Reinterpreting Eros in Plato’s Symposium

Master’s Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Brandeis University Department of Ancient Greek and Roman Studies Leonard Muellner, Advisor

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

Master’s Degree

by Peter Caccavale

May 2012

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank everyone who encouraged me throughout this process including my family, friends and colleagues. Without your support and guidance I am sure this thesis would never have been successful. I owe special thanks to my advisor,

Professor Leonard Muellner, whose continued guidance and suggestions transformed this thesis from scattered thoughts to a structured work. From weekly meetings to editing a constant stream of drafts, your help was invaluable and I am very thankful for all of your advice. I would also like to thank my readers, Professor Patricia Johnston and Professor

Cheryl Walker. I appreciate the time you took to read such a large thesis and your suggestions and comments were instrumental in fixing my errors in both grammar and logic. Finally, I am happy to be able to thank Christina for her unwavering support and encouragement. By now you have probably heard more about Plato and Greek grammar than you ever would have wanted, but you have also added more to this work than I think you realize.

P.G.C.

ii

ABSTRACT

Redefining Eros in Plato’s Symposium

A thesis presented to the Department of Classical Studies

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Brandeis University Waltham, Massachusetts

By Peter Caccavale

At the heart of the Symposium there lies the conceptual problem of defining the term eros in a manner that remains faithful to both its linguistic and philosophical context. Beginning with the conversation between Apollodorus and his unnamed stranger and ending with Socrates departing for the Lyceum, eros remains the sole focus of the entire work. With such a burden of importance placed upon one single word and its subsequent meanings and interpretations, it is useful to apply a consistent and distinct methodology, whether to an overarching global theme or an individual speech, in order to reveal the subtle syntactical selections Plato makes to support his larger philosophical argument.

The common conceptualization of eros applied by scholars has tried to achieve a universal understanding, one overarching definition that can be applied to any context in which eros must have a one-to-one English equivalent. This technique has led to a problem in modern scholarship, in which translations vary to such a degree that the true

iii meaning of eros has become lost in the process. The cause of such confusion is not due to a lack of logical analysis, but a lack of a logical methodology on which to base such analysis.

The goal must be to strike a balance between the overarching concept of eros that pervaded the Greek consciousness, and the individual uses evidenced in the text of the

Symposium. This paper proposes a new methodology which will be founded on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and his theories of general linguistics. This approach yields a new interpretation of the word that both defines its individual meaning and the greater philosophical lesson Plato is attempting to convey. Eros is the desire of the soul, a desire that has future aspirations of finding a partner in whom one can contemplate the true meaning of beauty. It inspires, instructs, and guides those whom it touches toward immortality through fame, procreation, and wisdom.

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction and Statement of Methodology………………………………….1

Chapter 2: Setting a Global Baseline…………………………………………………….11

Section A: Eros is always of something…………………………………………11

Section B: The erastes/eromenos relationship is the expression of eros………...17

Section C: Eros is a causal agent………………………………………………...25

Section D: Eros is morally neutral…………………………………………….…31

Section E: Eros desires through social relationships…………………………….46

Section F: Philia is the relationship through which eros obtains desires………..61

Section G: Epithumia is the desire of the body…………………………………..72

Chapter 3: Deviation from the Baseline through Parole………………………………...86

Section A: Eros is self-predicative………………………………………………87

Section B: Eros partakes of epithumia…………………………………………..92

Section C: The true nature of epithumia………………………………………..102

Section D: Epithumia leads to eros……………………………………………..111

Section E: Philia is the path to immortality…………………………………….121

Chapter 4: Interpretation………………………………………………………………..135

Section A: The difference between eros and erotics…………………………...136

Section B: Socrates is eros……………………………………………………...145

Section C: Socrates is the helper and the hindrance……………………………154

Chapter 5: Conclusion………………………………………………………………….158

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………162

v

Chapter 1: Introduction and Statement of Methodology

At the heart of the Symposium there lies the conceptual problem of defining the term eros in a manner that remains faithful to both its linguistic and philosophical context. Beginning with the conversation between Apollodorus and his unnamed stranger and ending with Socrates departing for the Lyceum, eros remains the sole focus of the entire work. With such a burden of importance placed upon one single word and its subsequent meanings and interpretations, it is useful to apply a consistent and distinct methodology, whether to an overarching global theme or an individual speech, in order to reveal the subtle syntactical selections Plato makes to support his larger philosophical argument.

Eros, as defined by Lidell and Scott’s Greek lexicon, is “love of a thing, desire for it.” This definition of eros as both love and desire of an object captures the essence of the

Greek within a modern English equivalent that is conveniently succinct for translational purposes. This conceptualization of eros has been applied to the Symposium by scholars in several ways in order to achieve a universal understanding, one overarching definition that can be applied to any context in which eros must have a one-to-one English equivalent. This technique has led to a problem in modern scholarship, in which translations vary to such a degree that the true meaning of eros has become lost in the process. The cause of such confusion is not due to a lack of logical analysis, but a lack of a logical methodology on which to base such analysis.

1 For example, in his commentary, Kenneth Dover presents the following definition:

This word, which can denote any very strong desire (e.g. for victory) and is used also by Homer…to denote appetite for food and drink, usually means ‘love’ in the sense which that word bears in our expressions ‘be in love (with…)’…and ‘fall in love (with…)’: that is, intense desire for a particular individual as a sexual partner.1

In contrast, R.E. Allen claimed “Eros meant love in the sense of romantic love, and included sexual passion. But Eros could be used broadly enough in Greek—Diotima will so use it—to include desire in all its forms. It may be contrasted with Philia, love in the sense of affection or friendship or liking.”2 Leo Strauss claimed “Eros, strictly understood, is love of human beings, a desire to be together with a human being or human beings whom one loves, and this means the being together of bodies, not in any narrow sense.”3

In addition to these examples, other definitions of eros, as both love and desire, vary as wildly and haphazardly as suits the author’s particular style or poet license.

Frisbee Sheffield offers a definition of “passionate desire,”4 signaling that level of intensity is the differing factor between eros and other desires, such as epithumia. Gary

Alan Scott and William A. Welton also define eros as “passionate desire,”5 and yet they title the second chapter of their book “Six Speeches on Love (Erôs).”6 Seth Benardete, on the other hand, dismisses the concept of desire completely, and adopts the consistent translation of eros as “love,” erastes as “lover,” and eromenos as “beloved” throughout

1 K.J. Dover, Plato’s Symposium, p. 1 2 R.E. Allen, The Dialogues of Plato Volume II: The Symposium, p. 7 3 Leo Strauss, On Plato’s Symposium, p. 252 4 Sheffield, Plato’s Symposium p. 2 5 Scott & Welton, Erotic Wisdom, p. 29 6 Scott & Welton, p. 45

2 his works.7 These are only a few examples, but they help demonstrate the variations in modern translation of eros and the potential confusion that arises from them.

In their attempt to make a unifying classification of eros, each of these scholars has failed to develop a consistent and logical methodology explaining how any definition was reached. This is the cause for the various translations. Even though each definition seems to work within our translations, we have no way of justifying the correctness of one over another since we have no foundation on which to build our claims. This crisis of methodology is a true problem for interpreting the Symposium and, unless it is addressed in a thorough and logical manner, will continue to hinder our perception of eros within the text.

Although there is no explicit mention of any approach taken towards defining eros, each scholar uses an implied, default technique of equating one Greek word with an

English equivalent. This is the source of the varying definitions of “love,” “desire,” and

“passionate desire” as each attempts to achieve one overarching, universal truth concerning eros. This system, while useful for philosophical purposes, obscures the true meaning of eros by supposing, without evidencing through fact, that English actually contains a proper one-to-one equivalent word. In the search for such a definition, the true meaning of eros seems to have been lost in the process. Since eros plays such a crucial role in not only the Symposium, but other works as well, we must break out of the habits which have led to our current predicament and start with a new foundation.

Acknowledging this deficiency is the first step in truly understanding eros within

Plato’s Symposium. The solution will not be found in a new definition, but rather in a more formal, logical and succinct methodology that strives to create a system in which

7 Seth Benardete, On Plato’s Symposium and Socrates and Plato: The Dialectics of Eros

3 the true meaning of eros will reveal itself, independent of any modern tinkering or influence. The goal must be to strike a balance between the overarching concept of eros that pervaded the Greek consciousness, and the individual uses evidenced in the text of the Symposium. Whether or not this approach yields one definition is not as important as the method being used by modern readers, thousands of years removed from Greek culture. We must not let some need for translational consistency intrude upon the precision of Plato’s language and message.

In order to achieve this balance between a global and local perspective of eros within the Symposium, this paper proposes a new methodology which will be founded on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure. Within his creation of linguistic semiology, Saussure separated and defined the concepts of langue and parole as the system of language as a global phenomenon and the individual acts of physical speech, respectively. The title of one of his earlier manuscripts, De l’essence double du langage (‘On the dual essence of language’), plays upon the notion of langue first creating a concept in the mind of the sujet parlant followed by parole activating that same concept through speech. This duality of meaning, in which a word is first recognized globally (within the mind) and then executed locally (through individual speech), will be applied to this study of eros. It is Saussure’s perception of language, which consists of a series of relationships rather than fixed units, which will guide our understanding of Plato’s Greek. As Carol Sanders states, “it is therefore the richness, the constant folding-out of new potential found in the multiple functions of a sound or morpheme or in the polysemy of a word, that Saussure wishes to stress.”8

8 Ferdinand de Saussure, trans. Carol Sanders & Matthew Pires, Writings in General Linguistics, p. xx

4 This “richness” of language, is precisely the pervading complication that plagues modern translations of eros. In attempting to achieve that one-to-one overarching English definition, modern scholars have overlooked the intricate nature of eros in its role as a signifier (signifiant). Desire is a complex concept, full of the richness that Sanders refers to, both in English and Greek, and, therefore, should not be approached in such a linear and narrow fashion. In attempting to equate one English definition to the Greek word, the richness of meaning, the signified (signifié), is limited. As Saussure claimed:

It is just as literally true to say that the word is the sign of the idea as it is to say that the idea is the sign of the word. The idea constantly fulfills this role, since it is likewise impossible to fix and limit a word materially within the sentence without an idea. Sign implies signification; signification implies sign. Taking sign (alone) as a basis is not only incorrect, it has absolutely no meaning since as soon as the sign loses the entirety of its meanings, it becomes a mere vocal figure.9

By limiting eros simply to “desire” or “love,” modern scholars are only considering the localized spoken word, as seen through the text of Plato’s work, rather than the global perception of eros which each speaker draws upon to form his speech. These modern definitions also focused more on easing the translation into English, rather than remaining faithful to the Greek. This disregards the global commonality or shared thought which is half of any word’s conceptualization. This linear approach does not incorporate the full Greek perception of eros as the global language system (langue) representing a collective idea of Greek culture, since any word must have a common definition or definitions in order to be useful for communication. Therefore each context of eros within the Symposium innately represents a balance between the mindset of the

9 Saussure, p. 26

5 group influencing the expression of the individual, and the individual manipulating the common understanding in order to suit his or her particular purpose. The proposed methodology of this study seeks to approach eros from a dual perspective in terms of

Saussure’s langue and parole in order to open the interpretation of the word and bring to light both its meaning and function.

To accomplish this, eros must first be viewed as a universal signifier. This is the realm of langue. As Saussure points out, langue is both a mental and social reality made up of values defined by difference. Because langue relies on groups of oppositions, one sound can have many meanings, or one meaning may be indicated by several sounds. In other words, in a sign system such as language there is the possibility of overlap, but not redundancy. This explains how several words in Greek share some facsimile of the meaning “desire,” but also precludes the possibility of each word carrying the exact same meaning.

Saussure describes this phenomenon in the following way:

Neither idea nor sign, nor different signs, nor different ideas may ever represent, innately and individually, a given term. The only given consists of different signs inseparably combined with different ideas, in a high degree of complexity. These two states of disorder, when brought together, lead to a state of order.10

In its most basic state, it is not the form of the sign, but the speaker’s mental representation of it that operates in language. In terms of eros, this means that there is no simple universal truth to be found, which modern scholars have attempted to create, as the only evidence available explicitly is individual interpretation of the abstract concept, made physical through speech. Our understanding of the word must come from an

10 Saussure, p. 3I

6 analysis of both its use within the abstract langue, that is, the general, mental conception of the word which would be shared commonly among Plato and his audience, and the physical parole, the individual usage employed by each of the symposiasts. Through analyzing each context of eros, we will isolate every way in which the word is used in a similar manner by each symposiast, thus establishing their common perception of the word as a signifier. We will then have a baseline against which we can distinguish the ways in which each speaker takes the common langue and interprets it differently in order to make his point (parole).

Although preempted by his premature death, Saussure’s writings on langue give a clear interpretation of his thoughts, even if incomplete, on parole. According to Saussure, any word, aside from first being conceived within our consciousness, also depends on being activated through speech. In other words, “neither the word nor its meaning exist outside the consciousness that we have of them…(but)…a word only truly exists, however one views it, when it is sanctioned in everyday use.”11 While langue explains the genesis of a word’s definition squarely within the mind, parole is the individual expression of that definition through speech. For that reason, there is value in analyzing speech itself and inferring the origin of that speech. As he later puts it, “the aim of language…is to make oneself understood.”12 When taken in this context, the parole of eros is the individual use of the word by each of the speakers within the Symposium.

These contexts, although subject to the agenda of the speaker, must contain some semblance of the shared group concept; otherwise, the speaker’s meaning would be unintelligible to his audience. In fact, the entire work can be seen as a rhetorical exercise

11 Saussure, p. 56 12 Saussure, p. 121

7 of langue and parole as the speakers are attempting to take the shared concept of global eros, qualify it into an individual representation that achieves a unique and specific definition, then re-apply the newly conceived definition back to the original shared idea, in order to redefine the universal concept of eros.

With this basic foundation, the full methodology can now be established. First, eros must be analyzed through the lens of langue in order to establish a standard baseline definition or interpretation of the word. This will be done through thorough examination of each of its uses throughout the Symposium and isolating the commonalities of use and understanding. These examples shed light into the global way in which eros is understood as a sign. In order to broaden the scope of this universal realization and avoid skewed data, other works will be analyzed in order to ensure as universal a concept as possible.

Second, each context must again be analyzed through the lens of parole, as each speaker takes the concept of global eros and applies it within a unique interpretation through their specific speech. This approach will highlight the differences as compared against the baseline of similarities, thus revealing the unique ways in which eros could be altered and yet still be understood within Greek syntax. This type of internal organization allows for close scrutiny, as any proposed theory of eros must reflect the specificity of the original Greek.

Finally, these similarities and differences must be used to reinterpret eros through both a global and local lens with the goal of a clear, succinct and faithful perception of both the word itself and the Symposium as a whole. The result will yield an idea of eros that can be applied across an array of different texts, as its fundamental principles will remain constant. This is possible through the definition of the langue, since this common

8 understanding of the word is shared in the language itself, regardless of the work or context in which it appears.

Within this basic framework, one extra caveat must be appended. Eros must be taken within the context of a group of three words which, in some form, all relate to the workings of desire: eros, epithumia, and philia. The reason for this grouping can again be attributed to Saussure’s concept of langue. If langue is based upon difference, as mentioned before, then language must be understood through relationships between words. Saussure asserts there are two types of relationships: syntagmatic and paradigmatic. The latter is associative and leads to groupings of words into clusters within the mind (e.g., learn, learned, learning, learner). Although these words are fundamentally similar, there must be the prerequisite of difference, in order to distinguish between one word and another within the group. As previously mentioned, sign systems allow for overlap, but not redundancy. Within the Symposium, eros is grouped with epithumia and philia in a complex relationship that allows specific interactions, depending on context, and yet retains a difference of meaning, to avoid superfluous repetition.

Although modern scholarship has difficulty separating the meanings of these terms, Saussure’s method concludes that, linguistically, a difference must exist. The usage in contexts of each of these three words, taken as a group, will each be analyzed according to our proposed methodology. Revealing their similarities and differences will allow for the best possible understanding of eros as these three words hold a special connection within both the context of the Symposium and the Greek language as a whole.

9 This proposed methodology will finally allow for a foundation upon which we can reevaluate the interpretations proposed by modern scholarship. Regardless of the discovery of any specific definition, it will lay the foundation for how eros should be approached and understood, introducing avenues of further research. If, at the conclusion of such analysis, one overarching philosophical truth may be extracted, it is a welcome, yet unnecessary surplus, for the goal of this paper is not to impose upon the ancient work the modern need for equivalency between English and Greek, but to allow Plato’s words to speak for themselves. Just as the individual symposiasts take the common perception, adjust it to suit their agenda through physical expression, and in turn reapply this new meaning to amend the original interpretation, this methodology seeks to do the same. By analyzing the global meaning of eros and comparing that to the individuality of each speaker, we are able to readjust our conception of the original shared meaning. By simply interpreting what is presented through context and applying a fundamentally sound methodology, this paper allows the truth of the Symposium to reveal itself to be more complex and detailed than modern interpretations have yet conceived.

10

Chapter 2: Setting a Global Baseline

The first step in analyzing the use of eros, epithumia and philia through langue and parole is to set a controlled baseline against which contextual comparisons can be made. This baseline should encompass the global conceptualization of eros shared by

Plato and his audience. This standard, though often expressed indirectly, can be inferred through patterns of syntax, phrasing, and meaning across the contexts of the Symposium.

By isolating each use of eros, and categorizing these into a relationship of linguistic units based upon similarity, a shared perception of eros can be identified. This relationship can then be compared with the uses of epithumia and philia, in order to distinguish the differences through Saussure’s paradigmatic approach. In other words, by analyzing the commonalities in speech concerning eros within the text, we can surmise the common conception of eros that each speaker is drawing upon. Having separated this global meaning of eros from its individual interpretation through a process of inferring, a standard meaning or group of meanings will reveal itself. With this common conceptualization of eros at our disposal, we will then be in a better position to identify individual variations in meaning.

Section A: Eros is always of something

Being the cognate noun for erao, an active verb of desire, eros, by definition, must always partake of something, or have an object. While seemingly self-explanatory, this concept distinguishes the langue of eros from its related parole, as the model of eros

11 taking an object is the universal constant, while the specific details of what that object might be is variable. Within the Symposium, the separate contexts of each of the seven speakers reflect this global understanding of eros.

Although incorporating their own individual ideals and interpretations, each of the symposiasts draws upon a common understanding of eros, which is reflected in the patterns of similarity within his diction. Specifically, each symposiast conceives of eros as taking a genitive. This grammatical construction works with both eros as a noun and its cognate verb erao. In our methodology, we will analyze the use of the verb erao in the same manner as eros. While a distinction must be made between a noun and its cognate verb, for our purposes they will be one and the same since the action of desiring through erao follows the same thematic baseline as eros functioning as a noun.

The first explicit use of this construction, eros + genitive, occurs in the speech of

Phaedrus and his story of Achilles. Phaedrus attempts to refute the notion that Achilles was the eromenos of Patroclus by making him the erastes. It will be revealed that only the erastes partakes of eros and, therefore, Phaedrus makes Achilles the subject of the verb erao in order to distinguish his new role by claiming:

…Ἀχιλλέα Πατρόκλου ἐρᾶν…13

…Achilles desired Patroclus…

This construction, subject + form of the verb erao + genitive, is prevelant throughout the text and serves as the standard means of expressing “eros of” an object. This explicitly connects eros and an object in a manner that reveals the nature of eros through the types of object(s) that modify it. Therefore, by categorizing the objective genitives of eros, we

13 Symposium, 180a5

12 are categorizing the nature of eros. For the moment, we must first provide more examples in order to justify this construction as being common throughout the work and therefore within the realm of langue.

Pausanias also uses this construction in his descriptions of eros. Although his contexts vary, the grammar remains constant. This constancy is precisely what we need to establish our baseline. Within his speech, Pausanias describes the eros of boys (καὶ

ἔστιν οὗτος ὁ τῶν παίδων ἔρως),14 the eros of freeborn women (ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν

ἐλευθέρων γυναικῶν προσαναγκάζομεν αὐτοὺς καθ᾽ ὅσον δυνάμεθα μὴ ἐρᾶν),15 the eros of the body (ὁ τοῦ σώματος μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν),16 the eros of

Aristogeiton (ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτονος ἔρως),17 and the eros of the heavenly goddess (ὁ

τῆς οὐρανίας θεοῦ ἔρως).18 In each example, the grammatical formula is consistent: eros always takes an objective genitive.

This construction persists across each speech as Eryximachus, through the perspective of a physician, describes several functions of eros, including: how the master physician can make the opposites of the body have eros for one another (καὶ ἐρᾶν

ἀλλήλων),19 the eros of the well-ordered man (τὸν τούτων ἔρωτα),20 and the eros of the heavenly muse (ὁ τῆς Οὐρανίας μούσης Ἔρως).21 Aristophanes, through his story

14 Symposium, 181c4. For the desire of boys, see also 181d7 (χρῆν δὲ καὶ νόμον εἶναι μὴ ἐρᾶν παίδων) and 181d1 (οὐ γὰρ ἐρῶσι παίδων). 15 Symposium, 182a1 16 Symposium, 183e1 17 Symposium, 182c6 18 Symposium, 185b6 19 Symposium, 186d6 20 Symposium, 187d7 21 Symposium, 187e1

13 of the first human beings, tells of the eros of one another (ὁ ἔρως ἔμφυτος

ἀλλήλων),22 which he later clarifies as being the name for the longing and pursuit of the whole (τοῦ ὅλου οὖν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ διώξει ἔρως ὄνομα).23

At this point we arrive at the speeches of Agathon and Socrates. From the beginning of the work, these men are distinguished from their peers in terms of their ability to create and deliver speeches. Eryximachus acknowledges this before Agathon’s speech as he says:

καὶ εἰ μὴ συνῄδη Σωκράτει τε καὶ Ἀγάθωνι δεινοῖς οὖσι περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά,

πάνυ ἂν ἐφοβούμην μὴ ἀπορήσωσι λόγων διὰ τὸ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ

εἰρῆσθαι: νῦν δὲ ὅμως θαρρῶ.24

And if I was not aware that both Socrates and Agathon were formidable

concerning erotics, altogether I would have feared they were at a loss of speech as

many things of all kinds have been spoken, nonetheless now I am confident.

This high praise by Eryximachus distinguishes the next two speakers as being superior rhetoricians, or at least considered so by their fellow symposiasts. Because of this, we might expect both Agathon and Socrates to wander from our emerging baseline, and yet both adhere to the same standard as the previous four speakers in terms of eros taking an object.

Agathon admits his own divergence from the themes of the previous speakers by claiming:

22 Symposium, 191d1 23 Symposium, 193a1 24 Symposium, 193e4-6

14 ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ βούλομαι πρῶτον μὲν εἰπεῖν ὡς χρή με εἰπεῖν, ἔπειτα εἰπεῖν.

δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι πάντες οἱ πρόσθεν εἰρηκότες οὐ τὸν θεὸν

ἐγκωμιάζειν…25

I wish first to say how it is necessary for me to speak, then to speak. For it seems

to me that everyone speaking before did not praise the god…

With this, he has distinguished himself from the group, thus commencing the pattern described in our methodology, in which each speaker interprets the langue of eros individually, through parole. At this point, we expect him to change the grammatical construction of eros as he has decided that he will speak about the personified eros, not his associated gifts to mankind:

οὕτω δὴ τὸν ἔρωτα καὶ ἡμᾶς δίκαιον ἐπαινέσαι πρῶτον αὐτὸν οἷός ἐστιν,

ἔπειτα τὰς δόσεις.26

Thus it is right that we praise Eros first for what sort he is, then for his gifts.

By claiming this, Agathon has announced his intention to deliberately focus on the nature of eros as opposed to the objects it modifies. And yet, even with his intention not to focus on the objects of eros, our grammatical baseline still applies as he describes beauty as being the object of eros through the same genitive construction (ἐκ τοῦ ἐρᾶν τῶν

καλῶν).27

Each of the first five speakers sets the stage for the speech of Socrates. Like

Agathon, although his skills have been distinguished from the others by Eryximachus, he too will describe the objects of eros through the same grammatical construction we have

25 Symposium, 194e4-6 26 Symposium, 195a3-5 27 Symposium, 197b8

15 established. Where they were simply using this construction in terms of grammar, however, Socrates makes a point of encompassing the need for eros to have an objective genitive as a key theme of his entire speech. He accomplishes this through a preliminary line of questioning directed at Agathon. Although the exchange holds greater philosophical significance, at its heart it outlines the same basic principle: eros must have an object.

Socrates makes this point by first asking:

ὁ Ἔρως ἔρως ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός; 28

Is Eros the eros of something or nothing?

Agathon responds to this by saying, “πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν (surely it is (of something)).”29 With this question, Socrates has established our basic principle that eros must always take an object, both through his grammatical construction (eros + genitive) and his rhetorical point. He will then proceed to make use of this construction through contexts such as “the eros of that thing (ἐκείνου…ἔρως),”30 “eros of shameful things

(αἰσχρῶν…ἔρως),”31 “eros of beauty (κάλλους…ἔρως),”32 “eros of the good (τοῦ

ἀγαθοῦ…ἔρως),”33 and “the eros of immortality (τῆς ἀθανασίας τὸν ἔρωτα).”34

Later, he even provides us with an example of eros outside the realm of a formal speech

28 Symposium, 199e6 29 Symposium, 199e8 30 Symposium, 200a2 31 Symposium, 201a5 32 Symposium, 201a9 33 Symposium, 207a2 34 Symposium, 207a4

16 as he asks Agathon for protection against “the eros of this man (Alcibiades) for me (ἐμοὶ

ὁ τούτου ἔρως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου).”35

Each of these contexts, while used for unique and separate purposes, all point to a universal understanding of eros in which eros must govern an object. Grammatically, this is reflected through eros, and its cognate verb erao, always taking a genitive. This perspective explicitly shows that eros, by nature, needs an object when described not as a pronoun, but as a general desire. This also applies for its cognate verb erao, since, as previously mentioned, it shares the same baseline as eros within our methodology. Since eros has the same basic grammatical function across each of the speeches, our methodology places it within the realm of langue and adds it to our evolving perception of the shared meaning of eros.

Section B: The erastes/eromenos relationship is the vehicle for expressing eros

Having established the grammatical formula in which the non-personified eros must have an object, we must now look to how eros is actually expressed in the daily activities described by the speakers. The vehicle for this expression is the relationship between the erastes and eromenos. These terms have several subtexts, as they refer to the active/passive, masculine/feminine, and lack/need natures of both the erastes and eromenos, respectively. By definition, the erastes partakes in eros, as he or she is the active participant whose name literally means “desirer” or one who has eros. In contrast, the eromenos, by definition, does not partake in eros, as he or she is the passive participant whose name means “the one who is desired (literally the passive participle of

35 Symposium, 213c7

17 eran),” or the one without eros. This fundamental understanding, that eros only resides within the erastes, is pervasive throughout each of the seven speeches of the Symposium, and is stated in both indirect and explicit terms.

As the first speaker, Phaedrus provides the foundation for how this relationship is demonstrated through speech. He makes this distinction between erastes and eromenos obvious through his story of Alcestis, the wife who was willing to sacrifice herself for the sake of her husband, Admetus. Phaedrus claims:

οὓς ἐκείνη τοσοῦτον ὑπερεβάλετο τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα...36

she (Alcestis) surpassed them (her in-laws) so far with her philia on account of

her eros...

In this context, Alcestis partakes of eros, making her the erastes even though, as a woman, traditionally she would have been the eromenos. As a rhetorical counterpoint to the erastes, Phaedrus provides an example of a famous eromenos: Achilles. In sacrificing himself for his erastes, Patroclus, Achilles is duly honored by the gods and sent to the

Isles of the Blessed. Being the eromenos of Patroclus, however, Achilles does not partake in eros. This makes his exploits even greater, which Phaedrus explicitly expresses when he claims:

…μᾶλλον μέντοι θαυμάζουσιν καὶ ἄγανται καὶ εὖ ποιοῦσιν ὅταν ὁ

ἐρώμενος τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ, ἢ ὅταν ὁ ἐραστὴς τὰ παιδικά. θειότερον

γὰρ ἐραστὴς παιδικῶν: ἔνθεος γάρ ἐστι.37

36 Symposium, 179c1-2 37 Symposium, 180b1-4

18 …indeed they (the gods) admire and are amazed and do good things whenever the

eromenos is fond of his erastes, rather than an erastes his favorite. For an erastes

is more divine than his favorite, for he is full of the god.

With this assertion, Phaedrus has explicitly stated that the erastes partakes in eros, while the eromenos does not. This is reflected in his word choice, as he makes a distinct point of saying that Achilles did not desire (erao) Patroclus, but, rather, showed “ἀγαπᾷ” towards him, expressing a type of fondness or brotherly affection. Again, we must return to Phaedrus’ original claim of whether or not Achilles desired Patroclus (Ἀχιλλέα

Πατρόκλου ἐρᾶν).38 Phaedrus states that it was Aeschylus who made Achilles the eromenos of Patroclus,39 and did so incorrectly. According to Phaedrus, Aeschylus “talks nonsense (Αἰσχύλος δὲ φλυαρεῖ)”40 in reversing the roles. Either way, both men defer to the concept that whoever is partaking of eros must be the erastes.

Phaedrus continues this pattern throughout his speech as he describes “the man who desires (ἄνδρα ἐρᾷ)”41 who, if caught partaking in a something shameful (τι

αἰσχρὸν), “would not suffer so much as by his favorite (ἂν… ἀλγῆσαι… ὡς ὑπὸ

παιδικῶν).42 In this context, as well as throughout the Symposium, the “favorite” is equivalent to the eromenos. Therefore, we can equate the man who desires with the erastes, the one who has eros through desiring (erao). This syntax repeats as Phaedrus

38 Symposium, 180a5 39 The reference comes from the lost work Myrmidons, in which Aeschylus makes Achilles the erastes of Patroclus, possibly being the first to do so. 40 Symposium, 180a4 41 Symposium, 178d4-5 42 Symposium, 178d6-e1

19 describes “the man desiring, seen by his favorite (ἐρῶν γὰρ ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ παιδικῶν

ὀφθῆναι).”43

In terms of langue, Phaedrus’ speech is the first example of the overarching concept of eros residing only within the erastes. Since he holds the position of speaking first, there is no comparison against which to evaluate his claims. Nevertheless, his individual contexts are beginning to reveal deference to a shared conceptualization of eros. As we will see beginning with Pausanias, Phaedrus is not the only speaker who describes the erastes/eromenos relationship in this way.

Whereas Phaedrus was interested in the deeds done within the erastes/eromenos relationship, Pausanias chooses to focus on its sexual aspect. Even though the theme and overall argument is different, our baseline remains constant, as Pausanias also describes the erastes as having eros. In explaining the laws concerning eros, Pausanias claims:

…ὥστε τινὰς τολμᾶν λέγειν ὡς αἰσχρὸν χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς.44

…some people dare to say it is shameful to gratify one’s lover.

Within this context, the eromenos, who performs the gratification, does not desire (erao) his erastes, but gratifies (χαρίζεσθαι) him. This construction, of the eromenos gratifying the erastes is Pausanias’ standard means of expressing the action of the eromenos, who is not inspired by eros, and occurs five more times: ἁπλῶς

νενομοθέτηται καλὸν τὸ χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς,45 οὕτως οὗ μὲν αἰσχρὸν ἐτέθη

χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς,46 εἰ μέλλει καλῶς χαριεῖσθαι ἐραστῇ παιδικά,47 εἰ

43 Symposium, 179a3 44 Symposium, 182a2-3 45 Symposium, 182b2-3 46 Symposium, 182c7-d1

20 μέλλει συμβῆναι καλὸν γενέσθαι τὸ ἐραστῇ παιδικὰ χαρίσασθαι,48 μοναχοῦ

ἐνταῦθα συμπίπτει τὸ καλὸν εἶναι παιδικὰ ἐραστῇ χαρίσασθαι.49 Pausanias’ syntax reveals that individually on the level of parole he, like Phaedrus, still follows the accepted standard that restricts the eromenos from partaking in eros. For this reason, we are able to claim that Pausanias is following the same global langue of eros.

Like Phaedrus, Pausanias also employs an anecdote to defend his stance, specifically, the story of the tyrannicides, Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Pausanias claims:

ἔργῳ δὲ τοῦτο ἔμαθον καὶ οἱ ἐνθάδε τύραννοι: ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτονος

ἔρως καὶ ἡ Ἁρμοδίου φιλία βέβαιος γενομένη κατέλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν

ἀρχήν.50

Even the tyrants learned this, for the eros of Aristogeiton and the philia of

Harmodius becoming steadfast loosened their power.

Within this context, Pausanias echoes Phaedrus’ notion of eros by placing it squarely within the realm of the erastes, not the eromenos, who partakes of philia. In making these claims, Pausanias seems to be drawing upon the same notion of eros as Phaedrus, albeit for different purposes. Their common conceptualization is becoming clearer, as both appear to believe that within the erastes/eromenos relationship, eros is selective, belonging only to the erastes.

Eryximachus also recognizes this distinction between erastes and eromenos and although his speech differs greatly in subject matter, the basic principle remains constant.

47 Symposium, 184b5-6 48 Symposium, 184d1-3 49 Symposium, 184e3-4 50 Symposium, 182c4-7

21 In speaking about balance and harmony within the body, he describes well-ordered men

(τοῖς μὲν κοσμίοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων)51 and claims:

…δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ φυλάττειν τὸν τούτων ἔρωτα…52

…it is necessary to gratify and preserve the eros of those (the well-ordered

men)…

Without explicitly mentioning either the erastes or eromenos, Eryximachus still follows the abstract concept of eros. Following the syntax of Pausanias, we can identify those being gratified as those who have eros: the erastai. Likewise, those who are connected to the erastai are said to “gratify,” with no mention of eros, or erao, making them the eromenoi. He makes the selective nature of eros more explicit as he claims the physician must be able to distinguish between those who have eros (the erastai) and “those in whom there is no eros (καὶ οἷς μὴ ἔνεστιν ἔρως),”53 the eromenoi.

Eryximachus goes on to say that one should “gratify the well-ordered eros (τῷ

κοσμίῳ Ἔρωτι χαρίζηται).”54 He has connected eros to the erastes through the term

“well-ordered,” which is used to describe both eros and the erastes, as the erastes partakes in eros. Also, the erastes is “gratified” by the implied eromenos, who does not partake in eros. These are the same eromenoi mentioned by Phaedrus and Pausanias, and are described with the same language. Once again, we are told that the erastes partakes in eros, while the eromenos does not.

51 Symposium, 187d4-5 52 Symposium, 187d6-7 53 Symposium, 186d3 54 Symposium, 188c3

22 Aristophanes also follows this pattern through his new creation myth of eros. In his description, Aristophanes tells of the eromenoi, who lay with older men at a very young age. He claims that “when they have reached manhood, they desire boys (ἐπειδὰν

δὲ ἀνδρωθῶσι παιδεραστοῦσι).”55 Where before they did not partake of eros, these boys have now become erastai as men, and therefore partake in eros, as evidenced through the verb paiderasteo. He reiterates this point by saying that “a man of such a kind becomes…a desirer of boys (πάντως μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος

παιδεραστής…γίγνεται),”56 again showing that the erastes has the eros. Finally,

Aristophanes makes the entire relationship more explicit by claiming that the wish of the erastes is for “joining and fusing with his eromenos, to be made one from two

(συνελθὼν καὶ συντακεὶς τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐκ δυοῖν εἷς γενέσθαι).” This joining and fusing is labeled as eros, and it is the erastes who partakes in eros through the relationship with his eromenos.

Like the previous speakers, Socrates also follows this syntax. Through his conversation with Diotima, he makes the point that eros must reside within the erastes by describing his ignorance on the subject which Diotima corrects:

ᾠήθης δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τεκμαιρομένῃ ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις, τὸ ἐρώμενον

ἔρωτα εἶναι, οὐ τὸ ἐρῶν. 57

You supposed, as it seems to me from those things which you said, the thing

being desired is eros, not the thing which is desiring.

55 Symposium, 192a7-192b1 56 Symposium, 192b4 57 Symposium, 204c1-2

23 Within this context, Diotima has taken the argument that the eromenos has eros, and disproves it by distinguishing the eromenos as being the object of eros, not the subject.

Later, she explicitly makes this point when she says that eros “at the same time is, by nature, an erastes (καὶ ἅμα φύσει ἐραστὴς ὢν).”58 With these lines, Socrates, through

Diotima, explains that eros only belongs to the erastes, thus eliminating any possibility that the eromenos would partake in eros.

Finally, when Alcibiades arrives, he too uses the example of the erastes and eromenos to make his point about eros. He claims that Socrates’ method of being an erastes is so deceitful that he might rather be their favorite than their erastes (καὶ

ἄλλους πάνυ πολλούς, οὓς οὗτος ἐξαπατῶν ὡς ἐραστὴς παιδικὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς

καθίσταται ἀντ᾽ ἐραστοῦ).59 Even though Alcibiades has not heard any of the previous speeches, nor any of the new contexts in which they may have used eros, he is clearly subscribing to the overall point that eros must always be of the erastes. His distance from the earlier speeches strengthens the argument that this conceptualization of who partakes of eros was a commonality outside of the original six symposiasts.

Although each of the speakers is using the erastes/eromenos relationship in a different way, the fundamental principle of eros remains the same: the erastes has eros while the eromenos does not. This concept extends beyond the scope of the Symposium, as Plato, in the Phaedrus, explicitly claims that the eromenos actually feels a “counter- desire (ἀντέρωτα),”60 not eros. By analyzing each context, we see that while the individual expressions of eros vary in terms of the themes and style of each speech, there

58 Symposium, 203c3 59 Symposium, 222b2-b4 60 Plato, Phaedrus, 255e1

24 is a commonality in the way in which this relationship operates. It is precisely for this reason that we are able to gain insight into the realm of langue through analysis of the parole.

Section C: Eros is a causal agent

One of the basic understandings of desire, both in Greek and English, is that actions are performed on account of it. In this sense, eros can be thought of as a causal agent, something that provides a reason or gives agency to particular people to perform particular actions. In other words, certain actions are intrinsically changed when they are done on account of eros.

Once again, this trait first appears in the speech of Phaedrus with his story of

Alcestis as he claims she “surpassed (her in-laws) so far with her philia on account of her eros (οὓς ἐκείνη τοσοῦτον ὑπερεβάλετο τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα).”61 As previously mentioned, Alcestis is described as being the erastes and therefore partaking in eros. At the same time, the context reveals how it is not simply Alcestis’ philia that allowed her to surpass her in-laws, but her philia on account of eros. In this sense, eros has acted as a causal agent on Alcestis, spurring her to achieve her goal. Phaedrus goes on to claim that

“the gods honor most of all both zeal and courage concerning desire (θεοὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν

ἔρωτα σπουδήν τε καὶ ἀρετὴν μάλιστα τιμῶσιν).”62 Again, it is not simply the fact that one has zeal and courage (σπουδήν τε καὶ ἀρετὴν), but zeal and courage concerning eros. The appearance of causal prepositions alters the description of the

61 Symposium, 179c1-2 62 Symposium, 179d1-2.

25 behavior by implying that the intangible apparatus, eros, acting within the erastes is the justification behind such abnormal action.

By acting as the behavioral cause within the erastes, eros provides agency to words that may not otherwise possess it, like zeal and courage. Phaedrus repeats this causal process of eros with the story of Orpheus, who did not have “the courage to die for the sake of eros as Alcestis (τολμᾶν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔρωτος ἀποθνῄσκειν ὥσπερ

Ἄλκηστις).”63 In each case, eros is the spark that brings forth the true nature of an erastes and drives them to achieve something great. This is reflected through the grammatical construction, verb of action + causal preposition + eros. Whether they are successful in this endeavor is another issue.

Like Phaedrus, Pausanias also draws upon a common conception of the causal nature of eros in his description of homosexual relationships. In his speech, he refers to men “who are inspired out of this eros (οἱ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ἔρωτος ἔπιπνοι).”64 The nature of eros is likened to a spiritual inspiration (ἔπιπνοι) that enters into the aspiring erastes. He demonstrates this inspirational eros as being easy to spot as “even in the eros of boys itself someone would come to know those who were purely impelled by this eros

(καί τις ἂν γνοίη καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ παιδεραστίᾳ τοὺς εἰλικρινῶς ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ

ἔρωτος ὡρμημένους).”65 In claiming this, he is drawing upon the speech of Phaedrus, who cited the Homeric epics as portraying eros as a mental force the gods breathe into heroes:

63 Symposium, 179d5-6 64 Symposium, 181c5 65 Symposium, 181c7-d1

26 καὶ ἀτεχνῶς, ὃ ἔφη Ὅμηρος, μένος ἐμπνεῦσαι ἐνίοις τῶν ἡρώων τὸν θεόν,

τοῦτο ὁ Ἔρως τοῖς ἐρῶσι παρέχει γιγνόμενον παρ᾽ αὑτοῦ.66

And absolutely, what Homer said, (namely) that the god breathes anger into some

of those heroes, and Eros produces this for those desiring, bringing it about from

himself.

In each case eros is portrayed as the instigator, the active and unseen force that “inspires” and “impels” the erastes towards its object.

Although Eryximachus is more concerned with manipulating eros within the human body (the role of the physician), he too makes indirect mention of its causative nature. This occurs in his discussion of the different types of eros, one of which is a violent manifestation. Eryximachus describes the process of inspiration as being

“whenever the eros of excessive violence becomes more in control (ὅταν δὲ ὁ μετὰ τῆς

ὕβρεως Ἔρως ἐγκρατέστερος…γένηται).”67 Like Phaedrus and Pausanias,

Eryximachus imagines eros as being the cause that spurs action in the erastes. The moralistic viewpoint of such actions will be discussed later. Regardless, another distinct pattern in the global conception of eros, its function within langue, is becoming clear through the individual uses within parole.

Like those before him, Aristophanes also follows this pattern of the nature of eros within the erastes. In his speech, he warns that humans must show piety to the gods in order that we do not get split in two once more, like our original human ancestors.

According to Aristophanes, we must follow eros “in order that we may flee that fate, and

66 Symposium, 179b1-3, “μένος ἐμπνεῦσαι” comes from Iliad 10.482, 15.262 67 Symposium, 188a7

27 chance upon another, since eros is the leader and general for us (ἵνα τὰ μὲν

ἐκφύγωμεν, τῶν δὲ τύχωμεν, ὡς ὁ Ἔρως ἡμῖν ἡγεμὼν καὶ στρατηγός).”68 Again, eros is the inspiration and the guide that leads the erastes towards his or her ultimate goal. Although Aristophanes has altered his individual language to describe this causative action, he defers to the same basic formula as the previous speakers.

We would expect this basic principle of eros as a causal agent to break down within the speech of Agathon, since, as previously mentioned, he has been marked as being separate from the speakers before him. Although his speech does encompass a different scope from those previous, the causal nature of eros remains. Agathon refers to this through his description of eros as the inspiration of poets:

πᾶς γοῦν ποιητὴς γίγνεται, κἂν ἄμουσος ᾖ τὸ πρίν, οὗ ἂν Ἔρως ἅψηται.69

So at least everyone becomes a poet, even if he was without the Muses before,

whomever Eros lays hold of.

As the subject of the verb ἅπτω, eros is again functioning in the role of the causal agent.

Those who are touched by eros develop the skills of a poet, even though they were devoid of such skills before. Agathon adds to this notion by claiming:

…ὅτι οὗ μὲν ἂν ὁ θεὸς οὗτος διδάσκαλος γένηται, ἐλλόγιμος καὶ φανὸς

ἀπέβη, οὗ δ᾽ ἂν Ἔρως μὴ ἐφάψηται, σκοτεινός.70

…that he of whom this god becomes a teacher, he turns out notable and

conspicuous, but of whom Eros does not lay hold of, turns out obscure.

68 Symposium, 193b1 69 Symposium, 196e2-3 70 Symposium, 197a4-6

28 The same verb, ἅπτω, is used in both contexts, as eros is the teacher who inspires those whom it touches.

Agathon explicitly summarizes this causative nature of eros at the end of his speech when he claims:

οὕτως ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, Ἔρως πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὢν κάλλιστος καὶ

ἄριστος μετὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄλλων τοιούτων αἴτιος εἶναι.71

So eros seems to me, Phaedrus, himself being supreme as the most beautiful and

best and after this to be the cause of all other such things for others.

The “αἴτιος” Agathon mentions is the same function described in his previous contexts, as well as those of Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus and Aristophanes. Even though the explicit reference is not made until the end of his speech, and even though the speech is in many ways different from its predecessors, Agathon still conceptualizes eros as a causal agent in the same manner as the previous speakers. This shared understanding of eros is the common thread that connects its meaning in each speech and forces us, not being a part of this culture, to form a similar interpretation based on this common conceptualization.

Like Agathon, Socrates also makes a speech with a unique scope unlike any of his predecessors, and, yet, he too falls into the same pattern of describing eros. This main expression of eros as the causative agent occurs at the end of his speech where he summarizes the role eros plays for humans in obtaining what they desire:

…τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει συνεργὸν ἀμείνω Ἔρωτος οὐκ ἄν τις ῥᾳδίως

λάβοι.72

71 Symposium, 197c1-3

29 …for human nature no one would easily take a better helper than Eros.

In equating eros to a partner that works with an individual and aids in performing actions to achieve an end, Socrates has utilized eros as a causative agent in the same manner as the previous speakers.

Within each of these contexts, certain features of eros are brought to light. First, eros provides agency to the words associated with it within each sentence. This appears through causal prepositions such as on account of, concerning, or for the sake of eros

(διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα, περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔρωτος). Each of these designations takes the original concept (the philia of Alcestis, for instance) and attempts to relate how it has been altered by the presence of eros. For instance, Alcestis’ philia is not what made her famous, but her philia on account of eros. This is a standard formula that occurs throughout the Symposium, across each of the seven speeches.

Second, eros demands active verbs of inspiration that describe its action as the motivating force that enters the human body and provides the agency for achieving certain deeds. These verbs show that mankind is, by nature, neither able to have nor act upon certain desires without the presence of eros. While this may seem straightforward, it will, in fact, have greater ramifications in terms of the individual ways in which each speaker applies this concept. Eros is the conceptualization of an unseen force, which propels the erastes towards the object of his desire. What this desire consists of, and how it will be achieved is not the concern of the global idea of eros (langue), but will be addressed on a more specific and individualized level through each speech (parole).

72 Symposium, 212b3-4

30 The uses of eros within both langue and parole establish eros as the cause of certain types of human behavior. Eros is the leader, the guide, the unseen force, and the motivation behind the deeds of the erastes. This fundamental description helps to explain the variations in interpretation of the workings of eros by each of the speakers. While each of the seven understands eros to be a causative agent, they all have distinct ideas about how eros inspires and what goals eros seeks. Even though these speeches are different, the prevailing notion of causal behavior runs through each. By identifying the similarities in each of the localized uses of eros (parole), we are able to draw a consistent understanding of the global perception of how eros must work (langue). This notion of eros as the causative agent will help us to understand the differences of each speech later on.

Section D: Eros is morally neutral

Now that we are confidently molding a more consistent picture of eros across each of the seven speeches, one prevailing question arises: does eros have a moral aspect? This question has its origins in the speech of Phaedrus and prevails all the way to the arrival and speech of Alcibiades. The morality of eros is interpreted in various ways, as each of the speakers introduces his own agenda into the rightness and wrongness of eros, but the fact remains that eros appears to have a bivalent role as enabling both right and wrong actions without distinguishing between the two. This moral ambiguity is revealed as each speaker attempts to introduce his understanding of laws and social morality in an attempt to justify his own share in eros. Even though these are different, the fact that each speaker feels the need to justify the morality of eros points to a larger

31 concept of neutrality, in which eros inspires all desires as long as they can be categorized under the realm of its meaning. The way in which these desires are obtained or the purpose for which they are sought is not the concern of eros.

Returning to the speech of Phaedrus, we can apply this concept of moral ambiguity to his stories of famous erastai: Alcestis and Orpheus. As previously mentioned, Phaedrus claims that Alcestis “surpassed (her in-laws) so far with her philia on account of her eros (οὓς ἐκείνη τοσοῦτον ὑπερεβάλετο τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ τὸν

ἔρωτα).”73 Phaedrus claims that as a result of this behavior, the gods sent her soul up from Hades:

καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐργασαμένη τὸ ἔργον οὕτω καλὸν ἔδοξεν ἐργάσασθαι οὐ μόνον

ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ θεοῖς, ὥστε πολλῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐργασαμένων

εὐαριθμήτοις δή τισιν ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοί, ἐξ Ἅιδου ἀνεῖναι

πάλιν τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνης ἀνεῖσαν ἀγασθέντες τῷ ἔργῳ.74

And when doing this deed she seemed to do it so well not only to men but also to

the gods, so that although many have done many noble deeds to whom the gods

have given this honor are few, that they should send up their souls again from

Hades, but that (soul) of that one (Alcestis) was sent up in admiration of her deed.

In terms of morality, Phaedrus explicitly states that the deed was deemed noble (καλὸν

ἔδοξεν) by the gods, implying that it just as easily could have been deemed ignoble.

Phaedrus emphasizes the magnitude of Alcestis’ achievement by noting “those to whom the gods have given this honor are few.” Although the action has been judged based on

73 Symposium, 179c1-2 74 Symposium, 179c3-d1

32 its morality, Phaedrus is clear in stating that the deed was noble (τὸ ἔργον…καλὸν), not the causative eros behind that deed. The deed itself only became noble through the judgment of an outside party.

Phaedrus expresses the counterpoint to noble deeds through Orpheus, who was also inspired by eros, being an erastes:

Ὀρφέα δὲ τὸν Οἰάγρου ἀτελῆ ἀπέπεμψαν ἐξ Ἅιδου, φάσμα δείξαντες τῆς

γυναικὸς ἐφ᾽ ἣν ἧκεν, αὐτὴν δὲ οὐ δόντες, ὅτι μαλθακίζεσθαι ἐδόκει, ἅτε

ὢν κιθαρῳδός, καὶ οὐ τολμᾶν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔρωτος ἀποθνῄσκειν ὥσπερ

Ἄλκηστις, ἀλλὰ διαμηχανᾶσθαι ζῶν εἰσιέναι εἰς Ἅιδου.75

But Orpheus, son of Oeagrus, they sent back in failure from Hades, showing a

phantom of the woman for whom he came, but not granting her, for he seemed to

be faint-hearted, being just as the kithera-player, and did not seem to have the

courage to die for the sake of eros as Alcestis, but to contrive to enter into Hades

alive.

Orpheus, like Alcestis, was also inspired by eros, and yet he fails in his quest. Nowhere does Phaedrus make the claim that the failure was a result of eros. Rather, the failure is a result of the action (contriving to enter Hades alive) rather than the causal agent of that action. Once again, the decision of whether this action was right or wrong does not lie with eros, but with an outside party, reflected through the verb of judgment, ἐδόκει.

Phaedrus makes the distinction clear: even though both were inspired by eros, with Alcestis deemed to have used her eros in the right way and Orpheus the wrong, the morality of each situation does not lie with eros, but with.how the performance of the

75 Symposium, 179d2-7

33 action was judged by an outside party (in this case, the gods). Phaedrus summarizes this concept through his claim that eros within the erastes can lead to both “shame for shameful things and the ambition towards those noble things (τὴν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς

αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνην, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς φιλοτιμίαν).”76 Once again, the concepts of shame and nobility are attributed to the action, not eros. With these lines Phaedrus is the first to introduce a concept that is constant throughout the Symposium: wicked deeds and noble deeds are two outcomes of the same cause; however, the morality lies with the deeds themselves, not eros. Each of the speakers will clearly envision eros in the role of the external instigator, who spurs others to action but is not affected himself.

Whereas Phaedrus simply introduced the tip of a much larger concept, Pausanias will be obsessed with it and expand it in great detail. He seeks to clarify Phaedrus’ argument by claiming:

πᾶσα γὰρ πρᾶξις… οὔτε καλὴ οὔτε αἰσχρά.77

Every action…is neither noble nor shameful.

With this, Pausanias has explicitly stated what Phaedrus implied, that how the action is performed determines its morality. He summarizes this by saying, “for when done rightly and nobly it becomes noble, when not rightly it is shameful (καλῶς μὲν γὰρ

πραττόμενον καὶ ὀρθῶς καλὸν γίγνεται, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ αἰσχρόν).”78

In terms of langue, Pausanias is adhering to the same baseline as Phaedrus: eros is morally neutral. And yet, in order to make his argument he decides to introduce a duality of eros, in order to explain right and wrong behavior. Pausanias describes the wrong type

76 Symposium, 178d1-2 77 Symposium, 180e4-5 78 Symposium, 181a3-4

34 of eros, which he calls “popular (ὁ πάνδημος),”79 as influencing the man who “desires of bodies more than souls (ὁ τοῦ σώματος μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν),”80 and “along with the flower of the body ceasing, the very thing which he desired, he departs flying away (ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι, οὗπερ ἤρα οἴχεται

ἀποπτάμενος).”81 Pausanias is describing a scenario in which the erastes only pursues his eromenos for purely physical reasons (the body). Once the beauty of the body dissipates with old age, the erastes leaves his eromenos in search of a new, younger partner. Pausanias imparts a moral judgment upon this behavior by claiming:

…οὐ δήπου κοσμίως γε καὶ νομίμως ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα πραττόμενον ψόγον

ἂν δικαίως φέροι.82

…surely any deed whatsoever not being done in an orderly and lawful manner

should justly bring reproach.

If we look closely at the syntax, however, we realize that even though Pausanias has created a dual eros in order to explain the cause of right and wrong behavior, the moral judgment is not of eros, but of the deed.

On the other hand, the right type of eros, which he calls “heavenly

(Οὐρανίας),”83 governs such behaviors as honesty and a genuine care for the education of the eromenos. Pausanias describes this erastes as being praised by the law:

79 Symposium, 183d8 80 Symposium, 183e1 81 Symposium, 183e3-4 82 Symposium, 182a4-6 83 Symposium, 181c1

35 …ὁ νόμος δέδωκε τῷ ἐραστῇ θαυμαστὰ ἔργα ἐργαζομένῳ

ἐπαινεῖσθαι…84

…the law granted opportunity to be praised for the erastes who accomplishes

amazing deeds…

Again, the moral judgment is being passed upon the deeds themselves, not eros.

Pausanias acknowledges this by describing the role of eros as “the one urging us to desire in a noble manner (ὁ καλῶς προτρέπων ἐρᾶν).”85 Eros is once again the outside force that propels the erastes towards action; the morality of that action is not ascribed to eros.

Pausanias goes on to pit these two types of eros against one another. He begins by describing the actions of wrong desire:

εἰ γὰρ ἢ χρήματα βουλόμενος παρά του λαβεῖν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄρξαι ἤ τινα

ἄλλην δύναμιν… ἱκετείας τε καὶ ἀντιβολήσεις ἐν ταῖς δεήσεσιν

ποιούμενοι, καὶ ὅρκους ὀμνύντες, καὶ κοιμήσεις ἐπὶ θύραις, καὶ

ἐθέλοντες δουλείας δουλεύειν οἵας οὐδ᾽ ἂν δοῦλος οὐδείς…86

For if either wishing to take money from anyone or to hold office or any other

power…making supplications and entreaties in their requests, and swearing oaths,

and sleeping at doors, and willing to do acts of slavery as not even any slave

would do…

84 Symposium, 182e2-3 85 Symposium, 181a6 86 Symposium, 183a2-7

36 He goes on to claim that by doing these actions, the erastes “would garner the greatest reproach (τὰ μέγιστα καρποῖτ᾽ ἂν ὀνείδη).”87 On the other hand, the erastes who performs lawful actions is deemed by the law “to act without reproach (ἄνευ ὀνείδους

πράττειν).”88 Once again, in these contexts the moral judgment is placed upon the actions, rather than the cause of the actions. Pausanias himself summarizes this sentiment by saying that any deed “is neither noble itself just as it is not shameful itself, but noble if nobly performed and shameful if shamefully performed (οὔτε καλὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ᾽

αὑτὸ οὔτε αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ καλῶς μὲν πραττόμενον καλόν, αἰσχρῶς δὲ

αἰσχρόν).”89

By pitting both sides of eros against one another, Pausanias is showing how the erastes, though inspired by eros, does not always seek the most noble of goals. This does not mean, however, that eros bears the moral judgment. On the contrary, Pausanias is clear in expressing the act itself as the moral indicator, while eros remains morally neutral, as it simply fulfills its role as the causal agent no matter what type of action that agency might produce.

Eryximachus takes this concept of eros causing right and wrong actions and translates it into a discussion on sickness and health within the body. He does this by claiming “indeed it is, as Pausanias was saying, that it is right to gratify good men, and wicked to gratify immoral men (ἔστιν δή, ὥσπερ ἄρτι Παυσανίας ἔλεγεν τοῖς μὲν

87 Symposium, 183a1-2 88 Symposium, 183b4 89 Symposium, 183d4-6

37 ἀγαθοῖς καλὸν χαρίζεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῖς δ᾽ ἀκολάστοις αἰσχρόν).”90 The verb χαρίζεσθαι (“gratify”) tips us off to the subject being the eromenos, the one who gratifies the erastes, which in turn identifies the good and wicked men as erastai. And yet, even though the erastai are categorized as either morally right or wrong,

Eryximachus makes no mention of the morality of eros, just the actions of those who are inspired by eros.

He clarifies exactly what he means by good (καλὸν) and wicked (αἰσχρόν) by claiming:

…οὕτω καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ἑκάστου τοῦ

σώματος καὶ ὑγιεινοῖς καλὸν χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δεῖ…τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς καὶ

νοσώδεσιν αἰσχρόν τε καὶ δεῖ ἀχαριστεῖν…91

…thus in these bodies themselves it is necessary to gratify the good and healthy

of each body…but it is necessary to be thankless to the bad and sickly parts…

Finally, he equates the one who judges this morality to be the physician:

…καὶ ὁ διαγιγνώσκων ἐν τούτοις τὸν καλόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἔρωτα, οὗτός

ἐστιν ὁ ἰατρικώτατος.92

…he who distinguishes between the noble and wicked eros in these, he is the

most skilled at healing.

These two contexts establish that there is a judgment of morality towards the erastes, similar to the speeches of Phaedrus and Pausanias. Unlike his predecessors, however,

90 Symposium, 186b8-9 91 Symposium, 186c1-4 92 Symposium, 186c7-d1

38 Eryximachus seems to be applying the moral value directly to eros (ἐν τούτοις τὸν

καλόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἔρωτα). This seems to be contradictory to our baseline of a morally neutral eros.

In order to understand this discrepancy, we must look to the specific description

Eryximachus is giving of this dual eros. His argument revolves around the concepts of balance, or harmony (ἁρμονία). As he explains the type of harmony within what he calls the right and wrong eros, we would expect to be presented with an argument on the nature, not the deeds, of eros to support his claim. Eryximachus presents his evidence in the following manner:

…καὶ ἐπειδὰν μὲν πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῦ κοσμίου τύχῃ ἔρωτος ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ

ἔλεγον, τά τε θερμὰ καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ ὑγρά, καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ

κρᾶσιν λάβῃ σώφρονα, ἥκει φέροντα εὐετηρίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν ἀνθρώποις

καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἠδίκησεν: ὅταν δὲ ὁ μετὰ

τῆς ὕβρεως Ἔρως ἐγκρατέστερος περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ὥρας γένηται,

διέφθειρέν τε πολλὰ καὶ ἠδίκησεν.93

…and when the others of the well-ordered eros, as I said just now, hot and cold,

dry and wet, and he takes on a temperate harmony and mixture, he comes bearing

both a good season and good health to men and the other animals and plants, and

does no damage. But whenever the violent eros becomes more in control

concerning the season of the year, he utterly destroys and does great damage.

93 Symposium, 188a2-8

39 The syntax of this passage points not to the nature of eros as morally right or wrong, but as the cause of actions that are morally right or wrong. In other words, it’s not eros that is good, but its action of bringing a good season and good health. The term φέροντα changes the sentence from focusing on eros to focusing on the actions resulting from eros. The same applies for the wrong eros, as the morality is being applied to the outcome: the great damage as a result of an action inspired by eros.

Eryximachus provides one last summary of his argument in which he attempts to describe the morality of eros:

…ὁ δὲ περὶ τἀγαθὰ μετὰ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀποτελούμενος

καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς, οὗτος τὴν μεγίστην δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ

πᾶσαν ἡμῖν εὐδαιμονίαν παρασκευάζει…94

…but the one (of the dual eros) which is completed for good with moderation and

justice both among us and for the gods, this one has the greatest power and

provides for us all good fortune…

Once again, even though Eryximachus originally claimed to be talking about eros itself, the emphasis lies with the action as a result of eros (“completed for the good”). By analyzing these contexts, we see that even though the scope of Eryximachus’ speech was dissimilar from those of Phaedrus or Pausanias, he still is drawing upon the same concept of a morally neutral eros, as it is the actions as a result of the causative agent that receive the moral judgment. Once again, eros is not concerned with the actions it inspires, whether they be destructive or beneficial for mankind or the gods. It remains neutral, and allows those affected by these actions to enforce morality upon them, while eros remains

94 Symposium, 188d5-8

40 the instigator who spurs morally twofold behavior, but avoids such moral judgments itself.

While Aristophanes presents a creation myth that seems incongruous with the previous speeches, he still describes eros in the same morally neutral manner as his predecessors. He does this by first praising the erastes, in the form of the original humans, as they “delight in lying together and being intertwined with men, and these are the best of boys and lads since they are the most manly in nature (καὶ χαίρουσι

συγκατακείμενοι καὶ συμπεπλεγμένοι τοῖς ἀνδράσι, καί εἰσιν οὗτοι βέλτιστοι

τῶν παίδων καὶ μειρακίων, ἅτε ἀνδρειότατοι ὄντες φύσει).”95 He then presents the counterargument to his praise by claiming that “some say they are shameless, but falsely; for they do not do this by shamelessness but by courage and manliness and masculinity

(φασὶ δὲ δή τινες αὐτοὺς ἀναισχύντους εἶναι, ψευδόμενοι: οὐ γὰρ ὑπ᾽

ἀναισχυντίας τοῦτο δρῶσιν ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ θάρρους καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἀρρενωπίας).”96

This counterargument is referring to Pausanias’ speech of the right and wrong actions inspired by eros, in which he too refers to the wrong type of action as shameless.

Aristophanes, although he avoids bringing the judgments of law and custom into his speech, is still participating in a moral evaluation of the actions spurred by eros, rather than eros itself. This is evident through his word choice, as the ambiguous “some

(τινες)” are judging these progenitor humans based upon what they do (δρῶσιν), not based upon their nature. The presence of this verb of doing alerts the reader to the shift in perspective, as Aristophanes is not describing eros, but the erastes. Again, this distinction

95 Symposium, 191e8-192a2 96 Symposium, 192a2-5

41 is subtle, yet important, as eros itself remains morally neutral while the actions done on account of eros are subject to moral scrutiny by an outside observer. While Aristophanes is applying the concept of right behavior versus wrong behavior, he is still placing the moral judgment on the action, not the cause of that action. In this way, even though the theme and scope of his speech is unlike anything prior, his description of eros points to its moral ambiguity.

These opinions on the morality, or lack thereof, of eros culminate in the speech of

Socrates, who, through Diotima, will take each opinion and attempt to provide an overarching truth in order to unify the apparent contradictions in each speech. While this might seem necessary, as each of the previous speakers has described the morality involving eros through a different approach, our baseline shows that the differences actually reside in the parole, while there is still unity within the langue. In other words, there is no discrepancy in whether or not eros can be right, wrong, or neither, as each symposiast has deferred to a common construction in which the moral judgment of noble

(καλός) or good (ἀγαθός) versus shameful (αἰσχρός) is applied to the action of the erastes, not the eros which inspired that action. It is through each of the individual interpretations of that fact, through parole, that we find the differences, not through the global understanding of eros as morally neutral. We can safely assume, therefore, that if

Socrates is attempting to persuade the others (the same goal that the previous speakers had), his usage through parole should be different, but the overall adherence to the baseline (langue) should remain constant.

42 Socrates begins his interpretation of the morality of eros through analyzing its objects. In his encounter with Diotima, Socrates tells how Diotima challenged his assertions of the rightness or wrongness of eros:

…ἢ οἴει, ὅτι ἂν μὴ καλὸν ᾖ, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι αἰσχρόν; 97

…or do you think, that whatever is not noble, it is necessary to be shameful?

These terms, καλὸν and αἰσχρόν, are the exact ones used by the previous speakers in their attempt to qualify the morality of behaviors spurred by eros. By phrasing her question in this manner, Diotima has taken the idea of right and wrong behavior and applied it to eros itself, much in the manner of Eryximachus. She then rephrases the question in terms of ignorance and wisdom:

ἦ καὶ ἂν μὴ σοφόν, ἀμαθές; ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι ἔστιν τι μεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ

ἀμαθίας;98

And if it is not wise, would it be ignorant? Did you not perceive that there is

something between wisdom and ignorance?

She finally comes to her conclusion by claiming:

μὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκαζε ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, μηδὲ ὃ μὴ ἀγαθόν,

κακόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν

μηδὲ καλόν, μηδέν τι μᾶλλον οἴου δεῖν αὐτὸν αἰσχρὸν καὶ κακὸν εἶναι,

ἀλλά τι μεταξύ τούτοιν.99

97 Symposium, 201e10-11 98 Symposium, 202a2-3 99 Symposium, 202b1-5

43 Then do not compel what is not beautiful to be ugly, or what is not good to be

bad. In this way even eros since you yourself agree that he is neither good nor

beautiful, suppose no longer that it is necessary for him to be ugly and bad, but

something between these two.

With this, Diotima has, in essence, eliminated any possibility of eros having morality.

This is the culmination of the previous speakers, who, although they described eros in the same manner to make their point, did not use such a thorough dismissal of all morality. If eros itself cannot be right or wrong, we must look to the objects of eros to find the morality of any behavior. This is the overarching claim expressed by each of the previous speakers, which Diotima explicitly claims:

ταύτην δὴ τὴν βούλησιν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον πότερα κοινὸν οἴει εἶναι

πάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ πάντας τἀγαθὰ βούλεσθαι αὑτοῖς εἶναι ἀεί;100

Do you suppose this wish or this eros to be common to all mankind, and that

everyone always wishes to have good things?

With this question, Diotima places the burden of morality squarely on the object of eros, as τἀγαθὰ, in its neuter form, expresses the idea that things eros seeks are deemed as good, not eros itself.

In support of her claim of eros as the moral intermediate, Diotima describes the ways in which an erastes can desire objects deemed wrong, according to the general consensus. These behaviors include “money-making (χρηματισμὸν),”101 which echoes the speech of Phaedrus who claimed that those who “intend to live nobly (μέλλουσι

100 Symposium, 205a5-7 101 Symposium, 205d4-5

44 καλῶς βιώσεσθαι),”102 produce “wealth (πλοῦτος).” Likewise, Apollodorus, in the prologue, mentioned the “money-making (χρηματιστικῶν)” friends of the unnamed stranger, who “think (they) are doing a lot when (they) are doing nothing (ὅτι οἴεσθε τὶ

ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ποιοῦντες).”103 These examples both refer to behavior as being either right or wrong (right in the case of Phaedrus, wrong in the case of Apollodorus). This shows how moral judgment is purely subject to the bias of the outside party creating the judgment. Diotima has taken this relative nature of morality and identified it as being such, and in doing so she has equated the morality with the object of eros, such as

“money-making,” rather than with eros itself. In this way, even though Socrates, through

Diotima, has created a new interpretation of the morality of eros through individualized parole, the underlying factor is still that eros is morally neutral and therefore our baseline remains intact.

Alcibiades, although his speech covers a much different topic from that of his predecessors, also adheres to this concept. The context specific to the morality of eros occurs in 217c8, when he describes his method of making Socrates desire him as being

“like an erastes plotting against his beloved (ὥσπερ ἐραστὴς παιδικοῖς

ἐπιβουλεύων).”104 With this line, Alcibiades reveals his intentions towards Socrates as being morally wrong, since an erastes, as Pausanias claims, is not supposed to resort to tricking his eromenos. Alcibiades even recognizes this as he later claims that “on that occasion (he) was ashamed and let him (Socrates) go (καὶ τότε μὲν αἰσχυνόμενος

102 Symposium, 178c7 103 Symposium, 173c7-d1 104 Symposium, 217c7-8

45 ἀφῆκα αὐτόν).”105 The shame Alcibiades confesses is the shame of wrongful behavior, not the cause of that behavior. Alcibiades is equating his shame to the plotting, which deflects the moral judgment away from eros. In this way, Alcibiades, like all the speakers before him, is deferring to the global concept of eros, in which it remains morally neutral.

What each of these contexts shows is that while any erastes is inspired by eros, the ultimate goal of that inspiration is unique to the morality of the individual. Some use eros for good deeds, other for bad ones; however, as Diotima points out, no matter what one desires, be it shameful or laudable, that desire falls under the umbrella of eros. In this way, eros distances itself from the judgment of morality as it simply inspires action. How an erastes chooses to manifest that action is not the concern of eros, but relates to the moral character of the individual. Through our analysis of each context in which morality is a factor, it becomes clear that each of the symposiasts understands that actions have consequences and receive public scrutiny. Whether that is praise or reproach is not the concern of eros, since as a linguistic signifier eros encompasses both.

Section E: Eros desires through social relationships

So far, we have established some basic qualities of eros based upon the similarities across the Symposium. First, eros has been identified as always taking an object: an intrinsic quality for any word that expresses desire. Second, the erastes/eromenos relationship has been identified as the main vehicle for expressing eros in everyday life. Third, eros functions as a causal agent, in that eros inspires the erastes as an external stimulus. Lastly, eros has been deemed morally neutral, since the concepts

105 Symposium, 217d2-3

46 of right and wrong refer to the behaviors on account of eros, rather than eros itself. Now that we have covered the object, means of expression, inspirational nature, and moral neutrality of eros, the last common feature that must be explained is the type of desire expressed by eros. In doing this, we find that each of the speakers believes that the type of desire that only eros designates functions through social relationships.

To keep our approach sound, we must first clarify exactly what we mean by desires specific to eros. In our paradigm, eros and epithumia both operate as terms indicating desire. For this reason, their meanings will overlap, something that our methodology allows under the concept of Saussure’s sign systems. The overlap between eros and epithumia occurs within the context of desires that do not involve society as a whole. For example, the erastes/eromenos relationship will be revealed as a public relationship, in that it was meant and expected to be seen and judged by society. This relates to the morality of eros, as moral judgments can only be made of public acts.

Epithumia, on the other hand, does not partake in the erastes/eromenos relationship and has no vehicle for public expression. This type of desire usually involves something in private, such as the desire for food or a sexual encounter without a lasting relationship.

This difference will be explained in detail through our analysis of parole, as each speaker envisions the ultimate relationship between epithumia and eros in varying ways. For the purposes of langue, however, it is sufficient to analyze both epithumia and eros in terms of their place within society. Whereas epithumia has no social obligation, eros does and actively seeks objects that lead to interaction between the erastes and society.

Within the text, Phaedrus is the first to make the social aspect of eros clear, as he claims that eros is “the shame towards shameful deeds and the ambition towards those

47 noble things (τὴν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνην, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς

φιλοτιμίαν).”106 As previously established, the judgment of deeds as shameful and noble is not decided by eros but by the common perception of the larger society. This alters our understanding of the passage as eros, at least in this context, is seeking noble things. Phaedrus indicates these noble things as including “public honor (τιμαὶ),”107 a term which implies a social relationship. Society deems these noble things (τοῖς καλοῖς) and behaviors performed to obtain them as either noble or shameful. For Phaedrus, the ultimate goal of eros is to obtain public praise.

This brings us back to the story of Alcestis. Phaedrus describes Alcestis’ actions in the following way:

…ἐθελήσασα μόνη ὑπὲρ τοῦ αὑτῆς ἀνδρὸς ἀποθανεῖν, ὄντων αὐτῷ

πατρός τε καὶ μητρός, οὓς ἐκείνη τοσοῦτον ὑπερεβάλετο τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ

τὸν ἔρωτα, ὥστε ἀποδεῖξαι αὐτοὺς ἀλλοτρίους ὄντας τῷ ὑεῖ καὶ ὀνόματι

μόνον προσήκοντας, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐργασαμένη τὸ ἔργον οὕτω καλὸν ἔδοξεν

ἐργάσασθαι οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ θεοῖς…108

…who alone was willing to die for her husband, though he had both father and

mother, whom she surpassed so far with her philia on account of eros, as to make

them appear as being alien to their son and relations in name only, and when

doing this deed she seemed to do it so well not only to men but also to the gods…

106 Symposium, 178d2 107 Symposium, 178c7 108 Symposium, 179b7-c5

48 If we analyze this passage through the lens of the goal of eros, we see that it clearly involves a social relationship. First, Phaedrus makes a point of mentioning that Admetus had a mother and father, whose responsibility it should have been to die for the sake of their son. This, in turn, alerts us to rethink the presence of philia, which is the force through which Alcestis is accomplishing this deed. Philia denotes a social relationship in which two people are connected to each other in a particular manner. This will be addressed in the next section, but for now its presence indicates that the social relationship, and subsequent obligation, between Admetus and his parents has failed, while the relationship between Alcestis and Admetus has allowed her to succeed in her eros. This is again reflected in the phrase “to appear as being alien to their son and relations in name only,” as the relationship between parents and children (philia) has failed.

Second, we should take note of the presence of the verb ἔδοξεν, which indicates a judgment. In this case, it is the judgment of Alcestis’ behavior by the gods that allows her to achieve her ultimate prize of immortal glory. This ultimate goal of immortality will be crucial to our understanding of eros as we proceed through our analysis. For the moment, we should take this to mean that Alcestis has achieved an immortal name, something that can only be achieved through a social relationship. In other words, the only way to achieve glory is to have actions recognized as being glorious by society.

Pausanias follows the example of Phaedrus and also claim that eros desires through social relationships:

49 …ὁ νόμος δέδωκε τῷ ἐραστῇ θαυμαστὰ ἔργα ἐργαζομένῳ

ἐπαινεῖσθαι…109

…the law granted the opportunity to be praised for the erastes who accomplishes

amazing deeds…

Here, the goal of the erastes is described as the desire for praise: something which can only be accomplished through the laws and customs of society. This plays directly into his example of Harmodius and Aristogeiton:

ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτονος ἔρως καὶ ἡ Ἁρμοδίου φιλία βέβαιος γενομένη

κατέλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρχήν.110

For the eros of Aristogeiton and the philia of Harmodius, having become

steadfast, loosened their (the tyrants) power.

As with Alcestis, the eros of Aristogeiton on its own is not enough to accomplish the expulsion of the tyrants. His eros is paired with the philia of Harmodius in order to achieve that goal. This construction is the same as that of Alcestis, in that only through the social relationship contained within philia was Aristogeiton able to fulfill his eros.

Likewise, the ultimate goal remains constant: immortality of name. Through his actions,

Aristogeiton, and through association Harmodius, would be immortalized forever. While one could argue that they were not actively seeking immortality, they knew that their actions would be remembered by their fellow Athenians.

In each context, the final goal that eros is seeking is public recognition through praise and glory. This is only accomplished through the erastes/eromenos relationship,

109 Symposium, 182e2-3 110 Symposium, 182c5-7

50 since it is the eromenos who provides the necessary social relationship (philia) for bringing about the obtainment of the goals of eros. Without the philia, both between the erastes and eromenos, and between the erastes and his society, eros would not be able to achieve its aspirations of public praise, which, as our analysis of morality showed, is the consequence of worthy behavior.

In his speech on medicine and the role of the physician, Eryximachus attempts to ground his argument of eros in reality through analysis of the human body. Therefore, we would not expect to find any sort of social connotations within his speech. And yet, as in his description of eros, he claims that:

οὕτω πολλὴν καὶ μεγάλην, μᾶλλον δὲ πᾶσαν δύναμιν ἔχει συλλήβδην

μὲν ὁ πᾶς Ἔρως, ὁ δὲ περὶ τἀγαθὰ μετὰ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης

ἀποτελούμενος καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς, οὗτος τὴν μεγίστην

δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ πᾶσαν ἡμῖν εὐδαιμονίαν παρασκευάζει…111

Much and great power the whole eros has, rather, all the power, but the one which

is completed for good with moderation and justice both among us and for the

gods, this one has the greatest power and provides for us all happiness…

Here, Eryximachus has defined power (δύναμιν) as being the object of eros. We must analyze the specific syntax in order to see how this power is achieved in order to understand the social connection. Eryximachus has said that he who holds this power is the one whose eros led to “good with moderation and justice both among us and for the gods.” This line indicates that a social relationship has been established between gods and men which led to the obtainment of power. He makes this clear when he claims, “φιλίας

111 Symposium, 188d4-8

51 θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων…ἐπίστασθαι (He (eros) creates philia between gods and men).”112 Eros is now being portrayed as the causal agent that is seeking a goal

(δύναμιν) that, in this context, can only be achieved through the social relationship between gods and men (brought about by philia).

Even though Eryximachus alters the pattern set forth by Phaedrus and Pausanias in making his speech (parole), the implications of each context point to a greater overarching concept (langue) in which eros seeks the qualities that can only be granted through social relationships. It is impossible for one to acquire power without associating with those whom one intends to have that power over. In the case of Eryximachus, the reverse is true as well, as the gods are the ones granting power and only through philia with the gods can eros acquire power. The objects of this type of desire have been identified, so far, as power, happiness, beauty, goodness, and praise. As we are halfway through our analysis, it is becoming clear that these types of desires can only occur within a society. One cannot have power without a group to rule over; one cannot have happiness without a societal norm that establishes what happiness is; and one cannot have beauty without an agreed standard of what beauty should be.

Following Eryximachus, Aristophanes uses his speech to re-imagine the origin myth of eros. We would expect that, being a comic playwright, Aristophanes’ goal of eros might reflect the fantastic qualities of his speech. What we find is that, although encapsulated within a speech very different from those before it, Aristophanes, too, defers to the notion of eros seeking objects through societal relationships. This deference occurs in the summary of his speech, as he claims “but in fact I speak about both men and

112 Symposium, 188d1

52 women that thus our race might be happy, if we fulfill eros and each obtain his own favorite and departing toward his original nature (λέγω δὲ οὖν ἔγωγε καθ᾽ ἁπάντων

καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, ὅτι οὕτως ἂν ἡμῶν τὸ γένος εὔδαιμον γένοιτο, εἰ

ἐκτελέσαιμεν τὸν ἔρωτα καὶ τῶν παιδικῶν τῶν αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος τύχοι εἰς τὴν

ἀρχαίαν ἀπελθὼν φύσιν).”113 With this phrase, Aristophanes has identified the ultimate goal of eros to be happiness, the same goal as Eryximachus’ eros.

This happiness is identified as completion of the whole, as humans, having been cut in half by Zeus, are constantly looking for their other half. In order to achieve this fulfillment of the whole, however, humans needed to find a specific partner who matches with their body and soul in a way that indicates they are two halves of the same original form. In his description, Aristophanes is very clear about how this relationship works:

ὅταν μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ ἐντύχῃ τῷ αὑτοῦ ἡμίσει καὶ ὁ παιδεραστὴς

καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς, τότε καὶ θαυμαστὰ ἐκπλήττονται φιλίᾳ τε καὶ οἰκειότητι

καὶ ἔρωτι, οὐκ ἐθέλοντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν χωρίζεσθαι ἀλλήλων οὐδὲ

σμικρὸν χρόνον.114

And so whenever both a desirer of boys or any other kind, that person himself

meets his own half, then they are wonderfully overcome with friendship and

kinship and desire, so as to say they are not wishing to be separated from each

other even for a little time.

Here, Aristophanes has described the moment of obtaining the happiness sought by eros, as each human has found his or her soulmate. Once again, this type of encounter is

113 Symposium, 193c2-5 114 Symposium, 192b5-c2

53 marked by a specific social relationship, as indicated by the presence of philia. Only through that social relationship, which will later become that of the erastes and eromenos, can one obtain the ultimate goal of happiness. Additionally, Aristophanes has introduced a key aspect into what sort of social relationship the erastes and eromenos create, as the feelings they share for one another are given permenance and a future aspect. This becomes a key attribute of the relationship in our analysis of parole. In terms of eros, the main point to observe is that once again the ultimate goal is a social value, happiness, and therefore eros requires a social relationship in order to obtain this goal.

Without the appearance of the other half, humans would never be able to understand or find what they are missing. It is the reciprocal nature of the relationship that gives substance to the desire for happiness.

The speech of Agathon will also identify happiness as one of the goals of eros, albeit through a different context. Agathon indicates this abstract goal of eros at the beginning of his speech by saying that “of all the gods who are happy…eros himself is the most happy, being the most beautiful and the best (φημὶ οὖν ἐγὼ πάντων θεῶν

εὐδαιμόνων ὄντων ἔρωτα… εὐδαιμονέστατον εἶναι αὐτῶν, κάλλιστον ὄντα καὶ

ἄριστον).”115 Like his predecessors, Agathon acknowledges happiness as a trait of eros, along with beauty and being the best. What Agathon has not done, however, is to say that eros desires any of these traits. This discrepancy must be resolved if we are to apply it to our baseline. Fortunately, Agathon’s speech provides the necessary resolution.

Within his speech, Agathon claims that in order to truly understand eros we must

“praise him first for what sort he is, then for his gifts (ἐπαινέσαι πρῶτον αὐτὸν οἷός

115 Symposium, 195a5-7

54 ἐστιν, ἔπειτα τὰς δόσεις).”116 He justifies this approach through the saying “like always draws near to like (ὡς ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ ἀεὶ πελάζει).”117 If these two statements are taken to their logical conclusion, then if, according to Agathon, he is attempting to describe the nature of eros, eros associates with similar things, and eros is the most happy, beautiful and best, then it must hold true that Agathon equates the fact that eros is happy with eros being the desire for happiness. In Agathon’s mind, one must first possess what one desires. Therefore, if eros possesses happiness and beauty, then it must also have desired those same traits.

Agathon is even more explicit in the desire of beauty when he describes the gifts of eros which he previously mentioned. These gifts are related through the creation myth of eros, in which Agathon claims that “once this god (eros) grew, from this desiring of beauty all good things came to be (ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ὁ θεὸς οὗτος ἔφυ, ἐκ τοῦ ἐρᾶν τῶν

καλῶν πάντ᾽ ἀγαθὰ γέγονεν).”118 With this claim, he directly equates eros to the desiring of beauty, the same concept he associated with the nature of eros at the beginning of his speech. When taken together, both contexts relate the desire of eros to the concepts of beauty and happiness: the same words used by the previous speakers.

For the use of our baseline, we must now look to see how eros obtains these social goals. The answer lies in Agathon’s story of eros as the teacher:

τοξικήν γε μὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ μαντικὴν Ἀπόλλων ἀνηῦρεν ἐπιθυμίας

καὶ ἔρωτος ἡγεμονεύσαντος, ὥστε καὶ οὗτος Ἔρωτος ἂν εἴη μαθητής, καὶ

Μοῦσαι μουσικῆς καὶ Ἥφαιστος χαλκείας καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ ἱστουργίας καὶ

116 Symposium, 195a4-5 117 Symposium, 195b5 118 Symposium, 197b7-9

55 Ζεὺς κυβερνᾶν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ κατεσκευάσθη τῶν

θεῶν τὰ πράγματα Ἔρωτος ἐγγενομένου, δῆλον ὅτι κάλλους…119

Apollo invented archery and medicine and prophecy with eros and epithumia

taking the lead, so that also this god would be a student of eros, and the Muses in

connection with music and Hephaestus in connection with metal-work and Athena

in connection with weaving and Zeus in governing both gods and men. Hence, the

doing of the gods were also constructed when eros had been born among them,

clearly in connection with beauty…

This passage tells us that these particular skills of the gods were invented as a result of a particular relationship between the gods and eros, in which eros acted as the teacher.

Once again we see that the ultimate object of eros is beauty. Agathon is claiming that the manner in which eros obtains beauty is through a relationship with the gods. This is the same type of social construct that the previous speakers have mentioned.

Agathon goes on to claim that “from this desiring of beauty, all good things came to be for gods and humans (ἐκ τοῦ ἐρᾶν τῶν καλῶν πάντ᾽ ἀγαθὰ γέγονεν καὶ θεοῖς

καὶ ἀνθρώποις).”120 The positioning of this line directly after the description of the gods’ skills implies that the good things Agathon is referring to are in fact the skills. This explains why the relationship is described as between gods and men. Each techne that

Agathon mentions (archery, medicine, prophecy, music, metal-work, weaving) are skills that are invented by gods, but given to humans. This social relationship is the same as that of the earlier speakers, and through it, eros is able to obtain beauty and happiness.

119 Symposium, 197a6-b5 120 Symposium, 197b8-9

56 Although Agathon’s speech covers a unique topic, the description of eros still falls within our baseline of langue, as eros obtains certain social values through relationships.

In the speech of Socrates, we see the culmination of the social relationship eros seeks to obtain certain desires. First, Diotima asks Socrates, “So what eros is in need of and does not have is beauty (ἐνδεὴς ἄρ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἔχει ὁ Ἔρως κάλλος)?”121 She goes on to claim that “at the same time by nature (eros) is an erastes concerning beauty

(καὶ ἅμα φύσει ἐραστὴς ὢν περὶ τὸ καλὸν).”122 These contexts place the goal of eros squarely in the realm of beauty, just as the previous speakers. Diotima does not stop there, however, and goes on to equate beauty and goodness, saying that “men desire the good (οἱ ἄνθρωποι τἀγαθοῦ ἐρῶσιν).”123 Diotima continues this abstraction from beauty to the good and finally to the form of beauty which she labels as the end result of

“all those previous toils (οἱ ἔμπροσθεν πάντες πόνοι).”124

With these, Diotima has labeled the ultimate goal of eros as beauty and goodness, the same goals from the previous speeches. Additionally, Diotima provides a new argument which provides the ways in which humans seek these goals: immortality. She lays out three main paths by which mortals can obtain immortality: procreation, fame, and wisdom through philosophy. Each of these paths requires the same type of relationship as described by prior speakers. First, she describes the immortality of name by claiming:

121 Symposium, 201b5 122 Symposium, 203c3 123 Symposium, 206a4 124 Symposium, 210e6

57 ἐπεὶ οἴει σύ Ἄλκηστιν ὑπὲρ Ἀδμήτου ἀποθανεῖν ἄν, ἢ Ἀχιλλέα

Πατρόκλῳ ἐπαποθανεῖν…μὴ οἰομένους ἀθάνατον μνήμην ἀρετῆς πέρι

ἑαυτῶν ἔσεσθαι, ἣν νῦν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν; 125

Do you suppose that Alcestis would have died on account of Admetus, or Achilles

sought death for Patroclus…unless they thought to achieve immortal memory

concerning this virtue, which we now keep?

In this way, immortality is achieved through name, as one’s name will be preserved through all time. In order for this to happen, however, one needs the proper relationship in order to achieve social recognition. This relationship is that of the erastes and eromenos, as evidenced by Achilles and Alcestis. Through this, their deeds were made known to all as Diotima identifies a general “us” (implying the symposiasts and the reader) as the ones preserving the immortal name. This social relationship is twofold as, without the erastes/eromenos relationship, there would be no way to have one’s deeds recognized and without society as a whole (including the reader) there would be nobody to preserve the name.

This pattern continues to her example of procreation as well, as through the erastes/eromenos relationships between a man and woman children are produced. This type of relationship is different from one that is strictly for pleasure, as the act of procreation requires a future aspect in which one wishes to be with his or her partner in the future as well as the present. Additionally, procreation only produces immortality if done within a society, as the goal of having children is to have them surpass the parents’ deeds within society.

125 Symposium, 208d2-6

58 Finally, the same sort of principle applies to wisdom through philosophy, since it is made clear that only through the eromenos can the erastes gain wisdom. Diotima claims that through the contemplation of beauty through the eromenos, the erastes is able to behold the form of beauty and in doing so, to connect with divinity, thus becoming immortal:

τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι,

καὶ εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ;126

But in begetting true virtue and nurturing it, he begins to become dear to the god,

and if any other among men is immortal then that person is also?

By contemplating beauty and abstracting it all the way to its purest form, one is able to enter a social relationship with the god, through philia, and in doing so become immortal.

With these contexts, Socrates, through Diotima, has taken the statements of the previous speakers and brought them to their logical conclusion. If, as Diotima claims, the true goal of eros is immortality, then the three methods of obtaining it must involve social relationships, whether between the erastes and eromenos, the erastes and society, or the erastes and the gods. Although he has incorporated a philosophical abstraction to make his point, at the core of his argument Socrates is referring to the same global conceptualization of eros as the other symposiasts: the ultimate goals of eros are obtained through particular social relationships.

Even though Alcibiades claims he will not be making a speech about eros, what he does speak about is the erastes/eromenos relationship. Within this context, he addresses his own role as the erastes of Socrates as he claims that “nothing is more

126 Symposium, 212a5-7

59 important to me than to become the most excellent (ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι

πρεσβύτερον τοῦ ὡς ὅτι βέλτιστον ἐμὲ γενέσθαι).”127 Being an erastes, and therefore inspired by eros, the goal of Alcibiades reflects the ultimate goal of eros: obtaining the highest excellence. While the story of Alcibiades’ affection for Socrates represents the unfulfilled erastes/eromenos relationship, through the context of his words we can still extrapolate the same global concept he draws upon to make his point. That concept is the aspirations of eros and the need of a social relationship. Even though

Alcibiades failed in his goal to become the most excellent, he still attempted to obtain that goal through an erastes/eromenos relationship with Socrates. The fact that Alcibiades was not present to hear their speeches enhances the fact that this conceptualization of eros must be one that is shared by all the men, making it exactly what we need for our global baseline.

Although each of the seven speakers is manipulating the desires of eros to suit his individual rhetorical needs, the similarities are striking and run through each speech.

Ultimately, eros is seeking something more than simple sexual gratification at any particular moment. This understanding of eros will become especially important when analyzing the differences in each speech, as each speaker understands the way in which eros achieves these goals differently. For now, it is essential to identify that uniform understanding of eros seeking goals beyond simple sexual pleasure and requiring social relationships to do so. This baseline provides the reference point against which to recognize the differences in each argument. The comparison of these similarities and

127 Symposium, 218d1-2

60 differences will lead to a new understanding of exactly why eros seeks these abstract goals and the role of epithumia and philia in that quest.

Section F: Philia is the relationship through which eros obtains its desires

Having established the baseline qualities of eros within the Symposium, we must now focus our analysis on how eros obtains its desires. This issue has a direct correlation to the erastes/eromenos relationship as being the vehicle through which eros obtains the objects of its desire. This relationship is an expression of philia, a word often translated in English as “love,” but more fundamentally representing a relationship that forms a social connection or bond between the parties involved. With philia playing such a major part in the workings of eros, we must establish a baseline of what exactly philia entails in order to understand its relationship with eros.

Once more we must start with the speech of Phaedrus, since, as previously mentioned, he connected eros and philia within the word “ambition (φιλοτιμίαν).”

Phaedrus claims eros is “the shame towards shameful deeds and the ambition towards those noble things (τὴν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνην, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς

φιλοτιμίαν).”128 The key part within this word is “-timian,” or “honor,” which gives the literal meaning of ambition as love of honor. Phaedrus goes on to say that “even the gods honor most of all both zeal and courage concerning eros (οὕτω καὶ θεοὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν

ἔρωτα σπουδήν τε καὶ ἀρετὴν μάλιστα τιμῶσιν).”129 Phaedrus repeats this claim by saying “in fact, the gods honor better than any other this excellence concerning eros

128 Symposium, 178d2 129 Symposium, 179d1-2

61 (ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι μάλιστα μὲν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν οἱ θεοὶ τιμῶσιν τὴν περὶ τὸν

ἔρωτα).”130

As previously established within our baseline, Phaedrus has made honor one of the ultimate goals of eros. The act of honoring is, in fact, a social or community activity, as one cannot honor his or her self, but must be honored by the larger society as a group.

This dependency on society echoes the dependency of eros on philia, in that only through philia can eros achieve its goal, such as honor. This explains Phaedrus’ use of philotimia, since if we break the word down into its constituent parts, it is incorporating philia through the root “phil-,” indicating the operation of a social relationship. In other words, ambition as a concept only works when the acts of an individual are performed in sight of the group, and then judged by that group as either worthy or shameful. If, as our baseline has shown, eros seeks these types of social praises, the only way it can accomplish its goal is through the use of philia.

This is reflected through Alcestis, the one who received the honor of the gods. In his description, Phaedrus claims that she surpassed her in-laws “with her philia on account of eros (τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα).”131 The syntax of this passage indicates that it was the relationship, philia, which allowed Alcestis to surpass her in-laws who should have been the first to sacrifice themselves for their son. This represents the duality of philia, in that just as Alcestis was honored through upholding and exceeding her social obligation, the parents of Admetus failed in theirs. Within this example, Alcestis has created another relationship to the gods, which is logical since they are the ones who will immortalize her soul forever. Additionally, Phaedrus has clearly stated that the philia

130 Symposium, 180a7-b1 131 Symposium, 179c1-2

62 arose from eros, indicating that, while the desire originated within eros, the execution of that desire is performed through philia.

Pausanias, too, uses philia in this manner as he speaks on the morality of behaviors instigated by eros. Within his speech, he describes how eros is the bane of tyranny:

τοῖς γὰρ βαρβάροις διὰ τὰς τυραννίδας αἰσχρὸν τοῦτό γε καὶ ἥ γε

φιλοσοφία καὶ ἡ φιλογυμναστία: οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι συμφέρει τοῖς ἄρχουσι

φρονήματα μεγάλα ἐγγίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲ φιλίας ἰσχυρὰς

καὶ κοινωνίας, ὃ δὴ μάλιστα φιλεῖ τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἔρως

ἐμποιεῖν.132

For this thing (eros) is shameful to barbarians, because of those tyrannies, and

both philosophy and love of exercise. For, I suppose, it is not useful for the rulers

that great ideas arise among their subjects, nor strong friendship and partnerships

and all those other things which eros loves to create.

Like Phaedrus, Pausanias has depicted philia as the relationship (φιλίας ἰσχυρὰς) that arises from eros. The words philosophia and philogumnastia both carry the phil- prefix since both represent social acts; philosophy and exercise are both activities that must be done within a group.

This interpretation of philia comes through in the story of Harmodius and

Aristogeiton:

132 Symposium, 182b7-c4

63 ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτονος ἔρως καὶ ἡ Ἁρμοδίου φιλία βέβαιος γενομένη

κατέλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρχήν.133

For the eros of Aristogeiton and the philia of Harmodius, having become

steadfast, loosened their (the tyrants’) power.

Here, Pausanias reveals the mechanics of how the erastes/eromenos relationship is the vehicle for obtaining the desires of eros. In this example, the erastes, Aristogeiton, has sought the relationship (philia) with his eromenos, Harmodius. Pausanias is very clear in mentioning both of these aspects as the reason for the ultimate overthrow of the tyrant’s power, as the eros of Aristogeiton alone would not have been enough to accomplish the deed. Through the philia only obtainable for the erastes through a relationship with an eromenos, both were able to achieve the ultimate goal of immortality of name.

While this example shows the positive outcome of such a relationship, this is not the only result, as all behaviors are judged by one’s peers. This is explored in more detail as Pausanias claims that an erastes acting in an improper manner “would be prevented from performing such an act both by friends and by enemies (ἐμποδίζοιτο ἂν μὴ

πράττειν οὕτω τὴν πρᾶξιν καὶ ὑπὸ φίλων καὶ ὑπὸ ἐχθρῶν).”134 Here, the relationship is twofold, as the erastes has a responsibility both to those with whom he has a good relationship (his friends) and those with whom he does not (his enemies), as each group is part of the larger society as a whole. Even though the outcome earns the erastes reproach, the fact remains that he had to engage in a social interaction in order to attempt to achieve immortality of name through the erastes/eromenos relationship.

133 Symposium, 182c5-7 134 Symposium, 183a7-8

64 Pausanias provides an example of this type of immortality of name as he says that such a goal of the erastes/eromenos relationship could be “wishing to obtain money from anyone or to hold office or gain any other power (εἰ γὰρ ἢ χρήματα βουλόμενος

παρά του λαβεῖν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄρξαι ἤ τινα ἄλλην δύναμιν).”135 Again, power, receiving money from another, and holding office are all goals that require society and a certain type of relationship within that society. Eros seeks these goals, and only can achieve them through the relationship involved with philia.

Eryximachus, although straying from the themes of the speeches of Phaedrus and

Pausanias with his excursion into medicine, also uses philia in this manner. One such instance occurs during his explanation of the role of the physician:

δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἔχθιστα ὄντα ἐν τῷ σώματι φίλα οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι ποιεῖν καὶ

ἐρᾶν ἀλλήλων.136

For indeed it is necessary that he (eros) make the things which are most hateful in

the body friends.

In his speech, Eryximachus has identified the goal of eros as harmony within the body.

Here, he has described the manner in which eros achieves that harmony: balancing the most extreme of opposites. He lists these opposites as hot and cold, bitter and sweet, and dry and wet. The key to understanding this operation is the word used to describe the outcome, φίλα. Eryximachus is saying that the things that were once the most opposite have engaged in a social relationship, through philia, and through this relationship eros is able to achieve its ultimate goal of harmony. This description, although based in

135 Symposium, 183a2-3 136 Symposium, 186d5-6

65 medicine and science, follows the exact same pattern as the previous speeches: eros partakes of philia in order to achieve its goal.

He continues this line of thought as he describes how eros is able to bring to humans the greatest fortune:

…ὁ δὲ περὶ τἀγαθὰ μετὰ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀποτελούμενος

καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς οὗτος τὴν μεγίστην δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ πᾶσαν

ἡμῖν εὐδαιμονίαν παρασκευάζει καὶ ἀλλήλοις δυναμένους ὁμιλεῖν καὶ

φίλους εἶναι καὶ τοῖς κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν θεοῖς.137

…but the one (eros) which is completed for the good with moderation and justice

both among us and for the gods, this one has the greatest power and provides for

us all good fortune and being able to associate with each other and have philia

even with the gods stronger than us.

Once again, eros is depicted as requiring the relationship of philia in order to achieve its goal. In this example, that goal is the good (τἀγαθὰ), something which is a recurring aim of eros throughout the work. Eryximachus states that the good is acquired through moderation and justice “both among us and for the gods.” This is simply a description of philia, as through this relationship eros is able to obtain the good, along with power.

Likewise, humans, specifically erastai who partake of eros, are able to obtain the same good (good fortune (εὐδαιμονίαν)) through a philia between humanity and the gods.

Here, as before, the ultimate goal of eros can only be achieved through the social relationship encompassed within philia.

137 Symposium, 188d5-9

66 Aristophanes takes these three previous contexts of philia and applies them to his own creation myth, in which he explains the origin of both eros and mankind. As previously stated, Aristophanes explains eros as being the desire of the whole and the search for one’s literal other half. This is accomplished through procreation, an act that requires philia through the erastes/eromenos relationship.

He goes on to explain this phenomenon through his creation myth, as Zeus cuts these progenitor humans in two for their licentious behavior in attempting to overthrow the gods. The inherent problem in this splitting is that these humans have backwards genitals and therefore cannot procreate. Pitying them, Zeus “changes their genitals to the front, for until this they had these on the outside, and they both beget and bear not into each other but into the earth, just as cicadas (καὶ μετατίθησιν αὐτῶν τὰ αἰδοῖα εἰς τὸ

πρόσθεν—τέως γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκτὸς εἶχον, καὶ ἐγέννων καὶ ἔτικτον οὐκ εἰς

ἀλλήλους ἀλλ᾽ εἰς γῆν, ὥσπερ οἱ τέττιγες).”138 By changing the genitals to the front, Zeus “made procreation in each other (τὴν γένεσιν ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐποίησεν),”139 thus making procreation one of the possible outcomes of sexuality between men and women.

As previously mentioned, Aristophanes describes how Hephaestus introduced mankind to eros through the erastes/eromenos relationship. In doing so, he also provided them with the ability to have desires of the soul, rather than the body, which led to the desire, through eros, of procreation. According to our baseline, however, philia must be involved in order for this procreation to lead to the ultimate goal of immortality. This

138 Symposium, 191b6-c2 139 Symposium, 191c3

67 type of immortality will be described in detail by Diotima as being an act through which mankind is able to keep his family name and honor alive through all time.

Like the previous speakers, he describes this through the exact same formula of eros leading to philia which leads to immortality. He does this through his description of those who procreate, which he calls “woman-lovers (φιλογύναικές)”140 and “man- lovers (φίλανδροί),”141 depending on whether they are women seeking men or men seeking women. The goal of either type of lover, however, is again procreation.

Aristophanes explicitly makes this claim by saying that “if a man might meet with a woman, they might beget and be a family (εἰ ἀνὴρ γυναικὶ ἐντύχοι, γεννῷεν καὶ

γίγνοιτο τὸ γένος).”142 This provides justification for the presence of the phil- prefix, which we have seen before. The immortality Aristophanes is describing can only be achieved through the social relationship between both the erastes and eromenos, which encourages contemplation of the future and desires of the soul, and between the erastes and society as whole. This second aspect is critical, as procreation is a social symbol which allows society to deem one worthy of praise due to one’s fertility and production of offspring. Without the social interaction between erastes and society through philia, there would be no such praise and, therefore, no immortality of name and race. Like those before him, Aristophanes is drawing upon the same global idea of philia as the social relationship that leads to obtainment of the goals of eros, in order to create his argument.

This unifies his speech to the Symposium as a whole, where otherwise it may have seemed unrelated due to his fantastic content.

140 Symposium, 191d7 141 Symposium, 191e1 142 Symposium, 191c5-6

68 Agathon, in his attempt at rhetorical manipulation, incorporates aspects of each of the previous speakers into his own encomium of eros. One such aspect is the same concept of philia as the path of eros towards its object. This object proves to be the familiar goal of balance and harmony, which Eryximachus introduced in his speech. This can be seen through his description of eros as the ruler of the gods:

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκτομαὶ οὐδὲ δεσμοὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ

βίαια, εἰ Ἔρως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἦν, ἀλλὰ φιλία καὶ εἰρήνη, ὥσπερ νῦν, ἐξ οὗ

Ἔρως τῶν θεῶν βασιλεύει.143

For there would have been no cutting nor fettering of each other nor many other

violent things, if eros was among them (the gods), but friendship and peace, as

now, from the time when eros rules over the gods.

Here, Agathon has equated the goal of eros to peace among the gods. The role of philia is again marked as being the path through which the goals of eros are achieved. Agathon demonstrates this through a clever rearrangement of Hesiod’s Theogony. Agathon claims that the violent acts of cutting and fettering were done before eros was ruler of the gods.

This absolves eros of responsibility and paves the way for the ultimate goal of peace. In terms of philia, Agathon’s rearrangement of the creation myth is, in fact, a rearrangement of philia, as he is manipulating the relationship eros has to the rest of the gods. By making eros ruler, whereas before he was not, Agathon has enabled his eros to create peace through the newly formed relationships.

This understanding does not exactly match those of the prior speakers, since

Agathon has decided to “praise eros first for what sort he is, then for his gifts (πρῶτον

143 Symposium, 195c4-6

69 αὐτὸν οἷός ἐστιν, ἔπειτα τὰς δόσεις).”144 In claiming this, Agathon has announced his intention to speak of eros as the personified god, while omitting his relationship to mankind. And yet, even with this change in parole, Agathon still adheres to the conceptualization of philia as the relationship through which eros obtains its desires.

Through creating philia among the other gods, eros is able to create peace. Again, it is only through the philia that such an arrangement is possible. Therefore, the langue of philia from which Agathon creates his speech is the same fundamental principle as that of the earlier speakers, thus connecting the philia of Agathon to the baseline of philia throughout the Symposium.

The last speaker to address the role of philia in terms of eros is Socrates. Through

Diotima, he addresses several of the previous speakers and their contexts of philia, and applies these to a new context. For example, Diotima elaborates on the path to immortality, something first alluded to by each of the previous speakers. She claims that all men are driven by “a zeal and eros to follow immortality (ἀθανασίας...ἡ σπουδὴ καὶ

ὁ ἔρως ἕπεται).”145 With this, immortality is explicitly declared the ultimate goal of eros, and thus justifies our interpretation of the previous speeches. She then clarifies what the previous speakers had claimed by saying that all one needs to do to understand this concept is to “look at the ambition of men (τῶν ἀνθρώπων…τὴν φιλοτιμίαν

βλέψαι).”146 This is a direct reference back to the speech of Phaedrus, who also spoke of the ambition of men.

144 Symposium, 195a4-5 145 Symposium, 208b5-6 146 Symposium, 208c2-3

70 Diotima has simply taken the argument of the previous speakers and brought it to its logical conclusion, making immortality the goal of eros. Once again, philia is associated with the concept that leads to immortality (ambition). She continues this line of reasoning in the summary of her argument, in which she claims the proper erastes is the one who is “bringing forth and nourishing true virtue he begins to become dear to the gods, and he above all other men is immortal (τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ

θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων

ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ).”147 Here, Diotima has explicitly stated that in order to achieve procreation, a goal of eros, the erastes creates a relationship with the immortal, since he is seeking immortality. Again, the emphasis is placed on the relationship as through philia, the erastes is able to achieve his ultimate goal.

The importance of setting this baseline for philia cannot be overemphasized, as philia must be understood in this manner in order to make relevant comparisons to eros.

Both words are locked in a complex relationship that can only be unpacked through comparison of the differences against the baseline of similarities. Even though each of the speakers is applying philia in a different way, they are all drawing upon a similar concept of how philia must function in any context. This is the langue of philia, which is equally important to the langue of eros. Through the individual parole, we are able to draw a clear picture of the langue. In this case, philia is always portrayed as the pathway to obtaining the goals of eros. This baseline lays the foundation for understanding exactly how this relationship works, and why it is important in distinguishing epithumia, eros, and philia from one another.

147 Symposium, 212a5-7

71

Section G: Epithumia is desire of the body

The last of the three words in our evolving paradigm is epithumia. This term is used across the Symposium in a variety of ways, appearing in the same contexts as eros and even philia. For this reason, it must be considered both distinct and important within the relationship of all three words. Whereas eros is the associated with desires of the body and soul, epithumia is on associated with desires of the body. This sets up a hierarchy of whereby eros is able to draw upon epithumia in order to obtain more lofty objects, such as the immortality gained through philia. In order to approach this evolving hierarchy, we must first address the nature of epithumia.

Within the text, epithumia does not appear until the speech of Eryximachus.

Nevertheless, we can still draw a baseline of similarity using the contexts in which it appears in the last five speeches. Even though Phaedrus and Pausanias do not use the term, this does not mean that they would deviate from the common conceptualization if they had. This ambiguity, though not useful for advancing our methodology, certainly does not obstruct it either. Therefore, the integrity of our methodology is still intact and we can use it to ascertain the true nature of epithumia.

Not only is Eryximachus the first to use epithumia and its family of cognates, but he is also the first to distinguish between epithumia and eros. The reason for this is telling, as Phaedrus and Pausanias have focused their speech on the desires of the soul through the erastes/eromenos relationship. Epithumia, as desire of the body, had no place within this context and therefore is absent. Eryximachus broadens the dialectic to include

72 the desires of bodies, including both humans and animals. This paves the way for

Socrates later to expand his encomium of eros to include all of reality through the forms.

Eryximachus makes the first mention of epithumia through its cognate verb epithumeo and does this in terms of similar and dissimilar things within the human body.

He claims “the dissimilar desires and desires dissimilar things (τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον

ἀνομοίων ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ).”148 As we established previously, our methodology allows for cognate verbs to fulfill the same role in our paradigm as their cognate nouns since they adhere to the same qualities within our baseline. According to Saussure, in

Eryximachus’ claim the two verbs, epithumeo and erao, must be different since sign systems allow for overlap, but not redundancy. Having established that there is a difference, Eryximachus then provides clues as to the type of desire encapsulated within epithumia. He does this by claiming, “just as in our craft great importance is made of the right use for enjoying epithumia concerning cookery (ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ

μέγα ἔργον ταῖς περὶ τὴν ὀψοποιικὴν τέχνην ἐπιθυμίαις καλῶς χρῆσθαι).”149

Here, the type of desire associated with food is not eros, but epithumia. This is a deliberate choice by Eryximachus. Since we know that eros is used for seeking desires that require social relationships, it seems appropriate that it would not appear in this context, since the act of eating does not require any such social aspect. In this passage, epithumia seems to be desire of the body, not the soul. This difference is valuable within our study since Plato was one of the first to make the distinction between body and soul as two separate concepts.

148 Symposium, 186b6-7 149 Symposium, 187e3-5

73 In terms of thematic context, Eryimachus is attempting to describe harmony of opposing forces: body versus soul. This is reflected through his original claim, “the dissimilar desires and desires dissimilar things (τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον ἀνομοίων ἐπιθυμεῖ

καὶ ἐρᾷ).”150 These dissimilar things include sickness and health, fullness and emptiness, hot and cold, bitter and sweet, dry and wet. By using these comparisons, Eryximachus is attempting to prove that eros acts as the mediating factor providing balance within the body and soul. If eros is desire of the soul, then its opposite must be desire of the body, which explains the presence of epithumia. As we will see later, eros is able to function in this manner because there is an overlap of meaning in which eros can actually encompass desires of both body and soul, whereas epithumia is only the body. For the moment, the overall function of epithumia as bodily desire is unclear. Eryximachus has only hinted at its function by describing it as residing within the body, encompassing bodily functions

(such as eating), and being the opposite of eros. Although limited, Eryximachus’ speech is instrumental in establishing our foundation of similarity as the following speakers will expand upon these basic ideas.

While Eryximachus introduced some of the characteristics of epithumia,

Aristophanes will advance the notion even further. He begins by making a joke at the expense of Eryximachus. Earlier in the dialogue, Aristophanes fell victim to a fit of hiccups, and was not able to proceed with his speech. Eryximachus then takes his place, altering the order of speakers. This is a significant change, as, thematically, Aristophanes’ speech could only come after that of Eryximachus, based upon the content. Aristophanes has finished hiccupping after Eryximachus’ speech and jokes that he now wonders if “the

150 Symposium, 186b6-7

74 balance of the body desires such noises and ticklings (τὸ κόσμιον τοῦ σώματος

ἐπιθυμεῖ τοιούτων ψόφων καὶ γαργαλισμῶν).”151 While he is, of course, referring to his own bout of hiccups, we should notice how he uses epithumeo, not erao, to describe the desire of such bodily functions. This expands upon the concept Eryximachus proposed in which epithumia is the term for desires of the body, such as food.

Aristophanes continues this use of epithumia for desires of the body and expands upon it with his creation myth of eros. In describing the original humans he claims they were “desiring to grow together (ἐπιθυμοῦντες συμφῦναι).”152 This is telling, since contextually he is describing the original humans seeking sexual contact. Although eros was also involved in sexual activity, it carried the context of sex for the sake of procreation, a process which we established involved a social relationship. Here epithumia is involved simply in the merging of bodies, with no indication of any ongoing connection beyond the act of sex. Since eros is notably absent from the syntax, we can assume that this type of relationship is not that of the erastes/eromenos. In this way, the sexual contact Aristophanes is describing cannot have the desire for procreation (a desire of the soul), which requires a social aspect in order to obtain the future goal of immortality. Like the hiccups comment, Aristophanes has used epithumia in the context of merging bodies, not souls.

Epithumia appears in this same context once more as Hephaestus asks the humans:

151 Symposium, 189a3-4 152 Symposium, 191a8

75 ἆρά γε τοῦδε ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γενέσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις

ὥστε καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν μὴ ἀπολείπεσθαι ἀλλήλων;153

Do you desire this, to be together as much as possible for each other, so as not to

be left behind from each other both by night and day?

Again, the “being together” that Hephaestus is referring to is simply the joining together of bodies, not souls. Aristophanes explicitly describes this sort of desire in the previous line as he says “but clearly the soul of each is wishing for something else, that it is not able to say (ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλο τι βουλομένη ἑκατέρου ἡ ψυχὴ δήλη ἐστίν, ὃ οὐ δύναται

εἰπεῖν).”154 Aristophanes has distinguished the soul as not being part of epithumia, thus justifying our earlier baseline of eros. These early humans are acting solely upon the desire of epithumia, as they have not yet learned about the erastes/eromenos relationship that would allow for the soul to express its desire through eros.

This dichotomy between eros and epithumia is clear as Hephaestus says:

ἆρά γε τοῦδε ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γενέσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις,

ὥστε καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν μὴ ἀπολείπεσθαι ἀλλήλων; εἰ γὰρ τούτου

ἐπιθυμεῖτε, θέλω ὑμᾶς συντῆξαι καὶ συμφυσῆσαι εἰς τὸ αὐτό, ὥστε δύ᾽

ὄντας ἕνα γεγονέναι καὶ ἕως τ᾽ ἂν ζῆτε, ὡς ἕνα ὄντα, κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρους

ζῆν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνητε, ἐκεῖ αὖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἀντὶ δυοῖν ἕνα εἶναι κοινῇ

τεθνεῶτε.155

153 Symposium, 192d5-8 154 Symposium, 192c7-d1 155 Symposium, 192d5-e4

76 Do you desire of this, to be together as much as possible for each other, so far as

not to be left of each other both by night and day? For if you desire this, I am

willing to fuse and weld you together, as the two become one and as long as you

might live, being as one, both living in common, and when you die there also in

Hades to be one insead of two.

With this, Hephaestus has explained a new relationship in which, instead of desiring just sexual pleasure, the two partners would be together forever, caring for each other even through death. This is something markedly different from his previous offer of simply fusing bodies together. The relationship he has proposed now is that of the erastes and eromenos. This becomes more explicit, as in the next line Hephaestus says:

ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾶτε εἰ τούτου ἐρᾶτε καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ ὑμῖν ἂν τούτου τύχητε.156

But consider whether you desire this and whether it is sufficient for you if you

should obtain this.

Hephaestus has shifted his verb choice from epithumeo to erao and in doing so has indicated the presence of the erastes/eromenos relationship. At this point, Aristophanes claims:

…ἀλλ᾽ ἀτεχνῶς οἴοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀκηκοέναι τοῦτο ὃ πάλαι ἄρα ἐπεθύμει,

συνελθὼν καὶ συντακεὶς τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐκ δυοῖν εἷς γενέσθαι.157

…but he (the human) would simply think he had heard that which he was desiring

all along, joining and fusing with his eromenos to be made one from two.

Aristophanes introduces the term eromenos, making it clear that the human has learned of a relationship beyond simply sexual contact. This is also a reference back to the comment

156 Symposium, 192e4-5 157 Symposium, 192e7-9

77 of the soul not knowing what it wanted. Having heard Hephaestus’ offer, the human now has been given the description of “that which he was desiring all along,” a direct reference to the longing of the soul. In this sense, the soul wants the erastes/eromenos relationship, which, fittingly, includes the desires of the soul. The implication is clear: before Hephaestus’ offer, these humans were simply partaking in desire of the body through epithumia.

Epithumia as the desire of bodies rather than souls is also expressed through the speech of Agathon, although in a very different manner. Epithumia appears in a context that, at first glance, seems disconnected from the baseline that was created by

Eryximachus and Pausanias. Agathon claims that “Apollo invented archery and medicine and prophesy, with desire and eros taking the lead (τοξικήν γε μὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ

μαντικὴν Ἀπόλλων ἀνηῦρεν ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἔρωτος ἡγεμονεύσαντος).”158 This statement requires some interpretation in order to understand the point Agathon is making. He has associated epithumia and eros as sharing a similar, yet distinct, function

(leading Apollo to invent archery). On the surface, we are not entirely sure how eros, desires of the soul, and epithumia, desires of the body, can both lead to the creation of these crafts of Apollo. When we think in terms of what baselines have already been established, and interpret the passage through the larger context surrounding it, a clearer picture emerges.

First, we must look at how Agathon envisions epithumia and eros in relation to one another. In comparing the two he says:

158 Symposium, 197a6-7

78 πρὸς δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ σωφροσύνης πλείστης μετέχει. εἶναι γὰρ

ὁμολογεῖται σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, Ἔρωτος δὲ

μηδεμίαν ἡδονὴν κρείττω εἶναι.159

He (eros) partakes in addition to justice of the most moderation. For moderation is

agreed to be the mastering of pleasures and desires, but no pleasure is stronger

than eros.

Here Agathon has equated epithumia to hedone, a pleasure associated with the body. In making this comparison, Agathon is making epithumia the desire of the body rather than the soul. Within our baseline this makes sense, as eros encompasses both desires of the body and the soul. Agathon acknowledges this dual aspect of eros, by explicitly saying it is the master of epithumia, through its connection to moderation (σωφροσύνη).

Σωφροσύνη carries an association with the mind, as soundness of mind is equivalent to the self-awareness to be moderate. It is, therefore, logical that eros, involving the soul, is equated with σωφροσύνη, involving the mind. Both are being separated from epithumia and its desires of only the body.

This connotation of eros as moderation is a reference to Eryximachus’ association of eros with balance and harmony. Both descriptions place eros within an elevated role as the moderator of lesser desires and pleasures. We may now return to Agathon’s description of eros as the teacher of skills to the gods. In his description of eros as creator, Agathon returns to the notion of eros as that which leads to social relationships, through philia:

159 Symposium, 196c3-6

79 …ὅτι οὗ μὲν ἂν ὁ θεὸς οὗτος διδάσκαλος γένηται, ἐλλόγιμος καὶ φανὸς

ἀπέβη, οὗ δ᾽ ἂν Ἔρως μὴ ἐφάψηται, σκοτεινός.160

…he of whom this god (eros) becomes a teacher, he turns out notable and

conspicuous, but whom eros does not touch, turns out obscure.

These terms, notable (ἐλλόγιμος), conspicuous (φανὸς) and obscure (σκοτεινός), are all references to social standing. This is the same argument of eros seeking social relationships and immortality; Agathon is describing what Diotima will call immortality through name. By being touched by eros one gains the acclaim and glory of society and, therefore, immortality.

In terms of the skills of the gods, we can apply this same relationship between eros and epithumia. Again, Agathon claims that the gods learned their skills “with epithumia and eros taking the lead (ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἔρωτος ἡγεμονεύσαντος). The word order within the syntax is reflection of the relationship between the two words.

Epithumia is mentioned first, as it is the desire of the body, or the desire that does not have a social relationship through philia. In this sense, the gods, before eros, are echoes of the humans Aristophanes described: they may desire something else (through the soul) but without eros have no way of obtaining these goals. Eros as the master of epithumia is mentioned second, as it is the term that incorporates social relationships through philia.

With eros taking the lead, the gods now have the means to achieve social relationships.

Since Agathon is personifying eros as an actual being or deity, the relationship that leads to creation of skills is between eros, the teacher, and the individual god, the student.

Agathon makes this clear in the case of Apollo by saying “so that also this god (Apollo)

160 Symposium, 197a4-6

80 would be a student of eros (ὥστε καὶ οὗτος Ἔρωτος ἂν εἴη μαθητής).161 Through eros, Apollo has achieved the social relationship necessary to create his skills. This relationship is between himself and the personified eros. If we now assess the entire context as a whole, epithumia plays the role of desire of the body, while eros represents desire of the soul which is accomplished through social relationships.

With so many interpretations of a similar baseline, Socrates takes the initiative to present a correction to the previous speeches. In terms of epithumia, he will agree that it is desire of the body, but he will modify the context in which it is used. He begins by questioning Agathon on exactly what someone does and does not desire, saying:

εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ὢν βούλοιτο ἰσχυρὸς εἶναι καὶ ταχὺς ὢν ταχύς, καὶ

ὑγιὴς ὢν ὑγιής—ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τις ταῦτα οἰηθείη καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα

τοὺς ὄντας τε τοιούτους καὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα τούτων ἅπερ ἔχουσι καὶ

ἐπιθυμεῖν…162

For if being strong he wished to be strong, and being swift to be swift, and being

healthy to be healthy—for perhaps someone might think in these and things of

such a kind, that those who both are such and have those also desire those things

which they have…

Here, Socrates has explicitly listed the objects of epithumeo as strength (ἰσχυρὸς), swiftness (ταχὺς), and health (ὑγιὴς). These objects are directly related to the physical body, as opposed to the soul. Therefore, the use of epithumeo is justified.

161 Symposium, 196b1 162 Symposium, 200b9-c2

81 As he begins the story of his encounter with Diotima, Socrates shifts to a more philosophical argument of desire. Although the theme of the usage has changed, the contexts still follow the pattern of epithumia representing desires of the body. For instance, in her discussion on procreation, Diotima begins by saying:

κυοῦσιν γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ

τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἔν τινι ἡλικίᾳ γένωνται, τίκτειν ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ

φύσις.163

For all men are pregnant, Socrates, both within the body and within the soul, and

upon reaching a certain age, our nature desires to beget.

With this, Diotima has claimed the same dichotomy between body and soul that distinguishes epithumia and eros. The verb she uses to describe this type of desire is epithumeo, which we associate with the desire of the body that does not carry the social relationship that leads to immortality of the soul. At this point, however, it is not explicitly stated whether epithumeo is referring to the body or the soul.

To ascertain the use of epithumeo, we must look at the entire context. What

Diotima is describing is the biological state of a human male upon entering puberty. This is jusitied by her use of the temporal marker “upon reaching a certain age.” By forming her syntax in this manner, Diotima is making age the causal agent of the desire. This age is related to the body, not soul, through the biological process of puberty. This is reflected through her use of “nature (φύσις),” which in this case is being used in the biological sense of bodily processes. These markers all point to the desire being felt for procreation being that of biological instinct of the body, rather than the more conscious desire of the

163 Symposium, 206c1-4

82 soul. Therefore, the use of epithumeo is justified, as it relates to a sexual encounter that lacks eros and does not include the more permanent and lasting relationship of an erastes and eromenos.

This context appears again as Diotima claims:

ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ὡς δεινῶς διατίθεται πάντα τὰ θηρία ἐπειδὰν γεννᾶν

ἐπιθυμήσῃ…νοσοῦντά τε πάντα καὶ ἐρωτικῶς διατιθέμενα, πρῶτον μὲν

περὶ τὸ συμμιγῆναι ἀλλήλοις, ἔπειτα περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τοῦ

γενομένου…164

For you must have observed the terrible state into which animals are thrown

whenever they should desire to beget…all are sick and erotically disposed, first

concerning the intermingling with each other, then concerning the raising of their

offspring…

Once again, epithumia, through epithumeo, is being used in a linear progression with eros, through erotica. To explain the use of both we must follow the chronology Diotima has created. First, they desire (epithumeo) sexual intercourse. She describes this encounter with συμμιγῆναι, or intermingling, which relates back to Aristophanes’ speech in which sexual activity is described as “intertwining (συνεπλέκετο),”165 or a literal fusion of bodies. It is not until eros is introduced, through the idea of being

“erotically disposed,” that the animals then turn towards raising their offspring. She then goes on equate this erotic disposition with the rearing of offspring and sacrificing for the sake of others, all of which lead to the same immortality that humans seek. This is

164 Symposium, 207a7-b2 165 Symposium, 191b3

83 reminiscent of each of the previous speakers, especially Phaedrus and his account of

Alcestis.

By ordering her words in this manner, Diotima is equating epithumia with the desire of sexual contact through bodies, and eros with the social relationship that leads to immortality. This is a play on the formula of body versus soul, with epithumia once again encompassing desires specifically of the body with no sense of any future aspect or goals beyond the body. These desires do not incorporate any social values or relationships, and therefore have no reference to philia. Even though Diotima has expanded her theme to a higher level of philosophical discourse and imagery, at the core of her words lies the same principles that describe the fundamental essence of epithumia and its relationship to eros.

Taken as a whole, these contexts, while different, provide a baseline for understanding epithumia. We are now developing an understanding of epithumia in which it encompasses desires that lack the relationship to society that would allow for social praise and, thus, immortality. These types of desires, at least in the context of the

Symposium, tend to encompass desires of the body, rather than the soul. While this need not necessarily be taken in the strictest sense, it does provide a useful foundation for future interpretation. The main aspect for our purposes is the lack of the type of interpersonal relationship described by philia. This is because the one who partakes of epithumia does not partake of eros and, therefore, cannot have an erastes/eromenos relationship. We now have a complete set of similarities for eros, epithumia, and philia and are in a better position to begin evaluating them on the basis of differences. The foundational concept of epithumia points to its position on the bottom rung of the

84 emerging progression from desire of the body, to desire of the soul, to desire of immortality. This hierarchy marks epithumia as being related, yet distinct from eros, while still justifying its relationship within the paradigm. Now that the similarities have been established, we can begin analyzing the differences that distinguish each term from the others. In doing so we will be able to compare the similarities in differences in order to understand eros, and its meaning within the Symposium, in the most thorough way possible.

85

Chapter 3: Deviation from the Baseline through Parole

The similarities in use of eros, epithumia, and philia across the speeches provide us with a baseline of how each speaker conceives of the nature of eros and its use within any given context. While this baseline serves as a useful foundation, a complete picture of eros within the Symposium can be revealed only through the analysis of contexts in which its use and meaning depart from or elaborate on the established baseline. In terms of our methodology, these deviations show where the speaker has taken the global langue of eros and used it in a modified manner. This is possible due to the open system of language, in which a speaker can introduce new words or modify the meanings of existing ones in order to expand the richness of vocabulary. The same methodology must be applied to epithumia and philia, since both play crucial roles within the paradigm.

Epithumia provides a second word that carries the general meaning of desire and therefore provides a point of comparison against eros. The features of this type of desire along with the objects it takes has begun to emerge through our baseline discussion, but will become apparent through analysis of different, individualized usages. Philia, while not a word for desire, must be analyzed nonetheless as it refers to the social relationship that brings about obtaining the objects of eros. We cannot appreciate how eros truly functions, or at least the way in which the speakers use it, unless we can explain its relationship to both epithumia and philia through analysis of the speaker’s parole.

86 Whenever a speaker within the Symposium introduces a new context of eros that is distinct from the common baseline, they are modifying the global concept of eros, its langue, and expressing that modified notion through individualized parole. This is the nature of their encomia on eros, as each speaker must take the global concept and modify it in order to distinguish his own speech from the one prior. This is justified by claiming that he knows the actual truth, while his predecessor(s) did not. In other words, each speaker draws upon the langue of eros, adapts its meaning through his parole, and in doing so attempts to persuade others in order to change the shared langue. This cyclical pattern is a key to understanding eros within the Symposium, and it becomes clear once the divergent uses are isolated and compared against the baseline of similarity. Our methodology demands that signifiers within sign systems offer the possibility of overlap, but not redundancy. Each context that deviates from the baseline provides an opportunity to isolate differences of meaning within our paradigm. At the end of our survey, it will become increasingly clear that the relationship among these three words is more complex than can be expressed through simple English equivalents. The uses of epithumia, eros, and philia overlap in a manner that produces a linear progression from epithumia to eros to philia. Creating a model of this progression that distinguishes the different uses into several fundamental categories will guide our understanding of the entire paradigm.

Section A: Eros is self-predicative

While our commonalities establish the grammatical objects of eros, specifically the taking of an objective genitive, they do not address what types of verbs eros makes use of in order to perform actions. Given the role of eros as a signifier of desire, we need

87 to specifically address contexts in which it acts as the subject of a desiring verb. Taking this approach, the first significant piece of data that emerges is that eros can act as the subject of its cognate verb erao, thus making eros self-predicative.

While the verb erao is common throughout the text, instances of eros operating as its subject are rarer. The reason for this has to do with the nature of each speech. As

Agathon says, the first five speakers were not praising eros, but praising his works and gifts for mankind. Agathon then claims that he will be the first to speak of the nature of eros as distinct from its works. Although Agathon will not actually use eros as the subject of erao, his statement paves the way for Socrates to do so. By attempting to explain the nature of eros, rather than its works, Agathon introduces the concept of a personified eros which performs actions and therefore can operate as the subject of a verb rather than an object. For this reason, instances of eros as the subject of erao prior to Socrates amount to only one context, which is indirect.

Surprisingly, this first context occurs within the speech of Eryximachus. At the beginning of his speech, he takes the moral ambiguity of eros, first established by

Phaedrus and Pausanias, and equates it to sickness and health within the human body.

These opposites, he claims are actually two sides of the same phenomenon, eros, which he equates to that which is “dissimilar (τὸ ἀνόμοιόν).”166 Then, he continues this line of thought by claiming:

…τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον ἀνομοίων ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ.167

…that which is dissimilar desires and desires dissimilar things.

166 Symposium, 186b6 167 Symposium, 186b6-7

88 Since he has established that the “dissimilar” is functioning as a stand-in for eros,

Eryximachus is indirectly claiming that eros functions as the subject of erao. This is the first time that the personified eros is thought of as “desiring.” Also, Eryximachus has identified a difference between eros desiring through erao and desiring through epithumeo. This distinction will later be discussed in terms of the temporal nature of both verbs and will play a critical role in redefining our understanding of both eros and epithumia.

Whereas Eryximachus was indirect in his treatment of eros as the subject of erao,

Socrates will make the construction explicit. In interrogating Agathon, Socrates addressed the problem of what exactly eros desires by asking:

πότερον ἔχων αὐτὸ οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, εἶτα ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, ἢ

οὐκ ἔχων;168

And does he have that which he both desires and desires, when he both desires

and desires, or does he not have it?

The subject of these verbs, “he,” is referring to eros, and therefore explicitly shows that eros can act as the subject of its cognate verb, erao. Later on, during the narrative of his lesson with Diotima, he uses this construction once more:

οὗ ἐνδεής ἐστι καὶ μὴ ἔχει, τούτου ἐρᾶν;

that which he is in need and does not have, does he desire this?169

Once again, the subject (“he”) is eros as Socrates is attempting to ascertain the true nature of eros through its behaviors. This is the same personification that Agathon introduced,

168 Symposium, 200a5-6 169 Symposium, 201b1-2

89 except that where Agathon avoided the issue of whether or not eros desires, Socrates makes it the focus of his argument.

These contexts reveal two main points of how eros operates as the subject of its cognate verb. First, they reaffirm our assertion that the cognate verb erao functions as a derivative of its cognate noun eros and follows the same baseline. The same will be shown for epithumeo and phileo in connection to epithumia and philia. In other words, just as eros, epithumia, and philia are related, yet distinct, as signifiers, so too are their verb forms. This explains why both Eryximachus and Socrates describe eros as being able to act both as the subject of epithumeo and of erao. This makes these verbs related, yet different, mimicking their cognate nouns. Second, if erao is used of the same type of desire as eros, then it too must represent desire of objects of the soul that require a social relationship, a concept established in our methodological baseline. When applied to

Socrates’ contexts, the use of erao becomes clear, since in 204d5 the object of erao is beauty (ἐρᾷ ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν), the same abstract concept that was established as requiring philia, since only through the judgment of society are objects deemed beautiful or not.

Likewise, Eryximachus equates eros to health, and health to beauty by claiming:

…οὕτω καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ἑκάστου τοῦ

σώματος καὶ ὑγιεινοῖς καλὸν χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δεῖ…170

…thus in these bodies themselves it is noble and necessary to gratify the good and

healthy of each body…

170 Symposium, 186c1-3

90 This context relates to the morally ambiguous eros, which was the subject of erao in

Eryximachus’ context. If gratification, as previously established, is the action of the eromenos towards the erastes, then Eryximachus is making it clear that the “noble

(καλὸν)” and “good (ἀγαθοῖς)” are epithets for eros. Therefore, eros is once again seeking a goal that can only be achieved through a specific social relationship, and the verb describing that desire is erao. This implies that erao is used as a reflection of eros, in that it, too, is a description of desires distinct from epithumia and in need of philia to be brought to fruition. This explains the self-predicative nature of eros, as erao is simply the verbal representation of the same concept.

While there is less evidence in this analysis compared to the previous baseline of similarities, this is due to the speakers, not our methodology. The text is clear in stating that Socrates has the proper understanding of the self-predicative eros where his fellow symposiasts did not. This is reflected through his interrogation of Agathon in which he describes this new perspective of eros. In agreeing to every point Socrates makes,

Agathon is acknowledging his mistake in the way he understood eros prior to Socrates.

This explains the lack of evidence, as Socrates is following the pattern of our methodology. He is drawing upon the accepted langue which explains the types of objects eros is associated with, and then applying his own parole by interpreting how these objects are actually obtained. His answer lies in the self-predicative eros: eros desires certain objects through erao. Socrates then uses this new interpretation to persuade his audience of the validity of his claim, as reflected through the agreement of

Agathon, and in doing so reshapes the agreed-upon langue. This explains why eros as self-predicative is not fully explained until Socrates, as each of the previous speakers was

91 not interpreting eros in the same manner as he was. Only through analysis of Socrates’ parole are we able to analyze a difference against which to compare our baseline of similarities. While the self-predicative nature of eros is implied by Eryximachus and

Agathon, it is only explicitly stated by Socrates. This places it within the realm of

Socrates’ parole; yet through comparison to the langue, we create a new interpretation of the function of eros.

Section B: Eros partakes of epithumia

Although our baseline established that eros is distinct from epithumia, it does not restrict the two from overlapping. In fact, within our paradigm we would expect such overlap to occur as both are signifiers within the general concept of desire. Therefore, we must analyze the use of eros in terms of epithumia in order to establish how the two interact. In doing this, we find that eros, while self-predicative, also overlaps with the realm of epithumia as often both appear in the same context.

Once more we must return to the speech of Eryximachus, as he is the first to establish this explicit connection with his claim:

…τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον ἀνομοίων ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ.171

…that which is dissimilar desires and desires dissimilar things.

Again, the subject of this phrase has been established as being eros. Therefore,

Eryximachus is clearly stating that eros can both desire through epithumeo, and desire through erao, and by using both verbs in the same context he has distinguished their meanings as being distinct from one another. If we acknowledge that erao adheres to the

171 Symposium, 186b6-7

92 same qualities established in our baseline for eros, we must do the same for epithumeo. In this sense, the type of desire expressed by epithumeo must reflect the baseline of its cognate noun, epithumia, which encompasses desires that do not involve social relationships or connections to the group.

In order to extrapolate some sense of this conceptualization of the relationship between eros and epithumia, we must analyze how exactly Eryximachus describes each.

If both eros and epithumia are residing within the body, there must be qualities within each body that Eryximacus is attributing to social and non-social desires. He actually explains some of his reasoning by distinguishing between what he calls the disordered or violent eros (ὁ ὕβρεως Ἔρως)172 and the well-ordered eros (τοῦ κοσμίου ἔρωτος).173

This well-ordered eros lines up with our established baseline as it is:

…ὁ δὲ περὶ τἀγαθὰ μετὰ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀποτελούμενος

καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς…174

…the one which is completed for the good with moderation and justice both

among us and for the gods…

This well-ordered eros is aiming for the good, an objective that our baseline established as requiring a social relationship in order to achieve. This relationship is explicitly mentioned as being characterized by “moderation and justice both among us (humans) and for the gods.” This phrase is describing two social interactions: one between human beings and one between the gods. Both lead to eros being able to obtain the good.

On the other hand, Eryximachus advises caution towards the violent eros:

172 Symposium, 188a7 173 Symposium, 188a2-3 174 Symposium, 188d5-7

93 ὁ δὲ Πολυμνίας ὁ πάνδημος, ὃν δεῖ εὐλαβούμενον προσφέρειν οἷς ἂν

προσφέρῃ, ὅπως ἂν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καρπώσηται, ἀκολασίαν δὲ

μηδεμίαν ἐμποιήσῃ…175

But the popular one, that of Polymnia, it is necessary that one apply it being

cautious to those whom one applies it, so that if one should reap the pleasure of it,

he makes no debauchery…

This sort of eros is equated with pleasure, a term which our baseline established as being associated with epithumia as a desire of the body, not the soul and therefore requiring no social interaction. Eryximachus then makes its relationship with epithumia explicit by claiming that ἡδονὴν is equivalent to the desire for sustenance:

…ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ μέγα ἔργον ταῖς περὶ τὴν ὀψοποιικὴν

τέχνην ἐπιθυμίαις καλῶς χρῆσθαι…176

…just as in our art great importance is made to use well epithumia; concerning

the art of cookery…

In this sense, epithumia is connected to the pleasure through the adverb “just as

(ὥσπερ).” In other words, the type of pleasure sought by the violent form of eros is the same as epithumia for food.

When the entire context is reanalyzed through this lens, we are now able to understand why Eryximachus has distinguished between erao and epithumeo. His dual eros seeks different goals, which are determined by its dual natures. The well-ordered eros seeks desires of the soul, such as the good, and therefore partakes in eros. The

175 Symposium, 187e1-3 176 Symposium, 187e3-5

94 violent eros, however, seeks desires of the body, such as pleasure, and therefore is more suitable for the desire expressed through epithumia which requires no social relationship through the erastes and eromenos. This explains why the term eros participates in both eros and epithumia, as it partakes in actions that fall under the realm of both types of desire. This is related to the moral ambiguity of eros, as it distinguishes between what type of desire one seeks, be it of the body or soul, as it encompasses both. This is because often desires of the body will progress towards desires of the soul. It is exactly at this moment of transition that epithumia and eros overlap.

This concept is elaborated by Aristophanes, as he explains the creation myth of both humanity and eros. In his speech, he claims that eros stems from the progenitor humans searching for completion through fusion with their other half. At the end of his speech, Aristophanes summarizes his point by claiming:

…τοῦ ὅλου οὖν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ διώξει ἔρως ὄνομα.177

…eros is the name for the pursuit and desire of the whole.

In this context, Aristophanes has equated eros to epithumia, picking up on the original claims of Eryximachus. Like Eryximachus, however, Aristophanes’ context on its own does not explicitly reveal what the relationship is between the two words, only that eros partakes of epithumia. Once again we must look more closely at the entire speech in order to understand how Aristophanes is envisioning the connection between these two concepts.

The key to understanding eros in terms of epithumia within Aristophanes’ speech resides in the scene between Hephaestus and the original humans. In returning to the

177 Symposium, 192e10-193a1

95 example from our baseline of epithumia, we see that the original humans are described as partaking in epithumia, not eros as they are described as “ἐπιθυμοῦντες συμφῦναι

(desiring to grow together).”178 This type of desire is of the body, as these humans are literally searching to fuse their bodies together. When Hephaestus arrives, he asks:

ἆρά γε τοῦδε ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γενέσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις;

Do you desire this, to be together as much as possible for each other?179

Upon hearing this question, the humans are confused (ἀποροῦντας), since Hephaestus’ offer has taken their desire to be fused in body and added a temporal, future element (“as much as possible”). This future element will later be described as the desire to be together through life and even until death. The idea of being together in the future incorporates the social relationship present in eros but lacking in epithumia. Since these original humans are lacking eros, they do not understand and Hephaestus is required to explain his offer:

…θέλω ὑμᾶς συντῆξαι καὶ συμφυσῆσαι εἰς τὸ αὐτό, ὥστε δύ᾽ ὄντας ἕνα

γεγονέναι καὶ ἕως τ᾽ ἂν ζῆτε, ὡς ἕνα ὄντα, κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρους ζῆν, καὶ

ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνητε, ἐκεῖ αὖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἀντὶ δυοῖν ἕνα εἶναι κοινῇ

τεθνεῶτε.180

…I am willing to fuse and weld you together, as the two become one and as long

as you may live, being as one, both living in common, and when you die, there

also in Hades to be one instead of two, being dead together.

At this point, he presents this as his final offer by saying:

178 Symposium, 191a8 179 Symposium, 192d5-7 180 Symposium, 192d8-192e4

96 ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾶτε εἰ τούτου ἐρᾶτε καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ ὑμῖν ἂν τούτου τύχητε…181

But consider whether you desire this and whether it is sufficient for you if you

would obtain this…

The syntax of Hephaestus’ final offer is different from that of his previous one as the verb has now shifted from epithumeo to erao. This scene is reflective of the transition between epithumia and eros since, once the social aspect is incorporated, the type of desire is no longer the same. This explains why eros partakes in epithumia, as the desire that began with epithumia is brought to fruition through eros. Without the original epithumia for desiring of bodies, there would be no moment of clarity in which one realizes that his or her soul is searching for more. This is the overlap of eros with epithumia, as the desire is a matter of both. Even with this overlap, however, there is still a clear distinction in how both words function.

The key to this story is the verb choices employed by Aristophanes. At the beginning, the progenitor humans have no idea that they are lacking anything. Their desire for each other is to physically join bodies through sexual intercourse. This is explained through our baseline as being the realm of epithumia; hence, the verb that

Hephaestus uses when first presenting his offer is epithumeo (ἆρά γε τοῦδε

ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γενέσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις;). During his explanation of the offer, however, Hephaestus describes a relationship that differs from being purely sexual, as the two partners live and die together, spending every moment in each other’s company. This type of situation is the foundation of the erastes/eromenos relationship, as this description of a mutual death echoes the stories of Alcestis and Achilles. It comes as

181 Symposium, 192e4-5

97 no surprise, then, that at this point Hephaestus changes his verb of desire from epithumeo to erao, as the humans have now been introduced to a new type of desire, the erastes/eromenos relationship.

We are now able to return to Aristophanes’ claim that eros is the desire

(epithumia) of the whole. The story of Hephaestus shows that eros originally stems from epithumia. Once the one desiring through epithumia has the moment of recognition of what its soul, rather than body, desires, the type of desire shifts to the realm of eros. The line of demarcation between epithumia and eros is blurred, as one seems to lead to the other; however, it is clear that there is a difference between the two. The reason for

Aristophanes’ choice of words is that eros must encompass epithumia in order to switch from desire for the body to desire for the soul.

Agathon is the next speaker to apply this concept to his speech. During his discussion on the nature of eros, he claims:

πρὸς δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ σωφροσύνης πλείστης μετέχει. εἶναι γὰρ

ὁμολογεῖται σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν…182

He partakes, in addition to justice, of the most moderation. For moderation is

agreed to be mastering of pleasures and desires…

Like Eryximachus, Agathon has connected epithumia and pleasure. Additionally,

Agathon has claimed that eros is the mastering of both epithumia and pleasure. In this sense, eros must partake of epithumia in order to master it. Here, the context reveals the nature of both terms, as Agathon has made eros more abstract than epithumia. Eros, in this context, is equated to moderation (σωφροσύνης), which on its own suggests the

182 Symposium, 196c3-5

98 realm of the mind or soul rather than the body. This refers back to our baseline, in which epithumia was connected to the body, while eros was of the soul. The distinction

Agathon is making is that in order to pursue desires of the soul, one must first begin by mastering those of the body. Like Aristophanes, Agathon is alluding to a hierarchy in which desire begins with epithumia and proceeds to eros. Eros must partake in epithumia in order to pursue the more complex social relationship that leads to immortality.

In order to expand our approach towards Agathon’s perception of eros and epithumia, we must return to his claims about the intrinsic skills of the gods. As previously stated, Agathon claims that:

τοξικήν γε μὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ μαντικὴν Ἀπόλλων ἀνηῦρεν ἐπιθυμίας

καὶ ἔρωτος ἡγεμονεύσαντος…183

Apollo invented archery and medicine and prophecy, with epithumia and eros

taking the lead…

Whereas before the relationship between these two was vague, we can now apply the new analysis to clarify the meaning. As stated in our baseline, epithumia is present due to its connection to desire that lacks social interaction. Conversely, eros is present due to its connection with social relationships and interactions. Agathon makes this clear as he claims:

…ὅτι οὗ μὲν ἂν ὁ θεὸς οὗτος διδάσκαλος γένηται, ἐλλόγιμος καὶ φανὸς

ἀπέβη, οὗ δ᾽ ἂν Ἔρως μὴ ἐφάψηται, σκοτεινός.184

183 Symposium, 197a6-7 184 Symposium, 197a4-6

99 …he of whom this god (eros) becomes a teacher, he turns out notable and

conspicuous, but of whom eros does not touch, turns out obscure.

Again, these terms notable (ἐλλόγιμος), conspicuous (φανὸς) and obscure (σκοτεινός) are all references to social standing. Agathon is describing what Diotima will call immortality of name, as being touched by eros brings the recognition of society as a whole as they judge behavior worthy of praise.

As stated in our baseline discussion of epithumia, the syntax of Agathon’s claims is critical. The presence of epithumia is due to its nature as the type of desire that lacks the social interaction of the erastes/eromenos relationship. This makes the gods similar to the humans Aristophanes describes, who desire something through their soul which they cannot explain. Without eros, the gods have clearly not been able to create these skills.

With eros taking the lead, the gods now have the means to achieve social relationships.

Since Agathon is personifying eros as an actual being or deity, the relationship that leads to creation of skills is between eros, the teacher, and the individual god, the student.

Agathon makes this clear in the case of Apollo by saying “so that also this god (Apollo) would be a student of eros (ὥστε καὶ οὗτος Ἔρωτος ἂν εἴη μαθητής).185 Through eros, Apollo has achieved the social relationship necessary to create his skills. If we now assess the entire context as a whole, epithumia plays the role of desire of the body, while eros represents desire of the soul which is accomplished through social relationships.

Only through both, with epithumia leading to eros, can the gods create these skills.

Agathon has taken the common understanding that epithumia is of the body and eros is of

185 Symposium, 196b1

100 the soul and incorporated aspects of both into a new representation of eros as the master of epithumia.

Each of these points culminates within the speech of Socrates, as he takes these elaborations but uses them in a more precise manner. This process begins with the same interrogation of Agathon we examined previously, as he asks:

τοσόνδε δὲ εἰπέ, πότερον ὁ Ἔρως ἐκείνου οὗ ἔστιν ἔρως, ἐπιθυμεῖ αὐτοῦ

ἢ οὔ;186

Tell me this much, whether Eros desires that thing of which it is eros, or not?

Socrates has identified eros to be the subject of the verb epithumeo and has done so in the most explicit way we have seen thus far. He continues by asking:

πότερον ἔχων αὐτὸ οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, εἶτα ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, ἢ

οὐκ ἔχων;187

And when he has that which he desires and desires, does he then desire and desire

it, or not?

Once again, eros is the subject of both erao and epithumeo, with a clear distinction being drawn between the meanings of both actions. In terms of eros partaking of epithumia, the key to these two contexts is the ordering of Socrates’ questions. He first establishes that eros desires (epithumeo), with no mention made of the verb erao. Then, he expands his question to ask whether eros both desires (erao) and desires (epithumeo). By ordering his questions in this manner, Socrates is playing on the concepts established by the previous speakers; specifically, the linear progression through which desire expressed by eros

186 Symposium, 200a2-3 187 Symposium, 200a5-6

101 begins with epithumia. The reason for this has not yet been established by our analysis, but it will become clear as we move to our interpretation of epithumia through the lens of parole.

Each of these four speakers has engaged the conceptualization of eros within the langue and used it to express their own understanding of it (parole). This, in turn, has developed the relationship between eros and epithumia into two words inextricably connected to one another. According to the speakers, desire is something that begins in a most raw and undeveloped form, and it will remain that way until another force takes it to more abstract realms. This pattern, while not consistent across each speech, forces us to reconsider our understanding of eros, epithumia and the interaction between the two. In doing this, we can then apply this new interpretation to better understand the universal understanding residing in the background of each speech, the langue of eros. While the overall relationship has not yet been completely revealed, we are beginning to distinguish some key aspects of this complex system; specifically, that eros partakes of desires of the body (epithumia) in order to obtain the desires of the soul.

Section C: The True Nature of Epithumia

Having established that eros partakes of the desires described by epithumia through its function as the subject of epithumeo, we now must turn our attention towards understanding how and why such an intertwined relationship exists between the two. The first clue that emerges from such analysis is that epithumia, like eros, is self-predicative.

At face value this seems reasonable, since epithumia is also a signifier of desire and therefore its personified form must also act as the subject of desiring verbs in a similar

102 manner to eros. If we look more closely, however, it becomes evident that epithumia can only desire particular objects and cannot partake in eros. This difference distinguishes the term from eros and alerts us to a particular realm of influence which eros can cross but epithumia cannot. In other words, for reasons yet unknown, epithumia is restricted in the function of its meaning in a way that eros is not. The first step towards understanding this difference is to analyze the self-predicative quality of epithumia.

The first instance of a self-predicative epithumia occurs in Socrates’ interrogation of Agathon, as he says:

σκόπει δή… ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκότος εἰ ἀνάγκη οὕτως, τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν

οὗ ἐνδεές ἐστιν, ἢ μὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐνδεὲς ᾖ;188

Consider then…instead of it being likely, if it is necessary, does that one desiring

desire the thing of which he is in need, or does he not desire it, if he is not in need

of it?

Socrates has clearly named the subject of this sentence as being something partaking in epithumia (τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν). Therefore, he has made epithumia self-predicative as the one desiring desires (ἐπιθυμεῖν). In this sense, epithumia is operating in the same manner as eros, in that someone under its influence desires an object by using the cognate verb, epithumeo.

Within the text, Socrates is the only speaker to use epithumia in this manner. Even though the previous speakers do not use the same construction, Socrates’ word choice is still understood by his audience. This can be seen through Agathon’s responses, which are always affirmative. As we established in our methodology, in sign systems the

188 Symposium, 200a8-b1

103 speaker, in forming his parole, must draw upon some measure of the common langue in order to be understood. Agathon’s affirmation of Socrates’ use of epithumia indicates that the conceptualization of epithumia as a self-predicative has to be drawing upon a concept that the group understood, otherwise Socrates’ speech would be unintelligible. Therefore, epithumia as self-predicative has to agree with our global baseline, in order for the meaning to come across. In this case, it does just that as Socrates has equated epithumia to necessity, a term that Agathon previously equated to epithumia and desires of the body which do not partake in the social relationship of philia.

With this new view of epithumia as equal to necessity, we are in a better position to interpret Socrates’ context. Prior to this context, Socrates asks a slightly different question of Agathon:

πότερον ἔχων αὐτὸ οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, εἶτα ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, ἢ

οὐκ ἔχων;189

And when he has that which he both desires and desires, does he both desire and

desire it, or does he (desire it) when he does not have it?

We should notice that the subject of this question is explicitly eros, as Socrates is trying to address the problem of whether one who desires lacks or possesses that which one desires. This explains the presence of both epithumeo and erao, as we know that eros is able to function as the subject of both verbs. And yet, when we look once more at the context of our first passage, the subject has shifted to epithumia (“τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν”). This again proves the relationship between the nouns of our paradigm and their cognate verbs,

189 Symposium, 200a5-6

104 as to epithumoun is acting in the same manner as epithumia as self-predicate. It is only after this change of subject that the concept of necessity appears:

σκόπει δή… ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκότος εἰ ἀνάγκη οὕτως, τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν

οὗ ἐνδεές ἐστιν, ἢ μὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐνδεὲς ᾖ.190

Consider then…instead of it being likely, if it is necessary, that one desiring

desires the thing which he is in need, or does not desire, if he is not in need.

This subtle change in semantics shifts the focus away from eros and onto epithumia. This explains why the verb erao has disappeared and has been replaced by epithumeo.

Whereas eros could partake in epithumia, the reverse is not true.

The association with necessity explains this shift, since, as previously mentioned, necessity has been explicitly connected to desires of the body and epithumia. This association occurs within the speeches of Agathon and Aristophanes. In his speech,

Agathon claims:

…τὰ δὲ παλαιὰ πράγματα περὶ θεούς, ἃ Ἡσίοδος καὶ Παρμενίδης

λέγουσιν, Ἀνάγκῃ καὶ οὐκ Ἔρωτι γεγονέναι, εἰ ἐκεῖνοι ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον: οὐ

γὰρ ἂν ἐκτομαὶ οὐδὲ δεσμοὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ

βίαια, εἰ Ἔρως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἦν, ἀλλὰ φιλία καὶ εἰρήνη, ὥσπερ νῦν…191

…but those ancient dealings concerning the gods, which Hesiod and Parmenides

speak of, have happened by means of Necessity not Eros, if those men were

speaking the truth. For there would have been no cutting nor fettering of each

190 Symposium, 200a8-b1 191 Symposium, 195c1-6

105 other nor many other violent things, if Eros was among them, but friendship and

peace, as now…

Here, Agathon has equated the rule of Necessity to cutting and fettering of human beings.

While he references Hesiod and Parmenides, we cannot help but notice the similarities with Aristophanes’ speech, which directly preceded that of Agathon. In his speech,

Aristophanes told of how Zeus split humans in half and Hephaestus offered to fuse them back together. If we return to our baseline of epithumia as desires of the body, we recall that these original humans were operating under the realm of epithumia, not eros, until

Hephaestus teaches them the intricacies of the erastes/eromenos relationship. With this in mind, we see that the cutting and fettering which Agathon has equated to Necessity is in fact epithumia. This interpretation is the same one being used by Socrates as he associates the verb epithumeo with acts done out of necessity. These are acts of the body, rather than soul, and carry no social relationship, only a desire to fulfill a need in the present moment.

This usage of epithumia continues through the speech of Diotima, who claims:

ἀλλὰ μὴν Ἔρωτά γε ὡμολόγηκας δι᾽ ἔνδειαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν

ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν τούτων ὧν ἐνδεής ἐστιν.192

But you have agreed that eros, from a need of good and beautiful things, desires

these very things of which he is in need.

Once again, the concept of necessity is being described; hence, the use of epithumeo.

While this explains the syntax, it does not explain the thematic element of the passage.

Our baseline established that such concepts as the good and the beautiful are the realm of

192 Symposium, 202d1-3

106 eros, not epithumia. This demands an explanation for the use of epithumeo as the verb describing this particular type of desire, which our baseline established requires the philia obtainable through eros. For this, we must return to Aristophanes’ speech and his description of the gods.

In that story, the skills of the gods are described as belonging to epithumia, until they are brought to fruition through the teachings of eros. The same context is being used by Socrates, as the “need” of eros is the origin of the linear progression through which desire of body (epithumia) in the present leads to desire of the soul (eros) in the future.

This explains the presence of epithumia, as eros draws upon epithumia in order to obtain the good and the beautiful. Therefore, this original necessity of eros cannot be expressed through erao; rather, here eros desires first through epithumeo in order then to desire through erao. Diotima is describing the linear progression of desire.

Diotima again plays on epithumia as a need when she claims:

οὔκουν ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ μὴ οἰόμενος ἐνδεὴς εἶναι οὗ ἂν μὴ οἴηται ἐπιδεῖσθαι.193

So the one who does not suppose to be in need does not desire that which he does

not suppose he is in need of.

Here again, the emphasis is placed on whether the subject realizes he is in need. That need is then associated with epithumia, through epithumeo, in the same way as the previous contexts. Whenever a desire is of the body, it must fall under the realm of epithumia. This goes back to the speech of Aristophanes, who claimed that the first humans did not realize they were missing anything, yet their souls were aware of an indescribable need. As previously mentioned, the verb used by Hephaestus in his offer is

193 Symposium, 204a6-7

107 epithumeo.194 The context is the same; when someone has an inner desire that they cannot articulate or do not know how to act upon, this necessity is epithumia.

This new understanding of epithumia provides a temporal aspect in addition to its contextual meaning. The temporal is innately connected with the contextual, as the former intertwines with the latter to produce a fuller conceptualization of epithumia and its relationship to eros. Again, we must turn to Socrates, as he makes this distinction clear. In his speech, he makes the argument that those who have something cannot desire it. This refers back to his trance in the prologue to the Symposium, a trance brought on by

Aristodemus making the argument that one must lack, not possess, that which they desire.

Since Socrates had made himself beautiful in order to obtain beauty, he realized the flaw in his logic. Now, he has changed his interpretation of eros to be a lack, rather than possession of that which one desires. For his examples he cites those who are strong, swift and healthy:

εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ὢν βούλοιτο ἰσχυρὸς εἶναι…καὶ ταχὺς ὢν ταχύς, καὶ

ὑγιὴς ὢν ὑγιής ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τις ταῦτα οἰηθείη καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς

ὄντας τούτων ἅπερ ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν…195

For if being strong he wished to be strong…and being swift to be swift, and being

healthy to be healthy, for perhaps someone would think in these and everything of

such a kind, those also desire those things which they have…

This establishes the desire of these men as being epithumia, again referring to the bodily nature of epithumia, as strength, health, and swiftness are all physical attributes within

194 Symposium, 192d6 195 Symposium, 200b9-c2

108 the body. Having established this as being epithumia, Socrates introduces the temporal aspect by claiming:

ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν τις λέγῃ ὅτι… ἐπιθυμῶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἃ ἔχω, εἴποιμεν ἂν

αὐτῷ ὅτι σύ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, πλοῦτον κεκτημένος καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν

βούλει καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα κεκτῆσθαι…196

But whenever someone might say that…I desire these very things that I have, then

we would say to him, sir, having obtained wealth and health and strength, then

wish also to have possessed these in the future…

With this, Socrates has established that epithumia only covers desires that reside within the present. By advising the hypothetical man that he wishes to possess his desires in the future, Socrates establishes that epithumia does not convey such future desires.

He elaborates his point further by establishing that one who possesses objects in the present should be conscious of the future in order to always possess the objects of their desire. He relates this back to epithumia by asking:

καὶ οὗτος ἄρα καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ μὴ ἑτοίμου ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ

τοῦ μὴ παρόντος, καὶ ὃ μὴ ἔχει καὶ ὃ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτὸς καὶ οὗ ἐνδεής ἐστι,

τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα ἐστὶν ὧν ἡ ἐπιθυμία τε καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐστίν;197

Then both this man and every other who is desiring this, desires that which is not

provided and not present, both what he does not have and is not and is in need of,

and that sort of thing is both epithumia and eros?

196 Symposium, 200c5-d2 197 Symposium, 200e2-5

109 With this, Socrates has introduced the concept of desire which extends beyond the present into the future. In this context, we would expect to find erao, as this desire extends beyond necessity of the present into a future-oriented realm. This is not the syntax Socrates uses, however, and he is very deliberate in doing so.

Using our global baseline, we know that epithumia must incorporate desires of the body that lack a social relationship, while eros seeks objects through philia. At the same time, the speakers have introduced the concept of eros drawing upon epithumia in order to switch the desire from that of the body to that of the soul. It is this moment of transition that Socrates is describing in this context. The subject of the passage is the same hypothetical man who only desires objects in the present (strength, swiftness and health). At this point, however, Socrates has told the hypothetical man that he should desire to have these present objects in the future as well. This transition from present to future is the transition from epithumia to eros. The hypothetical man now seeks objects which are “not present” and “he is not in need of.” This explains why at this moment there is both epithumia and eros (ἡ ἐπιθυμία τε καὶ ὁ ἔρως), since it is the moment when eros partakes of epithumia in order to pursue objects in future.

Taking a step back and viewing epithumia and eros through our global baseline, this new interpretation of their temporal aspects fits nicely within our model. If epithumia is desire without philia, then there can be no future aspect to it, since philia requires the forethought and future planning of obtaining goals at a later time. For, as we have seen, the social relationship involves the judgment of society. This judgment can only occur after an action has been performed. This demands a future aspect to eros, as someone who wishes to have immortality of name must plan their actions in advance. It is this

110 planning on the future judgment of society that epithumia cannot perform, as it involves a particular consciousness that involves the mind and soul, rather than the body.

When taken as a whole, each of these new qualities of epithumia explains a term that is vastly more complex than simply the bodily desire established in the global baseline. Through its uses, epithumia is described as self-predicative, a type of necessity, and restricted to the present. In terms of our methodology, these traits are manifestations of the universal langue, desire of the body, transformed through the speaker’s individual usage, parole. Although each of the symposiasts agrees that epithumia is bodily desire,

Socrates is the only one who expands upon this definition. Using the interpretation encompassed within his parole, we are in a position to re-adjust our understanding of the langue. We are able to justify this through the interrogation with Agathon. By engaging in conversation with Socrates and accepting his premises, Agathon is also indirectly accepting his usage of epithumia since, as Saussure claimed, if Socrates was using epithumia as a signifier that related to an atypical meaning, he would not have been understood by his peers. With this, our methodology allows us to redefine our perception of epithumia. This new concept of epithumia can only be understood through the comparison of the individualized uses through parole against the common baseline established through langue. The result is an epithumia that is restricted, yet complex, and a critical component in the functions and desires of eros.

Section D: Epithumia leads to eros

While we have redefined the meaning of epithumia, we still need to approach its relationship with eros. Up to this point, the concept of epithumia leading to eros has been

111 suggested, but not manifested in great detail. This was to avoid confusion as we did not have the meaning defined first. Now, the meaning of epithumia will guide us towards its usage within the paradigm of epithumia, eros, and philia. The answer lies within the ordering of concepts within each context, as desire begins with epithumia and progresses towards eros in a linear fashion as one seeks more future and socially based goals.

Aristophanes is the first speaker to elaborate on this progression with his notion of eros as pursuit of the whole. Once more, we must return to his creation myth of both eros and human beings. As we established in our baseline, the type of desire his progenitor humans feel is described by epithumia:

…ἐπιθυμοῦντες συμφῦναι, ἀπέθνῃσκον ὑπὸ λιμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀργίας

διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐθέλειν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ποιεῖν.198

…desiring to grow together, they were dying of hunger and other inactivity

because of wishing to do nothing apart from each other.

This is the beginning of the desire felt between the split humans as they begin searching for their other halves. Again, this raw form of desire is the realm of epithumia as it is purely instinctual; these humans even abandon food, the most basic necessity, in favor of sexuality and desire of the body. At this point in the story, Hephaestus steps in and asks what it is they wish to have from each other. Aristophanes tells us that the humans are confused (ἀποροῦντας),199 as their souls are wishing for something they cannot explain:

198 Symposium, 191a8-b1 199 Symposium, 192d5

112 ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλο τι βουλομένη ἑκατέρου ἡ ψυχὴ δήλη ἐστίν, ὃ οὐ δύναται

εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ μαντεύεται ὃ βούλεται, καὶ αἰνίττεται.200

But the soul of each is clearly wishing for something else that it is not able to say,

but it divines what it wishes and disguises it.

At this point, Hephaestus clarifies his offer:

ἆρά γε τοῦδε ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γενέσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις,

ὥστε καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν μὴ ἀπολείπεσθαι ἀλλήλων; εἰ γὰρ τούτου

ἐπιθυμεῖτε, θέλω ὑμᾶς συντῆξαι καὶ συμφυσῆσαι…201

Do you desire this, to be together as much as possible for each other, so as not to

be separated from each other both by night and day? For if you desire this, I am

willing to fuse and weld you together…

Again, the idea of being fused together is under the realm of epithumia, as the desire is still the necessity to be connected simply in body, not soul, through sexual contact. At the same time, however, Hephaestus has changed the object of this desire by introducing the concept of desiring someone for more than sexuality, as the partners would be together every minute of every day even through death. At this point, Hephaestus introduces this new concept as being eros by saying:

ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾶτε εἰ τούτου ἐρᾶτε καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ ὑμῖν ἂν τούτου τύχητε…202

But consider whether you desire this and whether it is sufficient for you if you

would obtain this…

200 Symposium, 192c7-d2 201 Symposium, 192d5-e1 202 Symposium, 192e4-5

113 In essence, Hephaestus has introduced humanity to the concept of eros by defining its nature and basic attributes. Aristophanes makes this moment of recognition explicit by claiming:

…ταῦτ᾽ ἀκούσας ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἐξαρνηθείη οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τι ἂν φανείη

βουλόμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ἀτεχνῶς οἴοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀκηκοέναι τοῦτο ὃ πάλαι ἄρα

ἐπεθύμει, συνελθὼν καὶ συντακεὶς τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐκ δυοῖν εἷς γενέσθαι.203

…we know that hearing this no one would deny it nor would be found wishing for

something else, but, frankly, he would think he had heard this which he was

desiring all along, joining and fusing with his eromenos to be made one from two.

This exchange is highlighting the moment of transition from epithumia to eros, as the humans have finally understood what they desire in their souls: the erastes/eromenos relationship. This is evidenced by the presence of the term eromenos, which up until now has not been used of either of the partners. Aristophanes is very clear in his diction, as he still uses the term epithumeo, but in relation to the previous desire before the introduction of eros (“this which he was desiring all along”). This modifier, πάλαι, sets the desire of epithumia in the past, while the present desire is ruled by eros, as evidenced by the use of eromenos. Lastly, the act of thinking (οἴοιτ᾽ ἂν) indicates that, whereas before the humans were lacking the contemplation necessary to express their feelings, now they have acquired the terms to conceptualize their desire.

At this point, when the transition from epithumia to eros has happened,

Aristophanes finally provides an unequivocal shift to eros by claiming:

τοῦ ὅλου οὖν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ διώξει ἔρως ὄνομα.204

203 Symposium, 192e5-9

114 Now eros is the name for the desire and pursuit of the whole.

With this, the transition is complete as Aristophanes acknowledges that eros incorporates epithumia as it progresses towards this new type of desire. While the parole of Socrates expanded upon the idea that epithumia flows into eros, this story by Aristophanes is the first to explicitly make the claim and explain the process of how such a transition occurs, thus laying the foundation for Socrates’ further expansion.

Using this story as our guide, we can now follow the linear progression from epithumia to eros. First, the desire begins as something unrefined and without any forethought: the desire for sexual contact. This has no social relationship, nor any discernable desire to think outside of the present moment. In other words, while the humans desired to be together in body, they had no conception of this type of contact extending into the future. Such desire of the body in the present moment, with no future aspirations of a continuing relationship, explicitly falls under the realm of epithumia. At this moment, Hephaestus arrives as an external, causal force with an offer that proposes to disrupt this system of bodily desire by offering a temporal element of being together forever. In this manner, Hephaestus is acting as a metaphor for eros itself. The comparison is twofold as first, like eros, he is a creative, causal force in his role as the metal-worker of the gods. Second, he is acting as the causal force of this particular story, as he arrives unannounced and instills within humanity the name and concept of eros.

At first, this future-oriented relationship that Hephaestus offers is not understood, as the humans are confused by his words. This is because they are not able to form into a coherent idea the actual desire of the soul, nor do they have the proper terminology to express that desire, as they are driven by epithumia, not eros. Hephaestus then explains

204 Symposium, 192e10-193a1

115 his offer in more detail, referring to his offer through erao. At this point the humans realize that they now have a term to describe to what they have desired all along. The term for this desire is eros, as the desire now incorporates a future element, and the vehicle through which this is accomplished is the erastes/eromenos relationship. The transition is complete, as Hephaestus has given both the sensation of eros and the words to describe this new phenomenon.

Like Aristophanes, Agathon also follows this linear progression as he attempts to persuade his fellow symposiasts that eros is the teacher of the gods. The first context in which he hints at the evolution from epithumia to eros occurs right in the beginning of his speech as he disagrees with the creation myth of Phaedrus:

ἐγὼ δὲ Φαίδρῳ πολλὰ ἄλλα ὁμολογῶν τοῦτο οὐχ ὁμολογῶ, ὡς Ἔρως

Κρόνου καὶ Ἰαπετοῦ ἀρχαιότερός ἐστιν, ἀλλά φημι νεώτατον αὐτὸν εἶναι

θεῶν καὶ ἀεὶ νέον, τὰ δὲ παλαιὰ πράγματα περὶ θεούς, ἃ Ἡσίοδος καὶ

Παρμενίδης λέγουσιν, Ἀνάγκῃ καὶ οὐκ Ἔρωτι γεγονέναι, εἰ ἐκεῖνοι

ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον.205

Although I am agreeing with Phaedrus in many other things, I do not agree with

respect to this: that Eros is more ancient than Kronos and Iapetos, but I say he is

the youngest of the gods and forever young, but those ancient dealings concerning

the gods, which Hesiod and Parmenides speak of, have happened because of

Necessity not Eros, if those men were speaking the truth.

Agathon has fundamentally altered the timeline of events between gods and men by equating the era of violence with necessity, and the following peace with eros. While part

205 Symposium, 195b6-c3

116 of this is certainly a rhetorical ploy to dismiss his counterparts and elevate his own speech, this comment also refers back to the emerging progression of epithumia to eros.

As mentioned before, the speakers have equated epithumia with necessity in order to explain the type of desire it entails. If we apply this notion, then Agathon’s words hold a different meaning. He would be claiming that before eros there was epithumia, whereas the previous speakers used the reverse order. This corresponds with his next thought as he claims:

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκτομαὶ οὐδὲ δεσμοὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ

βίαια, εἰ Ἔρως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἦν…206

For there would have been no cutting nor fettering of each other nor many other

violent things, if Eros was among them…

This claim of “cutting” and “fettering” is a direct reference back to the speech of

Aristophanes and his theory of the original human form. As we have established,

Aristophanes associated this state of the original humans as being the realm of epithumia.

Agathon has made the same claim, although more indirect, by equating this period to necessity, which has been established as equivalent to epithumia. From the start, Agathon has announced his intention to follow this same progression of epithumia leading to eros.

This adherence will help us understand the meaning of his story of eros as the teacher of skills.

To reinforce his point that eros is the inspirational teacher, Agathon claims that all the gods learned their respective crafts through eros:

206 Symposium, 195c4-5

117 τοξικήν γε μὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ μαντικὴν Ἀπόλλων ἀνηῦρεν ἐπιθυμίας

καὶ ἔρωτος ἡγεμονεύσαντος, ὥστε καὶ οὗτος Ἔρωτος ἂν εἴη μαθητής, καὶ

Μοῦσαι μουσικῆς καὶ Ἥφαιστος χαλκείας καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ ἱστουργίας καὶ

Ζεὺς κυβερνᾶν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.207

Apollo invented archery and medicine and prophesy with epithumia and eros

taking the lead, so that also this god would be a student of eros, and the Muses in

connection with music and Hephaestus in connection with metal-work and Athena

in connection with weaving and Zeus in governing both gods and men.

With our new perspective on epithumia, we are now able to analyze more thoroughly what Agathon is conveying through his language. The key concept of this sentence is the designation of both eros and epithumia as factors which lead to the creation of skills.

Before, we made the argument that epithumia is present because of the nature of each craft in relation to their respective gods. Apollo is archery, medicine and prophecy just as the Muses are music, Hephaestus is metal-work, Athena is weaving and Zeus is the governing of gods and men. We cannot extract any of the skills from their gods as they are one and the same. What is lacking, however, is the social relationship that would allow each god to become famous for that skill and would allow him or her to teach these skills to mortals. In terms of progression, each of these skills begins with epithumia, as the god has the desire to simply learn them in the present moment without contemplating any future action. Once the next step is taken, in which the gods desire to pass their skills on to mortals, they are in need of philia, which is associated with eros.

Agathon makes this connection more clear when he says:

207 Symposium, 197a6-b3

118 ὅθεν δὴ καὶ κατεσκευάσθη τῶν θεῶν τὰ πράγματα Ἔρωτος ἐγγενομένου,

δῆλον ὅτι κάλλους—αἴσχει γὰρ οὐκ ἔπι ἔρως—πρὸ τοῦ δέ, ὥσπερ ἐν

ἀρχῇ εἶπον, πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ θεοῖς ἐγίγνετο, ὡς λέγεται, διὰ τὴν τῆς

ἀνάγκης βασιλείαν.208

Hence, the doings of the gods were also constructed when Eros had been born

among them, clearly in connection with beauty—for there is no eros for

ugliness—though before this, just as I said in the beginning, many terrible things

happened among the gods, as it is said, through the kingship of necessity.

Here, Agathon has explicitly stated that the skills of the gods were only brought to fruition “when Eros had been born among them.” This follows our baseline of eros being the causal force that governs future desires. In addition, these desires must be eros since the ultimate goal is said to be beauty (δῆλον ὅτι κάλλους), a familiar object of eros within the text. In terms of epithumia, Agathon has again associated it with necessity, as he claims that before eros, necessity ruled.

If we follow the progression of his thought, he first claims that epithumia, through necessity, rules the gods. This explains why the skills of the gods lie dormant, as they do not have the proper force to be created with the goal of being shared among humanity. In this sense, the gods are like Aristophanes’ early humans, as they have the desire within them but have not been taught the necessary means to express this desire or bring it to fruition. Also like the early humans, Agathon’s gods require an external stimulus to provide the causal spark to their epithumia. In this context, that spark is eros itself in its personified and deified form. Agathon describes the moment of transition between eros

208 Symposium, 197b3-7

119 and epithumia by saying that both led each god to his or her skill; however, it is clearly stated that even though epithumia is involved in the beginning stages, eros is the force that takes over once the skill desires beauty. This beauty is one of the goals that eros seeks through philia. Once again, epithumia governs desires of the body that have no social interaction or future ambitions, while eros is the force through which desire seeks immortality through philia and forethought towards the future.

In terms of our paradigm, we now understand the connection between epithumia and eros in a more succinct way. These words cannot have the same meaning, as they denote different types of desire. These types are distinguished through our global baseline and manipulated through individual speakers. Through this manipulation we are able to see the nature of the relationship and adjust our baseline accordingly. Eros, although distinct from epithumia, draws upon some of the same qualities, but uses them to seek an entirely different set of objects. These objects cannot be pursued by epithumia, a factor that limits the scope of its meaning and function. For our methodology, this means that as a signifier, epithumia has a limited range of global meanings which it can signify. These objects must be of the body, with no concept of social interactions or the future goals.

Even with this explanation of the relationship between eros and epithumia, we have an incomplete picture and must now create a full understanding of philia through analysis of its use in parole. Only then will we have a complete system which we can analyze in order to understand the themes being addressed throughout the work.

120 Section E: Philia is the path to immortality

While epithumia and eros operate within a complex relationship in which their meanings overlap in very specific ways, philia stands apart within our paradigm. First and foremost, this is because philia does not belong to the group of words acting as signifiers for desire. And yet, even with this distinction, philia plays a major role in the

Symposium and is clearly connected to eros in particular ways. Specifically, eros seeks objects that require social relationships, while philia represents those relationships. This leads to a situation in which eros needs philia in order to obtain its goals. Our methodology allows for such a connection, since we have established that meanings of words can operate within a linear progression, such as epithumia leading to eros. With philia, this progression is even more explicit, as philia does not represent a desire for an object, but a state of possession of that object. Eros cannot, by Socrates’ argument, ever acquire the object which it seeks, while philia does not have such restrictions. This places epithumia and philia at opposite ends of our paradigm. At the same time, however, all three words are connected through the intermediacy of eros. If this process is taken to its ultimate conclusion, as Diotima does, the final goal of eros is immortality and the only means by which to achieve this end is philia.

According to Diotima, there are three ways for mortals to achieve immortality: public fame, procreation, and wisdom through philosophy. While each path requires a different set of skills, they each share the same objective. This means that these three paths can be analyzed and compared against a common denominator. For the purpose of our study, that commonality is the presence of philia, as each path, although undertaken by eros, ultimately comes to fruition through the vehicle of a social relationship.

121 Additionally, although Diotima is the first to provide an explicit system of achieving immortality, none of the three methods are innovative in the Symposium as they have their origins within the first five speeches of the work. Whereas the symposiasts were vague, Diotima will cut through their argument with rhetorical precision in order to organize the most useful parts of each speech to create an overarching generalization.

Using our methodology, we are invited to mimic Diotima in our analysis of philia and its relationship to our paradigm.

First, we must address fame as a route to immortality, specifically the fame achieved through ambition. In her description of the ultimate desire of all men, Diotima claims that this desire must be of immortality:

ταύτῃ τῇ μηχανῇ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, θνητὸν ἀθανασίας μετέχει, καὶ

σῶμα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα: ἀθάνατον δὲ ἄλλῃ. μὴ οὖν θαύμαζε εἰ τὸ αὑτοῦ

ἀποβλάστημα φύσει πᾶν τιμᾷ: ἀθανασίας γὰρ χάριν παντὶ αὕτη ἡ

σπουδὴ καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἕπεται.209

“Through this device, o Socrates,” she said, “a mortal thing partakes of

immortality, both in body and all other respects; an immortal thing does it in no

other way. So do not wonder if, by nature, all things honor their own offspring,

since for the sake of immortality this eagerness and eros follows everything.”

She then describes ambition, as being the first method for achieving this immortality:

καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰ ἐθέλεις εἰς τὴν φιλοτιμίαν βλέψαι, θαυμάζοις ἂν

τῆς ἀλογίας περὶ ἃ ἐγὼ εἴρηκα εἰ μὴ ἐννοεῖς…210

209 Symposium, 208b2-5 210 Symposium, 208c2-3

122 And if you wish to look at the ambition of these men, you would wonder at the

unreasonableness concerning what I have told you if you consider it…

She continues by claiming that Socrates need only look at how concerned these men have become with the desire to gain a name:

…ἐνθυμηθεὶς ὡς δεινῶς διάκεινται ἔρωτι τοῦ ὀνομαστοὶ γενέσθαι…211

…you consider how terribly they are affected with the eros to become named…

To provide an example for her claim, she then returns to the stories of Alcestis and

Achilles:

ἐπεὶ οἴει σύ…Ἄλκηστιν ὑπὲρ Ἀδμήτου ἀποθανεῖν ἄν, ἢ Ἀχιλλέα

Πατρόκλῳ ἐπαποθανεῖν…μὴ οἰομένους ἀθάνατον μνήμην ἀρετῆς πέρι

ἑαυτῶν ἔσεσθαι, ἣν νῦν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν;212

Do you suppose…that Alcestis would have died on account of Admetus, or

Achilles sought death for Patroclus…unless they thought to achieve immortal

memory concerning this virtue, which we now keep?

Diotima finally ends her thought on ambition by claiming that men do all that they can in order to achieve this type of fame and glory. Again, this argument should sound familiar, especially when set against our global baseline for philia. Within those similarities, philia is the social relationship through which the erastes achieves immortality. If philia is indeed the means of obtaining the immortal, we must go back through each speech in order to see what contexts emerge to support this claim.

211 Symposium, 208c4-5 212 Symposium, 208d2-6

123 The speech of Phaedrus is the most appropriate starting point because, aside from being the first speech in the work, it is the first to address the concept of philotimia, which Diotima utilizes in her speech. As previously mentioned, Phaedrus claims that through philotimia, eros seeks the beautiful. If we take this same context and apply the lens of immortality, as proposed by Diotima, then Phaedrus’ words carry a new meaning.

In the story of Alcestis, Phaedrus claimed that it was her philia that led to her immortality:

οὓς ἐκείνη τοσοῦτον ὑπερεβάλετο τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα…καὶ τοῦτ᾽

ἐργασαμένη τὸ ἔργον οὕτω καλὸν ἔδοξεν ἐργάσασθαι οὐ μόνον

ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ θεοῖς, ὥστε πολλῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐργασαμένων

εὐαριθμήτοις δή τισιν ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοί, ἐξ Ἅιδου ἀνεῖναι

πάλιν τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνης ἀνεῖσαν ἀγασθέντες τῷ ἔργῳ.213

whom she herself surpassed so far with her philia on account of eros…and when

doing this deed she seemed to do it so well not only to men but also to the gods,

so that although many have done many noble deeds, those to whom the gods have

given this honor is few, that they should send up their souls again from Hades, but

that of that one (Alcestis) was sent up in admiration for her deed.

If we break this thought down into its constituent parts, a linear progression emerges that supports the relationship of our paradigm. First, Alcestis was inspired by eros; second, her eros led her to philia; finally, her philia allowed her to achieve immortality.

This path to immortality involved neither procreation nor philosophy. Alcestis became immortal through her name and glory living on through the ages, which,

213 Symposium, 179c1-d1

124 according to Diotima, was planned in advance, echoing the future aspect of eros. As he attempts to justify this desire for immortality, Phaedrus makes it explicit and clear that the force behind this type of eros is ambition for beauty (ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς

φιλοτιμίαν).214 This is the exact term used by Diotima and this correlation redefines our perspective towards Phaedrus’ story. Phaedrus is the first to explain the aspiration for reputation in terms of immortality. For if, indeed, philia is the driving force behind ambition, and ambition is the means by which eros achieves immortality of name, then we have established our first connection between both eros with philia and philia with immortality.

The same retro-analysis can be done to the speech of Pausanias and his story of

Harmodius and Aristogeiton:

ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτονος ἔρως καὶ ἡ Ἁρμοδίου φιλία βέβαιος γενομένη

κατέλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρχήν.215

For the eros of Aristogeiton and the philia of Harmodius, having become

steadfast, loosened their (the tyrants’) power.

In this instance, we find the same type of linear progression towards immortality, as the eros of Aristogeiton leads to the philia of Harmodius, which in turn leads to their immortality of name through slaying the tyrants. The immortality of name is the social judgment placed upon the actions spurred by eros. Without the social relationship of philia, both between Harmodius and Aristogeiton and between the pair and society as a whole, this immortality of name could not have been achieved.

214 Symposium, 178d2 215 Symposium, 182c5-7

125 Pausanias extends this concept beyond the realm of famous heroes such as

Harmodius and Aristogeiton, or Alcestis and Achilles, to include the everyday affairs of the average Greek. He claims that an erastes could seek the same type of immortality of name through behaviors which he marks as worthy of social reproach:

εἰ γὰρ ἢ χρήματα βουλόμενος παρά του λαβεῖν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄρξαι ἤ τινα

ἄλλην δύναμιν ἐθέλοι ποιεῖν οἷάπερ οἱ ἐρασταὶ πρὸς τὰ παιδικά,

ἱκετείας τε καὶ ἀντιβολήσεις ἐν ταῖς δεήσεσιν ποιούμενοι, καὶ ὅρκους

ὀμνύντες, καὶ κοιμήσεις ἐπὶ θύραις, καὶ ἐθέλοντες δουλείας δουλεύειν

οἵας οὐδ᾽ ἂν δοῦλος οὐδείς, ἐμποδίζοιτο ἂν μὴ πράττειν οὕτω τὴν πρᾶξιν

καὶ ὑπὸ φίλων καὶ ὑπὸ ἐχθρῶν.216

For if wishing to obtain money from anyone or to hold office or gain any other

power, if he should wish to do the things erastai do to their favorites, making

supplication and entreaties in their requests, and swearing oaths, and sleeping at

doors, and willing to do acts of slavery as not even any slave would do, both by

friends and enemies he would be prevented to perform such acts in this way.

Each of these actions involves a social relationship through philia which leads to a famous name. One can be fabulously wealthy, like King Croesus in Herodotus, or politically powerful through holding office. Such goals relate to one’s social standing and the way one is viewed and judged by one’s peers. By including this passage on wealth and power, Pausanias has introduced a means by which an average Greek could hope for immortality.

216 Symposium, 183a2-3

126 This type of immortality earned through eros and ambition continues with the speech of Eryximachus. In his case, we can take his entire speech as an act of self-praise as he associates eros with a physician. He begins this process by claiming:

ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς λέγων, ἵνα καὶ πρεσβεύωμεν τὴν τέχνην.217

I will begin by speaking from medicine, in order that we may pay honor to this

skill.

Eryximachus then continues to build his speech upon the foundation that eros must be a physician. In making this claim, he has indirectly announced his intention to praise himself, as he is a physician. This self-aggrandizement is done with the same intention as those who seek money or power: immortality through fame. Again, this act is done through philia, as he is attempting to persuade his audience that the skill of the physician is the most worthy of praise. This act of praise (πρεσβεύω) is a representation of the social relationship expressed through philia. If Eryximachus can persuade his audience that physicians are worthy of public praise and glory, he will achieve the same immortality of name as those erastai described by Phaedrus and Pausanias. In this way, he has followed the same formula, philia through eros  immortality, which Diotima described in her speech. Although Eryximachus has taken a more brazen approach, the end result is the same: glory by way of eros (in the form of the physician) and immortality through glory.

Agathon takes a similar approach to Eryximachus, as he equates eros to a poet.

Being a famous poet himself, this again is a form of self-aggrandizement as he seeks to

217 Symposium, 186b2-3

127 achieve his own immortality by equating himself to eros, just like Eryximachus. He first reveals his intention early on in his speech as he says:

ποιητοῦ δ᾽ ἔστιν ἐνδεὴς οἷος ἦν Ὅμηρος πρὸς τὸ ἐπιδεῖξαι θεοῦ

ἁπαλότητα.218

But he is in need of a poet of such a kind as Homer was, to display the tenderness

of the god.

With this, Agathon has modeled himself after Homer, since eros is in need of a poet to praise him, and Agathon is fulfilling that role through his speech. This connection to poets will later be picked up by Socrates, as he claims that all poets are procreators through their work. This type of procreation is another path to immortality.219 By modeling himself like Homer, Agathon is attempting to gain a similar immortal fame for himself. Like Eryximachus, though, he must first persuade his audience that eros is a poet and poets are worthy of such social praise.

This connection to Eryximachus is explicitly made as Agathon claims:

καὶ πρῶτον μέν, ἵν᾽ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην τιμήσω ὥσπερ

Ἐρυξίμαχος τὴν αὑτοῦ, ποιητὴς ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς οὕτως ὥστε καὶ ἄλλον

ποιῆσαι.220

And first, if once again I may honor our art just as Eryximachus honored his own,

the god is a poet so wise as also to compose in others.

Here, Agathon has directly stated his intention to mimic the approach of Eryximachus by honoring his own art. Once again, he is using the verb τιμάω, which we have seen in

218 Symposium, 195c7-d1 219 Symposium, 209a5 220 Symposium, 196d6-e2

128 connection with the honor that leads to immortality of name. Like Eryximachus, Agathon is attempting to persuade his audience that his art is worthy of being praised in a way that will bring him immortality of name. In doing this, he, like Eryximachus, is attempting to force a type of philia which will result in his being praised. Even though his approach is slightly different from his predessors, Agathon is still attempting to obtain immortality through philia, as only through society judging his art worthy of the highest praise will he achieve the immortality of name that he seeks.

Having established the contexts in which humans can seek immortality of name through ambition and social praise, we must now move on to the second path described by Diotima. This path is immortality through procreation, and, as Diotima claims, this is the most common path sought by both men and animals alike. She states her claim in the following way:

κυοῦσιν γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ

τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἔν τινι ἡλικίᾳ γένωνται, τίκτειν ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ

φύσις.221

For all men are pregnant, Socrates, both in respect to the body and the soul, and

whenever they become of a certain age, our nature desires to beget.

Here, Diotima has reiterated our previous claim that the desire of the body begins with epithumia. At the same time, she has also included procreation within the type of desire that belongs to the soul, eros. Once again, the realms of epithumia and eros overlap, as the progression moves from desire of the body to desire of the soul. This progression

221 Symposium, 206c1-4

129 leads to the erastes/eromenos relationship, through which one can achieve immortality through procreation. She goes on to explain this process in more detail:

…ἡ θνητὴ φύσις ζητεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀεί τε εἶναι καὶ ἀθάνατος.

δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον, τῇ γενέσει, ὅτι ἀεὶ καταλείπει ἕτερον νέον ἀντὶ

τοῦ παλαιοῦ…222

…the mortal nature seeks as far as it is able to exist forever and be immortal. It is

able only in this way, by generation, that it always leaves behind a new thing in

place of the old…

She goes on to explain this process as one of replenishment, as through procreation one is able to pass along his name, legacy, and literally his flesh and blood to the next generation. Through this process, she claims, one can never die as one continues on through procreation.

This argument has at its core the same principle of philia leading to immortality.

In procreation, the philia is twofold, as first there must be the specific type of relationship caused by eros, that of the erastes and eromenos. As previously mentioned, this type of relationship, since it is guided by eros, has the ability to project wishes and desires into the future, allowing for the desire to have children and, therefore, immortality. Second, procreation can also lead to immortality of name. This can be achieved if one has a large number of children, which is deemed worthy and glorious by society, or if those children go on to perform heroic deeds. Either way, the act of having children involves the social relationship encompassed by philia.

222 Symposium, 207d1-3

130 The last path to immortality that Diotima describes is through wisdom and philosophy. This approach is often viewed by modern scholarship as being the main focus of the entire Symposium. And yet, at its core, it follows the same principle as the previous two methods of obtaining immortality. Diotima begins her description by doubting the ability of Socrates to succeed in this endeavor:

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν σὺ μυηθείης: τὰ δὲ

τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά, ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς μετίῃ, οὐκ

οἶδ᾽ εἰ οἷός τ᾽ ἂν εἴης.223

Perhaps even you, Socrates, might be initiated into these erotics, but I do not

know if you would be able to approach the rites and revelations on account of

which these things are also pursued, if someone should be properly instructed.

This passage is of particular interest for our study, as Diotima is saying that those who procreate and those who seek fame are desiring happiness for themselves. These types of goals are not the true cause of happiness or the good or beauty, but intermediate forms.

This is reminiscent of the Lysis, which states that one should always search for the primary cause of what humans hold dear. The term used in that argument is “πρῶτον

φίλον,” or the primary relationship “on account of which all other things are deemed to be dear (οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα φαμὲν πάντα φίλα εἶναι).”224 This primary relationship will be revealed as the form of beauty. Once again, the path to obtaining this final goal is achieved through a concept related to philia (πρῶτον φίλον), as one needs to achieve a particular social relationship in order to view the form. For Diotima, this

223 Symposium, 209e5-210a2 224 Plato, Lysis, 219d1-2

131 relationship begins within the erastes and eromenos, as the erastes is able to contemplate true beauty. She describes this original relationship as a process of abstraction as the erastes moves from the desire of beautiful bodies, to the desire of beauty itself:

…καὶ πρῶτον μέν…ἑνὸς αὐτὸν σώματος ἐρᾶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα γεννᾶν

λόγους καλούς, ἔπειτα δὲ αὐτὸν κατανοῆσαι ὅτι τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ ὁτῳοῦν

σώματι τῷ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ σώματι ἀδελφόν ἐστι…225

…and first…he desires one single body and at that point there to beget beautiful

discourse, then to recognize that the beauty on any body is akin to that on any

other body…

At this point, the erastes has recognized that beauty is not unique to single bodies, but shared across all bodies. With this moment of recognition, the erastes contemplates beauty further and brings the abstraction to beauty of the body rather than soul:

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος τιμιώτερον ἡγήσασθαι τοῦ ἐν

τῷ σώματι…226

Next he comes to believe that this beauty in souls is more valued than beauty in

bodies…

Finally, the erastes arrives at the form of beauty itself, the πρῶτον φίλον from which all other forms of beauty emerge, but are simply imitations. She then explains this touching of the form of beauty as being true immortality:

ἢ οὐκ ἐνθυμῇ, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ μοναχοῦ γενήσεται, ὁρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ

καλόν, τίκτειν οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδώλου ἐφαπτομένῳ, ἀλλὰ

225 Symposium, 210a6-b1 226 Symposium, 210b6-7

132 ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτομένῳ τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ

θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι, καὶ εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων

ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ.227

Or are you not convinced, that then alone it will befall him, in seeing the beautiful

through that which it is visible, to beget not images of virtue, because he does not

touch an image, but the true virtue, because he touches the truth? But begetting

true virtue and nourishing it, it is possible for him to become dear to the god, and

if any other among mortal men is immortal, he is, too.

With this, Diotima has arrived at the ultimate goal of eros, the touching of the form. Her description of the process by which one achieves immortality through wisdom mimics our own baseline of epithumia, eros, and philia. The progression begins with desire of the body (epithumia), moves to desire of the soul (eros), and through the social relationship created by eros (philia), one achieves immortality.

Once more, Diotima has indicated through her syntax that the method through which one obtains this sort of immortality is philia, as by touching the form, one becomes

“dear to the god.” This is a description of a social relationship, between the erastes and the form, through which by touching true immortality, one becomes immortal. This process is done completely through abstraction of thought, brought on by the beauty of the eromenos. Just as the ultimate goal is achieved through philia, it also begins with philia, as the erastes/eromenos relationship is the vehicle though which eros obtains true immortality. Whereas fame and procreation can lead to a type of immortality, Diotima

227 Symposium, 212a2-7

133 claims that these are but images of the form. If one is to obtain the purest form of immortality, one must advance through thought and wisdom, being guided by eros.

Each of these three types of immortality are obtained through different paths. One involves sexual activity, while the others involve performing noble deeds and pursuing wisdom. This variation of methods allows for mostly everyone to achieve some form of immortality. And yet, even with these various paths, at the core of each lies a relationship involving philia. This relationship between the erastes and other humans, society as a whole, or the gods, is the key to obtaining the desires of eros. Immortality is a subjective concept, which cannot be self-proclaimed but must be granted by society or the gods.

Through philia, those spurred on by eros are able to perform actions that lead to social approval and praise, the passing on of legacy and name, and the procurement of true wisdom and virtue. For this reason, philia stands apart from epithumia and eros within our paradigm, but without it, eros cannot function and immortality cannot be achieved. In her speech, Diotima draws upon the common understanding that eros achieves its desires through philia and adds a new dimension in which the ultimate goal of eros is immortality. In this way, Diotima has taken the langue of both eros and philia, interpreted them in a new way through her individualized parole, and in doing so persuaded the group of symposiasts to modify the common langue.

134

Chapter 4: Interpretation

Through our methodology of analyzing both the similarities and differences within each speech of the Symposium, we have identified a set of fundamental characteristics of our paradigm of epithumia, eros, and philia which provides a guideline for understanding the meaning and function of each word within the text. With this new explication of the individual words, we are now able to turn our attention towards interpreting the larger philosophical message of the Symposium which these words create.

Since eros stands as the main theme of the narrative, by changing the way in which we understand eros, new interpretations of the entire work can arise.

While this type of global study of the work as a whole could lead to many conclusions, our study will focus only on those that are directly related to our methodology. These new interpretations represent the synthesis of all the information our study has gleaned concerning eros and directly alter the standard reading of the

Symposium. Specifically, our study shows that Socrates and eros are directly related in a more complex manner than originally thought, and that connection makes the entire work a rhetorical and philosophical representation of the same linear progression from epithumiai to eros to philia to immortality that our study revealed. Socrates will be shown to be the embodiment of eros, both by his peers and his own characterization of himself, and the ramifications of his role will reveal why he is both the means and obstruction for achieving true wisdom.

135 Section A: The difference between eros and erotics

Within the Symposium there is a significant contradiction concerning the topic of discourse. While the speakers make it abundantly clear that they are crafting speeches in praise of eros, in the prologue we are told that some speeches were on ta erotika, or the things concerning eros. Again, our methodology claims that these two terms, eros and erotics, might overlap, but are not redundant. Since Plato is very deliberate in the syntax of each speaker, this discrepancy cannot be accidental. At the same time, since no previous interpretation of the Symposium has made clear the distinction between eros and its related words, this discrepancy has often been overlooked. When approached through the lens of our methodology, however, we are able to create a justified explanation for the difference.

The passage concerning erotics occurs as Apollodorus is speaking with the unnamed stranger who approaches him on the street. The stranger proceeds to inquire about the symposium which, at this time, happened many years ago:

Ἀπολλόδωρε, καὶ μὴν καὶ ἔναγχός σε ἐζήτουν βουλόμενος διαπυθέσθαι

τὴν Ἀγάθωνος συνουσίαν καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

τῶν τότε ἐν τῷ συνδείπνῳ παραγενομένων, περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων

τίνες ἦσαν.228

Apollodorus, actually I have just now been looking for you, as I want to find out

about the banquet of Agathon and Socrates and Alcibiades and the others present

in that symposium, and what were the speeches they delivered concerning erotics.

228 Symposium, 172a6-b3

136 The stranger has categorized the speeches as concerning erotics, not eros. While this may seem like semantics, since erotics is clearly a derivative of eros, we will see that only a few of the speakers categorize their own speeches, or have them categorized by others, as concerning erotics. This selectivity of who is actually speaks about erotics is highlighted by this stranger, as he specifically isolates Agathon, Socrates and Alcibiades. As we will see in the text, this triad is not chosen arbitrarily.

As the structural framework of the text shifts to the symposium itself, we find another clue as to the distinction between erotics and eros. After Eryximachus suggests that the group deliver speeches concerning eros, Socrates gives his approval of the idea and proceeds to affirm his own knowledge of the subject:

οὐδείς σοι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, ἐναντία ψηφιεῖται. οὔτε γὰρ ἄν που ἐγὼ

ἀποφήσαιμι, ὃς οὐδέν φημι ἄλλο ἐπίστασθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά...229

No one, Eryximachus, will vote against you. For neither would I refuse in any

way, I who claim to know nothing else than erotics…

Here, even though Eryximachus had suggested speeches in praise of eros, Socrates claims that his only knowledge is not of eros, but of erotics. This corroborates the claim of Apollodorus’ unnamed stranger, who identified Socrates as one of the symposiasts who spoke about erotics. These two passages highlight an underlying distinction between erotics and eros and, as we look more closely at the speeches themselves, we find that this difference is one of, if not the, main themes of the entire work.

The term erotics does not appear in, or in relation to, the speeches of Phaedrus,

Pausanias, or Aristophanes, further justifying their absence in the claim of the stranger.

229 Symposium, 177d6-8

137 Its first appearance is within the speech of Eryximachus and his description of the medicine within the human body:

ἔστι γὰρ ἰατρική, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, ἐπιστήμη τῶν τοῦ σώματος

ἐρωτικῶν πρὸς πλησμονὴν καὶ κένωσιν…230

For medicine is, so as to speak in total, the knowledge of erotics of the body with

respect to fullness and emptiness…

He goes on to describe a variety of different applications of erotics in the same manner including music (καὶ ἔστιν αὖ μουσικὴ περὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἐρωτικῶν

ἐπιστήμη “and on the other hand music is knowledge of erotics concerning harmony and rhythm”),231 harmony and rhythm (καὶ ἐν μέν γε αὐτῇ τῇ συστάσει ἁρμονίας τε καὶ

ῥυθμοῦ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ διαγιγνώσκειν “and indeed in this construction itself of harmony and rhythm it is not difficult to distinguish erotics”),232 and natural disruptions (καὶ γὰρ πάχναι καὶ χάλαζαι καὶ ἐρυσῖβαι ἐκ πλεονεξίας καὶ

ἀκοσμίας περὶ ἄλληλα τῶν τοιούτων γίγνεται ἐρωτικῶν “likewise hoar-frosts, hails, and mildews, which spring from mutual encroachments and disorders in such erotics”).233

Finally, Eryximachus contextualizes all of these different representations of erotics within the mantic, who he claims is the one who holds true knowledge of erotics:

230 Symposium, 186c5-7 231 Symposium, 187c4-5 232 Symposium, 187c5-7 233 Symposium, 188b3-5

138 καὶ ἔστιν αὖ ἡ μαντικὴ φιλίας θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων δημιουργὸς τῷ

ἐπίστασθαι τὰ κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ἐρωτικά, ὅσα τείνει πρὸς θέμιν καὶ

εὐσέβειαν. 234

And that mantic who knows what human erotics concern custom and piety; he is

the creator of philia between gods and men.

With this final thought, Eryximachus has contextualized our entire paradigm within the function of the mantic. He claims that the mantic is able to understand how erotics leads to philia, which we have established as the path to immortality. While the physician seeks this immortality of fame from his reputation, erotics is the knowledge through which this immortality is achieved. Ironically, Eryximachus, while he understands that erotics is the path to understanding eros, does not know erotics himself, as he does not mention the erastes/eromenos relationship at all in his speech. Since we know that the erastes/eromenos relationship leads to immortality, its absence is noticeable and relates to the lack of true understanding that Eryximachus has for the subject. Nonetheless, at this point in the work we are not fully cognizant of how Eryximachus is envisioning this type of mantic, both in character and function. For this, we must turn to the speech of Socrates and Diotima, whose explanation of the workings of eros and erotics will clarify and expand upon this foundation Eryximachus has laid.

Before Socrates even delivers his speech, his connection to erotics is made explicit through the comments of his peers. Once more Eryximachus is the one who claims that Socrates and Agathon are knowledgeable in erotics. Since we now know that

Eryximachus has some sort of understanding of erotics himself, it is logical that he would

234 Symposium, 188c7-d2

139 be the one to characterize Agathon and Socrates as knowledgeable on the subject. He makes this claim after the speech of Aristophanes but before that of Agathon:

καὶ εἰ μὴ συνῄδη Σωκράτει τε καὶ Ἀγάθωνι δεινοῖς οὖσι περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά,

πάνυ ἂν ἐφοβούμην μὴ ἀπορήσωσι λόγων διὰ τὸ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ

εἰρῆσθαι: νῦν δὲ ὅμως θαρρῶ.235

And if I was not aware that both Socrates and Agathon were formidable

concerning erotics, altogether I would have feared they were at a loss of speech as

many things of all kinds have been spoken; nonetheless now I am confident.

Again, Socrates and Agathon are isolated from the group as being especially well- informed of erotics. This marks a distinct shift in the dialogue, as Agathon will be the first to attempt to describe the nature of eros rather than its actions toward mankind. He directly claims this to be his methodology at the beginning of his speech:

οὕτω δὴ τὸν ἔρωτα καὶ ἡμᾶς δίκαιον ἐπαινέσαι πρῶτον αὐτὸν οἷός ἐστιν,

ἔπειτα τὰς δόσεις.236

Thus it is right that we praise eros first for what sort he is, then for his gifts.

Even though Agathon will not use the term erotics, it is because of this shift in methodology that he is proclaimed knowledgeable in erotics. As we will see in the speech of Socrates, the concept of understanding the nature of eros rather than its gifts to humans lies at the heart of Diotima’s explanation of erotics.

While these previous contexts do introduce some of the qualities of erotics and how it differs from eros, neither Eryximachus nor Agathon is able to provide a full

235 Symposium, 193e4-7 236 Symposium, 195a3-5

140 explanation. The reason for this is that they have not been led by someone who knows erotics, as Diotima will do for Socrates. In fact, when Socrates describes his conversation with Diotima, he identifies it as a lesson in erotics:

ἣ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἐδίδαξεν…237

Indeed she also taught me erotics…

He reiterates this point later as he claims “all these things she taught me, when she made discourse concerning erotics (ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα ἐδίδασκέ με, ὁπότε περὶ τῶν

ἐρωτικῶν λόγους ποιοῖτο).”238

These passages all point to the lesson of Diotima as being the source of Socrates’ knowledge. Therefore, we are able to define erotics based upon her lessons. The first clue as to its function is Diotima herself. She is described as a mantic and healer of the

Athenian plague, the same description given by Eryximachus in his portrayal of the physician. This is telling, since in both cases, the mantic and physician are described as guides or teachers. This is precisely the function of Diotima as she guides Socrates along the path of obtaining immortality.

If we think about Diotima in the role of teacher or guide, erotics can be thought of as her lesson, since this is how she teaches Socrates. These lessons are a series of questions intended to modify Socrates’ way of thinking from the types of eros described by the previous symposiasts in terms of his gifts to mankind, to eros as being the intermediate daimon between mortal and immortal. This focus on the nature of eros as opposed to his gifts is the same argument introduced by Agathon, but explained in detail by Socrates. Having been initiated into these teaching on erotics, Socrates is now worthy

237 Symposium, 201d5 238 Symposium, 207a5-6

141 of the moniker given to him by his peers and his own self-proclaimed knowledge of erotics. He even admits his own secret knowledge by referring to himself as a mantic, since after the speech of Agathon he claims, “but did I not say the things I was saying just now like a mantic, namely that Agathon would speak marvelously and I will be at a loss

(ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μαντικῶς ἃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Ἀγάθων θαυμαστῶς ἐροῖ, ἐγὼ δ᾽

ἀπορήσοιμι)?”239 Socrates has inherited the same mantic qualities that Diotima had and that Eryximachus first alluded to in his speech.

Thinking about erotics in this way, we see that the true lesson Diotima is offering

Socrates is the guidance of how to achieve immortality through philia, in this case philia of sophia. This point is reflected in her name, as Diotima can be taken as “honored by

Zeus,” a reflection of the ultimate goal of immortality, becoming theophiles. The honor aspect of Diotima’s name refers to the same time of social relationship established through philia and theophilos. As the leader of those seeking immortality, Diotima is showing Socrates how to create the necessary philia in order to become immortal. Her role echoes the intermediate nature of eros itself.

The last speaker of our marked group is Alcibiades, who, arriving late to the symposium, still uses the term erotics in a very peculiar manner. Within his speech,

Alcibiades reveals that he was once taught erotics by Socrates. This is a key fact, since he goes on to imply that he never finished the training and has since rejected it, resulting in his grudge toward Socrates. Nonetheless, these two are particularly marked by Plato, as he describes a connection between both men and the form of beauty. Diotima describes

239 Symposium, 198a5-7

142 the form as arriving “suddenly (ἐξαίφνης)”240 which is the same term used to describe both Socrates’ arrival at Agathon’s party241 and Alcibiades’ arrival later on in the narrative.242 This language connects the two men to each other in a manner that suggests the philia they shared towards obtaining the form through wisdom. Likewise, both men claim that they can only speak the truth. Socrates says “ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὑπ᾽ ἀβελτερίας

ᾤμην δεῖν τἀληθῆ λέγειν περὶ ἑκάστου τοῦ ἐγκωμιαζομένου (for I, by simple- mindedness thought it to be necessary to speak the truth concerning each thing being praised),”243 while Alcibiades makes a similar claim by saying “ὅμως εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι ἀληθῆ

λέγω (nevertheless, I know well that I am speaking the truth).”244

In addition to being connected through language and descriptions, both men are also connected through erotics, for, as previously mentioned, Socrates taught them to

Alcibiades. Although this lesson seems to have failed, the connection between both men remains, which after Alcibiades’ speech we are told by our narrator Aristodemus:

εἰπόντος δὴ ταῦτα τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου γέλωτα γενέσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ παρρησίᾳ

αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἐδόκει ἔτι ἐρωτικῶς ἔχειν τοῦ Σωκράτους.245

After these had been said by Alcibiades there arose laughter towards his

frankness, because he still seemed to be erotically held by Socrates.

240 Symposium, 210e4 241 Symposium, 213c1 242 Symposium, 212c6 243 Symposium, 198d3-4 244 Symposium, 213a1 245 Symposium, 222c1-3

143 This erotic connection is based upon the teaching given by Socrates to Alcibiades. In that relationship, Socrates was acting as a teacher in the same manner as Diotima, while

Alcibiades was acting as a student in the same manner as Socrates had previously been.

Once again, erotics is related to the knowledge required for the obtainment of immortality. This separates it from eros, since it is not eros itself, but the teachings concerning the nature of eros that lead one to immortality. These passages suggest that erotics is the term applied to the knowledge of how to describe the true nature of eros, something that only Socrates is able to do, since he has been taught by Diotima. This explains why he originally claims that he is not wise, but only wise in erotics. Wisdom is listed by Diotima as being one of the paths to immortality. Socrates, as someone who is famous for proclaiming himself not wise, has not achieved immortality through wisdom, but knows how such a desire could be accomplished. For this reason, he is singled out from the other speakers of the Symposium, along with Agathon and Alcibiades, who seem to have the basic understanding of erotics but not to the same extent as Socrates. Also, just as Socrates once taught Alcibiades, through his speech of Diotima he is directly addressing Agathon. It is this connection of student and teacher concerning erotics that distinguishes these three men and justifies the original claim of the unnamed stranger to

Apollodorus.

When we apply this distinction of erotics and eros to the entire work, we see that the Symposium as a whole can be interpreted as a comment on erotics, rather than eros.

The first four speakers are attempting to describe eros, but are lacking the proper training and guidance. Therefore, their efforts fall short as none seem to have truly grasped the nature of eros, as opposed to its deeds toward mankind. Just as images of beauty are

144 mistaken for the form of beauty, the first four speakers are mistaking the deeds of eros for eros itself. The erotics taught by Diotima and Socrates are an attempt to see through these images and obtain the pure form. In this way, the entire work is a reflection of the distinction between eros and erotics.

Section B: Socrates is Eros

While the discrepancy between eros and erotics displayed the separation of

Socrates from the rest of the speakers, it does leave one last question: what exactly is the role of Socrates in the Symposium? There can be no doubt that Socrates is elevated above the rest in his knowledge of erotics and the path towards immortality. His speech is positioned as the last of the original six, and his content is a synthesis of all the themes and arguments of the previous speeches into one overarching perception of both the nature of eros and its function for humanity. Additionally, the structure of the Symposium stresses the speech of Socrates by having it occur directly in the middle of the work. Even with this advantage of position, Socrates’ speech is neither a refutation nor endorsement of the previous five speeches. Rather, his speech is didactic, as he seeks to teach his listeners, especially Agathon, the same lessons that he was taught by Diotima. This is the true role of Socrates, as he, like Diotima, is the mantic guide who leads one who is ignorant on the path to wisdom. He is neither wise nor ignorant, but acts as the intermediate between the two, having never touched the form but knowing of how one could touch it; in a way, Socrates is the embodiment of eros.

145 The first glimpse of Socrates in this role occurs in the prologue with Apollodorus talking to the unnamed stranger. With the first line of the work, Apollodorus tells the stranger that he has told the story of the Symposium many times:

δοκῶ μοι περὶ ὧν πυνθάνεσθε οὐκ ἀμελέτητος εἶναι.246

I seem to be not unprepared of the things you inquire.

Apollodorus appears to have repeated the story so often, or found the story so valuable, that he has it almost completely memorized. Also, the story was so well-known that apparent strangers were stopping him on the street asking to hear the story. This complex and confusing opening compels us to ask why Plato has even included it. One reason is dramatic, since if so many people are eager to hear the story so long after it happened it must have been something extraordinary. Secondly, the information exchanged within the symposium is marked as special and exclusive. This second consequence of such an opening relates directly back to Socrates as eros, since he has a group of followers so eager to hear his words that they run about seeking all the information they can gather.

Apollodorus includes himself in this group as he describes to the stranger his own devotion to Socrates:

οὐκ οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι πολλῶν ἐτῶν Ἀγάθων ἐνθάδε οὐκ ἐπιδεδήμηκεν, ἀφ᾽ οὗ δ᾽

ἐγὼ Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβω καὶ ἐπιμελὲς πεποίημαι ἑκάστης ἡμέρας

εἰδέναι ὅτι ἂν λέγῃ ἢ πράττῃ, οὐδέπω τρία ἔτη ἐστίν;247

246 Symposium, 172a1-2 247 Symposium, 172c3-6

146 Did you not know that for many years Agathon has not been home, and it is not

yet three years that I have been spending time with Socrates and making it my

daily care to know whatever he says or does?

He then proceeds to state the cause for this devoted behavior:

πρὸ τοῦ δὲ περιτρέχων ὅπῃ τύχοιμι καὶ οἰόμενος τὶ ποιεῖν ἀθλιώτερος ἦ

ὁτουοῦν, οὐχ ἧττον ἢ σὺ νυνί, οἰόμενος δεῖν πάντα μᾶλλον πράττειν ἢ

φιλοσοφεῖν.248

Before that time, running around at random and thinking I was doing something, I

was more wretched than anyone, not less than you are now, thinking it necessary

to perform everything rather than philosophize.

With these lines, Apollodorus reveals that the search for philosophy is what compels him to devotedly follow Socrates. He is attempting to gain immortality through wisdom and in doing so he has identified Socrates as the manner through which he believes he will accomplish his pursuit.

Once again, this places Socrates in the role of teacher and guide. This is, in fact, the role of eros, as our methodology showed that eros and its desires of the soul lead to the desire for philosophy. What Apollodorus seems to be missing is that eros is always the intermediate, not the end result, a concept that relates back to whether we possess that which we desire. In pursuing Socrates so devotedly, he is creating the wrong type of philia, as he needs the erastes/eromenos relationship as the vehicle through which he can find the true form of beauty. Even though his approach is flawed, Apollodorus has still

248 Symposium, 173a1-3

147 shown that Socrates is acting as a physical manifestation of eros within a human being, guiding those around him to pursuits of the soul and immortality through erotics.

While the prologue introduces this idea, it only becomes clear through the context of the symposium itself and the manner in which the symposiasts refer to Socrates. The first speech to do this is that of Diotima as she describes her own creation myth of eros.

She claims that eros is neither immortal nor divine, but something in between which she calls a daimon:

ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα, μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου…δαίμων μέγας, ὦ

Σώκρατες: καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ.249

As I said formerly, between mortal and immortal…a great daimon, Socrates, for

all of the spiritual is between the gods and mortals.

She goes on to claim that this intermediate state is due to the parents of eros, Poros

(resource) and Penia (lack). Diotima goes on to claim that this places eros between ignorance and wisdom, something Socrates calls himself, as he says he is not wise and yet knows of erotics.

This intermediate state of eros as constantly between lack and possession, ignorance and wisdom, and body and soul is the same set of characteristics used to describe Socrates. By coming to Diotima, Socrates depicts himself as the man searching for answers but in need of guidance, as he lacks the necessary knowledge of eros and erotics. At the same time, in making his speech he is, in fact, teaching the rest of the symposiasts the lessons he once learned. In doing so, his role has reversed as he has become the possessor of knowledge. And yet, he repeatedly claims that he is not wise but

249 Symposium, 202d11-e1

148 only knows erotics. These characteristics all work in unison to portray a man who is between wisdom and ignorance, with the ability to guide those who seek the truths of philosophy.

In his role as the guide, Socrates describes the process of learning erotics through the language of the mystery cults. He does this through the words of Diotima as she questions his ability to learn this secret knowledge:

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν σὺ μυηθείης: τὰ δὲ

τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά, ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς μετίῃ, οὐκ

οἶδ᾽ εἰ οἷός τ᾽ ἂν εἴης.250

For perhaps even you, Socrates, might be initiated into these erotics; but I do not

know if you would be able to be initiated into the rights and revelations, on

account of which these things exist, if one pursues them correctly.

Diotima’s language is that of the mystery cults, as Socrates must be “initiated” into the

“rights and revelations.” This terminology makes the knowledge that Socrates learned secret, which explains the zeal with which the unnamed stranger interrogates Apollodorus at the beginning of the dialogue.

This verb, muesthai, enhances the secret nature of Socrates’ knowledge as it implies silence. Likewise, ta epoptika is the language of that which is seen in the initiation into a mystery cult. This helps describe the syntax Socrates, through Diotima, uses since, having been initiated, he attempts to teach the others through optical language.

His optically descriptive verbs include θεάσασθαι, ἰδεῖν, ἴδῃ, θεωρῶν, κατίδῃ,

θεώμενος, and κατόψεταί, all of which mean to see or observe with particular

250 Symposium, 209e5-210a2

149 reference to contemplation through the mind’s eye. Diotima will even explain this necessity for optical syntax by claiming “there is not any description (οὐδέ τις

λόγος)”251 for the form of beauty.

With this emphasis on Socrates as the possessor of secret knowledge and the lack of the ability to express that knowledge, we see that Socrates is not able to teach wisdom to his students. Rather, he is only able to guide them along the path towards wisdom.

This, again, is a reflection of eros, which cannot ever possess that which it desires, as evidenced by the fact that one only desires that which one does not have. The rest is up to the individual seeking wisdom, as their experience is based upon ta epoptika, that which is seen. This moment of the final encounter with the form is the realm of philia, as one establishes the social relationship with true beauty, through contemplation of the eromenos, and gains the immortality he seeks. This is not what Socrates offers in his speech, since, as he says, he is not able to describe in words the moment of realization; it must be seen and experienced on an individual basis. What Socrates provides is a path towards obtaining philia and immortality through his teachings of erotics. In this way,

Socrates is a reflection of Diotima, and both are embodiments of eros.

This characterization of Socrates is repeated by Alcibiades, as he too was once a student of Socrates attempting to achieve true wisdom through philosophical teaching. In his speech, Alcibiades calls Socrates “shoeless (ἀνυπόδητος),”252 “resourceful

(εὐπόρως),”253 and a “daimon (τῷ δαιμονίῳ).”254 These are the exact words Socrates

251 Symposium, 211a7 252 Symposium, 220b6 253 Symposium, 223a8 254 Symposium, 219c1

150 uses to describe eros, which he also calls “shoeless (ἀνυπόδητος),”255 “resourceful

(εὐπορήσῃ),”256 and a “daimon (τὸ δαιμόνιον).”257 Alcibiades goes on to equate

Socrates’ teachings to the mystery cults by comparing him to the satyr Marsyas:

καὶ φημὶ αὖ ἐοικέναι αὐτὸν τῷ σατύρῳ τῷ Μαρσύᾳ…ὁ μέν γε δι᾽

ὀργάνων ἐκήλει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος δυνάμει, καὶ ἔτι

νυνὶ ὃς ἂν τὰ ἐκείνου αὐλῇ…τὰ οὖν ἐκείνου ἐάντε ἀγαθὸς αὐλητὴς αὐλῇ

ἐάντε φαύλη αὐλητρίς, μόνα κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν

τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους διὰ τὸ θεῖα εἶναι.258

And I say that he is like the satyr Marsyas…on account of instruments, he

charmed people by the power of his mouth, and those who pipe his music do so

even now…but whether those are played by a good flutist or a paltry flute-girl,

this alone makes possession and reveals those lacking both the gods and rites of

initiation, because it is divine.

Here, Alcibiades has used the same terminology to describe the erotics Socrates teaches by comparison to the revelations and rites of initiation of the mystery cults. Like that of

Socrates, Alcibiades’ description of erotics involves the same type of optical language, as the rites are seen (δηλοῖ), not spoken. In doing this, Alcibiades, even though he has not had the benefit of hearing Socrates’ description of the true nature of eros, has equated

Socrates to eros by making him the guide to secret knowledge. Through Socrates, one learns the initiations and rites into the mystery cult of wisdom. Since Socrates is only the

255 Symposium, 203d1 256 Symposium, 203e2 257 Symposium, 202d13 258 Symposium, 215b3-215c6

151 guide towards and not the possessor of that wisdom, he is once again placed in the role of the intermediate: the role of eros.

The comparison of Socrates to eros is a major theme of the entire work. It has its origin in the prologue and gradually develops throughout each speech, culminating in the description of Alcibiades. He is described as the mantic and philosopher, the one who possesses secret knowledge, and the connection between ignorance and wisdom. The key to understanding this description of Socrates is to make sure we correctly assess his role.

Our baseline of eros serves as a useful guide in doing this.

Like eros, Socrates requires an erastes/eromenos relationship in order to fulfill his goal of teaching a student about erotics. We see this in the speech of Alcibiades, who admits that, although he was unsuccessful in his attempt, he did at one time serve as the erastes of Socrates in order to obtain wisdom. Also, Socrates is a causal agent, since

Alcibiades describes the sensation of hearing Socrates speak as being a form of possession:

ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούω, πολύ μοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιώντων ἥ τε καρδία

πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτου, ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ

ἄλλους παμπόλλους τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχοντας.259

For whenever I hear him, my heart leaps, much more than those affected by the

Corybantes, and tears flow by his words, and I see many others affected in the

same way.

259 Symposium, 215e1-4

152 The words of Socrates are described in the same manner as eros: the external force that enters the body and causes a particular kind of behavior that would not have existed otherwise.

Additionally, Socrates, like eros, is portrayed as being morally ambiguous, since he does not seem to care about the behaviors he causes in others. The two examples of this are Agathon and Alcibiades, the two students in this work. Socrates never tells

Agathon that his actions are worthy of praise or reproach, he simply corrects his statements and teaches him “the truth.” Likewise, he holds no judgment of the behaviors of Alcibiades, who has cast aside the teachings of Socrates in order to pursue a life of politics and ambition. In both cases, Socrates does not seem troubled by either type of behavior, but simply moves on to find another student. Finally, the erotics Socrates teaches are only possible through social relationships. In the case of Socrates and his students, the philia is created by Socrates’ encouragement of the proper erastes/eromenos relationship, through which an erastes can achieve immortality through wisdom. This is expressed through the speech of Diotima and her description of an ascent up a metaphorical ladder towards the form of beauty. In her description, the beginning is always finding an eromenos through which the erastes can contemplate the higher forms of beauty.

These traits, coupled with the speech of Alcibiades, point toward Socrates as the human embodiment of eros. His actions mimic those of the daimon he describes; a fact that is noticed by those who listen to his words. He describes eros as the philosopher, a role which Socrates himself epitomizes. He is a causal agent, morally ambiguous, and requires philia through the erastes/eromenos relationship for his teachings to be achieved.

153 He encourages others to possess wisdom, yet claims that he himself is ignorant, only possessing the secret knowledge required to obtain wisdom. He is the path through which one can be initiated into the rites of eros and achieve the ultimate philosophical pursuit: immortality through wisdom.

Section C: Socrates is the helper and the hindrance

Although he may act as the embodiment of eros, our analysis of Socrates’ role within the Symposium also reveals that the same magnetic personality that draws students to his teachings also prevents them from ever obtaining their desire. As we move through the narrative, it is obvious that none of the characters, including Socrates, have actually obtained the philosophical immortality that Diotima describes as being the purest and most beautiful of all. The question now becomes whether or not the obstruction of true wisdom is the nature of eros itself or the personality of Socrates. While we may be able to theorize the correct answer, the answer itself is not as important as the problem. By approaching the question of why nobody seems to be able to achieve true wisdom, we are able to discover the attributes of both Socrates and eros.

In our methodology we established that eros draws upon the desire of the body, epithumia, and incorporates it into the desire of the soul. This type of desire seeks future goals, specifically immortality, and attempts to obtain those goals through the social relationship of philia. Why, then, can none of Socrates’ students seem to climb the ladder of abstraction that leads to the form of beauty, as dictated by the teachings of erotics? In returning to the prologue, we find a clue that may help us understand the problem.

Apollodorus describes the behavior of Socrates’ unnamed followers as chaotic and

154 random as they desperately try to learn everything they can about the teachings of

Socrates. Similarly, Apollodorus himself claims that he has been following Socrates for three years, absorbing all of his teachings and mimicking his every move. Both types of followers, the fanatic stranger and the supposedly more knowledgeable Apollodorus, are focusing their attention on Socrates, rather than the pursuit of wisdom.

In this case, Socrates stands as both the guide towards and obstruction of true wisdom. Applying our study of the langue and parole of eros, we know that eros is the intermediary, not the end result of desire. Since, as a rule, those who desire cannot possess, eros is not capable of offering the object of desire to those who seek it; rather, eros is able to inspire the erastes and guide him down the path that will lead to that object. This crucial difference means that Socrates, as the embodiment of eros, cannot offer wisdom to his followers, he can only initiate them into the secret knowledge that allows them to obtain that wisdom on their own. By following Socrates with a zealous fervor, both the stranger and Apollodorus have confused eros for erotics, the same mistake that the symposiasts make in their speeches. Our study shows that erotics and eros are related, yet distinctly different concepts. The followers of Socrates have misunderstood the proper path towards wisdom, since it is not through the person of

Socrates that they will acquire wisdom, but through their own application of his teachings.

Another cause of the problem of Socrates lies in the realm of philia, and once again our study of eros provides us with the ability to recognize this problem. In our study, we established that eros obtains its desires through the social relationship encompassed within philia. Only through philia can immortality be achieved, as each

155 path requires a social element, whether it is the approval and praise of society or the contemplation of beauty within the eromenos. By only chasing Socrates, his followers are mistaking the relationship with him as the philia they need to obtain wisdom. This cannot possibly work, however, since he represents eros, not philia. Again, the teaching of erotics is being misinterpreted by those following Socrates.

The reason for this misinterpretation has to do with the mystique of Socrates, since he is the only possessor of the secret knowledge his followers crave. Without a point of reference against which to compare the wisdom of Socrates, his followers are making the mistake of assuming him to have already achieved wisdom, even though his role as eros, coupled with his own admission, suggests otherwise. His fellow symposiasts make the same error, as they too defer to his wisdom and set him, and his speech, apart from their own. By doing this, they are treating Socrates as though he already possessed the wisdom they seek.

When we interpret the role of Socrates through the lens of our study of epithumia, eros, and philia, a new interpretation of the Symposium emerges in which the entire narrative can be understood as an expression of the linear progression through which one seeks immortality through wisdom. By creating these speeches on eros, each of the first five symposiasts attempts to learn its nature. In a sense, the act of delivering the speech is an act of desire. We know from our analysis, that each speaker is attempting to explain the means through which eros achieves immortality. For Phaedrus and Pausanias, this is achieved through ambition towards social praise and immortality of name. Eryximachus and Agathon also seek immortality of name through the praise of their own individual crafts, medicine and poetry, respectively. Finally, for Aristophanes eros is the desire to

156 find one’s other half which leads to immortality through procreation and completion of the whole. In this way, the content of each speech is a reflection of how each symposiast envisions the function of eros.

The one path to immortality that is conspicuously missing is that of immortality through wisdom and philosophy. This path only appears within the speech of Socrates as he explains the teachings of Diotima. Being positioned in the middle of the work,

Socrates’ speech represents a literal roadblock in the narrative, which is reflective of his role as the obstruction in the pursuit of wisdom. Each speaker is giving accounts of eros based upon their lives and personalities, but have failed to distinguish between eros and erotics. Only by pushing past the magnetic personality of Socrates can his students achieve true wisdom. In our progression of desire, eros always leads to something beyond itself, immortality. By mistaking Socrates for eros, those who follow him are obstructed from pushing past eros to philia and the relationship through which immortality is achieved.

Both within the Symposium and as part of the outside world, Socrates stands as the force that draws people towards the teaching of erotics and at the same time inhibits them from applying those teachings to achieve true wisdom. The narrative itself is a representation of that phenomenon. On the one hand, the first five symposiasts desire to learn the true nature of eros represented by a linear progression from the speech of

Phaedrus to that of Socrates. On the other hand, Alcibiades stands as the manifestation of the obstructive force of Socrates, as he was not able to get past the lure of Socrates’ personality in order to obtain true wisdom. Even years after his split from the teachings of

157 Socrates, Alcibiades is still drawn to him, unable to resist the lure of his apparent wisdom.

Socrates himself indirectly acknowledges his own role as both the lure and obstruction, as he describes the images of the form that deceive those seeking wisdom.

By seeking wisdom, men seek Socrates; but, as Alcibiades points out, Socrates is nothing but an image of beauty. He is “like those silenes sitting in the statuary shops (φημὶ γὰρ

δὴ ὁμοιότατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς σιληνοῖς τούτοις τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἑρμογλυφείοις

καθημένοις)”260, which, when opened, are revealed to hold only “images of the gods

(ἀγάλματα θεῶν).”261 By mistaking Socrates’ teachings of wisdom for wisdom itself, his followers desire the image, rather than the form, of true beauty and the immortality of wisdom to which it leads.

260 Symposium, 215a6-b1 261 Symposium, 215b3

158

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The intention of this study was to identify the problem of eros within the

Symposium, provide a methodology for understanding its contextual uses, and use these findings to redefine the meaning of eros throughout the work. This approach has yielded a new interpretation of the word that both defines its individual meaning and the greater philosophical lesson Plato is attempting to convey. Eros is the desire of the soul, a desire that has future aspirations of finding a partner with which one can contemplate the true meaning of beauty. It inspires, instructs, and guides those whom it touches toward immortality through fame, procreation, and wisdom.

In our paradigm of eros, epithumia, and philia, we identified the differences in meaning, use, and theme of each word in order to understand the interaction between them. This complex relationship can only be identified through analysis of the global langue and individual parole, revealing similarities and differences in use and meaning across each speech. In the sign system of the Greek language, eros stands as a distinct signifier of a particular concept, bound by accepted usage and meaning. Eros is a selective force which takes the desires of the body and transforms them into desires of the soul in order to elevate the erastes to a higher plane of thought and reason.

Without the type of methodology created in this study, the subtlety of Plato’s argument would be lost on his modern audience. His use of eros changes the way the narrative functions, as it is no longer simply an arrangement of speeches in praise of a similar topic, but a linear progression of thought as the themes of each speech flow from

159 one to the next in an attempt to portray the workings of eros. Since eros stands as the core theme of the entire work, it is imperative that we find the appropriate methodology for approaching the word as we, thousands of years removed from Plato’s time, are at a cultural disadvantage. Without a set of guidelines for interpreting eros, we would not be able to appreciate the skill with which Plato has crafted his argument.

Eros, epithumia, and philia are clearly marked within the text as forming a complex triad, the intricacies of which form a layer of interpretation that must be identified and dissected if we are to understand the lessons Plato is teaching. There is a pattern in the way in which these words operate, as each speaker takes the global understanding of eros and manipulates it into his own individualized conception of the word in order to make his argument. Their common intention is to persuade their audience and in doing so redefine the global meaning of eros. Our methodology allows for the same approach to be taken in interpreting eros. By analyzing the langue and parole, we are able to understand how eros operates in each speech.

This study is not intended to be the definitive study on eros, nor will any definition be provided in an attempt to create the one-to-one equivalent that has pervaded and obstructed modern scholarship. On the contrary, this study is meant to serve as a beginning, the foundation on which future scholarship can be built. There may not be one overarching meaning of eros, but we will never discover such a definition without creating a solid methodology on which to base our conclusions. Such a methodology is conspicuously absent from modern interpretations and is hindering our ability to appreciate the themes of the Symposium. The mechanism of language demands that words be identified and manipulated in order to change their meanings to suit the needs

160 of a culture. Our methodology is no different. It should be challenged and questioned in an attempt to ascertain the truth. If it succeeds in generating even the slightest push to change the discourse on eros, then it has succeeded in its goal. The truth of eros is more complex and detailed than modern scholarship has yet acknowledged or understood, and only through the proper approach can that truth be revealed.

161 Bibliography

Allen, R.E. The Dialogues of Plato Volume II: The Symposium. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984.

Benardete, Seth. On Plato’s Symposium. München: Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung, 1994.

--. Socrates and Plato: The Dialectics of Eros. München: Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung, 2002.

Berg, Steven. Eros and the Intoxications of Enlightenment. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010.

Cummins, Joseph W. “Eros, Epithumia, and Philia in Plato.” Apeiron. 15.1 (June 1981): 10-18.

Dover, Kenneth, ed. Plato Symposium. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Halperin, David M. “Plato and Erotic Reciprocity.” Classical Antiquity. 5.1 (April 1986): 60-80.

Hyland, Drew. “Ἔρως, Ἐπιθυμία, and Φιλία in Plato.” Phronesis. 13.1 (1968): 32-46.

Lesher, James, and Nails, Debra, and Sheffield, Frisbee. Plato’s Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and Reception. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.

Mahoney, Timothy A. “Is Socratic erōs in the Symposium Egoistic?” Apeiron. 29.1 (March 1996): 1-18.

McNeill, David N. An Image of the Soul in Speech: Plato and the Problem of Socrates. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010.

Rhodes, James M. Eros, Wisdom, and Silence: Plato’s Erotic Dialogues. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003. de Saussure, Ferdinand, ed. Carol Sanders and Matthew Pires. Writings in General Linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Scholtz, Andrew. Concordia Discors: Eros and Dialogue in Classical Athenian Literature. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Scott, Gary Alan, and Welton, William A. Erotic Wisdom: Philosophy and Intermediacy in Plato’s Symposium. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008.

162 Sheffield, Frisbee C.C. Plato’s Symposium: The Ethics of Desire. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2006.

Stannard, Jerry. “Socratic Eros and Platonic Dialectic.” Phronesis. 4.2 (1959): 120-134.

Strauss, Leo, and Benardete, Seth, ed. On Plato’s Symposium. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001.

163