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1-12-1967 Congressional Record S.J. Res. 18 - Voting: Lowering Age to 18 Mike Mansfield 1903-2001
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Recommended Citation Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Congressional Record S.J. Res. 18 - Voting: Lowering Age to 18" (1967). Mike Mansfield Speeches. 641. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/641
This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. S586 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE January 19, 1967 REDUCTION OF US. FORCES IN that the total number of sponsors ls 41 The request that our forces be with EUROPE at this point. drawn from France seemed to provide an Mr MANSFIELD. Mr. President. I I ask unanimous consent that the res excellent opportunity to bring home ap send lo the desk a resolution and ask olution be referred both to the Commit proximately 70,000 of the 900,000 or more that It be read, along wL. lhe names of tee on Armed Services and the Commit American defense personnel and depend the cosponsors. tee on Forei
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 56, Mansfield Library, University of Montana Jcownry 1!1, 1967 Rl 10.. 'AL Rl CORD- ~b rA'I 1: s:; 7 st.nndards or Lrainlng, equipment, staf North Atlantic re lou and our c neral cut In U ld outfl fing and logistics v.hich hav b en maln po Uon tn the v.orld resuii.S from Urf p nc or ta ned for the six US dlrl ion on ~he There 1S not magic number or US. null on American defer 1 ru cl nd European Contlntn h v not b n cv n troops "'hlch, Vi hen tnUon ~~ in Euro1 , dependents In rro or Lhnt cut or remotdy approached by any other v.ill guarantee a lnst probes from U1e force In rope ould t thl •' tion NATO nation. East or a r crud scene of mU1 rl m m In me tlng I he \Y commiLm nts cl - to t sl mtlcant I should be not d the W t There Is not a magw 11um r "'here In U e "'orld. no bly II \ lctn m only three mcmb rs of NATO, oth r than of U.S troops \\hlch ean underwnte our l\ly o 11 \I\\, 1 reit.cra ,I U ,,t \\llh th • United Stnws. t1ll require 2 years diplomacy and Insure ult1mntc solutions or \\ ithouL n urob!C'nt of In nee uf of compulsory en1ce from th lr army of Europe s problems ns w c think they pa) m nts, \\ith or \\iU10ut th • immt•n draftee . 'The e members nrc Portugal, should be solved r uln•ments ot \'letnam. the wductlon Or cc. and Turkey. Great Brttam ha A sub tantlal reduct1on m .S forces or us fore• in We rn Europe Is Ju li long since abandoned consenptlon en In Europe v.ould sttlllea\e an lmpressne fted on Its ov. n merits. lonc-m crdu• tirely as long ago as 1960. Other West U.S. military presence on the Io.'uropean adJustment Ill US pollry 11. ill. n l>t ct to ern f~uro)~an nations ha\e either also Continent TheUS. treaty commltnll'nt Europe Indeed, I bccau ar. ad,ocn<".Y ended compulsory rnlllt.ary ~rvice, or to the defense of We tern Europe under of this cou1se long bcfor< wc b<<"ame lm sharplv reduced the term of their man the North Atlantic Treaty \\ould re mcn:.ed in the conftlct 111 \'wlnnm or power draft. rnam Intact. In that context, tlwre deeply concerned with quc,tlons of bal Fnmce no longer sct>s a need to a.o;slgn \\OUld be no abandonment of mterna ance of pnvrnpn s anv forces to NATO or en~n to guaranU'r tlonal responslbllllles and no lm ita ttou Bef01 ~ closmg, I would like to rraffitm othC'r NATO forces access to French tcr to pro\ ocallon U1at the propo ed resolution 1n no \\ ay rttory. W t Germany has the t'QUha Indeed, v. hat nation would be so fool exclude C{)nsultation \\ 1th our NATO lcnt of 8, rather than the committed 12 hardy as to believe that a reduction m allies. or \\ ith the SoviC't Union, for that divtsions marutcd, equipped and staffed US. forces stationed m Europe 1. e\ 1- rn:\ttN I v. ould bE' less than frank, ho\\ Finally, not only Great Bntain, a:; noted, dence of \\eakness or lack of wlll'' What ever, if I d1d not , tate t.hat I do not but Belguim as \\ell Is anxious to reduce nation would be so foolhardy as to con favor U1e kind of con$ult..at1on that turns lls commttments of troops to NATO. clude that the Umted States, which has into a prolong('(} rxt•rcise for dl'ftl nng Jt set-ms to me tlla t It Is long past the fielded se' era! hundred thousand men m dcctstons and action. time not only to recognize contemporary VIetnam, on the fringes of its vital in And before closing, I should also hkr European rcalillcs but to act on them. ternatiOnal interests. would abandon the to emphns1ze that thts resolution does There is no longer any blinking the fact North Atlantic region which is a corner not Intrude in any way on the b:\..~1c n· that the European governments do not stone of tho
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 56, Mansfield Library, University of Montana Janttary 19, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 8589 France: In 1952. France had aLout five 330.000 men. This reduction in size was on defense. the British Government an somewhat undcrstren ~ th divisions as in large part a result of heavy expendi nounced, without apparent preliminary signed to Afcent, with about four of these tures on the development of a nuclear consultation with its allies, that it in divioions stationed in Germany. Follow striking force. The present striking tended to reduce the British Army of the inrr the outbreak of the Al r; erian rebellion force, consisting of supersonic planes Rhine-BAORr--to 64,000 men within in latr. 1954, France in l!J55 and 1956 carrying 60 kiloton atomic bombs, is not, the next 12 months and ultimately to wi thd rcw three of these dl visions and as far as can be determined, coordinated 45,000 men, that it would reduce its other units for service in Algeria, with with the strategic forces of either Great armed forces by almost one half by 1962, the understanding that they would be Britain or the United States. and that it would rely more heavily on 1·ct.urned as soon as po.ssiblc. The de West Germany: When West German nuclear deterrent power. The Govern pleted French forces in Germany rearmament was originally contemplated ment anticipated that higher expendi amounted to about 1 12 divisions. These within the framework of the abortive tures on strategic nuclear forces would divisions were brought up to the strength European Defense Community, it was require reductions in expenditures on of two divisions when the Algerian war agreed that West Germany would raise conventional forces. It assumed that came to an end in l!J62. They were armed forces of about 500,000 men in steady improvements in relations be modernized but were never moved to the cluding an army of about 400,000 men, tween France and Germany made the forward positions required by NATO and would contribute 12 divisions to the presence of large numbers of British strategy, Other French forces stationed Community. These force goals were car troops on the Continent less urgent. in Al ';cria were brought back to France ried over into the London and Paris ac After lengthy negotiations with NATO but were not reassiQ; ned or earmarked to cords of 1954 under which Germany was military authorities and West Germany, NATO command. invited to accede to NATO. Force goals Great Britain agreed to limit its with On July 1, 1966, the two French divi for the \Vest German army have be::!n drawal.:; from BAOR to 22,000 men. At sions stationed in Germany-about 60,- postponed or tacitly revised downward a the same time. the British tactical air 000 mrn-and tactical air units sta number of times, partly because West force stationed in Germany was cut by tioned in Germany-about 10,000 men Germany's 12-month period of service one half. Britain's present commitment were withdrawn from NATO command. under the draft-changed to 18 months of 55,000 men to the BAOR has been On the same date. French personnel as in l!J62-did not permit the raising of variously described as the equivalent of signed to the integrated NATO com sufficient manpower. At present, West 2 \13 or 3 divisions. Commitments to the mands were withdrawn. Some of the Germany's 12 divisions still suffer from dzfensc of Malaysia and disorders in French air units stationed in Germany a shortage of manpower, and especially some African members of the Common have been redeployed in France. The from a shortage of officers and trained wealth entailed further reductions in Frrnch and West German Governments technical specialists. For lack of train 1964. l<'!aving r..bout 51,000 men in the have recently reached an agreement that ing areas in West Germany, West Ger BAOR. permits the continued stationing of re many's armed forces have also been In recent years, British spokesmen maininr; French forces in Ge1many on obliged to seek areas for exercises in have consistently argued that NATO's the basis of the 1954 London and Paris other European countries. Some West force guidelines should be adjusted down accords and an exchange of letters of German military authorities acknowl ward from supplies and supporting understanding. NATO and French mili edge that West Germany probably has troops to sustain 90 days of conventional tary authorities have yet to agree on a the equivalent of only eight full divisions combat to supplies and supporting per mission for these forces. at present. They dispute the claims of sonnel to sustain 10 to 30 days of con The steps taken by the French Govern some American officials that German ventional combat. In recent months, ment on July 1 completed the withdrawal armed forces suffer from serious defi British authorities have been reported to of French air. naval. and ground forces ciencies in equipment. With the excep have decided on cuts of from 15,000 to from Afcent and other NATO commands. tion of a small territorial force-28,000- 20,000 men in the BAOR unless West No French forces are at present assigned and an even smaller reserve for local de Germany agreed to increase substantially or earmarked to these commands. In fense. all of West Germany's armed its contribution to offsetting the costs March 1959, the third of the French forces-total about 440,COO-are as of maintaining the BAOR in Germany. Mediterranean ileet that had been ear signed to NATO. The redeployment of some supplies and marked to NATO's Mediterranean com Luxembourg: Luxembourg's army has support troops to England would appar mand was withdrawn. In June 1963, shrunk from about 5,500 men to about ently permit cuts of at least 10,000 men. France announced the withdrawal of 2,000 men in the last 5 years. The artil For the time being, however, it has been naval units earmarked to NATO's Chan lery battalion of 500 men attached to reported that all cuts have been post nel Command and Atlantic Comm.and. American forces in Germany consists of poned in view of the fact that the United In April 19G4, the French Government volunteers. An infantry brigade would States has apparently agreed to spend announced the replacement of French presumably be available to NATO after $35 million more than planned on arms naval officers assigned to these com mobilization. In recent months, there and services in Britain in 1967 while mands by liaison officers. In recent has been pressure to disband the army United Slates-United Kingdom-West months. the French Gol'ernment has also entirely and to rely on neighbors for Ge1man talks on troop deployment. indicated that permission for NATO mil defense. strategy, and offset agreements continue. itary planrs to fly over French territory Netherlands: In the late 1950's, the The strength of Great Britain's army in will be granted on a monthly rather than Netherlands reorganized its army to pro 1959 was about 324,000 men. In 1966, it a yearly basis. that France will no long vide two active divisions instead of one stood at about 218,000 men. er participate in NATO's Military Com active division, and two reserve divisions United States: In 1950, the United mittee. and that France will continue to instead of four reserve divisions. In re States had troops amounting to about make financial contributions only to a cent years, the size of the army has 1 \I! to 2 divisions stationed in Europe, selected few NATO Infrastructure proj shrunk from about 98,000 to 85,000. In most of them stationed in West Germany ects. The French Government has con addition to two assigned divisions, the as occupation forces. In September 1950, templated liaison arrangements with equivalent. of about two divisions is ear President Truman announced that he various NATO and national commands. marked to NATO command. had approved substantial increases in the These arrangements as well as ones pro United Kingdom: In the 1954 London strength of U.S. forces stationed in West viding for French participation in .an and Paris accords, the United Kingdom ern Europe. In April 1951. the Senate integrated air defense system covering a undertook to maintain on the Continent passed Senate Resolution 99 expressing sector of northeastern France have yet the four divisions-about 77,000 men "the belief of the Senate that the threat to be worked out with NATO author and tactical air force it stationed at that to the security of the United States and ities. time in Germany, unless overseqs emer our North Atlantic Treaty partners At present, France has about three gencies or a heavy strain on external fi makes it necessary for the United States active divisions stationed In France in nances dictated otherwise. Withdrawals to station abroad such units of our Armed addition to those in Germany. In 1961, would be subject to the approval of Sa Forces as may be necessary and appro the French army numbered over 800,000 ccur and a majority of the Brussels priate to contribute our fair share of the men. By 1966, It had shrunk to about Treaty powers. In its 1957 white paper forces needed for the joint defense of the
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 56, Mansfield Library, University of Montana S:> CONGRI ~ 10~. AL RECORD- 1[ Joml(n·y J.'l, 1' 17
be easll"!r reading ror Members of the Euror>e-Afsouth-appear to be lnrg( ly fore ate hlll'.Y Tl1c ext nt to wlu h Senate, that the entire study be prlnU>d, umeportcd. S mllarly, the dcsir d • A ro comm mls cnn oount on m not In Wlnll print, but In the \L~ual size s length n.nd d•·tlclcncles In NATO nn\al • earm rk d force a 1l11n c rnmtt- print. and &lr forces a1e d1fl cult to c tnbh h. m• n 1 u'lclear. Th PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there Ancl further complicating the task of 1 h folio n r ort rrll , on puu !ely objection? 1 he Chair hears none, and m a urlng national contributiOns again t a\ a liable n d t1 1ef rt• n• co rll in It Is so ord red. force goals is the d1stlnctwn b(' ween complete mfo1 m lion H include , fir t, There being no obJection, the researd1 forces "a IRned to NATO"-tho com a tuble 1\ II a ct Unl d br<"akdO'I\ n ot paper was ordered to be printed In the ing under the operational command or rrport d NATO fon·e oats and tho cOm RECORD, as folloW control of Snceur for p£ acet1me t1 nmh mJtm nts and cu1 r• n c 11t1tbuUons or DECEMBJ:R 23, 1966. and dunng emergulcles under condi NATO mo rnb rs onh for the ror-ouud To; Hon MJCHAJ:L MAN FIELD. tions aRrN'.ch country-and forrP 1.1 1 ned to tht• Crttcinl and n·n F'rom: Foreign Affairs Dhlsfon, Legisla forc<'s "earmnrkc•d for ass1 nment to tral sector that IS, to t\fcent; st·coml, tive Reference Service, the Ubrary of NATO''- thosc forces which natwns tables shouin curnnt contnbutlon of Congress. have agreed to n i n to a NATO com !li'Ollnd foJct•s nt Afnorth and AI outh; Subject. NATO force goals, the contribu mand at some future time-in many ttm·d, a It tmg ot NATO countllt~ that tions ot NATO memb rs, con cription cases. reserves v. luch v. ould presumably g1n~ a\·atlnble lllfonnnuon on chan o•s policies of NATO members. be avallabl · only v.:Jtll!n specified pe 111 c·on Cl iptlon policio s: fourth, n table Clm:D.Al. JU:J.~,\ItltS riods aflcr mobilization. The onlr slto\~ 111 dl'fl'n • expcnd1tuns as a P< r forces at ))Icscnt "assigned" to NATO There arc sPvcral diillculllcs in esti crnta e of •ro national produrt for a1 e most ground forces ~talioncd in Eu 't\'IO mcmbns, lllth, n tuble showing mating NATO forCl goals and the cxte11t to which NATO members have meL their rope and some tactical a1r units. Force npprO\:ed NATO Infrastructure co t commitments. First, it has been the goals and commitment.~ for "earmarked" -shal ing formulc.s. lonf{-standing policy of the va1 ious NATO commands and of the individ I. rorn grmls, uahontll rnmmr1n fils, uutl (I rn' tOtt' ,1, frons In ~1F('f.S.T ual NATO members to classtfy NATO I \1 \I \It\' lOH! F (lOA!~ 'tl~l\11 \I HI ()lila \II' 1 .1>i 10 30 \ 10 F. I> < 1)\lll 11'· force coals and the extent to which these I!E\IJY lll\'J~I
German accession to NATO. Neverthe \\1 l <. rm LilY 1 1 1.~,4 1'1)111 I (IIJ('fl(, }! Ill\ f.llc 11"1 rJ HI less, the commitments and actual con ~fin) 5lrtll til t1l~ .1houl t••J,"oo tributions of some NATO members have t'' • been the subjrct ne1ther of officml state ~tllu rlmd \ t IC'tUt ~ell\ 1 WP. ments nor of w1official speculation. Second, to the extent that some NATO ground force goals and the contributions of NATO members are known, they are I 1~ I <'•I t {t S usually expressed m terms of divisions. But the nwnber or men assumed to a division and the nwnbcr v.:ho contnbute t (1111 tnn th. support to a diVISion vary widely For example, Secrcta1-y McNamara recently D. AF'<.:ENT FQRCF. COALS divisiOn, and when F'rnnce still assi1•twd painted out that a dhislon shce in the In February 1952. the North Atlanuc two diVISIOnS to NATO command, Af U.S. 7th Army statwned in West Gt:r Council mcctinr: at Lisbon Is beheved to cent might be said to have had about many amount!'Q to about 45 ,000 men have approved 1954 !UOund force goals 27' 3 a.~swned divisions. No information whereas a West German division slice for Afcent of between 25 and 30 combat has lx'en found on present requiruncnts amounted to about 17,000 men.' There ready divisions and between 30 and 35 fo1· reserve clivi Ions. fore, a NATO member may well have resprve divisions capable of mobilization C'. NOTF.S ON .N'\riONAI C'UNTRlUt 1111 $ TO met Its commitments in terms of the within 1 month. These goals were not 1\f'fFNT nwnber of d1vis10ns ass1gn!'Q to a NATO even close to being met m 1954, or 111 Belgium : BelgiUm s o.rmy has ~hrunk command. But these div1 ions may fall 1957. Followmg a study by NATO's Mil in si7.c by about 10,000 men In the last and log1 t1c~ support that 1s, m terms of itary Committee in 1956--57-MC-70- 5 years. In 1963. four battallons-ubout manpower, staffing, eqwpment, traimng Afccnt force goals for the end of the 2.000 men-were rrdeploycd from Ger and logi.Hics support; that is, in terms of prriod 1958-63 were reported to be Sl't many to eastcm Bel 1um. TherP ha\e general combat rcadmess. MoreovPr, at 30 combat-ready diVI Sions and con tx-en M!veral rercnt rrports that the Bel especially on NATO's C!•ntral front in siderably fewer reserve d1vls10ns. It was rnan Crtlvemmcnt has decided to rrque t West Germany, these di\lslons may not al~o reporte-d that MC 70 set out a re a reductiOn ln 1ts military commllm• nts be deployed as far forward as NATO QUirement for lhe stockmg of supplies to NATO from six to fow· brigade , or strategy reqmrcs It IS generally be· and eqUipment to su&tam these 30 divi from Its two diVISions at pr
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 56, Mansfield Library, University of Montana 8590 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE January 19, 1967 North Atlantic area," approving "the the sending of replacement for these United States: Several thousand understanding that the major contribu withdrawals would be completed by the marines are believed to be assigned to tion to the ground forces under General end of 1966. Unofficial reports in the the U s. 6th Fleet which is in the Eisenhower's command should be made spring of 1966 placed U.S. withdrawals Mediterranean and earmarked to by the European members of the North from the 7th Army In the range of Afsouth. Atlantic Treaty," and approving plans 30,000 to 45.000 men. The present C ICELAND AND PORTUGAL to send four additional divisions of strength of the five U.S. divisions and Iceland: Iceland has no national mili ground forces to Western Europe. By three armored cavalry regiments sta tary establishment. the end of 1952, the equivalent of four tioned in Germany is believed to bP. be Portugal: Portugal has earmarked one additional U.S. divisions had arrived in tween 210,000 and 225 ,000 men. A farge division of 18,000 men stationed in Portu Europe, with the bulk of them stationed number of the some 56,000 U.S. airmen gal to NATO command. It is believed in Germany. stationed in Europe are also believed to that this division is at present only at In April1954, and again In March 1955, be attached to U.S. forces in Germany. half strength. Most of Portugal's army. President Eisenhower declared that it ll. GROUND FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFNORTH totaling about 120,000 men, is stationed was the policy of the United States "to AND AFSOUTH: Mll..ITARY CONTRIBUTIONS OF in the Portuguese provinces in Africa. continue to main tam in Europe, including PORTUGAL AND ICELAND One air force reconnaissance squadron Germany, such units of its armed forces A . AFNORTH is assigned to NATO. as may be necessary and appropriate to Denmark: All of Denmark's armed IlL CHANGES IN CONSCRIPTION POLICIES OJ.' contribute Its fair share of the forces forces-about 50,000 men-are reported NATO MEMBERS needed for the joint defense of the North to be either assigned or earmarked to Efforts have been made at various times Atlantic area while a threat to that area Afnorth with standing units of 2% exists, and will continue to deploy such in the past 15 years to persuade NATO infantry brigades and three battalions members to acce!)t 18 months as the forces in accordance with agreed North earmarked to this command and some Atlantic strategy for the defense of this standard term of service for men active reserve units assigned to the drafted Into the armies of NATO coun area." President Kennedy, In a Febru command. Denmark's Army totals about ary 1961 message to the Permanent tries. There appears to have been no 30,000 and has remained at relatively period, however, when all NATO coun Council of NATO said: "While relying constant strength during the past 5 also on the growing strength of all, the tries with a draft required 18 months years. or more service. Military authorities at United States will continue its full par Norway: All of Norway's armed forces ticipation In the common defense effort. SHAPE continue to believe that even 18 are reported to be either assigned or months service is inadequate, and that I am convinced that the maintenance of earmarked to Afnorth with standing U.S. military strength 1n Europe is es the minimum service period required Is units of a brigade group and several 24 months, in view of the time needed for sential to the security of the Atlantic battalions earmarked to this command Community and the free world as a the adequate training of troops in mod and most reserve units assigned to the ern armies. whole." President Johnson, in a similar command. Norway's armed forces have message to the December 1963 Minis decreased in size in the last 5 years from Belgium: Military service was extended terial Session of the North Atlantic about 40,000 men to 34,000 men, with the from 12 months to 24 months in March Council said: "To NATO's continuing army shrinking in size from about 21,000 1951, reduced to 21 months In August fulfillment of this task-that of creating to 17,000 men. Norway is reported to 1952, reduced to 18 months in May 1954, a balanced defense posture-r pledge my have committed itself in 1952 to main reduced to 15 months in 1957, and re country's will and resources. We will tain standing units of two full army duced to 12 months in September 1959. keep in Europe the equivalent of six brigades. Military service is currently required for American divisions that are now de West Germany: One of West Ger 12 months, and for 15 months for certain ployed there, so long as they are needed; many's 12 divisions assigned to Afcent Is categories of specialists. and under present circumstances there also assigned to Afnorth and is stationed Canada: No compulsory military serv Is no doubt that they will continue to be in Schleswig. ice since the end of World War II. needed. I am confident that our allies B . AFSOUTH Denmark: Throughout the 1950's, will also make their full contribution to Greece: Greece has 11 infantry di Denmark appears to have had a 16- this NATO defense, so that the burdens visions, two of which are reported to be month term of service for army draftees and reponsibilities of partnership may be close to full strength, and one armored and an 18- to 24-month period of service equitably shared." division. Eight of these divisions are for drafted noncommissioned army offi On the basis of the 1951 Senate resolu assigned to NATO. About 10,000 men cers. In September 1963, the term of tion and Presidential statements such as of the Greek Army are currently sta service was reduced to 14 months for those cited above, the U.S. commitment tioned in Cyprus. Greek armed forces men serving In the armored forces and In respect to ground forces assigned to total about 160,000 men and the Greek signal units, for which formations there Afcent has usually been described as "a Army about 118,000. Both the armed were enough volunteers. Recently, the fair share" or the equivalent of the ap forces and army have remained at rela period of military service has apparently proximately six divisions deployed in tively constant strength in recent years. been reduced to 12 months for army Europe by the end of 1952-for "as long Italy: Italy assigns seven divisions and conscripts and 14 months for drafted as they are needed." Secretary McNa five Alpine bridages of 8,000 men each to noncommissioned officers. mara, In a June 15, 1966, press conference Afsouth. Italy's Army has decreased in France: In December 1950, France in referred to the U .S. commitment as five size by about 30,000 men in the last few creased the period of military service divisions and to the authorized strength years and now numbers about 270,000 from 12 months to 18 months. During of U.S. Army forces to support this com men. Italy's total armed forces cur the height of the Algerian war, the mitment as 225,000 men. rently number about 376,000 men. term of required service was 27 months. The strength of U.S. ground forces Turkey: Turkey's ground forces total This was reduced to 18 months in 1962 assigned to Afcent has remained rela 16 divisions, four armored brigades, four following the reestablishment of peace tively constant since 1952. During the armored cavalry regiments and two para in Algeria. In 1965, France replaced its 1961-62 Berlin crisis about 40,000 more chute battalions. Fourteen divisions are system of universal military service with U.S. troops were sent to Europe, re assigned to Afsouth. Turkey's army has a system of selective service as part of its portedly bringing the total number of shrunk in size in the last few years from program to modernize and reduce the size U.S. ground forces stationed in or near about 400,000 to about 360,000 men. of the army. The present te1m of service Germany to about 280,000. These rein When Turkey bombed Greek Cypriot is 16 months with the possibility of forcements have since been withdrawn. positions on Cyprus in August 1964, it release 1 month early. In the spring of 1966, the Department of withdrew some air units assigned to West Germany: West Germany estab Defense confirmed that about 15,000 Afsouth. These units were returned in lished a system of conscription in 1956. specialists had been or were being with a few days, at which point Greece an The terms of service was set at 12 drawn from the U.S. 7th Army for nounced that It would not go through months. In September 1961, this term service in Vietnam or the United States. with its announced intention of also was extended by 3 months on an emer Secretary McNamara has since said that pulling some units out of NATO. gency basis. In February 1962, the serv-
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 56, Mansfield Library, University of Montana 0;\GRI IO~AL RE ORO- "ATI: • ;)91
Ice unn was xtcnded to 18 months, arm • cmcrccnc resc e of 11 000, ln .S Qo.- rr.mfnt I nn n v. hlch Is the requirement today. v.hlch some men v.ho completed their nr Th term of nice cun~nUy national sen1c unC:er the old ssst m rC'qulrcd In the arm~ I 24 months, Wlllch '1111ll n e unUI \ oluntary 1 ecrultment P..U.T l\ em to ha\ e b n the term required r ·aches n at! actory lc\ I. Other\\ I c turtles 1.01 d n !nee at lc t 1959 \ olunlary military sen 1cc 1., completely 66 n67, 11 •r. Iceland. o nai10nal military c tab- Ill rtf t·Ct rART "t: 11 luncnt nitcd ~tates: Uncia the Sci cti\'e U r 11ou c Commftlrr. on Go Italy: The requh d t.ctrn of scnlcc In Scn1re Act of 1948 army draft<· v.cre rmmcnt Op rations An lm tl II n or Ut rmy was 18 months m l!l59. In ri'Qulrcd to serve 21 months. This penod US partlc- p Uon In the !'.'ATO common In· frru; ructur • progrnm f rty·f fth rt'por Oc obrr 1962. this term \\as 1 educed to of .I'I\ 1cc was inc1 ea.cd to 24 months 111 15 month, which Is the clllreut rcqnhe 1951, and has remamed at 24 months Wa.shlngt.on US Oo~crnment PrlnUng Of Ike. 1066 30 p (89th c• ngreu. 2nd S - nwnt C\ er I;IIlCe. alon. Howe rteport ·o 2323). Set! p 27 Luxembourg. In 1959. Luxembourg re IV Drtcnsc czpcnditurr1 of NATO mcm rr. Mr. JACKSON. fr, Plc !dent, will quhed 12 month cnice for men draft-!'d n p cent of gro • rn~tlonal product 195 , IIlLo tlw army This t('rm v.as r duced 1058, 1964, 1965 I the Senator y1eld? to 9 months In Augu L 1963, and reduced Ur. MANSFIELD. I yield. to 6 mon hs as or January 1, 1966. In Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I com Novl'mhcr 1966, th('re \\as a govcrnmPnt mend the able nnd dlstlngul hed ma cri Is as a re ult of an order to draH 400 3. 6 3 5 jority l!'adcr for hi action today In &ug men Into the army The Socialists have 4 6 4 0 gezt:ng the refenal of the Senate resolu 3.3 3. 2 urged an Immediate end to the draft. eo tion to the Foreign Relations Commitll'C The Cltr! tlan Soclahsts favor ending the 6.1 and to the Armed Service' Committee. 4 3 As Is well known. all of us In this body draflin July 1967 after consultation v.llh ('I NATO anthorlties. There are also pres 4 0 do not agree on the Issues ral~ed by this . urcs to d1sband the army entirely. I S resolution which go to the very heart 4 'l [F'rom the New York Tlmcs, Jan. 12, tnG7J 4 3 of the military balance that the West 7 R has worked so long and hard to constmct .LfVVQ ON:-J O.L !>llnOBW'
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 56, Mansfield Library, University of Montana 8592 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE Janua1·y 19, 1967
hnd not been permitted to succeed 1n Man The question now Ia whether we have the so as to advance the leglt!mnte srrurlty In churia, or Mussol!ni 1n Ethiopia, or Hitler will to persist In our efforts. I! the wind terests o! all concerned. In C7.cchos!ovak1a or 1n the Rhineland. And from the East blows warm !or a time Instead IV. we think tha t our sacrUl.ces 1n this dirty o! cold, w111 we shed our NATO cloak? We war In 11 ttle VIetnam will make a dirtier and see among some young people and even For some time the allles have been dis bigger war less likely. It ts on that basl.8 among some who are old enough to know cussing allied troop levels and burden-shar Ing. The danger Is that what begins as a tha t we ask young Americans to tlgh t 1n the better a temptation to assume that because jungles and mountains or VIetnam. no attack has been made, no defense Is neces review might end In bickering, loss or mutual I am or course deeply concerned about sary. Aesop would appreciate a logic that confidence, and weakness- unless we proceed VIetnam, as most or you are and as most concludes that because what we have been very carefully and In full awareness of the Americans are. We have honestly tried to doing has worked, we can safely quit doing It, Importance or not putting In )eopnrdy the convey our readiness to stop the fighting on Security, as we all should know, Is not a hard-won mill tnry balance. terms as consistent with the Integrity or condition; It Is a process. This range of problems Is now under dis North Vietnam as they are with the Integrity cussion by the British , German, and Amer The circumstances of 1966 are not the cir ican governments, with the asslstnnce or the or South VIetnam. We would much rather cumstances or 1949. As times change, the make peace than war. Alliance can and should adjust. But the all Secretotry Genernl of NATO. I hope thnt certain guidelines will be observed as these In a long run sense, however, I am not important question remains the same; to anxious about the outcome 1n VIetnam. paraphrase Winston ChurchUI, It ts this: discussions proceed : Our goals are 11m1 ted and our forces are will the Atlantic allies stay the course? One. A subst...'1ntial American presence In Western Europe Is a key to stability. The strong. I am confident that In time the ad m. versary w111 see the advantage to hlm In a main purpose of the American troop commit settlement that involves net ther the conquest The tasks of deterrence and defense stretch ment Is to leave no doubt In the Kremlin nor the surrender or either side. on ahead, therefore, as far as any of us can that the United States would be Involved, I am certalnly not anxious about the At see. We do not know what Soviet Intentions deeply Involved, !rom the outset or a move lantic AIUance, but In the long view It Is at are, and neither does the Soviet government. against Western Europe. It needs to be clear the center or our concerns, !or It Is on what Intentions are not airy abstractions. They that Russian forces would meet enough happens here, In this community, that the are what one Is actually going to do. And American forces to mnke the engagement a world's prospects !or peace with freedom and what one Is going to do ts always shaped Soviet-American crisis, not just a European justice chiefly depend. in part by how one thinks the other fellow one. This means, In my judgment, that a The strength and confidence of the At can and wUI react. I! there Is little danger token American force Is not adequate. It lantic ames remain the single most decisive of a deliberate and massive Soviet attack, should be an effective combat force, not Jt"t factor In world atralrs. It Is In part because the Soviet government something to be tripped over. but a force It was with this fact In mind that a United dares not assume that an attack would not capable or putting up a serious fight. States Senate subcommittee, whlch I have the be strongly resisted and, 1! pressed, that It Two. The adequacy or allied conventional honor to chair, thls year held a major set or would not qUlckly lead to a nuclear response. forces should be measured In terms of their hearings on the Atlantic Al1lance. It was We cannot have the same confidence, how ability to meet and contain sizable but less with thls same !act In mind that I opposed ever, that the Soviet government will refrain than all-out attacks by conventional forces In the Senate the h asty passage of any reso from exerting political pressures, or manu of the Soviet bloc. lution relating to American forces In Western facturing local crises, or probing here and The allied conventional forces, like the Europe that might; be Interpreted- by allies there to test our will or to exploit a local American component, are not present In or adversaries-to mean a reduced American opportunl ty. The danger Is that any such Western Europe as a kind or hostage whose 1n terest In Europe. action could grow to dangerous proportions. destruction would trigger a nuclenr response. n. Soviet forces are stUI sta tloned In the cen No one, surely not the Soviet government, ter of Europe, as are Western forces. In can suppose that a massive assault on West The member states of the Atlantic All!ance ern Europe could be even briefly restricted to may take Justifiable pride In their basic terms or numbers or NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces effective enough to be quickly conventlonnl forces. Indeed, the Idea of a policies In the years since World War ll. big conventional war Is so tar-fetched that Their historic association In the Marshall employed In the central European area, the Plan and In the North Atlantic Treaty have ratio Is roughly 7 to 10 In favor o! Soviet and we do not need to prepare for that contin gency. I! a massive attack Is to be made, transformed the weakness or the late 40's satelll te troops. Central Europe Is therefore, as It has been, It wi11 surely begin with a nuclear strike Into the strength of the 60's. North America against Western Europe and North America. and Western Europe have enjoyed an un an armed camp, where large forces equipped paralleled period or prosperity and growth. with the most powerful weapons or war con not a movement of great armies across We~t They have used their strength on several front each other across an arbitrary boun ern boundaries. occasions to resist aggression against the dary that no one thinks pemanent. We can No, the real political and military function small and the weak; they have used their not be satisfied with a stabilization that rests of allied conventional forces Is to resist and prooper!ty to support large programs or as on this foundation. contain a limited attack, thereby confront sistance to the poor. They h ave taken long Furthermore, the evidence Indicates thnt Ing the adversary with the choice or cnlllng strides toward the creation of a European the Soviet government Is gambi!ng enormous It otr or of enlarging It, with all the risks economic community- a process that Is o! scientific and material resources on the the latter course would Involve-In partic course !ar from complete. Together with chance that It may be able to seore a decisive ular, of course, the risks o! provoking tho Japan and other countries they have reduced advance In weapons systems. It now has 700 employment of the American Strategic Air barriers to trade and developed Impressive to 750 MRBM and IRBM launchers, mostly Command. practical measures or International monetary located ne.. r Its Western borders and tar It Is time to put aside the unrealistic force cooperation- and In these fields also more geted on Western Europe. According to So goal or enough conventional NATO forces history 1.s In the making. viet rnllltary leaders their strategic offensive to meet and contain whatever conventlonnl During these years the defenses o! the At and defensive nuclear weapons systems have forces the Soviet Union could order Into lantlc A!Uance h a ve been greatly strength been quantitatively Increased and qualita action. ened, both absolutely and relatively. The tively Improved In the last !ew years. Their At the same time. however. nothing less shl!t In the b ala nce or power since 1949, underground nucleo.r test program and mis than a force capable of containing a sizable, coupled with firm reaction to Soviet testlngs sile testing program lend support to these though ltmlted, attack Is adequate, for a Jess or our resolve- from the first Berlin crisis to claims-and plainly the Soviet government er force would tempt the Soviet government the Cuban missile crisis-has produced a re does not accept the Idea that military t ech to test the all!ed will, and would confront the markable and hopeful stabilization In Europe. nology has reached a platenu and that the allles with the choice of backlng down or The rears that seized sober men less than two present balance o! forces cannot be upset. Initiating a general nuclear war. decades ago have quieted down. No armed I take It !or granted that the Soviet gov In a crisis we need to be able to deploy attack has been made on Western Europe, ernment will do all It can to reduce the at once military forces strong enough to hold and l! we maintain an appropriate balance of American lead In nuclear weapons sys tems rather than give ground, thus Improving our forces and a firm resolve, none Is likely. Our a lead that provides a reassuring margin or diplomatic pooltlon. This Is one of the les hopes that a genuine European settlement safety for all o! us. I also take It !or granted sons we have learned tn Berlin. I am re will one day be attained rest on Soviet recog that prudence requires the American gov minded of what General Norstad sal<.l at the nition or, and respect !or, the durability or ernment to fully Implement the safeguards, hearings before our Senate subcommittee this balance, the constancy o! our resolve, spelled out during Senate consideration o! this year: and. It should be added, the restraint we have the nuclear test-ban trenty and agreed to by "It ts argued In some places that conven consistently shown In the use or our power. the President, to Improve Its capabilities. tional forces were things of the last war or A traditional saying has It that "where It is our profound common hope that ways even or the 1914-1918 war. I was In a pool there's a will, there's a way." Our experience can be found to turn events ln a happier tion to 'supervtse' the part o! our forces In In the Atlantic Alllance confirms lt. We hnd direction. There must be a better way to the Allied Forces during several confronta the will to turn weakness Into strength and nssure the legitimate security Interests or tions In Berlin. The movement or troops, we have. We had the will to be both firm both sides than to maintain an armed camp the wllllngnesB to use or comml t troope, wa.s and restrained In the tests to which we have In Central Europe. If and when the Soviet an important Item. I Just do not think we been subjected. The combination has been government sees an advantage In reciprocal could have met those requlremente lf we hnd the foundation or peace In the Western world . reductions In forces, th!.s could surely be done not had the conventional forces we hnd."
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 56, Mansfield Library, University of Montana .!o 1 Zl n 1 y 1 !J, 1 9 G7 CO~GRl - IO~AL R ORD- T'!';ATE
Tl ,.,., It Ia I Ule head-coun of 'ATO'a proolcm 1ves, nd the probll'm Ia one awhllr That Ia theJr df'~ 51 n Tb~ r l o! con"·n~ onal !ore Ulan Ulelr oomt>nt pa t.hat challeng our Ingenuity, our ...nse or u contlnut' t<> think that our U.SOClBUon In btl t} t.ha~ counta tn.lrn • and our r.ln rttr In ll\ing up 1.0 NATO and 1~ lnt<'ruaUonnl t'Onunand& &H\N A the 14 adju t to l.be f renc:h v.1 thdro."' al our obligation under Article 3 of our treaty our vlt.nl ln~rt' t6 !rom NATO I ~hlnk w can make aome sav for ' continuous and elfect.ive self-help nnd 1 personally c.anno lms.gtne a time v.'llen ln ln British and Amt'rlcan log! tic and mutual aJd" Of' circum t.a t<' In .., hlch, the Alii net' v.lll upport <'lcmenta ln Eurore wHhout ~rltlc The words or thnt obligation v. ere carefully be obsole• n ana.chr< nl&m u e th~ lr ~ c mb t st.rcncth u<~>d tn the order or ~heir Importance· "&elf future, 1\4 I t'e It, will be tlllt>d "'lth IA&ka l<>roo,er, In Ume, t.cclmologlcal a. Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 56, Mansfield Library, University of Montana