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Putting WMD Terrorism Into Perspective

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Putting WMD Terrorism Into Perspective John Parachini Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective What would you do? The FBI’s National Infrastructure Protec- tion Center (NIPC) warned that “Al Qaeda and affiliated groups continue to enhance their capabilities to conduct effective mass-casualty chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks” and that Al Qaeda possesses “at least a crude capability to use” CBRN weapons.1 As a policymaker, doubts about the quality, interpretation, and inherent uncer- tainty of intelligence continue to gnaw at you with each day that passes, for example, with unanswered questions about the extent, history, and even lo- cation of Iraq’s forbidden weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal, much less more furtive transnational threats. Rewarded for decisiveness as policymakers are, the instinctive route is to play it safe and extrapolate worst-case conclusions from imperfect informa- tion, even if serious consequences for government resource allocation result. Although constantly making pessimistic interpretations of imperfect data clearly has its disadvantages, such an approach seems prudent when assess- ing the threat of CBRN terrorism. The September 11 attacks and a series of other Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda–inspired attacks—from Bali to Mombassa, and Riyadh to Casablanca—all combine to elevate the perceived potency of the Al Qaeda threat. Even though Al Qaeda consistently has used conventional explosives in these attacks, movement adherents may also be willing to use CBRN weapons on a grand scale. The degree to which they have actually acquired the capability to do so, however, remains unknown. How should we assess this risk? Limited as it is, the historical record cautions against axiomatically sug- gesting that the Al Qaeda movement or any other terrorist group will inevi- John Parachini is a policy analyst at RAND in Virginia. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the views of RAND or its research sponsors. Copyright © 2003 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Washington Quarterly • 26:4 pp. 37–50. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ AUTUMN 2003 37 l John Parachini tably successfully use CBRN weapons in a catastrophic attack against the United States. Moreover, although hedging against terrorists exploiting the catastrophic potential of CBRN weapons is an essential task of government, resources and the public’s patience are finite. Focusing on a particular means of attack must not come at the expense of adequate attention to broader diplomatic, border control, intelligence, and law enforcement ef- forts to counter terrorism. Attention cannot simply result in obsessing over CBRN effects but also must produce improved understanding of the mo- tives, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and context for actual attacks, not just ex- pressions of interest. Moreover, as if all this were not complicated enough, counterterrorism efforts must not focus solely on Al Qaeda, as amorphous as it is, but must address broader terrorist trends and a variety of other groups including Hizballah; the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); and less well identified, armed rebel factions in Chechnya, Indonesia, and the Congo—to name a few that we know of today. Fighting in the Dark The few historical cases of terrorist interest in and acquisition of CBRN weapons make for a comparatively small data set to formulate general obser- vations about the potential for terrorists to use unconventional weapons successfully. Furthermore, the details of many of these cases are sketchy and often ambiguous, which only further complicates the task of accurately por- traying the scope and magnitude of the threat. With these uncertainties, many people will understandably hedge against the unknown and err on the side of finding the threat potential high. A close reading of the February 2003 FBI alert mentioned earlier and a May 2003 unclassified CIA report entitled “Terrorist CBRN: Materials and Effects” reveals the nuanced language of intelligence analysts who weigh the meaning of ambiguous information.2 The CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence asserts that Al Qaeda “has crude procedures for making mustard agent, sarin, and VX.” Else- where in the same CIA publication, however, the caption beneath a drawing copied from a document taken from an Al Qaeda safe house in Afghanistan de- scribes “interest in the production of more effective chemical agents such as mustard, sarin, and VX.”3 In the FBI’s NIPC Information Bulletin, Al Qaeda is alleged to have “experimented with procedures for making blister (mustard) and nerve (sarin and VX) chemical agents.”4 The conclusion that experiments, standard procedures, and interest in preparing these chemical agents existed may be based on a very different set of facts. The dual-use nature of chemical, biological, and radioactive materials opens up the possibility that innocent, naturally occurring events are mis- 38 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ AUTUMN 2003 Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective l taken for pernicious weapons-development activities. For example, repu- table media organizations reported findings of Iraqi clandestine weapons programs throughout the recent hostilities, which only proved to be false alarms on further inspection, not the smoking gun that officials and private experts expected to find. Homeland security officials and experts face simi- lar challenges, bedeviled by the anticipated clandestine CBRN terrorist ac- tivity they consistently expect to find. Al Qaeda’s interest in and willingness to use unconventional weapons are not in ques- tion, but evidence of Al Qaeda’s capabilities is Attention cannot fragmentary and reveals the difficulty of find- simply obsess over ing conclusive proof of a threatening capabil- ity. Demonstrating interest in something is far unconventional different both from, first, experimenting with terrorist effects. it and, second, mastering the procedures to execute an attack. Gaining access to materials is certainly a major barrier, but it is not the only one. Delivering toxic materials to targets in sufficient quantities to kill in the same fashion as explosives is not easy. Journalists repeatedly asked Gen. Tommy Franks and Secretary of De- fense Donald Rumsfeld whether U.S. forces had found evidence of Al Qaeda CBRN weapons capabilities in Afghanistan; they consistently re- sponded that forces discovered evidence of considerable interest, even some equipment that could be used for biological weapons development, but no hard physical evidence of weapons production. The difficulty of finding evidence of Al Qaeda’s unconventional weapons capabilities in Af- ghanistan foreshadowed the difficulty of finding clandestine weapons pro- grams in Iraq. In both cases, the perceived intentions of Al Qaeda and Iraq led to the suspicion and strong presumption of their capabilities, but hard evidence of capabilities commensurate with perceived and indeed stated intent has proven elusive. The use of unconventional weapons by terrorists has fortunately been rare. In the last 25 years, only four significant attacks by terrorists using poi- son, disease, or radioactive material as weapons and a few instances where groups or individuals showed interest in using such weapons have occurred. The first incident was in 1984 in Oregon when a religious cult sought to de- press voter turnout in a local election by clandestinely contaminating res- taurant salad with salmonella, sickening at least 751 people. In 1990, in northern Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) attacked a Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) base with chlorine gas, injuring more than 60 military personnel and enabling the LTTE to rout the fort. An at- THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ AUTUMN 2003 39 l John Parachini tack on the Tokyo subway with liquid sarin in 1995 and the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States are the other two incidents.5 The March 1995 attack by Aum Shinrikyo—a Japanese religious cult— on the Tokyo subway using sarin liquid catapulted concern about terrorist use of unconventional weapons to the front burner of U.S. security policymaking. The dramatic Tokyo attack occurred at a time marked by significant con- cerns about loose nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union, as well as revelations of covert unconven- tional weapons programs in Iraq, the 1993 Evidence of Al Qaeda’s terrorist attack on the World Trade Cen- unconventional ter, and the April 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. The cumulative impact of a ter- weapons capabilities is rorist group using a chemical weapons agent fragmentary. in a society as orderly as Japan’s, major con- ventional terrorist attacks on the U.S. home- land, and a series of revelations about hidden weapons programs both in Iraq and the former Soviet Union led to a number of new presidential directives and new legislative initiatives. Federal officials worried about the danger of a similar subway incident in the United States and the challenge such an at- tack would pose for emergency responders. Would the United States be able to respond any better than Japan had, or would the loss of life be even worse? These events in the early 1990s fundamentally changed how federal offi- cials, particularly in the White House, perceived the safety of the U.S. homeland. Previously, terrorism was an evil that occurred far away from U.S. shores. The early and mid-1990s, however, demonstrated not only the will- ingness of foreign and U.S. terrorists to strike on U.S. soil but also that ter- rorists, even if they were not yet targeting U.S. soil, were willing to do what once had been taboo: kill indiscriminately with large quantities of explosives or even use poison or disease as a weapon. These events led the executive branch and Congress to increase counterterrorism funding significantly and initiate several new presidential directives, numerous governmental and pri- vate studies, expert commissions, and a plethora of new programs to in- crease the capabilities of local responders, particularly when faced with CBRN attacks.6 The nature of terrorism seemed to have changed fundamentally.
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