Separation of Campaign and State

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Separation of Campaign and State Separation of Campaign and State Bradley A. Smith* ABSTRACT In a pair of recent decisions, Davis v. FEC and Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, the Supreme Court has struck down on First Amendment grounds laws that would have arguably created more, not less speech. The federal statute at issue in Davis actually raised contribu- tion limits for certain candidates being outspent from the personal resources of wealthy opponents; the state law in Arizona Free Enterprise Club provided for state subsidies to candidates being outspent by their opponents and inde- pendent spenders. The Court’s opinions in these cases, taken on their own terms, are unsat- isfying. The Court correctly recognizes the deeply troubling nature of the gov- ernment policies at issue in Davis and Arizona Free Enterprise Club, which involved the government in favoring certain candidates over others, but it has not successfully articulated why those policies are offensive to the First Amendment, given that each law provides more resources for a candidate to speak. This Article argues that the Court’s opinions show only an inchoate rec- ognition of the core problem. Government involvement in regulating and es- pecially in subsidizing candidate speech inherently entangles government in campaigns in a manner incompatible with core American assumptions about democracy, in much the same way that direct subsidies to churches violate the First Amendment’s religion clauses even if made available to all religions. The Roberts Court, however, is trapped by its refusal to challenge prece- dents allowing government subsidies of campaigns and wrongly confusing the government’s authority to regulate the “time, place and manner” of elections under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution as the authority to regulate politi- cal speech and campaigns. This Article argues from history, text, and struc- ture that Article I, Section 4 applies only to regulating such actual election mechanics as the system of election, maintenance of voter lists, and the method of casting and counting ballots, not to the regulation of political debate that precedes elections. The Article further argues that the text of the First Amendment and the structure of the Constitution require a “separation of campaign and state,” limiting direct government regulation or subsidizing of political speech and campaigning analogous to the judicially created doctrine of “separation of church and state.” The Article concludes with a review of some of the impli- cations of such a doctrine. * Visiting Judge John T. Copenhaver Chair of Law, West Virginia University, and Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault Professor of Law, Capital University. November 2013 Vol. 81 No. 6 2038 2013] SEPARATION OF CAMPAIGN AND STATE 2039 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ................................................. 2039 I. ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB, DAVIS, AND THE CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF CAMPAIGNS .......................................... 2042 II. CAMPAIGNS VS. ELECTIONS ............................. 2056 III. SEPARATION OF CAMPAIGN AND STATE ................ 2073 A. The Problem of Scope and Line Drawing ........... 2075 B. Thumb on the Scale ................................. 2087 C. Separation of Campaign and State .................. 2098 IV. SOME ISSUES FOR A DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION ........ 2102 A. Should the Doctrine Apply to the States?............ 2102 B. The Problem of Line Drawing Remains ............ 2102 C. A Doctrine of Separation of Campaign and State Would Deprive the State of Weapons Needed for Its Own Self-Preservation .............................. 2105 CONCLUSION ................................................... 2107 INTRODUCTION The arrival of the Roberts Court has heralded a new agnosticism toward campaign finance regulation. The credulity that marked the Court’s opinions at the turn of the century has been replaced by a more skeptical approach.1 In cases such as Citizens United v. FEC,2 Randall v. Sorrell,3 and FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,4 the ma- jority’s skepticism has been contested by heated dissents,5 but the de- cisions, whatever their merits, have been based comfortably on traditional First Amendment doctrine. One can argue that the deci- sions may have misapplied that doctrine, but in each of these cases the Court majority sees the government adopting a policy that severely limits political speech, perhaps intentionally, and therefore strikes 1 Compare Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) (“The state statute is not void, however, for want of evidence.”), and McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 188–89, 209, 211, 223, 231, 238, 239–40 (2003) (upholding campaign restrictions against constitutional challenges), with FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (“[T]he First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.”), and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (overruling McConnell in part). 2 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 3 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 4 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 5 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 393–485 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 504–36 (Souter, J., dissenting); Randall, 548 U.S. at 273–81 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 281–90 (Souter, J., dissenting). 2040 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2038 down the law after finding that such regulation is not justified by a compelling government interest.6 Two recent cases, however, do not fit so neatly within this frame- work. In Davis v. FEC,7 the Court struck down a federal statute that, under certain circumstances, actually increased the size of political contributions that an individual could make to a candidate.8 And in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett (“Ari- zona Free Enterprise Club”),9 the Court struck down an Arizona law that, under particular circumstances, provided political candidates with state subsidies in order to increase the reach of their political speech.10 In these cases, the Court’s opinions, taken on their own terms, are less satisfying than those in Citizens United, Randall, and Wisconsin Right to Life. This Article suggests that the Court correctly recognizes the deeply troubling nature of the government policies at issue in Davis and Arizona Free Enterprise Club, but has not success- fully articulated why those policies are offensive to the First Amend- ment. This Article sets forth, in rudimentary terms, an alternative theory, which I will call “separation of campaign and state.” “Separation of campaign and state,” of course, conjures up our well-known and long-standing commitment to separation of church and state. It is intended to. Like the separation of church and state, it is not explicit in the Constitution but flows from the document’s struc- ture and purpose.11 Like separation of church and state, it hardly re- solves all difficult First Amendment questions, but it answers many and provides a sound formula for addressing harder cases.12 For over 100 years, since the passage of the Tillman Act13 in 1907, Congress has enacted legislation to regulate campaign finance.14 In 6 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348–65, 371–72; Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 476–81; Randall, 548 U.S. at 247–48, 253–63. 7 Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 8 Id. at 743–45. 9 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 10 Id. at 2813, 2828–29. 11 See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 217–21 (1963). 12 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683–86 (2005). 13 Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). 14 See id.; Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold), Pub. L. No. 107- 155, 116 Stat. 81; Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263; Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972); Taft- Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947); Smith-Connally Act, Pub. L. No. 78-89, 57 Stat. 163 (1943); Hatch Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 76-753, 54 Stat. 767 (1940); Hatch Act, Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939); Federal Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 68-505, §§ 301–319, 43 Stat. 1053, 1070–74 (1925) (repealed 1972); Publicity Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 62-32, 37 Stat. 25 (1911); Publicity Act, Pub. L. No. 61-274, 36 Stat. 822 (1910). The Tillman 2013] SEPARATION OF CAMPAIGN AND STATE 2041 Burroughs v. United States,15 the Court, without analysis, found consti- tutional authority for this undertaking in Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution,16 which provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be pre- scribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators,”17 and Article II, Section 1,18 which pro- vides that “[t]he Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.”19 On the basis of this opinion, broad authority to regulate political campaigns was later assumed in the seminal case of Buckley v. Valeo,20 and in all campaign finance cases since.21 This Article argues that Burroughs and later cases wrongly con- flate the concept of “elections” with that of “campaigns,” and that these are distinct concepts that can and should be separated for consti- tutional purposes. Further, it argues that the Constitution does not provide an explicit grant of power for the federal government to regu- late political campaigns and that, in fact, the Constitution should be deemed to create “a wall of separation” between political campaigns and state power, similar to the one that has long been accepted be- tween church and state.
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