HAMAS’ TERRORISM STRATEGY: OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS By Ely Karmon* From 1996 to 1999, Hamas used suicide bombings and then relative restraint in order to derail the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In recent years, although Hamas has desired to perpetrate more terrorist attacks, its capabilities have been limited by stepped up security operations and coordination by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. What will Hamas leaders do next? The September 1999 incident in is contrary to the interests of Palestinians which Hamas recruited Israeli Arabs to and with its long-term objectives of building bomb two buses in the central Israel towns an Islamic state in the whole of Palestine. Its of Haifa and Tiberias suggests that the low profile terrorist activity in the 1996- organization has taken a strategic decision to 1999 period was sometimes interpreted as a derail the on-going negotiations between strategy intended to facilitate the Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). continuation of Netanyahu’s rule and, The prospect of progress in the implicitly, the continuation of the crisis in political process, together with the likely relations between the Palestinian Authority establishment of a Palestinian state in only and Israel. part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, is unacceptable to the Hamas leadership. The OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES FOR election of a new Israeli government in May HAMAS’ TERRORIST ACTIVITY 1999 did not dampen the movement’s support for continuing the armed struggle In reality, the sharp decline in against Israel. Hamas has expressed fierce terrorist attacks, particularly the bloody opposition to the PA’s policies, hoping that suicide bombings, was due to the combined “jihad” operations will sabotage the peace preventive counter-terrorist policy of the PA process. and Israel. (1) Hamas has drawn intense scrutiny by The PIJ, the smallest radical Islamist researchers, politicians, and the Israeli organization, was greatly weakened after public at large since February/March 1996, Israel allegedly killed its leader, Fathi when deadly suicide bombs planted by Shkaki, in Malta in October 1995. Hamas, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad meanwhile, continued attempts to perpetrate (PIJ) allegedly handed victory to Benjamin suicide attacks during Netanyahu’s term. Netanyahu’s conservative Likud party in (2)In October 1998, Israeli researcher Israel’s June 1996 elections. Reuven Paz pointed out a change in Hamas seemed satisfied with the Hamas’s terrorist tactics, as conveyed in election results and the ensuing slowdown of several articles published by prominent peace negotiations, in keeping with its figures in Hamas. One article was published conviction that any compromise with Israel in the October 1998 issue of Hamas’ Middle Eat Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) 66 Hamas’ Terrorism Strategy: Operational Limitations And Political Constraints monthly Filastin al-Muslimah under the very Hamas’ failure to follow through on threats unambiguous title: “A new method of of revenge following the assassination military resistance in Palestine.” The article attempt on the life of Hamas’ political chief hints at a “green light” to various Hamas Kahlem Mash’al in Jordan and the killing of groups in the West Bank, mainly in the the Awdallah brothers in the West Bank. Hebron area, to initiate independent Ghosheh admitted: “For two years now, operations. According to Paz, one reason for almost since I took over in June 1996, the this change may be the difficulties Hamas [Israeli] security organs have not stopped activists in the West Bank face due to tracking down al-Qassam operations and increased surveillance by Palestinian foiling operations almost daily.” As for security forces and Israeli pressure, Palestinian security services, Ghosheh said, concomitant with the discovery of some of “they, too, have not stopped hunting down its “laboratories”. Among the setbacks our mujahidin….The fact is, Palestinian suffered by the movement were the March security organs know every detail. They are 1998 killing of bombmaker Muhi al-Din al- the ones which laid their hands on the Sharif; the subsequent arrests of Hamas explosives factory for the mujahidin in political and military leaders; and the Nabulus and before that the ones in Bayt September 1998 killing of the Awadallah Sahur and Hebron. It was the PA security brothers who were wanted by Israeli and PA organs which seized the materials which the security forces. The article gives the mujahidin use in their struggle.” impression Hamas is concerned with Nevertheless, Ghosheh promised that Hamas covering its trail due to the double impact of “will resist through awareness, popular Israeli and PA pressure. move, and the forces that can go ahead with In April 1999, Filastin al-Muslimah their jihad, as jihad operations will be the published an annual report of the 1998 best reply to this conspiracy. We know that terrorist operations of the `Iz al-Din al- many jihad operations have produced Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, significant political results…Our Palestinian which, as Reuven Paz stresses, revealed the people are very close to Hamas’ program. difficulties Hamas combatants faced due to Resistance should take place every day at the Israel-PA security coordination least with stabs or shooting from machine supervised by the American Central guns, and this is what the Zionist planners Intelligence Agecy (CIA). According to the have failed to curb.” report, 1998 operations were characterized In the June 1 issue of Filastin al- by the use of time bombs, commando Muslimah, the ex-secretary general of attacks with hand grenades, and armed Hamas’ political bureau, Musa Abu-Marzuq, ambushes with light weapons. In contrast to explained the reason for Hamas’ absence previous years, there was only one suicide from the military field during Netanyahu’s attack. This was due to an effort to preserve tenure. “[The] absence was not a decision the variety of methods of operations and to but an expression of the realities of the conserve the lives of the fighters for other balance of forces on the ground. Struggle types of missions. The report admits a and jihad are in an ebb and tide. Those who general decline in Hamas’s terrorist activity have rights will not allow their rights to be in 1998, resulting in a corresponding decline blown with the wind. They strongly believe in Israeli human casualties. that jihad is the way to regain our rights and In an October 24, 1998 interview to protect our honor.” the Jordanian newspaper Al-Urdun Hamas The same day, Khaled Mash’al told spokesman Ibrahim Ghosheh addressed the Lebanese al-Diyar: 67 Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) Ely Karmon There is no change in Hamas’ view strugglers there. Any objective observer can that resistance must continue. see the security cooperation that is taking Resistance in Palestine, however, is being place among the Israeli occupation subjected to immense pressure and authorities, the Palestinian Authority and the challenges. The situation in Palestine is the CIA with a view to encircling and aborting exact opposite of that in Lebanon, which the Jihad action while it is still in the phase possesses an abundance of positive factors. of formation. They are arresting and Naturally, this pleases us and we hail this liquidating our strugglers...We, in the embracing of the resistance by the people Islamic Jihad Movement, are facing and the government, the political cover enormous challenges and obstacles. Even provided by Syria, and the Islamic support our military action is the target of distortion, extended by Iran. As for Palestine, the fabrications and a dirty psychological resistance is subjected to a trilateral security warfare being waged by the proponents of siege…the Zionists, the Palestinian the Oslo accords. Nevertheless, the will for Authority, and the United States, Jihad and martyrdom still exists in our represented by CIA intervention… people.(4) Hamas’ “internal” (or, local) In an interview to Al-Majallah, leadership gave more or less the same Isma’il Abu-Shanab, a leading figure of explanations for the organization’s Hamas in Gaza, declared that the paralysis operational weakness. Mahmud Al-Zahhar of Hamas’s military wing should be viewed from Gaza told the London-based Al- in light of objective circumstances and Majallah: reasons: The modus operandi of resistance in The first is the change in the Hamas depends upon military Palestinian reality brought about by targets, soldiers and settlers. But the presence of a Palestinian major restrictions, especially after authority, and hence the absence of the signing of the Wye River the factor of direct friction with the agreement, prevented the occupation… [and] the continuing implementation of a large number of pursuits, not only by the Israeli side operations. The Palestinian jails are but also by the PA. This has limited full of the sons of Hamas who were the resistance activities. The political arrested as they were trying to carry changes have another dimension that out operations or as a result of affects the resistance’s ability and confessions. Some of these efficiency at the present stage. But operations were aborted the last this does not mean at all that … that minute… Hence, the operations the military wing has become continue but the attempts to abort paralyzed. There is ebb and flow in them also continue. It is a real war in the action and this happens in all which we win one and lose one.(3) revolutions and military operations Ramadan Abdallah Shalah, the PIJ in the world.(5) secretary-general, addressed the same issue SEPTEMBER 1999: A REVIVAL OF in an interview with the Dubai-based Al- HAMAS’ BOMBING STRATEGY? Bayan: Carrying out military operations It is now clear that Hamas organized inside Palestine depends on the the double car-bomb attacks in Tiberias and circumstances and resources of the Haifa on September 5, 1999.