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Nuclear Disarmament: US and Russia Resume Negotiations

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Nuclear Disarmament: US and Russia Resume Negotiations CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 53 • May 2009 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: US And RUSSIA RESUME NEGOTIATIONS Nuclear disarmament is back on the international agenda. On 24 April 2009, US and Russian delegations began negotiations in Rome with the aim of further reducing their strategic nuclear arsenals. As a first step, the START I Treaty, which will expire on 5 December 2009, should be replaced with a new agreement. Due to the narrow timeframe, this new arrangement can be expected to be rather limited. However, if more substantial measures are to follow, a whole range of stumbling blocks will have to be removed. The nuclear weapons- free world envisaged by US President Obama is bound to remain a vision. Otherwise, it will become increasingly diffi- cult for them to get non-nuclear countries to commit to the NPT and to put an end to nuclear proliferation. Third, there is now an international de- bate – triggered by the US – on complete nuclear disarmament. In his Prague speech of 5 April 2009, which referred to the long- term goal of a world free of nuclear weap- ons, President Obama positioned himself at the vanguard of this debate. Surprising- ly, Medvedev also subscribed to this vision in his first meeting with Obama. Reuters/Jason Reed President Obama und President Medvedev announce nuclear disarmament negotiations, 1 April 2009 Fourth, and finally, the matter of nuclear disarmament and arms control is a suita- Verifiable nuclear disarmament and arms delivery systems or any particular verifica- ble area for improving bilateral US-Russian control were assigned low priority during tion measures. Without START I, therefore, relations, since this issue bears compara- the presidency of George W. Bush. The new all verifiable nuclear arms control would tively little potential for conflict. Obama is US president, Barack Obama, has restored come to a halt. hoping for cooperation with Moscow in a these issues to the political agenda. Four number of international issues of mutual key factors have contributed to the current Secondly, both Washington and Moscow interest, such as preventing Iran from gain- situation where Washington and Moscow are under pressure to provide evidence of ing nuclear arms. are returning to the issue of nuclear dis- their own disarmament efforts with a view armament. First of all, the Strategic Arms to the upcoming review conference for the The US and Russia do, however, also have Reduction Treaty (START I) on limiting stra- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear diverging interests when it comes to tegic nuclear weapons, which took effect Weapons (NPT) in April 2010. Of the more nuclear policy. For Washington, nuclear in December 1994, expires on 5 December than 25,000 nuclear warheads remaining weapons remain important instruments 2009. While the US and Russia also imple- on the planet, more than 90 per cent are of security policy. However, their impor- mented the Moscow Treaty in June 2003, in the hands of the US and Russia. If the tance has strongly declined since the end according to which the two sides under- two sides want to avoid another failure of of the Cold War. At the time, the US arse- take to reduce their respective deployed the meeting of state parties to the NPT nal consisted of a total of about 22,000 nuclear warheads by about two thirds as in 2005, as well as a further weakening nuclear weapons; today, that number to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of the NPT, they will have to demonstrate stands at about 2,200 (However, the of 2012, this agreement – unlike START I that they are meeting their disarmament number of attributed warheads is sig- – does not include any stipulations as to obligations under Article 6 of the treaty. nificantlly higher using START counting © 2009 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 53 • May 2009 rules). No new nuclear warhead designs Presumably, moreover, both parties will ons. This is mainly due to Russia’s con- have been developed since the early 1990s. agree new upper limits of around 1,500 cern that Washington might otherwise Instead, the focus has been on improv- nuclear warheads on about 700 strate- rapidly equip its delivery systems with an ing conventional operational capabilities. gic delivery systems of each side. This increased number of warheads, in a move This trend towards denuclearization in US figure is only marginally less than the that Russia would be unable to counter security policy will continue under Presi- one agreed by both sides in the Moscow with comparable measures. dent Obama. Moreover, he feels committed Treaty. Such a ceiling would permit the to restoring the US’s moral high ground. In US to avoid far-reaching decisions on is- Much the same is true for matters involv- a world with more and more conflicts, the sues such as the decommissioning of its ing strategic delivery systems carrying US must engage to re-construct interna- strategic triad consisting of land-based conventional payloads. Such systems are tional order through cooperation. Nuclear missiles, ballistic-missile submarines, part of the US, but not the Russian arse- arms control and disarmament is an im- and long-range bombers, which would nal. The US B-1 long-range bomber is no portant element in that regard. certainly be necessary in the case of longer equipped with nuclear arms, but lower limits. In fact, the Obama admin- only carries conventional weapons. In ad- For Russia, on the other hand, nuclear arms istration is unable to make such deci- dition, four Trident submarines have been are important attributes of its self-ascribed sions before it has completed the Nucle- modified to carry conventionally-armed role as a superpower. The conventional ar Posture Review requested by the US cruise missiles. Furthermore, for the fu- capabilities of the Russian armed forces are Congress and expected to be submitted ture, Washington retains the option of far below those of the US and NATO. The by the end of 2009. Russia, for its part, equipping long-range ballistic missiles country’s relations with China, which is an could easily reconcile a cap of 1,500 stra- stationed on Trident submarines with aspiring power also in terms of its nuclear tegic warheads with its current modern- conventional payloads. For the time be- force, are not devoid of friction. Therefore, ization plans, which envisage a total of ing, Congress has stopped such “Prompt nuclear deterrence is of great importance 1,400 to 1,600 warheads, mainly on new Global Strike” projects, which are aimed for the Russian leadership. Accordingly, the delivery systems. at targeting terrorists better over long upgrading of the Russian nuclear force is distances. The Pentagon, with the support being advanced purposefully. Medvedev Controversial issues of the State Department, is requested to has announced that it will be fundamen- The two sides have varying priorities when complete a report by September 2009 tally modernized by 2020. As long as new it comes to disarmament. The main goal of that should discuss the advantages and disarmament treaties do not obstruct the US is to reduce the number of nuclear risks of equipping strategic delivery sys- these intentions, they are welcomed by warheads, but it already shows flexibil- tems with conventional warheads. Rus- Moscow insofar as they can be leveraged ity to also include delivery systems; Russia sian experts regard strategic conventional for a visible demonstration of Russia’s pari- aims to concentrate on delivery systems. In delivery systems as a matter of serious ty with the US. other words: Washington is relying more concern, since the US could re-equip these upon the Moscow Treaty, which reduced platforms with nuclear warheads, or con- A new treaty in 2009? nuclear warheads, while Moscow is argu- versely, use them to attack strategic tar- Obama and Medvedev have decided not ing on the basis of START I, which concen- gets in Russia with conventional arma- to extend the START I Treaty for another trated on delivery systems and covered ments. Ultimately, both sides will have five years – which would be feasible under nuclear warheads through specific count- to agree on a compromise including ele- one of the treaty’s clauses – but to replace ing rules for the number of warheads on ments of both START I and the Moscow it by a new agreement altogether. Neither certain delivery systems. There are two un- Treaty, and therefore covering both war- Washington nor Moscow are interested derlying controversial issues here: The first heads and delivery systems. in continuing the extremely complex and is the inclusion of non-deployed nuclear cost-intensive verification measures es- warheads that can be used as part of stra- Important documents tablished under START I. However, rapid tegic systems; the other is the inclusion of START I Treaty action is required to avoid a situation strategic delivery systems carrying conven- Moscow Treaty where there is no verifiable arms control tional warheads. Non-Proliferation Treaty at all. In order for the new treaty to be Parameters set by Obama and Medvedev for ratified by the US Congress and the Rus- The US is currently planning to retain new disarmament talks on 1 April 2009 sian Duma before START I expires, it would around 1,500 nuclear warheads in reserve. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. have to be submitted to both parliaments Due to efforts by the Bush administration, Kissinger, Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear- by August 2009. these were not included in the Moscow Free World”, 15 January 2008 Treaty. As long as the US nuclear infra- Prague Speech by President Obama, 5 April It already seems clear today that the suc- structure remains relatively weak – so 2009 cessor agreement to START I will only in- goes the argument that in the past has clude limited disarmament measures.
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