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Mission Statement

The European Policy Centre (EPC) is an independent, not-for-profit think tank, committed to making European integration work. The EPC works at the ‘cutting edge’ of European and global policy-making providing its members and the wider public with rapid, high-quality information and analysis on the EU and global policy agenda. It aims to CHALLENGE EUROPE promote a balanced dialogue between the different Europe@50: back to the future constituencies of its membership, spanning all aspects of economic and social life. Graham Avery Jean-Luc Dehaene Renaud Dehousse Andrew Duff Guillaume Durand Paul Gillespie Alain Lamassoure Anand Menon Yves Mény Antonio Missiroli Kalypso Nicolaïdis John Palmer Renato Ruggiero Philippe de Schoutheete Richard Sinnott Rafal Trzaskowski Antonio Vitorino

February 2007

European Policy Centre Résidence Palace 155 Rue de la Loi 1040 Brussels Tel: 32 (0)2 231 03 40 Fax: 32 (0)2 231 07 04 Email: [email protected] www.epc.eu In strategic partnership with the King Baudouin Foundation and the Compagnia di San Paolo

With the support of the European Commission CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 16

Europe@50: back to the future

Graham Avery Jean-Luc Dehaene Renaud Dehousse Andrew Duff Guillaume Durand Paul Gillespie Alain Lamassoure Anand Menon Yves Mény Antonio Missiroli Kalypso Nicolaïdis John Palmer Renato Ruggiero Philippe de Schoutheete Richard Sinnott Rafal Trzaskowski Antonio Vitorino

Articles in this publication represent the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the EPC.

February 2007

ISSN-1783-2462 2 Challenge Europe – February 2007 prto adr 55 40 50 Duff by Andrew 26 Pandora Operation 43 byLamassoure Alain setback Relaunching Europe aftertheconstitutional by Rafal Trzasko onthebasis oftheNice Treaty? Can theCouncilfunction 34 8 by GuillaumeDurand Introduction HOW CAN THE DEADLOCK OVER THE CONSTITUTIONAL II. 6 18 by Jean-LucDehaene Was theEuropeanConvention’s work invain? 4 by Philippe European process 11 inthe The evolution ofintergovernmental cooperation Mény by Yves withonlytwo poles triangle An ‘institutional’ by PaulGillespie Would today’s signthe Treaty still leaders ofRome? byMissiroli Antonio Introduction HOW DID THE EUGET THIS FAR? I. by JackiDavis Foreword About theauthors TREATY BEBROKEN? de Sc wski houtheete Table of contents eortcErp 93 71 74 82 by J Europe democratic andmore demandsamorepolitical Globalisation by Richard Sinnott veto selective orinclusive consultation EU referenda: by Anand MenonandKalypsoNicolaïdis together better, doingless, Europe@50: 63 by Antonio Introduction WHEREIS THE EUGOING? III. by RenaudDehousse bereformed? still Can theEuropeaninstitutions fewr 110 by RenatoRuggiero Afterword by Graham Avery An ever-wider Europe? Where willtheEU’s end?101 borders ohn P almer Vitorino

3 Challenge Europe – February 2007 4 Challenge Europe – February 2007 Renaud Dehousse of EuropeandisaformerPrimeMinisterBelgium. Jean-Luc Dehaene Commission official. Graham Avery of the World Trade Organization andaformerItalian Foreign Minister. Paul Gillespie Guillaume Durand Vice-President oftheEuropeanParliament DelegationtotheConvention. and constitutionalaffairsspokesmanforthe ALDE Group.Hewas Andrew Duff Director, CentreforEuropeanStudies,SciencesPo, Paris. on the50 Renato Ruggiero Centre. HeisalsoDeputyChairman oftheEPC’s Political Europeprogramme. John Palmer in InternationalRelations,University ofOxford. Kalypso Nicolaïdis Antonio Missiroli Yves Mény West EuropeanPolitics atBirminghamUniversity. Anand Menon special responsibilityforEuropeandwas amemberoftheConvention. Union pourunMouvement P Alain Lamassoure School ofPolitics andInternationalRelationsatUniversity CollegeDublin. th Anniversary ofthe Treaty of Rome.HeisaformerDirector-General is PresidentoftheEuropeanUniversity Institute,Florence. is amemberoftheGoverning BoardoftheEuropeanPolicy MEP isaLiberal Democrat MemberoftheEuropeanParliament is Foreign Policy Editorof is DirectoroftheEuropeanResearch InstituteandProfessorof is Counsellorof theItalianPrimeMinisterfor theDeclaration is anEPCSenior Adviser andaformerEuropean is ChiefPolicy Analyst attheEuropeanPolicy Centre. MEP was Vice-Chairman oftheConvention ontheFuture MEP isNationalSecretaryforEuropean Affairs forthe is DirectoroftheEuropeanStudiesCentreandLecturer is aPolicy Analyst attheEuropeanPolicy Centre. is Jean MonnetProfessorofLaw and Politics, and About theauthors opulaire (UMP) The Irish . HeisaformerMinisterwith Times , andteaches inthe Justice and Home Affairs, andformerDeputyPrimeMinisterofPortugal. Political Europeprogramme. Heisaformer European Commissionerfor Antonio Vitorino a LecturerattheCollegiumCivitas, Warsaw, Poland. Rafal Trzaskowski Opinion &Political Behaviour Research Programme attheUCDGearyInstitute. International RelationsatUniversity CollegeDublin,andDirectorofthePublic Richard Sinnott Representative totheEuropeanUnionfrom19871997. Institute forInternational Affairs, Brussels.Hewas Belgium’s Permanent Philippe deSchoutheete is ProfessorofPolitical Science intheSchool ofPolitics and is ChairmanoftheEPC’s Governing BoardandChairofits is aResearch Fellow attheNatolinEuropeanCentreand is DirectoroftheEuropeanProgramme attheRoyal

5 Challenge Europe – February 2007 6 Challenge Europe – February 2007 As theEuropeanUnionpreparestocelebrate its50 by JackiDavis Foreword Member States exaggeration tosay thattherejectionof Constitutionintwo founding crossroads’ todescribekeymomentsintheEU’s history, but itisno Journalists areperhapsoverly fondofresortingtoclichés such as‘ata on theEU’s past,presentandfuture. commentators addressalloftheseissuesinarange ofthought-provoking articles In thisissueof Constitutional Treaty andrespondtothelonger-term challenges itfaces. how theEUcanbreakcurrentdeadlock over what todoaboutthe by any meansinevitable.Itisalsoanappropriatemomenttoconsiderboth Europe –progresswhich many now takeforgranted, butwhich was never progress which hasbeenmadeover thepast50 years inthebuildingof It will,however, provide anidealopportunitytohighlighttheastonishing and thelack ofconsensusontheway forward. given themajorchallenges facingtheEUincomingmonthsandyears equally sombrewhen EUleadersmeettocommemorate theanniversary, But theskiesover Europearestilldullandgrey, andthemoodislikelytobe against theConstitutional Treaty appeartobeslowly lifting. clouds which gatheredfollowing theFrench andDutch referendavotes involved in thedebateover how to build ontheprogressmade by theEUover The European Policy Centrehaslong been–andwill,ofcourse, remain–closely the Union. but alsoforthelongerterm astheycontemplatethefuturedevelopment of wrestle withthedilemmaover what todoaboutthe Constitutional Treaty, which answers needtobefoundnotonlyfortheshortterm, asEUleaders How thatconsentcanbeobtained inanever-expanding EUisaquestionto as intheearlydays, butrequirestheconsent andsupportofthegeneral public. the constructionofEuropecannolongerbedriven solelyby politicalelites, It underlinedwhat hasbeenincreasinglyevident forsometime;namely, that Challenge Europe was a genuineturningpoint. , ahostofleadingpoliticians,academicsand th birthday, thestorm Editor of attheEuropeanPolicyJacki Davis Centreand isHeadofCommunications moment intheUnion’s history. future. This publicationisintendedasacontributiontothatdebate atthiscritical the past50years andconfrontthechallenges itfacesnow andwillfaceinthe Challenge Europe Challenge .

7 Challenge Europe – February 2007 8 Challenge Europe – February 2007 progress madetodatehave beenputforward andtested, butnoneofthesefully single patternofdevelopment. Many competingexplanationsfortheastonishing In itsfirst50years, theprocessofEuropeanintegration hasnotfollowed one byMissiroli Antonio Introduction I. HOW DIDTHEEUGET THISFAR? security policy) towhich theusualboundaries donotapply. emergence of newpolicy areas(justice andhomeaffairs,foreign and the singlemarket andtheLisbon Agenda), andinpart becauseofthe in partbecauseofthegrowing tangleofcompetencesinkeyareas(such as intergovernmental procedures andbodieshasbecomeincreasinglyblurred, Furthermore, thetraditional contrast betweencommunityand Nation StatetoMemberState”. residues. Thus itevolves, inthewords ofProfessor Alberta Sbragia, “from Milward hasshown) by poolingsovereignty rather thantryingtopreserve its some degreeofcontrolover any newcommonpolicy (asProfessor Alan EU acquirenewcompetences,butevery individual countryalsoretains who opposeit).Itis,rather, apositive-sum game inwhich notonlydoesthe game, asimpliedby thetraditional federalists (butalsoby theEurosceptics adequately. Itis,forexample,amyth thatsuch atransfer isazero-sum nation statetoan“ever closer”Unionalsofailsto describetheprocess The federalist visionofanunstoppabletransfer ofsovereignty fromthe resurface now inacompletelydifferentcontext. Euratom), butgradually disappearedfromtheEUscreenlateron,onlyto of thewhole process(theEuropeanCoalandSteelCommunity spill-over effect)either. Energypolicy, togive oneexample,was attheroot ‘functionalist’ approach (whereby integration hasbeendriven by aconstant Similarly, therearemany events anddevelopments which donotfitthe determination underChancellorHelmutKohl topursuemonetaryunion. many ofthedevelopments ofthepast50years –mostnotably, Germany’s by theessentialnationalinterestsofMemberStates)doesnotaccountfor For one,the‘realist’approach (whereby decisions are stilldriven primarily grasps theoriginalityandcomplexityofthisuniquephenomenon. States andtheir willingnessandabilityto act(andtodosocollectively). mainly about externalactionandtherefore morereliantontheMember nature tothe community pillar, andforeignsecurity policy, which is and homeaffairs,which ismainlyaboutlegislationandthereforecloserin Mr deSchoutheete wiselydraws adistinctionbetweentheareaofjustice precisely thesenewdevelopments. Wallace recentlytocointheterm“transgovernmentalism” todescribe increasingly intertwinedandblurred:aprocesswhich ledProfessorHelen policy-making butalsothethreemorerecent ‘pillars’ have become the currentsituationinwhich notonlythetwo traditional ‘modes’ofEU Philippe deSchoutheete pinpoints thevarious stageswhich have ledto States –by choice, chance ordefault. height ofitspowers, theCollege‘owed’ someofitsinfluencetotheMember constant multiplierofinfluenceandpowers. Healsoshows thateven atthe European Parliament, forwhich theco-decisionprocedurehasturnedinto a has lostoutlatelytotheCounciland–especially ironically–tothe past 50years, andunderlines theextenttowhich theEuropean Commission Yves Mény considerstheevolution oftheEU’s ‘institutionaltriangle’over the enshrined inmorerecenttreaties. though thecommitmentsitcontainsarefarlessdemandingthanthose today’s HeadsofStateandGovernment would probablynotsignuptoit,even EU didnotexistandthe Treaty ofRomewas presentedtothemforapproval, reasons which gobeyond thesheer‘quality’ofcurrentpoliticalleaders–if the EU’s development, andcomestotheconclusionthat–foranumberof Paul Gillespieconsiderstherespective rolesofpersonalitiesandinstitutionsin unexpected consequencesofpastdecisions. that specifictrendscannotbediscernedandevaluated, includingsome process isthereforeasnecessaryittimely. However, thisdoesnotmean A certainmeasureofeclecticisminanalysingtheEuropeanintegration of effectiveness morethanideology. adjustments may prove indispensableinone ortheotherdirection–forreasons constant source ofcontroversy. Shiftsoccurallthetimeandeverywhere, and local, national,European,even global–isapermanentchallenge anda the ‘mostappropriate’(notnecessarily‘lowest’) level ofgovernment –beit people indifferentcontexts. Allocating competencesanddecision-makingat Finally, even thenotionof‘subsidiarity’meansdifferentthingsto

9 Challenge Europe – February 2007 10 Challenge Europe – February 2007 Antonio MissiroliisChiefPolicy Analyst attheEuropeanPolicy Centre. entire work oftheEuropeanConvention shouldbeseenasawaste oftime. ‘No’s’ in theFrench andDutch referendaontheConstitutional Treaty, the Finally, Jean-Luc Dehaenewonders whether, inthelightoftwo shocking sovereignty ofthemarket. and thosewho seeitasfundamentallyunderminingthefreedomand the benefitsofpublicintervention (beitdirectandproactive, orregulatory) now beemergingwithintheEU:notablybetweenthosewho stillbelieve in little relevance today, anewandarguablymorefundamentalcleavage may But healsowarns that,while someofthepastdisputesmay appeartohave provided by the unimportant”, while allthesubstanceistobefoundindraft text As toitspossiblefutureshape,hesays, “thenameofthebaby is rather on institutionalreform. represents thebestpossiblepointofdepartureforforthcomingnegotiations addressed alltherelevant issuesconfrontingtheUniontoday, andstill traditional intergovernmental negotiations,while thelatterconvincingly He arguesthattheformershowed (andovercame) thestructural limitsof outcome oftheConvention representapointofnoreturnfortheEU. His answer isacategoric‘No’,as,inmany ways, boththeprocessand Conventionnels . understand their meaning.” Hisaccount, andup-to-datehistoriography, show As Monnetput it:“Onealways hastogoback tothebeginnings ofthingsto which facilitated it. circumstances thatgave risetoitaswellthebackground circumstances the Treaty ofRome,wemustunderstand theimmediatepolitical impasse. To answer thequestionofwhether today’s leaderswould stillsign That misinterpretsboth theoriginsofEuropeanintegration anditscurrent to theCommunitymethod. to thecontingentpoliticalchoices andleadershipwhich actuallygave birth economic interdependenceimpellingstatestowards integration, rather than geopolitical andeconomicfactorssuch asFranco-German peaceorgrowing that famousaphorism. The firstpartistoooftenrelatedtoobjective In historicalretrospect,itistemptingtoconcentrate onthesecondpartof Declaration on10May 1950. memoirs, describingthehighpoliticalmanoeuvringthat ledtotheSchuman possible withoutmen;nothingislastinginstitutions,” he wroteinhis This was EU‘founding father’Jean Monnet’s greatinsight.“Nothingis Economic Community). have preferredan Anglo-German Free Trade Agreement totheEuropean government, includingEconomicsMinisterLudwig Erhard,who would championed by theBritishandappealedtomany withintheGerman Co-operation ortheEuropeanFree Trade Association (which was competing modelprovided by theOrganisationforEuropeanEconomic the Quaid’Orsay hadstrenuouslyresistedsupranationality), orthe de Gaulle’s electionasFrench Presidentthefollowing year (hisfollowers in of withstandingthepressuresubsequentevents such asCharles The geniusofthattreatywas tocreateaninstitutionalframework capable ratified, ithasnochance ofbeingapplied.” concluded; ifitisconcluded,hasnochance ofbeingratified; andifitis the Treaty ofRome withthepartingwords: “A treatyhasnochance ofbeing November 1955fromtheSpaakCommitteepreparingwhat was tobecome Fifty years on,itisalltooeasytomock theBritishobserver who withdrewin by PaulGillespie Would today’s leaders stillsignthe Treaty of Rome? 11 Challenge Europe – February 2007 12 Challenge Europe – February 2007 about theoutcome. those opposingtheCommunitymethodelsewhere). There was noinevitability arenas –andmuch moreintheBritishone(afactorthatloomedlargeamong enjoyed equalsupportatthetimeinFrench, GermanandBeneluxpolitical Competing confederal andtraditional intergovernmental modelsofcooperation and thewhole systemisoverseen by anindependentcourtwithdirecteffect. Commission which initiateslegislation,majoritydecision-makingisweighted sovereignty ispooledselectively andscrutinisedby anindependentEuropean there was noinevitabilityaboutthechoice oftheCommunitymethodinwhich d’Estaing onthe EuropeanMonetarySystem andby François Mitterrand over push formore integrationist policieswas repeatedlater, for exampleby Giscard The pattern ofstrongFrench leaderswillingtouse theirpoliticalautonomy to The role of strong leadership support usingcoalitionaland partydiscipline,issuelinkagesandsidepayments. the Treaty ofRomethanks tohissuccessinmobilisingreluctantagricultural interest groups,Mollet’s teamlobbiedthem.In1957,hesecured ratification of interest groupstopursueanewCommunitydeal.Rather than beinglobbiedby In 1956-7,hesteppedfarbeyond hisown party, coalition,bureaucrats and methods aftertheEDCwas voted down intheFrench National Assembly. Community (EDC)in1953-4andcontinuedhiscommitment toCommunity Community in1950-1,buthadstronglysupportedthe EuropeanDefence victory inJanuary 1956.Mollethad wavered on theEuropeanCoalandSteel anti-integrationist PierreMendes-France, who hadledthepartytoelectoral appointment oftheSocialistleaderGuyMolletaspremier rather thanthe Crucial forthesuccessof Treaty ofRome negotiationswas the coalitional shiftsintheFrench government. inter-state bargaininginthe1950swas highlycontingentonsuccessive integration policy, Craig Parsons arguesthatthe outcomeofinter-elite and In hisvaluable revisionistaccountoftheroleideasinhistoryFrench much oftheEU’s currentlossofmomentum.) (Arguably itisthelossofthatroleinearly21 decisions aboutintegration inthe1950sandfrom1970sto1990s. structural divisions –especiallyinFrance, thecrucialdriver ofstrategic Support forthesethreeoptionscross-cutleft-right,sectoral, institutionaland 1 st century which explains 2 the single market and Maastricht. It was replicated by Helmut Kohl in Germany and Jacques Delors in the Commission during the later period.

The point is made here using the French example to underline a wider one: namely, that political leadership makes a vital difference linking objective interests and circumstances to particular outcomes in the history of European integration. Without such leadership, nothing is possible.

At a time in international affairs when institutions matter more and more, they have a lasting effect – not least in constraining subsequent choices about integration. The more Community methods chimed in with prevailing 2007 Challenge Europe – February legal and economic norms, the more difficult it became to revert to previously desired confederal or traditionalist alternatives.

This neofunctionalist logic of spillover explains a lot about how integration deepened in the 1980s and 1990s. But the associated assumption that ‘deepening’ was somehow inevitable, irreversible or uncontroversial has been dealt a rude blow as the whole process has become more highly politicised over the last 15 years.

Public opinion became more aware of how intrusive integration had become in constraining national decisions. There was growing concern about the effects this had in hollowing out national democracy without a commensurate growth of democratic access at the transnational level. A gulf emerged between the overwhelming approval for integration among political elites and the better-informed, in contrast to much less positive attitudes among most national electorates.

Nevertheless, the number of those in the EU-15 identifying first with their nation but also with Europe grew steadily in this period, compared with the number identifying only with their nation.

Crucially, researchers have shown that among the first group, such multiple political identities are more complementary than competing and are clearly associated with a willingness to deepen integration in selected fields.3 By the same token, the growing number of Eurosceptics concentrated among those who identify only with the national became a more potent political influence.

It also remains a large – and for the most part unanswered – question politically and in research terms as to whether the enlargement to 25 Member States

13 14 Challenge Europe – February 2007 constrain awidermembershipwithdeeperstructuresofdecision-making. in 1996,Nice2000andRome2004representedasubstantialeffortto defensively. The successive treatiessignedatMaastricht in1992, Amsterdam Faced withthispoliticisation,EUleadersrespondedbothproactively and Widening anddeepening EU-15 or, induecourse,fallintolinewiththem. in 2004and272007willfundamentallyaltertheseconfigurations inthe Germany within aframework ofwiderEuropeanlegitimacy and security. The problem built into thepost-war Europeanorder:how toreconcile France and They have survived inter-governmental assaultbecause theysolved acrucial right abouttheirlastingeffect. institutional structuresand balances reached inthe1950s. SoMonnetwas But the50intervening years have filled outitsremitwhile retainingthe Treaty, afterall,was much lessbroad inscope. considered capableofconfrontingthechallenges ofthe Treaty ofRome. That Countries which couldreach such anagreement couldcertainlybe to gettheirway –justbecauseoftheFrench andDutch referendaresults. determination ofMemberStateswhich have ratified it,orstillwant todoso, the achievement ofreaching agreementamong25governments –orthe or amomentofmadness.Butitwould beamistaketounderestimate It istoosoontosay whether thiswhole processwas aconstitutional moment France’s EUPresidency. will presumablyberenegotiated,repackaged orrenamedin2008during The ConstitutionremainsatanimpasseuntilaftertheFrench electionsand centre butundeveloped institutionsinforeignandsecuritypolicy. affairs andtrade policy andaconfederal arrangement witharelatively strong strong federal-type arrangement withoutacentral government forintra-EU or traditional internationalones. A doublehybrid emerged,combininga methods, by moreclearlydifferentiatingthemfromstrictlyinter-governmental During thatprocess,therewas anopportunitytoresurrectconfederal of negotiation. the constitutionaltextarrived atthrougha new andmuch moreopenprocess On any account,thiswas anambitiousagenda,which culminatedin realise theirgoals,representinterestsandputproblemsinamore we mustaskwhether theyfacethesamekindofimaginative challenge to If wearetojudgewhether today’s EUleaderswould signthe Treaty ofRome, use ofthemtoserve thecauseofinternationalpeace.” than ofputtingtheminamorerational andhumanperspective, andmaking a questionofsolvingproblems,which aremostly in thenatureofthings, problems inperspective.” “That was thepoint,” addedMonnet.“Itwas less French planningcommissariat,whose reactionwas simply:“This putsmany remembered showing themtohisbrilliantcolleague,PierreUri,inthe Recalling theoriginaldraft oftheideasinvolved in April 1950,Monnet the relationshipbetweencorenationstatesinEurope. significance ofthebargainstruck inthe Treaty ofRome,which sochanged solved by thesamelevel ofthinkingwhich createdthem”. That was thegreat According to Albert Einstein,“thesignificantproblemswefacecannotbe representation ofsmallerstates. The securitywas provided throughNATO. than conflictual,throughindependentinstitutionsandtheweighted legitimacy was achieved by makingthatrelationshipcomplementaryrather multipolar world. transatlantic relations toitswest;andrepresenting theEU’s interestsina neighbourhoods toitsnorth,southandeast; respondingeffectively tochanging and securityinthe490 million-strong EUanditsequallynumerous setting; governing climate change andenergyrequirements;creating stability in Europe;creatinganewframework forpolitical actioninthistransnational They include:managing globalisationandgrowing economicinterdependence capturing theimaginationofanewgeneration ofEuropeans. which the Treaty ofRomewas predominantlyconcernedandcapableof face them,much moreambitiousthanthefunctional economicintegration with But thevery successofthose50years haschanged thegroundrules.Newtasks than toreinvent it. In thatsense,theyneedtodeepenandconsolidatetheoriginal bargainrather they faceadifferentworld onwhich theirinstitutionshave hadalastingeffect. Precisely becausetheyaretheinheritorsofthese50years ofdevelopment, New ground rules rational andhumanperspective. 15 Challenge Europe – February 2007 16 Challenge Europe – February 2007 best symbolises astyleofduplicitous leadership which faces oneway integration in thefirstdecadesofEU’s existence. The Roman god Janus publics, rather thanthe“permissive consensus” which facilitated functional Researchers discernanew“constraining dissensus” betweenelitesandmass resolved by accommodating domesticintroversion andlowering ambitions. The perceived disconnectbetweenleadersandvoters intheEUisalltoo easily Tackling theproblem of ‘disconnect’ had moresectionalpreoccupations. peoples orpotentialmemberslike Turkey –asweretheirpredecessorswho concerns –aboutimmigration, internal migration, relationswithIslamic Yet many EUleadersseemjustasparochial andshort-termistintheir There isfarlessexcuseforsuch inward-lookingness now than50years ago. and placesflungfaracrosstheseas.” French, orDutch, hadknown when theirnationstatesopened ontopeople petty. Incertainrespects,itwas actuallyalotsmallerthantheworld the parochialism. For allitsgrowing wealth,theworld oftheEECwas quite for therecovery of Western Europewould beacertainEuro-centric of France, warts andall. Tony Judt pointsout,too,that“thepricetobepaid The originalshapeandstyleoftheEEChadmuch incommonwiththat do so. deliver onitspromise. We shouldalsorememberthatittookalongtimeto to befoughtforagainandbeforeitbecameinstitutionalisedcould In Schuman’s words, itwas “aleapinthedark”,arisky venture which had extensive oppositionorindifference. initiative anddrove throughtheoriginalCommunitybargaininfaceof Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, GuyMolletandPaul-Henri Spaak seizedthe aphorism: “Nothingispossiblewithoutmen.” Leaderssuch asRobert To answer thosequestions,weareforced back tothefirstpartofMonnet’s methods supersedeit? redundant? Orcanitbeextendedtootherspheres?Canintergovernmental the 1950s’bargainrequirequalitative change? IstheCommunitymethod more prominently. And whatever textisagreed canberevisited.Butdoes ill-defined. Irrespective ofwhat becomesofthattext,thesetaskswill loom The Constitutional Treaty addressesmany oftheseissues,butleaves others 4 reflection thisyear andnext. test willbetoseewhether andhow theyemergefromtheperiodof the menandwomen who canmakeitpossibletodeliver iteffectively. The European inthisnewconfiguration. Such institutionalinnovation stillawaits The nationalisnotsupersededbutentangledwith–andharnessedby –the between European,nationalandsubnationallevels. power, andareconfiguration ofpoliticalaccountabilityandresources stronger politicalpartiesandinterestgroupscapableofbalancingexecutive This would involve thecreationoftransnational spacesfordeliberation, of across theEU. So would moreeffortstocreateapublicsphereofmediaandcommunication also forthePresidentofCommissionwould beone way toachieve this. citizens topolitics.DirectelectionsnotonlytheEuropeanParliament but political participation,accessandaccountabilitywhich canreconnect Too littlethoughthasbeengiven tocreatingnewtransnational structuresof preserve adiminishingpoliticalcapacity. towards Brusselsandanothertowards domesticelectorates inaneffortto .Tony Judt (2005) 4. Jack CitrinandJohn Sides(2004)‘Morethan Nationals:How IdentityChoiceMattersintheNewEurope’, 3. Craig Parsons, p.91. 2. Craig Parsons (2003) 1. Paul Gillespie isForeign Policy Editorof and abletomeetthesechallenges emergeandconsolidatethemselves. will takeanothertwo years toseewhether theyandnewleadersmoreready batch ofleaderswould sign the Treaty ofRomenow would be‘No’,butit The omensarenotgoodandtheanswer tothe questionwhether thecurrent Endnotes Relations.in theSchoolofPolitics andInternational whereheteaches CollegeDublin, atUniversity and EuropeanIntegration’ on Identity Political ‘Multiple for hisdissertation been awarded aPh.D. European intheEU in Richard K.Herrmann, Thomas RisseandMarilynnB. Brewer(eds.) Postw , LanhamandOxford:Rowman &Littlefield. A CertainIdeaofEurope ar: A ar: A History ofEuropesince1945 , IthacaandLondon:CornellUniversity Press. The Irish Times Irish The , London: William Heinemann.p.309. Transnational Identities,Becoming Hehasrecently . 17 Challenge Europe – February 2007 18 Challenge Europe – February 2007 trying tosetup newformsofcooperation between former enemies. harsh realityof politics. This lessonwas understood by the Europeans,who were regimes: institutional arrangements arefragile constructionswhen facedwiththe the timebecauseofpolitical tensionsbetweenthe West andtheCommunist It was cleartoeveryone thatthedecision-makingprocesswas blocked mostof Second World War ofanefficientinternationalsystemhad evaporated. Economic Community(EEC) was launched –thatthevisionsbornafter beginning oftheFifties – andeven moresoby thetimeEuropean common tointernationalorganisations.Itwas already obvious by the Much moreexplicitwas thewillingnesstoavoid thepitfallsand traps so materialised, aseverybody knows. If thiswas thehiddenagenda oftheFounding Fathers, very littleofithas the Commissioncouldhave becometheGovernment ofEurope. the nationalandinternationallevel. which hadnoequivalent amongsttheexistingtoolsofgovernment, bothat Those who originally conceived theseinstitutionscreatedaframework Union uniquearestillinplace. The ingredientswhich madetheCommonMarketandthenEuropean Mény by Yves An ‘institutionaltriangle’ withonlytwo poles? the expressionofterritorialrepresentationinstyleof,say, the becoming afully-fleshedrepresentative body; theCouncilmight have become in thisdirection:theParliamentary Assembly couldhave moved towards Each ofthebranches had,initsmake-up,elementswhich couldhave pushedit way –very close,forexample,totheway theGermaninstitutionsfunction. This tri-polarorganisationcouldhave evolved inamuch moretraditional unusual triangle. institutions (parliament/government) was replacedby theEU’s famousand powers, werenotfullyhonouredandtheusualdualisticpolarisationof inherent inrepresentative democratic systems,such astheseparation of European CommissionandtheParliamentary Assembly. Venerable concepts The entiresystemwas builtonthreemainfoundations:theCouncil, 1 Bundesrat ; and Assembly, which was the its assertiveness when nationalpower isatstake. The Parliamentary The Council,while divided onalmostevery issue,hasdemonstrated much ofthishasbeenput intopractice. initially envisaged, butwhat actuallyhappenediswell-known: inreality, not a lame-duck Parliamentary Assembly. This was thescenariowhich was with theaddedadvantage offacingadivided Council(atleastintheory)and On paper, there isnodoubtthattheCommissionwas inthedriving seat, I I I in asense, Three elementsweredesignedtogive theCommissioncapacitytoact, the inherentegoisticvested interestsofthenationstates. intended toembody akindof’general interest’,supersedingandovercoming The Commissionwas supposedtobethekeyinstrumentofthisstrategy. Itwas organisations setupafterthewar and,inparticular, theUnitedNations. the aimofavoiding theparalysis affectingmostoftheinternational In ordertomakethesystemwork, specialtoolswereputinplacewith the triangle– the Council,Commission andthentheParliament –and progressive change inthe balanceofpower betweenthethreeelementsof I would liketobrieflyaddress thisevolution both by consideringthe very different. remaining apparentlyunchanged onpaper–has infactbecome downgrading, withtheresultthattriangleinitially conceived –while Commission. And theCommission itselfhas,willy-nilly, agreedtoitsown in gainingpower andinfluence, mainlytothedetrimentof which haditsown (not negligible)impact. by examining theevolution oftheCommission’s strategy and behaviour, the Commission. a unanimous the Commissionobjectedtochanges madetoitsproposal,only Qualified majoritydecisionsrequiredtheCommission’s approval. If Qualified Majority Voting (QMV); after atransition period,mostoftheCouncil’s decisionsweretobetakenby exclusive rightofinitiative; basis ofaCommissionproposal. The Commissionwas empowered withan the representatives oftheMemberStates(theCouncil)couldonlyacton super partes Council couldimposeitspreferencesover thoseof and tofulfilitsmission: ‘parent pauvre’ in thetriangle,hassucceeded 19 Challenge Europe – February 2007 20 Challenge Europe – February 2007 amendments withoutitssupportandapproval. full controlover theengine:nomovement withoutitsimpulse;nomajor proposals ifitwas nothappy withtheCouncil’s amendments,would give it over therightof initiative, combinedwiththepossibilitytowithdraw its the Commissionwould becomeakeyplayer inmany ways. Itsmonopoly In theory, oncethetransition periodwas over andQMVreplacedunanimity, There isnodoubtthattheCommissionwas initiallyinafavourable position. How theCommission lost itsway of theEUPresidency –establishing, shopping listof suggestionsandrecommendations fortheirstintsas holders Commission becameatrap: governments acquiredthehabitofpreparinga However, what lookedinitially likeasplendidopportunityforthe technical expertise. was incharge oftheirpreparation andresponsiblefor providing the behind them,by lobby groups)weretakenover by theCommission,which Many oftheseproposals initiated by individual MemberStates(andoften, This was nodoubtseeninitiallyasablessingby anactivist Commission. by theCommissionwereinfactprompted by oneorseveral governments. It becameobvious thatmany, if notmost,oftheinitiatives pushedforward exercise oftherightinitiative. Another lessvisible,butatleastasimportant,evolution occurredinthe hoped foranincrementaldevelopment ofaFederal Europe. This was amajor setback bothfortheCommissionandallthosewho and endedinJanuary 1966withtheso-called‘LuxembourgCompromise’. chair’, camefromGeneral DeGaulle’s France, onagriculturepolicy issues, expropriation. The strongestreaction,intheformof‘Crisis theempty spirit, which theyperceived asakindofcreepingandunsolicited But MemberStatesbecameincreasinglyupsetwiththisentrepreneurial EU Treaties, usingakindof‘impliedpowers’ strategy. areas where theCommissionwas keentoplay arolevia Article 235ofthe (the fourfreedoms,theCommon Agriculture Policy, etc.)andinthenew Initially, thiswas thecase,bothinpolicy fieldsregulatedby thetreaties it, sendingout easypoliticalsignals,and thenleaving the Commissionto de facto , theCommission’s agendafor issues, thisdoes notprevent itfromforging acommonfront As indicated above, althoughtheCouncil may often bedivided onkey There isnodoubtthat theCouncilhasplayed adecisive role inthisprocess. Commission’s powers isentirely self-inflicted. It would, however, beanexaggeration tostatethatthisdeclineinthe The Council’s role intheCommission’s decline been createdwhich reducedtheCommission’s scopeforaction. avoid toofrequent confrontations.Butonceagain,akindofconvention had This attitudewas certainlypromptedby thedesiretobuildupconsensusand to withdraw proposalseven when itsinitiatives weredistortedby theCouncil. The Commissioncontinuedtoweakenitsabilitytaketheleadby optingnot the GermansorScandinavians andthecoalitions theyareabletoputtogether. the shotsandisreplaced,dependingonpolicy area,by theBritish,French, In anever-increasing numberofcases,theCommissionisnot inapositiontocall the tune”,assaying goes. framework ofcommonpoliciesandregulations–“hewho pays thepiper, calls of agiven policy. Proactive membersbecameleadersinestablishing the play adecisive roleindeterminingtheobjectives, modalities andorganisation Many empiricalstudieshave underlinedtheextenttowhich policy initiators capacity tosettherulesofgame the development ofcomitologyhassubstantiallyreducedtheCommission’s multinational/transnational expertise,which nootherbody canmatch. But The addedvalue oftheCommissionhasalways beenits been accompaniedby asimilartransfer ofsubstance. This would betheleastofitsproblemshad transfer offormalpower not of initiative fromtheCommissiontoCouncil. Commission, thegeneral trendhasbeentowards amajorshiftinthepower paved theway fortheInternalMarketandgave someautonomy back to the With theexceptionofimplementationSingleEuropean Act, which accusations ofover-regulating! struggle withthehassleofdrafting thenecessarylegislationandface Commission, especially withinthecontext ofanenlargedUnion. vis-à-vis its nationalpartners. vis-à-vis the 21 Challenge Europe – February 2007 22 Challenge Europe – February 2007 majority, itstillhasproceeded For instance,even where theCouncilcouldtakedecisionsby qualified also neededmore controlandlegislative powers. necessary but insufficienttocorrectthedemocratic deficit;theelected body it hadbecome clearthatelectingtheParliament by universal suffrage was contributed tocreatingthepolitical climateneededforchange. Inparticular, The radical criticisms ofthe“democratic deficit”intheEightiesandNineties created by thetreaties. Parliament electedby the peoplecouldemergefrommodestassembly anyone: afterall,thesecrethopeofmany Europeanswas thatagenuine European Parliament. This newequilibriumshouldnotcomeasasurpriseto The othercauseoftheCommission’s declineliesintheparallel riseofthe The Parliament’s gainistheCommission’s loss unfortunately, rarely fulfilled. Commission couldplay aninstrumental role ingettingtheseresultsis, might produceduringtheirterminthePresidency chair. The hopethatthe sometimes exaggerated aboutwhat theIrish, Austrians orthePortuguese is thereforalltosee–particularlythemedia.Expectations arehighand than whether theyareactuallyfeasibleinadministrative terms,buttheresult Sometimes, imaginative politicalarrangements becomemoreimportant and greatskillsasnegotiatorsintheultimatephase. Prime MinistersfromtheEU’s smallercountrieshave acquired from itsprotective role It istellingthattheCommission,which usedtoget someofitslegitimacy and hasbeenreplacedasago-betweenby theholderofEUPresidency. The Commissionplays theroleof‘honest broker’lessandthanitusedto, between thevarious MemberStates’positions. but alsointhenegotiatingphase–particularwhen adealhastobestruck observers: theCommissionhasnotonlylostgroundatinitiative stage, addressed properlyinthisshortpaper, butwhich arefamiliartoEU This evolution has procedural andbureaucratic implicationsthatcannotbe swallow thedecisionandtoputblameonobscureforces inBrussels. minority, itwas convenient forthemtoarguethat theyhadbeen‘forced’ to of thetime. And insomecaseswhere one or several MemberStateswereina vis-à-vis de facto the smallMemberStates,haslostthisgame. by consensus–i.e.unanimouslymost savoir faire to twisttheCommission’s arm,buteven lesstowrestconcessionsfrom for obvious reasons:theParliament hadfewinstrumentswithwhich its legitimateambitions.Instead,itsetsightsontheCommission It couldhave chosen theCouncilasmaintargetforachieving with two competitorsandnotone:theCouncilCommission. difference lies,however, inthefactthatEuropeanParliament was faced executives andparliamentswhich characterises Western democracies. The Up tothispoint,thestorylookslikearemakeofclassicstrugglebetween its appetiteformorepower. the mostofscarce windows ofopportunitywhich openeduptosatisfy Clearly, however, thiswas notenoughandtheParliament hadtotrymake a (little)roomfortheParliament. the CouncilandCommission,trianglewas takingshapeby making Commission’s control. ’collegial’ is becoming animpossibletask formany reasonsbeyond the Commission is still,formallyspeaking, aCollege.Butmaking it truly decline: itsdiminishedcollegiality andincreasingbureaucratisation. The A thirdfactorplayed ahiddenbutpowerful roleintheCommission’s Size doesmatter subsequent adoptionoftheServicesDirective. example ofthisnewcapacityhasbeentherecentre-negotiation andthe become an‘honestbroker’betweentheCommissionand Council. A striking Council inweakeningtheCommissiontosuch anextentthatittoohas But theresultsareplain. The Parliament becametheobjective allyofthe take amoretransnational approach toissues. and theCommissionotherwisehave many interestsincommonandoften The storycouldhave unfoldedinanentirelydifferentway, astheParliament its claims. an idealopportunityfortheParliament toshow itsmuscleandaffirm the Council.Furthermore,SanterCommission’scandal’ provided institutional game. After many years ofquasi-exclusive proposals insomeareas.Obviously thishaschanged theplaying fieldforthe established theso-called‘co-decision’procedureforapproving legislative This was partiallyaddressedby theMaastricht Treaty in1993,which tête à between 23 Challenge Europe – February 2007 24 Challenge Europe – February 2007 graduation ceremony. Barroso Commission,by contrast, lookslikeauniversity cohortafterthe British club.Commissionersfromonlysixcountriesaresittinginarmchairs. The The photograph ofthefirstCommissionlookslikeaninformalmeetingina José ManuelBarroso. from Walter Hallstein’s teamin1958tothatofthe current incumbent Commission ondisplay attheentrance toitsBerlaymont headquarters, First ofall,numberscount:itistellingtolookatthepictures formal control hasbecomemoreimportant thanpolicy assessment. projects andless attentionpaidtothesubstance ofpolicy on theother, since Communications, etc.ontheonehand;and moremicro-managementof qualitative terms:fewerproposalsandmore White andGreenPapers, Politically, theCommissionhasrestrained itsambitionsinbothquantitative and suspicious ofit. traumatised way, suspiciousofeveryone becauseeveryone appears regularity becomestheobsessive goal. The Commissionbehaves ina absorbed by themicro-management ofthousandsprojectswhose formal Today, the entire energyoftheCommissionapparatus seemstobe bureaucratic circle. financial rulesonit–hasforced theCommissioninto anextremelyvicious possible –particularlyby imposing very strictprocedural, administrative and between theParliament andCounciltocontroltheCommission astightly But theCommissionfacesaneven worse problem: the implicitagreement become predominant. features ofavery largebody, bureaucratic/sectoral objectives willinevitably there isnopolitical/ideologicalgluecapableofovercoming thedispersive to goback totheprevioussituationofarelatively cohesive Commission.If This difficultyisnow builtintothesystemand itwillbeprobablyimpossible sufficient groundsandunderstandingtoagreewhat thisis? of commonEuropeaninterest,how canitsPresidentensurethereare difficult toachieve: iftheCommissionissupposedtorepresentsomeform as diverse asitispossibletoimagine.Collegialityinsuch acontextbecomes Backgrounds, interests,languagesandviewsaboutthefutureofEuropeare between 27Commissionerscomingfromthesamenumberofstates. This imagealsoreflectstheunavoidable fragmentation ofcompetences ad hoc .The literature onInstitutionsandinparticularthe‘institutional triangle’isimmensebutonecontribution 1. Endnote Yves Mény isPresident inFlorence. Institute of theEuropeanUniversity institutional triangleturningintoaBermudawhere navigators getlost. indispensable totheproperfunctioningofUnion andtoavoid the Given theuniquenatureofEuropean institutions, astrongCommissionis weakening oftheCommissionhasgonetoofar. located intheCouncil,risingParliament remainstooweakandthe has notyet beenabletoputinplaceproperly. Too much power isstill Any democratic systemneedschecks andbalancesthattheEuropeanUnion third partythatEuropeneeds. second istoreturnthe’spirit ofthe Treaties’ tomakeittheindispensable ‘straightjacket’ andtoapplythesubsidiaryprinciplemoreeffectively. The The firstrequirementisto liberate itfromtheabsurdbureaucratic new impulse. the timehascometoredresssituationandgive theCommissiona activities. SinceEuropehaslittletodowithnationalgovernmental structures, in France orof a Byzantinebureaucracy confinedtodetailsandmundane Nobody canwish ontheCommissionfateoflate Commission hasplayed inthedevelopment oftheUnion. reasons, thekissofdeathandjeopardisecrucialrolethat The combinedactionsoftheCouncilandParliament are,forvery different Conclusion Revue dudroitdel’Unioneuropéenne is particularlyvaluable onthisissue:Paolo Ponzano “Leprocessusdedécisiondansl’Unioneuropéenne”, , 1/2002,pp.35-52. Commissariat auplan 25 Challenge Europe – February 2007 26 Challenge Europe – February 2007 October 1970. report (alsoknown astheDavignon report)adoptedby Foreign Ministersin cooperation amongmembersoftheEuropeanCommunitywas theLuxembourg It isgenerally acceptedthatthepointofdepartureforintergovernmental by Philippe the European process The evolution of intergovernmental cooperation in taste ofanimportant failure. Whatever the meritsofthecase,exercise leftallpartieswith thesour presence, whether hehadnot,atthetime,beentoointransigent. Couve deMurville. Years later, inareflective mood,heaskedhimself,inmy put responsibilityforthison theshouldersofFrench Foreign MinisterMaurice Belgian Foreign Minister andas‘fosterfather’ofthe Treaty ofRome,clearly In hismemoirs,Paul-Henri Spaak, who played aprominentrolebothas irresponsible behaviour. acrimonious, withparticipantsaccusingeach otherofarrogantand supranational conceptdeveloped intheFifties. Itwas also quite of theways between theGaullistconceptof Its finalfailurewas immediately perceived asaturningpoint,clearparting Monnet’s proposalsacceptabletothesmallercountries. without any ofthesupranational proceduresorinstitutionswhich hadmade construction establishedinParis, presumablydominatedby France, and subordinate thenascentEuropeanCommunitytoan intergovernmental General deGaulle,hadbeenseenby hispartnersasadeliberate attemptto Those negotiations,launched andlargelydominatedby French President the failureofFouchet negotiationsinthespringof1962. The significanceofthatinitialstepcanonlybeunderstoodby aflashback to “political cooperation”. of diplomaticconsultation,inanexercise initiallyknown as in thefieldofforeignpolicy, infavour ofthetraditional methods basis oftextspreparedby theSpaakCommittee,was deliberately discarded, father Jean Monnetandconsolidatedby the Treaty ofRomeonthe It was thefirsttimethat‘Communitymethod’,devisedby EUfounding de Sc houtheete l’Europe despatries and the practical experience ofthetwo approaches existingsideby side. showed just how touchy thewhole subjectremained even after15years of But thevery name oftheSingleEuropean Act concluded inFebruary 1986 were clearlyseparate, butnot antagonistic. in theEuropeanParliament. Communityactivities andpoliticalcooperation working groups. Ministersagreedtoanswer questionsonpoliticalcooperation very limitedatthebeginning, was progressively extendedtocover practically all suspicions, ifnottheambiguity. The presenceoftheCommission,which was Common senseandthehabitofworking togethergradually reduced the The SingleEuropean what’s Act: inaname? the afternooninBrusselsasaCouncil. in themorningCopenhagentodiscusspoliticalcooperation issuesandin at theinsistenceofFrench Foreign MinisterMichel Jobert, ministersmet A maximumlevel ofparanoia was reached onacertainday in1973when, institutions inforeignpolicy matters. frequently supportedby Britain,was keentoavoid interferenceby Community Community competencesandinstitutions.Ontheotherside,France, that ministerialmeetingsintheintergovernmental modewould encroach on The Commissionanditsfriends,especiallytheBeneluxcountries,wereafraid atmosphere ofsomeambiguityandsuspicion. cooperation developed quitesuccessfullyintheSeventies andEightiesinan ministerial decisionsdonotautomaticallydispelmutualsuspicions.Political All compromises,even goodones,containanelementofambiguity, and was born. exercise parallel to–andthereforealsodistinctfromit.Political cooperation Community would henceforthbecomplementedby anintergovernmental On thatbasis,ministerscametoanagreement. The EuropeanEconomic Commission associatedonlyinalimitedway withthenewexercise. and NATO competenceswerespecificallysafeguardedandtheEuropean travelling circus moving fromPresidency toPresidency. EuropeanCommunity would have nolegalbasis, noinstitutionsandseat:themodelwas thatofa scope: foreignpolicy the issueswhich hadledtothatfailure. The proposedconceptwas limitedin The meritoftheDavignon reportwas thatit found acceptablecompromiseson stricto sensu , withsecuritymattersbeinglefttoNATO. It 27 Challenge Europe – February 2007 28 Challenge Europe – February 2007 text onthetable which divided thevarious activities oftheUnioninto months ofnegotiations intheIntergovernmental Conference, putadraft treaty In thespring of 1991,theLuxembourg Presidency, onthebasisofseveral two forms ofEuropeanactivity. on thattextdeeplyscarredby thequestion oftherelationshipbetweenthese The nextstageonthis roadwas the Treaty ofMaastricht, withthenegotiations Treaty:The Maastricht themove towards structure a‘pillar’ business andintergovernmental cooperation. a roadpursuedtothisday: gradual importance towhat was happeningbecauseitwas thefirstsignificantstepon completely healed. With hindsight,Ifeelthatwewererighttoattach such no morethanafootnote)shows thatthewounds oftheSixtieshadnotbeen The importanceattached tothisatthetime(when today itwould seem tojustify underlines thebringingtogetheroftwo separate texts. this case)norby asummary ofitscontent,butby anadjective which history) notby thenameoftown where itwas signed(Luxembourgin This explainswhy thistreatyisknown (possiblyuniquelyindiplomatic content, althoughthatcontentwas quitesubstantial. had never beenthecasebefore,suddenlybecamemoreimportantthanits legal textcovered bothCommunityaffairsandpoliticalcooperation, which negotiators, includingmyself, greeteditwithenthusiasm. The factthata putting anendtoyears oftiresomequarrelsanddogmaticdisputes–that The outcomehadbeensouncertainandseemedmomentous–hopefully the highestlevel. bring themtogetherinonelegaltextwas onlytakenatthelastminuteand Representatives (COREPER)andthePolitical Committee–andthedecisionto had beennegotiatedseparately –basicallyby theCommitteeofPermanent that thetwo partsofthetreaty(Communityaffairsandpoliticalcooperation) down tosubsequentgenerations withthe“single”qualification. The answer is Inquisitive young studentsmustaskthemselves why thisdocumenthaspassed secretariat inBrusselstoprovide administrative support. legal basisforpoliticalcooperation forthefirsttime,withapermanent of Rome,includingthefirstmentionmonetaryunion.Italsoprovided a The SingleEuropean Act was thefirstsubstantialmodificationof Treaty rapprochement between Community pillars : a means unanimous decision-makinginthe Council,ismuch betteradaptedto The implication ofthisisthatintergovernmental cooperation, which basically have beendoing foryears toestablishthe singlemarket. legislation, mutualrecognition ofactsandprocedures–thesortthingwe affairs policy isessentially legislative innature:itimplies harmonisationof little effective influenceonforeignpolicy. Bycontrast, justiceandhome on legislationbutpolitical decisions.Inmostcountries,parliamenthas Foreign andsecuritypolicy isessentiallyexecutive in nature:itisbasednot very different. justifying) why national governments wishtoretaincontrol.Buttheyare to thecoreofnationalsovereignty, which explains(withoutnecessarily Foreign policy, justiceandhomeaffairsalldealwithmattersclose the timeofintrinsicdifferencebetweensecond andthirdpillars. Again withhindsight,itseemstomethatwefailed totakeaccountat and securitypolicy, which was –andremainsavery ambitiousobjective. structure initiallysuggestedby Luxembourg.Itfixedthegoalofacommonforeign As everybody knows, thetextagreedinMaastricht was basedonthepillar affairs andintergovernmental cooperation. Maastricht negotiationsturnedontherelationshipbetweenCommunity purpose ofthisarticle,thecentral pointisthatthemajordrama ofthe Monday”. Much hasbeenwrittenaboutthecausesofthatfailurebut, forthe To thisday, thatmeetingisknown inDutch diplomaticcircles as“Black Belgium declaredinCouncilthattheypreferredtheLuxembourgapproach. into abrick wall attheendofSeptember, when alltheMemberStatesexcept ambitions. However, thePresidency misreadthepoliticalsignalsandran straight justice intotheCommunityfold,butwithmuch-reduced objectives and alternative textwhich rejectedthepillarstructureandbroughtforeignpolicy and In thecourseofsummer, theincomingDutch Presidency drafted an the years, butthemajorityofCouncilseemedready togodown thisroad. saw itasathreattotheCommunitymethodwhich hadserved ussowellover This innovation was, ofcourse,hotlydebated.BelgiumandtheNetherlands would work accordingtodifferentrulesandprocedures. policy, ontheonehand,andjusticehomeaffairs,other. Each pillar Community pillarandtwo intergovernmental pillarsforforeignandsecurity 29 Challenge Europe – February 2007 30 Challenge Europe – February 2007 that cooperation. institutions could play some role,withoutcompromising thenatureof advocates ofintergovernmental cooperation accepted thatEuropean cooperation would coexistwithit,even intreatytexts. And the the Communitymethodaccepted thatsomeformofintergovernmental After theclimacticbattles over the Treaty ofMaastricht, theadvocates of method andintergovernmentalism, was typicalofa trend. the past,acauseofideologicalconfrontationbetween theCommunity The relaxedattitudeofthe Treaty of Amsterdam towards what hadbeen,in significant consequencesinlateryears. Foreign andSecurityPolicy (CFSP)–aninnovation which was tohave Representative/Secretary General oftheCouncil,incharge ofCommon from Communitybusiness. The treatycreatedthepostofHigh Foreign policy andsecurity, ontheotherhand,remainedclearlyseparate pillar structure. treaty andtheEuropeanUnion–anotherexample ofambiguityinthe which didthiswas presentedasanannextoboththeEuropeanCommunity framework, withopt-outsforBritain,DenmarkandIreland.Buttheprotocol incorporation ofthe Another significantresultofthe Amsterdam negotiationswas the Court ofJustice werelimited. the power oftheEuropeanParliament andthejurisdictionofEuropean of five years. Unanimousdecision-makingremainedthegeneral rule,and that titlewerenottobefully incorporated inanewCommunitytreatytitle.However, proceduresunder pillar, butmigration, asylumandjudicialcooperation incivil matterswere Police andjudicialcooperation incriminalmatters remainedinthethird “area offreedom,securityandjustice”. compromise leadingtoMaastricht, was blurredinwhat was now calledthe The clearseparation betweenpillars,which hadbeentheessenceof This pointwas taken upby the Treaty of Amsterdam signedinOctober1997. The Amsterdam Treaty: blurringthelines procedures inthetwo pillarswas notanoptimalsolution. foreign policy thanitistojusticeandhomeaffairs.Establishingidentical acquis communautaire of theSchengen Convention intothetreaty , even afteratransition period Intermediate solutions then became possible, such as the one retained for asylum and migration in the Treaty of Amsterdam. In The Case for Europe, published shortly after that treaty was signed, I described “a multiform network of procedures and heterogeneous constructions, providing flexible answers to differing needs”.

Current state of play

This trend was to be confirmed in the following years, not by the Treaty of Nice – which makes no relevant contribution in this debate – but by practice. Two examples are the Lisbon process and the role of Javier Solana, 2007 Challenge Europe – February the EU’s High Representative for CFSP.

The “open method of coordination” was devised by the Lisbon European Council in March 2000 because Member States, while recognising that common efforts were needed in the field of economic and social policy and innovation, were in no way ready to accept the transfers of sovereignty which an extension of the Community method would have entailed.

Yet the Lisbon process is not purely intergovernmental: it is based on benchmarking and a system of peer review in which the Commission plays the role of scrutiniser of national policies and the European Council (of which the Commission is a member) that of guidance and arbitration. Professor Helen Wallace calls it “intensive transgovernmentalism” in which “the primary actors are leading national policy-makers, operating in highly interactive mode and developing new forms of commitment and mutual engagement”.

Many observers consider today that the Lisbon process is failing to deliver on its promises but, whatever its merits, the fact is that it was conceived as a sort of halfway house between the Community method and traditional intergovernmental cooperation.

In creating the post of High Representative for CFSP, negotiators in Amsterdam certainly had no intention of departing from its traditional intergovernmental character. But when the European Council appointed a former Foreign Minister and Secretary General of NATO to the post, instead of the high-level civil servant many had expected, a subtle element of change was introduced.

With time, tact and political acumen, Mr Solana has created for himself a situation in which he is not simply a reflection of the common will of ministers

31 32 Challenge Europe – February 2007 gives himarolenotunlikethatwhich theCommissionplays inCommunity This growing perception, sharedby MemberStatesandforeignpowers, foreign policy field. presidencies) astheembodimentofcommonEuropeaninterestin a marginoffreedom,andisperceived (much more thansuccessive EU making statementswhich would antagonisesomeMemberStates.But hehas nuclear issuesin Teheran, MrSolanaobviously avoids taking positionsor putting hissignatureonatreatybetweenSerbiaandMontenegroordiscussing in Council. When takingthefloorinUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil, new Member States intheConvention was highlysignificantinthis respect. There is nodoubtinmy mindthat theroleplayed by representatives of the treaty itselfnever comesinto force. today isfrequently citedasaproposalwhich shouldberetainedeven ifthe counter tolong-acceptedorthodoxy onbothsidesandyet itprevailed, and Convention Working Group which discussedthisproposal.Itran directly Relations CommissionerChris Patten expressedseriousmisgivings inthe Commission andtheCouncilsecretariat.BothSolana and thethenExternal It iscertainlysignificantthatthisproposalwas initiallyopposedby boththe intergovernmental cooperation. imagine aclearerway ofblurring thelinesbetweenCommunityaffairsand simultaneously sittingas Vice-President oftheCommission.One couldhardly An even morecogentexampleistheconceptof aForeign Minister considerable evolution in thinking. compromise couldnow be–atleastpartlyandopenly –discarded,shows a the simplefactthatwhat hadbeenafundamental elementoftheMaastricht if pillarsnolongerexistassuch, proceduresremaindifferentandseparate. But structure. Itispossibletoarguethatthismove ismoreapparentthanreal:even The mostspectacularexampleofthisistheproclaimedabolitionpillar and extendingthetrendidentifiedabove. on itsconclusions,areclearlytobeunderstoodasconfirming,accelerating The Convention ontheFutureofEurope,andConstitutional Treaty based an institution! Jobert would not recognisehimasoneofthem.Inaway, hehasbecome of theSixtiesandSeventies such asMauriceCouve deMurvilleorMichel affairs. Heheadsanintergovernmental institution,butthepurists Representative totheEuropeanUnionfrom19871997. Hewas Belgium’s Permanent Brussels. forInternational Affairs, Institute oftheEuropeanProgrammePhilippe deSchoutheeteisDirector attheRoyal at thecontinentallevel, thecompromisesdescribedabove willbeoflittleuse. concerns thelegitimateroleofallinstitutions.Ifitdevelops intoamajorissue This ideologicaldebategoestothevery foundationsofoursocieties.It fuelled by differentviewsontheconclusionstobedrawn fromglobalisation. freedom andsovereignty ofthemarket. That isofcourseanotherdebate, institutions isfeltby some,inBritainandelsewhere, tounderminethe Today, thetransfer –andeven theexercise –ofexistingpowers by European to underminethefreedomandsovereignty ofMemberStates. exercised, withthetransfer ofpowers toEuropeaninstitutionsfeltby some the level atwhich intervention andregulation ismostappropriately economy (althoughobviously notunderthatname). The debate was about European leadersatthetime–acommitmenttosomeformofsocialmarket The foundingfatherssharedwithGeneral de Gaulle–andallother the debatecouldflareupagainonbasisofanewideologicalcleavage. However, aword ofcautionisneeded. Those compromisesarefragile and mutual suspicion,by successive compromises. years hasnow beensettled,albeitwithsomeremnantsofambiguityand It would betemptingtoconcludethattheideologicaldebateofearly Conclusions to themandtheyaddressedwithcommonsense. skirmishes won orlostonthatideologicalbattlefield. The issueswerenew years oftheCommunity. They didnotbear theintellectualscarsoflong They werenaturally lessconnectedtothefundamentaldebatesofearly 33 Challenge Europe – February 2007 34 Challenge Europe – February 2007 de l'Europe” President Jacques Delorsspokeabout would nolongerbethesame. That iswhy formerEuropean Commission Central andEasternEurope would fundamentallychange theUnion;thatit Convention. People wereindeedaware ofthefactthatenlargementto It was thisshortcomingwhich directlyledto thesettingupof viewed asafailureby almosteveryone. mentioned. Noanswer was forthcoming,which meantthatNicewas Nice Intergovernmental Conference(IGC),even if they werenotexplicitly and thesequestionswerenotnew:theyhadalready surfacedduringthe earlier LaekenDeclaration, when settingoutthetaskofEUConvention, These challenges wereexcellentlyexpressedinthequestionslisted the come fromEurope. and citizensexpectanadequateresponse–something which canonly on theincrease. Above all,globalisation’s grasp isbeingincreasinglyfelt Furthermore, callsformoresimplification,transparency anddemocracy are effective inaUnionof27MemberStatestoday, andeven moretomorrow. decision-making procedureslaidoutinthecurrenttreatiesarenolonger large onthehorizon.Every day itbecomesclearerthattheinstitutionsand The challenges which theConvention soughttoaddresscontinueloom may differ. of theConvention’s proposals,even iftheformwhich isfinallychosen one way oranother, wewillalways have tofallback onthecontent that actuallythecase?Personally speaking,Ibelieve theopposite.In It mightthereforeseemasiftheConvention was heldinvain, butis into force initscurrentform. population, have ratified thetreaty, itishighlyunlikelythatwillever enter half oftheEU’s MemberStates,representingmorethanhalfofits up by theConvention intheirreferenda. And despitethefactthatmorethan France andtheNetherlands rejectedthedraft Constitutional Treaty drawn Did wewaste ourtimeattheEuropeanConvention? At firstsight,yes. by Jean-LucDehaene Was theEuropean Convention’s work invain? . “la nécessité d'une refondation quantitative dimensiontoit–Europeis nolongerthesameandthus italso the endof Cold War hasbrought anewqualitative aswell We alsohave tobearinmindthatenlargement oftheEuropean Unionafter A framework for the21 turned outtobeacorrectassessmentofthesituation. Convention would notbeabletoignoreitsconclusions. With hindsight,this This offeredthemaximumguarantee thattheIGCtobeheldafter reunified Europe. consensus andpresenttheirdecisionsintheformofa‘constitutive’ textfora to getthisnewEuropeoffagoodstart,andthusdecided totryreach historic natureofthismoment. They hadanopportunitytocreatetheconditions terminology oftheChairman,Giscardd’Estaing–werevery consciousofthe All themembersofConvention –the of thenew, united Europe. along asfullmembersoftheConvention, thereby makingitthefirstinstitution eve ofthereunificationEurope). The tenfutureMemberStateswereinvited the Convention meetingontheeve ofthelastenlargement(andthus,on of theIGC. Thirdly, andespecially, becauseofthemomentumcreated,with because thedebateswereheldinpublic,contrast tothesecretdiplomacy particular, from the EuropeanParliament andtheCommission.Secondly, as thefullparticipationofrepresentatives fromtheEuropeaninstitutions,in not justfromMemberStates’governments butalsofromparliaments–aswell First ofall,becauseitscomposition:politiciansinsteaddiplomats–and reasons forthis. Why didtheConvention succeedwhere theIGCfailed? There wereseveral Keys to theConvention’s success break thedeadlock by exploringnewavenues. In settinguptheConvention, theEuropeanCouncilmadeanattemptto the challenges ofthe21 an adequateinstitutionalframework withinwhich newEuropecantackle resolve allofthequestions andproblemsraised. Yet itnevertheless creates Convention endeavoured toreach consensus.Consequently, itdoes not The Constitutional Treaty isacompromisetextpreciselybecausethe st st century. century ‘Conventionnels’ , tousethe 35 Challenge Europe – February 2007 36 Challenge Europe – February 2007 Secondly, because since thisisatypicalexample ofparliamentarywork. (which isthecase, such acomplextreatywhen thereisnoconstitutional obligationtodoso First andforemost,becauseitisapoliticalerrortoorganise areferendumon go wrong? therefore subscribetotheresultsofConvention’s work. Sowhy didit forward fortheUnion, given thechallenges ofthe21 are necessary. They defendtheConstitutional Treaty asanimportantstep Both politicalandsocio-economicdecision-makersagree thatthesereforms Where diditgowrong? (although thiswilltakelongertoachieve). (third pillar),andeventually alsotothecommonforeign anddefencepolicy application oftheCommunitymethodtoareajustice andhomeaffairs dimension oftheUnionastoppriority. This requiresastep-by-step In thelightofglobalisation,treatypresentsreinforcing thepolitical Presidency; andasmallerCommission. (something which hasnotyet beenfullyachieved); amorestableCouncil decisions basedonmajorityvoting intheCouncilasgeneral rule legislative procedurewithafully-fledgedrolefortheEuropeanParliament; following prioritiesintermsofreorganisation:asimplified,satisfactory To give avery briefsummary, theConstitutional Treaty highlightsthe challenges: namely, reorganising The Constitutional Treaty lays thegroundwork forresponding tobothofthese the world. end oftheCold War, theprioritieshave switched toEurope’s placeand role in for peaceandstability. Within thecontextofglobalisation,which aroseafterthe European nationsinordertoovercome theirdifferencesandlay thefoundations In thepost-war context,prioritywas given tostructuringrelationsbetween fundamentally altered. Europe hashadtopositionitselfsincetheendofCold War has has toreorganiseitself.Moreover, theworld context withinwhich thenew good campaign, which was notthecaseineither France orthe Netherlands. if inter alia you areplanning areferendum,you have toorganise a , inFrance, theNetherlandsandGreatBritain) and positioning Europe. 1 st century. They 2 Nevertheless, the referenda have taught us something, particularly the French one.

Firstly, it is striking to note that the expansion of the political dimension of the European Union hardly got a look-in, even though Eurostat statistics clearly show that citizens are in favour of this because they realise that the challenges posed by globalisation can only be tackled at a European level.

Instead, the discussion focused solely on economic aspects, with opponents playing on the population’s fears about rapid change in the wake of globalisation in a highly populist manner. The much-praised European 2007 Challenge Europe – February social model was supposedly under threat. Enlargement was also presented as a threat in terms of being a source of migration and delocalisation.

When cast in this light, enlargement exhibits the same visible characteristics as globalisation. From that point, you are just one step away from portraying the Union as the catalyst for, and accelerator of, globalisation, and it can then be labelled as a threat – a step which people such as former Prime Minister and current Socialist MP Laurent Fabius in France took quite unashamedly.

The reality is that in the long term, enlargement and the strengthening of European integration are the only structural answers to the challenge posed by globalisation.

In order to become a member of the Union, the new Member States have had to accept its rules of the game (the Community acquis) and within the Union, everyone is subject to the same rules.

The EU’s structural support sets new members on the path towards growth and accelerated economic development. As a result of this, differences are reduced while the internal cohesion of the Union increases.

Yet this is not just a one-sided operation for the benefit of the new Member States alone. All the European Commission’s reports point to a win-win situation, which is demonstrated, inter alia, by the positive trade balance in the West’s favour.

Just to cite one example of the misunderstandings which arise: the employment which is created thanks to an increase in exports to the new Member States is not ‘seen’ by citizens, whereas the marginal phenomena of delocalisation and migration are very visible and are blown up out of all proportion by the media.

37 38 Challenge Europe – February 2007 The firstgrouppreferstofoldinonitself,rollingintoanationaloreven long term. the uncertainfutureahead,andEuropeanproactive approach over the considerable sectionofpublicopinion,which shuddersatthethoughtof A widegapthereforeexistsbetweenthe(short-term)fearsofa is, ofcourse,wishfulthinkingandutopian. challenge ofglobalisationwould betakencareofinthelongterm!Butthis The truthisthatifwewereabletoorganisethe world alongEUlines,the EU tomeetthechallenges ofthe21 thus theywereallconvinced thatthistreatylaidthefoundations toallow the itself entangledin. They approved thedraft Constitutional Treaty inanIGCand leadership. They mustfindaway outofthedeadlock thatEuropehasgot In themeantime,politicalleadersinEuropeareresponsible forproviding Where dowe gofrom here? Europe istheonlyanswer. understanding ofthechallenges oftheglobalisedworld towhich astrong Therefore, everything possiblemustbedoneto provide citizenswithabetter structural responsetothecontinualthreatofnationalconflictsinterest. integration projectwas supportedandexperiencedby thepopulationasa This standsinstarkcontrast tothepost-war years, when theEuropean the challenge by furtherexpandingEuropeintoaglobal player. regional hedgehogposition,while thesecondtakesastructural approach to ratified thetreaty. find away out. without areferendum). Itistobehoped thattheGermanPresidency will leaders inFrance andtheNetherlands toratify thenewproposal (preferably particularly inthethirdpart) inaway which willallow thenewly-elected draft Constitutional Treaty (therearesomelessessential pointsinit, the treaty(theformisofsecondary importance)preserve theessenceof a newbasictreaty. The questionishow to ensurethatthecontentsof The nameofthebaby israther unimportant, buttheUnionreallyneeds as thepointofdeparture. Treaty andstartfromscratch allover again.Itthusseemsappropriatetotake this It isthereforedifficultfortheEuropeanCounciltoignore draft Constitutional st century. EighteenMemberStateshave .IntheNetherlands,referendumwas decideduponby parliament,against thewillofgovernment. 2. Conversely, areferendumontheprincipleofenlargement, beforestartingnegotiations,would have been 1. Endnotes of EuropeandisaformerPrime MinisterofBelgium. Jean-Luc DehaeneMEPwas Vice-Chairman oftheConvention ontheFuture in vain. turn outtobethepreferredway aheadand,thus,thatoureffortswerenot I thereforeremainconvinced thatthepathindicatedby theConvention will stable by thetimegovernment’s campaignfinallygotunderway. In theinitialphasetherefore,government remainedaloof. The horseshadalready boltedfromthe answer tothatquestionwould have beenanoverwhelming YES atthattime. meaningful, sincethatisanimportantquestionofprinciple. As amatteroffact,Iamconvinced the 39 Challenge Europe – February 2007 40 Challenge Europe – February 2007 of thenegative French andDutch referendaontheConstitutional Treaty Slowly butsurely, thepauseforreflectiondecreedby EUleadersinthewake by GuillaumeDurand Introduction TREATY BEBROKEN? II. HOW CANTHEDEADLOCK OVER THECONSTITUTIONAL citizens. Institutional navel-gazing mightalsoberather dangeroussinceit Voting ishardlytheEU institutions’central problem –letalonethatofEU the Intergovernmental Conference,the redefinitionofQuality Majority For alltheattentionpaidtoitindebatesatConvention andthenin institutional reformshould not beoverestimated. But heputsthisinawider contextandexplainswhy theimpactofany Rafal Trzaskowski does notdeny thatinstitutional reformmightbeneeded. range ofalternatives. December. Betweenthesetwo ‘non-options’,thereis,however, afairlywide the StubbreportandEuropeanCouncilatitsmeeting inBrussels Commission inits“integration capacity”report,theEuropean Parliament in reforms areneededbeforethenextenlargementtakes place:theEuropean “absorption capacity”. All theEUinstitutions have now acknowledged that has beenmadevery clearthroughtherecentdebate ontheUnion’s particular, thelinkbetweenfurtherEUenlargementandinstitutionalreform On theotherhand, certainly nothelpitenterintoforce. Presidency, demonstrates acommitmenttothesubstanceoftextbutwill countries, withFinland joiningtheranks oftheratifiers duringitsEU again. Inthiscontext,continuingwiththeratification processinother clear thattheywillnotholdanotherreferendumonpreciselythesametext against starkreality:theFrench andDutch governments have madeitvery ensure theConstitutional Treaty entersintoforce asitstandshascomeup One theonehand,notionthateverything possibleshouldbedoneto it appearsthatthetwo moreextremepositionsarelosingsupporters. consensus isemergingastowhat shouldbedonewiththe Treaty. However, seems tobecominganend. This certainlydoesnot mean thata status quo is increasinglylessofanoption.In down theconstitutionaltext,someelementsshouldinsteadbeaddedtoit. Faced withthesedifficultquestions,othersbelieve that,rather thancutting is notpreserved? Constitutional Treaty andavoid openingaPandora’s boxifitsfullsubstance How isitpossibletomaintainthedelicatepoliticalbalanceachieved by the between themini-treatyoptionandmuch-reviled ideaofcherry-picking? to retainthe“substance”ofConstitutional Treaty? Isthereany difference Merkel inDecemberwhen shesaidthatitwould bea“historicmistake”not essentially thesameasoneputforward by GermanChancellor Angela How willitrelatetotheexistingdraft Constitutional Treaty? Isthis option This obviously raises many questions:how “mini”can thistreatyreallybe? Brussels inSeptember2006. this publication,alongthelinessetoutby NicolasSarkozyinaspeech in Then thereistheoptionofa“minitreaty”outlinedby Alain Lamassourein expect: growth, jobs,prosperity, security, etc. policies which would actuallyhelpEuropetodeliver what itscitizens distracts politiciansfromthereformandimprovement ofmoresubstantial out ofthecurrent institutionalcrisis. an innovative mechanism which would enabletheUnion to‘leapforward’ a startingpoint toreflectonhow thiscould becircumvented, thus proposing Renaud Dehoussetakesthe near-impossibility ofunanimousratification as partly fornationalconstitutional reasonsbutmainlyforpoliticalones. given thefactthatreferendaarebecomingmore and morewidespread, whatever consensualtextisproduced by theEUinstitutions –especially increasingly difficulttojumpandmightwellleadthe repeatedfailureof However, itiscleartoeveryone thattheunanimityhurdleisbecoming ratification ofthetext. dare toquestionisthattheUnionwilleventually need tosecureunanimous emerges fromthecurrentdeliberations, thegeneral assumption which few Irrespective ofthesubstance andformofthefutureinstitutionaltreatywhich unanimously agreedby thepeoplesand/orparliaments of27MemberStates. chance) andtomaximise theoddsoffutureinstitutionalreformbeing countries who would probablyhave voted ‘No’iftheyhadbeengiven the to assuagetheconcernsofFrench andDutch voters (andofthoseinother Andrew DuffMEParguesthatthe“Constitutionplus”optionisbestway 41 Challenge Europe – February 2007 42 Challenge Europe – February 2007 Guillaume DurandisaPolicy Analyst attheEuropeanPolicy Centre. continue andaway forward mustbefoundsoonerrather thanlater. But thereisnow atleastawidespreadrecognitionthattheimpassecannot changing politicalsceneinkeyMemberStatessuch asFrance andtheUK. Many factorswilldeterminetheoutcomeofthisprocess–notleast the deadlock over thefutureofConstitutional Treaty. leaders astheybegintowrestleinearnestwiththedilemmaofhow tobreak Taken together, thesefourpaperssetoutthemainoptionsopentoEU under thenew system(thethresholds are respectively 55%of Member It istruethat itwould bepossibleto take decisionsmuch more quickly will bemetautomatically. almost allimaginableconstellations ofMemberStates,thetwo othercriteria proposal, itwould beenough togatheramajorityofweightedvotes. In First ofall,theNicesystemiscomplicatedonlyon paper. To agree ona however, thatsomeoftheargumentsagainstitareexaggerated. most logical,efficientandtransparent thatwecouldget.Far fromit.Ibelieve, Of course,Idonotclaimthatthesystemofweightedvotes agreed inNiceisthe Why Nice isnot allthat nasty like tochallenge theconventional wisdom. however, allorthodoxyisforgedthroughconfrontationwithheresy, Iwould time, gainedthestatusofundisputeddogmainpro-European circles. Since, This istheofficiallyrecognisedversion ofthestateaffairswhich, with roughly two-thirds oftheEUpopulationtosupportit. would beenoughtoconvince amajorityofMemberStatesrepresenting was primarily supposedtobeaboutsimplicity. To agreeonagiven policy, it The introductionofanewweightedvotes systemintheConstitutional Treaty if notsheerdisaster. and thatitwould provide theenlargedEUwithasimplerecipeforparalysis, Many politiciansandexpertspredictedthatitwould betotallyunworkable and atleast62%oftheEUpopulation. vast majorityofweightedvotes; italsohastorepresentamajority ofmembers Not onlydoesasuccessfulcoalitionofEUMemberStateshave togathera and thesecretsofanever-changing EUdemography. who isnot familiarsimultaneouslywithEUjargon,advanced mathematics dreadfully complexandallegedlyalmostimpossibletoexplainanyone The decision-makingmechanism agreedinNiceDecember2000is by Rafal Trzasko the Nice Treaty? Can theCouncil functiononthebasisof wski 43 Challenge Europe – February 2007 44 Challenge Europe – February 2007 seems thatmostEuropeanpoliticiansunderstandthispredicament,which is comfortably withdecisionsbeingforced uponothersby slimmajorities.It Union doesnotyet enjoy such popularlegitimacy thatitcanfunction possible majorityofstates. We have notyet builtafederal construction. The We areallbetteroffifagiven decisionhasundisputedbacking ofthegreatest construction astheEU. process, legitimacy shouldprevail over effectiveness insuch adelicate votes). Itseemstome,however, thatwhen itcomestothedecision-making States and65%oftheEUpopulation,insteadalmost74%weighed of theirdemography (their combinedpopulation isstillafewpointsshortof As smallgroups ofpoorMemberStatescannot influencedecisionsbecause any attemptatwatering down orscrapping theEU’s cohesionpolicy. the poorMemberStateswould have tobeonthesamesideinorder block If thesystemcontainedin the Constitutionweretobeadopted,almostall Greece), astheyaremostly smallintermsofpopulation. relatively poorMember States (the12‘new’onesplusSpain,Portugal and The double-majoritysystemwould seriouslyreducetheinfluenceof to bereckoned with,asit can easilyinfluencethedecision-makingprocess. majority ofnewMemberStatesorrelatively poorMemberStatesisaforce Let megive someotherexamples. UndertheNicesystem,acoalitionof European integration. depends much moreondemography, would to askwhether thestrengthening oftheduo,thankstoasystemwhich It is,therefore,altogethersensible–althoughformany stillblasphemous– status quo. bold initiatives, itismostlyconcernedwithpreservingtheanachronistic direction; today itiscertainlyonthedefensive -insteadofproposingnew the Franco-German integration motorwas moving theUnioninright good idea.Nowadays, many countrieshave misgivings. Fifteen years ago, asked offtherecord)thatstrengtheningofParis-Berlin axiswas a At thebeginningof1990s,mostMemberStateswould have agreed(if only aboutsimplicity–italsorepresentsamajorpower shift. Secondly, thepossibleintroductionofdouble-majoritysystemisnot why theCouncilofMinistersrarely resortstovoting anyhow. per se always bebeneficial for contained therein areapanaceaforallthe illsthatbesettheUnion. of theenlarged EU.However, weshouldavoid theconclusionthat recipes Constitutional Treaty areundoubtedlynecessary toenhancetheeffectiveness Many oftheinstitutionalreformswhich would have been introducedby the The Constitution was nopanacea Russia) –wereinareaswhere decisions aretakenunanimously, notby QMV. recently, onthemandatefornegotiations onanewagreementwith The mostpublicisedcases–when Poland wieldeditsveto (on VAT and,most federal statesfinditmoredifficultto come upwithonecoherentposition. Member States–Germany andBelgium– wereoutvoted, simplybecause taken by QualifiedMajority Voting (QMV) wereonesinwhich founding abstain lessoftenthanthefoundingmembers. The greatestnumberofdecisions Moreover, theallegedlyobstreperousnewMemberStatesblock decisionsor Contrary tocertainpredictions,justasbefore,decisions are very rarely blocked. problem resolutionthatonfutilepresentationsofnational positions. paradoxically moreeffective becausepeopleareforced tofocusmoreon Some Councilinsidersclaimthatafterenlargement,decision-makingis Did thedecision-makingprocessbecomemoredifficult?Opinionsvary. paralysis. Importantdecisionsarebeingtakenday by day. time –theNicesystemhasnotledenlargedEUintodecision-making Most importantly, itseemsthat–contrary tothepropheciesmadeat the newrules,theywould have toconvince nolessthantenofthem. frustrate theplanstoagreeonaninflexible Working Time Directive. Under order toblock any furtherwatering-down oftheServicesDirective or, say, for theUKandPoland togarner thesupportofsixsmallMemberStatesin Other, similarexamples canbegiven –undertheNicesystem,itisenough renationalise orstartdismantlingthewhole policy. States optedoutofthe‘cohesionclub’,itwould stillnotbepossibleto Under theNicesystem,even ifseven oreightrelatively rich newMember the netpayers would have theirway. enough for, say, Czechs, MalteseandCypriotstochange theiropinionand the decision-makingprocesswhen theyallstick together. Itwould be the requiredblocking thresholdof35%),theycanonlyhave animpact on 45 Challenge Europe – February 2007 46 Challenge Europe – February 2007 importantly, thedelegationsdonotknow each otherwellenoughforareal the walls oftheCouncil’s Justius Lipsiusheadquartersthanbefore.Most other’s eyes. Someparticipantsclaimthatmuch morebusinessisdoneoutside room. People arestaringintoscreensmorethantheylookingeach Committee ofPermanent Representatives (COREPER),letaloneintheCouncil According tosomeexperts,itisimpossiblenegotiateanymore even inthe claim thatitworks fine,while otherspointtodifficulties. enlarged Councildoesnotwork inthesameway asbefore.However, some Let uslookatthefunctioningofCouncil. There isnodoubtthatthe minister beloyal inthefirstplace?) between theCouncil’s andtheCommission’s views? To whom shouldthe one thought in thatcontext–what happens ifthereisadiscrepancy double-hated arrangement fortheForeign Ministerwould beworkable. (Just or turnouttobeanothernail initscoffin.Itisfarfromclearwhether the of theEuropeanCouncilwould actuallystrengthentheCommunitymethod example, nobody canpredict whether thenewpermanent postofPresident However, thelikelyimpactofsome proposedchanges isdoubtful.For home affairspolicy. Common Foreign andSecurityPolicy (CFSP);andamorerobustjustice make theEUmoreeffective: moreQMV; arevamped andreinforced Certain reformscontainedintheConstitutional Treaty would undoubtedly Berlusconi; andthePoles –well,thePoles aredifficult. defence policy; theItaliansaremoreinward-looking thanunderSilvio less keenontheEUthanattimeofSt.Malo declaration onEU like awounded lionessprotectinghercubs;theBritish government ismuch are inastateofshock caused by enlargementwhich makesthembehave the Germansaremuch moreready toasserttheirGermanness;theFrench It isalsoduetothechanging EuropeanpoliciesofthemajorMemberStates: Member States. changing, thisismainlysimplyaresultoftheincreaseinnumber more difficultafterenlargementandifthenatureofCouncilis formula forallocatingvotes. Ifdecision-makingintheEUreallybecame All ofthat,however, doesnothave much todowithachoice ofaparticular spirit isinretreat. national interestsappeartobeslowly gainingtheupperhand. The Community de corps to develop –hence,proudposturingandanaggressive defenceof esprit be introduced inthe Accession Treaty. share-out ofvotes intheCouncilandseats intheEuropeanParliament can changed by asimple,albeitunanimous, Councildecision.Changes inthe institutional reform. The numberofEuropeanCommissionerscan be realistic chance ofgettinginbefore2010)withoutagreeing afully-blown It ispossiblefortheEUto takeinCroatia(othercountriesdonothave a no provision madeforthe allocation ofvotes tothree extra members. Member States,butthenthe Treaty ofMaastricht was designedfor12,with It istruethattheNice Treaty was onlydesignedto accommodate 27 it certainlyisfeasible. dogmatic, butitisalsosimplyuntrue.Itmightbeunthinkable forsome,but enlargement isimpossibleonthebasisofNice Treaty. Notonlyisthis The EuropeanParliament’s constitutionalcommitteeproclaimsthatfurther because acceptingthislogiccouldmeanthatwewill have neither. enlargement andthefutureofConstitutional Treaty. This isdangerous, Some politiciansarevery keenonexploitingthe link betweenfurther member oftheenlargedEUunderdouble-majorityvoting system? with currentdemographic trends, Turkey couldbethemostinfluential reform? Dowewant theopponentsofenlargementtopointfactthat, to have enlargementinmindwhen theydeliver theirviewsoninstitutional question thantheonetheywereasked.Dowewant theFrench ortheBrits The people,when consultedinareferendum,always answer adifferent Is itwisetomakealinkbetweenthetwo? Iamnotsosure. we needinstitutionalreformbeforeanotherenlargement?Ofcoursedo. out themuch-needed flexibilitywhich shouldunderpinourbehaviour. Do We shouldalsobeaware ofthedangersdogmaticthinking,which rules Institutional reform andenlargement improvement intheoverall politicalclimateinEuropemighthelpmore. it contains.ReformingtheCouncil’s internalworking methodsoran functioning oftheCouncilwillnotbeimproved overnight by thearrangements Let’s not kidourselves –theConstitutional Treaty is nomagicwand; the Team Presidency isjustafancy nameforthecurrentarrangement. Many oftheotherreformscontainedintreatyarepurelycosmetic– 47 Challenge Europe – February 2007 48 Challenge Europe – February 2007 state definitely(orcreatetheimpression)thatwithoutaprofound is aneedforinstitutionalreformbeforeenlargement,theUnionshouldnot The EUshould,above all,bepragmatic. Although onemightagreethatthere adjusted accordingly. seven votes. QMVandblocking minoritythresholdscouldbe population sizebetweenthoseofIrelandandFinland, would begiven with theinfamousIoanninacompromiseonQMV).Croatia,a (it isenoughtoremindourselves ofthenegotiationswhich culminated Examples ofsuch changes arenumerousinthehistoryofEU scares many peopleoff. The founding fatherswereso successfulinthe Union hasalways developed organically. The top-down approach simply of which function accordingtothe rules established50years ago. The should thereforefocusmuch moreonreformingconcrete EUpolicies,some are notinterestedinhow theEUworks; theyjustwant ittodeliver. We Our citizens,by andlarge,tendtodistrustgrand constitutional designs. They What EUcitizens want from this. era which welive inastheendofallmeta-narratives. Let’s takeourcue The greatFrench philosopherJean-François Lyotard definedthepostmodern referenda didnothappen. The citizensarenot. We sometimesbehave asifthe French andtheDutch so-called experts,areobsessedwiththenitty-grittyof the EU’s functioning. the feelingthatsomepeopledoindeedlive inanivory tower. We, the Sometimes when Iwalk down thecorridorsofBrussels’institutions,Iget the EUisunfair. of thereformscontainedinConstitutional Treaty onthefunctioningof Being labelledas‘anti-European’simplyforquestioningtheimpactofsome Wasn’t the‘reflectionperiod’launched preciselyforthatpurpose? dislike politicalcorrectnesswhich doesnotallow any discussionwhatsoever. with abetteralternative totheConstitutional Treaty? Ofcoursenot.Ijust not. Itneedsitvery much. Am Isuggestingthatitwould beeasytocomeup Am IsuggestingthattheEUdoesnotneedinstitutionalreform?Ofcourse should becomehostagetotheUnion’s inabilitytoreformitself. institutional reform,CroatiashouldbebarredfromenteringtheEU.Noone n etrra h olgu iia,Wra,Poland. Warsaw, and aLecturer attheCollegiumCivitas, Rafal Trzaskowski isaResearch Fellow attheNatolinEuropeanCenter the questionofshare-outvotes. Sadly forthepeoplewho writeaboutit,noteveryone’s life revolves around are nowhere nearthetopofaverage citizen’s listofpriorities. institutional reformscontainedtherein,butweshouldrememberthatthey addressed by theConstitutional Treaty. We shouldnotforgetaboutthe with theexceptionofCFSPandjusticehomeaffairs,werenoteven We shouldtherefore,pay much moreattention to policy changes which, not. The reallyseriousproblemslieelsewhere. resolve mostoftheproblemsenlargedUnion.Itcertainlywould Constitutional Treaty –andespeciallythenew voting system–would reform? No,butthegreatestmistakewecanallmakeistoclaimthat Let merepeatthequestion:shouldwejustforgetaboutinstitutional realists who dislikeddogma. 1950s preciselybecausetheyoptedforfunctionalism;were 49 Challenge Europe – February 2007 50 Challenge Europe – February 2007 in thefaceof immenseNigeria,Portugal intheface ofUkraine, or even a where thesedesperate peoplecomefrom.Butwhat can tiny Luxembourg do Everyone agreesthat theproblemmustbetackled atitsroots,in thecountries where everyone circulates freely. national rules–even though theseareentirelyineffective withinanarea the impossibilityoftakingdecisions inBrussels,each oneequipsitselfwith countries, andallprefercontrolled tounchecked immigration. But,given is done. And yet alltheEU’s MemberStateshave now becomeimmigration the unanimousagreementofsame54ministers.Hence, almostnothing 2. and killedmorepeoplethanthedestructionof World Trade Center. being madeonitssoilforanoperation thatwould have beenmorespectacular triple attack onitsrailways onlyby amiracle andtheUKuncovered plans was hitthefollowing year; and, in thesummerof2006,Germany escapeda In 2004,Madridexperiencedthehorrificattacks atthe Atocha station;London from the Allah’s fanatics,ourcountrieshave becometheprimetargets. Since September112001,while theUnitedStateshasmanagedtoprotectitself States: –54Excellencieswho canonlytakedecisionsby unanimity! The result? by aCouncilmadeupofalltheHomeandJustice MinistersoftheMember its influenceandcredibilityinaEuropewhich hasstalled. And becausewe The consequencesofthisfailureare,however, already clear:France haslost promised by thosewho campaignedfora‘No’. Constitution, wearestillwaiting forthefamous‘PlanB’–alternative project Some 18monthsaftertheunfortunateFrench referendumrejectedtheEuropean byLamassoure Alain Relaunching Europe after theconstitutional setback 1. national sovereignty donotchallenge theexistenceofaEuropeandimension: Let uslimitourselves tothreesubjectswhere even thetouchiest champions of is andhow paralysed Europeisintheareaswhere itisneededmost. after month,week–ofhow ineffective exclusively nationalaction a Unionwhich now hastwiceasmany members,wesee evidence –month have notchanged therulesgoverning theway theEUworks toadaptthem The management The fightagainstterrorism: of immigr In thisarea,every decisionistakeninBrussels ation: Here again,nothingispossiblewithout 3. pressure onandsanctionsagainstthecountriesconcerned. countries? We obviously have topoolourresources intermsofaidfor, country likeSpain,which onlyhas adiplomaticrepresentationinsix African reach adelicate politicalbalance:between largeandsmallcountries, must beavoided atallcosts. These negotiationsallowed MemberStatesto Convention, andthenin the Intergovernmental Conferencethatfollowed, complex negotiationswhich tookplaceover two years withintheEuropean The secondcondition isthatreopeningthePandora’s boxofthevery is compulsory. is legallypossible–IrelandbeingtheonlyMemberState where areferendum to besubmittedforparliamentaryratification inallthecountrieswhere this on a‘gameofdice’,withreferendumhereorthere:the newtreatywillhave This meansthatthistime,wecannotallow thefutureofUnion todepend reform would buryEuropeforalongtime. the firsttorejectConstitutional Treaty, anotherfailureoninstitutional after thecatastropheof29May 2005,when voters intheNetherlandsbecame The firstisanagreementtoexcludethepossibilityoffailure. Two orthree years However, such aninstitutionalinitiative presupposestwo politicalconditions. appears premature,why notembarkontheelaboration ofanewordinarytreaty? current EUtreatydoesnotwork andsincetheEU’s constitutionalambition in France andacross Europe,NicolasSarkozysuggestedanewpath.Sincethe There isnomoretimetowaste. That iswhy, afterhaving consultedextensively Urgent needfor action queuing upinMoscow tonegotiateseparate dealstobuyRussiangas. ban it;someincreasinggasolinetaxeswhile otherscutthem;andwitheveryone approach –withsomeMemberStatesrelaunching nuclearenergywhile others We thereforecontinuewithanineffective andridiculous‘everyone forhimself’ national policies. But theexistingtreatiesdonoteven authorisetheUniontocoordinate the primarycauseofadecreaseinourcompatriots’purchasing power. between therepresentatives oftheright andthoseoftheleft,etc. between old and newmembers,between federalists andEurosceptics, Energy: This isthemajorconcernofallbigpowers today and 51 Challenge Europe – February 2007 52 Challenge Europe – February 2007 of theUnion(federal ornot,liberal orsocial,etc.),relatetothe‘rulesof introduced inthedraft Constitutionwhich, withoutprejudgingthenature By doingthis,onewould infacttakeonboardallthosenewprovisions this textwhich addto,oramend,theprovisions oftheNice Treaty. pen, by takingthedraft Constitutionasabasisandretainingallthearticlesof parliamentary ratification. And thistextshouldbeproducedwithscissors,nota Amsterdam, theSingleEuropean Act of1985,etc.)willbesubmittedforsimple the elaboration ofanordinarytreatywhich, likethepreviousones(Nice, To respondtothesetwo requirements,itisnecessarytolay thefoundationsfor long –Heads ofStateandGovernment have dodged thisfundamental 1. and democratic. subjects which needtobeaddressedinordermaketheUnion botheffective the nexttwo decades? Alas, no! There areatleast fourotherfundamental corresponding toitsproclaimed ambitionsandtheexpectationsofitscitizensfor Does thismeanthatEurope willthenhave theframework foraction Key questions for thefuture least wewillhave attendedtothemosturgent thingsfirst. as possibleinadaptingtothedoublingofnumber ofitsmembers. At vote ineach MemberState. This way, theUnionwillhave lostaslittletime once theyhave beenratified throughthe ordinary processofaparliamentary Gathered togetherinanordinarytreaty, theycouldenterinto force in2009 explicitly acceptedthem. well astothosewhich have ratified theConstitution,sincetheyhave said ‘No’,sincetheywerenotchallenged inthereferendumcampaigns,as Constitution. They shouldbeacceptabletothecountrieswhich have These provisions representaquarterofthe 448articlesinthedraft launch politicalinitiatives, etc. President by citizensthroughtheEuropeanParliament; thecitizens’rightto of Foreign Affairs oftheUnion;electionEuropeanCommission appointment ofafull-timeChairtheEuropeanCouncilandMinister Voting; thelegislative powers given totheEuropeanParliament; the and theMemberStates;replacementofunanimityby QualifiedMajority the principlesbehinddistributionofcompetencesbetweenUnion game’ –who decidesatEuropeanlevel, onwhat subjectsandhow? That is: The settingofthe ultimatebordersofthe Union. For alongtime –too this area.Further initiatives willneedto betaken. but measured progressthatwould beallowed by thedraft Constitution in The world moves tooquickly to allow ustocontentourselves withthereal while theyareincreasingeverywhere else. against abackdrop ofcutsinmilitarybudgetsall Europeancountries conflicts’ thatKosovo andBosnia have become…allthisishappening new risksofconflagration intheMiddleEast,handlingof‘frozen proliferation, foreseeablepolitico-militaryfailuresin Afghanistan andIraq, 3. Commission andtheEuropeanCouncilin2008. national parliamentstotryagreeoncommonsuggestions tosubmitthe That iswhy theEuropeanParliament hasproposedworking togetherwith Galileo project. policies such astransport networks orthesymbolic(emblematic) the EU-15),andwithoutbeingabletofinalisefinancing offundamental Europe would bereducedasashareofGDP(1.04% against1.15%in for 2007-2013onlyonconditionthattheiroverall contributionto the 25HeadsofStateandGovernment wereabletoagreeonthebudget wants to financeCommunitypoliciesany more:inDecember2005, With highdeficitsinthebudgetsoflargeMemberStates,noone by nationalcontributions. absence ofown resources attheUnion’s disposal,itsbudgetisstillfinanced attention fromtheexistenceofanequallyseriousfinancialcrisis:in arising fromthelostreferendainFrance andtheNetherlandshasdetracted 2. not belongtothegeographical continent. ‘privileged partner’statustobeofferedtheUnion’s neighbourswhich do have tobeconcludedby beingmorepreciseaboutthecontentof Council aspartofthediscussionsonEU’s “integration capacity”.Itwill This debateisatlastunfoldingintheEuropeanParliament andinthe in morethantenotherMemberStates. ‘No’ campaignsinFrance andtheNetherlands,openingupasimilardebate Turkey’s bidforEUmembershipplayed animportantroleinthevictoryfor their publicopinions.However, thepublichasstartedtospeakup:hostility question, regardingitastooserioustoentrusttheirnationalparliamentsand The reformofthefinancingCommunitybudget. The establishmentofacommon foreignanddefencepolicy. The politicalcrisis Nuclear 53 Challenge Europe – February 2007 54 Challenge Europe – February 2007 Nationale of theConvention. same day inthecountriesconcerned. imagine anewprocedurewhich will,thistime,lead toareferendumonthe reality, itwillbeeasiertorelaunch theideainamoreserenemannerandto Once theUnionisback ontrack thankstoatreatybetteradaptedthis this nature. EU’s founding MemberStates,peoplearenotyet ready toacceptatextof that weneed.Buttheunhappy experienceof2005shows that,even inthe a unionofpeoples,andnotonlystates,itisindeedConstitution 4. Secretary forEuropean forthe Affairs Secretary Alain LamassoureisaMemberoftheEuropeanParliament andNational Populaire (UMP) Populaire Finally, , Minister with special responsibility forEuropeandamember withspecialresponsibility Minister , the relaunch oftheconstitutionalproject. Hewas formerlyamemberofFrance’s . Union pour un Mouvement un pour Union If wewant toestablish Assemblée celebrate the signingofthe Treaty of Rome50years ago. Their starting pointistheBerlin Declaration on25March, which will and mandateforanewIntergovernmental Conference(IGC). June Summit,theGermansmustbroker anagreementonthetiming,process risk assessment.Iftheyare tocrown theirPresidency with success atthe Council, hasaheavy responsibilitytosteertheUniontowards thecorrect The Germangovernment, which currentlyholdsthePresidency ofthe public opinion? which have provoked somuch dissentagainsttheconstitutionalproject in make dowithsecondbest,orwetrytoresolve theundeniableproblems than 2004,oranewversion which isbetter?Inotherwords, dowe is which ofthemismostlikelytosucceed:anewversion which islessgood Given thatbothoptions carry theriskofasecondfailure,keyquestion the originaltextwithaviewtoitssubstantialimprovement. this authoriscommitted,involves a‘constitutionplus’–thatis,modifying without apromiseoflater, moreradical reform. A secondoption,towhich consists ofdissectingtheoriginaltexttodevisea‘minitreaty’–withor espoused mostprominentlyby NicolasSarkozyandthefaint-hearted, has tobeaddressedonboththetacticalandstrategic levels. Oneoption, In decidinghow torevisethe2004treaty, EUleadersfaceachoice which peoples ofEuropeisrisky. new version ofthe2004Constitutionback beforetheparliamentsand Second, theEuropeanCouncilmustbepreparedtotakearisk.Puttingany successful ratification ofthenewtext. heads ofgovernment shouldprepareajointcampaigntoensurethe important thanintherenegotiationofstalledConstitutional Treaty. The the decisionstakencollectively. This accountabilityisatnotimemore member oftheEuropeanCouncilshouldbeheldtoaccountindividually for First, theymustriseabove narrow nationalorpartisanpreoccupations.Each themselves todotwo difficultthings. If theyaretorescuetheirConstitution,Europe’s leadersneedtosteel Duff by Andrew Operation Pandora 1 55 Challenge Europe – February 2007 56 Challenge Europe – February 2007 two standor fall together. Part IIIamplifies andinterpretsPart I.Certainly one For onething,Part III ofthe2004treatyislegally inseparable fromPart I: the mini-treaty idearepresents dubious law, poorpoliticsandbadtactics. only the2004text,butalso theconsensuswhich lay behindit.Inshort, the court ofdemocratic opinion. Any sortofcherry-picking willdestroy not controversial, butalsotactically doomedtofailforasecondtimeinthe reforms —asissuggested isnotonlytechnically difficultandpolitically to re-edit,orgofurtherandreducetheforce andscope oftheproposed The nextstepismoredifficult:ittoconvince theSarkozyclubthatmerely certainly resultinsomethingworse. up thewhole ofthe2004 package dealtorenegotiationwould almost or parliamentaryopiniononthisissue).Itcanalsobeaccepted thatopening Minister Tony Blair, although,regrettably, henolongerreflectsBritish public much oftheoriginalConstitutional Treaty aspossible(even UKPrime Everyone willagreewith theGermansthatitisimportanttoconserve as Ring-fencing thegood faces, simplisticsolutionswillnotwork. Overall, Berlinwillhelptoascertainthat,inthecomplexcrisisthatEurope the French presidentialelections. hope thatitwillimposesomedisciplineonthemainstreamcandidatesin Eurosceptical Polish Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski.Onemay even Council. Itwillnodoubtprove tobeparticularlyinspiritingforthe The BerlinDeclaration willbeanexercise ofcatechism fortheEuropean post-national democracy willbehalted. cohesion andexternalstrength,theEU'sdevelopment intoamature, It mightalsowarn thatwithoutaConstitution,Europewilllack internal the 21 process isessentialiftheUniontobeequippedmeetdemandsof reaffirmation thattheearlycompletionofEurope’s currentconstitutional determined inovercoming occasionalsetbacks. Itmustendwith would beusefultorecallhow theEUhasproved itselfingeniousand and remindusofthebasicverities oftheEuropeanintegration process.It should explainwhy theEUhasbeendeveloped tohelpuswork together This documentshouldaskwhat itiswewishtodotogetherasEuropeans.It st century andtheaspirations ofalargemajorityitscitizens. October 2004. years earlier, towhich they allsolemnlyappended theirsignaturesin the coreagreement betweenHeadsof StateandGovernment ofthree In June 2007theEuropeanCouncilneedstoconfirm andconsolidate procedures (Part I),asitdoestothe CharterofFundamentalRights(Part II). principles, goals,competences, instruments,powers anddecision-making agreement stillappliesto theConstitution’s keyarticlesonvalues, period ofreflectionthat,despitecertainimperfections, theoverall political It isnotunreasonabletodraw theconclusionfromUnion’s enforced it stillholdsgood. would betoinsistonring-fencingthe2004textwhere theconsensusbehind The GermanPresidency mustresistallsuch temptations. The wisemove Pandora’s vase. seems tobealltoomany who, withEpimetheus,aretemptedtoopen to re-opennegotiationsonthepresidency oftheCouncil; andsoon. There Voting systemofthe Treaty ofNice;several smallerMember Stateswant the Poles back Godbutalsowant areturntotheQualifiedMajority demote theForeign Minister and torecallsomeoftheirnotorious‘redlines’; in theEuropeanCommission;Britishwant todestroy theCharter, to Thus, the Vatican wants God;theFrench want apermanentFrenchman painfully arrived atin2004. demonstrate, likeKingCanute,how easyitistodestroy theconsensusso provoked astormofcriticism.Perhaps herswas adeliberate mistaketo remarks aboutwishingtoseeChristianityinthepreambletreaty German Chancellor Angela Merkelhasalready seenhow herunguarded result ofacarefully- ‘mini treaty’greatlyunderestimatetheextenttowhich the2004textis mass popularconversions toitscause.Furthermore,thosewho advocate a simply changing thenameofConstitutional Treaty would prompt deception. Likewise,onehasnosympathy withthosewho believe that One may questionwhether theConstitutionoughttoberescuedby crude would beatoddswiththespiritofthistransparent age. changes arenotproposed.Butsuch adeliberately obscurantist approach articles oftheexisting Treaty establishingtheEuropean Communitywhere can reprintashortenededitionofthe2004textwhich leaves outthose woven politicalcompromise. 2 57 Challenge Europe – February 2007 58 Challenge Europe – February 2007 informed viewwhatsoever onitsrelative merits. explain ordebatetheConstitution, Westminster Parliament hasno They mightaddthatintheUK,where practically nobody hasyet begunto general malaiseaboutthecurrentstateofEuropeananddomesticaffairs. provisions ofParts IandIIthatproved tobecontroversial, butrather a campaigns, itwas nottheinstitutionalreformsencapsulatedin done so. They mightpointoutthatintheFrench andDutch referendum position toactasspokesmanforthemajorityofMemberStateswhich have The Germans,having themselves ratified theConstitution,areinagood group underthe improved rulesforenhanced cooperation envisaged inthe Constitution. The euro-zone statesshouldestablish themselves asaformal core economic policy responseto globalisation,shouldbe writtenintothe that oftheeurozone;and the goalsofLisbon Agenda, shapingEurope’s 1. The economicgovernance oftheUnionshouldbe strengthened,particularly causes ofpublicdissent. modernisation orinnovation, chosen toaddressdirectly themostimportant As farassubstanceisconcerned,five policy areassuggestthemselves for have successfullycompletedtheratification process. of theMemberStates,representingatleasttwo-thirds oftheEU’s population, not confernewcompetencesontheUniontocomeinto effectoncefour-fifths Part IVshouldbemodifiedsoastoallow any amendment toPart IIIthatdoes subsidiary toPart I. legislative andadministrative procedures–becomesclearlyanddirectly mainly thecommonpoliciesofUnionand detailedbudgetary, We needtocreateaclearhierarchy within thetreatysothatPart III–thatis, therefore, letusseizethechance tosoftenfuturerevisionprocedures. difficult toeffectchanges inthefuture.Inimpendingrenegotiation, the French left,isthatconstitutionalisingtheEUtreatiesmakesitmore The onetellingcriticismofthe2004package, advanced mostcogentlyby Tackling thereal problems or theUK–willfindthemselves inastrongpositionduringitsrenegotiation. 2004 treaty–Czech Republic,Denmark,Ireland,Poland, Portugal, Sweden Indeed, noneofthosecountrieswhich have yet todeliver theirverdict onthe the present a systemofown resources which is morefair, transparent andbuoyant than political priorities –includingfutureenlargement. The goalistoendupwith enable theUniontomatch moredirectlyitsspending decisionswithits Member States,thatithasto beaccountableandthatitmustdesignedto that theEUbudgetexiststo redistributewealthbetweenricher andpoorer negotiated in2008-09. The newsystem shouldbebasedontheconviction expenditure (theCommon Agricultural Policy), isdueinany casetobe 5. A revisedfinancialsystem,covering bothrevenue (theUKrebate)and capacity andprivileged partnerships. should becreatedasaresponsetothecurrentdebate aboutabsorption should befleshedoutinthischapter. A newcategoryof Associate Member The conceptofneighbourhoodpolicy, introducedsummarilyinPart I, transitional arrangements, atpresentallabsent,could bewelldescribed. involving pre-accession agreements, screening,safeguardprovisions and be includedintheConstitution. The rigorousmembershipprocess, policy oftheUnion. The Copenhagenmembershipcriteriashould 4. A newchapter shouldbeinsertedintoPart IIIgoverning theenlargement and diversity ofsupply. conservation and renewable energysources aswellimproving thesecurity as amajorfeatureofthereformedUnion,involving realisableobjectives of and fisheriespolicies.Itwould alsoallow acommonenergypolicy toemerge need toconform. This reformwould openuptheperspective ofrecastingfarm climate change shouldbecometheimperative towhich allcommonpolicies market andaimedatpollutioncontrol,shouldbeupgraded. Combating 3. Environmental policy, which istoday merelyaflankingpolicy ofthesingle a SocialUnion,againunderthenewrulesonenhancedcooperation. wishing togofurthershouldcommitthemselves voluntarily toaProtocolon provisions ofthenewtreatytoeaseitsinterpretation. Those MemberStates Declaration onSolidarityshouldgathertogetherallthesocialpolicy articulated withrespecttothesocialdimensionofsinglemarket. A new equity, efficiency andemployability. The motto‘unityindiversity’ shouldbe setting outagreed,sharedsolutionstotheknown, commonproblemsof 2. A commonarchitecture fortheEuropeansocialmodelshould bedefined, common interestofsustainableeconomicgrowth andfullemployment. changes tothenationalbudgetarypoliciesofMemberStatesinUnion’s Constitution. The EuropeanCommissionneedsgreaterpowers topropose ad hoc , overly complicated (andstingy)arrangements. 59 Challenge Europe – February 2007 60 Challenge Europe – February 2007 The GermanPresidency willneedtoproposeanefficientlydemocratic Improving theprocess widely acrosstheUnion. problematical inthedebatesFrance andtheNetherlands,more improve theaddedvalue ofEUspending. All oftheseissueshave proved insecurity aboutclimatechange, reassurecitizensaboutenlargementand financial discipline,modernisesocialandeconomicpolicies,address Modifications toPart IIIinthesefive areaswould bedesignedtostrengthen could hopeto leave hisor hernationalparliament poorly informedor text. After thepainfulexperience ofthelastyears, nogovernment minister National parliaments, ofcourse,retaintheir powers toratify (ornot) thefinal parliamentary forumswiththe EuropeanParliament. as inthecontinuationof the currentandsuccessfulexperimentofjoint Affairs CommitteesofParliaments oftheEuropeanUnion(COSAC) –aswell their jointscrutiny organ–theConference ofCommunityandEuropean important roleintheConvention, shouldbeassociatedwiththeIGCthrough National parliaments,which, withtheEuropeanParliament, played an compromise requirediflefttoitsown diplomaticdevices. would, inany case,behard-pushedtoreach thehighstandardsofpolitical legitimacy thatinclusionoftheParliament would bringto theprocessand development oftheUnion. An IGCactingonitsown would lack theextra It hasbecomeclearthatMEPshave much tocontributetheconstitutive States andEUinstitutions. legislation likelytofosteragreementbetweenpolitical parties,Member between thetwo. This isaproven processforcomplexpiecesofEU constitutional co-decisioninwhich textsareshuttled andreconciled Instead, theIGCandEuropeanParliament shouldadoptanewformof fall victimtoPandora’s temptation. renegotiation successfully, mainlybecauseaConvention would belikelyto Tempting asitmay be,anewConvention isunlikelytocarryoutsuch a suitably gloriously, undertheFrench Presidency oneyear later. Portuguese Presidency inthesecondhalfof2007ifitistoconclude, can takeplace.Clearly, anIGCwillneedtobeconvened underthe process, aswellatightschedule, by which such ajudiciousrenegotiation The Hague. As ever in theUnion,theremustbesomething inthenewdeal But therenegotiation willnotbeatrilateral onebetweenLondon, Paris and a fairerfinancialdeal. objectives such asreform oftheCAP, more structural economicchange and reform ofEUcommonpolicies thatachieves some long-heldBritish means thattheinstitutional package mustbewrapped upinsideagenuine treaty asavery greatimprovement onthatsignedby hispredecessor. This Prime MinisterGordonBrown willbeanxioustopresent therenegotiated let alonethewiderBritishpublic. predators –would ever wintheapproval ofthepresent HouseofCommons, that such a‘Treaty ofNice they willnotacceptatechnocratic fix. And thereseemsvery littlechance From what weknow oftheFrench andDutch voters (andweknow alot), to winpublicsupportinFrance, theNetherlandsandBritain.Idisagree. itself onlywiththehardcoreissuesofpowers andinstitutions ismorelikely Nicolas theFaint-heart appearstobelieve thata‘minitreaty’ concerning associate membership. however, bemore prudentforthemtochoose thesafety-valve optionof block theconstitutionalprogressforwhole ofthe restofEurope.Itmight, themselves unabletocarrytheirvoters would stillhave thelegalpower to An obdurate countrywhose government andpoliticalpartiesshowed Europe-wide referendumtoconfirmpopularsupportfortheEuropeanproject. complete theirofficialratification dutiesfirstandonlythereaftertoholda One imaginative way outofthedilemmamightbeforallparliamentsto credentials by callingforreferendaarelesskeentodosonowadays. political partieswhich werekeenearliertodemonstrate theirpopulist advocate themtomakethecase.Butitisalready clearthatsomeofthose There remainsthedelicatequestionofreferenda.Itisuptothosewho Ratification national parliaments. exercise, hasnow committeditselftotakingintoaccounttheopinionsof the EuropeanCommission,which isdestinedtoplay a key roleinthis consulted aboutthestateofconstitutionalrenegotiation.Furthermore, bis ’ –sellingnationalsovereignty toforeign 61 Challenge Europe – February 2007 62 Challenge Europe – February 2007 or editorofmany booksonEuropeanintegration. Heisalsotheauthor totheConvention. European Parliament Delegation andwas Vice-President ofthe Liberals andDemocratsforEurope(ALDE), spokesman forthe affairs Alliance of Heisconstitutional Parliament. Andrew DuffMEPisaLiberalDemocratMemberoftheEuropean settlement itneedsanddeserves. leaders willhave onelastchance tobringtheUnionconstitutional for everyone. With animproved productandbettermarketing,allEurope’s . See Andrew Duff(2005) 2. See Andrew Duff,‘PlanB:how torescuetheEuropeanConstitution’(ENandFR)atwww.notre-europe.eu 1. Endnotes The StruggleforEurope’s Constitution , Federal Trust/I.B.Tauris. states hadalltheappearances ofa sleight ofhand. “constitution” toreferadocumentofwhich therealmastersremained crucial decisions areoftenmadeatthe last minuteby Headsof State and criticism ofthe erratic natureofintergovernmental negotiations, where As earlyasthe Amsterdam Treaty in 1997,several voices wereraised in “reform ofthereformprocess”. over thelastfive years, aclearconsensus hasemergedontheneedfora as thecompletionofinternal marketandthesinglecurrency. However, transforming theEuropean projectwiththelaunch of majorinitiatives such True, thetreatieshave beenreformedfourtimesinlessthan20years, charter. signature andratification ofany amendmenttothenewfundamental draft Constitutionwas extremely cautious,retainingunanimitybothforthe As iswell-known, thesectiononfuturetreatyrevisions containedinthe direction thatisincompatiblewiththeirwishes. governments canmakesurethatEuropeanintegration doesnotgoina This conservatism iseasilyexplained.Bykeepingcontrolofthisprocess, control have increaseddramatically. of MemberStateshasrisenfourfoldandpublicdemandsfordemocratic not changed sincetheEuropeanprojectwas launched, whereas thenumber The mechanism for reformingEUtreatiesisremarkablyconservative. Ithas be reformed? encompasses very differentvisionsoftheEuropeanproject,cannolonger negotiations. ShouldwethereforeconcludethattheenlargedUnion,which will notbeeasilyconvinced thattheyshouldengageinanewroundof on theother, those countriesthathave already ratified thedraft Constitution of anewreferendumiswidelyrejectedinbothFrance andtheNetherlands; It isfairtosay thattheproblemiscomplex.Ononehand,prospect in rather shortsupply, despitesomeinnovative attempts. the French andDutch referenda ontheEU’s Constitutional Treaty have been Since thespringof2005,ideasonhow torespondthecrisistriggeredby by RenaudDehousse Can theEuropean institutionsstillbereformed? 2 This spokevolumes aboutthenatureoftext:usingword 3 1 63 Challenge Europe – February 2007 64 Challenge Europe – February 2007 Government inahurrytoreach aconclusion. more subtly, theycan letitbeunderstoodthat for want ofconcessions ona an IGC.Each delegationthushastheright ofveto onthefinaloutcome; or, The problem isexacerbatedby the ‘doubleunanimity’required toconclude exclaim inNice:“We can’t goonlikethis!” to organisethedebatesefficiently, leadingUKPrimeMinister Tony Blairto Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs),ithasbecomeincreasinglydifficult which leads tobottlenecks. It isnosurprisethenthatduringrecent between foreignaffairsministers,oreven HeadsofState andGovernment, Generally, thethorniestproblemstendtobereferred up tomeetings continued torise. lack ofstrongleadershipis oftenfelt,especiallyasthenumberofactorshas disjointed negotiations,especiallyinthefinalphasesof theconference. The State allowed topresentitsown proposals–can sometimesleadto one orotheroftheparticipants.Itsdecentralised nature –witheach Member make itamodeloftransparency, inspiteoftheleaksthat may comefrom This procedureinvolves many difficulties. Itsdiplomaticnaturedoesnot constitutional requirements(Article48, Treaty ofthe EuropeanUnion– TEU). being ratified by allthestatesinaccordancewiththeirrespective convened inadiplomaticconference,andcanonlyenterintoforce after common accordofthegovernment representatives oftheMemberStates is characterised by itsextremerigidity:amendmentsmustbeadopted by As already mentioned,thegeneral revisionproceduresetoutintheEUtreaties A modelincrisis block ofunanimitysothatitmightcontinuetoevolve. evolution, itwould bewisetoconsiderways ofgettingaroundthestumbling If weacceptthatEuropehasnotyet cometotheendofitsinstitutional ratification stage. member isneededfortheleastreform,thereahighriskofproblemsat feared: inaUnionmadeupof27MemberStates,where theconsentofeach Moreover, thefateofConstitutional Treaty highlightedwhat many had of Europe,which drewuptheConstitution. procedures andtheinvention ofanewbody, theConvention ontheFuture Amsterdam andtheninNiceledtotheestablishmentofmoreopen 5 4 The half-failuresbothin number ofmember countries:aparliamentary assemblycanrefuse to ratify number ofbodies which have thepower ofveto is infacthigherthanthe today, 30-plustomorrow, thechances offailurearehigh.Besides, the In asysteminvolving multiplestagesofnegotiation and27MemberStates in anewonelikePoland ortheCzech Republic. founding MemberStatesrather thatinatraditional nay-sayer likeBritain,or in atleastonecountry;the onlysurprisewas that thisoccurredintwo It was widelyexpectedthat theoutcomeofreferendawould benegative a structural problem. The failureoftheConstitutionmustbeseenasaconfirmationthatweface the finalcompromise. demands. Inotherwords, theMemberStatesremained largelyincontrolof question, which oftenledtheConvention memberstomoderate their overshadowed by thethreatoffinal compromisebeingcalledinto additional concessions. The mostdelicatephasesofthedebatewerethus could voice any strongobjectionstheyhadtothedraft textandgain that theConvention was tobefollowed by anIGCwhere theMemberStates procedure. The constraint ofdoubleunanimitystillexists.Everybody knew decisive differencetothebalanceofpower inthecontextofrevision However, itwould bewrongtoconcludethatthisinnovation madea Union’s legalpersonality. dismantling ofthepillarstructure,simplificationtreatiesand compromise onissuesthatthepreviousIGChadstumbledover, such asthe This change inthe rulesofthegameenabledConvention toachieve a debates, which wereopentothepublic. parliaments andtheEuropeanParliament; andgreatertransparency inthe actors inthereformprocess,sinceitincludedmembersofnational significant changes tothisbasicsystem:wit,involving agreatervariety of The establishmentoftheEuropeanConvention broughtaboutseveral advantage, regardlessofthegeneral interest. self-interested bargaining,witheach statetryingtomaximiseitsown We thusfallintowhat hasbeendescribedasa“joint-decisiontrap”: or, asthecasemay be,intheensuingreferendum. particular point,thefinaldocumentmightnotberatified by itsparliament 6 65 Challenge Europe – February 2007 66 Challenge Europe – February 2007 pointing outthatwiththeincreaseinnumberofMemberStates,itwas Before theConvention hadeven begunwork, several voices wereraised How to get round theconstraint of doubleunanimity significant reformswillbeimpossible. If wefailtoaddressthisdifficulty, wemay findourselves inasituationwhere 1954 withtheEuropeanDefenceCommunity(EDC) Treaty. a treatysignedby ’its’government, astheFrench National Assembly didin reform mechanisms. Ifitwants tocontinue evolving, itwillhave tocrossthe Let’s facefacts:the EuropeanUnionhasreached thelimitsofcurrent (although tovarying degrees) thatEuropecouldbebuiltwithoutthem. the riskofbeingexcluded, asbothofthemfinditdifficulttoimagine Besides, thesetwo founding statesarenotlikelytobetooconcernedabout it ishardtoseewhat kindofformaldeclaration could answer themall. the motives behindtheFrench andDutch ‘Nos’weresoheterogeneousthat The conditionsareradically differentinthecaseofdraft Constitution: and Irishfearsofbeingexcludedinsomeway iftheyvoted ‘No’again. the indifferencetowhich thedraft treatieshadbeensubjected,andin Danish elsewhere; namely, intheorganisationofenergeticcampaignstoovercome The determiningvariables which explaintheabout-faceinbothcaseslie with aviewtosecondreferenda. also fartoosuperficial.Itlendsmuch credibilitytothesetextsdrawn up of holdingareferendumif‘Yes’ istheonlypossible option? This solutionis The cynicism ofthisapproach makesitdifficulttodefend:what isthepoint concerns ofthosewho voted ‘No’beforesubmitting thetexttoanewvote. precedents andadoptaprotocolordeclaration which would answer the Irish. Somethereforeconcludedthatwecouldtakeinspiration fromthese had already beenrejectedby theDanishpeopleandNice Treaty by the Of course,thereisnothingnewaboutthisproblem:theMaastricht Treaty confirmation ofthisview. setbacks sufferedby thedraft Constitutionhave provided spectacular Without this,any reformwould very likelybe doomedtofailure. The treaties –unanimityintheIGCandratification by alltheMemberStates. necessary toreviewthedoubleunanimityrequirementlaiddown inthe 7 rearguard”, in thewords ofthechief architect ofthePenelope draft, the late It thendealtwith thequestionoflegalstatus ofany recalcitrant states –“the fate ofthedraft Constitutionconfirmedthewisdomofthisadvice. seems logicalgiven theimportanceoftheseconditionsinany negotiation. The enter intoforce shouldbe addressed atthebeginningofnegotiations,which suggested thatthequestionof theconditionsunderwhich thenewtreatywould There wereseveral advantages tothisingenioussolution.Quite rightly, it to approve thistreatyamendmentprocedureunanimously. to keeptheirestablishedrights;ontheotherhand, MemberStateswere hand, itofferedevery guarantee totherecalcitrant statesby allowing them The legallegitimacy ofthissolutionwas basedontwo elements:onthe one benefit toalargeextentfromtheexistingarrangements”. anything comparedwiththe currentsituationbecauseitwould continueto from theUniontotakeonaspecialstatusunderwhich itwould notlose participation intheUnion,now basedonaConstitution, andwithdrawal solution, offeringeach Member Stateachoice “betweencontinued In ordertoavoid adeadlock, theCommissionproposedaninnovative the EuropeanCommissionduringConvention –the‘Penelope’ project. This questionoccupiedacentral placeinthedraft Constitutionpreparedby can onlybeamendedby unanimity. inevitably involves, thereisalsoalegaldifficulty, sincethepresenttreaties In additiontothepoliticalobstaclesthataqualitative leapofthismagnitude paralysis. The questionishow tobringaboutthisturningpoint. integrated Europe,butwith27ormoreMemberStates,itonlyleadsto Unanimity madesenseinaunionofsixstateswithsharedvisionmore once pointedout. European University Institutecommissionedby theEuropeanCommission already usequalifiedmajorityrevisionprocedures,asareportfromthe After all,many internationalorganisations,startingwiththeUnitedNations, hampered by theobjectionsofarecalcitrant few. those stateswhich sowishtomove forward todosowithoutbeing putting apuremajoritysysteminplace,but,moremodestly, ofallowing Rubicon andthrow offthestraitjacket ofunanimity. Itisnotaquestionof 8 9 67 Challenge Europe – February 2007 68 Challenge Europe – February 2007 The icy receptiongiven toitshowed thatthetimewas notyet ripeforthis requirements ofinternationallaw) alsomadeitweakpolitically. unanimity. What madetheproposalworthwhile legally(upholdingthe however, since allMemberStateswereexpectedtoagreegive up and theneedforreforms. This ledittomakearather optimisticassumption, The Penelope documentthusendeavored toreconcilerespectforthelaw present status. François Lamoureux been made. questions are farbeyond thescopeof thispaper. Proposals have already What formmight thisnewagreementtake andwhat might itsaimbe? These Council ofEuropetodiscourage themfrommoving ahead? Steel Communityhadlistened tothosewho arguedin favor ofreforming the would webetoday ifthesixfounding membersoftheEuropeanCoaland method mightbenecessary fortheprocesstoremaindynamic. Where history ofEuropeanintegration hasshown thatthis typeof‘roundabout’ But simplicityisnotthedominantfeatureofmulti-level structures,andthe established by theexisting treaties. Moreover, thenewagreementcouldnotinprincipleaffectrules would leadtothecreationofnewstructuresalongsideexistingones. bound tomakethingsmorecomplex,atleastinthe initial phase,sinceit Legally, thissolutionisperhapslesselegantthantheprevious one.Itis the newtreatywould anyway remainmembersoftheEuropeanUnion. to attach lessonerousconditions toitsentryintoforce; thosewho cannot ratify need forunanimousagreement:thesignatoriesofnewtextcaneasilyagree created alongsidetheEuropeanUnionoftoday. Inthishypothesis, thereisno instead ofreformingtheexistingtreaties,anewlegalstructurewould be For such aradical change tobeconceivable, anotherpathmustbetaken: on them. see thegovernments calmlygiving upthepower thatunanimityconfers in thecaseofastatenecessitybroughtaboutby acrisis,itishardto be reluctanttorelinquishtheirveto power. Intheseconditions,except the failureofanattemptatreform.Even themorepro-Europeanstatescould in favour ofthosewho supportthe kind ofsacrifice.Intruth,thisisnotatallsurprising.Unanimityworks 11 10 – which werewooed withtheprospectofkeepingtheir status quo and arepreparedtoaccept etefrErpa tde,Sine o Paris. SciencesPo, Centre forEuropean Studies, andDirector, Renaud Dehousse isJeanMonnetProfessor ofLaw andPolitics, to it? Union beabletomeettheexpectations ofitscitizensifitdoesnotgetdown Changing thiswould no doubtbearealquantumleap.Butwillthe nature oftheprocess. rule shouldbereviewed,althoughwithoutprejudice totheconsensual holders thereare,thegreaterrisksofdeadlock. The paralysing unanimity This islikelytomakesubstantive reformnearimpossible. The moreveto intergovernmental natureofthetreatyreformprocess hasnotbeenaltered. Despite theinterestinginnovations ofthepastfewyears, the reached thelimitsofwhat itcanachieve. central role,isstillembodiedinthepresenttreaty, it has undoubtedly Although thediplomaticmodelofearlydays, where thestatesplay a period ofchange. the Europeaninstitutionalset-up:EUisgoingthroughanuncertain The sameappliestothereformprocessassomany otheraspectsof Conclusion procedure laiddown in Article 48ofthe TEU. activities toward thenewstructure,oreven reformingtherevision Maybe thenitwould bepossibletoenvisage moving someoftheUnion’s guarantees ofunanimity. lay thefoundationsofaconsensualevolution even withouttheformal and thenewprojectproves tobeattractive, itwillprove thatitispossibleto points, which couldinspireanewway forward. Ifthingsdevelop smoothly, At thesametime,draft Constitutionrecordedagreementonmany strengthened Europe. voter? Energyandsecuritypoliciesareobvious candidatesfora that theConstitutionwas tooabstract intheeyes oftheaverage opinion. How oftenwas itsaidduringthereferendumcampaigns are concreteenoughtosecurethesupportofgovernments andpublic that boldreformsareacceptedmoreeasilywhen theirambitions Let ussimplystatethatthehistoryofEuropeanconstructionsuggests 69 Challenge Europe – February 2007 70 Challenge Europe – February 2007 .ColetteMazzucelliandDerekBeach (dir.) (2006) 5. PhilippedeSchoutheete (2000) 4. RenaudDehousse(2005) 3. ArticleIV- 447oftheConstitution. 2. See Andrew Duff,‘B Plan:How torescuetheEuropeanConstitution’, 1. Endnotes 1See,forexampleGuy Verhofstadt (2006) 11 François Lamoureux’Draft Constitution:why arearguardshouldbeestablished’, 10. EuropeanCommission‘Feasibility Study, Contributiontoapreliminarydraft ConstitutionoftheEuropean 9. EUI,RobertSchuman Centre(July 2000) 8. On Ireland,seeforexampleBrigidLaffan’Securinga‘yes’: fromNiceItoII’, 7. Fritz. Scharpf ’The Joint Decision Trap’, 6. Rienner Pub. No. 52,September2006,http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Etud52-en_01.pdf Education andResearch. Union, working document,4/12/2002’.p.XI. on ReorganizationoftheEuropeanUnion Treaties Reforms Macmillan, B.P.G. Smith(2002) , The Hague/London:KluwerLaw International. La findel’Europe The CaseforEurope:Unity,Diversity andDemocracy intheEU Constitution BuildingintheEuropeanUnion: Public Administr Reforming the Treaties’ , Paris: Flammarion. The UnitedStatesofEurope Leadership inEUConstitutionalNegotiations . ation , Vol.66, 1988, p.239. 1988, , Vol.66, Amendment Procedure.SecondReport Notre Europe,StudiesandResearch , London:Federal Trust for Notre Europe Notre Europe The Processof Treaty , 28 April 2004. , 25 April 2005. , London: , Lynne driven solelyby aEuropean elite,withoutbringing thepubliconboardas well. Netherlands, it isthattheprocessofEuropean integration cannolonger be If thereisone clearlessonfromthe2005 referendainFrance andthe and takeaccountofdiffering nationalattitudestowards itsroleandpurpose. Greater flexibilitymightindeed beessentialtoholdtheenlargedEUtogether participants andtheneedfor moreflexibility. balancing theneedtoensurethatEUremainsacommon projectforall explores thevarious ways inwhich aUnionof30-plusmightmove forward, The firstarticleinthischapter, by Anand MenonandKalypsoNicolaïdis, regarded asathreattotheUnion’s politicalintegrity. policies andadvancing integration. Butgoingdown thispathisalsowidely there isenoughpoliticalwill–andeffective forimplementingcrucial euro anddefencepolicy allshow thatthiscanwork inpractice –provided a central issue. The experiencesoftheSchengen free-movement zone,the In such avast anddiverse EU,‘differentiatedintegration’ islikelytobecome very dangerous. number ofcountriesiswithdrawn, which isbothunlikelyandpotentially this assumption–unlessthepromiseofeventual membershipmadetoa EU leaderswillhave tothinkaboutinstitutionalreformonthebasisof have morethan30memberswithintheforeseeablefuture. At somepoint, at aslower pacethaninthepast,andrealityisthatUnionwill The enlargementtrain is,however, likelytoremainontrack, albeitmoving globalised world. it withthenecessarytoolstofacechallenges andopportunitiesofa in theshortrunthatwillimprove thedecision-makingprocessandprovide settlement any timesoon.Nevertheless, theEUneedsaninstitutionalreform unlikely thattheUnionwillbeequippedwithafinalconstitutional Treaty by French andDutch voters iseventually solved, itisnow very However theproblemarisingfromrejectionofEU’s Constitutional by Antonio Introduction III. WHEREISTHEEUGOING? Vitorino 71 Challenge Europe – February 2007 72 Challenge Europe – February 2007 unsettled: thenatureofUnion’s politicalsystem–i.e.theway itreally new constitutionalsettlement,thereisanothercrucialissuewhich remains Beyond theinstitutionalarchitecture andtheway theUnioncanachieve a whole series ofpastEUreferendatellusaboutthepossibleways forward. difficult challenge. Richard Sinnottassesseswhat thevoting patternsina compromise acceptabletoEuropeanpublicopinionwillbeaparticularly Member StatesandwithintheStates.Inthiscontext,findinganew and what theUnioncanoffer, andbetweencitizensbothindifferent The two votes alsoexposedthecontradictions betweenwhat citizenswant ever-wider Europe. against defining Europe’s boundaries,andexamines theprospectsforan no prospectof doingso.Graham Avery considers theargumentsforand ‘neighbours’ arehopingto move intotheEUhousewhile othershave ‘Neighbourhood Policy’, which iscurrentlyblurred by thefactthatsome Answering thisquestionwould alsoclarify thepurposeofEurope’s States participateinwhich policies. to theissueofwhat theUnion doesandnotdo,which Member the situationwillneedtobeclarified,notleastbecause itisdirectlylinked should beclosedtoanyone asamatterofprinciple. At somepoint,however, status’ andstarttalksaswell. There isnoreasonwhy theUnion’s door unclear which ofthesecountrieswilleventually begranted ‘candidate While Turkey has already started(bumpy) accessionnegotiations,itis for granted. eventual membershipcannot,foravariety ofdifferent reasons,betaken This doesnotmeanthattheyshouldjointheEU–onlytheir will allbe,inoneway oranother, ‘problematic’potentialMemberStates. still outsidetheclub),remainingcountrieswithmembershipambitions into thefold(andpossiblyafewofsmall Western Europeanstates Once theUnionhasfulfilleditspromisetobringBalkancountries there anabsolutelimittohow bigtheUnioncangetwithoutcollapsing? a countryEuropeanandthereforepotentiallyeligibleformembership,is (publicly, atleast)by politicians–astowhere theEU’s bordersend:what makes Finally, thereistheperennialquestion–oftendebatedbutnever answered whether a“morepolitical”Unionisdesirable andfeasible. role ofdeliberative democracy andEuropeanpoliticalparties,considers works andconnectswithEUcitizensinpractice. John Palmer examinesthe Justice and Home Affairs, and former Deputy Prime MinisterofPortugal. andformerDeputy andHome Justice Affairs, HeisaformerEuropeanCommissionerfor Europeprogramme. its Political Antonio isChairmanoftheEPC’sVitorino Governing BoardandChairof of thoseopportunitiesandminimisethethreats. where the EUisheaded–andhow itintendstogetthere–makethemost pose asmany threatsasinternalones.Butaclearvisionwillbeneededof globalised world, externalchallenges willprovide asmany opportunitiesor This willnot,ofcourse,dependonlyondevelopments withintheEU:ina can buildonthoseachievements over next50years and,ifso,how. way, beenaremarkablesuccessstory. The questionnow iswhether theEU The first50years ofEUintegration have, foralltheupsanddowns alongthe 73 Challenge Europe – February 2007 74 Challenge Europe – February 2007 They arguethatsinceconsensusontheway aheadhasproved difficultto own good. the mainlessonfornexthalf-centuryisthatithasbecometoobigits certainly worth celebrating. Yet many –toomany –seemtobelieve that A unionwhose membershiphasgrown almostfivefold in50years is by Anand MenonandKalypsoNicolaïdis Europe@50: doingless, better, together if andwhen theyare,bothwillbedesirable. and thenextenlargements mustwait fortheseconditions to befulfilled.But of ownership onthepartof–theirpolitical leaders.Constitutional reform Member States,notablyby cultivating closerlinkswith–andagreatersense performing itscurrenttasks moreeffectively and reconnectingwithits The way aheadfortheUnionlies instreamliningitspolicy ambitions, governments concerning the needforequalityofstatuswithinUnion. heightened sensitivities among, particularly, newandsmallMemberState widespread uneaseamongEuropeanpeopleabout integration and Indeed, such ideasare potentiallycounterproductive, given both on thebasisofconfusedlogic. is practically conceivable, andthosewho argueintheirfavour tendtodoso which variable geometryora‘coreEurope’(anexceptionbeing foreignpolicy, in way aheadfortheEUliesviaill-conceived andimpractical schemes of We, however, believe inaninclusive Europe. We rejectthenotionthat the quasi-impossible. in itsmidstwithoutsomekindofcoregrouptoprovide leadershipis to meanthatoperating withnew, largecountriessuch asPoland (or Turkey) should nottrytobiteoffandswallow morethanitcanchew –istwisted in theprocess,sensibleideaof“integration capacity”–thattheEU Nostalgia rather thananewvisionseemstobetheorderofday. And small grouporgroupsofstateswillingtotakethelead. Nice Treaties), theonlyway todrive integration ‘forwards’ istodosoviaa for thedampsquibsproducedby thenegotiationson Amsterdam and (although itisimportanttorememberthatthesecannotbeheldresponsible achieve inrecentyears, andparticularlysincetherecentenlargements ad hoc arrangements continuetofunctionremarkablywell). Neither I I characteristics, honedover halfacentury: Advocates ofasmaller Uniontendtooverlook threeofitsfundamental and ideas–butwithoutgiving upitssoul. To besure,theEU at50mustinnovate andrenewitsstock ofinstruments must provide areliable,effective andinclusive commonhouse. to survive butforthosestates,peoplesandcitizenswho choose tostay in,it state; aconstructuniqueinhumanhistory. Such aconstructmustbeflexible This iswhy weneedtounderstandtheEUasafederal union,notafederal by choice, achoice constantlyreassertedrather thanmadeonceandforall. a MemberStatetoleave theUnionasafundamentalprinciple:wearetogether One ofthedraft Constitution’s greatestinsightswas toacknowledge therightfor states (notablytheUS)arepotentiallyhighlymisleading. unanimity –meansthatfacilecomparisonswiththedevelopment offederal retain controlover allmajordecisionsand,inmany cases,taketheseby Yet thelargelyconfederal structureoftheUnion–inwhich MemberStates solidarity betweenpoliticalcommunities. so many policy areaswhile establishingsystematic schemes tofoster linking highlydeveloped sovereign statesexercised somuch influenceover The EUisnotaregionalUnitedNations.Never beforehasaninstitution and solidarityinaglobalisedworld? Are today’s EUleadersuptotheformidablechallenge ofbalancingchoice Saving theEU’s soul groupings ofMember Statesbeingformed withoutspecificobjectives. not beimpeded fromdoingso.Conversely, there isnopointinimagining states agreeon aspecificobjective thatisbestpursuedtogether, theyshould Functionalism: Indeed, theEUstoryhasproved thatsizealonedoesnotimplyleadership. the other, therespectdue toevery Member Stateanditspopulation. hand, thepower thatcomeswitheconomicanddemographic sizeand,on of thecontinent.Instead,asubtlebalancehasemerged between,onone project. Never againshouldonebig statebeallowed todominatetherest The absenceofhierarchy: the EUisaboutdoingthings together. Thus, ifasub-group of the EUwas explicitlybuilt asananti-hegemonic 75 Challenge Europe – February 2007 76 Challenge Europe – February 2007 States (France, Germany andtheUK)withIran. Capacityandpolitical will group, notably inthenegotiationsundertaken by thethreelargest EUMember of variable geometry. We can already discernthe outlinesofa‘leadership’ Foreign andsecuritypolicy may betheareawhich lendsitselfbesttothelogic euro zoneandattendantfarces relatedtolabourmobility). the ridiculousreasoningthat ledtoLithuania’s rejectionasamemberofthe attempts toconfersecond-class statusonthem(aperception reinforced by Member States,several ofwhom arebridlingover what theyperceive as others moving forward even withoutit.However, italsoappliestothenew This isclearlyadangerinthecaseofUK,ever suspiciousoftheidea others fromgoingahead. enterprise willnottrytoforce aunanimousvote inanattempttoprevent More significantly, thereisnoguarantee thatthosestatesexcluded fromthe objective mustnothinder another. Functionalism –andcommonsenserequirethat thepursuitofone the It may simplybethecasethat(justified)requirementnottoundermine about theirattractiveness. since theywereintroducedin Amsterdam in1999,which says something Constitutional Treaty. Yet equally, theseprovisions have never beentested participate asopposedtotheninespecified(equallyrandomly) inthe respect ascomparedtoitsputative successor–requiringonlyeightstatesto principles enumerated above. The Nice Treaty isrelatively permissive inthis Enhanced cooperation ismeant,intheoryatleast,tobefaithfulthe ‘core group’,assuggested,notably, by theever-inventive NicolasSarkozy. out inthe Amsterdam Treaty, orthecreationofsomekind‘vanguard’ or possible flexiblefutures:theuseofenhancedcooperation procedureset Under currentconditions,two possibilitiespresentthemselves intermsof Is enhanced cooperation theanswer? I have beenthecasewhen Lithuaniawas prevented fromadoptingtheeuro). not becausesomeMemberStateschoose toexcludeothers(asseems because thoseontheoutsidedonotwish–orareabletotakepart, be includedincooperative ventures. Smallergroupingsshouldonlyexist Inclusiv acquis communautaire eness: countries ableandwillingtopursuepoliciesshouldalways has ruledoutlikelyareasofcooperation. matters ofeconomic policy. Even here, however, the groupischaracterised relatively compact sizeandabilitytoexercise leadershipwithin the Unionon explaining its reluctance toexpanditsmembership asadesiretopreserve its Others, ofcourse,have seentheEurogroupasavanguard inwaiting, after theFrench andDutch referendawas paradoxical tosay theleast. by theDutch andItalians. The call foravanguard of thefoundingmembers tried tocallameetingofthe sixoriginalEECmembers–anattemptscuppered on theConstitutional Treaty, formerGermanChancellorGerhardSchröder the NetherlandsandSpain.Meanwhile, inthe lightoftheDutch referendum framework andinvolving Austria, Belgium,France, Germany, Luxembourg, comprises theSchengen 2Club,created in May 2005outsidetheEU formally onmattersrelatingtointernalsecurity. A completely differentgroup The ‘bigsix’(France, Germany, Italy, Poland, SpainandtheUK)already confer vanguards seemappropriatefordifferenttasks. The problemnow, ofcourse, isthatnosuch ‘project’exists,anddifferent specific objective. and EconomicMonetaryUnion–thedecisionwas takeninthenameofa geometry hasbeenattemptedbefore.Inthosepreviousinstances–Schengen the others. This standsinstarkcontrast totherare casesinwhich variable aspirations astothedestinationtowards which thegroupwillbeleading political leaderswho have talkedinthesetermshave expressedonlyvague The obvious questionthisposesis:‘vanguard ontheway towhere’? The various identity throughcollaboration acrossanumberofareas. group inquestion–and,thecaseofacoregroup,makingsdifferent this logiconestepfurtherby implyingagreaterdegreeofpermanenceforthe The optionofavanguard orcore,notformalisedinany treatyprovisions, takes A vanguard for theUnion? whole derives benefitsfromtheseactions. able toactdosointhenameofUnionasawhole, andtheUnionasa mediation-intervention) anddifferentpartsoftheworld. Those willingand States willbemostrelevant todifferenttypesofmission(civil-military or In thespiritoffunctionalismandnon-hierarchy, differentgroupingsofMember undertaken undertheumbrellaofEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy. combine here,astheyalready have andwillcontinuetodosoinmissions 77 Challenge Europe – February 2007 78 Challenge Europe – February 2007 of non-hierarchy: statusasasubstituteforpurpose.Second,indoingso,they big, rich orfoundingstates–forthesakeofit,thereby underminingthenotion key proponentsoftenseemmoreconcernedwithassertingtheirdifference–as There aretwo fundamentalproblemswiththenotionofa‘vanguard’. First, its Stability andGrowth Pact. of France andGermany inavoiding sanctionsforbreaching thetermsof much credibilityfollowing theturbulentsecondhalfof2003andsuccess euro shouldtake.French callsforsomeformof‘economicgovernment’ lost more by divergent preferencesthanconsensusaboutthefuturedirection accession states untiltheyraised theircorporate rates). When thisfailed,a threatened to cutregionalaidtolow-tax economiesamongst the 2004 using goodold-fashioned bullying(Jacques Chirac andGerhard Schröder the currentclimate,France andGermany didattemptastepinthisdirection corporate taxrates. While harmonisingtheserates isclearly anon-starterin address what they perceive tobeunfaircompetition fromcountrieswithlow These lie,atleastin part,inadesireonthepartofsomeMemberStates to defensive originsofthisinitiative inordertoappreciateitsfullsignificance. of doingbusinessinthevarious MemberStates. Yet itisimportanttograsp the providing potentialinvestors withgreaterclarityabout thefiscalimplications The statedobjective issensibleenough:itwould increasetransparency, EU corporate taxbase. current attemptsby Taxation CommissionerLászlóKovács tocreateacommon A tellingexampleofthelimitationsideaa‘core’ isprovided by the hence theircontinuedchallenge tohighertax, moreregulatedeconomies. would stillfacetheproblemoftheirmembershipsinglemarket and excluded, forinstance,Ireland’s low-tax regimeorliberal-minded Britain, actions isviacollective actionthatinvolves thosestates. A coregroupwhich Indeed, theonlyway todealwiththeexternalimpactofotherMemberStates’ creation ofacoreEurope. dumping. Yet thisopposition doesnotprovide asufficientbasisforthe characterised by perceived deregulation,liberalisation, andsocialfiscal There areplentyofopponents,particularlywithintheEU-15,aUnion to fulfilanobvious needorfunction. perceived toberather thanwithenablingittoreach somenewdestinationor are concernedmorewithleadingtheUnionaway fromwhere itiscurrently flexibility only allowed competences tomove upwards to Brusselsrather than In thisregard, thedraft Constitution undoubtedlyfellshort. Itsprovisions on in thecurrentclimateofdistrust towards integration. Commission itselfneedsto becautiousinattemptingtodoso,particularly up with‘bold’initiatives to‘kick-start’ theintegration process.Butthe one cancontroltheproclivity ofcertainirresponsible governments tocome Competence, inotherwords, isamoresensitive issue thanever before.No want tostokefearsofthedangersaEuropean superstate. first steptowards harmonisation. This, inturn,isgristtothemillofthose who scheme willinevitablybe seen–indeedithasalready beenportrayed –asa obviously fallswithinthiscategory. However presented,theCommission’s particularly thosedealingwithcontentiousorpolitically-sensitive sectors. Tax The firstisthatcautionrequiredbeforeunveiling newinitiatives, leaders withinitneedtolearnsomepainfullessons. of theEUtomeddleinGermandomesticaffairs),Union andthenational coalition have usedhighlyacerbiclanguage when discussingthe‘tendency’ German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s positive tone, many membersofher number ofMemberStatestocriticisetheUnionopenly(forallcurrent the lightofagrowing willingnessamongpoliticiansinanever-increasing In thewake ofthereferendumresultsinFrance andtheNetherlands,in Learning painful lessons the Union’s currentimpasse. notion thatambitiousschemes pioneeredby afew represent arouteoutof The taxexamplealsounderlinesseveral oftheproblemsimplicitin effective aslongtheirmaintargetsrefusetoparticipate. scheme. Hereinliestheproblemwithsuch schemes: theycannotbe attracting foreigninvestment –have alldeclaredtheiroppositiontothe Lithuania –low-tax countrieswhich have proved relatively successfulin enhanced cooperation procedure.Predictably, Britain,Ireland,Latvia,and necessary legislationand,anticipatingopposition,todosounderthe Commissioner Kovács hasthereforedeclaredhisintentiontointroducethe other formsoftaxation. that low corporate rates are,insomecases,morethancompensatedforby second-best optionwas devised,toharmonisethetaxbase,thereby revealing 79 Challenge Europe – February 2007 80 Challenge Europe – February 2007 which nationalpoliticiansareabletocarpandcriticisestemsfromtheirlack rather toreconnectitwithitsconstituent MemberStates. The easewith The secondlessonisthatthereaneed,nottorelaunch theUnion,but greatly limitingtheseparliaments’leverage againstcentralisation. proportionality testinadditiontotheunclearprovisions onsubsidiarity, thus provisions onnationalparliamentarycontrolfailedtoincludea ‘big brother’grab forpower onthepartofEUlaw-makers; anditslaudable instance); itswording onpre-emptionwhen theUnionactssoundedlikea to comeback down totheMemberStates(incompetitionoragriculture,for more closely with theoutputsofintegration. The morenationalpoliticians the Constitutional Treaty representedaway oflinkingnational parliaments Hence, the‘yellow’ cardprocedurewhich would have beenintroducedby related’ provisions ofthedraft Constitution. implement –withoutrecourse toaformaltreaty–mostofthe‘democracy In procedural terms,EUHeads ofStateandGovernment coulddecideto There aretwo potentialsolutionstothisproblem. Given this,itislittlewonder thatpopularfaithintheUnionisdiminishing. Restoring thepublic’s faith intheUnion Brussels makesgoodpoliticalsense. policy stances–as,indeedwould allpoliticians. Defending‘us’against therefore, would bewelladvised tobearthisinmind when formulatingtheir happens toPoland, notwhat happenstotheEU. Polish politicians, about hiscountrythathasfarbroadervalidity: Poles careaboutwhat It tookPoland’s flamboyant President Lech Kaczynskitodarestateatruth short-term nationalobjectives. blame theEUforeverything thatgoeswrongandtotakedecisionsbasedon It ishardlysurprisingthatnationalpoliticiansfacestrongincentives bothto for itsfailuretodeliver onthem. instance), butitsindividual membersareequallyquick toblame‘theUnion’ unrealistic initiatives (thestatedambitionsoftheLisbonprocess,for Consider theEuropeanCouncil:notonlyisitquick tolaunch hopelessly Union officialsas‘them’. of asenseownership ofwhat theUniondoes;anabilitytotalkabout nItrainlRltos nvriyo xod UnitedKingdom. ofOxford, University Relations, in International oftheEuropeanStudies CentreandLecturerKalypso Nicolaïdis isDirector UnitedKingdom. of West EuropeanPolitics atBirminghamUniversity, oftheEuropeanResearch and ProfessorAnand MenonisDirector Institute even provide such amarket? support oftheirpopulations,what isthepointofaEuropeanUnionthatcannot ‘projects’ seemunlikelyeithertofindaconsensusbetween governments, orthe of thisprocessdidlittletoinspireEuropeanpublics. Yet, inanera where further fall inlove witha market.Inmany ways hewas right,andthelow-profile nature Former CommissionPresidentJacques Delors once famouslyaskedwho could ‘Bolkenstein’ directive). perfunctory bureaucratic consultation(which lasted two years forthe carry outpoliticalimpactassessmentsoftheirinitiatives and not justthrough for arace tothebottom.Onother hand,Europeanlaw-makers needto of mutualrecognition,which representsmuch morethanthestartingpistol fail tograsp thephilosophicalandconstitutionalimportofcoreprinciple Services Directive during2006.Ontheone hand,Europeancitizensoften Lessons canbedrawn fromthedebatewhich surroundedtheadoptionof be addressed. If theUnionisnottofalterincarryingoutitscoretask,such trendsneedto increasingly questioned. even thepillarsoffreemovement andnon-discriminationseemtobe sums given by governments toindustryover thelastyear. Moregenerally, Poland, andSpaintorecentstateaidfiguresrevealing afailuretoreducethe ranging fromapparentlyprotectionist impulsesincountriessuch asFrance, Treaty, aseriesofpotentialthreatstothe internal markethave emerged, political attentionhasfocusedonhigh-profileissuesliketheConstitutional First andforemostamongsttheseisthecreationofasinglemarket. While asked toperform. policy initiatives andfocusinginsteadonthosetasksithasalready been More substantively, theUnionwould benefitfromturningitsback ongrand about theoutcomes. are involved inpolicy-making, thelesscredibleitisforthemtocomplain 81 Challenge Europe – February 2007 82 Challenge Europe – February 2007 democratisation andcitizenparticipation. project isconfrontedby aproblemitpartiallyevaded in1957–thatof again theproblemsinvolved inratifying EUtreatiesby selective referenda. on theConstitutional Treaty inFrance andtheNetherlandshighlightedonce The indecisionanddelay following thenegative outcomeofthereferenda The problem of ratification by selective referenda to respondtheFrench andDutch ‘No’votes ontheEuropean Constitution. problem has,ofcourse,immediateandacuteimplicationsfortheissuehow referenda intheprocessofratifying changes toEUtreaties. This paperfocusesonavery specificaspectofthisproblem,namelytheuse On the50 by Richard Sinnott EU referenda: selective veto orinclusive consultation on theUnion as awhole. country thatvotes ‘No’,theoutcomehas apotentiallyfundamental impact voting ‘No’. In thecaseofdevelopmental referenda,aswellaffecting the have appliedto jointheEU,consequencesmainlyaffectcountry are radically different.Inthe caseofaccessionreferendaincountriesthat The consequencesof negative decisionsin these two kindsofreferendum new applicant,asproposed in someMemberStates,mostnotablyFrance. possible futurereferendainexistingMemberStateson the accessionofeach of treaty-baseddevelopments inEuropeanintegration, butitalsoincludes union. The developmental referendumcategoryrelatesmainlytotheratification Member StatesonjoiningspecificareasofEUactivity, forexamplemonetary with theproposaltojoinUnion,butalsoincludes referendainexisting referendum categorymainlyincludesreferendainapplicant countriesthatdeal namely accessionreferendaanddevelopmental referenda. The accession In thiscontext,itisimportanttodistinguishbetweentwo typesofreferendum, European constitutionaldevelopment? distinct fromsomeMemberStates)shouldhave aveto over theprocessof some otherconcessions?Ifnot,isitrightthatnationalelectorates (as If so,shouldthisbeonthebasisofarenegotiatedtreatyor Should theelectorates inthecountriesconcernedbeaskedtothinkagain? th anniversary ofthe Treaty ofRome,theEuropeanintegration 1 2 This aspectofthe 3 by flat trajectories, with the latter atline aFigurein slightly 1). The lowerpre-1982 levelandpost-1997 of justperiods topmost the abovearecharacterised (see 1997 precipitous slightly 50%. and more betweenand 1991 fall mainly sustained rise in support between 1982 and 1991 and an almost equally sustained h Eurobarometerthe ’membership indicator’, EuropeanThe public’s basic attitude European to integration, measured as by opinion public EU natureof The donesoonerrather thanlater. better probably is this ratification-by-referendumand the issue;consider to importance, some future set of treaty changes will be. It is therefore important of scalethis on not aretable However,the changes currentlyonthe if even EuropeanConstitution are important and cannot simply be abandoned. be emphasised that this analysis assumes that thethe naturetreaty of Europeanchanges public in opinion.the proposed Before embarking on thisIn task, considering it should how to respond to this problem, it is necessary to take account of veto by that country on the Union’s constitutionalvoting development.‘No’. Thisis because a negative vote in referendumany one country maycan amount be greaterto a for the UnionIndeed, as ait whole can bethan argued they thatare forthe theeffects country of a negative decision in a developmental 100 Fig. 1: Trends in support for European integration, EU 1973-2005Europeanintegration,forEU support Trends in 1: Fig. 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 0 Source: EB3-EB66 Source: EB membership & dissolution indicators, EB3-EB64 indicators, dissolution & membership EB Source: 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977

1978 Dissolution –very sorry Dissolution –indifferentanddon’t know Membership good 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 5 1992 shows distinctive two features a – 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 4 83 Challenge Europe – February 2007 84 Challenge Europe – February 2007 by 2001. 40% in1981,rosetoahighpointofonly49%1991andthenfell21% that enthusiasmfortheintegration project,which stoodatjustunder additional Eurobarometermeasure(the’dissolution indicator’)shows is even lesspropitiousthanthemembershipindicatorsuggests. An In fact,however, thepublic-opinioncontextoftheseratification processes ratifying theEuropeanConstitution went asfaritdid. and Nice Treaties wereratified andinwhich theincompleteprocessof This lower level ofsupportispartthecontextinwhich the Amsterdam halted until2004, when amodestupward trendre-establisheditself. At thatpoint, however, Dutch opiniontookadownward turnwhich was not took endorsement ofmembershipto well over 80%around 1991/92. a gradual and,by andlarge,uninterruptedpathof risingsupportwhich for membershipoftheUnion (justshortof70%).From there,itfollowed Thus, theNetherlands startedinthe1970swithahighlevel ofsupport of supportforEUmembership. 2001 andDenmarkin1992)have shown distinctively differenttrendsandlevels The fourcountriesconcerned(theNetherlandsandFrance in2006,Ireland wax andwane. of theratification processsimplyonthebasisthatsupportforintegration may This, inturn,suggeststhatitwould bewrong to exorcise thereferendumaspart or againstparticulartreatychanges. levels ofsupportorlack of supportforintegration intovoting decisionsfor changes suggeststhatitwould bewrongtoassumeadirecttranslation of the fourcountrieswhich have, atonetimeoranother, said‘No’toEUtreaty However, examination ofoverall trendsinattitudestoEUmembership eliminate thoseconstraints. treaty changes shouldbeencouraged toconsidertakingmeasures that areconstitutionallyorpoliticallyconstrained toholdreferendaonEU changes shouldbeavoided where possible,andeven thatthosecountries All ofthismay seemtobepersuasive evidencethatreferendaonEUtreaty result thatindifferenceoutstrippedenthusiasmby 30percentage points. or an“indifferent”responsetothisquestionrose58%by 2001,withthe Equally strikingisthefindingthatproportiongiving eithera“don’t know” integration (see Figure 2). contexts andat quitedifferentlevels and trajectories ofsupportfor European It isclearthat each oftheseoccurred inquitedifferentpublic-opinion return tothefour‘No’outcomes inEuropeantreatydevelopmental referenda. Having outlined thetrendsinattitudesfourcountriesconcerned, letus Interpreting the ‘No’ votes signs ofrecovery fromthatmodestfall. 75%, andthethreeorfourmostrecentEurobarometers have shown some and 1997. After 1999,opinioninIreland didretreat,butonlyfrom80%to the downward trendthat characterised Europeasawhole between1992 (from 47%in1984to80%1999).Inparticular, Irishopiniondidnot join The 15years thatfollowed saw aremarkably sustainedandsubstantialrise support formembershiptothemidfortiesin1984. However, 1979saw thebeginningof asubstantialdropthattookIrish Irish opinioninthemid-to-late1970swas notfarbehindthatoftheFrench. Reflecting Ireland’s morepositive endorsementofentryintotheEUin1973, by 2006. experienced asustainedrecovery inthelate1990sandwas back atabout60% Unlike theEuropeanaverage, however, Danishsupportformembership have seen,startedintheUnionasawhole in1992. Danish attitudestoEUmembershipjoinedthegeneral declinethat,aswe began asustainedrisethattookittothelow sixtiesin1993/94. At thatpoint, support formembershiplanguishedinthemidthirtiesuntil1985,when it True totheEuroscepticimagewithwhich DenmarkjoinedtheEEC,Danish support formembershipstoodatjustaboutthe50%mark. 2005, theyear ofthereferendumonEuropeanConstitution,French decade, while haltingthedecline,hasshown nosignofrecovery andin after which itfellyear by year upto,andincluding,1996. The following accompanied by ariseinsupportthatpeakedatalmost70%1987/88, The startofFrançois Mitterrand’s French Presidency in1981was took themtojustbelow 50%in1980. Dutch, however, theFrench immediatelyenteredonadownward paththat the EECthatwas justslightlylower thanthatintheNetherlands.Unlike France startedinthemid-1970swithalevel ofsupportformembership 85 Challenge Europe – February 2007 86 Challenge Europe – February 2007 against the incumbent government in the Member State concerned. State Member the in government incumbent the against or for opinion public of balance the with do to everything and Europe with do to nothing have issues European on referenda that is interpretation One opposite two to open is opinioninterpretations public of that role have the sparkedcontextualisation of an intense debate different configurations very opinion. public However, context ofin this ofthe the political science literature.Thekeypoint emergeto fromall thisof thatis referenda canwonbelostor in for support of level prevailingmembership The was again.about 50%, different having wasfallen from ‘No’ 74% in French 1987 to The44% in 2004. 1991. in 89% of high a from support in fall substantial a of end the at came it that in ‘No’ Irish the from However,differed seventies. it high to mid the in membership for support of background a against expressed was it that in The 2001. autumn Dutch ‘No’ in to the European Constitution 81% was a bit like to the Irish ‘No’ to Nice, immediately recovered it and 2001, in 71% spring to 1999 in 81% from was fall that but Union, the of membership for support in fall a of wake the in occurred Ireland’sNice 2001, to In ‘No’ to about was and (68%). level trend highest-ever its reach upward long a on been had membership EU for In 1992, Denmark voted ‘No’ to the Maastricht Treaty when Danish support Fig. 2: Membership good: Ireland, Denmark, Netherlands, FranceNetherlands, Denmark, Ireland, good: Membership 2: Fig. 100 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 0 74 Source: EB indicators, EB1-EB66 indicators, EB Source: Source: EB3-EB66 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 Year 90 91 92 93 94 95 ‘No’ vote Ireland – A goodthing Netherlands – A good thing Denmark – A good thing France – A goodthing 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 (i.e. thesecond-order effect)isdetectable, itplayed amuch smallerrolein although theeffect ofsatisfaction-dissatisfaction withtheincumbentgovernment Treaty, Garry, Marsh and Sinnottconcludethat:“Ouranalysis…suggeststhat, Likewise, inadetailedanalysis ofvoting inthetwo Irishreferendaonthe Nice this conclusion”. on thesinglecurrency in September2000gives noreasonforchanging 20 not holdforDenmark,atleastasfartheEuropean issueinthelate of referendumsasmainlyreflectingthepopularity the government does to theDanishcase,Palle Svensson concludedthat:“The Franklin thesis In ananalysisoftheconflictbetweenthesetwo interpretationsastheyapply the overall legitimacy oftheEuropeanproject. ratification would bequitedefensibleandcouldseenascontributingto outcomes weremainlydeterminedby therelevant issues,theiruseintreaty process ofratifying Europeantreatieswould bedaft. If, however referendum by domesticpoliticalissuesandforces, using referendaaseven partofthe European treatychanges. If referendumoutcomesweremainlydetermined referenda shouldbeencouraged ordiscouraged asameansofratifying These conflictinginterpretationshave profoundimplicationsforwhether than totheincumbentgovernment willdeterminetheoutcome. of thereferendum,morelikelyitisthatvoters’ attitudestotheissuesrather usually addtheobvious riderthatthemoresalientissueissubject referendum, arethedeterminingfactors.Expositionsofissue-voting model policy issues,or specificaspectsofthetreatythatissubject which attitudestoEuropeanintegration ingeneral, ortospecificEuropean The alternative tothisviewisthe‘issue-voting’ interpretation, accordingto standing ofgovernments inthefirstorderarena”. necessarily betakenatfacevalue becauseallowance mustbemadeforthe cases ofsecond-ordernationalelectionsinwhich theresultsshouldnot proposed by governments inparliamentaryregimesshouldbeviewedasspecial As exponentsofthe‘second-orderelection’interpretationputit:“…referenda at thenationallevel). and/or theirassessmentofthegovernment’s performanceonfundamentalissues voters’ attitudestofirst-orderissues(i.e.theirnationalpartyidentification or Europeanelections),inwhich theoutcomeissaidtobedeterminedby the In thisview, referendaareakinto‘second-orderelections’(e.g.localorregional th century isconcerned.” Headds that “thesixthDanishreferendum 7 6 87 Challenge Europe – February 2007 88 Challenge Europe – February 2007 reference groupssuch aspoliticalparties”. length andqualityofthecampaignclaritystandpoint circumstances, inparticularwhether theissueisaneworanoldone, from referencegroupsorrelyontheirown attitudesdependsonthe ‘second-order’ or‘issue-based’andtheextenttowhich thevoters takecues European Constitution,Svensson notesthat“whether referendumvoting is Finally, takingintoaccounttheevidencefrom2005referendaon European issues”. determining theoutcomecomparedwitheffectofattitudestoarange of is unlikelyto solve theproblemof electorates ofparticular countries If ratification-by-referendum cannotbe abolished,andifmuddling through the ratification-by-referendum route. electorates ofcountriesthat, forpoliticalorconstitutionalreasons,pursue problem ofgranting aveto over EUconstitutionaldevelopment tothe of thetreatyinthatreferendum. Inwhich case,theUnionisleftwith of gettingagreementtohold asecondreferendumorofsecuringratification nature oftheissue(s)involved, thismay ormay notwork eitherinthesense Depending onthesizeandweightofcountryconcerned andonthe endorsement ofthetreatyinquestioneach country inasecondreferendum. Danish ‘No’toMaastricht andtheIrish‘No’ toNice. The endresultwas an individual basis. This iswhat was donesuccessfullyinrespondingtothe referendum decisions(orotherfailurestoratify) astheyoccurandon an A morerealisticpossibilityistomuddlethrough,dealing withnegative referenda ontheissue.For obvious reasons,thisisunlikelytobesuccessful. One possibilityistoseekagreementamongtheMember Statesnottohold then beappliedtotheproblemofcurrentconstitutionalproposals. of theratification process.Ifthismatterofprincipleweredecided,itcould European Constitutionshouldbe,buttowhat todoaboutreferendaaspart response totheproblemsinvolved inratifying thecurrentlyproposed The question‘Whatistobedone?’refersnotwhat theimmediate What isto bedone? and, iftheyshould,what thatroleshouldbe. i.e. whether ornotreferendashouldhave aroleintheratification process This latterpointiscrucialwhen itcomestodecidingwhat istobedone; 8 9 having a veto over developments in integration, perhaps the time has come to grant the electorates of all Member States – or rather the electorate of the Union as a whole – a voice in the process. In other words, perhaps the time has come to institute EU-wide referenda to deal with constitutional developments in the Union.

In order to clarify what is involved in this proposal, it may be useful to remind ourselves of two simple distinctions: 1) the nature of the outcome of the referendum process, i.e. whether it is indicative or definitive; and 2) the arena within which the referendum takes place – the different arenas 2007 Challenge Europe – February in this case being the EU as a whole versus individual Member States.

Cross-tabulating these two distinctions gives a four-fold typology of EU referenda: (A) supranational consultative, (B) supranational binding, (C) national consultative, and (D) national binding. (See Figure 3).

The fact is that the Union already has two of these types of referenda: national consultative referenda (Type C), as in, for example, the Netherlands; and national binding referenda (Type D), as in Ireland. Of the other two types, one (Type B) is probably unrealistic on the grounds that it would be extremely supranational.

Fig. 3: A typology of potential and actual EU referenda Nature of the outcome

Decision-making arena Indicative Definitive

A B Supranational Supranational EU as a whole consultative; e.g. none binding; e.g. none (but possible) (and impossible?)

C D

National consultative; National binding; Selected Member States e.g. the Netherlands e.g. Ireland

89 90 Challenge Europe – February 2007 to holdasupranational consultative referenduminwhich thevotes would only realistically, Type A implies either Type Cor Type D. Itsimplywould notbefeasible This proposalismorecomplexthanmay appearatfirstsight. This isbecause, ratification ofEUtreatychanges. In short,theproposalistoholdasupranational consultative referendumfor as awhole andinwhich theoutcomewould beindicative. referendum; i.e.oneinwhich thedecision-making arenawould betheEU This bringsusthecoreofproposal,which istointroducea Type A throughout the Union,theproposalwould have the furtherbeneficial If weassumethat anEU-widereferendum would takeplaceonthesame day back tothedrawing board. consultative processmightwellresultintheframers ofthetreatybeingsent European level andsuffered defeatinseveral MembersStates,the On theotherhand,ifratification proposalonlysqueakedhomeatthe proposal was narrowly defeated. a secondreferendumincountryorcountrieswhich theratification strong EU-wideendorsementwould provide areasonable basisforholding 65% infavour. At aminimum,narrow nationaldefeataccompaniedby a depending onwhether the Europe-wideresultwas abaremajorityor, say, For example,anarrow defeatinonecountrywould lookvery different to assesstheresultsinindividual MemberStates. the Unionasawhole and usingthisoutcomeasabroadercontextinwhich This would give arealitytotheconsultative processby gaugingopinionin treating theprocessasconsultative. electoral veto by extendingthereferendumtoallMemberStatesandby The firstconsequencewould betheelimination oftheselective national Consequences andconclusions provisions makingtreaty-relatedreferendabinding. consultative, exceptinthosestatessubjecttounalterable constitutional in each andevery MemberState. These country-level referendawould alsobe An EU-widereferendumwould, be counted,announcedandhave force atthelevel oftheUnionasawhole. de facto , alsoinvolve anationalreferendum .The many dimensionsoftheproblemareanalysedinfollowing recentpapers: StefanoBartolini‘Should 1. Endnotes Institute. UCD Geary the Public Behaviour OpinionandPolitical Research Programme atthe of Relations CollegeDublinandDirector atUniversity and International Richard SinnottisProfessor ScienceintheSchoolofPolitics ofPolitical contribution tomakingtheEuropeanUnionmoredemocratic. referenda aspartoftheratification processwould makeasignificant merit ofthecaseforchange, usingEU-wideandnationalconsultative provided thatelitestakeonthechallenge ofconvincing thepublicof Provided thattheproposedconstitutionalchanges arefundamentaland make theircasetotheEuropeanpublicatnationaland level. who are committedtostrengtheningtheintegration processcanandwould The proposalforanEU-wideconstitutionalreferendumpresupposes thatelites effectiveness ofthecampaign. related towhether theissueisafundamentalone,andtoquality electorate andthedegreetowhich citizensvote ontheissueatstakeare This bringsusback tothepointthatqualityofdeliberation by the complex and/orarcane, theyprobablydonotbelonginaconstitution. public. The answer tothisobjectionisthatiftheissuesinvolved areallthat would noteliciteitherinterestorunderstanding onthepartofEuropean in EUconstitutionaldevelopment aretoocomplexandarcane, andthatthey Perhaps thestrongestobjectiontoproposalisthatissues thatarise referenda mightbeincorporated intoaEuropeantreatyorconstitution. experience withtheproposedprocess,deviceofEU-wideconsultative introduced by theEuropeanCouncil.Subsequently, andtakingaccountof It isassumedherethataEurope-wideconsultative referendumprocesscouldbe States inthewake oftheFrench andDutch ‘No’results. related anddamaging‘wait andsee’responseadoptedby several Member consequence ofeliminatingtherealorpresumeddominoeffect,and No. C-05-02,2005, http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-05-02.pdf.; SimonHix‘Why Deficit intheEU: A ResponsetoMajone andMoravcsik’ in Notre EuropeP the Unionbe‘Politicised’? ProspectsandRisks’in olicy P apers , No.19,2006; Andreas Follesdal andSimon Hix‘Why There isaDemocratic Politics: The Right orthe Wrong SortofMedicine fortheEU? European Governance P apers (EUROGOV) , 91 Challenge Europe – February 2007 92 Challenge Europe – February 2007 .Palle Svensson ‘The EuropeanReferendumExperience in Western Europe’.Paper presentedinthepanel 7. .MarkNFranklin, Ceesvan derEijkandMichael Marsh,‘ReferendumOutcomesand Trust inGovernment: 6. For adiscussion oftheEurobarometerindicators,seeOskarNiedermayer, ‘SupportforEuropeanIntegration: 5. For acontrary pointofview, see Andrew Moravcsik ‘WhatCan We LearnfromtheCollapseofEuropean 4. The problemshadpreviouslybeenencounteredintheDanishreferendumonMaastricht Treaty and 3. Iwould liketothankPalle Svensson forvery helpfulcommentsonthefirstdraft ofthispaper. 2. .John Garry, Michael MarshandRichard Sinnott,‘‘Second Order’ Versus ‘Issue Voting’ EffectsinEU 8. .Palle Svensson ‘The EuropeanReferendumExperiencein Western Europe’,Paper presentedinthepanelon 9. on “DirectDemocracy inEurope–comparative andtransnational perspectives”, 3 Budapest, 8-10September2005:25. Referendums: EvidencefromtheIrishNice Treaty Referendums’inEuropean Budapest, 8-10September2005:9. Public SupportforEuropeinthe Wake ofMaastricht’ in Internationalized Governance Trends andContrasts’, inOskarNiedermayer andRichard Sinnott(eds.)(1995) Constitutional Project?’in the IrishreferendumonNice Treaty. Vierteljahresschrift ‘What Can We LearnfromtheCollapseofEuropeanConstitutionalProject?’in Right orthe Wrong SortofMedicinefortheEU?NotreEuropeP the EUneeds(Left-Right)Politics? Policy Reformand Accountability areImpossiblewithoutIt’in “Direct Democracy inEurope–comparative andtransnational perspectives”, 3 2005: 215. , 47,Jg.2006,Heft2,S.219-241. Politische , Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press.pp.53-72. Vierteljahressc hrift , 47,Jg.2006,Heft2,S.219-241. West EuropeanP West olicy P apers olitics , No.19,2006; Andrew Moravcsik , Vol. 18,No.3,1995:110. Union P rd rd Public Opinionand olitics ECPR Conference, ECPR Conference, , Vol. 6,No.2, Politics: The Politische by J democratic Europe demandsamoreGlobalisation politicalandmore at theinstigation oftheMemberStatesthemselves –governments have not Union anditsinstitutionswhen unpopulardecisions aretaken–very often about EUaffairsinaludicrously short-sightedway. Quick todemonisethe help. The politicalelitesinmostcountries conducttheirpublicdiscourse What passesforpublicdebate onEuropeinmany Member Statesdoesnot and diplomatic,insufficientlypoliticaldemocratic. called ontomake.EUaffairstendbedismissedasexcessively technocratic engage withtheEuropeanprocessorwhat democratic choices theyarebeing changes inbothEUpolicy andgovernance. Voters have littleideahow to especially the(necessary)enlargementofUnionand seeminglyconstant decision-taking intheEU. This is,inpart,duetothespeedofdevelopments, The European publicisbewilderedby thecomplexitiesofpolicy-making and elections agreaterchoice ofalternative policy strategies. democratic. This mustinvolve politicalpartiesgiving voters inEuropean becomes lesstechnocratic anddiplomatic,morepolitical The EUwillnotbeabletoconfrontthechallenges ofglobalisationunlessit States isstillgrowing. the gulfbetweenEUinstitutionsandcitizensinmany ofits27Member evolution oftheEUcannolongerbeignored.Opinionpollsconfirmthat The warning signals inrecentyears ofagrowing popularuneaseaboutthe to boththeEUandwiderprocessofEuropeanintegration. continuing lossof unlikely tobepermanentlyorfatallydamagingtheUnionitself. A But such failures,iffollowed by anappropriatechange ofstrategy, are globalisation itself. greater influenceinternationally–notleasttohelpshapethegovernance of reforming itseconomy, strengtheningitsinternaldecision-makingorseeking Union sometimesimplementspolicieswhich prove inadequatefor As itcrossesthelargelyunchartered seasofglobalisation,theEuropean desperately needed tointheirown interests. surprisingly found itdifficulttomobilise support fortheEUwhen they have ohn P almer political legitimacy, however, couldposeamortal threat 93 Challenge Europe – February 2007 94 Challenge Europe – February 2007 88. In1966,42%professeda“very strong”attachment tothepartyoftheir of theelectorate belongedtoapoliticalparty;today, thefigureisjustonein this withstrikingstatisticsfortheUnitedKingdom.Fifty years ago,onein11 orientation ofspecificgovernments. Professor Vernon Bogdanorillustrates political partiesandgovernment systems,irrespective ofthepolitical Opinion pollsreveal astartlingdeclineinpublicconfidencenational Member States. are heldineven lower esteemthantheEUanditsinstitutionsinmost It islesswidelyappreciatedthatnationalpoliticiansandpoliticalinstitutions restricts thepolitical choices opentovoters. more crowded space in thepoliticalcentre. This loss ofpolicy differentiation Mainstream parties have foundthemselves driven intoanever smaller and them fromeach other, butwhich arecredibleinthenewglobalenvironment. need todevelop alternative nationalpolicy strategies thatsharplydifferentiate At thesametime,globalisation isrestrictingthepoliticalspacewhich parties support forsingle-issuecampaigns andactivity involuntary organisations. younger peopletojoinpolitical partiesinthepastnow tendtoleadtheminto report amassive declinein membership. The energyandtheidealismwhich led also marginalisedtheinfluenceofvoluntary partymembers.Parties acrossEurope Accelerating bureaucratisation andtheprofessionalisation ofpartypoliticshas mainstream partiesare. War. Voters today arenow uncertainwhat thebasic‘missionandvalues’ of been astrikingdeclinein‘ideological’politicssince theendofCold Why shouldvoters feelsodisenchanted withnationalpoliticians? There has has beenderailed. to theEU.Butasaconsequenceoftwo ‘No’votes, theproposedEUtreaty mainly becauseofdomesticeconomic,politicalorsocialissuesquiteunrelated and theNetherlandstopunishdeeplyunpopularnationaladministrations, Constitutional Treaty provided anirresistibleopportunityforvoters inFrance against unpopularMemberStategovernments. The referendaontheproposed The EUhassufferedenormouscollateral damageasaresultofthebacklash organisations –notleastthechurch. the populationtrustedpoliticalparties,comparedwith29%forcivil society A recentEurobarometerpollfoundthatacrosstheEUasawhole, just17%of choice; today only13%doso. 1 2 decision-making bodies. to beinformed butalsotobeconsulted aboutthefuturedirection of In modern European democracies, thepublic expectsnotonly decision-making architecture. who isresponsibleforwhat –andwho isaccountabletowhom –withinthe and Europeanlevels ofgovernance. They have noclearunderstandingof confused aboutthedivision ofresponsibilitiesbetween regional,national Council ofMinisters)arenotbeingheldproperlyto account. Voters are that EUdecision-makers(especiallygovernments acting togetherinthe inconsistent informationandcommunication. There isawidespreadview The currentdemocratic malaisehas,however, deeperrootsthanpooror to ‘Brussels’. the messagesdelivered to thepublic.Communicationscannotsimplybeleft ownership withtheEUinstitutions(notably the Commission)of EU communicationsstrategy requiresMemberStates totakeshared Wallström toaddresstheseproblems arewelcome.Buttobeeffective, an recent initiatives taken by EuropeanCommission Vice-President Margot of how theUnionfunctionsandkeypolicy issuesitfaces. The More canbedonetoimprove publicknowledge andunderstanding in theirnameby theirgovernments andby theEU institutions. to adequatelyunderstand(letalonepassjudgementon)what isbeingdone elitist. Many citizensbelieve thattheyaredeniedtheinformationneed EU decision-makingistooremote,esoteric,technocratic andtoo At theEuropeanlevel, theseproblemshave beenreinforced by asensethat Consulting thecitizen –theriseof deliberative democracy respond tothechallenges ofglobalisation. apparent impotenceofnationalgovernments andmainstreampartiesto ‘populist’ andxenophobicpartiesbenefitby exploitingpublicuneaseatthe policies requiredtosurvive andprosperinaglobaleconomy. Onlyextreme painful adjustmenttothenewpatternsofemployment andsocialwelfare increasingly marginalactorsinthedramas generated by thesometimes Even inthelargerEUMemberStates,governments tendtobeseenas European elections. been thedownward trendinvoter participationinbothnationaland More worrying thantheimplosionofmembershippoliticalpartieshas 3 95 Challenge Europe – February 2007 96 Challenge Europe – February 2007 state becauseitdealswithissues which cannotberesolved at nationallevel. Milward argues,European integration hasrescued,andnotdisplaced,thenation of MemberStates’and(where appropriate)regions.Indeed,asProfessor Alan The EUwill,asfarahead asanyone cananticipate,continue tobea‘federation been established. feasible onlyforthose‘nationstates’where apopular That iswhy initiatives such astheEuropeanCitizens’Consultations, democratic accountability when theyactwithintheEUprocess cannotnow be But thecrisisof confidenceinMemberStates governments’ transparency and utopian illusion. They arguethattheexistingdemocratic mandategiven to But someexpertsbelieve thatafullyfledgedEuropean the publicandEUinstitutions. citizens –while indispensable –may notsufficetoclosethegapbetween Improved informationoramorestructuredsystem ofconsultationwith Are party-based democratic politicsredundant? in any futuretreaty. signatures needtobecollectedshouldbe.Itisessentialthatthisretained is stillunclearwhat theminimumnumberofMemberStatesinwhich right toproposethattheCommissionintroducenewlegislation,althoughit Initiative was includedintheConstitutional Treaty. This gives citizensthe Thanks totheConvention ontheFutureofEurope,aEuropeanCitizens’ participation inthefutureusingarange ofinnovative techniques. for Europe’s development. The aimistoestablishamodelforEuropeancitizens’ common groundandmakerecommendationstopolicy-makers onthepriorities deliberations areassistedby expertstoidentifythekeyissuesatstake,lookfor of geography andlanguage.Citizenschosen randomly totakepartinthe from all27MemberStatestodebatethefutureofEUacrossboundaries These Consultationsareproviding anopportunityformembersofthepublic on Europeanissues,aresoimportant. European Policy Centre–todevelop radical newways ofconsultingcitizens not-for-profit foundations andarange ofotherorganisations,includingthe by theKingBaudouinFoundation –togetherwithothernon-partypolitical, the MemberStatesshouldsuffice. the EUinstitutions(includingCommission)by theelectedgovernments of 5 They view‘Parliamentary Government’ as demos demos has already 4 remains a launched 6 decision-makers andcitizens. Parliament would essentially actasacommunicationsrelay between “semi-Parliamentary, semi-consociational democracy” inwhich aEuropean the behaviour ofgovernments intheCouncilofMinisters. Butonlyadedicated, More canbedone tostrengthenthepowers ofnationalparliaments toscrutinise governments andscrutiny by nationalparliaments. weak tonon-existentwhen itisexercised purelythroughelectedMember State The growth andcomplexityofEUaffairs hasmadedemocratic accountability The future for European parties who presentthemselves asaspirant leadersoftheEUexecutive. between partieswithdifferentprogrammes andvalues, ledby personalities only have meaningwhen theyareaskedtochoose inEuropeanelections For themassofpeople,involvement intheEuropeangovernance processwill democracy willtendtoappealmost toorganisedspecial-interestadvocates. it isvulnerable tothecharges of‘corporatism’ andelitism.Consultative Advocates ofthemore radical versions of‘directdemocracy’ recognisethat multiple identities. and othersdemonstrates, Europeansalready increasingly live inaworld of Parliamentary systemattheEuropeanlevel. and non-majoritarianinstitutions”areseenasasubstituteforparty-based Other formsofdecision-makingsuch as“judicialisation,expertdecision-making democracy’ offersabetterway forward. democratic systemandarguethatanalternative processof‘deliberative Some questionthefutureforany party-basedEuropeanParliamentary only addtotheproblemsofdemocratic accountabilityatthenationallevel. denied. Any attempttobypass astrongerdemocracy attheEuropeanlevel will ‘European’ identitiesinherentlycontradictory. As thework ofPaul Gillespie a nationalidentityasmuch astheotherway round.Norare‘national’and States, however, itwas thecreationofConstitutionwhich generated transnational The ‘realists’andthe‘sceptics’agreethattherecanbenoEuropean determined by majorityvote afteraprocessofpartypoliticaldebateandconflict. society bodiesaswellgovernments) orby courtsofjustice,rather thanbeing decisions shouldbetakenthroughaformofconsensus(possiblyinvolving civil demos without a‘shared’Europeanidentity. IntheUnited 9 These areallvariants oftheideathatkey 8 Still otherspleadfora 7 10 97 Challenge Europe – February 2007 98 Challenge Europe – February 2007 based on19 political culturebroughtaboutby globalisation. Traditional politicalidentities themselves atthenationallevel iftheyaretosurvive theprofoundchanges in Without doubt,politicalparties(nationalandEuropean)willneedtore-invent the CouncilofMinisters(when governments legislateunderCommunitylaw). executive institutionstoaccount. This meansnotonlytheCommission,butalso elected EuropeanParliament canreallybecharged withholdingtheEU’s for European politicians. They have – forgoodreasons–traditionally seen Taken together, these developments would implyacultural revolution alternative Europeanstrategies intheseareastoobecomes possible. Security Policy moreseriously, ahealthy democratic debateabout global environment totake theconstructionofanEUCommonForeign and sustainability Moreover, ifMemberStatesareforced by changes inthe and significantchoices onissuessuch asjobs,prosperity, socialjusticeand In thisperspective, itbecomes possibletooffervoters farmorewide-ranging individual countriesacting alone. be very differenttothatwhich existsbetweentheglobalmarketand European economiesifcollectively mobilisedby theMemberStateswould would existbetweentheglobalmarketandhugepotentialof the the freedomofactionopentoUnion.Butbalance ofpower which Of course,therealitiesofglobalisationwillalways imposesomelimitson single stateactingalone. alternatives ataEuropean level inaway which would beimpossibleforany of globalisation,EUMemberStatescancreatenewspaceforpolicy When theyacttogetherthroughsharedsovereignty tomeetthechallenges offered voters and,therefore,tendtobefoughtonpurelynationalissues. voters. They are‘notaboutenough’intermsoftheEuropeanpoliticalchoices European Parliament electionslack sufficientpoliticalconsequencetoengage the sameway thatmany regionalpartiesinMemberStatesdo. At present, will retaincloselinkswiththeirnationalaffiliatesintheMemberStates– programmes and(eventually) membershipstillhave tobebuilt.Ofcoursethey At theEUlevel, genuinelyEuropeanpartieswiththeirown identities, functioning andtheirrelationshiptowidercivil societymovements. are alsomelting.Parties willhave tofundamentallyrethinktheirinternal consequence, someoftheoldideologicaldelineationsbetweenleftandright th and 20 th century classstructuresareinevitablyfading. As a 11 .John Palmer ‘Europe: Whose Europe?’ An Address by totheEuropean UnionInformalMinisterial 3. Eurbarometer:http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63_en.pdf (page25). 2. Vernon Bogdanor, NewStatesman,23October2006. 1. Endnotes ChairmanoftheEPC’s HeisalsoDeputy Europeprogramme. Political Centre. John Palmer isamemberofthe Governing Board oftheEuropeanPolicy undermine –democracy atthenationalandsub-national levels. The evolution ofEuropeandemocratic politicswillstrengthen–certainly not the EuropeanParliament. through thestillslowly-emerging politicallifeoftheEU institutions,above all non-governmental organisationsandothercivil societyinterestsaswell demos It isalready possibletodiscerntheoutlinesofadeveloping European than alongnationallines,andincreasinglyso.” in theParliament ismorealongtransnational andideologicalpartylines genuine ‘democratic partysystem’intheEuropeanParliament. First, voting the positive side,andpotentiallyfarmoreprofound,istheemergenceofa Comparative Politics attheLondonSchool ofEconomics,statesthat“…on In astudy ofvoting patterns,SimonHix,ProfessorofEuropeanand identities andby providing funding.Changeisalready underway. Treaty would have encouraged by giving Europeanpartiestheirown legal about achieving fullpartystatus–adevelopment thattheConstitutional The majorpoliticalgroupsintheEuropeanParliament areatlastserious the EUexecutive (thenearestequivalent toaMemberStategovernment). Presidency oftheUnionitself. This would give voters thepower tohelpshape candidates forthePresidency oftheEuropeanCommissionandmaybe the to exploitthespaceforcollective action. They shouldalsooffervoters their European Parliament electionspresentingseriousprogrammatic alternatives With orwithoutanewtreaty, EUpartiesshould gotovoters inthe2009 resulting popularconsensusislikelytoremainintactforlong. without democratic politicalchoice betweendifferingstrategies, no European integration. ButtheEUhasnow evolved tothepointwhere, consensus rather thanconflictandchoice ascentral tothedynamic of Conference on“Communicating Europe”,EuropeanPolicy Centre,7 April 2004.www.epc.eu. Full – intheever-growing cross-borderactivities ofbusiness, trade unions, 12 99 Challenge Europe – February 2007 100 Challenge Europe – February 2007 2 ProfessorSimonHix’The EuropeanParliament- stocktaking andchallenges’ in‘After theannushorribilis–a 12. 1 GeoffMulgan,Fiona MactaggartandRushanara Ali (2006) 11. Paul Gillespieanswers Jens-Peter BondeintheFutureofEuropedebate–EuropeanPolicy Centre. 10. AnnePeters (2003) 9. Peter Mair’Popular democracy andtheEuropeanUnionpolity’, 8. Vivien A. Schmidt, ’The EuropeanUnion:Democratic Legitimacy inaRegionalState?’,Departmentof 7. AlanMilward (1993) 6. .Professor Andrew Moravcsik ‘The EU Ain’t Broke’, 5. http://www.european-citizens-consultations.eu andKingBaudouinFoundation (http://www.kbs-frb.be/ 4. review oftheEuropeaninstitutions’, Young Foundation. 51&offse... -36k www.epc.eu/en/pub.asp?TYP=ER&LV=294&see=y&PG=KWM%2FEN%2Fportal_kw_one&CAT= Integration onlinePapers, EIoP. No. C-05-03,2005.http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/ pdf/egp-connex-C-05-03.pdf International Relations,BostonUniversity. code/home.cfm) 355&l= address: http://www.epc.eu/en/default.asp?TYP=SEARCH&LV=279&see=y&PG=TEWN/EN/directa&AI= A PleaforaEuropeanSemi-Parliamentary andSemi-ConsociationalDemocracy, The EuropeanRescueoftheNationState EPC Working P EPC Working aper Prospect Magazine No.22, January 2006.www.epc.eu European Governance Papers , London:Routledge. Parties forthePublicGood , March 2003. (EUROGOV), , London: European finally end?’ countries can wetakein?How farshould theEUexpand? Where willit But inrecent years peoplehave begun to ask:‘How many more give uspauseinforecastingthefuture. So perhapsthefactthatsuccessive expansionswere unpredictedshould pressure fromitsneighbours, notthroughimperialistambition. enlargement hasbeenreactive rather thanproactive. Ithasgrown under join itsclub–infactithastendedtodiscourage them –anditsstrategy for of integration. Itwas largelyunplanned:the EUnever invited otherstatesto This historyofexpansionisatributetothemagnetismEuropeanmodel 20 years? were partoftheSoviet Union–would becomemembers oftheEUwithin that thecountriesofCentral andEasternEurope–including somewhich could berealised? When theIronCurtainstillexisted,who predicted But even asrecently1987,didanyone expectthatSchuman’s dream moral support.” delivered fromtheircurrentsubjugation,willdemandmembershipandour free peoples,butalsotowelcomethepeopleofEastwho, when foresight: “We mustconstructEuropenotonlyintheinterestsof in the1950s,EUfoundingfatherRobertSchuman wrotewithextraordinary At theoutset,noonepredictedextentofthisexpansion.Itistruethat from fourto23. grown fromsixto27,andthenumberofitsofficiallanguageshasincreased has expandedfrom230to490million,thenumberofitsMemberStates years when itwas notnegotiatingwithprospective members.Itspopulation Since then,theEUhasenlargedrepeatedly:infact,therehave beenfew of enlargement. a member”,itwas silentonthecriteriaformembershiporlimits However, although itstatedthat“any Europeanstatemay applytobecome envisaged fromthebeginningthatEuropeanCommunitywould expand. The Treaty ofRome,whose half-centurywearecelebrating in2007, by Graham Avery An ever-wider Europe? Where willtheEU’s borders end? 101 Challenge Europe – February 2007 102 Challenge Europe – February 2007 critical oftheEU’s expansion.Butfewpoliticalleaderswant togive They arereasonableandpertinentquestions,notnecessarily of thenewmembersin2004and2007,have oftenposedthesequestions. class ortheacademicworld. Ordinarycitizens,welcomingthearrival Interest intheEU’s futurebordersisnotlimitedtothepolitical enlargement played amajorrole. Treaty inFrance’s referendum,inwhich itisoftenargued(incorrectly)that the EU’s futurelimits,particularlyafterthe‘No’vote ontheConstitutional Many ofEurope’s politicianshave calledforadebateoreven adecisionon report totheJune 1992EuropeanCouncil inLisbon).Itaddsadiplomatic answer (infact, thisisasimplerepetition ofwhat itstated15years agoina The Commission issaying here,inanelegantway, thatthequestionhasno is definedfirstandforemost by itsvalues.” must apply, orthattheEUmustaccept allapplications. The EuropeanUnion generation. The treatyprovision…does notmeanthatallEuropeancountries simple timelessformula,and issubjecttoreviewby each succeeding of ideas,values, andhistoricalinteraction cannot becondensedintoa elements which allcontributetoEuropeanidentity. The sharedexperience “The term‘European’combinesgeographical, historicalandcultural Commission todraw anumber ofconclusions. of theEuropeanUnionhasbeenraised inrecentyears. This hasenabledthe prepared forthatdiscussionstatesthat:“The questionoftheultimateborders The wide-ranging reportonenlargementwhich theEuropeanCommission question abouttheEU’s futurelimits. communication”. Buttheysay nothingin response tothefrequently-asked on thesubject,includingpromiseof“greatertransparency andbetter all aspectsofenlargement,anditsconclusionsincludeadozenparagraphs The EuropeanCouncilofDecember2006heldamuch-heralded debateon of theEU’s futurefrontiers?Practically nothing. What exactlyhave theEuropeaninstitutionssaiduptonow onthesubject aboutitslimits? What hastheEUsaid its citizens. universally agreedthattheEUshouldlistenmoretoconcernsof an answer, andtheirreluctanceisparadoxical atatimewhen itis Europeans whose societyrespectsmany Europeanvalues. members –for example,NewZealand, acountrymainlypeopled by like-minded states indistantpartsofthe world tobeconsideredas possible argument concerningEuropean values was really valid, wewould expect But thisdoesnothelpusmuch withourquestionoflimits.Infact,if the negotiations withanapplicant country. These ‘politicalcriteria’ arenow aconditionforopening(andcontinuing) of minorities”. democracy, theruleoflaw, humanrightsandrespectforprotection candidate countryhasachieved stability ofinstitutionsguaranteeing Council inCopenhagen1993that“membership requiresthatthe This referencetovalues followed thedecisionofEuropean rule oflaw’] may applytobecomeamemberoftheUnion”. democracy, respectforhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms, andthe which respectstheprinciplesset out in Article 6[which mentions ‘liberty, modified thetextof Treaty ofRometosay that“any Europeanstate The Treaty of Amsterdam in1997addedareferencetovalues: its Article 49 the EUisdefinedby values rather thangeography. It isoftensaid–andtheCommissionhasreaffirmedthatmembershipof geographical, cultural andhistoricalterms. on how todefine‘European’.Opinionsdifferonwhat itmeansin Rome saidthat“any Europeanstatemay apply”withoutproviding guidance The problemofdefininglimitshasitsorigininthefactthat Treaty of What does ‘Europe’ mean? to addressthisissue. So letmetrytogive ananswer, andtoexplainwhy thepoliticiansarereluctant History shows that‘taboo’questionsofthiskindareoftentheimportantones. considered ‘taboo’by Europe’s institutions? be aprecisedefinitionortimelessformula? And why is thequestion But surelythequestionoffuturelimitsmeritsananswer, even ifitcannot for EUmembership. warning tocertainEuropeanstates(unnamed)which may thinkofapplying 103 Challenge Europe – February 2007 104 Challenge Europe – February 2007 Liechtenstein, MonacoandSan Marino. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Andorra, expected soon), Serbia, Turkey, Iceland,Norway, Switzerland, Armenia, Croatia, Macedonia(FYROM), Montenegro(appliedinJune 2006,membership 47 members:theEU’s 27MemberStates,plus Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Let uslookfirstattheCouncil ofEuropewhich, in2007,willhave thefollowing all theEU’s MemberStatesbelong. and Co-operation inEurope(OSCE),intergovernmental organisationstowhich in themembershipofCouncilEuropeandOrganization forSecurity there isnodefinitive boundary. Although the Ural Mountainsandthe North, West andSouth,itiswell-definedby seasandoceans,buttotheEast So what arethegeographical limitsoftheEuropeancontinent? To the territory isthattheyarepartofFrench territory. the rule,becausereasonwhy theyareconsideredaspartofEuropean overseas departments (Guadeloupe,Martinique,etc.). This exceptionproves lie outsideEuropearenevertheless withintheEU:forexample,France’s precondition formembershipoftheEU.Interestingly, someterritorieswhich This demonstrates thatgeographical contiguityorproximityisa the 21 But isitreallysodifficulttosay which countriesareacceptedasEuropeanin Towards alistof ‘European’ states drawing onhistoricalexperience. Such examplesshow how difficultitistoarrive atanagreeddefinitionby religion isthecriticalfactor. Enlightenment definesEuropeincultural terms.For others,theChristian For somecommentators,the experienceoftheRenaissanceand several otherMemberStates. parts oftoday’s EUwereoutsideit–mostofGermany, partsoftheUKand included intheRomanEmpire’s politicalandeconomicspace,while many have existedatdifferenttimes. Asia MinorandNorthern Africa were In any case,differentgeographical, cultural andpoliticalconceptsofEurope Asian landmass. consider Europelessasacontinentthanthewesternpeninsulaof Caspian Seaareofteninvoked asnatural frontiers,somegeographers st century? OfficiallistsofEuropeanstatesdoexist:they can befound ultimately could thebordersofEUlie?’ the bestanswer thatcanbegiven atthe presenttimetothequestion ‘where now maketo anofficialdefinitionofEurope ingeographical terms, anditis In my view, thislistof44countriesisthe best approximationthatwecan The outer limitsof theEU way? Will EU-27eventually become EU-44? embrace thetenothers?CanfinallimitsofUnion bedefinedinthis already consideredby the EUaspotentialmembers.Coulditeventually Of these17states,thefirstseven (theBalkancountriesplus Turkey) are I I I I I I I I We canexcludethreegroupsofstates: closely inrelationtopossibleEUmembership. could notbeconsideredasUnionmembers.Soletusanalysethemmore different fromthoseoftheEU,andtheyincludeanumberstateswhich It isobvious thatthebasicaimsandactivities ofthesetwo organisationsare and theHolySee. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,Canada,theUnitedStates the 47memberstatesofCouncilEuropeplusBelarus,Kazakhstan, Now letuscheck thislistagainstthatoftheOSCE, which has56members: as European,butarenotyet membersoftheEU: This analysisleaves usfinallywith17stateswhich areofficiallyrecognised Russia. countries covered by theEuropeanNeighbourhood Policy Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,Georgia, Moldova andUkraine (EastEuropean EFTA); Association – Iceland, Norway andSwitzerland (countriesoftheEuropeanFree Trade Turkey; (Balkan countries); Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,Macedonia,MontenegroandSerbia which have norealinterestinjoiningtheEU Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco,SanMarinoandtheHolySee:micro-states of OSCEwhich areconsideredby thatorganisationas‘Central Asian’; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan andUzbekistan:members USA andCanada:‘transatlantic’ membersofOSCE(andNATO); 1 . 2 ); 105 Challenge Europe – February 2007 106 Challenge Europe – February 2007 to absorbnew members”,anditisclear thatinstitutionalreformof some “the paceofenlargement musttakeinto account thecapacityof Union Nevertheless, theDecember2006European Councilstatedexplicitly that absorption capacity. in itsrecentreportonenlargement, hasusefullydemystified thenotionof the samesenseasothers decidedatCopenhagen,andtheCommission, It isoftensaidthatthis‘fourth criterion’isnotaconditionformembershipin both theUnionandcandidatecountries”. European integration, isanimportantconsideration in thegeneral interestof capacity toabsorbnewmembers,while maintainingthemomentumof The 1993EuropeanCouncilinCopenhagenstatedthat“theUnion’s ‘outer limits’. Thus thetotalof44isnotfixedinstone;but,asnow, itdoesrepresentthe leave theEU. example, becameindependentin2006)andexistingMemberStatesmay even Furthermore, newstatesmay becreatedinEuropefuture(Montenegro,for for membershipandtheEUisnotobligedtoacceptapplications. As theCommissionhasremindedus,noEuropeancountryisobligedtoapply This doesnot,ofcourse,meanthattheEUwill necessarilyhave 44members. I I conclusion that: to opennegotiationsformembershipwould have tobebasedonthe hardly justifythisonthebasisthatcountrywas notEuropean. A refusal If theEUdecidedtorefuseanapplicationfromacountryinthislist,itcould the listisderived. positions officially, sincetheyaresignatoriestotheagreementsfromwhich legitimate. Butitwould bedifficultforEUgovernments totakesuch Union concerningtheconceptofEurope,such positionsareperfectly members oftheEU.Sincetherearehonestdifferencesopinionwithin example, Turkey, orRussia–arenotreallyEuropeanandshouldbe Naturally, somewillarguethatcertaincountriesinthelistof44–for integrate thecountryasamember. the EuropeanUniondoesnothave sufficient ‘absorptioncapacity’to Article 6ofthe Treaty, ortheCopenhagenpoliticalcriteria; the countrydoesnotrespectsufficientlyprinciples mentionedin I I In thelongerterm,EUmay eventually consideraspotentialmembers: any countriesoftheformer Soviet Union. The ‘nextfrontiers’oftheEUwould thuscorrespondtoallofEuropewithout I I I In theshortandmediumterm,EUwilllimititsexpansionto: accession willnotbesetuntilnegotiationsareclosetocompletion. timescale. The December2006EuropeanCouncilconfirmedthat targetdatesfor expand, butmoreslowly. That much isclear, butwecannot bepreciseaboutthe its populationhasincreasedby one-third.Inthecomingyears, itwillcontinueto In thelast12years, thenumberofEUMemberStateshasmorethandoubledand members oftheEU. What aretheirchances ofjoining,andwhen? Let uspasstoarapid survey ofthe17Europeancountrieswhich arenotyet Prospects for future enlargement reform itselfsufficientlytoimprove itsabsorptioncapacity. reform itselfsufficientlytorespectEuropeanvalues andtheUnioncouldoneday ‘geographical’ grounds,sinceinprincipleanapplicantcountrycouldoneday decision would surelybelessdefinitive andpermanentthanarefusalon the EUcouldrefusetoopennegotiationsforoneofthesereasons.Butsuch a So ifanapplicationformembershipisreceived fromanotherEuropeancountry, present 27members. kind mustprecedeoraccompany any expansionoftheEUbeyond its than towards it. difficult; andin termsofvalues, itiscurrently moving away from theEUrather Russia, alsoaEuropean countrybutwhose sizewould makeEUmembership Neighbourhood Policy; Moldova, Belarus)which will,inthemeantime,remain intheEU’s six EastEuropeancountries (Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, applied, couldjoinrapidly. the threeEFTA countries(Iceland,Norway, Switzerland)which, ifthey a longtime; Turkey, whose accessionisuncertain andinany casewillnottakeplacefor Macedonia, Albania); the sixcountriesoftheBalkans(Croatia,Bosnia,Serbia,Montenegro, 3 4 107 Challenge Europe – February 2007 108 Challenge Europe – February 2007 for bothsides? ‘No’ couldhave undesirable diplomaticandeven economic consequences impossible for many years. Sowhy try todecide‘Yes’ or‘No’now, when a from meetingtheCopenhagen criteriathat,inany case,EUmembership is Second, itrisks on ‘will Turkey join?’ In fact,discussionsonthe‘limits ofEurope’cantooeasilybecomedebates Germany have amorerestrictive position,even ontheinclusionof Turkey. member inthelongterm.Butpoliticiansotherstates such asFrance and frontiers). Poland, forexample,wants itsneighbour Ukraine tobeanEU to allow theneighbourstotakeover thetaskofmanagingEU’s external them intheEUtoensurestabilityandsecuritytheir neighbourhood(and Member Stateswhich have borderswithnon-membersoftenwishtoinclude taken by unanimity. views onfuturemembership–andalldecisions enlargement mustbe it sodifficulttoaddressthem? questions thatpeoplepose.Sowhy dotheEU’s institutionsandleadersfind However, one canatleasttackle thetopicinaway thatgives answers tothe prediction fortheultimatelimitsofUnion. claim thatmy analysisiscomplete,andIhave notofferedadefinitive prospective EUmembers,andreviewedbrieflytheirprospects.Idonot I have listedabove thecountrieswhich Ibelieve couldbeconsideredas Why isthequestionoffuturefrontierssoproblematic? First, it is More fundamentally, thediscussionencountersthreekindsofproblem. (‘enlargeophiles’) prefertoavoid debate. are infavour ofadecision,while thosewho wishtocontinuetheprocess that, ingeneral, politiciansopposedtofurtherexpansion(‘enlargeophobes’) Public discussionontheEU’s futurefrontiersischaracterised by thefact and now iswhether adecisioncouldbetakenontheselimitsinadvance. celebrated -historianswillbeabletogive it.However, what interestsushere limits: oneday –maybe in2057,when thecentenaryof Treaty ofRomeis Without doubt,therewillbeananswer tothequestionofEU’s ultimate divisive negative between MemberStates,which have widely-differing consequences . Take the caseofUkraine: itissofar .With theexceptionofEstonia,LatviaandLithuania,which joined theEUin2004. 4. Norway andSwitzerlandalready appliedfor EU membership,buttheirpeoplesaid‘No’inreferenda.If 3. With theexceptionofBelarus,which nevertheless would beacceptedfortheEU’s NeighbourhoodPolicy 2. Liechtenstein isaninterestingborderlinecase:althoughitamemberoftheEuropean Economic Area, it 1. Endnotes Commission official. Graham Avery isanEPC Senior Adviser andaformerEuropean a strategic choice madeinadvance. from thecourseofevents andsuccessive politicaldecisions,rather thanfrom policy of‘constructive ambiguity’willprevail. The EU’s finallimitswillresult So itseemslikelythatfortheEU’s enlargement,anditsultimateborders,a and diminishtheleverage forthoseincluded. To definetheUnion’s ultimatebordersnow would demotivate thoseexcluded of accessionneedstoremainopen. interest. Inordertomaintainthisleverage, thepossibility(notguarantee) transformation inthedirectionofstabilityandprosperityareEU’s behaviour considerably inthehopeofobtainingmembership. Their neighbouring statesarewillingtomodifytheirpoliticalandeconomic membership tootherEuropeancountries.Experiencehasshown that There isafinalargumentof decisions longinadvance ofthemomentwhen theyarenecessary. in politics,timeisapreciouscommodity:itunwisetotakepolitical years, itisimpossibleforeithersidetomakearational judgement.Moreover, Until theneighbourhoodpolicy hasdeveloped morefullyover anumberof Policy, anenhanced policy orsomeotherkindofrelationship? to EUmembershipisnotclear–would itbethepresentEUNeighbourhood Third, itis Norway reapplied,Icelandwould probably follow. and fortheCouncilofEurope,ifitspoliticalconductwas moreinlinewithEuropeanstandards. has signifiedthat,withitstiny population(34,000)itprefersto stay outsidetheEuropeanUnion. premature . Take againthecaseofUkraine: itslong-termalternative interest in keepingopentheprospectofEU 109 Challenge Europe – February 2007 110 Challenge Europe – February 2007 ratified theConstitution,orthattwo countriessaid‘No’inpopularreferenda. political significanceofthefactthat18EUMemberStates have successfully willingness toagreethatwhatever solution isfoundcannotignoreeitherthe treaty andthosewhich responded negatively –aredemonstrating acertain compromises, therearepositive signsthatboth ‘sides’–thosewhich ratified the While itisclearlyprematuretoadvance hypotheses aboutpossible and thosewhich have rejectedit. of MemberStates(18upuntilnow) which have already ratified thetreaty a newsenseofrealismseemstobespreadingamongboththelargemajority The debatehasnow beenrevived, albeitinaless-than-perfectmanner, and the EU’s Constitutional Treaty intheFrench andDutch referenda. the long‘pauseforreflection’which was launched afterthedouble‘No’to The combinationofallthesefactorshasalready hadapositive impacton European project. impasse over theConstitutional Treaty and thereby relaunching the preside over aEuropeanCouncillargelydevoted toovercoming thecurrent before theendofGermany’s EUPresidency, Chancellor Angela Merkelwill French Presidentwillbegin. Then, inthemiddleofJune, justafewdays of the Treaty ofRome. At thestart of April, theprocessofelectinganew construction reflect ademandfor‘more’ not‘less’Europe. showing that mostofthecriticalverdicts onthe currentstateofEuropean Europe-wide opinion pollsalsoprovide somesignsofencouragement, Charter ofFundamentalRights. of instrumentsdirectdemocracy; andgranting fulllegalforce tothe of theCouncil;extension ofQualifiedMajority Voting; theintroduction for Italy:thecreationofan EU Foreign Ministerandapermanent President in any casevery clearin settingoutsomeofthereformsthatareessential Massimo D’Alema,inaspeech totheEuropeanUniversity ofFlorence,was the treatywhile changing theformifnecessary. ItalianForeign Minister A pathtowards acompromiseshouldbepossible,saving thesubstanceof States willmeetinBerlinforasolemncelebration ofthe50 On 25March, theHeadsofStateandGovernment oftheEU’s 27Member by RenatoRuggiero Afterword th anniversary and inthechallenges wefaceinthefuture. need tosearch forthisnewmotivation: itisalltooclear inourdailylives often saidthat Europeisinneedofanew ‘motivation’. However, we donot confront thenewrealityand thenewproblemsfacingsocietytoday. Itis But itisalsoclearthat,on itsown, thisisnecessarybutnot enoughto which Europe andtheworld sufferedinthefirsthalfof20 who have onlyknown thesuccessofthesevalues andnotthetragedies heart ofthishistoricproject. This isespeciallytrueforyounger generations It isabsolutelyessentialtorememberthedeepmotivations which lay atthe identify what itmeanstobelong to,andsharein,theconstructionofEurope. centred upontheindividual –anditisthesevalues, morethanothers,which makes itpossibletocharacterise Europeasanoriginalsystemofvalues exercise ofit,basedonthecommongood.Itisthis grand visionwhich It was notamatterofrevoking nationalsovereignty butofsharingthe common institutionsabletoarticulateinterests. innovative processfor intra-European relationsbasedonthecreationof in Europe,menofgreatvisionandcourage conceived of–andrealisedan achievements. Following theendofaterrifyingglobalconflictwhich began No onecanfailtoacknowledge ourcontinent’s profoundhistorical Europe todate. of theenormouspoliticalandideologicalvalue oftheconstruction necessarily shortdocument,which takesasitsstarting pointtherecognition declaration onthefutureofEurope. This should beahighlypoliticaland On thisoccasion,EUHeadsofStateandGovernment mustapprove a the 50 be ontheGermany Presidency’s first‘big’appointment:thecelebration of As thedialogueover institutionalreformgetsunderway again,alleyes will promote economicgrowth, preserve socialrightsandfightunemployment. ensure securityofenergysupplies,prevent themainthreatstohealth, promote peaceanddemocracy intheworld, protecttheenvironment, responsibility oftheEuropeanUnionthanindividual MemberStatesto 50% (risingtoabove 75%insomecountries)feltthatitwas morethe policy, and68%wanted acommonforeignpolicy. Furthermore,morethan from theEU-25MemberStateswanted acommonsecurityanddefence In recentpollsfromGallupEuropeinBrussels,77%ofthoseinterviewed th anniversary ofthesigning Treaty ofRome. th century. 111 Challenge Europe – February 2007 112 Challenge Europe – February 2007 United Stateswillrequireproactive internationalcollaboration. even redressinghugefinancialimbalancessuch asthoseaffectingthe no singleEuropeancountrywillfeatureamongthetop-ranking powers. And China, India,RussiaandBrazil. Within two orthreedecades,itislikelythat could beprofoundlychanged by theemergence ofnewgreatpowers: Forecasts suggestthatthecurrent ranking oftheworld’s economicpowers is capableoftackling successfullyonitsown. balance; by globalchallenges which nosinglenationstate,however powerful, Our timesarecharacterised by rapid andprofoundchanges intheworld capable ofcommanding consensusamong the27HeadsofState and The forthcoming BerlinDeclaration shouldthereforebeapolitical message fears inarapidly-changing world. style democratic institutions, willbeabletorespondpeople’s hopesand coordination ofeconomic and socialpoliciesframed inCommunity- defence policy, integrated in a monetaryunionaccompaniedby genuine towards agenuinepoliticalunion, equippedwithaforeign,securityand interdependence andtheresultingglobalisation.But onlyanEUgeared There isastrongdemandtoday toimprove thegovernance ofourgrowing who live inpoverty. generations inourcountriesandtodemonstrate our solidarity withallthose alternatives. We alsohave apoliticalandethicalduty, bothtothenew order –isthereforenotanoption,butanecessity. There arenovalid to continuebeaprotagonistofpeaceandprogress inthenewworld integration, anditssocialcultural development, allows ourcontinent Union –onewhich, by dintofitsinstitutional,political,economic In thelightofthisreality, therealisationofamorecomplete European adequate globalpolicies. unmanageable, even fordeveloped countries,intheabsenceofnewand energy resources andtheneedtoprotectenvironment couldbecome To anever greaterextent,problemssuch asinadequateincreasesinwater and born intheSouthofglobe. population couldriseby two billionover thenexttwo decades,with80% valid responseonlywithincertainlimits.Expertspredictthattheworld’s living standardslookever lesssustainable.Migration flows canconstitutea The problemofpoverty in theworld andtheunacceptabledisparitiesin Foreign Minister. Director-General ofthe World Trade andaformerItalian Organization Declaration onthe50 Declaration Renato Prime Minister forthe RuggieroisCounselloroftheItalian Union, working togetherandallwiththesamerightsduties. is possibleforustogetback ontothepathtowards astrongerEuropean The nextfewmonthswillbecruciallyimportantindeterminingwhether it construction ofEuropeandwould thereforebedifficulttoargueagainst. date formeetingsuch goalshasbeenawell-establishedpractice inthe reaching anagreementonthe’constitutional’problem. After all,settinga fixed –forexample2009,rightbeforethenextEuropeanelections As wellassettingadatetoachieve thismajorobjective, oneshouldalsobe completing thefundamentalaspectsofEU. capacity; anditmustfixoneormoredatestosetthetimehorizonfor mention two: itmustequiptheEUwithrealandeffective decision-making in finerhetoric,thismessagemustcontainsomecommitments.Iwill However, inorder tobecredibleandavoid lookinglikeamereexercise the Constitutional Treaty andthefutureofEurope. Government, andthusfacilitatethelaunch ofthedifficultnegotiationson th niesr fteTet fRm.Heisaformer ofthe Anniversary Treaty ofRome. 113 Challenge Europe – February 2007

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The European Policy Centre (EPC) is an independent, not-for-profit think tank, committed to making European integration work. The EPC works at the ‘cutting edge’ of European and global policy-making providing its members and the wider public with rapid, high-quality information and analysis on the EU and global policy agenda. It aims to CHALLENGE EUROPE promote a balanced dialogue between the different Europe@50: back to the future constituencies of its membership, spanning all aspects of economic and social life. Graham Avery Jean-Luc Dehaene Renaud Dehousse Andrew Duff Guillaume Durand Paul Gillespie Alain Lamassoure Anand Menon Yves Mény Antonio Missiroli Kalypso Nicolaïdis John Palmer Renato Ruggiero Philippe de Schoutheete Richard Sinnott Rafal Trzaskowski Antonio Vitorino

February 2007

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