Project MIMEVA

Study of generic Mine-like Objects for R&D in Systems for Humanitarian Demining Final Report

6 HH Pol HV Pol 4 VV Pol 2

-2 -1 0 1 2 3 Norm. Backscattered Fields Backscattered Norm. Time (ns)

Prepared for DG Information Society (DG INFSO) Unit E-6 Contract reference (administrative agreement): AA 501852

European Commission, DG Joint Research Centre Institute for Systems, Informatics and Safety Technologies for Detection and Positioning Unit TP 272, Via E. Fermi, 1 I-21020 Ispra (VA), Italy MIMEVA: Study of generic Mine-like Objects for R&D in Systems for Humanitarian Demining

This final project report is based upon the contractually deliverable items listed below:

D 1.2: Final List of mines for which Validation Tests will need to be Conducted with Advanced APL Detection Equipment

D2.1:Report on the Available Methods for Replication of Landmines

These documents, together with background text and supplementary information identified as relevant to the project have been edited together to form a coherent final report of the project. Compiled and edited by: John T. Dean, Ispra, July 2001 With contributions from: Joaquim Fortuny-Guasch Brian D. Hosgood Athina Kokonozi Adam M. Lewis Alois J. Sieber

All experts are with the Unit TDP of the Institute of Systems Informatics and Safety, JRC, Ispra. MIMEVA: Study of generic Mine-like Objects for R&D in Systems for Humanitarian Demining

Executive Summary

The MIMEVA project aimed to assess available methods of production of mine simulants and surrogates in terms of the similarity of these replicas to real mines when viewed by a range of sensors identified most frequently as candidates for components in multi-sensor systems, namely: metal detectors, thermal infrared and a ground penetrating radar. The simulant designs resulting from this project may be used to support the testing of new equipment intended to detect anti-personnel (AP) mines – with particular attention to the difficult to find “low- metal content” designs. The main threat mines, affecting areas in where EC humanitarian aid programmes have been undertaken, were identified. In these areas the presence of mines has required action beyond the normal provision of development assistance. Mine types, which pose a post-conflict threat and against which detectors will be required to operate, are listed. Emphasis is placed on South East Europe. Tests that were conducted on surrogates and real mines using three classes of electromagnetic sensor are described. Metal detectors were used to establish the low frequency match between the surrogates and the live mines, radar measurements established the correlation in the microwave region and infrared measurements addressed the thermal properties. A number of surrogate designs were identified including new constructions based on the assembly of commonly available parts. The new designs include air gaps, which are demonstrated to be important in the microwave and infrared regions. Several designs have the possibility to exchange inserts that represent the fuze. It is shown that this is a valuable feature. The results confirm correlation between the electromagnetic features of surrogate mine designs and real mines in the identified spectral regions and thus confirm that the surrogates are appropriate for initial testing of the performance of new mine detection sensors in a controlled manner. The surrogates are completely inert, and are not subject to legal control over their movement allowing them to be used in a wide range of situations. The report is supported by annexes which

· Describe the threat mines,

· Detail the features of the main high explosives used,

· Consider the designs of various surrogate solutions

· List possible sources of mine surrogates References used in the compilation of this report are listed to support further investigations.

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Table of contents 1 Introduction...... 1

1.1 The MIMEVA Contract ...... 1 1.2 Scope of work ...... 1 1.3 Applications for mine replicas ...... 1 1.4 Work undertaken ...... 1 1.4.1 Initial Research 1 1.4.2 Simulants 2 1.4.3 Measurement plan 2 1.4.4 Execution of measurements 3 1.5 Structure of this report...... 3 2 Initial research ...... 5

2.1 Landmines affecting EC projects – compilation strategy ...... 5 2.1.1 Identification of threat objects 5 2.1.2 Scope of the threat list 5 2.2 Mine Types against which Detector Validation Tests will need to be conducted...... 6 2.2.1 Locations considered 6 2.2.2 Categorisation by mine characteristics 6 2.3 Occurrence of landmines in designated territories ...... 7 2.3.1 Study 7 2.4 Full List of Mines for equipment to be evaluated against ...... 7 2.4.1 Mine List in alphabetic order 8 2.4.2 Cylindrical shape mines - detectability by metal content 9 2.4.3 Cylindrical shape mines – listed in order of increasing body diameter 10 2.5 Selection of mine types against which mine detection systems must be capable to operate in South East Europe ...... 11 2.5.1 Cylindrical Shape mines, occurrences in SEE 11 2.5.2 Box Shaped AP blast mines occurring in SEE 11 2.5.3 Common Cylindrical AP mines in SEE: Detectability by metal content 12 2.5.4 Common Cylindrical AP mines in SEE: By body diameter 12 2.5.5 Common AP mines in SEE: Explosive type 13 2.6 Overview of the study into mine types that must be identified ...... 13 3 Applications and possible solutions ...... 14

3.1 Mine awareness training ...... 14

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3.1.1 Applications of replicas for mine awareness training and validation of models. 15 3.2 Replicas for mechanical demining systems ...... 15 3.2.1 Test and validation of the simulants for mechanical demining machines 15 3.3 Targets to evaluate electromagnetic sensor systems for mine detection 15 3.3.1 Test and validation needs 16 4 Proposed construction for replica mines...... 18

5 Validation of surrogate mines ...... 19

5.1 Radar Measurements ...... 20 Background 20 5.1.2 Equivalence Criteria 21 5.1.3 Results 22 5.1.4 Conclusions from the measurements at radar frequencies 30 5.2 Evaluation of mine surrogates in infrared ...... 31 5.2.1 Introduction 31 5.2.2 Experimental set-up 31 5.2.3 Results for mines and their direct surrogates 32 5.2.4 Measurements with simulant mines 39 5.2.5 Conclusions from the Infra-red measurement 40 5.3 Metal detector measurements...... 42 5.3.1 Introduction 42 5.3.2 Detectors 42 5.3.3 Targets 43 5.3.4 Method of measurement 44 5.3.5 Results from Comparison of explosive filled and silicone RTV filled mines 45 5.3.6 Discussion 54 5.3.7 Investigation of responses to ITOP SIM model fuzes 54 5.3.8 Discussion 63 5.3.9 Discussion 68 5.3.10 Conclusions from metal detector measurements 68 6 Replication of mines for test and evaluation of detectors ..... 69

6.1 Methods ...... 69 6.2 Recommendations...... 69 6.3 Benefits and limitations ...... 70 Annex 1 : Distribution of mines by country...... 72

Annex 2: AP blast mine descriptions ...... 74

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Annex 3: Summary of properties of principal main explosives used in anti-personnel landmines ...... 105

Annex 4: Example model mines from Maquettes Sédial ...... 106

Annex 5: Example posters ...... 110

Annex 6: US mine simulants - ITOP...... 113

Annex 7: Australian mine simulants...... 116

Annex 8: New simulants ...... 124

Design Outline 125 Annex 9: Acquisition times and file names relating to the Infrared measurements ...... 136

Annex 10: Theoretical Interpretation of relative size of signals for the two detectors ...... 143

Annex 11: Sources of mine replicas...... 147

References...... 149

Reference: jtd/G07/1233

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Glossary

2D Two dimensional 3D Three dimensional A to D Analogue to Digital ABS Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene (plastic material) AISI American Iron and Steel Institute AP / APL Anti-Personnel (mine) / Anti-Personnel Landmine AT Anti-Tank (mine) CKA Colin King Associates Ltd. comp. Composition (B) CROMAC Croatian Mine Action Centre Cu Copper (chemical element) CW Continuous Wave Czech Czechoslovakia DDR Deutsche Demokratische Republik - Former East Germany DG Directorate General DND Department of National Defence (Canada) EC European Commission EMSL European Microwave Signature Laboratory ESB Explosive surrogate block EU European Union F France FFT Fast Fourier Transform FP Framework Programme (of the European Commission) g gram GPS Global positioning System H Hungary Hexogen Explosive (RDX ) HH Horizontal – Horizontal (transmit and receive polarisation) HV Horizontal – Vertical (transmit and receive polarisation I Italy IBS Integral with Belleville spring IP Integral Pressure (Fuze) IP2 Integral double percussion type, pressure IPAL Integral Pressure (Fuze) with anti-lift device IR Infra-red IS Information Society JRC Joint Research Centre (of the European Commission) kg Kilogram m Metre MCI Metal Component Insert MEDS Mechem Explosive Detection System MIMEVA Acronym for Project AA 501852

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mm Millimetre MsMs Multi sensor Mine signature (project) N No NGO Non Governmental Organisation OTS Off the Shelf PTFE Polytetrafluorethylene R&D Research and Development RDX 1,3,5-triaza-1,3,5-tri-nitrocyclo-hexane ROM Romania RSA Republic of South Africa RTV Room temperature Vulcanising RU Russia s Second SAI Space Applications Institute SEE South East Europe Sn Tin (chemical element) TIR Thermal infrared TNT Tri-nitro Toluene Trialene Equivalent to Tri-nitro Toluene Trotyl Equivalent to Tri-nitro Toluene USA United States of America UXO Unexploded Ordnance v.low very low VV Vertical – Vertical (transmit and receive polarisation) Y Yes YU Yugoslavia

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Terminology relating to alternative targets:

Generic class Relating to, or characteristic of, a whole group or class. In this case the term implies mines of broadly similar size and shape. Metal or explosive contents may differ and interchangeable parts on the replicas may address these aspects. Specific (mine) A particular mine type

Model Mine Targets that have been manufactured to replicate the appearance of specific mines. They will usually be reverse-engineered from available samples of the original. The extent of realism will depend on the manufacturer and the purpose. For example they may be externally, visually correct, or they may be fully accurate internally and thus suited for a wide range of training tasks. Model mines are free from explosives. Replica Mine Any target that may be used for the purpose of testing equipment designed for mine detection. The replica mine may represent a specific mine or a generic class of mine. This terminology encompasses all other target descriptions in this list (models, simulants, surrogates and training mines). Replica mines are normally free from explosives – exceptions to this could be where the target will be used to exercise multi- sensor systems including an explosive detector. No fuzes will be fitted and it will not be possible to detonate the replicas. Simulant Mine Targets that have been manufactured to replicate the physical and electromagnetic characteristics of a generic class of mine. Simulant mines contain no explosive, however the quantity and position of metal and the distribution and quantity of the explosive substitute will be well specified. Surrogate Mine Targets that have been manufactured to replicate certain physical and electromagnetic characteristics of specific mines. They may be reverse-engineered from available samples of the original. Surrogate mines will normally be free from explosives. The sensors for which a surrogate has been designed to exercise must be specified. Training mines Military targets used for training purposes. They may be replica mines (see above) or they may be modified production mines where the fuze and explosive charge have been replaced by a benign substance of similar visual appearance. In some training mines the metal content will replicate closely that of the original live mine.

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1 Introduction

1.1 The MIMEVA Contract

The MIMEVA project was part of a programme of support actions initiated by the European Commission (EC) Directorate General (DG) III under the EC Framework Programme IV (FP IV). It aimed to provide information and materials of use to contractors undertaking R&D in the field of humanitarian demining. 1.2 Scope of work

The objective was to study and compare different ways to simulate landmines, which could be used to support research, training and development needs in humanitarian demining [1]. The technical annex to the contract specified that:

· Types of mine for which surrogates (or simulants) are needed to support R&D should be identified.

· In the context of R&D into landmine detectors, benefits and limitations of different approaches to replicate landmines should be evaluated. Methods were to be identified to validate the candidate surrogate and simulant landmines. Thus, the work requested, in the context of testing new sensors and systems included: - Identification mine types which represent a threat, against which sensors should be proven, and - Design and evaluation of mine replicas appropriate for the testing of new sensors. Procurement of targets for test of ongoing R&D projects did not form part of the MIMEVA activity. 1.3 Applications for mine replicas

Replicas are needed to address a number of needs including

· Mine awareness training

· Evaluation of mechanical demining systems

· Evaluation of electromagnetic sensor systems for mine detection. Other needs include the training of military personnel on the handling and placement of mines; for demining personnel, both military and civilian, on the ways to destroy or render-safe landmines that have been detected, in order to clear the area of the threat. Aspects that determine the methods of clearance include safety to demining personnel and others, the location with respect to property, the impact of local detonation in polluting other areas being cleared. Non humanitarian clearance needs were not considered in this study. 1.4 Work undertaken

1.4.1 Initial Research

Initial research was conducted to identify the types of landmine that are predominant in mine-affected countries. In addition, an external specialist in humanitarian demining was commissioned to provide up to date information on mines and experience gained from humanitarian demining actions conducted in many countries. The result has been developed into a summary of the main mines that may be found in

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various geographic areas. These mine types are analysed and classified in terms of their shape, dimensions, fuze characteristics, and type and quantity of high explosive.

1.4.2 Simulants

The role of simulants and other representations of mines was considered with respect to the overall project requirement “to study and compare different ways to simulate landmines for research, training and development needs in humanitarian demining”. With respect to the main task, the replication of landmines, for the purpose of providing test objects appropriate to the reliable testing of new sensor and systems, was addressed in detail. The design of existing simulants was examined with respect to a number of criteria including:

· Availability,

· Safety

· Appropriateness of the replica as a test object (from the electromagnetic standpoint)

· Transportability

· Cost

· Possibility to build from easily obtainable parts Existing simulants address some of these issues well – especially safety, transportability, and in respect of metal detectors, representing the signature of a wide range of mines. Proposals were made for new targets, which can offer improved features in respect of cost, sourcing from low-cost components, and, from the electromagnetic standpoint, the inclusion in the model of certain voids, a features of many landmines that may contribute to their identification, particularly by radar sensors.

1.4.3 Measurement plan

A measurement plan was drawn up to address how example simulants were to be assessed for a number of sensors. Consideration of the R&D contracts awarded by the EC, and other work current in 1998-9 indicated that the most likely sensors, which could be offered as new humanitarian demining tools, would be:

· Improved metal-detectors, including detector arrays and detectors with enhanced signal processing features;

· Ground penetrating radar, including radar arrays and signal processing features added to the radar system;

· Thermal infrared systems. Other systems proposed or under test at that time included nuclear back-scatter systems, mechanical resonance sensors, olfactory explosives-sensors and quadropole resonance systems. From this analysis, and with the support of DGIII, the contract activity focussed on the development and assessment of replica mines suitable for the assessment of the three primary classes of sensor highlighted above together with multi-sensor systems employing one or more of these sensors. The measurement plan developed for this project [2] ensured a defined methodology was used to characterise the both simulants and original mines.

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1.4.4 Execution of measurements

All measurements for this project were made at the JRC. The European Microwave Signature Laboratory was used to assess the radar performance. Infrared and metal detector measurements were made at the demining test facility and in the Karl Friedrich Gauss Laboratory. Measurements were made with standard laboratory test equipment coupled to calibrated antennas and calibrated positioning systems. This was supplemented, for the metal detector measurements, by two proprietary detectors each working with a different technology (pulse-induction and continuous-wave) from which response signals were taken early in the processing chain avoiding some of the filtering effects and delays associated with audio output for the man-machine interface. For the infrared a standard thermal infrared camera (AGEMA 570) was used to record images. Where appropriate standard measurement thermocouples were used to measure temperatures of the objects under investigation. Targets used included:

· Simulants from the ITOP series,

· Simulants based on designs supplied by Colin King of CKA Limited,

· Live mines (but without an active fuze) made available 1.5 Structure of this report

This project final report addresses the topics identified in the previous section. Main results are presented in the text. Supporting information provided in annexes to this report. Section 2 - Initial research – provides a catalogue of mine types that have been identified in countries that have been the subject of EC demining actions. By agreement with DG III the project is limited to AP blast mines, as these were seen to represent targets that are most difficult to detect reliably. The results are tabulated by mine type and also presented for the South East Europe (SEE) region, ordered by the characteristics of the mines. Section 3 - Applications and possible solutions – considers the range of applications for which mine replicas may be used. Possible solutions for replicas for mine awareness training are discussed followed by consideration of the approach and an identified solution for the evaluation of mechanical demining systems. The main focus of this section addresses targets that are suitable for the evaluation of electromagnetic sensor systems for mine detection. Section 4 - Proposed construction for replica mines. – In this section generic mine surrogates developed for NATO (under ITOP) and for the Australian defence forces are reviewed and their strengths and limitations discussed. A proposal for two simulant designs is presented that shows improvements compared to the ITOP design, with respect to radar signatures. Section 5- Validation of surrogate mines - The measurement plan developed under the MIMEVA project is presented. Changes to the plan, introduced during the project, are discussed. The measurements made for each of three sensor classes on a range of mine targets, simulants, and surrogates derived from actual mines is presented. Correlation between characteristics of real mines in the electromagnetic spectrum and the mine simulants was established. The number of (actual) mine targets available limited the number of comparisons that could be made. Nevertheless the measurement principles were established and the extent of the validity of the existing and proposed designs is discussed.

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Section 6- Replication of mines for test and evaluation of detectors - The conclusions discuss the design of mine simulants and show that this approach can result in simpler initial testing with reduced need for site security and a significant increase in safety for the initial test phase. Further the results from the initial testing using the simulants can contribute to early design improvements thus lowering risks later in the development projects.

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2 Initial research

2.1 Landmines affecting EC projects – compilation strategy

2.1.1 Identification of threat objects

In this section the mines found in a selection of mine affected areas, globally, are catalogued. Mine types against which detectors will be required to operate were identified by considering those mines that have been found in areas where EC sponsored demining actions had taken place. Physical features including size, shape and explosive content are used to further classify the mines. During this project, the Mine Action Co-ordination Group (MACG), chaired by DG RELEX requested that emphasis in mine actions should be placed on South-East Europe, in order to support the Stability Pact. The initial mine lists are refined in section 2.5 to highlight those AP blast mines that present the major threat in SEE.

2.1.2 Scope of the threat list

Mines discussed in this document are limited to AP blast mines with non-metallic cases. This limitation is applied on the assumption that metal-cased are generally larger mines (and incidentally more lethal) which should be more easily detectable than the low-metal mines considered in this report. The absence of these mines from this threat list does not imply that no attention should paid to their detectability. Final testing must verify that any new detector system is capable of identifying all threat mines, not only those deemed to be hard to detect. The threat list was compiled from research undertaken by the JRC, complemented by information provided by Colin King of CKA Limited, under contract to the JRC. Details of mines and images were derived information in the public domain, principally including

· Norwegian Peoples Aid, http://www.angola.npaid.org/mines_database.htm [5];

· Banks E., Brassey’s Essential Guide to Anti-personnel mines [6];

· King C. (Ed), Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance [7]. Primary sources of information listed by country are: Countries Information sources Bosnia and Herzegovina Colin King Associates, Croatia CROMAC Kosovo Angola Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid Mozambique Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid Somalia/ Uganda (South Sahara Norwegian Peoples Aid reference) Afghanistan Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid Cambodia Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid Iraq Norwegian Peoples Aid Laos Norwegian Peoples Aid

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2.2 Mine Types against which Detector Validation Tests will need to be conducted.

This section lists the plastic cased AP mines that pose a humanitarian threat and are ones against which new sensors and multi-sensor systems will be required to operate.

2.2.1 Locations considered

The following areas were considered in this study. The list includes countries where significant demining actions sponsored by the European Commission have taken place.

SouthEast Europe Area Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia Kosovo Africa Angola Mozambique Somalia Uganda Zimbabwe Asia Afghanistan Cambodia Iraq Laos

2.2.2 Categorisation by mine characteristics

The initial study [3] resulted in a general categorisation for AP mines. This classification makes a basic discrimination between mines that are difficult to locate using a metal detector and those that are easily found, again using the metal detector as the primary search tool. From this general categorisation three types of mine were identified that could be considered as representative of certain groups of AP mine. While not identical it was considered that the design features of these three mines (designated “Representative mines” in the following table) could be considered as a basis for the design of surrogates. Using de-activated examples of the “Representative mines” was not considered to be an option as all mines and component parts are military controlled items under the Ottawa agreement.

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Category Mine types Comments Representative mines 1 MI AP DV 59 Small plastic cased AP blast PMA-2 mines, broadly similar in Type 72 R2M2 configuration. Most have very low PMA-1 metallic content. (MI AP DV 59 has no metal content at all). PMA-2 R2M1 R2M2 2 PPM-2 Large AP blast mines (SPM is a PMN time delay limpet mine). There are PMD-6 a variety of casings and PMN configurations. All mines contain moderate amounts of metal. PMN-2 SPM

2.3 Occurrence of landmines in designated territories

2.3.1 Study

The CKA report to the JRC (Full List of Mines for Validation Tests) included a list of the main mines deployed in the territories of interest except Croatia and Kosovo. For Croatia a list with approximate numbers was obtained from the Croatian Mine Action Centre (Hvartski Centar za Razminiranje). This information is summarised in Annex 1. The deployment of mines in Kosovo is believed to be broadly similar to the profile of use in Bosnia as a result of the common history of both areas, being formerly parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The mines distributed in the affected countries are the ones against which new detection systems must work. Annex 1 shows details of the full set of mines distributed by country. For ex-Yugoslavia there has been high usage of PMA-3, PMA-2 and PMA-1A mines, and data is provided that gives an indication of the relative distribution of these mines. Mine Characteristics are described in Annex 2. 2.4 Full List of Mines for equipment to be evaluated against

The following table is list of mines which have been deployed in quantity in the countries identified earlier. It is ordered by type designation. It is clear that, when considering the performance of equipment that will be deployed in a particular theatre, the mines list can (and should) be limited. In each theatre, where possible the sensors should be proven to respond effectively to the known threats. A summary of APL blast mines which have been widely used in South East Europe is given in section 2.5.

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2.4.1 Mine List in alphabetic order

This list summarises the AP blast mines with their main characteristics that represent the main threat in the countries listed in section 2.2.1.

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2.4.2 Cylindrical shape mines - detectability by metal content

This table summarises the expected detectability of cylinder shaped mines by a metal detector. It correlates approximately to the relative weight of metal components in the mine – however as the shape, electrical conductivity and magnetic permeability, of each part, contribute to the response there is not a simple relationship.

Mine Height Diameter Weight Explosive Weight Explosive Detectability (by Reference metal detectors) GYATA- 61 106 520 300 TNT Y 64 M409 28 82 183 80 Trialene Y MAI-75 61 95 300 120 TNT Y MD82-B 55 55 128 28 Y MN79 40 56 99 29 Y P4 Mk1 38 70 140 56 TNT Y PMN 56 112 600 240 TNT Y PMN-2 54 125 450 115 TNT Y PPM-2 63 125 371 110 TNT Y PRBM 35 58 64 158 100 TNT Y DM-11 34 82 231 122 RDX/TNT Y (low) PMA-3 36 103 183 35 TNT Y (low) R2M1 56 69 130 58 RDX/WAX88/12 Y (low) R2M2 56 69 130 58 RDX/WAX88/12 Y (low) SB-33 32 88 42 35 comp. B Y (low) M14 40 56 100 30 Tetryl Y (v,low) T 72-A 40 70 150 34 TNT Y (v,low) T 72-B 40 76 150 28 TNT Y (v,low) TM-100 107 33 180 100 TNT Y (v,low) VAR-40 45 78 105 40 Comp B or T4 Y (v,low) AUPS 36 102 300 115 Comp B Y (v,low) PMA-2 61 68 135 100 Trotyl/Hexogen Y (v,low) (70/30) VS-MK2 32 90 135 33 RDX Y (v,low) VS-50 45 90 185 42 RDX Y (very low /TS-50 metal)

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2.4.3 Cylindrical shape mines – listed in order of increasing body diameter

This table summarises the cylinder shaped mines by relative size. It is offered as a guide to the level of difficulty that detectors such as those using radar or thermal infrared may encounter in the detection process.

Mine Height Diameter Weight Explosive Weight Explosive Detectability (by Reference metal detectors) TM-100 107 33 180 100 TNT Y (v,low) MD82-B 55 55 128 28 Y MN79 40 56 99 29 Y M14 40 56 100 30 Tetryl Y (v,low) PRBM 35 58 64 158 100 TNT Y PMA-2 61 68 135 100 Trotyl/Hexogen Y (v,low) (70/30) R2M1 56 69 130 58 RDX/WAX88/12 Y (low) R2M2 56 69 130 58 RDX/WAX88/12 Y (low) P4 Mk1 38 70 140 56 TNT Y T 72-A 40 70 150 34 TNT Y (v,low) T 72-B 40 76 150 28 TNT Y (v,low) VAR-40 45 78 105 40 Comp B or T4 Y (v,low) M409 28 82 183 80 Trialene Y DM-11 34 82 231 122 RDX/TNT Y (low) SB-33 32 88 42 35 comp. B Y (low) VS-MK2 32 90 135 33 RDX Y (v,low) VS-50 45 90 185 42 RDX Y (very low /TS-50 metal) MAI-75 61 95 300 120 TNT Y AUPS 36 102 300 115 Comp B Y (v,low) PMA-3 36 103 183 35 TNT Y (low) GYATA- 61 106 520 300 TNT Y 64 PMN 56 112 600 240 TNT Y PMN-2 54 125 450 115 TNT Y PPM-2 63 125 371 110 TNT Y

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2.5 Selection of mine types against which mine detection systems must be capable to operate in South East Europe

2.5.1 Cylindrical Shape mines, occurrences in SEE

This list focuses on cylindrical AP blast mines found in SEE. This subset includes the mines that have a cylindrical form. Some have protrusions, fins or flat surfaces, which aid assembly or camouflage. Mines are listed with an indication of the country in which they are found. Numbers are given where available and represent the quantity removed by 2000, otherwise the “+” sign indicates that this mine type has been found in that territory.

Mine Origin Bosnia and Croatia Kosovo Reference Herzegovina GYATA-64 (PMN H + + equivalent) M1 AP DVM59 F + + M409 B + + PMA-2 Ex YU 30587 17400 + PMA-3 Ex YU 40503 13000 + PPM-2 DDR + + PRBM 35 B + + TM-100 Ex YU + + + VS-50 /TS-50 I + +

2.5.2 Box Shaped AP blast mines occurring in SEE

This list focuses on those mines found in SEE that are box shaped.

Mine Origin Bosnia and Croatia Kosovo Reference Herzegovina PMA-1A Ex YU 18950 1300 + PP Mi-D Cz + + TM –200 Ex YU + + +

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2.5.3 Common Cylindrical AP mines in SEE: Detectability by metal content

This table summarises the cylinder shaped mines found in South East Europe grouped in order of expected detectability, by a metal detector.

Mine Height Diameter Weight Explosive Weight Explosive Detectability (by Reference metal detectors) GYATA- 61 145 520 300 TNT Y 64 M409 28 82 183 80 Trialene Y PPM-2 125 63 371 110 TNT Y PRBM 35 58 64 158 100 TNT Y PMA-3 36 103 183 35 TNT Y (low) TM-100 107 33 180 100 TNT Y (v,low) PMA-2 61 68 135 100 Trotyl/Hexogen Y (very low (70/30) metal) VS-50 45 90 185 42 RDX Y (very low /TS-50 metal)

2.5.4 Common Cylindrical AP mines in SEE: By body diameter

This table summarises the cylinder shaped mines in SEE by relative size. It is offered as a guide to the level of difficulty that detectors such as those using radar or thermal infrared may encounter in the detection process.

Mine Height Diameter Weight Explosive Explosive Detectability (by Reference Weight metal detectors) TM-100 107 33 180 100 TNT Y (v,low) PPM-2 125 63 371 110 TNT Y PRBM 35 58 64 158 100 TNT Y PMA-2 61 68 135 100 TNT (Trotyl) Y (very low metal) /Hexogen (70/30) M409 28 82 183 80 Trialene Y VS-50 /TS- 45 90 185 42 RDX Y (very low metal) 50 PMA-3 36 103 183 35 TNT Y (low) GYATA-64 61 145 520 300 TNT Y

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2.5.5 Common AP mines in SEE: Explosive type

This table summarises the AP blast mines found in SEE by explosive type.

Mine Height Diameter Weight Explosive Explosive Detectability (by Reference (mm) (mm) (g) Weight (g) metal detectors) VS-50 /TS- 45 90 185 42 RDX Y (very low 50 metal) PMA-3 36 103 183 35 TNT Y (low) TM-100 107 33 180 100 TNT Y (v,low) PRBM 35 58 64 158 100 TNT Y PPM-2 125 63 371 110 TNT Y GYATA-64 61 145 520 300 TNT Y PMA-2 61 68 135 100 TNT(Trotyl)/Hexogen N (70/30)

M409 28 82 183 80 Trialene Y

Clearly the predominant explosive to be detected is TNT. However the lesser used VS50 and M 409 mines require that any explosive detection system must either

· include the possibility to identify the other explosives included in the table above or

· at least ensure that mines not armed with TNT do not result in a declaration that the area is clear. Characteristics of the explosives are given in Annex 3. 2.6 Overview of the study into mine types that must be identified

This section of the report has summarised the characteristics of small AP blast mines in order to consider future test strategies for mine detectors.

· For the MIMEVA study only non-metal cased targets are listed.

· For some detection systems it may be necessary only to prove the performance against the most challenging targets in each group. For others performance against each target may need to be validated. The actual case will depend on the sensors used and the basis of any decision algorithms used to achieve a detection decision.

· The metal content of each mine is listed as it is considered that some future detection systems may use this fast responding detector as first indicator of the possible presence of a mine. Other detectors (either slower responding or requiring significant data processing) may give confirmatory information.

· The tabulations are designed to aid the selection process – but must be used with caution as the full circumstances of the test procedure of future sensors and systems are not known at this time.

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3 Applications and possible solutions

In this section the possible applications of the different types of replica are discussed and solutions proposed. While this project addresses primarily the application of replicas to test and validation, other applications are included for completeness. 3.1 Mine awareness training

When models of mines are used for mine awareness training, the primary need is visual realism. Internal structure is not important, but the shape and colour are. The following approaches were identified:

· Recovered mines that have been rendered safe, thorough an approved procedure.

· Model mines that do not have the possibility to be an explosive object.

· Computer based models which show the external structure, colour (or colours) and which may be a three-dimensional model – thus allowing each target to be viewed from any angle.

· Photographs or drawings of real mines or true replica models. The first two approaches suffer the disadvantage that the resultant objects will become controlled items - that is they will be subject to export controls in all countries that are signatory to the Ottawa convention. The first method may however be the lowest cost solution in a mine-affected country and therefore may be used despite the security implications. R&D is mainly undertaken in countries unaffected by landmines where the availability of recovered mines will be limited. These items are prohibited from importation and the only legal holders are likely to be the military, which has a legitimate need to train personnel to recognise the various mines that may be a threat both in wartime and in peacekeeping activities. Some sources of landmine models are listed here. Model mines are available from several sources. As an example, JRC has purchased copies of a number of mine types from Maquettes Sedial of Nantes, France. ( http://www.sedial.com/ ). It should be noted that these models are externally realistic and their movement is subject to export control agreements with the French government. These models are inappropriate for use as controlled references as it is usually not possible to dismantle the model to verify the internal structure. Further, the materials used for the components are not specified. Examples are shown in Annex 4. Another source of mine models is Miltra Engineering in the UK. This company produces models for a range of military training applications, including, but not limited to, landmines. Model (training) mines are also produced by KIK Chemical Industry in Slovenia. These are intended for training in mine awareness and render safe procedures and may not be appropriate for validating detectors. (Within the time-scale of this project no samples of these replicas were examined). Databases of mines do exist and can be applied for training. Usually these are based on military information – indeed a searchable database may contain various levels of detail that are appropriate for different applications. This may mean that for mine awareness training in Humanitarian Demining only limited information may be relevant. Generally the databases include information on dimensions, colour, type of mine (blast/ fragmentation. Anti-personnel, anti-tank etc.) and photographs (often from several perspectives) for each included mine. Some examples of mine databases are listed in Annex 11. Three dimensional computer models have also been developed. One example was developed by Essex Corporation as part of a US led initiative with DARPA. This has been used in some HD applications. IT is part of an interactive suite of training aids.

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Photograph or sketch based training aids are listed by Global Information Networks in Information (at the following web address http://ginie1.sched.pitt.edu/ginie-crises-links/lm/ ) for Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador, Laos, Mozambique, Somalia, Yemen, Zaire. Some examples are given in Annex 5.

3.1.1 Applications of replicas for mine awareness training and validation of models.

These models and images are appropriate for training deminers in recognition. For test applications this type of model is of limited use. Generally, they may a lack a realistic internal structure. The weight of the original mine may not be reflected in the model. It may not be possible to dismantle this type of model. It is therefore also not feasible to make changes to the amount of included metal or to change the material of the simulated explosive block (to modify the dielectric constant). The models are realistic, and subject to similar import and export restrictions as a weapon. These factors make this method of replicating landmines unsuitable for use as targets on which to base an evaluation of the performance of demining sensors. For this class no testing and validation is appropriate except to confirm by visual inspection against certified data (normally, military records) that the model or image is an accurate representation and thus any training may start from a sound base. 3.2 Replicas for mechanical demining systems

Mechanical demining systems require a specific type of mine replica to prove their effectiveness. The targets should contain a remotely readable marker. After clearance by a demining machine the marker may be identified as present (indicating that a mine would have survived intact, and thus the threat would not have been removed) or absent, in which case the mine is considered destroyed. One surrogate of this type was identified during the MIMEVA project. This was developed in Canada for the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND). The surrogates were developed by CCMAT and Amtech Aeronautical Limited of Medicine Hat, Alberta. (http://www.amtech-group.com/ )

3.2.1 Test and validation of the simulants for mechanical demining machines

The Amtech surrogates have been proven on the Mechanical Mine Surrogate Site in Canada. This test site is an area of prepared ground prepared by the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT) to test mechanical demining assistance devices proposed. The surrogate mines, developed by Amtech, react to the same pressure inputs as mines, are buried in the soil to record and compare the performance of different systems being evaluated. The surrogates include magnetic induction tag technology – if the transponder coil is damaged by the mechanical demining equipment (which will occur if the mine body is destroyed there will be no response in a subsequent electromagnetic scan. If the replica is mainly intact (or only partly damaged the transponder will give a response. Each replica has a unique serial number – thus in a trial, where a large number of surrogates should be deployed it is possible to identify the remaining targets rapidly as well as to record their individual positions without false alarms. These mine surrogates are specific for mechanical mine clearance systems. 3.3 Targets to evaluate electromagnetic sensor systems for mine detection

Investigation of possible targets suitable for evaluation of electromagnetic based sensors and multi- sensor systems formed a major activity of the MIMEVA project. Ideally a target would be suitable to

AA 501852 Page 15 MIMEVA: Study of generic Mine-like Objects for R&D in Systems for Humanitarian Demining Applications and possible solutions evaluate any type of detection system – but there are several reasons why this appears to be not be achievable in practice. The formats of the targets and the possible solutions are discussed below.

· Recovered mines that have been rendered safe, thorough an approved procedure,

· Model mines with realistic internal structures,

· Replica mines, which may not be direct copies of mines, but do offer similar electromagnetic signatures to that of the live targets. This class includes the (generic) Simulant mines and Surrogate mines. The latter aim to represent specific mines in respect of the response for particular sensors. Different approaches are preferred for the various applications. The first two approaches suffer the disadvantage that the resultant objects will become controlled items. This means that they will be subject to export controls in all countries that are signatory to the Ottawa convention. The first method may however readily available solution in a mine-affected country despite the security implications. Importantly, for any final test of sensor systems before testing in a real demining situation, evaluation of the sensors against targets based on safe (but otherwise original targets) is the best way of gaining confidence in a sensor equipment. This is an important consideration to deminers who would work with any future equipment. A high level of confidence is needed on performance under realistic conditions and thus the final tests should always be against targets that are as realistic as possible, while preserving the necessary levels of safety. Legal constraints, together with safety issues determine that the preferred approach any testing that may have to be replicated by international partners on a range of test locations is by the use of these generic surrogates.

3.3.1 Test and validation needs

Test scenarios include proving that the sensor will be able to detect the particular component within a mine. A range of sensors has been considered. Required features of the surrogate are shown in table 3.1. From the point of view of testing with reproducible targets it is important that test objects will not be subject to controls on their movement that result from being classified as an armament. The surrogates proposed do not contain any parts that originate from mines or directly copy mines. As such they are no constraints on anyone constructing the design. There are also no controls on the movement of these objects – they may therefore be freely moved inside countries and across national borders greatly simplifying the concept of initial testing. If targets are required to contain blocks of explosive then they will be subject to security controls – nevertheless a surrogate design could allow for the local insertion of the explosive block thus simplifying the control process. These replica targets can be completely specified in materials and construction. They form a series of reproducible targets that are free of any legal restrictions on where they may be used.

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Table 3.1. Required characteristics of different replicas for a range of sensors (Terminology is defined on page vii).

Sensor type Characteristics Essential components of target Recovered targets Model Simulants and Generic surrogates checked mines surrogates including Explosive

Magnetometer Presence of ferrous Ferrous metal parts similar to those found in the Good match May not Can match Neither Explosive nor metal intended targets match substitute required Metal Detector (MD) Presence of metal Metal parts with similar material (in respect of s Good match – Must add a May not Will match Neither Explosive nor parts in mine and m) and shapes as the intended mine-targets substitute for the fuze match substitute required container on low metal mines Imaging MD Shape of metal parts Metal parts with similar material (in respect of s As above May not Will match Neither Explosive nor and m) and shapes as the intended mine-targets match substitute required Radar – SAR and Dielectric contrast, Overall shape; case material similar to original; Good match May not Generic shape – Non-explosive substitute ground penetrating dielectric interfaces metal parts with similar material and shape as the match cylinder or rectangular possible (GPR), including intended mine-targets. Explosive block solid. Internal structure arrays and represented by block of similar shape and values may reflect a solid or include air gaps polarimetric variants. of er and loss tangent (d) at radar frequencies Thermal Infrared Thermal contrast Overall shape; case material and colour generally Good match May not Shape. Internal Non-explosive substitute camera similar to original. Significant parts have similar match structure may be solid possible material thermal capacity, conductivity and shapes or include air gaps. as the intended mine-targets. Polarimetric TIR Specular Reflectance As above plus outer surface should have paint Good match May not As above Non-explosive substitute camera with similar IR radiance properties to the original match possible mines. Optical system Visible features, colour Replica shall have the similar same shape and Good match Good Limited match. Shape Non-explosive substitute colour to the original target can be mapped into possible the sensor’s memory Optical + polarimetry Visible features, As above, but the surface qualities shall match Good match May not As above Non-explosive substitute colour, reflectance well with those of original targets match possible Electronic nose Presence of explosive Construction may affect the rate of leakage of the Good match No Lacks explosive Essential for this sensor vapour from the explosive. match. Quadropole Presence of explosive Targets may contain limited quantities of metal. Good match No Lacks explosive Essential for this sensor resonance There must be no electromagnetic screening of the match. explosive. Nuclear detection of Presence of explosive Few constraints on the construction of the model. Good match No Lacks explosive Essential for this sensor explosive match.

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4 Proposed construction for replica mines

The priority identified for this project was to match results from replicas to those obtained from selected representative mines. The planned approach was to measure sample mines (less fuze) from one of the ex-Yugoslavia countries. After discussions with local and national representatives of the Italian Authorities it became clear that there was no legal way in which this could be done since importation and movement of mines and mine –like objects was precluded by law. During these discussions however it was identified that the authorities were willing in principle to lend to the JRC some mines form their training stock (permitted under the Ottawa treaty). Again, however the law specifically prohibited the movement of the training mines by others than the military, also the release of any mine like objects to non-military personnel or organisations. It took until November 2000 before authorisation and delivery could be completed. At that point two samples of each of 4 types of Italian mines (less fuze), together with training mine samples which contained no explosive were available. It was then feasible to create a replica of identical form to the original but with a substitute for the explosive. Surrogates were obtained from the USA. These were the SIM series –also known as NATO ITOP series - described in Annex 6. This design represents the explosive by a solid cylinder of silicone RTV contained in an ABS plastic case. The construction means that any air-gaps in a real mine are not reflected in this design. The cylinders are made in six diameters. Each diameter cylinder is a different height. Three smaller diameters represent AP mines and the three larger sizes represent anti-tank mines. The metal components are represented by a series of inserts – one set for the AP simulants and one set for the AT simulants. The series of inserts are marked with a code letter, which indicates the metal content of the inserts. Each insert (with its appropriate metal parts) is filled with silicone RTV (similar to the simulant body). The purpose of the different amounts of metal is to allow the representation of mine targets with different amounts of metal from zero to a fairly high metal content. This design, where the metal parts are all fitted in a vertical cylinder) does not address the representation of mines like the PMN where there is a large metal component laid horizontally in the mine body. Advice was obtained from the Department of Defence, Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) Australia on the design of mine simulants. These are described in Annex 7. They are somewhat similar in concept to the US SIMs but include details of paint specifications that may be used to ensure correct IR performance in respect of the reflectance. Colin King (under the earlier mentioned contract) made recommendation to construct surrogates representative of generic classes of mine. There are two basic designs. Each includes air gaps and the possibility to represent different mine classes by altering the metal parts and the representation of the explosive block. It is considered important from the point of view of responses from radar or from TIR sensors that air gaps are considered since they can significantly affect the responses seen by such sensors. These simulants are based on the use of standard components to avoid fixed costs in production. Therefore the surrogate mine bodies are made from a combination of plastic plumbing parts with a small amount of cutting to reduce the length, or machining to adjust diameters. Similarly fize parts are based on the procurement of standard mechanical engineering parts including tube, rod, machine screws, nuts and springs. The resulting simulants suitable for test applications are shown in Annex 8. Measurements made on the Italian mines and the surrogates obtained for this project (Annex 8) with the metal targets selected from the ITOP SIM simulants are described in the following section 0 - Validation methods for mine surrogates Simulants described and tested are cylindrical. This reflects the geometry of the majority of AP mines deployed. (The number of box mines in the field is relatively low). The approach suggested here allows mine replicas to be built based on easily obtainable parts - however it does mean that some care will need to be taken to ensure that any sensors under test do perform adequately against box mines.

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5 Validation of surrogate mines

The objective of this section of the study was to validate simulant and surrogate designs against representative threat mines. Following confirmation of the design of a surrogate mine it could be considered suitable for procurement for the testing of demining detection equipment – both current and in development. The measurement strategy was defined early in the project [2]. During the project some adjustments were made to the plan. These changes were made to accommodate the types of live mines that were accessible to the project (legal issues prevented access to live examples of mines from ex Yugoslavia), and to allow the use of commercially available metal detectors (See section 5.3). Where feasible, sensor independent measurement systems were used. In practice this has meant that radar assessments were made using the wide-band, calibrated facilities offered by EMSL which is described at http://demining.jrc.it/emsl.htm . Metal detector comparisons have been made by the use of pulse and continuous wave detectors using outputs early in the processing chain to reflect changes in field levels. As these measurements are not sensor independent, a reference object has been included in each test to ensure that any drift or set-up differences may be eliminated the measurement in subsequent data analysis. Metal detector and infrared measurements were made taken at the JRC outdoor test facility described at http://demining.jrc.it/electromagnetic.htm . Infra red measurements have been restricted to the TIR band (l = 7.5 - 13mm) using an AGEMA 570 camera. This is considered to be a representative instrument as technology driven cost factors currently dictate that this will be the preferred sensor band. The level of sensitivity (discrimination to 0.1K is considered adequate for humanitarian demining applications.

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5.1 Radar Measurements

5.1.1 Background

The radar signatures of the surrogates and the corresponding live mines were measured in the anechoic chamber of the EMSL. Since the wavelength in the soil is generally shorter than that in the free space, a frequency range significantly higher than that used by a GPR (typically 0.5-1.5 GHz) must be selected. The dielectric contrast between the mine and the surrounding medium when the mine is measured in-air is expected to be higher that that with the mine buried in the ground. However, in backscatter measurements, the dielectric contrast will basically affect the power level of the backscattered signal, not its waveform. The signature waveform will mostly depend on the constituent materials and internal structure of the mine. Thus, in-air measurements are perfectly appropriate to estimate the degree of resemblance between surrogate mines and the corresponding live mines. The frequency range selected for these measurements was 1.5 to 9.5 GHz. The range resolution associated with this frequency range is about 2 cm. Therefore, it can be expected that differences in the inner structure of the surrogates and the live mines will strongly modulate the backscattered fields. The measurements were all fully polarimetric. The mines under test were placed at the focus of the chamber as shown in figure 5.1.1. Both the live mines and the surrogates were laid horizontally at the same position with a high degree of accuracy. During the tests, the backcattered fields were collected at different aspect angles in azimuth f, and

Figure 5.1.1. Sketch of the measurement set-up: top view (left) and side view (right). in elevation q. The results shown in this section were obtained with an incidence angle of q=90 deg. Four landmines provided by the Italian Army were characterized: a Tecnovar-VAR40, a Tecnovar-MAUS, a Tecnovar AUPS and a Valsella MK2 (see figure 5.1.2). For comparison purposes, two simulant mines provided by Colin King Associates were also characterized. All mines and simulants were positioned with their vertical axes oriented to the z axis of the chamber. The antennas were positioned so the angle of incidence was along the x-y plane (i.e., q=90 deg). The CKA-B simulant had the fuze pointing towards the antenna, at the initial azimuth position (f=0 deg).

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Figure 5.1.2. Photographs of the Tecnovar-Var40 (upper-left), a Tecnovar-MAUS (upper-right), a Tecnovar AUPS (lower left) and a Valsella MK2 (lower right).

5.1.2 Equivalence Criteria

The measurable used to characterise the targets is the complex backscattered electromagnetic field as a function of the frequency. This is a vector with a number of complex values equal to the number of frequencies measured. The comparison was performed using data that was previously calibrated. As a result of the measurement we get two complex arrays of frequency domain data (in practice these arrays will have two dimensions: CW frequency of the radar and azimuth aspect angle of the sample). The first one is the reference corresponding to the measurement with the real mine. The second measurement is that using the surrogate. In order to assess the level of equivalence between the two measurements we applied the following procedure: 1st. For each azimuth angle we computed the normalised cross-correlation in the frequency domain using the following formula: X ×Y * S[k] = k k N -1 N -1 time 2 time 2 å X n × å Yn n=0 n=0

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Xi and Yi are the two frequency-domain sequences corresponding to the measurements with the real mine and the surrogate, respectively. 2nd. Frequency to time domain transformation of the complex vector S[k] using the Chirp-Z transform. This is needed to get the cross-correlation in the time domain. Thus,

FFT Xcorr[t]Û S[k]

From its definition Xcorr[t] is a sequence of complex numbers whose amplitude will range between 0 and 1. The higher the value of Xcorr[t] is, the better (i.e., it will indicate a high resemblance between the surrogate and the real mine). It’s important to keep Xcorr[t] as a sequence in order to detect any error in the positioning of the samples. Note that a displacement between the two measurements would result in a sequence Xcorr[t] with the maximums slightly shifted from the origin.

5.1.3 Results

The backcattered fields in the time domain for the Tecnovar-Var40 are shown in figure 5.1.3. It can be observed that the radar signatures of the surrogate and the live mine are quite different. A possible justification for this disagreement may be the presence of an additional spring in the fuze of the surrogate. The documentation we got from the Italian Army on the live mines indicates that there is a spring in the fuze missing. The results corresponding to the characterisation of the Tecnovar-MAUS are shown in figure 5.1.4. Here it is clearly seen that the radar signatures of the surrogate and the live mine are almost identical. This indicates that, within the measured range of frequencies, the used surrogate mine replicates the live mine with a high degree of accuracy.

Figure 5.1.3: Time Domain backscattered fields of the Tecnovar VAR40 at the initial aspect angle in azimuth (f=0 deg): surrogate (left) and live mine (right)

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Figure 5.1.4: Time Domain backscattered fields of the Tecnovar MAUS at the initial aspect angle in azimuth (f=0 deg): surrogate (left) and live mine (right)

As an example, figure 5.1.5 shows the cross-correlation function Xcorr[t] obtained with the measurements of the Tecnovar-Var40 and the Tecnovar-MAUS in the HH polarisation. As expected, the higher cross- correlation (or degree of resemblance) is obtained with the Tecnovar-MAUS. The highest value of the cross- correlation for the Tecnovar-Var40 is about 0.7.

Figure 5.1.5. Time domain cross-correlation between the responses of the surrogate and live mines. Technovar VAR40 at the initial aspect angle in azimuth (f=0 deg): (left) and Technovar MAUS (right).

The resulting cross-correlations in the HH and VV polarisations for the five aspect angles in azimuth are summarised in Table 5.1.1. Measured cross-correlations for other aspect angles were found to be of the same order than those presented in Table 5.1.1 and therefore are not listed here. In fact, the Tecnovar MAUS, the Tecnovar AUPS and the Tecnovar-VAR40 present a high degree of azimuthal symmetry (i.e., they are bodies of revolution). Consequently, the cross-correlations are expected not to change with the aspect angle. On the other hand, the Valsella-MK2 is not a body of revolution and its backscatter shows a strong modulation with the aspect angle. This modulation is however replicated by the surrogate quite precisely.

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Tecnovar-Var40 Tecnovar-MAUS Aspect Angle (deg) HH Pol VV Pol HH Pol VV Pol -2 deg 0.674087 0.719865 0.987364 0.978406 -1 deg 0.672946 0.717655 0.987307 0.978850 0 deg 0.648199 0.697055 0.986747 0.978494 +1 deg 0.650276 0.695594 0.986448 0.977940 +2 deg 0.644475 0.672047 0.986076 0.977023 Table 5.1.1. Cross-correlations for the Tecnovar-Var40 and Tecnovar-MAUS

These results further confirm the fact that the surrogate and live Tecnovar-MAUS are almost identical and therefore not distinguishable with a wide-band radar. The lower degree of resemblance observed with the Tecnovar-Var40 is probably due to a difference in the inner structure of the mine and not to the explosive. The resulting cross-correlations for the Tecnovar-AUPS and the Valsella-MK2 in the HH and VV polarisations for the five aspect angles in azimuth are summarised in Table 5.1.2.

Tecnovar-AUPS Valsella-MK2 Aspect Angle (deg) HH Pol VV Pol HH Pol VV Pol -2 deg 0.856192 0.849133 0.899670 0.854839 -1 deg 0.858165 0.847202 0.907831 0.864753 0 deg 0.851593 0.843920 0.882812 0.837591 +1 deg 0.856443 0.849126 0.888317 0.851869 +2 deg 0.851910 0.851905 0.895107 0.857844 Table 5.1.2. Cross-correlations for the Tecnovar-AUPS and Valsella-MK2

For these two types of landmine, the degree of resemblance is slightly lower than that of the Tecnovar- MAUS. From a practical viewpoint, the backscattered signal by the surrogate and the live mine are still not distinguishable with a wide-band radar. As an example, Figure 5.1.6 shows the cross-correlation in the time domain between a PMA-3 and a surrogate from Colin King Associates (CKA-A). It can be seen that the degree of resemblance (apart from a scaling factor) is quite high. The maximum cross-correlation is about 0.8. This result indicates that this surrogate shows a signature very much like that of a real mine. Therefore its use in laboratory measurements as a simulant for this AP mine is appropriate. Another important aspect in this comparison between the responses of live mines and surrogates is the dependence of the signatures on the aspect angle in azimuth. Two series of signature measurements varying the aspect angle in azimuth have been performed. In the first one, the aspect angles ranged from 0 to 350 deg., sampling a total of 36 points. This measurement was intended to estimate the degree of rotational

AA 501852 Page 24 MIMEVA: Study of generic Mine-like Objects for R&D in Systems for Humanitarian Demining Validation of surrogate mines symmetry of the objects as seen by the radar. In the second measurement, five closely spaced aspect angles were measured from –2 deg to +2 deg. The results of the first series of tests are shown in the Figures 5.1.7 and 5.1.8 for the HH and VV polarizations, respectively. As expected, it can be seen that the CKA-B and the Valsella-MK2 are clearly non-symmetric and show a clear modulation as a function of the azimuth aspect angle. On the other hand, the PMA-2 and the Tecnovar-AUPS show no dependence on the aspect angle, which indicates that they are bodies of revolution. The results of the second series of measurements varying the aspect angle are shown in Figures 5.1.9 and 5.1.10 for the HH and VV polarizations, respectively. The time domain responses for the a CKA-A, a CKA- B, a Tecnovar-AUPS, a Valsella-MK2, a Tecnovar MAUS, and a Tecnovar Var40 are presented as examples. Here the variation of the response as a function of the aspect angle is almost negligible due to the small electrical size of the objects. These results further confirm the validity of the use of surrogates to replace real landmines in initial evaluation of detection equipment.

Figure 5.1.6. Time domain cross-correlation between the responses of a PMA-3 and the surrogate CKA-A at the initial aspect angle in azimuth (upper-left); backscattered signals in the time domain (upper-right); pictures of the PMA-3 (lower-left) and the surrogate CKA-A (lower-right) in the chamber of the EMSL.

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Figure 5.1.7. Time domain responses as a function of the azimuth aspect angle in the HH polarization for a PMA-2, a modified PMA-2 (metal ring added), a Tecnovar-AUPS, a Valsella-MK2, and a CKA-B.

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Figure 5.1.8. Time domain responses as a function of the azimuth aspect angle in the VV polarization for a PMA-2, a modified PMA-2 (metal ring added), a Tecnovar-AUPS, a Valsella-MK2, and a CKA-B.

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Figure 5.1.9. Time domain responses as a function of the azimuth aspect angle in the HH polarization for a CKA-A, a CKA-B, a Tecnovar-AUPS, a Valsella-MK2, a Tecnovar MAUS, and a Tecnovar Var40.

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Figure 5.1.10. Time domain responses as a function of the azimuth aspect angle in the VV polarization for a CKA-A, a CKA-B, a Tecnovar-AUPS, a Valsella-MK2, a Tecnovar MAUS, and a Tecnovar Var40.

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5.1.4 Conclusions from the measurements at radar frequencies

Radar signatures of the surrogates and the corresponding live mines were measured in the anechoic chamber of the EMSL. Four landmines (Tecnovar-Var40, Tecnovar-AUPS, Tecnovar MAUS, a Valsella-MK2) , two simulants provided by Colin King Associates (CKA-A and CKA-B), and a PMA-3 surrogate were characterized. The degree of resemblance between these signatures has been estimated from the time domain cross-correlations. From the results, it can be concluded that:

· The signatures corresponding to the surrogate and live version of the Tecnovar-AUPS, Tecnovar MAUS, and the Valsella-MK2 showed a maximum cross-correlation above 0.85 both in the HH and VV polarizations. This indicates that constituent materials and internal structure of the surrogate match quite precisely those of the live mine.

· The signatures of the two simulant mines provided by CKA are close to those of some mines. As an example, the CKA-A has a radar signature close to that of a PMA-3, with a maximum cross- correlation close to 0.8.

· As expected, the Valsella MK2 and the CKA-B show a strong modulation with the aspect angle in azimuth. This is mostly due to the shape and position of the fuzes (metallic cylinders in the case of the CKA-B), which “break” the azimuthal symmetry of the mine.

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5.2 Evaluation of mine surrogates in infrared

5.2.1 Introduction

Thermal infrared responses of anti-personnel landmine surrogates were compared with those of the corresponding live mines [8]. The experiments were carried out in the Gauss Laboratory of the JRC, which has a large internal sandpit. This section describes the infrared measurements made on two pairs of mines VAR-40 and MAUS/1 and surrogates constructed as training mines in the same cases. Results show that infrared signatures of the measured mines are comparable with those of the surrogates.

5.2.2 Experimental set-up

Pairs of mines, consisting of a surrogate and the corresponding live mine, were positioned on the sand surface. The area was heated using a 2 kW tungsten halogen lamp. The lamp was mounted off-nadir at a height of 120 cm, providing an illumination of 43000 lux on the sand surface. The responses of the test objects were observed during the heating and cooling phases using an Agema 570 camera, operating in the long-wave infrared range (7.5 to 13 micron). The camera was mounted vertically over the area of interest at a height of 180 cm. A further experiment was conducted with the same pair of mines buried, each at the same depth, in dry sand. Figures 5.2.1.(a)-(d) show some photographs of the test arrangement.

Figure 5.2.1. (a) The experiment set up Figure 5.2.1. (b) Leveling test objects (VAR 40)

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Figure 5.2.1. (c) The test objects on the surface Figure 5.2.1. (d) Yellow spot indicates explosive

5.2.3 Results for mines and their direct surrogates

Two types of mine were measured: Tecnovar VAR40 and Tecnovar MAUS. The measurements were made for targets over one cycle comprising a heating phase and a cooling phase. To eliminate effects of position, the measurements were repeated with the mine and surrogate transposed.

5.2.3.1 Tecnovar VAR-40 (Heating Phase)

A surrogate and a live Tecnovar VAR-40 (with explosive but without a fuze capsule) were positioned on the surface of the sand and heated by the halogen lamp (see Figure 5.2.2). The thermal responses of these targets during the heating phase were measured. The resulting temperatures on the surface of the two mines are shown in Figure 5.2.3.

· The live mine is closer to the heating source · Heating for 12 mins · Image acquisition: image /2 mins

Figure 5.2.2. Measurement set-up used in the first series of infrared measurements.

Initially, the live mine was closer to the lamp. Consequently the temperature of this mine was 0.4°C higher than that of the surrogate. This was due to the targets having passed through several cycles of heating and cooling prior to this measurement. After a 12 minutes heating period, the difference between the temperature rise on the surface of the live mine and that of the surrogate was 0.7°C.

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LIVE SURROGATE Tlive-Tsurrogate

T1 (initial temperature) 25.7 25.3 0.4

T2 (final temperature) 50.3 49.2 1.1

Temperature rise (T2-T1) 24.6 23.9 Difference: 0.7°C

Surface temperature variation - mines on the surface (Var-40) -explosive on left-12 mins 60 heating

Live mine surrogate 30 background Temperature(C)

0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 image

Figure 5.2.3: VAR40 Heating (12 minutes) and cooling cycle showing surface temperature as a function of elapsed time. The thermal contrast at the start and end of the heating period are shown in the false-colour infrared images of Figures 5.2.4 and 5.2.5.

Figure 5.2.4. Thermal image of the live mine (right) Figure 5.2.5 Thermal image of the live mine (right) and surrogate (left) at start of heating phase. and surrogate (left) at end of heating phase (12 minutes).

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5.2.3.2 Tecnovar VAR-40 (COOLING PHASE)

The targets were measured during the cooling phase in order to observe the cooling rate for the live mine and the surrogate. During this phase, see Figure 5.2.3, a total of 11 images spaced 2 minutes in time were acquired.

Initially, the live mine (closer to the lamp) was 0.5°C warmer than the surrogate. After 20 minutes of cooling the difference in the temperature decrease on the surface of the live mine was 0.9°C lower than that of the surrogate. The live mine was 0.2°C warmer than the surrogate.

LIVE SURROGATE Tlive-Tsurrogate

T1 (initial temperature) 50.3 49.2 0.5

T2 (final temperature) 21.6 21.4 0.2

Temperature decrease (T2-T1) 28.7 27.8 Difference: 0.9

Figure 5.2.6. Thermal image of the live mine (right) Figure 5.2.7. Thermal image of the live mine (right) and surrogate (left) at start of cooling phase. and surrogate (left) at end of cooling phase (20 min).

To eliminate the effect of the relative position of the mines to the energy source the measurement was repeated with mine and the surrogate transposed (as shown in Figure 5.2.8).

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· The surrogate is closer to the heating source · Heating for 27 mins · Image acquisition: image/10 sec

Figure 5.2.8. Measurement set-up used in the second series of infrared measurements.

After 12 minutes of heating the temperature rise for the surrogate (closer to the lamp) and the live mine were 19.8°C and 19.4°C, respectively. After 27 minutes the temperature rises went up to 24.1°C and 23.9°C, respectively. The temperature rise on the surface of the surrogate was 0.5°C higher than that of the live mine. It was noted that this temperature rise was lower than that in the previous case (before the positions were inverted). This is considered to be due to the different initial temperature of the mines. Initially, the surface of the live mine and of the surrogate one were 6.1°C and 5.3°C cooler respectively than in the first measurement.

LIVE SURROGATE Difference (Tlive-Tsurrogate)

T1 (initial temperature) 19.6 20 -0.4

T2 (after 12 mins) 39 39.8 -0.4

T3 (final temperature) 43.5 44.1 -0.6

Temperature rise (T3-T1) 23.9 24.1 -0.5

Figure 5.2.9. Thermal image of the live mine (left) Figure 5.2.10. Thermal image of the live mine (left) and surrogate (right) at start of heating phase. and surrogate (right) at end of heating phase (27 min).

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As shown in figures 5.2.9 and 5.2.10, the behaviour of the surrogate and the live mine during the heating phase are very similar. The heating rate is the same. Differences in temperature rise of the targets were found to be due to different positions with respect to the lamp. The false colour images corresponding to the start and end of the cooling phase are shown in Figures 5.2.11 and 5.2.12, respectively. During the cooling phase (30 min), see Figure 5.2.13, the images were acquired at a rate of one image every 10 sec. After 20 minutes of cooling the temperature decrease for the surrogate (closer to the lamp) and the live mine were 22.2°C and 21.7°C, respectively. After 30 minutes the decreases in temperature were 25.7°C and 25.2°C, respectively. The differences in temperature decrease on the surface of the surrogate was 0.5°C lower than that of the live mine. The temperature decrease was lower than that in the previous case (before the positions were inverted) but this was found to be due to the different initial temperatures.

LIVE SURROGATE Tlive-Tsurrogate

T1(initial) 43.5 44.1 -0.6

T2 (after 20 mins) 21.8 21.9 -0.1

T3(final) 18.3 18.4 -0.1

Temperature decrease (T3-T1) 25.2 25.7 -0.5

Figure 5.2.11. Thermal image of the live mine Figure 5.2.12. Thermal image of the live mine (right) and surrogate (left) start of cooling phase. (right) and surrogate (left) at end of cooling phase (30 min).

According to the above results, we can conclude that the presence of the explosive does not make any difference to the cooling phase.

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Temp.difference between the mine and its background-mines on the surface (Tecnovar Var-40) -explosive on right-27 mins heating 9

4 for the surrogate for the live mine

Temp.difference(C) 3

0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 image number

Figure 5.2.13: VAR40 Heating (27 minutes) and cooling cycle (30 min) showing surface temperature as a function of elapsed time.

5.2.3.3 Tecnovar MAUS (HEATING PHASE)

A surrogate mine and a live MAUS were placed on the surface and heated by the halogen lamp. The thermal response of the targets was observed. In the first measurement, the live mine was closer to the heating source. The temperature responses for the surrogate and the live mines during the heating and cooling phases are shown in Figure 5.2.14.

Initially, the live mine was 0.1°C warmer than the surrogate. After 10 minutes of heating, the difference in the temperature rise on the surface of the live mine was 0.4°C higher than that of the surrogate.

LIVE SURROGATE Tlive-Tsurrogate

T1(initial) 15.3 15.2 0.1

T2(final) 33.6 33.1 0.5

Temperature rise (T2-T1) 18.3 17.9 0.4

As in the case of the Tecnovar VAR-40, to eliminate the effect of the relative position of the mines to the energy source the measurement was repeated with mine and the surrogate transposed.

After 10 minutes of heating the temperature rise for the surrogate (closer to the lamp) and the live mine were 35.3°C and 34.6°C, respectively. The difference in the temperature rise on the surface of the surrogate was 1°C higher than that of the live mine. As expected, the mine close to the heating source was warmer.

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LIVE SURROGATE Tlive-Tsurrogate

T1(initial) 16 15.7 -0.3

T2(final) 34.6 35.3 -0.7

Temperature rise (Tmax-Tmin) 18.6 19.6 -1.0

5.2.3.4 Tecnovar MAUS (COOLING PHASE)

At the start of the cooling phase, see figures 5.2.14 and 5.2.15, the live mine (closer to the lamp) was 0.5°C warmer than the surrogate. After 17 minutes of cooling, the difference in the temperature decrease on the surface of the live mine was 0.2°C higher than that of the surrogate.

LIVE SURROGATE Tlive-Tsurrogate

T1(initial) 33.6 33.1 0.5

T2(final) 16.6 16.3 0.3

Temperature decrease (T2-T1) 17 16.8 0.2 Concerning the results with the positions of the surrogate and live mines inverted during the cooling phase. After 15 minutes of cooling the temperature decrease for the surrogate (closer to the lamp) and the live mine were 17.6°C and 17.3°C, respectively. At the end, the difference in the temperature decrease on the surface of the surrogate was 0.3°C lower than that of the live mine.

LIVE SURROGATE Tlive-Tsurrogate

T1(initial) 34.6 35.3 -0.3

T2(final) 17.3 17.7 -0.4

Temperature decrease (T2-T1) 17.3 17.6 -0.3

temperature variation mines on the surface (Tecnovar Maus) -explosive left- 10mins heating, 17 mins cooling 40

20 Live mine Surrogate Background

temperature (C) 15

0 134 136 138 140 142 144 146 148 150 152 154 images

Figure 5.2.14: Tecnovar MAUS (explosive on the left side) heating (10 minutes) and cooling cycle (17 minutes) showing surface temperature as a function of elapsed time.

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temperature variation - mines on the surface (Tecnovar Maus) -explosive on the right- 10mins heating, 15 mins cool down

Surrogate(B) 20 Live mine (B) Background

temperature (C) 15

0 150 155 160 165 170 175 180 185 images

Figure 5.2.15: Tecnovar MAUS (explosive on the right side) heating (10 minutes) and cooling cycle (15 minutes) showing surface temperature as a function of elapsed time.

5.2.4 Measurements with simulant mines

The performance of simulant mines from the MsMs program were evaluated in comparison to the performance of mines type VS 50, MAUS and VS MK2. The mine simulants used were from the MsMs programme. The M3A body is equivalent to the B body surrogate described in Annex 8 but without the cylindrical protrusions on the side. The M2A body is a surrogate intermediate in size between the A and B body surrogates. As for the measurements on the VAR40 and the MAUS, the targets were measured over a period of time. In this case instead of using a local heat source (halogen lamp) the observation was made with the mines illuminated by sunlight. For this measurement the mines were situated within the Gauss Laboratory at JRC which is fully illuminated by the sun. The mines were placed on the surface of the laboratory sandpit. Measurements were started at 09h45 on a March day, and recorded every hour. The plot on figure 5.2.16 shows that the simulants and the live mines performed in a similar way.

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Figure 5.2.16. Surface temperatures of mines and simulants over a 24 hour period under solar radiation Period: 09:45 14 /03/2001 until 09:39 15/03/2001 55

50 M3A 45 VS-MK2 MAUS-1 40 VS-50 35 2A

temperature (C) 20

0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Observation time (h)

5.2.5 Conclusions from the Infra-red measurement

The first tests have shown that it is possible to perform this type of test under various conditions (e.g. different soil types, object depth, orientation, illumination conditions) and that one test alone is not conclusive. It would also be possible to carry out further tests including a comparison of the thermal transmission properties of the mines, for example. The tests conducted to date, however, indicate that the thermal properties of the surrogates are very close to those of the originals. Some observations were made which should help to improve the set-up for future experiments of this type. · Positioning of test objects: The objects were very carefully positioned for these tests. The sand surface was carefully smoothed and levelled after positioning of the test objects in order to minimise eventual differences in the thermal images which are due to surface variations and roughness. The sand itself had been previously sieved to remove any foreign objects which could cause imperfections in the top surface or which could obstruct or deviate the heat flow. Furthermore, the air temperature and relative humidity inside the laboratory were continuously monitored and recorded, before during and after the tests. From this point of view, the environmental conditions can be said to be satisfactory and suitable for further tests of this type. · Illumination and heating of test objects: Although the lamp used to heat the surface and objects were carefully selected, the heating pattern produced by such a lamp is not sufficiently homogeneous to allow variations in the heat distribution to be ignored. This distribution is well documented by the thermal images. This problem is currently under investigation, however there are no immediate solutions. · The use of solar energy is to be avoided too since it does not allow for further testing under identical conditions. The energy provided by the source was sufficient, however relatively long periods of heating and observation (30 minutes to one hour) were required in order to obtain best results. Inverting the position of the objects at least shows what is due to the object itself and what is due to the variation in illumination intensity. During the tests, the surface temperature was regularly monitored with a second non-contact IR thermometer (Omega OS 86). When a surface temperature of 60 to 65 ºC was reached, the heating was interrupted and the cool down phase was then monitored. This temperature was

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considered to be similar to that found in real conditions under strong sunlight and not enough to induce deformations or damage in the test objects or to cause any reaction in the explosive itself. The surface temperature of the buried test objects was also monitored with a separate temperature probe (Hanna instruments HI 9065). · The images also show how the responses from the objects are strongly influenced by the angle of illumination or heating. This phenomenon could be of use in order to compare the response of different objects (shallow buried and surface laid) in the thermal IR range and will be investigated outside the MIMEVA activity. · Image acquisition: The images were acquired using various time intervals for the first tests. The results show that each object or object set has an particular time during the test at which best contrast can be obtained. This has been verified on previous occasions during other tests in the laboratory. Until these time factors are better understood, it is considered prudent to continue to make relatively long image acquisition series in order to cover the whole period of temperature variations between the objects and their surroundings. These times can be optimised however before further experiments. The spatial resolution of the images is satisfactory and the thermal resolution seems to be quite sufficient for these purposes. The field of view of the IR imager was verified by means of copper corner markers, which were then removed for the duration of measurements. The actual acquisition times and file names are provided in a separate document Annex 9. · In order to provide a comparable data, future experiments should be performed in an identical manner as soon as the further replicas become available.

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5.3 Metal detector measurements

5.3.1 Introduction

This section describes in-air measurements made with two metal detectors on AP landmines fitted with fuze surrogates. The measurements complement the radar and infra red tests made within this project.

5.3.2 Detectors

Detectors were selected to represent two technologies used for metal detectors: continuous wave and pulse induction. Model: Foerster Minex 2FD 4.500 Coils: 1 elliptical excite coil 2 semi-elliptical receive coils, connected differentially Signal type: Two frequency continuous wave with phase-sensitive demodulation. Frequency: 2.4 and 19.2 kHz active simultaneously Modifications: Analogue output fitted by manufacturer. The output signal is proportional to a weighted difference of the quadrature parts of the response at the two frequencies. The weights are selected to give immunity to magnetic soils. The audio alarm sounds when the output exceeds positive or negative voltage thresholds, according to which half of the head is nearer the target. Different sound pitches are used for the two.

Fig.5.3.1 Foerster metal detector

Model: Guartel MD8 Coils: 1 circular excite coil 2 semi-circular receive coils, connected differentially Signal type: Unipolar pulsed induction Frequency: 1 ms between pulses Modifications: Analogue output fitted at JRC consisting of a tap at the output of the correlated receiver The audio-alarm frequency is the same for the two sides of the head, but the tapped signal is bipolar.

Fig. 5.3.2 Guartel Metal Detector

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5.3.3 Targets

The following targets were measured as part of the MIMEVA investigation. De-fuzed Mines

Type with original explosive with silicone-rubber block main charge explosive block substitute AUPS + + VAR 40 + + Valsella Mark II + + MAUS + +

Replica fuzes

ITOP: simulant AP mine fuzes, types C0, E0, G0, I0 and K0

ITOP: simulant AT mine fuzes, type M0 and O0 JRC: fuze-can surrogates, numbers 1, 2 and 3 (see below) Mine simulants

CK Associates Ltd. type M1A The M1A simulant was manufactured for the JRC specifically for multi-sensor measurements [9]. 28 examples of this are currently buried in the Ispra test lane. Calibration spheres

9.525 mm diameter phosphor bronze (92-94% Cu, 6-8% Sn), on a PTFE support 19.05 mm diameter AISI 316 non-magnetic stainless steel, in a silicone rubber support Scanning and acquisition apparatus

5.3.3.1 Positioner

Metal detectors utilise a position scan to differentiate areas where metal is present from clear areas. Normally this is done by the operator at a speed, which he sets (although the operating procedure should guide him to sweep within a specified range of speeds). To scan under controlled conditions an x-y motorised positioning frame was used to physically move the detectors. Sweeps were made over 1350mm and 600mm in the x and y directions respectively. To allow for acceleration during the x sweep data was recorded for 1200mm of the sweep. The x scan was made in alternate directions, each at 200mm/s. Acceleration was measured as 0.3g. The y direction was incremented in 5mm steps.

5.3.3.2 Acquisition

The signals measured were taken from the receive circuits of the detectors – avoiding the processing factors associated with the audio output.

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Data was acquired using a National Instruments AI-16-XE50 PCMCIA 16 bit analogue to digital converter (A to D) board, at 1000 points/s corresponding to 0.2mm spacing in y direction. Signals were filtered through a low-pass filter and the data was decimated before storage to 4.44 mm spacing.

5.3.4 Method of measurement

The measurements were conducted over the dry sand reference plot of the Ispra test lane and on the edge of the sandy soil plot. In all cases, the targets were positioned as far away as practical from any of the existing buried metal targets, on non-metallic support, a few cm above the sand. These precautions were intended to avoid interference both from other targets and from the ground. The following test protocol was followed: 1. Check detector head and target supports are horizontal using spirit level. 2. Place calibration sphere on support. 3. Set height of detector approximately and tighten the telescopic handle firmly. 4. Adjust calibration sphere height using mm graduated rule and card shims. 5. Place target on support and record orientation. 6. Adjust target height using mm graduated rule and card shims. 7. Send positioner to home position. 8. If detector has been switched off, allow it at least ten minutes to warm-up. 9. Set volume of audio o/p to minimum (to conserve battery). 10. Check sensitivity setting is correct. 11. Check low battery indicator. 12. Re-zero detector. 13. Check scan parameters. 14. Start scan. The protocol was developed in a preliminary study. Improvements include are the use of calibration spheres, better accuracy on the height adjustment and the introduction of the warm-up time for the detectors (to maximise circuit stability). The sensitivity adjustment on the Foerster detector appears to have no effect on the analogue output. Nevertheless it was always set to the maximum (position H). The ground learning button was never used. Calibration checks were performed each day according to the manufacturer’s procedure and the detector was confirmed to be functioning normally. The Guartel detector has three sensitivity settings and changing them does affect the size of the tapped signal. Medium sensitivity (position II) was used, except where stated otherwise. On the highest sensitivity, there was an interference signal, possibly due to feedback between the detector and the motor drives. The Guartel detector initiates a self-diagnostic test, automatically, each time it is switched on.

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5.3.5 Results from Comparison of explosive filled and silicone RTV filled mines

5.3.5.1 General remarks

In the following figures, the calibration sphere is on the left-hand side of the image. The images are as seen from above, with the bottom left hand corner nearest the home position of the scanning frame. The false colour scale corresponds to the measured signal in volts. It is the same for all images in a group but may be different from group to group. In certain cases, the images are shown with a compressed false colour scale, to show up weaker signals. The median signal value was subtracted from all images, which has the effect of removing any D.C. offset present. In the majority of cases, this was done globally but, where noted, the median was subtracted line by line, to show up weak features above drift. A calibration sphere is included in every measurement to allow verification that the detector was operating at the same sensitivity on each measurement. The line plots are sections through the maximum/minimum of the 2D scan, normalised so that the calibration sphere signal is ±1. The height of the scan is quoted from the top of the target to the sole (bottom flat surface) of the detector head.1 The spatial scale is the same for all images. It is also the same in both x and y directions, so the features have the correct aspect ratio. The plots from the Guartel detector are cropped on the bottom edge, except where indicated. All images were constructed by interleaving data from the forward and reverse passes. The offset was adjusted in order to register the two data sets. Two different sized calibration spheres were used according to the metal content of the target (and hence size of received signal). The two calibration spheres were also calibrated between themselves. This is shown in Figure 5.3.20.

1 The Foerster detector has a raised heel and two small raised discs on the sole of the head, but the height here is quoted with respect to the main flat surface.

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Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Target: AUPS silicone filled Surrogate detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm

Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Target: AUPS explosive filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm

Fig.5.3.3 Response of Foerster detector to AUPS mine

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Detector: Guartel MD8 Target: AUPS silicone filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm

Detector: Guartel MD8 Target: AUPS explosive filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm

Fig. 5.3.4 Response of Guartel detector to AUPS mine Note: There was an angular misalignment of the detector in the plot of the silicone RTV filled AUPS, but it does not affect significantly the section plots.

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Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Target: VAR40 silicone filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm

Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Target: VAR40 explosive filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm

Median subtracted line by line

Fig. 5.3.5 Response of Foerster detector to VAR 40 mine.

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Detector: Guartel MD8 Target: VAR40 silicone filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm

Detector: Guartel MD8 Target: VAR40 explosive filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm

Fig. 5.3.6 Response of Guartel to detector to VAR 40 mine

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Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Target: Mark II silicone filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm

Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Target: Mark II explosive filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm

Fig. 5.3.7 Response of Foerster detector to Mark II mine

Notes In the case of the explosive filled mine, the peak appears offset from the calibration sphere in the y direction (vertical on page). The additional plot marked “displaced” is a section through the scan at y= + 40 mm with calibration sphere maximum.

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Detector: Guartel MD8 Target: Mark II silicone filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm

Detector: Guartel MD8 Target: Mark II explosive filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm

Fig. 5.3.8 Response of Guartel detector to Mark II mine

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Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Target: MAUS silicone filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 19 mm AISI 316 Height: 50mm above target 40mm above sphere

Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Target: MAUS explosive filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 19mm AISI 316 Height: 50mm above target 40mm above sphere

Fig. 5.3.9 Response of Foerster detector to MAUS mine

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Detector: Guartel MD8 Target: MAUS silicone filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 19 mm AISI 316 Height: 50mm above target 40mm above sphere

Detector: Guartel MD8 Target: MAUS explosive filled Model detonator can: Number 2 Calibration sphere: 19 mm AISI 316 Height: 50mm above target 40mm above sphere

Fig. 5.3.10 Response of Guartel detector to MAUS mine

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5.3.6 Discussion

In figures 5.3.3 and 5.3.4, the silicone filled copy of the AUPS mine gives somewhat weaker signals than the explosive filled copy for both detectors, indicating that the internal metal parts are slightly different. In figures 5.3.5 and 5.3.6 for both detectors, the signals from the VAR 40 with real explosive and silicone rubber fillings are almost identical. In contrast, the signals in figures 5.3.7 and 5.3.8. from the Valsella Mark II mine with the silicone rubber filling are much stronger than the signals from the mine with the explosive filling, for both detectors. Two versions of the Mark II (mechanically fuzed and electrically fuzed) are noted in [7], with substantially different metal detector response. It appears that the explosive-filled and silicone- filled Mark II mines here are of these two types respectively, or of some other differing variants. The displacement of the peak in the signal from the explosive filled Mark II mine for the Foerster by about 40mm is due to the fuze can and striker pin, which are offset in this direction. Note that the size of the displacement, 40mm, is too large to be explained by inaccurate positioning. For the Guartel detector, the displacement is less apparent to the eye because the peak is very broad in the y direction. In figures 5.3.9 and 5.3.10, for the MAUS, the explosive filled mine gives a stronger signal, in both detectors. The ratio measured here is 1: 0.86 for the Foerster detector and 1: 0.89 for the Guartel detector2. This mine has two 85 mm diameter ferromagnetic retaining rings, and so gives a particularly strong signature. The small difference between the explosive filled and silicone filled MAUS mines can be explained by small differences in the thickness, permeability or conductivity of these rings. From this it may be inferred that dimensional tolerances and material specification of the components of this mine (at least) may allow significant variation. This seems to be quite possible, as the function of the mine is unlikely to be affected by (for example) small changes to the properties of the steel ring. For all the mines, the strength of the signal relative to the calibration sphere signal is less for the Foerster than for the Guartel.

5.3.7 Investigation of responses to ITOP SIM model fuzes

One of the most systematic attempts so far to develop safe and convenient but representative targets for testing demining equipment was made within the ITOP programme [10]. Families of simulant AP and AT mines were designed with model fuzes having a range of different metal contents. These ITOP “SIMS” are currently under consideration as a NATO standard. A description of the model fuzes is reproduced overleaf. Signatures for these objects have already been measured in Project MINESIGN (Contract No. AA 501 032) [11] using the Guartel MD8 detector and are also reproduced here. In addition, signatures were measured with the Foerster detector. The main trend of increasing signature strength is clearly shown and consistent for the two detectors. This was a principle design aim for the ITOP SIMS.

Both detectors successfully found the fuze simulant with the smallest metal content C0 at 50mm.

The following table (5.3.1) lists the characteristics of the SIM inserts. A picture of the metal parts is given in Annex 7.

2 A value of 0.79 was found in the preliminary study for the Foerster detector. The value obtained in this present work is more reliable because of the greater care taken in setting the height, and because a calibration sphere was used

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Table 5.3.1 PM-MCD/ ITOP SIM Inserts

Levels of AP SIM 12, 9 & 6 AT SIM 30, 25 Contents ** Detectability cm & 20 cm Zero* A No Metal. Only Dow Corning RTV 0 A0 3110 Silicone.

Very Difficult C0 1/8 inch diam [0.131g] carbon steel NONE ball.

E0 NONE 0.100g carbon steel pin, 0.27 inch length x 0.062 inch diam. Vertical Hard to Detect G Very small copper tube, 0.5 inch 0 G0 length x 0.125 inch O.D x 0.016 inch wall thickness [0.393g]. Vertical I Small aluminum tube, 0.5 inch length 0 I0 x 0.187 inch O.D x 0.015 inch wall thickness [0.172g]. Vertical. Moderately K Two (2) parts: 0.100g steel pin as for 0 K0 Difficulty E0 and small aluminium tube, 0.50 inch length x ¼ inch O.D x 0.015 inch wall thickness [0.22g]. Vertical. NONE Large aluminium tube, 1.5 inch M0 length x ¼ inch diam x 0.015 inch wall thickness [0.66g]. Vertical. Easiest to NONE Four (4) parts: 0.200g steel pin 0.54 O0 Detect inch length x 0.062 inch diam, large aluminium tube as for M0, 1.61g carbon steel spring, 1.00 length x 11/32 inch O.D with 0.041 inch diam [Vertical] and a ¼ inch diam [1.060g] carbon steel ball.

* Expected to be undetectable with a metal detector

** Levels C0 to O0 are also potted with Dow Corning RTV 3110 Silicone Simulant fuzes carrying the same letter code contain identical samples of metal. The plastic fuze containers are in two sizes - for AT and AP simulants respectively. The signatures shown here are for the surrogate fuzes shown in the white cells in the table.

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SIM insert C0 SIM insert K0

SIM insert E0 SIM insert M0

SIM insert G0 SIM insert O0

S IM insert I0

Figure 5.3.11. Signatures for the simulant fuzes for the Guartel detector, as measured in the MINESIGN project.

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SIM insert C0 SIM insert K0

SIM insert E0 SIM insert M0

SIM insert G0 SIM insert O0

SIM insert I0 Figure 5.3.12. ITOP SIM fuze surrogate signatures for the Foerster detector. (In each image, the left-hand signature is from the 9.5 mm bronze sphere. Calibration sphere and target both at 50 mm height).

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5.3.7.1 Study of three surrogate detonator cans

The following figures are shown on a compressed scale to bring out the small signals from the detonator can surrogates.

Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm Target: Model detonator Can: Number 1 Orientation: open end up

Target: Model detonator can: Number 2 Orientation: open end up

Target: Model detonator can: Number 3 Orientation: open end up

Figure 5.3.13 Signatures of surrogate detonator cans for Foerster detector

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Detector: Guartel MD8 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm Target: Model detonator can: Number 1 Orientation: open end up

Target: Model detonator can: Number 2 Orientation: open end up

Target: Model detonator can: Number 3 Orientation: open end up

Figure 5.3.14 Signatures of surrogate detonator cans for Guartel detector

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Figure 5.3.15 Section plots through peaks of signatures of surrogate detonator cans

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5.3.7.2 Effect of orientation of surrogate detonator can

Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm Target: Model detonator can: Number 2 Orientation: open end up

Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm Target: Model detonator can: Number 1 Orientation: closed end up

Figure 5.3.16 Signatures of surrogate detonator can number 2, open end up and closed end up.

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Dimensions Inner diameter

Outer height Inner depth

Outer diameter

Figure 5.3.17 Dimensions of the surrogate detonator cans

Table 5.3.2 Values of Dimensions

Model Outer Inner Outer height Inner depth Outer Metal Mass Density detonator can diameter diameter Volume Volume (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm3) (mm3) (g) (kg m -3) Number 1 6 4.6 8.45 7.6 238.92 112.61 0.304 2699 Number 2 6 4.95 8.5 7.5 240.33 96.00 0.2374 2473 Number 3 6.5 5.6 8.45 7 280.40 107.99 0.2101 1946

No training mines, neither those with nor those without explosive, contained fuzes. Since this factor will certainly affect the response seen by a metal detector (especially where other metal parts are small) it was decided to model the fuze. The approach was to use thin walled cylinders described above.

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5.3.8 Discussion

The responses of the Foerster detector are somewhat different for each of the three surrogate detonator cans but the responses of the Guartel detector to each can is almost identical. It may be shown theoretically, for the case of solid spheres, that the low frequency system in the Foerster detector gives signals that are more affected by changes of conductivity and diameter. For a squat cylinder, the geometric constants will be different, but the overall trends the same. In this sense, the result for the model fuze cans is consistent with theory. However, a proper analysis should also take into account the presence of the cavity. Surrogates 1 and 2 are made from aluminium alloys. The density of Surrogate number 1 is typical for commercial aluminium and its alloys [12], [13]. Surrogates numbers 2 and 3, especially the latter, are made of lighter metal, possibly alloys containing magnesium. The exact alloy composition is not known and is, anyway, insufficient to define an accurate conductivity value: this would have to be measured independently to compare with a detailed mathematical model. Detonators normally have only a thin foil facing the striker pin and a relatively thicker base on the opposite end. Therefore the orientation with the open end of the can facing the pin is more realistic. As would be expected, a slightly stronger signal was obtained with the base facing the pin, closer to the detector, but the orientation made only a small difference.

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5.3.8.1 Low Metal Surrogate Mine

Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm Target: CK Associates surrogate mine Type M1A

Detector: Guartel MD8 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm Target: CK Associates surrogate mine Type M1A

Figure 5.3.18. Signatures of the CK Associates M1A simulant for the two detectors

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5.3.8.2 Introduction

The M1A surrogate is a low metal content surrogate mine procured from CK Associates Ltd. for the Multi- sensor Mine-signature (MsMs) measurements project started during the year 2000. Further information may be seen at http://demining.jrc.it/msms 28 surrogates of this type are currently buried in the Ispra test lane at depths between 0 and 15cm. Results Both detectors were unambiguously able to detect the surrogate at 50mm in air, (fig. 17) but the signature is the weakest of all the objects scanned here and, as noted in the preliminary study, detection of the deeply buried M1A’s in the test lane represents an excellent challenge. Fig. 19 is a simple example of how contrast enhancement can be used to reveal the presence of such a weak object in the image. The algorithm used to generate the compressed colour scale is to divide the range into positive and negative halves and compress the standard colour sequence logarithmically in each half. An extensive programme of multisensor measurements on the JRC test lane is currently ongoing. It will be of great interest to see if data fusion techniques can also help in detecting these objects.

Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm Target: CK Associates surrogate mine Type M1A

Detector: Guartel MD8 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm Target: CK Associates surrogate mine Type M1A

Figure 5.3.19. Signatures of the CKA M1A simulant for the two detectors plotted on a compressed false colour scale

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5.3.8.3 Relative size of signals from calibration spheres

Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm Target: 19 mm stainless steel sphere Height 40 mm

Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm Target: 19 mm stainless steel sphere Height 44 mm

Detector: Guartel MD8 Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze Height: 50mm Target: 19 mm stainless steel sphere Height 40 mm

(Note that this image is rotated through 180° so that the larger sphere appears on the right hand side. The polarities of the signals therefore appear reversed. This image is also uncropped: the features in the corners are due to the gantry legs) Figure 5.3.20 Signatures of the two calibration spheres for the two detectors

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Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 Left hand target: 9.5 mm bronze sphere Height: 50mm

Right hand target: 19 mm stainless steel sphere Heights: 40mm and 44mm

Figure 5.3.21 Effect of small increase of height

Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500 and Guartel MD8

Left hand target: 9.5 mm bronze sphere Height: 50mm

Right hand target: 19 mm stainless steel sphere Height: 40mm

Figure 5.3.22 Comparison of signals for the calibration spheres for the two detectors

Table 5.3.3 Dimensions and materials of calibration spheres Volume Mass Density Conductivity Calibration sphere Outer diameter 3 –3 (mm ) (g) (g m ) (W -1 m –1) (mm) Phosphor bronze 9.525 452.47 4.0317 8910 Stainless steel AISI 19.05 3619.79 28.7707 7948 316 Expected values [12] Phosphor bronze 8900 7.41E+06± 1.7E6 Stainless steel AISI 7960 1.35E+06±0.0E6 316

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5.3.9 Discussion

In these measurements, the calibration spheres were introduced to ensure that detector drift did not lead to false interpretation of changes of signal strength. All the section plots are normalised to the calibration spheres for this reason. The variation in the maximum between one plot and another is of the order of ±0.1mV, or 1% of the signal for the bronze sphere. From the table, the spheres have exactly the densities expected for their nominal material composition. On the assumption that the compositions are correct, the conductivity for the stainless steel material is fixed to within 6%, but uncertainty in the phosphor bronze conductivity is 23%. An ideal calibration sphere would be easily reproducible and therefore the best material is one whose conductivity is relatively little affected by composition. In this sense, AISI 316 is a better choice than phosphor bronze. A possible disadvantage of using stainless steel is that ferromagnetic behaviour can be introduced by work hardening, so the properties will change if the sphere is dropped or similarly abused. The silicone rubber block (in which the spheres were mounted for this measurement) helps avoid this effect. Although not the primary purpose of the calibration spheres, it is possible to go beyond these basic observations and relate the relative signal sizes to the theoretical response, at least approximately. This is discussed in Annex 10.

5.3.10 Conclusions from metal detector measurements

The measurements demonstrate that the surrogates based on the some mine case but with silicone rubber substituted for the explosive create a very similar response in both types of detector to that caused by an original mine. It is concluded that the use of silicone rubber to simulate explosive does not have any negative impact on the response of metal detectors and that this approach is therefore appropriate. The use of a replaceable insert to represent the fuze (either of the ITOP design or an alternate) allows a surrogate mine body to represent a wider range of mine types with different quantities and distribution of metal parts. From the point of view of the future assessments of metal detectors it is therefore concluded that surrogates based either on the ITOP (and DSTO) designs, or those from CKA Ltd., would be a valid approach.

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6 Replication of mines for test and evaluation of detectors

6.1 Methods

The work undertaken in this project has demonstrated that the process of modelling mines by using materials with similar electromagnetic and thermal constraints can create a close replica of a mine appropriate for testing humanitarian demining sensor systems. The recommendations made here cover the following classes of sensor:

· Metal detectors

· Radar

· Thermal infrared The sensors gave different responses to different mines. In most cases the models that were replicas of the mine with explosive showed a good correlation in response. Where exceptions occurred it was attributed to changes in the structure that were inherent in the production. This implies that there can be a range of responses for nominally the same mine. These differences are likely to be due to details of the construction that may occur during the production through product development or through use of different sources for the components – as a result of procurement policies, factory location, or component changes due to manufacturing process changes by the supplier. The measurements of the CKA A and B body simulants and comparison against the responses from the examples of real mine showed that there is sufficient similarity in the radar domain to justify the use of these designs as generic simulants. The simulants are similar in shape and dimensions to the M14 and PMN mines. Within the time period of this project it was not possible to confirm that they represent good surrogates for these mines as no actual M14 or PMN mine was available to provide a reference. In the metal detector test series the target type M1A from CKA was investigated. This is a similar design to CKA-A target – but manufactured at a later time. The “realistic” model approach confirms that the substitution of silicone RTV type Dow Corning 3110 in place of the main explosive block is an acceptable change as far as the radar and Infrared sensors are concerned. Importantly also for the metal detectors the presence of the RTV in place of explosive does not affect the Metal detector results. For sensors detecting presence of explosive (i.e. substance detection) or systems that include such sensors, no recommendations are made in this study relating to appropriate substitutes for the explosive. In this case it is recommended that appropriately sized samples of the correct explosive (TNT, RDX, PETN, TETRYL or other) shall be included within the surrogate. Models based on actual (or reproduction) mine cases are controlled items. The assembly of a similar structure to a mine using commonly available parts creates a generic target with sufficient similarity to a mine to allow the initial testing. Further these targets may be fitted with alternative sized substitute explosive blocks and with different amounts of metal to represent different classes of mine target. 6.2 Recommendations

· For the evaluation of sensors based on a single technology it has been shown that a wide range of surrogate designs may be appropriate.

· For radar and infrared sensors silicone rubber has been shown to be a good substitute for the explosive block. Certain waxes also possess acceptable properties for use as an explosive substitute in such simulants.

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· For radar the presence of an air-gap within the mine body will lead to additional reflection interfaces which in many situations will simulate more closely the response of a real mine.

· For infrared the presence of an air-gap within the mine body (and the possibility to change the volume of the explosive block substitute) will model the thermal response in a manner that is closer to the performance of a real mine.

· It is recommended that for laboratory evaluation of multi-sensor systems generic replicas of mines (simulants) should be used with design similar to those described in Annex 8 and in the description of the MsMs project [9].

· Usage of targets designed for the MsMs project has some benefits in that a significant level of data has been accumulated already – allowing some (detector) performance comparisons to be made.

· The CKA design approach (as also used in the MsMs work) has some benefits over the SIM series of replicas, in that air gaps are provided (important for some sensors including radar and other systems that may use the presence of a cavity).

· A wider range of sensors may be accommodated by exchanging the inert “explosive block substitute for a pressed sample of the selected explosive to evaluate systems that rely on substance detection for operation. In these cases real explosive is a prerequisite to a successful test).

· Consideration should be given to using identical metal components in the above recommended replicas, as those used in SIMs and in the Australian surrogate mines as these parts are already a de facto standard. The metal content of the recommended simulants may be adjusted using the metal components that are used in the ITOP SIMs, according to the test requirement. 6.3 Benefits and limitations

Replicas described in Annex 8 will allow consistent testing to be carried out at any test site. Results based on these targets are repeatable and thus may be compared independently of where they are taken. The suggested design may be loaded with an inert substance (RTV 3110), or with samples of explosive, according to the needs of the test. In neither case is the target a potential weapon and will not be subject to movement or export restrictions. For final testing before trial in a live minefield candidate sensors should be proven against inert versions of the mine types that are prevalent in the area foreseen for the live trial. This is because no replica can fully represent the characteristics of a real mine and therefore this should be seen as a final proof of a demining system.

During the project the JRC, in conjunction with a number of National laboratories within the EU, commenced a project to assess sensors using a common test area. The project is called “Multi sensor Mine signature” (MsMs) project. The test protocol was developed from that used in MIMEVA and is available at http://demining.jrc.it/msms .

The recommendations made in this report are based on comparison of the measured responses of selected electromagnetic sensor classes to the surrogate and selected landmines. They are used to indicate the validity of the surrogate for possible future use in the initial assessment of new sensors and systems.

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ANNEXES

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Annex 1 : Distribution of mines by country. Occurrence is indicated by “+” signs (or indicative numbers where available). Bosnia and Croatia Kosovo Angola Mozambique Somalia/ Afghanistan Cambodia Iraq Laos Origin Herzegovina Uganda APPM-57 + N. Korea AUPS + I Cuban AP + Cuba DM-11 + DDR GYATA-64 + + + + H M1 AP DVM59 + + + + + + F M14 + + + + USA M409 + + + + B MAI-75 + ROM MD82-B + Vietnam MN79 + Vietnam NO-4 + Israel P2 Mk2 + Pakistan P4 Mk1 + Pakistan PFM-1/S + Ex YU PMA-1A 18950 1300 + + Ex YU PMA-2 30587 17400 + Ex YU PMA-3 40503 13000 + Ex YU PMD-6/M + + + + + RU PMN + + + + + RU PMN-2 + + + RU PP MI-D + + + + Czech.

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PPM-2 + + + + + DDR PRBM 35 + + + + + + B R2M1 + + RSA R2M2 + + RSA SB-33 + I Type 72-A + + + CHINA Type 72-B + CHINA TM100 and 200 + + + VAR-40 + I VS-50 /TS-50 + + + + + I VS-MK2 + + I (Other) 10522 5300 + +

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Annex 2: AP blast mine descriptions

APP M-57 AP mine, Bakelite casing, Cuba and North Korea

GENERAL DESCRIPTION The APP M-57 is a plastic box mine, rectangular shaped, with a hinged lid that overlaps the sides. The casing is similar to the Yugoslavian PMA-1A but there are some significant differences. The hinged lid has a ridged diamond pattern on the top of the mine. The base has two compartments. The main charge, a 200g block of cast TNT, is fitted into the rear compartment. The lid and the base are hinged with two plastic bolts at the rear end of the mine. The lid has an inner plunger placed parallel to the front side of the lid. A cross plate with a deep groove is placed at the base of the mine, beneath the plunger. Various fuzes have been used including (Yugoslav) UPM-1, UPMAH-1 and Model 43 fuzes. It is screwed into the TNT block. The capsule with the friction sensitive composition is placed in the groove at the front of the lower half of the mine case. When the lid is lowered, the plunger rests on the capsule.

METHOD OF OPERATION Pressure on the lid forces the inner plunger in the lid to crush the fuze capsule, which contains a friction sensitive component. On detonation this ignites the main detonator that fires the main charge. The mine has been actively deployed in Angola.

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AUPS AP blast mine, plastic (or metal) casing, Italy

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The AUPS is a cylindrical plastic AP mine with a body consisting of two parts which are threaded together. The lower part of the mine body has vertical ribs on the side and the diameter is decreased at the base. The upper part of the mine has four grooves at the top edge to assist assembly and disassembly. A circular raised plastic press button is located centrally at the top of the mine, in a raised well with external threads. A plastic safety cap is screwed onto the raised well when the mine is in transit. The detonator well is placed centrally at the base of the mine and is closed by a plastic cap. The AUPS has an interchangeable fuze system that allows the use of an external pull fuze or hydrostatic fuze. The mine is delivered with a stake and a pre-fragmented metal jacket which converts the mine into an AP fragmentation mine with a lethal radius of 10 m. When the mine is used in pull mode, the pull fuze is screwed into the fuze well at the base of the mine which is turned upside down and mounted to a stake.

METHOD OF OPERATION

If the mine is used without an external fuze, required pressure on the press button shears four plastic connections which releases the spring loaded striker. The striker initiates the detonator which in turn initiates the booster and the main charge.

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PN-1 AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Cuba

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The PN-1 mine is a plastic box mine, rectangular shaped, with a hinged lid that overlaps the sides. The lid has an inner ribbed cross plate placed parallel to the front side of the lid. A deep groove is cut in the cross plate, so that it fits over the MUV or RO-1 type fuze and rests on the winged striker retaining pin. The main charge, which consists of a rectangular TNT block, is placed at the back of the mine. The fuze is similar to the CIS MUV.

The detonator is screwed onto the fuze, which is resting in a half circular groove in a thin plastic bulkhead at the base of the mine. The detonator is fitted into a detonator well in the main charge. There are two drain holes at the rear on each side of the base to allow water to escape. These also allow attachment of booby-trap devices. The mine is a successor of the Cuban PMM-1.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Pressure on the hinged lid presses the striker retaining pin out of its hole, releasing the spring loaded striker. The striker initiates the detonator which in turn fires the main charge.

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DM-11 AP pressure blast mine, plastic casing, Former East Germany

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The DM-11 is a small, cylindrical plastic mine with a rubber outer casing. The upper half of the mine body acts as the pressure plate. There is a detonator well centrally positioned on the top of the mine, closed with a threaded plastic cap. The detonator is surrounded by the integral booster charge. Beneath the detonator is a Belleville spring with a striker tip pointing upwards. The upper part of the mine beneath the black rubber cover, has a convex circular shape and is placed into the circular concave shaped lower part of the mine. The upper part is movable. The bottom of the upper part of the mine has a protrusion which fits into a groove in bottom of the concave shaped lower part of the mine. The mine has two main charges, one in the upper part and one in the lower part of the mine. The DM-11 is delivered with a circular plastic cover, which is covering most of the upper surface and the mine sides when used.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Pressure applied to the edge of the top of the mine moves the upper part of the mine sideways and presses the protrusion in the bottom of the upper mine part out of the groove in the bottom of the lower mine part. Pressure is transferred to the protrusion, which is pressed upwards until the Belleville spring snaps into reverse. The striker tip initiates the detonator, which in turn fires the booster, the upper main charge and the lower main charge. A direct vertical pressure on the top of the mine will not set off the mine because the protrusion will not be pressed out of the groove in the lower part of the mine body.

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GYATA-64 AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Hungary

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The GYATA is similar to the Russian PMN mine but there are some differences. The mine body is made of brown Bakelite. The pressure plate on the top is made of black rubber. The detonator/booster well is placed on the side of the mine body and closed by a circular brown Bakelite transport cap. Before the mine is deployed in the ground, the well cap is unscrewed and replaced with booster/detonator cap which appears similar to the well cap on the Russian PMN but it has a hole through the flat screw wing. The booster and the detonator is placed inside a plastic tube on the cap and cannot be removed from the assembly. The fuze assembly is screwed into a well on the opposite side of the detonator/booster well. The fuze is secured with a safety pin to prevent the striker to move forwards. The fuze is delay armed, with a thin metal string attached to the back part of the striker which is cut a lead strip upon arming. The GYATA can have two possible delay arming times. 90 and 150 sec. The arming delay time will, however, also depend on the temperature.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the safety pin is removed, the spring loaded striker is released and pressed forwards, causing the steel wire to start cutting through the lead delay strip. After the delay strip is cut, the striker is allowed to move forward until is stops on a step in the actuating plunger. The mine is now armed. A pressure on the rubber plate will depress the actuating plunger until the striker is released. The striker fires the detonator and the booster, which in turn detonates the main charge.

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MI AP DV 59 AP blast mine, polyethylene casing, France

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The MI AP DV 59 (M-59) is a small AP pressure operated blast mine consisting of a ribbed plastic case with a central fuze well into which screws the NM SAE 59 friction fuze. The detonator is located beneath the fuze, in the fuze well placed centrally in the bottom plate of the mine body. A metal detector ring fits on the upper surface on the mine, under the fuse assembly. The metal detector ring is removable. The mine has a three winged plastic safety cap fitted on the top of the fuze assembly. When this safety cap is removed, the mine is armed.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When pressure is put on the top of the firing pin, the shear collar, holding the firing pin, fails. The firing pin, charged with a friction compound, slides downwards against the mating sleeve, producing a flame which fires the detonator which in turn initiates the main charge.

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M14 AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, USA, South Africa

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The M14 is a small cylindrical AP blast plastic mine. It has a pressure plate with an indented yellow indicating arrow on the top which accommodates the mine fuze wrench. The arrow and the pressure plate can be rotated from safe (S) to armed (A) position. The letters A and S is embossed into the top of the mine body. When set in the armed position, it allows pressure to be applied to the Belleville spring beneath. The detonator and the white detonator plug are screwed into the fuze well in the centre of the base. The pressure plate is secured with a U- formed safety clip, which is fitted into a slot on each side of the pressure plate. A pull cord is attached to the clip. The lower part of the mine contains the main charge. The upper and the lower part of the mine body are screwed together. The lower part has six vertical ribs on the side of the body to provide strength and serve as a means for identifying the mine in darkness. The only metal in this mine is the steel firing pin on the Belleville spring.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the safety clip is removed and the pressure plate is rotated to armed position (A), direct pressure on the top of the pressure plate causes the Belleville spring to press down and snap into reverse, driving the firing pin into the detonator which detonates and fires the main charge.

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PRB M409 AP blast mine, plastic casing, Belgium

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The PRB M409 is the successor of the PRB BAC H-28. It has a circular plastic body with a pressure plate fitted with a black plastic transit cover. The transit cover has six ribs and engages the top of the mine including the a raised pressure crown located at the top centre of the mine. A steel safety clip is inserted through the transit cover and the pressure crown. The safety clip is retained in position by a clear plastic sleeve and the pressure of the spring loop against a rib of the transit cover. When laid, the safety clip and the transit cover is removed. The detonator retaining-plug is located at the side of the mine and is sealed with melted plastic. The only metal components are two steel spring strikers, two copper-cased percussion caps and either an aluminium or clear plastic cased detonator. An exact Portuguese copy of this mine exists under the names M-969 or M-411. It differs only in the colour which is brown on the M-969 (M-411). The transit cover is made of white plastic and the transit cover is screwed onto a treaded pressure crown on the top of the mine. If the transit cover is rotated (unscrewed) as little as one turn, the mine is armed.

METHOD OF OPERATION

The mine is equipped with two steel spring strikers, which are held apart by a cylindrical plastic bolt with two apertures. The bolt is connected to the pressure membrane of the fuze and moves freely along a groove containing two percussion caps. The detonator is placed in the slide, between the two percussion caps. A pressure of 8 kg or more will press the membrane down (minimum 1,5mm depression), and the plastic bolt will be displaced releasing one or both the two strikers. The strikers detonate the percussion caps, which in turn fires the detonator and the main charge.

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MAI-75 AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Romania

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The MAI 75 is a circular Bakelite AP mine with a small circular pressure plate on the top. The upper and the lower part of the mine body is screwed together and sealed with a black rubber ring to make the mine waterproof. The mine is conical shaped at the base and top, with a small circular flat area at the bottom of the mine. The body has 18 ribs on the sides, to allow easier unscrewing of the upper and lower part. The pressure plate is secured with a metal safety clip, which is fitted into two small holes on each side of the pressure plate. When the safety clip is in position, it is resting on the mine body and prevents the pressure plate from being depressed. The fuze mechanism and the fuze assembly are screwed into a fuze well located centrally beneath the pressure plate.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the safety clip is removed, the mine is armed. Required pressure on the pressure plate depresses it, transmitting pressure to the two corners on the plastic lugs pointing upwards. Depression of these two corners rotates the plastic lugs and the two corners in the spring housing groove are lifted upwards until the spring- loaded striker is allowed to pass through. The striker initiates the detonator, which in turn fires the main charge.

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MD-82B AP pressure blast mine, plastic casing, Vietnam

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The MD-82B is a small cylindrical AP blast plastic mine. It is similar to the United States M14 and the Vietnamese MN-79 in shape but has a totally different fuze mechanism. It has a pressure plate on the top with four lugs in the centre of the base, which keeps the fuze beneath in position. The pressure plate is secured with a U-formed safety clip, which is identical to the one at the MN-79. A metal ring is attached to a hole in the safety clip. The safety clip fits into two sleeves on each side of the pressure plate and prevents depressing of the pressure plate. The fuze is made of metal and the fuze housing is square in shape and closed in one end. Inside the fuze house is a circular tube, which covers the striker and the striker assembly.

The fuze head has a traverse slot which corresponds with a straight slot in the tube. A metal pin is fitted into the two slots from the side, keeping the spring-loaded striker in position. The fuze well is located centrally in the base of the mine. It is closed with a transit plug which is screwed into the threaded well when the mine during storage. Before laying the mine, the transit cap is replaced with the detonator and the detonator cap. The lower part of the mine contains the main charge and is a plastic tube, which fits into the outer casing. The inner tube is melted together with the mine casing at the bottom sides of the mine and cannot be removed. A green circular plastic plate is laid on the top of the explosive, with a hole in the centre to allow the firing pin to hit the detonator beneath.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the safety clip is removed from the pressure plate, direct pressure on the top of the pressure plate depresses it transferring the pressure to the top of the fuze house. Depressing of the fuze house allows the metal pin in the slot to be pushed out and upwards until the striker in the tube is released. The spring loaded striker fires the detonator, which in turn fires the main charge.

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MN-79 AP pressure blast mine, plastic casing, Vietnam

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The MN-79 is a small cylindrical plastic AP blast mine. It is a copy of the American M14 AP mine but differs in some ways. The main difference is the Belleville spring, which is made of metal on the MN-79 and plastic on the M14. This makes the MN-79 easier to detect with a metal detector. It has a pressure plate with an indented yellow indicating arrow on the top, which accommodates the mine fuze wrench. The pressure plate has three lugs on the side of the base which correspond with three other lugs which are attached to the inner side of the mine body. The arrow and the pressure plate can be rotated from safe (K) to armed (M) position. The letters K and M are embossed into the top of the mine body. When set in the armed position (M), the three lugs on the pressure plate are moved away from the three corresponding lugs which allows application of pressure to the Belleville spring beneath. The firing pin assembly is attached to the base of the pressure plate by three lugs on the assembly base which correspond with three lugs in the centre of the pressure plate base. The assembly is kept in place by a plastic spider. The detonator and the detonator plug are screwed into the fuze well in the centre of the base. The pressure plate is secured with a U-formed safety clip, which is fitted into a slot on each side of the pressure plate. A metal ring is attached to the clip. The lower part of the mine contains the main charge. A red circular plastic plate is laid on the top of the explosive, with a hole in the centre to allow the firing pin to hit the detonator beneath. The upper and the lower part of the mine body are screwed together. The lower part has six vertical ribs on the side of the body to provide strength and serve as a means for identifying the mine in darkness. The only metal in this mine is the steel firing pin on the Belleville spring.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the safety clip is removed and the pressure plate is rotated to armed position (M), direct pressure on the top of the pressure plate depresses the firing pin assembly down transferring pressure to the Belleville spring which is pressed down until it snaps into reverse. This allows the firing pin to be driven into the detonator, which detonates and fires the main charge.

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NO-4 AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Israel

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

No. 4 is a plastic box mine, rectangular shaped, with a hinged lid that overlaps the sides. The mine casing is similar to the Yugoslavian PMA-1 and the mine is therefore often mistaken as a PMA-1. The hinged lid has four rising grooves formed as a rectangle on the top of the mine. The name of the mine and the lot number is printed inside the rectangular area. The main charge is fitted into the rear part of the mine body and is covered by a grey plastic housing. Two models of the mine exist. The old model has a deep oval groove in the front end of the lid. The front end of the lower casing has a hole drilled through it, which accommodates the MUV type fuze. The groove fits over the MUV-type fuze and rests on the winged striker retaining-pin. The new model has the same hole in the front end of the lower casing. The groove in the lid, however, is square with a slot on each side, which will rest on a square slotted plate, which has the same function as the wings on the MUV fuzes. The fuze incorporates a lead -shear arming delay. When the arming pin with the O-ring is removed, the spring-loaded striker is released and will start to shear through the lead wire until it is cut. The arming delay time is unknown but it is thought to take less than one hour. This will, however, depend on the temperature. In Angola only the old version of the No-4 mine has been encountered to date.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Pressure on the hinged lid, forces the retaining pin out of the fuze releasing the spring-loaded striker. The striker fires the detonator which in turn fires the main charge.

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P2 Mk2, P2 Mk3, P3 MK1, P4 Mk1 AT and AP pressure operated blast mines, plastic casing, Afghanistan

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The P2 Mk2 is a square plastic AT mine with a large circular pressure plate screwed into the top of the mine. The pressure plate has radial and circular strengthening ribs at the top. The fuze well is located centrally on the top of the mine, beneath the pressure plate. The mine is fuzed with the P4 Mk1 AP mine which is cylindrical in shape and made of plastic. It has a pressure plate on the top, which is screwed onto the top of the mine body.

The fuze is a sprung striker retained by a shearing pin. An aluminium disc is placed on the top of the detonator beneath the spring to secure the mine. When arming the mine the pressure plate is unscrewed and the disc is removed. A canvas carrying-handle is attached to one side of the mine body. A secondary fuze well is located centrally at the base of the mine and accumulates the No. 12 anti-lift device.

The P2 Mk3 AT mine is a newer version of the P2 Mk2 AT mine. It has the same appearance and structure as the P2 Mk2 but is slightly bigger. The P3 Mk1 AT mine is similar to the P2 Mk2 and P2 Mk3 AT mines in working principle but has a circular mine body.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the required pressure is applied on the top of the pressure plate on the P2 Mk2, P2 Mk3 or the P3 Mk1 mine, the plate collapses transferring the pressure to the top of the P4 Mk1 AP mine causing the shearing pin in the fuze to break. The sprung striker is released and pressed downwards initiating the detonator which in turn fires the main charge in the P4 Mk1 AP mine. The main charge in the AP mine fires the booster and the main charge in the AT mine.

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PFM-1 and PFM-1 S AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Commonwealth of Independent States

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

This small, scatterable AP mine has a body made from low-density polythene. It comes in two varieties, both identical in external appearance other than a Cyrillic 'C' (English 'S') cast into the plastic on one side of the flat wing. In the centre of the mine is a cylindrical fuze made mostly of aluminium; the remainder of the bulbous section of the mine is filled with a liquid explosive. The fuze is sealed into the plastic casing by a metal compression band, with the end of the fuze protruding a few millimetres. When the mines are packed together in their dispenser, metal strips run through slots in the end of each mine's fuze to retain an arming plunger. These mines are manufactured in a variety of colours, including green, brown and white. The self-destruct mechanism in the PFM-1 S is prone to malfunction, leaving the mine in a very delicate state.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Both varieties of this mine are pressure operated, but the PFM-1 S also incorporates a self-destruct mechanism. When the mine is ejected from its dispenser, the strip is pulled out from the slots in the end of the fuze, freeing the plunger. This plunger, pushed by a spring at the far end of the fuze, moves through a viscous liquid, rotating the detonator into line to arm the mine. After this arming delay, pressure on the bulbous portion of the mine forces the liquid explosive into the hydraulic fuze. An internal sleeve is moved up until the striker retaining balls are allowed to escape into a recess, releasing the spring-Ioaded striker onto the detonator. In the PFM-1 S, this firing action will be initiated by a spring-actuated viscous delay mechanism after about 24 hours.

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PMA-1 AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Former Yugoslavia

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

PMA-1A is a plastic box mine, rectangular shaped, with a hinged lid that overlaps the sides. The plastic lid has a corrugated surface. The fuze with a chemical capsule is fitted into the main charge with the chemical capsule resting on the inside recess of the mine body. The fuze body is made of Bakelite and consists of a sleeve ring and a threaded portion. In the sleeve the initiating composition is placed, which consists of the explosive mass uniformly glued onto the inside parts of the sleeve. A retaining ring is placed in the sleeve to protect from damage during insertion of the detonator. A protective rubber washer is placed on the threaded portion to insure a hermetic seal between the fuze and the explosive charge. The rubber shock-absorber is pulled over the sleeve of the fuze body to protect the fuze from damage during transport and handling. On the front part of the body, a steel safety pin is fitted to prevent accidental closing of the mine lid and activation of the fuze. The lid has a projection on the inside for pressure on the chemical capsule. Two drain holes are made in the bottom of the mine to allow water to escape. Lethal radius is 1m. and hazardous radius is 25m.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Pressure on the hinged lid causes the projection on the inside of the lid to crush the capsule with the friction sensitive chemical components, igniting the contents, which in turn fires the detonator and the main charge.

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PMA-2 AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Former Yugoslavia

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

PMA-2 is a small, cylindrical plastic mine with a 6-horned pressure fuze screwed into the threaded fuze well located centrally on the top surface of the mine. The shape of the actuator gives a larger area for activation while minimising the mines sensitivity to blast detonation systems using overpressure. In the absence of a fuze a black protective plastic cap closes the fuze well. The explosive charge consists of a main charge and an initiation charge. The fuze body is made of Bakelite. On the lower section are internal and external threads. The internal threads secure the initiator to the fuze body while the external threads secure the fuze to the mine. On the external threads is a rubber gasket, which makes the connection to the mine body water proof. The pressure star is made of plastic. The star and the shock needle are one piece. A rubber shield is affixed to the shock needle and prevents water from entering the fuze body. The safety pin is made of metal wire and is inserted through the hole in the shock-needle. A 1 m. string is secured to the eye of the safety pin.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Required pressure applied to the pressure star allows the shock needle to be forced downwards into the friction sensitive chemical components, igniting the contents, which in turn fires the detonator and the main charge.

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PMA-3 AP pressure operated blast mine, rubber/plastic casing, Former Yugoslavia

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

PMA-3 is a small, cylindrical plastic mine. The casing is in two halves joined together by a protective rubber cover to seal the mine. The upper half of the mine body is the pressure plate. The mine is fuzed with the UPMAH-3, which is inserted into the fuze well located centrally on the bottom of the mine and covered with a fuze well plug which has a rubber gasket to ensure a water tight seal. Except for the aluminium shell of the detonator cap, all the components of the PMA-3 are non-metallic. A safety ring of polystyrene is mounted over the rubber cover in the groove formed between the upper and lower half of the casing. Between the ends of the ring is a compressed steel spring. The ring ends are held together with a safety clip, which holds the spring in place. A string is connected to the safety clip and is wound about the circumference of the mine. The free end of the string is secured to the safety ring and rubber cover with tape.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Pressure above the activation threshold applied to the pressure plate on the top of the mine will cause it to pivot about the fuze which crushes the fuze with the friction sensitive chemical components, igniting the contents, which in turn fires the detonator and the main charge.

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PMD-6 AP pressure operated blast mine, wooden casing, Former Soviet Union

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The PMD-6 series and the PMD-7 AP mines have been used widely since the beginning of the World War 2. The PMD-6 appeared for the first time in the Soviet - Finland war in 1939. The mine is square in shape and is wooden cased with a hinged lid that overlaps the sides. A deep slot is cut in the front end of the lid so that it may fit over the fuze and rest on the striker retaining-pin. Many variations of this mine have been encountered. The PMD-6 is fitted with a steel leaf spring in the lid, to prevent the lid from actuating the ignitor prematurely. It also increases the operating pressure. The PMD-6M does not have this feature. The PMD-6 series and the PMD- 7 mines will have limited operational time as the wooden lid quickly corrode or rot thereby offering no pressure to the winged retaining pin. The fuze, however, may remain operational for a considerable time. As a result the mine may not detonate when direct pressure is applied to it but it can easily detonate if it is attempted removed.

METHOD OF OPERATION

The PMD-6 series and the PMD-7 can be used with a trip wire but is usually pressure activated. When pressure operated, the lid rests on the wings of the striker retaining-pin. A pressure on the lid will press down the striker retaining-pin releasing the spring-loaded striker. The striker initiates the percussion cap and the detonator that in turn initiates the main charge.

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PMN AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic, Former Soviet Union

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The PMN is made of a circular Bakelite body with a rubber plate on the top. The rubber plate is secured to the mine body by a thin metal band. The detonator/booster well is placed on the side of the mine body, opposite of the fuze assembly well. The booster housing is made of plastic and the detonator is fitted into the booster. A plastic plug is screwed into the detonator/booster well to close it. Some PMN’s, are found with the Gyata booster/detonator cap instead of the original well cap with the separate booster/detonator. The fuze assembly is screwed into the well on the opposite side of the detonator/booster well. The fuze is secured with a safety pin to prevent the striker to move forwards. The fuze is delay armed. A thin metal wire is attached to the back part of the striker and is enclosing a lead strip. The delay arming time is from 15 to 37 min. depending on the temperature.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the safety pin is removed, the spring loaded striker is released and pressed forwards, causing the steel wire to start cutting through the lead delay strip. After the delay strip is cut, the striker is allowed to move forward until is stops on a step in actuating plunger. The mine is now armed. A pressure on the rubber plate will depress the actuating plunger until the striker is released. The striker fires the detonator and the booster which in turn detonates the main charge.

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PMN-2 AP blast mine, plastic casing, Former Soviet Union

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The PMN-2 was designed as the replacement of the older PMN. Both the mines are similar in size. The mine body is made of light green injection moulded plastic with a black rubber cross plate on the top. A thin plastic plate screwed to the mine body secures the rubber plate. The PMN-2 has a delay armed fuse. The delay arming time is approx. 6 sec. The PMN-2 is designed to be resistant to explosive clearance methods. The detonator housing cover is located on the side of the mine body, close to the arming handle. The booster plug is located under the mine, on the right side of the arming handle. The filling plug is identical to the booster plug and is located under the mine, in the front of the arming handle. The spring and striker plug is located on the side of the mine body about 90 degrees to the left of the arming handle.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the arming key is twisted and pulled out, the bellow is released. The bellow is slowly pressed together by the spring pressure from the spring beneath. After approx. 6 sec, the bellows will free the spring loaded detonator housing. Pressure on the rubber will allow the detonator housing to slide across until stopped by the activating plunger. The striker is then released which fires the detonator and the booster, which in turn detonates the main charge.

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PP Mi-D AP pressure operated blast mine, Czech Republic and Slovakia

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

This simple blast AP mine is a copy of the Russian PMD-7, a smaller version of the PMD-6, which dates back to the Second World War. The mine consists of a wooden box with a hinged lid that overlaps the sides. The main charge is a block of cast TNT into which an RO-1 or MUV Series fuze, fitted with an MD-2 detonator, is placed. The fuze and retaining pin protrude through the end of the mine opposite the hinge. These mines may be assembled in the field and can therefore vary considerably in appearance.

METHOD OF OPERATION

PP Mi-D may be initiated by tripwire, but is more normally pressure-operated. The fuze assembly is inserted into the end of the mine until the detonator is inside the TNT block. For pressure actuation, a winged retaining pin is used so that the lid rests on the wings of the pin, the fuze accommodated by a deep slot cut into the lid. Once armed, pressure on the lid simply pushes the pin out of the fuze to release the striker. A normal pin may be used in conjunction with a tripwire run to a securing point at right angles to the fuze.

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PPM-2 AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Former East Germany

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The PPM-2 is a cylindrical blast plastic mine consisting of a two piece threaded mine case with radial strengthening ribs. On the flange around the circumference there are two lugs with holes, one often with a spring carrying clip fitted. A wrench designed to fit around the diameter of the mine, has grooves that will accept the external ribs. The wrench is used to tighten the two case halves so that the rubber gasket will fully water proof the mine. A rubber sealing-ring is placed between the upper and the lower part of the mine body. PPM-2 uses a piezoelectric fuze system with delayed arming. It is kept safe by a short-circuit system which ensures that the detonator cannot fire until the mine is fully armed. A safety steel pin is inserted through the sealing ring.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the safety pin is withdrawn, a tension spring causes a metal edge to start cutting through a lead delay strip. After 1,5 - 3 hours the metal edge cuts through the lead strip and allows the spring to pull the short circuit contact away from the firing circuit. After this stage, application of the required pressure to the pressure plate, depresses it transferring the pressure to the top of the plunger on the piezoelectric impulse generator. When the plunger is depressed, it generates an electric impulse which can no longer pass through the short circuit with low resistance. The electric impulse passes through the connector strip as there is no other path to follow. The connector strip is made of metal-impregnated plastic and has a relatively high resistance. As the connector strip is in direct contact with the detonator, the electric impulse initiates the electrical detonator which in turn fires the main charge.

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PRB M-35 AP blast mine, plastic casing, Belgium

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The PRB M35 is a small circular plastic AP blast mine. A large recessed threaded fuze well is located centrally on the top of the mine. The fuze well accommodates the M5 fuze. The fuze has a protruding pressure cap on the top. A plastic safety pin is inserted through a hole in the pressure button and plastic ring is attached to the end of the safety pin. The fuze has two spring-loaded steel strikers separated by a cylindrical bolt with two apertures. The bolt holds the strikers apart and covers the percussion caps. The detonator is placed centrally at the base of the fuze. The only metal components are two steel spring strikers and the two percussion caps.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When sufficient pressure is applied to the pressure button on the top of the fuze, it will depress the plastic pressure bolt holding the two strikers apart and covering the percussion caps (minimum 1,5mm depression). The plastic bolt will be displaced releasing one or both the two strikers. The strikers detonate the percussion caps, which then fires the detonator and the main charge.

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R2M2, R2M1, R2M2 Variant AP blast mines, plastic casing, South Africa

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The R2M1 is a small cylindrical AP blast mine with a circular moulded plastic body. The pressure plate on the top of the mine has 12 radial ribs with a circular projection in the centre surrounding the protruding striker knob which is red and visible as a red nipple. On the upper side of the mine body is a ribbed bellows which is made of a PVC moulding forming a short lip at the bottom and a flange at the top. The short lip is engaged between the two parts of the mine body, to seal the mine, and the flange is forming the upper edge of the mine enclosing a red plastic bellows ring. A foam sponge is placed between the pressure plate and the body cap. The fuze consists of the two part plastic fuze housing, the striker knob (housing) and the striker assembly with the striker the spring and the 6,5 g LZY detonator. The upper part of the fuze housing is screwed onto the lower part of the housing. The detonator is glued into a recess beneath the fuze housing. Three holes are drilled in the body of the spring housing to accommodate three steel striker retaining balls. When the mine is unarmed, a safety clip is inserted into a slide in the protruding centre of the pressure plate and through a recess in the red spring knob, to prevent the pressure plate from pressing down the spring knob. The booster well is placed centrally in the base of the mine. The threaded booster plug is made of red plastic and is screwed into the booster well. The mine is relatively watertight but mines that have been buried for a long time, are often found with the striker pins damaged by water. The lower part of the mine body has vertical ribs on the sides and the bottom. Two variants of this mine are known. One is named R2M2 which is the successor of the R2M1. The main difference is that the detonator on the R2M2 is water proof. The booster with the booster plug is also different on the R2M2. The second variation differs mainly in the bellows on the side of the mine, which is reaching from the bottom edge to the top edge of the mine. The bellows ring is also missing. The mine body is made as one part instead of two and the mine generally appears as a simpler and cheaper model. The base has no vertical ribs but has three holes around the booster well. There are also small differences on explosive content (TNT only) and the weight but all three models uses the same fuze type.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Pressure on pressure plate causes the projection to press down the striker knob which compresses the unloaded striker. When the three holes in the body of the striker knob correspond to the three retaining balls, it allows the balls to fall away into the holes releasing the striker which is now loaded due to the downwards pressure of the spring. Once released the forward movement of the striker fires the detonator. The detonator initiates the booster which in turn fires the main charge.

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SB-33 AP blast mine, plastic casing, Italy

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The SB 33 is a resilient plastic AP mine slightly irregular in shape but almost circular. The plastic is moulded in an irregular pattern to aid concealment. A circular elastic neoprene pressure plate cover makes up most of the upper surface. The detonator plug is located on the underside of the mine, offset from the centre and is made of the same material as the mine body. The detonator is fastened to the detonator plug, which is screwed into the detonator well. In transit an inert blue detonator cap is used to neutralise the mine. On the side of the mine is a socket for an arming pin. Removal of the pin arms the mine. The SB 33 is entirely waterproof and contains a minimum of metal. An electronic version of the SB 33, the SB 33 AR, incorporates a sensitive anti-handling device. It differs only in the colour of the transit detonator cap, which is red. Once armed with the detonator and detonator cap, it is indistinguishable from the normal type.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Steady pressure on the pressure cover simultaneously compresses the striker spring and rotates its cylindrical surround. When sufficient force has been applied, the cylinder brings a window around in line with the detonator. The firing pin enters sideways through this window to initiate the detonator, which in turn fires the main charge. Should the mine be subjected to undue shock, the striker bounces straight down inside the cylindrical surround without rotating it so that the mine will not fire. This makes the SB resistant to countermeasures including flails.

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T-72A AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Former Soviet Union

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The T-72A is a small cylindrical AP blast plastic mine with a soft rubber cap which covers the complete top of the mine. The diameter at the base is slightly smaller than the top. The booster and detonator plug are screwed into the booster well in the centre of the base and the detonator is placed in the middle of the booster. A small plastic screw is fitted offset on the base to deny unscrewing of the upper and lower body. The safety pin with a small ring attached, is fitted into the side of the mine body. This ring is the only visual difference between the T- 72A and T-72B. A pressure plate is placed beneath the rubber on the top of the mine. It is held above the diaphragm by a pre-wound retaining ring. Beneath the pressure plate is a Belleville spring with a striker in the centre. The T-72A is waterproof and is sealed with a black rubber ring between the upper and lower body.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Once the safety pin is removed, the spring loaded retaining ring is released. The three lugs is moved from under three corresponding lugs in the pressure plate. The pressure plate is now released and the mine is armed. Pressure on top rubber and the pressure plate causes the Belleville spring to press down and snap into reverse. The striker initiates the percussion cap which fires the detonator which in turn fires the booster and the main charge.

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T-72B AP pressure operated blast mine with tilt mechanism, plastic casing, China

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The T-72B is a small cylindrical AP blast plastic mine with a casing appearing identical to the T-72A except for the safety pin which is triangular instead of round. It has a soft rubber cap which covers the complete top of the mine. The diameter at the base is slightly smaller than the top. The booster, and detonator plug is screwed into the booster well in the centre of the base and the detonator is placed in the middle of the booster. A small plastic plug is screwed into a well, offset on the base. The plug is only screwed into the well to close it, as the T-72B uses the same base as the T-72-A where the plug prevents separation of the upper and lower part of the mine. A pressure plate is placed beneath the rubber on the top of the mine and is resting on a spring loaded metal switch, located centrally on the electric control assembly beneath the pressure plate. The electric control assembly is equipped with two 1,5 V batteries which are thought to last for approximately 3 months. When the batteries are removed, the mine can no longer function, not even on direct pressure. The anti-disturbance mechanism consists of a small metal cylinder with a steel ball resting in a groove in the bottom centre. The arming mechanism consist of a spring loaded plastic switch which is kept in loaded (unarmed) position by the safety pin which is fitted into a small hole on the upper side of the mine body. The T-72B is waterproof and is sealed with a black rubber ring between the upper and lower body assemblies.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Pressure: Once the safety pin is removed, the way switch is turned on by the pre-loaded spring. After a 3 – 4 minute delay, the mine is armed. Pressure on the electronic control assembly, depresses the spring loaded metal switch in the centre of the electric fuze, allowing electrical contact, creating a flash in the burning wire which initiates the detonator which in turn fires the booster and the main charge.

Anti-disturbance: If the mine is disturbed by means of quick movements or tilted more than 10 degrees, the steel ball will move away from the groove and touch the walls of the cylinder allowing electrical contact, creating a flash in the burning wire which initiates the detonator which in turn fires the booster and the main charge.

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VAR-40 AP blast pressure mine, plastic casing, Italy

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The VAR-40 is a waterproof AP mine with a circular resin-based plastic body with vertical ribs moulded into the edge of the upper body. It has a centrally placed pressure button on the top. When deployed, this pressure button will normally be the only visible part of the mine. The VAR-40 can be delivered in various camouflage colours. During transit, the pressure button is secured with a transit cap, which encloses the pressure button, thereby preventing it from being depressed.

METHOD OF OPERATION

N/A

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VS-50 AP blast mine, plastic casing, Italy

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The VS-50 is a scatterable AP mine which consists of a circular plastic body with vertical ribs moulded into the circumference. It can be laid manually or scattered by helicopter. The mine body consists of two parts which are threaded together. The top of the mine has a black circular rubber pressure plate which is linked to the frame of the mine through a ring nut. A detonator well is located centrally at the base of the mine and is closed by a blue plastic transit cap when stored. When arming the mine, the transit cap is removed and the detonator holding plug with the detonator is screwed into the detonator well. The safety pin is then rotated 90 degrees and pulled out. The mine is fitted with a removable safety pin for manual laying or a safety cap for helicopter scattering. The safety cap will be removed by air drag during the free-fall thus arming the mine. Anti-shock protection is provided by an integral pneumatic device. The VS-50 is completely water proof.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Steady pressure on the pressure plate, depresses it, transferring pressure to the top of the striker housing. The spring-loaded striker is kept in position by the striker housing and a protruding arm on a lever. The striker housing is depressed until a second protruding arm on the lever, on the opposite side, slips into a recess in the striker housing. This allows the lever to be moved sideways until the spring-loaded striker can bypass the protruding arm and be released. The striker initiates the detonator which in turn fires the main charge. If the pressure plate is depressed by a sudden pressure, the air in the chamber compressed between the pressure plate and the body of the mine is compressed and inflates a flexible bellows which becomes rigid and prevents the lever to move sideways and release the spring loaded striker. The mine will therefore not detonate when it is subjected to rapid shocks and is not sympathetically detonated by other VS-50 mines placed down to 10cm distances. After a few milliseconds, the compressed air will leak through a pinhole. The bellows is deflated and the lever is free to rotate.

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VS-MK-2 AP blast mine, plastic casing, Italy

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The VS-Mk-2 is a scatterable non-metallic AP mine with a circular resin-based plastic body with vertical ribs moulded into the circumference. VS-Mk-2 can be delivered in various camouflage colours. It can be laid manually but is designed to be scatter laid from helicopters, vehicles or low flying aircraft. The mine is fully waterproof and has a long storage- and life time. It is fitted with a removable safety pin for manual laying, or with a drag extractable safety cap locking the firing mechanism, for helicopter, vehicle or air-craft scattering. The VS-Mk-2 has a circular pressure plate on the top and it provided with a double anti-shock device which makes the mine from explosive countermeasures. The anti-shock device prevents the mine from being trigged when an impulsive load is applied onto the pressure plate caused by an accidental drop when scattered, by the explosion of a nearby or suspended charge, or by the action of fuel explosive mine clearance systems. A detonator well is located offset at the base of the mine and is closed by a plastic transit cap when stored. When arming the mine, the transit cap is removed and the detonator holding plug with the M41 detonator is screwed into the detonator well.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the activation load is applied to the pressure plate, the pressure plate and piston is depressed, which loads the striker. The striker is kept locked by the tooth of a lever and is released only when the lever has rotated of a given angle. The rotation of the lever allows the alignment of a proper hole in the stem of the pressure plate with the tooth of the lever, which releases the loaded striker which fires the detonator which again detonates the main charge.

A sudden pressure (shock) on the pressure plate, inflates the air-pressure inside an anti-shock bellows due to an extra pressure in the upper chamber. This prevents the rotation of the lever.

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References and Acknowledgements: Data for this annex was compiled from information: A2.1: On the Internet site of Norwegian Peoples Aid (landmine database) http://www.angola.npaid.org/ supplemented with information from the following sources:

A2.2: Banks E., Brassey’s Essential Guide to Anti-personnel mines, recognising and disarming, Brassey’s London and Washington 1997.

A2.3: King C. (Ed), Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance, Jane’s Information Group Limited, London, Third Edition 1998-1999.

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Annex 3: Summary of properties of principal main explosives used in anti-personnel landmines

RDX (Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (1,3,5-triaza-1,3,5-tri-nitrocyclo-hexane)) Also referred to as cyclonite, or hexogen, RDX is a white crystalline solid usually used in mixtures with other explosives, oils, or waxes; it is rarely used alone. It has a high degree of stability in storage and is considered the most powerful and brisant of the military high explosives. Chemical formula: C3H6N6O6, molecular weight: 222.1, melting point 205oC. RDX compositions are mixtures of RDX, other explosive ingredients, and desensitizers or plasticizers. Incorporated with other explosives or inert material at the manufacturing plants, RDX forms the base for the following common military explosives: Composition A, composition B, composition C, HBX, H-6 and Cyclotol. Of these composition A, and composition B have been used as the explosive in landmines. Composition A is a wax-coated, granular explosive consisting of TDX and plasticizing wax. Five varieties of composition A have been developed and designated as composition A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-5. Compositions A-4 and A-5, with desensitizer added, have been developed, but these explosives are not widely used. Composition A is used as the bursting charge in Navy 2.75- and 5-inch rockets and land mines. Composition B consists of castable mixtures of RDX and TNT; in some instances, desensitizing agents are added to the mixture. Composition B is used as a burster in Army projectiles and in rockets and land mines. Source: http://www.ordnance.org/rdx.htm

Trinitrotoluene, A generic name including any of several nitro substitution compounds produced by the substitution of three nitro (NO2) groups for three hydrogen atoms in toluene (C6H5CH3). Because hydrogen atoms can be replaced in both the C6H5 group and the CH3 group, it becomes possible, through the different positions these three NO2 groups may occupy relatively in the molecules, to produce 16 different tri-nitro-toluenes. Each of these exhibits individual characteristics, such as melting point, boiling point, specific gravity, solubility, and sensitivity to detonation. All are produced by nitration of the hydrocarbon or its products or by indirect reactions. Symmetrical, or 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene, is commonly called TNT, the best known of the compounds. It forms pale yellow crystals of specific gravity 1.65 and with a melting point of 82° C (180° F). Its low melting point allows it to be melted and poured into artillery shells and other explosive devices. It burns in the open at 295° C (563° F), but it may explode if confined. In the absence of a detonator, it is a rather stable material, does not attack metals, does not absorb moisture, and is practically insoluble in water. TNT dissolves in benzene and in acetone and, like all nitro compounds, reacts readily with substances that surrender electrons, that is, with chemical reducing agents. High-velocity detonators, such as mercury fulminate and nitramine, induce its violent and explosive decomposition. TNT can be absorbed through the skin, causing headache, anemia, and skin irritation. Source: http://www.iversonsoftware.com/reference/chemistry/Trinitrotoluene.htm

Tetryl The chemical name for tetryl is 2,4,6-trinitrophenyl-N-methylnitramine. Some commonly used names are nitramine, tetralite, and tetril. Tetryl is an odorless, synthetic, yellow crystal-like solid that is not found naturally in the environment. Under certain conditions, tetryl can exist as dust in air. It dissolves slightly in water and in other liquids. Tetryl was used to make explosives, mostly during World Wars I and II. It is no longer manufactured or used in the United States. Source: http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts80.html

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Annex 4: Example model mines from Maquettes Sédial

Model PMA-2 AP blast mine

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Model VS-MK2 AP blast mine

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Model PMN mine AP blast mine

Model M-14 AP blast mine

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Model PMN-2 AP blast mine

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Annex 5: Example posters

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Annex 6: US mine simulants - ITOP

WHAT ARE SIMULANT MINES?

· A Set of Standard Test Targets that simulate the range of characteristics found in many landmines by the most commonly used mine detection sensors · SIMs are proposed NATO and International Standard Test Targets for Countermine and Humanitarian Demining

CHARACTERISTICS OF SIMs

· SIMs accurately and consistently interact with metal detection, radar and infrared detection sensors in a way representative of actual live mine target categories · Have generic characteristics, do not replicate any specific mine · Safe to store, issue, transport and use · SIMs do not replicate explosive fill chemical content for Nuclear, NMR, NQR, Acoustic or Trace gas detectors · PM-MCD development as part of 4 Nation T&E Working Group (FR/GE/UK/US) for development of International Test Operation Procedures for Countermine and Humanitarian Demining Equipment SIM TARGET SETS

· Rugged, durable design and construction · One Target Set consists of six (6) size non-metallic SIMs and 36 Metal Inserts · Three (3) Anti-Tank (AT) SIMs 30 cm diameter; 10 cm high 25 cm diameter; 8.33 cm high 20 cm diameter; 6.67 cm high 18 AT size metal inserts

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· Three (3) Anti-personnel (AP) SIMs 12 cm diameter; 4 cm high 9 cm diameter; 3 cm high 6 cm diameter; 3 cm high 18 AP size metal inserts

WHY SIMULANT MINES?

· Live or inert land mine characteristics often vary from year to year and lot to lot · Large number of mines in the world - you can't test with them all · Lack of available live or inert land mines · Increasing restrictions on live mines · High explosive loaded mines have: costly precautions safety hazards rigid accountability safeguards against theft · Increasing need for mine targets - decreasing supply

SIMs - THE TARGET OF TODAY AND TOMORROW

· For mine detection equipment test and evaluation or mine detection training · Six (6) size SIM targets cover range of AP and AT mine diameters and provide sequence of target area and target volume · Dielectric match with TNT and Comp B · Accurate match of thermal diffusivity · SIMs furnished with metal inserts containing small metal parts with increasing Levels of Detection Difficulty (LDD)

BENEFITS OF SIMs

· Improved Data Exchange Provides confidence in the accuracy and quality of test data Allows acceptance of data by other countries for evaluation Facilitates interchange of data between Universities, Non-Government Organizations, Industry, Military and Governments Reduces requirement to retest during foreign equipment evaluation

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· Reduces test costs · Safer testing · Facilitates technology and data transfer between the Countermine and Humanitarian Demining communities SIMULANT

SIMULANT MINE DEVELOPMENT

· Previous standard mine target work done by the US Army at Fort Belvoir, the National Institute of Standards, VSE Corporation, the Canadian Army (small metal targets) and other organizations · SIM development focused on low metallic mines difficult to detect with current mine detectors · All size SIMs have a diameter/height ratio of 3.0 except for the smallest AP (6 cm) which has 2.0 · SIM bodies are ABS plastic · High Explosive (HE) fill simulant is RTV silicone rubber · Electromagnetic property testing of HE simulants was conducted from 50 MHz to 26 GHz by Dr. J. Curtis at the US Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station

METAL INSERT DEVELOPMENT

· Metal parts tested based on type, material, size, shape and orientation of parts found in mines · Other parts, smaller and larger, used to establish and bracket upper and lower detection range · Hundreds of tests of small metal parts with five of the worlds leading mine detectors · Laboratory detectability testing at Auburn University by Dr. L. Riggs · Detonation tube/cup detectability modeling by Dr. L. Carin of Duke University · Five (5) levels for AT SIMs and five (5) levels for AP SIMs with an overlap of three (3) levels were selected · SIMs can be changed from entirely nonmetallic to five levels of metal by the simple change of the insert · Special metal inserts with actual or surrogate metal parts or intermediate levels of detection difficulty can also be used · Live or inerted mines can be calibrated to determine and catalog their LDD · Tomorrow's mines can be evaluated against today's tests · As more mines are calibrated the utility of SIMs increases · SIMs also furnished with one (1) zero metal insert · Metal inserts can be used as stand alone targets in testing metal detector sensors

PERMANENT IDENTIFICATION

· If lost, the SIM can be identified years later as an inert simulant · The word inert is permanently marked on the SIM in three languages - avoids EOD/police hassle

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Annex 7: Australian mine simulants

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Target Description Rational Designation SIM APNM S AP mine simulant, cylindrical, Challenging target for GPR/Thermal, small, non-metallic case variable metal content SIM APNM L AP mine simulant, cylindrical, Size and shape of vast majority of deployed large, non-metallic case AP/AV mines. Variable metal content. SIM APNM X AP mine simulant, box, non- Similar to APNM L but square shape for metallic case IR/EO SIM APWD X AP mine simulant, box, wood Simulates wooden ‘Shu’ mines, variable case metal. SIM ATNM C AT mine simulant, cylindrical, Large variable metal content AT mine. non-metallic case Cylindrical for IR/EO SIM ATNM X AT mine simulant, box, non- Large variable metal content AT mines. Box metallic case shape for EO/IR. SIM ATNM B AT mine simulant, bar mine, Track cutting mine variate. This simulant is non-metallic case ½ the size of a metal Bar mine but twice the length of an air scatterable variant. SIM APM X AP mine simulant, box, metal Metal cased AP mine case SIM FRM C AP bounding fragmentation Bounding mine class such as Valmara 69 etc. mine simulant, cylindrical, metal case SIM ATM C AP mine simulant, cylindrical, Large metal cased mine such as common metal case, tilt rod capable M12. SIM ATM X AT mine simulant, box, metal Large box metal cased mine. case, tilt rod capable

Table A7.1: Landmine simulants used in DSTO detection trials. US NVESD metal component set is used with these targets.

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Example of one DSTO simulant

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Metal parts for inserts used by DSTO and US

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Annex 8: New simulants

(This is extracted from a study conducted for JRC by the independent demining consultant Mr C. King of CKA Ltd.)

SUPPORT TO STUDY OF GENERIC MINE-LIKE OBJECTS FOR R&D IN SYSTEMS FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING

PROVISIONAL DESIGNS FOR SURROGATE MINES

20 December 1999

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PROVISIONAL DESIGNS FOR SURROGATE MINES

Design Outline

The surrogates are based on a modular system in which some components and assemblies are interchangeable. The A body surrogate is broadly representative of small, minimum-metal blast antipersonnel mines; a cutaway diagram and list of components are at part A of this Annex. The B body surrogate is more typical of large anti- personnel blast mines with plastic casings, which may have either a low or medium metal content. Both design use readily available materials and entail the bare minimum of machining operations. Metal Component Inserts (MCI) are firmly located using good interference fits, while most of the joints are currently made using either Cyanoacrylate adhesive or hot-melt glue. In some cases, alternative components would be sourced and better assembly techniques evolved for larger-scale production. The 2 major replaceable assemblies are the MCI and Explosive Substitute Block (ESB), although a number of other components could also be changed. MCls can be produced in a wide variety of configurations to offer generic metal targets or accurately represent the metallic components of specific mines; more information is given in part C of this annex. Explosive substitute blocks can be moulded from any substance, enabling any physical or chemical property that is critical to detection to be represented. The A Body Unscrewing the base (G) of the A body casing allows access to the MCI (K) and ESB (F), which can both be replaced in a matter of seconds. With a differently designed holder (I), MCls could also be emplaced horizontally to represent transverse fuze mechanisms. The body will accept ESBs of different sizes to represent the range of explosive weights (30 -50 g) typical for this type of mine. The pressure plate assembly (A) can be replaced, and with it, the assemblies within the internal void beneath. Collars can be placed around the cylindrical body (C) to allow, for example, external fins such as those found on many Italian AP mines. With the pressure plate sealed into place, the A body surrogate is robust and fully waterproof. The B Body The B body surrogate has been supplied in the form of a Russian PMN I Chinese Type 58 AP blast mine, however it can be adapted for a number of other configurations. The side plugs can be unscrewed and blanked off to leave a basically cylindrical casing that can be placed either way up. The metal securing band (R) and plunger spring assembly (K and L) are then extracted to remove all remaining metal. When inverted, the white base cap (I) is removed to reveal a small cavity (J) which will accept ESBs; there is also a central holder (P) which will accept MCls inserted from either direction. Thus the B body can be reconfigured as, say, the minimum-metal Yugoslav PMA-3 using a 2-component MCI and a small ESB. The B body is also robust, but more difficult to fully waterproof. . Supplied MCis and ESBs

Each of the sample A body surrogates is supplied with a Polyurethane ESB and 3-component MCls. For more details of this MCI. A clear tube containing the components of the MCI has also been included. The B body samples contain wax ESBs and, as mentioned previously, have a metal content representative of the Russian PMN mine. This entails the use of a 1-component MCI as the stab receptor of the detonator assembly. MCIs are shown in part C of this annex.

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SUPPORT TO STUDY OF GENERIC MINE-LIKE OBJECTS FOR R&D IN SYSTEMS FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING

METHODS OF REPLICATING ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

Requirement This report details the methods for replicating anti-personnel (AP) mines, together with the process followed to arrive at the proposed design concept. The benefits and limitations of the optional methods, including off-the- shelf (OTS) solutions, are to be outlined. DESIGN CONCEPTS

The study (and common sense) suggests that there are broadly 2 ways to approach the production of mine surrogates: specific mines can be selected and replicated with great accuracy, or characteristics can be represented in generic surrogates. Both systems have advantages and disadvantages which affects their suitability for different applications.

Specific Replicas

For this method, in principle, the most appropriate mine types are identified and then copied with the highest degree of accuracy possible. There are, however, practical limitations: they must be inert (contain no explosive whatsoever) and mechanically non-functional (otherwise they become ‘mines’ under the definitions within international law). It is also virtually impossible to replicate every component using exactly the same material as the original.

Advantages

Confidence. If a detection technique works well against an accurate replica, there is every reason to believe that it will be effective against the real mine. This minimises the chances of misdirected or wasted effort.

Credibility. Success against accurate replicas is more likely to convince those within and outside the research team that the results are significant. Specific problems. Certain types of mine are well known for being difficult to detect. With this method, specific `problem’ mines can be singled out for attention. Similarly, the most difficult mines within a given region can be addressed as a matter of priority.

Disadvantages

Selection. There are hundreds of mine designs across a variety of types, making it very hard to select the top priorities. Even among the top candidates, there are often many distinct variations that demand consideration. Unless entire categories are ignored, a large number would have to be replicated in order to represent the threat.

Expense. Most types of mine would be extremely expensive to replicate. The specialist tooling of moulds, variety of plastics and industrial techniques (such as ultrasonic welding) virtually rules out the option of workshop fabrication. With a large combination of materials and operations, it is also highly unlikely that any single AA 501852 Page 131 MIMEVA: Study of generic Mine-like Objects for R&D in Systems for Humanitarian Demining Annex 8

manufacturer could undertake the task. During initial enquiries, a UK plastics workshop estimated the cost of mould production for a simple AP mine casing (with no screw threads) at 15,000. An accurate replica or more complex approximation would be substantially more expensive.

Applicability. There is no guarantee that detection data against a specific mine can be extrapolated to other, different types. There is always a possibility that the chosen mine has a unique characteristic which makes it more susceptible to detection using a given technique.

Generic Surrogates

The ‘generic’ method abandons the idea of accurately reproducing mine characteristics, representing general features instead. Manufacturers have generally identified approximate size, shape and metal content as the primary features to represent. Most have been designed primarily for metal detection, though they may have a filling intended to represent some of the characteristics of TNT.

Advantages

Cost. Since it is not necessary to slavishly reproduce every feature, the generic surrogate is a considerably cheaper option than the replica. Existing Off-The-Shelf (OTS) mouldings and components can be sourced, substantially reducing the need for special fabrication and machining.

Versatility. Features and characteristics found to be unsatisfactory can often be modified quickly and cheaply. The ability to alter or replace components also allows some variations to be produced without the need for new designs.

Proof of principle. The ability to create and vary a given characteristic may allow better overall assessment of detection techniques than a specific example, which may or may not be representative of other similar mines.

Disadvantages

Confidence. Success of a detection technique against a generic surrogate does not guarantee the same result against a live mine. This decreases the level of confidence in data and, under some circumstances, might necessitate an additional confirmatory stage (against accurate replicas or real inert mines) in the proving process, before live field trials are conducted.

Selection of features. The generic approach requires appropriate features to be selected and reproduced in order to adequately represent the detection signatures of a real target. Existing generic surrogates, for example, do not attempt to reproduce any of the voids or internal structures of a real mine, which may render them unsuitable for use with certain detection techniques. It is also possible that some seemingly insignificant feature (or combination of features) within the real mine has an unforeseeable implication for detectability.

AVAILABLE OPTIONS

Real Mines Although not strictly within the scope of this report, some notes on the use of real mines are relevant. Under the Ottawa Treaty, international law does make provision for the use of real mines for detection research. Since it is AA 501852 Page 132 MIMEVA: Study of generic Mine-like Objects for R&D in Systems for Humanitarian Demining Annex 8

clearly unsafe to use fully armed mines in laboratory tests, either ‘neutralised’ or ‘inert’ mines are needed. Demining teams (military or civilian) have no difficulty obtaining live mines from, for example, the Balkans; the problem is transporting them to European destinations and gaining authority for their use.

Neutralised mines will normally have the most sensitive elements of the fuze train removed. These are the igniter, detonator and possibly the booster, all of which may be incorporated into a single ‘detonator’ assembly. The missing parts can be easily and accurately replicated to give a truly authentic target. The remaining high explosive main charge (often TNT) is very stable, constituting no more than a moderate fire risk, and may be handled in complete safety. But despite the inherent stability of properly neutralised mines, security, handling and transport regulations are extremely stringent and may create a major administrative and logistic obstacle.

Inert mines have all of the explosive removed. They therefore require a substitute main charge as well as the replicated components of the initiation train. Although with each replacement component, the mine becomes less authentic, the materials, fit and finish of the inert mine will still be far superior to most replicas. Although beyond the scope of the contract and therefore not a formal recommendation, the use of inert mines should be thoroughly investigated if specific types are identified for research.

Off The Shelf (OTS) Solutions

Current and former OTS mine surrogates were reviewed and are either mine-specific or very generic. However, it is interesting to observe that all of those currently available are generic, while mine replicas are either discontinued or claimed to be ‘available on request’. The probable reasons for the non-availability of replicas are the large production costs and the minimal commercial market. The biggest potential market for the replicas are the military and commercial demining teams, who both have access to real, inert mines for training purposes. Where dummy mines are required solely for visual identification, they are invariably supplied in the UK by Miltra Engineering, who found little market for working models. Although this level of detail is not available from the potential manufacturers, it is highly unlikely that all of the materials used would be the same as those in the original mines.

The two available generic OTS options (from Military International and the Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate at Fort Belvoir, USA) are primarily intended for metal detection and make no attempt to reproduce any detailed features or characteristics of real mines. Even the metal content is generic, using targets such as steel balls and short lengths of tubing.

CKA Proposal

CKA considered the drawbacks of both the purely generic and the modelling approaches to the production of simulant and surrogate mines. The resultant proposal is an attempt to minimise the disadvantages by establishing an acceptable compromise between the two techniques. This is achieved through the use of a modular system in which critical characteristics are replicated accurately, while less important aspects are represented generically. For example, metallic components can be replicated relatively easily to create an authentic signature, while an OTS casing with basic modifications eliminates the need for a special moulding.

The principle is simple, however, in order for it to succeed, the scientific community must specify which mine characteristics they consider to be critical and which are not. Since different detection technologies will focus on different characteristics, lists of key components and characteristics should be drawn up for each of the likely detection techniques. These lists can then be used to enhance the surrogate design by identifying those components and characteristics that need to be interchangeable, and those that do not.

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CKA GENERIC SURROGATE DESIGN

Casings

Since it is important to minimise the number of types to be produced, the major decision is over the choice of casings. The casing is normally the single most expensive part to accurately replicate, particularly if complex shapes, such as screw threads, are to be formed. Three sizes of cylinder would offer a reasonable representation of a broad cross-section of mines, though a box section should also be considered. The CKA system proposes the use of plumbing fittings, which are available in a wide variety of cylindrical configurations.

These fittings are relatively cheap, easily available and manufactured to very close tolerances; many also have threaded caps which are watertight, yet allow easy access. Most fittings are available in at least two types of plastic: the ‘solvent weld’ fittings are generally based on PVC while the non-solvent types are normally polypropylene or polybutylene. These plastics are easily machined, allowing them to be cut to any length, for example.

Main charge

Although the original concept was to have replaceable moulded inserts to represent explosive fills, it is preferable to have a material permanently cast into place. This will eliminate unwanted voids and prevent movement. If a single substance (such as RTV 3110) adequately represents all of the explosive characteristics necessary for detection, this should be specified as the permanent fill.

Metallic components

The proposed design uses standard ‘metal component inserts’ to represent small assemblies such as detonator capsules, firing pins and small springs; these can contain either generic metal targets (Simulants) or accurate models of mine components where a specific mine surrogate is needed. They are easily replaced and can be used in any of the mine bodies, which have vertical or horizontal holders positioned inside. Larger components (such as the transverse striker assembly) are fitted to screw-in plugs for the PMN-type surrogate. These can be removed and blanked off, or replaced by other transverse assemblies.

Internal structures

Some additional internal structures should be mounted in the casing to represent the non-metallic parts of the fuze mechanism. These need not be complex, but should be appropriate to the type of mechanism being represented (eg a shallow plastic cone to represent a Belleville spring). Fabricating and fitting new internal structures is relatively simple and could probably be done either by the JRC or the contractor.

CKA REPLICAS As a result of contracts with other research groups and detector manufacturers, CKA have designed and built replicas of the Russian PMN, Yugoslav PMA-1, PMA-2 and PMA-3, and the Chinese Type 72 (AP). These mines still use casings based on plumbing fittings, but selected or altered to represent the relevant mine with much greater accuracy than the generic version. Major internal structures are present, and individual metal components are represented in the shape and configuration of the original as far as possible. This type of surrogate should be considered for specific applications.

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RECOMMENDATIONS It is recommended that: a. For general research and development, the modular generic approach should be taken, with critical features represented as accurately as possible. b. For the modular generic approach, three cylindrical casings should be used: an evenly proportioned cylinder (approximately 50 mm diameter by 60 mm high), a shallow cylinder (approximately 60 mm diameter by 30 mm high), and a larger cylinder corresponding to the size of a PMN mine (approximately 110 mm in diameter by 60 mm high). c. A box-type casing (around 140 mm long, 60 mm wide and 50 mm high) should also be seriously considered, since a significant number of minimum- and medium-metal mines have casings in this configuration. d. Since there are only 3 minimum-metal anti-personnel mine types of mine commonly found in the former Yugoslavia (PMA-1, PMA-2 and PMA-3), closer replication of these types should be considered for research specific to the Balkans. e. The JRC should establish the features and characteristics that they consider to be critical to detection, so that the designs can take account of these priorities. f. The detection of tripwire should given equal priority to the detection of AP mines; real tripwire should be sourced from the Balkans for use in detection trials.

C KING February 2000

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Annex 9: Acquisition times and file names relating to the Infrared measurements

A summary of the activities and relevant time periods for the measurement series undertaken for MIMEVA are recorded in the tables on the following pages.

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MIMEVA Test3 (13 DEC 2000 / Gauss lab.) Mine type : VAR-40 File base name : MIM3

Height 45 mm Diameter 78 mm Mine weight 105 gr. Explosive weight 40 gr. Composition B or T4 Casing material and colour Plastic. Khaki, green, black

Time File number Interval Note 1 Note 2

10 :29 038- 039 Mines on surface Explosive on left

10 :40 – 11 :05 040- 053 2’ Mines covered 2mm dry sand

11 :07 – 12 :07 054- 084 2’ 2kW lamp ON (60 minutes heating)

12 :09 – 13 :53 085 - 137 2’ 2kW lamp OFF (106 minutes cool down)

14 :13 – 14 :15 138 - 139 Mines placed on surface

14 :17 – 14 :29 140 -146 2’ 2kW lamp ON (12 minutes heating)

14 :31 – 14 :51 147 - 157 2’ 2kW lamp OFF (20 minutes cool down)

15 :18 158 Inverted mine positions on surface Explosive on right

15 :18 – 15 :46 159 - 324 10’’ 2kW lamp ON (27 minutes heating) Temp. = 55°C

15 :46 – 16 :15 325 - 500 10’’ 2kW lamp OFF

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MIMEVA Test4 (14 DEC 2000 / Gauss lab.) Mine type : MAUS/1 File base name : MIM4

Time File Interval Note 1 Note 2 number

09 :50 001 Mines on surface Explosive on left

10 :02 002 Mines covered 2mm dry sand

10 :04 – 11:04 003- 033 2’ 2kW lamp ON (60 minutes heating) (43k Lux on surface)

11 :06 – 12 :58 034 - 090 2’ 2kW lamp OFF (112 minutes cool down)

13 :00 – 13 :20 091 - 101 2’ Inverted mine positions (under 2mm sand) Explosive on right

13 :46 – 14:18 105 -121 2’ 2kW lamp ON ( 32 minutes heating)

14 :20 – 14 :46 122 - 135 2’ 2kW lamp OFF (26 minutes cool down)

15 :00 136 Mines placed on surface Explosive on left

15 :00 – 15:10 137 -142 2’ 2kW lamp ON (10 minutes heating) Temp. = 50°C

15 :12 – 15 :30 143 - 152 2’ 2kW lamp OFF (17 minutes cool down)

15 :34 153 Inverted mine positions on surface Explosive on right

15 :34 – 15 :44 154 - 165 1’ 2kW lamp ON (10 minutes heating)

15 :45 –16 :00 166 - 181 1’ 2kW lamp OFF (15 minutes cool down)

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MIMEVA Test7 (18,19 JAN 2001 / Radiometry lab.) Mine types : C. King simulants 1-4 File base name : MIM7

Time File Interval Note 1 Note 2 number

16 :15 001 30 s Mines on surface See photo

16 :15 002 – 50 30 s 2kW lamp ON (24 minutes heating)

051 – 150 30s

10 :15 151 Mines buried under 2mm sand – lamp OFF See photo

10 :23 – 11 :25 152 – 276 30s 2kW lamp ON (62 minutes heating) See #280,287,302

11 :26 – 14 :14 277 – 613 30s Lamp OFF (168 minutes cool down) #323,368,440

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MIMEVA Test8 (22 JAN 2001 / Radiometry lab.) Mine types : US SIM simulants + MAUS1 File base name : MIM8

Time File Interval Note 1 Note 2 number

10 :20 001 30s Mines on surface See photo

10 :21 – 10 :46 002 – 050 30s Mines on surface (25 minutes heating)

10 :46 051 – 150 30s Mines on surface

13 :30 151 Mines buried under 2mm sand – lamp OFF

13 :30 – 14 :32 152 – 276 30s 2kW lamp ON ( 62 minutes heating) See #154,200,265

14 :32 – 16 :44 277 – 540 30s Lamp OFF (132 minutes cool down) 286,309,329

Lamp : 20° off nadir and 130 cm from sand surface Detector (Agema 570): Vertical and 150 cm from sand surface

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MIMEVA Test 5 ( 24 JAN 2001 / Gauss lab.) Mine type : Tecnovar AUPS-AS(1) File base name : MIM5

Time File Interval Note 1 Note 2 number

11 :20 001-20 30s Test5A (No mines- verified heat pattern on See #20 surface)

11 :45 – 12 :16 024 – 083 30s Test 5B. Mines on surface. Explosive EAST. Lamp See #82 ON

12 :16 – 13 :16 084 – 177 30s Lamp OFF. 60 minutes cool down See #94,117

13 :16 – 14 :06 178 – 277 30s Test 5C. Mines buried –2mm. Lamp ON 50 See #180,211 minutes

14 :06 – 15 :00 278 – 387 30s Lamp OFF 54 minutes cool down See #202, 278,319

Lamp : D=130cm Detector : H=150 cm vertical

Verified FOV A570 (@ 8m = ~ 242*300 cm)

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MIMEVA Test6 ( 31 JAN 2001 / Gauss lab.) Mine type MK2 File base name : MIM6

Time File Interval Note 1 Note 2 number

12 :00 001 Test6B : Mines on surface (Lamp OFF) Sand temp. 12º C

12 :00 – 12 :30 002 - 060 30s Lamp ON, Mines on surface/ Explosive EAST Heating 30 minutes

12 :30 – 13 :30 061 - 181 30s Lamp OFF Cool down 60 minutes

14 :00 182 Test 6C : Mines under 2mm sand / Explosive EAST

14 :00 – 15 :00 183 – 303 30s Lamp ON, Mines under 2mm sand Heating 60 minutes

15 :00 – 15 :45 304 – 392 30s Lamp OFF, Cool down 45 minutes

Lamp : D=130cm Detector : H=150 cm vertical

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Annex 10: Theoretical Interpretation of relative size of signals for the two detectors

In the measurements of section 5.3, the ratio mine signal/calibration signal is, for almost all targets, larger for the Guartel detector than for the Foerster detector. (The only exception is model detonator can number 3, where the Foerster signal is slightly higher). In general, the response of a metal detector to a given object is characterised by the ratio of the electromagnetic skin-depth d to the size of the object. Two limits arise, the thin-skin limit where the skin- depth is much smaller than the object size, and the thick-skin limit, where it is much greater. An exact solution exists for the impedance change ?Z in a nearby coil, caused by a small metallic sphere of radius a [14]. For non-magnetic spheres it is

w æ 3 3 ö DZ = Be Br V ç1+ - coth z÷ (9) ç 2 ÷ m 0 I e I r è z z ø the limits being

2 4 w æ 3 a 12 a ö DZ = Be Br V ç - i + .....÷ (10) ç15 d 2 315 d 4 ÷ m 0 I e I r è ø for a<< d and

w Be Br æ 3 9 d ö DZ = V ç- i + (1+ i) + ...... ÷. (11) è 2 4 a ø m 0 I e I r for a>> d z = (i+1) a / d where V is the sphere volume ? is the angular frequency

Ie is the current in the exciting coil

Be is the magnetic field due to the exciting coil in the neighbourhood of the sphere

Ir is the current in the receiving coil

Br is the magnetic field due to the receiving coil in the neighbourhood of the sphere

The formulae above are numbered as in [14]. The forms given here are modified so as to be appropriate for detectors with separate excite and receive coils. Note that the quantity Br / Ir is a constant determined by the geometry of the coil and is finite even when the receive coil carries negligible current, as would normally be the case. The Guartel detector is a pulsed induction instrument and so both the real and imaginary parts contribute to the output signal SG. However, the contributions of the higher frequency terms will tend to dominate, because of the factor of ? in (9a). The two-frequency system of the Foerster detector is designed so that the output signal is proportional to the weighted difference of the imaginary part of the impedance change at the two frequencies. The weights are chosen to be inversely proportional to the frequency i.e. the term in front of V is the same for

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the two frequencies [15]. Now, for the Minex 2FD 2.500 used here, f2 = 8 f1 exactly, so the signal SF is

æ 7 /8 1 1 ö = KV Im ç - coth z + coth( 8z)÷ S F ç 2 ÷ è z z 8z ø

Table A10.1 Values of a/d

Sphere Guartel detector Foerster detector

f eff ~ 500 kHz f1=2.4 kHz

Bronze 9.5mm diameter. 18 1.3

Stainless steel 19 mm 15 1.1 diameter.

The response of the Guartel detector to the calibration spheres is determined by the spectrum of its pulsed field and the overall curve of impedance change against a/d (figure A10.1). But from the table, it is clear that the signal is dominated by terms with large a/d i.e. the detector is essentially operating in the thin-skin limit. In this region, the normalised impedance change is relatively small and slowly varying with a. On the other hand, the Foerster detector is operating close to the maximum of the SF /(KV) curve shown in figure A10.2, which is at a/d = 1.50. Therefore, the fact that the ratios (target signal)/(calibration signal) were found to be lower for the Foerster detector than for the Guartel detector can be explained theoretically as being because the calibration spheres happened to have been of size and material such as to produce relatively large signals for their volume in the Foerster detector. Choice of different calibration spheres could produce a different result. The Foerster detector was operating on a steep part of its response curve, whereas the Guartel was operating in a flatter region, so that the signals in the Foerster were more affected by small changes of volume or conductivity. This partly explains why the model detonator cans all showed different signals for the Foerster, but all gave similar signals in the Guartel (see section 8 on surrogate detonator cans above).

Table A10.2 (Response to large sphere)/ (Response to small sphere)

Detector Height above top of Height above centre Ratio of signals large sphere (mm) of large sphere (mm)

Foerster 40 49.5 9.45

Foerster 44 53.5 7.67

Foerster 45 54.75 7.11 (linearly extrapolated)

Guartel 40 49.5 10.1

The height of the detector was always 50mm above the top of the small sphere, corresponding to 54.75mm above the centre of the small sphere. The relative sizes of the signals from the two spheres may be related to the theory as follows. In the third row of the table, the response ratio is extrapolated to the height at which the centres of the two spheres would be on the same level. The ratio of the signals, 7.11, is less than the ratio of the volumes,

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8, because the bronze sphere lies closer to the maximum of the signal/volume curve. For the Guartel detector, the interpretation is less direct, because the response will be affected by the spectrum of frequencies present in the pulse and also because data was measured only at one height. However, it is clear that the ratio is larger than for the Foerster, and at equivalent height, would be closer to the volume ratio 8. For this detector both spheres lie in on the flatter part of the curve well beyond the peak, where the signal is more nearly proportional to the sphere volume. A suggestion for further work is to make measurements with a familiy of different sizes of sphere, all made from the same material, and plot the curve of signal/volume against sphere diameter. From the scale factor required to fit the horizontal axis to the theory, the conductivity of the material might be inferred. More challenging would be to attempt the same experiment with ferromagnetic spheres to obtain also the effective permeability.

Figure A10.1 Variation of impedance change per unit volume with sphere radius/skin depth

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Figure A10.2 Variation of signal/volume with sphere radius/skin depth for the Foerster 2-frequency continuous wave detector

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Annex 11: Sources of mine replicas This annex identifies some sources of mine training aids and replicas. Since prices depend on many factors, including type of surrogate, quantity needed, and delivery details, they are subject to change. It is recommended to contact the source to agree prices for specific needs. The suppliers are categorised under the headings:

· Models

· Databases

· Computer Simulations

· Simulants

· Surrogates

Models

Model mines are available from several sources.

· Maquettes SEDIAL 16 Rue des Granits 44100 NANTES - FRANCE - Telephone: - +33 (0) 2 40 43 91 11 - Fax : +33 (0)2 40 43 66 03 ( http://www.sedial.com/ ). It should be noted that these models are externally realistic and their movement is subject to export control agreements with the French government. These models are considered inappropriate for use as controlled references as it is usually not possible to dismantle the model to verify the internal structure and materials used.

· Miltra Engineering Ltd, 207 Chester Road, Watford, Hertfordshire WD1 7RH, United Kingdom. e-mail to: [email protected]; Telephone + 44 1923 818342, Fax: + 44 1923 818342 (http://www.xga42.dial.pipex.com/ )

· KIK Chemical Industry, Fužine 9, 1240 Kamnik, Slovenia. E-mail: kik.kamnik@kik- kamnik.si Telephone +386 1 839 1011; Fax: +386 1 839 2735 Databases

· MINEFACTS CDROM Interactive database program. V1.2 contains over 675 landmines from all over the world. Developed and published by the US Department of Defense.

· ORDATA II Enhanced International deminer’s guide to UXO identification, recovery and disposal. Canadian Department of Defence – includes strong catalogue of UXO. The data in the recovery and disposal sections are password protected to allow distribution to mine awareness programmes.

· EODIS, SWEDEN This system includes IT security and safety routines; an Ammunition database; an Identification tool including 3D image presentation. It is available in various languages and is suitable for mission planning. In support of operational management it includes positioning (GPS + laser range finder) and localisation methods; render safe procedures; warning systems and mission reporting sections.

· Base de Données, MINEX;. École Supérieure et d’Application du Génie, 106, rue Eblé, Angers, France. Restricted issue french military training database of mines.

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· Janes Defence Equipment Library – Section on Mines A commercial database, comprehensive, but the cost per copy makes it uncompetitive compared with the databases sourced from the national agencies above, Computer simulations

· Essex Corporation, 9150 Guilford Road, Columbia, Maryland 21046-189, USA. Telephone: 301-939-7000, e-mail: [email protected] Essex Corporation produced a computer based training system as part of a US led initiative with DARPA.

· JRC – but only to a limited extent (examples of 3D computer models)

· Thales (F) – developed some computer models of mines for training applications. Photograph or sketch based training aids are listed by Global Information Networks in Information (at the following web address http://ginie1.sched.pitt.edu/ginie-crises-links/lm/ ) for Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador, Laos, Mozambique, Somalia, Yemen, Zaire. Simulants

The following sources of Mine simulants were identified:

· VSE Corporation, 2550 Huntington Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22303-1499, USA. E-mail: [email protected], telephone +1 (0) 703 329 3239, fax +1 (0) 703 960 3748. Manufacturers of ITOP SIMs – see Annex 6.

· Colin King Associates Ltd. Wych Warren, Forest Row, E Sussex, RH18 5LP, United Kingdom, e-mail to: [email protected] , telephone + 44-1342 826 363, fax: + 44-1342 826 363 Development and manufacture of mine simulants.

· Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Electronics Surveillance Laboratory, Surveillance Systems Division, PO Box 1600 Salisbury, SA 5108, Australia. DSTO developed simulants for internal use. There are restrictions on the availability and use of the design data. Surrogates

· Colin King Associates Ltd. As noted above for mine simulants – however simulants produced have not yet been validated as exact surrogates.

· CroMAC has the capability to produce surrogates based on modification of real mines. There are safety considerations to the approach used which must be carefully evaluated. Due to the nature of these surrogates they are appropriate only for use in controlled test areas within Croatia.

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References

1 MIMEVA – contract technical annex. EC DG III reference AA 501852 2 Title: Measurement plan for MIMEVA, Report No: SAI-AA501852/MEAS_PLAN; SAI, TDP. July 1999 3 MIMEVA D1.1 Initial list of mines for which validation tests will need to be conducted with advanced APL Detection Equipment. JRC delivery to DG INFSO for contract AA 501852 MIMEVA 4 MIMEVA D1.2 – Final list of mines for which validation tests will need to be conducted with advanced APL Detection Equipment. JRC delivery to DG INFSO for contract AA 501852 MIMEVA 5 On the Internet site of Norwegian Peoples Aid (landmine database) http://www.angola.npaid.org/mines_database.htm 6 Banks E., Brassey’s Essential Guide to Anti-personnel mines, recognising and disarming, Brassey’s London and Washington 1997. 7 King C. (Ed), Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance, Jane’s Information Group Limited, London, Third Edition 1998-1999. 8 Carter L. J., Kokonozi A., Hosgood B., Coutsomitros C., Sieber A. J., Landmine detection using stimulated infrared imaging. IGARRS July 2001 (IEEE, 0-7803-7033-3/01 9 Joint Multi-sensor Mine –signature measurements project. Described at http://demining.jrc.it/msms/protocol/protocol.htm (Annex E describes the test mine replicas). 10 U.S. Army Project Manager for Mines, Countermine and Demolitions (PM-MCD), Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Four Nation (FR/GE/UK/US) Test and Evaluation (T&E) Working Group for development of International Test Operation Procedures (ITOP) for Countermine and Humanitarian Demining 11 MINESIGN: data accessible at: http://apl-database.jrc.it 12 Goodfellow Cambridge Ltd. On line catalogue; http://www.goodfellow.com 13 Matweb, The On-line Materials Information Resource; http://www.matweb.com 14 Impedance changes in a coil due to a nearby conducting sphere, G R Hugo and S K Burke; J. Phys. D Appl. Phys. 21 (1988) pp. 33-38 15 Phase angle based EMI discrimination and analysis of data from a commercial differential two frequency system, C Bruschini and H Sahli; SPIE Aerosense 2000, 24-28 April 2000 Orlando, Florida, Detection and remediation technologies for mines and mine-like targets, Proc. SPIE 4038 paper number [4038-156]

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Mine data has been compiled using data from the following sources: Countries Information sources Bosnia and Herzegovina Colin King Associates, Croatia CROMAC Kosovo Angola Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid Mozambique Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid Somalia/ Uganda (South Norwegian Peoples Aid Sahara reference) Afghanistan Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid Cambodia Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid Iraq Norwegian Peoples Aid Laos Norwegian Peoples Aid

Data for annex 2 was compiled from the following sources of information: A2.1: On the Internet site of Norwegian Peoples Aid (landmine database) http://www.angola.npaid.org/mines_database.htm A2.2: Banks E., Brassey’s Essential Guide to Anti-personnel mines, recognising and disarming, Brassey’s London and Washington 1997. A2.3: King C. (Ed), Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance, Jane’s Information Group Limited, London, Third Edition 1998-1999.

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