EESTI RAHVUSVAHELISES JULGEOLEKUKESKKONNAS RAHVUSVAHELISES EESTI INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ESTONIA 2021 2021 Translation by Margus Elings, Refiner Translations OÜ Editing by Scott Abel, Tekstikoda OÜ Design: Taivo Org Illustrations: Joosep Maripuu, Taivo Org, Bigstock, Shutterstock, Scanpix ISSN 2613-3261 (print) ISSN 2613-327X (online) CONTENTS Foreword . 2 Russia’s foreign policy . 4 From crisis to crisis: 30 years of Russian policy in its ‘Near Abroad’ . 6 The standoff between the Belarusian government and its people . 10 Lukashenka’s departure is a prerequisite for economic reforms . 12 Russia in search of a new head of state for Belarus . 14 Russia continues its aggression against Ukraine . 16 Violent upheaval in the Caucasus . 20 Russia in Africa: ambitions and reality . 24 Russia’s domestic politics and economy . 30 2020 constitutional amendments . 31 Increasing domestic tensions and the Kremlin’s response . 35 Russia’s socio-economic downturn . 40 The Russian Armed Forces . 45 ‘New type’ of airborne assault units . 50 The ‘Belarus military district’ – military cooperation between Russia and Belarus . 53 Russian special services . 59 GRU psychological operations . 60 Russian special services’ influence operations in cyberspace . 65 Growing pressure from China . 69 Chinese influence operations move to the West . 73 Sinicising Chinese technology . 76 China and Russia – a practical partnership . 78 2 Foreword FOREWORD his is the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service’s sixth Tannual report . The reason why we continue with this tradition remains the same – to offer the public both in Estonia and abroad an expert view of the security environment and the threats our service deals with . Consid- ering Estonia’s geopolitical situation, the range of topics should not come as a surprise . MIKK MARRAN Director General of the Estonian The year 2020 was a good lesson for Foreign Intelligence Service anyone making predictions . Like every- one else, when finalising last year’s report in January, we failed to predict cultivated image of derzhava (a great how strong an impact the pandemic power), both at home and abroad, the would have on global developments . past year once again showed us the Although we have lived in a changed fragility and controversy of Russia’s world for the last 12 months in many influence in its neighbouring region . It ways, the security environment around is clear that the dictatorship in Bela- us has largely remained the same . rus, nurtured by its eastern neighbour, National interests and patterns of be- has no long-term perspective, and we haviour do not change overnight . Still, must be prepared for another year of the coronavirus crisis offered new op- unexpected developments . The events portunities for authoritarian regimes to in the South Caucasus have signifi- exert influence and accelerated already cantly increased Russia’s influence in existing trends . We could say that in a the region, but have also cast doubt time of universal mask-wearing, some on Russia’s ability – and motivation masks also fell off . – to guarantee stability . A disparity In this report, we take a closer look between image building and actual at Moscow’s view of international influence is also visible in Russia’s trends . Despite the Kremlin’s carefully activities in Africa . Foreword 3 THE CORONAVIRUS Over the last year, Russia’s most sig- CRISIS OFFERED NEW nificant domestic developments along- OPPORTUNITIES FOR side the coronavirus crisis included constitutional amendments introduced AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES by executing a mediocre maskirovka, TO EXERT INFLUENCE . IN A as well as growing tensions in the re- gions and an assassination attempt on TIME OF UNIVERSAL MASK- the opposition leader Alexei Navalny . WEARING, SOME MASKS Dramatic fluctuations in oil prices in ALSO FELL OFF . the first half of the year and ongoing international sanctions have in turn raised questions about the sustaina- bility of Russia’s economic model . In but a topical issue . We also take a look a situation where the average Russian at the Russian special services’ “best has experienced falling living standards practices” in cyberwarfare against for years, widespread protests should democracies . not be ruled out . At any rate, we are As always in recent years, we cannot seeing increasing signs of disapproval . ignore China, whose activities raise This report also delves into the military new security issues every year . We talk exercise Zapad, where the Russian and about China’s increasingly confron- Belarusian armed forces train for large- tational foreign policy, as well as its scale war against NATO in the Baltic influence operations and the threats and Far North region . We also look at of ‘sinicising’ Chinese technology . Like key developments within the Russian our partners, we, too, keep a close eye armed forces, such as efforts to mod- on China’s tightening co-operation ernise the airborne forces . The crisis in with Russia, a relationship mostly Belarus led us to analyse the co-opera- dominated by Beijing . tion between the Russian and Belaru- While we live in a complex security en- sian Union State’s armed forces – the vironment, I remain confident that the area where Minsk and Moscow have Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, achieved the greatest level of integra- with its domestic and international tion over the decades . As concerns the partners, will be able to provide deci- Russian special services, this time we sion-makers with the necessary aware- focus on GRU psychological opera- ness and sufficient early warning . tions – well-forgotten old practices, rather than anything completely new, Bonne lecture! 4 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY Foreign policy during the pandemic: the Eurasian SOURCE: KREMLIN .RU, CC BY 4 0. Economic Union Summit in May 2020 Russia expects the COVID-19 pandemic to weaken Western unity. espite creating some limita- Russia acknowledges that the trend tions, the COVID-19 pandemic towards multipolarity leads to a great- Dhas not changed Russia’s long- er risk of conflict, as the major powers term strategic goals . On the contrary, increasingly compete for resources and the Kremlin believes that the pandemic spheres of influence . will accelerate two trends that Russia Regardless, Russia expects to benefit itself is working to promote: a transi- from this trend, as it sees multipolar- tion towards multipolarity in interna- ity as an opportunity to increase its tional relations and declining Western room for geopolitical manoeuvring, influence on the global stage . RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 5 An example of the Russian-initiated smear campaign on social media against the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine especially at the expense of Western powers . The Russian leadership believes that the global epidemic will force the West to focus on domestic policy and economic problems, cause populist and extremist movements to emerge, and ultimately undermine the values-based and institutional unity of Western so- In the longer term, Russia’s goal with cieties . For its part, Russia is prepared the EU is to get the sanctions relaxed to add fuel to the flames to encourage or lifted without making any conces- these trends . Therefore, 2021 will sions in return . However, Russia’s again see Russian influence operations behaviour remains cynical, as illustrated designed to create and deepen divides by its response to the poisoning of within and between Western socie- Alexei Navalny, the investigation into ties, including at the EU level . This will the downing of flight MH17, cyber- include attempts to discredit West- attacks on Western institutions and ern-produced COVID-19 vaccines, as assassinations associated with the with the Oxford–AstraZeneca vaccine, Russian special services in European which Russian propaganda labelled cities in recent years . as a “monkey vaccine”, followed by attempts to spread this information in The inauguration of President Joe Western media . With these smear cam- Biden will not significantly change paigns, Russia hopes, on the one hand, Russia’s agenda towards the US – it to create a more favourable position for will remain largely confrontational . Still, its own vaccines on the world market Russia will likely try to take advantage and, on the other hand, to promote of arms control negotiations and the its strategic ambition to show itself as extension of the New START treaty to being the first among the major powers appear as a constructive partner while to provide a solution to the COVID-19 retaining its massive superiority in crisis . non-strategic nuclear weapons . 6 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: 30 YEARS OF RUSSIAN POLICY IN ITS ‘NEAR ABROAD’ While Russia seeks to undermine Western influence on the international stage, it is important to keep an eye on Russia’s neighbouring region, where the Kremlin’s policy is aimed at establishing itself as the dominant force. The Kremlin’s strategic priority is its A major power’s desire to establish neighbouring region, where Ukraine itself as a leader in its neighbouring and Belarus are the priority countries region is understandable, especially if in maintaining Russia’s sphere of influ- aimed at promoting stability and eco- ence . Since the collapse of the Soviet nomic development . However, looking Union, Russia has strived to secure at the regional situation in Russia’s economic and military dominance in neighbourhood 30 years after the the region and deflect any interference collapse of the Soviet Union – except by competing international powers . At for the Baltic States – a legitimate the same time, the Nagorno-Karabakh question arises: Where are the stability conflict, which escalated in September and economic development? Almost all 2020 and claimed thousands of lives, the countries in the region are weighed showed that multipolarity will inevita- down by territorial conflict or internal bly reach Russia’s own backyard, as it crisis (see map on pages 8-9) . Whence has happened in the South Caucasus this drastic difference from the Eastern with Turkey firmly asserting itself in European and Baltic countries now the region’s balance of power .