DOCSLIB.ORG

Temporal Changes to Fire Risk in Disparate WUI Communities in Southern California Nicola C

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Temporal Changes to Fire Risk in Disparate WUI Communities in Southern California Nicola C Temporal Changes to Fire Risk in Disparate WUI Communities in Southern California Nicola C. Leyshon M.S. PhD Student- Fire and Emergency Management Administration, Oklahoma State University Co authors: Dr. Christopher A. Dicus, California Polytechnic University San Luis Obispo David B. Sapsis, Cal Fire Fire Resource Assessment Program McIntire-Stennis Cooperative Forestry Research Program 20 Largest California Wildfires by Structure Loss Post-disaster Regulations YEAR 1961 1980 1989 1991 1993 2003 2007 S. CALIFORNIA S.CALIFORNIA PANORAMA OAKLAND HILLS LAGUNA BEL AIR FIRE 49ER FIRE FIRESTORM FIRESTORM Event FIRE FIRESTORM BEACH FIRE CEDAR FIRE WITCH FIRE 2 Killed Loss 4 Deaths 312 25 Killed 15 Killed 505 Structures 441 structures 1650 344 Structures Structures 2843 Structures 4847 Structures Details Structures WUI BUILDING Cal Fire California ‘BATES BILL’- State CALIFORNIA CODES adopted Awareness of established enacted Fire identified Very High Policy BUILDING CODE WOOD SHAKE VEGETATION Safe FIRE HAZARD SEVERITY requiring ignition PRC 4291- (2005) response ROOFING MANAGEMENT regulations ZONES in Local resistant Roofing 30m (100 feet) of PROGRAM PRC 4290 Response Areas (LRA) defensible space Southern CA Firestorm 2003 Cedar Fire 273,247 acres burned 15 Deaths 4847 Homes lost Southern CA Firestorm (2007) Witch Creek Fire 197,990 acres burned 2 Deaths 1650 Homes lost Fire Risk vs Fire Hazard? Risk = expected Hazard = physical damage conditions that can cause damage Fire Risk = Hazard - Mitigations Research Questions 1. Is Fire Risk increasing as people develop out into the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI)? 2. How are homeowners responding to catastrophic wildfire and mitigation policy? 3. Are mitigation levels different across disparate communities? Objectives of study 1. Conduct an analysis of historical data to assess impact of Home Ignition Zone characteristics on structure loss. 2. Develop a GIS model to assess changes in probability of structure loss over time 3. Analyze risk through time in 3 communities that vary in demographics, socioeconomic status, and local culture. Study Sites Study Site Population Average Income (USD) Average House Value (USD) RANCHO SANTA FE 3117 $180,612 $1,139,911 RAMONA 20,292 $60,033 $485,597 JULIAN 1,502 $65,781 $510,138 Witch Creek Fire (2007) Juilan Ramona Rancho Santa Fe Cedar Fire (2003) SELECTON CRITERIA • Demographically Disparate • Experienced major catastrophic wildfires in the last 20 years (Witch Fire, Cedar Fire) Rancho Santa Fe Ramona Julian Methodology Data Collection (2005, 2009, 2010, 2012) GIS data Analysis (Arc Map) Multispectral Imagery Analysis (Arc Map) Defensible Space Analysis Hyperspectral Imagery Analysis (ENVI) Data Validation Fit the Mitigation Model (SPSS) Fire Risk Model (Risk = Hazard- Mitigation) Demographic Comparison of Risk Methodology: GIS Data Analysis Mapping of urban expansion using land use data (SanGIS) Pre 1986- 1990- 1995- 2000- 2004- 2008- 1986 1990 1995 2000 2004 2008 2012 Results: GIS Data Analysis • WUI expanding in all three study sites • Most rapid development in Rancho Santa Fe • Largest Proportion of Non Urban Land in Julian Methodology: National Agriculture Imagery Program (NAIP) Imagery Supervised Image Classification (Arc Map 10.2) NAIP Imagery Available for years • 2005 • 2009 • 2010 • 2012 Image showing NDVI index- Brighter red: Healthy vegetation Composite RGB, IR and NDVI image used for classification Results : National Agriculture Imagery Program (NAIP) Imagery Result: Polygon of tree and grass cover across each study site to be used in defensible space analysis Producer User Tree 92% Tree 92% Grass 70% Grass 84% Urban 83% Urban 67% Producer Accuracy: The probability that the method will correctly identify the feature. User accuracy: The likelihood that the resulting polygon depicts the correct feature on the ground. Methodology: Defensible Space Analyzing defensible space in four divisions of the Home Ignition Zone (HIZ) HIZ Buffers used to (A) Structure intersect vegetation polygons and other (B) 0-1.5m structures (C) 1.5-9m (D) 9- 30m Outputs (For all 11,747 structures)… % Tree cover in each zone, % Grass cover in each zone, and presence of structure in B C & D Results: Defensible Space Average % Tree Cover in Average % Tree Cover in Zone A over time Zone B over time 50 50 • Average cover Zone A : 8% 45 45 40 40 35 35 • Average Cover Zone B : 17% 30 30 25 25 20 20 15 15 • Average Cover Zone C : 23% 10 10 5 5 0 0 2005 2009 2010 2012 2005 2009 2010 2012 • Average Cover Zone D : 26% RANCHO SANTA FE RAMONA JULIAN RANCHO SANTA FE RAMONA JULIAN Average % Tree cover in Average % Tree Cover in Zone C over time Zone D over time 7 YEAR AVERAGES 50 50 45 45 • Rancho Santa Fe: -4.21% 40 40 35 35 30 30 25 25 • Ramona: +2.69 20 20 15 15 10 10 • Julian: + 5.30 5 5 0 0 2005 2009 2010 2012 2005 2009 2010 2012 RANCHO SANTA FE RAMONA JULIAN RANCHO SANTA FE RAMONA JULIAN Methodology: Hyperspectral Imagery Analysis (ENVI) Detecting Wood shingle roofing with Mixed Tuned Matched Filtering Target Detection using NASA Aerial Visible Infrared Imaging Spectrometer (AVARIS) 1. Set Region of Interest (ROI) using known location of wood shake roof 2. Plot spectral result and search for matching cells Methodology based on research by Herold et. al (2003) Results: Hyperspectral Imagery Analysis (ENVI) • 85 structures identified as wood shake roof out of 2089 Homes in RSF study site. • 70 homes verified to have woodshake using on site collection and Google Earth • Method 82% accurate • 89% of detected wood shake homes pre 1990. • Data limited to Rancho Santa Fe 2014 • Period of urban development used in model to represent roof type and structural materials Methodology: Fitting the Model Proposed Home Ignition Zone Mitigation Model Poor Moderate Good (1) (2) (3) I ran a logistic regression using the 2005 data and known locations of homes destroyed in the Witch fire to test this model. Methodology: Fitting the Model = + + + + + + + + + + + + − Y= Home burned in the witch fire (0,1) X1- Within the Fire perimeter (0,1) X2- Period of urban development (1-5) (Values 6 & 7 were out of range of 2005 data) X3- House Size (m2) X4-Percent Tree coverage Zone A (%) X5-Percent Tree coverage Zone B (%) X6-Percent Tree coverage Zone C (%) X7-Percent Tree coverage Zone D (%) X8-Percent Grass coverage Zone B (%) X9-Percent Grass coverage Zone C (%) X10-Percent Grass coverage Zone D (%) X12- Distance to Wildland vegetation (0-2) Sample of all homes within Witch Fire Boundary and .5km zone (n = 3,669) Results: Fitting the Model Variable Significance Interpretation Period of Urban development <.000 Older homes have a higher probability of loss. Increases in percentage of tree in B increase odds of Percentage of Trees in Zone B (0-1.5m) <.000 losing home Increases in percentage of grass in B increase odds of Percentage of Grass in Zone B (0-1.5m) <.024 losing home Increases in distance from wildland vegetation Distance from wildland vegetation <.005 decrease odds of losing home. Mean % Tree Mean % Grass Burned Cover in Zone B Cover in Zone B No (n= 1846) 16% 10% Yes (n= 1823) 18% 11% Methodology: Fitting the model Home Ignition Zone Mitigation Model Input Structure Period of Urban Development Pre 1990 Other Within Distance to Wildland Vegetation Other Wildland Vegetation Over 18% Tree Over 11% Grass Under 18% Presence of cover and no cover and no Tree and Zone 2 - 0-1.5m structure structure structure Grass cover Presence of No Zone 3 - 1.5-9m structure structures Presence of Zone 4 - 9-30m structure Poor Moderate Good (1) (2) (3) Model Limitations • Ground cover next to house • Vents and other openings • Vertical continuity of landscaping • Siding materials • Leaf litter and Property Hygiene • Tree Species Results: Home Ignition Zone Mitigation Model Home Ignition Zone Mitigations across study sites over time 9000 • Rancho Santa Fe had the greatest improvement in 8000 mitigation over the 7 year study period. 7000 • Small changes in Mitigation 6000 over time in each 5000 community Structures 4000 • All three communities improved over the 7 year 3000 period 2000 • Greatest improvements 2005-2009 1000 0 2005 2009 2010 2012 2005 2009 2010 2012 2005 2009 2010 2012 Rancho Santa Fe Ramona Julian Poor Moderate Good Methodology: Fire Risk Model RISK = HAZARD –MITIGATION Hazard Cal Fire Fire Hazard Severity Zone (FHSZ) model Implemented Mitigation Proximity to wildland vegetation Period of Urban development ‘Defensible Space’ Proximity of other structures Methodology: Fire Risk Model RISK = HAZARD –MITIGATION HOME IGNITION ZONE MITIGATION RISK = (Hazard – HIZ FIRE RISK HAZARD SCORE Mitigation) SCORE 3 -2 MFR Moderate (1) 2 -1 MFR 1 0 HFR 3 -1 MFR High (2) 2 0 HFR 1 1 VHFR 3 0 HFR Very High (3) 2 1 VHFR 1 2 VHFR MFR ≤ -1 Moderate Fire Risk -1 < HFR <1 High Fire Risk VHFR ≥ 1 Very High Fire Risk Results: Fire Risk Model Fire Risk across study sites over time 9000 • Julian had the greatest proportion of Very High 8000 Risk structures 7000 • Rancho Santa Fe had greatest reductions in Risk 6000 over 7 years 5000 • Proportion of Very High risk Structures 4000 structures in Ramona increased over the 7 year 3000 study period. 2000 1000 0 2005 2009 2010 2012 2005 2009 2010 2012 2005 2009 2010 2012 Rancho Santa Fe Ramona Julian Very High High Moderate Results: Fire Risk Model Rancho Santa Fe • Very High Risk in Higher Income Areas • Secluded hilltop mansions in wildland vegetation (chaparral). • Poorer Mitigation in lower Income Areas • High prevalence of ornamental vegetation and secondary structures Results: Fire Risk Model Ramona • Very High risk in lower income areas. • Poor mitigation in lower income areas • Larger family size • Lower disposable income. Results: Fire Risk Model Julian • Very High Risk overall • High fire hazard (coniferous trees, steep slopes) • Wooden construction.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • ESF[Type the Document Title]
    2008 Weather Support to the FEMA/DHS Joint Field Office Established in Response to the Devastating Southern California ESF[Type Wildfires[Pick the date] of October 2007 An Incident Support Specialist Overview the Abstract: On October 24, 2007, President George W. Bush, signed a Major Disaster Declaration for the State of California document for severe wildfires affecting Southern California. The Disaster Declaration [Year]put into motion federally funded and state title] coordinated response and recovery efforts, including establishing a FEMA/DHS Joint Field Office. Weather support for this function was provided by an Incident Support Specialist (ISS) [Type the abstract of thefrom document the here. National The abstract Weather is typically Service a short in [Type the Los Angeles/Oxnard, summary of the contentsCalifornia. of the document. This Type paper the abstract is an of overviewthe ofdocument those local efforts, document here. The abstractincluding is typically the a short products summary of andthe contents services provided, and an of the document.] examination of the complexities involved. subtitle] It also discusses the lessons learned and the successes realized. Todd Morris Physical Scientist WFO Los Angeles/Oxnard Table of Contents I. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................3 II. Background .......................................................................................................................................4
    [Show full text]
  • The East Bay Hills Fire, Oakland-Berkeley, California
    U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series The East Bay Hills Fire Oakland-Berkeley, California USFA-TR-060/October 1991 U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion T for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are devel- oped to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service. The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announce- ments of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters. This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building technology, and other related areas. The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 8–Fire Hazards
    CHAPTER 8–FIRE HAZARDS CHAPTER 8 – FIRE HAZARDS: RISKS AND MITIGATION CHAPTER CONTENT 8.1 Wildfire Hazards, Vulnerability, and Risk Assessment 8.1.1 Identifying Wildfire Hazards 8.1.2 Profiling Wildfire Hazards 8.1.3 Assessment of State Wildfire Vulnerability and Potential Losses 8.1.4 Assessment of Local Wildfire Vulnerability and Potential Losses 8.1.5 Current Wildfire Hazard Mitigation Efforts 8.1.6 Additional Wildfire Hazard Mitigation Opportunities 8.2 Urban Structural Fire Hazards, Vulnerability, and Risk Assessment About Chapter 8 Among California’s three primary hazards, wildfire, and particularly wildland-urban interface (WUI) fire, has represented the third greatest source of hazard to California, both in terms of recent state history as well as the probability of future destruction of greater magnitudes than previously recorded. More recently, with the catastrophic wildfire events of 2017 and 2018, fire has emerged as an annual threat roughly comparable to floods. Fire and flood fire hazards are surpassed only by high magnitude earthquake hazards, which typically occur less frequently but can result in extreme disaster events. For the 2018 State Hazard Mitigation Plan (SHMP), the fire hazards risk assessment has been expanded to include separate discussions on wildfire hazards and structural fire hazards. Structural fire hazards can occur as a cascading hazard emerging from wildfires or earthquakes, or as an independent hazard event. In either case, fire hazard mitigation actions are crucial in minimizing potential risk. Preparation and implementation of Local Hazard Mitigation Plans (LHMPs) with linkage to a jurisdiction’s general plan, play an important role in the fire mitigation process.
    [Show full text]
  • Del Norte Fire Safe Plan Was Stimulated by a National Effort to Enhance Fire Safety for All Communities Threatened by Wildfire
    DDDeeelll NNNooorrrttteee FFFiiirrreee SSSaaafffeee PPPlllaaannn Community Wildfire Protection Plan September, 2005 This plan is a project of the: Del Norte Fire Safe Council POB 1564, Crescent City, CA 95531 707-951-5437, [email protected] www.delnortefiresafe.org Produced by: Tracy Katelman, Registered Professional Forester, ForEverGreen Forestry POB 1276, Eureka, CA 95502, 707-443-2400, FAX: 707-443-5597, [email protected] ©2005, ForEverGreen Forestry and Del Norte Fire Safe Council DDDEEELLL NNNOOORRRTTTEEE FFFIIIRRREEE SSSAAAFFFEEE PPPLLLAAANNN EEEXXXEEECCCUUUTTTIIIVVVEEE SSSUUUMMMMMMAAARRRYYY The creation of the Del Norte Fire Safe Plan was stimulated by a national effort to enhance fire safety for all communities threatened by wildfire. The Del Norte Fire Safe Council volunteered for the task of coordinating the local effort to develop a fire safe plan. The Council received a grant from the US Forest Service Economic Action Program in 2003. The specific purpose of the grant was to fund the creation of a plan to identify and prioritize projects to reduce wildfire risk through the implementation of fuel hazard reduction, community education, and pre-fire suppression in Del Norte County. ForEverGreen Forestry was contracted to develop the plan through the collection of appropriate and necessary information regarding fire safety in Del Norte County (e.g. research, stakeholder input, etc.) using a collaborative process, and to document these efforts in a comprehensive fire safe plan. The Plan, in short, identifies risks and mitigations to reduce risks from wildfire in Del Norte County. It also provides residents with a step-by-step guide on how to fire-safe their homes, structures, and community, and how to best deal with an impending wildfire.
    [Show full text]
  • 11.12.20 Comment Letter Re Otay Ranch Village 13
    XAVIER BECERRA State of California Attorney General DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 600 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 1800 SAN DIEGO, CA 92101 P.O. BOX 85266 SAN DIEGO, CA 92186-5266 Public: (619) 738-9000 Telephone: (619) 738-9519 Facsimile: (619) 645-2271 E-Mail: [email protected] November 12, 2020 San Diego County Planning & Development Services Attn: Mark Wardlaw, Director of Planning & Development Services 5510 Overland Avenue, Suite 310 San Diego, CA 92123 By email: [email protected] RE: Otay Ranch Resort Village—Village 13 Final Environmental Impact Report; Otay Ranch Resort Village, Project Nos. GPA04-003, REZ04-009, TM-5361, SP04-002, and ER LOG04-19-005 Dear Mr. Wardlaw: We appreciate your preparation of a Final Environmental Impact Report (FEIR) responding to public comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR), including the comments we submitted on December 27, 2019, regarding wildfire risks associated with the proposed Otay Ranch Resort Village—Village 13 Development (Project). After reviewing the FEIR, we acknowledge and appreciate that you have provided more information regarding wildfire risks associated with the Project. We believe, however, that the FEIR’s discussion of these risks remains inadequate.1 I. THE FEIR FAILS TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE INCREASED WILDFIRE RISK THAT WILL RESULT FROM THE PROJECT In our comment letter, we explained that locating new development in a very high fire hazard severity zone will itself increase the risk of fire and, as a result, increase the risk of exposing residents, employees, and visitors to that enhanced risk. We further explained that the DEIR fails to analyze the increased risk of wildfire that will result from siting the Project within a such a zone.
    [Show full text]
  • Command Decisions During Catastrophic Urban- Interface Wildfire: a Case Study of the 1993 Orange County, California, Laguna Fire
    COMMAND DECISIONS DURING CATASTROPHIC URBAN- INTERFACE WILDFIRE: A CASE STUDY OF THE 1993 ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, LAGUNA FIRE A THESIS Presented to the Department of Occupational Studies California State University, Long Beach In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Science in Interdisciplinary Studies Emergency Services Administration Emphasis By Michael S. Rohde B.S., 1999, University of Phoenix August 2002 WE, THE UNDERSIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, HAVE APPROVED THIS THESIS COMMAND DECISIONS DURING CATASTROPHIC URBAN- INTERFACE WILDFIRE: A CASE STUDY OF THE 1993 ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, LAGUNA FIRE By Michael S. Rohde COMMITTEE MEMBERS Richard L. Resurreccion, Ed.D. (Chair) Occupational Studies James E. Koval, Ph.D. Family and Consumer Sciences Patrick McIntosh, M.S. Assistant Chief, Orange County, California, Fire Authority ACCEPTED AND APPROVED ON BEHALF OF THE UNIVERSITY Elizabeth Ambos, Ph.D. Acting Dean of Graduate Studies California State University, Long Beach August 2002 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study is dedicated to the firefighters of California whose professional skill and drive for excellence are both exceptionally remarkable and unparalleled. It is the researcher’s hope that this study will provide information that can be used to inspire and improve firefighter safety and command for their most challenging moments. The researcher acknowledges the friendship and mentorship of Dr. Richard Resurreccion, without whose constant support, guidance, devoted personal interest, and years of urging my graduate degree would not have been possible. Thanks to Dr. James Koval and Chief Patrick McIntosh for their participation on my thesis committee, to Phyllis Parmet for her assistance, and to Chief Kirk Summers for his inspiration and brotherhood.
    [Show full text]
  • The Home As Emergency Fire Shelter
    I. The Home as Emergency Fire Shelter Every home constructed in fire prone areas should be so sited, constructed, and maintained that it could be considered a shelter-in-place for natural disasters inclusive of wildland fires. Such was the case with the Spanish haciendas that had fireproof tile roofing and fireproof exterior walls and extensive fire-safe landscape buffers around their structures. However, after WWII when construction expanded rapidly into the wildland-urban interface areas, such lessons were quickly forgotten and homes were often sited in high-risk fire topography and quickly built with the easiest available material: wood. Quite predictable, wildland fire disasters grew bigger and bigger and burned more and more homes even in seemingly fire-safe areas as firebrands carried the wildland fire from wood roof to wood roof, burning thousands of homes even within the city, as was the case in the 1991 Oakland Tunnel Fire. When the November 6, 1961, Bel-Air Fire burned or severely damaged over 500 homes, the fire was ranked only second in the Western states to the San Francisco Fire that followed the earthquake of 1906, as the insurance loss was estimated at $24 million. Because of the high risk and exposure to insurers, private fire insurance had pretty well dried up by 1968 and the insurance companies were then forced by the State of California to form a FAIR PLAN umbrella insurance pool that spread the shock losses of brush fires among all insurance companies. Because of its generally low cost relative to the risk insured, it was a key incentive to continue development in high risk fire areas often without meaningful fire safe changes in land use, planning, and construction, as FAIR PLAN subsidized insurance for homeowners living in such areas.
    [Show full text]
  • (City of Malibu) August 12, 2020 CORRESPONDENCE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA - NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY GAVIN NEWSOM, GOVERNOR CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION SOUTH CENTRAL COAST DISTRICT 89 SOUTH CALIFORNIA ST., SUITE 200 VENTURA, CA 93001 (805) 585-1800 W19b LCP-4-MAL-20-0035-1 (City of Malibu) August 12, 2020 CORRESPONDENCE LCP-4-MAL-20-0035-1 CITY OF MALIBU August 9, 2020 While some of my previous concerns and comments that I had expressed to the City of Malibu Planning Commission on 11-18-2019 and 1-11-2020 have been addressed, codifying fire safety in fireprone wildlands that have often been developed without concerns for public safety such as in Malibu remains a conundrum. I truly believe that home losses in wildland fires will not be reduced in the future with the City of Malibu’s amendment to the Local Implementation Plan (LIP) portion of its certified Local Coastal Program (LCP) unless homeowners maintain their properties in a fire-safe condition year-round and the City of Malibu and the local Fire Department finally gets knowledgeable and dedicated boots on the ground to implement a meaningful fire safety program irrespective of or in addition to these proposed changes. Past fire history has clearly shown that the minimum distances, as proposed, are still not enough to reduce or eliminate wildfire conflagrations. As proposed, hedges and flammable fences and walls are now prohibited within (still only) five feet of the outermost projections of any building while main buildings on the same lot must (still only) be separated by a minimum of ten feet, and projections are still permitted within six feet of the required ten feet.
    [Show full text]
  • Hillside Fire Safety Information
    Hillside Fire Safety Information Everyone is now aware of the possibility of wildfire in any brush and grass-covered land in California. As lucky as we are to live in Mandeville Canyon, we must be educated to that possibility and do all that we can to keep our families and our homes safe. Fire preparedness has made our area safer than it was a few years ago. Improvements are constantly being made in brush clearance, warning systems, readiness and fire-fighting response. Here is some information for everyone to consider. We hope it is helpful and encouraging. NotifyLA- Register your phones and devices online at this site and you will be immediately alerted and instructed in any emergency: https://emergency.lacity.org/alerts/notifyla Early warning: We have early warning of fires within or outside the Canyon via NotifyLA on our registered devices. If an emergency warning is received by any means turn on local TV immediately. If a threatening fire approaches, LAPD will likely come to your door with a warning, an order to evacuate or to “shelter in place”, that is to stay in your home. 1 Note: Lives have been lost in fires elsewhere when residents did not exit soon enough and then tried to flee their homes at the last minute as flames approached their property. The “Shelter in place” order will be given when a safe exit is not feasible. ALERTWildfire is a new system of several fire-spotting cameras on our ridges, which allow quick response to any fire day and night. The cameras are monitored by volunteers and controlled by Fire Departments.
    [Show full text]
  • News Headlines 11/9-13/2017
    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ News Headlines 11/9-13/2017 550,000 homes in Southern California have the highest risk of fire damage, but they are not alone Sheriff's Hoist Rescue in Barton Flats - Big Bear Rock climber injured in 15-foot fall; rescued by SB Sheriff’s helicopter Five people hurt in Victorville crash; 2 airlifted Sales tax hikes seemingly defeated: Barstow’s Measure J, Victorville’s Measure K fail to gain two-thirds majority needed Home-built sand rail burns on road 1 550,000 homes in Southern California have the highest risk of fire damage, but they are not alone Doug Smith and Nina Agrawal, LA Times Posted: November 13, 2017 The Del Rosa neighborhood lost 121 homes when the Old fire swept down from the mountains. (Video by Brian van der Brug / Los Angeles Times) On a cataclysmic fall day in 2003, David Mead stood on the roof of his house using a garden hose to fight off an undulating river of embers that floated down his street. When he saw the battle was lost, he jumped off and escaped in the car he had left running, just in case. Mead’s house was one of 121 destroyed in the Del Rosa neighborhood of San Bernardino when the Old fire swept out of the mountains that day. The decimation of that 1950s tract development at the foot of the San Gabriel Mountains illustrates a phenomenon that is commonplace in Southern California — neighborhoods built so close to forest and chaparral that they could fall to the kind of urban conflagration that wiped out a whole neighborhood of Santa Rosa in last month’s fires.
    [Show full text]
  • Santa Clara County Firesafe Council Monthly Board Meeting
    Santa Clara County FireSafe Council Monthly Board Meeting Topic: FireSafe Council Monthly Meeting Time: Apr 20, 2021 01:30 PM Pacific Time (US and Canada) Join Zoom Meeting https://zoom.us/j/97239136920?pwd=aXBJcFdEMXpXK3FtVTcyblE2WEY3Zz09 Meeting ID: 972 3913 6920 Passcode: 664676 Item Time Section Title Agenda Item Speaker Attachment 1 1:30 PM Call to Order Dede Smullen 2 1:31 PM Board & Advisors Reports SCCFD Jason Falarski CAL FIRE Chief Ed Orre President's Report Dede Smullen 3 1:40 PM Consent Items Approve March 2021 Meeting Minutes 1 Accept March 2021 Financials 2 Ratifying Board Action via Email. Resolution 2021-02 Resolution 3 Authorizing Signing the Forest Health Grant Agreement Adopt Resolution 2021-03 Non-Discrimination Policy 4 Action Item Resolution 2021-04 Establishing Board Committees 5 Charters attached 4 1:45 PM Speaker Trends in wildfire & structure loss in California: A review of the data Alexandra D. Syphard, PhD, Chief Scientist Vertus Wildfire Insurance Services LLC 5 2:15 PM Report Strategic Planning and Committee Board Reports Paul Hansen 6 2:25 PM Activities Reports 6 CEO Report Seth Schalet Financials Update Chris Sommerfield Managing Director Report Eugenia Rendler Hazardous Fuel Reduction Program Report Communications, Outreach and Education Report Grants Written Report Only Planning Program Report Carla Ruigh 7 2:40 PM Round Robin All 8 3:00 PM Adjourn General Meeting Next Meeting Date and Location May 18, 2021 Zoom Only Attachments 1 March 2021 Meeting Minutes 2 March 2021 Treasurer's Reports 3 Resolution 2021-02 4 Resolution 2021-03 5 Resolution 2021-04 6 Manager's Activities Reports 2021 Meeting Schedule - Zoom May 18, 2021 September 21, 2021 June 15, 2021 October 19, 2021 July 20, 2021 November 16, 2021 August 17, 2021 December - TBD Santa Clara County FireSafe Council Monthly Board Meeting Item Time Section Title Agenda Item Speaker Attachment 1 1:30 PM Call to Order Dede Smullen 2 1:31 PM Board & Advisors Reports SCCFD Jason Falarski Brian Glass spoke since Jason was out.
    [Show full text]
  • Firebrands and Spotting Ignition in Large-Scale Fires
    Review CSIRO PUBLISHING International Journal of Wildland Fire 2010, 19, 818–843 www.publish.csiro.au/journals/ijwf Firebrands and spotting ignition in large-scale fires Eunmo KooA,E, Patrick J. PagniB, David R. WeiseC and John P. WoycheeseD AEarth and Environmental Sciences Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545, USA. BMechanical Engineering Department, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA. CUSDA Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Research Station, Riverside, CA 92507, USA. DHughes Associates, Inc., 2551 San Ramon Valley Boulevard, San Ramon, CA 94583, USA. ECorresponding author. Email: [email protected] Abstract. Spotting ignition by lofted firebrands is a significant mechanism of fire spread, as observed in many large- scale fires. The role of firebrands in fire propagation and the important parameters involved in spot fire development are studied. Historical large-scale fires, including wind-driven urban and wildland conflagrations and post-earthquake fires are given as examples. In addition, research on firebrand behaviour is reviewed. The phenomenon of spotting fires comprises three sequential mechanisms: generation, transport and ignition of recipient fuel. In order to understand these mechanisms, many experiments have been performed, such as measuring drag on firebrands, analysing the flow fields of flame and plume structures, collecting firebrands from burning materials, houses and wildfires, and observing firebrand burning characteristics in wind tunnels under the terminal velocity condition and ignition characteristics of fuel beds. The knowledge obtained from the experiments was used to develop firebrand models. Since Tarifa developed a firebrand model based on the terminal velocity approximation, many firebrand transport models have been developed to predict maximum spot fire distance.
    [Show full text]