Command Decisions During Catastrophic Urban- Interface Wildfire: a Case Study of the 1993 Orange County, California, Laguna Fire

Home , Bel Air Fire, Butte Fire, Day Fire, Firefighting foam, Fire Command Vehicle, Laguna Canyon

COMMAND DECISIONS DURING CATASTROPHIC URBAN- INTERFACE WILDFIRE: A CASE STUDY OF THE 1993 ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, LAGUNA FIRE

A THESIS Presented to the Department of Occupational Studies California State University, Long Beach

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Science in Interdisciplinary Studies Emergency Services Administration Emphasis

By Michael S. Rohde B.S., 1999, University of Phoenix August 2002

WE, THE UNDERSIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, HAVE APPROVED THIS THESIS

COMMAND DECISIONS DURING CATASTROPHIC URBAN- INTERFACE WILDFIRE: A CASE STUDY OF THE 1993 ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, LAGUNA FIRE

By Michael S. Rohde

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Richard L. Resurreccion, Ed.D. (Chair) Occupational Studies

James E. Koval, Ph.D. Family and Consumer Sciences

Patrick McIntosh, M.S. Assistant Chief, Orange County, California, Fire Authority

ACCEPTED AND APPROVED ON BEHALF OF THE UNIVERSITY

Elizabeth Ambos, Ph.D. Acting Dean of Graduate Studies

California State University, Long Beach August 2002

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study is dedicated to the firefighters of California whose professional skill and drive for excellence are both exceptionally remarkable and unparalleled. It is the researcher’s hope that this study will provide information that can be used to inspire and improve firefighter safety and command for their most challenging moments. The researcher acknowledges the friendship and mentorship of Dr. Richard Resurreccion, without whose constant support, guidance, devoted personal interest, and years of urging my graduate degree would not have been possible. Thanks to Dr. James Koval and Chief Patrick McIntosh for their participation on my thesis committee, to Phyllis Parmet for her assistance, and to Chief Kirk Summers for his inspiration and brotherhood. To my long-time friends and work comrades with whom I experienced the Laguna Fire, especially Chiefs Chip Prather, Steve Whitaker, Jim Radley, Buck Henderson, Michael Moore, Rich Witesman, and Rich Dewberry, I express my great respect, admiration, and thanks for their courage to share of themselves here so that others may learn, and for the courage, determination, and skill that they demonstrated during that terrible fire My sincere thanks go to my mentors and teachers, the subject matter experts who have provided exemplary leadership and skill through so many fires and who shared with me both their years of experience and friendship: Chiefs Bill Teie, Bill Clayton, Gary Nelson, Tim Sappok, Mike Warren, John Hawkins, and Charles Manor. My wife, Rebecca, and my sons, Patrick and Taylor, have all my love and thanks for their years of support while I toiled in education. I would not be who I am without them. iii

ABSTRACT COMMAND DECISIONS DURING CATASTROPHIC URBAN- INTERFACE WILDFIRE: A CASE STUDY OF THE 1993 ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, LAGUNA FIRE By

Michael S. Rohde August 2002 The purpose of this study was to examine the challenges and commonalities experienced by the personnel who commanded six catastrophic California wildland- urban interface fires and how future fires of this nature might be commanded and prepared for. The study includes a description of strategies and tactics specific to the Laguna, Old Topanga, Kinneloa, Harmony, Paint, and Tunnel Fires. The Laguna Fire was studied in depth through recollections of those who performed in command functions during that fire. Commonalities were significant and uniform among the studied fires, suggesting that the experiences of the Laguna Fire participants mirrored those of the participants in the six studied fires and that they are likely indicative of potential experiences during future fires occurring under similar conditions. Subject matter experts commented on the Laguna Fire and other fires, contrasting their perceptions of those fires with industry best practices. These observations were then recommended for inclusion in fire command training curriculum.

iv CHAPTER Page

v CHAPTER Page

CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iii CHAPTER

1. PROBLEM FORMULATION ...... 1 Research Problem ...... 2 Objectives of the Study ...... 3 Significance of the Study ...... 4 Limitations of the Study ...... 5 Assumptions of the Study ...... 6 Methods and Procedures ...... 7 Organization of the Study ...... 7 2. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ...... 10 The Interface Fire Regime ...... 10 Climate and Wind Factors ...... 11 Human Cultural Fire Factors ...... 14 Fire Service Command Organization ...... 17 Command and Human Factors ...... 18 Fire Command Training ...... 20 Fire Case Studies ...... 22 The Tunnel Fire ...... 23 The Paint Fire ...... 30 The Kinneloa Fire ...... 40 The Old Topanga Fire ...... 45 The Harmony Fire ...... 56 Developing and Contemporary Fire Regimes ...... 59 Lessons Learned ...... 64 Chapter Summary ...... 64 3. STUDY SETTING ...... 65 Natural Setting ...... 65 Fire Weather ...... 68 Fire Services ...... 69 The Fire Siege ...... 70 The Laguna Fire ...... 72 Immediate Postfire Issues ...... 91 Chapter Summary ...... 92 vi CHAPTER Page

4. DOCUMENTATION OF INTERVIEWS ...... 94 Laguna Fire Participants ...... 94 Charles “Chip” Prather, Incident Commander ...... 95 Rich Dewberry, Laguna Beach Fire Chief (Retired) ...... 102 Steve Whitaker, Operations Section Chief ...... 106 Michael S. Rohde, Planning Section Chief ...... 113 James Radley, Department Administrative Duty Officer ...... 121 Richard Witesman, Law Enforcement Liaison ...... 128 Harold (Buck) Henderson, Logistics Section Chief/Branch Director ...... 132 Michael Moore, Liaison Officer ...... 136 Subject Matter Experts ...... 138 Bill Clayton, Division Chief ...... 139 Gary Nelson, Division Assistant Chief (Retired) ...... 147 Tim Sappok, Division Chief ...... 160 John Hawkins, Assistant Chief ...... 166 William C. Teie, Deputy Director for Fire Protection (Retired) ...... 170 Mike Warren, Fire Chief ...... 174 Charles (Chuck) R. Manor, Deputy Chief ...... 181 Chapter Summary ...... 185 5. RESEARCH OBSERVATIONS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 186 Observations ...... 186 Major Fire Characteristics ...... 187 Research Approach ...... 191 The Orange County Fire Department ...... 192 Significance of Experience ...... 194 Value of Prefire Planning ...... 195 Media Relations ...... 196 Fire Organization ...... 197 Independent Action Strategy ...... 198 Command Officer Assignment ...... 200 Unified Command ...... 201 Human Interactions and Communications ...... 201 Resource Ordering ...... 203 Command Strategy ...... 205 Planning and Support ...... 207 Safety and Accident Management ...... 209 Management Focus ...... 210 Firing Operations ...... 211 Emerging Trends ...... 212 Incident Management Teams ...... 213 Role of the Agency Head ...... 214 Role of Relationships ...... 215 Postfire Actions ...... 216 vii CHAPTER Page

Findings of Best Practices ...... 217 Chapter Summary ...... 222 Recommendations for Further Study ...... 223 APPENDICES ...... 226

A. GLOSSARY ...... 227 B. COMMONALITIES OF FIRE BEHAVIOR AND DYNAMICS AMONG THE STUDIED FIRES ...... 234 C. TIMELINE OF THE LAGUNA FIRE ...... 237 D. MAP OF THE LAGUNA FIRE ...... 243 E. SITUATIONS AND CONDITIONS CHARACTERIZING THE LAGUNA FIRE ...... 245 F. COMPARISON OF LOSS AMONG STUDIED FIRES...... 248 G. RESUME OF THE RESEARCHER ...... 250 REFERENCES ...... 252

viii 9 CHAPTER 1 PROBLEM FORMULATION

During the period of October 26 to November 4, 1993, the worst wildfire in the history of Orange County, California, struck the cities of Laguna Beach, Irvine, and Newport Beach, the community of Emerald Bay, and the surrounding unincorporated area. The “Laguna Fire” (also known as the Laguna Hills Fire) was geographically centered in and around Laguna Canyon, an historical wildfire corridor. The fire burned 14,337 acres and 441 homes, caused over $528 million in damage, and required the evacuation of over 26,000 people. Despite extreme fire conditions, no lives were lost, although scores of persons were injured. The Laguna Fire joined a long and notorious list of California wildfire disasters. These catastrophic wildfires are multidimensional and complex in both cause and effect. They are not isolated to any one particular community, and many fire departments are faced with the risk of wildfire. This region at risk is known as the “wildland-urban interface.” It is a zone of mixing of wild areas with homes and other structures. The fire protection challenge presented by such risk is well established. In California, an average of 703 homes were lost annually between 1985 and 1994, with an insured loss exceeding $107 billion. The problem continues to grow and add dimensions. Incident command of these fires has posed monumental human challenge. A factor of urban migration, people have moved ever farther into wild areas throughout the United States in search of human values of solitude, independence, and freedom from perceived urban ills. In California, this migration is often followed by construction of whole new cities on this fringe. However, fire is a necessary natural

10 factor, and recurrent wildfire in most landscapes is only a matter of time. The addition of a wildland-urban interface has complicated this natural cycle through competing values. The very values that brought new residences to these areas are often the very substance which poses the most significant risk of fire. Once a fire has started, it is often too late to demand fuel modification, road access, or firefighting infrastructure that would aid in saving homes. Indeed, natural factors at play during wildfire, such as high winds and heavy fuel accumulations, may be sufficient to defeat the very best available firefighting technology in even well-prepared interface communities. Modern conflagrations involving wildlands and adjacent communities have become so common as to occur almost every year in the United States, severely challenging fire protection organizations.

Research Problem While much has been written regarding the topic of wildland-urban interface fire, little has focused on the skillful application of fire command practices. This study evaluated and compared the practices and experiences of senior fire officers or “incident management team members” who led initial firefighting actions during the catastrophic 1993 Laguna wildland-urban interface conflagration. The study contrasted the Laguna Fire with five other major California wildland interface fires that had similar characteristics and sought subject-matter expert review of the firefighting strategy and tactics of the Laguna Fire and other fires. The research is important because it describes the emergency work environment and suggests training and preparation that should be provided to fire officials who may be responsible for wildland interface fire command. Similarities were found between these wildfires that are unique to the catastrophic wildland urban interface fire environment. By defining these qualities, the study presents important data relative to training and preparation issues. 11 The study focused on early or “initial periods” of fire management, since this period often involves the greatest degree of structural loss in interface communities. This initial period typically has included a concurrent mustering and buildup of firefighting resources. These resources are commonly least available when demands for them are at their peak. During these conditions, incident commanders are often required to make instant judgments regarding strategy, resource placement, and values at risk. Often, these judgments are made with the unavoidability of significant loss. This study identified variables in modern wildland interface fire conflagrations that influence successful management of outcomes during incident command.

Objectives of the Study The objective of this study was to examine what challenges and commonalities were experienced by incident commanders during management of catastrophic urban interface fires. The study includes a description of mitigations and strategies that were successfully utilized in the management of these fires. Specifically, answers were sought to the following research questions: 1. Are there situational events or characteristics that distinguish a major wildland-urban interface fire from other wildfires? 2. Were experiences and events that confounded command activities at the 1993 Orange County, California, Laguna fire consistent with other major catastrophic wildland interface fires in California? 3. What were the individual experiences of those who commanded the Laguna fire? 4. What were the common characteristics of the six fires studied? 5. What did the experiences of the six fires suggest with regard to specific training themes for future commanders of catastrophic wildland interface fires? 12 Significance of the Study Studies with regard to catastrophic fire management and the specific challenges faced by incident commanders are needed for training and preparation of fire officers. Retired California Office of Emergency Services (OES) Assistant Chief Jerry Smith recommended in an after-action report on California’s 1993 statewide fire siege that more comprehensive training was needed and that training should be targeted at every level in the fire service organization (Smith, 1994, p. 11). Smith went on to comment specifically on the need for command-level training. While urban-interface wildfires are common, conflagrations occur with more limited frequency. It is generally not possible for all fire officers who might face this command situation to experience conflagration directly. This study determined, through case study, specific training variables that can be used during training design. Given the extensive risk for urban interface wildfire in California and elsewhere, this study identifies training elements useful to many fire organizations. Effective preparation of community protection strategies, firefighter preparedness, fire prevention, and related efforts rely on studies of past conflagrations to serve as predictors for future challenges. This study adds a specific dimension previously unavailable in most case studies: specific and personal challenges faced by the incident commander and other senior incident staff. The study may assist those involved in fire officer training with strong data to support future curriculum development on how to deal with the challenges associated with a developing conflagration catastrophe. The study may also be useful to students in considering lessons of the past and how they might apply to their own professional situations.

13 Limitations of the Study Certain limitations were identified regarding the generalization of the data collected in this study. 1. The principal case study was of the 1993 Orange County, California, Laguna Fire. Interviews were conducted with the participants in this incident but not with participants in all other incidents. After-action and other official reports and studies were consulted for all studied incidents. 2. The study compared the Laguna Fire to five catastrophic wildland interface fires occurring in and adjacent to metropolitan areas of California. The fires occurred under similar weather and wildland fuel conditions, and with similar structural loss. The fires were of similar duration, threat, cultural and physical settings, and risks. Studied fires all created structural conflagration in the early hours of the fire due to urban proximity to the fire’s origin. Other major fires occurred in California during this period and some involved extensive structural loss; however, those that did not match some of the stated comparatives were not studied. 3. Only members of the Incident Command System Command and General Staff of the Laguna Fire or selected subject matter experts intimately knowledgeable of strategic command issues were interviewed for the study. Other fires discussed are illustrated through various official reports or expert observations as the source of information, as cited. 4. All fires studied appear on a list compiled by the U.S. Forest Service citing the top 10 most destructive wildfires in terms of structural loss in the United States (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2001b). 5. To ensure relevance to contemporary fire services, studied incidents were limited to those most destructive fires occurring in California during the period 1985- 2001. Similar fire technologies such as rapid mutual aid and resource mobilization,

14 modern communications, modernized resources and fire attack equipment, training, and command organization existed for all incidents studied. 6. All of the fires studied were reviewed for the initial action period only— generally, the first 6 to 12 hours of the incident. This period includes time frames when local agencies attempted to organize and respond to the various incidents. For all of the studied fires, this was the period of highest structural loss. None of the fires utilized organized state or federal Incident Management Teams during the time frames that were studied, largely due to the time delay involved in the mobilization of such teams. Also, some fire jurisdictions that experienced the studied fires do not typically utilize such teams and rely on internal and cooperating agency personnel to fill key incident management positions. 7. Emerging trends were noted during the study for metropolitan interface wildfires occurring in small “urban canyons” near and within highly developed communities. Some of these incidents are detailed, but analysis is left for further study. As a point of clarification, the Orange County Fire Department (OCFD) was reorganized in an unrelated action after the Laguna Fire. The successor agency is known as the Orange County Fire Authority.

Assumptions of the Study The following assumptions were made with regard to the collection of data.

1. Catastrophic wildland urban interface fires in California present many similarities with regard to command and control issues. Lessons learned from these incidents may be universally applicable to current and future wildland-urban interface fires. 2. Factors influencing fire behavior are common and known. Other than their characteristic variability, they are static in nature and predictable.

15 3. Fires of this nature will continue to be a problem due to the expanding nature of the wildland-urban interface and the repetitious and fluctuating patterns of weather and environmental factors which encourage conflagration.

Methods and Procedures This study was conducted using the principles and practices of documentary and descriptive research. The study includes specific case study of the 1993 California Laguna wildfire and the experiences of those who were involved in the command and control of this emergency. Documentary research, including literature review, was also accomplished related to five other modern and catastrophic urban interface wildfires that experienced similar high loss. The documentary research provided a foundation by which the Laguna Fire was contrasted and compared. Patterns and commonalities were found among the six studied fires. Using descriptive research, 8 interviews were conducted with fire service Incident Commanders, senior fire officers, and others with intimate knowledge of the management of the Laguna Fire. Seven subject matter experts were then consulted and asked to render opinions and observations regarding command challenges identified by interview participants. Finally, research questions were considered with particular respect to previously undefined training needs for fire commanders who might be responsible for managing future fires of this magnitude.

Organization of the Study The remainder of this study is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 is a historical review of the California urban interface fire regime. The regime includes factors of climate and wind, human culture and development, fire service organization, and command and human factors. A description of developing and changing elements within this regime is also presented. Chapter 2 contains a review of how this regime influenced five historic wildland-urban interface catastrophic wildfires. Common 16 elements and lessons learned derived from these wildfires have profound implications for those who might manage similar emergencies. Chapter 3 is a description of the study setting of the Laguna Fire. The fire’s geographic and natural setting and critical weather affecting the fire are detailed. The impacts of pre-fire readiness of local fire services and the onset of a Santa Ana wind- driven regional wildfire siege are also presented. Finally, the Laguna Fire is chronicled in detail as to significant events, timetables, and important emergency management actions. Chapter 4 chronicles individual experiences of those who were involved in the command of the Laguna Fire and command “best practices,” as identified by subject matter experts who have superior command experience and have authored and lectured extensively on the subject of wildland-urban interface fire. Laguna fire interviewees included participants in the Incident Command of that fire, including most of those who held Incident Command System “Command” and “General” staff positions. These interviewees provided rich data on their individual experiences, perceptions, and command practices during the Laguna Fire. Subject matter experts were then consulted to provide opinions and observations regarding best practices for command of wildland- urban interface fires. The experts considered all of the studied fires, the comments of the interviewees, and other fire experiences in rendering opinions for this study. Collectively, comments of experts and Laguna Fire participants were considered in reflection of the research questions and, in particular, the development of new training criteria for those who might command catastrophic wildland interface fire. Chapter 5 contains a summary of the study and contains two forms of recommendations: (a) recommendations for program development, and (b) recommendations for further research. Chapter 5 also includes a reflection on the research questions posed in the study and the answers derived from the thesis research. 17 Appendices provide a glossary of terms (appendix A), identification of commonalities of fire behavior and dynamics (appendix B), a timeline (appendix C) and map (appendix D) of the Laguna Fire area, and a summary of situations and conditions characterizing the Laguna Fire (appendix E), and a comparison of loss among studied fires (appendix F). A descriptive resume of the researcher is included as appendix G. Each chapter includes an introduction and a summary that tie the various chapters together and add relevance.

18 CHAPTER 2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter contains a general statement regarding the California urban interface wildfire problem or “regime” and a review of the historical facts of five catastrophic wildfires that occurred in contemporary times. A review of natural, physical, and cultural elements and fire services issues contributing to the problem was undertaken as well as a review of key events and timetables for the Tunnel, Paint, Old Topanga, Kinneloa, and Harmony Fires. Each of these fires caused a catastrophic structural loss as the fires transitioned from wildland to urban conflagration.

The Interface Fire Regime The wildland-urban interface problem received contemporary recognition first in California and the nation after the 1961 Bel Air wildfire. Although similar fires had occurred in California as early as 1923 and in the northern states during 1910, the evolution of news and television media brought this fire a certain notoriety and nation- wide attention (Pyne, 1982). Over 480 homes were lost in this chaparral-fed wildfire in the Santa Monica Mountains within the City of Los Angeles. Command of firefighting for catastrophic urban interface wildfires of this magnitude has proven to be complex and multidimensional, with critical decisions over life safety and property loss hanging in the balance. California continued to experience fires similar to Bel Air through the following 4 decades, with most other regions of the United States paralleling some of this state’s volatile experiences in more recent years, as urbanization of wildland areas accelerated nationally. Most western states, particularly Montana and Alaska, and the east coast of

19 Florida have experienced fires with severity of structural loss that was once assumed by some to be only a California phenomenon. The U.S. Fire Administration indicated in its study Wildland Fire Management: Federal Policies and Their Implications for Local Fire Departments (1999, p. 7), that “the once-clear distinction between areas of wildland and structural firefighting has begun to blur.” This study has focused on contemporary aspects of the California fire problem.

Climate and Wind Factors To understand California’s fire problem, one must first know that the combustibility of its native vegetation in many of its regions is considered to be among the most volatile in the world. California’s Mediterranean climate and chaparral “fuels” have contributed to enormous fires. According to the California State Board of Forestry (1996), “It’s not a question of if accumulated fuels will burn but when they will burn” (p. 10). Foehn winds are a classic element of most catastrophic wildland interface fires. Foehn winds are characterized by a strong mountain downslope wind condition that is spawned by areas of atmospheric high pressure making a sudden and sharp decrease into areas of low pressure. As the winds lower in altitude, they become more warm and dry adiabatically. These winds severely dry exposed natural fuels and can create extreme fire spread. They are known locally as Santa Anas, Sundowners, Diablo, Mono, or North winds. Whatever name Californians have bestowed upon them, they usher in periods of explosive wildfire danger (Schroeder & Buck, 1970). An historical fire weather pattern has been identified through geological research to exist along the California Coast. Studies of ash deposits in near-shore marine sediments suggest repeated fire occurrence during the past 2 million years. Ash layers were formed in marine sediments when overlying smoke plumes from

20 coastal wildfires deposited ash on the ocean surface (Byrne, Mensing, & Michaelsen, 1999). The study of offshore marine sediments focused on the past 560 years near Santa Barbara (Mensing, Michaelson, & Byrne, 1999). This study determined that the interval between these ash sediment depositions has remained constant at every 20 to 30 years, typically occurring at the end of wet periods and the beginning of droughts. The research shows a strong correlation between California climate and fire history, with large fires occurring with regularity from before the Chumash/Piute habitation period through modern times. The study concluded that large fires are a southern California climate phenomenon that will continue unabated, irrespective of contemporary fire suppression or fuel modification. Both of these studies also showed that not all significant coastal fires recorded generated marine sediment deposits, suggesting that large fires may have occurred with greater frequency. Fires occurring with frequency greater than natural cycles (less than 10 years) can be deleterious to the native chaparral ecosystem, leading to a pronounced decline in shrub cover and a concurrent increase in herbaceous and grass fuels. In the past 50 years, humans have greatly increased the frequency of fires, often beyond the limits or ability of native shrub lands to rebound from the effects of theses fires (Keeley, Fothering, & Morais, 1999, p. 1). In many cases, the vegetation changes have increased the flammability of vegetative cover (Stephenson & Calcarone, 1999, pp. 64-66). Conversely, natural fire exclusion in upper mountain regions of California has led to increasing and unnatural density of fuels, which can contribute to conflagration. This has occurred in California and nationally largely due to the success of organized fire suppression during the past 100 years. Recent studies suggest that, unlike in western coniferous forests, prescribed burning on a landscape scale in chaparral would be irrelevant to conflagration 21 reduction. This study concluded that large chaparral fires, unlike other locations in the western cordillera, are not the product of 100 years of increased fire suppression and fuel build-up. Interestingly, 40% of these fires burned in relatively young fuels (around 10 years of age), challenging the concept of reintroduction of landscape fire as a means of conflagration management. Conversely, large fires, which have been shown to be part of the chaparral ecology and can be counted on with certain regularity. It is also interesting that wind-driven chaparral fires often follow historic fire corridors, burning the same location repeatedly. Fires burning in these corridors often follow the same path as previous fires and repeat their pattern of spread. In a study by the U.S. Geological Survey, Keeley et al. (1999) suggested that “high intensity wildfires are a natural feature of the chaparral landscape and there is no evidence that they are an artifact of modern fire suppression practices” (p. 2). In contrast to coniferous forests, where fire suppression over the past 100 years has indeed changed the landscape, fire suppression in southern California chaparral ecosystems has not been a dominant factor in influencing increased fire intensity. The study by Keeley et al. (1999), however, suggests that population is the key factor and that the number of fires has increased, although the number of burned acres has remained constant. However, for large fires since 1878, there has been a reduction in average size or acreage, suggesting that development has increased the frequency of ignition but that other factors, including suppression and development, have served to limit the size of large fires. The study also demonstrated that 40% of large fire areas included fuels between 11 and 20 years of age, challenging previously held beliefs on the value of prescribed burning programs that sought 10- to 20-year burn intervals. In the study, the practice of prescribed burning was suggested for relegation to certain key areas of community defense. In a study by the University of California, Santa Barbara (Gomes, Marshall, & Schmidt, 1993, p. 37), it was determined that the surge of 22 residents into the structural-wildland intermix has contributed to wildfires becoming more destructive as regional populations have increased.

Human Cultural Fire Factors A number of studies blame urban sprawl as the primary source of increasing ignition and a leading factor for increasing severity of urban-interface fire in southern California (Goldstien, Candau, & Moritz, 2000; Keeley et al., 1999). California is the most populated state in the nation, and human-caused fire leads all causes of ignition. In a strong statement of how population increases wildfire risk, linear regression data from 1921 to 1993 for California’s Sierra Nevada foothills and similar data for southern California’s Riverside County suggest with 95% confidence that the addition to former wildlands of 1 housing unit per square mile means an additional 0.001733 ignitions per year per 1,000 acres, and an increase of 1 person per square mile means an additional 0.001438 ignitions per year per 1,000 acres. Roughly, this suggests that, for every 600 homes or 700 people, there will be one more ignition per year per 1,000 acres. This suggests a strong correlation between expanding populations in wildland interface areas and increased wildfire activity (California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection [CDF], 1995, p. 2). Further studies by the U.S. Geological Survey (Keeley, 2001) indicate that population is a key factor in wildland fire ignition in southern California. The study examined population growth and the number of fires per decade during the period 1910- 1999. Among two of southern California’s fastest growing regions, Los Angeles and

Riverside counties, the resulting data suggest a direct linear correlation (R2 = 0.96, p < 0.001) between population density and fire frequency. In speaking of the southern California fire environment or “regime,” Pyne (1984, p. 249) characterized it as one that behaves much like a wildland regime but

23 whose values and sources of ignition resemble an urban fire regime. He cited that the southern California regime is only partially the product of natural processes, and largely an outcome of southern California’s rapid urbanization following World War II. More important, Pyne indicated that the contemporary fire regime is a product of two general processes: the reservation of mountain wildlands and the subsequent urbanization of lands that either border or interpenetrate those reservations. If either were transformed, so would the fire regime be transformed. The largely anthropogenic nature of the southern California fire regime is characterized by arson and repeated burning of lands in much more frequent occurrences than natural episodic wildfire. Some of the costliest losses and most severe burning intensities in decades in California have been recorded during the past 50 years. Human influence, through selection of building construction styles and features and nonfire-resistive landscaping, has exacerbated this problem immensely and contributed to conflagration intensity (CDF, 1996). California’s State Fire Marshal Emeritus, Ron Coleman, described this continuing dilemma faced in California: “We have not practiced what we have learned about Interface fire problems” (p. 15). The use of wood shingled roofing materials and other similar nonfire-resistive features has led to a number of conflagrations. Pyne (1982) indicated that the “largest nonwood shingle conflagration is smaller than the average wood shingle conflagration” and that “the largest wood shingle fire has raised more structures than all the nonwood shingle conflagrations combined” (p. 406). In southern California, less than 1% of all wildfires escape initial control, yet the fraction that does escape is responsible for the most damaging fires (Doss, 1995). Wood shingled construction has been commonly associated with high fires losses. It is amazing that many California residents have, when permitted, rebuilt homes destroyed in wildfires, using nonfire-resistive construction. 24 Perry (1990) described criteria by which structures have low probability for survival during a wildland fire siege (pp. 281-283).

1. Fire resources are not scheduled to arrive at structures before the wildfire. 2. Wind speeds exceed 30 miles per hour with critical fire behavior. 3. Wood shake roofs, wood construction. 4. Structures built on slopes over 50%. Natural vegetation on slopes. 5. Structures and vegetation not separated. 6. Poor access to structures. 7. Structures spaced less than 20’ apart. 8. Poor water supply. 9. Isolated structures with narrow access, no green belts or protection for firefighters or resources. 10. No incident action plan. Free-lance firefighting. 11. Single-resource ordering, deployment. 12. Resource focus on a hydrant or single structure. In contrast, Perry gave criteria for high probability of survival in wildland urban- interface fire sieges (p. 283):

1. Good preplanning, preattack by fire department and used by first-arriving officer. 2. Resources ordered early, predeployed in advance. 3. Incident objectives known. Good incident action plan, control objectives. Expectation levels set with law enforcement. 4. Wind speeds under 15 miles per hour. No critical fire behavior. 5. Housing subdivision has fuel management plan. No vegetation in or around structures. 6. Slopes do not exceed 30%. 7. Air attack and/or bulldozer, hand crews support operations. 8. Good water supply. 25 9. Building construction other than wood. 10. Good wide-access roads with wide turnouts and green belts. 11. Strike team deployment. 12. Resources keep mobile, flow with the fire and changing conditions. Wise use of water. Wood decking, adjacency of combustible ornamental vegetation, lack of heat- resistant windows and roof vent construction, inadequate road bed materials, narrow road bridges or bridges with inadequate load bearing capacity, structures poorly situated with respect to topography, and access road without fuel clearance were also cited by Perry as contributors to structural loss. Perry (1990) indicated that fire involvement of a wood shingle roofed structure during a wind-driven wildfire prior to arrival of fire resources is an indicator of sure loss. The CDF uses a similar standard; however, it cites 1/3 roof involvement as the prediction factor (Clayton, Day, & McFadden, 1986). The Missoula Fire Sciences Laboratory of the U.S. Forest Service studied structural ignition and determined that defensible space was the principal factor in structural protection. In tests of building materials at 33, 66, and 98 feet from the ignition source, no material ignited at a distance of 66 feet when exposed to timber crown fire burning intensity (Public Entity Risk Institute, 2001, p. 47). Chaparral fire intensities can exceed those of timber fire, and greater distances (generally exceeding 100 feet) are thought necessary for protection against chaparral fire. In most situations, such clearance must exist prefire.

Fire Service Command Organization The increased fire activity in the urban interface has also been the crucible for change in fire organization. Out of a dramatic and catastrophic California wildfire siege of 1970 came the implementation of FIRESCOPE (Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies, later renamed Firefighting Resources

26 of California Organized for Potential Emergencies), which integrated local state and federal response in ways that had never achieved before (U.S. Fire Administration, 1999, p. 19). The contemporary Incident Command System evolved from this project and has become the common command system for the entire country (FIRESCOPE, 2001). The principle of “Unified Command” within the Incident Command System accommodates the representation and participation of all jurisdictions that have responsibility for parts of the incident (Teie, 1997, p. 363). Perry (1989) described the command of interface fires as a process of managing internal and external influences. These influences included organizational issues, strategic decision making, media relations, community relations, political perceptions, personnel welfare, and cost effectiveness. These command issues were cited as being present at all wildland fires, including interface fires (pp. 16-23). Perry (1990) offered case studies describing the effectiveness of a process where experienced fire officers used judgment and training to make immediate yet accurate “gut-level” decisions. These observations identify a nexus between wildfire fighting and command experience with success and safety in critical and dangerous wildfire conditions.

Command and Human Factors The impact of human factors during critical wildfire decision also plays an important role in an incident commander’s ability to deal with critical situations. Human factors played a preeminent role in two extensively studied incidents in which firefighters were critically injured or killed during fire “burnovers” or fire overruns. In a 1995 study of naturalistic decision making during firefighting operations (Putnam, 1995, p. 31), Dr. Gary Klien indicated that “the most prominent reason for bad decisions in operational settings is a lack of experience.” This conclusion was

27 reinforced in the Calabasas Incident Entrapment Analysis (County of Los Angeles Fire Department, 1997), when lack of experience and poor judgment were determined to be the chief contributing factors to a burnover that severely injured 10 firefighters in the Corral Canyon area on October 22, 1996, in southern California’s Santa Monica Mountains. A key command issue at this fire was the use of inexperienced Division Supervisors and a resultant degradation of safety and personal control. One Division Supervisor contributed directly to some of the burn injuries when he directed staff into inappropriate positions and terrain above the fire. Lack of appropriate training and supervision was cited as a contributing factor to all of the Calabasas Fire entrapments. During the July 2, 1994, South Canyon fire on Storm King Mountain outside of Glenwood Springs, Colorado, 14 elite, highly trained federal wildland firefighters made fireground decisions and carried out tactical missions without complete analysis (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1994). This led to their entrapment and death on July 6. Federal wildfire safety expert Paul Gleason determined that “ignorance, casualness, and distraction” also played a key role in that Colorado burnover (as cited in County of Los Angeles, 1997, p. H-60). In the Corral Canyon wildfire, experienced command staff was in place but allowed subordinate and inexperienced field commanders to lead operations in tactical areas requiring greater experience. Studies of both fires focused on the lack of understanding or application of fire behavior principles and data as a chief component of the accidents. In both fires, breakdown of the accepted command structure also played a significant role. Despite significant injury and loss of life, neither of these fires included catastrophic structural loss as a component of the incident. In an interesting testament to the nexus between fire history and behavior, and firefighter safety, the site of the Corral Canyon burnover was nearly the same as that of a previous burnover involving eight firefighters who were injured while fighting the 28 Liberty Fire of December, 1958. Some of the firefighters involved in the 1996 wildfire and all of those involved in the 1958 wildfire were trapped when their fire apparatus was overrun on a road above a “chimney” or fire-favored location. The burnover sites were within 1 mile of each other in Los Angeles County’s Corral Canyon (Boucher, 1991, p. 171). The key human factor affecting firefighter safety and decision making, according to Dr. Gary Klein (as cited in Putnam, 1995), is that firefighters use a naturalistic decision-making process known as “Recognition Primed Decisions,” which relies on past experience to make immediate decisions at a single moment of choice, a condition typical of emergency command situations (p. 31). This process is used in contrast to a rational choice model that allows for comparison of alternatives. Naturalistic decision making requires that the appropriate training and experience preexist within the individual making the decision; otherwise, a risk exists for selection of an inappropriate alternative. Operations Chief Deputy Fire Chief (Retired) Larry Miller of the County of Los Angeles Fire Department has likened this process to having mental pictures of events and outcomes in one’s head which are consulted at the time of need. Choice then is driven by application of past events and outcomes, however appropriate, as a means of crisis decision making (Miller, 1996, p. 39). This conclusion speaks particularly to the need to have training that replicates field experiences for potential incident commanders.

Fire Command Training In defining the term and complexities of a “major fire,” Teie (1997) indicated that acreage loss alone does not define the major fire (p. 362). The elements of impact to people, property, and resources were described as the major fire indicators. These

29 impacts often define the complexity within which the incident commander must work. Teie cited the 1991 Oakland Hills Fire (California) as an example. In this fire, only 1,500 acres were lost but the fire’s toll included 25 lives and over 3,354 homes and 456 apartments. This fire, known as the Tunnel Fire, became the worst wildland-urban interface fire in California’s history to date. Teie (1997) defined command complexity using three characteristics: (a) the fire involves more than one responsible fire agency; (b) resources assigned vastly increase; and (c) demands for resource deployment outpace availability, causing prioritization of assignments. All of these components work against the incident commander in his/her efforts to achieve the most successful outcome. These components should be understood by students involved in command fire officer training. Training programs available for incident commanders vary in uniformity. The most diverse and in-depth training is provided under programs sponsored by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group and its partner state and federal resource agencies. These courses are targeted for agencies with primary and substantial wildland fire responsibility and certain regional or county fire departments with extensive wildland fire risks. The emphasis of this training is on organizational and operational skills in various command system positions or specialty components. Firefighters who represent municipal government often have predominantly structural fire protection roles but may also have wildland fire risks. Specific training courses in California of sufficient depth and content for this audience are lacking, with a few notable course exceptions sponsored by the State Fire Marshal. Few states outside of California offer specialized training curriculum. In a study of wildland fires for the Council of Western State Foresters, Teie and Weatherford (2000) identified the need for expanded local training. Their study identified that the national fire problem exceeds the realm of resource agencies to include students from local jurisdictions. 30 As an example of the need for municipal oriented firefighters to receive wildland fire training, California’s worst wildland interface fire, the “Tunnel” fire, occurred in two local fire jurisdictions where wildland fire was not the primary fire service emphasis (California OES, 1992, p. 6). Greater mobilization and use of local government resources for wildland firefighting in California have occurred in the past decade due to the expanding interface fire problem and fire economics. This action has also brought municipal firefighters to wildfires on a more frequent basis (Smith, 1992). Recent years have yielded some of the highest structural losses due to wildfire in recorded history (the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Policy, as cited in U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2001a). With this loss has come a commensurate increase in firefighter injury and death. It is the consensus of many fire and forestry professionals that additional training is needed for individuals involved in the management of these wildfires, especially among local government who share in a portion of this risk.

Fire Case Studies This paper studies components of command in relation to several historical fires and, in broader perspective, the 1993 Laguna Fire. Aspects of training and experience have played heavily into the outcome of various strategies and tactics for these incidents. These outcomes suggest several aspects for training for those who will be responsible for future catastrophic wildland-urban interface fire management. In order to understand and review the strategic and tactical environment of the Laguna Fire, an understanding of the commonalty and criticality of command decisions during similar catastrophic urban interface fire adds perspective. The commonalty of critical decision points is remarkable between the Laguna Fire and other, similar, California wildfires. This allows for comparability with five additional California case studies of fires that occurred in similar highly urbanized settings.

31 The Tunnel Fire Officially known as the “Tunnel Fire,” this 1991 urban interface wildfire occurred in the heavily populated East Bay Hills in the San Francisco Bay area of California (California OES, 1992; Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 1992; Oakland Fire Department, 1992; Sullivan, 1993). The fire occurred within the cities of Oakland and Berkeley, and involved lands managed by the East Bay Regional Parks District. Like most other large California wildfires, it occurred in low humidity- high foehn wind (“Diablo wind”) conditions, among heavy fuels, and after a period of protracted drought. The communities consumed by the fire were constructed largely in the 1960s using generally wood sided and roofed styles that would be banned under modern fire codes enacted since the fire. This combination of combustible fuels, fire-prone structures, and critical fire weather patterns is the classic prescription for firestorms that have swept California periodically, most prominently during the past half century. During the Tunnel Fire, 25 lives were lost, including those of an Oakland fire battalion chief and police officer. A total of 3,354 structures and 456 apartments were destroyed by the fire, causing more than $1.5 billion in damage during the period between October 19 and 22, 1991. The majority of the structural loss occurred within the first several hours of the fire. More than 150 people were injured. The East Bay Hills, like other fire-prone California locations, possesses a significant fire history. In an early fire that was a harbinger of future California fires, the City of Berkeley fire of September 17, 1923, burned 640 structures in only an hour, just a few miles north of the Tunnel Fire area. In what would become a trend for similar future losses, 92.5% of the structures lost in Berkeley had wood shingle roofs, (National Board of Fire Underwriters, 1923, p. 9). The Fish Canyon fire in Oakland on September 22, 1970, burned 200 acres in some of the same area as the 1991 fire and

32 burned 39 structures, which constituted 100% of the residential development in the fire area at that time. Berkeley’s Wildcat Canyon Fire of December 14, 1980, burned an additional five structures. The 1970 and 1991 fires share remarkable comparisons (U.S. Fire Administra- tion, 1999). They started near the same location, in similar fuel and weather conditions. Burned residential structures in the 1970 fire were constructed of nonfire-safe materials, as were most of those destroyed in the 1991 fire. The two fires also demonstrate a common trend with wind-driven wildfire: It will burn in the same locations repeatedly, with similar patterns of spread, in a so-called historical fire corridor. Despite an investigative report from the 1970 fire that recommended strict controls on rebuilding, extensive reconstruction using nonfire-resistive features occurred. All of the homes rebuilt from the 1970 fire were destroyed in the 1991 fire. Following two modern and emerging trends, the Tunnel Fire was centered in fire service jurisdictions that are primarily focused on provision of urban fire services. The fire also consumed the relatively modest size of 1,500 highly residentially developed acres. Contemporary wildfires in urban interface areas are forming new patterns and paradigms. Urban interface fires, unlike their 20th-century counterparts, require neither protracted time nor large acreage to become extremely destructive. In the case of the Tunnel Fire, structures became involved almost immediately after the fire began to spread. Some wildfire training and preparedness had occurred within the Oakland and Berkeley fire departments prior to the 1991 fire. Fire officers were trained and experienced in handling large structural fires, structural collapses, and the like, as well as smaller wildland fires. Wildfire risks were probably given equal weight to other high risks within these communities. But like many firefighters from “multi-risk” municipal- oriented organizations, no initially available fire officer at the incident possessed the 33 combination of experience and training that would have made him/her expert in complex or catastrophic wildfire control. A shortage of on-duty command officers also hindered initial command. Of the three Oakland chief officers on duty at the time of the fire, one was killed while attempting to rescue trapped civilians. In general, both the Berkeley and Oakland fire departments had labored from 30% and 40% (respectively) reductions in staffing in the previous 12 to 15 years. The lack of staff to accomplish the public information function was particularly problematic, resulting in little provision of official guidance for evacuations or media/public information. The Tunnel Fire started at 12:12 p.m. on Saturday, October 19, but was contained by 1:39 p.m. that same day at 3 acres. The City of Oakland Fire Department struck five alarms for the fire, bringing 21 engine companies, two ladder companies, four patrol units, and two helicopters from the Oakland and Berkeley fire departments, the CDF, and the East Bay Regional Parks District. The weather was clear and warm but winds were calm. Crews overhauled the fire for several more hours, with the last company leaving the fire at 6:41 p.m. A check was made later in the evening for hot spots or smoke, and none was located. On Sunday, October 20, strong “ Diablo” winds were blowing throughout the bay area, starting in the East Bay Hills between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. Like their cousin, the notorious Santa Ana winds of southern California, they are strong easterly winds that heat adiabatically and dissect fuel moistures. They are common to the northern California bay area an average of only 6 days a year (Sullivan, 1993, p. 10). By 8:50 a.m., two companies of Oakland firefighters had returned to the previous day’s fire scene to check for hot spots. Within minutes, a number of hot spots and a small flare-up were identified within the fire perimeter. These flare-ups had been controlled by 9:45 a.m. However, between 10:40 and 10:50 a.m., a major flare-up occurred. A first alarm was transmitted 34 at 10:58 a.m., with multiple alarms following quickly. Unlike during the previous day’s blaze, the Oakland Fire Department did not immediately notify the City of Berkeley Fire Department to respond. Later, this was given over to the complete engagement and saturation of Oakland dispatchers. But it also created a void in the early response. The fire rapidly outflanked responding resources and involved the first structure at around 11:20 a.m., as the fire neared 100 acres in size. The rugged canyon terrain in the fire area influenced both the wind and the spread of the fire. Critical and multidimensional issues faced fire commanders, including rapidly spreading vegetation and structural fires, evacuation, inadequate resources, limited access, and disruption of electrical power due to downed power lines. The Tunnel Fire overwhelmed the initial fire control strategy almost immediately. The sheer magnitude of the advancing fire and its tornadic behavior forced firefighters from offensive positions and required a refocus of limited resources on evacuation. Radio communications were overwhelmed as fire companies reported serious and life-threatening conditions on all fronts. Telephone and cellular phone service was similarly saturated. The area of the Tunnel Fire was served by narrow and winding streets that posed significant obstacles for both fire apparatus access and civilian evacuation. Despite relative nearness to fire station facilities, long response times into the hills of 10 minutes or more were common due to the constraints of these roads. During the Tunnel Fire, many civilians were trapped and some were killed on traffic-jammed streets as the fire overran their positions. At 11:37 a.m., nearly 1,000 residents were trapped in a traffic jam near the exposed Parkwoods Apartment complex as an engine and two truck companies from the Oakland Fire Department attempted to access the fire area. Structures were being consumed by this time at a rate of one every 4.5 seconds (Sullivan, 1993, p. 19). Fire 35 companies at the apartment complex initiated tactics to try to buy time to allow an evacuation to be completed and to search exposed structures. These tactical positions were overwhelmed by the rapidly spreading fire, forcing a retreat. By 11:45 a.m., initial mutual aid from surrounding cities began to arrive. Radio communications frequencies were saturated with traffic, making contact with command impossible. Without direction, these companies chose positions alongside Oakland companies, who were attempting to save structures. This situation demonstrates an often experienced paradox. On one hand, companies are needed immediately for a critical fire situation, while at the same time there is a need to exercise command control by gathering resources into “staging areas” so they may be allocated by plan to the area of greatest need. Some independently acting fire companies were inadequate as a limited, single resource and they were unable to deal with the volume of fire encountered. Also, some strike teams diverted from assigned positions, resulting in some perimeter positions receiving no suppression action until late in the day. Having been left out of the firefight, the City of Berkeley became increasingly concerned about the fire. In Oakland, the assumption was that Berkeley was already committed. A Berkeley Fire Department chief officer decided to drive into Oakland and assess the risk to his city in the absence of communications from Oakland. Berkeley’s dispatch center had been flooded with calls, not only from within its city but from Oakland residents asking about evacuations and other issues. Shortly after noon, the fire was found to be within Berkeley limits, and the department responded, committing three alarms and all on-duty firefighters by 12:30 p.m. Fire intensity increased dramatically after noon and firebrands were being carried aloft in the thermal/smoke column and raining out ahead of the main fire. This situation was causing numerous spot fires both in vegetation areas and among structures. These spot fires occurred as far as a half mile ahead of the main fire and 36 jumped a freeway. Some of the Tunnel Fire’s spot fires developed into significant and threatening semiautonomous organizational events. Many fire hydrants serving the area lost water pressure as power lines burned at powered pumping stations. As structures burned and domestic pipes burst, additional demand was placed on already taxed water systems. Water systems in upper reaches of canyon areas typically went dry. The existing water grid was inadequate in design and capacity to service major fire needs. Pipe threads on fire hydrants within Oakland were also nonstandard, frustrating the efforts of mutual aid fire companies to use them. Firefighters from San Francisco were committed to holding the fire from Oakland’s Claremont Hotel. The large, century-old structure was felt to be a “conflagration breeder” with its huge wood construction. Firefighters were successful in holding the line there. The Incident Command Post was burned over several times, first near the day- before’s fire. Two additional command posts were burned over or became untenable during the first half hour of the fire. A Command Post was then established on Highway 24 just west of the Caldecott Tunnel in Oakland, and it served for the majority of the incident. Unified command among Oakland, Berkeley, the City of Piedmont, and the CDF was formed around 2:00 p.m. The command structure utilized the Incident Command System and officers of the various responsible fire agencies as staff. The CDF provided an Incident Management Team to assist in command at 5:30 p.m., 6 hours after the fire started. With the arrival of the Incident Management Team, functions of the Incident Command System that had not been implemented, such as the “Planning Section,” were initiated. Coordination with police agencies who were charged with evacuations was also problematic. No direct communication between police and fire agencies was established, and fire and law command posts were separated by considerable distance. 37 Despite these communications problems, the Oakland Police Department and assisting police agencies evacuated over 5,000 civilians in the first hours of the fire. Air attack resources were in limited availability during early operations. The first helicopter from CDF did not arrive over the fire until 11:55 a.m., almost an hour after the fire flared. This delay can also be attributed in part to improper procedure in ordering firefighting aircraft by the City of Oakland. Competing needs from other regional fires also drew aircraft elsewhere initially. The first airtankers from CDF were diverted from other fires, with 40 to 45 minute flight times, making their first drops at 1:00 p.m. One additional airtanker was dispatched at 12:39 p.m. and six more were assigned later in the afternoon. In addition to the airtankers, seven water-dropping helicopters would be used. The effectiveness of aircraft was diminished by the high wind conditions over the fire. Aircraft operations were more hazardous than usual, since flight patterns required travel over heavily populated areas. As additional resources were requested, some confusion occurred and duplicate orders were processed. The lack of a centralized and single ordering point led to orders being made by numerous agencies. Also, multiple field commanders were initiating resource requests in the absence of central command authority. The Tunnel Fire caused over 1 billion dollars in damage and exceeded the worst expectations of most involved fire professionals. The fire drew the largest mutual aid response of California firefighters in history to that date. It is also viewed as the worst urban interface wildfire in California’s history. This fire was viewed by some as the first example of the State of California’s unique and exemplary fire mutual aid system mobilizing faster and with greater strength than the ability of fire commanders to utilize the assembling resources effectively (Teie, personal communication, June 27, 2002). A total of 440 engine companies and more than 1,500 firefighters responded to the Tunnel Fire. The Tunnel Fire was the impetus for landmark legislation that 38 establishes Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones throughout California. Within these zones, construction materials and styles, water systems, vegetative clearance, and street widths and access are strictly controlled. Following the fire, the fire departments of Oakland and Berkeley signed automatic aid agreements with each other and other area fire agencies to allow for automatic exchange of service in the future.

The Paint Fire The Paint Fire (Painted Cave Fire) occurred during critical fire weather patterns in and above the community of Santa Barbara, during the period June 27 to July 2, 1990 (Ford, 1991; Gomes et al., 1993; Perry, 1990). Of six major fires and among 50 recorded wildfires since World War II in Santa Barbara County, this wildfire exhibited the most extreme rate of spread under “Sundowner” wind conditions (Gomes et al., p. 7). Even though the community is located on the California coast, temperatures had reached 105 degrees and humidity levels were as low as 9% for 2 days preceding the fire. A “Red Flag Alert” was in effect for extreme fire danger. Ten-hour fuel moistures registered at a critical 2% and live fuel moistures averaged 60%, signaling drought conditions. Winds changed from their normal onshore flow to a strong offshore pattern during this period. Structures were threatened by the Paint Fire almost from its inception. On June 27, the entire southern California area was experiencing extreme wildfire conditions. Following 4 years of drought, fires had already burned 6,600 acres and 14 homes in Orange County to the south, and another fire had burned 600 acres in Ventura County the night before. A relatively small fire of 75 acres the day before in the City of Glendale had destroyed 66 homes. Santa Barbara was exemplary of the formula for California fire disaster: high winds, critical burning conditions, and an expanded urban interface into accumulations of notoriously dangerous fuels. The fire

39 siege of Wednesday, June 27 began at 10:00 a.m., with the Santa Barbara County Fire Department’s issuance of a Red Flag Alert for extreme fire danger. At 1:00 p.m., weather stations in the hills reported 104 degrees with 9% relative humidity, live fuel moisture of 6%, and dead fuel moistures of 2.5%. Winds were blowing offshore at 15 to 30 miles per hour, heating adiabatically as they moved toward the coast (Gomes et al., 1993, p. 71). The first incident came at 3:13 p.m., with a reported fire in the county landfill above Santa Barbara. A fire in rubbish and other materials was accelerated by the offshore winds, causing fire to spread rapidly and threaten adjacent structures a little after an hour after the fire started. Santa Barbara County firefighters quickly escalated their response to the fire, ultimately bringing three alarms of local resources and three strike teams of mutual aid engines to control the fire. Despite the loss of a county maintenance building, firefighters brought this blaze under control shortly before 6:00 p.m. Drift smoke from the dump fire would also promote several reports of false alarms in the West Camino Cielo area. The Santa Barbara coast experiences a quirk in fire weather that creates a special hazard. Their so-called “Sundowner” winds constitute an atmospheric episodic phenomenon that increases fire danger during evening hours. The strong, dry wind seeks lower elevation and follows the geographic land surface in combination with a night- time offshore or down-canyon diurnal wind flow. The winds are common in summer and fall months and typically start at dusk and cease around midnight. In particularly strong episodes, the Sundowner condition can last overnight until morning. With Sundowners, the effect of the companion hot and dry daytime conditions are then exacerbated by the presence of this wind pattern, causing wildfires to burn under extreme conditions.

40 At 6:02 p.m. a brush fire was reported on State Highway 154 at Painted Cave Road, approximately 3 air miles above the City of Santa Barbara. Firefighters deployed at the dump fire noticed the new smoke simultaneously, and some units were immediately redeployed. This was a difficult redeployment because the dump fire continued to demand resources in its own right (Gomes et al., 1993, p. 65). By the time the first units arrived at the rapidly building fire, Sundowner winds were blowing at 25 to 30 miles per hour, moving the fire down canyon and along ridges from San Marcos Pass toward Santa Barbara. The first arriving County and Forest Service firefighters initiated a hose lay in an attempt to keep the then 2- to 5-acre fire in check. The fire was situated on a 40-60% inaccessible slope, with a fuel loading of 25 to 40 tons per acre. It had been 90 years since the area had burned, and flame lengths were 40 to 70 feet. Within 15 minutes, the fire was already 50 acres in size and wind velocities had increased to 50 to 60 miles per hour. The first call for additional resources was placed, requesting three strike teams or 15 additional engines, as the fire moved toward the city with an extreme rate of spread of 7 miles per hour. The initial inaccessibility and intensity of the fire forced most firefighters to wait until the fire burned to a more favorable location for attack. By 6:30 p.m., firefighters initiated an evacuation of residents from the San Marcos Road area and Tucker’s Grove Park. Firefighting aircraft were requested early. But, in typical fashion for extreme fire weather episodes, most aircraft were already committed to other incidents. They would be reassigned but would not arrive until 7:00 p.m. With the high winds, heavy smoke limiting visibility, and the rapid growth of the fire, the air resources were by then of limited value. Any hope of containment was soon abandoned. As the fire increased in intensity, it developed a thunderhead-like pyrocumulus cloud, a sure sign of extreme rates of combustion and fire spread. 41 The pyrocumulus cloud is an ominous fire behavior sign for any fire. It typically requires heavy fuel loading, rapid burning rates, and extreme rates of spread. It is usually associated with uncontrollable, fuel-driven, wildfire conditions. For this behavior to develop without an element of uphill slope to drive fire development is remarkable. In fact, the fire burned downhill toward Santa Barbara in very steep terrain. This indicated extraordinary burning and spread conditions brought about by heavy fuels and high winds, despite the effects of reverse natural slope. By 6:24 p.m. the Paint Fire was near the outskirts of Santa Barbara, spotting continuously one half to three quarters of a mile ahead of itself (Foote, Martin, & Gilless, 1991). In only 20 minutes the Paint Fire traveled 2 miles. Evacuations were formally initiated for the city and outlying areas near San Marcos Pass, including the Cielo, Laurel Springs Ranch (a youth camp), and Trout Club areas. Wind gusts were now exceeding 60 miles per hour, with relative humidities of 9%. Observed flame lengths continued between 40 and 70 feet. By now, large orders for fire resources were being placed simultaneously by both County and Forest Service Incident Commanders. The fire was located “on the Forest,” indicating initial U.S. Forest Service jurisdiction. Forest Service Incident Commander Curtis Vincent had placed a request for 10 engines, 10 crew, and three bulldozer strike teams at 6:20 p.m. The County of Santa Barbara Fire Department and its Incident Commander, Assistant Chief Keith Simmons, were developing strategy and resource orders for protection of the developed area below. By 6:30 p.m., fire commanders had jointly organized a Unified Command to deal with the blaze. The County, cooperating with the City of Santa Barbara, would assume responsibility for the lower zone of the fire and protecting structures, and the Forest Service would retain control of the upper zone inside the Los Padres National Forest. The County Fire Department immediately requested 20 additional strike teams 42 of engines for structure protection. Even as agencies unified in command, the fire was threatening its first structures at Santa Barbara’s urban perimeter. Twenty-seven minutes after the Paint fire started, it claimed its first structure. The County Fire Department’s resource request was difficult to fill. Other regional fires had depleted resources and left the southern California FIRESCOPE coordination center very busy. To staff the Paint Fire, other fire crews were requested to give up assigned resources. In Orange County, fire commanders were asked to release resources because their fire, despite burning structures earlier, had moved into wildlands and no longer threatened structures. In a demonstration of the craftsmanship of California’s fine-tuned mutual aid system, Orange County immediately sent nearly half of the fire resources that it had committed north to Santa Barbara. These resources had significant travel times and would not arrive in Santa Barbara until 1:00 a.m. The Forest Service also ordered additional national resources, including a Type 1 Incident Management Team. By 6:45 p.m., only an hour after the fire was reported, the Paint Fire was burning numerous structures in Santa Barbara. As the fire transcended from wildland fire to urban conflagration, entire blocks were set afire at the same time. Structures would be completely consumed by fire in periods ranging from 3 to 11 minutes (Perry, 1990, p. 284). Santa Barbara County fire officials tried an unusual strategy. On the first streets reached by the fire, Via Los Santos and Via Los Padres, over 40 homes were burning at once. A backfire was ordered to be set into these homes in a futile attempt to hold the fire from other streets. By 7:00 p.m., fire was attacking Santa Barbara on a half-mile-wide front across the mouth of the Maria Ygnacio Canyon drainage. It had run from the mountaintop to cross the 101 freeway near the coast in just 45 minutes. One of the fire’s two fatalities 43 occurred when a 30-year-old woman was overtaken by the firestorm in brush-covered terrain after fleeing one of 10 grouped rural homes. All 10 structures in the neighborhood from which she fled burned to the ground; none of them had defendable space. As the fire overwhelmed firefighting resources, homes on some streets burned before firefighters could even reach them. News reports carried stories of residents standing in front of flames asking, “Where are the firefighters?” At 7:00 p.m., the first airtankers arrived, having been diverted from commitments at other fires in southern California. In their first hour on scene, they were grounded due to high and erratic winds. By 7:15 p.m. the fire had moved into the Tucker’s Grove/Camino Del Rio area, and hundreds of homes were involved. Santa Barbara County’s local fire agencies’ maximum mobilization of resources had occurred earlier in the fire, and no new resources were immediately available. Mutual aid resources still had a 2- to 3-hour response time. Typical of California firestorms, local firefighters were challenged to save lives, evacuate, and save what they could. Structures with combustible features and no defendable space were often triaged in favor of those with more promise for protection. Locations untenable to firefighters for safety reasons were allowed to burn. Sheriff’s Deputies moved from block to block, using loudspeakers to urge residents to evacuate immediately. Around 7:30 p.m., six Sheriff’s Deputies evacuated 350 inmates from a jail facility ahead of the fire to a local high school. They were also forced to evacuate their primary communications facility, disrupting radio and 911 telephone communications for the entire county. Tactical firefighting direction was decentralized to individual fire companies to take action where they felt most beneficial and safe. At 7:38 p.m. the fire jumped the six-lane U.S. Highway 101 and began to burn structures in the Hope Ranch area. By 9:00 p.m., within a 120-minute period from the report of the first residence burning in Santa Barbara, 648 structures had burned. By 9:30 p.m. the fire was burning 44 actively in the Modoc/Hollister and threatening Hope Ranch neighborhoods, and it had burned a series of apartment buildings and commercial structures. One of the structures threatened to liberate hazardous materials, but concentrated efforts by firefighters prevented that occurrence. By 9:30 p.m., 12 of the ordered mutual aid strike teams had arrived. Orders had been placed for an additional 32 engine strike teams, which were still responding. Weather overnight would remain clear, warm, and dry. For the firefighters on the Santa Barbara front, their first break occurred around 9:30 p.m. The driving force of the fire, the Sundowner winds, began to abate. Typical of southern California fire behavior, an abating offshore wind condition usually signals the return of a daytime onshore diurnal wind pattern that can serve to spread fire in opposite directions from the offshore wind-driven initial fire spread. Despite this change, the lessened intensity of the wind brought significant relief for those protecting the Santa Barbara urban front. However, the fire gained renewed intensity near the top of some canyons, causing loss of additional isolated structures. Exploding propane tanks near these isolated structures hampered firefighting operations. However, the wind change had spared the city of Santa Barbara from significant structural loss. Most of the damage would be confined to unincorporated areas. By 11:00 p.m., over 600 firefighters from throughout southern California were committed to the Paint Fire. By 1:00 a.m. on the first night of the fire, a cool air chill had settled over portions of Santa Barbara, while elevations above this marine layer the air remained warm and dry. While additional Sundowner winds were predicted for the next few evenings, none substantially materialized. Crews worked hard to protect structures from midnight of the first night throughout the next day near the Trout Club in the vicinity of San Marcos Pass. Fourteen structures would be lost there. The fire came close to the mountain community of Painted Cave but was held just outside. By Friday morning, June 29, the fire was contained. It would take until the following Monday to achieve 45 complete control. In the end, 4,900 acres, 427 homes, 221 apartments, 15 businesses, and 10 public buildings were destroyed; 3,000 people were evacuated; and at least $250 million in damage was incurred. Some 1,795 firefighters staffing 120 engines, 34 handcrews, five airtankers, and five helicopters were deployed. Over 20 fire agencies participated in the response. One helicopter was lost to a crash during the fire (Gomes et al., 1993, p. 10). The fire did most of its destruction in its first 1-1/2 hours. The CDF conducted a study of structural survivability during the Paint Fire. The Defensible Space Factor Study (Foote, 1994; Foote et al., 1991) focused on 902 structures that were threatened directly by the Paint Fire. Of those buildings, 70% of those with nonflammable roofs survived, while only 19% of those with flammable roofs survived. Of those structures with brush clearance of 30 feet or more, 78% survived, while only 38% without clearance survived. Of those structures receiving defensive protection by civilians or firefighters, 83% survived fire exposure, while only 31% of those without direct protection survived. Perhaps most dramatic, those structures with nonflammable roofs and brush clearance had an 86% chance of survival, while only 4% of those without these features survived. These statistics bear out the importance of brush clearance, fire-resistive interface construction, and defensive intervention by firefighters and civilians to structural survivability during a wildland interface fire siege. The Paint Fire demonstrated one of the most rapid rates of spread in California wildfire history. Despite a heavy and cooperative response by local, state, and federal agencies in the Santa Barbara area, dense accumulations of native vegetation near heavily populated areas and critical fire weather patterns had combined to produce the disaster. Despite a massive mutual aid response, most of the response arrived after the majority of the structural loss had occurred. A total of 648 structures were destroyed within the first 1-1/2 hours, burning the first only 12 minutes after the fire had started. Fire officers were severely challenged by the lack of adequate fire resources, lack of 46 defendable space, and extreme rates of spread that compromised their ability to implement strategies for public and property protection. This fire also demonstrates the vulnerability of nonfire-resistive construction to urban interface wildfire. Significant areas of “lessons learned” for the fire service were cited in the after-action report (Gomes et al., 1993, p. 91). They included intergovernmental coordination, tactics and strategy, citizen warning, evacuation, reentry, and the role of the media. With regard to intergovernmental relations, it was observed that the California fire services mutual aid system operated superbly in delivering needed resources to the Paint Fire as soon as possible. However, once they were on the fire, the chaotic nature of the work environment left some resources misassigned or experiencing prolonged waits for orders. Some of these companies became “lost in the system” and, rather than wait, took independent action. Coordination with law enforcement was also difficult, initially due to differing command post locations and lack of communications. Postfire agreements have since corrected this issue by requiring co-located command posts. In a study conducted by the University of California, Santa Barbara (Gomes et al., 1993), it was determined that large-scale, fast-moving brush fires such as the Paint Fire defy, if not render impossible, the development of an effective plan to fight the fire. The rapid spread of the fire allows no opportunity for the command organization to formulate effectively, or particularly to enforce, a strategy for mass arriving fire units. This condition led to a state of “organized dysfunction” in which firefighters were often forced to rely on predetermined tactics and training (p. 94). Incident Commanders took the action to decentralize command and allow individual fire companies to operate within professional judgment during the period of heaviest structural loss. (The Commanders of the 1993 Laguna Fire in Orange County took the same measure.) Paint Fire commanders felt that this action allowed trained individuals on the ground to make the most appropriate decision based on their experience, training, and visual assessment. 47 The use of backfiring as a tactic achieved mixed results. One backfire was successful in saving structures, while another was not and may have unintentionally contributed to structural loss. Paint Fire commanders felt, in retrospect, that both backfires were appropriately set, with no other tactical option available at the time. From a fire behavior viewpoint, the fire conditions at the time were far less than optimal for firing operations. The Paint Fire’s threat to a pool chemical facility in Santa Barbara was determined by a single firefighter’s personal knowledge and not through the use of the extensive hazardous materials disclosure data maintained by the fire department. After- action reports cited the need to access and utilize these data during such disasters. The lack of effective and early public information processes on the part of both fire and sheriff’s department responders led the media to “fend for themselves” and may have led to inaccurate information or tardy notification to some neighborhoods to evacuate. This problem was directly proportional to the historic speed and intensity of the Paint Fire. After-action reports indicated that law and fire attempted the best evacuation notification possible and were fully engaged; however, the first notice that many residents had was the presence of the fire itself (Gomes et al., 1993, p. 99). Three evacuation shelters at University of California, Santa Barbara, El Rancho School, and First Presbyterian Church were operated by the Red Cross. Approximately 3,000 people used these shelters in the first 4 days following the fire. While evacuee reception and care went well, difficulty occurred with regard to law-fire coordination of evacuation reentry. Some residents felt that they should have been permitted to reenter sooner. Stronger procedures were developed between sheriff and fire departments as a result of their Paint fire experience.

48 The Kinneloa Fire The “Kinneloa Fire” (County of Los Angeles Fire Department, 1994a) occurred within Los Angeles County, in and near the communities of Eaton Canyon and Altadena, and the cities of Pasadena and Sierra Madre. The fire, which occurred during the period October 27 to 30, 1993, became the most destructive urban interface wildfire ever to occur along the San Gabriel Mountains front of the Angeles National Forest. The fire occurred during a Santa Ana wind event and was one of the first fires in a major California firestorm siege that ultimately included 20 other major fires. The fire area had burned many times before and is part of a classic chaparral fire regime (Doss, 1995). The previous worst fires for these mountains occurred in November 1980 at the mouth of San Gabriel Canyon several miles east of the Kinneloa Fire. That fire burned 55 homes. In the past 60 years, a dozen fires have destroyed 332 homes along the front country of the San Gabriel Mountains. These wildfires, as elsewhere in California, often burn repeatedly in the same areas. In Los Angeles County, nearly every square mile of brush lands has burned at least once since 1919. Starting from an abandoned campfire, the Kinneloa Fire at first seemed innocent—an almost minor blaze along the Old Mount Wilson Toll Road in Eaton Canyon above Pasadena. The Toll Road was actually only a fire truck trail, a far cry from its heyday, when it served recreationists from Los Angeles in the early 1900s as the gateway to the mountains. Occurring in some of the most rugged terrain in the Angeles National Forest, the fire’s potential was not unheeded by first responding firefighters. Weather forecasts the day before had warned of Santa Ana winds and “Red Flag Warning” conditions for October 27, and numerous fires had already occurred in southern California. The Stagecoach Fire in Orange County had burned two structures and 700 acres of brush just hours earlier.

49 The response was initiated by the Los Angeles County and City of Pasadena Fire Departments at 3:48 a.m. on October 27. Los Angeles County firefighters recognized during the response that the fire was within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Forest Service and requested their response as well. The developing Santa Ana wind condition was not yet prevalent in Eaton Canyon. The early morning air was cool and calm, and the fire was burning lazily as the first units arrived on scene. Firefighters arrived at 3:56 a.m. and reported 2 acres of medium brush involved, with creeping flames burning in steep terrain, with a southwest wind of 10 miles per hour. By 4:30 a.m. the initial responders would be joined by forces from the U.S. Forest Service. The presence of extensive power lines in the area of the fire prohibited the use of Los Angeles County helicopters at 4:45 a.m., but the fire was still creeping and had grown to only 3 acres by that time. Weather changed dramatically as the sun rose over Eaton Canyon. At 5:25 a.m., the Incident Commander reported that the weather was changing and that the fire could “run at any time.” The Forest Service Incident Commander requested that air tankers be dispatched to the incident as soon as possible. At 5:30 a.m., the fire began to move rapidly, briefly trapping and overrunning firefighters along the Mount Wilson Toll Road. Strong Santa Ana winds announced their arrival as winds changed direction and rapidly increased in velocity. The fire began to move downhill through Eaton Canyon toward communities below. At 5:45 a.m., the Incident Command Post was burned over near Midwick and Altadena Drives, and commanders fell back to the McCurdy Nature Center at Eaton Canyon Park. By now, command was “unified” and shared by the Los Angeles County Fire Department, the U.S. Forest Service, and the Pasadena Fire Department. The initial incident objectives of the unified command team included (a) establishing unified command among the three involved fire departments, (b) immediate deployment of 50 ordered resources into the fire area and aerial assistance at first light, (c) coordination with law enforcement to begin evacuations as necessary, and (d) requesting additional resources for structure protection as necessary. At 5:58 a.m., unified incident commanders began to order numerous engine strike teams for structure protection operations. This resource order would eventually include 38 engine strike teams (190 engines). By now, the fire bore no resemblance to its previous innocence, instead demonstrating extreme fire behavior and rapid rates of spread. Exemplary of the rapidly changing fire situation, the Incident Command Post was overrun for the second time at the Nature Center at 6:10 a.m. Evacuation of some 2,000 residents in the path of the fire was initiated. The Kinneloa Fire was threatening structures all along Altadena Drive by 6:38 a.m., and at 6:45 a.m. the first structure was ignited on Glen Canyon Road at Midwick Drive. With daylight, water-dropping helicopters from the Los Angeles County Fire Department arrived on scene and began operations. Resources were responding in mass, yet most were still some distance away. Those firefighters on scene were confronted by a daunting challenge. By 7:15 a.m., several structures were involved and numerous others were threatened, including Los Angeles County Fire Station 66. The fire had grown to 300 acres. Heavy winds were carrying firebrands well ahead of the main fire, igniting one spot fire north of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory nearly 2.5 air miles away. As the fire intensity grew, so did the area of the fire. By 7:30, the fire was reported to be 500 acres, and 45 minutes later to be 600 to 700 acres in size. By 8:00 a.m., many structures were involved on various residential streets in the Eaton Canyon area. One supervisor reported:

Upon arrival at my designated division, I was confronted with many structure fires and many homes threatened. I contacted Kinneloa Incident Command and reported, “Kinneloa I.C., Division E, at scene with two engine companies. At least ten homes fully involved and many more impinged upon. We need help now!” 51 The fire was spreading rapidly on both the wildland front and through adjacent structures. Evacuation efforts were ongoing, and they included residential properties, a convalescent home, a residential treatment facility for girls, and St. Luke’s Hospital. Evacuations became so problematic that the Kinneloa Incident Command designated a separate “Washington Command” to deal with evacuation issues in the vicinity of Washington Boulevard. Loss of structures occurred at a rapid rate for the next several hours. The criticality of this situation was complicated by the inability of air tankers to continue to operate in the high winds at 9:30 a.m. The fire had also severed electrical power required to operate domestic water pumps and at 9:45 a.m., water pressure was lost to a portion of the fire area. Providing some positive news was that “Class A” firefighting foam was being applied by fire companies to threatened structures and was effectively serving as a barricade to fire impingement. The fire continued to move through wildlands in the San Gabriel Mountain front to threaten new areas and additional structures throughout the day. By nightfall, the fire had consumed all of the structures that it ultimately would consume, plus 3,500 acres. Incident objectives were expanded at that time to include the following: (a) confine the fire east of the Lake Avenue fuel break to the Mount Lowe Truck Trail, (b) confine the fire south of the Mount Wilson Highway from the Mount Lowe Truck trail to the Mount Wilson Observatory, (c) confine the fire west of the Little Santa Anita Canyon, and (d) provide structure protection in the urban interface and begin overhaul and mop-up of damaged structures. By the morning of October 28, the fire had grown to 5,000 acres. Fire weather conditions were also moderating with lighter winds. However, the fire now involved large acreage and was located in steep and rugged terrain within the Angeles National Forest. Heavy brush and terrain would complicate suppression efforts for another 2 days before containment would be achieved. Rural structures and improvements, 52 including the Mount Wilson Observatory, were threatened for a time. Ultimately, the fire area included 5,485 acres, with a perimeter of 16 miles. Of the 3,000 structures within the fire area, 500 homes were evacuated and 133 were lost. Commercial structures and other buildings burned added to the total loss of 187 structures. Sixty-two fire agencies provided resources to the Kinneloa Fire. Two-hundred engine companies, 85 camp crews, 15 water tenders, four bulldozers, extensive support and “overhead” command staff, and numerous aircraft were involved in the fire fight. Thirteen firefighters were injured but no fatalities occurred. Financial accountability for fire resources was initially determined, as it is for all major California wildfires, through an on-location crafted Cost Share Agreement. This agreement spelled out the financial responsibilities of the three agencies participating in unified command. Of the 38 engine strike teams assigned to the fire, 25 had come through the California mutual aid system. Extensive demobilization efforts were required to process and release these resources by a specific plan, either to other incidents where they were needed or to their home units. The Kinneloa Fire experience bears out the necessity for rapid organization among agencies sharing responsibility for a multijurisdictional urban interface fire. The unification of command in this case included police agencies involved in evacuations as well as fire agencies. Forecasted changes in fire weather conditions evolved with dramatic and consequential impacts for firefighters. The fire also exhibited the need to continue efforts of perimeter control, even during a siege on structural interface areas. As the fire evolved across mountainous fronts, it continued to threaten and involve new communities, requiring the constant mobility of structural protection assets. As with other fires, resources were not present initially at sufficient levels to prevent widescale structural loss. Similar to many other urban interface fires, the major 53 structural involvement occurred early in the incident and, as the fire weather condition that drove the fire into the community abated, the structural threat eased as well. As winds changed and up-slope ridges drove the fire into more rural areas of the Angeles National Forest, some structures and improvements in isolated areas were threatened briefly. Finally, to ease completely the threat to the adjacent communities, the wildfire required containment and control. It is important to note that this wildfire burned, as most others often will, in a remarkably similar pattern as previous wind- driven wildfires in this area. This observation offers some guidance as to geographic prioritization of fire prevention efforts to high risk locations.

The Old Topanga Fire The fire history of the Santa Monica Mountains is one of the most reviled and studied in the State of California. So many fires have swept this terrain that, in the past 50 years, nearly every square inch of the range has burned, with some sites burning two or three times. Significant structural loss has occurred on many fires. To many, this coast and range is simply known as an extension of the range’s southern terminus, Malibu. The “Old Topanga Fire,” November 2 through 11, 1993 (County of Los Angeles Fire Department, 1994b; Los Angeles City Fire Department, 1994), would follow this wildfire legacy and draw the largest deployment of fire resources in California’s mutual aid system history (International Association of Fire Chiefs, 1993). Following the typical California fire siege regime, the fire would start 48 hours after a similarly devastating urban interface wildfire in Orange County’s Laguna Beach and at the same time that another major wildfire was burning to the north in Ventura County during a critical fire weather episode. Eighteen major fires burned in southern California during this period.

54 The Old Topanga Fire destroyed more homes than any other wildfire in the history of the County of Los Angeles Fire Department. This fire was the worst of the worst, eclipsing 20 other catastrophic wildfires occurring since the Department’s inception 73 years prior. The Old Topanga Fire destroyed 388 structures and resulted in the deaths of three civilians, while consuming 16,500 acres. The fire traversed seven previous burn areas, with brush ranging in age from 8 to 70 years. It had been 8 years since the fire area’s last major fire. Situated perfectly to accept the full force of Santa Ana winds, the Santa Monica Mountains rise from north-to-south-oriented canyons from sea level to elevations as high as 3,111 feet. A tortured landscape, the rugged terrain is covered in heavy native chaparral, a species that has adapted to high-intensity/short-interval return wildfire. The orientation of its major canyons is in alignment with the north-to-northeast Santa Ana winds, so their effects are intensified as the winds drop in altitude, warm adiabatically, and push for sea level. Two of the range’s major canyons are Malibu and Topanga. Both have been visited so frequently by wildfire as to gain distinctions as “historical fire corridors.” Urban centers are located both north and south of the range, along the 101 freeway to the north and in Malibu to the south, with the greater Los Angeles area within a short travel distance. Many rural structures exist within the interior of the range. Many are high-value homes belonging to celebrities and wealthy persons. Some residents of this region have lost their homes to wildfire three times after rebuilding on the same site (Doss, 1995). Previous major fires in the Malibu area include the Kanan Fire near the community of Malibu of October, 23, 1978, which had been the region’s worst in terms of structural loss previous to Old Topanga. That fire consumed 230 homes and 25,000 acres. Images of firefighting futility were broadcast nationally from the Kanan Fire, showing a firefighter standing with his back to the Pacific surf as he fought involved 55 structures at Malibu’s Broad Beach. The October 9, 1982, Dayton Fire consumed 85 homes and 42,000 acres and was the second largest in size in 30 years in Los Angeles County. The September 25, 1970, Wright/Malibu Canyon Fire consumed 123 homes and 27,925 acres. The Newton Fire of December 25 and the Hume Fire of December 27, 1956, burned simultaneously, burning 4,000 acres and 26 homes and 26,000 acres, respectively. The Piuma Fire of October 14 and the Decker Fire of October 15, 1985, also burned simultaneously and consumed 5 structures and 5,120 acres, and 16 structures and 6,526 acres, respectively. It is interesting to note that the Piuma and Decker fires burned the same area as the Hume and Newton fires 29 years previous. Beginning in the Ventura County community of Thousand Oaks and burning to Malibu, the October 26, 1993, Green Meadow Fire started a week before the Old Topanga fire on the west end of the Santa Monica range and consumed 74 structures and 38,150 acres. This fire was still active near Leo Carillo Beach in Malibu on the morning of the Old Topanga Fire. The October 21, 1996, Calabasas Fire in nearby Corral Canyon caused the entrapment and injury of six firefighters on October 22, and burned 5 homes and 13,010 acres. East of Malibu, and in the City of Los Angeles’s portion of the Santa Monica Mountains, other notorious fires have occurred. The Mandeville Canyon Fire of October 23, 1978, burned 5,500 acres and 25 structures. The infamous Bel Air Fire of November 6, 1961, burned 484 structures and 6,090 acres. This fire occurred at the same time that television media in the Los Angeles area were developing widescale mobile coverage capability, and the fire was broadcast live to millions. A fire burning in Topanga Canyon at the same time as the Bel Air Fire burned an additional 9,720 acres. Earlier large fires in the Santa Monica Mountains included the Latigo Fire in October 23, 1935, and the Trippet Fire in November, 1938, which burned 116 56 structures, and the Las Flores Fire in July 1942. Collectively, these and other fires destroyed over 600 homes in the Santa Monica Mountains. These fires were followed by the Topanga Fire of November 4, 1948; the Newton, Hume, and Lake Sherwood Fires, which burned simultaneously in December 1956; and the Calabasas and Liberty Fires in December 1958. Seventy-four homes and 17,000 acres were lost to the Liberty Fire alone. All of these fires burned within historical fire corridors. This pattern of repeated major fires following similar paths and of multiple fires occurring during the same period is noteworthy. Most of these Malibu fires also occurred during periods of multiple fire siege in southern California. Recent trends in this pattern have been for less burned acreage and greater structural loss, as development has increased (Boucher, 1991, p. 221). Without doubt, the Santa Monica Mountains have one of the most remarkable fire histories in the cordillera. On November 2, 1993, the Santa Ana winds were blowing throughout Malibu with speeds of 20-40 miles per hour and gusts to 60 miles per hour. Live fuel moistures in chaparral had dropped to a critical 60%. Relative humidities ran from 7% to 13%, and a Red Flag Warning had been issued by the National Weather Service for critical burning conditions. The Green Meadow fire at the Los Angeles-Ventura County line had erupted again early in the day and had burned down the Arroyo Sequit Canyon to the coast. This fire had drawn many of the local Malibu fire resources; however, the Los Angeles County Fire Department had backfilled most of the vacated stations. At 10:46 a.m., a brush fire was reported to the Los Angeles County Fire Depart- ment along an upper portion of Old Topanga Canyon Road. A massive and augmented brush fire response was initiated from both the Los Angeles county and city fire departments that included both ground and air resources. Some crews being released from other fires were reassigned immediately to this new incident, allowing for a rapid deployment of an unusually large firefighting force. 57 Initially arriving crews were met by a heavy and aggressive fire condition and they immediately requested a second alarm. Although the fire was only an acre in size, it had already created spot fires in four locations across the first road. Almost immediately, these spot fires entered heavy fuels that had not burned since 1926. Within 10 minutes the fire had already grown to 200 acres in size. Within the first half hour the Incident Commander reported that the fire would “go to the beach,” as previous fires in the same location had done in 1956, 1970, and 1985. The Incident Commander indicated later that “by the time I got there, the fire had already jumped the [first] road. It was going like a freight train. It was very hectic, knowin’ who was where. The fire was screamin!” (County of Los Angeles Fire Department, 1994b, p. 20). Initial command was quickly unified between the Los Angeles city and county fire departments. Radio frequencies were overwhelmed with emergency communications and hampered by the rugged terrain’s impact to reception. Inability of radios to work within this rugged terrain would continue to hamper firefighters throughout the incident. Heavy winds blunted the efforts of helicopters to deliver water drops on the fire’s edge. Amid the confusion and intensity of the firefight, two severely burned civilians were discovered by fire crews in upper Topanga Canyon. As fire crews struggled to evacuate residents ahead of the fire, they were forced in many respects to abandon firefighting efforts. Incident Command established initial objectives for the rapidly growing fire: (a) place resources ahead of the fire, (b) establish an anchor point for suppression efforts, (c) begin perimeter control on the fire, (d) immediately augment resources and place resource orders, (e) order “overhead” fire officers to meet command requirements and overcome communications difficulties, and (f) ensure citizen safety. The Incident Commanders requested 10 engine strike teams (30 engines), 3 of which were to report to upper Topanga Canyon and the remaining 7 to the Malibu coast. Also, 10 crew strike teams and additional aircraft were ordered. 58 Within an hour, the fire was over 1,000 acres in size and had a smoke column visible throughout southern California, climbing 6 miles into the sky. More than 20 engine strike teams (100 engines) had been requested for the fire. As the fire approached Saddle Peak, flame lengths were observed over 150 feet; 100-foot flame lengths were common as the fire moved through older fuel beds. It was common to observe spot fires 0.5 mile ahead, with one spot fire occurring as far as 2.5 miles ahead of the main fire. Evacuations were ordered for the immediate Topanga Canyon area. This complicated fire response, as citizens crammed the canyon’s narrow streets. One hour and 15 minutes into the fire, the request for engines would be increased to 40 strike teams (200 engines), and Air National Guard retardant-dropping aircraft were requested to augment forestry and fire department helicopters and airtankers. As fire commanders assembled along the coast at Station 70 in Malibu, they expanded the Incident Command System and ordered 35 additional strike teams of engines (175 engines). The 36,000 acre Green Meadow fire to the west was also threatening to grow, causing additional concern for the Malibu coast. Using maps depicting past fire history, incident commanders began to plan strategy for the Old Topanga Fire and to expand evacuations. Station 70 served as an interim command post until it was moved to the Malibu campus of Pepperdine University hours later. By noon, the fire was positioned at the head of most major canyons above the community of Malibu, and over 300 engines had been requested for response. Fire resources were being directed to Pacific Coast Highway for an anticipated structural protection effort. Along the coast, winds occasionally shifted suddenly from the offshore Santa Ana to onshore, then back again. The wind change caused a phenomenon known as a “roll eddy.” The eddy’s wave-like action changed fire spread dynamics

59 and, with suddenness, trapped five fire engines, destroying two and sending six firefighters to the hospital. To deal with the massive mutual aid response that had been requested, three staging areas near the fire were established. Fire Station 125 near Las Virgines Road and the 101 freeway was located on the north side of the fire, Pacific Coast Highway and Topanga Canyon Boulevard was located to the southeast, and the City of Malibu Civic Center served as the staging area to the southwest. By this time, 165 engine strike teams (825 engines), 129 camp crews, 50 water tenders, and 13 bulldozers were requested from the Los Angeles county and city fire departments and the California mutual aid system. The bulk of these resources were on scene within 6 hours of the request. From the air, 12 medium and 11 heavy helicopters and 31 retardant airtankers and other fixed-wing aircraft, including California Air National Guard units, supported ground efforts. To better manage the massive response of firefighters, fire commanders organized the incident into three geographic “branches” under the Incident Command System, later expanding to five, including the Air Operations Branch. Command was shared between the Los Angeles city and county fire departments by assignment of all Los Angeles City area into “Branch 1.” The Los Angeles City Fire Department initially responded with seven strike teams (35 engines) to manage this responsibility and augmented them with additional resources as the fire moved closer. Los Angeles City also established a separate staging area at their Fire Station 23 in Pacific Palisades. By 2:15 p.m., structures in mid-Topanga Canyon were threatened by flames. Around 2:45 p.m., the fire made explosive runs towards the coast along major canyons in the fire area, igniting many structures along a 4-mile-wide front. The fire had traveled 6 miles from its origin to the coast. The areas of Las Flores and Rambla Pacifico was particularly hard hit around 3:30 p.m., despite the presence of hundreds 60 of fire engines. As the fire knocked out power in Rambla Pacifico, it affected water pressure through loss of pumps. Water storage capacity was also lost and reservoirs were depleted by this problem. Soon, fire hydrants went dry in the fire area. Fire companies attempting to protect structures were driven from some sites but, where tenable, made stands at others. Ornamental vegetation adjacent to homes was noted in a number of cases to contribute to the fire loading around a structure, sometimes contributing to its demise. A wooden bridge over Las Flores Creek burned and collapsed, leaving no escape from the fire for firefighters and civilians alike. Fire officers, including the Los Angeles County Fire Chief, had overflown the Las Flores area by helicopter as the fire approached. They had determined the likelihood of large structural loss and the probability that, once committed, fire resources would be unable to leave as the fire moved across their position. They also determined that commanders and company officers were capable of making decisions and using tactics that would keep them safe, and they ordered the deployment. This action implemented an independent action strategy for this area. Several senior officers described the fire behavior in Las Flores Canyon as “area ignition,” given the rapid and high intensity burnout that occurred. Sadly, two civilians died in this area while trying to escape the flames in a pickup truck. Numerous fire companies were overrun and sought refuge either in structures or personal emergency fire shelters. The high-intensity fire also burned an apartment structure to the ground, despite aggressive, extensive, and water-supplied firefighting efforts near Pacific Coast Highway and Las Flores Canyon. Of all of the structures in Las Flores Canyon-Rambla Pacifico, 79% were lost. Many had combustible roofs, lacked fire-safe construction features, or lacked defendable space. Some structures were cantilevered over canyons on stilts, allowing direct exposure to flames on their undersides.

61 Concern also developed for an anticipated bifurcation of the fire as it reached the coast. Experience had shown that fires would “mushroom,” moving laterally both east and west along the coastline. Driven by 50-miles-per-hour winds, the fire had literally burned to the sand near Las Flores and Rambla Pacifico. As the fire moved west, it consumed another 50 homes in Malibu’s Big Rock community, beginning around 4:45 p.m. Some structures that had survived the first pass of the fire within the burned area perimeter were also being lost as adjacent remnant fires continued to spread into the unburned structures. With some resource orders duplicated due to accounting errors, 40 additional orders for engine strike teams (200 engines) were placed into the mutual aid system. Helicopter water drops included Class A Foam, which proved to enhance the effectiveness of the drops. One pilot was quoted as saying that the knockdown potential of the water-foam mixture was 4 times that of water alone. By nightfall, the Old Topanga fire had consumed over 10,000 acres and had claimed three lives. Twenty entrapments and burnovers of firefighters had occurred throughout the day. Five hundred fifty engines organized into 110 strike teams had arrived or were responding to the fire, and up to 700 more engines were being requested. However, the great majority of the structural loss had occurred during the previous hours of the fire. Structure protection along the southwest coast and perimeter control activities would dominate the second day of the fire and a number of days thereafter. Mop-up and extinguishment of structures within the fire perimeter also drew concern. At 1:00 a.m. on November 3, the Santa Ana winds finally diminished. The return of more normal winds caused interior areas of the fire to flare anew, requiring further action. The fire was completely contained on November 11. The Old Topanga Fire had drawn the largest deployment of mutual aid resources in California history. The fire was part of a second series in the two-series California 62 firestorms of 1993. During this southern California fire siege, over 305 strike teams of engines consisting of 1,525 engines would be deployed to 18 fires by fire agencies from throughout California (FEMA, 1994, p. 5). Rapid and massive deployment of resources to the Old Topanga Fire was made possible in large part by the fire’s immediate proximity to tremendous urban fire resources. In later review, some identified the response as overwhelming (Teie, personal communication, June 27, 2002) and “beyond the capacity of a command team to effectively utilize.” This conclusion was reinforced by images of mutual aid engines packed in traffic jams along Pacific Coast Highway. Like many other fires, after-action complaints were received by citizens who spoke of structural loss while engines “sat” on Pacific Coast Highway. Reasons for their staging on the highway were many, including: (a) the resources were awaiting assignment, (b) the resources had not checked in with fire commanders or been briefed, (c) the resources were unaware of the nearby fire loss or exact fire location, and/or (d) the resources did not have good communications. This mobilization problem was not specific to the Old Topanga Fire but was potentially exacerbated by the large number of resources requested and their rapid arrival. Available technological solutions used by private industry and the military had not found their way into fire service use because of budget or coordination obstacles. Demobilization of these resources was also prolonged, complicated, and extensive, given the volume of resources present. The Old Topanga Fire stressed the management capability of the County of Los Angeles Fire Department. This organization is a veteran of many catastrophic wildfires and possesses well-experienced and qualified officers. However, the dimension of size, exceptional resource commitment, and tactical difficulty of the Old Topanga Fire exhausted the capacity of the department to manage this fire independently. For this reason, on the third day of the incident (November 4), an Incident Management Team 63 from the CDF was integrated with Los Angeles County Incident Management to give the incident greater organizational depth. This was the first time in modern history that such an integration of command staff was required by a fire under the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles County Fire Department. The Rand Corporation was commissioned by the Los Angeles County in 1994 to do an independent after-action report on the Old Topanga Fire (Carter, Bean, & Weissler, 1994). By conservative estimate in the study, over 3,500 homes were directly threatened by the fire, with a total loss of 388 structures (11%). An additional 18,700 structures were within 2 miles of the fire’s perimeter. The Rand study researchers made several observations regarding fire management. Specifically, Rand reported that the inadequacy of radio communications posed a danger to firefighters, hampered command and control activities, and contributed towards losses. The study also described the massive mutual aid response as warranted, but acknowledged that, despite rapid ordering, some communities were exposed to fire well before help arrived. The massiveness of the response was credited with the protection of more than 75% of the community of Big Rock and a number of other neighborhoods, despite aggressive threats. Another study reviewed by the Deputy Director for Fire Protection for CDF concluded that only 15-20% of the engine resources requested by this fire were actually utilized in a fire suppression or protection capacity. In those communities that did receive a large contingent of fire resources yet still suffered large losses, the Rand researchers concluded that other contributing factors included lack of communications, lack of water availability, poor roads, roads with significant brush “canopy” or adjacency, lack of local knowledge, some firefighters’ lack of wildland fire experience, and firefighter injury. These factors were in addition to extreme fire behavior and large structural loss. The study concluded that structural loss or location of loss was not influenced by media pressure or wealth of the 64 homeowner. Structural components contributing to the fire loss included combustibility of building materials, building density, ornamental vegetation, narrow and winding access streets and drives, and lack of adequate water supplies. The Rand researchers further concluded that better communications, resource tracking, and deployment tools were needed, and that technological solutions should be sought for improved resource management.

The Harmony Fire The Harmony Fire (Harmony Grove Fire) occurred during the period of October 21-23, 1996, in northern San Diego County, California (City of Carlsbad Fire Department, 1998). Burning in and around the cities of Carlsbad, Encinitas, and San Marcos and in the communities of Elfin Forest, Harmony Grove, La Costa, and Rancho Santa Fe, the fire destroyed 101 structures and 8,000 acres of wildlands, and it resulted in one fatality. It was one of the most destructive fires in the history of San Diego County, resulting in $52 million in damage. The fire occurred during a critical fire weather episode that included strong Santa Ana winds and late in a fire siege that included serious fires already burning in Orange and Los Angeles counties to the north. Red Flag Warnings for extreme fire conditions had been issued by the National Weather Service prior to 9:00 a.m. on October 21. At 1:52 p.m., a brush fire was reported in the unincorporated community of Harmony Grove near 9237 Harmony Grove Road. The CDF responded with five engines, one bulldozer, two airtankers, a helicopter, and two handcrews. Responding with them were units from the Elfin Forest/Harmony Grove Volunteer Fire Department and the Rancho Santa Fe Fire Department, with a combined initial attack force of 75 firefighters. These firefighters consolidated into a single Unified Command to attack the fire.

65 First units, arriving at 2:01 p.m., reported a fast-moving fire, and they requested additional assistance from nearby communities. A brush fire in nearby Encinitas had already drawn some of the otherwise available mutual aid fire resources. This Encinitas fire would remain small, allowing for some fire resources assigned to it to be diverted later to the Harmony Fire. In the community of Harmony, the fire quickly moved to threaten rural structures. Santa Ana winds were increasing, creating extreme fire behavior. The Incident Commander reported the fire to be 50 acres, and he requested strike teams to assist in protection of structures. When the Incident Commander asked line personnel how many structures had been lost so far, they were only able to answer, “We haven’t had time to count . . . a bunch!” (City of Carlsbad Fire Department, 1998, p. 38). The fire quickly outflanked fire resources. Civilians and automobiles flooded into the area, making access by fire apparatus and evacuation difficult. At one point, the Operations Section Chief considered setting a backfire on Rancho Santa Fe Road but had to abandon the plan due to hundreds of gawkers in the area. An Elfin Forest man perished after he received severe burns while trying to escape his fire-threatened home. He had waited too late to evacuate, and by then the fire was upon him. While attempting to leave, he hit a fire hydrant, incapacitating his car. Then, attempting to flee on foot, he was overrun by flames. State Forestry firefighters were also briefly trapped south of the community of San Marcos. Here, they dived under their fire apparatus for cover and they survived. Wood shingled roofs in the Harmony Grove area and a forest of nonnative eucalyptus trees fed the growth of the fire. Twenty-two structures would be lost in the Elfin Forest-Harmony Grove area. As the fire grew, it threatened additional structures. The limited firefighting resources available were required to be redeployed from perimeter control activities to structure protection. Dead radio service areas hampered 66 communications for firefighters and jammed available frequencies. As the fire climbed above the community of Harmony Grove and reached the top of a mesa, it began to move rapidly west toward urban areas. By 4:00 p.m., the Harmony Fire covered over 1,000 acres. Police agencies moved through the area, ordering evacuations, and the American Red Cross opened an evacuee center at San Marcos High School. Animal rescue was begun by the Humane Society. This was a considerable undertaking, given the rural nature of the fire area and the volume of animals and livestock. At 4:30 p.m., the CDF requested fire agencies from coastal cities to the west to join in the Unified Command due to the expanding structural threat. Fire Department officers from Carlsbad, Encinitas, and San Marcos joined the existing command team. By 5:00 p.m., the fire had grown to 2,000 acres but was still burning within unincorporated areas. The fire was a little more than 3 hours old when it threatened the communities of Rancho Santa Fe and La Costa. Stucco walled and noncombustible tiled roofed homes in these areas assisted with prevention of structural loss. At 5:15 p.m., the fire was one eighth of a mile from the City of Carlsbad and was spotting half a mile ahead of itself. The city opened its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at 5:30 p.m. and its Fire Chief requested five strike teams of engines (40 engines) above what was already committed to the Harmony Fire, for structure protection in the city. This request was difficult to fill due to the draw-down of fire resources caused by the regional fire situation. Evacuations were also ordered for the southwest portion of Carlsbad as the fire rapidly approached the city. The fire was rapidly approaching the city. The evacuation order caused citizens to fill streets with automobiles as fire resources attempted to reach the area. Evacuation and emergency services access was also hindered by street construction projects in the area.

67 By 6:00 p.m., the fire was burning structures in La Costa and Carlsbad. Police responded to reports of citizens panicking as the fire moved into their neighborhoods. During the next 2 hours, over 54 homes in the city of Carlsbad were destroyed. The cities of San Marcos and Encinitas would lose an additional four homes each. This fire followed a typical Santa Ana, wind-driven, critical fire weather pattern. Also typical of the fire “siege” event was the occurrence of multiple major fires at the same time. As the Harmony Fire occurred late in this siege, the fire fighters had difficulty in obtaining needed resources due to commitments to other fires. The fire started in rural areas and gained size and intensity before moving into urbanized areas. Nonfire-resistive home construction, dense stands of nonnative and naturally oily eucalyptus trees, and heavy brush accumulations fueled the fire’s development. Carlsbad’s Fire Chief went on record to say that, had homes been constructed of noncombustible roofs, none would have been lost. Inadequate radio systems hampered communications and created safety problems for firefighters. The late evacuation order failed to alert citizens of Carlsbad within enough time to evacuate the area before the fire struck and it impeded access by emergency resources as residents fled. In the aftermath of this fire, government leaders passed new brush clearance regulations, banned wood shingled roofs, and developed new radio communications systems. Integration of fire agencies under a Unified Command early in the fire was determined to have led to collaborative and effective firefighting.

Developing and Contemporary Fire Regimes In the development of this study, four other fires were noted that, although of smaller size, still developed catastrophic loss. These fires in “urban canyons” share several common denominators with the larger fires discussed in preceding pages,

68 including abundant native fuels loading, nonfire-resistive construction, rapid structural involvement, and steep slopes. Two of the four fires occurred under Santa Ana wind critical fire weather patterns, and two did not. Nonnative, ornamental vegetation often played a role in structural loss in these fires. However, they differed significantly from other fires studied in that the burning time in native fuels was relatively small, sometimes only minutes. But each wildfire served to wick fire into structures, developing urban conflagration. Also, structural involvement was almost immediate in these new fires, sometimes even before the arrival of initial firefighting resources. The fires all occurred within a “metropolitan-urban interface,” where the fires were within view of and adjacent to intense urban development. Other studied catastrophic fires generally developed in wildlands for a period of time before becoming urban conflagrations. The Trafalger Canyon Fire occurred on August 1, 2001, in San Clemente, California. The wildland component of the fire burned 2 acres of native and introduced vegetation in a small coastal canyon area consisting of 50 acres of open space. The canyon was relatively narrow, running from the beach due east for a distance of approximately one quarter of a mile. Heavy, mixed chaparral with coastal sage and some ornamental vegetation intermixed on steep slopes dominated the 100-foot-deep canyon landscape. The canyon is generally discontinuous with other wildlands and is surrounded by suburbs. The arson-caused fire started in late afternoon, with an onshore diurnal wind flow of 10 to 15 miles per hour. Widely scattered and limited stratus clouds were visible on nearby headlands and ridges in the fire area. Relative humidity was estimated to be near 40% at the time of the fire. Structures were located along the ridges along both sides above Trafalger Canyon. All of the structures were residential in nature and were generally densely packed and uniform, consisting largely of multistoried ocean view condominiums. Some slopes leading to these structures exceeded 60% slope and were heavily 69 vegetated. Weed and brush clearance around some of the structures was absent, and wood shake shingled roofing and siding was in prevalent use. Some structures were cantilevered over canyons. The Orange County Fire Authority responded initially with a “urban vegetation response” but upgraded to a full “watershed fire response” more typical of a wildland setting within 1 minute of the initial report. Two minutes after the dispatch, and before the arrival of ground units, a Sheriff’s Department helicopter arrived and reported a “brush fire with 40-foot flame lengths and one condo complex well involved” (Orange County Fire Authority, 2001, p. 1). This condominium structure was later determined to be wood shingle roofed and sided, with a cantilever over uncleared brush. Heavy involvement of native fuels and the condo structure led to heavy spotting up to one quarter mile ahead of the main fire, including on several roofs. Despite a response of more than 55 engines, aircraft, crews, and other resources in less than an hour, five structures, including four condominium complexes, were damaged, with a loss exceeding $3.5 million. The fire’s entire structural involvement was ignited within the first hour of the fire. In another Orange County example, the community of Lemon Heights/Tustin experienced the “Mardick Fire” of October 21, 1996, which destroyed 11 homes and seriously damaged another 33 within 2 hours. The fire started in a 2-acre parcel of native vegetation and spread rapidly to homes. Arriving fire units reported 10 structures partially or wholly involved upon their arrival. A 40-miles-per-hour Santa Ana wind with its associated critical fire weather pattern was in effect at the time of the fire. In addition to substantial Orange County Fire Authority resources, 19 strike teams (95 engines) responded from mutual aid fire agencies. With the fire’s occurrence during a Santa Ana wind “fire siege,” most of these strike teams were immediately redeployed

70 when available to other fires in Malibu (Calabasas Fire) and San Diego County (Harmony Fire) on their release by Orange County. In the case of the Mardick Fire, the incident began in “State Responsibility Wildlands” but immediately adjacent to the urban edge. Wildland involvement was minimal, including 2 acres of chaparral, one wind-blown spot fire, and undeveloped lot property. However, the area of the Mardick Fire is within an “historical fire corridor” and just south of an area that had seen the loss of 66 homes from the “Paseo Grande” fire of October 29, 1967. All of the structures lost or damaged during the Mardick fire were of wood shingle roofed construction. In the third example, the “College Hills Fire” within the City of Glendale, California, burned 75 acres and 33 homes on June 27, 1990. The arson-caused fire occurred during critical fire weather dominated by high temperature and low humidity. Although high-elevation winds replicated Santa Ana wind conditions, winds at the surface were onshore but very dry. The fire also occurred during the same period as the Paint Fire, noted above, and simultaneous to another major wildfire in Orange County (Carbon Fire), which burned 6,640 acres and 17 structures. Regional fire activity required resource deployment coordination between these and other fires. In the fourth incident, on June 30, 1985, the City of San Diego experienced a fire in the Mission Valley that began along Interstate 8 and traversed a slope into the community of Normal Heights. The “Normal Heights Fire” burned 300 acres of brush and 64 homes, predominantly constructed of nonfire-resistive construction. The fire occurred on a warm, summer day but not within a critical fire weather pattern. The principal means of wildfire spread were onshore coastal winds, steep slopes, and chaparral fuels, then later wood shingle structural roofs. The City of San Diego Fire Department and mutual aid responded with 97 engine companies to fight the blaze. Air support was initially delayed due to ordering problems and availability, but 71 numerous air tankers were eventually involved. San Diego has extensive risk with over 200 miles of canyon ridges within its developed area. It should be noted, too, that, in the Harmony Fire, wildland pockets or “urban canyons” contributed to some of the losses in the City of Carlsbad, even though the fire gained its original momentum within wildlands. The dominant factor in each of these new-regime fires was their relatively small burned acreage, the immediate involvement of significant numbers of structures, the metropolitan nature of the responsible fire agencies, and their significant dollar loss. This kind of wildfire is occurring with greater prevalence in southern California as rapid urbanization continues. Such fires, with their overwhelming initial demand on fire services and short- term duration pattern, emphasize the need for fire-safe construction and installed fire protection features such as vegetative management. Numerous examples exist as to the efficiency of vegetative management practices, including fuel modification and prescribed burning. A fire during Christmastime 2000 in the Ventura County, California, community of Ojai demonstrated that prescribed burning of critical parcels could save residences from a Santa Ana wind-driven wildfire when a fire started just outside that community. In Orange County’s community of Foothill Ranch, the August-to- September 1998 “Santiago” fire threatened structures in a wind-driven condition. A collapsing thunderhead cloud over the fire generated winds of 40 miles per hour, causing the 7,700-acre fire to run toward the community. Despite jumping a nearby freeway with extreme burning, the fire failed to damage a single structure. The community had an extensive system of fuel modification, fire resistive construction, excellent water and road systems, and was being protected by significant fire resources.

72 Lessons Learned Command of wildland-urban interface fire has been found to be a complex and demanding process. It requires the practitioner to be skilled in a wide variety of social, technical, organizational, analysis, and forecasting skills. In review of five major incidents, many commonalities were observed. Excellent data also exist to suggest what training and preparation is needed for fire officers who might command such incidents. Commonalities of the command practice can be associated into broad themes for further study. Each issue may be present in a theoretical urban-interface wildfire to some degree. These factors are presented as commonalities grouped in themes in appendix A. The factors are compared retrospectively to the Orange County, California, Laguna Fire in later chapters.

Chapter Summary In this chapter, five catastrophic interface wildfires were studied and many commonalities to the fire environments were identified. The fires commonly exhibited extraordinary demands for fire and emergency resources. The fires also offer some predictability for occurrence and fire behavior patterns. These issues speak to fire training themes and can be contrasted and compared with other major fires for definition and lessons learned. The history of these fires establishes a California urban-interface wildfire regime that demonstrates unique challenges and characteristics that renders such fire here remarkable. Perhaps no other state in the nation can experience such extensive risk to life and concentrated values, in so many locations, simultaneously in a fire siege, or muster and respond with such a magnificent firefighting force. This response capability was described as both a boon and a bane to fire managers.

73 CHAPTER 3 STUDY SETTING

Chapter 3 is a detailed discussion on the environmental, physical, cultural, and natural setting of the Laguna fire area, the fire services state of preparedness, and critical fire weather patterns and regional fire activity of the pre-Laguna Fire condition and a description of the facts and timelines associated with the Laguna Fire in significant detail. The setting described in this chapter will be the source for reflection by members of the command organization for the Laguna Fire presented in chapter 4. A timeline of events is presented as appendix B, and a map of the Laguna Fire is presented as appendix C.

Natural Setting The area of Laguna Canyon is an historical wildfire corridor. Many fires have occurred in Laguna Canyon and the immediately surrounding area of the San Joaquin Hills—so many, in fact, that the Laguna Canyon and its surrounding area are known as an historical wildfire corridor. Some of the more significant fires have included 1,725 acres in 1931 centered in the Laguna Hills; a fire on October 1, 1945, which burned 1,200 Laguna Canyon acres; a 2,500-acre fire on September 24, 1955; a fire in nearby Boat Canyon on December 12, 1979, which burned 550 acres and one structure; a fire on May 24, 1985, which burned 440 acres; and the Laguna Fire of October 26, 1993, which burned 14,337 acres and 441 structures. Many other smaller fires have occurred, and it is not unusual to have one or more fires in the canyon or its nearby environs each year.

74 Nearly 17,000 acres of the Laguna Canyon-San Joaquin Hills area have been dedicated to open space preservation through a variety of state parks, regional county parks, private conservancy districts, and other jurisdictions. Together, these wild lands form a continuous belt around the city of Laguna Beach and abut six adjacent incorporated cities. This land dedication has preserved the historical wildfire corridor intact. Even though 75% of this area burned in the Laguna Fire, a future of continuous urban interface wildfire risk will be guaranteed as these areas revegetate and redevelop their natural propensity for wildfire. The native vegetation within these lands is predominantly California coastal sage and chaparral. Canyon bottoms typically exhibit coast live oak/sycamore woodland, riparian habitat, and some oak/grass woodland in isolated pockets. In eastern areas of the San Joaquin Hills, much of the native vegetation was converted to grass- lands through a decade of livestock grazing. In the absence of modern grazing, native vegetation is reclaiming some areas. Although wildfire intervals typically range 20 years, in some remote coastal canyons of the San Joaquin Hills there was no historical record of wildfire prior to the 1993 Laguna Fire. This is due in part to the generally moist marine climate of coastal-facing canyons and historical human exclusion from ranch properties. With the dedication of former ranchlands to parks, these areas have seen dramatic increases in recreational use. Some areas of Laguna Canyon and the San Joaquin Hills may have experienced increased fire frequency as a result of human caused ignition. While lightning has played a role in fire ignition in the San Joaquin Hills, the role has been a minor one. The clear majority of fires are human caused with a significant arson component. As area population and development increases, trends are suggesting a parallel increase in fire occurrence. Despite frequent wildfire in portions of the area, terrain exists where heavy brush had achieved 80 years or more of age. These “old age class” fuels pose severe 75 burning potential. The San Joaquin Hills are characterized by steep and rugged terrain separated by several major canyons. Canyons typically exhibit 60% slopes, with elevations rising to 1,184 feet at Signal Peak just south of the city of Irvine, 1,001 feet at Temple Hill in the city of Laguna Beach, and 936 feet at Niguel Hill near the city of Laguna Niguel. The San Joaquin Hills terminate on the south into the Pacific Ocean. To the north, west, and east of the San Joaquin Hills, urban areas push against preserved area boundaries and provide home to hundreds of thousands of people. The city of Laguna Beach, with a population of 23,000 in 1993, sits geographically like an island of civilization within wilderness. On the inland perimeter of the San Joaquin Hills, much has been accomplished with regard to construction of fire safe communities. Modern structures are built of fire-resistive roofing and style, communities incorporate fuel breaks and green belts as isolation from dangerous native fuels, and fire protection infrastructure is modern, extensive, and full service. However, within much of the city of Laguna Beach, the communities of Emerald Bay and Laguna Canyon, and in pockets of Newport Beach, Irvine, Dana Point, and Laguna Niguel, structures have been constructed with classic risk features such as lack of defendable space, wood shingle roofs, inadequate fire- resistive construction and styles, and lack of good access and egress. The San Joaquin Hills host significant and rich variations of flora and wildlife. A number of state and federally listed “threatened” and “endangered” species, and a host of species listed as “species of concern” find habitat here. Significant archeological resources are located here, including Native American sites and fossil troves. Protection of these species and assets has been in conflict with fire protection goals from time to time. From 1990 to early 1993, the OCFD, along with its partners in the LBFD and the CDF desired to conduct prescribed burning in Emerald Canyon. Previous prescribed burning had been conducted on 550 acres in this canyon in 1990, 76 and additional mosaic burning of like acreage was desired to achieve age-class reduction of old and volatile chaparral. Age-class reduction was an important goal because Emerald Canyon leads directly into the dense and nearly 100% wood shingle residential community of Emerald Bay, and age-class reduction can sharply reduce the heat output and spread of wildfires in treated fuel beds. Weather conditions that support prescribed burning yet guarantee relative safety against catastrophic fire spread occur in only a very limited range of days in the San Joaquin Hills each year. These weather conditions typically occur in Emerald Canyon during nesting periods for two birds that are species of concern: the California Gnatcatcher and the Cactus Wren. Multiple nesting pairs of both birds were found within the prescribed burn project site. Research was ongoing for these species and access to the pristine site was prized by biologists. To accommodate this study, the prescribed burning was postponed. In 1993, the Laguna Fire started north of Emerald Canyon and made its first “run” down this canyon under very high intensity burning conditions. Structural loss in the community of Emerald Bay was extensive. Since 1993, environmental and resource trustee groups have worked with fire agencies to conduct small-scale and cooperative burning within the San Joaquin Hills for resource enhancement goals, but no significant tracts have been managed with prescribed fire for fire hazard reduction concerns. In a joint report issued after the fire, FEMA and the California OES called upon resource and fire agencies to clarify policy and rules that might permit fuel modification methods, both mechanical and fire-based in resource areas of concern (FEMA, 1994, p. 15).

Fire Weather In a variation to other southern California historical fire corridors, Santa Ana winds are sometimes reduced in the San Joaquin Hills by the presence of the nearly 6,000-foot Santa Ana Mountains, 15 miles to the east. Even though the San Joaquin 77 Hills and Laguna Canyon have similar aspects to the Malibu Canyon area of the Santa Monica Mountains, the effect of wind on the Santa Monica Mountains is usually more frequent because of the absence of any geographic obstruction. The Santa Ana Mountains serve to reduce or eliminate wind events in the San Joaquin Hills that are not strong enough to overcome the range’s geographic obstruction. Still, the Santa Ana winds can punish the San Joaquin Hills, especially in severe windstorms. When the Santa Ana winds are at their strongest, there is little if any difference in wind speeds between Malibu and Laguna Beach. The strong Santa Ana winds dissect fuel moisture rapidly and render fuels ready for explosive burning. Strong Santa Ana winds sometimes take on a unique characteristic in the San Joaquin Hills. When Santa Ana winds are oriented to blow from the northeast or east, they strike the Santa Ana Mountains and force themselves through major canyons and up and over the range. Strong Santa Ana winds crossing the mountains seek lower elevation adiabatically to affect the San Joaquin Hills strongly. The winds have a profile of 10,000 to 20,000 feet in elevation and are only partially obstructed by the mountains. In a unique feature here, Santa Ana winds also seek their way around the relatively short 30 miles of the Santa Ana Mountain range. This feature, like a rock in a stream, forces wind around the obstacle, only to see it reconverge on the opposite side. This reconvergence of wind occurs very near the Laguna Fire’s origin. The reconvergence also contributed to extreme instability in both upper-level and surface winds during the Laguna Fire. In accordance with a classic historical fire weather relationship typical of southern California fire sieges, the Laguna Fire followed a relatively wet season in 1992 to 1993 and a 6-year prior period of drought (1986 to 1992).

Fire Services Fire services directly responsible for the Laguna fire included the OCFD (successor: Orange County Fire Authority) and the Laguna Beach Fire Department 78 (LBFD). The LBFD is a small but full-service, four-station fire organization providing basic municipal fire and rescue services. The city’s firefighters were not unfamiliar with wildland fire and had experienced a number of fires in the Laguna Canyon area. The much larger county fire department had significant responsibility for wildland-urban interface areas. At the time, the department was the fourth largest in California. The department maintained specialized wildfire resources such as bulldozers and hand crews, wildland engines, and other equipment. As a “contract county” agency to the CDF, the department protected significant wildland areas for the State. Its employees viewed wildland fire as a primary duty and were trained and prepared accordingly. Extensive ground-based fire resources were located in proximity to the origin of the Laguna Fire. At the time, the County Fire Department did not have its own air resources but relied on small law enforcement helicopters and forestry aircraft for air support. In addition to these two modern fire agencies, mutual aid from other Orange County cities and from around the State of California joined them in firefighting operations.

The Fire Siege The Laguna Fire was a member of a siege of Santa Ana wind-driven wildfires that occurred during the period October 26 to November 4, 1993. Three major fires burned within Orange County during this period alone, part of a total of 18 major fires burning in southern California. For the OCFD, the siege began with the dispatch on October 26 at 5:00 p.m. of two strike teams of engines (10 engines) to the Green Meadow fire in Ventura County. That fire burned 40,051 acres from the city of Thousand Oaks to the Pacific Ocean and took 66 structures along its way. Orange County strike teams would be committed there under mutual aid until October 31 and would not be available to assist in Orange County’s own fire disaster hours later.

79 Within Orange County, the first of the three major fires began at 11:07 p.m. in the Anaheim Hills. Units responding to a reported structure fire in Yorba Linda observed the fire and gave the first report. Since the fire was located in a “mutual threat” area, firefighters from the OCFD and the cities of Anaheim and Orange all initially responded. By 11:34 p.m., over 104 firefighters were committed to the “Stagecoach Incident.” The fire was accelerating as it moved through brush-covered wildlands toward homes, with winds of 75 miles per hour and humidity levels as low as 5%. The fire was spotting 0.5 mile ahead of itself. Given the proximity of the communities of Anaheim Hills, Villa Park, and Orange, resources were ordered rapidly. By midnight, 243 firefighters staffing 16 engine companies, eight engine strike teams (40 engines), two bulldozers, four handcrews, two helicopters, and other various equipment, and 35 command personnel had been committed. At 1:00 a.m., the Red Cross was requested to open evacuation shelters and evacuations were initiated. Just 15 minutes later, the fire’s embers began to rain on wood shingle roofs 0.5 mile in front of the fire. At 1:27 a.m., the first structure was ignited along Canyon Drive in the Crest de Ville neighborhood of the city of Orange, followed almost immediately by another on Teton Street. This neighborhood had lost structures in the October 9, 1982, Gypsum Fire. By 1:55 a.m., several structures were burning in and around this neighborhood. As additional units were rushed to support structure protection operations, at 2:21, a county fire bulldozer was trapped in the flames. Fortunately, the operator suffered no injuries. However, the intensifying fire caused one involved structure to collapse at the end of Crest de Ville, showering the neighborhood with embers. By 3:00 a.m., significant resources were deployed at the head of the fire, where many wood shingle roofed homes were threatened. Aided by a large road construction site between the fire and the structures, firefighters were successful in containing the 80 Stagecoach Fire to 750 acres, with 2 homes destroyed and 27 damaged. Crews would work the fire throughout the night to control hot spots and to construct line around the fire. By morning, the fire was nearly 80% contained and its forward momentum stopped. But in an ominous sign, as the sun came up, the Santa Ana winds intensified. A fire in Riverside County to the east cast a plume of heavy smoke over the area of the Santiago Fire. The worsening situation and threat of a fire siege was apparent to many veteran firefighters. Another major fire in Los Angeles County in the Pasadena area was drawing large amounts of fire resources from throughout the region. The Kinneloa Fire would ultimately burn 5,485 acres and 133 structures in its own right.

The Laguna Fire The Laguna Fire (County of Orange Fire Department, 1993a, 1993b; Teie, 1994, pp. 280-283) started under suspicious origin along Laguna Canyon Road (State High- way 133) south of Interstate 405 in unincorporated area between the cities of Irvine and Laguna Beach. The area was protected by the OCFD (successor agency: Orange County Fire Authority). It was part of a southern California-wide fire siege that included 18 fires and occurred in two series separated by 5 days, the Laguna fire being part of the first (FEMA, 1994, p. 5). The fire, together with the concurrently burning Stagecoach and Ortega fires, would become part of the worst fire disaster in the history of Orange County, California (Orange County Register, 1993, p. 21). Had the Laguna Fire occurred alone, it would have been the county’s worst experience in its own right. Weather recorded at the start of the fire at the nearby El Toro Marine Corps Air Station included winds north to northeast at 25 to 35 miles per hour, with gusts to 40 miles per hour, temperature of 81 degrees, and relative humidity of 6%. Dead fuel moisture monitored by the OCFD at its Irvine Lake Station recorded at 4%. Later, on

81 October 27, the Marine Corps Air Station would record the hottest temperature in the nation that day, 96 degrees. Initial calls were received by the OCFD at 11:50 a.m., October 27, 1993. The OCFD dispatched four engines and a battalion chief. The initial OCFD response would normally have been greater; however, many of its resources were still committed on the Stagecoach Fire in the Anaheim Hills. Three minutes after its initial dispatch, OCFD also requested a response from the LBFD, who dispatched two more engines and a battalion chief. As OCFD’s first due engine, Engine 326, approached the scene at 11:58 a.m., the crew reported a large column of smoke and requested water tenders to supply water to this rural fire. As Engine 326 pulled on scene at 11:59 a.m., the crew reported two acres of grass and light brush moving into heavier brush with a moderate rate of spread. The OCFD fire dispatch center, known as the Emergency Communications Center (ECC), added the water tenders and diverted three bulldozers, a Sheriff’s Depart- ment reconnaissance helicopter, two crews and a crew superintendent from the still- active Stagecoach Fire to this new incident. The OCFD Operations Assistant Chief was nearby, on his way home from the Stagecoach Fire, and he immediately diverted to the Laguna Fire. He arrived at 12:03 p.m. and implemented the Incident Command System, assuming the function of “Laguna Incident Command.” The command post was established on Laguna Canyon Road (Highway 133) north of El Toro Road. The Assistant Chief would retain this position for the OCFD throughout the emergency. His initial report included that the fire was 4 to 5 acres in size with potential to become a major emergency. He requested two engine strike teams, to be composed of the closest available resources, and three airtankers in additional to the initial assignment. He assigned the first due OCFD battalion chief to be the “operations section chief.” The incident commander and 82 operations section chief implemented the following three objectives: (a) hold the fire south of the main ridge between the origin and the Emerald Canyon drainage, (b) hold the fire North of Laguna Canyon Road, and (c) hold the fire east of the Emerald Canyon fire access road. As the fire moved from grass and sage into heavier brush, flame lengths increased to 15 to 25 feet. This is a strong visual fire behavior indicator that suggests that burning is occurring at extreme rates. While Santa Ana winds were prevalent at the fire initially, wind speeds on the surface were moderate. The extensive turn of the fire’s smoke plume just above the fire indicated that stronger Santa Ana’s were just slightly aloft. Initial operations were directed to hold the fire to the north side of Laguna Canyon Road. The incident commander was concerned that, if the fire crested the ridge above the fire, it could “run” toward the beach and threaten structures along the coast. All regional fixed and rotary wing aircraft were committed to other fires in southern California and none was initially available for the Laguna Fire, except for the Sheriff’s Department reconnaissance helicopter. As the fire began to climb the first ridge, a division supervisor at the head of the fire noted that the Santa Ana wind was “surfac- ing” or reaching ground level and increasing significantly. At 12:03 p.m., the operations section chief requested that “all units come to the head of the fire” with the intention of placing a maximum effort to hold that critical piece of line. OCFD fire units were joined at this time by arriving units from the LBFD. Together, they attempted an unsuccessful stand on a narrow fire road south of the fire’s head. At 12:08 p.m., the incident commander made a “priority request” for airtankers and reported that if the fire crossed the main ridge, it could provide a structural threat. Despite the lack of airtanker availability, the OCFD made a priority request for eight airtankers at 12:08 p.m. OCFD fire commanders radioed a dire prediction that, 83 without air support, the fire would threaten structures and that the fire was burning hot and outflanking them. From the beginning and throughout the incident, the fire would be driven by fire resource availability, or more specifically the lack thereof. Whether the issue was airtanker or helicopter availability, arrival of engine resources, or lack of overhead staff, resources seemed always insufficient or too late to address the rapidly expanding and urgent incident demands. As such, incident commanders were required to make a series of compromises in strategy and tactics to the detriment of values at risk. This situation is typical for large southern California fire sieges, especially for incidents occurring after an earlier major incident or two has siphoned much of the available resources. Due to other regional priorities, air tankers would not arrive over the fire until 1:40 p.m., after they were diverted from other fires. At 12:09 p.m., just 19 minutes into the incident, the incident commander requested six additional engine strike teams (30 engines) after it was clear that tactical control was unachievable. These engines were directed to respond to the Laguna Coast for structure protection. This would bring the total request to eight strike teams or 40 engines. The fire was now 20 acres in size and climbing the ridge at the top of Emerald Canyon. Commanders from the OCFD and LBFD formed a “unified command” and modified incident management objectives to include the following: (a) hold the fire on the south to Laguna Canyon Road, (b) protect structures in Emerald Bay and Laguna Canyon, and (c) hold fire on the north to the Emerald Canyon watershed. The first of several staging areas was established on the north at Laguna Canyon Road and El Toro Road. As the fire crested the San Joaquin Hills around 12:28 p.m. under the full force of Santa Ana winds, it trifurcated into three major drainages: Laguna, Emerald, and Moro canyons. This would lead the fire into three separate and distinct communities below. The fire had far outstripped the ability of on-scene resources to mount an 84 offensive and direct attack. By virtue of both sheer size and high fire intensity, the fire was dangerous to approach directly. Flame lengths were common in brush fuels in the 40 to 60 feet range and approached 70 to 100 feet in slope, fuel, and wind-favored locations. The fire area included heavy chaparral fuels, some of which had not burned in 80 or more years. At 12:29 p.m., the Incident Commander requested 10 additional engine strike teams (50 engines) and reported great potential for a major fire. He advised the dispatch center that the current request totaling 18 strike teams (90 engines) “would probably be light.” He also ordered the evacuation of 3,500 from the community of Emerald Bay about 4.5 miles ahead. In an ominous sign, heavy smoke held horizontal by the heavy winds already blanketed Emerald Bay. By 12:30 p.m., every available fire resource in Orange County was already on scene or en route to the Laguna fire. This situation meant that other fire resources would be coming from surrounding counties and would be a minimum of 1 to 2 hours distant from the incident. Incident management objectives were changed to reflect the evacuation of threatened communities and the protection of structures. Commanders still hoped to contain the fire between Laguna Canyon Road on the south and Emerald and Moro canyons on the north. With foresight, the local school district superintendent ordered the evacuation of all schools in the district. At the El Moro Elementary School ahead of the fire on the coast, the evacuation was particularly orderly. Educators and school officials implemented a well-thought-out emergency plan at 12:36 p.m. and evacuated all students and personnel quickly by school bus, as 11 engine companies stood by to protect them. The evacuation required only 26 minutes. At 12:40 p.m., state park rangers evacuated beach and coastal canyon areas of threatened Crystal Cove State Park. The fire was now 200 to 300 acres in size and moving with a rapid rate of spread. The LBFD Fire Chief advised staff by radio that he believed that the fire “would bump 85 Laguna Beach.” The Incident Commanders requested an Incident Management Team from OCFD and response of its Fire Command vehicle. By 12:47, the fire was already located near the Big Bend area of Laguna Canyon and burning actively in Emerald Canyon at a rate near 100 acres per minute. The upper end of the Emerald Canyon drainage had burned completely in just 5 minutes and the fire was now nearly 1,000 acres in size. All available firefighting resources were diverted to the community of Emerald Bay, since it would be the first to be hit. At 13:01 p.m., the CDF advised that three airtankers and an air attack supervisor were en route to the Laguna fire, having been diverted from fires elsewhere to this new priority. As the fire moved through Emerald Canyon, it burned pockets of century-old chaparral. In wind- and slope-favored locations, fire behavior became extreme and the “power of the fire” overcame the “power of the wind.” Observers noted that, despite the wind’s effect to generally push fire and smoke perpendicular to the surface, when these pockets of fuel burned, the fire intensity forced smoke up and nearly vertical into a tornado-like thermal column. Thus, the intensity of the fire overcame the wind’s intensity. Included in this powerful thermal column were tons of uplifted burning materials. As the fire developed these towering columns, then burned through the heavy fuels, the power of the wind reasserted itself. This caused the thermal column to collapse or break “wave like” onto the surface and shower the area ahead of the fire like an incendiary attack. This action rapidly spread fire and caused extreme spotting. The phenomenon was observed several times throughout the fire. Most unfortunate for the community of Emerald Bay, the phenomenon occurred immediately adjacent to the community. At one time, the fire moved a half mile in only 10 minutes. At 1:11 p.m., the Incident Commanders requested Laguna Beach police to prepare for evacuation of the city. A fire liaison officer was assigned to coordinate evacuation needs with police 86 agencies. At 1:12 p.m., the Incident Command Post was ordered relocated to the Thurston Middle School in the city of Laguna Beach. The school was located in an area at risk in the Top of the World community; however, the school was protected by brush clearance and was believed to be safe. At 1:24 p.m., Incident Commanders increased the engine strike team request to a total of 25 strike teams (125 engines), based upon their projection that the fire would strike hard at developed areas. A new staging area was established along the coast at El Moro School, north of the community of Emerald Bay. A previously unfilled resource request for two water dropping helicopters was increased to six. The ECC advised that, due to other regional fire activity, they had so far only been able to acquire nine mutual aid engine strike teams. The Planning Section Chief advised the ECC to make “priority requests” with the FIRESCOPE southern California coordinating center due to the extreme structural threat. All responding strike teams were ordered to report to the coast side of the fire at El Moro Staging. Emerald Bay was an exclusive beachfront community with expensive homes that protruded back into Emerald Canyon. Many of these were built of nonfire-resistive construction, and nearly 60% of all structures had wood shingle roofs. Some homes along canyon edges were cantilevered over canyons and supported by stilts and pilings. Brush clearance within the community and along its wildland edge was spotty; however, a 30- to 40-foot-wide firebreak was maintained along the immediate edge of the community. Since evacuations had been ordered early, many of the 3,500 residents in the community were evacuated before the fire hit. Day turned to night in the community as the fire approached. Of the 25 strike teams ordered, only 6 strike teams of the 7 on the fire at that time would be in Emerald Bay when the fire first hit. Other resources outside of Emerald Bay were assigned to structural protection duties along Laguna Canyon Road, in Boat Canyon, and at El Moro School. At 1:37 p.m., structures 87 were ignited en masse as the fire blew from the mouth of Emerald Canyon, 4.7 miles from its origin. The 30- to 40-foot-wide firebreak posed no obstacle to this occurrence. As the fire progressed down Emerald Canyon, initially arriving fire units at the top of the Emerald Bay community had considered a backfiring operation to try to keep fire from entering homes there. The Emerald Structure Protection Group Supervisor was ready to initiate this tactic but observed what he thought to be two civilian vehicles on fire roads between the community and the head of the fire in Emerald Canyon. This situation prevented him from ordering the tactic for fear of entrapment of these vehicles. Later, it was learned that the fire chiefs of the OCFD and LBFD were in these vehicles, scouting ahead of the fire. This was an unexpected position for these executive officers, and their presence in the canyon denied firefighters the opportunity to backfire. In retrospect, fire officers in Emerald Bay were concerned about their ability to ignite and hold a large backfire, given high winds during this period, but many line officers lamented the fact that the opportunity to try the tactic was missed. More limited firing operations were conducted successfully in small fuel beds adjacent to and within the Emerald Bay urban interface. One firing operation in particular was credited with saving about a dozen homes. At 1:39 p.m., ECC reported that all fire radio frequencies were “saturated” by overuse and many communications were inaudible or missed. The radio system was designed for use by only six users at one time and was trying to capture 10 times that volume. Telephone landlines and cellular phones were equally saturated. This communication difficulty would continue to plague the incident for hours. At 1:40 p.m., the Structural Protection Group Supervisor, unable to reach Incident Commanders due to radio saturation, reported to the ECC that several homes were involved at the top of Emerald bay and that another 100-150 were immediately threatened. He requested

88 10 additional strike teams of any kind of engines immediately to his position. None was immediately available. At 1:47 p.m., the first airtanker from the CDF arrived over the scene. The fire was approaching 3,000 acres in size. High winds and heavy smoke from the fire obscured pilots’ views and limited the effectiveness of their drops. Airtankers were ordered to concentrate on the flanks of the fire that were visible through the smoke in an attempt to hold the fire’s lateral spread in check. Air drops are most effective when used in tandem with ground operations. This ground reinforcement was impossible due to the higher demands of life safety and structure protection. Air drops were deemed effective in perimeter control in the upper Park Drive and Alta Laguna areas of Laguna Beach. They were less effective or unusable due to heavy smoke in other areas, where damage was heaviest. At 1:51 p.m., the fire was advancing toward Laguna Canyon Road. Incident Commanders stressed the objective to hold the fire from crossing the road, but few additional resources were available to assist in this objective. On the west, the fire had burned through the Emerald Canyon watershed and was now burning in Moro Canyon. Good opportunities existed here for perimeter control but no resources were available at that time to support operations there. Six additional mutual aid strike teams (30 engines) had arrived and doubled the firefighting resources assigned to Emerald Bay by 1:50 p.m. Several reports of “persons trapped” were received from citizens there who had stayed behind to protect their own homes. By 2:13 p.m., the Structural Protection Group Supervisor in Emerald Bay reported 20 to 30 structures involved. As the fire burned both chaparral and structures in Emerald Bay, several features of conflagration were observed. A massive fire whirl developed on the north side of the community between the mouth of Emerald and Moro canyons. The tornado action of the fire whirl was intense enough to tear historical coast 89 live oaks from the ground in several locations. Some structures immediately adjacent to the firewhirl were spared due to their fire-safe construction, yet over 100 of their neighbors on both sides were lost or damaged. The firewhirl caused spotting into the community to become extreme, and at one time ignited 17 structures nearly a half mile downwind in front of the advancing fire’s edge. Winds were blowing consistently at 35 to 40 miles per hour with higher gusts, and relative humidities were at 6% to 7%, even on the immediate coast. Backfiring was successfully initiated in Boat Canyon to protect structures there. Around 2:19 p.m., water pressure failed within the community of Emerald Bay, from electrical failure of pumps and/or dwindling storage supplies. Water utilities had been requested by Incident Commanders to boost area pressure but the old water system in Emerald Bay was insufficient for a fire of this magnitude. The water system failure would plague firefighters for 6 hours. By now, around 40 homes were ablaze in Emerald Bay. At 2:37, the Incident Commander implemented an independent action strategy that decentralized decision making to field resources to “stand and fight” or “cut and run” from involved neighborhoods, depending on their impression of firefighter safety and structural survivability. Firefighters attempted to protect structures and move with the fire as it threatened previously uninvolved developed areas. At 2:42, the Incident Commander added two objectives to the fire’s plan: (a) the prevention of loss of life in hillside areas, and (b) protection of the downtown business district in the city of Laguna Beach. The Incident Commander also ordered the total engine strike team request increased to 40, or 200 engines. The County Fire Crew Superintendent and several bulldozers were assigned to reassert an effort at perimeter control. Starting off Laguna Canyon Road, they would attempt to make their way through to establish a fire line along the west side of the fire and to hold Moro Canyon.

90 For reasons of fire intensity, terrain, and lack of resources, this was an unsuccessful tactic. The Incident Commander ordered activation of a “medical branch” to deal with potential civilian casualties and activated the countywide HEAR (Hospital Emergency Administrative Radio) system to alert and prepare all regional hospitals. To support the medical branch, five groups consisting of a paramedic unit plus two ambulances were assembled. These groups were staged around the fire geographically. Also, South Coast Medical Center in Laguna Beach prepared for a possible evacuation of its facility. Thirty-four additional ambulances were assigned to the hospital. Ambulances were required to respond from throughout Orange and Los Angeles counties to support this need. Fortunately, only minor injuries were treated by the medical groups and the hospital’s evacuation was not required. The County of Orange EOC was also activated to support the fire. Firefighters and police officers normally available for EOC duty were already committed. In their absence, their functions were performed by civilians from other government agencies. Assistance from the American Red Cross was sought to open and operate five evacuation shelters at high schools in Dana Point, Corona Del Mar, and Newport Beach, at Saddleback College in Mission Viejo, and at the Community Services Facility of San Juan Capistrano. The Orange County Sheriff’s Department, California Highway Patrol, and the City of Laguna Beach Police Department mobilized nearly 200 officers for fire support operations. Later, through mutual aid, this force climbed to over 300. As the fire burned around and through Emerald Bay, it jumped Pacific Coast Highway at 3:03 p.m. and burned areas of Irvine Cove directly above the beach. Here the use of “Class A firefighting foam” was very successful for structure protection. Forty-four trailer homes at the El Moro Trailer Park at the mouth of Moro Canyon burned as well. Exploding propane tanks and burning road bridges complicated 91 firefighters’ efforts to protect this trailer community. As it burned El Moro, the fire was over 4,000 acres in size and had burned 49 Emerald Bay homes. The fire was spreading concurrently on the south in Laguna Canyon as well, threatening the grounds of the famed Laguna Art Festival. Radio communications continued to be very difficult due to communications volume and smoke interference. Only nine engine companies were available in Laguna Canyon due to the extensive commitment in Emerald Bay. Additional resources were ordered but had not yet arrived. A 1.5-mile backfire operation was initiated along Laguna Canyon Road at 3:15 p.m. in hopes of holding the fire from crossing to the south side and threatening new and heavily populated areas. Of the nine available engines, three would be assigned to protect the Arts Festival area and six would be assigned to the firing operation near Big Bend. The Incident Commanders ordered additional engines, bringing the total request to 40 strike teams or 200 engines. The Big Bend area of Laguna Canyon is characterized by a sharp “oxbow turn.” Leading into this oxbow from the west is a small and tortured side canyon that runs at right angle to the general course of other area canyons. This geographic feature was a known factor in creating unusual and aberrant fire behavior and winds in previous fires. As the small band of firefighters assigned to light backfires within Laguna Canyon watched, the main fire dropped into this canyon above Big Bend. Almost immediately, fire behavior began to increase. Firefighters raced to try to place backfires ahead of this building condition. As firewhirls developed in the Big Bend area at 3:53 p.m., firebrands were carried aloft and ignited a slope high up on the south side of Laguna Canyon Road in six locations and under hundreds of homes. The fire’s size had grown to approximately 5,000 acres. It would take only 5 minutes for the fire to travel an additional mile toward the heart of Laguna Beach.

92 The incident’s Planning Section Chief was overhead in a reconnaissance helicopter and observed the occasion. The fire was clocking an extreme rate of spread and demonstrating severe fire behavior, with flame lengths nearing 100 feet on fire- and wind-favored slopes. As the fire crossed Laguna Canyon, the Planning Section Chief recommended the evacuation of the city of Laguna Beach. This recommendation was acted upon immediately by the Incident Commanders, initiating the evacuation of 23,000 people at 3:55 p.m. The fire moved an additional 1.25 miles in only 17 minutes, and it reached the small and eclectic Laguna Canyon community of Canyon Acres. Abandoning the firing operation, fire resources in Laguna Canyon relocated to protect structures in Canyon Acres but were driven back by intense flames. Losses were heavy, with over 52 structures and most of the enclave lost. Landing in a helicopter at the Incident Command Post at Thurston School, the Planning Section Chief brought fresh maps and projections for Incident Commanders to review. Evacuation of hillside neighborhoods within the city of Laguna Beach was a primary concern. Evacuation had not been ordered there because it was believed that the fire could be held to the north of Laguna Canyon. With the fire now on the south side of the canyon and running rapidly, the need for evacuation was immediate and extreme. Narrow and winding roads lead to ridgeline areas, and evacuating residents had the potential to be trapped while evacuating. Worse yet, mutual aid fire resources were still some distance away, and resources would be needed from other commitments in Emerald Bay and other fires. Of the 17 strike teams then operating in Emerald Bay, 12 were ordered diverted to Park Drive in the city of Laguna Beach into areas ahead of the fire. The decision to relocate resources from Emerald Bay’s heavily fire-involved community for Laguna’s downtown was driven largely by the fact the Emerald Bay was evacuated and Laguna Beach was not yet evacuated. The probability for loss of life in Laguna was deemed 93 high. Two strike teams would remain in Emerald Bay, three would be located in the Boat Canyon area, and a task force consisting mostly of initial attack resources would be assigned to Laguna Canyon and Canyon Acres. Exacerbating the communications difficulties, the critical Moorhead radio repeater above Boat Canyon was destroyed by the fire, further interrupting communications. The Incident Command Post was also in a location of increasing risk. Located at Thurston Middle School at the top of a ridge above Laguna Canyon, the Command Post was in danger of being overrun. Airtankers concentrated on the top of the ridge just south of Laguna Canyon and on the Command Post itself. In addition to the Incident Command Post, nearly 250 structures were located here in the community known as Skyline. As the fire began to climb the last ridge below these structures, its spread was in alignment with the full force of the Santa Ana winds. Heavy chaparral fuels, 60% slopes, and 70- to 120-foot flame lengths raced toward the Skyline community. These flame length estimates were later reaffirmed in video tape review of the fire. Flames were measured in contrast to adjacent structures as the fire struck, with the involved structures’ dimensions serving as the baseline for flame length measurement. During a planning meeting conducted at 4:00 p.m., new incident objectives were established. It had become clear that major losses in the city of Laguna Beach were unavoidable. Losses in Emerald Bay and El Moro were already extensive. Most of the command organization worked with an assumption that a high loss of life was possible, if not likely. With the rate of spread that had been observed, it was believed that the fire could reach downtown areas and the beach within 30 minutes. The southern perimeter control objective was established at Park Drive, which runs from the Coast Highway north into the hills. Forrest Drive, directly north of the downtown commercial district, was also set as a control objective. Both streets run through the middle of developed urban areas. 94 Incident Commanders ordered discontinuance of staging and directed all incoming resources to meet the Operations Section Chief on Pacific Coast Highway at Park Drive for immediate assignment. The strategy called for holding a fire line from the beach to the top of the highest coastal ridge and protection of the downtown district. Modified objectives were to (a) protect from loss of life in the hillside areas; (b) evacuate Laguna Beach, Laguna Canyon, El Moro, and Emerald Bay; (c) prioritize resource deployment into Laguna Beach to buy evacuation time and stop fire growth in the developed areas; (d) hold fire north of Forrest Avenue; (e) hold fire west of Park Avenue; (f) hold fire, where possible, west of Laguna Canyon Road; (g) hold fire at location to be determined east of Newport Beach; and (h) hold fire at location to be determined south of Turtle Rock/Irvine. A new division was also established along upper Park Drive in Laguna Beach’s Top of the World community. The division was required to backfire to protect structures. At one point, a senior OCFD Captain and a U.S. Forest Service Hot Shot crew would, under significant risk, construct a downhill fire line from the Top of the World to the bottom of Laguna Canyon and backfire out from it as the line was built. This effort closed a huge risk of the fire encircling the City of Laguna Beach from its back side along a new and dangerous front. The highest rate of structural loss occurred after the fire crossed south from Laguna Canyon Road. In the first hour immediately following that event, the fire consumed 248 structures at a rate of 4 per minute, principally in the communities of Skyline, Mystic Hills, and along Tahiti Drive. In its first 6 hours of the fire, an average of 45 acres was burned every 60 seconds. Most of the structures were lost in five major runs of the fire. During this period the maximum rate of spread clocked for the Laguna fire was 12 miles per hour. Average fire spread moved forward at 6 miles per hour. Several watersheds experienced near-total burnout of surface biota, some approaching 95 99%. Flame lengths averaged 58 feet, with temperatures near 2,000 degrees, and approached 70 to 100 feet in fire-favored locations. Spotting was common 0.5 mile ahead of the fire, and the most distant spot was observed 1.5 miles ahead of the fire. The rapid spread of the fire also confounded efforts to maintain an operational organization to the incident. Divisions were established under the Incident Command System, only to be burned through, necessitating the reestablishment of division boundaries elsewhere. Finally, two branches and seven divisions were established in large geographical areas that retained fluidity in boundaries and organization. The lack of available qualified staff hampered additional organizational development. Structure protection groups were also temporarily established for Emerald Bay, Boat Canyon, and Laguna Canyon with resources that fluxed from one area of need to another. A little after 4:00 p.m., a local state of emergency was declared by the Orange County Board of Supervisors. This was followed by a declaration by the Governor of California the next day. A State of Emergency was declared by the Governor for Orange, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, and Ventura counties for the numerous fires burning in all of those areas. A Federal Disaster Declaration followed the state’s declaration and brought the assistance of federal resources, including FEMA, along with other financial disaster assistance. Public information efforts had been conducted live for all television, radio, and print media and had greatly assisted in evacuation notification efforts. The incident interrupted normal programming on all local television and radio and was carried internationally. A public information hotline received over 15,000 calls in the first 24 hours of operation. At the Incident Command Post, airtankers were dropping to protect this facility by 4:10 p.m. Resources were requested to come to the school for structure protection but they were jammed with evacuating traffic along Park Avenue close to downtown. As the fire rapidly closed in on the Thurston School, telephone lines were lost, followed 96 by the loss of power minutes later. Smoke obliterated the sun and forced airtanker support away. At 4:30 p.m., the fire leapt from the canyon and ignited 12 classrooms at the command post. The single engine company that had made it through the traffic congestion below protected the command post as it was evacuated. Commanders were forced to watch the fire’s consumption of the adjacent community until the fire front passed and it became safe to relocate to the Main Street Beach in downtown Laguna Beach. Near the Thurston School, 211 structures were lost in the Skyline community. An OCFD engine strike team became nearly trapped there but managed to save one of the few fire-resistive structures in the area. This home later became known as the “Miracle House.” Its noncombustible roofing, fire-resistive windows and roof eaves, and defendable space, and a firefighter’s stand made it the only home to survive in several square blocks. At 4:29 p.m., reports were received that the fire had spotted into the Woods Canyon area directly east of the city of Laguna Beach. Aerial reconnaissance found that a new and very large fire had indeed developed. But given the clarity of the sky from the winds, the fire that seemed so close was miles away along the Ortega Highway east of San Juan Capistrano in the Santa Ana Mountains. Only six engines and a few officers from the OCFD, U.S. Forest Service/Cleveland National Forest, and Riverside County Fire Department were available to respond to this new major fire, given the commitment to the Laguna Fire. This fire would become the “Ortega Fire” and would burn 21,384 acres and 19 structures. At one time, near 5:00 p.m., and due to its emergency commitments, the OCFD had only 15 companies left to serve a population of nearly 2 million people. By 5:00 p.m., firefighters in the area of Park Avenue were forced to retreat to Temple Hills Drive and Thalia Streets, losing another 27 structures. The Laguna Fire 97 was burning near the Laguna Beach High School and just above downtown, directly threatening City Hall and the city’s Headquarters Fire Station. Also visible from areas of Laguna Beach to the southwest was the Ortega Fire, which had grown in only a couple of hours to over 7,000 acres. On the north, the fire had reached Los Trancos Canyon and was beginning to threaten the city of Newport Beach at 5:30 p.m. Limited evacuations were initiated in Newport Beach along the community’s wildland interface. Incident Commanders added new incident objectives. On the north, the strategy was to keep the fire out of the Buck Gully area of southern Newport Beach and to protect the Turtle Rock community within the city of Irvine. This would principally be done by a large backfiring operation. A representative from the City of Newport Beach Fire Department and the Irvine Police Department joined the command organization in “Agency Representative” liaison positions. Backfire operations were initiated along Pacific Coast Highway, Newport Coast Drive, and near Irvine to protect these areas. By 6:30 p.m., the Laguna Fire was near 10,000 acres, with 750 acres burning in heavily developed areas south of Laguna Canyon Road. Pacific Coast Highway was reconfigured by police to be all outbound south of Laguna Beach. Traffic was jammed along this route. But at 7:00 p.m., the offshore Santa Ana wind began to diminish within the city of Laguna Beach. These conditions gave firefighters along Park Drive and Forrest Avenues needed relief and allowed them to hold their lines. By 10:00 p.m., the Santa Ana winds abated completely and a sea breeze from the west returned. Although no new structures along the Laguna coast were threatened, the fire continued to burn some structures within the perimeter that had been missed in the fire’s first pass. Limited resources were available to commit within the burned area, and many remnant fires continued to burn. In conjunction with bulldozers, handcrews, and engines, backfire operations continued essentially from the coast all the way north around the San Joaquin Hills. 98 By 11:15 p.m., backfiring had secured Newport Beach, although the fire had grown to 13,000 acres in size. As the night grew on, the onshore winds pushed the fire to the north, briefly threatening the city of Irvine and its community of Turtle Rock. Irvine police evacuated 500 from the community, raising the total evacuated to 27,500. Firefighters were able to hold their ground here with the help of diminished winds, lighter grass fuels, and backfires, with a resultant absence of structural loss. Backfiring was completed when the fire line was tied back into Laguna Canyon Road near the fire’s origin by 8:00 a.m. on October 28. These combined factors provided initial containment of the fire. Firefighters had been required to herd cattle from range areas to complete the backfire and the acreage had increased to over 14,000 acres. Extensive fire control and mop-up activities would continue for another 24 hours. A secondary search was initiated for fire victims in the ruble that remained of burned-out structures, using a contingent of 150 U.S. Marines from nearby Camp Pendleton. Almost miraculously, no lives were found to have been lost to this fire. The OCFD Fire Marshal and his inspector staff were coupled with representatives from the county and city Building Departments to accurately account for the number of structures lost and their locations. Resource agencies were also mustered to begin watershed damage assessment and rehabilitation efforts. In the end, 306 engines, organized into 57 strike teams and one task force, had fought the Laguna Fire. They were assisted by 19 bulldozers, 25 handcrews, 12 air tankers, 10 helicopters, 1,968 firefighters, 300 police officers, and 150 U.S. Marines. They were also assisted by countless city and county employees, Southern California Edison, the American Red Cross, and many others. The Laguna Fire would be declared contained on October 28, 1993, at 6:00 p.m. and controlled on October 31 at 6:00 p.m. 4-1/2 days after its origin. In contrast to the 441 structures lost and 601 others suffering minor damage, 1,082 structures were saved by direct firefighter intervention. (Saved 99 structures were defined as structures within 100 feet of uncontrolled fire.) Insured losses exceeded $435 million.

Immediate Postfire Issues Several significant issues demanded fire service attention in the days following the fire. These included political tours and information gathering, demobilization of resources, watershed rehabilitation, and resident accountability. The Governor of California and numerous state dignitaries, two United States Senators, numerous leaders of federal response agencies, members of the County Board of Supervisors, and numerous local political leaders all required briefings and other forms of interaction requiring staff and executive support. The State OES placed a hold on resource releases from the Laguna Fire while they considered the regional and statewide deployment and the firefighting reserves situation. This further taxed the incident with the demands to maintain and care for significant resources (21 strike teams of engines) past their time of need and generated considerable ill will at the field level from mutual aid responders who wished to be released. Finally, after a full extra day of consideration, the OCFD demanded and received a state resolution to outstanding issues, allowing for a release of resources. With regard to watershed rehabilitation, the OCFD Fire Chief directed the incident’s planning section chief to garner and mobilize resource and public works agencies in this effort. Following this initiation, representatives from the CDF, the County of Orange Public Works, and the City of Laguna Beach commanded restoration and mitigation efforts. Early initiation of this effort was critical due to the short time frame until the expected start of the fall rain season. The historical rains that followed the Laguna Fire during the winter of 1997- 1998 heavily impacted watersheds that had been denuded of vegetation during the fire. Rainfall amounts of nearly double annual averages that winter were brought about by 100 a strong El Niño weather phenomenon. Following a typical southern California “fire- flood sequence,” heavy runoff from one particular 5-inch overnight rainfall event contributed to extensive mudslides. This event led to the loss of two lives, 25 injuries, and damage to property including 40 homes in Laguna Canyon and in the city of Laguna Beach. During the Laguna Fire, field search operations were conducted on all burned- out structures twice: once by firefighters and fire inspectors and second by United States Marines under firefighter direction. Further accountability concerns were then relinquished to representatives of the County of Orange Sheriff’s office and the Laguna Beach Police Department. In retrospect, areas of structural fire-resistive construction and adjacent fuel modification were seen as the deterrent to loss, even in some of the most heavily burned areas. This observation reinforced modern code preference for such construction and spurred additional legislative efforts to expand regulation and emergency planning for fire-prone areas in California. Mutual aid planning was also reviewed and efforts were undertaken to expand mutual aid systems to use out-of-state fire resources that might be closer to southern California in future emergencies.

Chapter Summary Incident events and prefire conditions were found to be intrinsically linked during the Laguna Fire. The fire demonstrated many features of fires studied in chapter 2, yet retained some individualized character and generated specific, if not unique issues. In chapter 5 an analysis and comparison is presented on the similarity of these incidents. The fire moved with extraordinary speed and high fire intensity, outmaneuvering available fire resources and creating command complexity. This condition posed extreme demands on fire emergency managers.

101 The reality of the disaster driven by fire was followed by water, with higher loss of life from floods borne of fire-denuded slopes than from the Laguna Fire itself. The response garnered to the fire represented a maximum deployment of not only the two participating fire agencies but of their cooperating regional fire and law enforcement agencies, as well. Factors that contributed to the development of the Laguna Fire continue to exist in many locations in California, in Orange County, and even the Laguna Beach area, leaving great potential for the reoccurrence of similar events. A number of situations and conditions characterized the Laguna Fire. These are summarized in appendix D. A comparison of the losses associated with the Laguna Fire with the Paint, Tunnel, Kinneloa, Old Topanga, and Harmony Fires are summarized in appendix F.

102 CHAPTER 4 DOCUMENTATION OF INTERVIEWS

The purpose of this chapter is to document study respondents’ comments and points of view. Two types of respondents are identified. First are key personnel who served in Command and General Staff of the Incident Command System for the Laguna Fire. These respondents provided their reflections of their Laguna Fire experience and their lessons learned, and specifically responded to a survey instrument designed for this study. The second group consists of subject matter experts who are recognized for their expertise in the field of wildland interface fire command. These experts provided their reflections on actions and conclusions of the Laguna Fire, and commented on the lessons learned by the Laguna Fire participants. The experts identified what they felt are best practices that can be used to effectively manage this type of fire. Collectively, the 15 Chief Officers who were study respondents share 467 years of fire service experience, with an average experience of 31 years.

Laguna Fire Participants The Laguna Fire participants who were interviewed and whose comments are reviewed here are (a) Charles “Chip” Prather, Incident Commander; (b) Rich Dewberry, Laguna Beach Fire Chief (Retired); (c) Steve Whitaker, Operations Section Chief; (d) Michael S. Rohde, Planning Section Chief; (e) James Radley, Department Adminis- trative Duty Officer; (f) Richard Witesman, Law Enforcement Liaison; (g) Harold (Buck) Henderson, Logistics Section Chief/Branch Director; and (h) Michael Moore, Liaison Officer.

103 Charles “Chip” Prather, Incident Commander Chip Prather is the Fire Chief for the Orange County Fire Authority. He is the veteran of 30 years in the fire service and is extensively experienced in wildland fire operations and command. He holds a Bachelor degree from the University of Redlands and a Harvard fellowship. At the time of the Laguna Fire he held the position of Assist- ant Chief in command of the Operations Bureau. During the fire he held the position of Incident Commander for the OCFD. Chief Prather had been participating in the command of the Stagecoach Fire in the Anaheim Hills, starting on the evening of October 26. He was returning to his home on October 27 and passing near the origin of the Laguna Fire at the time that the alarm was transmitted. Observing the building column of smoke, he diverted immediately to the new fire. Prather arrived shortly after the first responding Battalion Chief, Steve Whitaker. After a brief discussion to develop initial incident objectives, Whitaker was assigned to be the Operations Section Chief. Prather immediately recognized the fire’s potential to “run to the coast” and he began to place significant resource orders. This would include repeated but unfulfilled requests for aircraft support, which was unavailable and assigned to higher priority fires. Prather established his first Incident Command Post on Laguna Canyon Road (State Highway 133) north of El Toro Road. This command post site served him for a little more than an hour. Initial actions were attempted to hold the fire close to its origin. When it became apparent that the fire was out of control, the majority of resources were directed to the Laguna Coast to address structure protection concerns. Prather directed all Orange County local agency engine strike teams except the initial attack resources into either Emerald Bay or Boat Canyon at the head of the fire.

104 Prather also ordered the evacuation of the community of Emerald bay and the El Moro Elementary School. Acknowledging incident potential, Prather established additional incident command system functions to work for the Operations Section Chief, including Structure Protection Groups. He also unified his command with the Fire Chief of the City of Laguna Beach, given that the fire was destined to burn into their jurisdiction as well. Prather indicated that the fire situation vastly outpaced incident planning and resource availability from the beginning. The lack of initially available air resources such as air tankers and helicopters was cited by Prather as a significant deficit in the initial response. The incident received aircraft support an hour after Prather’s initial requests and just as the fire began to enter the community of Emerald Bay. By the time the aircraft arrived, they could do nothing near the burning structures because of heavy smoke conditions. As Battalion Chief Mike Rohde arrived, Prather assigned him as the Planning Section Chief and began a process to reorganize the fire for major incident command. These actions included creation of new incident objectives and relocation of the command post to a larger facility to meet growing incident support needs. Initially, the Thurston Intermediate School in Laguna Beach was suggested by Laguna Beach Fire Chief as a command post facility. Prather rejected that site as too close and threatened by the fire. Instead, he selected a fire station in Dana Point to serve as the new command post. Prather began to drive to this station with his Planning Section Chief and continued to make new resource orders and direct the fire as he traveled. However, as they arrived at the fire station, the Orange County Fire Chief contacted Prather and directed him to relocate his command post to the Thurston School. Despite Prather’s concerns for the school’s location in a potential path of the fire, Prather followed executive direction immediately and returned to establishe his 105 command post at the school. A positive aspect of the school site was the ability to collocate command activities with the City of Laguna Beach. Brush clearance had been conducted around the school, providing some defensible space. Later, however, during a dramatic fire run, the school became involved in fire. This forced the command post to be relocated to its third and final location, on Main Street Beach in downtown Laguna Beach, and another reorganization of the incident objectives. During the command post burnover and transit to the new beachfront command post, Prather felt that some command and control was compromised. In retrospect, Prather indicated that he “never should have gone to the school for a command post.” The ride to the new command post was treacherous, as the steep mountain road was covered with aircraft-dropped fire retardant. This made the Chief’s vehicle slide dangerously as he moved downhill toward the coast. Prather recalled that, as he traveled, he thought that “nothing good will come of this.” Prather was advised of a possible extension of the Laguna Fire into Aliso Canyon behind Laguna Beach. This would have been a terrible strategic condition. However, this reported fire was found to be much farther away than originally reported, in the San Juan Canyon off the Ortega Highway. Soon, Prather was asked whether he could spare any resources for this new fire. He responded that he was unable to do so due to the developing and historic risk to affected coastal communities. Prather reported that he would have liked to have personally made a mental shift from “initial attack” to “major fire” command mode sooner. He felt that he had retained direct involvement in tactical situations early on, at the neglect of larger organizational issues. The duration of this involvement was about an hour. Prather’s communication with the Operations Section Chief was difficult and sporadic due to radio and telephone saturation. The Chief felt that this was deleterious to command and that the Operations Section Chief was “out of the loop” for some important decision making. In retrospect, 106 Prather would have liked to have much improved communications with his Operations Section Chief, possibly even collocation with him at the incident command post. Prather also felt that, had additional qualified staff been available, additional branches, divisions, and other assignments would have been effective in improving command and control. In an example of how loss of contact with the Operations Section Chief impacted decision making, Prather felt that he was forced to make some critical decisions in the absence of Operations input. Most important of these issues was a decision to delegate responsibility for selection of tactics and targets to individual resources, through the implementation of an independent action strategy. Prather felt that the command organization was overwhelmed and not in sufficient strength to provide effective command and control, and he felt that the strategy would be the safest and most productive, given the extensive structural siege that was occurring. The Operations Section Chief was inaccessible for consultation on this point, and the imminent involvement of the command post in the fire also weighed into this calculation. Prather determined that the best course was to rely on the prior training of individual companies to provide for their safety and effectiveness; however, he remained concerned for their safety. In retrospect, Prather would have liked to have found a different way to make and implement that decision that would have incorporated greater Operations Section Chief input, including better discussion of alternatives. The lack of adequate communications led to inadequate intelligence regarding the fire’s position and current risks. Prather resolved this by assigning his Planning Section Chief to a series of reconnaissance flights. The Planning Section Chief observed the fire to jump Laguna Canyon Road during one of these flights, causing him to recommend the evacuation of the city of Laguna Beach and the command post, in its entirety. Prather acted immediately to order the evacuation of the city. Despite the fact 107 that Prather had assigned a senior Chief Officer to establish liaison with law enforcement, he felt that an inadequate level of coordination or cooperation was being achieved. In retrospect, he would have preferred an enhanced liaison with police and even collocation of command posts. Some contact with local police was occasionally achieved through a third party, the Laguna Beach Fire Chief. Reports from the fire’s north side were sporadic and did not accurately reflect the growing fire threat from that area. This was in large part due to the lack of assigned supervisory staff in this area, which was difficult to resolve due to lack of qualified staff. A threat to the city of Irvine’s community of Turtle Rock was initially identified by the Department’s duty officer in the ECC who received telephonic reports from concerned citizens. In coordination with command, this duty officer arranged for deployment of needed resources for structure protection. Prather cited the physical condition and fatigue of firefighters at the Laguna Fire as a major concern. He felt that the safety and quality of decisions probably degraded as firefighters’ shifts were extended. In some cases these shifts exceeded 48 to 72 hours without rest. This was difficult to remedy without relief personnel, due to the large number of regional fires and the intensity of fire service demands. Chief Prather responded with candor regarding his personal emotional response to the challenges of commanding the Laguna Fire. He cited three incidents during the fire that gave him a sense of being overwhelmed. The first was when his Planning Section Chief reported from a helicopter that the fire had jumped Laguna Canyon Road and was threatening to take downtown Laguna, and that he recommended evacuation of the City of Laguna Beach. This report indicated a whole new, and much more dire, fire situation. The second incident occurred when he observed the Orange County Fire Chief appear to be “rattled” at the command post while considering inevitably huge losses—a condition he had never observed in this man, who normally possessed 108 significant poise. The third incident occurred when he viewed hundreds of burning structures from a vantage point as he prepared to evacuate the command post at Thurston School. Prather indicated that he confronted and overcame his emotions by asking himself, “If not me, who; if not now, when?” Prather indicated that, while decisions were difficult, interaction with others in his command team gave him a sense of teamwork and confidence. Even so, Prather was surprised, given the intensity of the fire, that no fatalities had occurred. Chief Prather credited the OCFD’s Public Information Officer Dan Young with his all-out effort to involve the media in delivering safety and evacuation messages. Prather felt that Young’s actions to get the media to where the action was and to be on the ground rather than at the command post was critical to his success in using the media to the best advantage. Media coverage was nearly overwhelming but provided important intelligence on the fire’s progress as well as fire and evacuation information to citizens. Chief Prather greatly appreciated the extraordinary support provided by the CDF in supplying needed resources. The forestry agency’s liaison, Chief Mike Warren, arranged for aircraft, hand crews, and other specialized support from the scene. Prather also directed the OCFD Fire Marshal to organize a house-by-house mapping by Fire Inspectors of fire loss and a secondary search for possible fire victims using U.S. Marine Corps troops from nearby Camp Pendleton. These were effective actions that relieved line firefighters of these responsibilities with highly qualified staff. Significant issues arose that required considerable effort by the Incident Com- mander in the days immediately following the fire. The first was the coordination of the release of mutual aid resources back to the State’s fire and rescue mutual aid system. This required significant and sometimes troubled contact with the OES. After an abnormally protracted period, excess resources were released from the fire; however, 109 their extended stay required extensive incident support. Another issue requiring attention was watershed rehabilitation for flood-prone areas damaged by fire, and recovery efforts in structural loss areas. Even though the rehabilitation and recovery work was to be led by other agencies, it required fire service leadership and equipment to promote rapid implementation. Media follow-up after the emergency was intense and seemed oriented toward identifying parties responsible for the losses, potentially including the fire department. Prather indicated that any inability to immediately produce documents or comments was viewed by the media with suspicion. Media interaction and education required a tremendous effort. Finally, the outpouring of political interest from local, state, and national politicians and bureaucrats required support and coordination. Chief Prather indicated that future incident commanders should be aware that a major incident’s responsibilities “do not end as the hose is rolled up.” The OCFD’s involvement in after-action responsibilities continued for months following the fire. Chief Prather indicated that future command training for fire officers who might be involved in such fires should include methodology for dealing with chaos. He believes that the incident command system should provide structure but be very flexible. Incident Commanders should be aware of the serious personal stress that they will undergo during such situations. Prather felt that a stronger model of consequence analysis is needed, because all of the strategic choices available in command of the Laguna Fire seemed to carry dire consequences. In this case, no standard answers existed, and the Chief was required to rely on his personal experience and training to make such decisions. Prather felt that the future of the fire service could be dominated by terrorism and related acts that similarly overwhelm fire resources, that command challenges could be very similar, and that lessons learned here might be applicable in these challenges as well.

110 Rich Dewberry, Laguna Beach Fire Chief (Retired) Rich Dewberry was the Fire Chief for the City of Laguna Beach during the Laguna Fire. He has since retired, after 24 years, spending his entire career in the city. He is a graduate of the National Fire Academy Executive Fire Officer program. During the Laguna Fire he held the position of Incident Commander for the City of Laguna Beach. The LBFD consists of four stations. Because the City is surrounded by jurisdiction served by the OCFD (County Fire; successor: Fire Authority), its firefighters have significant experience in working together in automatic and mutual aid incidents, almost on a daily basis. During Laguna Beach’s larger fires, they are generally staffed with significant County Fire resources. Laguna Beach and County Fire shared training opportunities and other activities as well. This significant relationship was beneficial to these agencies during the Laguna Fire and aided in rapid integration of staff, ideas, and resources. Chief Dewberry responded on the initial report of a fire in Laguna Canyon along with a Battalion Chief, two brush engines, and a structure engine from his city. Dewberry contacted County Incident Commander Chip Prather on his arrival. Prather asked him to scout ahead of the fire for potential control locations. Dewberry was joined by County Fire Chief Larry Holms in this effort. Holmes was accompanied by his wife at the time. In two vehicles, they entered backcountry roads ahead of the fire. During reconnaissance, the two Chiefs determined the fire would make a major run through Emerald Canyon and impact the community of Emerald Bay. At that time, Dewberry felt that the fire would remain in the jurisdiction of the County, but he offered any resource at his disposal to Chief Holms.

111 The Incident Command Post had been located out of a vehicle on Highway 133 just north of El Toro Road. The Incident Commander had decided to relocate the Command Post to a larger fixed facility. Dewberry suggested to the County Fire Chief that Thurston Middle School in Laguna Beach could be used. Its location south of Laguna Canyon in the Skyline community was not in the expected path of the fire at that time. The school had also been “pretreated” with fuel modification, as brush had been eliminated by a goat herding program sponsored by the City. This fuel modification barrier extended some 60 feet into the brush fuels. Holms agreed with this offer and directed incident staff to move the Command Post to this location. The two Chiefs then headed for this location. By the time Dewberry arrived at Thurston School, significant structural involvement was occurring in Emerald Bay and the fire was beginning to threaten Laguna Canyon structures as well. While Dewberry had been contributing to incident management, he felt that the unification of command occurred here at the school with his assumption of the role of Unified Incident Commander. He conducted mental calculations regarding the large resources that had been ordered and their probable arrival times, feeling ill at ease because resources would not arrive in a timely enough way, given the speed of movement of the fire. Dewberry was surprised when the fire jumped Laguna Canyon and he felt that the incident became “a whole new ball game” at this point. Within minutes of this occurrence, structures were burning on both sides of Laguna Canyon Road, and the fire burned over the command post, igniting an entire wing of classrooms. Dewberry later identified the fuel modification zone around the school as inadequate, and he sought in after-action to increase modification distances throughout the City. It was during the time that the command post was burning that a strategy was selected that endorsed independent action by resources assigned to the fire. Dewberry 112 felt that this was the only command option, given the lack of resources and organization of the fire at that time, and he believes that it resulted in a positive outcome with regard to structure protection. “If a million fire trucks had been there and waiting, the Skyline community would still have been lost.” This statement referred directly to the nonfire- resistive construction of this area, particularly wood shingled roofing on most of the homes. The most significant problem of the Laguna Fire, in Dewberry’s opinion, was the water system failure associated with inadequate water storage and pumping capacity. Dewberry had been working for years to establish new reservoirs above Laguna Beach to improve fire flow. This effort had been frustrated by environmental, financial, and political concerns. He knew that the City could not meet fire flow requirements for a large fire and he was concerned that the gravity flow system might fail in such a demand. This was the case during the Laguna Fire, especially when pump stations were directly damaged or power was lost due to the fire. He was aware, too, that the Police Department was having significant problems in effecting evacuations because people did not want to evacuate. As the fire continued to grow, Dewberry felt that the fire had the potential to sweep through his city and burn all the way south into the city of Laguna Niguel. Several threats developed over the next several hours, including a report that the fire had entered Woods Canyon behind Laguna Beach. This would have held serious consequences for the incident; however, these reports proved to be inaccurate. In retrospect, Dewberry felt that tabletop simulations and more preplanning for the potential of this fire would have helped responding agencies. He felt that scenarios and deployments could have been better preplanned and could have reduced the mental fatigue experienced by command staff and made their response more effective.

113 Dewberry acknowledged that this was the most significant fire of his career. He noted that, after the fire, the City passed a more restrictive building materials ordinance and implemented a residential inspection program. He also noted the success of a 300- foot-wide fuel brake above the Boat Canyon/Hillcrest neighborhood that served to prevent any structural loss in that area, noting that 80-foot flame lengths dropped to about 12 feet when the fire entered this zone, rendering the fire controllable in this location. Chief Dewberry spent considerable time in public contact in the days immediately following the fire. He felt that this was important to the political and community relations needs of the organization, and he felt that it was also important to firefighters, who had a strong attachment to the city and its people. He spoke personally with many who had lost homes. He acknowledged that some anger was originally targeted on the fire department. He felt that this outreach was significant in reducing that emotion. Fire resources from the City also aided initially in taking down damaged chimneys and other heavy reclamation work, the chimney often being the only standing element of a heavily damaged home. Dewberry indicated that the disaster response began only with a fire phase, and that his agency was involved in extensive mitigation work for 6 months or more after the fire. Given the steep topography in and around Laguna Beach and the proximal time of the fire to the expected start of the rainy season, concern was very high for the potential of flooding. The fire-flood sequence in the mountains of southern California is a well-documented and understood phenomenon, and Laguna Beach was positioned in a classic way for severe impact by flooding. The City of Laguna Beach mounted a community sandbagging program and mobilized many community organizations to support the filling and placement of sandbags and straw barriers on hillsides and around homes. Sixteen crews from the California Conservation Corps were utilized to do heavier work, including the removal of brush and debris from stream courses; the Fire 114 Department operated a sophisticated computer program and weather monitoring equipment that monitored storms in and around the area; and the city’s entire staff was utilized to operate heavy equipment, maintain road closures, and conduct related activities. Tragically, the concern for flooding was realized during city-wide flooding in December of 1997 and during an evening in March of 1998, as heavy “El Niño” rainfall sent water and mud down from fire-damaged hillsides in Laguna Canyon, burying several homes, damaging nine other homes, and killing two residents.

Steve Whitaker, Operations Section Chief Steve Whitaker is a Battalion Chief with the Orange County Fire Authority, with 28 years of service experience. He maintains Incident Command System qualifications as an Incident Commander and as an Operations Section Chief. He possesses a Bachelor in Business degree from the University of Southern California. Whitaker responded to the Laguna Fire as the “first-due” or initially responding Battalion Chief officer. Chief Whitaker is broadly experienced as a fire officer and was intimately familiar with the area and fire history of Laguna Canyon and the surrounding San Joaquin Hills. On October 26, Chief Whitaker was recalled to duty following the extensive deployment and “drawdown” of resources caused by the Stagecoach fire in Anaheim Hills. The primary duty Battalion Chief and the second recalled Battalion Chief had both been dispatched to the Stagecoach Fire. This situation had also depleted vehicles and radios, and Chief Whitaker was forced to utilize a substandard pool car with only the vehicle radio for communications. He had no area maps and was forced during the height of the Laguna Fire to secure a local map from a real estate office. His initial dispatch to the Laguna Fire was to an incorrect location on Highway 133 in the Irvine Valley. Initially unable to locate a fire, Chief Whitaker looked in his car’s rear view

115 mirror and observed a large column of smoke. This initial misdirection caused Whitaker to arrive a few minutes later than what normally would have been required for response. On his arrival at the Laguna Fire, Whitaker observed that the “head” of the fire was moving with a faster rate of spread than he had ever witnessed at a wildfire in his career. The fire had already crested what he felt was a key ridge, indicating to him that the fire would be uncontrollable. He observed the first-in engine, Engine 326, initiating a hose lay on the right or north flank. Not being able to see the left or south flank, he decided to scout this expanding fire line and he found that it had already extended a quarter mile toward the City of Laguna Beach in just a few minutes. Returning to the origin, he found that Assistant Chief Chip Prather had also arrived. After a short conference he was assigned as the Operations Section Chief, and Prather assumed the role of Incident Commander. Their shared view was that the fire would burn to the coast and threaten structures along the way. On his return to the head of the fire, Whitaker encountered Rich Dewberry, the Fire Chief for the City of Laguna Beach. Chief Dewberry asked Whitaker what he needed. Whitaker replied that he needed Chief Dewberry to prepare structure protection plans for the City of Laguna beach. Dewberry expressed an idea that some tactical control locations might exist ahead of the fire and left Whitaker to scout them. Ultimately, it was determined to be too dangerous to deploy personnel to the fire’s head. Noting heavy flame lengths and spotting, Chief Whitaker determined that it was unsafe to attempt further direct attack on the fire. At that point, he abandoned holding efforts on the fire’s head and began to redeploy resources toward the coast to prepare for structure protection activities. He felt he was on the “wrong side of the fire” and needed to stop current efforts and redirect strategy toward development of major fire operations. He established a staging area along the coast at the El Moro School, and 116 personally relocated himself 6 miles from the fire’s origin to a position near the corner of Pacific Coast Highway and Boat Canyon to observe the fire’s growth. One of the major issues affecting the fire, in Chief Whitaker’s opinion, was the loss of radio communications. This occurred as a result of system overuse and saturation, and because of poor system coverage, especially along the coast. This loss of communications left Whitaker without vital coordination ability with either the Incident Commander or field forces. In retrospect, Chief Whitaker said he would have overcome this gap by filling Branch Director positions earlier to provide for adequate field supervision, and he would have co-located himself with the Incident Commander for closer coordination. Chief Whitaker observed that the saturation of communications was a great obstacle. Lack of radio discipline and the ability of all fire officers to understand the greater needs of the incident created operations obstacles. As an example, Whitaker recalled one engine assigned near the fire’s origin as placing repeated radio demands for a water tender to support the holding of a remote and low-priority piece of fire line in the midst of the peak structural loss. Chief Whitaker noted some confusion in organizational development between himself and the Incident Commander that resulted from the poor communications. For example, two individuals were given the assignment to be the Emerald Structure Pro- tection Group Supervisor, one by the Incident Commander and one by Whitaker. In this case, Whitaker later remedied this by splitting geographic responsibilities and forming a new Boat Canyon Structure Group adjacent to the Emerald Group. This later proved beneficial because numerous reports were received in the area of trapped victims. Whitaker was able to delegate these reports to the Group Supervisors in the area for immediate attention. The loss of basic radio and cellular phone communications continued to plague the Incident Commander-Operations Section Chief relationship 117 throughout the incident. As an example, Whitaker was made aware that the incident objectives had been changed only two times during the first 9 hours of the fire, and not the four times that had actually occurred. A more serious challenge, according to Whitaker, occurred when the Incident Commander made a decision to delegate structural triage and fire attack decisions to the lowest levels of engine company captains and Strike Team Leaders with the selection of an “Independent Action strategy.” This action was taken without consultation with Whitaker, although communications had been attempted on the matter without success by the Incident Commander prior to the decision. Whitaker felt that this action “derailed” his organization building, and that he was close to an organizational resolution that would have provided stronger command and control and increased safety. He also felt that this action may have contributed to a loss of resource status. The lack of availability of resources at critical periods posed challenges for Whitaker. At several intervals, Whitaker asked for resources in the staging area to be deployed to active fire line, only to find that no resources were available. He directed Staging Area Managers to notify him immediately of the arrival of new resources. When the fire jumped to the south side of Laguna Canyon and threatened the downtown areas of Laguna Beach, Whitaker and the Incident Commander sought guidance from the Laguna Beach City Fire Chief on deployment priorities for the incident’s deficient resources. Laguna’s Chief, Rich Dewberry, indicated that, since the downtown business district was going to be central to revenue production needed for community postfire recovery, its protection should be a priority. More important, evacuations had occurred in some of the fire area and time was needed to secure the evacuation of the downtown area. Resource redeployment was needed to accomplish this objective. Based on this input, the Incident Commander directed most of the incident’s engines to be redirected to downtown Laguna Beach. This reassignment left inadequate 118 resources to deal with an extensive fire problem in several areas in favor of another. The Structure Protection Group Supervisor in Emerald Bay had initially been directed to reassign all of its resources. The Supervisor protested, and reported that he had at least 60 homes on fire. Whitaker agreed to balance resource redeployment needs and make assignments counter to the Incident Commander’s direction but within the spirit of that direction to the best extent possible. In the end, 90% of the engine resources on the Laguna Fire at that time were redirected to downtown Laguna Beach because of the pressing evacuation concerns and concentrated high economic values at risk. As the fire reached the coast and began ferociously to take structures, Whitaker declared to the Incident Commander that the incident could become a “life loss fire.” He requested and received significant police resources to aid in evacuation, and the Incident Commander established a Medical Group to deal with potentially injured victims. Chief Whitaker was amazed to determine several days later that no lives were lost during the incident. One action that proved beneficial, in Chief Whitaker’s opinion, was the organization of the individual initial response fire resources into a Task Force so that they could be better supervised and managed. This led to the Task Force’s productive assignment and important firing operations in Laguna Canyon. Firefighter safety was the paramount concern in Chief Whitaker’s assignment of resources, and this risk was so extreme that he decided that no resources should be deployed in the narrow side canyon, despite the loss of scores of homes there. Chief Whitaker also utilized a personal record-keeping tool to keep track of resource needs. When a Division or Structure Protection Group Supervisor requested resources, he listed the request by constructing a small empty box on a on ICS organization chart under the Supervisor’s title. He listed in the box the resource type that was requested, such as an “Engine Strike Team.” When he had a resource available for the 119 assignment he directed them to the request and listed the resource’s radio number in the box. In this manner, he tracked and assigned resources throughout the fire. As the structural involvement grew near downtown Laguna Beach, Whitaker ordered that all responding resources report directly to his location on Pacific Coast Highway near Park Avenue for immediate assignment in a critical effort to hold the line there. This eliminated the procedure of arriving resources reporting to staging areas. As units arrived on Pacific Coast Highway, Whitaker met them and assigned them personally. During this same period the Command Post was overrun by the fire. Whitaker indicated that the temporary loss of top command caused by this event was not critical to him at the time, since he had already obtained a recent update on direction from the Incident Commander and was working towards its accomplishment. Whitaker felt that his span of control was exceeded in that he was forced to concentrate on the structural protection issues exclusively and had little time for perimeter control issues. He felt that this situation was exacerbated by the selection of the Independent Action strategy. This strategy required him to supervise more closely and eliminated some span of control. When a Branch Director was assigned to perimeter control issues in wildlands northwest of Laguna Beach, Whitaker had no direct contact with him and did not feel that he had an appropriately contributing role in management of that portion of the fire. The one perimeter control issue that Whitaker focused on was the containment of the fire from reaching behind Laguna Beach on the north. Such an occurrence would have vastly increased the scope of the disaster. This action was accomplished by construction of hand line and firing operations using one County Fire Captain and a U.S. Forest Service Hot Shot Crew. Given the extensive amount of dangerous line to hold and the fire behavior conditions, Whitaker felt that this was an exceptional accomplishment.

120 While Whitaker was aware that some additional structural loss was occurring within the fire’s perimeter to homes that had survived the fire’s first passage, he felt that this situation was unmanageable because no resources were available. The limited resources available were prioritized toward limiting extension into uninvolved developed areas. Whitaker planned to deploy the maximum resources to hold the fire near a favorable location above downtown Laguna Beach to coincide with a predicted diminishment of the strong Santa Ana winds. This wind abatement occurred as forecast, which allowed resources to hold the fire at the desired location. After this effort was secure, Whitaker contacted the Branch Director responsible for perimeter containment along the northwest coast. He discussed firing operations and other control efforts and ensured that these were coordinated with the overall incident plan. In retrospect, Whitaker observed that he and others were at the mercy of the elements. Huge losses mounted rapidly until the winds abated. He observed that, on at least two occasions, he was overwhelmed by the mounting losses and his lack of ability to effect a positive outcome. Insightfully, Whitaker reflected on the adage, “If not me, who? if not now, when?” He indicated that he told himself to “suck it up” and continued his work. In after-action meetings, Whitaker identified that the fire resources used favorable winds and topography when possible to limit losses. In some cases, Whitaker observed that wind-sheltered areas were easily protected but that they were impossible in wind-, slope-, and fuel-aligned areas of fire spread. Selection of fire line locations was nearly always a decision based on the arrival of adequate firefighting resources first, then the selection of favorable locations second. Whitaker believes that five factors were most important in affecting his management of the Laguna Fire: 121 1. He had the ability to see the “big picture” and conceptualize the entire incident, then break issues into manageable tasks that could be addressed. 2. The rapid rate of spread and the historical intensity of the fire eliminated many control options because of firefighter safety concerns and the need to concentrate on immediate and large-scale evacuations. 3. Sanctioned and unsanctioned independent action by fire companies complicated command and control. Whitaker felt that this was a case in which officers were repeatedly confronted with the worst fire situation in their career, causing them to focus exclusively on their current situation, even though other situations elsewhere might have been even worse. 4. There was a serious lack of resources, including senior command staff, to accomplish needed work and supervision. 5. There was a lack of adequate interface with the Incident Commander. Chief Whitaker was demobilized from the fire late in the evening of October 27 due to a pending critical appointment the following day. Structural loss had been abated earlier in that evening, and most fire line was in place. Whitaker acknowledged that the experiences of the Laguna Fire were the most significant in his career.

Michael S. Rohde, Planning Section Chief Michael (Mike) Rohde is a Battalion Chief with the Orange County Fire Authority. He possesses 29 years experience in the fire service, including 15 years as a Chief Officer. He maintains Incident Command System qualifications as an Incident Commander, Operations Section Chief, Planning Section Chief, and Wildfire Behavior Specialist. He is extensively experienced in the command and suppression of wildland fires. He possesses an Associate in Science degree in Fire Technology and a Bachelor of Science degree in Business from the University of Phoenix, and he is a candidate for

122 a Master of Science degree in Emergency Services Administration from California State University, Long Beach. He is a California State-certified Fire Officer. Rohde is an instructor for numerous Incident Command System courses and the State Chief Officer Command 2E-Wildfire Strategy and Tactics course. As a private consultant, Rohde has conducted extensive oil spill and hazardous materials incident command training, and wildland prefire planning. Rohde responded to the Laguna Fire initially as an Engine Strike Team Leader; he arrived approximately 1 hour after the initial alarm for the fire. On arrival, he was reassigned by the Incident Commander to become the Planning Section Chief, and he retained this responsibility throughout the fire. Chief Rohde was very familiar with the Laguna Fire area and its fire history. On October 26, Chief Rohde had been recalled from home to the Stagecoach fire in the Anaheim Hills of Orange County at approximately 11:00 p.m. He had worked the entire night as a Division Supervisor, protecting structures in neighborhoods of East Orange and Villa Park. Several structures had been lost in this area overnight. As the sun rose on October 27, Rohde observed that the Santa Ana winds had increased significantly and that several large columns of smoke to the north and east indicated that a classic fire siege was beginning. Chief Rohde was alerted shortly after 12:00 p.m. on October 27, by the Incident Commander of the Stagecoach Fire, to respond to County Fire Headquarters in Orange for reassignment to the Laguna Fire. On arrival at Headquarters, Rohde was immediately redirected as a Strike Team Leader and told that his assigned engine resources would meet up with him at the fire. On arrival at the command post on Laguna Canyon Road, Rohde met with the Incident Commander, Chip Prather. Chief Prather immediately reassigned him to become the incident’s Planning Section Chief. Rohde began immediately to assess the incident situation and obtain resources information from the 123 ECC. In Rohde’s opinion, the fire had already escaped any potential containment and was a major fire at that time. Noting that the command function was still in an “initial attack” mode and operating out of vehicles, Rohde suggested to Prather that they move to a new command facility capable of expanding to meet the needs of the incident. The Incident Commander and Rohde joined in one vehicle and moved toward such a location in Dana Point. Rohde and Prather collaborated as they traveled regarding the nature of the incident and its resource needs, resulting in the request of a large amount of resources. They also developed incident objectives to meet the expanding emergency situation. As they arrived at a fire station in Dana Point, they were redirected by the fire chiefs of Laguna Beach and OCFD to their preferred location at Thurston Middle School in Laguna Beach’s Top of the World community. The stationary command post was established at that school on their arrival. Chief Rohde and Prather worked closely together and were rarely separated physically for the first 12 hours of the incident. The exception to this was during Rohde’s reconnaissance flights, during which he remained in close radio contact with the Incident Commander. In Rohde’s opinion, this teamwork was crucial to the success of the command organization. The demands of this relationship did compromise some planning function development, but the ability to collaborate on major decisions and to change objectives rapidly, as necessary, was superior. Rohde organized a skeleton Planning Section out of the firefighters who had been assigned to bring the department’s command vehicle to the fire. Of this crew, only one Captain was qualified for planning work in the incident command system, in his case as both a Resources or Situation Unit Leader. This individual was charged to acquire planning data about the fire. Additional Planning Section staff was also ordered through the ECC. Unknown to

124 Rohde, no planning staff was available in southern California, and qualified staff were ordered to respond from northern California, which greatly delayed their arrival. Rohde noted that radio system saturation was particularly problematic as the fire began to ignite structures along the coast near Emerald Bay. This left the command post with poor data on the evolving fire situation. Also, no current map existed to depict the fire’s size or values at risk. Since no other Planning Section staff had arrived, Rohde personally participated in a helicopter reconnaissance of the fire. His first flight identified many structures involved in the community of Emerald Bay and a threat to a mobile home community in El Moro, but the fire was holding northwest of Laguna Canyon Road. With this information, Rohde returned to the Command Post for the first incident planning meeting. At that meeting, new incident objectives were set to reflect the changing incident risks and potential control points. As the fire’s intensity grew and threatened to cross Laguna Canyon, Rohde was asked by the Incident Commander to make a second reconnaissance flight. He observed firing operations in progress to secure the Festival of the Arts grounds but noted that operations would not be conducted soon enough to protect against the approaching wide fire front. Chief Rohde observed fire whirls developing in Laguna Canyon near “Big Bend.” Spot fires developed immediately downwind and two thirds up the slope across Laguna Canyon, high above the firefighters who were stationed there. These spots were observed by Rohde to move into a sheet of fire running in alignment with fuels, wind, and slope and then eddying into the Canyon Acres neighborhood. Chief Rohde radioed to the Incident Commander and reported that the fire had jumped the canyon and now threatened the majority of the City of Laguna Beach, including the downtown business district. Rohde indicated that the rest of the City of Laguna Beach and the command post should be immediately evacuated and that homes along Skyline Drive would be hard hit. The Incident Commander initiated the civilian evacuations. Rohde observed 125 that the fire moved into the Canyon Acres neighborhood and involved many structures. Fire conditions were so severe there that he advised ground forces in the area that it was unsafe to enter this narrow canyon neighborhood. As the firestorm continued to develop in Laguna Canyon, the Incident Com- mander requested that Rohde land at the command post with an updated map and fire behavior information. Landing the helicopter proved difficult because air tankers were dropping retardant in the area. On arrival at the command post, Rohde provided a detailed report to the Incident Commander, including his recommendation again that the command post be evacuated. He stated, “If we stay here, we are going to feel the heat.” However, the Incident Commander decided to stay at the school, since many felt that an existing perimeter of fuel modification around the school would protect it. Chief Rohde then facilitated a planning meeting of incident staff and used reconnaissance maps to demonstrate anticipated fire growth. New incident objectives were established that included holding the fire at major streets within the developed areas of the city. The Incident Commander delegated responsibility for tactical firefighting decisions via radio to the lowest command and supervision levels, in part because of the pending potential involvement of the command post in the fire. As the meeting progressed and the fire neared, power, lights, and telephone service were lost when the fire burned nearby lines. As he reflected on this experience, Chief Rohde expressed a deep regard for the actions of the Incident Commander to team with him during this period of crisis decision making, and he lauded the Commander for remaining cool under tremendous pressure. As the meeting concluded, the fire turned the sky dark as night, then leaped from the canyon, igniting portions of the school. As the fire extended to include 200 structures in the neighborhood adjacent to the command post, incident staff sheltered-in- place and waited for the fire’s leading edge to pass. As soon as possible, Chief Rohde 126 and the rest of the command team moved the command post to the Main Street Beach Park in Laguna Beach. The relocation took approximately half an hour. At that point, Rohde felt that they were “starting over” with much of the fire organization and “regrouping after taking a serious beating.” From the new command post, Rohde felt that he was still pulled significantly from traditional planning section duties by the needs of the Incident Commander and the incident. Junior staff had been assigned important roles usually assigned to experienced personnel in Logistics, Safety, and Liaison because of a lack of qualified staff. This required Rohde to extend work effort into these areas when requested. The Incident Commander requested that he work in particular to brief the Orange County Sheriff and other law enforcement agencies and to integrate the cities of Newport Beach and Irvine into the fire’s organization. As the evening progressed and the winds diminished, the operations section reported significant progress. However, the absence of logistical support for the incident became much more problematic. The lack of base facilities, staging areas, fuel, and food started to hamper operations. Mutual aid resources, especially engine strike teams, were also arriving in abundance by this early evening hour, but lack of command organization and intelligence made assigning of resources difficult, yet demands for additional assistance remained high. Strike Teams from Tulare County in California’s central valley were immediately assigned on their arrival to firing operations to protect the Irvine area. Rohde toured the region of heaviest structural involvement with the Incident Commander around midnight and made plans for a search for victims and an accounting of damaged structures. Around dawn, Rohde held a planning meeting for the day shift of October 28. This was his first opportunity to gather some critical staff, given their operational demands. Given that the structural siege was concluding and that overnight progress on containment had been made, Rohde had withheld substantial, yet unfilled, resource 127 orders placed earlier by staff. Given the regional fire situation, no additional resources were yet available to fill potential orders. As the meeting progressed, it became clear that these orders were no longer needed. Special arrangements had been made for National Guard helicopters for water dropping operations, and they would be available for the day shift. Chief Rohde was surprised, as was most of the command staff at the meeting, as Division Supervisors reported the true extent of the fire on the north and the suppression actions that had been required overnight. With the taxed ability of the limited planning section staff, the first published Incident Action Plan was substandard and inadequate. As resources continued to arrive throughout the day, they were assigned to needs identified at the morning planning meeting. As the second day progressed and structure protection needs abated, local government engine strike teams were staged in a regional park that lacked traditional incident support facilities. These crews were also fatigued and expecting support. The absence of this support caused dissension from resource staff that was generally directed at the Planning Section staff. Rohde worked with dispatch centers but was unsuccessful in achieving needed demobilization direction for excess engine strike team resources. Working later with the Incident Commander, and following sometimes tense discussions with the California OES, release coordination orders were acquired, almost 24 hours following resources being declared as excess to the incident’s needs. Within the first 48 hours, significant environmental and community rehabilitation needs developed, and fire services were asked to provide leadership and organization to these efforts. The County Fire Chief requested that Rohde lead this initial effort, giving him the direction to “organize it, get appropriate agencies to lead it, and get out of it.” Chief Rohde held a series of meetings that led to a coalition of city, county, state, and federal agencies assuming appropriate rehabilitation responsibilities. Rohde was also extensively involved in after-action reports, public hearings, and administrative 128 documentation of the incident. This effort continued for several months following the fire. In reflection on the role that Chief Rohde performed in the Laguna Fire, he felt that his most important contribution was to support the Incident Commander as requested or required and to keep up with the rapidly changing needs of the incident. Rohde felt that this required him to “work outside of the box” with respect to the more traditional roles and expectations as a Planning Section Chief, and to be flexible in filling higher priority duties which personnel were unavailable to perform. This caused Rohde to conduct work normally associated with Liaison, Logistics, and Safety functions. He also interacted extensively in operational planning with the Operations Section Chief and Incident Commander. Rohde felt that a fire spread prediction should have been made earlier that would have identified the “Big Bend” area of Laguna Canyon as an impossible holding point, given the extreme fire conditions and limited resource availability. Chief Rohde felt that, with such information, an earlier evacuation of downtown Laguna Beach would have been ordered. He also felt that most firing operations, while successful in some respects, were in many cases initiated too late to be of wide-scale, offensive use. Chief Rohde is still remorseful that a stronger planning document was not produced in the first day of the incident. He attributes this problem in part to the lack of qualified planning section staff. During the Laguna Fire, Rohde placed a request for numerous staff to serve in Planning Section incident command system positions. Because the OCFD ECC was so overwhelmed by the fire situation, they “handed off” these requests to the CDF. Because the forestry agency’s personnel were similarly committed in southern California, they passed the order to the statewide coordination center, who filled the orders with forestry personnel from areas north of Sacramento. This effectively delayed

129 the arrival of Planning Section staff for key positions until 48 hours into the incident, well past their peak need. Chief Rohde would have liked to have had stronger field reconnaissance, especially after dark, when helicopters were no longer available. Significant fire growth occurred overnight, when changing winds drove the fire toward the north to threaten the city of Irvine. Poor communications and lack of field observation staff led to significant gaps in fire intelligence. When the Incident Commander ordered independent action on the fire ground, much resource status was lost. Nearly 50% of the operating resources on the fire had checked in on fire lines and were not tracked by the Planning Section for the first 24 hours. This took an extensive effort by coordination centers, Operations, and Planning Section staff to reconcile resource status to allow for effective resource deployment planning. In the absence of these data, the Incident Action Plan on the second morning of the fire called for no relief of resources and for holding resources in place to continue work until accurate status could be determined. This status updat- ing effort dominated much of the second day and confounded provision of accurate resource availability or need determination. This complicated regional firefighting efforts, as did the failure to provide accurate intelligence to coordination centers. Chief Rohde indicated this was the most difficult and demanding fire of his career.

James Radley, Department Administrative Duty Officer James (Jim) Radley retired after a 33-year career in the fire service at the rank of Assistant Chief with the Orange County Fire Authority. During his tenure with the Authority and its predecessor, the OCFD, Radley served as the executive chief in command of several bureaus, including the Operations and Fire Prevention Bureaus. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in Forest Management from California State University, Humboldt, and possesses an extensive wildland fire command background with both

130 Orange County and with the CDF. He holds the Incident Command System qualification of Incident Commander. During the Laguna Fire, Chief Radley assumed responsibility for Department coordination from the agency’s Emergency Command Center (ECC, also known as “dispatch”). As the “Administrative Duty Officer” for the entire agency, he was responsible for facilitating the movement of resources from outside of the agency to the fire, and for maintaining coverage within the agency during the Laguna Fire for other emergencies. Chief Radley also facilitated centralized automotive and warehouse support activities needed for the fire siege. Chief Radley has been credited with securing firefighting resources for the Laguna Fire that might not have been available if not for his personal and directed efforts. Because of the regional fire siege involving 23 fires, most available resources had been committed to other incidents and were not initially available to Orange County. Chief Radley initiated a series of personal contacts with high-ranking fire officials throughout southern California to reinforce traditional mutual aid requests. These contacts caused the Laguna Fire to become the top priority of the California statewide fire mutual aid system. Chief Radley had been monitoring developments of the Stagecoach Fire on the morning of October 27. His impression was that the Stagecoach Fire was winding down. He was in the ECC when the initial telephone reports for the Laguna Fire were received via the 911 system. The initial reports gave Radley indications that the fire was likely to develop into a major incident. He observed ECC staff reacting to resource demands for the Laguna Fire and contacted the Incident Commander of the Stagecoach Fire personally. He instructed the Incident Commander to reduce the resource commitment to the dwindling Stagecoach Fire immediately by as much as possible for redeployment to the Laguna Fire. 131 For Radley, the speed and evolution of the Laguna Fire were the greatest challenge. The immediate threat to structures required abundant firefighting resources. The fire’s Incident Commanders made successive large requests for resources, especially engines and aircraft. Radley pointed out that a large gap existed between “what looked good on paper and reality” with regard to these resource requests. He made numerous contacts with the Laguna Fire staff to communicate realistic expectations for resource arrival. At one point, nearly an hour into the incident, Radley indicated that nearly 40 strike teams of engines (200 engines) had been requested for the Laguna Fire, yet only 9 (45 engines) had responded so far. Understanding the regional situation and fire resource depletion, Radley knew that much of the resources requested would be responding from distant locations. Some of the available resources would come from central and northern California, half a day’s drive away. Chief Radley knew that travel times alone for these resources would place them on scene long after the fire would have done its worst. All available firefighting aircraft in southern California had also been committed to higher priority incidents. Radley was aware that the County Fire Department had already committed its maximum effort, leaving the jurisdiction of nearly 1.5 million people protected by only a dozen and a half fire apparatuses and various paramedic units. Later in the evening of October 27, a second major fire broke out on the Ortega Highway east of San Juan Capistrano. The Department was able to commit only two engines, a Battalion Chief, and a medic unit to monitor this fire, which eventually consumed 21,384 acres. The OCFD was required to rely entirely on mutual aid for response to the Ortega Fire for over 48 hours. Chief Radley took uncommon steps in order to obtain needed resources. He first turned to other partner fire agencies in Orange County. He placed personal calls to various dispatch centers and asked to speak to the highest ranking authority on duty. 132 Radley told these individuals that the Laguna Fire “was the real thing,” and he stressed the need to fill the pending mutual aid requests because of the urgency of the fire condition and structural threat. Radley described the need as “urgent and legitimate.” Chief Radley used his personal relationship with many of these individuals to communicate the need with credibility. The city fire departments within Orange County responded significantly to this appeal, sending every available fire resource that they could muster. The City of Anaheim, for example, sent 10 of its 14 on-duty companies to the Laguna Fire. The commitment from the Orange County cities was extremely important because they were the only mutual aid resources that were positioned geographically close enough to make a difference to the structural protection needs of the Laguna coast. Also, the county’s well-functioning Mutual Aid procedures ensured that coverage would be maintained in other areas of the county that were depleted due to the response to the Laguna Fire. Radley then turned to the CDF’s regional wildfire coordination center for southern California in Riverside. There he encountered Chief Stan Lake. Lake and Radley had worked together for years in Orange County and had a strong personal relationship. Radley asked for a change in the status of the Laguna Fire to become the highest priority in southern California for resource allocation. This was a difficult request to honor because major fires were burning in Los Angeles County and in other CDF areas in Riverside and San Bernardino counties. Also, historically, Orange County had not experienced major fires with the severity or frequency as some of the other counties. Lake knew this, and he had to be convinced that, in the wake of so many threatening incidents, Orange County really needed the resources that were being requested. By the time Radley and Lake spoke, the Laguna Fire had been burning for about an hour, and the fire’s trajectory into the heavily populated Laguna Coast was assured. 133 Radley and Lake agreed, after some discussion, that the Laguna Fire was the most critical, and Lake directed air tankers to be diverted from other fires to the Laguna Fire. Lake also redirected mutual aid engines already en route to other fires to change course to the Laguna Fire. The Laguna Fire would maintain this priority status for the next 6 hours. Lake also dispatched an agency representative, Chief Mike Warren, directly to the Laguna Fire. Warren confirmed the fire’s urgency and recommended additional helicopter and air support. Chief Radley also contacted the “Region 1” Statewide mutual aid regional coordination center at the Los Angeles County Fire Department. While he was successful in making the Laguna Fire’s needs known, Los Angeles County was also experiencing a major fire in the Kinneloa/Pasadena area, with a large structural loss, and that department could offer little assistance. Radley also personally felt that he was getting a stronger personal response from Chief Lake based on their long-term relationship. The CDF was also obligated to provide additional support due to the fire’s involvement of State Responsibility wildlands protected under contract by Orange County. That support can be variable dependent upon regional fire activity, and many fires were burning simultaneous to the Laguna Fire. Radley continued to rely heavily on the CDF as a source of support throughout the incident. Radley’s reliance on personal telephone calls as an adjunct to the traditional mutual aid requests was a very successful means of conveying the historic threat of the Laguna Fire. His contacts were often with other senior fire officers with whom he had worked with for years. These agencies then responded with significant resources. He also participated in a number of conference calls with the FIRESCOPE partner agencies to participate in the prioritization and allocation of rare firefighting resources. In one such call, Radley was successful in acquiring airtankers, which were diverted to Laguna Beach from the Green Meadow Fire in Ventura County. In 134 comparison to other fires studied, Radley achieved nearly 60% higher response to mutual aid requests than the average fulfillment of mutual aid requests at all studied fires. The value of this achievement cannot be overstated, and it conveys the importance of relationship and trust in fire command activities. Radley credited the Fire Department and its involvement and leadership in regional mutual aid systems as invaluable to the department’s success with its resource requests. During the Laguna Fire, Radley recognized some occasions when the command team onsite was unable to deal with some expanding fire issues or may have been simply unaware of them. Working in the ECC, Radley was in a position to be immediately aware of numerous 911 reports of new fire threats. As examples, Radley cited the immediate need to place resources into the El Moro mobile home park to deal with structural loss, and the late evening threat to the Irvine community of Turtle Rock. In both cases, no resources were in the area, and Radley worked with Incident Staff to ensure assignment of engine strike teams to these developing needs. Chief Radley’s most difficult moments involved the loss of, or lack of, effective communications with incident staff, including the Incident Commander. Cellular tele- phones and fire department radios were both saturated, which made direct communication difficult. Radley also cited the inability of nonsworn executive staff to independently support firefighting missions as a handicap in the Fire Department’s ability to organize effectively for disaster response. Radley cited several examples in which command and control would have been strengthened, had additional senior fire officers been available for deployment. Lack of command strength in the organization required the agency to conduct triage concerning where critical support would be offered. Radley also cited the lack of senior staff as the cause of the Department’s inability to adequately staff base camps and other logistical needs or to provide staff for the county EOC. The lack of ability to obtain real-time intelligence to determine fire growth and 135 risks also hampered command and control. This latter problem was resolved by placing a member of the incident’s staff in a helicopter to conduct reconnaissance, which provided Radley with his first high-quality reports of incident progress. Chief Radley observed, as did a number of others, that the role of the Agency Fire Chief for the jurisdiction experiencing a wildland fire of this nature is not clearly defined or described. Radley suggested that the most beneficial role for Fire Chiefs and agency heads would be to provide a strong bridge between the command post with other cooperating agencies and government heads early in the development of such catastrophic incidents. According to Radley, the need for such work in the Laguna Fire was extensive. Radley cited a serious demobilization problem that developed immediately following the Laguna Fire that was caused by indecision at the statewide coordination center level with the Governor’s OES. The OES did not want the Laguna Fire command to release excess resources until the state agency could decide what to do with them. Indecision came from the question of whether to set up a regional staging area in case another major fire developed. This decision took more than a day to resolve. Since the Laguna Fire was understaffed and had inadequate base facilities or logistical support, the incident command was unprepared to support these resources with food, fuel, or other necessary means. Radley cited several instances in which firefighter fatigue from extremely long shifts by both local and mutual aid resources was of significant safety concern. Radley participated in the resolution of the situation with OES, causing mutual aid resources to be released from the fire. It took a period of several days before local firefighters could be appropriately rehabilitated and rested. Relief of command and senior staff was particularly problematic due to lack of qualified staff. Radley believes that this problem should be better addressed for future fires.

136 Chief Radley lauded the positive aspects of prescribed fire programs and fire codes requiring fuel modification around homes and noncombustible new construction. These installations demonstrated their benefit in reducing losses significantly, where present. No structures were lost in several areas that were so treated, despite high- intensity fire. Radley was the Department’s lead representative to after-action reviews conducted by the California OES, the California State Board of Forestry, and other governmental reviews. He also coordinated the development of official reports created by the OCFD regarding the Laguna Fire. These reports led to creation of stronger fire codes and acquisition of new radio systems and firefighting helicopters by the agency. Radley described these after-action efforts as extensive but absolutely necessary and productive.

Richard Witesman, Law Enforcement Liaison Richard (Rich) Witesman is a Division Chief for the Orange County Fire Authority. He has 36 years of fire service experience, including 27 years as a Chief Officer. He possesses an Associate in Science in Social Justice and Fire Technology, and a Bachelor of Arts in Business Administration. He is experienced as a Deputy Incident Commander of a CDF Major Incident Management Team and holds an Incident Command System qualification as Incident Commander. He is broadly experienced in wildland fire command. During the Laguna Fire, Chief Witesman was assigned to liaison with law enforcement, specifically due to the critical demands for coordination between police and fire agencies responsible for this incident. Rapid involvement of a number of law enforcement agencies was critical to the Laguna Fire. Traffic control and evacuation concerns were apparent immediately, and law enforcement has the primary responsibility in these areas. Principal law enforcement agencies involved included the California

137 Highway Patrol, Orange County Sheriff, City of Laguna Beach Police Department, and the California Department of Parks and Recreation. Witesman also worked with the California Department of Transportation to facilitate road closures. The OCFD had relationships and trust with many of these agencies as a result of day-to-day working arrangements. The Department did not have a prior relationship or an established level of trust with the Laguna Beach Police, which ultimately impacted decision making later in the incident. Witesman responded to the Laguna Fire with the initial expectation that he would be the Incident Commander for this fire. However, his superior, the Assistant Chief for Operations, arrived on the fire ahead of Witesman, assumed command instead. When Witesman and the Incident Commander conferred, it was clear to both of them that the fire would “go to the coast.” The only question was how long it would take. The Incident Commander assigned Witesman to work with Police, and Witesman achieved his initial contacts within 10 minutes of that assignment. He asked for traffic closures in Laguna Canyon and along Pacific Coast Highway, and he requested assistance in evacuating the community of Emerald Bay and El Moro School along Pacific Coast Highway. This effectively secured all access from the north, west, and east, with the ocean lying to the south of the incident. State Parks personnel were requested to evacuate the involved Crystal Cove State Park. The Highway Patrol and Sheriff both sent supervisory personnel to the Command Post immediately, while Laguna Beach Police dispatched a motor officer to assist in coordination. Witesman was very aware of the implications of evacuation management posed by the previous Tunnel Fire and the resulting fatalities. He felt that the same potential existed for the Laguna Fire and he communicated this to law enforcement. Chief Witesman was able to obtain the attendance of two Laguna Beach Police supervisors, a Sergeant and a Lieutenant, by the time the command post had been 138 relocated to the Thurston School in Laguna Beach. By this time, the Sheriff and fire resources were concentrated in the community of Emerald Bay and had been largely successful in evacuating this area. While evacuations had been recommended for Emerald Bay, they were not made mandatory because there were not enough Police and Fire resources in the community at this stage of the fire to force this occurrence. Witesman noted that there was a reluctance on the part of Laguna Beach Police to act rapidly to initiate evacuations. Witesman felt that senior officers there did not fully share the incident staff’s dire forecast for fire spread. Witesman commented that these officers from Laguna Beach had a “change of mind” when the fire burned over the command post where they were located and began to involve many structures. Planning had been in process to evacuate more than 23,000 people from the heart of Laguna Beach. Initially, Laguna Beach Police wanted to use the Laguna Beach High School as a relocation site for evacuation. Witesman convinced them that the school would be involved in the fire area and suggested broader evacuation goals. Evacuation of the entire city was then rapidly implemented. In cooperation with the Highway Patrol, CAL-TRANS, and others, Laguna Beach Police implemented a southbound-only evacuation of the City, using all lanes of Pacific Coast Highway. Relocation centers were developed at area high schools and managed by the Red Cross. The Orange County Sheriff’s Department mobilized over 100 deputies, commanded by a Lieutenant and a Captain, to assist in evacuations. The Sheriff command officers collocated with Fire officials and relocated with the command post from Thurston School to Main Street Beach following the burnover. The Orange County Sheriff also was present at the beachfront command post. Witesman was able to maintain only a minimal relationship with Laguna Beach Police, possibly due to the limited numbers of officers available in this small agency, and certainly with respect to the independent nature of the Laguna Beach City government. Witesman considered that 139 Laguna Beach may have been “protecting political interests” by minimizing their participation at one time. He noted that the increasing and overwhelming presence of the Orange County Sheriff’s Department and the Orange County Sheriff himself was instru- mental in eventually bringing the Laguna Beach Police completely into the command process. Later, as the fire spread to threaten the Cities of Irvine and Newport Beach, their police departments also became involved. The City of Irvine initiated an evacuation of the community of Turtle Rock, independent of the incident’s prior knowledge, but they informed incident staff of this action. Police officers were forced to go door to door in residential areas to ensure that evacuation orders had been followed. Had law enforcement not cooperated in this effort with significant resources, this objective could not have been met in a timely way. This police response was ultimately aided by a mutual aid request to law enforcement agencies throughout Orange County. The Orange County Sheriff’s Department recalled many officers from nonpatrol assignments to augment their response. Following the request for mutual aid, the Orange County Sheriff became the contact point for all law enforcement, significantly streamlining communications and coordination. This greatly diminished the need for intensive command-level interaction by Laguna Fire staff. While mutual aid coordination is planned and practiced regularly among fire agencies, it was clear to Witesman that this is a rarer occurrence among law enforcement agencies. Coordination issues were so overwhelming between police and fire agencies that it required this unusual and focused command assignment for appropriate facilitation of interagency needs. Witesman felt that the early incident commitment to this coordination was critical to its success, noting that, unlike in the Tunnel Fire evacuation, no fatalities occurred during the Laguna Fire. He also felt that the longstanding relationships between the Sheriff, Highway Patrol, and the Orange County Fire Authority contributed significantly to this success. At 9:00 p.m., Chief Witesman was 140 reassigned from the Laguna Fire to be the Orange County Incident Commander for the Ortega Fire.

Harold (Buck) Henderson, Logistics Section Chief/Branch Director Buck Henderson is a Division Chief with the Orange County Fire Authority, where he heads the Operations Support Division. He is a veteran of 35 years of fire service and holds a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration degree from California State University, Fullerton. At the time of the Laguna Fire, Henderson was a Battalion Chief. Initially, he was assigned responsibility as the Logistics Section Chief, but during the height of the structural siege, he was reassigned as a Branch Director, responsible for structure protection in the Top of the World community of the City of Laguna Beach. Chief Henderson began his work for the 1993 fire siege on the night before the Laguna Fire at the Stagecoach Fire in the Anaheim Hills. He had been working as the Logistics Section Chief for the Stagecoach Fire and was asked to move his entire operation to the Laguna Fire to support this new incident. Logistics needs at the Stagecoach incident were considered met at that time. His initial involvement was plagued by a lack of transportation, and Henderson was forced to utilize his personal vehicle, without radios or emergency lights. In his first stop at the Laguna Fire, Chief Henderson established a staging area at the El Moro School, north of Emerald Bay along Pacific Coast Highway. This staging area was in a position so that the majority of the responding mutual aid resources would encounter the location on their way to the fire. Almost immediately, Henderson made a request for crews to protect structures and he recommended a backfiring operation for the El Moro mobile home park adjacent to the staging area, which he felt would be threatened in the next 20 to 30 minutes. His staff initially consisted of one individual,

141 Captain Hank Raymond, to assist him in developing logistical support. Without initial facilities or sufficient staff, he was forced to “operate out of a phone booth at the corner of Laguna Canyon Road and Pacific Coast Highway.” Henderson was aware that water pressure was failing and that some hydrants had run dry in some locations above downtown Laguna Beach. A civilian approached him and offered the use of five portable water pumps capable of pumping 250 gallons per minute. Henderson accepted these and directed them for use in pumping swimming pools in the fire area. The Command Post had been relocated to the Thurston School by that time, and Henderson reported there for a briefing. Once at the Command Post, Henderson was informed that he was needed in the capacity of Operations Branch Director. Given the pressing need for structure protection along the Skyline/Top of the World neighborhoods, Henderson assumed that role and passed his responsibilities as Logistics Section Chief to Captain Raymond. Raymond had never performed this duty but was qualified in several logistics section functions. This transition occurred at approximately 4:00 p.m. To facilitate his assignment as Branch Director, Henderson borrowed the Incident Commander’s car and hand-held radios. During his tenure as Branch Director, Henderson was required to oversee the containment of the northern flank of the fire. In one particularly bold effort, he directed a senior and experienced Orange County fire captain, Ron Newport, to lead a crew of U.S. Forest Service Hotshots in a downhill line construction and backfiring effort. Henderson acquired air tanker retardant drops to protect structures in this area as firing proceeded. This effort succeeded in completing a fire line from the Top of the World to the bottom of Laguna Canyon, eliminating the potential for fire to sweep behind Laguna Beach and assault structures from a new front. Henderson’s assignment to supervise the Branch also came before the bulk of the engine resources had arrived, allowing him an 142 opportunity to scout ahead of the fire and develop a deployment plan for expected resources. Henderson noted that many of the engine strike teams that had been directed to assist him were stopped in traffic jams in canyons below the ridgetop homes. Here, fleeing civilians’ vehicles and fire trucks had hopelessly clogged access roads. Henderson drove into this area and acquired a strike team, which he assigned to extinguish the fire at the Thurston School. The former command post had been abandoned by this time, and the command staff were en route to Main Street Beach to reestablish command there. Additional resources arrived, including a California OES strike team. The fire had worked its way into the bottom of a large bowl and was positioned to run against structures along the top. Some structures located below the rim of the bowl were indefensible with regard to firefighter safety. These structures were sprayed with Class “A” foam and then firefighters were withdrawn. As Henderson was able to acquire more highly trained staff, he devised a plan to fire out around structures at the top of the bowl, to eliminate this threat. Waiting until Santa Ana winds abated and starting at 3:00 a.m. on the first night of the fire, Henderson used two engine strike teams to support firing crews and completed this task successfully. Despite the night condition, the strike teams protected homes against several serious fire runs. Henderson indicated that the decision to fire around these homes was the best alternative, given available resources and the opportunity created by a break in weather and burning conditions. Had this operation not been conducted overnight, many more resources would have been required to protect the homes and firing might not have been a workable option during the heat of the day. Seventy-five homes, many with wood shingle roofs, were protected by this effort. Also critical in this effort was the availability of at least one strike team of OCFD firefighters, who were experienced and 143 knowledgeable in wildland firefighting. The OES strike team was composed of personnel without such experience, and Henderson noted that, as a result, they were slow to commit, reserved in action, and unable to adequately forecast fire occurrences. Paired, however, the resources were more efficient. Chief Henderson also noted that many strike teams had self-committed to positions lower in Laguna Beach’s canyons during the sanctioned independent action strategy earlier in the first day. They committed to what Henderson felt was the “first bad situation they encountered.” Henderson commented that he had to become very forceful and loud to convince these resources to move farther up the hill to protect uninvolved areas. Although the area had been evacuated, many civilians had stayed on to protect their own property. Henderson was confronted by people who begged for him to assign resources to fight a fire near their homes. All available resources were already committed and working hard to keep the fire from extending to new areas, and homes within the perimeter were not as high a priority at that time. Henderson tried to assign resources to these problems when he could, sometimes assigning one engine to try to knock down a fire in large structures that would normally have required many engines. In retrospect, Chief Henderson would have preferred that the incident team had not declared an independent action strategy and had utilized staging areas to concentrate, organize, and deploy resources by a systematic means. Henderson noted that the firing operation that he supervised waited for conditions that supported it, making it more successful than operations that were attempted during harsher conditions. Henderson did not have a continuing role in logistical support after his reassignment as Branch Director. The Captain who replaced him in that assignment did a good job, in Henderson’s opinion, but was severely hampered by a lack of command experience and lack of staff assistance. 144 Michael Moore, Liaison Officer Michael (Mike) Moore is currently a Battalion Chief and the Training Officer for the Orange County Fire Authority. He is a veteran of 21 years of fire service. He holds a Bachelor of Administration degree from the University of Redlands and a Master of Science in Public Administration degree from California State University, Long Beach. At the time of the Laguna Fire, Chief Moore held the rank of Fire Captain. He was assigned as the Liaison Officer in the Incident Command System for the fire. Chief Moore arrived at the Laguna fire at approximately 5:00 p.m. on October 27. He reported off-duty to the command post, which by this time had been relocated to the Main Street Beach Park in Laguna Beach. He approached the Incident Commander, Chief Prather, and offered his assistance. The Incident Commander requested that Moore assume the duties of Liaison Officer and work with incident stakeholders who had critical issues at that time. Moore had never worked or received training as a Liaison Officer, yet understood this to be an important need to relieve the Incident Commander of these concerns. Stakeholders with immediate issues included power and gas utilities and telephone services. Numerous power lines were down in the fire area, creating hazards for firefighters. Gas line ruptures had led to several gas explosions. Immediate priorities called for securing these utilities. The loss of power to critical water pump and reservoir systems had also depleted the availability of firefighting water, which had to be restored as soon as possible. In more traditional incident command systems, Liaison would have significant interface with law enforcement. In this case, a special Law Enforcement Liaison had been established elsewhere and was outside Moore’s scope of responsibilities. How- ever, Chief Moore had several contacts with Laguna Beach Police Department officials.

145 These contacts were generally rushed and inadequate in detail and depth to deal with most liaison issues. Another pressing area requiring coordination was that of animal control and rescue issues. Significant volunteer participation was offered here. Animal evacuation sites and volunteer rescue units were mobilized under Chief Moore’s oversight. Moore also worked with representatives of the major landowner, the Irvine Company, during the second day of the fire. This contact sought to provide information regarding the fire’s involvement in ranch lands owned by the company as well as issues of trespass security. Chief Moore became a participant, along with the Incident Commander and Planning Section Chief, in resolving issues associated with the demobilization of excess resources. The issue involved the insistence by the California OES that the Laguna Fire staff not release extra firefighting resources until the state agency had decided what to do with them. The state office could not decide whether to allow the excess resources to return to their home quarters or to mobilize them to a staging area, awaiting possible new fire outbreaks. This was an unusually protracted process, exacerbated by the fact that the Laguna Fire was understaffed and had had unreasonable logistical support for so many resources. Moore felt uncomfortable in this tense discussion with the state agency because he was working without training in a highly political environment with high-ranking chief officers from various agencies. Other senior fire officers from cooperating agencies also approached him with complex coordination issues. These officers were used to dealing with fully trained and qualified liaison officers. Moore felt that some of their issues were beyond his capacity or training. Because he had never been in the assignment before, he was forced to “wing it” to get the job done. Still, he felt that he was successful in accomplishing much and in relieving the Incident Commander of many responsibilities. 146 On the third day of the incident, Chief Moore was assigned to work with the Planning Section Chief to mobilize community recovery and environmental rehabilitation efforts. This required the coordination of many local, state, and federal agencies and private support organizations in a collaborative role. Once this was organized, Moore relinquished this responsibility to lead recovery agencies and officials, including the City of Laguna Beach Public Works Director, a Forester from the CDF, and representatives from the County of Orange Public Works Department. Fire and law enforcement officials continued to work in recovery efforts in the role of contributing partner agencies. Chief Moore would like to have had training and/or experience in his liaison position before assuming it under historic fire conditions. However, he believed that his chief responsibility was to assume these duties from the Incident Commander and to do the best he could with them. This allowed the Incident Commander to focus on other concerns. Given the unavailability of qualified staff and the pressing need to coordinate the actions of stakeholders with firefighting efforts, Moore felt that personnel who find themselves in this position must be flexible and ready to accept such responsibility when needed.

Subject Matter Experts The subject matter experts who were interviewed and whose comments and views are reported here were (a) Bill Clayton, Division Chief; (b) Gary Nelson, Division Assistant Chief (Retired); (c) Tim Sappok, Division Chief; (d) John Hawkins, Assistant Chief; (e) William C. Teie, Deputy Director for Fire Protection (Retired); (f) Michael L. Warren, Fire Chief; and (g) Charles (Chuck) R. Manor, Deputy Chief.

147 Bill Clayton, Division Chief Bill Clayton is a Division Chief with the CDF, in command of Division 7, covering the northern San Diego County area and the Rainbow Conservation Camp in Fallbrook, California. He has 44 years experience in wildland fire, including 30 years as a Chief Officer. Chief Clayton holds a Bachelor of Science and a Master of Science degree in Business Administration. He has been awarded the Certificate of Achievement from the United States Congress, the Governor’s Medal of Valor, and six other awards for lifesaving efforts during wildland and structural fires. He has written numerous articles and is the co-author of “Wildland Firefighting,” a fire service training text. Clayton has been a lead instructor in many wildland fire courses, including the State of California’s Command 2E-Wildland Fire Strategy and Tactics course; he is a highly sought conference speaker. He has served as Incident Commander during many wildland-urban interface fires and has experience as a member of both state and national Incident Command Teams in various positions, including Incident Commander for CDF Team 6 and Operations Section Chief for a Federal Type 1 Incident Management Team. Chief Clayton has responded to fires and provided training both nationally and internationally, particularly in Australia, Mexico, and Portugal. Chief Clayton attributes his commitment to fire command excellence to some of his early wildland firefighting experiences. In 1970 he served at one of the largest and most destructive wildland interface fires in modern times: the San Diego County, California “Laguna Fire” (a different fire from the 1993 Orange County Laguna Fire reported here). That fire started 40 miles east of the San Diego metropolitan area and burned under strong Santa Ana wind conditions to the urban fringe, burning 175,425 acres and 382 homes. Chief Clayton was assigned to the fire as a “Task Force Leader” in charge of several engines. He reflected that he had never seen a fire move as quickly, be as physically demanding, or burn as many structures as quickly as this fire did.

148 Clayton noted that the incident organization had little, if any, command organization. Many crews, including his Task Force, were required to “free lance” or take independent action in the vacuum of command. Many of Clayton’s crew members suffered minor injuries, especially burns to the eyes. Several engines also received some fire damage. As the 1970 Laguna Fire entered Harbison Canyon near the community of Alpine, only five engines in Clayton’s Task Force were available to protect the community of 300 homes. During an ensuing 15-minute fire storm, 105 of these homes were destroyed. Clayton recalled with disdain the lack of command and the impact that it had on firefighter safety and operational effectiveness. He had vowed at that time that he personally would “never ever run a fire like that.” Clayton recognized that this was a complex challenge, given the obstacles of major incident command. In contrast to the 1970 Laguna Fire, Clayton cited the February 2002 Gavilan Fire in the northern San Diego County community of Fallbrook as an example of effective incident management. Chief Clayton was the Incident Commander for this fire, which burned nearly 6,000 acres and 43 of 191 exposed homes under 50+-mile- per-hour Santa Ana wind conditions. The fire occurred in the Santa Margarita River drainage, which is characterized by rural homes dispersed among steep terrain and heavy chaparral fuels. The area had been identified prior to the fire as a “target hazard” for its high loss potential. The fire was characterized by rapid burning, and at one time it extended 1,500 acres in only an hour. Civilians were trapped in their residences by the fast movement of the fire, requiring helicopter rescues and action by a number of civilians to take shelter in a swimming pool while the fire burned adjacent homes. During backfire and structure protection operations, two engine companies were burned over and a number of others were damaged while trying to escape the fire; however,

149 there were no firefighter injuries. He indicated that, despite these adversities and the severity of the fire, it could have been far worse. The Gavilan Fire command process was initiated well prior to the actual incident. In recognition of the fire loss potential of this area, Chief Clayton had extensively preplanned the likely movement of the fire and had developed extensive strategies and tactics to deal with a potential conflagration. When the fire began and Clayton recognized that the fire would become a major fire, he used these plans to guide command development for the incident. These plans included potential control lines, strategies and tactics including potential backfiring locations, fire behavior calculations, staging areas, resource needs, helicopter water loading points, Incident Base and other support facility locations, maps, and related information. He indicated that this planning relieved him of the “mental energy” required to conceive these necessary elements ad- hoc on site. This allowed him to focus on more dynamic elements of the incident itself. Chief Clayton considers such preplans to be essential to successful incident management in fast-moving, high-risk fire environments. The plans, in his opinion, create a sense of confidence within the Incident Commander to deal with a catastrophic situation and to provide benchmarks for success. The Gavilan Fire’s behavior closely followed the predictions and therefore the team achieved the desired outcome of relatively low structural loss and limited acreage. While the 1993 Orange County Laguna Fire area had been preplanned years before, the plans had not been updated and had been lost over the years. Chief Clayton feels that preplanning alleviates much of the mental anguish or feelings of overwhelming that were experienced by Orange County Chief Officers during the Laguna Fire because the result is expected and positive actions are identified in advance to achieve the best outcome.

150 Chief Clayton compared the 1993 Orange County Laguna Fire decision to delegate command to the lowest level through an “independent action strategy “during the fire’s structural siege as similar to his unsuccessful 1970 Laguna Fire experience in San Diego County. Clayton asserted that it is critical to maintain command and control for firefighter and public safety and operational effectiveness. Problems associated with such a decision, according to Clayton, are the creation of a “lone gun mentality” in which independent action is uncoordinated and results in increased losses or lack of coverage for critical areas of the fire. The lack of control also contributes to an over- abundance of radio communications, often overwhelming communications systems. He also believes that, when command tries to reassert itself following such an action, field units are prone to mistrusting a command system that has already abandoned them once and are reluctant to accept reinstated organizational discipline. Clayton feels that a fire organization will not necessarily start following orders again, once the “lone gun mentality” has been established. Chief Clayton recognized the unusual obstacles placed on Incident Commanders to organize a fast-moving and dynamic wildland-urban interface fire. In command development for more common incidents, the Incident Command System advises the use of Divisions and Groups as the means for initial incident organization. Clayton practices an alternative method within the Incident Command System that allows for more flexible and broader control of rapidly evolving incidents. Within the Incident Command System, Divisions and Groups are commanded by Branches. Once Clayton recognizes that a fire has major potential, he makes his first organizational assignments at the Branch level, and allows Branch Directors to establish Divisions and Groups as needed or as resources and situation dictate. Clayton establishes Branches encircling the fire and then may add others to address special needs such as structure protection or evacuation. 151 This practice has a number of advantages. It maintains command presence for the entire fire and reduces the need or opportunity for independent action. By establishing Branches first, he assigns to key management roles the initially responding Chief Officers who are most familiar with local fire resources and conditions. Chief Clayton also believes that such an organization is better situated for concurrent management of multiple risks such as perimeter control and structure protection. As the incident resources grow, the organization can grow within the initial Branch structure. In review of the Orange County Laguna Fire and other incidents studied in this thesis, Chief Clayton felt that communications saturation and overuse on these incidents was an “organizational” problem, as opposed to a “technical” problem. Clayton suggested that segmentation into Branches also allows for communications segmentation through radio frequency assignment. Radio discipline can then be enforced more effectively at the Branch Director level than incident-wide, due to dispersed and direct supervision. At the Orange County Laguna Fire, a number of OCFD Chief Officers were utilized in subordinate Incident Command System positions, such as Division or Group Supervisor, and as Strike Team Leaders. This practice soon exhausted the availability of the most experienced fire officers and left many areas of the fire either undersuper- vised or unsupervised. This also contributed to an inability of Orange County fire officials to deal with both perimeter control and structure protection simultaneously during a significant portion of the fire. Chief Clayton indicated that a focus on structure protection and loss of perimeter control is a strategic error that can lead to extensive losses as the fire continues to grow. Chief Clayton stressed that it is important to “put the fire out” and focus specialized resources on the wildland fire problem, even as demanding structure protection needs are addressed. Clayton believes that, had the Laguna Fire been organized broadly using Branches initially, less experienced fire 152 officers, including mutual aid responders, could have worked under local Chief Officers as Branch Directors more effectively. Clayton observed that “a strong Branch Director can make up for a weak Division Supervisor, but a strong Division Supervisor cannot make up for weakness above.” Clayton identified that Incident Commanders often “hang on” for too long a time period to the idea that they might catch a rapidly extending fire, instead of recognizing that a formula has been met that will guarantee major fire development. Chief Clayton indicated that rapid identification of the probable fire outcome is critical to staying ahead of a developing fire and providing effective command. Preplanning was identified as a means for assisting that recognition. Chief Clayton identified other command development practices with which he had experienced success. In contrast to most of the studied fires, Clayton often delays implementation of the Operations Section Chief position in order to achieve stronger tactical supervision at the Branch level. This requires the subsequent assignment of Branches, with the Incident Commander retaining operational control for an extended period. Clayton identified preplanning as an important tool in such an action, since preplanning eliminates some of the mental energy required to conduct other command components that could dominate Incident Commander attention. Chief Clayton feels that immediate logistical support is critical to the success of a major wildland-urban interface firefighting effort. Clayton sometimes fills the Logistics Section Chief position before he designates an Operations Section Chief in response to this concern. Chief Clayton related that such a priority may be essential to the success of firefighting efforts. Issues of food, water, fuel, sanitary resources, and related support needs confounded the Laguna Fire. Chief Clayton felt that prioritization of the Logistics Section Chief assignment alleviates these issues by concentrating

153 timely effort to acquire needed support and allows for extended fire attack operations to continue without interruption. Chief Clayton recommended that Incident Commanders view the fire personally before they commit themselves to a command post location and extended planning, even if this view must be accomplished “fast and well.” He recommended a short helicopter reconnaissance as a best means for accomplishing this. Clayton “sizes up” fires for threats and values at risk, fire intensity and color, smoke color and dynamics, terrain, access, and other factors. He then processes a mental image for the ultimate size and complexity of the fire, evaluates various control scenarios, and directs and orders actions and resources based upon this mental picture. If his mental image indicates the potential for a major fire, he reacts to change his command approach from an initial attack mode to developing organization and strategy to meet the incident’s potential. Chief Clayton felt that the Operations Section Chief is a key supervisory position; however, he noted that the position has a tendency to become committed to a plan because of the close personal involvement and necessarily focused view. Clayton believes that this can lead to entrenchment in early incident strategy. He contended that the Incident Commander must sometimes direct the abandonment of the initial attack phase when he/she believes that it should be transitioned into a major fire organization. He felt that it is important to “reinforce success” and, if the Operations Section Chief (and others) might be committed to an initial plan that is chronically unsuccessful, the plan should be changed by the Incident Commander to a more successful strategy. Such decisions are driven, according to Clayton, by the fire situation, resource availability, and the Incident Commander’s macro view of incident potential. Clayton believes that the Incident Commander must articulate his thinking so that key subordinate staff understand both the direction and the intent of commands. 154 Chief Clayton had recently experienced a burnover of firefighters and engines, during the Gavilan Fire. When asked how he organized and managed burnover situations, he responded that he often forms the burnover as a separate “Incident within the Incident.” Often, he assigns the Incident Safety Officer to be responsible for such situations and establishes separate communications and staffing for it. Clayton felt that it is important to separate firefighting operations from the burnover or rescue concerns to the extent that it is practical to do so. This view is driven by the need to maintain a strong firefighting focus and in recognition of the conflict that might develop from the often extensive demands associated with burnover or rescue situations. Chief Clayton believes that a strong safety and risk statement should be included as part of an Incident Commander’s objectives. He prefers to indicate that a strong risk- versus-gain benefit analysis should be conducted for high-risk operations, and that the reason for accepting elevated risk should be driven only by life safety concerns. He strongly believes that property or resource values alone do not justify such risk. He believes that, when excessive risk is undertaken, it must involve strong planning and preparation. He believes that prior training is essential to such preparation. Clayton stated his belief that firefighters’ perceptions of inappropriate risk often translate to their own “gut feeling” that something might be wrong or unsafe. “The brain may be driven by ego but the gut is driven by fear”; if the “gut” indicates a concern, the questioned action should be extensively reviewed or not undertaken. With regard to evacuation management, Chief Clayton acknowledged the lead role of law enforcement in accomplishing evacuations. However, he feels that the Incident Commander has a responsibility to identify safe access and egress routes, fire risks, and safe locations for evacuees to law enforcement agencies. Preplanning of evacuation routes and fire apparatus access were suggested as means for avoiding traffic jams between fleeing civilians and fire apparatus within fire areas, as were experienced 155 in the 1993 Laguna Fire and the 1991 Tunnel Fire. Chief Clayton generally requests immediately a police representative of “rank and authority” to work with him at his command post when civilian populations are at risk. Chief Clayton recommends that high-risk urban interface areas be the subject of multi-agency tabletop exercises to test preplanning for worst case fires. He has used this technique to prepare staff for the pace and demands that would be faced during actual incidents and has used them as a tool to build relationships and understanding among partner response agencies. He acknowledged the importance of relationship and trust among participating response partners as key to successful coordination during emergencies. Chief Clayton embraces a passion for wildland fire command. His often- repeated quote epitomizes his view of the wildland firefighting profession: “The way of the wildland firefighter is resolute acceptance of hardship and danger [and] only the spirit of attack born in a brave heart will bring success on the fire line.”

Gary Nelson, Division Assistant Chief (Retired) Gary Nelson is a veteran of 37 years of fire service with the County of Los Angeles, California, Fire Department, 16 years of which were served as a Chief Officer. He retired in 1996 as the Division Assistant Chief for Division III, the Department’s most active brush fire area. This area included the communities of Saugus, Valencia, the Antelope and northern San Fernando Valleys, surrounding unincorporated areas, and the Angeles National Forest. During his tenure with Los Angeles County, Chief Nelson commanded many wildland fires. He participated in 12 major wildland interface fires in the Malibu area, beginning with the Newton Fire in 1956 and including the Old Topanga Fire in 1993. Chief Nelson is a highly respected instructor and has authored state and national wildfire training curriculum, including Fire Command

156 2E-Wildland Fire Strategy and Tactics, Introduction to I-Zone Firefighting, and Intermediate and Advanced Incident Command Systems. In one particular fire experience, Nelson learned the value of application of timely resources. During the 1982 Dayton Fire, which became the second largest in the history of the Los Angeles County Fire Department, Nelson watched an isolated flank of the fire as it “back burned” with relatively low intensity just north of the 101 freeway near Las Virgenes Canyon. He stated that the particular piece of line may have been manageable at that point with as few as two engine companies. Despite repeated requests for resources to hold the fire there, commanders were unable to reallocate resources to deal with this situation in time. Instead, the fire burned into a new location that could support active movement, causing the fire to spot across the 101 freeway and threaten the community of Monte Nido. Hence, for the lack of a few engines, 30 were required to protect this community. Twenty structures were lost in Monte Nido and lives were put at risk. This experience supported Nelson’s strongly held philosophy to aggressively commit resources to manage the fire to the smallest extent possible and to take advantage of tactical opportunities. Chief Nelson approaches wildland interface fire command with a specific plan. His strategy include the following major points. 1. Look for the “big decisions.” The fire command environment is an overwhelming and demanding one. Constant communications and data of all types flood into the command post, and many verbal interactions are requested. Chief Nelson recommends that Incident Commanders focus on the “big decisions,” such as (a) whether the head of the fire can be stopped using favorable terrain, fuel breaks, and timely resources; (b) how severe the threat is to life and when the threat materializes, and (c) how the fire can attack be balanced between offensive perimeter control and defensive structural protection. 157 Nelson commented that important information can be buried among the overwhelming data provided to the Incident Commander and that vigilance may be required to discern important facts. Nelson noted that important decisions must regularly be made in the absence of complete facts. In these cases, knowledge of past fire history and expected fire behavior must be used to compensate for incomplete facts. 2. Make a Fire Projection Map. Using best available data, past fire history, and experience, develop a map of expected fire spread. Use “interim” planning staff (selected greater alarm responders) to keep the map current. Use this map to plan resource allocation, determine priorities, and consider additional resource orders. Nelson draws anticipated fire perimeters for each of the next several hours of the fire to aid in this consideration. 3. Make life safety the highest priority. Ensure sure that initial responders concentrate on actions that promote protection of life, including evacuation, until there is no longer a threat. Although Nelson recognized a lead role of law enforcement in this regard, he noted that fire personnel are often on scene in significant numbers before law enforcement forces can mobilize. He recommended using briefings to ensure that fire companies are aware of their duty to act to protect those at risk. 4. Exercise opportunities to limit the size of the fire. Chief Nelson recommended that fire commanders look for breaks in fuel caused by development, agricultural use, old burns, or other means to limit the spread at the head of the fire. He believes that there is a threshold when wind speeds are locally under 30-40 miles per hour, when this can potentially be achieved. Timely arrival of adequate resources is critical to such an effort. Nelson stated the fire’s flanks should be “pinched” by suppression action as much as is possible, using wildland resources to diminish the width of the fire’s head as it enters structures downwind. Nelson places a high priority on this action as a means of reducing risk to life and property. He cited an experience at 158 the 1961 Bel Air fire where, as a Crew Supervisor, he directed a hand crew in perimeter control activities while engines fought structure fires. He commented that, “if crews alone can make progress in this environment, a combination of wildland resources and engines, supported by aircraft, can make great progress on important parts of the flanks.” 5. Request resources using a sequence, not all at once. Chief Nelson considers the dispatch center’s participation to be critical to the success of major fire operations. He believes that mass ordering of resources all at once confounds and complicates dispatcher interaction and fails to achieve the desired response of specific resources in the Incident Commander’s prioritized preference. He recommended ordering by a system of requests that focuses first on resources needed in the first hour, second hour, and so forth, as bundled groups. Nelson directs these resources to one of at least two staging areas that he establishes on opposite sides of the fire. Nelson believes that this makes the Incident Commander’s resource priorities more easily understood by the dispatch center and promotes use of the nearest appropriate resource. Nelson believes that this practice also mitigates dispatcher overload and assists in focusing on the “big decisions.” He stated that overwhelming orders was a documented problem for dispatchers in the Tunnel Fire in the Oakland hills in 1991. Chief Nelson uses preidentified “Blitz Lists” that provide resource needs for specific geographic areas. He requests resources in accordance with these lists for major fires. A typical list for the Malibu/Santa Monica Mountains area might call for 10 engine strike teams (50 engines), six Division Supervisor-qualified fire officers, bulldozers, aircraft, and hand crews, all to be dispatched and planned to arrive on scene within the first hour. Nelson’s desired dispatch plan for this area is even agency specific to include “wildland experienced” cooperating fire agencies such as the Los Angeles City and Ventura County fire departments. Participation by these agencies allows the 159 County Fire Department to provide for a timely response of resources while maintaining jurisdictional coverage. In this case, four engine strike teams are provided by the County, four by Los Angeles City, and two by Ventura County. Preplanning for a specific area may call ultimately for 20 to 50 engine strike teams, but Nelson sequences the requests to allow time for dispatching of this initial resource base, then requests the balance of the resources, not to exceed around 10 strike teams at any one time. Addi- tional strike teams beyond the initial Blitz List request would be expected to respond from some distance through the mutual aid system. 6. Plan and train on routine functions, in order to be able to use mental energy on the important issues. Many skills, including but not limited to resource management, command post staffing and operations, expanding the operations organization, and information management, can be rehearsed on simulators until they become routine. With proper “gaming,” one’s skills can encompass any size of incident. Chief Nelson’s fire organization strategy includes establishment of at least four Divisions and two Branches within the first hour and two to three staging areas for managing incoming resources. His initial organization designates supervisors for all exposed areas of the fire. He typically staffs staging areas with truck companies or paramedic unit personnel until they can be replaced by fully qualified staff. Nelson has briefed and trained subordinate fire officers in the rapid implementation of this strategy. He also believes in running a lean initial organization, but with essential positions staffed, to allow for maximum deployment of resources to the tactical problem. Wildland-experienced strike team leaders are highly sought in this strategy for reassignment and leadership at the Division Supervisor level and above. As soon as possible, he prefers to assign Division Supervisors to scout potential deployment areas ahead of the fire. Nelson typically deploys the first two Division Supervisors to active portions of

160 each flank, then assigns the next two to areas ahead of the fire on each flank to conduct reconnaissance and prepare for future resource deployments. Nelson benchmarks success in wildland fire situations by preplanning desired outcomes for critical fire corridors. He considers fire history, critical fire weather patterns, resource deployment, concurrent offensive (perimeter control) and defensive (structure protection) operations, and related factors in developing a best-possible- outcome expectation. He includes the development of an effective incident organization, using his “Blitz List” 1-hour deployment model as a means for evaluation. As Nelson observes the unfolding of an incident, he watches for achievement of preplanned results and organizational development as indicators of success. Nelson equates lack of achievement of the preplanned expectations with increased risk to life and property, increased firefighter risk, escalating organizational difficulty, and loss of control. Nelson completed preplanning for all of the Malibu/Santa Monica Mountains region during his 6-year assignment as a Battalion Chief in this area. In consideration of reports from some of the thesis-studied fires of the sense of overwhelming experienced by some senior staff during extreme fire siege, he indicated that preplanning was key for him in reducing this experience, since preplanning suggests likely outcomes, expectations, and opportunities. Chief Nelson cited an example at the 1993 Old Topanga Fire, where early on, he observed the lack of accomplishment of preplanned objectives and organizational benchmarks, including lack of command presence and perimeter control activities. Nelson observed that, as a Branch Director at this incident, he personally had little interaction, as would normally have been expected, with either the Incident Commander or Operations Section Chief, and he had difficulty in obtaining aircraft, crew, or bulldozer support. To Nelson, these signs and symptoms indicated trouble. He believes that lack of initial success often compounds and escalates into greater and greater 161 organizational, strategic, and tactical difficulty. This became true in the Old Topanga Fire and contributed to an extraordinary replacement of command during the second day of the incident. For Nelson, another significant indicator of command success at the Old Topanga Fire was that no Incident Action Plan was published for the first 3 days of the fire. Nelson felt that more successful fires would have provided such guidance documents, at least in a basic form, by the end of the first day. Finally, the lack of expected logistical support for his Branch during the first 48 hours indicated command and support inadequacies. Noteworthy to Nelson at the Old Topanga Fire was that the Incident Com- mander had directed the Operations Section Chief to remain at the Command Post with him, resulting in loss of tactical control and field coordination. When Nelson was given a description of an observation by Orange County’s Laguna Fire staff of the potential desirability to use this same method as a means of overcoming command communications difficulty, Nelson responded that this would be a poor choice and that the Operations Section Chief’s absence from the field leads to critical degradation of coordination, control, and organization. He suggested that establishment of Divisions, Branches, and the Operations Section Chief position, as well as complete delegation of tactical issues, was critical to the Incident Commander’s ability to manage such a incident. Nelson believes that, through effective delegation, the Operations Section Chief has opportunities to interact appropriately with the Incident Commander. Nelson reinforced the need to assign wildland-qualified and -experienced Strike Team Leaders and other senior officers to higher responsibility positions early in the process to provide for needed organizational depth. Nelson indicated that he asks arriving Strike Team Leaders whom he does not know personally whether they have “done this before” and typically gets truthful responses when considering such assignments. Nelson also discussed how the selection of poorly experienced Division Supervisors can negatively 162 affect safety and operational outcomes. He discussed the 1996 Calabasas Fire as an example in which an inexperienced Division Supervisor directed engine companies across an inappropriate location, leading to their burnover and personnel injury. As a means of streamlining deployment of resources and reducing the burden on the Operations Section Chief, Nelson recommends a practice in which the Operations Section Chief identifies Division boundaries, assigns and briefs Division supervisors, identifies resource needs, and then informs Staging Area Managers to direct arriving resources into specific Divisions by a stated priority order, usually in batches of 10 to 20. He then directs all responding resources to staging areas to receive assignments. This has many benefits. According to Nelson, it reduces radio traffic, allows for resources to be “checked in” and tracked while on the incident more effectively, simplifies deployment from staging areas, allows for priorities to be met in resource allocation, allows timely tactical decision making in all areas, and delegates a very large volume of individual interactions to a Staging Area Manager. Nelson then checks back with the Staging Area Manager periodically to obtain information on needs and deployments. Nelson indicated the importance of staging areas to the organization of an incident and effective utilization of resources cannot be overstated. In discussion of multi-agency coordination, Chief Nelson cited that the Old Topanga Fire used Branches as a means of designating agency responsibility. For the portion of the City of Los Angeles that was included in the fire, a separate Branch was established to be managed by the City’s fire department, staffed by City fire resources. Nelson believed that this was an appropriate way to provide for agency jurisdiction while retaining coordination under a single command system. It also satisfied the City’s concerns that their own fire department should be managing fire issues within the city proper.

163 Chief Nelson stressed that the overordering of resources can create a difficult problem for the Incident Commander and that it should be guarded against. Overorder- ing also robs limited resources and greatly diminishes the capacity of the agencies in the region to respond to new fires. At the Old Topanga Fire, so many resources were ordered that they jammed Pacific Coast Highway in Malibu with nearly 900 engines. Ultimately, more than 1,100 were ordered. This resource was beyond the capacity of incident staff to manage, support, or utilize. More realistic ordering can be achieved by good preplanning of needs, according to Chief Nelson. He indicated that, based on his experience, it was difficult to visualize a resource need that exceeds 200 to 300 engines. Chief Nelson stated that resource management is a “game played in four quarters,” each quarter possessing its own set of problems and predictability. He believes that, since many problems are predictable, many are also preventable. In the first quarter, resources are scarce and there are many demands. In the second quarter, overwhelming resources are arriving, more than can be put to work immediately (10-50 resources). In the third quarter, the maintenance phase, team leaders worry about maintaining a stable work force through shifts and personnel rehabilitation. In the fourth quarter, the resources are demobilized. Nelson felt that good preplanning and rehearsal is the best opportunity to positively impact the first two phases, which include resource staging and assignment, tactical deployment and strategy, and organization building. With regard to logistical support, Chief Nelson has established additional benchmarks that he uses to promote rapid and effective implementation of necessary efforts. He identified issues such as communications, fuel, water, facilities, and food as critical. Nelson uses local personnel to initiate these activities, even before fully trained and qualified logistics staff arrive at the incident, often using one fire company. He places a high priority on establishment of effective radio communications, including 164 designation of command and tactical radio frequencies. Among the concerns that he believes should be addressed within the first 2 hours are command post facilities, staging areas, supply ordering and control, a communications unit/plan using three to four frequencies, and a medical plan for management of injured firefighters. He places particular importance on the medical plan to ensure that it includes the means and equipment for remote rescue and extrication such as rope, stretchers, helicopter evacuation, and other specialized technical needs. Ultimately, Chief Nelson believes that he needs around 12 personnel to effectively run a developing command post and to “get on top of” resource management, using several people to accomplish the planning function, several to accomplish logistics, and four to eight to accomplish Operations leadership and staging. In consideration of the period of time when a wildland fire begins to change into a large structural loss fire, Chief Nelson feels that it is essential to have strong command and control in place for the safety of firefighters and the operational efficiency of the incident. He cited experience during the Old Topanga Fire, where 20 firefighter entrapments occurred during such a period. He believes that strong Division Supervision is particularly useful in preventing entrapments because of the higher quality of supervision and safety oversight provided. In describing the Old Topanga burnovers, he indicated that inexperienced companies sometimes selected “suicide streets” or locations of untenability as tactical positions. He believes that a tendency exists for independently acting companies to commit to a low-priority objective because it is the one that is immediately visible. Nelson believes that, without close supervision and organization, areas that need protection are missed, that needed rescues may not be realized, and that firefighters may overcommit to unsafe situations and accept unreasonable risk. Nelson believes that hazards can be created, particularly by firing operations initiated during independent action. 165 Chief Nelson recognized the value of independent action as a strategy of last resort. For example, when multiple and imminent threats to life exist on the arrival of initial resources, resources must be committed, using skills learned in training and preplanning. Nelson indicated that, in these cases, a high level of safety must be followed, and that all decisions must be made in the context of standard risk acceptance guidelines. These guidelines call for extensive firefighter risk for life safety and rescue concerns and lesser risk acceptance to save property. Natural resource values alone do not warrant excessive firefighter risk. He indicated that independently acting resources should coordinate their efforts with adjoining companies and, as soon as possible, rejoin and reorganize their efforts to be a part of the broader organization, as soon as the critical mission has been accomplished. Nelson believes that, while firefighters sometimes see only the “probability of success” of independent action, they should also be trained to understand the “consequences of failure” associated with such action. Nelson believes that independent action, more often than not, exacerbates incident management difficulty rather than diminishes it. As an example of the difficulty in reorganizing from independent action, Nelson cited an experience from the Old Topanga Fire, when the Las Flores area above the Malibu coast experienced an “area ignition” and an order was given to evacuate immediately. The order was given during a period of sanctioned independent action. In practice, only a portion of the fire companies in this area evacuated, and a number of entrapments occurred. Chief Nelson discussed a need for leaving some fire companies behind after the initial structural siege to maintain control and protect structures within the fire’s perimeter. During the Laguna Fire, a number of structures were lost within the perimeter after surviving the initial flaming front passage. These were usually lost to residual burning wildland fuels or from exposure to earlier ignited structures. He suggested a 166 formula of leaving 10% of the initial deployment of engines behind in such areas to guard against such loss. Nelson recommended the establishment of a Integrated Com- mand System Group to deal with large areas of both involved and uninvolved structures within the perimeter after the fire front passes. Nelson described the importance of relationships in command organizations as a means of conveying trust and acceptance during high-risk, high-stress environments. He cited numerous occasions on which he relied on personal friendships and work associations to convey important issues and gain understanding or commitment. These relationships were needed, both internal and external to his own organization. As a means of addressing the fire service’s future concerns for such fires, Chief Nelson forecasted the increased use of organized incident management teams as a means for enhancing command and control. Federal and state wildland agencies routinely use such resources effectively in the management of their fires. At the old Topanga Fire, a State Incident Management Team was requested by the Los Angeles County Fire Chief to assist in the management of the fire. The state team melded into a skeleton organization established by the County Fire Department and greatly expanded its depth. This was a highly emotion-charged and controversial decision and implementation, the first in the history of the Los Angeles County Fire Department. At the fire’s executive command level and in many subordinate positions, dual responsibility was then shared by county and state firefighters, using primary and secondary or “deputy” positions within the Incident Command System. Nelson observed that, as wildland experience in municipal organizations diminishes from retirements and less frequent routine wildfire, such relationships and organizations will be important to acquire seasoned staff to manage complex incidents. This case was demonstrated by the efficiency of this melded command of the Old Topanga Fire. Nelson feels that this cooperative approach is best to meet political, jurisdictional, and operational concerns 167 and that it effectively utilizes the full range of expertise found in participating fire organizations. Chief Nelson would also like to expand on current Incident Command System practices with regard to development of command strategy. He cited a military practice that incorporates “commander’s intent” with objectives to clarify missions, as opposed to the fire service practice of stating incident objectives alone. In “commander’s intent,” critical safety concerns or operational opportunities and limitations can be expressed in an institutionalized format. An example could be that “fire attack shall be conducted by the direct attack method, except in the case of underslung line, which is unacceptable for safety reasons.” Such admonishments require special and customized notation in today’s Incident Command System processes. In his reflection of how he would have enhanced his own performance during the Old Topanga Fire, Chief Nelson indicated that he would have requested additional qualified staff to fill more Division Supervisor positions, would have given stronger briefings to Staging Area Managers, would have worked in the absence of the Opera- tions Section Chief to better coordinate with adjoining Branches, would have pushed harder in his efforts to acquire hand crew resources, and, had he been able to obtain adequate resources, would have attempted firing operations specifically in Tuna Canyon. Chief Nelson feels that the most fundamental function of command is making the tough decisions at the right time and recognizing which are the fundamental and critical decisions. In Chief Nelson’s philosophy, life safety and firefighter risk are the primary concerns. He believes that humans can effectively focus on three to four issues in a time of crisis. He suggested that Incident Commanders ask themselves, “Am I focused on the three or four things?”

168 Tim Sappok, Division Chief Tim Sappok is a Division Chief with the CDF. He has 27 years of fire service experience, 15 of which have been served as a Chief Officer. Currently, he is in charge of the San Bernardino Unit Mountain Division and the Pilot Rock Conservation Camp. Chief Sappok has previous experience with CDF as Incident Commander of Major Incident Management Team 10, and is part of the instructional cadre for Incident Management 3, a course titled Transition From Initial Attack to Major Fire for Incident Commanders. Chief Sappok refers to the period of time in an incident in which a fire transi- tions from the initial attack phase to a major fire as the “Rodeo Hour,” for the propensz- ity for resources to “cowboy” or do things outside of an organized and cohesive approach. Tim feels that this situation is especially exacerbated in areas such as southern California, where multiple agencies respond initially to fires with large, if not overwhelming, amounts of resources. He has observed that Incident Commanders frequently make early strategic errors, including (a) feeling compelled to commit all arriving resources to work immediately or, conversely, staging everything until a firm plan can be constructed; (b) failing to develop a cognitive plan for resource commitment or to develop appropriate incident objectives; and (c) becoming so concentrated on ordering resources (Sappok term: “hardware”) that they fail to order appropriate support and supervisory resources such as Division Supervisors. The arrival of massive multiple agency resources only compounds these issues, according to Sappok. He noted that these resources, in the vacuum of organization, tend to “revert to a comfort level” and work with those with whom they are most familiar rather than cooperate to achieve a combined result from the large response. Manifestations of this action include ordering resources through one’s own agency, sometimes duplicating orders that are transmitted by other agencies also working at the

169 scene, potentially bypassing closer resources for one’s own agency resources, and receiving or giving tactical orders to one’s own units despite, or sometimes in disregard of, broader organizational direction. Chief Sappok believes that, to mitigate this condition, immediate incident command organization is of extreme importance. He personally works immediately on arrival to collocate all responding agency lead chief officers to begin this coordination. He noted that “everybody wants to go fight the flames” but that organization is critical to overall incident success. It is Chief Sappok’s intent in his organizational efforts to intercede before individual resources or agencies have the opportunity to act independently. He stated that, by acting quickly, an incident organization may achieve one plan that includes well-thought-out phases and objectives for incident growth. Sappok believes that, if agencies or resources begin to act independently, whether the actions are for better of worse, these actions must be incorporated into the incident plan, as there is no reasonable opportunity to start over again. Sappok felt that those initial uncoordinated actions have great potential to complicate broader incident planning and organization. Chief Sappok felt that it is “absolutely critical” for initially responding incident commanders to have a prior relationship with initially responding chief officers from cooperating agencies in order to be able to affect a strong interagency fire organization. Sappok stated that he even has surrounding agency Chief Officers’ cell phone numbers preprogrammed into his cell phone to ensure communications. Sappok described the value of relationship and trust to many incident facets including resource ordering and deployment, incident financing, command and objective development, incident supervision, and related issues. Sappok feels that the most important facet of the Incident Commander’s responsibility is situational awareness. He feels that each incident presents different 170 situational aspects at various times, and while the resources and methods that might be brought to bear are similar in style and substance to other incidents, the timing and application of this technology constitute the art of Incident Command. He reinforced the need to look for control opportunities such as the fire’s movement into favorable terrain, old burn areas, agricultural areas, noncombustible fuels or developments, and related areas for securing the fire to the least possible growth. When asked about his prioritization of structure protection versus perimeter control and how he believed such choices affected resource deployment, he commented that this issue was situational as well, and that the Incident Commander must be able to make situational decisions based upon the best information available, pointing out that this question could be conditional upon the intensity of the fire’s threat to structures, resource availability, fire spread dynamics, and the like. In his home unit within San Bernardino County, Sappok has facilitated a prefire, joint interagency fire management statement between the U.S. Forest Service-San Bernardino National Forest, San Bernardino County Fire Department, and CDF regarding management for joint fires. This consensus statement was developed to guide initial agency actions on multiple-agency-response fires and has been approved by agency heads from each of the three participating agencies. Given overlapping and proximal jurisdictional boundaries, the majority of large fires in this unit are multi-agency fires. The consensus statement includes the following points: 1. The policy of the command group shall always be firefighter and public safety. 2. The establishment of an Incident Command Post shall be a management priority. 3. Each involved agency has the responsibility to minimize the fiscal impact on all other partner agencies. 171 4. Each agency whose jurisdiction is involved or threatened shall have a representative assigned to the Incident Command Post. Each representative shall be qualified to act in a Unified Command or as an Agency Representative based upon incident progress or potential. 5. Notification to other potentially threatened agencies shall be made as soon as possible by the responsible communications center. 6. When a Unified Ordering Point is established, each other agency involved in the Unified Command shall make every reasonable attempt to send a representative to the Unified Ordering Point dispatch center. To maintain this agreement and promote additional cooperative efforts and relationships, periodic cooperator meetings are also held. Sappok cited the “tremendous value” of prefire planning to the incident management process, identifying likely needs and scenarios for fire growth and development. He believes that the preplans identify potential outcomes and focus the situational assessment and decision making of the Incident Commander. Chief Sappok spoke extensively on the complexities of financial management for major fire incidents. Changes in federal and state policy have greatly affected the traditional funding for major fires, with a transition to increased responsibility for structure protection by local government. This is a highly controversial and evolving policy that has caused complex disputes at many large fires, especially in southern California. Sappok felt that the issue was “coming to a head,” so that new policy and agreement would be needed among various agencies. Sappok believes that an Incident Commander of an expanding incident should order resources that are needed without undue consideration of cost. He recommended clear accounting of the actual use of resources, whether it be for perimeter control or structure protection, on National Forest lands or Lands of State Responsibility, and so forth. Sappok tries to organize Division 172 and Branch boundaries by areas of financial responsibility to assist in this process. Sappok indicated that the past method of agency ordering to assign financial responsibility works infrequently because ordered resources are often redirected to needs other than their ordered purpose by the time they arrive at incidents. In consideration that many of the studied fires, including the Laguna Fire, used an “independent action strategy,” Chief Sappok felt that the action represents a “two-edged sword,” in that it generates productivity but command may not know or be able to direct where or what productivity occurs. He also feels that accountability suffers through this strategy and that its use should be limited. Sappok feels that organization building at the Division level is most important in reducing and directing independent action. Unlike other experts consulted, Sappok prefers using Divisions and Groups before Branches in most cases. However, he acknowledged benefits of the independent action strategy. He cited the high-quality training of firefighters and their ability to continue strong independent action in a command void, and he believes that, when necessary, the strategy can still be productive. In command building, Sappok believes that delegation of authority and responsibility is critically important at the Operations Section Chief and Division/Group Super- visor levels. He commented that there are times that the Incident Commander will not know what the current status is of operational aspects of the incident. During these times he must trust the judgment of the staff to whom he has delegated authority. He includes specific objectives and direction when he provides this delegation, and states what productivity is expected. He stated that the Incident Commander’s situational awareness must include the readiness to take decisive action to place appropriate people in critical positions and to make important decisions, sometimes aside from personal sensitivities. Sappok noted that, commonly, engine or other company officers are used initially to accomplish Division Supervision, but he noted that they should be replaced 173 and reunited with their crews as soon as possible to achieve higher productivity and increase crew safety. Chief Sappok cited the “massive and insatiable appetite” for information that is requested about contemporary incidents, greatly complicating the job of Incident Command. Sappok stated that the greater the difficulty of the incident, the higher the intensity of information requests. These requests are frequently received from fire executives from various involved agencies. Sappok sometimes assigns a Deputy Incident Commander to deal exclusively with such demands when inquiry is overwhelming, so that the Incident Commander’s focus can remain concentrated on the incident. He indicated that “eloquence counts” for such reporting relationships, and that the ability to communicate and describe an incident in appropriate terms assists in carrying out this responsibility. Sappok agreed with other experts in the handling of burnover and other accidents. He distinguishes accidents as “incidents within an incident” and he attempts to reengage operations personnel, when appropriate, as soon as possible. Sappok felt that this was essential because the accident can consume the total attention of the Incident Commander otherwise, and focus is still needed for the firefighting situation. He recommended that information regarding the outcome of the accident and its victims be shared with incident personnel to avoid rumors and ease anxiety, when possible. This basic information should not include ongoing preliminary investigation information. Chief Sappok shared an interesting perspective from his experience as instructional cadre for “California Incident Management Three,” a training program for developing Incident Commanders. At this course, he has noted that Chief Officers describe that they perceive a generalized home-agency lack of confidence or delegation of trust to the Battalion Chief level to make important incident decisions. In Sappok’s view, this is a reversal of previous fire service practice. He referred to this process as 174 the “depowering of the fire service” and lamented that it negatively impacts incidents through Incident Commanders’ reluctance to make important decisions for fear of institutional conflict or potentially negative review. He fears that this can lead to significant compromise of some incident strategy and tactics, which can be especially pronounced in interface zone incidents that require quick decision making and action. In Sappok’s observation, this problem has become endemic in the California Fire Service and runs counter to national business trends in employee empowerment. Sappok believes that empowerment is key to development of good Incident Commanders and Command staff and he believes that empowerment should be promoted.

John Hawkins, Assistant Chief John Hawkins is an Assistant Chief with the CDF, responsible for the Eastern Division within Butte County and the Butte Fire Center. He is a veteran of 30 years of fire service and possesses an Associate in Science degree in Fire Science and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Forest Management from California State University, Humboldt. Hawkins is a graduate of the National Fire Academy Executive Fire Officer program and is a California-certified Fire Officer. In 1998, Hawkins was awarded the prestigi- ous State of California “Ed Bent Instructor of the Year” award. He serves as Incident Commander of CDF Major Incident Management Team 5, has been the Incident Commander of Team 3, and has prior experience as the Operations Section Chief for a Federal “Type 1” Incident Management Team. He has written and delivered many courses related to wildland fire and incident command, including the State Chief Officer Command 2E-Wildfire Tactics and Strategy course. As a private consultant, Hawkins has consulted extensively on incident command for the Alyeska pipeline services in the State of Alaska. During the 1993 firestorms, he served as the Operations Section Chief of the Old Topanga Fire after CDF assumed cooperative management of the incident

175 with the Los Angeles County Fire Department. Chief Hawkins was interviewed by telephone on June 27, 2002. Chief Hawkins believes that preplanning is key to success in wildland interface fire, especially with regard to the predeployment of resources to critical areas. Such planning must detail concurrent perimeter control and structural protection efforts so that mobilization of resources is immediate and effective during an emergency. Hawkins emphasized historical fire corridors in his planning efforts due to the repetition of fire and values at risk concentrated in these areas. He studies past fire history for the corridors to determine what strategies and tactics worked or failed to work. He urged practitioners to not be afraid to “think big” in planning or in implementing such plans. With regard to initial organization, Hawkins poses the question, “Will the fire get away from initial control efforts?” In the affirmative, he considers the use of Branches as the initial organizational tool of line supervision. Like other experts consulted, Hawkins believes that this enables him to encircle the fire organizationally and focus of critical issues such as structure protection during the period when qualified supervisory individuals may be difficult to acquire. Hawkins believes that Branches also “chunk out” or separate an incident into manageable units that make command and control more efficient. In contrast to other experts consulted, Chief Hawkins felt that the opinions of the Laguna Fire staff were correct in their after-action proposal to co-locate the Incident Commander and the Operations Section Chief when the fire became catastrophic and communications became unworkable. Hawkins felt that it was critical for these two positions to conduct rapid and clear communications, which are typically needed during a massive structural siege of a wildfire. He would have recommended Branch organization for the Laguna Fire to allow the Operations Section Chief greater flexibility to increase the interface with the Incident Commander and with Branch Directors then 176 directing the bulk of incident operations. Hawkins was very opposed to a developing practice within primarily federal Incident Management Teams to establish a position known as “Planning-Operations Section Chief.” This position, envisioned as a go- between for the Planning and Operations Sections, is designed to relieve the Operations Section Chief of meeting attendance or other interactions in the command organization. Hawkins felt that the Operations Section Chief must have the “feel” of the incident organization and lend his participation to ensure quality incident management in all areas. Hawkins has noted a breakdown in tactical planning and execution when such an intermediary position is established for incidents. Hawkins identified issues associated with the use of incident management teams, indicating that one of the most significant obstacles to their use on wildland interface fires was the propensity for such incidents to have experienced and concluded the structural threat in less than 18 hours. Incident management teams can have long transition times and can be “bureaucratic” in their approach, tending to make their assumption of an incident irrelevant to the structure protection need. By bureaucratic, Hawkins indicated that he meant that fire service policy, structure, and preferences get in the way of efficient management, such as when only certain titled individuals or groups are allowed to backfire regardless of experience, 24-hour shifts are undesirable when they may be most efficient, and related “artificial rules.” Chief Hawkins forecasted that rules for accountability in fire service actions promulgated by state and federal occupational safety and health organizations will eventually address fire service actions at wildland fires, as they have already begun to affect the structural firefighting environment. Hawkins cited the severe losses in several recent fire seasons in which significant numbers of firefighters were killed or injured. He tied this concept specifically to the use of the “independent action strategy” for interface zone fires, where resources are allowed to select and commit to various 177 structural targets, usually during the peak period of fire siege. Hawkins cited an acute loss of accountability, organization, and planning that occurs in such a strategy and commented how emotion rather than rational planning is characteristic of such events. Although recognizing its frequent occurrence, Chief Hawkins felt such a strategy was unacceptable for professional command organizations. Hawkins also believes that better accountability is needed for wildland firefighters who typically work alone in “overhead” assignments, citing a recent death of an Emergency Medical Technician on a fire near Santa Barbara, California. Pairing of firefighters into teams should be considered, according to Hawkins, for assignments whenever possible. Hawkins believes that incident objectives should be stated and announced to incident participants to ensure cohesiveness of direction. In his view, priorities are generally stated in the following order: manage risks to life and property, stop the forward spread or “head” of the fire, contain the first priority flank, contain the second priority flank, then contain the rear of the fire. He uses situational leadership to select people for assignment to incident command system positions, recognizing their skill and match for specific assignments. He also promotes early development of Unified Com- mand to ensure affected jurisdictions have opportunity for command level input. He recognizes that Incident Commanders “cannot work by themselves” and recommends that assistants be assigned to conduct resource and situation status tracking and communications for the Incident Commander. Development of a situational orientation is critical to planning, and the Incident Commander should utilize an accurate map and forecast potential incident growth and needs. Chief Hawkins is intimately familiar with current curriculum of wildfire training programs in California. He is of the opinion that many courses, especially those that are required for Chief Officer certification, should be revised to meet current conditions and recognized best practices. 178 William C. Teie, Deputy Director for Fire Protection (Retired) William (Bill) Teie retired after 34 years of fire service as the Deputy Director for Fire Protection for the CDF. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in Forest Management from California State University, Humboldt. Chief Teie is an accomplished author of several important fire service textbooks regarding wildland fire. As Deputy Director for Fire Protection, Chief Teie was responsible for leadership and command of all fire operations for the largest and most respected state forestry agency in the United States. Chief Teie has considerable national and international consulting experience, including recent work in South Africa. He has served on numerous National Fire Protection Association committees relating to wildland fire and serves as the Western States representative to the National Wildfire Coordinating Group. He is the past President of the California Fire Chiefs Association, and is a member of the Institute of Fire Engineers of the British Empire. He was honorably discharged from the U.S. Army as a lieutenant, where he was responsible for mapping and intelligence. Chief Teie was interviewed by telephone on June 27, 2002. Chief Teie indicated that the ability to mobilize resources in California is both a help and a hindrance to Incident Commanders. Teie noted that, all too often, Incident Commanders err by not having a vision or plan with respect to the risks and probable demands of a growing incident, and sometimes order excessive resources in lieu of better planning. He cited a review of the Old Topanga Fire in which he participated, where 1,100 engines were requested to respond. Of these resources requested, his review determined that only 15-20% of them actually were committed to fire fighting- related operations. Some engines were dispatched from northern California to the Old Topanga Fire in southern California and returned without expending their original tank of water.

179 Teie suggested that the ability of the fire response system to mobilize can vastly exceed an incident organization’s ability to deploy and utilize the resource, emphasizing the importance of rapid organizational development and appropriate planning to ensure that only a needed firefighting force is requested. Teie also spoke of the “drawdown” and regional depletion of resources that can occur with overordering, and the impacts that this action causes to later occurring incidents. Teie believes that better prediction skills are necessary for Incident Com- manders, not only in fire behavior but in their ability to accurately forecast the resource needs of an incident. Chief Teie believes that incident resources should be better and more fully utilized, and moved around incidents to places of need. “Parking an engine around a house for a week is not good utilization.” Better utilization reduces the overall need for total resources, reducing incident costs and regional response system impacts. Teie described a Sierra foothills incident which occurred in the early 1990s, known as the Old Gulch Fire. According to Teie, the Old Gulch Fire was in an initial attack mode long past a time when it should have transitioned to a major fire command organization. One result of this was that the Old Gulch Fire was continuing to request excessive resources that included 200 additional engines. Teie was aware of the considerable resources already at the Old Gulch Fire, which included one third of all CDF engines in the State. He attributed the new order for engines to a lack of effective planning and resource utilization. At the same time, a new incident, known as the Fountain Fire, broke in the Sierra Cascades north of Redding. The Fountain Fire became a major fire and eventually consumed nearly 64,000 acres and 636 structures. Given the risks presented early at the Fountain Fire, Chief Teie acted as agency head and redirected the 200 engines responding to the Old Gulch Fire to the Fountain Fire. As the agency head, Teie felt that it was important to oversee the broader deployment patterns to current and future incidents as part of their principal 180 responsibility during periods of fire siege. He believed that development of an overall strategy based upon values at risk is essential not only for an agency administrator but for an Incident Commander as well. Teie felt that an Incident Commander sometimes has to “make do” with the resources at hand. During periods of extreme fire siege, Teie has been faced with many fires that were understaffed or in need of resources. During such sieges he worked with his principal cooperators to select top priority fires and allocate resources accordingly, with the intent of “picking off” some of the fires and reducing the overall demand, and finally providing adequate staffing to all incidents. Chief Teie indicated that a successful strategy for major fires is to reinforce and hold the fire line that has been created as a top priority. He felt it “makes little sense to construct fire line on the same portion of the fire four to five times” if it can be supported and maintained initially. Teie lamented that the fire service should emphasize more effort during overnight shifts than traditionally occurs because fire behavior abates during this period and control efforts can be more successful. He noted that internal politics also influence fire management efforts. In one example within CDF, Teie noted that Incident Commanders are reluctant to declare a fire “contained” because such a declaration causes incident support, resources, and funding to cease. He noted that such obstacles are changing traditional values and terms regarding wildfire management. With regard to the expanded use of professional incident management teams to command wildfires, Teie noted that the teams represent a “practical solution that has its own set of problems.” Teie believes that teams concentrate skills and allow for one member’s weaknesses to be balanced by the strengths of others. However, problems can result when local fire organizations are territorial over command of fires within their jurisdictions and resist the influence of the incident organization. Some organizations also have large Incident Management Teams, according to Teie—an issue that he 181 believes contributes toward territoriality and should be controlled. Teie views the use of fire teams as an evolutionary process that is still very much in flux. A recent trend to assign multiple fire teams to the same incident, often one federal and one state team, was described by Teie as a highly unproductive and wasteful practice. He cited territoriality as one reason for this problem but also noted that the focus and emphasis of teams vary and create conflicts. As an example, federal teams operate under federal policy and guidelines that are often heavily focused on natural resources values and are often fought on lands were federal ownership is predominant. California state teams, while similar, have different policy, procedure, and concerns and they often command fires with considerable private property involved. Chief Teie believes that, in the future, teams should become more reactive to leadership demands and situations presented by the local political and fire environment. Teie believes that a view is needed that fires are fought from a “renter” rather than an “owner” mentality that emphasizes local issues better. Also, since not all organizations fight fire the same way, integration of other agencies and local participants through a blending with management team staff for large incidents could be more effective. Teie noted that some incident organizations and teams form a “group mentality” that can lead them astray from appropriate actions, and that participants should guard against this development. Teie also mentioned that Incident Commanders must remember that they work for and are accountable to someone, and that this relationship calls for concentrated effort. Chief Teie noted that some Incident Commanders or incident staff “personalize” an incident and potentially refer to an incident as “their incident,” “my fire,” or in like terms. He believes that is a psychological error that promotes excess internalization and unwarranted protectiveness of strategic and tactical decisions. He recommended, instead, that firefighters understand that they are at an incident to do a special job, and 182 that job requires a positive and cooperative focus and good interagency relations. He believes that Incident Commanders and other senior incident staff should lead by example. Chief Teie also values subconscious thinking by experienced fire officers, indicating that such thinking often translates to “gut feelings.” Teie indicated that, in his experience, some of the best incident managers with whom he has worked rely on this process in decision making. Teie believes that presuppression planning is the best time to consider alternatives for fire scenarios that present extensive loss potential. Teie suggested that preplans should specifically include command authority, rules, procedures, and expectations, in addition to the more commonly included potential objectives, strategies, and forecasts. He believes partnership programs such as CDF’s “FIRESAFE” program that involves local interests in presuppression activities, are promising for what they can achieve with regard to protection of communities within the interface zone. He believes that local jurisdictions have a responsibility for the hazards that they are creating in interface areas, and that they should include fire mitigation measures and fire resources to mitigate created risks. Teie commented that he believes that FEMA-sponsored disaster relief after fires is nothing more than “welfare” that should be stopped. He believes that these funds, which are often used to reconstruct houses of vulnerable construction or location, would be better spent on presuppression or fire mitigation programs.

Michael Warren, Fire Chief Mike Warren is the Fire Chief for the City of Corona, California, Fire Department. He is a veteran of 31 years of fire service, including 17 years with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, achieving the rank of Battalion Chief; 6 years with the CDF, achieving the rank of Deputy Chief in San Bernardino County;

183 and the past 8 years with the City of Corona. He holds a Bachelor in Resource Management degree from Northern Arizona University, with a minor in Police and Fire Science. He has commanded many wildland fires and has experience as an Operations Section Chief with a Federal “Type 1” Incident Management Team. During the Laguna Fire he was the Agency Representative for the CDF. Two weeks following the Laguna Fire, he was the CDF Incident Commander for the Old Topanga Fire in Los Angeles County. Chief Warren responded to Orange County as the Agency Representative for CDF at the Laguna Fire. In this capacity, he was responsible for approving financial expenditures and facilitation of state resource response to the Laguna Fire as a result of its physical location within State Responsibility Area. State Responsibility Area (SRA) includes principally private and nonfederal watershed lands throughout California the fire protection of which has been designated by statute as the responsibility of the state. Most SRA is protected directly by the CDF. However, six counties have contracted to the state to act as CDF’s agent in the protection of these wildlands within their political jurisdiction. These so-called “contract counties” are Los Angeles, Orange, Ventura, Santa Barbara, Kern, and Marin. Additional SRA is protected by federal land management agencies, principally the U.S. Forest Service. Contract agents of the state have the responsibility to respond substantially and command SRA fires within their contract area. The CDF responds a senior chief officer to assist in coordination and act as the State Incident Commander in unified command situations. It is important that Warren had, in previous assignments, worked closely with the OCFD and had strong personal and working relationships there. This relationship provided him extensive credibility with incident staff, which he exercised to influence command processes during the fire.

184 On arrival at the Laguna Fire, Warren noted that most actions were still in an “Initial Attack” mode. The Command Post had been burned over at Thurston Elementary School and was in the process of being relocated. Field units operating at the fire had been given responsibility to take independent action. Warren decided that he needed better intelligence about the fire and began to create a map and tour the fire area. He found CDF engines staged at the El Moro School, the initial staging area. These CDF engines had been attempting to contact incident command without success. Warren realized that “there wasn’t much we were going to be able to do” with the fire, and he directed the CDF engines into action to protect structures. As Warren completed his reconnaissance, he tried to consider the fire situation 12 to 24 hours ahead to determine what the wildland fire needs would be. He listened to a National Weather Service forecast and determined that the Santa Ana winds were ebbing, indicating to him that the fire would turn north with the return of the normal onshore winds. On his return to the new beachfront command post, Warren met with the County Incident Commander, Chief Prather. The Incident Commander indicated that he was desperate for specialized wildland resources, including helicopters, air tankers, an air attack supervisor, hand crews, and bulldozers. By this time, a new fire had begun off the Ortega Highway in wildland (SRA) areas east of San Juan Capistrano. This fire eventually burned over 20,000 acres, but at that time it was already becoming a major fire. Warren contacted resources assigned to this new fire, including a helicopter, and diverted them to the Laguna Fire. He took this action outside of the normal dispatch procedures because of the extreme threat to life and property at the Laguna Fire. He then communicated his diversions to the regional command center for CDF and the Incident Commander of the Ortega Fire. He relied considerably on personal relationships to convey the importance of these reassignments and to obtain additional resources. 185 Chief Warren recognized considerable politics at play between the county and city fire and police agencies operating at the Laguna Fire. He viewed the County Fire Department staff as aware of the need to reorganize the fire for major incident command but he noted reluctance among others. The County Incident Commander asked Warren to identify what was not happening that was needed and where the resources should be extended. Warren responded that resources were needed to the north side of the fire to begin effective perimeter control. Warren maintained constant contact with CDF Region Chief Glen Newman, the CDF regional command center in Riverside (currently referred to as Sierra South- Operations), to ensure that the Laguna Fire maintained its top priority status within southern California and continued to receive diverted resources of all types. He observed several issues of concern with the Laguna Fire operations by early evening, including (a) nearly exclusive emphasis on structure protection and limited and ineffect- ive action on offensive attack (perimeter control), and (b) limited consideration of the fire’s spread and future strategies and needs. Warren observed that the structures that were going to burn were already involved shortly after the time he arrived at the fire. Warren commented that he has observed other fires where command and control was inadequate during the height of wildland interface structural siege. He noted that on one Riverside County fire he witnessed structures burning unattended while many resources were staged not far away. He felt that planning ahead to envision where the fire would be going or seeing “tomorrow’s fire” aids in planning for resource deployment prior to the time of need. While the Laguna Fire was covering existing problems on the coastal side of the fire, Warren felt that command should direct resources to the north, where the fire would be heading. Warren noted that some incident commanders deploy engines into neighborhoods that have been professionally evaluated as not being at risk, because citizens 186 there can see the fire and believe that they may be in danger. Such action, Warren said, is taken to meet political sensitivities and to demonstrate commitment to exposed neighborhoods. While this action may be successful in achieving much good will, it can also be costly and unproductive in a growing and dynamic fire environment. In Warren’s view, the Laguna Incident was hampered by a succession of poor choices for Incident Command Posts. The first was the Thurston Middle School, a location at the head of the fire above a steep, heavily fueled canyon. This site was in the process of being burned over as he arrived. Chief Warren noted that there was an attendant loss of communications and incident direction as the Command Post was burned over and forced to relocate. The second inadequate site was the relocation site at the Main Street Beach in downtown Laguna Beach. This site had poor access and no parking, making the site very difficult logistically to support or utilize. Warren indicated that a more appropriate site would have had opportunities for communications, expansive parking, room to accommodate service and support activities usually attendant to a base facility, utilities, and outside space for resting crews. Two weeks following the Laguna Fire, Warren was dispatched to the Old Topanga Fire in Los Angeles County as the CDF agency representative. On his arrival at the Incident Command Post at Pepperdine University, the fire was 2 to 3 hours old. Warren indicated that he did not have the same relationships with the Los Angeles County Fire Department that he had in Orange County; therefore, his approach was much more “low key” or “smooth and easy” as he introduced himself to the command interaction. At 6 to 7 hours into the incident, Warren noted that Incident Commanders were still working “off the hoods of their cars with Thomas Brothers maps,” an indica- tion to him that the staff was still operating in an initial attack mode. Warren had expected much more extensive command development, facilities, and intelligence by this point in the fire. His assessment of the fire behavior and values at risk was that this 187 fire was an extreme threat and that it should be classified as the top-priority fire in the country for resource allocation Warren directed CDF resources into action at various points on their arrival. Since Warren was responsible to authorize expenditures for action on SRA wildlands, he was consulted regarding resource ordering to fund expenditures. This participation brought him greater involvement in the command of the fire, where he suggested additional command development. This was viewed with skepticism by some Los Angeles County staff. The Los Angeles County Fire Department had a new fire chief at that time. Chief P. Michael Freeman was new from his previous position in Texas, and he was experiencing his first major southern California wildfire. He approached Warren and asked for his opinion on the management of the Old Topanga Fire. Warren responded regarding his perception of strengths and deficiencies. As the conversation progressed, Freeman asked Warren whether CDF was willing to assume management of the fire from Los Angeles County. This was the first time in the history of this organization that this department had ever entertained such a request. The Los Angeles County Fire Department had a long and rich history of managing its own fires, and this was a sage change event to make such a request. A lack of experience through attrition of senior staff and the current staff having been on duty for over 24 hours had left the Los Angeles County Fire Department without needed depth of experience to manage this fire alone. Aware of the political ramifications of such an action, Warren declined for CDF to assume management of the fire but offered an alternative: CDF would offer to bring in a management team to integrate with Los Angeles County staff to complement and strengthen its command of the Old Topanga Fire. A unified command would be established between CDF and Los Angeles County, with Los Angeles County retaining

188 a lead in the relationship. Chief Warren assumed the role of CDF Incident Commander. The implementation of this command arrangement was a challenge for all parties. Traditions and politics became obstacles to its implementation. Some Los Angeles County staff found it difficult to work with their CDF counterparts. The Los Angeles County Fire Chief replaced some key County incident staff, including the Incident Commander, who, among others, needed rest. Warren and his new counterparts started the command process, building essentially from the beginning, first inventorying and debriefing field Branch Directors and Division Supervisors as to their progress and needs. Warren was very aware that emotions continued to run high, not only for the change of command but because of the impact of the catastrophic fire itself. Command meetings continued to be tense for some time. Warren had prepared for the transition to Unified Command by selecting highly qualified staff to respond to assist Los Angeles County. In lieu of normal ordering procedures, he hand picked this staff for their interpersonal and technical skills as well as their ability to contribute to the incident without further damaging the sensitive political environment. One of the most significant problems facing the incident team was the very large level of resource orders that had been placed for engines. Over 900 engines had arrived at the fire, far more than the incident had the ability to deploy or manage. Pacific Coast Highway in Malibu had the appearance of a traffic jam of fire engines. Still, 200 more were on order to respond to the incident. Warren’s efforts to “get a handle on resources” at the Command Post had been confounded by lack of accuracy in some records and the loss of others. Finally, Warren dispatched a representative to the Los Angeles County Fire Department’s communications center. Once there, the representative discovered many duplicate records for resource orders that in many cases had been filled two and three times, far exceeding the levels of resources that were needed or had 189 been requested. The lack of a consistent resource tracking system in the communications center compounded this difficulty. Warren ordered the cancellation of resources not yet on the scene. Following resource reconciliation, line assignments and demobilization of the vast resources were conducted as appropriate. Chief Warren provided his view that developing fire officers can gain valuable experience from observing and working with high-quality command practitioners. He advises command officers to ask questions of other agency participants and ensure that a dialog occurs that enhances communications and free exchange regarding strategy and tactics. He admonishes agencies that have a limited experience in wildfire, yet might find themselves involved in such a fire, to not be afraid to seek outside assistance. Warren observed that the Old Topanga Fire command process could form the basis of a process that can work in other locations. The principal success of the Old Topanga command process was its integration of agencies to achieve command depth. Los Angeles County maintained an active and crucial role. CDF provided extensive depth to this process and bolstered Los Angeles County’s ability to be successful. Warren noted that such teamwork and cooperation is essential for fires of catastrophic magnitude.

Charles (Chuck) R. Manor, Deputy Chief Chuck Manor is a Deputy Chief assigned as second in command to the San Diego Unit of the CDF. He is a veteran of 28 years of fire service experience, principally in southern California with CDF. He possesses a Bachelor of Science in Fire Protection Administration degree from California State University, Los Angeles, and is experienced as the Incident Commander for CDF Major Incident Management Team 10. As a Battalion Chief, Manor was the Incident Commander for the Harmony Fire, which was studied in this thesis.

190 Chief Manor stated that, with the Harmony Fire, he immediately recognized its potential for both major fire loss and political complication. The fire occurred just outside of several incorporated cities that maintained their own fire departments, and threatened all of them. Several of these jurisdictions would eventually involve themselves in the command process and a couple would select to work largely independent of Manor’s command organization. Arriving at the Harmony Fire almost simultaneously with him were chief officers from the Elfin Forest and Rancho Santa Fe fire departments. Since the area was SRA, Manor assumed the lead command responsibility but also organized a Unified Command immediately. He noted that air tankers were on the scene early, but that some of the drops were wasted on a flank that was headed into an old burn. Soon after the fire began to develop intensity, Manor noted an increase in Santa Ana winds. Structures were noted to be near the head of the fire and inaccessible, so Manor directed aircraft to take what action they could to protect these structures. He also requested the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department to initiate evacuations. This was difficult to achieve because they did not have enough staff to keep a representative at the command post full time and the Deputies involved felt at risk from the fire. Soon, structures in Elfin Forest were involved, and a civilian fatality occurred that area. Organizationally, Manor feels that evacuation is an operations section issue that should be included as a Law Enforcement Branch, something he attempted at the Harmony Fire with marginal success. Like many subject matter experts consulted, Chief Manor prefers in escaping fire situations to establish his incident organization, utilizing Branches first before Divisions. He prefers this method to ensure that the entire fire area is organized, and he believes that the practice allows utilization of local leadership in key positions by their establishment first. Like the other major fires studied, the Harmony Fire suffered from a lack of good intelligence. 191 In provision of the initial organization, Manor selected a very experienced fire officer, CDF Battalion Chief Jack Story, to assume the role of Operations Section Chief. Manor feels that it is imperative for the Incident Commander to surrender all tactical decisions to an Operations Section Chief or risk mental entrapment in an initial attack mode. In this spirit, Story assumed tactical responsibilities and Manor assumed strategic responsibilities for the fire. Manor then organized each of the affected fire jurisdictions into their own branch to manage defensive structure protection responsibilities. Manor assigned CDF assets to perimeter control and counted on the Operations Section Chief to continuously move these resources with the fire’s spread. Command difficulty was compounded by actions within the City of Carlsbad, where they began to order and deploy resources independent of the command process. It is interesting that this occurred, since the Incident Commander had attempted to mitigate such circum- stance by including a representative from the Carlsbad Fire Department in his command. This situation required extensive follow-up but was settled when the Incident Commander assigned two engine strike teams directly to Carlsbad for deployment and Carlsbad interacted more closely with the incident organization. The Command Post for the Harmony Fire was required to relocate five times as a result of larger facility needs and fire threats. Manor ordered a CDF Major Incident Management Team to assume command of the fire. Their arrival was expected early the next morning. In Manor’s mind, the fire would be “over” by then and all of the structural risk would have abated. This later proved to be a very correct assumption. Chief Manor described a period during which an independent action strategy was used during the Harmony Fire, but he showed how it was modified by the existence of Branches and an Operations Section Chief. Manor believed that the establishment of a basic command framework allowed the Operations Chief to continuously redirect resources to new or higher priority threats but maximized the discretion of individual 192 company officers in selecting tactical targets. Manor indicated that prior crew training is critical to the success of this strategy in order for it to be effective and safe. Manor also assigned several engines to work the rear area of the fire to protect structures from residual fire and to ensure that containment was not lost where line had already been placed. He felt that this was an important tactical need for all similar fires of this nature. Tactics were complicated by the heavily developed and populated nature of the fire area. At one time, the Operations Section Chief wanted to fire-out along Rancho Santa Fe Road but was prohibited from using this strategy by the presence of 200 to 300 civilians observing the fire in the same area. The fire management team had great difficulty in acquiring resources because it was the last fire to develop in a siege of Santa Ana wind-driven fires in southern California. Manor prefers to delegate the development of resource orders to the Operations Section Chief so that person can match perceived needs to ordering. Chief Manor indicated that preparation for Incident Management Team assumption of a fire is a 2- to 3-hour process that requires the assistance of a senior officer other than a member of the command or general staff of an incident. According to Manor, all of the incident staff are critically committed in ongoing operations and are generally unavailable for such assignment. At one point in the Harmony Fire, Manor realized that no additional requested resources would be able to respond and arrive before the fire ran out of fuels. He felt that the resource base on scene would be adequate to contain and extinguish the fire and so he ceased ordering additional resources. In reflection of what he would have liked to do differently regarding his command of the Harmony Fire, Chief Manor stated that he like to have solved the “intelligence problem” and achieved good reconnaissance information. He believes that 193 firefighters must be able to recognize when defensive actions do not work and that sometimes they must make a choice to work tougher tactics of direct attack. “When the fire continuously blows by your position when you’re working defensively, sometimes you just have to start at the rear and go direct, extinguishing fire as you go.” Manor also felt there is a propensity for untrained personnel to focus on what is burning, when the focus should be on what is at risk ahead. He urged Incident Commanders to recognize early when initial attack has failed and organize for a major fire. Finally, he suggested that the best Incident Commanders have a strong planning orientation or have worked as Planning Section Chiefs. He attributed these skills to being very similar to the thinking required for Incident Commanders. Manor suggested that developing Incident Commanders seek such experience and orientation.

Chapter Summary In this chapter 15 interviews have been documented, 8 from Laguna Fire participants and 7 from subject matter experts. One of the subject matter experts became involved in the Laguna Fire later in its command. Many of the subject matter experts had some level of participation in one or more of the five other fires studied in the thesis. The findings, observations, and conclusions of these interviews have many commonalities and suggest best practices for use in command of catastrophic wildland interface fires. These findings, observations, and conclusions are presented and discussed in chapter 5.

194 CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH OBSERVATIONS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The objective of this study was to examine what challenges and commonalities are experienced by incident commanders during management of catastrophic urban interface fires. The study includes a description of mitigations and strategies that were successfully utilized in the management of some of these fires. Specifically, answers were sought to the following research questions: 1. Are there situation events or characteristics that distinguish a major wildland urban interface fire from other wildfires? 2. Were experiences and events that confounded command activities at the 1993 Orange County, California Laguna Fire consistent with other major catastrophic wildland interface fires in California? 3. What were the individual experiences of those who commanded the Laguna fire? 4. What were the common characteristics of the six fires studied? 5. What did the experiences of the six fires suggest with regard to specific training themes for future commanders of catastrophic wildland interface fires? The following chronicles the observations, findings, and recommendations of this study.

Observations The observations gleaned from this study are organized under the following headings: common fire characteristics, research approach, the OCFD, significance of

195 experience, value of prefire planning, media relations, fire organization, independent action strategy, command officer assignment, unified command, human interactions and communications, resource ordering, command strategy, planning and support, safety and accident management, management focus, firing operations, emerging trends, incident management teams, role of agency head, role of relationships, and postfire actions.

Major Fire Characteristics In the first three chapters, six major wildland interface fires were studied: the Tunnel, Paint, Old Topanga, Kinneloa, Harmony, and Laguna fires. These fires shared many commonalities and were very consistent with regard to ignition factors, rates of spread and structural involvement, command challenges, and fire service response. The first two research questions were (a) “Are there situation events or characteristics that distinguish a major wildland urban interface fire from other wildfires?” and (b) “What were the characteristics of the six fires studied?” In consideration of these two research questions, the following commonalities were observed. 1. Each fire started as a wildland fire but transitioned rapidly to involve structures. 2. All of the fires occurred in mountainous terrain, exhibited rapid rates of spread, and occurred during critical fire weather patterns. Rates of spread averaged 4 to 7 miles per hour, with peak rates of spread ranging between 10 and 12 miles per hour at the Laguna and Paint Fires. 3. Civilian fatalities were common on the studied fires, with four of the six fires experiencing such loss. A total of 31 fatalities occurred during these fires, including one firefighter and one police officer. Twenty-five of the fatalities occurred in a

196 single fire, the Tunnel Fire. Hundreds of civilians, firefighters, and police officers were injured, some seriously. 4. Significant and massive structural loss was associated with each of the fires during the first operational period of the fire (12 hours). 5. Many of the command organizations in the studied fires experienced difficulty in transitioning from an “initial attack” mindset to a “major fire” mode, which delayed a number of organizational, planning, and deployment changes that were critical to the firefighting effort. Two fires (the Old Topanga and Laguna) may have reverted to an initial attack mindset from a higher level of organization by implementation of an independent action strategy. 6. All of the fires required significant response from the California Fire and Rescue Mutual Aid System. Two of the fires received the largest and second largest responses ever mustered by the system to date. 7. Five of the six studied fires incorporated some form of a strategy of independent action during the height of the fire’s structural siege. Responders at each of these incidents experienced safety and operational control compromises as a result of this action, and felt they were forced into this “strategy of last resort” by operational demands and resource limitations. 8. Those fires receiving the largest mutual aid response experienced significant difficulty in mobilizing the firefighting force once it was at the scene of the fire. 9. All of the fires presented overwhelming organizational challenges to the Incident Command System, although experienced practitioners have developed mitigating methods to deal with this challenge for development of effective command. 10. Some of the incident organizations were unable to mount simultaneous efforts to control the perimeter and protect structures. Study findings suggest that this may have led to increased structural loss. 197 11. Radio and telephonic (cellular and landline) communications system saturation was commonly experienced in all of the fires. 12. All of the incident organizations practiced methods of triage of large expanses of homes based on impression for the survivability of structures, considering factors of defendable space, construction type, and the impression of civilian life safety and firefighter risk. 13. All of the fires required significantly greater firefighting resources in the first several hours than could be delivered to the fires in a timely way. 14. Inability to acquire accurate and timely intelligence created an inability to accurately forecast fire spread and behavior, created problems with community risk assessment, and confounded deployment planning in most of the studied fires. 15. Water system problems were common, as the fires involved many structures and entered a conflagration stage. 16. Civilian evacuations were problematic, and law enforcement alone was rarely available in enough numbers to mount effective evacuation of endangered areas immediately. Serious traffic jams involving responding emergency equipment and vehicles carrying fleeing civilians critically affected response and evacuation during the Tunnel and Laguna fires. 17. All of the fires occurred in and adjacent to heavily populated and developed areas. 18. Logistical support, including vehicle fuel, firefighting and drinking water, and food became obstacles to continued and uninterrupted firefighting operations due to lack of timely provision at most of the fires. 19. The fires in which television and radio media were utilized to communicate evacuation messages achieved a significant degree of success with evacuations. Those

198 fires that failed to deal effectively with media experienced the development of incident complications due to dissemination of misinformation. 20. Movement and support of firefighting resources under the mutual aid system were time consuming and cumbersome, posing many organizational challenges. Some practitioners identified that resource mobilization was as difficult to manage as the fire itself; others felt that the two issues could not be separated. 21. In all of the studied fires, structures surviving the fire’s first assault were often lost to residual fires when limited available resources were concentrated on expanding fire perimeters and were unavailable for interior fire areas. 22. All of the studied fires occurred in areas rich in fire history, with repetitive patterns of major fires with striking similarity of burn patterns and characteristics. Most historical fires had also involved structural loss. 23. Most, but not all, of the structures lost in the studied fires were constructed of nonfire-resistive structural features. Many had wood shake roof construction. 24. The value of fuel modification near high-risk communities was demonstrated repeatedly through either reduction of fire intensity or obstruction to fire spread. 25. Respondents identified that tactical experience from fire attendance is different from command experience. While tactical experience contributes significantly to command performance, additional and different training and experience were cited as required to perform effectively in command positions. 26. Of the four fires identified as emerging trends involving urban green belts and open space as the primary wildland fuels bed, all occurred in municipal jurisdictions. These fires all exhibited characteristics of the larger studied fires, albeit of much shorter duration. These fires generally experienced high structural and monetary losses. Political jurisdiction and fire protection for these areas is complex, demanding new solutions. 199 Research Approach This research focused an expanded study of the 1993 Orange County Laguna Fire to explore the personal experiences of those involved in the command of a wildland interface fire. A comparison between the Laguna Fire and the Paint, Kinneloa, Old Topanga, Tunnel, and Harmony fires was also conducted. A finding in this study was that all of the wildland interface fires demonstrated similar character and nature, and experienced similarity in fire history, values at risk, and outcome. This finding is supported by the conclusions listed in chapter 3 and those commonalities listed above as “major fire characteristics.” It is suggested that similar fires in the future will encounter obstacles to command development, operations, and effectiveness similar to those identified in this study. Subject matter experts consulted regarding this question agreed with this assumption. All of the studied fires occurred in California, where fire command and control systems and mutual aid are consistent statewide, and during a common period of time in which equipment, technologies, training, and related systems were also consistent. The research also reviewed the practices of subject matter experts who have exemplary experience in the command of wildland-urban interface fire. The subject matter experts commented on the findings and practices of the Laguna Fire staff, and provided what they considered to be “best practices” for the management of similar fires of this nature. It is particularly interesting that, even though these subject matter experts were interviewed separately, many reported utilization of many of the same best practices. Finally, subject matter experts and Laguna Fire staff suggested training program needs for those who might command such fires. With regard to the research question, “Were experiences and events that confounded command activities at the 1993 Orange County, California Laguna fire consistent with those related to other major catastrophic wildland interface fires in California?”

200 the overwhelming opinion of both Laguna Fire participants and subject matter experts was that the Laguna Fire experience was replicative of the strong majority of California wildland interface fires that assumed catastrophic proportions. Therefore, the study assumed that the experiences of the Laguna Fire staff would be consistent with those of the participants not only of the six studied fires but also of any wildfire in California occurring under similar conditions. The research question “What were the individual experiences of those who commanded the Laguna fire?” was answered by studying responses in the individual interviews chronicled in chapter 4. The observations of the Laguna Fire participants were similar to and concurrent with those of the management of the studied fires and with the opinions and observations of the consulted subject matter experts; thus, they are applicable for future training.

The Orange County Fire Department The Laguna Fire was managed by a contract county fire department to the CDF. As such, the OCFD (Successor agency: Orange County Fire Authority) and its personnel were directly responsible for protection of approximately 180,000 acres of wildland within Orange County, and they routinely responded to assist state and other jurisdictions in fires throughout California. The department was more experienced with wildfire than many local government fire departments. Still, the agency had not suffered a catastrophic loss of structures within its jurisdiction in almost a generation of firefighters. The agency had experienced past losses of 14 homes in 1982, 4 homes in 1980, and 66 homes in 1967. While some fire officers at the Laguna Fire were considered experienced to very experienced, none was considered expert in wildland interface fire command. The agency is very large and diverse, with significant fire protection responsibilities other

201 than wildland fire. Given these challenges, the Department’s employees with wildland fire management skills are required to be proficient at many tasks other than wildfire and cannot concentrate solely on proficiency in this area. Given the demands for diverse and contemporary fire services in many California communities, this situation probably reflects the condition of most California fire departments and their employees. The feeling of many senior officers involved in the Laguna Fire was that the pretraining that they had received was inadequate to prepare them to meet the challenges of the Laguna Fire. This training had included Incident Command System training under the auspices of the National Wildfire Coordination Group for a variety of Command and General Staff positions. Most officers cited that their awareness of large wildland- urban interface fire behavior and consequences was a result of their prior training or through experience as a responder to other agencies’ large fires. However, while these experiences were deemed valuable, most officers cited that such experience provided tactical orientation, rather than strategic or command-level experience. Experts and Laguna Fire participants agreed that tactical experience is different from strategic or command-level experience. The research question “What did the experiences of the six fires suggest with regard to specific training themes for future commanders of catastrophic wildland interface fires?” yielded rich and detailed data with specific application and importance to the California Fire Service. Many issues were identified, and some suggest the need for additional study. The findings presented below constitute a description of the Laguna Fire experience and of practices at the Laguna Fire that contrasted with suggested industry “best practices,” as derived from subject matter experts. Given that the majority of the studied fires initially involved significant local government fire service response and the variability of training levels among the responders, the need for expanded training was evident. Training inadequacies 202 compromised operational ability, or safety in some cases, in almost all of the studied fires. Study interviewees cited that much of the best experience in command of such fires is concentrated among state and federal forestry agencies in California. However, command skill also exists in more limited numbers in selected individuals and fire agencies that have either personal experience or jurisdictional wildfire risks. Princip- ally, such experience is concentrated in Contract Counties to CDF and a few large fire departments that have extensive wildland exposure, such as the City of Los Angeles. Quality command experience is difficult to acquire due to the lack of local incidents, even in Contract Counties, except through participation in state or federal jurisdiction fires. This condition certainly hampered the command of the Tunnel Fire, which was managed initially by primarily municipal fire jurisdictions and experienced the greatest organizational difficulty of the studied fires.

Significance of Experience Expert practitioners commented significantly on the issue that training alone cannot qualify firefighters for assumption of wildland interface fire command. As an example, at the Calabasas Fire in Los Angeles County, a Chief Officer who had been trained as a Division Supervisor but lacked experience was found to be a direct contri- butor to a firefighter burnover and injury through his direction that placed firefighters into an inappropriate position. A significant challenge for the future of the California Fire Service is to overcome this gap between training and experience for a larger and more diverse group of firefighters. A significant number of practitioners attributed considerable value to “gut-level” feeling or intuition and its application to high-risk decision making. In the opinion of the respondents, these feelings are the manifestation of training and experience at the subconscious level that works to provide for increased awareness of situations and risk.

203 One expert said that “your brain might be driven by ego but your gut is driven by fear” and that acting on these emotions or instincts is often productive with regard to firefighter safety. The emerging trends in wildland interface fire observed in the study indicate the likelihood of additional high-loss wildfires in urban areas typically protected by agencies without significant wildfire experience, further emphasizing training needs.

Value of Prefire Planning A key factor in all of the fires was the predictability of the fire’s behavior, weather at time of occurrence, spread, and threat to life and property. All of the fires occurred in areas of known fire behavior and history, and many occurred in areas where structures had been lost en masse to past wildland fires. The ability to forecast fire behavior and plan for firefighting deployment and public protection was therefore deemed achievable. The study determined that great variability existed in development of such preplanning among the studied fires, ranging from mental notation of risk to extensive written plans, including tabletop exercises with key cooperating agencies. For the Laguna Fire in particular, written plans had been completed in the 1980s but had not been maintained over a period of years and had been lost. However, most local fire officers recognized the risk of the Laguna Canyon area to wildfire, and many had at least mentally considered possible outcomes. Preplanning for prescribed fire to reduce fuel hazards had also been contemporarily accomplished for portions of the Laguna area. The subject matter experts universally identified written and detailed prefire planning as key to the success of fire officials in responding effectively to such fires. The plans were suggested for all geographic areas of elevated structural risk and for all historical fire corridors. The experts suggested that planning achieves several benefits.

204 They indicated that prefire plans provide predictability of fire behavior and outcomes, eliminating “surprises” and providing important benchmarks for fire analysis and forecasting as well as for measurement of success. The prefire plans were suggested to include two aspects: fire development and organizational features. The plans include detailed and specific strategic and tactical guidelines and targets, resource needs, projected fire behavior and growth, evacuation and life safety needs, structural and other values at risk, and how to implement selected elements of the Incident Command System, including command, operations, firefighter safety, basic planning and logistics, evacuation and life safety, law enforcement coordination, resource deployment plans, incident planning, and logistical support. Reliance on these preplanned features allows fire officers to assess rapidly and benchmark organizational performance in high-risk and highly dynamic environments, leading to the opportunity to identify combat success of critical firefighting elements. A chief benefit of preplanning suggested by the experts is the reduction of the sense of being overwhelmed that was described by several persons involved in the Laguna Fire and other fires. With preplanning, outcomes are anticipated and actions are identified that can be productive. Experts cited that many actions can be preplanned, relieving Incident Commanders and other staff from expending “mental energy” on these efforts ad hoc. Thus, Incident Commanders are free to focus on other demands.

Media Relations Great success was described by Laguna Fire staff in the use of media to alert citizens to the fire risks and to direct evacuation. Experts recommended this practice for all interface fires and cited great difficulty at the Tunnel and Paint Fires when media concerns were not addressed initially by the incident organization. Significant misinformation was supplied by the media in the absence of incident-supplied

205 information at both fires. At the Laguna Fire, incident staff interacted continuously with the media and did so from the fire line, instrumentally assisting in an orderly evacuation of 25,000 people.

Fire Organization The majority of the subject matter experts interviewed for this study utilized a specific method within the Incident Command System for organization of major fires. Usually, the system suggests identification of Divisions and Groups for tactical supervision of subunits of fires. Divisions are typically used for delineation of geographic areas, while Groups are used for organization of specific functions that may be incident- wide in scope or use (e.g., Structure Protection Group, Law Enforcement, or Hazardous Materials Group). The majority of the experts “step up” in the Incident Command System to utilize Branches as the initial means of organization when they perceive that a fire will greatly expand beyond initial control efforts. In the Incident Command System, Branches supervise Divisions and Groups. The practice has several benefits. The first benefit is that assigning Branches (Branch Director) positions typically places initial responding Chief Officers into key organizational positions. These officers are typically the local people who are most familiar with the fire environment and with whom the Incident Commander has an established working relationship and trust. The second benefit is that the entire fire area can be delineated for supervision immediately. Third, by having highly qualified Branch Directors, an Operations Section Chief is able to delegate many tactical responsibilities to branch Directors and has greater opportunity to interact and to communicate with the Incident Commander and other incident staff. In the practice of experts, Branches are delineated around all flanks of the fire and for areas needing particular focus, such as structure protection or evacuation. The organization is then expanded to include Divisions and Groups as Branch Directors

206 identify needs or have staff to fill the positions. Most of the consulted experts believed that such an organization would have assisted the staff of the Laguna Fire. In reflection, most Laguna Fire commanders would have desired the establishment of Branches, but no staff was available by the time the need was identified. Experts cited that use of Branches also allowed for delineation of political jurisdiction or expertise, as well as for facilitating organization. In the case of the Harmony fire, each City having its own fire jurisdiction was assigned a Branch to operate in a structural protection capacity. Such was the case also with several fires that split wildland area from structure protection areas, with agencies having not only political jurisdiction but strength or expertise in one area over another. An example is the Kinneloa Fire, where wildland responsibility for the fire entering National Forest lands was assigned to a Branch with U.S. Forest Service personnel for supervision. This organization, according to experts, most effectively organizes multiple risks under one command organization, allows for a multitude of various expertise to be utilized most effectively, and concentrates staff in areas of greatest familiarity.

Independent Action Strategy The issue of the independent action strategy and its causes, origins, and outcomes proved to be one of the more interesting observations of the study. Universally, the independent action strategy was considered a strategy of last resort by all of the respondents. Yet, nearly all of the studied fires, and many more in the opinion of consulted experts, used this strategy at some point in their response. Clearly, the selection or unselected evolution of this strategy is driven by the presence of an overwhelming and dangerous fire condition, coupled with an inadequate number of resources to deal with the immediate problem. Such conditions are felt to be endemic of early periods in catastrophic wildland-urban interface fires in California and, indeed, may even by a

207 characteristic indicator of a developing major fire event. The evolution of this strategy is often driven by the command staff’s inability to enforce another strategy upon an incident through lack of effective command organization, communications, operational demands, or opportunity. In all cases observed, the strategy led to elevated firefighter risk and loss of organizational control. Some observations, such as the experience of the Old Topanga Fire, would suggest that firefighter entrapments are more common during such periods. Experiences of the Laguna Fire and the Paint Fire suggest that firing operations are more likely to occur without coordination or to be attempted with inadequate margins of success during independent action. In an expert observation of the Laguna Fire, the implementation of an independent action strategy convoluted earlier attempts by command staff to place the fire in a major incident mode, reverting the incident back into an initial attack mode of operation. The loss of resource accountability, ability to focus fire resources on priority problems, and other concerns were also cited. Experts also identified that, after a period of independent action, field units may not respond easily to authority, once it is reestablished, possibly due to a lack of trust for an organization that has already abandoned them once. These observations were reinforced by two independent studies: a Rand Corporation study of the Old Topanga Fire and a University of California, Santa Barbara study of the Paint Fire. Still, the independent action strategy has its use and benefit. Many respondents cited the positive impact on structure protection that can be achieved by trained crews operating in this mode. A key point noted universally, however, is that training is key to the safety and effectiveness of crews working with this strategy. One major fire service periodical even published a debate on the matter; proponents and detractors of the strategy stated their cases. In the words of one expert, “With independent action you get productivity, but you may not know or be able to direct what that productivity 208 is.” Generally, the approach to management of this problem has been to organize and “make it go away as quickly as possible.” The most successful practitioners of this strategy utilized the “Branch first” method of incident command development to provide at least a basic framework of command. This method was demonstrated at the Harmony Fire and through the reported practices of a number of consulted experts. This allowed for setting incident priorities on a dynamic basis, safety and operational oversight, and supervision of lesser-trained staff by experienced officers, mitigating as well as possible many of the negative aspects of this strategy. There appears to be a significant need to quantify the independent action strategy more closely and to develop standardized methods of dealing with its management. Significant operational and safety issues are attendant to this strategy, and incident commanders should be trained to recognize and deal with these concerns.

Command Officer Assignment At the Laguna Fire, some experienced officers were assigned to mid-level supervisory positions when they could have worked in positions of higher responsibility. When it became apparent that personnel were needed at the Branch Director level, they were difficult to acquire. Some areas of the Laguna Fire received inadequate or no direct supervision as a result of this shortage, leading to unrecognized fire growth and untimely awareness of structural threats on the north side of the fire as winds shifted late in the first day. During the study, the researcher found that availability of wildfire qualified and experienced Chief Officers to respond to the studied fires was very limited. In the case of the Laguna Fire, the OCFD allocated only 13 Chief Officers, due to other fire commitments and coverage concerns; in the Tunnel Fire, the City of Oakland was able to muster only three Chief Officers initially. Planning for the

209 assignment of this rare resource for best and maximum utilization appears to be critical. The concept expressed by experts to use Branches first places greater emphasis on placing this limited pool of people into key incident positions.

Unified Command The Laguna Fire and all but one of the studied fires used the Incident Command System of “Unified Command.” This organization included leaders from each jurisdiction that was confronted with direct fire involvement or the imminent threat of involvement. Under Unified Command, fire executives are required to make all critical decisions as a team. Unified Command was also suggested by experts to include law enforcement when extensive evacuations are required, and to include only those agencies with statutory authority or financial responsibility. The Laguna Fire’s command was unified between the LBFD and the OCFD. This was a practical and effective means of achieving needed coordination.

Human Interactions and Communications Communications, both by radio and telephone, presented a serious obstacle in all of the fire situations studied. The staff of the Laguna Fire specifically identified the inability of the Incident Commander and the Operations Chief to communicate as deleterious to the fire organization and operations. In their absence, both parties made significant operational decisions without the advice or consent of the other. For example, a decision to initiate an independent action strategy was made by the Incident Commander when he could not reach the Operations Section Chief during the height of the structural siege. While the Incident Commander felt that this was necessary to achieve the best operational effectiveness and safety, given the extreme conditions, the Operations Section Chief felt that the action undermined his organizational efforts and eliminated the effectiveness of direction that he had already provided. He felt that the

210 action dismantled his organization building and disrupted many of the communications, command, and control elements that he had placed into effect. The Operations Section Chief felt that the action increased his span of control to a point of overwhelming his ability to manage, and he felt that it was unfortunate, because he was only a few minutes from better organization. Experts expressed the opinion that the Operations Chief should have had an opportunity for counsel with the Incident Commander on this decision; in retrospect, the Laguna Fire Incident Commander agreed. However, one expert cited that, in his experience, it is common for Operations Section Chiefs to view that they are “15 minutes from the objective,” given their close view and tactical orientation to the fire; he further contended that the Incident Commander must sometimes make such decisions when in the best interest of the incident. During this study, the Incident Commander and the Operations Section Chief independently postulated that, in retrospect, they would have co-located to achieve better communications. All except one of the subject matter experts disagreed with this concept, and stated that, through early establishment of Branches and delegation of responsibility, the Operations Section Chief would have had greater opportunity to maintain a working relationship with an Incident Commander. In emphasis of this point, one expert cited the experience at the Old Topanga Fire, where collocation of the Incident Commander and the Operations Section Chief was deleterious in providing coordination and real-time management of the fire. One dissenting expert agreed with the staff of the Laguna Fire, indicating that he believed that the co-location concept would be most appropriate. This same expert commented that the U.S. Forest Service contemporary practice of designating a Planning-Operations Section Chief to be a go- between for this organizational relationship was inappropriate because it divorced the Operations Chief from the decision-making process and allowed the Operations Section Chief to remain in the field with no command interactions. All of the experts felt that it 211 was critical for the Operations Section Chief to participate in the incident’s organizational and planning processes in order to make needed contributions and to receive feedback on incident limitations, opportunities, and issues, and that the Operations Section Chief should balance the field management time with such activities. The assignment of radio communications by Branch or Division was also seen as a means of segregating incident communications into manageable units and ensuring that tactical communications are received by the appropriate tactical supervisor. All respondents stressed the need for radio discipline and an awareness that is needed by radio users of the extreme demand and value for radio access, and accordingly to reduce radio traffic to the minimum and most important concerns.

Resource Ordering One subject matter expert commented at length on the role of the agency dispatch center in the success of wildland interface fire command. This expert planned, with the assistance of communications center staff, how fire communications would be separated by radio frequencies to avoid communications saturation and how dispatch of mass resources would be accomplished through a procedure that generated the maximum response to potential incidents while maintaining adequate coverage. This expert would also phase the request of resources so that dispatch center staff would not be overwhelmed. The expert felt that it is important to allow the dispatch center staff to focus on the “game plan” to achieve the greatest resources at the scene in the most timely fashion, and that overordering can confuse or compound this objective. He suggested phasing requests to include no more than 50 resources at a time. With regard to resource ordering, it is clear that many of the studied incidents ordered significant if not overwhelming resources that were, in some cases, beyond the ability of the incident management team to mobilize and manage once they were at the

212 scene. An after-action study of the Tunnel Fire and a Rand Corporation study of the Old Topanga Fire confirmed this conclusion. Experts cited the regional depreciation of ability to respond to other incidents when a resource allocation to a single incident is immense, and cited that effective management of resources at the incident is far better than just throwing more equipment at the problem. Several experts could not imagine a fire scenario that would require more than 200-300 resources, although two of the incidents studied nearly tripled that response. After-action studies of the 1,100-engine order for the Old Topanga Fire determined that a maximum of 20% of this resource was actually used in the fire suppression or protection efforts for this fire. In an interesting finding, it was observed that all of the fire commands ordered significantly greater resources than could be mustered in reasonable time frames. The best performance, on average, for the California Fire and Rescue System to provide mutual aid followed a formula that included the following: Once a local region or county responds to its maximum ability in the first hour, the average reinforcement from the Mutual Aid System averaged 10 to 12 additional strike teams in the next 2 to 3 hours. This meant that the maximum available resource for any fire problem studied averaged 15 to 20 engine strike teams (75 to 100 engines) in the first 3 to 4 hours. This period coincided with the period of highest structural loss in most of the studied fires. This finding has important implications for Incident Commanders, since resource deployments can be planned to achieve the best potential outcome, given that reinforcement will be limited to this number. Many resources that were required to travel for more than 6 hours arrived after the structural siege had occurred, but often in time to assist with perimeter control, standby protection for other areas, or mop-up and overhaul activities. This was certainly experienced at the Laguna Fire, which occurred late in a Santa Ana episode when many regional resources were already committed. During the Laguna Fire, the initial and 2-hour reinforcement resources conducted the 213 clear majority of structural protection operations. Initial reinforcement was generally provided for the Laguna Fire from agencies located in Orange and Los Angeles counties and CDF, with some assistance from Inland Empire and San Diego counties. As demonstrated by the experience of several fires, and in the recommended practice of experts, resource ordering should have a nexus between the time required for resources to muster and respond and their expected arrival at an incident with meaning- ful work for the resources to accomplish. At the Harmony Fire, resource orders were discontinued when the Incident Commander felt that no additional resources could be mobilized in time to respond before the fire would run out of fuels and would have done its worst. At the Laguna Fire, the Planning Section Chief caused a number of resource orders to be held until reconciliation of the significant resources already on scene could be accomplished. At the Old Topanga Fire, the CDF Incident Commander cancelled excessive resources when he judged that incident needs were more than met. Each of these actions resulted in better utilization of resources at the scene.

Command Strategy A common problem during early firefighting at all of the studied fires was the challenge to mount simultaneous efforts in perimeter control and structure protection. According to the majority opinion of the subject matter experts, mounting concurrent efforts in these areas is extremely important, and to abandon offensive control efforts in favor of structure protection alone is a critical strategic error. Experts suggested assigning wildland resources, including handcrews, bulldozers, and aircraft, to perimeters as much as practicable and assigning structural engines to protect structures, even in oppressive structural risk environments. One expert supported this recommendation but described the issue as situational, cautioning, however, to guard against domination of one strategy over another for protracted periods. This point was emphasized by the

214 experience of those at the Laguna Fire and other fires. Incident Command staff at the Laguna Fire had very limited resources assigned to perimeter control activities initially, consisting of two bulldozers and a Superintendent. Aircraft and handcrews were unavailable, and all engines, including wildland engines, were assigned to structure protection. As a result, the fire perimeter continued to grow unabated. The Operations Section Chief indicated that, due to communications and span-of-control limitations, he was unable to mount a serious effort in offensive action. The Incident Commander assigned a Branch Director nearly 5 hours into the fire to begin a concerted effort at perimeter control. This effort continued with backfiring operations throughout the night into early morning, ultimately achieving containment of the fire early on the second day. The experts suggested use of a strategy that attempts to “pinch” the head of the fire from both flanks as much as possible. This strategy then limits the size of the fire’s head as it enters structural areas. Experts indicated that it is important to take advantage of natural breaks, including noncombustible geographic features, agricultural development, water features, old burn areas, and noncombustible developed areas, as possible control points and to take every opportunity to stop or limit the fire at these points. The second major consideration is to prioritize resource deployment to hold line that has been completed, and not reconstruct fire line repetitively in the same area, if at all possible. One expert related a story of how a major fire could have been stopped with just two to three engines at such a location but, for lack of assignment of a small number of resources, the fire renewed in intensity and size to burn numerous structures in an adjacent community. For lack of the few engines, 30 more were required to protect this community. The Laguna Fire staff was able to exercise a strategy-of- opportunity by reacting to a forecasted wind change and redeploying the bulk of the

215 assigned resources to a line above downtown Laguna Beach. When the wind subsided, crews were able to hold this line and prevent additional loss. Structural protection resources are sometimes required to conduct dual duties, switching from structure protection to perimeter control as opportunities permit. Since many fires follow well-established fire history, prefire planning can be of assistance in resource deployment.

Planning and Support The initiation of effective planning was described most often by experts as the early mental development of a vision or picture for the likely size, spread, risks, containment, and outcomes of an incident. Communicating and developing this vision becomes critical to the Incident Commander’s ability to muster an appropriate organization and response. An initial, short size-up by the Incident Commander using visual observation was recommended by a number of experts to assist in developing this vision. Developing and maintaining the incident organization and managing its resources was cited by Laguna Fire participants and subject matter experts as being problematic, perhaps more so than the demands of the fire itself. One of the subject matter experts described this as a four-phase process that is very resource deficient in the beginning and resource bloated near its end. The ability to mobilize an effective organization rapidly appeared key on all of the fires studied, with inadequacies in organization often proving costly, exacerbated by the effects of time, fire growth, and greater resource arrival. Elements of initial incident organizational development appearing to be most critical included command (and unified command, where appropriate) staging areas; operational supervision; unified and single-point incident resource ordering; incident logistics, including fuel, water, food, basic automotive repair support;

216 and incident planning, including resource and situation status tracking. Many of these elements were deficient during the Laguna Fire, especially incident logistics and planning. In both cases, only minimal staff was assigned to these areas in insufficient number to accomplish basic and essential functions. As a result, logistical support was deeply deficient, especially with regard to incident facilities, and the Planning Section initially was unable to develop a written plan for the following operational periods. However, these functional units were able to develop appropriate and important inputs to the organization and its command for critical decision making but were unable to complete in entirety other products expected by the Incident Command System. It is particularly interesting that orders to staff these functions were passed to areas outside southern California because of the extreme demands on local agencies due to the wildfire siege. Given the speed of the Laguna Fire’s growth, by the time qualified Planning and Logistics staff arrived, they were far too late to provide effective contributions. Expert practitioners reported that they commonly use assistants early in the process to accomplish planning, communications, and logistics functions, viewing them as essential to conducting and maintaining rapid and effective deployment. Most experts use ad hoc or minimally trained staff to initiate these actions until they can be replaced by more qualified staff. Some experts felt that not initiating these actions until fully qualified staff arrived was sometimes an unreasonable and crippling delay. All respondents described the importance of continuous and early reconnaissance to effective incident planning and deployment of resources. The Laguna Fire staff first achieved good intelligence when a senior officer was assigned to observe the fire by helicopter.

217 Safety and Accident Management Subject matter experts were universal in their recognition and demand for firefighter safety as a priority. Most felt that this was the most important task for Branch- and Division-level operational supervision. In general, if organization building occurs efficiently, these positions should have the most qualified fire officers with significant experience. It was felt that experienced officers can lead less experienced mutual aid resources to be effective and safe but that, left alone, less experienced responders can and do find themselves in untenable and unsafe positions. Experts felt that this is particularly problematic during use of independent action strategies and they emphasized the need for at least basic supervision. Many respondents commented that a strong safety message should be included in the Incident Commander’s objectives, and that a continual management emphasis on safety is needed throughout an incident. One expert had been involved with a fatal burnover fire in which rescue of firefighters was ill planned and extremely delayed. This expert focused on the provision of a rescue team that is fully equipped for mountainous terrain rescue, including rescue harnesses and rope, litters, emergency transportation, and other specialized equipment. Some experts described their methodology for handling burnover situations. In several experts’ practices, they establish a separate subcommand or “incident within an incident” for the burnover site and assign specific personnel, equipment, and communications to manage such events. Usually, the Safety Officer is assigned to manage or interact with this subincident. As soon as possible, experts divorce operational resources who are assigned to firefighting missions from this duty and remove personnel who have injuries or critical incident stress from work altogether. An attempt is made to redirect forces into their primary function of perimeter control and structure protection as the burnover site achieves adequate staffing. Experts cited that a natural

218 response for firefighters is to try to assist in the burnover, and that vigilance is needed not to abandon fire control efforts.

Management Focus In all of the studied fires, and in the universal opinion of consulted experts, the need for early organization and a strong focus on critical decision making are essential to achieve the “best potential outcome.” Experts referred to this process is “focusing on the big decisions” and being able to separate the critical decisions from the saturation of communications and information that floods the Incident Commander. According to experts, critical issues, in order of priority, are those involving life safety, action on containment opportunities, and property protection. Municipal firefighters tended to view natural resource protection as a more distant objective, while resource agency staff tended to place resource values as equal to property protection. In all of the studied fires, the last structure loss generally occurred early in the incident, somewhere near 6 hours from the time of origin. This rapid loss generally occurred in less time than is required to mobilize and deploy professional wildfire incident management teams, emphasizing that local agencies who have wildland-structural interface responsibility should not count on arrival of professional incident management teams to provide for best potential outcomes alone. This finding, coupled with the strategic and tactical dynamics described by experts as common for such fires, suggests the need for broader training of potential incident commanders who have responsibility for wildland interface fire protection, regardless of jurisdiction. Experts were generally consistent in their opinion regarding the importance of the first hour in the organization of the fire to achieve the best potential outcome. This is the time in which an Incident Commander must realize when a fire has escaped control, should no longer be fought in an “initial attack mode,” and should undergo

219 transition to a major fire mode. Experts benchmarked command success in the first hour by (a) establishment of up to six Divisions, Groups, or Branches within the Incident Command System; the establishment of up to three tactical and command radio frequencies; (b) development of incident objectives, a fire projection map, and maintenance of situation and resource status as the fundamentals of a Planning Section; (c) establishment of incident logistics, including at least temporary command and staging facilities and accommodation for fuel, water, and food; and (d) development of a strong safety orientation. Experts cited that it is important to ensure that the incident organization, like the Incident Commander, must be able to separate the important issues and facts from the storm of information that is received. A general perception by research interviewees was that many wildland-urban interface fires are “over,” meaning that most of the significant structural loss has occurred, within a matter of hours, which emphasizes the speed with which such organization must be accomplished. Command and organizational development that occurs after this period was thought to be far less useful than that which is provided during this critical period.

Firing Operations While not studied specifically, many operations involving backfiring were noted, and offensive firing operations occurred at each of the studied fires. In the majority of the situations studied, the backfire was lost after ignition due to factors of adverse fuel, wind, topography, timing, lighting too much fire at one time, or inadequate resources to hold the fire once it was ignited. Some of the firing operations increased structural losses directly. Still, some operations were conducted that were successful and served to protect a number of structures. The willingness of firefighters to attempt backfire under very adverse firing conditions suggests that greater training and more control are needed in firing operations. Firing operations that were withheld until

220 timing and other factors indicated a more positive likely outcome were far more successful. It was noted that many firing operations occurred during periods of independent action and were characterized as insufficiently supported with resources, or as tactical acts of last resort.

Emerging Trends Research identified several emerging trends that emphasize the importance of training for potential incident commanders in many jurisdictions and identify areas of concern for future study. A growing phenomenon identified in this research was the occurrence of relatively small-acreage wildland interface fires that occur near or intermixed with urbanized areas and incorporated cities. Areas such as nature reserves, green belts, small urban canyons, and like areas form the primary wildland fuel in these fires. Several fires originating in such areas were identified that consumed many structures and caused millions of dollars of loss. Even though the wildland area of fire origin was small and wildfire behavior short lived, the dynamics of fire spread, structural vulnerability, and fuel loading were the same as in the larger fires studied in this thesis. Given the ever-increasing population and movement of new communities into former wildlands of California, this kind of fire has potential to become the dominant high-loss wildland-structural interface fire of the future. Fire protection in these areas should receive appropriate focus regarding both fire prevention and suppression efforts. Additional study is needed regarding how to overcome legal issues associated with fuels management and structural vulnerability and how best to respond to this fire type to achieve the best potential outcome.

221 Incident Management Teams Many respondents identified the importance of the availability of qualified and experienced fire managers to the successful management of wildland-urban interface fire incidents. Professional incident management teams were considered beneficial for wildfire applications because they concentrate experience among their members, increasing efficiency and safety. However, parochial issues of team orientation, policy, and priorities made them undesirable for application to some of the fire incidents. Teams also required 6 to 18 hours to mobilize, which was beyond the period of structural siege in all of the studied fires. Most teams reside within state and federal forestry agencies in California today, and some blend local government personnel into their ranks. Many respondents felt that these organizations are focused on control of large fires and, as currently configured, may not be flexible or mobile enough to deal with generally short-lived interface fire problems. Parochialism is also a factor within some jurisdictions that experience major fires. In the case of the Los Angeles County Old Topanga Fire, the initial transition to a CDF team was somewhat acrimonious, territorial, and prideful, especially on the part of county firefighters who had never before experienced another agency providing such leadership in their organization. Yet, the Old Topanga Fire provides a model for potential use in future incidents. During that fire, the incident management team became an integration of county and state staff, seeking to cooperatively work with a command organization of greater depth than could have been achieved by either agency alone. Given retirement of many senior officers, much of the knowledge base in wildfire management in many agencies is disappearing in California. A new organizational structure for teams that incorporates rapid mobility and deployment, interagency participation, and political sensitivity and flexibility would be a welcome service to California. Incident Management Teams were provided in four of the six studied fires,

222 two being State of California teams and two being federal teams, replacing local agency staff who commanded initial actions. No fire received command team assistance prior to 6 hours into the fire. Experts agreed that a high-ranking staff officer, other than the Incident Com- mander or member of general staff, should assume responsibility for facilitating this transition, due to the time-consuming nature of the transition preparation. A suggested practice was that the transition process integrate the initial command organization with an incident management team through a “shadowing” period in which the staff members work concurrently. The purpose of this is to ensure that the transition is seamless and shares all critical incident elements. Experts cautioned incident organizations to not “give up” making critical decisions, ordering of resources, or other commitment-related decisions when a team is planned to assume an incident. Experts suggested that the Incident Commanders continue to run an incident as if they planned to fight it to the end, ensuring no reduction in the quality of effort toward fire control. Transition to a incident management team is one area of clear need for participation by the agency head. In many situations, incident management team commanders are not direct employees of the agency head, and a statement of direction, statement of local agency continuing participation, and delegation of command authority are often required of the agency head for the incident management team to complete the transition.

Role of the Agency Head Several participants in the Laguna Fire and several subject matter experts commented on the role of the agency head, the Fire Chief level that commonly supervises Incident Commanders. Several respondents questioned what role the agency head should have at incidents, with wide variation noted in the participation of Fire Chiefs who led agencies at the studied fires. One agency chief/subject matter expert felt that

223 the role should be to coordinate multi-agency response and political issues, and to oversee that appropriate policy was being implemented. In particular, this expert felt that it is the agency head’s role to ensure that issues such as overordering of resources, interagency conflicts, and the like are dealt with before they become significant problems. Yet other respondents noted that, when agency heads interacted at strategic and tactical levels of an incident, their influence often became problematic. In the case of the Laguna Fire, the agency head/Fire Chief was extensively involved at these levels, generating several issues that created complexity. Agency head participation at these levels was sometimes felt by respondents to be invasive and complicating of command processes already engaged, and even unwarranted. Some respondents felt that participation by agency heads at tactical levels communicated a lack of trust or confidence to both Incident Commanders and incident staff. Clearly, there is a strong role for agency head perspective at wildland-urban interface incidents, and accommodations and teamwork are needed on both sides of this issue. For instance, agency heads are typically required to provide direction and delegation to incident management teams when they assume incident responsibility. Agency heads also carry considerable political and jurisdictional responsibility in command of their various organizations, and they may carry a different and needed point of view. Additional clarification is needed with regard to expectations for leadership and subordination in this regard.

Role of Relationships A recurring finding in many aspects of the command and organization of wildland-urban interface fire command was the “absolute” importance that positive relationships play in credibility, assessing needs and resource allocation, and commitment to action at all levels. Trust was a factor that was many times observed to be relationship driven; had the relationship not been created prior to the fire occurrence,

224 the demands of the fire left little time for relationship building concurrent with firefighting. Relationships were found to be important at all levels of the incident management interface. During the Laguna Fire, the OCFD Duty Officer relied on relationships to place added emphasis for critical resource orders through personal telephone contacts. He was significantly more successful in acquiring mutual aid than his counterparts in other studied fires, and he attributed these contacts and prior established relationships to his success. An expert described the powerful value of relationships with cooperating fire agencies, and he described regular meetings and associations with those who are responsible for commanding cooperative fires. This expert knows each responsible individual personally and has the phone numbers on his cell phone to ensure immediate contact when needed. These relationships are often formalized into mutual and automatic aid agreements on a local level. The well-defined mutual aid procedures within Orange County served to significantly increase the mobilization for the Laguna Fire, yet allowed county agencies to maintain necessary emergency coverage. Incident command system position assignments were often made by study respondents based on the personal knowledge and trust between themselves and the available pool of command officers. Often, the most important responsibilities were assigned to individuals with whom the Incident Commander shared the highest degree of trust. Respondents also cited use of job-person match criteria in placing individuals in responsibilities for which they had known skills. Most respondents felt that the importance of relationships could not be overstated.

Postfire Actions Most respondents reported that extensive political, operational, administrative, and related work was required following catastrophic wildland interface fires, often becoming time-consuming and resource-intensive projects and programs. One

225 jurisdiction described the after-action to the Laguna Fire as being as complex as the fire itself. Another respondent said that it is important to understand that the fire service responsibilities “don’t end when the hose is rolled up.” Many of the after-action concerns for major fires were driven by a well-understood fire-flood sequence. Two fatalities occurred in Laguna Beach following flooding and mudslides from fire-denuded slopes—two more than were lost to the Laguna Fire itself. The LBFD attributed a positive public outcome of the Laguna Fire as a direct result of its outreach efforts and public contact. Many respondents acknowledged participation in public hearings and meetings, elected official and governmental oversight, and significant development of after-action reports. Many of these reports were cited as bringing positive developments to the fire service—in the case of the Laguna Fire, bringing disaster grants, a helicopter program, new communications systems, new fire codes and ordinances, and better mutual aid procedures.

Findings of Best Practices The best practices described below are recommended for use as part of a systems-based and methodical approach to managing catastrophic urban interface wildfire. Subject matter experts observed that the implementation of multiple and successive best practices is often required to achieve best potential outcomes. The following summarizes the best practices discussed by Laguna Fire participants and subject matter experts during this research. 1. Consider using Branches to delineate initial operational areas, as opposed to Divisions or Groups, when it is clear that the fire will escape initial control efforts to become a major fire. 2. Develop and use prefire plans for management of critical wildland-urban interface fire risks.

226 3. Use 1-hour and 2-hour plans for strategic, tactical, and incident organization development for benchmarking successful performance. 4. Mount an immediate and concurrent effort for perimeter control and structure protection needs. It is a serious tactical error to abandon perimeter control. Use resources situationally but attempt to strike a balance between these efforts. 5. Implement a strategy that “pinches” both flanks of a fire as much as possible so that the head of the fire is reduced as it impacts structures. 6. Consider carefully the incident’s resource needs and avoid overordering resources, avoiding unnecessary regional depletion and keeping incident resources manageable. 7. Phase ordering of resources so as not to overwhelm the dispatch center and to allow the dispatch center to maximize its performance. Preplan resource needs for specific areas and order needed resources using the preidentified lists. 8. As the Incident Commander, ensure focus on the “big decisions”: life safety, opportunities for containment, property protection, and awareness of critical natural resource values at risk. 9. Develop and maintain a firefighter rescue/medical capability that includes ability to rescue at high-angle and mountainous locations, and ensure rapid transport. 10. Use local staff to initiate critical support functions, including staging; resource and situation status; and logistics to include facilities, water, fuel, and food, and communications. Establish a radio operator to interact on the radio for the Incident Commander. 11. Draw an expected perimeter map with 1-hour, 2-hour, and multiple-hour ellipses for fire planning and performance benchmarking. 12. When the “independent action strategy” is selected or evolves, it is important to provide a basic command and operational supervision framework to ensure focus 227 on critical issues including firefighter and public safety, a macro view of fire dynamics and values at risk, the concentration of resources to become an effective firefighting force, and for effective command and control. Understand that the independent action strategy increases productivity but that incident managers may not know or be able to direct what that productivity will be. 13. Use job-person match criteria when assigning positions within the Incident Command System, using individuals’ characteristics and capabilities to the best extent possible. 14. Allow higher risk operations only under well-planned and orchestrated circumstances and only in circumstances of rescue or life safety. Do not allow higher risk operations for protection of natural resource values alone. 15. Focus firefighting resources on what will be on fire, as opposed to what is already on fire. 16. Prioritize the holding and reinforcement of fire line that has been created to avoid wasting efforts and having to recreate the fire line multiple times. 17. Ensure reassignment of the most capable chief officers to higher level Incident Command System positions if they arrive in a lesser position where they can be replaced. Expect that only a limited number of senior and experienced chief officers will be available to respond to any given incident. 18. Ensure that the Operations Section delegates authority and responsibility to Branch Directors or Division Supervisors so that the Operations Section Chief has adequate time to interact effectively with the Incident Commander and other Command and General Staff. Ensure that the Operations Section Chief attends appropriate planning meetings. Consider co-location of the Incident Commander and Operations Section Chief only if essential and only when appropriate organization, support, and delegation have been provided to the Operations Section Chief. 228 19. Ensure that Branch Directors and Division and Group Supervisors are fully qualified for their responsibilities, especially to ensure that appropriate safety and operational needs are met. 20. Ensure that all political jurisdictions involved in an incident are included in the organization so that one command serves the entire incident. Utilize Unified Command or Branches to delineate political jurisdiction as appropriate. 21. Use fire history and previous fire data as means of predicting fire behavior and outcomes of future fires. 22. Use observers to maintain real-time and accurate intelligence as to fire spread and values at risk. Use air reconnaissance when possible. Consider a personal reconnaissance to assess fire behavior and risks. 23. Anticipate that only 75 to 100 engine companies may be available during the first 3 to 4 hours of an incident, and plan for best potential outcomes accordingly. 24. Be vigilant in firing operations and ensure that they are used only when there is a direct benefit and when control can be reasonably assured. Ignite the least amount of backfire possible to achieve the objective. 25. Take advantage of control opportunities where presented to avoid having low-fire intensity areas escape and become large problems. 26. Assign resources as a Structure Group to provide continuing protection of structures left unburned by the initial fire’s passage if there is still a risk of their ignition. Assigning 10% of the firefighting force of what would be required to initially protect a structural concentration from the initial fire passage is recommended to protect unburned exposures from residual fire. 27. Be aware that management of incident resources can pose as difficult a challenge as the fire itself.

229 28. Use media effectively to communicate evacuation and other critical fire information to the public. 29. In burnover or injury situations, establish separate supervision, staffing, communications, and capabilities to support this need. Divorce operations resources from this concern and recommit them to operational needs as quickly as possible. Remove those injured or subjected to critical incident stress from operations as needed or appropriate. 30. Develop and foster professional relationships that will aid in command development, resource accruement and deployment, and related challenges. 31. Be aware of emerging trends in wildland-urban interface fire that include risks from small islands of wildland fuel in developed and urbanized areas. 32. Be aware that law enforcement resources may initially be insufficient to manage evacuation without firefighter assistance. Prioritize and emphasize relations with law enforcement, especially when evacuations are planned or required. 33. Utilize a senior officer other than incident commander or general staff to facilitate the transition of a fire from the initial organization to a professional incident management team due to the demands of such a facilitation. 34. Use statements and descriptions of “ Commander’s Intent” to add clarity when communicating incident objectives to subordinates. 35. Use financial responsibility as a factor when setting Division and Branch boundaries to ease cost apportionment calculation. Assign boundaries in accordance with federal, state, and local government responsibilities when possible. 36. Be aware that significant after-action effort is required in public contact, governmental oversight, and after-action review following catastrophic wildland-urban interface fires. Recognize that positive service enhancements and presuppression codes and improvements may be achieved following such events. 230 37. Class “A” foam was found to be particularly useful at several of the studied fires as a wildland firefighting tool for both perimeter control and structure protection through both airborne and ground applications. At the Laguna Fire, several isolated structures that were considered marginally defendable, with high firefighter risk, were foamed and protected, despite the withdrawal of firefighters for safety reasons. 38. Tabletop and advanced imagery simulations are highly recommended for command training for their development of appropriate mental experiences that assist recognition-primed decisions.

Chapter Summary While the staff assigned to the Laguna Fire accomplished significant and exemplary achievements with regard to protection of structures, life safety and evacuation, command, and fire suppression, this research identified specific areas where command and control could have been made stronger, more effective, and more capable. The issues confounding command were found to be endemic of fires of this type and were common to the Laguna Fire and all of the studied fires. While initial terrain and fuel types, numbers of people exposed, and other variables in the early stages of the incident may have been unique, over time, none of these variables presented consistency or made them remarkable, with the significant exception of the multiple deaths associated with the Tunnel Fire. All of the studied fires exhibited much more consistency than variability, rendering them predictable and describable as a group. Experts felt that the potential for multiple fatalities was present with all of the studied fires, and fatalities occurred in three of them. The fact that fatalities did not occur at the Laguna Fire was surprising to most of that fire’s command organization. Perhaps the greatest concern identified in this research was the direct impact on firefighter and civilian welfare that occurs a result of command decisions, reinforcing the tremendous odds at stake for the command of such fires. This responsibility should 231 not be taken lightly by anyone who would assume command. These findings may chart paths toward successful command and suggest new training and program development for use against future wildland-urban interface fires in California.

Recommendations for Further Study Many issues were identified in the research that suggest additional study requirements. 1. Additional training is needed to define the roles and responsibilities of those personnel who conduct support activities early in the incident, with the purpose to start basic staging, logistics, and planning functions. Benchmarks have been established for productivity of these functions for the first 1 or 2 hours in this research and in expert practitioner methods. Typically, after this initial time period, ad hoc staff are supple- mented or replaced by fully qualified staff. No consistent guidance exists, except ad hoc guidance, on what specific work or work quality might or should be accomplished by the lay person performing this temporary assignment. Development of training for these functions could enhance and standardize performance. Currently, existing training for Incident Commanders is categorized and structured according to Type 1, 2 or 3, with 1 being the highest capability. Similar stratification could be developed for other positions, such as those listed above. 2. Enhancement and growth of fire service Incident Management Teams to incorporate the political and jurisdictional requirements of the entire California Fire Service is needed. The evolution of this process could develop a widely accepted and rapidly mobile capability that is more able to respond within critical time frames to wildland-urban interface fire incidents. 3. Mechanisms and training development are needed to create opportunities for greater experience in Incident Command System positions so that agencies without regular opportunity for wildland fire experience receive stronger experience 232 development commensurate with training to avoid operational deficiencies. Current changes in certification procedures are under way in California at this time; these may contribute toward this objective. 4. The emergence of a fire problem involving smaller wildland fuel beds within incorporated cities and highly urbanized areas has demonstrated that high potential for loss exists here. Further study of this problem and definition of firefighting and fire prevention practices are needed. In particular, the balance of natural resource preservation and fire prevention should be fully addressed by all concerned parties. 5. The best practices described in this study should be considered for inclusion in standardized training programs targeted for personnel who would command such fires. These best practices should be considered for benchmarking successful performance achievement. 6. A number of factors have accelerated the importance of training and preparation of wider fire service populations for participation in command of urban interface wildfire. Traditionally, these concerns have included, and will continue to include, mutual aid response, but have grown to include emerging fire problems such as urban wild lands within incorporated communities. In some communities where direct responsibilities are new because of annexations and growth, this has created a condition where some of the least experienced fire agencies carry tremendous responsibility and vulnerability. These concerns require not only greater training but a commitment to new equipment, procedures, and systems. Given rapid growth in formally rural areas, many communities should consider this potential. 7. Additional study and training are needed with regard to the effects of firing operations during catastrophic wildland-urban interface fires to identify which operations achieved successful objectives, which did not, and what practices and procedures should be implemented to guide future operations to more successful conclusions. 233 8. Better methods of tracing and deploying resources are needed to enable faster and more efficient utilization at the fire scene. 9. Matrices and decision models are needed to guide Incident Commanders in the selection of alternatives when dealing with developing catastrophic wildland interface fire. Enhanced tools are needed to assess risks and develop strategies under prefire planning conditions. 10. New technologies available in commercial and military applications should be reviewed for adoption by the fire services. Integration of technological changes into incident management have been slow. One example includes commonly available resource tracking and assignment technology now used for mail, shipping, and related functions that has yet to be adopted by fire services. The last broad change occurred in the early 1970s with the adoption of FIRESCOPE programs. 11. Study and procedural development are needed regarding the expected role of the agency head during major wildland-urban interface fires. Currently, this participation is ad hoc and, in cases, it is resented by staff operating at the fire. Clearly, a role is necessary, and participation by the agency head could benefit from standardization. 12. Stronger means of integrating law enforcement and fire officials for response to catastrophic fires are needed.

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APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A GLOSSARY

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Air tankers: Typically multiple-engine, fixed-wing aircraft capable of dropping large amounts of fire-retarding chemicals on wildfires. Automatic aid: An agreement between two or more participating agencies for the sharing, and immediate response, of each agency’s resources to areas of common interest, usually on a reciprocal basis. Backfire: An offensive firefighting strategy in which fuels ahead of the main fire are ignited with the expectation that the two fires will burn together and halt the main fire’s forward progress. Backfiring is typically conducted over broad landscapes. Best possible outcome: A thesis-developed term for identifying desirable firefighting results brought about through implementation of command “best practices,” usually involving an initially poor or dire set of circumstances. Burnover: A typically accidental condition in which firefighters or their equipment are trapped by spreading wildfire. Many of these situations result in injuries or fatalities. CDF: An acronym for the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, the State agency principally responsible for wildland fire suppression on lands of interest to the state. Chief officer: A senior agency fire commander, responsible for oversight of multiple firefighting resources or of mid- to upper-level organizational functions; typically a Battalion, Division, Assistant, Deputy, or Fire Chief rank; also known as a Command Officer. Containment: The application of fire suppression techniques that results in surrounding and halting fire progress or growth. Significant latent heat usually exists to render the fire a continuing threat, should fire behavior factors worsen. Contract counties: The California counties of Los Angeles, Ventura, Orange, Santa Barbara, Marin, and Kern, whose county fire departments serve as contract agents for protection of State Responsibility Areas to the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. Control: The success of fire suppression efforts to render a fire extinguished to the point that no additional spread or growth is expected. Defensive action: A strategy or tactic designed to protect values at risk from an advancing fire (e.g., structure protection). Direct method: A method of fire suppression that closely follows the actual perimeter of the fire regardless of but sometimes utilizing favorable terrain or other fire obstacles. Division: A designated geographic area of a fire’s perimeter, usually determined by a set of topographic features, political jurisdiction, areas of financial responsibility, or related factors, that is used to delineate supervisory responsibility and work assignments in the Incident Command System. This area is generally managed by a Division Supervisor.

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ECC: Emergency Communications (or Emergency Command) Center. An agency dispatch center. Engine: A specialized type of fire apparatus that carries a crew, water, hose, and related equipment for applying water to a fire. Specialized engines are designed for wildland and structural applications. EOC: Emergency Operations Center. An interagency location from which a government exercises executive command and support coordination between emergencies and various government layers and organizations. Federal lands: Those lands owned by the Federal government. Wildlands with this designation within California are typically administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, U. S. Forest Service; U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; or the Department of Defense. Fire behavior: The physical manifestation of fire intensity and spread, as influenced principally by topography, fuels, and weather. Fire history: The historic fire behavior, risks, and spread dynamics of fires in a given area, typically associated with historic fire corridors, or the past experience of a specific fire’s dynamics over the immediately previous operational periods. Fire line: A physical location where, either through mechanical or manual removal, an interruption in natural vegetation is created with the intent of stopping fire spread. The width of the fire line is determined by the size and height of adjacent vegetative cover and the fire intensity that it is expected to resist. Fire Officer: A crew supervisory-level individual responsible for command of single or small groups of resources who may, in certain circumstances and with specific talents, be responsible for mid-level or higher incident organizational functions. Typically, a Fire Captain or Fire Lieutenant rank. Firing: The tactic of igniting small amounts of wildland fuels parallel or immediately adjacent to the main fire, or for removing pockets of unburned fuel within the fire’s perimeter. Also know as “burning out.” Fuels: Carbonaceous and woody natural vegetative cover, in both alive and dead states, that is available for ignition and combustion through wildfire. Light fuels might include annual grasses; heavy fuels might include old and dense chaparral, forests, or forest litter. Group: A functional area within the Incident Command System consisting of operational resources assigned to conduct specific and specialized activities. Typically, Groups may move about the incident area to conduct their assignment. Examples are “evacuation” or “structure protection” groups. A Group is typically supervised by a Group Supervisor. Hand crew: An organized group of wildland firefighters who specialize in fire line construction using hand tools.

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Historical fire corridor: A geographic area that has been the location of repeated wildland fires that have generally burned with similar character and dynamics. Incident Action Plan (IAP): An official incident document created by the Planning Section, the document incorporates command objectives, priorities, and direction, strategy and tactics, resource assignments, communications, medical and safety issues, maps, and related information. Under the Incident Command System, an Incident Action Plan is published and distributed widely for each operational period, is the product of command team meetings and consensus, and is used for shift briefings. During initial attack, the Incident Commander creates an abbreviated form known as an Initial Incident Briefing. Incident Command System: A nationally accepted method of emergency incident management that incorporates operational, planning, logistical, administrative/financial, and command elements. Incident Commander: The person who has overall responsibility for command and leadership of an incident organized under the Incident Command System. Independent action strategy: A method of fire suppression that is generally unsupervised or uncoordinated on a macro scale, in which individual fire resources are required to take the best available action based upon safety and prior training. Indirect method: A fire suppression method that identifies and reinforces favored fire control locations with the intent of controlling the fire when it arrives at that location. Typically, significant areas of unburned fuels may exist between the favored location and the actual fire. Initial action mode: Those actions taken by fire resources during the initial and subsequent time periods of an early firefighting effort. During major fires, they are typically characterized by independent or less coordinated action by resources and by critically fewer resources than are needed to meet emergency demands. Incident Command during these periods is characteristically incipient and developing, often experiencing difficulty in exercising desired command and control. LBFD: Laguna Beach Fire Department. The fire agency of jurisdiction in the City of Laguna Beach. Liaison: Those organizational elements of the Incident Command System that seek to incorporate and coordinate the actions and needs of various stakeholders, agencies, landowners, and others affected by or contributing to incidents. Participants in this process are typically referred to as Agency Representatives. Representatives who have jurisdictional and financial obligations at incidents are often not included in this group, but are incorporated into Unified Command. Local Responsibility Area: Lands within the jurisdiction of a municipality (or other jurisdiction) for which the primary responsibility for fire protection is other than the State of California or the federal government. Logistics: Support elements of an incident: communications, supply management and resource ordering, facilities, food and water, and ground transportation. Typically,

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these elements are organized under the Incident Command System under the Logistics Section, commanded by a Logistics Section Chief. Major fire mode: An incident command presence and operational perspective that includes strong organization, command and control, diversity of operational aspects, and establishment of safety, planning, logistics, and related support elements, all organized and focused toward the goal of operating at a major fire. Major fire: A wildland fire that exceeds initial control efforts and expands to involve significant area, values, or risks; involves extensive firefighting and support resources’ and involves more than one operational period. Developing fire paradigms are challenging this definition with regard to the time element. Mutual aid: An agreement for provision of fire equipment and staff by various agencies and organizations to major fires within the area served by the agreement. In California, mutual aid may be dispatched statewide for a free period of up to 12 hours, after which services must be reimbursed at an agreement rate. The concept of mutual aid provides availability of extensive resources to any partner agency to the agreement; it has become a sophisticated and often-used vehicle for mustering fire services. Also known as Master Mutual Aid agreement or Mutual Aid System. National forest lands: Those lands designated by United States Congress as multiple- use lands owned by the Federal government. These lands are administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service. OCFD: Orange County Fire Department. Successor agency, Orange County Fire Authority. A large, contract county fire organization based in Orange County, California, responsible for fire protection to 23 cities and the unincorporated areas of the County. OES: The State of California, Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. The Fire and Rescue Division of this agency is responsible for coordination and administration of the state’s Fire and Rescue Master Mutual Aid agreement and related agreements. OES also supplies state-owned engines to various fire departments throughout California, who supply staffing and response for the OES engines to the state’s needs when requested. Offensive action: A fire suppression method that focuses on containment and control of the fire’s spread. Examples are backfiring or fire line construction. Operational period: A period of time set by the Incident Commander during which a planned fire control effort will be attempted and managed. The term refers to a work cycle of usually 12 or 24 hours in length, typically commensurate with the incident’s work shift pattern. Operations: Those activities or resources at the scene of a fire that physically conduct fire suppression and related functions. These functions are typically organized within Strike Teams, Divisions, Groups, and Branches within the Operations Section of the Incident Command System. They are commanded typically by an Operations Section Chief.

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Overhead: A phrase used to describe the group of staff who are individually assigned to conduct supervision and management duties under the Incident Command System. Perimeter control: Those actions taken to secure a fire from continuing growth and spread; often referred to as offensive actions. Planning: Those elements of incident management that include resource and situation tracking and analysis, strategic and suppression planning, fire behavior, weather, and spread forecasting, mapping, fire intelligence, environmental or other specialized input, demobilization, and incident documentation. These functions are typically organized as a Planning Section within the Incident Command System, commanded by a Planning Section Chief. The Planning Section is responsible for creation of Incident Action Plans and for conducting associated briefings and meetings on such plans. Prefire planning: Those actions accomplished prior to the fire that identify fire risks, dynamics of fire spread, probability and risks, intended actions, and possible control objectives. Typically, prefire plans identify evacuation concerns, resource demands, strategy and tactics, cooperating agency information, and related information of value. Resources: Firefighting equipment, staff, and assets used to conduct, command, and support firefighting operations. Resources may also be used in reference to “natural resources,” in this case meaning environmental assets and values. Size-up: A mental process of fire risk and condition analysis, resource needs assessment, and fire behavior forecasting, usually conducted for assessment of safety and operational demands, or for selection of response methods needed to contain or control a fire. State Responsibility Area (SRA): Wildlands within the State of California that have been designated by the Legislature to be of concern to the State for their watershed characteristics. These lands are nonfederal lands outside of the incorporated limits of a municipality. Principal responsibility for wildland fire protection in SRA resides with the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF). However, CDF contracts for protection in Orange, Los Angeles, Ventura, Santa Barbara, Marin, and Kern Counties (Contract Counties) with county fire departments serving these jurisdictions, and with selected federal management agencies such as the U.S. Forest Service, for protection of portions of SRAs in specific locations. Strategy: A macro statement of overall incident command objective and direction, or an overall style and manner of fire organization and deployment. Strike team: An assemblage of resources under the Incident Command System, often commensurate with master aid agreement structure, that groups firefighting resources, supervisors, communications, and capability into a versatile tactical unit. For example, an engine strike team consists of five like resources (engines) and a Strike Team Leader. Superintendent: An individual with typically strong to exceptional wildland firefighting expertise, and a specialist in the use of hand crews.

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Tactic: A fire suppression method or technique that is implemented in an organized manner to attack a fire, concentrating wildland fire crews in a cohesive and combined manner for maximum effectiveness. Examples are hose lays to control an advancing fire edge and fire line construction using hand crews and bulldozers. Unified Command: A process within the Incident Command System that shares command responsibility with all agencies having geographic and political jurisdiction or financial responsibility. Typically, an Incident Commander is identified for participation in the Unified Command from each jurisdiction involved, with only one participating jurisdiction named by consensus to process resource orders for an incident. Unified ordering point: That jurisdictional agency selected by a Unified Command that will receive and process all resource requests and related orders for an incident. Watershed: A significant geographic area where soil, vegetation, and topography serve to channel and retain precipitation, typically valued for flood prevention or control, or for development of water as a natural resource.

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APPENDIX B COMMONALITIES OF FIRE BEHAVIOR AND DYNAMICS AMONG THE STUDIED FIRES

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Commonalities of Fire Behavior and Dynamics Among the Studied Fires

1. Natural processes 1.1 Foehn or related wind conditions and critical fireweather patterns. 1.2 Fire area within or adjacent to steep and rugged mountainous terrain. 1.3 Fire history, historical fire corridors, and recurrent fire. 1.4 Proximity of chaparral and/or other combustible fuel ecosystems. 1.5 Extreme burning conditions and rapid rates of spread. 1.6 Seasonal drought conditions, with critical live and dead fuel moistures. 1.7 Fire siege pattern of multiple major fires. 1.8 Conflagration phenomenon associated with mass fire after structural involvement.

2. Community development 2.1 Presence of nonfire-resistive construction. 2.2 Structures placed in poor, fire-prone, topographic locations. 2.3 Structures isolated or with poor access; fuel presence compromises access or underloaded bridges prohibit fire apparatus use. 2.4 Lack of adequate fuel modification or brush clearance from structures, lack of defensible space. 2.5 Poor or inadequate fire flow and water supplies. 2.6 Structural spacing is dense. 2.7 Inadequate community road infrastructure

3. Emergency response 3.1 Available regional services overwhelmed by initial fire problem. 3.2 Responding resources arrive at structures after fire involvement. 3.3 Unavailability of specialized resources such as aircraft, bulldozers, and hand crews. 3.4 Lack among some firefighters of adequate training or experience. 3.5 Communications systems often inadequate or overwhelmed. 3.6 Diminished regional resource availability and potentially protracted response times due to fire siege. 3.7 Frequent compromise to balance fire fighting operations with competing needs such as evacuation; often associated with abandonment of perimeter control in favor of higher priorities. 3.8 Inadequate prefire planning, or lack of use of plans. 3.9 Problematic evacuation management and coordination with police agencies. 3.10 Insufficient or inadequate incident command system organization. 3.11 Unification of command with appropriate responding agencies. 3.12 Management of the responding resources, including ordering, mobilization, response, staging, briefing, deployment, and demobilization; use of mutual aid system. 3.13 Need for interpretation and utilization of weather and behavior information, prediction of fire behavior.

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3.14 Difficulty in implementing strategic and tactical planning and direction. 3.15 Inadequate real-time intelligence regarding fire location, spread, and values at risk 3.16 Difficulty with fire service business management, financial issues. 3.17 Emerging fire regimes, such as metropolitan-wildland interface and urban open-space wildfire community risk. 3.18 Weather conditions limiting use or effectiveness of aircraft. 3.19 Command post location, accessibility, and functionality. 3.20 Coordination with community Emergency Operations Centers and regional fire coordination centers. 3.21 Utilization of fuel modification, past burn areas, and prescribed fire areas as strategic opportunities. 3.22 Protection or ecological, archeological, and related values at risk. 3.23 Structures continued to be lost within the fire’s perimeter after the pass of the fire front, yet commonly, little or no resources were assigned to these risks. 3.24 All of the studied fires required multiple days of firefighting to achieve control. 3.25 Collapse of fire communications by radio, cellular, or land line telephone service. 3.26 Structural involvement increased fire intensity. 3.27 Multiple resource ordering points. 3.28 Demands for after-action fire service participation in recovery and mitigation efforts.

4. Human factors 4.1 Civilian fear factor and panic considerations. 4.2 Firefighter fear and use of “Recognition Primed Decisions.” 4.3 Fire cause relationships to the urban environment, given demographic and population density considerations. 4.4 High-risk decision making. 4.5 Leadership and teamwork orientation. 4.6 Elevated firefighter safety risk. 4.7 Organizational obstacles caused by territoriality or pride

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APPENDIX C TIMELINE OF THE LAGUNA FIRE

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Laguna Fire Timeline, October 1993

Date, time/ elapsed time Action

October 27 11:50/:00 Brush fire reported to the Orange County Fire Department, Hwy. 133 south of the 405 freeway. 11:52/:03 Six engines, one water tender, three Battalion Chiefs, and one Assistant Chief en route (Orange County E326, E226, E36, E222, B54, B6, A3, WT16, Laguna Beach E304, E302, BC1). 11:57/:07 Laguna Beach Fire Chief Rich Dewberry en route. 11:58/:08 County E326 reports large smoke column visible, requests additional water tenders. 11:59/:09 County E326 scene, 2 to 3 acres of medium brush with a moderate rate of spread. Taking the right flank. 12:00/:10 Police requested for traffic control. 12:01/:11 County Fire Communications Center diverts three bulldozers, one medium helicopter (Sheriff’s), two handcrews, and a Superintendent from the Stagecoach Fire in the Anaheim Hills to the Laguna Fire. A bulldozer from the Orange County Environmental Management Agency is also dispatched. 12:03/:13 County Assistant Chief Prather on scene, assuming “Laguna Command.” Reports fire is now 4-5 acres with moderate rate of spread and potential for a major fire. Requests the closest two engine strike teams of any type and three airtankers in addition to the initial responding units. 12:03/:13 County Battalion 54, Chief Whitaker on scene, assigned to be the Operations Section Chief. Initial incident objectives set. 12:08/:18 The Operations Section Chief reports the fire is exhibiting 15-25’ flame lengths in medium to heavy brush. He indicates he is trying to hold a road at the head of the fire, but that if the fire goes over the hill, there will be a structure threat. 12:08/:18 Incident Commander makes a “priority” request for airtankers. 12:09/:19 Incident Commander requests six additional engine strike teams. Forty engines are now on order. He reports the fire is 20 acres in size and has crested the ridge above Emerald Canyon. Incident objectives are revised and Unified Incident Command is established between the County and Laguna Beach Fire Departments.

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12:11/:21 Stronger Santa Ana winds surface over the fire and increase fire intensity and rate of spread. 12:28/:38 The Operations Section Chief reports the fire has split into two or three fronts with 40- to 50-foot flame lengths, no containment, and increasing winds. He states that the fire is moving into the City of Laguna Beach. The fire is spotting as far as 1.5 miles ahead. 12:29/:39 Incident Commanders requests 10 additional engine strike teams and reports great potential for a major fire and a significant risk to structures. He restresses the need for air tankers although the communications center advises that none is currently available. County Battalion 6, Chief Runnestrand, is assigned as the Emerald Structure Protection Group Supervisor at the head of the fire in Emerald Bay. 12:35/:45 County Fire Chief Larry Holms on scene. Discusses the need for structure protection with the Incident Commanders. El Moro Elementary school along the coast is ordered evacuated and a strike team is assigned to protect evacuating students and citizens. Incident Commanders report the fire to be 200 to 300 acres in size with extreme rates of spread. Additional resources are requested including four bulldozer strike teams, 4 more water tenders, and as many engines as he can get. Incident Commanders indicate the fire will strike Laguna Beach. 12:44/:54 Incident Commanders request Command vehicles and a incident management team from County Fire. The County Fire Chief reports the fire to be over 900 acres and that the top of Emerald Canyon burned in just 5 minutes. 12:50/1:00 County Battalion 53, Chief Rohde, on scene and assigned as Planning Section Chief. Initiates major incident planning and transition activities. 13:01/1:11 Forestry agencies divert aircraft from other fires to the Laguna Fire, including one air attack coordinator and three airtankers. (Air attack 310, Airtankers 22, 27, and 73). 13:02/1:12 County Fire Chief reports the fire has moved a half mile in 10 minutes. The El Moro School completes its evacuation near the fire’s head. The Command Post is relocated to Thurston School in Laguna Beach. 13:13/1:23 The fire is at least 1,500 acres and is near the mouth of Emerald Canyon near structures in the community of Emerald Bay. The fire has traveled 4 miles in 1 hour 23 minutes. Incident Commanders request a total of 25 strike teams or 125 engines. Six additional helicopters are requested for a total of 10. None are currently available. 13:29/1:39 County Fire dispatchers report problems obtaining engines for the Laguna Fire due to regional fire activity. Of the 25 strike teams requested, only 9 are en route. The community of Emerald Bay’s 3,500 residents are being evacuated.

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13:36/1:46 Numerous reports of structures threatened and calls for assistance with evacuations are being received. County Fire Communications report that the radio system is saturated and that radio transmissions are being lost. 13:40/1:50 Several Emerald Bay homes are “well-involved” and another 100 to 150 immediately threatened. Ten additional engine strike teams are requested by telephone by the Emerald Structure Protection Group. He cannot raise the Incident Commanders on the radio due to system saturation. The fire is 1,900 acres in size. Twelve engine strike teams are operating in Emerald Bay. 13:47/1:57 First arriving airtankers drop retardant near El Moro. Pilots report difficulty in seeing targets in heavy smoke. 13:51/2:01 Priority is placed on holding the fire to the west side of Laguna Canyon Road. Twenty to 30 Emerald Bay homes are burning and numerous reports of trapped victims are received. 14:16/2:26 The Logistics Section Chief, County Fire Battalion Chief Henderson, reports that the fire will reach the El Moro Trailer Park on the coast in 15 minutes. Resources are assigned to protect the trailer park. 14:19/2:29 Reports of loss in fire hydrant pressure on several Emerald Bay streets during structure firefighting operations. Water Department is requested to boost pressure. 14:28/2:38 The Planning Section Chief reports that downtown Laguna Beach will be threatened. 14:37/2:47 Incident Commanders order delegation of authority to strike teams to choose appropriate risks and actions. Fire is now over 3,000 acres in size and 40 to 50 structures are involved, hundreds more threatened. Only 14 engine strike teams are on scene and the Operations Section Chief indicates an immediate need for 30 to 40 more. Once again, new incident objectives are established. 14:42/2:52 Incident Commanders request activation of the County-wide hospital disaster network and the dispatch of ambulances in anticipation of civilian injuries. The fire jumps Pacific Coast Highway near Irvine Cove. 15:15/3:25 Incident managers gather at Command Post for first formal planning meeting. The highest priority is assigned to hold the fire west of Laguna Canyon Road and downtown Laguna Beach. Backfire operations are initiated along Laguna Canyon Road. 15:27/3:37 Forty-four trailers are burning at the El Moro Trailer Park despite aggressive firefighting by one engine strike team. Many LPG tanks explode. The fire has grown to 4,000 acres and has become the number 1 regional priority. Large firewhirls occur at the mouth of coastal canyons.

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15:53/4:03 The fire jumps Laguna Canyon Road near Big Bend and begins a rapid run toward many structures in Laguna Beach. The fire has grown to 4,000 acres. As the fire climbs a ridge toward structures in heavy brush, flame lengths exceed 100 feet. 15:58/4:06 The Planning Section Chief in a reconnaissance helicopter reports that the spot fires on the east side of Laguna Canyon have “taken off” and run 1 mile in only 5 minutes. The fire is burning in alignment with slope, wind, and heavy fuels. The Planning Chief recommends the evacuation of the city of Laguna Beach. Evacuation of an additional 24,000 people is initiated. 16:10/4:20 A second planning meeting is held at the Command Post. New objectives are established. A risk to the Command Post from the spreading fire is identified. The fire moves into the Canyon Acres neighborhood. Fire conditions in the narrow canyon are untenable for structure protection and 52 structures burn. Air tankers are dropping retardant to protect the Command Post and structures in the Skyline neighborhood. Backfiring is initiated to protect the Top of the World neighborhood. 16:16/4:26 Seventeen engine strike teams are operating on the Laguna Incident. Eleven of these are reassigned to the Park Drive area for assignment to protect structures on the ridge lines above downtown. Two strike teams remain in Emerald Bay among ongoing losses. The decision to relocate resources is driven by the fact that Emerald Bay has been evacuated and Laguna Beach has not. Loss of life potential is considered high in Laguna Beach. Three strike teams are assigned to the Boat Canyon area, one at El Moro Trailer Park, and one Task Force in Laguna Canyon. 16:16/4:27 Strategy implemented to hold fire west of a line from the beach to the top of the coastal ridge, essentially along Park Avenue through the middle of the city. Secondary lines are identified in the Bluebird Canyon area but that control point would involve an additional 500 to 1,000 structures. The fire has grown to 6,000 acres. 16:18/4:28 Incident Command Post at Thurston School is burned over. Several classrooms are ignited immediately, spreading to a total of 12. As fire diminishes, Command Post begins a relocation to the Main Street Beach. 16:20/4:30 Structures burn at a rate of 4 per minute, with 211 homes in the Skyline area nearly simultaneously involved. Fire resources are blocked from accessing the area on narrow canyon roads by evacuating civilians. Large firewhirls are observed. 17:00/5:10 Fire is bumping the City Hall and Laguna High School. On the north, the fire is burning in Moro and Muddy Canyons in old age class fuels. The evacuation of Laguna Beach is proceeding with all lanes of Pacific Coast Highway being used for south-bound traffic. The fire jumps Park Drive in one location, burning 27 additional structures. New control objectives are added as the fire grows to include 750 acres south of Laguna Canyon Road.

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17:30/5:40 Thirty-one additional structures are lost along Laguna Canyon Road. The fire has grown to 8,000 acres and has spread on the north into Trancos Canyon. Additional structures are burning within the fire’s perimeter that were missed in the fire’s first pass due to exposure fires. A strategy is developed to backfire north from the coast along the developed edge of Newport Beach and Turtle Rock/ Irvine to protect structures. Homes along the east side of Newport Beach are evacuated. The Command Post is now active after its relocation to Main Street Beach. 18:00/6:10 The last structures to become involved in the Laguna Fire burn along Temple Hills Drive. 18:30/6:40 With changing winds becoming onshore, the large backfiring operation begins to make progress. The fire has grown to 10,000 acres. 22:00/10:10 Onshore winds push the fire over the coastal hills toward the city of Irvine. The fire has grown to 12,000 to 13,000 acres. 23:30/11:10 Irvine Police evacuate 500 people from portions of the Turtle Rock community. Total evacuated exceeds 27,500. October 28 00:00/13:10 The fire is declared contained in the downtown Laguna Beach area. 03:00/16:10 Upper Shady and Boomer Canyons are burning. The fire has reached 12,000 acres in size. Backfiring and bulldozer line construction continues. 08:00/21:10 The community of Turtle Rock has been saved by backfiring operations. No structures have been lost there. 11:00/24:00 The County Fire Department’s information phone line has handled 15,000 contacts. Media attention has come from worldwide sources. 18:00/31:10 Dozer line and backfiring has reached Highway 133 and contained the fire to more than 14,000 acres. October 31,1993 18:00/4.5 days The Laguna Fire is declared controlled.

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APPENDIX D MAP OF THE LAGUNA FIRE

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Source: Orange County Fire Authority. 253

APPENDIX E SITUATIONS AND CONDITIONS CHARACTERIZING THE LAGUNA FIRE

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Situations and Conditions Characterizing the Laguna Fire: General Themes and Related Situations And Conditions

1. Natural processes 1.1 Foehn wind conditions and critical fireweather patterns. 1.2 Fire area within or adjacent to steep mountainous terrain. 1.3 Fire history, historical wildfire corridor, and recurrent fire. 1.4 Proximity of chaparral, fuel age, and/or combustible fuel ecosystems. 1.5 Extreme burning conditions and rapid rates of spread. 1.6 Seasonal drought condition, with critical live and dead fuel moistures. 1.7 Conflagration phenomena associated with mass fire after structural involvement. 1.8 Fire occurred at typical pattern of years of drought followed by wet year followed by fire. 1.9 Presence of threatened and endangered species inhibited fire presuppression efforts. 1.10 Multiple major fires in the county and greater southern California burning concurrently.

2. Community Development 2.1 Presence of nonfire-resistive construction. 2.2 Structures placed in poor, fire-prone topographic locations. 2.3 Structures sometimes isolated with poor access; fuel presence or bridges sometimes compromised fire service access. 2.4 Lack of adequate fuel modification or brush clearance from structures, lack of defensible space. 2.5 Poor or inadequate fire flow and water supplies. 2.6 Dense structural spacing. 2.7 Community access to city of Laguna Beach limited.

3. Emergency Response 3.1 Available regional resources overwhelmed by initial fire problem. 3.2 Fire resource demands elsewhere denied incident of usual initial response. 3.3 Lack of aircraft to support initial fire response and ineffectiveness due to fire and weather conditions after arrival. 3.4 Communications centers and system overwhelmed. 3.5 Lack of regional fire resources due to regional fire siege. 3.6 Elevated firefighter safety risk. 3.7 Need to balance life safety/evacuation concerns with fire fighting. 3.8 Extended loss of momentum on perimeter control due to conflicting demands for resources. 3.9 Evacuation management and police agency coordination. 3.10 Difficulty in implementing Incident Command System field components due to rapidly changing fire conditions. 3.11 Temporary loss of top leadership when fire burned through command post. 3.12 Management of responding resources, including staging and assignment. 3.13 Inadequate staff available to fill out complete Incident Command System due to competing requirements. 255

3.14 Difficulty in demobilizing resources through Office of Emergency Services/California Mutual Aid System. 3.15 Strategic and tactical planning and direction. 3.16 Command post locations and functionality. 3.17 High-risk decision making. 3.18 Redirection of resources from one burning neighborhood to another. 3.19 Coordination with EOC’s and FIRESCOPE Coordination Centers. 3.20 Use of past fires, prescribed burns as opportunities for control. 3.21 Protection of ecological and archeological values at risk. 3.22 Need for new command and control and suppression technologies. 3.23 Fires within the perimeter were lost to remnant fires after the fire front passage, with little or no resources assigned to their protection. 3.24 The fire burned for multiple days until control was achieved. 3.25 The American Red Cross provided evacuee shelter management. 3.26 Multiple ordering pints making conflicting requests and orders. 3.27 Radio system and telephonic communications failure.

4. Human Factors 4.1 Civilian fear and panic 4.2 Getting public information to those who needed it most. 4.3 Accountability for missing persons. 4.4 Reports of persons trapped and civilian defense of property. 4.5 Firefighter use of recognition primed decisions. 4.6 Demands for fire service participation in post fire and political activities. 4.7 Public volunteerism and desire to assist.

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APPENDIX F COMPARISON OF LOSS AMONG STUDIED FIRES

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Comparison of Loss Among the Studied Fires ______

Paint Fire: June 27, 1990 1 life 427 structures 4,900 acres 120 engines responded

Tunnel Fire: October 19, 1991 25 lives 3,354 structures 1,600 acres 440 engines responded

Kinneloa Fire: October 27, 1993 187 structures 5,485 acres 200 engines responded

Laguna Fire: October 27, 1993 441 structures 14,437 acres 306 engines responded 27,500 evacuated

Old Topanga Fire: November 2, 1993 3 lives 388 structures 18,000 acres 900 engines responded

Harmony Fire: October 21, 1996 1 life 110 structures 8,000 acres 120 engines responded

All Fires Total 30 lives 4,907 structures

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APPENDIX G RESUME OF THE RESEARCHER

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MICHAEL S. ROHDE 21 Aloysia, Rancho Santa Margarita, California 92688 Phone: (714) 858-8659 Fax: (714) 858-9168 E-mail: Mbpt @ aol.com

Education • Master of Science, Emergency Services Administration, California State University, Long Beach, Thesis: Command Decision Making During Catastrophic Urban-Interface Wildfire: A Case Study of the 1993 Orange County, California, Laguna Fire, 2002. • Bachelor of Science, Business Management, University of Phoenix, 1999. • Associate in Science, Fire Technology, Santa Ana College, 1980. • State of California, Certified Chief Officer (In progress) • State of California, Certified Fire Officer, 1983 • Graduate: County of Orange Executive Development Program, 1993.

Experience • Twenty-nine years fire service experience including 25 years with the Orange County Fire Authority (OCFA), California’s fourth largest fire department, and seasonal experience with state and federal forestry agencies and the Los Angeles County Fire Department. Fifteen years as a Battalion Chief, including leadership of line battalions of up to eight stations and 50 personnel, and staff assignments as Adjutant to the Operations Bureau Commander, Manager for Fire Prevention Advance Planning, and Hazardous Materials Program Coordinator. Member of the OCFA Safety and Occupational Health and Weapons of Mass Destruction Committees.

• Eighteen years consultant experience in fire service, emergency management, oil spill, occupational safety, and hazardous materials issues. Clients have included major oil, defense, and utility companies, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, government, community colleges, and the California and National Fire Academies. Ten years part-time faculty, California Specialized Training Institute. Expert court witness and conference speaker.

• Comprehensive experience in command and control of “all risk” incidents, including historical fire, flood, hazardous materials, earthquake, and terrorism emergencies. Experience includes the Laguna Beach wildfire of 1993, the Fricker Pesticide Fire of 1985, the Oklahoma City Bombing of 1995, and the El Nino floods of 1997-98.

Credentials and Certifications • Incident Command System qualified: Incident Commander, Operations Section Chief, Planning Section Chief, and Wildfire Behavior Specialist. • California Community Colleges Credentialed Instructor. • Certified Instructor: Chief Officer and Fire Officer programs, State of California. • Certified Hazardous Materials Specialist and Hazardous Materials Instructor, State of California.

Honors • Two-time honoree, Orange County Fire Services “Overachiever Award”, 1985 and 1991. • Member: Phi Kappa Phi, Exemplary Honoree: Epsilon Pi Tau, academic honor societies. • Secretary-Treasurer, OCFA Chief Officer’s Association. • Member, Southern California Association of Foresters and Fire Wardens. • Assistant Scoutmaster, Boy Scouts of America.

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