RESEARCH PAPER 99/48 Kosovo: Operation 29 APRIL 1999 "Allied Force"
On 24 March 1999 NATO initiated a campaign of air strikes, codenamed Operation "Allied Force", against the military capability of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). This paper provides a chronological overview of the main events in the campaign between 24 March and 28 April and details the major developments both in the region and internationally. It looks at the humanitarian and legal issues that have arisen from the conflict before concluding with a consideration of potential future developments.
The historical background to the conflict and developments during 1998 are covered by Library Research Papers 98/73, Kosovo, and 98/93, Kosovo: the Diplomatic and Military Options. The build-up to the NATO action is covered in Library Research Paper 99/34, Kosovo: NATO and Military Action, of 24 March 1999.
Tim Youngs, Mark Oakes and Paul Bowers
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS & DEFENCE SECTION
Mick Hillyard
ECONOMIC POLICY & STATISTICS SECTION
HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY Recent Library Research Papers include:
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99/32 The resignation of the European Commission 16.03.99 99/33 The Access to Justice Bill [HL]: Legal aid [Bill 67 of 1998-99] 22.03.99 99/34 Kosovo: NATO and Military Action 24.03.99 99/35 The Control of High Hedges 25.03.99 99/36 The Right to Buy 30.03.99 99/37 Economic Indicators 01.04.99 99/38 Genetically Modified Crops and Food 31.03.99 99/39 The Health Bill [HL] [Bill 77 of 1998-99] 08.04.99 99/40 The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Bill [HL] [Bill 74 of 1998-99] 14.04.99 99/41 The Football (Offences and Disorder) Bill [Bill 17 of 1998-99] 14.04.99 99/42 The Road Haulage Industry: costs and taxes 19.04.99 99/43 Disability Rights Commission Bill [HL] [Bill 73 of 1998-99] 20.04.99 99/44 Unemployment by Constituency - March 1999 21.04.99 99/45 Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Bill [Bill 18 of 1998-99] 22.04.99 99/46 Local Elections - Proposals for Reform 28.04.99
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ISSN 1368 8456 Summary of main points
The NATO campaign of air strikes against the military capability of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), known as Operation “Allied Force”, entered its sixth week on 28 April 1999. NATO has substantially increased its forces in the region since the operation commenced on 24 March, with over 1,000 combat aircraft now involved. The Alliance has specified the conditions that Belgrade has to meet before the air campaign will be halted. These are: an end to all Serb military actions; a withdrawal of all police and paramilitary forces; agreement on the deployment of an international military force to Kosovo; the unconditional return of all displaced people; unhindered access for relief organisations; and a commitment to work towards a political framework, based on the accords agreed at Rambouillet.
In Kosovo itself, the offensive by Yugoslav Army and Serbian interior ministry police units continues, as reports emerge of increased activity by the rebel Kosova Liberation Army (KLA). Ethnic Albanian refugees continue to cross into Albania, FYR Macedonia and Montenegro, but in smaller numbers than at the start of the crisis. Many refugees have made allegations of widespread brutality on the part of Serbian and Yugoslav troops, including mass executions, gang rape and the systematic forced detention of men of fighting age. NATO claims there are currently around 100,000 men unaccounted for, but warns the figure could in fact be much higher. As of 28 April the UNHCR estimated that a total of 603,200 had fled the province, with an unspecified number displaced within Kosovo itself.
Tension continues to mount between the pro-Western Montenegrin Government in Podgorica and the pro-Milosevic Serbian and Federal Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade. Montenegro has sought to avoid involvement in the conflict with NATO, prompting allegations by Belgrade of treachery on the part of the Montenegrin leadership, and raising fears that President Milosevic may seek to remove Montenegrin President Djukanovic, a move that could provoke civil war. The Western leaders have declared their support for Mr Djukanovic and warned Belgrade of unspecified consequences if it tries to destabilise Montenegro.
Russia has strongly criticised the NATO air strikes, but has not provided military assistance to Belgrade. Instead, Moscow has taken a leading role in attempts to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict, although the imposition by NATO of an oil embargo against the FRY could provoke tension if NATO forces attempt to stop and search Russian vessels. Commentators also believe the deployment of NATO troops into Kosovo without Belgrade’s approval could prompt the Russian military to break the arms embargo on the FRY.
At present NATO has made no firm decision on sending troops into Kosovo in an offensive capacity, perhaps aware that such a move could endanger the unity of the Alliance. However, the military options for a ground offensive are currently being updated, and some Western leaders have indicated that troops be could used in a "permissive" or "semi-permissive" environment without President Milosevic’s approval, once air strikes have inflicted sufficient damage on Belgrade’s military machine. NATO insists, though, that air power alone is capable of achieving its declared objectives. CONTENTS
I The Build-up to NATO Action 8
A. Talks Adjourned at Rambouillet 8
B. The Start of the Yugoslav Offensive in Kosovo 8
C. Final Diplomatic Efforts 8
II The Start of Operation "Allied Force" 10
A. International Reaction 10
III Chronology of Developments (24 March – 28 April 1999) 12
A. Week One of NATO Air Strikes (24 - 30 March) 12
B. Week Two of NATO Air Strikes (31 March - 6 April) 16
C. Week Three of NATO Air Strikes (7 - 13 April) 19
D. Week Four of NATO Air Strikes (14 - 20 April) 21
E. Week Five of NATO Air Strikes (21 - 28 April) 24
IV The Humanitarian Situation 31
A. The Situation in the Region 31
B. Definition of emergency aid 32
C. Level of UK total emergency aid 34
D. The UK Response to the Kosovo Crisis 37
1. DFID's Objectives 37 2. Organisation of aid effort 38 3. The form of UK assistance 38 E. Level of EC aid 41
V War Crimes 42 A. Geneva Conventions 42
B. Genocide Convention 47
C. International Tribunal 50
D. Allegations of War Crimes 51
VI Opinion within the United Kingdom 54
VII Current Developments and Future Prospects 56
A. The Campaign So Far 56
B. Criticisms of NATO 57
C. Attitudes within NATO 58
D. The Oil Embargo 59
E. Main NATO Deployments and the British Contribution 61
1. Operation "Allied Force" 61 2. Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) 62 3. NATO Kosovo Enforcement Force (KFOR) 62 4. Operation Allied Harbour/AFOR 63 5. "Task Force Hawk" 64 F. Possible Outcomes to the Crisis 65
Appendix 1: Summary of NATO forces 69
Appendix 2: Summary of Yugoslav Forces 73
Appendix 3 - UK Ground Forces in FYR Macedonia 77
Appendix 4 - RAF Strike Missions 78
Appendix 5: Airlifts funded by DFID 80 RESEARCH PAPER 99/48
I The Build-up to NATO Action
A. Talks Adjourned at Rambouillet
On 19 March 1999 the co-chairmen at the Contact Group-sponsored negotiations at Rambouillet, Foreign Ministers Hubert Védrine of France and Robin Cook, announced the adjournment of the talks without agreement from Belgrade. Although international mediators succeeded in persuading the ethnic Albanian delegation to sign up to the draft accords, the Yugoslav delegation continued to object to key aspects, including the proposed deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force to ensure the implementation of the accords. NATO had threatened Belgrade with military action if it blocked negotiations.
The failure of the talks led the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to withdraw the unarmed monitoring force, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), from Kosovo over fears for the safety of its personnel.
B. The Start of the Yugoslav Offensive in Kosovo
On 20 March, as the monitors withdrew from Kosovo, Belgrade launched a major offensive with Serbian Interior Ministry police (Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova or MUP) and Yugoslav Army (VJ) forces. During the first four days of the offensive in the Mitrovica region and along the Prizren-Djakovica-Pec axis an estimated 20,000 people were forced to flee their homes.1
Under the terms of the October agreement between President Milosevic and US envoy Richard Holbrooke Belgrade had agreed to reduce its forces in the province to the pre- conflict levels of 12,000 VJ troops and 10,000 MUP troops. However, by 23 March NATO estimated that Belgrade had massed approximately 16,000 MUP troops and 20,000 VJ troops in Kosovo itself with a further 8,000 VJ reinforcements available on the provincial border.
C. Final Diplomatic Efforts
In a final attempt to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis, Mr Holbrooke travelled to Belgrade for talks with President Milosevic on 22 and 23 March. It became clear, though, after several hours of negotiations that Mr Holbrooke had been unable to persuade President Milosevic to comply with NATO’s demands.
After briefing Alliance members on the failed negotiations in Belgrade, Mr Holbrooke announced on 23 March that he was handing over the process to NATO Secretary- General Javier Solana. Mr Solana then announced that he had delegated responsibility to
1 For a map of the region see Library Research Paper 98/73, Kosovo
8 RESEARCH PAPER 99/48 the Alliance's Supreme Commander, General Wesley Clark, to initiate air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), although he gave no indication as to when the action would begin.
It was also reported that Secretary-General Solana had written to the leaders of Albania, Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia), Romania, and Slovenia to assure them of support from the Alliance in the event of a threat to their security from the Yugoslav military. He stressed that their countries' security was of "direct and material concern" to the Alliance and emphasised that NATO would find it unacceptable if the FRY were "to threaten the territorial integrity and independence" of its neighbours.2
In Belgrade the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Momir Bulatovic, declared a state of emergency, calling for the mass mobilisation of reserves and placing the Yugoslav armed forces on a high state of alert.
2 Times, 25 March 1999
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II The Start of Operation "Allied Force"
Shortly after 20:00 GMT on 24 March 1999 the first air strikes by NATO forces were reported against targets around Pristina, the provincial capital of Kosovo. NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana declared:
Clear responsibility for the air strikes lies with President Milosevic who has refused to stop his violent action in Kosovo and has refused to negotiate in good faith. 3
In a televised address to the American public on 25 March President Clinton warned that: "If President Milosevic will not make peace, we will limit his ability to make war."4 He cited three objectives for the NATO action:
First, to demonstrate the seriousness of Nato's opposition to aggression and its support for peace. Second, to deter President Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for those attacks. And third, if necessary, to damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo by diminishing its military capability.5
Mr Clinton also warned that a failure to act now could lead to a wider war throughout the Balkans, potentially involving Greece and Turkey, although this view was disputed by the Greek government.
A. International Reaction
The international reaction to the NATO air strikes was mixed. The UN Security Council met in emergency session, with two of the permanent members, Russia and China, calling for an end to what they termed the “illegal military action".6 The Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, said that violence "does not resolve problems. Indeed it makes them more complex."7 In apparent deference to domestic political pressure, the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, issued a stark warning of the potential consequences of the NATO action:
This means war in Europe, possibly even more. It is an extremely serious step and to take such a step without the United Nations Security Council is more than incomprehensible. Of course we are doing all that we can, but we cannot do everything. We could, but conscience does not allow it.8
3 Financial Times, 25 March 1999 4 Independent, 25 March 1999 5 ibid. 6 "Russia condemns Nato at UN", BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk , 25 March 1999 7 Guardian, 25 March 1999 8 ibid.
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Mr Yeltsin also ordered a freeze in Russia's relations with NATO and deputies in the Russian lower house of parliament, the Duma, called for military assistance to be provided to Belgrade. In response to the domestic pressure the Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, claimed that the NATO action had rendered the UN arms embargo on Yugoslavia null and void, although the Russian Government gave no indication that it was intending to supply military equipment to the FRY.9
On 26 March Russia put forward a draft resolution in the UN Security Council, co- sponsored by non-Council members Belarus and India, calling for an immediate halt to NATO attacks and an urgent resumption of negotiations. The motion was supported by two permanent members, Russia and China, and also by Namibia. However, the other three permanent members (France, the United Kingdom and the United States) all voted against, as did the remaining members of the Council: Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, Netherlands and Slovenia. Therefore, as the motion failed to win the minimum nine votes required for a majority, the votes against of France, United Kingdom and United States did not count as vetoes.10 NATO leaders expressed satisfaction with what they perceived to be extensive support for their position within the Council. Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, declared on 31 March:
It was the UN Security Council that, last week, considered a resolution from the Russians condemning the NATO action. That resolution was defeated by 12 votes to three, the biggest defeat of a resolution since 1993.11
The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, made the following statement on the NATO action:
It is indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace…As Secretary-General I have many times pointed out, not just in relation to Kosovo, that under the [UN] charter the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security - and this is explicitly acknowledged in the North Atlantic Treaty. Therefore, the council should be involved in any decision to resort to the use of force.12
9 Guardian, 25 March 1999 10 MoD web site at http://www.mod.uk/news/kosovo/unsc260399.htm 11 HC Deb 31 March 1999, c1217 12 Guardian, 25 March 1999. For a detailed examination of the legal issues surrounding the NATO action, see Kosovo: NATO and Military Action, Library Research Paper 99/34, 24 March 1999
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III Chronology of Developments (24 March – 28 April 1999)
A. Week One of NATO Air Strikes (24 - 30 March)
The Military Campaign
The initial wave of attacks on 24 March involved eighty allied aircraft and US and British ships in the Adriatic. Details of the initial attack were provided in a press briefing by Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, and Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Charles Guthrie, on 25 March. Sir Charles said:
The first targets, which were mainly facilities associated with the Yugoslavian air defence system, were hit just after 7 o'clock. Assets used included air-launched cruise missiles, fired by US B-52 aircraft, which had taken off from RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire earlier in the day, and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles fired by USN ships and, for the first time, by HMS SPLENDID. Follow-on attacks were conducted by manned tactical aircraft, including RAF Harrier GR-7s, based in southern Italy, using Paveway 2 Laser Guided Bombs. Other targets included facilities associated with military units directly involved in aggression within Kosovo. 13
NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Wesley Clark, stated at a press conference at NATO headquarters on 25 March that:
We're going to systematically and progressively attack, disrupt, degrade, devastate and ultimately, unless President Milosevic complies with the demands of the international community, we're going to destroy his forces and their facilities and support.
On the first night of operations three Yugoslav MiG 29s were shot down - two by US pilots, one by a Dutch pilot. The first night represented the debut of the B-1 Stealth bomber in combat. On the night of 26 March two more MiG 29s were shot down by US F15s over eastern Bosnia. On 27 March a US F-117 Stealth fighter went down outside Belgrade. The pilot was rescued several hours after the crash. On the same day NATO Secretary-General Solana announced that the Alliance was moving into phase two of its military campaign:
A few moments ago, I directed SACEUR to initiate a broader range of air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
I have taken this decision with the support of all Allied governments which are determined to bring a halt to violence in Kosovo and to prevent further humanitarian catastrophe.14
13 MOD web site at http://www.mod.uk 14 Press statement by Javier Solana, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int
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NATO spokesman Jamie Shea said the intention was to target tanks and artillery that were being used against civilians in Kosovo.
During the week targets were hit around the whole of the FRY, including sites around Belgrade, Novi Sad, Pristina in Kosovo, and Podgorica in Montenegro. Bad weather significantly hampered many operations. On 29 March all six RAF Harrier GR7s taking part in bombing raids on Pristina were forced to return without dropping their bombs due to poor weather. Similar problems affected Harrier operations on 31 March, 1 and 2 April. In response to such problems, the US Department of Defense announced on 29 March, the deployment of five B-1B Lancer bombers (along with approximately fifteen additional aircraft) which have an all weather capability.
The Situation in the Region
Reports from Kosovo indicated that thousands of civilians were being forced to flee their homes. NATO claimed it had evidence that Serbian and Yugoslav forces were driving people out of Pristina and the town of Orahovac, and it was reported that the town of Pec was virtually empty after VJ and MUP units started shelling and burning buildings on 26 March.
Ethnic Albanian refugees alleged that Yugoslav forces were torching villages and threatening the civilian population with death if they did not leave immediately. There were also reports of several alleged massacres by Federal units. By 30 March the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that an estimated 94,000 ethnic Albanians had been forced out of Kosovo since the start of NATO military action on 24 March.15 A UNHCR representative said:
The pattern that emerges is paramilitary forces arriving, rounding people up and telling them at gunpoint to go. So we are seeing officially sanctioned ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population.16
On 29 March NATO claimed it had “convincing proof” that Fehmi Agani, a prominent figure in Dr Rugova's LDK party and one of the negotiators at Rambouillet, had been executed by Yugoslav forces, although the report remains uncorroborated.17 Further reports claimed that a number of other leading ethnic Albanians had been killed by Federal forces, including Bajram Kelmendi, a human rights lawyer, and Baton Haxhiu, editor-in-chief of the Albanian language newspaper, Koha Ditore.18
15 Financial Times, 31 March 1999 16 Guardian, 30 March 1999 17 Financial Times, 1 April 1999 18 Guardian, 30 March 1999
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Resistance from the KLA appeared to be patchy, but Albanian TV reported on 30 March that the KLA had ordered a general mobilisation, calling on all men aged between 18 and 50 to "fulfil their military duty to liberate Kosovo." Reports from the province claimed that KLA fighters were stopping ethnic Albanian men from fleeing.19
In neighbouring FYR Macedonia hundreds of ethnic Serbs rioted on 25 March in the capital, Skopje, in protest at the NATO air strikes. The crowd damaged vehicles outside a hotel housing monitors from the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission that was withdrawn on 20 March. Firebombs were thrown at the US embassy and vehicles set alight. FYR Macedonia has an ethnic Serb population of approximately 40,000, comprising roughly two per cent of the country's total population of 1.9 million.
In Greece, which has strong historical and religious ties to Serbia, several demonstrations were held against the NATO action.
On 29 March the Albanian Parliament called the Yugoslav actions in Kosovo “a crime against humanity in the heart of Europe” and appealed to NATO to send ground troops into Kosovo to halt the conflict.20
Diplomatic Moves
On 29 March the British Ministry of Defence published a list of people believed to be accountable for war crimes, including President Milosevic, the head of state security, Lieutenant-General Radomar Markovic, and other top commanders believed to be involved in the campaign in Kosovo. Mr Robertson said attempts were being made to split the military hierarchy in Belgrade, declaring:
There are decent people inside that structure who do want to hold on to Kosovo but who do not want to go down in history as successors to the Nazis. They are the group of people that the message has to get through to…I don’t believe for a minute that there is unity of purpose within the whole regime.21
Responding to claims that the refugee crisis had been precipitated by NATO military action, Prime Minister Tony Blair told the House of Commons on 29 March:
Let us be clear where the responsibility for the refugee crisis lies. It is not NATO bombing that has caused the refugee crisis; it is the policy of brutality and repression against innocent Kosovar Albanian people.22
He added:
19 Financial Times, 1 April 1999 20 ibid. 30 March 1999 21 Independent, 30 March 1999 22 HC Deb 29 March 1999, c739
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For every act of barbarity, every slaughter of the innocent, Milosevic must be made to pay a higher and higher price.23
On 30 March the Russian Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, held six hours of talks in Belgrade with President Milosevic in an attempt to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict. At the conclusion of the talks Mr Milosevic said that, if NATO halted its air strikes, he would reduce his forces in Kosovo and allow all peaceful refugees to return to the province “if they are Yugoslav citizens.” However, many Kosovar Albanians do not hold Yugoslav passports. Mr Primakov also said later that Belgrade would insist that NATO end its support for the KLA. There were some unsubstantiated reports that Belgrade was willing to accept a peacekeeping observer force comprising neutral nations and also Russia.24
However, NATO leaders swiftly rejected President Milosevic's proposal. The German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, speaking on behalf of the EU, said: “This is no basis for a political solution”,25 and the US State Department spokesman, James Rubin, declared that the proposal fell "far short of what is necessary in order for NATO to stop its air campaign."26 Mr Rubin went on to say:
Our position is clear. Milosevic must halt the offensive against the Kosovar Albanians, withdraw his forces and embrace a settlement based on the Rambouillet framework.27
Defence Secretary George Robertson dismissed calls for a break in NATO’s bombing campaign, saying: “Any pause by us would lead to a multiplication of the ethnic cleansing.”28
In Italy the governing coalition came under increasing strain as the former Communists within the government warned that they were considering withdrawing their ministers if the NATO action continued.29
On 30 March President Yeltsin reiterated his opposition to the NATO action, but said Russia would not become involved in the conflict:
Russia has made her choice, and will not allow herself to be drawn into armed conflict. I will do everything for a speedy cessation of military action.30
23 HC Deb 29 March 1999, c739 24 Independent, 31 March 1999 25 Financial Times, 31 March 1999 26 ibid. 27 ibid. 28 Guardian, 31 March 1999 29 Financial Times, 30 March 1999 30 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 March 1999
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B. Week Two of NATO Air Strikes (31 March - 6 April)
The Military Campaign
During the second week of operations Yugoslav units, ammunition dumps and other sites, primarily in Kosovo, were targeted. NATO also expanded the operation’s scope to include communication lines and major transportation routes, in order to isolate Yugoslav forces operating in Kosovo. The Ministry of Interior and other buildings in the centre of Belgrade were hit by NATO cruise missiles. On 1 April a bridge over the Danube in the northern city of Novi Sad was destroyed.
On 31 March, three US soldiers from "Task Force Able Sentry" (formerly part of the UN Preventative Deployment Force in FYR Macedonia) were captured by Serbian forces close to the Macedonia/Kosovo border.
US forces and equipment continued to deploy to the region. On 1 April the deployment of 12 additional F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter/bombers was approved by US Secretary of Defence, William S. Cohen. On 4 April the US announced the deployment of 24 Apache AH-64 helicopters and 18 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) to Albania under the designation "Task Force Hawk". According to the Department of Defense, "Task Force Hawk" will, “enhance NATO’s ability to conduct tactical operations against specific Federal Republic of Yugoslavia units in Kosovo, especially during periods of limited visibility and poor weather.”31
On 3 April Mr Cohen announced that the USS Theodore Roosevelt battle group would remain in the Mediterranean to support Operation "Allied Force". The battle group was scheduled for deployment to the Persian Gulf. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USS Theodore Roosevelt, is one of the most modern in the US fleet. On 6 April aircraft from the carrier became involved in air operations for the first time. On the same day the US Navy announced that the USS Nassau Amphibious Ready Group would remain on station in the Adriatic past its scheduled 13 May return-home date.32
Russia dispatched an intelligence-gathering vessel to the Adriatic to monitor the situation.
The Situation in the Region
On 31 March several thousand ethnic Albanian refugees arrived at the Macedonian border from Pristina after reportedly being forced onto trains at gunpoint by Serbian forces. Large numbers of Serb civilians were also believed to have fled Kosovo due to the
31 US Department of Defense web site at http://www.defense.mil For further details on "Task Force Hawk" see section VIIc 32 ibid.
16 RESEARCH PAPER 99/48 conflict. By 2 April an estimated 634,000 people had been displaced from their homes in Kosovo, representing one third of the pre-war population.33 FYR Macedonia and Albania appealed to the international community for more assistance to copy with the increasing numbers of refugees seeking sanctuary on their territory.
NATO accused the authorities in Belgrade of trying to erase the identities of thousands of ethnic Albanians by destroying their property deeds, birth and marriage certificates, and other records. In the House of Commons the Defence Secretary said that the actions of Belgrade's forces in Kosovo were "not just murder but premeditated murder."34
In early April the French newspaper, Le Monde, reported that the German Government had obtained a detailed plan drawn up by Belgrade for the mass deportation of the ethnic Albanian population from Kosovo. The document for the operation, known as Operation “Horseshoe”, could, if proven authentic, provide important evidence for any future attempts to prosecute the leadership in Belgrade for war crimes. According to the German Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping:
Operation Horseshoe began in Kosovo in November 1998… It shows that the Yugoslav Army and police had planned, and then started, to drive people out of certain parts of Kosovo, from November until the Rambouillet negotiations began.35
The worsening humanitarian situation in the region led the OSCE to announce that some of its resources would be transferred to the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies in Albania and FYR Macedonia.36 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, warned on 4 April:
Kosovo's neighbours are swamped and they are no longer able to cope with the influx. All nations must now help to save lives.37
Albania confirmed on the same day that it would accept 100,000 refugees from FYR Macedonia after the Government in Skopje expressed fears that the influx of large numbers of ethnic Albanians could destabilise the country's ethnic balance.
The Macedonian Prime Minister, Lupco Georgievski, criticised the West for failing to provide adequate assistance for the refugee crisis:
The people in Brussels (NATO headquarters) started the war and left for Easter holidays. They left the problem for Macedonia.38
33 Financial Times, 3 April 1999 34 Guardian, 1 April 1999 35 Times, 9 April 1999 36 UNHCR Kosovo Crisis Update, 1 April 1999 from UNHCR web site at http://www.unhcr.ch/news/ 37 Financial Times, 5 April 1999
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On 7 April 30,000 refugees were moved overnight from FYR Macedonia to Albania by the Macedonian authorities. The Yugoslav authorities temporarily closed the border crossings to Albania and FYR Macedonia. NATO accused Belgrade of using ethnic Albanians as "human shields" against the air strikes.
In Montenegro, the second republic alongside Serbia in the Yugoslav federation, President Milosevic replaced the top military commander, General Milorad Martinovic, with a close ally, General Milorad Obradovic, raising fears that Belgrade was preparing to move against the pro-western government of Montenegrin President Djukanovic. The move prompted a swift reaction from NATO leaders, with Foreign Secretary Robin Cook warning President Milosevic on 2 April against exploiting the crisis in the region to undermine his political opponents in Montenegro:
Milosevic should know now not to create trouble in Montenegro. He already is in enough trouble himself. He does not have the resources or the time to fight on another front. Do not think of trying to open up another front in Montenegro.39
Diplomatic Moves
NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana called on Yugoslavia to "stop all repressive and combat activity and withdraw its forces from Kosovo, and accept arrangements in which all refugees can return safely to Kosovo under protection of an international security force."40 This appeared to indicate that NATO would be willing to send some form of escort force to protect returning refugees, perhaps even prior to the signing of a peace deal.
In Belgrade the Russian ambassador to Yugoslavia held talks on 4 April with Ibrahim Rugova, the self-declared president of Kosovo. The ambassador contradicted NATO claims that Mr Rugova was under house arrest by saying that the ethnic Albanian leader was safe and free to move.41
On 6 April Belgrade declared a unilateral cease-fire as a "good-will gesture" over the Orthodox Easter weekend.42 NATO dismissed the move as a diplomatic ploy and said it would continue the air campaign until its objectives were met. Belgrade also reported that President Milosevic had held talks with the ethnic Albanian leader, Dr Rugova, in search of an agreement that would enable refugees to return home. NATO claimed Dr Rugova was acting under duress.
Criticism of the NATO action by Russian ministers and officials continued, with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stating on 31 March that:
38 CNN web site at http://www.cnn.com , 7 April 1999 39 Financial Times, 3 April 1999 40 ibid. 5 April 1999 41 ibid. 6 April 1999 42 Independent, 7 April 1999
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The real goals of those who masterminded, imposed, and are now expanding the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia is to establish NATO's unquestionable diktat in the Balkans. Yugoslavia was a weak spot in these plans. Therefore it had to be hit in order to undermine its military and economic potential. Washington is already working out options of Kosovo's separation from Yugoslavia or dismemberment of the province in practical terms. The implementation of such plans presupposes not only the strengthening of Albanian guerrilla units, but also the commencement of a ground operation.
In an attempt to ensure continued Russian involvement in the diplomatic process the chairman of the OSCE, Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollenbaek, travelled to Moscow for talks with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov. Mr Vollenbaek declared:
It is important that Russia should continue to be involved and we will see if there is any way that they can assist in finding a solution.43
C. Week Three of NATO Air Strikes (7 - 13 April)
The Military Campaign
Week three witnessed a further escalation of NATO’s air campaign, particularly within Kosovo. On 7 April General Wesley Clark described the operation as having two clear fronts, with NATO forces conducting strategic strikes against Yugoslav army and special police force headquarters and infrastructure in and around Belgrade, whilst simultaneously increasing tactical strikes against Yugoslav ground forces in Kosovo.44 The NATO tactics in Kosovo were outlined on 12 April by US Defence Secretary, William Cohen:
We are systematically choking off the Yugoslav army and security forces in Kosovo by cutting their supply lines. As we isolate and weaken the Serb forces in Kosovo, we are launching aggressive attacks against troops on the ground by hitting staging areas, headquarters and forces in the field.45
On 8 April NATO decided to send 8,000 troops to Albania to help with the humanitarian effort. An important development for the deployment of future NATO forces was the announcement on 11 April by Albania that it was placing its military infrastructure, including installations, ports and airspace, at NATO’s disposal. On the same day Mr Cook confirmed that the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible was being diverted from the Gulf to the Adriatic. On 12 April a passenger train in south-eastern Serbia was hit by two missiles from a NATO fighter, reportedly killing ten people.
43 Financial Times, 7 April 1999 44 Department of Defense web site at http://www.defenselink.mil 45 ibid.
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On 13 April General Wesley Clark requested 300 more aircraft from the US and a comparable increase from other NATO members for use in Operation "Allied Force". The additional aircraft fell into three main categories – ground attack, air suppression, and tankers. General Clark said that the additional planes would allow him to strengthen and intensify the air campaign. On the same day the UK announced that an additional 1,800 troops, supported by 14 Challenger tanks and 40 Warrior armoured vehicles, were being deployed to FYR Macedonia, bringing the total of UK military personnel in Greece, Albania and FYR Macedonia to 6,300.
The Situation in the Region
On 13 April the Montenegrin Foreign Minister, Branko Perovic, rejected the vote in the Federal Yugoslav Parliament of 12 April to join with Belarus and the Russian Federation, claiming that the vote was not legitimate. He also warned that the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro was coming under increasing pressure:
With every day that passes there is less and less likelihood that we can remain in this federation.46
The Government of FYR Macedonia ruled out the use of its territory for an "aggressive" NATO ground intervention into Kosovo, but repeated it would permit NATO to use the country as a staging post for a peace-keeping force to police a negotiated settlement.47
Diplomatic Moves
On 7 April the NATO spokesman spelt out the Alliance's conditions for an end to the air strikes:
• a verifiable end to all Serb military actions and the immediate end of violence and repression; • the withdrawal of all Milosevic’s military police and paramilitary forces; • the stationing in Kosovo of an international military force; • the unconditional and safe return of refugees and internally-displaced persons; • unhindered access for the humanitarian relief organisations; • and finally, the credible assurance of a willingness to work towards a political framework based on the Rambouillet Agreement.48
On 9 April President Yeltsin warned that Russia would step in if NATO launched a ground offensive against the FRY:
46 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 April 1999 47 Independent, 10 April 1999 48 NATO Press Conference 14 April 1999, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int
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I have already told Nato, Americans and the Germans: Don't push us to military action, since that will certainly lead to a European war or even a world war, which is inadmissible. Nato wants to launch ground operations, it wants to simply seize Yugoslavia and make it their protectorate. We cannot permit that. Russia is not going to get involved in the conflict unless the Americans push us to it.49
The speaker of the Russian Duma, Gennady Seleznyov, claimed that President Yeltsin had ordered Russian strategic missiles to be targeted at NATO nations involved in Operation "Allied Force", although this was later dismissed by the Kremlin as incorrect.50
It was reported on 11 April that NATO officials were considering a major reconstruction project for the Balkans similar to the Marshall Plan for Europe in the aftermath of World War II.51 US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called for an integration strategy with "an explicit goal to transform the Balkans from Europe's primary source of instability into an important part of its mainstream."52
D. Week Four of NATO Air Strikes (14 - 20 April)
The Military Campaign
On 14 April Operation "Allied Harbour" was announced by NATO. The ACE Mobile Force (land) was earmarked for deployment to Tirana to help in stabilising the humanitarian crisis.
On 14 April Yugoslav sources reported that NATO aircraft had attacked several convoys of ethnic Albanian refugees near the town of Djakovica killing approximately 64 people. Pictures on Yugoslav TV purported to show civilian vehicles destroyed in the attack, but the Pentagon initially insisted that NATO fighters had only struck a military convoy near Djakovica, and suggested that perhaps Yugoslav forces were to blame for the civilian casualties. On 16 April NATO admitted responsibility for the attack, but said that the civilian deaths were a tragic accident and vowed to continue the campaign.
NATO said satellite intelligence showed an additional 8,000 Yugoslav forces had been sent to Kosovo, raising the total number of MUP and VJ troops in the province to around 43,000.53
200 VJ troops crossed briefly into Albania on 20 April but withdrew after a short confrontation with Albanian forces. The UN reported that 250-300 VJ soldiers had also
49 Guardian, 10 April 1999 50 New York Times, 9 April 1999 51 Sunday Times, 11 April 1999 52 Financial Times, 13 April 1999 53 New York Times, 20 April 1999
21 RESEARCH PAPER 99/48 entered the UN demilitarised zone on the strategically important Prevlaka peninsula between Croatia and Montenegro. The Prevlaka peninsular forms the northern part of the entrance to the major Yugoslav naval port of Kotor and is seen as vital by both Zagreb and Belgrade. The Croatian Ambassador to the UN lodged an official protest with the Security Council, demanding an immediate withdrawal of Yugoslav forces.
On the same day NATO forces struck several bridges and radar sites, and destroyed the headquarters of President Milosevic's ruling Socialist Party in Belgrade. NATO claimed the building housed "vital elements in the control apparatus of President Milosevic's regime."54 The attack indicated an increasing willingness on the part of NATO to strike at elements of the Yugoslav President's power structure.
The Situation in the Region
Further tens of thousands of Kosovar refugees were reported to be crossing into Albania and FYR Macedonia with an additional 200,000 believed to be on the move within Kosovo itself. NATO estimated that at least 3,200 people had died during the fighting of the previous few weeks.55
On 15 April US Defence Secretary Bill Cohen told the Senate that the KLA had not been defeated by the Yugoslav offensive:
The bombing campaign will shift the military balance decisively in favour of the KLA. Milosevic would then face a choice between either a Nato-backed peace agreement, or confronting a situation in which the KLA is resurgent.56
On 16 April a Yugoslav army lieutenant, captured by the KLA two days earlier, was handed over to the US Army in Tirana. The Yugoslav foreign ministry claimed this was clear evidence of "cooperation and coordination between the terrorists and the US-led NATO forces."57
NATO alleged that Yugoslav forces were organising "grave digging chain gangs", and the US ambassador-at-large for war crimes said that the scale of atrocities in Kosovo could be considerably higher than originally believed, with over 100,000 ethnic Albanian men missing.58
The KLA claimed on 20 April that it was massing thousands of troops west of the town of Mitrovica to defend around 250,000 civilians trapped by the fighting. A KLA spokesman
54 NATO Press Conference 21 April 1999, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int 55 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 17 April 1999 56 Guardian, 16 April 1999 57 Agence France Presse, 21 April 1999 58 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 18 April 1999
22 RESEARCH PAPER 99/48 expressed the fear that Belgrade may try to depopulate the entire northern and eastern regions of the province with the aim of establishing a partition.
The UNHCR claimed that as of 19 April 1999 there were 359,000 refugees in Albania and 132,700 in FYR Macedonia. An additional 73,000 ethnic Albanians were believed to have been displaced to Montenegro.
On 16 April the Montenegrin Government came under increasing pressure from the Serb minority in the republic to provide more support for Belgrade, prompting a call from President Djukanovic for the NATO air strikes to end, and for Belgrade to halt its part in the conflict. Mr Djukanovic said the NATO action was damaging his country's moves towards democracy.59
The newly appointed commander of the VJ in Montenegro, General Milorad Obradovic, wrote to the government in Podgorica on 19 April insisting that the Montenegrin Ministry of the Interior be placed under direct control of the VJ. President Djukanovic refused, stating that the idea was "unacceptable".60
On 20 April VJ units deployed to Montenegro's only border crossing with Croatia and demanded that the Montenegrin police units hand over control. Again Mr Djukanovic refused to back down, declaring:
Our policy is that the border between Montenegro and Croatia should be controlled by ourselves and the forces of the Ministry of the Interior. This will remain so.61
It was also reported that VJ forces had cleared a number of Muslim villages in Montenegro close to the border with Kosovo.
Diplomatic Moves
On 15 April 1999 a peace proposal from the German government was leaked, calling for:
• A suspension of air strikes if President Milosevic begins withdrawing his forces from Kosovo • An outright halt once withdrawal is complete • UN authorisation of an international military force • A transitional administration for the territory • Relief agencies start work in Kosovo as soon as possible after a plan is agreed • Return of refugees and reconstruction
59 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 18 April 1999 60 Financial Times, 22 April 1999 61 ibid.
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Chancellor Schröder said the proposal was in line with NATO's objectives and was not intended to water them down. Washington described the plan as "constructive", but insisted that there would be no cease-fire until Belgrade complied with NATO's demands.
On 18 April President Clinton warned that the Balkans would not be secure until President Milosevic left power, saying Serbia needed a democratic transition, "for the region cannot be secure with a belligerent tyrant in its midst."62
On the same day Belgrade announced it was breaking off diplomatic relations with Albania and accused the Government in Tirana of complicity in NATO's campaign and of launching attacks across its border.63
E. Week Five of NATO Air Strikes (21 - 28 April)
The Military Campaign
On 21 April Alliance planes hit the official residence of President Milosevic on the outskirts of Belgrade. A Yugoslav Minister accused NATO of attempting to "assassinate the president of a sovereign country."64 NATO, however, maintained the residence was a legitimate military target and denied that it was trying to hit the President himself. Pentagon spokesman, Ken Bacon, declared:
We are not targeting President Milosevic or the Serb people. We are targeting the military and the military infrastructure that supports the instruments of oppression in Kosovo… Much of the military and security forces are run out of a variety of residences and office buildings throughout the country, particularly in the Belgrade area. They are all interconnected.65
On 22 April NATO hit the Serbian state television station in Belgrade, killing at least 10 people. NATO defended the strike, claiming the station was a legitimate target and a "ministry of lies". A NATO spokesman declared that the attack "must be seen as an intensification of our attacks at the very brains of Milosevic's military apparatus and leadership."66 The Government in Belgrade said the attack was a "monstrous crime without precedent in history."67 The International Federation of Journalists protested to NATO, saying the Alliance had pledged to avoid hitting civilian targets.68 The Italian
62 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 18 April 1999 63 ibid. 64 Financial Times, 23 April 1999 65 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 22 April 1999 66 ibid. 67 ibid. 68 BBC Ceefax, 23 April 1999
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Foreign Minister, Lamberto Dini, also questioned the attack, declaring: "I disapprove. The question of television wasn't, I believe, part of the plan."69
The first Apache helicopters arrived in Albania on 21 April, and two days later the US Defence Secretary, Bill Cohen, announced that an additional 2,000 troops, 15 Abrams MBTs, 14 Bradley IFVs, and a howitzer battery would be sent to Albania to support the Apaches. The move brought the number of US troops in Albania to around 5,000.70 William Cohen also announced the deployment of a further 30 KC-135 equivalent tanker aircraft, air crews and support personnel to the Balkans. This represented the first tranche of the additional 300 aircraft requested by SACEUR. On 26 April a fully armed Apache helicopter crashed during a training exercise in Albania.
On the same day the last remaining bridge over the Danube in Novi Sad was destroyed. The 27 April NATO operations concentrated on targeting assembly areas, Serb Army and Special Police Infrastructure and key petrol, oil and lubricants facilities. NATO also attacked facilities at Podgorica airfield in Montenegro, a radio relay site and a munitions storage area. A television transmitter on top of the Socialist party HQ building in Belgrade was also attacked. President Clinton signed the Presidential Select Reserve Call- up, which gives Secretary Cohen the authority to call up as many as 33,100 reservists. According to the DOD, the call-up will be sequential with the first group likely to number around 2000 involved in air refuelling and logistical backup. The Hungarian defence minister, Dr Janos Szabó, announced that NATO tanker aircraft are to be stationed near Budapest.
On 27 April General Sir Charles Guthrie provided the following summary of the effect NATO attacks have had on Yugoslav forces since the conflict began:
Overall, Nato has now conducted 474 attacks, covering 227 individual sites. We estimate that we have destroyed over 70 combat aircraft out of a total of 450, including 23 out of 83 of the critical aircraft types – MiG29s and MiG21s. As a result of this success the Serb Air Force has not had the will to face Nato in the air.
We have also destroyed 9 of the strategic surface to air missile radar systems. We judge that remaining SAM systems are now reluctant to operate, fearing further losses. We have damaged 9 of Serbia’s 17 military airfields, 4 of them severely. 40 aircraft hangars have been destroyed and a further 31 have been damaged.
The Serbian integrated air defence system is not yet inoperable, but we know that Serbian commanders are seriously worried about the impunity and accuracy with which Nato aircraft are able to strike at Milosevic’s forces on the ground. In
69 Times, 24 April 1999 70 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 23 April 1999
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addition, we know that the infrastructure supporting the Serb military is now creaking under the weight of regular and carefully targeted operations.
The damage we have inflicted on Serbian oil refining and distribution operations is particularly heavy, with both of their oil refineries put out of action, and 16 storage depots attacked. Serbia is dependent now on reserve stocks and imports.
We have also succeeded in causing severe disruption to Serb military communications systems. 31 fixed communications sites have been attacked, including 19 key sites between Belgrade and the southern former Republic of Yugoslavia.
A further example of the way in which the Serb infrastructure is being taken apart, piece by piece, is the damage so far inflicted on lines of communication. In all, more than 20 road and rail bridges have been damaged or destroyed. Of particular strategic significance is the River Danube which cuts the country in half. Of the 9 major bridges over the Danube, 5 have been destroyed, 1 has been damaged and 3 are still fully serviceable. With actions such as these we aim to restrict as far as we reasonably can the movement of Serb forces within the country, and also the movement of supplies.
We have also made a particular and direct impact on Serbian ability to conduct operations in Kosovo. All railway lines serving Kosovo have been cut, together with 3 of the 8 roads. In addition, one-fifth out of all major ammunition storage depots have been significantly damaged, and almost one-fifth of all army barracks have been attacked.
On 23 April NATO leaders at the 50th anniversary summit in Washington issued a statement on Kosovo, in which they declared the Alliance's commitment to the security of the countries in the Balkan region:
13. We will not tolerate threats by Belgrade regime to the security of its neighbours. We will respond to such challenges by Belgrade to its neighbours resulting from the presence of NATO forces or their activities on their territory during this crisis.71
On 25 April Romania and Slovenia granted NATO forces access to their airspace for operations. FYR Macedonia also agreed to the stationing of additional British and German forces on its territory, which, once deployed, would take the number of NATO personnel in FYR Macedonia to around 16,000.72
As of 28 April Bulgaria had yet to grant access to its airspace, although approval of NATO's request was believed to be imminent. In the event that approval is granted, additional Alliance planes could be sent to Turkey for attacks through Bulgarian airspace.
71 Statement on Kosovo, NATO PR, 23 April 1999 72 NATO Press Conference 25 April 1999, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int
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The Situation in the Region
In Kosovo KLA forces continued to mount hit and run raids against Serbian forces in the field. NATO reported that VJ units were continuing their operations in the Rogova mountain region west of Pec with the intention of creating a "cordon sanitaire" around KLA supply and reinforcement routes.73 NATO claimed that 35,000 buildings had been damaged in 550 settlement areas in Kosovo since March 1998.74
In an interview on US television on 21 April President Milosevic denied his Government was operating a policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo:
There was never a policy of this country and my policy to expel any citizen of Yugoslavia from any part of this country… I believe that when aggression stops, when bombing stops, then it will be very easy to continue (the) political process.75
He also blamed NATO for the refugee crisis that had developed:
When they started their damn bombing and they started their dirty aggression against this country, there was not one single refugee. When they started bombing, refugees appeared, of course, as a result of bombing, and everybody knows it.76
However, on 25 April the first sign of open dissent emerged within the leadership in Belgrade when the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister and former opposition leader, Vuk Draskovic, called for the country's leadership to stop deceiving the population:
The men running this country must tell the people clearly where we stand and with whom we stand, tell them... what will remain of Serbia in 20 days if this dreadful bombing goes on… We should tell them: 'Don't expect anything from world opinion, nor from the collapse of Nato, nor from Russia.'77
Mr Draskovic, who is not a member of President Milosevic's inner circle, warned that Russia was likely to seek a compromise with NATO over Kosovo, rather than risk a confrontation. In a further interview with the BBC on 26 April Mr Draskovic indicated his support for a UN peacekeeping force with Russian involvement to be deployed to the province:
73 NATO Press Conference 21 April 1999, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int 74 ibid. 75 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 22 April 1999 76 ibid. 77 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 26 April 1999
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I would like to have UN forces without forces from Nato countries - we must approach a settlement and a settlement must be based on the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations.78
On 27 April it was reported that the privately-run TV station that had carried Mr Draskovic's comments had been taken off the air by the Yugoslav Army. Mr Draskovic denounced the move, saying:
In the case Mr Milosevic supports this, I am ready to stand up against Mr Milosevic. We will enter the streets and demonstrate against this anti-democratic decision. 79
However, on 28 April it was announced that Mr Draskovic had been dismissed for "jeopardising respect for the federal government."80
The day before, another senior Yugoslav official, Goran Matic, a minister from the Yugoslav United Left party of Mr Milosevic's wife Mirjana Markovic, indicated that a diplomatic resolution to the conflict could be imminent. Mr Matic, who is closer than Mr Draskovic to Mr Milosevic's inner circle, said he believed that "this will be the week in which the basic outline of an agreement on Kosovo can be firmed up." He went on to say that the conflict could be resolved as quickly as "both sides can bring elements of rationality to the problem," although he insisted that the Belgrade's official position remained one of opposition to an armed international presence in the province.81
On 22 April several thousand people demonstrated in the Montenegrin capital, Podgorica, against the NATO air strikes. However, the demonstration, organised by the opposition Socialist People's Party, failed to attract as much support as the organisers had hoped.
On 25 April 161 ethnic Albanian refugees arrived in the United Kingdom and were granted exceptional leave to remain for twelve months. On 27 April the flow of refugees out of Kosovo resumed as over 5,000 ethnic Albanians crossed into FYR Macedonia.
Diplomatic Moves
On 22 April the Russian special envoy to Yugoslavia, former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, announced that talks with President Milosevic had yielded agreement from Belgrade for an "international presence" under the control of the UN. Mr Chernomyrdin gave no clarification on whether the force would be armed, leading President Clinton to declare:
78 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 27 April 1999 79 ibid. 80 BBC Ceefax, 28 April 1999 81 International Herald Tribune, 28 April 1999
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If there is an offer for a genuine security force, that's the first time Mr Milosevic has done that, and that represents I suppose some sort of step forward.82
However, Belgrade subsequently denied that it had agreed to a military force, stating instead that it had proposed an unarmed UN observer force.83
NATO air strikes were reported to have done considerable damage to Yugoslavia's petroleum supply system, including the two refineries at Novi Sad and Pancevo. However, the Financial Times reported on 23 April that crude supplies had continued to arrive after 24 March from countries such as Italy, Greece and also the United Kingdom, although the damage to the refineries apparently was preventing Belgrade from producing refined gasoline, diesel or jet fuel. To halt any further supply of oil the European Commission agreed on 23 April to prohibit the supply and sale of petroleum and petroleum products to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. To ensure that Belgrade could not replenish its supplies from other sources, NATO indicated its intention to impose an oil embargo on the FRY.84
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov declared his country would not be party to an enforced oil embargo, raising fears that Russian vessels might try to break the blockade. However, on 25 April Defence Secretary George Robertson said he did not anticipate any Russian move, stating that: “The refuelling of the Serb machine is not on Russia’s agenda.”85
The US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot, held talks on 27 April with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and special envoy Victor Chernomyrdin to co-ordinate efforts towards finding a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Mr Talbot described the talks as "intense and constructive",86 but cautioned that the task was extremely complicated.87
Mr Cook also declared his desire for Russia to be "part of the solution to the Kosovo crisis", and indicated that Russia's previous opposition to a international military presence in Kosovo appeared to be changing:
[The Russians] are now willing to recognise that that international presence, to be credible, had to be a military presence. That is welcome. Of course to be credible, it would have to be a military presence that really did reassure the Kosovar Albanians.88
82 Financial Times, 23 April 1999 83 Guardian, 24 April 1999 84 For further information on the oil embargo see Section VII D 85 BBC Ceefax, 25 April 1999 86 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 27 April 1999 87 International Herald Tribune, 28 April 1999 88 "Interview by the Foreign Secretary", Robin Cook, BBC World Service, London, 27 April 1999, from FCO web site at http://www.fco.gov.uk
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It was expected that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan would travel to Moscow for talks on 29 or 30 April and there were signs that another diplomatic initiative by the Russian special envoy was imminent.
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IV The Humanitarian Situation
A. The Situation in the Region
The fighting in Kosovo has provoked a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions. As of 28 April the UNHCR estimated that there were 367,200 refugees in Albania, 142,650 in FYR Macedonia, 15,000 in Bosnia and more than 63,000 displaced Kosovars in Montenegro. The US State Department reported on 22 April that "at least an additional 650,000 Kosovars appear to be internally displaced persons." That would mean approximately 1.5 million ethnic Albanians, or three-quarters of the estimated 1998 population, have been forcibly expelled from their homes.89
The international community has responded to the humanitarian crisis by setting up camps in the region and flying some refugees out for temporary residency in third countries. Table 1 below details the numbers of refugees evacuated to third countries:
Table 1: Humanitarian evacuations of Kosovar refugees from FYR of Macedonia from 5 April through 28 April 1999 (figures subject to daily verification)90
Receiving Country Arrivals 28 April Total Austria - 811 Belgium - 676 Croatia * - 188 Czech Republic 115 115 Finland 147 481 France 592 1,777 Germany - 9,974 Iceland - 23 Israel - 106 Netherlands 157 1,011 Norway 162 1,732 Poland - 635 Spain - 103 Sweden 157 444 Switzerland - 33 Turkey ** 263 5,407 United Kingdom - 161 TOTAL *** 1,593 23,677
89 Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo, Fact Sheet based on information from U.S. Government sources, 22 April 1999, from the US State Department web site at http://www.state.gov 90 UNHCR Kosovo Crisis Update, 28 April 1999 from UNHCR web site at http://www.unhcr.ch
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* Croatia: of whom 88 bilaterally without UNHCR/IOM involvement ** Turkey: of whom 1,980 without UNHCR/IOM involvement (source: Turkish government) *** Total: of whom 2,068 without UNHCR/IOM involvement
The following section looks at the British and EU response to the crisis, after an initial description of how such aid fits in with the UK's overall approach to international development.
B. Definition of emergency aid
In recent years, humanitarian aid or assistance has become a rigorously defined category of UK assistance called emergency aid. Emergency aid combines food aid, disaster relief, refugee relief and disaster preparedness, and generally involves the provision of material aid (including food, medical care and personnel), finance and advice to:
-save and preserve lives during emergency situations and in the immediate post- emergency rehabilitation phase
-cope with short and longer term population displacements arising out of emergencies91
The Department for International Development's (DFID's) objectives for emergency aid were set out in its White Paper (Eliminating World Poverty)92. The relevant extract is reproduced below.
Disasters and Emergencies
Disasters, both natural and man-made, and often recurrent, are a significant burden on poor societies. The root causes of poverty tend to leave poor people not only more exposed to hazards, but also less able to cope in the event of a disaster. Our objectives in assisting countries to deal with disaster are not only to save lives through emergency relief, but also to protect and rebuild livelihoods and communities, and reduce vulnerability to future disasters. In responding to disasters, we aim to provide swift, appropriate and cost-effective financial, material and technical assistance, based on analysis of actual need. We shall endeavour to do this in ways that encourages [sic] the participation of all stakeholders in decisions that affect their lives, builds [sic] local capacity and lays a solid foundation for rehabilitation and recovery. The UK’s capacity to respond to disasters overseas will be strengthened through tapping the vast reservoir of available skills and building partnerships within the public and private sectors to ensure that all players are used to their best comparative advantage. In all disaster work, our responsibility must be first and foremost to those affected.
91 British Overseas Aid 1992/93-1996/97 92 Eliminating World Poverty: A challenge for the 21st century, Cm 3789
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Disaster preparedness and prevention will be an integral part of our development co-operation programme. We shall work with disaster-prone partner countries to develop systems for the better management of man-made hazards and, where feasible, natural hazards, so as to reduce their human impact. The multitude of actors involved in humanitarian work underlines the importance of international co-operation based on sound principles. Hence we shall encourage system-wide agreement on common performance standards and a code of ethical conduct for organisations involved in humanitarian work, and will seek to implement guidelines already agreed within the OECD. We shall work for, and co-operate with, a more effective and efficient multilateral humanitarian system, building on the capabilities of UN institutions, the Red Cross Movement, other international organisations and NGOs. Within the EU, we shall also work closely with other member states and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) to ensure more consistent joint policies and approaches.93
In April 1998, DFID published Principles of a New Humanitarianism as a guide to its humanitarian assistance operations. According to DFID, the benefit of this approach is that its humanitarian relief is provided in a "principled and accountable manner, while at the same time addressing the underlying causes for the crises."94 The values and standards underpinning DFID's humanitarian work are outlined below.
Principles of a New Humanitarianism
• we will seek always to uphold international humanitarian and human rights laws and conventions; • we will seek to promote a more universal approach in addressing humanitarian needs wherever they arise. People in need - wherever they are - should have equal status and rights to assistance; • our humanitarian policy will seek to work with other efforts aimed at tackling the underlying causes of a crisis and building peace and stability; • we will seek to work with other committed members of the international community, and in particular seek collaboration across the North/South divide to secure better international systems and mechanisms for timely joint humanitarian action; • we will agree 'ground rules' that prevent diversion of humanitarian goods and collusion with unconstitutional armed groups; • we will be impartial: our help will seek to relieve the suffering of non-combatants without discrimination on political or other grounds with priority given to the most urgent cases of distress; • we will seek the best possible assessment of needs, and a clear framework of standards and accountability from those who work to deliver our assistance; • we will encourage the participation of people and communities affected by crises to help them find durable solutions which respect their rights and dignity; • we will, where possible, seek to rebuild livelihoods and communities, and build capacity to reduce vulnerability to future crises;
93 Source: DFID's White Paper 94 DFID Annual Report 1999, page 94, Cm 4210
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• we recognise that humanitarian intervention in conflict situations often poses genuine moral dilemmas. We will base our decisions on explicit analyses of the choices open to us and the ethical considerations involved and communicate our conclusions openly to those with whom we work.95
C. Level of UK total emergency aid
The outturn for the UK's total development budget in 1997/98 was £2,059 million, of which some £196 million (9½%) was provided in the form of emergency aid. Of this £196 million, £90 million was provided as UK bilateral emergency aid with the remaining £106 million being provided through the UN and EC. In short, the UK provided 46% of emergency aid through bilateral channels, 44% through the EC and 10% through the UN.
Table 2 below shows the total level of UK spending on emergency aid for the five most recent years. In 1997/98 UK bilateral emergency aid was divided up between disaster relief (£65 million or 72%), refugee relief (£10 million or 11%), food aid (£9 million or 10%) and disaster preparedness (£6 million or 7%).96 The amount (£9.8 million) spent on refugee relief in 1997/98, was the lowest figure for some years.
The ten largest recipients of UK bilateral emergency aid are set out in table 3 below. In addition to UK bilateral emergency aid, DFID also funds emergency programmes through the UN and the EC. These figures are also set out in table 2.
95 DFID Annual Report 1999, page 95, Cm 4210 96 See DFID Departmental Annual Report 1999 page 93
34 Table 2
Emergency Aid1 £ thousand
1993/94 1994/95 1996/96 1996/97 1997/98 BILATERAL
Food Aid2 46,206 37,603 26,149 14,779 9,027 Disaster Relief3 114,308 146 353 93,803 88,344 65,127 Refugee Relief 17,331 22 383 19,348 12,704 9,808 Disaster Preparedness 1,755 2,998 2,740 4,449 5,872
Total Bilateral Emergency Aid 179,601 209,346 142,041 120,278 89,832 MULTILATERAL
UNITED NATIONS
UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs 101 1,600 207 243 173 UN High Commission for Refugees 18,847 15,055 16,046 5,036 10,000 UN Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) 9,000 6,000 6,666 8,140 10,067
TOTAL UN EMERGENCY AID 27,948 22,655 22,919 13,419 20,240 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
EC Food Aid (Emergency Provision) 35,960 28,466 32,301 25,265 20,455 EC Disaster Relief5 45,800 45,821 50,949 67,944 61,181 EC Refugee Relief5 11,200 6,650 12,030 9,553 2,665 EDF - Emergency and Refugee Allocation 8 500 24,916 15,446 4,159 1,842
TOTAL EC EMERGENCY AID 101,460 10,590 110,726 106,921 86,143
Total Multilateral Emergency Aid 129,408 128,508 133,645 120,340 106,383
Total Emergency Aid4 309,009 337,848 275,686 240,618 196,215
Notes 1. Emergency aid includes disaster relief, emergency food aid, short term refugee relief and disaster preparedness. 2. DFID channels assistance through the World Food Programme and NGOs as a means of providing emergency food aid. These amounts are recorded as bilateral food aid as DFID has control over the decision to provide such food aid to a particular destination.Regular non-emergency provisions of food are not included in this table. 3. DFID provides funding to certain UN Agencies for their humanitarian assistance programmes in individual countries. These amounts are recorded as bilateral disaster relief as DFID has influence over the bilateral disaster relief as DFID has influence over the use and destination of the funds. 4. DFID programme and GPEX expenditure are the same. 5. From 1995/96 EC Refugee Relief is included in the EC Disaster Relief totals shown in Table 8, but is shown separately here. Source Internaitonal Development Statistics 1993/94 to 1997/98 Table 3 Top Ten Recipients of UK Bilateral Emergency Aid 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 Country £m Country £m Country £m States of ex-Yugoslavia (1) 38 States of ex-Yugoslavia (1) 42 States of ex-Yugoslavia (1) 20 Angola 11 Rwanda 8 Monsterrat 12 Rwanda 9 Afghanistan 7 Sudan 5 Iraq (2) 7 Iraq (2) 6 Iraq (2) 3 Malawi 6 Angola 6 Ethiopia 3 Zambia 5 Monsterrat 6 Rwanda 3 Ethiopia 5 Republic of Tajikistan 4 Afghanistan 3 Afghanistan 5 Kenya 3 Malawi 2 Sudan 4 Sudan 3 Burindi 2 Liberia 3 Liberia 3 Angola 2
(1) Includes emergency aid to all the successor states of ex-Yugoslavia (2) There is no Uk aid to the government of Iraq. The amounts recorded as flows to Iraq are emergency aid provided through UN agencies and NGOs for Irqi citizens. Source: Statistics on International Development 1993/94 to 1997/98 RESEARCH PAPER 99/48
D. The UK Response to the Kosovo Crisis97
1. DFID's Objectives
DFID is responsible for the British Government's humanitarian effort arising from the Kosovo crisis. DFID's objectives are to:
• provide speedy assistance to refugees to relieve suffering and save lives; • promote the protection of the dignity and rights of refugees including the provision of reliable information to them, and the reunification of families; • encourage a climate of opinion in refugee hosting countries in the region that is tolerant towards refugees, and supportive of the international presence that seeks to assist them; • prepare adequately for new contingencies such as further refugee exodus, or significant movements between refugee hosting countries; and for the provision of humanitarian assistance within Kosovo as soon as access is possible; • plan for the return of refugees to Kosovo and the transition from emergency humanitarian relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction.
In practical terms, DFID's programme of assistance is currently engaged in:
• bolstering the role of UNHCR as the lead agency for refugee protection and assistance; • strengthening the in-country operating capacity of UNHCR, WFP, other UN agencies, Red Cross and NGOs which have the principal mandates to provide humanitarian assistance; • working with host governments to strengthen their capacity to plan and co- ordinate international and national assistance efforts; • advising and co-operating with the humanitarian assistance efforts of the NATO forces in the region; • providing logistical and other practical support (through airlifts, cargo handling equipment, transport assets, and logistic experts) to overcome practical constraints in assistance delivery; • providing material inputs (e.g. medical supplies, food, tents and blankets, water, sanitation and other requirements for refugee camps) for the use of beneficiaries, focusing particularly on the most vulnerable); • providing financial and other technical inputs to resource, expand and sustain humanitarian programmes that have been started; • directly managing humanitarian assistance projects where implementing partners are not available, and there is no alternative to direct DFID operations.
97 Many of the details of the UK effort have been taken directly from the Update Briefing from DFID of 19 April 1999.
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2. Organisation of aid effort
As part of a multinational aid effort, the UK’s humanitarian programme needs to be part of a well co-ordinated system. The UK assistance to the Kosovo crisis is managed by the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) of DFID. CHAD has established “Humanitarian Field Support Offices” in Albania and FYR Macedonia to work alongside the respective British embassies to ensure effective communication with host governments, NATO, UNHCR and other agencies, and other donors.98 The Field Offices are also responsible for the initial and rapid appraisal of further proposals for DFID assistance, supervising direct DFID-managed projects, and facilitating the work of the partners.
There is also an emphasis on working with local partners, not least in an effort to mobilise the refugees' own efforts. Although DFID supports the procurement of locally produced goods, it is also mindful of the need to mitigate, as far as possible, any adverse effects on the local economy and the local host population.
3. The form of UK assistance99
On 3 April 1999 the UK government announced that it had made a further £10 million available to boost the humanitarian relief effort for Kosovo refugees, bringing the total UK Government (bilateral) commitment to £20 million.100
The second £10 million tranche would come from the Treasury’s contingency reserve, which although within the Government's spending total, is outside DFID's budget.
An outline of the types of assistance provided by UK aid was given by Baroness Amos on 14 April. Her written answer is reproduced below.
Baroness Amos: Since 24 March, the Department for International Development has already spent or committed about £8 million assistance to the Kosovo refugees, including over £1.5 million for air transportation and cargo, £16,000 for an airport handling package for Tirana and £400,000 for a truck convoy for Albania. We have to date agreed cash grants of £0.82 million to UN agencies and £3.274 million to NGOs and the Red Cross. Further expenditure and disbursements are currently being considered.
An additional £3 million was made available for humanitarian assistance to the people of Kosovo between April 1998 and March 1999: of this, £1.5 million was allocated to the UN and £1.5 million to UK-based NGOs.101
98 In terms of working with non-governmental organisations, there is, for obvious reasons, a preference for working with NGOs with previous experience of working in the region. 99 During the 12 months prior to the NATO air strikes DFID channelled over £3 million through various NGOs. 100 "Clare Short to visit Macedonia and Albania, UK gives an additional £10 million for Kosovo Refugees", DFID PR, 20/99, 3 April 1999
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Since then further details of specific forms of assistance have been made available. The following section outlines some specific examples of the humanitarian assistance that has been provided by DFID.
Funding airlifts
• DFID has enabled United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), World Health Organisation (WHO), World Food Programme (WFP) and other operational agencies to deploy quickly personnel and immediate relief supplies to the refugees.
• Since 30 March there have been some 30 flights carrying over 1,000 tons of tents, blankets, food, medical kits and other emergency supplies for Albania and FYR Macedonia.102 Further flights are planned to transport emergency relief items including blankets, tents, cooking utensils, water and sanitation equipment.
Providing logistics support
• An airport logistic cell has been set up by DFID at Tirana airport to speed up the flow of aid into Albania: operations staff, 4 forklift trucks and other aircraft handling equipment have been flown in. DFID is providing a similar aircraft-handling package, including a team of 12 operators, for Skopje airport in FYR Macedonia.
• DFID is providing a convoy of five trucks and drivers to support UNHCR’s relief operations in Albania: the trucks arrived in Tirana on 16 April.
Setting up Refugee Camps and providing Humanitarian Supplies
• DFID has assisted NATO in the establishment of two camps with a current total capacity of 40,000 refugees at Brazhde/Stankowic in FYR Macedonia. DFID, in co- operation with UNHCR, has overseen the “civilianisation” of these camps and the take-over of service provision by NGOs.
• DFID is setting up a camp for 5,000 refugees in co-operation with UNHCR and NATO near Elbasan in southern Albania, and has offered to establish and run two new refugee centres in Tirana on behalf of the Albanian Government.
• DFID has funded the purchase and transportation of 14 World Health Organisation (WHO) emergency health kits to FYR Macedonia, and seven kits for Albania - these will cover the needs of 210,000 people for 3 months.
• DFID is helping to establish contingency stockpiles of food, tents and blankets in the region to enable the rapid provision of assistance to the internally displaced in Kosovo as soon as access to them can be obtained.
101 HL Deb 14 April 1999, c123-4w 102 Details are given in the table at Appendix 5
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Personnel Providing Specialist to Albania and FYR Macedonia.
• A team of 12 people has been provided to run the truck convoy in Albania. 2 air operations and aircraft handling experts in Tirana. 7 professional staff to manage DFID programme in Albania, including logistics, health, water and sanitation, and camp planning specialists.
• 5 professional staff to run DFID programme in FYR Macedonia, including logistics, health and water and sanitation specialists. 12 air operations staff under recruitment for Skopje.
Cash grants to International Agencies
• £500,000 to World Food Programme (WFP) to transport food supplies to the refugees.
• £250,000 to UNICEF for programmes in Montenegro.
• £1 million for the International Organisation for Migration for regional programmes, including refugee registration, public information and training and capacity building.
• £2.5 million to the British Red Cross for immediate relief supplies and to help establish a refugee family tracing system to help those who have been separated to get in contact with their relations and be reunited with them. This is to be implemented through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)/International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC).
• £72,000 to IFRC for relief logisticians
Resourcing NGOs’ humanitarian operations
• Oxfam (£300,000 for relief programmes in Albania) • Save the Children Fund (£300,000 for regional relief programmes) • Children’s Aid Direct (£102,000 for relief programmes in Albania) • Action Against Hunger (£99,600 for a feeding programme in FYR Macedonia) • Finnish Red Cross (£27,500 for lighting for refugee camps in FYR Macedonia) • International Centre for Humanitarian Reporting (£78,800 for radio programmes and distribution of radios) • Merlin (£140,000 for health care programmes in Albania) • Christian Aid (£600,000 for relief programmes in Montenegro and Albania) • Project Hope (£100,000 for a regional medical aid programme) • Salvation Army (£145,000 for mobile canteens in Albania) • ADRA (£200,000 for food distribution in Albania) • CAFOD (£100,000 for relief programmes in Albania) • War Child (£350,000 for a mobile bakery programme in Albania)
New NGO projects are now being approved on a daily basis by the DFID offices in Skopje and Tirana, using their delegated authority from DFID HQ.
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E. Level of EC aid
The EU General Council agreed on 8 April 1999 to provide PLOOLRQ £167 million); comprising million (£100 million) for direct assistance to Kosovo refugees and million (£67 million) for budgetary aid to the governments of FYR Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro.
The EU's direct assistance to the refugees is channelled through NGOs and the UNHCR. The budgetary assistance is provided to the governments of the three neighbouring countries. In addition, the EU will be working with the International Financial Institutions (IFI), such as the International Monetary Fund. Planning for a programme of reconstruction and development once the conflict is over remains at an early stage.
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V War Crimes
There are various issues relating to war crimes which may have been or may yet be committed in the course of the conflict. Many would claim that Mr Milosevic and other political, military and paramilitary figures in the FRY have committed war crimes in the course of their actions concerning Kosovo. NATO has been at pains to stress its efforts to avoid transgressing the laws of war in its attacks on the military capability of the FRY. In particular, the treatment of civilians is relevant to the actions of both the FRY and NATO. There is already an International Tribunal, set up in reaction to the Bosnia conflict, which can try those accused of war crimes in Kosovo.
Two of the most relevant texts are the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention, although a range of others could also be of interest.
A. Geneva Conventions
General Outline
The four treaties adopted in Geneva in August 1949, known as the Geneva Conventions or the Red Cross Conventions (they were sponsored by the Red Cross movement), are the most widely respected basic undertakings in the humanitarian field of the laws of war. They build on previous conventions in this field, and set out provisions for the protection of various types of victims of armed conflicts. The First Convention covers wounded and sick in armed forces in the field, the Second covers wounded, sick and ship-wrecked in armed forces at sea, the Third covers prisoners-of-war, and the Fourth covers civilians. Two Additional Protocols were adopted in 1977. These develop and widen the scope of application of the Conventions beyond armed conflicts solely involving states. Protocol I does this in relation to international conflicts, and also supplements the provisions of the Conventions in other ways, Protocol II does it in relation to civil wars.
The Geneva Conventions and Protocols have a wide measure of support and, in particular, the common articles which are shared by each of the Conventions are regarded as declaratory of customary international law. Violations defined in the Conventions as ‘grave breaches’ constitute war crimes and are subject to universal jurisdiction, meaning that any state may try any suspect regardless of their nationality and of where the alleged offence took place. Grave breaches include wilful killing, torture, inhuman treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury, biological experiments, extensive wanton destruction of property not justified by military necessity, and, in relation to civilians, unlawful deportation, transfer or confinement and taking of hostages.103 Protocol I adds to the list attacks on civilians and various other attacks (such as
103 First Geneva Convention, Articles 49 and 50; Second Geneva Convention, Articles 50 and 51; Third Geneva Convention, Articles 129 and 130; Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 146 and 147. The First and Second Conventions set out the same grave breaches, the Third and Fourth repeat these with additions.
42 RESEARCH PAPER 99/48 indiscriminate ones) likely to cause excessive loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects.104
UK and FRY Are Parties
The UK signed the Geneva Conventions on 8 December 1949 and ratified them on 23 September 1957. War crimes were made an exception to the rule of territorial jurisdiction by the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, so that war crimes committed abroad by foreigners may be dealt with by British courts. The UK signed the Additional Protocols on 12 December 1977, but did not ratify immediately, as it had concerns over many aspects of their application. These included the definition of those groups to be covered (successive Governments sought to exclude terrorist groups) and the question of whether British policy on nuclear weapons would be in conflict with the provisions in the Protocols on indiscriminate attacks. Eventually these obstacles were considered to have been overcome, and the UK ratified the Additional Protocols on 28 January 1998.
Yugoslavia signed the Conventions on 10 February 1950 and ratified them on 21 April 1950; it signed the Additional Protocols on 12 December 1977 and ratified them on 11 June 1979. In general the British Government regards the FRY as being bound by the obligations entered into by Yugoslavia, and this applies to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols.105 On its establishment the FRY made clear its intention to ‘strictly abide by all the commitments that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [ie former Yugoslavia] assumed internationally.'106 It thus accepted the treaty obligations of the former Yugoslavia, which in the field of human rights were quite extensive. Normally, this kind of succession to treaty obligations would require a formal notification to the other States Parties to each treaty, as has been given by other former Yugoslav republics. However, in the course of its ongoing consideration of a case brought against the FRY by Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning the application of the Genocide Convention, the International Court of Justice has judged that the FRY’s general statement of intention to be bound, together with the fact that other States Parties have not contested that it should be considered party to the Genocide Convention, are enough to entail that it is bound by it.107 This principle would be likely to apply to the Geneva Conventions as well.
104 Article 85. 105 This applies to treaties which do not have a special procedure for joining. The FRY was not considered automatically to be party to the UN Charter, as the General Assembly and Security Council refused to allow the FRY to take over the Yugoslav seat in the General Assembly. Where the obligations of the former Yugoslavia can be divided (a UN seat obviously cannot), each successor state may inherit the obligations pertaining to its territory. 106 Formal declaration on behalf of the FRY, 27 April 1992, confirmed in official Note of same date from Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia at the UN to the Secretary-General, cited in ICJ Judgement on Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 11 July 1996, section 17. 107 ICJ Judgement on Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 11 July 1996, section 17.
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Some Relevant Provisions of the Conventions
NATO and the FRY would be expected to adhere to the Geneva Conventions regardless of whether their conflict is held to be a war. Article 2, one of the common articles which appears in all four of the Conventions, begins:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them.
The reference to ‘declared war’ is of limited relevance today, as war is seldom if ever declared any more. It is probably not a sound interpretation to suggest that if all parties failed to recognise the state of war (rather than just one of them as stated in Article 2) then the Conventions would not apply. 108
The Fourth Geneva Convention relates to the protection of civilians in time of war. However, it tends to envisage the situation of an occupying armed force acting in another state’s territory and concerns the treatment of civilians in that context. It might not be wholly relevant to the current situation concerning the FRY, but Part II does include important humanitarian provisions, such as the provision and protection of civilian hospitals and the special protection of children.
Additional Protocol I makes further provisions for the protection of the victims of international armed conflicts. In its Article 1 it draws into the definition of an international armed conflict
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self- determination.
Part IV relates to civilians. Within this Part, Article 48 states that
in order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.
108 The Law of War, I Detter de Lupis, 1987, p12. De Lupis states that ‘most admit there was a drafting error,’ and cites various authorities to suggest that the intended effect of the phrase is simply to deny the right of states to refuse to apply the Conventions on the subjective basis that they do not recognise that a state of war exists.
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Protection is thus extended both to civilians themselves and to civilian objects. The definitions of civilian objects and military objectives are given in Article 52, discussed below.
Article 51 sets out detailed provisions for the protection of the civilian population. This includes that ‘the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.’
It also includes a prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, being those not directed at a specific military objective, or those which employ methods or means which cannot be so directed or which cannot be limited, and which therefore ‘are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.’ These include
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
The Article also prohibits the use of civilians to render any areas immune from attack or to shield military objectives or operations, and holds that
the Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.
However, the Article holds that the other parties to the conflict are not released from their obligations to those civilians simply because they are being used as shields.
Article 52 goes into detail on the protection of civilian objects, which may not be the object of an attack. Civilian objects are all those which are not military objectives, as defined in paragraph 2 of the Article. Paragraph 2 is as follows:
attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
In cases of doubt as to whether an object normally used for civilian purposes is being used temporarily for military purposes, the Article holds that it shall be presumed that it is not being used for military purposes (ie it will enjoy protection as a civilian object).
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Article 53 prohibits attacks on places of worship, historic monuments or works or art. Article 54 prohibits attacks on, destruction of, or removal or rendering useless of ‘objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,’ such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation works. A derogation is allowed in this regard within territory under a state’s own control ‘where required by imperative military necessity.’ Article 55 provides for the protection of the natural environment. Article 56 prohibits attacks on dams, dykes or nuclear power stations, even if those objects are military objectives, if the attack ‘may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.’ Article 57 sets out precautions which must be taken to spare the civilian population and civilian objects.
Additional Protocol II sets out provisions for the protection of victims of non- international armed conflicts. The regime here is a little looser than in the case of international armed conflicts, but there are still important provisions.
Article 1 of the Protocol states that it applies to all armed conflicts not of an international character and which take place within the territory of a High Contracting Party
between its forces and dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
It does not apply
to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature.
Article 3 holds that
nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict occurs.
Part IV of the Protocol relates specifically to the civilian population, and repeats in slightly modified form many of the provisions of Part IV of Protocol I. Article 13 makes the general provision that civilians shall enjoy protection from military operations. It holds that civilians shall not be the object of an attack, and that
acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
Article 14 prohibits attacks on, destruction of or removal or rendering useless of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs and agricultural areas for their production, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and
46 RESEARCH PAPER 99/48 irrigation works. Article 15 prohibits attacks on dams, dykes and nuclear power stations, and Article 16 prohibits attacks on places of worship, historic monuments or works of art.
Article 17 concerns the forced movement of civilians and reads as follows:
1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.
2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict.
Between them these articles embody the most relevant of the Geneva provisions in the current situation, although others might become relevant in the light of circumstances. NATO’s actions might be considered usefully in the light of the provisions of Additional Protocol I, while the FRY’s actions might be considered usefully in relation to both the Additional Protocols.
B. Genocide Convention
General Outline
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948. International legal action against genocide grew out of the work of Dr Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term in 1944 and pressed for its recognition as a specific crime. This recognition was reflected in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, and the General Assembly declared genocide a crime under international law in its Resolution 96 (I) of 11 December 1946. The prohibition on genocide is thus not restricted to the Convention: it predates it by at least two years, and is often cited as an example of jus cogens, that is, a peremptory norm of international law, binding on all states regardless of treaty provisions.109 Nor is the Convention solely concerned with upholding the prohibition: it is concerned with setting out provisions for the punishment of the crime.
109 Peremptory norms are ones which are accepted by the international community as a whole, from which there may be no derogation and which may be modified only by the emergence of a subsequent norm of the same character. They take precedence over other obligations. See, eg, International Law, 4th ed, M Shaw, 1997, pp96-8.
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UK and FRY Are Parties
The UK did not sign the Genocide Convention, as a result of concerns over its implications for British asylum law.110 In 1965 the Government’s view of these implications changed111 and the UK enacted the necessary provisions in British law under the Genocide Act 1969. At this point 73 states were party to the Convention. The Convention had entered into force on 12 January 1951 for those states which were party to it, having gained the required number of ratifications and accessions (20) under its Article XIII. Once the Genocide Act 1969 was passed the UK moved to accede to the Convention. The instrument of accession was deposited on 30 January 1970 and, again under the terms of Article XIII, became effective on 30 April 1970.
Yugoslavia signed the Convention on 11 December 1948 and ratified it on 29 August 1950. As mentioned above, the ICJ has ruled that the FRY is bound by the Convention, having declared itself bound (in respect to its jurisdiction) by the obligations which were entered into by the former Yugoslavia. As also noted above, this is not necessary as a means of prohibiting the FRY from committing genocide, which is an international crime regardless, but it does oblige the FRY to prevent and to punish the crime.
Some Provisions of the Convention
Article I of the Convention confirms that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or of war, is a crime under international law. States Parties undertake to prevent and to punish it.
Article II defines genocide. It reads as follows:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
110 Article VII states that genocide shall not be considered a political crime for the purposes of extradition (political crimes are not normally subject to extradition proceedings). The British Government was concerned that spurious allegations of genocide could be used to gain extradition of genuine political refugees. 111 HC Deb 15 November 1965, cc680-1.
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Article III provides that the following acts shall be punishable
(a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide.
Article IV provides that anyone committing any of the acts listed in Article III shall be punished, ‘whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.’
Article VI provides for trial
by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
The Genocide Act 1969 modified the application of the ‘double criminality’ rule in extradition cases involving alleged genocide. Normally extradition cannot take place unless the alleged crime was a crime in both this country and the country seeking extradition at the time when it was committed. Section 2(3) of the Genocide Act 1969 removes the requirement that at the time it was committed the alleged crime must have been a crime in the country in which it was committed. This was in recognition of the fact that when genocide occurs it tends to be the responsibility of the government in whose territory it occurs, and may be supported by legislation enacted by that government. It was considered contrary to the spirit of the Convention to allow such acts to go unpunished, even though the Convention itself is silent on the matter.
The definition of genocide can be read in a restrictive way, and there are cases of notorious mass killings which might not be regarded as falling within the definition. The list of groups the destruction of which constitutes genocide does not include political groups, so that the actions of many dictatorships in the second half of the 20th century would be excluded, while the ‘intent to destroy’ a group, ‘in whole or in part,’ and ‘as such’ may be difficult to prove. The Holocaust was of course the definitive example of genocide in modern times, and the killings in Rwanda in 1994 also generally have been regarded as such.112 The terms of the definition of genocide in the Convention would doubtless be read carefully by lawyers acting for any defendant charged with such crimes in relation to Kosovo.
112 The Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to Security Council Resolution 955, allows for prosecution of persons responsible for genocide in Rwanda. An interesting, if polemical, discussion of examples of mass killings which might or might not be considered to constitute genocide is given in Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, A Destexhe, 1995.
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C. International Tribunal
The International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia was established by Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993, on the basis of proposals contained in a report of the Secretary-General. The Resolution adopted the Statute of the Tribunal also contained in that report.113 The full designation is the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. It sits at the Hague, and since October 1996 the Chief Prosecutor has been Justice Louise Arbour from Canada. The Tribunal has over 600 staff from 57 countries. Its budget has climbed steadily each year, and is $94,103,800 for 1999.114
The Tribunal is not confined to conflicts between states, but merely to violations committed ‘in the territory of the former Yugoslavia’ between 1991 and a date to be set by the Security Council once peace has been restored. This was intended to avoid disputes about the status of the combatants in the Bosnia conflict, but also means that the Tribunal enjoys jurisdiction over the current conflict in the FRY. The Tribunal is responsible for prosecuting war crimes (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and of the laws or customs of war), genocide and crimes against humanity. It is not responsible for prosecuting crimes against peace, ie planning, preparation and initiation of war. This means that defendants could be brought before the Tribunal on charges of genocide, or of ordering or condoning grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, but not of initiating the conflict in the first place. In the first annual report of the Tribunal the President commented that ‘the underlying reason is probably that the Security Council preferred to reserve to itself competence in the field of aggression and similar crimes against peace.’115
The Tribunal takes primacy over national jurisdiction, so that suspects should normally be handed over to the Tribunal, rather than being tried in national courts.
As at 31 March 1999 the Tribunal had indicted 84 individuals in 25 indictments. Only one person had been convicted and was serving his sentence and one had been acquitted. Five others had been convicted but were appealing, one had pleaded guilty to 31 crimes against humanity and violations of the laws of war but was still being tried for genocide, and the trials of 10 others were ongoing. Six accused had died and charges against 18 had been dropped. A total of 26 people were in custody, including those still being tried or appealing and those awaiting trial.116
113 S/25704, 3 May 1993. 114 Fact Sheet, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 March 1999, from http://www.un.org/icty/glance/fact.htm. 115Annual Report of the International Tribunal…, A/49/342, 29 August 1994, p13. 116 Fact Sheet, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 March 1999, from http://www.un.org/icty/glance/fact.htm.
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UK Support for the Tribunal
On 22 April Mr Lloyd listed the financial contributions made by the Government to the work of the Tribunal:
The Government have already contributed £290,000 this year to support various aspects of the work of the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in addition to the UK's assessed contribution for 1999 of US$5.08m. The Tribunal has not so far sought further financial contributions for its work on Kosovo. We will give careful consideration to any such requests should they be made. We are also considering certain requests for assistance in kind, in addition to the assistance with information on atrocities that we are already providing to the Tribunal.117
D. Allegations of War Crimes
Since the Yugoslav offensive began in Kosovo in mid-March 1999 numerous allegations have been made of atrocities in Kosovo, with widespread reports of massacres, rapes, forced expulsions, and the destruction of civilian housing. However, independent corroboration of the claims will be difficult to obtain until international observers are able to return to the province.
The US State Department has compiled weekly summaries of alleged instances of ethnic cleansing, based on information from US Government sources. The following is an extract from the summary of 22 April 1999:
Kosovar Albanian refugees continue to report mass executions in at least 60 towns and villages throughout the province, and they have reported mass graves in Drenica, Izbica, Kaaniku, Malisevo, Pusto Selo, Rezalla and the Pagarusa valley. We have confirmed the presence of a mass burial site at Pusto Selo and another in Izbica. Numerous refugee reports indicate a new pattern of Serb execution in which Serb forces order ethnic Albanian men to run for about 1,500 meters, and then shoot them. This creates forensic evidence that would allow the Serbs to claim the victims were collateral casualties of military operations. Kosovar Albanian refugees continue to report both mass and individual summary executions throughout the province. Refugee reports of Serbian mass executions total over 3,800 ethnic Albanian deaths. The number would be far higher if we took into account the countless tales of individual murder. The organized and individual rape of ethnic Albanian women by Serb security forces and paramilitaries are being reported in increasing numbers by Kosovar refugees. According to refugees, Serb forces have conducted systematic rapes in Dakovica
117 HC Deb 22 April 1999, c613w
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and at the Hotel Karagac in Pec… Disturbingly, some 150,000 to 500,000 military-age men remain missing in Kosovo.118
The United Kingdom and other NATO countries have indicated a willingness to pass relevant intelligence information to the Tribunal to assist with its investigations. Foreign Office Minister Tony Lloyd stated on 22 April:
A senior FCO official, David Gowan, has been appointed to be Kosovo War Crimes Coordinator. He will be responsible for ensuring that the Government pass as much information as possible, including intelligence, to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia that might be relevant to the Tribunal's investigations.119
During the war in Bosnia, the leadership in Belgrade managed to avoid being directly implicated by the International Tribunal for the war crimes that took place. It may prove easier, though, for the Tribunal to prove complicity on the part of President Milosevic and his inner circle in the atrocities that are reportedly occurring in Kosovo, as SACEUR, General Wesley Clark, indicated in a recent interview:
I think it is very clear that the leadership knows precisely who these people are and what they're doing. There's no question that this is part of a grander design.120
The question then arises as to whether the leadership in Belgrade would be willing to conclude a settlement with NATO that does not grant them some form of immunity from prosecution, although Mr Cook has insisted that amnesties for indicted war criminals are not an option:
I don't believe that the major powers would offer an amnesty to anyone they indict and indeed that would not be the policy of Britain.121
Nonetheless, Mr Cook acknowledged that the need for a resolution to the conflict could force NATO into some form of accommodation with President Milosevic:
I will deal with anybody who enables us to return the refugees to Kosovo under international protection. If that involves dealing with those who have effective power in Belgrade, then we owe it to the refugees to do that. The question of the indictment of Mr Milosevic is one where we are very happy to provide all the
118 Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo, Fact Sheet based on information from U.S. Government sources, 22 April 1999, from the US State Department web site at http://www.state.gov 119 HC Deb 22 April 1999, c613w 120 BBC Panorama Special, 28 April 1999 121 BBC Panorama Special, 28 April 1999
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information to Judge Arbour. She must then make up her mind as to whether or not he is legally culpable.122
The chief prosecutor, Louise Arbour, has indicated that she intends to act quickly in issuing indictments to ensure that "amnesty never becomes an option".123
122 BBC Panorama Special, 28 April 1999 123 BBC Panorama Special, 28 April 1999
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VI Opinion within the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has played a prominent role in the NATO campaign and the Government remains committed to ensuring that the objectives set out by the Alliance are attained.
During the debate on Kosovo on 19 April the Shadow Foreign Secretary, Michael Howard, expressed his party's continued support for the Government:
We continue to support the Government. We continue to believe that it was right to take action against the regime that has inflicted so much terror on those whom it regards as its own citizens.124
However, he questioned whether NATO's original objective of averting a humanitarian disaster had been achieved:
Although I have no doubt that much damage has been done to Milosevic's military machine…we must nevertheless face facts, and one of those deeply unpalatable facts is that NATO's primary objective - to prevent a humanitarian disaster - has not been achieved. That must be the starting point for any honest examination as to how we should now proceed.125
For the Liberal Democrats, Menzies Campbell also indicated his party's support for the Government's position, but expressed doubts as to whether air strikes alone would be capable of achieving NATO's declared objectives:
Liberal Democrats have contended that an air campaign alone would not suffice and that military presence on the ground would be essential for the return of the refugees … I believe that it was wrong for NATO to rule out the option of ground forces in such an apparently unequivocal way… Milosevic should have been left in confusion and doubt about NATO's intentions.
However, other Members have questioned the decision to use military force. In a party political broadcast on 29 March, the leader of the Scottish National Party, Alex Salmond, said that the Government was mistaken to use air power against Belgrade, arguing that air strikes typically served to “steel the resolve of the civilian population” and cited London during the Blitz as an example.126 Alan Clark called the war "clumsy, wasteful and shambolic" and claimed the operation had "neither clearly defined objectives nor any measurable progress in attaining them."127 Tony Benn argued that NATO was contravening its own constitution by attacking a sovereign state without the explicit
124 HC Deb 19 April 1999, c583 125 ibid. c584 126 Financial Times, 30 March 1999 127 HC Deb 19 April 1999, c597
54 RESEARCH PAPER 99/48 authorisation of the UN Security Council, although the Government maintained that NATO has sufficient legal authority to act to prevent a humanitarian disaster in the province.
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VII Current Developments and Future Prospects
A. The Campaign So Far
As of 27 April 1999 around 11,000 sorties (4,400 strike sorties) have been flown in combination with Tomahawk cruise missile attacks from B-52 bombers and naval vessels in the Adriatic.128 The air campaign has widened quickly from initial attacks upon a narrow selection of targets, such as air defences and communication sites, to a broad range of targets, including those involving infrastructure and logistics, such as bridges, railways and refineries. The escalation of NATO operations was starkly illustrated by the bombing of military-related government buildings in the centre of Belgrade on 3 April.
Since the campaign began on 24 March there has been a steady build-up of NATO forces in theatre. The number of aircraft directly involved in the operation has more than doubled from an initial total of around 400 aircraft (250 planes from the US) to over 1000 (800 US). There has also been a move to 24-hour bombing. There are approximately 7,300 US troops and 6,000 other NATO troops directly supporting air operations at the Aviano Air Base in Italy and other European bases.129
The US Congress has also approved the call up of as many as 30,000 reservists, probably as pilots and aircrew. In addition to the planned deployment of some 16,000 land troops to form part of the proposed Kosovo peace implementation force (KFOR), around 8,000 NATO ground troops are being deployed to Albania, mainly to assist in the humanitarian effort. The increase in naval strength is best illustrated by the fact that there are currently three aircraft carriers (USS Theodore Roosevelt, HMS Invincible and the French carrier Foch) in the region.
It remains difficult to assess accurately the effectiveness of NATO bombing in weakening Yugoslavia’s military capabilities. NATO claims to have seriously degraded Yugoslavia’s air defences and overall military capability, although NATO aircraft are still encountering some anti-aircraft fire and missile attacks when on sorties.
The NATO air campaign has been slowed by unfavourable and unpredictable weather conditions. The problems that cloud cover can pose for laser-guided weapons, and the strict rules of engagement being placed on allied pilots in order to reduce the risk of civilian casualties (collateral damage) have slowed for the operation and have led to a heavy reliance on cruise missile attacks in the early part of the operation. The most crucial impact of this, both politically and militarily, has been the delay in hampering the operations of Yugoslav units in Kosovo and therefore NATO’s ability to slow or halt the ethnic cleansing. The deployment of Apache helicopters and MLRS rocket system to
128 NATO Press Conference 14 April 1999, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int 129 Department of Defense web site at http://www.defenselink.mil
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Albania is evidence of NATO’s desire to have a greater impact upon Yugoslav ground forces in Kosovo.
B. Criticisms of NATO
NATO has encountered some criticism over its handling of the campaign, with some commentators suggesting that the ever-increasing level of military hardware and personnel is evidence that initially NATO seriously underestimated and miscalculated the military task which it faced.
Another criticism levelled at Western leaders is the claim that they failed to foresee and make adequate provision for the scale of the humanitarian crisis that developed in the region, as argued by The Times of 4 April:
There seems little doubt that Milosevic was planning ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, but it defies common sense that he intended to send hundreds of thousands over the borders in a matter of days. NATO did not expect this, even though it had been warned, and it did not prepare humanitarian aid on the frontiers.130
Some commentators allege that warnings were given by the Pentagon, the Director of the CIA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, rather than back down after the initial wave of air strikes, Belgrade would in fact increase its campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.131 SACEUR, General Wesley Clark, later acknowledged:
We knew there were going to be some horrendous atrocities. We knew it was going to be fast and violent. We know it might lead to the expulsion of Kosovars from certain regions of Kosovo. That it would lead to the wholesale expulsion of the Kosovar Albanian population, no, we had no indication of that.132
Critics also believe it was a mistake to rule out explicitly the use of ground forces in an offensive role at the beginning of the operation. Instead, it is claimed that Alliance leaders should have kept President Milosevic in the dark as to their intentions, instead of insisting that air power alone would be sufficient. Others maintain that NATO should have assembled a large ground force in the region prior to the start of NATO air strikes, although such a move could have undermined the credibility of the diplomatic efforts at the Rambouillet talks. On the other hand, other observers, such as Lord Owen, believe that a military build-up prior to Rambouillet would have served as a demonstration of NATO's resolve:
130 Times, 4 April 1999 131 See for example Guardian, 6 April 1999, Washington Post, 7 April 1999, International Herald Tribune, 6 April 1999 132 BBC Panorama Special, 28 April 1999
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Had such a build-up been started before and during the Rambouillet negotiations, then President Milosevic would have negotiated more seriously and very likely neither Nato bombs nor missiles would have been used.133
However, as Lord Owen acknowledges, it could be argued that the decision to rule out ground troops simply recognised the political reality that NATO was operating in. A refusal to rule out the use of ground forces could have made it difficult for the Clinton administration to win support from Congress for the NATO action and undermined the unity of the Alliance.
The FRY authorities have made much of civilian casualties caused by NATO, some of which NATO has admitted, and there has been concern in some quarters over the way in which NATO has presented its reaction to such events. Critics have argued that unnecessary news management techniques have been used in a way which has reduced public confidence in the Alliance. NATO has stressed the precautions which it takes to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties, and contrasts this with the actions of the FRY authorities.
C. Attitudes within NATO
Indeed, the air strikes continue to pose political problems for some Alliance Member States. In Germany, the NATO air strikes have led to tension within the ruling coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens, with some commentators warning that, in the longer term, continued military action could lead to the collapse of the government.134 The Foreign Minister and head of the Green Party, Joschka Fischer, has argued that violence in some circumstances is justified, but other party members have criticised him for betraying the Green's pacifist tradition. One Green junior minister, Gisela Altman, has publicly criticised the Government for its support of the NATO action, and there have also been signs of dissent from within the SPD.
In Italy the governing coalition has come under strain after warnings from the former Communists that they were considering withdrawing their ministers if the NATO action continued. In Greece there is strong sympathy among opposition politicians and the general population for the Serbian position. Although Greece has not contributed forces to the military campaign, the Government of Prime Minister Costas Simitis has sought to indicate its support for a diplomatic resolution to the crisis, without undermining the unity of the Alliance.
None of the three new member states (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) have contributed aircraft to Operation "Allied Force" and both the Czech Republic and Hungary have explicitly ruled out sending ground troops to Kosovo, although Hungarian
133 Independent, 23 April 1999 134 See for example Financial Times, 23 April 1999
58 RESEARCH PAPER 99/48 army medical teams are operating in Albania. The current Hungarian Government also remains concerned over the position of the sizeable Hungarian minority of 340,000 in the northern Serbian region of Vojvodina and has criticised NATO for striking targets in Subotica, a town with a large ethnic Hungarian population.135
D. The Oil Embargo
On 23 April 1999 the EU agreed that ‘the supply and sale of petroleum and petroleum products to the FRY shall be prohibited.’136 This is politically binding on EU states; hitherto, crude oil was still being shipped to the FRY from several Member States, including the UK, Italy and Greece. Croatia, Hungary and Romania have also agreed to take measures to stop the flow of oil, and other states outside Europe, including the USA, have indicated that they intend to pursue similar prohibitions of their own. However, shipments of oil from countries such as Russia, have continued to arrive in the Montenegrin port of Bar, leading NATO to propose the establishment of a "visit-and- search" regime to prevent such shipments from occurring in the future.
Apart from the practical difficulties of upholding an oil embargo, there has been some discussion as to the legality of one in the absence of a Security Council Resolution. In practice this raises two questions: is a Security Council Resolution necessary for an oil embargo in itself, and does NATO have authority to police it?
Economic sanctions in general raise difficulties in relation to the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The British Government has cited a possible conflict with its obligations under the WTO rules as an impediment to the imposition by the EU of economic sanctions against Burma in the absence of a Security Council Resolution.137
Furthermore, effective sanctions on the supply of fuel would need cooperation from a wider group of states than is the case with NATO’s military action: effectively all the neighbouring states and all states which might supply fuel would have to be involved. The Security Council could compel this wider range of states to cooperate, at least in law if not in practice. It would need to adopt a Resolution under Chapter VII, and use the language of a ‘decision’ that all states shall refrain from the supply of petroleum and petroleum related products. This would constitute a mandatory embargo. The power to impose sanctions is derived from Article 41 of the UN Charter, while Article 25 sets out the undertaking that all Members of the UN agree to ‘accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.’
If the sanctions were to be supported by a blockade, it would be necessary to put military forces in place to uphold it. This would raise all the usual questions about the legal basis
135 Financial Times, 23 April 1999 136 Common Position 1999/273/CFSP, OJL 108, 27 April 1999, p1. 137 HC Deb 27 April 1998, cc4-5w.
59 RESEARCH PAPER 99/48 for the threat or use of force. One approach might be for NATO to argue that a blockade of its own could be considered an extension of its existing military operations, designed further to hamper the military capacity of the FRY, and that the same legal basis which it asserted for the bombing would apply. It is possible that it would gain the co-operation of neighbouring states in any case for a blockade of land or riverine supplies. A more difficult position would apply at sea, and this might be a reason for pursuing a Security Council Resolution.
Forces policing a blockade at sea would have to deal with ships from states which are neither combatants nor members of NATO and in waters which are not the territorial sea of a NATO state. This would raise its own difficulties, and intercepting and boarding ships without consent in these circumstances would need a clear legal basis. An unequivocal way to secure this would be a Security Council Resolution which explicitly authorised NATO to police an embargo, as for instance Resolution 1132 authorised ECOWAS to halt and inspect inward shipping in order to verify compliance with the arms and oil embargoes on Sierra Leone (although it did not authorise the use of force in order to do so). It would obviously be a sensitive matter if NATO forces were to intercept or board, say, a Russian ship. The consensus of the Russian Government in an embargo and in NATO’s role in policing it might be crucial in allowing this to pass off without incident. If the Security Council merely imposed an embargo without authorising NATO to uphold it, it is possible that NATO might still argue that actions disruptive of shipping could be taken in support of such a Resolution.
On 29 April 1999 Baroness Symons made the following points in reply to a question from Lord Glentoran concerning the effects of an oil embargo on Montenegro and on Russian attitudes, and the question of consent from states whose territorial waters might need to be used:
the law in this area is of course complex. There is customary law, treaties and international conventions. I assure the noble Lord that all of these areas will be considered not only by NATO but also by legal advisers here. We have to make any embargo as effective as we can. NATO is working out military options. We shall take into account any rules of engagement as well as international law. The noble Lord referred specifically to Montenegro. He also mentioned Russia which is not the only supplier, and nor indeed is the sea the only route. We shall seek to make any embargo as effective as possible and as consistent as possible. However, we shall of course take into account the needs of Montenegro in the way the noble Lord suggests.138
138 HL Deb 29 April 1999, c436.
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E. Main NATO Deployments and the British Contribution
1. Operation "Allied Force"
The overall UK contribution to Operation Allied Force was outlined by Chief of Joint Operations, Admiral Sir Ian Garnett on 23 April:
However, the air campaign is but one element of this operation. The UK is also providing significant land and maritime forces and this morning I will briefly remind you about our overall contribution. In the Ionian Sea HMS Invincible, with her embarked air group of Sea Harriers and helicopters, is accompanied by HMS Newcastle and Royal Fleet Auxiliary Fort Austin. In the Adriatic the submarine HMS Splendid, armed with her highly effective Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, remains on station. Also in the area, frigates HMS Iron Duke and HMS Somerset are operating respectively with NATO’s standing Naval Force Mediterranean and the French Carrier group.
Ashore in Macedonia elements of Fourth Armoured Brigade have been deployed since the middle of February. These include The Kings Royal Hussars with Challenger tanks, the Irish Guards and The Kings Own Royal Border Regiment with Warrior armoured fighting vehicles, and 4 Regiment Royal Artillery with 155mm guns.
Equally important are the combat support and combat service support units such as logisticians, signallers, electrical and mechanical engineers, field ambulance, pioneers and an RAF helicopter detachment.
These UK troops are under the NATO command of Lt General Mike Jackson, Commander Ace Rapid Reaction Corps, in whose headquarters the majority of staff are from the UK because we are its framework nation. In all we plan to deploy around 6,800 UK troops in Macedonia, ready to implement a settlement and escort the refugees home. About 100 other UK troops are also deployed in Albania to support the ACE Mobile Force (Land).
Returning to our air contribution, you will be very familiar with the excellent work being done by the Royal Air Force Harriers based at Gioia del Colle in Italy, and the Tornadoes flying from RAF Bruggen in Germany. However, equally essential to NATO’s air operations are the Tristar and VC10 air to air refuelling aircraft, based at Ancona in Italy and Brize Norton in UK, the E3D airborne early warning aircraft operating out of Aviano in Italy, and the Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft. 139
According to Sir Charles Guthrie, the UK had carried out around 350 attack sorties by 26 April, constituting about 10% of the overall attack effort by that stage.
139 MOD Press Briefing 23 April 1999 from MOD web site at http://www.mod.uk
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On 15 April 1999, George Robertson provided this estimate of the cost of the UK contribution to NATO action relating to the situation in Kosovo:
The total cost of military operations relating to Kosovo is impossible to estimate at this stage, given we do not know what Milosevic's next moves will be, and how we will need to respond. The costs will, however, be substantial. Our assessment of costs incurred as of 8 April is some £17 million; this does not include the costs of replenishing stock of ordnance expended.140
For further details on the UK contribution to military operations under Operation Allied Force, see Appendices 3 and 4.
2. Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)
The ARRC, commanded by British General Mike Jackson, form a NATO command and control element to take command of all NATO forces in FYR Macedonia.141 These forces include the extraction forces and the elements which had been pre-positioned to implement a peace agreement. According to NATO the force will:
Provide a single NATO Commander for coordination and control of national land forces deploying in FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Additionally, this organisation establishes a single commander to allocate infrastructure, coordinate training facilities, and assist liaison with the FYROM Government.142
3. NATO Kosovo Enforcement Force (KFOR)
KFOR is the name given to the NATO ground forces in FYR Macedonia originally established to police a peace agreement. NATO has estimated that around 26,000 troops would be required to fulfil such a task - KFOR currently numbers around 12,000, principally from the UK, France and Germany. 'Operation Agricola' is the UK contribution to KFOR.
The initial deployment of the planned 6,800-strong British contingent to KFOR was announced on 11 February 1999 by the Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson:
140 HC Deb 15 April 1999 c323-4w 141 The ARRC is the land component of NATO’s Rapid Reaction Forces under the permanent operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). It is multinational and comprises staff, assigned military formations and representatives from 14 contributing nations. It is trained, prepared and ready to deploy within days anywhere as directed by SACEUR to undertake combined joint military operations ranging from Peace Support Operations (PSO) to High Intensity Warfare. As the Framework Nation, the UK provides the infrastructure, administrative support, communications and 60% of the staff. 142 Atlantic News, 10 March 1999
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…the Government have decided today to send to the region at the beginning of next week the vehicles and other heavy equipment of the units that would form the leading elements of any deployment. They will include Challenger tanks and Warrior armoured vehicles and artillery. The units principally involved are the Kings Royal Hussars, the Irish Guards and 4 Regiment Royal Artillery, with a tactical headquarters drawn from 4 Armoured Brigade. Other units will also be providing equipment. Loading of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships Sea Centurion and Sea Crusader will begin on Monday.143
The detailed inventory of the equipment shipped on the Sea Centurion and Sea Crusader comprised fourteen Challenger main battle tanks, six AS90 self-propelled guns, 27 Warrior armoured infantry vehicles, eight Scimitars, 30 light armoured and support vehicles, nearly 30 Royal Engineer and REME specialist vehicles and four armoured ambulances.144
On 13 April the Prime Minister announced the dispatch of reinforcements to the British contribution. The additional forces were detailed by Air Marshal Sir John Day, on 14 April:
The British Army’s initial deployment in February and March comprised the headquarters of Fourth Armoured Brigade and The King’s Royal Hussars Battle Group. These were in addition to the British troops serving with the headquarters of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, the ARRC, and we currently have some 4,500 troops in Macedonia. The deployment of a second British Battle Group, which is the Irish Guards Battle Group, will add about another 2,000 troops to those numbers.
The two British Battle Groups are of similar composition, comprising Challenger main battle tanks, Scimitar reconnaissance vehicles, Warrior armoured infantry fighting vehicles, AS90 heavy artillery and armoured engineer vehicles. We have also deployed air defence assets to theatre, including high velocity missiles mounted on Stormer armoured vehicles.
4. Operation Allied Harbour/AFOR
Allied Harbour is the NATO/UNHCR operation being set up to assist in the provision of humanitarian relief to refugees in Albania. The NATO side of the operation is now known as AFOR, NATO's Albanian Force. AFOR is commanded by Lieutenant General John Reith and at its centre is the headquarters of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) - AMF(L). AFOR's mission and composition has been outlined by George Robertson:
143 HC Deb 11 February 1999, c565 144 Soldier, March 1999
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Its mission is to assist the humanitarian effort in Albania. NATO has directed General Reith that his main task is to establish a sustainable capacity to meet the humanitarian need, working in support of, and in close coordination with, the Albanian civil authorities and the International Aid Agencies, led by UNHCR, assisting them in the provision of humanitarian aid to the refugees.
AFOR will be a highly mobile reaction force. When fully deployed, it will number around 8,000 lightly equipped ground troops, comprising significant engineer and medical expertise. NATO is currently finalising plans for the composition of this force.145
Sixteen NATO countries are to be involved in AFOR with additional assistance being offered by five Partner nations. Key functions of the operation will include building tent camps, carrying out distribution of supplies and preserving the security of the camps. The planning of the operation is being co-ordinated with the UNHCR.146 During an MOD press conference on 19 April, Lt General Sir John Reith described his main priorities as follows:
I have really two primary tasks: one is the distribution of the stores and aid for the UNHCR and within that I need to take control of the airport at Tirana Rinus, and the upgrade of the road system, and we are looking at upgrading 50 kilometres of road, and provide the transport to move, topping up on UNHCR’s own resources; my other task is very clearly to help build the camps so that we can give the shelter to the refugees. For that task I will have some 8 Engineer Companies in country and for the distribution 2 Transport Companies and utilising what resources are available from the Albanian Army.147
Around 1,500 UK personnel will be deployed to AFOR as part of AMF(L). The UK contribution includes an Infantry Battalion Group, a Logistics Battalion and a Signals Squadron.148
5. "Task Force Hawk"
Task Force Hawk currently comprises 24 AH-64A Apache attack helicopters drawn from the US Army Europe and 18 Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) supported by 2600 personnel. The Apaches have been drawn from two battalions of the 11th Aviation Brigade in Illesheim, Germany. The task force will enable NATO to intensify attacks against Serbian army and police units operating in Kosovo especially during periods of limited visibility and poor weather.
145 MOD Press Conference 21 April 1999, MOD web site at http://www.army.mod.uk 146 NATO Press Conference 14 April 1999, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int 147 MOD Press Conference 19 April 1999, MOD web site at http://www.army.mod.uk 148 MOD web site at http://www.mod.uk/news
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The Apache can carry either up to 16 Hellfire laser guided missiles or 38 76mm rockets, in addition to 1,200 rounds for its 30mm cannon. The highly mobile MLRS, nicknamed "steel rain" comes in two versions. The original MLRS M77 has two six-pod launchers firing 12 rockets, each containing 644 bomblets and has a range of 20 miles. The more recent version of the MLRS can fire two Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMSs). These dispense 950 M74 bomblets to a maximum range of 110 miles and can devastate an area the twice the size of a football pitch. The nature of the system and the fact that the bomblets do not have self-destruct fuses, and therefore could remain unexploded on the ground posing a danger to civilians, will raise the possibility of greater collateral damage. Such unexploded bomblets could also be a threat to allied forces should they enter Kosovo in the future. Due to the greater range of the more modern system it seems likely that this system will be used. If deployed near the Kosovo border the ATACMS would help to weaken Serb defence before an Apache attack.
The A-10 close air-support aircraft would also probably be used alongside the Apaches to attack armoured vehicles. The Apache, while a very effective ground attack aircraft, is vulnerable to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as the 600 Russian-made Strela-2s held by Yugoslav forces and therefore requires substantial military support. Task Force Hawk currently includes a mechanised battalion equipped with 14 M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and M1A1 MBTs for force protection and a 580 strong logistics unit.149
On 23 April, Secretary Cohen authorised the deployment of additional forces to augment the operation. The additional forces comprise: 9 MLRSs, 14 Bradley IFVs, 8 Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicles (short-range air defence), 15 Abrams MBTs, 8 155mm Howitzers, and 19 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). Once these units are in theatre the total number of US forces in "Task Force Hawk" will be approximately 5,350.
F. Possible Outcomes to the Crisis
NATO leaders continue to hold to the belief that air strikes can achieve the Alliance's declared objectives, although contingency planning, albeit in its early stages, is now underway to look at possible scenarios for the deployment of ground forces.
Despite some early setbacks, NATO insists that the air campaign is having an increasing impact on Belgrade's forces in Kosovo. The main lines of communication into the province have been cut or damaged, and there are reports that Yugoslav forces are suffering increasingly from fuel shortages. Communications between forces in the field and the high command have also been disrupted. SACEUR, General Wesley Clark, appears confident that the arrival of the Apache force, operating in tandem with A-10 aircraft and the MLRS rocket system, will enable the Alliance to carry out its threat systematically to cut off and destroy the Yugoslav units in the province.
149 Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 April 1999
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As a result, the possibility in the near future of NATO ground forces fighting their way into Kosovo remains remote, not least because it would take several months to amass sufficient forces in the region for such an operation. There would also be considerable logistical obstacles to be overcome. During the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 the Allies were able to make use of an elaborate military infrastructure in Saudi Arabia to prepare for Operation "Desert Storm", whereas the infrastructure in both Albania and FYR Macedonia is poorly developed. Albania has only one large airport, in Tirana, and the movement of heavy equipment by sea would be hampered by the lack of adequate port facilities.
Even if such problems could be overcome, FYR Macedonia has said it would refuse any NATO request to mount an invasion of Kosovo from its territory, and the mountainous terrain in the region would pose difficulties for forces crossing from Albania.
In addition to the practical considerations, there are also doubts within the Alliance over such a course of action. The United States remains cautious of involvement in an operation that could lead to considerable casualties among Alliance forces, and other Member States have expressed concern over the legal basis for such an operation and the possible Russian reaction.
On the other hand, Alliance leaders are aware that Belgrade may continue to refuse to agree to an international peacekeeping force, leaving NATO with the option of continuing to bomb indefinitely or deploying a ground force. As a result, discussion has centred on the possibility of deploying ground forces into Kosovo without Belgrade's consent, once the Yugoslav forces in the province have been sufficiently weakened by the air campaign. NATO leaders have referred to this as a "permissive" or "semi-permissive" environment, a scenario that would require fewer troops than a large-scale invasion against a full- strength enemy. If such an option is chosen, the Pentagon has hinted that a ground force could be massed on the border between Serbia and Hungary to help tie down Yugoslav forces.
In the search for a diplomatic solution to the conflict, NATO leaders believe that Russian involvement could prove crucial in convincing Belgrade to accept an international peacekeeping force in Kosovo. However, attempts to secure Russia's co-operation could be hampered by the unstable political situation in Moscow, as rumours of tension between President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov intensify. The appointment by Mr Yeltsin of former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to the post of special envoy to Yugoslavia was welcomed in the West as a sign that Russia was willing to take a more pragmatic stance over Kosovo. The move was seen in other quarters as an attempt by Mr Yeltsin to undermine the authority of Mr Primakov, who has played a leading role in diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the Kosovo conflict.
Some commentators believe that the NATO action may have a longer-term impact on the political situation in Russia, and there have been suggestions that the Russian military might, at some point, be unprepared to remain aloof from the conflict. Pro-reform
66 RESEARCH PAPER 99/48 politicians in Moscow warn that the strong anti-western sentiment generated by the NATO action may lead to increased support for nationalist and communist parties in the November parliamentary elections, despite the fact that there appears to be little support among the population for a more interventionist stance. Although polls show that up to 96 per cent of Russians are opposed to the NATO air strikes, there is also a strong belief that Russia should not become involved in the conflict.
In the Balkans, earlier concern that the NATO action could ignite a wider conflict has so far proved unfounded, although commentators continue to warn of the danger of civil war in Montenegro.
The KLA leadership, whose requests to the West for training and equipment have been refused, believes Belgrade intends to partition Kosovo and is concerned that NATO may acquiesce, seeing the effective division of Bosnia as a precedent. One possible line of partition proposed by Serbian academics runs from Pec in the north-west to the region of Krajimorav in the south-east, thereby granting Belgrade control of key economic, historical and religious assets in the north and leaving the ethnic Albanians in control of the south-west.150 To counteract this possibility, the KLA has reportedly massed large numbers of troops in the north of the province.
NATO leaders maintain that neither partition nor independence is an option, although there appears to be a growing recognition in the West that the framework agreed at Rambouillet may have to undergo some amendments, such as removing the provision that would allow some Yugoslav forces to remain in Kosovo. On 28 March President Clinton's National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, hinted that the current conflict could ultimately threaten Serbia's control over the province:
…the only way that Kosovo can remain a part of Serbia is for Mr Milosevic to accept the peace settlement which gets the Serbian forces out of Kosovo, but keeps Kosovo Serbian. But the longer this goes on, obviously, that balance of power shifts.151
Furthermore, the EU envoy to the Rambouillet talks, Wolfgang Petritsch, declared on 29 March:
…everything is now moving in this direction of independence for Kosovo because it is difficult to imagine that the Albanians will be willing to remain in a state with the Serbs after the massacres.152
In recognition of the changing circumstances Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and his French counterpart, Hubert Védrine, indicated on 20 April that Kosovo could be turned
150 See for example Independent, 21 April 1999 151 Financial Times, 29 March 1999 152 Financial Times, 30 March 1999
67 RESEARCH PAPER 99/48 into an protectorate under some form of international authority. However, they both stressed that such a move would not be a precursor to independence for Kosovo.153
There is also growing international recognition that, once the conflict is resolved, there will be an urgent need for some form of regional economic reconstruction programme, potentially through the European Union, although planning for such a programme remains at an embryonic stage.
153 Financial Times, 20 April 1999
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Appendix 1: Summary of NATO forces
United States of America
Personnel Land Equipment Naval Vessels Aircraft
350 - in FYR 27 Multiple-Launch Surface Action Group 2 B2 Spirit Stealth Macedonia Rocket Systems Philippine Sea (Cruiser) Bombers conducting (MLRS) Gonzales (Destroyer) 14 B-52 Stratofortress reconnaissance for Nicholson (Destroyer) (Bomber/air launched cruise the 12,000 NATO 36 Bradley Infantry Thorn (Destroyer) missile - operate out of UK) force. Fighting Vehicles Detroit (Escort) 5 B-1B Lancer (Bomber) 15 F-18 Hornet 5350 - US troops are M1A1 Main Battle Carrier Battle Group (Bomber/air superiority being sent to operate Tanks Theodore Roosevelt fighter) and maintain the (Aircraft Carrier - 5,500 60 F-15 Strike Eagle Apache attack 18 High Mobility personnel and 80 aircraft) (Bomber/air superiority helicopters and Multipurpose Leyte Gulf (Cruiser) fighter) Multiple-Launch Wheeled Vehicle Vella Gulf (Cruiser) 64 F16 Fighting Rocket System (HMMWV) Halyburton (Frigate) Falcon (MLRS) ordered to Ross (Frigate) (Ground attack/interceptor) Albania. Albuquerque (Submarine) 24 F-117 Nighthawk Artic (Combat Support) (Stealth fighter/bomber) 14 A-10 Thunderbolt 2,200 Marines in the (Tankbuster) Adriatic. Amphibious Ready Group 5 U2 /TR1 (intelligence gathering) Nassau (Cruiser) 2 E-6 JSTARS Nashville (Cruiser) (Strategic surveillance/battle Pensacola (Frigate) management) 2-E-3 Sentry AWACS Submarine Squadron 20 KC 135R Norfolk (Attack Sub) (Reconnaissance) Miami (Attack Sub) 19 EA-6B Prowler (Electronic Warfare) 8 AV-8B Prowler (Electronic Warfare) 5 C-130 Hercules (Electronic Warfare) 12 C-130 Hercules Predator (Unmanned surveillance drone) 4 P-3 Orion (Maritime Patrol) 78 KC-135/10 (Inflight refuelling)
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24 AH-64 Apache (Attack Helicopter) 26 UH-60 Black Hawk /CH-47D (Utility/heavy duty helicopter)
United Kingdom
Personnel Land Equipment Naval Vessels Aircraft
6,300 in Macedonia All 28 Challenger Tank 1 Aircraft Carrier 10 L-1011 (Tristar of these forces, and those 12 AS-90 (Howitzer) Invincible Tanker) of other allies, are now 86 Warrior Armoured 3 E-3 Sentry under the operational Fighting Vehicles 2 Submarines 12 GR-7 Harrier control of General Sir 20 Scimitar Armoured Enterprise - Nuclear (Ground attack jump jets) Mike Jackson. Fighting Vehicles submarine 7 FA2 Sea Harrier 4 Striker Armoured Splendid - Attack 8 Tornado GR1 Medical Force in Recce Vehicles Submarine with cruise (Bomber – operating FYR Macedonia missiles from Bruggen Germany) Around 250 personnel of 1 PR-9 Canberra 2 Armed Field 2 Frigates Ambulance Group are (Maritime patrol) Somerset deployed as an element of 5 Chinook Helicopters Iron Duke 4 Brigade to FYR 2 Puma Helicopters Grafton (with French Macedonia. It has been 3 VC10 (Tankers- deployed in support of Carrier Group) operating from Brize the brigade, but has been Norton) closely involved in the 1 Destroyer 1 Nimrod R humanitarian support Newcastle provided by British forces. 2 Fleet Auxiliary Fort Austin Fort Grange Bailey
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Other NATO Contributors:
Country Equipment/Personnel Belgium 10 F-16 Canada Aircraft:
12 F-18 (40 pilots- over 100 sorties flown)
Ground Forces:
800 Troops and 280 vehicles will be deploying to FYR Macedonia in preparation for their employment in Kosovo. They do not have a mandate to operate in a combat role. The main component of the Canadian force will be a reconnaissance squadron equipped with 8 helicopters. Denmark 6 F-16 France Aircraft:
6 Jaguar (Ground Attack Fighter) 7 Mirage 2000C (Fighter) 10 Mirage 2000D (Bomber) 2 Mirage F1CR 2 Mirage IV P 1 Transall C160 Gabriel 4 Etendard IV P (Air defence - naval) 14 Super Etendard (Strike-attack - naval)
Navy:
French Carrier Group - Foch Orage - Ouragan-class Landing Ship Dock with 100 personnel from the 1st Airborne Hussar Regiment and an unspecified number of troops from the 17th Airborne Engineering Regiment. Deployed in support of AFOR.
Ground Forces:
2600 Troops - French contribution to KFOR. Includes armoured personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles.
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Germany Aircraft:
14 Tornado (8 anti-radar, 6 reconnaissance) 1 C-160 Transall (Cargo) CL-289 UAV
Ground Forces:
4000 troops (approx) - in support of KFOR. Equipment includes: 32 Leopard Tanks 32 Marder Infantry Combat Vehicles 30 Fuchs Armoured Personnel Carriers 24 Luchs Reconnaissance Vehicles 1 Bridgelayer 10 Helicopters Italy Aircraft:
6 Tornado 2 Alena AMX (Ground attack fighter)
Ground Forces:
2000 troops - Italian contribution to Operation Allied Harbour in Albania Netherlands 16 F-16 4 F-60 (Transport) 2 KC-10 (Inflight refuelling) 2 F-50 (Transport) 1 Gulfstream (Transport) 2 C130H Hercules 2 CH-47 Chinook helicopter Norway 6 F-16 1 C-130 Portugal 6 F-16 Spain 4 F-18 1 KC-130 1 CASA 212 Turkey Aircraft: 11 F-16
Ground Force Turkey has allocated a mechanised infantry battalion to NATO should the alliance send ground forces into Kosovo.
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Appendix 2: Summary of Yugoslav Forces
Overall Numbers
Army strength: 90,000 (37,000 conscripts) and possibly 150,000 reservists. Naval strength: 15,000 Air Force strength: 15,000.
Main Bases
1st Army: Belgrade, Novi Sad, Sombor, Kraljevo, Pancevo, Pozarevac, Kragujevac, Sremska Mitrovica, Sabac, Valjevo.
2nd Army: Podgorica, Uzice, Niksic, Danilovgrad, Raska, Novi Pazar, Cacak, Kremna.
3rd Army: Nis, Pristina, Krusevac, Prokuplje, Kursumlija, Leskovac, Vranje, Pirot.
Yugoslav Forces in Kosovo
Total Strength: NATO intelligence estimates that there are approximately 43,000 Yugoslav troops and paramilitary police now operating in Kosovo. They are reportedly equipped with around 300 tanks and 150 artillery pieces There are also between 15,000 to 21,000 Serb troops on the perimeter of Kosovo. These forces are equipped with tanks and APCs. Serb forces around the Kosovo border are divided into deployed forces, garrison forces, and reserve forces. The deployed forces have about 96 tanks, and the garrison forces have around 30 tanks in garrison. There is a concentration of Yugoslav troops along the border between Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. These forces have been building up for several weeks.
52 (Pristina) Corps. HQ Pristina. Subordinate to the VJ 3rd Army.
Role: Protect the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; protect key installations, force protection of deployed troops and equipment and keeping the internal lines of communication open.
Locations: Pristina, Pec, Prizren, Kosovska Mitrovica, Urosevac, Djakovica, Gnjilane. Currently deployed on operations in Kosovo.
Ministry of Interior Police (MUP) in Kosovo
Role: Internal security as well as all the other police related tasks. The MUP has two sub- organisations, the SAJ (specialist anti-terrorist police) and the PJP (combat police forces).
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Locations: Largely co-located with the VJ in their barracks. They man all the checkpoints on the main roads.
Numbers: Vary according to operational need. Peaked at approximately 13,000, fallen to about 9,000 now. Peacetime strength approximately 6,000.
Key Equipment
Yugoslav Army: Mechanised Forces
1,270 tanks, including T-72s, T-34s, T-55s and M-84s and 805 armoured fighting vehicles.
Main Battle Tanks Type Number M-84 239 T-72 65 T-55 785 T-34 181
M-84 tank. An updated copy of the Russian T-72. An effective vehicle but rarely seen in Kosovo in any numbers.
T-55 tank. An old Russian tank that is the mainstay of the VJ armoured forces. Late 1940's design but still reliable.
Armoured Vehicles
Type Number M-80 568 M-60P 169 BOV VP M-86 68
M-80 Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV). A copy of the Russian BMP-1 AFV.
BOV-M APC. A wheeled reconnaissance vehicle.
Anti-Aircraft Guns: 1,850
BOV-3. Self-propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun (SPAAG). A BOV-M chassis with a triple mounted 20mm cannon in a turret. Used in the ground role to good effect.
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PRAGA. An armoured truck with a twin-mounted 30mm cannon. A SPAAG that has been used to great effect against houses and infantry.
Air Force:
240 combat aircraft, including MiG-21s and MiG-29s, and 48 attack helicopters.
Type Number MiG-29 Less than 10 remaining MiG-21 70 J-22 Orao 30 Galeb 50 G4 Super Galeb 10 Armed Helicopters - 48 Gazelle
MiG-29 Fulcrum. A relatively modern Russian fighter. Multi-role tactical fighter for control of upper air space and ground attack. The most modern aircraft in the Yugoslav inventory.
MiG-21 Fishbed. A 1960s designed air defence fighter. Old, but still capable. The Air Force has about 70 of these aircraft.
J-22 Orao. An indigenously designed fighter, ground attack aircraft. Slow and relatively unmanoeuvrable.
G-4 Super Galeb. Advanced trainer, similar to the British Aerospace Hawk.
Anti-Aircraft Forces:
100 surface-to-air missiles: a mix of SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-9, SA-13, SA-14 and SA-16. All of these pose a significant threat to NATO airpower. Yugoslavia also has 1,850 air defence artillery pieces. Although not as effective as the missiles, these are dangerous to NATO planes.
Type Number SA-2 24 SA-3 16 SA-6 60
Strategic Systems. SA-2, 3 and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The first two are old, but have a high ceiling. The latter is a very effective medium level missile. It has already been used in anger in Bosnia and was the weapon responsible for shooting down USAF Capt Scott O'Grady's F-16 in 1995.
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Tactical Systems. SA-9 and 13. Essentially the same missile; the first is mounted on a wheeled chassis, the second on a tracked chassis. Both capable.
Man portable systems. SA-7, 16 and 18. These are single shot shoulder launched missiles similar to the US Stinger and the UK Blowpipe/Javelin. The SA-16s and 18s are the latest and most capable.
Navy
Vessel Number Submarines 4 Frigates 4 Patrol Craft 34 Mine Warfare 16 Amphibious 20
Command and Control
Command is exercised by the President (Milosevic) who is the chairman of the Supreme Defence Council. Command is delegated to Lt Col Gen Ojdanic who is the Chief of the VJ General Staff. All forces are subordinate to him. Orders are then cascaded to the Army Commanders, the Navy and the Air/Air Defence forces and then down to the Corps and the Brigade Commanders.
The MUP is commanded by the Interior Minister which also controls the State Security Directorates, which have their own specialists. In Kosovo the work of the Army and the MUP is co-ordinated. A clear chain of command goes from Pristina via Nis to Belgrade.
Command, Control and Communications links are modern and have built in redundancy. They are protected and have multiple alternative communications nodes.
Sources: MOD web site at http://www.mod.uk Department of Defense web site at http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/kosovo/ , International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997-98.
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Appendix 3 - UK Ground Forces in FYR Macedonia
Key British Armoured Units in/being deployed to FYR Macedonia Unit Peacetime Location Equipment 4 Armoured Brigade Main Osnabruck HQ Kings Royal Hussars Battle Munster 14 Challenger 1 Tanks Group HQ and A Sqn No 1 Company Irish Guards Munster 14 Warrior Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles Burma Company Kings Own Catterick 14 Warrior Armoured Royal Border Regiment Infantry Fighting Vehicles HQ 4 Regiment Royal Osnabruck 6 AS90 155mm Self Artillery and 88 Battery Propelled Guns Also under command Topcliffe & Thorney Island High Velocity Missile soldiers from 5 Regiment Royal Artillery & 47 Regiment Royal Artillery Army Air Corps Wattisham 3 x Lynx The following units are in the process of being deployed 1 Irish Guards Battle Group Munster 8 Scimitar Armoured HQ and 1 Rifle Company, Reconnaissance Vehicles Support and HQ Companies 44 Warrior Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles Squadron from the Kings Munster 14 Challenger 1 Tanks Royal Hussars Company from the Green Osnabruck 14 Warrior Armoured Howards Regiment Infantry Fighting Vehicles 52 Battery 4 Regiment Royal Osnabruck 6 AS90 155mm Self Artillery Propelled Guns 26 Armoured Engineer Hohne Various Armoured Engineer Squadron Vehicles including Armoured Vehicle Launched Bridges Squadron from the Windsor 12 Scimitar Armoured Household Cavalry Regiment Reconnaissance Vehicles 4 Striker Armoured Recce Vehicles with Swingfire Anti-Tank Missiles
Source: MOD at http://www.army.mod.uk/army
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Appendix 4 - RAF Strike Missions
Operation Allied Force - RAF Strike Missions Date Aircraft Involved Target Weapon Used 24/5 March 6 Harrier GR7 Ammunition storage facility Paveway II 25/6 March 6 Harrier GR7 Ammunition storage facility at Paveway II Leskovac 27 March No bombing missions due to poor weather 28/9 March 4 Harrier GR7 Ammunition storage facility near Paveway II Pristina 30 March – 3 No bombing missions due to poor weather April 4 April Harriers 'Seek-and-destroy' over western No targets Kosovo allocated 4/5 April 6 Tornados Main supply routes between Serbia - and Kosovo 5 April Harriers 'Seek-and-destroy' over southern No targets Kosovo allocated 5/6 April Tornados & Fuel storage facility near Pristina Harriers 6 April Harriers Military convoy, tanks BL-755 cluster munitions 6/7 April Tornados HQ and storage complex near Pristina 7 April Harriers Military vehicle compound in BL-755 Kosovo 8 April Harriers Military vehicle compound and BL-755 parked military vehicles in western Kosovo 10 April Harriers Military storage area and military relay station in Kosovo 11 April Harriers SAM battery and military vehicles 1,000lb bombs 11/12 April Harriers Petrol storage facility in Kosovo 12 April Harriers Mobile Serbian military targets 1,000lb bombs 12/13 April Tornados Obrva airfield and ammunition depot near Pristina 13 April Harriers Fuel dump near Pristina and RBL-755 military relay station and radar site munitions and in Kosovo 1,000lb bombs 14 April Harriers Ammunition dump in Kosovo 1,000lb bombs 14/15 April Tornados Army barracks and airfield Paveway II 15 April Harriers Command and Control facilities in Pristina, artillery/ anti-aircraft sites
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16 April Harriers Pristina Army Corps tactical HQ RBL-755 17 April Harriers Serbian Army APCs and vehicles RBL-755 17/18 April Tornados Military radar relay site in Serbia - 19 April Harriers Serbian Army unit near Urosevac - airfield, mobile Command Post and POL facility at Pristina 20 April Harriers Serbian Army Command Post in 1,000lb bombs Kosovo 21 April 4 Harrier GR7 Serbian Army Command Post in 1,000lb bombs Kosovo 22 April No bombing missions due to poor weather 23 April Harrier Military command posts BL-755 24 April No bombing missions due to poor weather 25 April Harrier – 20 Road bridge, Army Command Post, RBL-755 sorties airfield in Kosovo 1,000Ib bombs 26 April No bombing missions due to poor weather 27 April 15 Harrier sorties Besinje ammunition storage depot RBL-755
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Appendix 5: Airlifts funded by DFID
Date Journey Cargo Load 31 Manston to Tirana Tents + blankets* 24 MT March 31 RAF Lyneham-Prestwick- Tents and blankets* 13 MT March Thessalonica 01 April Amsterdam-Geneva-Tirana Trucks and health kits 17 MT 02 April Copenhagen-Tirana UNHCR blankets*; Oxfam 19 MT equip 03 April Copenhagen-Manston-Tirana Aircraft Handling Package 36 MT 03 April Copenhagen-Skopje Blankets* 36 MT 04 April RAF Lyneham-Tirana medical supplies (WHO) 11 MT 04 April Pisa-Skopje WFP Rations** 35 MT 04 April Manston-Tirana-Skopje Forklifts; 4x4s, tents 38MT 05 April Stansted-Tirana Tents + blankets* 40MT 06 April Dubai-Tirana Tents* 38MT 07 April Dubai-Tirana Tents* 40MT 07 April RAF Lyneham-Tirana-Skopje DFID Vehicle, Sleeping bags 12MT 08 April Bergen-Skopje tinned fish and biscuits (WFP) 41MT 08 April RAF Lyneham-Tirana Oxfam equipment, Sleeping 12MT bags 09 April Manston - Tirana Vehicles, handling equipment, 26MT bedding 09 April Bergen - Tirana Tinned fish and biscuits 38MT
10 April Manston - Skopje Vehicles, handling equipment, 40MT bedding 10 April Malaga - Skopje Vehicles 25MT 10 April Dubai - Tirana Tents 40MT 11 April Cairo - Skopje Kitchen sets 26MT 11 April Billund - Tirana Blankets and plastic sheeting 40MT 13 April RAF Lyneham - Tirana Sleeping bags 12MT 13 April Copenhagen-Tirana Water kits, health kits and 40MT blankets 13 April Billund - Tirana blankets and plastic sheeting 40MT 13 April Cairo - Tirana Kitchen sets 40MT 14 April Stanstead -Thessalonika DFID convoy 90MT 15 April Malaga-Tirana Vehicles and wheat flour 40 MT 16 April Malaga-Tirana vehicles and wheat flour 40MT 16 April Manston- Tirana DFID convoy 48 MT 18 April Billund - Tirana Blankets and plastic sheeting 40MT
* Cargo funded by UNHCR ** Cargo funded by WFP
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