HAMAS’ TERRORISM STRATEGY: OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS

By Ely Karmon*

From 1996 to 1999, used suicide bombings and then relative restraint in order to derail the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In recent years, although Hamas has desired to perpetrate more terrorist attacks, its capabilities have been limited by stepped up security operations and coordination by and the Palestinian Authority. What will Hamas leaders do next?

The September 1999 incident in is contrary to the interests of Palestinians which Hamas recruited Israeli to and with its long-term objectives of building bomb two buses in the central Israel towns an Islamic state in the whole of . Its of Haifa and Tiberias suggests that the low profile terrorist activity in the 1996- organization has taken a strategic decision to 1999 period was sometimes interpreted as a derail the on-going negotiations between strategy intended to facilitate the Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). continuation of Netanyahu’s rule and, The prospect of progress in the implicitly, the continuation of the crisis in political process, together with the likely relations between the Palestinian Authority establishment of a Palestinian state in only and Israel. part of the and Gaza Strip, is unacceptable to the Hamas leadership. The OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES FOR election of a new Israeli government in May HAMAS’ TERRORIST ACTIVITY 1999 did not dampen the movement’s support for continuing the armed struggle In reality, the sharp decline in against Israel. Hamas has expressed fierce terrorist attacks, particularly the bloody opposition to the PA’s policies, hoping that suicide bombings, was due to the combined “jihad” operations will sabotage the peace preventive counter-terrorist policy of the PA process. and Israel. (1) Hamas has drawn intense scrutiny by The PIJ, the smallest radical Islamist researchers, politicians, and the Israeli organization, was greatly weakened after public at large since February/March 1996, Israel allegedly killed its leader, Fathi when deadly suicide bombs planted by Shkaki, in Malta in October 1995. Hamas, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad meanwhile, continued attempts to perpetrate (PIJ) allegedly handed victory to Benjamin suicide attacks during Netanyahu’s term. Netanyahu’s conservative Likud party in (2)In October 1998, Israeli researcher Israel’s June 1996 elections. Reuven Paz pointed out a change in Hamas seemed satisfied with the Hamas’s terrorist tactics, as conveyed in election results and the ensuing slowdown of several articles published by prominent peace negotiations, in keeping with its figures in Hamas. One article was published conviction that any compromise with Israel in the October 1998 issue of Hamas’ Middle Eat Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) 66 Hamas’ Terrorism Strategy: Operational Limitations And Political Constraints monthly Filastin al-Muslimah under the very Hamas’ failure to follow through on threats unambiguous title: “A new method of of revenge following the assassination military resistance in Palestine.” The article attempt on the life of Hamas’ political chief hints at a “green light” to various Hamas Kahlem Mash’al in Jordan and the killing of groups in the West Bank, mainly in the the Awdallah brothers in the West Bank. Hebron area, to initiate independent Ghosheh admitted: “For two years now, operations. According to Paz, one reason for almost since I took over in June 1996, the this change may be the difficulties Hamas [Israeli] security organs have not stopped activists in the West Bank face due to tracking down al-Qassam operations and increased surveillance by Palestinian foiling operations almost daily.” As for security forces and Israeli pressure, Palestinian security services, Ghosheh said, concomitant with the discovery of some of “they, too, have not stopped hunting down its “laboratories”. Among the setbacks our mujahidin….The fact is, Palestinian suffered by the movement were the March security organs know every detail. They are 1998 killing of bombmaker Muhi al-Din al- the ones which laid their hands on the Sharif; the subsequent arrests of Hamas explosives factory for the mujahidin in political and military leaders; and the Nabulus and before that the ones in Bayt September 1998 killing of the Awadallah Sahur and Hebron. It was the PA security brothers who were wanted by Israeli and PA organs which seized the materials which the security forces. The article gives the mujahidin use in their struggle.” impression Hamas is concerned with Nevertheless, Ghosheh promised that Hamas covering its trail due to the double impact of “will resist through awareness, popular Israeli and PA pressure. move, and the forces that can go ahead with In April 1999, Filastin al-Muslimah their jihad, as jihad operations will be the published an annual report of the 1998 best reply to this conspiracy. We know that terrorist operations of the `Iz al-Din al- many jihad operations have produced Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, significant political results…Our Palestinian which, as Reuven Paz stresses, revealed the people are very close to Hamas’ program. difficulties Hamas combatants faced due to Resistance should take place every day at the Israel-PA security coordination least with stabs or shooting from machine supervised by the American Central guns, and this is what the Zionist planners Intelligence Agecy (CIA). According to the have failed to curb.” report, 1998 operations were characterized In the June 1 issue of Filastin al- by the use of time bombs, commando Muslimah, the ex-secretary general of attacks with hand grenades, and armed Hamas’ political bureau, Musa Abu-Marzuq, ambushes with light weapons. In contrast to explained the reason for Hamas’ absence previous years, there was only one suicide from the military field during Netanyahu’s attack. This was due to an effort to preserve tenure. “[The] absence was not a decision the variety of methods of operations and to but an expression of the realities of the conserve the lives of the fighters for other balance of forces on the ground. Struggle types of missions. The report admits a and jihad are in an ebb and tide. Those who general decline in Hamas’s terrorist activity have rights will not allow their rights to be in 1998, resulting in a corresponding decline blown with the wind. They strongly believe in Israeli human casualties. that jihad is the way to regain our rights and In an October 24, 1998 interview to protect our honor.” the Jordanian newspaper Al-Urdun Hamas The same day, Khaled Mash’al told spokesman Ibrahim Ghosheh addressed the Lebanese al-Diyar:

67 Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) Ely Karmon

There is no change in Hamas’ view strugglers there. Any objective observer can that resistance must continue. see the security cooperation that is taking Resistance in Palestine, however, is being place among the Israeli occupation subjected to immense pressure and authorities, the Palestinian Authority and the challenges. The situation in Palestine is the CIA with a view to encircling and aborting exact opposite of that in Lebanon, which the Jihad action while it is still in the phase possesses an abundance of positive factors. of formation. They are arresting and Naturally, this pleases us and we hail this liquidating our strugglers...We, in the embracing of the resistance by the people Islamic Jihad Movement, are facing and the government, the political cover enormous challenges and obstacles. Even provided by , and the Islamic support our military action is the target of distortion, extended by Iran. As for Palestine, the fabrications and a dirty psychological resistance is subjected to a trilateral security warfare being waged by the proponents of siege…the Zionists, the Palestinian the . Nevertheless, the will for Authority, and the United States, Jihad and martyrdom still exists in our represented by CIA intervention… people.(4) Hamas’ “internal” (or, local) In an interview to Al-Majallah, leadership gave more or less the same Isma’il Abu-Shanab, a leading figure of explanations for the organization’s Hamas in Gaza, declared that the paralysis operational weakness. Mahmud Al-Zahhar of Hamas’s military wing should be viewed from Gaza told the London-based Al- in light of objective circumstances and Majallah: reasons: The modus operandi of resistance in The first is the change in the Hamas depends upon military Palestinian reality brought about by targets, soldiers and settlers. But the presence of a Palestinian major restrictions, especially after authority, and hence the absence of the signing of the Wye River the factor of direct friction with the agreement, prevented the occupation… [and] the continuing implementation of a large number of pursuits, not only by the Israeli side operations. The Palestinian jails are but also by the PA. This has limited full of the sons of Hamas who were the resistance activities. The political arrested as they were trying to carry changes have another dimension that out operations or as a result of affects the resistance’s ability and confessions. Some of these efficiency at the present stage. But operations were aborted the last this does not mean at all that … that minute… Hence, the operations the military wing has become continue but the attempts to abort paralyzed. There is ebb and flow in them also continue. It is a real war in the action and this happens in all which we win one and lose one.(3) revolutions and military operations Ramadan Abdallah Shalah, the PIJ in the world.(5) secretary-general, addressed the same issue SEPTEMBER 1999: A REVIVAL OF in an interview with the Dubai-based Al- HAMAS’ BOMBING STRATEGY? Bayan: Carrying out military operations It is now clear that Hamas organized inside Palestine depends on the the double car-bomb attacks in Tiberias and circumstances and resources of the Haifa on September 5, 1999. The arrested

Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) 68 Hamas’ Terrorism Strategy: Operational Limitations And Political Constraints

Israeli Arabs involved in the failed attacks from a political faction’s monopoly into a were militants of the Islamic Movement in popular practice, which makes it all the Israel--a legal organization--and had more difficult for Israel and, for that matter, connections to Hamas activists in Gaza, the its subservient puppet entity, ’s West Bank, and Jordan. PA, to control future attacks against Zionist Three terrorists died in the targets.” (6) explosions, while a fourth, who had been in The ‘Iz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades the car in Haifa shortly before it exploded, also took credit for an early August shooting was later arrested by security forces. One of that wounded two Jewish settlers in the Old the dead men was believed to have been City of Hebron. Three other incidents, involved in a Hamas suicide attack in the including one near the northern West Bank city of Afula, in 1994, when his ID card was town of Jenin in which an Israeli immigrant found on the body of the suicide terrorist. from the former Soviet Union was killed, are The arrested activist told police that also believed to have been carried out by he and his partner, as well as the team in Hamas. A fourth attack was probably Tiberias, intended to load the bombs onto aborted when an explosive device went off inter-city buses. One terrorist would load the inside a warehouse in Hebron on August 15. bomb then disembark from the bus before PA police said two Islamist brothers who the explosion and make his getaway in a served five-year sentences in an Israeli jail care driven by his partner. for belonging to Hamas, were preparing a According to a September 1999 plastic toy-car bomb attack for detonation at report in the monthly Palestinian Times, an Israeli settlement site in downtown considered a Hamas mouthpiece, the Islamic Hebron. movement has apparently decided to resume Hamas can also content itself armed attacks on Israeli targets, particularly knowing that some terrorist attacks soldiers and settlers “after a self-imposed considered “private initiatives” by moratorium lasting nearly ten months.” And, Palestinians-such as the murder of two indeed, there was a rash of shootings and young Israeli students on the night of ambushes in the West Bank and in Israel in August 30 near Megiddo, in Israel-stem the summer of 1999. The most serious attack from the organization’s intensive occurred on August 10, 1999 when Akram indoctrination and propaganda in support of Alkam, a 23-year-old Palestinian from a the “popular” jihad against the “oppressor.” Bethlehem refugee camp, rammed his car Although the Palestinian Times into a group of Israeli soldiers, injuring eight claimed in September that, so far, the attacks soldiers before he was shot dead. The driver were “relatively minor and generally un- didn’t have any “formal” affiliation with qualitative in nature,” the message they were Hamas but according to the newspaper, his intended to convey was sufficiently clear for behavior strongly hinted of the movement’s all parties concerned, particularly Israel and influence and Hamas eventually did take the PA. credit for the operation. The Palestinian Times stressed that the fact that Alkam--an HAMAS ATTEMPTS TO REBUILD ITS ordinary, un-indoctrinated Palestinian---was MILITARY AND POLITICAL willing to carry out “martyrdom operations” INFRASTRUCTURE with his own meager means should be viewed as a striking success for Hamas: According to the September “The movement, after all, can now boast of Palestinian Times, Hamas’ military wing has succeeding in transforming ‘martyrdom’ been undergoing an arduous process of

69 Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) Ely Karmon rebuilding and restructuring following the “Association of Religious Palestinian assassinations of several of its top leaders in Leaders in Lebanon” with the blessing of the last few years. Hamas leaders are Hizballah’s mentor, Shaykh Fadlallah, and convinced that the terrorist campaign will has intensified its dialogue with Hizballah serve Palestinian interests in the long run. leaders. Moreover, a Jordan-based Hamas official At the same time, the Hamas alleged that renewed attacks on Israel would leadership has refused to open a dialogue actually strengthen the Palestinian with the PA as part of a united Palestinian negotiating position. According to the front in preparation for final settlement Palestinian Times report, a senior Hamas negotiations, a front that already has the official in Ramallah stated that “the blessing, in principle, of George Habbash’s resumption of armed struggle against the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Zionist entity carries with it the message that (PFLP) and Nayef Hawatmeh’s Democratic there can be no real peace or stability in this Front for the Liberation of Palestine region as long as the Palestinians don’t (DFLP). receive their dues in full.” Hamas has instead proposed, More important, claims the paper, is according to the Jordan Times, (8) the the fact that Hamas has probably realized formation of a new umbrella organization, a that it no longer has much to lose by “national body,” to replace the Palestine renewing attacks on Israeli targets. After all, Liberation Organization (PLO), which it the PA continues to intern hundreds of describes as obsolete. Hamas is involved in Islamist activists without charge or trial, intensive deliberations with Palestinian apparently to appease Israel and the United opposition factions to form the new States. Hamas does not place all the blame organization before the end of this year. for these arrests solely on the PA. Rather, Hamas leaders have stepped up Israel remains the prime and ultimate culprit contacts and visits with their allies in in forcing the PA to act virtually at its beck Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, with the intention and call. This, Hamas reasons, makes armed of forming a united front against the PA and struggle against Israel inevitable, even if it is Israel. Khaled Masha’al met with Syrian dangerous. Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam and Another reason for Hamas’ enhanced Foreign Minister Farouk a-Shara, in the terrorist activity was offered on the wake of the arrests in Jordan, to discuss the movement’s website on September 5, 1999: peace process and the positions of Israel and the mounting pressure on the organization to the PA. The Hamas leaders received mainly kidnap Israeli soldiers as a bargaining chip verbal support from the Syrians. for its own imprisoned militants. One Islamist activist said that, “the Islamic JORDAN MOVES AGAINST HAMAS movement will have to do something to give our prisoners hope…Arafat doesn’t Following the Wye Plantation represent us, and he doesn’t give a damn if agreement of October 1998, Hamas leaders our brothers remained in Zionist jails for in Jordan made passionate statements calling thirty years to come…we have to do for the continuation of military operations something.” (7) against Israel. Ibrahim Ghosheh declared in Hamas is also attempting to extend the Amman-based Al-Urdun on October 15, its influence in Palestinian refugee camps in 1998, that the movement is eager to avoid Lebanon, where ’s influence is weak. “the mutilation of the national fabric ... in In this framework, it has formed the the interest of the Palestinian people.” But,

Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) 70 Hamas’ Terrorism Strategy: Operational Limitations And Political Constraints he hinted, “this clear and strong Hamas Israel and the Palestinian Authority. This is position, which is appreciated by foes even true as well of the mid-September arrests before friends, cannot be guarantee forever”- Masha’al and Ghosheh on their return from a veiled threat against the PA if it goes a visit to Tehran, and the expulsion of Musa ahead with the agreement’s implementation. Abu-Marzuq from Jordan. The Hamas “The PA must not continue its present leaders were charged with “belonging to an policy and think that Hamas and its illegal organization,” storing weapons, and leadership will not respond to agents, who conducting military training exercises in the cooperate with Jews and hand them Kingdom--charges which Hamas has denied. mujahidin, weapons, and ammunitions.” Despite the seemingly resolute In an interview to the French Jordanian position concerning punishing Liberation on July 6, 1999, Shaykh Ahmed Hamas leaders and neutralizing their Yassin declared that there is no alternative activity, intensive negotiations for their to military action and promised that Hamas’ release with the active mediation of the military wing would flex its muscles in the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Jordan. near future. In another interview to Al-Sharq Hamas leaders made an effort to al-Awsat on August 19, Yassin stressed that discuss and redefine their relationship with his movement’s position on military action the Jordanian government. In a plea to King against Israel was firm and has not changed, Abdallah II on September 22, Musa Abu- due to of the continuing Israeli occupation Marzuq stated that Hamas had no intention of Palestine. Regarding claims by some of carrying out any military operations Palestinian security sources about recent against Jordan even if the Hamas leaders military moves by Hamas, Yassin stressed were not released. “Hamas will never target that “the sons of the ‘Izz-al-Din al-Qassam anyone from the Ummah and will never Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, are the change its policy especially in dear Jordan… ones who decide when, how, and where to The Movement’s pendulum will remain operate according to the conditions they face directed against the Zionist enemy,” he and their resources.” wrote. (10) The Hamas leaders in Jordan also But at the same time, Shaykh reaffirmed such militant statements to the Hussein Yousef Sulayman, a prominent Arab and international media. At a meeting Islamist official in the Bethlehem area, in August with Syrian officials, Khaled warned: “The Jordanian authorities think Masha’al said that Hamas would continue its that Hamas will cower and lower its head as “jihad, struggle and uprising against the a result of [the recent crackdown, but] the occupation.” Musa Abu-Marzuq said in opposite is true in reality. These measures Filastin Al-Muslimah that Hamas’ role “lies could embolden Hamas and force it to cross in clinging to Palestinian rights, in fighting certain red lines.” Sulayman didn’t say what the enemy, in activating jihad against the these red lines were, but hinted that “Hamas enemy in all spheres, and in mobilizing the would not cave in to pressure under any Palestinian people, the Arab nation, and the circumstances” (11) According to an Muslim nation along this course.” (9) Agence France Press of September 1, 1999, The arrest of Hamas militants in Hamas’ armed wing even warned that it Amman at the end of August 1999 and the would hit Jewish targets “in the region and closure of the organization’s journal and around the world” following the closure of offices in the Jordanian capital was intended its offices in Amman. to prevent radical Islamic elements from Jordan came under mounting sabotaging the political process between pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood and

71 Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) Ely Karmon opposition groups to free the Hamas leaders, ranging from the presence of Hamas offices amid mass demonstrations in the Palestinian in Amman--particularly its political bureau-- refugee camps and a hunger strike by the to other minor and formal details. At issue jailed Hamas leaders. By the end of October too is the future of Hamas leaders who bear 1999, it seemed that a formula for ending Jordanian nationality. the crisis had been reached. The official A Hamas source told Al-Sharq al- Jordanian news agency, Petra, quoted King Awsat on November 4: “Hamas is preparing Abdallah on October 23 as saying that he itself to deal with any possibilities and was confident Jordan would be able to unexpected results from the mediation being resolve outstanding differences with Hamas conducted by the Muslim Brotherhood “in the context of rule of law, and [with] the Jordanian Government…Within maintaining Jordan’s sovereignty and the framework of the search for an security.” This formula could include the alternative, the movement has now reached release of the jailed leaders, who would be the conclusion that it should not put all its permitted to remain in Jordan as “Jordanian eggs in one basket; that is, members of its citizens,” without any link to Hamas, Political Bureau should not live in one according to Jordanian governmental particular country.” Hamas could shift its sources, or under a symbolic presence of leadership to Damascus, Sanaa, Tehran, Hamas in the kingdom, according to Hamas Khartoum, and other capitals in which the sources. It seems that implementation of this movement has a presence. agreement has been postponed because of differences between the more extremist HAMAS STRATEGY DURING FINAL leaders jailed in Jordan and the more STATUS NEGOTIATIONS moderate Musa Abu-Marzuq. For the time being, Jordanian According to political analyst Khalil authorities continue their pressure on Shikaki, director of the Center for Palestine Hamas. On November 9, they arrested Izzat Research and Studies in Nablus, the internal al Risheq, a member of the Hamas politburo, Hamas leadership will be strengthened, at for belonging to an illegal organization, the expense of Hamas’ ability to become a along with two journalists, who were regional power. According to Shikaki, as charged with “hiding a fugitive.” The Hamas’ military leadership is mainly based Jordanian government continues to demand in Syria and Iran, the group’s ability to carry that Muhammad Nazal, a member of the out attacks might not change in the Hamas political office and its representative immediate future. Hamas militants have in Jordan, be handed over, in accordance been weakened by the killings of their most with arrest warrants issued against him when accomplished bomb makers and by Yasser the crisis broke out. Arafat’s clamp-down, according to Reuters A Hamas source, cited on November analyst Wafa Amr. He notes that Hamas’s 12 by the organization’s website, stated that priorities may now shift to consolidating a “this sudden escalation of the crisis social and political network in the …threatens the current good offices that Palestinian-ruled West Bank and Gaza even seek to find a political solution to the while continuing attacks on Israel. (12) crisis…and puts to an end the hopes created Ismail Abu Shanab, a senior Gaza- by these good offices.” based Hamas official, told Reuters that The Jordanian Al-Dustur observed Hamas was debating how to structure its on October 30 that all issues between Hamas leadership and whether it should be based in and the government remain in dispute, Palestinian areas or in exile. He hinted that

Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) 72 Hamas’ Terrorism Strategy: Operational Limitations And Political Constraints basing the main activity abroad, like the because they don’t require a political PLO did in the past, is not the best choice. decision.” Concerning terrorist activity, Abu Shanab said that as long as Israel respects PRESSURE ON HAMAS BEARS FRUIT Palestinian civilians, Hamas will confine its attacks to Israeli military personnel. He also Notwithstanding the very militant told al-Majallah on October 3 that the peace statements of the last year issued both by the process does not satisfy the Palestinian external leadership and Shaykh Yassin and people’s ambitions and that Hamas wants other internal leaders, Hamas has been “to be the vanguard that carries the banner forced to downplay its involvement in the of the Palestinian right until the Palestinian September 1999 bombings in Israel despite people retrieve their legitimate national the manifest attempts to perpetrate attacks rights. Therefore the resistance will continue even on a small scale and instill life into the under all conditions, even if there is a final declining activity of its military wing. solution.” In an interview to the Palestinian Al- The same issue of al-Majallah Ayyam on October 7, Shaykh Hasan Yusuf, carried an interview with Maj. Gen. Nasr a leading Hamas figure in the West Bank, Yusuf, Director General of the Palestinian denied the involvement of Hamas or any of Security Department and Member of the its leaders in recruiting or training the Fatah Movement’s Central Committee, in perpetrators of Tiberias and Haifa attacks. which he stated that the Hamas organization, Shaykh Yassin also denied rumors that including its military wing, will likely turn Hamas was recruiting Israeli Arabs due to into a political party after statehood. Yusuf the latter's "special situation." (13) Yassin estimated that there will be many local, went so far as to propose an open-ended regional, and international arrangements that moratorium on attacking Israeli and will hinder the military wing’s activities Palestinian civilians by both sides. “The and, hence, make it very difficult for Hamas Ezzul Deen al-Qassam [sic] fighters are to continue its terrorist actions. Yet, he said, aware that Islam is against targeting Hamas’s military wing is still capable of civilians who are non-combatants.” He influencing the peace process, “regardless of suggested that attacks by Hamas’s military the blows dealt to it either by the Israeli or wing on Israeli civilians were mostly a the Palestinian security measures. [The] reaction to Israeli attacks on Palestinian movement is capable of building itself civilians, including the murder of 29 despite the conditions around it and the worshipers by an Israeli settler in February difficulties it is now facing.” of 1994. (14) According to analysts cited by Amr, Yassin’s proposals were reinforced Shaykh Ahmed Yassin’s release from an by an ‘Iz al-Din al-Qassam statement, cited Israeli prison in October 1997 strengthened on October 12 by AFP, that it was ready to the Palestinian-based leadership. But the stop attacks on Israeli civilians if several exiled leaders maintained an upper hand conditions were met. “We are ready to because they held the key to Hamas’ exclude Jewish civilians from our operations finances and helped to mobilize regional provided that Israel stops its settlement backing for the group. Khalil Shikaki activities, and land confiscation, and that the maintains that the big attacks have to be Israeli army as well as the settlers stop personally approved by Shaykh Yassin and attacking Palestinian civilians.” The Hamas all the other leaders. “But this does not mean reaction was even more ambiguous after that smaller attacks would not be carried out three pipe bombs exploded simultaneously

73 Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) Ely Karmon in Netanya on November 7, 1999, injuring fingerprints. Nevertheless, DNA testing 27 people, two of them seriously. The three enabled the bodies to be identified, which bombs, plus a fourth later found by police, afterward led to the uncovering of the appeared very similar to pipe bombs found terrorist ring involved. near the Netanya police station last August. The two attacks perpetrated by The day before, ‘Iz al-Din al-Qassam Israeli Arabs in Tiberias and Haifa in warned in a statement that it was preparing September, both of which were organized by to escalate its armed attacks against Israel Hamas, were not planned as suicide despite its October pledge not to target missions. Three of the four terrorists civilians. “The Zionist regime, in the coming involved were killed when the bombs they weeks and months, should prepare itself for were transporting to the central bus station a wave of armed attacks, which will take exploded prematurely. The pipe bombs in different forms,” reported the AFP. Netanya were also not suicide missions, “Because of its stupidity and arrogance, the though the method employed demonstrated Zionist government has missed a historic the low technical level of the perpetrators. opportunity to keep Israeli civilians from being part of our operations and spare CONCLUSION innocents on both sides the horrors of bloodshed,” it said. On October 25 in The behavior of Hamas’s military Bethlehem an Israeli soldier had killed a wing and the numerous declarations of its Palestinian who tried to stab him, although political leaders during the last year show Palestinian police and eyewitnesses denied that the organization is earnestly interested there had been any such attempt. in perpetrating major terrorist attacks. The Hamas' website repeated earlier goal of such attacks would be to interrupt statements by Shyakh Yassin that Hamas the peace process and to show that Hamas wouldn’t target civilians and didn’t seek to stands in the vanguard of the struggle for the harm relations with the Palestinian liberation of all of Palestine. Nevertheless, Authority. Ismai’il Abu Shanab said he was the blows to its military apparatus-especially sure Hamas had nothing to do with the at the senior and medium level-during the incident and suggested that other groups last two years delivered by Israeli and PA might be responsible for the attack. security forces have seriously hampered According to the assessment of the these efforts, bringing about not only a Israeli defense establishment, as reported by reduction in the number of attacks but also a the Israeli Haaretz on November 12, 1999, sharp decline in the operational capabilities Hamas has ceased carrying out suicide of its militants. bombings in Israel for tactical reasons. “The These limitations in operational organization now appears to prefer planting effectiveness have been manifest in the bombs, having reached the conclusion that (possibly temporary) abandonment of the use of suicide bombers enables Israel to suicide attacks, the use of unprepared and find those behind the attacks by means of poorly trained Israeli Arabs, and the call to DNA tests performed on the bodies of the “the Palestinian masses” to return to the use suicides.” According to the report, Hamas of the knife and the stone, as in the old days tried to hide the identity of the terrorists who of the intifadah. The fact that Hamas has attacked in Jerusalem in 1997. The labels taken responsibility post factum for small were removed from their clothing and the terrorist attacks or attempts perpetrated by terrorists scraped the skin off their fingertips locally organized groups or individuals also to prevent identification by means of illustrates the difficulties it encounters in

Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) 74 Hamas’ Terrorism Strategy: Operational Limitations And Political Constraints recruiting and training expert terrorists. of its situation by carrying out a terror Moreover, the Jordanian move against the attack. (15) external leadership has certainly seriously Against this background, Hamas will disrupted Hamas’s logistical, financial, and probably lower the profile of its terrorist operational infrastructure, and neutralized, at activity, reorganize its weakened military least for the time being, the more extremist apparatus, recruit and train new militants elements in the leadership. and wait for the right moment to try and The new situation strengthens the strike again at the difficult and complex position of the internal leadership vis-a-vis process of negotiations between Israel and the external leadership, with which the Palestinians. Another option would be to seemingly it has disputed lately on the transfer part of its military infrastructure and strategy and the timing of the terrorist activity to southern Lebanon and attack attacks. While leaders in the West Bank and Israel from there. The Palestinian Islamic Gaza have had to take this new situation into Jihad has already adopted this solution and account in planning their activities, they are its guerrillas recently joined Hizballah in also more vulnerable to the counter- fighting against Israeli and South Lebanon measures of the Palestinian Authority. This Army troops. Ramadan Shallah, head of the does not mean that Hamas cannot reorganize PIJ, told Al Hayat on November 14, that his operationally and again become a critical militants were undertaking “a new strategy” threat to the peace process. to fight Israel from southern Lebanon, to According to the evaluation of the wage jihad “from any open front with the Israeli military intelligence organs, the PA is enemy.” attempting to prevent “strategic” terrorist Although Hamas has indeed stepped- attacks--those that result in heavy human up its presence in Lebanon and enjoys good casualties. However it does little to halt the relations with Hizballah, the use of Lebanon more diffuse violence, which leads to as the main battleground against Israel “tactical” attacks against Israeli settlers and would be a sign of extreme weakness, as it is soldiers in the Territories. The Palestinians for the PIJ. This solution would thus be will try to gain sovereign independence over taken in extremis, in the case that both the most of the territories through resistance and area under Palestinian control and Jordan struggle. General Amos Malka, Head of the become forbidden territory for any Hamas Israel's Intelligence Corps, recently told the terrorist activity. Knesset’s Committee for Security and It has been shown over the last three Foreign Relations that as the final settlement years that only an intense endeavor by all negotiations continue, Yasser Arafat may the parties involved in this long and arduous make use of “controlled crisis” to achieve process, plus close and sincere cooperation his goals in the event of an impasse. The between Israel, the PA, and Jordan, can Palestinian police do take action following defuse the radical Islamic organizations’ specific incidents, but he said there is no terrorist schemes. The question remains sign of a strategic decision to uproot the whether the PA leadership, and more terrorist infrastructure. In addition, the PA is specifically Chairman Arafat, will not condemning attacks. According to understand that terrorism is a two-edged General Malka, the Palestinians have not weapon. Its “controlled” manipulation or the renounced the use of violence and terrorism. giving of the “green light” to Hamas and As for Hamas, Malka said its military wing other forces to use violence and terror could is in a “deep crisis” and is aiming to get out eventually backfire and damage the

75 Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) Ely Karmon achievements and hopes of the Palestinian terrorist attack in under a week. On October people itself. 9, a Palestinian stabbed a woman soldier to death as she arrived at a bus stop near her ANNEX I home. HAMAS AND PIJ MAIN TERRORIST October 19, 1998: A Hamas member hurled ATTACKS: MARCH 1997-AUGUST 1998 two grenades into a crowd at the Central bus station in Be’er Sheva before running from March 21, 1997: A terrorist detonated a the scene. At least 59 people were wounded bomb on the terrace of the “Apropo” in the rush hour attack. Most of the injured restaurant in Tel-Aviv. Three young women were lightly or moderately wounded, though were killed and 48 people injured. The two were seriously hurt. Several bystanders terrorist, a member of Hamas’ “al-Tzurif” caught the attacker and turned him over to cell, was also killed. civil guard policemen. May 9 - 12, 1998: Two bombs were October 29, 1998: A Hamas suicide bomber detonated electronically near IDF patrols. targeted a school bus carrying children from July 30, 1997: Two bombs detonated in the the community of Kfar Darom to a regional Mahane Yehuda market in Jerusalem, killing school near the Gush Katif Junction. The 15 persons including two suicide bombers suicide bomber driving an explosives-laden and wounding 168 others. The ‘Iz-al-Din al- vehicle attempted to collide head-on with Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the bus. One soldier in the escorting the jeep Hamas, claimed responsibility for the attack. was killed, along with the suicide bomber. Aug 20, 1998: Rabbi Shlomo Raanan was Two passengers of the jeep were seriously stabbed to death by a Hamas terrorist in his injured. Six people sustained light-to- home in Tel Rumeiyda, Hebron. The moderate injuries, including three young attacker entered the house through a window people and three children. and escaped after throwing a molotov November 6, 1998: Two terrorists were cocktail that set fire to the house. killed and more than 20 people injured in a August 27, 1998: A small bomb placed in a terrorist attack in the Mahane Yehuda garbage dumpster near Allenby Street in market in Jerusalem. A car drove at speed Tel-Aviv injured fourteen people. One into the crowded market and exploded. In woman was seriously injured, and two the car, two suitcases were found containing moderately. The other ten suffered light a relatively small amount of explosives. The injuries. bomb was described by security sources as September 4, 1998: Three suicide bombers “amateurish.” The Palestinian Islamic Jihad detonated bombs in the Ben Yehuda (PIJ) has claimed responsibility for the shopping mall in Jerusalem, killing eight bombing in Jerusalem. persons, including the bombers, and August 8, 1999: The Hamas military wing, wounding nearly 200 others. The ‘Iz-al-Din the ‘Iz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades released a al-Qassam Brigades claimed responsibility statement taking responsibility for a for the attack. shooting attack on Jewish settlers in Hebron. October 13, 1998: One man was killed and The attack occurred when gunmen opened another critically wounded in a terrorist fire on two settlers as they drove through the attack as they swam in a spring in the Israeli-controlled city center. Jerusalem Hills. The two were ambushed by two men who opened fire on them at close ANNEX II range and then escaped in a car belonging to HAMAS INFRASTRUCTURE EXPOSED: one of the victims. This was the second JANUARY 1998-AUGUST 1999

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occurred in a garage, apparently used by January 14, 1998: Members of Hamas were Hamas as an explosives factory. arrested in the Nablus area (by the Israeli officials denied any involvement in Palestinian Authority), Ramallah (by Israel the death of Muhi a-din Sharif, while later and the PA) and Bait Lehem (by Israel). In Hamas accused the PA of his assassination. Nablus, Palestinian security officials April 6, 1998: PA security forces arrested discovered a bomb factory in an unoccupied the alleged killers of Hamas bomb-maker building, which the PA had raided after a tip Muhi a-Din Sharif. The PA claims that the from Israel, where they found 700 kilos of killing of Muhi a-din Sharif was the result of explosives. Dozens of plastic containers full a power struggle within the organization. In of an unidentified liquid, in addition to 10 response, Hamas accused the Palestinian plastic containers containing gas mask kits, Authority of “collaboration with the and bomb making chemicals such as Zionists” in the murder of Sharif, and the acetone, alcohol, and hydrogen peroxide. attempt to put the blame on members of Four Palestinians were arrested. Hamas. The interrogation of the suspects April 13, 1998: In an unprecedented move, arrested in the areas under Israeli control Palestinian security forces arrested a number revealed that they planned suicide bombings of key Hamas leaders, among them: Amad in Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem. In addition, Awadallah, who is suspected of having shot members of the Hamas intended to shoot at the bomb-maker Sharif; Ibrahim Maqadmeh, and kidnap Israelis as well as plant car considered Hamas’s senior leader in the bombs in Jewish settlements. The arrests territories; Hamas spokesman Abdul Aziz foiled plans to stage attack during the Rantisi, for violating a signed agreement Muslim holy month of Ramadan and with the PA not to carry out any media prevented serious terrorist activities in the campaigns following Sharif’s death; near future. Abdallah al Shami, a leader of the Islamic March 30, 1998: Palestinian police Jihad organization. uncovered seven large explosive factories in June 29, 1998: Israeli security forces Gaza, the largest discovered so far. A arrested five Hamas members in connection Palestinian security official denied initial with two attacks on Israeli patrols in the reports that the factories were connected to Jenin and Nablus areas. The attacks took Hamas. More than 1,000 hand grenades, place on May 9 and May 12, when two guns, anti-tank missiles and large quantities bombs were detonated electronically near of explosives, some of them smuggled from IDF patrols. The subsequent investigation Israel, were discovered in the factories. revealed that the cell was planning to set off March 29, 1998: A Palestinian was killed in a large bomb in the restaurant area of the a car bomb explosion in Ramallah, northern town of Afula. The members of the apparently while preparing a bomb for a cell were all residents of the Samarian suicide attack in Israel. The vehicle had village of Marka. Israeli license plates and had been September 11, 1998: Two Hamas activists, previously stolen in Israel. The dead man the brothers Adel and Imad Awadallah, were was Muhi a-din Sharif, the Hamas bomb killed in a clash with Israeli security forces. maker responsible for the death of a score of The shootout took place at an isolated house Israeli civilians and the wounding of just outside the village of Taibeh near hundreds more in a series of suicide Hebron. The house where the confrontation bombings. The explosion that killed Sharif took place was found to contain munitions and disguises, leading Israeli security

77 Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) Ely Karmon officials to believe that the two fugitives the Palestinian security services was killed were on the verge of carrying out a terrorist in a clash with Hamas. attack. May 24, 1999: In a crackdown on Hamas The brothers Awadallah were well known to activists, Palestinian police arrested Sa’ed Israeli security. Both were leading members al-Arabeed, a senior member of ‘Iz al-din al- of ‘Iz al-Din al-Qassam, the military wing of Qassam. Al-Arabeed, an aide to fugitive the Hamas. Adel Awadallah was among bomb-maker Mohammed Dief, was wanted Israel’s most wanted men. He was thought by both Israeli and Palestinian security to have been behind a number of terrorist services. He and his assistant Khalil Sakani attacks on Israeli civilian targets, including were arrested in a dawn raid on a Hamas the suicide bombings in Jerusalem in which hideout in Gaza. 21 Israelis were killed. His brother Imad was Al-Arabeed had been in hiding since 1995, accused by the Palestinian Authority of following a series of suicide bombings in killing Hamas bomb-maker Muhi a-din Israel carried out under his direction. He Sharif in an internal feud over use of Hamas allegedly assisted Hamas bomb makers funds. Imad Awadallah escaped from a Imad Akel and Yihye Ayyash. Suicide bomb Palestinian jail on August 15, and was attacks planned by Akel and Ayyash hunted both by Israel and by the Palestinian resulted in the deaths of scores of Israeli Authority. citizens. November 30, 1998: The Palestinian August 8, 1999: The Palestinian Security Authority arrested the man suspected of services detained several Hamas activists in planning the November 6 suicide bombing what it called “preventative” measures after in Jerusalem’s Mahane Yehuda market. Iyad renewing calls for terrorism against Israel by Hardan, who was arrested at the request of Hamas. Israel, is thought to be the commander of the Among the detained was Abdelaziz Rantisi Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Jenin area. and Ahmed Nimr Hamdan. Rantisi was According to Israeli security sources, he sent recently released after serving 15 months in out two suicide bombers, Yusef Ali jail. A third man, Ismail Abu-hanab, was Mohammed Zughayar and Suleiman Musa detained in Gaza City after gaving an Dahayneh, to execute the attack, which interview to a television station. Palestinian resulted in 27 injured and the deaths of the security sources said the arrests were in bombers. Only a malfunction in the reaction to the group’s recent calls for explosives charge kept the attack from terrorist action against Israelis. ending in more casualties. In January 1999: a Palestinian military court *Ely Karmon is a senior research fellow at sentenced two Hamas members to 15 years the International Policy Institute for of hard labor for preparing explosives for Counter-terrorism at Interdisciplinary the July and September 1998 suicide Center in Herzeliya and lectures in the bombings that killed 21 Israelis. department of political science at Haifa February 1, 1999: A Palestinian policemen University. and an eight-year-old girl were killed in a car chase after Hamas fugitives in Rafiah. NOTES The PA had reportedly been tracking the fugitives since the arrest of several members 1) See Annex II for a partial list of the main of an allied ‘Iz al-din al-Qassam cell. This blows to Hamas’s operational incident marks the first time a member of infrastructure.\

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2) See a partial list of Hamas’s terrorist attacks in Annex I. 3) Al-Majallah, August 15-21, 1999. 4) Al-Bayan, July 29, 1999. 5) Al-Majallah, October 3, 1999. 6) Ibid. 7) http://www.palestine-info.org 8) Jordanian Times, August 26, 1999. 9) Filastin Al-Muslimah, June 1999. 10) Abu-Marzuq’s plea appeared on Hamas’ website, http://www.palestine-info.org . 11) See Hamas’s website http://www.palestine-info.net/index_e.htm. 12) Wafa Amr, Reuters, September 23, 1999. 13) Palestinian Times, November 1999. 14) Ibid. 15) See Haaretz, November 2, 1999 and the Jerusalem Post, November 3, 1999.

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