashenka has left office . 12 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

LUKASHENKA’S DEPARTURE IS A PREREQUISITE FOR ECONOMIC REFORMS

Improving living standards in Belarus would require economic reforms, which would inevitably cause a social crisis.

The root cause of Belarus’s low stand- There are no good options available for ard of living is its failure to carry out a sharp reorientation of Belarusian ag- economic reforms following the break- ricultural exports; the close proximity up of the Soviet Union . Belarus has an of EU markets means that selling food externally subsidised state economy outside the Russian market would re- based on socialist planning principles, quire adapting to a highly competitive which has reached the end of its life . environment and improving production As social modernisation has been efficiency, which takes time . Without artificially delayed for decades, reforms the Russian market, structural reform would cause a shock . in this sector would force 5-6% of the electorate to change jobs, a painful The Belarusian economy is heavily process for many, which would likely dependent on Russia . All but a few turn them against the new power after economic sectors are under Russian such an upheaval . Other industries influence, either in terms of export would have better prospects of finding output, import input or credit . Such new export markets (including subcon- dependence can only be shed through tracting for industrial producers), and long-term purposeful action, which the negative social impact of reforms requires political will . would be smaller for them .

As well as the overall dependence on Belarus’s oil and IT sectors, which foreign trade with Russia, it is impor- have received a lot of media attention, tant to recognise that the single largest do not face as formidable a reform area of activity in the Belarusian econ- challenge as the agriculture and food omy is the combination of the food industry, nor do they share the same industry and related agriculture, whose socio-political significance because exports are aimed solely at the Russian their contributions to employment and market . GDP are modest . RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 13

THE STRUCTURE OF BELARUS'S ECONOMY

16%

14% Summary of agriculture and food industry

Wholesale and retail trade, services 12%

Construction 10%

Real estate services Transport and communications 8% Agriculture and forestry

6%

Chemical industry Food industry Share of GDP by economic sector economic of GDP by Share 4% Financial services Production of machinery and equipment Electricity, gas and water supply Production of building materials Other manufactured articles 2% Public utility and social services Metals industry Paper, cellulose timber and wood products Production of coke Production of transport vehicles 0% and petroleum products 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20% Share of the labour force

The agriculture and food industries form Belarus’s largest group of industries in terms of their combined impact on both employment and GDP .

SOURCE: ESTONIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

A key economic issue concerning for the labour force released as a result Belarus’s political process is the speed of structural reforms will depend on at which the country will manage to the choices of Belarusian voters in the reform its labour market . Whether and next elections . where new employment will be found

UNLOCKING BELARUS’S FUTURE WILL REQUIRE A MAJOR OVERHAUL OF ITS LABOUR MARKET – HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE WILL NEED NEW EMPLOYMENT . 14 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

RUSSIA IN SEARCH OF A NEW HEAD OF STATE FOR BELARUS

Russia is unsure about how to keep Belarus in its sphere of influence after a controlled transfer of power.

The tried-and-tested relationship protests, Russia’s leadership decided between the Kremlin and Alyaksandr to take control of the media conversa- Lukashenka spanning the past 26 tion about the events in Belarus . RT years shows that Russia has always (formerly Russia Today) propagandists supported Lukashenka in elections, were sent to Belarus to spin a narra- despite occasional tensions . Lukashen- tive of a Western attack on Belarusian ka has kept the strategically important sovereignty . Russian security opera- neighbour under control, ensuring tives were also placed on the ground that it remains in Russia’s sphere of to curb the protests and disrupt their influence and preventing its integration organization . with the West . Russia’s political and financial assis- The scale and duration of the protests tance to Belarus comes with special following the presidential election in conditions attached . Russia conducted Belarus came as an unpleasant surprise a thorough audit of Belarus’s public fi- to the Russian leadership . After initial nances before granting the loan assis- confusion, the Kremlin decided to con- tance agreed in September 2020; one tinue to publicly support Lukashenka as of the major criticisms was unjustified the legitimate president, at least in the internal security spending . short term . Over the years, Lukashenka has monopolised relations with Russia While it extends a helping hand, Russia in Belarus, which means that Russia is simultaneously using the political is unable to find another candidate to crisis in Belarus and Lukashenka’s replace him quickly . At the height of the weakened domestic and foreign policy

THE LONGER THE KREMLIN BACKS ALYAKSANDR LUKASHENKA, THE MORE IT RISKS BELARUSIANS’ ALIENATION FROM RUSSIA . RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 15

 After initial confusion, the Kremlin decided to continue to support Lukashenka, at least in the short term

SOURCE: VALERY SHARIFULIN / TASS

position to expand its interests and the attitude of Belarusians towards strengthen its influence in Belarus . Russia, which has so far been posi- The country is being pressured to draft tive . But Russia also wants to avoid constitutional amendments that Russia Lukashenka being ousted by protesters believes would calm the street protests at all costs, which could encourage the and allow for a controlled change of people in Russia to follow suit . Russia power . It would be in Russia’s interests would like to see Lukashenka’s succes- to have a weak president and several sor to be predictable and loyal to the centres of power vying for the Kremlin’s Kremlin . However, there are no easy attention, forming a pool from which to solutions for Russia to ensure that find people loyal to the Kremlin . the successor is aligned with Russia’s interests, while also preventing the The Kremlin knows that continued strengthening of Western influence in support for Lukashenka jeopardises Belarus . 16 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

RUSSIA CONTINUES ITS AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE

Russia is pressuring Ukraine to recognise the representatives of the occupying forces as legitimate negotiating partners.

Russia’s occupation of Crimea contin- in the Trilateral Contact Group, Rus- ues, and no progress has been made sia is putting pressure on Ukraine towards a settlement of the conflict to recognise the occupying forces’ in eastern Ukraine, despite Ukraine’s representatives as legitimate partners, efforts . Although armed clashes along which is obviously unacceptable to the Donbass “contact line” are signif- Ukraine . icantly fewer after another ceasefire, The Russian side is increasingly in force from 27 July 2020, there is no blaming Ukraine for withdrawing from political solution in sight . the Minsk agreements, most recent- The reintegration of the occupied Don- ly finding a pretext during the local bass into Ukraine under the conditions elections in Ukraine, criticising the demanded by Russia is unacceptable Ukrainian parliament’s decision to rule to the Ukrainian authorities . However, out elections in the occupied Donbass . Russia is playing for time, expecting Although Ukraine would have been that an unresolved conflict will sooner prepared to consider holding elections or later force the Ukrainian leadership in the eastern occupied territories, this to make concessions . is not conceivable under conditions that make it impossible to comply with The Normandy Summit on 9 Decem- Ukrainian law . ber 2019 has not been followed up, and many of the agreements reached The reality in the occupied territories of there have not been implemented . In eastern Ukraine is determined by the the negotiations to resolve the conflict occupying powers, which can restore

RUSSIA IS PLAYING FOR TIME, EXPECTING THAT AN UNRESOLVED CONFLICT WILL SOONER OR LATER FORCE THE UKRAINIAN LEADERSHIP TO MAKE CONCESSIONS . RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 17

RUSSIAN FORCES IN EASTERN UKRAINE – 1st AND 2nd ARMY CORPS

Kramatorsk

Lugansk

xxx Debaltseve 2nd Army Corps Gorlivka UKRAINE

Donetsk xxx 1st Army Corps Personnel: 35 000

Tanks: 481

RUSSIA Armoured vehicles: 914

Artillery: Taganrog 720 Mariupol MRLs: The occupying forces are equipped with tanks, armoured 202 vehicles, artillery and multiple rocket launchers in quantities that only a few European nations can match .

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF UKRAINE 18 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

military pressure on Ukraine at any time with the help of Russian-led and equipped armed forces . The occupying forces have tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) in quantities that only a few European nations can match (see map and table) . The presence of such a threat in the occupied part of Ukraine, a European nation, is a clear sign of Russia’s unwillingness to renounce aggression .

The situation in eastern Ukraine and the search for a solution to the conflict have unjustifiably sidelined the issue to accept Russia’s occupation of Crimea of the occupation of Crimea . Russia and the resolution of the conflict in feels confident and has not made the eastern Ukraine on the terms dictated slightest concessions on Crimea . On by Russia . In Belarus’s case, Russia has the contrary, using the difficulties with warned Western powers against inter- freshwater supply to Crimea, Russia fering in the country’s internal affairs is seeking to present the victim as the while imposing no such restriction on perpetrator, condemning Ukraine for itself when it comes to Ukraine . shutting off the water canal supplying In the run-up to elections in Ukraine, Crimea in 2014 . Russia is attempting the Russian leadership has extended to turn the Crimean water supply issue particular hospitality to the politicians into a domestic policy divide in Ukraine, of the Ukrainian Opposition Platform creating the illusion that Russia could – For Life . President Putin’s longtime make concessions in the Donbass if acquaintance, Ukrainian oligarch and Ukraine restored the water supply . member of parliament Viktor Med- Russia fully supports pro-Russian forc- vedchuk, is a frequent visitor with the es in Ukrainian politics, who are willing Russian head of state . Before the 25 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 19

 Ukrainian opposition politician Viktor Medvedchuk in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 6 October 2020

SOURCE: ALEXEI DRUZHININ / TASS

that Ukrainians should look to Russia for security and development . Med- vedchuk also promoted the Russian coronavirus vaccine, claiming he had achieved immunity with the help of the excellent Russian formula while on holiday in Crimea and asked Putin to allocate vaccine to Ukraine . This way Medvedchuk became a part of Russia’s massive vaccine campaign and put pressure on the Ukrainian government, October 2020 local elections in Ukraine, as a vaccine procurement from Russia Medvedchuk was one of the few to be would come with political strings granted an audience with Putin, other- attached . Medvedchuk also managed wise wary of face-to-face meetings due to negotiate a promise to loosen the to the coronavirus threat . After such sanctions against Ukraine from the meetings, the main message sent to Russian president; indeed, only a week the public is a declaration of the insep- later, Russia exempted three Ukrainian arable destinies and close ties between companies from restrictions . Ukraine and Russia . With such unabashed influence activ- The visit by Medvedchuk, who con- ities, Russia hopes to help Ukrainian trols an extensive media network in political forces that would prefer to Ukraine, was intended to influence the gravitate towards Moscow and oppose Ukrainian electorate, convincing them Ukraine’s chosen European path .

RUSSIA SUPPORTS UKRAINIAN POLITICAL FORCES THAT GRAVITATE TOWARDS MOSCOW . 20 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

VIOLENT UPHEAVAL IN THE CAUCASUS

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resulted in a significantly increased Russian military presence in the South Caucasus.

On Sunday morning, 27 September THE REASONS AND 2020, the Azerbaijani Armed Forces PRECONDITIONS FOR launched an offensive in the Na- GOING TO WAR gorno-Karabakh conflict zone . Armeni- The accepted view is that war breaks an and Nagorno-Karabakh units were out when there are the readiness, hit by massive indirect artillery fire capability and opportunity to start along the entire contact line, followed military action . This means that one by an armour offensive . The defenders side of the conflict is prepared to were initially able to hold their posi- use military force, deems its military tions, but the outcome of the conflict, capabilities sufficient to succeed on which lasted almost six weeks, was the battlefield and sees a favourable clear – Armenia suffered a military window of opportunity . defeat . With a ceasefire agreement that came into force in the early hours Before starting hostilities in Na- of 10 November 2020, Azerbaijan gorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani regained control of a large part of leadership was convinced that the Nagorno-Karabakh itself and seven conflict would not be resolved through districts surrounding the separatist negotiations, at least not in a way it region . These are areas that the central considered acceptable . At the same government of Azerbaijan lost to Ar- time, Azerbaijan had been purposefully menia in the First Nagorno-Karabakh investing in developing its military ca- War ending in 1994 . A status quo last- pabilities for years . Arms and defence ing more than a quarter of a century procurements had been accompanied had been broken with a major political by large-scale military exercises and upheaval for the South Caucasus more Turkish-backed training, which to- broadly . gether had significantly improved the RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 21

NAGORNO-KARABAKH AFTER THE CEASEFIRE

RUSSIA GEORGIA

AZERBAIJAN

Yerevan

ARMENIA

TURKEY Stepanakert

IRAN

areas under Armenian control and secured by Russian peacekeepers following the ceasere agreement

areas once again controlled by Azerbaijan following the ceasere agreement

the administrative boundaries of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast under the Soviet Union

SOURCE: ESTONIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 22 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY  Alongside reconnaissance and attack drones, SOURCE: ARMENIAN MINISTRY OF traditional indirect fire played an important role in the DEFENCE VIA REUTERS Nagorno-Karabakh war. The photograph shows an Armenian fighter operating a D-30 howitzer

Azerbaijani Armed Forces’ military Two other factors probably played a capabilities . role in Azerbaijani long-term think- ing . First, Armenia’s growing defence The last necessary condition – a fa- budget and rearmament efforts – in vourable opportunity – was presented another five years, Azerbaijan might by a combination of several factors . not have enjoyed the military superiori- The most important of these was the ty it did in autumn 2020 . Turkish political leadership’s readiness to support Azerbaijan both politically Second, the COVID-19 pandemic and and militarily, at a time when Armenia the accompanying economic crisis and its strategic ally Russia had been would have likely affected Azerbaijan’s hit hard by the coronavirus pandem- domestic political stability – growing ic . The Western powers, too, were dissatisfaction in society might have preoccupied with the fight against called into question President Ilham the coronavirus, economic issues and Aliyev’s holding on to power . A military domestic policy . victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, on the RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 23

THE SECOND NAGORNO- KARABAKH WAR WAS ALSO A DEFEAT FOR INTERNATIONAL other hand, represented a historic achievement for Azerbaijanis and will ORGANISATIONS AND THE continue to legitimise the country’s POST-COLD WAR SECURITY current political system for years to come . ARCHITECTURE IN GENERAL .

POLITICAL by both Armenia itself and the wider CONSEQUENCES international community . Neverthe- less, Armenia lost the war . This could The main consequence of the Sec- jeopardise Russia’s credibility as a ond Nagorno-Karabakh War is the guarantor of the security of its allies in strengthening of Russian and Turk- the future . ish influence in the South Caucasus . Russia’s military presence in the Turkey, in turn, has emerged as a region has grown significantly . Within regional powerhouse shaping the po- Azerbaijan’s territory, who won the litical situation in the South Caucasus . conflict on the battlefield, there now is And in addition to a Russian presence, an enclave secured by Russian peace- there is now a permanent Turkish mili- keepers, a solution that both Armenia tary presence on Azerbaijani territory . and Azerbaijan had previously opposed for years . Furthermore, Armenia will be As well as Armenia, the Second Na- increasingly dependent on Russia, with gorno-Karabakh War was also a defeat the safety of the Armenians remaining for international organisations and the in Nagorno-Karabakh and the military post-Cold War security architecture in security of Armenia itself now directly general, because two major regional dependent on Russia’s goodwill . This powers essentially decided the out- will affect Armenia’s domestic and come of the war . The content and style foreign policy in the future . On the of this agreement are reminiscent other hand, the course and outcome of of the spheres-of-influence thinking the war also involve risks for Russia . and power politics that characterised Armenia’s alliance with Russia was international relations in the 19th and seen as a strategic security guarantee 20th centuries . 24 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

RUSSIA IN AFRICA: AMBITIONS AND REALITY  President of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Vladimir SOURCE: KREMLIN .RU / Putin at the Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi CC BY 4 0.

Leaning on Africa, Russia projects itself as a great power, its geopolitical worldview firmly set on demonstrating the nation’s influence.

In recent years, the Kremlin has Russia’s growing interest in Africa increasingly focused on Africa, which was illustrated by the first Russia-­ offers opportunities for both strategic Africa Summit in Sochi in 2019, which and tactical advances – achievements received wide media coverage, making to show off Russia’s prominence and promises to double Russia’s trade with importance . Africa in the next five years . Vladimir RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 25

RUSSIA’S TOP TRADING PARTNERS VS ITS MAIN TRADING PARTNERS IN AFRICA (2019)

China 110 919 Germany 53 161 Belarus 33 346 ...

Egypt 6246 Algeria 3394 Morocco 1277 South Africa 1108 Senegal 715 Tunisia 657 Nigeria 421 Togo 400 Sudan 275 Côte d'Ivoire 275 ... 0 20 000 40 000 60 000 80 000 100 000 120 000 million USD

SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE

Putin and Egypt’s President Abdel African debts to Russia were written Fattah el-Sisi, then Chairperson of the off . African Union, opened the emphatical- Having advertised its campaign to ly grand affair . All African nations were expand influence in Africa at the Sochi represented, most of them at the level Summit, Russia has since lost mo- of head of state . According to official mentum in its advance towards these announcements, more than 50 trade objectives . agreements worth about 12 .5 billion US dollars were signed in Sochi . As a Russia’s trade volumes in Africa symbolic step, 20 billion US dollars of remain modest compared to several 26 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY  Russian military conglomerate Rostec representative SOURCE: ALGERIAN Dmitry Shugaev in a meeting with Algeria’s National Army NATIONAL TELEVISION Chief of Staff Saïd Chengriha in Algeria, September 2020

major powers, which enjoy a significant According to the Stockholm Interna- lead on the continent . Although Russia tional Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), increased its exports to Africa by 18% Africa accounts for 17% of Russia’s and imports by 11% in 2018, trade arms exports . The biggest recipient of flows have since been on a down- Russian arms in Africa is Algeria, with ward trend . The already much smaller which Russia has a strategic partner- volume of African trade compared to ship agreement, covering three key China and Western countries dropped areas - military, energy and politics . from $20 billion to $17 billion in 2019 Another important partner is Egypt and reached only $5 .8 billion in the due to its strategic position between first half of 2020 . Africa and the Middle East . Russia has successfully built a well-established Due to limited resources and strategic and multi-layered relationship with interests, Russia’s focus is on cooper- Egypt in both military cooperation and ation with the North African countries energy . However, Russia’s trade flows along the EU’s southern border . with Egypt are on a downward trend, RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 27

as with other North African countries . the guise of offering assistance to Rosatom’s construction of Egypt’s conflict-affected countries or fighting first nuclear power plant in El Dabaa piracy and terrorism . has stalled, as Egypt postponed the The region also interests Russia from issuance of a construction licence until a long-term strategic perspective, 2021 . Progress on the 525-hectare the objective being to counteract the Russian Industrial Zone within the West’s political, military and economic Suez Canal Economic Zone, part of influence . Russia is engaging local President el-Sisi’s large-scale Suez circles active in civil society in order Canal expansion project, is also slow . to increase its influence and carry out The project involves tax advantages activities opposed to the West . For promised by Egypt and would be an example, in Mali, several organisations export platform to Africa for Russian actively disseminate pro-Russian automotive, oil and gas industries . messages and conduct information Another strategically important loca- campaigns against France and the tion for Russia is Libya, which would West more broadly . One of these is the offer Russia the opportunity to deploy Groupe Des Patriotes Du Mali, which units on NATO’s southern flank and has publicly declared its goal of devel- provide greater flexibility for operations oping close ties with Russia . However, in the Mediterranean . Libya’s situation the impact of such organisations is volatile, and Russia aspires to be a remains insignificant, and Russia does key player in the peace negotiations not really have the ability to mobilise and the country’s political process . large numbers of people in Mali with As in Syria, Russia hopes to establish the support of local activists . itself in Libya’s most lucrative sectors Seeking to gain better control over the (e g. . infrastructure and energy) once region, Russia is making the most of the conflict is resolved . the opportunities available to expand Sub-Saharan Africa is less important its activities, increase its influence over to Russia . It focuses on arms exports decision-making processes and “man- and economic relations there, especial- age” conflicts . As in Libya, Russia is ly in the mining, energy and agricul- actively “resolving” the conflict in the tural sectors . Russia often acts under Central African Republic (CAR), where 28 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY  BRDM-2 armoured personnel carriers, a gift from SOURCE: CAMILLE LAFFONT / AFP Russia to CAR, on show in Bangui in October 2020

favourable conditions are being created Companies associated with oligarch for expanding business opportuni- Yevgeny Prigozhin have been operating ties with the support of the Russian in the CAR since 2017 . The Russian authorities . Under the guise of defend- leadership has provided him with ing the interests of the CAR, Russia is the opportunity to enter into lucra- reaping the benefits from getting UN tive business agreements regarding sanctions eased, thus cultivating an minerals and other raw materials . In image of a great power that assists return, Prigozhin is expanding Rus- African countries and pushes through sia’s influence in the CAR . Since 2017, vital decisions for their populations . under pressure from Russia, the UN In reality, Russia’s activities in the has gradually eased the sanctions CAR are driven mainly by its business imposed on the CAR in 2013, and interests . with the approval of the UN Sanctions

OVERESTIMATING ITS INFLUENCE IN THE REGION, RUSSIA HAS FAILED TO REACH ITS OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA . RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 29

EXPANDING ITS SUPPORT AT THE UN

Another reason Russia is stepping of Crimea (UNGAR 68/262) . Only 19 of up cooperation with African countries the 54 African countries voted in favour is to secure their support at the UN of the resolution; Sudan and Zimbabwe on issues that are important to Rus- voted against it . In the past, Russia sia . African nations represent over a has secured a favourable outcome for quarter of the vote in the UN General Zimbabwe and Sudan by vetoing sanc- Assembly . They are a useful ally to tions against them . In 2018, when the help swing the vote Russia’s way on resolution calling for the withdrawal of decisions concerning, for example, Russian troops from Crimea (UNGAR Syria or Ukraine . In 2014, 58 countries, 73/194) was voted on, even more Afri- including Egypt, Algeria, South Africa, can countries were absent or abstained . Rwanda and Gabon, abstained from Among them were 18 countries that voting in the General Assembly on a had supported UNGAR 68/262, includ- resolution condemning the annexation ing the CAR and Libya .

Committee and based on cooperation private sector, the expansion requires agreements with the CAR, Russia has no significant investment or resourc- begun supporting the Central African es from the state . Private operators Armed Forces (FACA) with weapons allow for flexible administrative and training . Enhancing defence coop- ­arrangements and have no formal ties eration with the CAR, increasing arms to their country . This allows Russia exports and providing security services to deny its involvement altogether if has also enabled a Prigozhin-affiliated necessary . If the situation in the host company to benefit from the easing country deteriorates and Russia is of restrictions on mining operations, ­unable to contribute effectively to con- and extract diamonds more safely and flict resolution, it can withdraw without export them more easily . much difficulty, leaving the situation for others to sort out, and thereby It is convenient for Russia to rely on adding to instability throughout the private corporations to expand its region . influence in Africa; financed by the 30 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

A regime that is closely tied to an ageing autocrat is showing growing signs of fatigue. The system seems to lack ideas as well as energy and opportunities for elegant political manoeuvring.

SOURCE: ALEXEI DRUZHININ / AP RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY 31

2020 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

By changing the constitution, the Kremlin legitimised the current president remaining in power after the 2024 election.

Questions and speculation concerning structures . The resetting, or “zeroing”, the future of Vladimir Putin and, more of Putin’s presidential terms to date broadly, Russia’s power structures also came as a surprise to the majority after 2024 have been around for of Russian society; quite a few people, some time . The solution arrived with especially among the middle classes in constitutional amendments . It proved large cities, had hoped that the end of a disappointment for policy observ- Putin’s presidency in 2024 would ush- ers expecting some brilliant political er in at least some positive changes in manoeuvre worthy of the momen- the country’s political system . tousness of this “2024 problem” . A day before the State Duma was due The constitutional amendments’ to finish considering the draft amend- main goal was to give the incumbent ments a simple addition was made: president the right to run again in a presidential candidate’s previous 2024 . The rest of the amendments terms in office before the amendments and proposals made during the entered into force would be discount- discussions were above all a cover to ed, removing this formal obstacle to disguise the initiative’s real purpose, Putin’s running for another presidency . which was kept from the public for as Most political analysts had expected long as possible . The constitutional that Putin would continue to hold on amendments also included clauses to his de facto powers after 2024, aimed solely at increasing the reform’s but the simple resetting of previous popularity, such as the indexation of presidential terms had been considered pensions and social benefits . However, unlikely due to its lack of sophistica- these were worked out in a way that tion and questionable legitimacy . The did nothing to actually reinforce social most widely held expectation was that guarantees . Alongside this hollow a new position would be created for rhetoric, several amendments were the current president employing some made to strengthen the president’s cosmetic reshuffling of the power power; these did not add anything to 32 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

Putin’s existing powers but simply presidential powers . However, leading enshrined in the constitution some de up to the second reading, a number of facto presidential powers already in proposed amendments were publicised place . A case in point is the weakening through a State Duma committee and of the institution of the prime minister; a special working group; the bulk of in the future, the president can remove these was of questionable legal value the prime minister separately from but conveyed generally accessible the cabinet . Moreover, the president ideological statements . By continually will appoint the foreign minister and keeping these in the media, an attempt ministers in charge of security and law was made to create the illusion of a enforcement, subject only to consulta- broad-based discussion, once again tion with the Federation Council . muddying the waters . By the time the issue of “zeroing” Putin’s previous The public narrative concerning the terms was put on the table, many had constitutional amendments repeatedly already forgotten that amendments underwent carefully deliberated chang- announced at the first reading had in- es of direction to avoid people’s atten- creased presidential powers . The lead- tion focusing on inconvenient issues ership’s desire to hide until the very for the ruling elite; the main objective last minute Putin’s intention to stay was to conceal the restructuring’s in power also showed that the ruling ultimate goal for as long as possible . elite is distinctly aware of the society’s For example, when first introducing growing weariness with the regime . the idea of constitutional changes in a speech to the Federal Assembly in Although the current legislation did January, President Putin referred to not require a referendum on these the need to increase the parliament’s specific constitutional amendments, role, although the proposals in the the Russian leadership was determined president’s first package of amend- to hold one anyway – to legitimise ments only concerned increasing the Putin’s continuing as president after presidential powers . The first package the 2024 elections . Therefore it was also included a proposal to expand the important to gain majority support State Council’s role, which led to spec- for the amendments in an official ulation about Putin’s intention to step vote . Despite the official success story in as head of the State Council from – 77 92%. of voters supported the 2024, and diverted attention away amendments – many regions report- from the proposals to strengthen the edly experienced serious problems RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY 33

PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN’S APPROVAL RATING UNTIL NOVEMBER 2020

The rating is based on VTsIOM’s surveys in which respondents were asked an open-ended question to name politicians whom they trust to make important government decisions .

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 2006-2008 2009-2011 2012-2013 2014-2015 2016-2020 0

SOURCE: RUSSIAN PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH CENTRE (VTsIOM)

achieving a satisfactory result in the unjust system of power would last referendum, as well as witnessing indefinitely as a result of the zeroing . the population’s growing weariness It is also worth noting that the most with the ruling elite and Vladimir important background factor inciting Putin . Some hitherto pro-regime the protest vote was the influence of voter groups showed their dissatis- the new media . Published sociological faction in the form of an unusually research also points to a significant large protest vote . The protest voters decline in Putin’s support in recent were mainly opposed to the zeroing of years . Examples include the approv- previous presidential terms . They also al ratings published by the Russian cited opposition to Putin personally, ­Public Opinion Research Center dissatisfaction with the principle that ­(VTsIOM), an organisation with an one person should remain in power for above-­average relationship with the so long, and the fact that the existing Russian authorities . 34 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

Vladimir Putin very likely intends to avoided a swell of internal tensions start a new term as president in 2024 . among the elite due to the chang- He could only be forced to abandon es . However, given Putin’s age, the this plan by a sudden serious health solution is strictly temporary; in the issue or growing popular opposition longer term, the question of what the beyond a critical level that the author- regime’s operational logic and the hier- ities can no longer control . The events archy of power will be like after Putin’s of 2020 represent a guarantee for departure will still build tensions within the continuation of the status quo for the elite . Increasing tensions among Russia’s ruling elite . For most of them, the ruling elite are, of course, only the news of Putin’s plan to continue one of the threats that Putin’s regime was positive, as this would ensure the was hoping to alleviate by resolving continuation of the current system the “2024 problem” early . Given the of power and way of life beyond the population’s growing weariness with 2024 election . Any fundamental the current power elite and deepening changes could affect the balance of critical moods, it was safer for the power within the elite, which the more authorities to address the key aspects conservative among them would prob- of Putin’s continuation in office – a ably want to avoid . By resolving the possible cause for protest – as early 2024 problem well in time, Putin also and unexpectedly as possible .

THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS WAS TO ALLOW VLADIMIR PUTIN TO RUN FOR REELECTION IN 2024 . THE REST WAS MOSTLY A COVER TO DISGUISE THE REAL PURPOSE OF THE INITIATIVE . RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY 35

INCREASING DOMESTIC TENSIONS AND THE KREMLIN’S RESPONSE

Increasing tensions combined with the regime’s rigidity and limited methods create preconditions for domestic political crises. The stagnant regime’s ability to respond and adapt will only deteriorate over the next decade, further complicating the situation.

Growing domestic political tensions shook his image as a strong leader . In have characterised life in Russia this context, it is especially important throughout recent years, and 2020 was to consider the changes in the Russian no exception, as general dissatisfac- media space over the last decade: the tion and moods critical of the regime share of online media in Russians’ me- were exacerbated by the effects of the dia consumption has steadily increased, COVID-19 epidemic and the accompa- while television watching and the nying restrictions . In addition to the viewers’ trust in this hitherto important socio-economic effects, the outbreak pillar of the regime has been steadily of the virus brought the shortcomings declining . It is increasingly difficult for of the Russian medical system to the the Kremlin to assert its own interpreta- public’s attention more than usual (see tion of events in the much more diverse graph on page 39); the weaknesses online media . It is worth noting that, and questionable leadership skills of according to a Levada Centre survey, the political elite also became more the number of respondents who place visible in the time of crisis . From the more trust in TV as a news source has very beginning of the first major wave consistently declined, while trust in of infections, the president was clearly online sources and social media has reluctant to act decisively and take re- been going up . sponsibility . During both the spring and The methods and rationale of the autumn outbreak, President Putin un- Russian power elite in controlling do- derlined the regional leaders’ responsi- mestic political tensions have remained bility, conveniently reserving for himself unchanged – the main emphasis is the role of an overseer . The president’s on intimidating and, if necessary, apparent personal fear of the virus also directly subduing the regime’s critics 36 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

THE MAIN INFORMATION CHANNELS AND MOST TRUSTED NEWS SOURCES AMONG THE RUSSIAN POPULATION

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 2009 2013 2014 2015 2016 2018 2018 2020 2020 March August January August

Television is the main information channel The internet and social media are the main Television is the most trusted information information channel channel The internet and social media are the most trusted information channel

SOURCE: LEVADA CENTRE

and opposition activists; the pressure to all voters: becoming more popular applied by the authorities has increased than Kremlin-backed candidates and with each year . The central government deviating from the central government’s is also looking more and more on edge, agenda will sooner or later bring grave in many cases overreacting in ways consequences . Unfortunately for the that have been counterproductive . For Kremlin, it turned out the conditions example, replacing the governor of on the ground had been misjudged, the Khabarovsk Krai was intended to resulting in several months of sharp create a more favourable setting for confrontation with the region’s popula- the central government in the autumn tion, which attracted unwanted atten- 2020 regional elections; the forced tion across the nation . removal on murder charges of the top official elected on the back of protest Another overreaction by the Russian votes was expected to send a message power elite – the poisoning of Alexei RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY 37

Navalny by the FSB – had much more also arise in Russia in the near future, or serious and far-reaching consequenc- how much time and room for manoeu- es . The very strong pressure from the vring the central government has left . It Russian authorities on Navalny’s organ- is important to note here that the accu- isations, which intensified significantly mulation of dissatisfaction leading up to from the summer of 2019, left no doubt a regime change is not a linear process . that the Kremlin perceived him as a On the contrary, political activities and serious threat . With increased domestic the social situation can either slow it tensions, the Kremlin decided to use down or escalate it . However, it is safe even more radical solutions than before . to say that the changed attitude in so- The assassination attempt on a leading ciety and growing moods critical of the opposition politician demonstrated the government have already significantly Kremlin’s deteriorating environmental altered the face and logic of the Russian perception – it clearly failed to fully regime . Repressive measures have now predict the impact of such an event on become the primary tool for maintain- Russia’s international position . When ing and defending power . the events came to light, Russia’s behaviour, especially the chosen PR In 2021, the main challenge for Russia’s strategy, at times gave the impression ruling elite will be to achieve a suitable that the decision-makers had simply result in the State Duma election amidst lost the plot . This was also the case heightened political tensions in the with the Kremlin’s justifications for country . The upcoming election will also jailing Navalny on his return to Russia . show the extent to which Navalny’s poi- soning helped to make the domestic po- In 2020, yet more legislative amend- litical environment more convenient for ments further restricting the already the Kremlin and keep opposition activity very limited opportunities for opposition in check . The undoubted goal of those activities and expressing civic opinions in power is to achieve a State Duma were introduced . Notable examples majority for United Russia, ideally a include extending the scope of the constitutional majority . It is possible that “foreign agents” law and the amend- new players will be added to the list of ments concerning the rules for public systemic, or controlled, opposition par- gatherings . ties that are allowed to run for the State The growing domestic political dis- Duma; several new systemic opposition satisfaction of recent years raises the parties were established in 2020, three question whether a situation similar to of which also made it to regional parlia- that in Belarus in autumn 2020 might ments in the autumn elections, paving 38 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

NEW PLAYERS ON THE KREMLIN- CURATED POLITICAL SCENE

In the autumn 2020 regional elections, three new systemic opposition parties – New People, For the Truth and the Green Alternative – were elected to regional par- liaments, paving the way for them to run in the forthcoming State Duma election . In addition to these three, other new parties were formed at the Kremlin’s initiative in the first months of 2020, but have so far remained less active . In early 2021, For the Truth announced plans to join A Just Russia, another systemic opposition party .

the way for them to run in the State Alternative party, which focuses on envi- Duma election . By introducing new po- ronmental issues . However, given that litical parties to elections, the Kremlin’s recasting the protagonist’s role in this political technologists hope, on the one national democracy spectacle is not an hand, to renew the systemic opposition, option; the essential condition for select- and on the other hand, to divide the ing groups or individuals for supporting protest votes against United Russia roles is that they must not be or become between different parties within the sys- too attractive to the electorate and temic opposition . Moreover, many of the threaten to overshadow the protago- new systemic opposition parties have nist . With these requirements in place, been set up to channel the mood of this any attempt to renew the ruling elite’s or that specific group of voters critical of political landscape is bound to have only the regime; examples include the Green a limited impact . RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY 39

HEALTHY LIFE EXPECTANCY AND PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE

Healthy life expectancy 75 Japan

Spain France Switzerland Cyprus Italy 73 Australia Norway South Korea Israel Austria Sweden Portugal Finland Greece Denmark United Germany 71 Slovenia Kingdom

Czech Republic China 69 Poland Qatar Slovakia Estonia USA

67 Hungary Latvia Baltic states’ average Lithuania Kyrgyzstan Caucasus states’ average 65 Georgia Uzbekistan Ukraine Russia Central Asian states’ average 63 Kazakhstan

Russia’s health care system is glaringly inefficient: despite a 2 or 3 times Indonesia Turkmenistan higher public health expenditure, healthy life expectancy remains at the 61 Egypt same level with Central Asian countries .

A vivid account of the Russian health care system’s extremely backward India situation emerges from a Russian Accounts Chamber report’s section on 59 Iraq medical institutions providing paediatric primary care:

Pakistan » 30% of medical institutions completely lack a water supply; » 52% of medical institutions lack a hot water supply; 57 Congo » 35% of medical institutions lack a sewerage connection; Angola » 41% of medical institutions lack central heating . Haiti 55 0 $ 1000 $ 2000 $ 3000 $ 4000 $ 5000 $ 6000 $ 7000 $ 8000 $ 9000 $ 10 000 $

Health expenditure per capita per year

SOURCE: HEALTH EXPENDITURE 2012-16 AVERAGE, WHO DATA FOR 2016 40 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

RUSSIA’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC DOWNTURN

In 2020, the economic crisis was accompanied by the Russian population’s rapid income loss.

The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic has Due to the rapid spread of the corona- sharply highlighted the Russian virus, the Kremlin was forced to impose economy’s structural weaknesses, the a “non-working period” from 30 March main factors being over-reliance on the to 12 May on the vast majority of com- export of energy carriers, an uncertain panies and institutions, combined with investment climate and the public an obligation to maintain staff salaries . sector’s excessive involvement in the However, this proved overwhelming for economy . For Russia, the situation is many businesses, as state aid meas- further complicated because the coun- ures provided only partial relief . try’s economy had not yet recovered According to Russia’s federal statistics from the previous crisis in 2014-15 . service, Rosstat, the country’s GDP fell The plunging oil prices on the world by 8% in the second quarter of 2020 . market caused by the pandemic During the second wave of COVID-19, reduced Russia’s export volumes by the Kremlin has sought to avoid impos- almost a third in the first half of 2020 . ing severe quarantine measures so as Revenues from the oil and gas sec- not to repeat the second quarter’s dark tor to the Russian state budget also scenario . In 2020 as a whole, Russia’s decreased by a third compared to the economy is predicted to shrink by about first half of 2019, significantly hamper- 4% . While growth may be restored from ing the country’s ability to implement the second half of 2021, as the virus effective economic measures to fight recedes, it is likely to be relatively slow, the crisis . The ongoing economic crisis given the build-up of systemic econom- hit all sectors of the Russian economy ic problems . hard . In addition to declining export One of the main goals of the Russian earnings, domestic consumption also government’s economic policy during contracted against the background of the crisis has been to maintain the rising unemployment and falling real country’s foreign currency reserves as income . RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY 41

AVERAGE GROSS MONTHLY WAGES 2006-2020, USD Average gross monthly wages 2006-20 (USD)

2000

Estonia

1500

1000 Russia

500

0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

SOURCES: ROSSTAT, STATISTICS ESTONIA

much as possible, not to spend them sharply due to rising unemployment on economic stimulus or social bene- and wage cuts . According to Rosstat, fits . To cover the state budget deficit Russians’ real incomes decreased and public investment needs, the tax by 4 .3% year on year in the first burden on business has been stepped nine months of 2020 . According to up, and government internal borrowing forecasts, the population’s annual has been significantly increased . This real ­income in 2020 will be 10% lower policy will certainly not contribute to than in 2013 . Therefore, Russia’s economic recovery . living standards have essentially ­stagnated for a whole decade (see The Russian population’s socio-­ figure) . economic situation has deteriorated

RUSSIA’S LIVING STANDARDS HAVE STAGNATED FOR A DECADE . 42 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

RUSSIAN POPULATION’S RAPID LOSS OF INCOME DURING THE CRISIS Russia’s population groups by monthly income, February-June 2020, RUB Russia’s population groups by monthly income, February-June 2020, RUB

40 February

June 30

20

10 Percentage of respondents Percentage

0 Up to 5,000 5,000-15,000 15,000-25,000 25,000-35,000 35,000-50,000 50,000-100,000

SOURCE: ROSGOSSTRAKH ZHIZN

In February 2020, the Russian insurance earning a salary corresponding to a mid- provider Rosgosstrakh Zhizn, with the help of dle-class living standard of 50,000–100,000 the Perspektiva research centre, conducted a roubles per month, and their share had de- sociological survey on people’s income, asking creased by 4% compared to February . In June the respondents to state their average monthly 2020, 8 1%. of respondents had to cope with income per household member . The survey extreme poverty, i e. . up to 5,000 roubles per was repeated in June to assess the impact of month, and their share had increased by 1 .2 per the COVID-19 epidemic on people’s income . cent . Although this study is unlikely to coincide with the official wage statistics and does not The results showed that in June almost 73% take into account income earned in the shadow of the population placed themselves in the economy, it does show a clear trend – the low-income bracket of up to 25,000 roubles; current economic crisis has rapidly reduced the the share of people in this income group had income of Russia’s middle class and pushed increased by 9 1. percentage points since Feb- more families to the brink of poverty . ruary . Only 3 .5% of the respondents reported RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY 43

According to Russia’s official statistics, other economic and political tensions as of the end of June 2020, 19 9. mil- entangling Russia, and the massive lion people, or 13 .5% of the country’s money printing by the Russian central population, lived below the subsistence bank . If the economic crisis drags on, minimum (11,468 roubles or about 128 Russia’s financial sector may also face euros per month) . Year on year, this major difficulties . number had increased by 1 .3 million . These statistics also took into account Russia’s stagnated economic perfor- the emergency social benefits paid in mance is mainly due to the govern- connection with the COVID-19 pan- ment’s unwillingness to reform the demic, mainly to families with chil- existing state-capitalist model . This dren . According to the government’s has been accompanied by reduced socio-economic development forecast, competition in the economy, ineffi- the real income of the population cient governance and corruption, as should return to the 3% growth path in well as a decline in investment activity . 2021 and maintain positive dynamics The West’s economic sanctions in in the following years as well . How- response to the Kremlin’s aggressive ever, this may be an overly optimistic foreign policy and the changes taking projection based on the expectation place in the global energy market also that COVID-19 will be a short-term have a significant negative impact phenomenon . In addition, Russians are on Russia’s economic performance . facing accelerating inflation caused by President Putin’s "national projects" the weakening rouble . In addition to investment programme, outlined in Western sanctions and oil prices, the his 2018 ‘May Decrees’, is unlikely to rouble is also negatively affected by meet the expectations placed on it

RUSSIA’S STAGNATED ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IS CAUSED BY THE GOVERNMENT’S UNWILLINGNESS TO REFORM THE EXISTING STATE-CAPITALIST MODEL . 44 RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ECONOMY

RUSSIA’S GDP COMPARED WITH DEVELOPED ECONOMIES AND SELECTED NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

70 000 120 Oil price IMF forecast Developed economies 60 000 Estonia 100 Russia 50 000 Kazakhstan 80 Turkmenistan 40 000 60 30 000

GDP per capita (USD) GDP per capita 40

20 000 USD/bbl) (Brent Oil price

20 10 000

0 0 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025

According to the IMF’s forecast published in October 2020, Russia’s economic develop- ment will continue to be almost twice as slow as the world economy average after the pandemic, causing Russia’s nominal GDP per capita to fall below Kazakhstan’s by 2025, ending up on a par with Turkmenistan .

SOURCE: IMF

regarding accelerating the economy, is likely to befall Russia’s plan for its as it does not seize the real opportu- socio-economic development goals, the nities or address the actual needs of deadlines for which the government the Russian market . According to IMF was forced to postpone from 2024 to forecasts (see figure), the same fate 2030 due to the COVID-19 crisis . The Russian Armed Forces 45

THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES

Despite the pandemic, Russia will continue to focus on its military advantages in Europe, including testing them in the Zapad 2021 military exercise.

Without the public being made aware of this, the Russian Armed Forces also experienced an extensive spread of COVID-19 in 2020 . The training for spring conscripts was delayed due to the procedures employed against  The Russian Minister of Defence SOURCE: MIL .RU / the spread of the virus . The reported presents measures against CC BY 4 0. cases and deaths also included senior COVID-19 to the ministry’s officers, generals and admirals . Whole leadership on 27 November 2020 units and crews were quarantined . Moreover, Russia shows no sign of However, the Russian Armed Forces’ having revised its long-term strategy for long term development and key capa- the armed forces, which is to increase bilities cannot be said to have suffered readiness for a full-scale confrontation significantly due to the virus . The usual with NATO . Regional superiority is still number of conscripts was recruited clearly a top priority for Russia, in terms and the annual major military exercise of the establishing of new military units – this time Kavkaz 2020 – took place and the modernisation and deployment on the typical scale . The customary of missile techologies . strategic nuclear exercise was post- poned by two months primarily due Examples include a new tank regiment to the coronavirus restrictions, but did (2019) and motor rifle division (2020) take place in December . created in the Kaliningrad Oblast . The 46 The Russian Armed Forces

motor rifle division is the sixth consec- systems in Europe and the resulting utive new division established by the change in the balance of power . The Russian Armed Forces in the western Russian leadership remains concerned direction within the past seven years . about US missile defence system Aegis Russia is also deploying the 120 km Ashore facilities in Europe, which in range Bal coastal defence missile sys- Russia’s view would prevent it from tems along the Gulf of Finland’s coast . being able to threaten NATO with a nuclear attack . While strengthening its conventional military capabilities, Russia is also To this end, Russian foreign policy increasing the versatility of its forces, resorts to influence activities and such as reforming the Airborne Forces deception . In September 2019, Rus- (VDV) described below, as an emerging sian President Vladimir Putin sent a new trend . In the future, VDV units are letter to several countries’ leaders, expected to be able to carry out tasks including NATO member states and across the entire spectrum of military China, proposing a moratorium on the engagement, from local conflict to deployment of INF intermediate-range large-scale conventional warfare . missiles in Europe . Moreover, Putin declared that Russia would be willing to Until now, the Russian Armed Forces do this unilaterally . At the same time, have taken it for granted that regional since 2017, three battalions equipped superiority in terms of short- and medi- with the new medium-range missile um-range missile systems and com- system 9M729 (the reason for the clash plete superiority in terms of tactical nu- over the INF Treaty) have been deployed clear warheads are the cornerstones of in the European portion of Russia . their military power in Europe . However, Imposing a formal moratorium to set an with the termination of the INF Treaty, example would therefore not require any the Russian national defence leadership real concessions from Russia but would has begun to worry about maintain- perpetuate its complete missile superi- ing this superiority . Russia is trying to ority in Europe, where NATO countries prevent the deployment of US missile currently have no surface-to-surface

THE MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION IN THE KALININGRAD OBLAST IS THE SIXTH NEW DIVISION ESTABLISHED ON RUSSIA’S WESTERN BORDER WITHIN THE PAST SEVEN YEARS . The Russian Armed Forces 47

 An amphibious landing on the island of Hogland in August 2020

SOURCE: MIL .RU / CC BY 4 0.

short-range missile systems, let alone medium-range ones . Once again, Russia is presenting itself as being open to cooperation by offering concessions that only appear as such .

Russia also continues to apply decep- tion in its foreign policy against NATO as a whole to weaken the alliance and transatlantic relations . In May 2020, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei transponders switched off, and recon- Lavrov sent a letter to NATO Secre- naissance flights have not ceased . tary General Jens Stoltenberg calling In 2021, another major exercise in for the suspension of major military the European direction, Zapad 2021, exercises along the “line of contact” traditionally a rehearsal for a conflict and suggesting that transponders on with NATO in the Baltic Sea region, is military flights be switched on . Similar expected . The exercise cannot be ig- calls from Russian high-ranking military nored by Estonia and NATO, as Russia personnel followed . In reality, there was will deploy tens of thousands of troops no significant change, only reduced along the borders of the Baltic states . press coverage of the exercises . Despite The Russian Air Force flight activity its apparent foreign policy initiative, over the Baltic Sea will increase sig- Russia continued military exercises in nificantly, and Russia is likely to move its Western Military District on a more additional warships from the Black Sea or less ordinary scale . At the end of and Northern Fleets to the region . As August 2020, the Russian 6th Com- in the previous exercise, Zapad 2017, bined Arms Army and the Baltic Fleet Russia’s 1st Guards Tank Army is likely conducted their first joint exercise in the to deploy some of its forces to Belarus Gulf of Finland, in the immediate vicinity as part of the Regional Grouping of of Estonia’s northeastern border, which Forces of Belarus and Russia . included an amphibious landing on the island of Hogland . Russian military However, this year’s exercise, Zapad aircraft also continue flying with their 2021, may be unprecedented in more 48 The Russian Armed Forces

ways than one . First, the structure of the exercise may be affected by THE LOCATIONS the course of events in Belarus . The Belarusian Armed Forces and the OF MISSILE Regional Grouping of Forces of Belarus and Russia have traditionally played BRIGADES AND a critical role in Russia’s operational plans for the western direction . Due RANGES OF THE to their close integration with the Russian armed forces, the Belarusian ISKANDER-M forces may be currently called Russia’s “Belarus Military District” . However, in MISSILES the event of a significant deepening of the domestic political crisis, or political ON RUSSIA’S reforms, in Belarus, adjustments to Russia’s military exercise scenarios or military planning in relation to NATO WESTERN may prove necessary . BORDER Another interesting aspect to look out for in the Zapad 2021 exercise is China’s possible participation in the Zapad series for the first time . China has taken part in Russia’s annual stra- tegic exercises since Vostok 2018 . If China also confirms its participation in Zapad 2021, it will be intriguing to see how the Chinese armed forces define their role in a military operation against NATO in Europe . However, a military alliance between Russia and China will

not materialise anytime soon, due to a "Iskander-M" SSC-7 "Iskander-K" lack of interest on China’s part . The Russian Armed Forces 49

"Iskander-M" SSC-7 "Iskander-K"

SOURCE: ESTONIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 50 The Russian Armed Forces

 Airmobile units of the Russian Airborne Forces in training

SOURCE: MIKHAIL KLIMENTYEV / TASS

‘NEW TYPE’ OF AIRBORNE ASSAULT UNITS

By the middle of the decade, Russia will form airmobile brigades in four strategic directions to be better prepared for ‘grey zone’ conflicts.

A critical fact about airmobile bri- apply to geographical areas; it also has gades is that Russia can use them a temporal dimension . for pre-emptive strikes, such as the destruction of critical targets or In the future, it will be increasingly capture of strategic objectives . The difficult to pinpoint the exact starting ability to fight in so-called grey zones point of hostilities, define the bounda- will become crucial in the future . The ries of an area of operations, or identify concept of grey zones does not only the enemy . Airmobile brigades, whose The Russian Armed Forces 51

tasks include supporting units that The plan is to replace the existing act separately from the main forces or units of the Airborne Forces with four partisan combat behind enemy lines, airmobile brigades – one for each fit well into this pattern . strategic direction . The 31st Airmo- bile Brigade in Ulyanovsk will cover The formation of airmobile, or “new the western strategic direction, while type”, assault units in the Airborne the brigade to be established in the Forces is a major objective of the Rus- Orenburg Oblast will cover the Central sian armed forces during this decade . Asia strategic direction . The units to The army brigades and naval infantry be set up based on the 56th and 83rd already have a small number of airmo- Guards Air Assault Brigades will cover bile units, but these are predominantly the southwestern and eastern strategic intended for reconnaissance operations directions, respectively . and “small tactical episodes” . Public sources are flooded with In contrast to the existing units, which distorted information concerning the do not have organic subunits with formation of airmobile units – from the their own aircraft, the new airmobile deadlines for forming the new brigades units are more independent and, most to speculation about their composition importantly, are equipped with helicop- and weapons . The formation of the ters and do not depend on the support airmobile brigades is unlikely to occur of other units for relocation . before 2025 .

Russia developed its concept of air- Establishing new brigades is not easy . mobile units in 2018, building on the Currently, Mi-28N attack helicopters are experience of the US, China and other used to perform fire support functions countries . Since 2018, airmobile units for airmobile units . Helicopters spe- have been tested in all major exercises cifically designed for airmobile units (Vostok 2018, Tsentr 2019 and Kavkaz should be introduced by the middle of 2020) . The 31st Guards Air Assault the decade . The aim is also to replace Brigade based in Ulyanovsk is an ex- the existing fleet of vehicles by adding perimental unit . amphibious capabilities and stronger

THE FORMATION OF AIRMOBILE ASSAULT UNITS IN THE AIRBORNE FORCES IS A MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES DURING THIS DECADE . 52 The Russian Armed Forces

AIRMOBILE BRIGADES TO BE FORMED AS PART OF THE RUSSIAN AIRBORNE FORCES

Orenburg Oblast

Ulyanovsk Kamyshin (Volgograd Oblast) Ussuriysk

SOURCE: ESTONIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

armour and upgrading the weaponry on guards air assault brigades, the new the vehicles . However, several parts of brigades are to have between 16,000 the Russian armaments programmes and 17,000 . Even if the existing have been stalled or suspended recently helicopter squadrons are included, it (partially due to sanctions) . Russia’s is clear that more people need to be ability to fully implement the arma- found for the new brigades . The cost ments programme for the airmobile of forming the airmobile brigades may brigades is therefore uncertain . be the liquidation of the 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade . Another problem is the scarcity of human resources . Many units in the This shortage of people is aggravat- Russian armed forces, including critical ed by the outflow and bad quality of units, are still understaffed . They are human resources, as well as a low trying to conceal this fact . Each new motivation to serve . Competition for ad- airmobile brigade is likely to be 4,000 mission to Russian military academies to 4,500 strong . (including the most prestigious ones) While there are currently around remains at a low level and will affect the 10,000 troops in the existing four officer corps’ quality in the future . The Russian Armed Forces 53  Exercise Union Shield 2019. Seated in the middle are Alexander Zhuravlyov, SOURCE: MIL .RU / Commander of the Western Military District of Russia, and Oleg Belokonev, CC BY 4 0. Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus from 2014 to 2019

THE ‘BELARUS MILITARY DISTRICT’ – MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND BELARUS

Despite political and economic differences, the Union State of Russia and Belarus has had success in military integration.

Belarus remains Russia’s most impor- as a bridgehead and deploy its troops tant military ally . With its geographical there, blocking NATO’s access to the location and territorial scope, Belarus Suwalki Corridor, influencing air traffic is a necessary buffer for Russia on its in neighbouring countries’ airspace western border and adds depth to the and establishing a land link with the western strategic direction . In times of Kaliningrad Oblast . crisis or war, Russia can use Belarus 54 The Russian Armed Forces

THE LEVEL OF INTEGRA- the Russian Armed Forces will assume TION OF RUSSIAN AND command over Belarusian air defence BELARUSIAN ARMED systems and units under the Unified Regional Air Defence System . FORCES The Russian and Belarusian armed THE OFFICER CORPS AND forces are very similar in terms of organisation and command structure . MILITARY EDUCATION Military cooperation between the two The Belarusian Armed Forces were es- is based on the Regional Grouping of tablished based on the Belarus Military Forces of Belarus and Russia (RGF) District of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the Unified Regional Air Defence which coincided with the territory of the System . Belarusian SSR . A significant number of senior Belarusian officers were born In a 1997 agreement, Russia undertook outside Belarus and ended up in the to protect Belarus with a combined Belarusian army because they served in arms formation equivalent in size to the Belarus Military District during the an army (10,000 to 30,000 troops) . collapse of the Soviet Union . Members In the event of a conflict, the RGF of the Belarusian officer corps were will be formed, comprising the entire educated in Soviet and Russian military Belarusian armed forces and the 1st educational institutions, according to Tank Army of the Russian Western the Russian training system, curricula Military District . The formation of the and traditions (see table) . Therefore, RGF, cooperation, and Russian units’ they share a similar threat perception deployment to Belarus are regularly and fundamental understanding of practised in the Union Shield (Shchit warfare and operational art with Rus- Soyuza) joint exercise and the Russian sian officers . Many Belarusian officers strategic exercise Zapad . see Russia as a role model . Cadets of The Belarus and Russian air defenc- Belarusian military educational insti- es are connected into a regional air tutions study in Russia, which further defence system . Since November encourages similar thinking . The two 2016, joint combat alert duty has been countries’ military elites also have close organised . In the event of a conflict, personal contacts . The Russian Armed Forces 55

SENIOR BELARUSIAN OFFICERS WHO STUDIED IN SOVIET AND RUSSIAN MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

NAME POSITION EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION Viktor Khrenin Minister of Defence Omsk Higher Combined Arms Command School (1992) Alexander Chief of the General Staff of the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School (1988) Volfovich Armed Forces (until 26 January 2021) Russian General Staff Military Academy (2008) Sergei Deputy Minister of Defence Ulyanovsk Guards Higher Tank Command School (1982), Potapenko Malinovsky Military Armoured Forces Academy (1992) Sergei Deputy Minister of Defence for Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School (1989) Simonenko Armament Andrei Deputy Minister of Defence for Volga Higher School of Logistics (1994), Military Academy of Burdyko Logistics Logistics and Transport of the Russian Ministry of Defence (2003), Russian General Staff Military Academy (2012) Alexander First Deputy of the Deputy Minister of Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms Panfyorov Defence for Logistics School (1989) Leonid Head of the Main Ideology Directorate Yekaterinburg Higher Artillery Command School (1992) Kasinski of the Ministry of Defence Igor Head of the Main Directorate of Military Department of the Financial University under the Mozhilovski Economy and Finance of the Ministry Government of the Russian Federation (2002) of Defence Oleg Voinov Head of the Department for Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms International Military Cooperation of School (late 1980s) the Ministry of Defence Pavel Chief of the Main Operations Russian General Staff Military Academy (2008) Muraveiko Directorate of the General Staff Valeri Deputy Chief of Military Command of Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School (N/A) Gnilozub the General Staff Vyacheslav Chief of the NBC Defence Directorate Tambov Higher Military Command School of Chemical Starkov of the General Staff Defence (1988) Igor Chief of the Electronic Warfare Pushkin Higher School of Air Defence Radio Electronics Danilchik Directorate of the General Staff (1991), Russian Air Force Academy (N/A) Andrei 1st Deputy Commander of the Air Orenburg Higher School of Anti-aircraft Missile Command Gurtsevich Force and Air Defence (1992) Andrei Zhuk Commander of the Northwestern Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School (1990) Operational Command Igor 1st Deputy Commander of the St Petersburg Higher Combined Arms Command School Demidenko Northwestern Operational Command (1992) Alexander Deputy Commander of the Western Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School (1992) Bass Operational Command Sergei Deputy Commander of the Western Volga Higher School of Logistics (1992) Grinyuk Operational Command for Logistics Vadim Commander of the Special Operations Leningrad Higher Combined Arms Command School Demidenko Forces (1988), Russian General Staff Military Academy (2008)

SOURCE: ESTONIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 56 The Russian Armed Forces

COMBINED OPERATIONAL The infrastructure’s maintenance and CAPACITY AND TRAINING operational reliability enable the rapid deployment of troops from Russia to Both Russia and Belarus have com- Belarus in crisis or war and ensures pulsory military service; enlistment for their smooth movement within and/or active and reserve duty follows similar passing through Belarusian territory . time frames in both countries . In addition to operational and strategic The training cycles are compatible; that exercises, the Russian and Belarusian is, the Russian and Belarusian armed armed forces also cooperate closely on forces are able to act together in oper- combined tactical exercises of different ational and strategic exercises . service arms . The airborne forces enjoy Union Shield is a regular joint exercise the closest cooperative relationship, whereby the Russian and Belarusian usually holding several dozen joint armed forces practise forming the RGF exercises a year, alternately in each and using it in the interest of the Union country . Among its various service State . To date, four exercises have arms, Belarus’s air defence units, in taken place: one in Belarus (2006) and particular, frequently train in Russia, three in Russia (2011, 2015 and 2019) . carrying out combat shooting field exercises in the Astrakhan Oblast . Belarusian units also participate in the Russian Armed Forces’ Zapad strategic exercises . Zapad 2017 tested Belarus’ WEAPONS AND support capabilities as a host country, EQUIPMENT as the Russian Armed Forces deployed The Belarusian Armed Forces mainly nearly 3,000 troops, 98 tanks, 104 use Soviet-made weapons, vehicles armoured vehicles, 32 artillery and 27 and equipment, to a lesser extent aircraft there . also modern or modernised Russian The Union State’s budget provides military equipment (Su-30SM fighter military technological cooperation aircraft, T-72B3 tanks) . At the time funds to refurbish military facilities of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and infrastructure shared by the RGF . the Belarus Military District was well It also finances a programme for equipped, but now the technology is the technological development and obsolete, and Belarus lacks the means modernisation of regional railways . to modernise . The Russian Armed Forces 57

MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND BELARUS

MILITARY TRAINING AND COMBINED OPERATIONAL CAPACITY TRAINING

Union Shield exercises ARMY ORGANISATION Russia’s strategic exercise Zapad Unied Regional Air Defence System Various service arms’ tactical exercises Regional Grouping of Forces Developing and testing Belarus’s capabilities as a host country

The nature of the military cooperation between Russia and THE OFFICER CORPS AND Belarus MILITARY EDUCATION

Nationality

Mindset RUSSIAN MILITARY Military education FACILITIES IN BELARUS

Close professional contacts Hantsavichy Radar Station

43rd Communications Centre of the Russian Navy MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Belarusian armed forces rely on Russian weapons and equipment

The Russian military industry uses Belarusian MAZ heavy trucks

SOURCE: ESTONIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 58 The Russian Armed Forces

The Belarusian military industry sup- created a capability gap in Belarus’s plies the Russian army with MAZ heavy air defences and thus in the Unified trucks, which are used as a platform Regional Air Defence System, which for ballistic missiles (Iskander-M) and Russia had to fulfil temporarily . Under anti-aircraft missile systems (S-400) . a 2017 agreement, Belarus will pur- chase 12 modern Su-30SM multi-pur- THE ISSUE OF pose fighter aircraft from Russia, some ESTABLISHING A of which have already arrived . MILITARY BASE From a military point of view, the con- Russia has two permanent military tinuation of the existing cooperation installations in Belarus: the 43rd and the maintenance and modernisa- Communications Centre of the Russian tion of weapons and infrastructure are Navy, used to communicate with sub- more important than establishing an marines cruising the world’s oceans, airbase . These circumstances are not and a Russian Aerospace Forces radar expected to change in the near future . station in Hantsavichy for ballistic mis- As the exercises Zapad 2017 and Slavic sile monitoring (the 474th Independent Brotherhood 2020 demonstrated, Radio Technical Unit) . These sites are Russia is able to deploy its units to not classified as military bases . Belarus quickly if necessary . The es- tablishment of a Russian military base For more than a decade, there has would require a change of heart among been talk of establishing a Russian the Belarusian leadership . As negative airbase in Belarus, but the idea has not political developments and the possible materialised . Between 2013 and 2016, withdrawal of Belarus from Russia’s Russian Su-27 fighters were located in sphere of influence may make it more Belarusian airbases, but this had to do difficult to support the Kaliningrad with the obsolescence of the Belaru- Oblast from Belarusian territory in a sian Air Force’s fleet – some aircraft military conflict, the peacetime de- were no longer fit for service, while ployment of Russian troops to Belarus others required modernisation . This cannot be completely ruled out . RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES 59

SOURCE: BEEBRIGHT / ISTOCKPHOTO RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES

One of the main tasks of the Russian special services, apart from intelligence gathering in other countries, is to influence foreign populations in the Kremlin’s strategic interests. 60 RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES

GRU PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Russia sees psychological warfare as part of a comprehensive informational confrontation with the enemy (mainly Western countries). All three Russian special services – the FSB, SVR and GRU – are involved in covert influence operations, each with a different focus.

According to the Russian Armed Forces’ doctrine, psychological warfare is one of the three main components of ‘infor- mational confrontation’ – the other two being information-technical influenc- ing of foreign countries (e g. . through cyberattacks) and protecting Russia against foreign information operations . For Russia, psychological warfare is the information-psychological influencing of foreign audiences to change their views and behaviour in Russia’s national  interest, including achieving the Russian Emblem of GRU Armed Forces’ objectives . Russia sees psychological operations' psychological warfare as part of a units comprehensive informational confron- tation with the enemy (mainly Western groups, such as ethnic and religious countries), and it is ongoing both during minorities, opposition groups and conflict and in peacetime . businesspeople – in friendly, neutral and hostile foreign countries alike . This According to Russian doctrine, the means that the entire world population targets of psychological warfare include outside Russia is a potential target . the political leadership, military per- sonnel and their families, the civilian Within the Russian Armed Forces, population, and certain specific target psychological operations are the RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES 61

responsibility of the Main Intelligence in line with Russian interests; these Directorate of the General Staff (GRU); are boosted through fake social media the GRU develops the plan for psycho- accounts and GRU-controlled online logical warfare, which is then approved portals . The choice of topics depends by the Chief of the General Staff . The on the GRU’s priorities, which may GRU’s chief psychological operations change in time . In online propaganda, division is military unit 54777 . GRU focuses on popular social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Both unit 54777 and the regional GRU Reddit and VK (VKontakte) . The work psy-ops units subordinated to it study, is measured quantitatively: in addition analyse and assess the military-political to the number of items produced in situation in foreign countries, and the each category (e g. . opinion pieces, news morale and psychology of their military stories and comments), the spread of and civilian population . They prepare these materials (e g. . the number of likes psychological influence materials and or shares) is also monitored . participate in the armed forces’ de- ception activities, or maskirovka, and In 2020, GRU-controlled English-lan- counter-­propaganda . Working under- guage online portals (such as inforos .ru, cover, they establish international con- infobrics org. and oneworld .press) dis- tacts while concealing their connection seminated false information about the with the GRU . They also study Russian COVID-19 pandemic, undermining the and foreign experience in carrying out Western countries’ efforts to curb the psychological operations . spread of the virus and praising Rus- Psy-ops units monitor foreign media sia’s actions . For example, they spread on a daily basis to keep abreast of the the statement that the US is taking coverage of issues relevant to the GRU, advantage of the pandemic to assert its current events and Russia’s role in worldview and the coronavirus is in fact them . Regular media monitoring reports an American bioweapon . The GRU uses identify, among other things, influential these portals to plant disinformation in Western publications’ articles that are the public sphere of foreign countries,

GRU-CONTROLLED ONLINE PORTALS DISSEMINATED FALSE INFORMATION ABOUT THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC TO UNDERMINE WESTERN EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE SPREAD OF THE VIRUS . 62 RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES

GRU FRONT ORGANISATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Aleksandr Starunski Denis Tyurin Former commander of unit 54777 Ocer of unit 54777

Aleksandr Kostyukhin Former commander Sergei Panteleyev of unit 54777 Witting co-optee of unit 54777 Founder Founder Founder Founder Founder Founder Founder Location

Informational Civilization – 13 Krzhizhanovsky St, 21st Century building 2, Moscow

Institute of the Russian Diaspora InfoRos Website creator Website creator Website creator

The common denominators of online portals created with the participation of military unit 54777 ocers: creating a positive image of Russia and disseminating information aligned with Russia’s interests to Russian diaspora around the world.

The GRU often uses front organisations and online portals created by them to conduct psychological operations in the public sphere . Above are some examples of projects set up by GRU unit 54777 officers and their associates .

SOURCE: ESTONIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES 63

in the hope that it will spread and the original source will go unnoticed .

One of the avenues pursued by the GRU psy-ops units is to influence Russians living abroad . To carry out this task, the psy-ops units have set up organisations and media outlets to gather and provide Russians residing abroad solely with information that aligns with Russia’s interests (and is therefore often biased) .

GRU-ORGANISED SECURITY CONFERENCE IN GREECE In October 2014, about six months after the occupation of Crimea, a conference entitled "The Security of Europe: A New Geopolitical Dimension" was held in  Source: Parlamentskaya Gazeta No 39, Athens without much international at- 7–13 Nov 2014 tention . At the event, organised by the Institute of Geopolitical Studies, a local the unit, publicly described the prepara- think tank, Greek and Russian present- tions for the event in the Russian state ers criticised the EU’s sanctions against media outlet Parlamentskaya Gazeta Russia and expressed outrage that the in November 2014, using the title of Greek government, under pressure from Deputy Director of the Institute of the the US and the EU, had behaved so Russian Diaspora (Institut Russkogo badly towards its ‘traditional friend’ . Zarubezhya), a GRU front: ‘What is What has so far remained hidden from happening at this conference right now the public is the fact that the conference is breaking through the information was organised by military unit 54777, blockade that has surrounded our coun- the GRU’s chief psy-ops division . Alex- try [since the occupation of Crimea] . We ander Shchedrin, then commander of have no outlet to foreign information 64 RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES

 A GRU-organised round table on Greek elections in Moscow in 2015. GRU officer Denis Tyurin (far left) next to future Greek Defence Minister Panos Kammenos

SOURCE: PRESSMIA .RU

space . No one else in the world knows from Klintsevich in the front row . The anything about the most significant Independent Greeks political party, led conferences held in Russia . The task by Kammenos, made it to the Greek was to make sure that Europeans knew government three months later, and what was really threatening them . Kammenos served as defence min- Member of the State Duma Franz Ada- ister until 2019 . Just before the 2015 movich Klintsevich came to our organi- parliamentary election, Kammenos sation, and considering our experience, visited Moscow, where he participated put forward an idea and a scheme that in a round table on the Greek election, could be realised; he provided the nec- organised by the news agency InfoRos, essary contacts . We identified a weak another front for unit 54777 . Alongside link in the West – Greece – which itself Kammenos, InfoRos director Denis suffers from sanctions . We found an Tyurin, an officer of unit 54777, gave organisation [in Greece] that is friendly comments to the media . to Russia, and together we organised This case shows how easy it was for this conference ’. the GRU to present its messages to At the Athens event, politician Panos receptive Western audiences and estab- Kammenos, co-founder of the Insti- lish high-level contacts . It is noteworthy tute of Geopolitical Studies, which that the intelligence officers used the co-organised the event with the GRU cover of an independent journalist or front, was seated just a few metres NGO representative . RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES 65

RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES’ INFLUENCE OPERATIONS IN CYBERSPACE

Russia continues to be the primary security threat to Western democracies also in cyberspace. In addition to espionage, Russian special services are actively using cyberspace in their influence operations to create divisions in Western societies, transnational relations and NATO.

The types of cyber attack described the target, taking into account their in our previous annual reports are field of work and interests (known as still used by the Russian services spear phishing) . Cyber attacks abus- to carry out their intelligence tasks, ing vulnerable websites also continue; which threaten the security of Estonia in order to infect the target’s device, and our allies . For example, malicious spyware is added to sites frequently emails infected with malware are sent visited by the target (known as water- to targets; these are designed to lure ing hole attacks) .

 Headquarters of Russian special services: FSB, GRU, SVR (clockwise from top)

SOURCES: BOSHKAREV; MOREORLESS / WIKIMAPIA ORG. / CC BY 3 0;. ALEXANDER BELENKIY / MACOS .LIVEJOURNAL COM. 66 RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES

 Deepfake technology enables the use of false personas to increase the credibility of influence operations

SOURCE: LINKEDIN COM. VIA WALORSKA, A . DEEPFAKES & DISINFORMATION . FRIEDRICH NAUMANN FOUNDATION / CC BY-NC-ND 4 0.

high once technological development reaches a level where deepfakes are convincing enough to be unrecognis- However, the abuse of cyberspace for able to the human eye . This would influence operations has increased . make it more difficult for the public to Russian services have adapted “active distinguish false information from the measures” from the Soviet period to truth . As a countermeasure to Russian new circumstances, taking into ac- influence activities, we have put to- count the development of the internet gether a selection of Russian services’ and other technology . For example, methods in cyberspace based on real hacking an information system to steal events (see figure) . and leak sensitive information (known as hack-and-leak operations) is similar Cyber operations originating in Russia to an “active measure” familiar from and the abuse of cyberspace for the the KGB’s arsenal: the KGB used to purpose of influencing will very likely disseminate genuine or doctored continue in 2021 . These are effective, documents to spark anti-government inexpensive and well-established discussions among the public . The ad- measures for the Russian services . aptation of such “active measures” is Moreover, influence operations can an ongoing process . In the future, the be a way to achieve long-term effects Russian services are likely to exploit without always requiring interven- deepfake technology, among other tion in the target country’s domestic things . This threat will be particularly politics .

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS CAN BE A WAY TO ACHIEVE LONG-TERM EFFECTS WITHOUT HAVING TO INTERVENE IN THE TARGET COUNTRY’S DOMESTIC POLITICS . RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES 67

EXAMPLES OF METHODS USED BY RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES IN CYBERSPACE

EXPLOIT OF A MEDIA WEBSITE NATO IS BAD NATO PAHA!

NATO PAHA! NATO IS BAD NATO PAHA!NATO IS BAD NATO PAHA! NATO IS BAD

Russian cyber attackers exploit vulnerable media websites as part of their influence operations . A website is hacked, and a news story with narratives suitable for Russia is planted; a link to the fake news story is then distributed on other platforms, subsequently also in Russian-language media, blogs, forums and elsewhere . In 2020, Lithuanian and Polish media websites were hacked on several occasions, planting fake news that denigrated NATO and its troops .

HACK AND LEAK

John won the SENSITIVE election! INFORMA- Mary won the TION SENSITIVE election! INFORMATION John won the election! SENSITIVE John won the INFOR- MATION SENSITIVE election! INFORMA- Mary won the TION SENSITIVE election! INFORMATION John won the election! SENSITIVE INFOR- MATION Stealing compromising and sensitive information through hacking and then leaking it is one of the Russian services’ most common influencing methods . Out-of-context information is disseminated, which can deepen disagreements in society on already sensitive issues and thus create dissatisfaction with the government . In 2019, documents from UK-US trade talks were stolen by breaking into the former UK trade secretary’s email account and leaked on social media . One of the topics of the negotiations at the time was the National Health Service (NHS); its possible privatisation was hotly debated in the UK during the election period . 68 RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES

DENIAL-OF-SERVICE (DOS) ATTACK

NATO IS BAD NATO PAHA!

NATO PAHA! NATO IS BAD

NATO IS BAD NATO PAHA! NATO PAHA! NATO IS BAD

To influence another country during a key political event (e g. . an election), the Russian services organise Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks against the media and government sector, impeding official information flow among other things . With such cyber attacks, Russia seeks to present itself as a force to be reckoned with, sowing fear and pressuring the target country to make more favourable decisions for Russia . On the day of the Montenegrin parliamentary election in 2016,

DoS attacks were launched against the websites of the country’s government and media . The attacks were repeated the following year after Montenegro announcedJohn won its the accession to NATO . SENSITIVE election! INFORMA- Mary won the TION SENSITIVE election! INFORMATION John won the election! SENSITIVE WEBSITE DEFACEMENT WITH INTIMIDATING CONTENT INFOR- MATION

John won the SENSITIVE election! INFORMA- Mary won the TION SENSITIVE election! INFORMATION John won the election! SENSITIVE INFOR- MATION

In order to disrupt the exchange of accurate information, create fear and deepen internal tensions in society, or damage the credibility of government agencies, Russian services have organised cyber attacks against websites and the information systems of internet service providers . Websites are hacked, planting images, text, video or audio with intimidating, threatening or otherwise disturbing content . Targeting an internet service provider makes it possible to attack a large number of websites simultaneously . In 2019, operatives of the GRU Main Centre for Special Technologies hacked a Georgian internet service provider’s system . Through it, the operatives defaced thousands of websites with an image of former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili accompanied by the text “I’ll be back” .

SOURCE: ESTONIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Growing pressure from China 69

GROWING PRESSURE FROM CHINA  The image of "Xi Jinping – the people’s leader" is SOURCE: CHINA CENTRAL TELEVISION heavily promoted in China

Implementing China’s foreign policy doctrine, or creating a "community of common destiny", will lead to a silenced world dominated by Beijing. Faced with growing confrontation with the West, China’s main goal is to create a division between the United States and Europe.

The Chinese leadership understands partner contrary to what the US claims . that a united West is an insurmountable China understands very well that a obstacle for China that must be broken . fragmented Europe is a weak adversary, Using various topics, such as Iran, the and its opposition to China is unlikely climate or health care, China wants to ever to be as fierce as that of the United find as much common ground with States . However, despite its calls for Europe as possible and make European closer cooperation, China has no inten- leaders believe that China is a reliable tion of changing itself but instead wants 70 Growing pressure from China

to use its size and influence to muffle politicians and diplomats . The phrase any critical voices from Europe . remains characteristic of China’s strate- gic thinking in foreign policy . Important Due to its tense relations with the US, foreign policy speeches and statements it is important for China to bring as by Chinese politicians and diplomats are many countries as possible into its packed with references to the inevitabil- sphere of influence . Putting President ity of creating a community of coun- Xi Jinping’s ideology at the centre of tries with a common destiny . While in party and state politics clearly indicates previous years, there was talk of climate that Xi Jinping’s leadership is meant to change as a force for global unity, the make China the most powerful country keywords in 2020 were health care and in the world by 2035 . However, current the coronavirus crisis . events also show that, far from moving towards liberalism, China is becoming Personal relations play a significant role an increasingly authoritarian regime in the Chinese strategy for expanding centred around the growing personality the community of common destiny . cult of Xi Jinping . There are several European forums in The concept of a “community of various formats where China sends its common destiny” was first introduced high-level diplomats, politicians and at the 2012 National Congress of the entrepreneurs, with the clear objective Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and of establishing personal relations to has since appeared with growing fre- influence the target countries’ policies quency in the vocabulary of top Chinese towards China . Growing pressure from China 71

 The coronavirus crisis in Taiwan in May 2020

SOURCE: TSAIINGWEN / YOUTUBE

 The coronavirus crisis in mainland China in May 2020

SOURCE: CCTV 4 / YOUTUBE

This desire to increase its influence Hubei Province, where the first cases of was also patently evident during the coronavirus infection were recorded . coronavirus crisis in the spring, as China was actively trying to brand itself as a In addition to smearing the West, “saviour” . The emphasis was put on the Chinese media praised the obedience of need to put politics aside and confront China’s people and their willingness to the virus devastating humankind . cooperate with the authorities during Simultaneously in China, the media, the spread of the virus . At the same heavily controlled by the Communist time, thousands of Chinese citizens Party, was actively defaming, demonis- worldwide were on the brink of mental ing and ridiculing Western democra- breakdown, having been barred from cy, saying that only an authoritarian returning home . Following border system like China could successfully closures, at first only the privileged defeat the virus . They failed to mention few – diplomats, certain specialists, the that the democratic and self-govern- odd delegation and students sent by ing island of Taiwan was much more the state to study abroad – could buy successful in managing the epidemic . a ticket for the special flights run by a During large ceremonies on both sides Chinese airline once a week . Ordinary of the Taiwan Strait in May, events in students received nothing but health Taipei could be held without masks, be- packs with face masks, gloves and cause the spread of the virus was under other personal protective equipment control . It is worth noting that Taiwan’s distributed at the embassies, along population density is twice as high as in with uncertainty about how to extend 72 Growing pressure from China

their visas and accommodation in the fact that random top-down individual dormitory . Chartered flights to China checks are made that include questions were primarily run for Chinese people in about a particular person’s behaviour Western countries because the central during these meetings . This amounts to government wanted to demonstrate to complete ideological control . The rare, the West how it cared about its citizens . brave journalists who have criticised the Chinese authorities’ actions or covered Criticism of the Chinese authorities and the real situation have been arrested, foreign missions, which began to spread some even imprisoned . within the Chinese diaspora, was quickly suppressed . Chinese educators were in- Journalists also play a part in creating structed to delete all social media posts a silenced world controlled by Beijing . critical of the Chinese authorities and to Foreigners invited as guests on Chinese spread this spirit of censorship through TV programmes mostly have a track as many channels as possible . record of expressing views acceptable to China . TV reports by Chinese journalists The CCP holds Chinese citizens living must be approved by a laoshi (teach- abroad under ideological control and er) before being broadcast, but the surveillance through cells created by content of an interview with a foreigner party members, including employees is usually not coordinated in detail of state-owned enterprises, journalists, beforehand . Behind this seemingly open diplomats and students . The cells’ mindset, however, is a widely followed indoctrinating ideological manipulation formula whereby criticism of China is takes the form of regular, intensive acceptable, but only to a certain extent, meetings on party politics . The aim is beyond which there must be a “but” to keep party members living abroad, – “but we cannot go around China; we including in Estonia, firmly under the simply must adapt to the new world CCP’s ideological control . Higher levels order” . This seeming criticism of China of the party hierarchy expect regular is spreading in Europe and is obscuring reports on participation in these political and undermining the perception of the meetings . People are disciplined by the security threat posed by China .

AN INCREASINGLY AUTHORITARIAN CHINA FORCES ITS MODEL OF GOVERNMENT ON OTHER COUNTRIES . Growing pressure from China 73

CHINESE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS MOVE TO THE WEST

The Chinese propaganda machine uses Western information channels to spread its narrative. Since the coronavirus pandemic outbreak, the amount of biased and fake news produced in China has increased, and its content has become more aggressive.

The global coronavirus crisis is creating Twitter and Facebook, which are banned favourable conditions for ideological in China, and write their posts in Eng- expansion, and through it, opportunities lish, enabling a large amount of biased for wider international recognition of and false information created in China China’s power ambitions . During the to end up in the global information pandemic, the main objectives of Chi- space . Such a plurality of opinions is nese foreign influence operations have not allowed on Chinese territory, where been to improve China’s image, spread user accounts critical of the regime are the message of the CCP and shape the quickly disabled . discourse around it, as well as to sway The Chinese authorities have begun the political decisions of countries and to recruit Chinese people living abroad international organisations in China’s as well as Westerners and Western favour . information channels to disseminate The introduction of new technolo- its message . There are a number of gies will help the CCP to intensify and bloggers on video hosting platforms expand its agitation and propaganda whose content praising China and jus- work . To spread its ideology more vig- tifying Chinese policy uses a style and orously, China has turned its focus on vocabulary that clearly points to CCP the social media channels popular in the propaganda . Besides content intended West, having opened numerous official for regular internet users, pro-Chinese and fake accounts in the last year to think tanks and scholars in Western spread its message . Chinese officials countries also publish opinion pieces are actively engaged in creating and and research papers aimed at the intel- disseminating disinformation . Lead- ligentsia . At first glance, these seem to ing diplomats and media figures use be critical of China and point out some 74 Growing pressure from China

 Common examples of Chinese fake news SOURCE: REDDIT COM. on Western social media

problems . Still, in most cases, the main goals . It is likely that the renaming of message is a call to adapt to China’s the Confucius Institute headquarters as presence and the rules it has estab- the Centre for Language Exchange and lished, even if this means abandoning Cooperation, along with any accom- the values of a democratic society . panying structural changes, is a mere formality, and the institutes’ activities, In 2020, this new approach to soft as well as the related problems and power also reached the Confucius threats, will remain largely unchanged . Institute, whose funding, management, It cannot be ruled out that alongside reputation and activities began to be the Confucius Institutes, which have re-evaluated . Changes were also made begun to lose their importance, the in the institute operating in Estonia . Chinese authorities will, in the future, The criticism aimed at Confucius want to employ other Chinese cultural Institutes, known to be instruments centres as instruments of influence, as of soft power, is taken seriously by these have not received criticism and China . It wants to reduce the negative have a “clean” reputation for the time publicity by rebranding the institute, being, allowing for easier information without actually abandoning its primary gathering as well as to establishing Growing pressure from China 75

and maintaining networks in foreign Tactically, China follows Russia’s countries . example in spreading propaganda and disinformation . However, this points Foreign think tanks with informal links more to conformity resulting from to the Chinese government seek to shared objectives rather than any co- adapt the CCP’s message to Western ordinated cooperation, as do the good pluralism . However, topics such as relations between Chinese and Russian personal freedom, the status of Hong representatives on social media and Kong and Taiwan, and the situation of the sharing of each other’s posts . At the Uyghurs and Tibetans are ad- present, China does not use disinforma- dressed strictly within the limits accept- tion as actively and as professionally as able to the Chinese authorities . In these Russia, but it is likely that it will expand cases, the Chinese propaganda machine and intensify its activities in this area in benefits from the lack of local experts the near future . China’s influence op- on China who could offer alternative erations aim to weaken Europe’s open perspectives . This means that the society by promoting its own propagan- Chinese version of the truth may begin da messages . to dominate the opinion space . 76 Growing pressure from China

SINICISING CHINESE TECHNOLOGY

China’s ambition to become the world leader in technology poses major security threats.

Following Xi Jinping’s strategic guide- lines, China is devoting all its resourc- es to technological development to become a world leader in the field and make other countries dependent on Chinese technology . China faces sanc- tions and obstacles, which is giving rise to the sinicisation of its technology – longer dependent on foreign suppliers . increasing reliance on domestic pro- China has set itself the goal of becom- ducers . If Chinese technology becomes ing fully independent in technology . entirely domestic, the technology and software’s working principles will be Cyber espionage has also been one of even more opaque than before . China’s traditional means of getting hold of foreign high technology . To China’s message last year about open- justify its actions, China is ostensibly ing up further to the world also seemed working to break the Western monopoly opaque . For example, in the field of and considers it acceptable to use any technology, this actually means looking means necessary to achieve this . for opportunities to access world-class technology . China wants to buy up Various legally sound schemes are be- talent from all over the world, get them ing purposefully used to gain access to to come to China, or invest in them, to projects all over the world . For example, gain access to the knowledge that China joint ventures with local companies are is lacking . The purpose is not to engage being set up in foreign countries with in mutually beneficial cooperation but to the obvious aim of obscuring China’s develop China’s capabilities to a level no involvement . Growing pressure from China 77 A

S R

R T I F

O I C  These are the areas in which China

T I A C L

wants to become the world leader;

U I N

D T means ‘sinicisation’ N E 汉化 L

O L Y I SOURCE: ESTONIAN FOREIGN IC G

E G M N O INTELLIGENCE SERVICE C

E S S E L

L O N

A A I CE Chinese technology may initially use

O A R U GPS and the BeiDou system in parallel . T E O

M Still, the ultimate goal is to make it T O T A exclusively reliant on BeiDou, claiming I V E

M that the BeiDou system has much more

I

N

D accurate positioning capabilities than U W S

T GPS . Integrating Estonia into China’s E R Y HIGH-SPEED TRAINS autonomous technology ecosystem N makes Estonia vulnerable and depend- ent on China .

The CCP and Chinese private enter- The country’s leadership has a clear prises are often linked either directly or objective of making the world depend- indirectly . For example, Huawei empha- ent on Chinese technology . Chinese sises that the company is owned by its media and analysts have made no employees, led by Huawei’s trade union secret of the long-term goal of em- committee . However, all Chinese trade ploying the Chinese BeiDou satellite unions belong to the All-China Feder- navigation system in all Chinese tech- ation of Trade Unions, the chairman of nology and exporting the system to which is also the CCP’s party secretary . countries that have joined the Belt and The current party secretary is also a Road Initiative . In other words, China vice-chairperson of the National Peo- is establishing an autonomous global ple’s Congress, China’s parliament . The ecosystem where in the era of the In- trade unions follow the same vertical ternet of Things, artificial intelligence, chain of command as the provinces – cloud services and ultra-high-speed they are actually headed by the party networks (5G today, 6G in the future), secretary and not by the provincial integrated Chinese technologies will governor, whose responsibilities are play a key role . administrative . 78 Growing pressure from China

CHINA AND RUSSIA – A PRACTICAL PARTNERSHIP

Cooperation between China and Russia has an important demonstrative aspect, which is meant to deter the West and contribute to achieving the two countries’ strategic goals.

Relations between China and Russia is increasing its influence in Tajikistan, are receiving increasing public atten- and Russia is unable to prevent it . It tion . It is important to monitor wheth- is also noteworthy that the Russian er China and Russia will move from media refrained from criticising China coordinated military action – such when the COVID-19 epidemic began to as joint exercises, joint patrols with spread . strategic bombers, joint development of technology – towards a real alliance If Russia and China get too close to in the coming years . At present, there each other, Western countries may seems to be no such trend, as both be tempted to lure Russia away . The have reservations about the other and Kremlin would take advantage of a China adheres to its official foreign situation like this and set conditions to policy doctrine – not to establish leave itself more room for negotiation . allied relations with anyone . However, Given Russia’s ambitions in the Baltic the strained relations between Chi- Sea region, Estonia must stand firmly na and the West may bring the two against any scenario to lure Russia at closer together . So far in their col- the expense of Estonia’s security . laboration, both seem to be working The Russian business community from a position of pragmatism and has become cautious when trading demonstrativeness . with the Chinese since many Russian However, in addition to demonstrating entrepreneurs have been deceived, and their relations, what stands out is the China’s payments are delayed . What Kremlin’s inability to defend its inter- stands out in Russia-China trade and ests when China ignores them . For ex- investment is a purposeful avoidance ample, the Kremlin has failed to stand of dollar transactions . This is in line up for the interests of Vietnam or with China’s goal of using the US Rosneft in the South China Sea . China dollar as little as possible . China has Growing pressure from China 79  Russia must increasingly accept China’s role as big brother SOURCE: ALEXANDER VILF / POOL / TASS repeatedly proposed to Russia to start during joint exercises . The Russians using the Chinese yuan, but Russia has may indeed start to share their war mostly turned this proposal down . experiences with the Chinese from Syria or other conflict zones . Russia may also In the context of military relations, share its experience of building and China wants Russia to share its combat deploying private military companies, experience . There is frequent talk in the as China has developed a new need to Chinese media about Chinese soldiers ensure the security of increasingly large having the opportunity to learn from global investment projects . Russia’s military experience in Syria

CHINA’S STRAINED RELATIONS WITH THE WEST MAY PUSH RUSSIA AND CHINA SIGNIFICANTLY CLOSER .