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India’s Nuclear Program: History, Issues and role in global nuclear politics By M Suleman Shahid Updated:- May, 2017 Introduction India’s nuclear weapons program is a cornerstone of New Delhi’s security strategy for the 21st century. For most of the post-war period, India badly trailed the established nuclear powers in weapon quality, quantity, and the sophistication of delivery systems. In recent years, however, India has indicated a willingness to take the steps necessary to becoming a first rate nuclear power[1]. History The Indian nuclear program evolved before the partition of United Hindustan. In 1944, Dr. Homi Jahangir Bhaba submitted proposal to Sir Durab Tata Trust in order to build the Nuclear Research Institute (NRI)[2]. Sir Durab was the uncle of Dr. Bhaba and well known wealthy businessman of India. Soon the NRI established in Bangalore on the fund of Tata Trust, after its completion in 1945. The name was also given to it on Tata Trust i.e., Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR)[3]. Dr. Bhaba became the first Director of TIFR[4]. In the end of 1945 Bhaba shifted the TIFR in Bombay, where it is still working on nuclear research since its inception[5]. On August 15, 1947, India got independence from British rule and year later it passed the country Atomic Energy Act and crafted the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)[6]. The essential purpose of AEC was carried out the in-depth studies of nuclear research and encompassed three associates, Dr. Bhabha, Dr. Krishnan and Dr. S.S. Bhatnagar[7]. During a press conference at that time, Indian Prime Minister Nehru expressed his views about the nuclear power as: “We are interested in atomic energy for social purposes. Atomic energy represents a tremendous power. If this power can be used for utilized to produce electricity, it will be a tremendous boon to mankind, because it is likely to be more available and cheaper than the building of huge projects. Therefore we are interested in the development from the social point of view.” In this context, government of India launched four years plans to build the infrastructure in order to nuclear investigation and carried out the research for the nuclear energy for medicine. Dr. Bhabha started to research on nuclear building theory, material, design and technology from the US, Canada and UK, and tried to inquire about sale of raw material like monazite and beryllium-containing ore[8]. In 1950, Indian government established Indian Rare Earth Limited (IRE) to search the minerals, thorium uranium concentrate and process rare earth compounds. In April 1951, IRE discovered the profusion amount of uranium deposits at Jaduguda and operation launched for drilling in December 1951. Jaduguda mine is providing uranium to all Indian nuclear installation where it requires since 1951 to till date[9]. Nuclear Infrastructure of India Before 1998, India had total 12 nuclear power plants, from which 8 nuclear power plants were outside the safeguards. At that time the most powerful rating plant was 220 MWe but after May 1998 nuclear tests, India started more plants and made six more nuclear power plants.[10] From those six plants there were two most powerful rating plants of 540 MWe each. Currently, India is enjoying 15 operational Pressurize Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR), from which 3 are under construction and 4 PHWR are planned.[11] Indian Nuclear Power Plant Power Plant Name Type Capacity (MWe) Started Date Safeguarded Tarapur Atomic Power Station- October 28, 1(TAPS-1) BWR 210 1969 Yes Tarapur Atomic Power Station- October 28, 2(TAPS-2) BWR 210 1969 Yes Tarapur Atomic Power Station- 3(TAPS-3) PHWR 540 January 2006 No Tarapur Atomic Power Station- September 4(TAPS-4) PHWR 540 2005 No Rajasthan Atomic Power Station-1 December (RAPS-1) PHWR 220 16, 1973 Yes Rajasthan Atomic Power Station-2 (RAPS-2) PHWR 220 April 1, 1981 Yes Rajasthan Atomic Power Station-3 (RAPS-3) PHWR 220 2000 No Rajasthan Atomic Power Station-4 (RAPS-4) PHWR 220 2000 No Rajasthan Atomic Power Station-5 (RAPS-5) PHWR 450 2007 No Rajasthan Atomic Power Station-6 (RAPS-6) PHWR 450 2008 No Rajasthan Atomic Power Station-7 Con. Planned (RAPS-7) PHWR 500 2011 No Rajasthan Atomic Power Station-8 Con. Planned (RAPS-8) PHWR 500 2011 No Madras Atomic Power Station-1 (MAPS-1) PHWR 220 1984 No Madras Atomic Power Station-2 (MAPS-2) PHWR 220 1986 No Narora Atomic Power Station-1 (NAPS-1) PHWR 220 1991 No Narora Atomic Power Station-2 (NAPS-2) PHWR 220 1992 No Kakrapar Atomic Power Station-1 (KAPS-1) PHWR 220 1993 No Kakrapar Atomic Power Station-2 (KAPS-2) PHWR 220 1995 No Kaiga Atomic Power Station-1 (KAIGA-1) PHWR 220 2000 No Kaiga Atomic Power Station-2 (KAIGA-2) PHWR 220 1999 No Kaiga Atomic Power Station-2 (KAIGA-2) PHWR 220 1999 No Kaiga Atomic Power Station-3 (KAIGA-3) PHWR 220 2007 No Kaiga Atomic Power Station-4 (KAIGA-4) PHWR 220 2007 No Kaiga Atomic Power Station-5 Con. Planned (KAIGA-5) PHWR 220 for 2007 No Kaiga Atomic Power Station-6 Con. Planned (KAIGA-6) PHWR 220 for 2007 No Kudankulam Power Plant-1 (KK-1) VVER 1,000 2007 Yes Kudankulam Power Plant-2 (KK-2) VVER 1,000 2008 Yes Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor-1 (PFBR-1) FBR 500 2010 No Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor-2 (PFR-2) FBR 500 2010 No Source: Nuclear Fuel Cycle Assessment of India: A Technical Study for US–India Cooperation Indian Research Reactors India has constructed research reactors for neurotic studies. The below given table illustrates the details of all Indian Nuclear Research Reactors with a description of safeguarded and non-safeguarded both. Start Name Place Type Date Function Safeguarded July10- Weapon Grade CIRUS Trombay 40MWth HWR 1960 Plutonium No 100MWth August1 Weapons Grade DHURVA Trombay HWR 0, 1985 Plutonium No APSARA Trombay 1MWth LWR 1956 Research No Critical URNIMA-1 Trombay Assembly 1989 Decommissioned No PURNIMA-2 Trombay LWR 1984 Decommissioned No PURNIMA-3 Trombay LWR 1994 Use U-233 No Zerlina Trombay PHWR 1961 Decommissioned No Compact High Temperature 0.1 MWth Produce Reactor Trombay small Reactor 2010 Hydrogen KALPAKKA 0.03MWth Test KAMINI M Reactor 1996 Use U-233 Andhra 0.1 MWth Low Unknow University Vishakapatm Power Reactor n Planned Research Research & 40 MWth Fast Development of Breeder Test Prototype Fast FBTR Kalpakkam Reactor 1998 Breeder Source: Nuclear Fuel Cycle Assessment of India: A Technical Study for US–India Cooperation Indian Enrichment Facilities India started its indigenous uranium enrichment facilities in early 1990’s. There were three main reasons to carry out the uranium enrichment.[12] The first reason was that India had intentions of making nuclear submarine so, India needed enriched uranium, the second was the crucial for thermonuclear device, and third objective was to obtain the fuel for Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). Mysore facility that is named as Rare Material Project— is a large scale facility of India. Start Name Place Type Date Function Safeguarded Center of Advanced Laser Technology Indore Enrichment 1993 Research No Rare Materials Uranium Project Mysore Centrifugal 1991 Enrichment No Laser Enrichment Laser Plant Trombay Enrichment 1993 Research No Uranium Enrichment Pilot Scale Research & Plant Trombay Ultracentrifuge 1985 Development No Source: Nuclear Fuel Cycle Assessment of India: A Technical Study for US–India Cooperation Heavy Water Production Plants of India The first Heavy Water Reactor (HWR) of India started to run in 1962.[13] The technology of HWR went to times of yore for which Indian nuclear establishment seeks international cooperation for large scale reformation. Completion Name/Location Type/Capacity Year Pilot-scale, Trombay operational? Nangal 7 tons/year, operating 1962 67 tons/years, Baroda intermittent operation 1980 71 tons/years, Tuticorin operating 1978 62 tons/years, Talcher, Phase 1 operating 1980 62 tons/years, Talcher, Phase 2 operating 1980 100 tons/year, Kota operating 1981 110 tons/year, Thal Vaishet operating 1991 185 tons/year, Manuguru operating 1991 Hazira 11tons/year, operating 1991 Source: Nuclear Fuel Cycle Assessment of India: A Technical Study for US–India Cooperation Fuel Fabrication Facilities The Indian fuel fabrication facilities are listed below in table. There is only one large scale fuel fabrication facility in India i.e., Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) located in Hyderabad. The NFC production capacity was 250 tons of UF-6 annually. In 2006 its capacity of production raised from 250 tons to 600 tHM per years.[14] Start Name Location Type Capacity Date Function Enriched Fuel Fabrication LWR Fuel Assemblies Plant Hyderabad BWR 25 1974 (Safeguard) Advanced Fuel Fabrication MOX Fuel for BWR, Facility PFBR, PHWR & (AFFF) Tarapur Unknown 20 1990 Research & Development Nuclear Fuel 1971/200 Complex Hyderabad PHWR 250/600 6 PHWR Fuel Bundles MOX Breeder Fuel Fabrication Kalpakkam Pilot Scale Unknown Unknown MOX Fuel Source: Nuclear Fuel Cycle Assessment of India: A Technical Study for US–India Cooperation Indian Reprocessing Plants: The Indian reprocessing plant’s productions are essential for the second and third stage of its nuclear program, presented by Dr. Bhabha and also essential for the weapons grade substances. The reprocessing plants’ names, locations, types, Mega Thermal, starting date and functions are given below. Start Name Location Type tHM/YR Date Function Safeguard Reprocess CIRUS, DHRUVA & Power PHWR Fuel. Only when Reactor Fuel Provide Fuel safeguarded Reprocessing 1977- for FBTR & fuel is Plant Tarapur PUREX 100/150 1991 AFFF present Reprocessing MAPS & Kalpakkam FBTR Fuel. reprocessing Provide Fuel plant Kalpakkam PUREX 100 1997 for PFBR No Fast Reactor Reprocess Fuel FBTR Fuel. Reprocessing May provide Plant Fuel for (FRFRP) Kalpakkam Fuel Scale Unknown future PFBR No Reprocess Lead FBTR & Minicell PFBR Fuel Facility Kalpakkam Demonstration Unknown 2003 in future No Reprocessing Plutonium 1964- CIRUS, reprocessing 74/1984- DHRUVA plant Trombay PUREX 30-50 cont Fuel for No weapon- grade plutonium Source: Nuclear Fuel Cycle Assessment of India: A Technical Study for US–India Cooperation Indian Uranium Mines & Mills: The uranium exploration started in India in 1967,[15] when the NPT was being formulated at international level.
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