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Republican Primaries 2008 John McCain

Type of paper: Master Thesis Study program: Cand.ling.merc Title: Republican Primaries 2008 – John McCain Name of author: Evelina Krajina CPR-no: Supervisor: Edward Ashbee Number of pages: 74,5 Total amount of pages: 86 Number of characters: 138.809 Submission date: June 01st, 2016. Copenhagen School. Resume. Denne afhandling er lavet baseret på en interesse af hvorfor John McCain blev valgt som Republikanernes præsidentkandidat, da han var meget bagefter i meningsmålene. Dette kom til udtryk ved at han lå lavt i meningsmålene igennem hele 2007, hvorefter han fra december 2007 til januar 2008 næsten fordobler tallene, og går fra 16 procent i december 2007 til 31 procent i januar 2008. Dette bliver startskuddet til en videre stigning i meningsmålene frem til 5 marts 2008, hvor han kan kalde sig Republikanernes præsidentkandidat, igennem at have sikret sig flest delegerede.

Afhandlingen tager afsæt i en analyse af de tre andre præsidentkandidater, , Mike samt , som på dette tidspunkt var den absolutte favorit. I dette kapitel analyseres det, til en hvilken grad de tre præsidentkandidater udgjorde en reel modstander. I kapitel 3 analyseres det i hvilken grad John McCain var en maverick på den politiske scene, samt hvilke mekanismer gjorde at han blev opfattet som en maverick. Til dette introduceres konceptet omkring Pavlovs hund, for at give læseren en forståelse af principperne bag betingelseslæring samt hvordan disse bruges, hvorefter Pavlovs hund anvendes på John McCain. I kapitel 4 analyseres vigtigheden af politisk støtte, og hvad dette gjorde ved John McCains valgkampagne. Til dette introduceres konceptet celebrity endorsement, samt vigtigheden af dette i en valgkampagne. I kapitel 5 og 6 analyseres vigtigheden af en distancering fra Præsident Bush samt mekanismerne som gjorde at John McCain var i stand til at vinde nomineringen.

På baggrund af dette konkluderes, det at John McCain var en anden type kandidat. Han var kendt som en outsider i det Republikanske parti da han ofte gik imod de konventionelle rammer. Denne afhandling er fundet frem til at John McCain igennem en distancering fra Præsident Bush formår at vende krigen i Irak til et positioneringsredskap, da han i kraft af en politisk vedtagelse om at øge antallet af tropper i Irak, bliver hyldet som en udenrigspolitisk ekspert. Dette, samt en

1 kombination af intens valgkamp i New Hampshire og støtte fra den Demokratiske Senator Lieberman gjorde at han opnår et momentum som fører til en sejr i New Hampshire. Denne sejr bliver cementeringen af hans stigning i meningsmålingerne og danner et grundlag for at han kan bruge krigen i Irak til et positioneringsredskap. På denne måde opnår han tilslutning da han formår at vende valgkampagnen til en diskussion om et emne han anses som ekspert på – krigen i Irak.

2 Table of Contents

RESUME. 1

1.0. INTRODUCTION. 5 1.1. RESEARCH QUESTION. 6 1.2. METHODOLOGY AND DELIMITATION. 6 1.3. DATA COLLECTION. 8 1.4. APPROACH AND FRAMEWORK. 9

2.0 WEAKER CANDIDATES. 10 2.1 MITT ROMNEY. 10 2.1.1. SALT LAKE CITY WINTER OLYMPICS 2002. 11 2.1.2. CRITICISM OF THE SALT LAKE CITY WINTER OLYMPICS. 11 2.1.3 GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS 12 2.1.4. 2008 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES 14 2.1.5. SUMMARY. 14 2.2. . 16 2.2.1. THE GOVERNOR OF . 17 2.2.2. SUMMARY. 18 2.3. RUDY GIULIANI 18 2.3.1. THE MAYOR OF NEW YORK. 20 2.3.2. CRITICISM OF DECLINE IN CRIME. 22 2.3.3. POST SEPTEMBER 11TH. 23 2.3.4. REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT. 25 2.3.5 SUMMARY. 26 2.4. CHAPTER CONCLUSION. 27

3.0. POLITICAL IDENTITY. 29 3.1. MAVERICK TENDENCIES. 30 3.2. THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT. 31 3.4. PAVLOV’S DOG. 33 3.5. POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND PAVLOV’S DOG. 34 3.6. LEADERSHIP STYLE AND POW. 37 3.7. CHAPTER CONCLUSION. 38

4.0. BACKING FROM KEY INTERESTS. 40 4.1. THE TRANSFER MEANING MODEL. 41 4.2. THE TRANSFER MEANING MODEL APPLIED ON JOHN MCCAIN. 43 4.3. RESTRUCTURING INSIDE THE MCCAIN CAMP. 45 4.4. ENDORSEMENT FROM JOE LIEBERMAN. 46 4.5. ENDORSEMENT FROM OTHER KEY INTERESTS. 48 4.6. GENERAL ENDORSEMENT. 49 4.7. ENDORSEMENT FROM REVEREND JOHN HAGEE. 50 4.8. CHAPTER CONCLUSION. 51

5.0. DISTANCING FROM BUSH ADMINISTRATION. 53

3 5.1. THE NEED TO CREATE DISTANCE. 54 5.2. INSURGENCY AS THE BEST STRATEGY. 55 5.3. SENATOR MCCAIN ON FOREIGN POLICY. 58 5.4. SENATOR MCCAIN ON . 60 5.5. APPEAL TO ANTIWAR VOTERS IN GOP. 62 5.6. CHAPTER CONCLUSION. 63

6.0 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE. 64 6.1. NEOCONSERVATIVE PHILOSOPHY AND IDEALS. 65 6.2. PRESIDENT BUSH’ NEOCONSERVATIVE IDEALS? 66 6.3. SENATOR MCCAIN’S NEOCONSERVATIVE IDEALS. 67 6.4. SUMMARY. 69 6.5. NEW HAMPSHIRE. 70 6.6. CHAPTER CONCLUSION. 72

7.0. CONCLUSION. 74

8.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 77

4 1.0. Introduction. The 2008 Republican Presidential Primaries presented a new era in elections. The incumbent Vice-President, Dick Cheney, did not wish to run for Presidency, as is usually the case. This meant that the floor for a Republican candidate was completely open and already in the end of 2006, it shaped up to be an early frontrunner in the mayor of , Rudy Giuliani. Mayor Giuliani was previously acclaimed in his leadership status post the terrorist attacks on World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001 as was subsequently seen as an American hero.

On the other hand Senator John McCain from Arizona also proved to be a frontrunner, with approval rates just below mayor Giuliani in late 2006 (Jones, 2007, ). Senator McCain was known as a maverick in politics where bipartisan cooperation across the political aisle and political viewpoints which more often than not, seemed to go against the established Republican views. However in early 2007 Senator McCain’s approval rates started to decrease throughout the year 2007 where it reached a low point of 14 percent in December 2007 (White House 2008: Republican Nomination). However less than a month later on January 10, 2008, Senator McCain’s approval rate had surged to 33 per cent. The increase continued steadily until March 2008 where he had secured enough delegates to be able to call himself the Republican Presidential Nominee (Glaister (2008). Within the observant reader, these series of events raise numerous questions, namely how was Senator McCain able to increase his approval rate to the double from December 2007 to January 2008? And how was it possible for Senator McCain to make this strong a comeback as a candidate?

5 1.1. Research Question. Based on these events the research question is as follows:

Why did John McCain win the Republican Nomination in 2008?

1.2. Methodology and Delimitation. The purpose of this thesis is to research why Senator McCain won the Republican Nomination in 2008. For this reason, the focus of this thesis will be distributed as follows; Chapter 2 will only focus on three other candidates, namely Mitt Romney, Mike Huckabee and Rudy Giuliani. This writer is aware that there were more candidates in the initial election, but has chosen to focus only on these three candidates, as they presented the highest poll numbers according to White House 2008: Republican Nomination. Chapter 3 will focus on the political identity of Senator John McCain, and will in the argumentation present two instances where the senator worked across the political aisle on bipartisan collaboration. This chapter will also introduce the framework of Pavlov’s dog as a means of arguing conditioned learning based on repetition and put this in perspective of Senator McCain. This chapter will not take into consideration Senator McCain’s voting record as the argumentation of this thesis rests on the perceived image of Senator McCain and not necessarily the real image.

Chapter 4 will introduce the framework of the transfer-meaning model as a theory of explaining the symbolic value of an endorsement. This chapter will hereafter apply the transfer-meaning model on Senator McCain, as a way of demonstrating how the theory affects the senator. This chapter will not go into depth on every endorsement senator McCain received, but will focus on the ones who added to his ethos, in order to substantiate the argumentation for this chapter. Chapter 5 will argue why it was necessary to establish a distance to the Bush administration, and how Senator McCain created this distance. This chapter will not take into consideration the similarities between Senator McCain and the Bush administration,

6 as this is considered beyond the scope. Chapter 6 will introduce neo-conservatism, and argue why this ideology presented an opportunity for Senator McCain to reposition the issue of war to his benefit. Lastly, this chapter will use the framework of political opportunity structure, as a means of arguing the momentum senator McCain gained in New Hampshire.

Many of the limitations of this thesis have been discussed in the previous section and will be summarized in this section. The scope of this thesis is the Republican Primaries in 2008 and Senator McCain. For this reason, the Democratic Primaries of 2008 will not be taken into consideration. This writer is aware, that there is an aspect of reaction in politics and acknowledges the fact that some of Senator McCain’s actions may have been reactions towards Democratic candidates. However due to the scope of this thesis, this will not be taken into consideration. The possibility of a reaction aspect is not deemed high in importance as it, in this point in time, comes second to winning the nomination.

The timeframe of this thesis will contain the time period from November 2006 to March 5th, 2008, as it was on this date Senator McCain had won enough delegates to be able to call himself the Republican Presidential Nominee. In this respect, aside from few references, Senator McCain’s run for the Republican Presidential Nominee in the 2000 election will not be taken into consideration. However for the purpose of argumentation in each chapter in this thesis, Senator McCain’s, and other candidates’ mentioned in this thesis, previous accomplishments will be analyzed. As the scope of this thesis regards the research question mentioned above, this thesis will not analyze nor argue the time frame after March 5th 2008 and until the general election including choice of running mate. Lastly, this thesis will not include a background analysis of the electoral system in the US, as this is considered beyond the scope.

7 1.3. Data Collection. This thesis does not present any first-hand empirical or quantitative data. This thesis will instead rely on secondary data primarily collected from published books, peer-reviewed articles, journals and studies from online university databases. Additionally, in order to gain a more contemporary insight, it was relevant to incorporate websites such as pollingreport.com and gallup.com as a way of collecting polls. Lastly, secondary data was collected from esteemed newspapers such as and , as a means to tapping into the current state of mind on the political scene. Although the data collection for this thesis is secondary data, it proved sufficient to be able to answer the research question due to the empirical research of the secondary data.

The secondary data proved to be a reliable source due to their neutral agenda. For the results of the polls, Gallup and Polling Report were used as sources for two reasons. Gallup and Polling Report both represent an accredited and neutral source and the desire to use both came from being able to verify one poll in the other source and vice versa. In addition, Polling Report tends to have detailed polls by weekly and monthly basis, that are also subcategorized by which media was responsible for the poll. This provided a good overview that could be matched with the Gallup poll.

All newspapers used as secondary sources in this thesis were specifically chosen due to their credibility. The New York Times, The Washington Post, , The Economist, CNN and The Boston Globe were used, as they are considered neutral in their news coverage. CBS News was also used in a few instances and although CBS News tends to have a more liberal stance than the before-mentioned newspapers, this did not seem to affect the credibility of the source, as it was substantiated by a more neutral source.

8 1.4. Approach and Framework. The structural approach for this thesis will take its starting point in the framework of structure and agency, thus incorporating the framework of political opportunity structure. The framework of structure and agency relies on the explanation of human behavior assumption of human social theory. The framework of a structural approach is based on the assumption, that the human being is influenced by outside events such as social level in society in the decision making process (Friedman & Starr (1997) p. 17). The framework of an agency approach is based on the assumption, that the human being is not influenced by outside events, and is able to make their own individual choice based on freedom (Friedman & Starr (1997), p. 18). In other words, structure is concerned with how the society creates the individual, by for example how the individual lives are shaped by family, culture etc. Agency on the other hand, is concerned with how the individual creates society through everyday behavior and actions.

What makes this particular framework interesting for this thesis is because the focal point of this thesis is politics. One can argue that in politics, one is not given the absolute truth, but the truth is rather dependent on the eyes of the beholder. This is why we see different policy approaches proposed by the different candidates, and even different political parties. The different approaches in politics appeal to different segment of voters, and in this thesis it is argued that politics is not an exact science and leaves room for interpretation. This interpretation opens up for a structure approach, which will be used in this thesis. The approach of structure is chosen as a framework for this thesis over the framework of agency, due to the complexity in the political spectrum. As mentioned before, the assumption of this thesis is that the individual’s willingness to adapt and accept a certain political policy, relates to the shape and form in their surroundings. This manner of reasoning opens up for the framework of political opportunity structure, that argues that success or failure is primarily affected by political opportunities. This thesis will however argue that is was a combination of Senator McCain’s own qualities along with the opportunity that arose from the adaptation of the Surge that were the key

9 instruments behind Senator McCain’s nomination as the Republican Presidential Nominee.

2.0 Weaker Candidates.

The 2008 Presidential Primaries where Senator John McCain was elected the Presidential Nominee for the Republican Party was an election where Senator McCain won due to a number of factors, one of these discussed in this chapter. He was not the favorite candidate in the polls, but during the course of a couple months, his numbers increased and went up twice as much as the other candidates (Saad (2007a) and (White House 2008: Republican Nomination). This chapter will argue, that one of the factors contributing to Senator McCain becoming the Republican Nominee was the lack of stronger, more profiled candidates in the election. This chapter will argue, that the candidates who originally were thought to have an upper edge, failed to communicate this to the voters, something Senator McCain utilized to precision in order to profile his own campaign.

2.1 Mitt Romney. Before Mitt Romney went into politics, he was a successful businessman, and this formed the ground of his style of campaigning and his policymaking. Having an MBA from Harvard, he quickly joined the private sector in the management consulting industry in Bain & Company (Lizza (2007). After having served as CEO and helping the company steer from financial crisis, he in 1984 cofounded Bain Capital, a private equity firm (Lizza (2007). When he in 1994 ran for Ted ’s seat in the Senate and subsequently lost to a smallest margin in history, he did not return to politics before his run for Governor of Massachusetts in 2002 (Lizza (2007).

10 2.1.1. Salt Lake City Winter Olympics 2002. Before Mitt Romney was elected the Governor of Massachusetts in 2002, he was perhaps mostly know for being the CEO of Salt Lake Organizing Committee, the company behind the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics in 2002 (Johnson (2007). In 1998 rumors emerged that the IOC members supposedly took bribes in order for Salt Lake City to win the bid for the Winter Olympics in 2002. The process led to the IOC organization adapting to new rules. In the wake of this, the Salt Lake Organizing Committee was under a financial turmoil with a deficit of 379 million dollars (Johnson, 2007). Mitt Romney was subsequently hired as CEO of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee and he turned the deficit into a surplus of 100 million dollars and with that came the public feather in his cap from President George W. Bush praising Mitt Romney for his excellent leadership (Vickers, 2007). In the midst of this, Harvard Business School taught a case study based on what he managed to do with the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics (Lizza, 2007). All of this gave Mitt Romney the reputation as a man who could make this happen and who could turn things around and according to critics, the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics was the ideal stepping stone for his run for the Governor of Massachusetts (Hohler, 2007).

2.1.2. Criticism of the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics. Even though Mitt Romney won a lot of praise and admiration from the way he administered the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics, the praise was, according to critics, inflated due to the fact that the numbers were exaggerated to an extent making Mitt Romney seem as the bigger deliverer than he was (Hohler, 2007). According to the chair of the organizing committee Robert H Garff, it seemed that Mitt Romney wanted to use the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics as a stepping-stone into something greater and was therefore eager to make it seem like the organization behind the games was in worse condition than it really was (Johnson, 2007). This is further substantiated by Utah Senator Bob Bennett stating that much

11 of the needed federal funds were already in place while Mitt Romney made the impression that he had spent a lot of time and efforts lobbying for the necessary funds (Hohler, 2007). In addition to this, one needs to take into consideration the context this was happening in. The Salt Lake City Winter Olympics were influenced by the recent terrorist attacks on World Trade Center on September 11th 2001. This caused the games to have a very patriotic theme, thus causing federal funds to go up, as the nation needed a patriotic stance at this particular moment (Farley, 2012).

2.1.3 Governor of Massachusetts As the Governor of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney announced his candidacy for Presidency on February 13th, 2007. He tried portraying himself as an outsider more than a party affiliate which gained him momentum while running for Governor of Massachusetts in 2002. While running for Governor he had downplayed hos party affiliation, as that was thought to be the best strategy in one of the most liberal states in the US (Killough, 2011). By doing so, Mitt Romney made an attempt to build a bridge between being a republican Governor in a liberal state. He made statements in which he was quoted referring to himself more of “a moderate” with “progressive views” (Killough, 2011) while putting forward his success in the private sector as a validation of his abilities to manage the state’s fiscal challenges. To illustrate his “moderate with progressive views” stance, Mitt Romney referred to one of the pillar stones in conservative point of view, abortion. He stated that he was open into seeing what the stance on abortion was but however that a woman’s right to choose goes above what was popular at the time (Montopoli, 2012). Being a Mormon as well as a candidate who has profiled himself on being a traditional Republican candidate in the 2008 Presidential Primaries, this aspect of his leadership did not make a strong impression with the traditional conservatives, thus making him a target for flip-flopping on the key beliefs within the Republican Party.

12 In addition to this, Mitt Romney seemingly adapted the more liberal policies in his time as the Governor of Massachusetts. In 2006 Mitt Romney held a comprehensive adaptation of a universal health care program in the state of Massachusetts, which came to be dubbed “Romney care” (McDonough, Rosman, Phelps, Shannon, 2006). In this health care reform, it meant that a near universal health care program would cover nearly every person in the state of Massachusetts (Mooney, 2011). The background of the Massachusetts health care reform consisted of two factors contributing to it. The first factor contributing to the health care reform was that the six-year federal government waiver for the state of Massachusetts was expiring. The waiver, which dealt with the flexible administration of Medicaid program beyond what was allowed under the Medicaid State Plan, was expiring and unless the waiver was extended or changed in some way, it meant that a lot of Medicaid users would lose coverage and the state would be forced to go back to federal regulations (McDonough, Rosman, Phelps, Shannon, 2006).

If the Massachusetts health care reform were not adapted, it would mean that the state had to go back to federal regulation. Going back to federal regulations would mean that a lot of users would lose coverage. Aside from this, there were data showing that the reform made in 1997 to the part of health care dealing with the individual purchase of insurance had shown less than favorable results. In 2000 it was estimated that 100.000 people in Massachusetts had individually purchased insurance but this figure ha dropped significantly to 50.000 at the time of reform negotiations (Impact of Merging the Massachusetts Non-Group and Small Group Health Insurance Markets, 2006). Based on these possible outcomes, Mitt Romney could have chosen to simply extend the waiver and thus keeping in line with Republican key values of less government and more freedom. He however chose an entirely different approach and reformed the entire health care program thus making it a near universal plan for the residents of Massachusetts. This aspect would serve as a point of criticism towards Mitt Romney in the 2008 Republican Primaries. Mitt Romney’s liberal stance on a number of core conservative issues served as an alienating factor towards the conservative Republican base and thus

13 opened a door of the accusations of a flip-flop in politics (Jones & Vassallo, 2009, p. 53).

2.1.4. 2008 Presidential Primaries When Mitt Romney announced his candidacy for Presidency in February 2007, his strategy was coming into the race as an outsider candidate as this strategy had proved successful in his run for Governor in Massachusetts. However, due to the nature of the election in the run for Presidency, this strategy meant he became a subject to much more scrutiny than he was during his campaign for Governor. For this reason, it became increasingly difficult maintaining the same level of progressiveness and moderateness in a campaign that dealt with the Presidency. With the amount of scrutiny a presidential candidate faces, it brought to light the fact that Mitt Romney had compromised on core Republican principles with the Massachusetts health care reform of 2006 as well as his statements of wanting to protect the women’s right to choose in the issue of abortion. In the wake of this, it meant that these issues were an overwhelming factor in shaping the course of his campaign. This combined with the fact that he did not seem to be able to connect with the general public, meant that he was seen as a stiff which subsequently meant he suffered from a low recognizability factor (Draper, 2011). Mitt Romney tried to redeem himself in a way by changing stance in order not to alienate the conservative core base. This and the fact that he was a Mormon however left him to gain scrutiny and distrust from the evangelical part of the Republican party and in that was alienate him with this group of voters, something that would later benefit Mick Huckabee (Heilemann & Halperin, 2010 p. 294-295).

2.1.5. Summary. Before Mitt Romney announced his run for the Presidency he was enjoying a rather successful career, firstly in the private sector, and later as the Governor of

14 Massachusetts. His experience in the private sector where he was holding heavy positions in private equity firms helped gain the validation of his experience in the private sector. His success in the private sector authenticated in this sense his ability to successfully manage and turn around a multi million-dollar corporation. This laid the groundwork for his first attempt at public office in 1994 when he ran for US Senate against incumbent senator Ted Kennedy. Even though he subsequently lost to Ted Kennedy, it was a loss with the least margin in history and Mitt Romney retreated and went back to what he knew best – the private sector. In 1999 he entered into something that would cement his abilities to turn around a deficit to a surplus when he gained the position as CEO of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee. In the Salt Lake Organizing Committee he helped put his strength as a successful businessman to the test by turning a large deficit into a 100 million dollar surplus.

The praise gained from the Salt Lake Organizing Committee would eventually come to be a stepping-stone into public office a second time around, this time as the Governor of Massachusetts in 2002. However being a Governor in one of the most liberal states in the US meant that Mitt Romney needed to compromise both on his core beliefs, but also the core beliefs of the Republican Party, something that would come back to haunt him when he announced his run for Presidency in 2008. This combined with the fact that he was suffering from an already low recognizability and the reputation of being somewhat of a stiff character, meant that other candidates often challenged him on his changing stances, leaving little room for defense. This subsequently meant that Mitt Romney was left with having to constantly defend his stances, instead of engaging in a dialogue about his own policies. In this way, it becomes seemingly clear that Mitt Romney appeared not to be in charge of his own campaign, but was rather in constant defense mode, thus leaving the impression of a weak candidate.

15 2.2. Mike Huckabee. When the Governor of Arkansas announced his run for Presidency on January 28th, 2007, there was not much noise, either positive or negative around him. Mike Huckabee was the Governor of Arkansas and until then, mostly known for his evangelical views and pastoral background (Cohn, 2015). Due to this and his unequivocal stance on core conservative issues like abortion and same-sex marriages, Mike Huckabee had a strong hold on the evangelical voters and in this way challenged Mitt Romney, who was seen as too liberal by comparison. This resulted in Mike Huckabee winning the caucus, due to the strong hold on the evangelical votes. While Mitt Romney proved to be presented as a flip-flop in the eyes of the religious right with his shifting stance on abortion, Mike Huckabee seemed to have a better grasp on his views, thus making him a more desirable candidate for the religious right. According to consensus, the white evangelical Christians consisted of about 40% of the Republican primary voters (Cohn, 2015), and this proved to help Mike Huckabee in the sense that he presented an image of a more digestible candidate who was more in line with the conservative Republicans.

When presented with the choice of Mitt Romney and Mike Huckabee as the better candidate, Mike Huckabee gained the strength due to his firm stance on core conservative issues, whereas Mitt Romney was perceived as more wavering candidate (Jones & Vassallo, 2009, p. 55). This meant that Mike Huckabee gained an overwhelming number of the evangelical Christian votes in Iowa. He won 34.4 per cent of the votes in Iowa, a state where a poll of people entering the Republican caucus showed that 80 per cent of Huckabee’s supporters in the state identified themselves as evangelicals (Luo & Kirkpatrick, 2008). However despite having good support from the evangelical Christians, it proved to be a too small niche to be able to win in the overall primaries. This becomes more evident by Mike Huckabee having strong support in the Southern states (Jones & Vassallo, 2009, p. 56-57). As time went on, Mike Huckabee showed that for every seeming strength, he had weaknesses that outweighed the initial appeal of the strengths.

16 2.2.1. The Governor of Arkansas. Mike Huckabee had, aside from being Governor of Arkansas, not much executive experience. Before he became the Governor he was a pastor in the local Baptist Church, leaving him with little policymaking experience to take on a position as a possible President of the United States. One can argue that history has shown, that it is not necessarily obligatory for a candidate to have had a heavy career in public office before ascending to the highest position in the country, had it not been for the way Mike Huckabee managed his public office as Governor. During the coarse of his career as the Governor of Arkansas, Mike Huckabee received and accepted suggestions for pardon more than twice as much as his three predecessors combined, a total of 1033 (Bacon & Franke-Ruta, 2009). This fact in itself would possibly not have instigated a concern had it not been for the Maurice Clemmons case as this case ignited the interest for Mike Huckabee’s pardons. So even though Mike Huckabee rejected a number of pardons, the issue here became and centered on his way of accepting clemencies. This proved important when Maurice Clemmons, convicted for burglary at age 16, one of the recipients of Mike Huckabee’s clemencies, was arrested for numerous offences including child molestation and aggravated assault after being released on parole. After this, Maurice Clemmons managed to shoot and kill four police officers before being shot and killed after a two-day hunt (Martin, 2013).

According to critics, Mike Huckabee failed to read Maurice Clemmons’ personal file in which there were several red flags including the person’s reluctance of rehabilitation (Martin, 2013). This, combined with the fact that Mike Huckabee did not raise a lot of money in his campaign, seems to have formed an uphill battle for his candidacy. In the 2008 Primaries Mike Huckabee only raised 16 million dollars (Choma, (2013), and if this number is compared to Rudy Giuliani’s numbers of close to 59 million dollars (Choma (2013), it becomes evident that Mike Huckabee’s campaign is a niche campaign designed for the voters from the religious right.

17 2.2.2. Summary. With the win in Iowa, Governor Mike Huckabee seemed to be an early frontrunner in the Republican Primaries in 2008. With his strong support from the conservative evangelical Christians he seemed to have an upper edge in the Iowa caucus, which he eventually won. His unequivocal stance on core conservative issues such as abortion and same-sex marriages provided him with a stronger hold of the Christian conservatives than Mitt Romney, who, as his closest competitor, was also trying to capture the votes of the conservative right. Mitt Romney was however perceived more inconsistent in his views, which in the end paved the way for Mike Huckabee. However, as time progressed, it became evident that Mike Huckabee only had support from a small niche of voters, the evangelical Christians. This became evident as he harvested more support in the Southern states than anywhere else. This, combined with a political scandal involving a large number of clemencies of convicted felons, one of which became a subsequent police murderer and the inability to raise enough campaign funds, meant Mike Huckabee’s campaigned proved to be inadequate for the majority.

2.3. Rudy Giuliani When the former mayor of New York City Rudy Giuliani announced his bid in the run for the nomination of the Republican Party in November 2006, he was the absolute favorite candidate in the early election (Saad, 2007, A). As shown in the figure below, Rudy Giuliani came off to a good start in the polls after he announced his run for the Presidency.

18 Figure 1: Percentage Choosing Rudy Giuliani for 2008 Republican Nomination.

Source: Adapted from Saad, 2007: A.

This section of the chapter will argue, that Rudy Giuliani was a frontrunner early in the Republican Primaries due to his recent past as the mayor of New York City. In connection to his public office, this section will argue that he, due to his position and action after the September 11th terrorist attacks in New York was hailed as a hero and as “America’s mayor” and because of this, enjoyed a high name recognition as well as high admiration nationwide. This factor, combined with his success in bringing down the crime rate as the mayor of New York City, and in connection with this, being responsible of jailing notorious boss of organized crime John Gotti, made him seem invincible. However this section will also argue that Rudy Giuliani made strategic mistakes when he seemingly disregarded the smaller states early in the primaries, and in stead concentrated his efforts in campaigning in the bigger winner-takes-all states. This part chapter will argue that this judgment in error proved to be catastrophic for his campaign, and was seemingly as a result of complacency with his position. However no matter the vast judgment in error this strategic move became, this part chapter will also argue that Rudy Giuliani’s support

19 system, much as Mike Huckabee, was concentrated in a niche of the Republican party and was not applicable to the party as a whole.

2.3.1. The Mayor of New York. As seen in the figure below, Rudy Giuliani and John McCain were not that much apart in the polls at the time where Rudy Giuliani announced his run for Presidency. The figure shows that Rudy Giuliani had a 28 per sent approval rate where as John McCain had a 26 per cent approval rate

Figure 2: 2008 Republican Nomination for President among Republicans and Republican leaners.

Source: Adapted from Jones, 2007A, Gallup.

This raises a series of questions as to why Rudy Giuliani had a steady approval rate from November 2006 to January 2007 after which he continued to increase in the polls. John McCain on the other hand, was also experiencing a steady approval rate

20 in the period November 2006 to January 2007 after which he started a downward drop in the polls.

Rudy Giuliani served as mayor of New York City from 1994 through 2001 and when he was elected it was on the promise to be tough on crime in a city that had been struggling with increasing crime statistics for three decades (Dobbs, 2007). His approach, which involved having more police in the streets, comprised of a strategy that in its essence included a tough stance on typically minor offences, as the logic behind was that those minor offences would lead to heavier crimes. This involved offences such as graffiti, riding the subway without paying and cannabis possession in small quantities and the strategy seemed to work as the crime in New York started to decline (Dobbs, 2007).

Figure 3: Violent Crime Rates in Selected U.S. Cities.

Source: Dobbs, 2007.

21

Figure 3 above shows an overall decline in crime in New York City in the time Rudy Giuliani was mayor of the city. However, figure 3 also shows that the decline in crime started some years before he came into office. This has led to criticism of the way Rudy Giuliani portrayed himself as a person who, by the power of his policies, managed to bring down the crime statistics in New York City (Dobbs, 2007).

2.3.2. Criticism of Decline in Crime. As shown in the figure 3 in section 2.3.1, the decline in crime in New York City started around 1990 where it had reached its peak of 2400 violent crimes per 100.000 inhabitants. For this reason, the statement that mayor Rudy Giuliani had contributed to and was a large reason for the crime rate in New York City had started to decline was greatly opposed by his critics (Allison, 2007). According to the study by professor Steven D. Levitt in Journal of Economic Perspectives in 2004 (Levitt, 2004, p.182), the decline in crime was rather a result of four reasons and not necessarily the tough stance on minor offences as Rudy Giuliani’s Presidential nomination campaign claimed in 2007. In the study, several reasons are mentioned that, according to the media, are listed as possible reason the crime rate started declining. Among these are listed in declining order as times mentioned in the media; improved police strategies, increased reliance on prisons, changing in crack/other drug markets, aging of the population, tougher gun control laws, stronger economy and increased number of police. These seven reasons were listed as the most stated reasons in the period 1991-2001 in the top ten newspapers in the US (Levitt, 2004, p. 164).

The study found in the end that there were four factors that had an actual impact in the decline in crime from 1990-2001. These factors included; increase in the number of police, the rising prison population, the receding crack epidemic and the legalization of abortion in 1973 (Levitt, 2004, p. 176-183). The legalization of abortion in 1973 seems to be an unlikely reason, as there does not seem to be a

22 direct link between crime and the legality of abortion. However, the study gives room for two underlying theories behind this, namely that studies show that unwanted children are at a greater risk of crime and legalized abortions reduces the number of unwanted births (Levitt, 2004, p. 182). Given the four factors mentioned above as the main reasons the crime started to decline, it becomes a chicken-or-the- egg discussion. Much of the criticism given to Rudy Giuliani for not being completely responsible for the decline in crime can be discussed as being the effect of the causes he implemented during his time as the mayor of New York City. This however does not explain the fact that crime started to decline three years before he came to office. His critics have therefore accused him for taking credit for a trend that was already in progress in the city. In addition to this, critics have stated that because the crime index is based on statistics from the FBI, which is based on the police department’s own numbers, the crimes were allocated and shifted into categories the FBI does not take into account (Allison, 2007).

2.3.3. Post September 11th. Towards the end of mayor Rudy Giuliani’s second term in office, the terrorist attacks happened on World Trade Center and subsequent to that, mayor Giuliani was hailed as a hero due to the manner in which he handled the situation and managed to be a gathering strength in the tragedy (Pooley, 2001). He made an effort to communicate to the American people that they stood united in the midst of the tragedy and because of this he, was named “America’s Mayor” in The Economist in 2005 (America’s Mayor, (2005). This sentiment seemed to transcend into the polls as well. Approximately two weeks after the terrorist attacks, Giuliani’s approval rate almost doubled compared to the year before, and stayed in the high numbers for the next five years as is shown in figure 4 below. The figure seems to indicate, that mayor Giuliani was seen as someone who had the ability to bring the nation and its people together in a time of tragedy and sorrow. His visibility during and after the attacks became a key narrative constructed by the media, featuring prominently in

23 newspapers and news around the world (McNamara & McNeill, 2012, p. 267). This presented a high contrast to the absence of President Bush and this prompted the media to report on mayor Giuliani’s leadership qualities as exceeding those of President Bush (McNamara & McNeill, 2012, p. 267).

Figure 4: Rudy Giuliani’s public opinion from 2000 to 2006.

Source: Adapted from /Opinion Dynamics Poll of 900 registered voters nationwide of the public opinion of Rudy Giuliani, Polling Report.

Subsequent to this, mayor Giuliani was named Time magazines Person of The Year for 2001 as a result of his leadership in the aftermath of September 11th (Pooley, 2001), and in the wake of this he received an honorary knighthood by Queen Elizabeth II in February 2002 (Reynolds, 2002). Due to this attention, one can argue that Rudy Giuliani had a good offset for a starting point into another heavier office due to the praise and attention he received in the aftermath of

24 September 11th. However, even though Rudy Giuliani rode on the wave of recognition and success post September 11th, it still proved challenging due to his political and personal life.

2.3.4. Republican or Democrat. Rudy Giuliani rode the wave of success in the aftermath of September 11th. He was praised on his leadership skills which subsequently made his approval rating double in the polls. This resulted in that there became less focus on his political stance. As a result of this, his political standpoint was somewhat forgotten until the 2008 Presidential Primaries. Here, what seemed not to have a high significance in the aftermath of September 11th, came to have an importance as this time, it did not concern his leadership skills in a time of tragedy but finding a candidate who would serve as a Republican front figure for the entire nation and not only New York City. In the beginning of his political career in 1968, Rudy Giuliani considered himself to be a Democrat and years later, in 1975, he changed his affiliation to Independent when he joined the Ford administration as Associate Deputy Attorney General (Newfield, 2002). However, after he joined the Reagan administration he once again changed party affiliation from Independent to Republican (Newfield, 2002).

This becomes interesting when one looks at his political stances pre and post September 11th as well as which bills he passed in his time as the mayor of New York City. He expanded coverage under Medicaid to cover children and adults under the Health Stat program which would cover almost a million children in New York City (Bumiller, 2000). In addition to this, he also codified a law that would guarantee the equal benefits for partners in same sex partnerships in 1998 even though he in 1996 publically opposed same sex marriage (Archives of the Mayor’s Press Office, release #248-99, 1999) & (Bumiller, 2000). This proved to be too much for the Republicans as mayor Giuliani was perceived as standing more to the left of any Republican candidate (Hawkins, 2006). The issue did not seem to stress much on

25 that fact but more that he was adamant about his stances on especially abortion and the woman’s right to chose. While this made sense in a liberal state as New York, it did not sit well with the more conservative parts of the Republican Party.

In addition with his stance on abortion issues and same-sex marriages, Rudy Giuliani had one more issue that he supported which came to clash with the core beliefs of the Republican Party. As a mayor of New York, Giuliani was an advocate for gun control as he believed in a more strict federal gun licensing (Citizens Crime Commission, 1997). Subsequent to this, he was the only Republican mayor to join a lawsuit against the gun manufacturers for negligence due to the overproduction of weapons in 2000 (Archives of the Mayor’s Press Office, Release #238-00, 2000). In the eyes of the more conservative Republicans this signified a break with the core principles the Party stood for and proved not to be a viable strategy.

2.3.5 Summary. Although Rudy Giuliani was the definite frontrunner early in the 2008 Presidential Nomination, he lost his momentum as time passed. Several reasons as to why he, on paper, would have been a good presidential candidate are present – namely his name recognition which in the aftermath of September 11th, 2001 earned him the Person of The Year award by Time Magazine. He had managed to be a contributing factor in the decline of crime in New York City by his tough stance on crime by the introduction and enforcement of a tough stance on minor offences as this was considered to be a gateway into tougher and heavier offences. Although a Republican by party affiliation, Rudy Giuliani took stances and proposed bills that would negate his party affiliation. This was illustrated in the stance of same sex partnerships where he signed a local law which provided a broad protection for same sex partners. In addition to this, he filed a lawsuit against gun manufacturers for negligence as well as expanding the Medicaid

26 coverage for uninsured children and adults in New York City. These hard facts, however high his overall popularity rose, proved to be too much for the conservative Republicans, which eventually ended his presidential campaign. In addition to this, Rudy Giuliani made the mistake of relying too much on his name recognition factor as his campaign strategy did not involve campaigning in the smaller states. Instead he focused his campaign on the bigger winner-takes-it-all states which eventually proved to be a mistake.

2.4. Chapter Conclusion. Senator John McCain was not the favorite candidate in the 2008 Presidential Primaries. This was due to a seemingly stronger profile from the three other candidates discussed in this chapter, namely Mitt Romney, Mike Huckabee and Rudy Giuliani. In the initial polls before the Iowa Caucus, all three candidates had higher approval rates than John McCain. However, the initial appeal proved to be just that – initial and while the candidates appeared strong, it would soon appear that they had controversies in their political careers that in fact made them less desirable or directly non-electable. Mitt Romney was a candidate who was a successful businessman before he was elected for public office and in that stance, this gained him validity on the business aspect as he could prove to solutions that he himself had implemented in the private sector e.g. the budgetary issues. Through his position as the CEO of Salt Lake Organizing Committee he managed to build a more public image on himself as well as proving he had the skills to turn a multi million dollar deficit into a surplus. This proved a good strategy as he was elected the Governor of Massachusetts in 2002. This is however where Mitt Romney came into difficulties as he was a Republican governor in one of the most liberal states in the US. This resulted in bills and political stances that were far from the Republican core policy which in the end proved too challenging for him to overcome.

27 Mike Huckabee on the other hand did not experience this challenge as he was the more conservative candidate. However this did not prove to gain a vast help as he, outside his home state, was virtually unknown. In addition to this, it seemed that Mike Huckabee had a strong hold of the evangelical voters but did not stand as strong with the rest of the Republican base.

The third candidate, Rudy Giuliani seemed from the beginning to have the political validity as well as a successful track record in making things done. This was cemented by his tough stance on crime when he was elected the mayor of New York City. This resulted in a rapid decline in crime statistics where the people of New York contributed this directly to him. In addition to this, he proved to be able to bring people together in the aftermath of September 11th terrorist attacks. For this he received great praise and gained a lot of popularity, and was for this reason the frontrunner when he announced his run in late 2006. All this however proved to be a non match against his often too liberal stances on core Republican values such as gun control, health care and same sex partnerships.

28 3.0. Political Identity. Senator McCain has attempted to position himself as a candidate who does not necessarily go by party line, but is rather guided by what is right and reasonable. In this way, Senator McCain has managed to create a name for himself as a person who can be trusted to do the right thing. This has earned him the nickname maverick, something his campaign wished to utilize as much as possible. But is Senator McCain truly a maverick, a person who fought against the bureaucracy of Washington and succeeded to tell about it? Or is senator McCain more a good politician in the sense that he knows which aspects of his political views to emphasize and which to turn into attributes if they presented to be less than fortunate for his campaign?

This chapter will argue that Senator McCain was more a maverick on the surface than in substance. This chapter will also argue that despite creating bipartisan collaboration with Democratic senators, Senator McCain was a maverick on the surface as he failed to carry through the results of the bipartisan collaboration when opportunity arose. Despite of this, Senator McCain remained known as the maverick of Washington. This chapter will argue that this was the result of Senator McCain’s subliminal political skills and this, combined with his ability to raise awareness on an issue only to maintain the status quo when it was time to cast the vote, resulted in Senator McCain gaining much praise for his seemingly maverick status. Despite of this flip-flop in opinion, this chapter will argue, senator McCain did not seem to suffer negative consequences but was rather strengthened and positioned as a candidate who “had seen the light” rather than a candidate who was flip-flopping. This chapter will focus on the two major political issues that helped position Senator McCain as a political maverick and will argue that due to taking on these controversial political issues, Senator McCain came out as a positioned and strong candidate.

29 3.1. Maverick Tendencies. One of the things many people came to associate John McCain with in the Republican Presidential Primaries in 2008 was the term maverick. Over the course of his campaign he utilized this term to the fullest, which eventually made him stand out with the voters. This term came to help John McCain a great deal during the Republican Primaries in 2008 as this term came to serve as a differentiation term to separate him from the other candidates. One of the first instances where Senator McCain proved he was able and willing to go against the Republican Party line was with the tobacco bill in 1997 (Howells (2011), p.137). This bill was considered controversial, as it would provide the FDA the power to reform and restructure the processes by which tobacco products are manufactured, marketed, and distributed. This would result in a significant change in policy, and essentially mean that the Republicans who were receiving contributions from tobacco companies, were risking alienating those contributors if the bill was passed (Howells (2011), p.137).

In its essence the symbolic significance of the bill and the fact that it was introduced by John McCain, meant that Senator McCain was able and willing to work against the established thinking in Washington in order to do what benefitted the American people the best – regulating the tobacco market. Even though the bill eventually died and Senator McCain did not attempt to modify the bill or in any other way change the bill to make sure a modified version would be more palatable for the Republican base, Senator McCain still came out of this situation looking like a hero (Howells (2011), p.140). With this bill he had proved he was willing to work with the Democrats in order to serve the greater good – the health of the American people (Rosenbaum (1998). As a result of this, senator McCain was widely hailed by the media for his stance against the tobacco companies’ influence on Washington (Rosenbaum (1998). What became an interesting side factor, is that the discussions about the tobacco bill brought forward questions and discussions about campaign contributions, as the campaign contributions were the driving force behind any candidate or a member of Congress. This coincided with Senator McCain’s

30 cooperation on a bill that limited the influence of campaign contributors, later known as the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.

3.2. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. In order to fully understand the significance of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, one needs to understand the conditions around the bill that made it a significant piece of legislation. In the aftermath of the , Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 19711 (Beitz (1984), p. 130). Its main aim was to establish comprehensive regulations on the way the political campaigns, both for Congress as well as for the presidency, raised money. The act as well as its subsequent amendments regulated nearly all aspects of the campaign finance activity that included the four dominant issues; the source of the contributions, the size of the contribution, public disclosure and public financing of presidential campaigns (Beitz (1984), p.130). Its aim was to create a transparent environment in the campaign framework in order to avoid another Watergate scandal. The result of FECA was, among other things that all donations of more than 100 dollars would have to provide substantial information about the donors, which would be available for public inspection. This, along with the preexisting bans on contributions would ensure a transparent framework in the nature of contribution limitations that clearly limited the amount any individual, committee or group could contribute to candidates or their political committees in any election (Beitz (1984), p.131).

This act, however effective in the aim of restricting the so-called hard money, fostered at the same time an increasing focus on the so-called soft money by the ruling of the Federal Election Commission. The Federal Election Commission, an independent regulatory agency that was created in a provision of the 1974 amendment to FECA, ruled that a donor could donate unlimited funds to a political party as long as it was aimed for party activities that did not directly support the

1 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 will hereafter be referred to as FECA.

31 candidate (Gitell (2003). Under these conditions it fostered an open door to unlimited funds from which the political party ultimately spent on the candidate and in this way opened a loophole in the current legislation. Senator McCain and Democratic Senator Russ Feingold formed a bipartisan cooperation in 1995 in the attempts to propose a bill that would close the loophole left by FECA (Gitell (2003). This bill proved controversial as former President George H.W. Bush vetoed a similar bill passed by a Democratic Congress in 1992, (Gitell (2003) and President Clinton was unable to get both houses to agree. This ultimately made the bill very unpopular by the time Senator McCain and Senator Feingold started working on it.

Initially the bill met resistance with both the Democrats and Republicans with both sides voting on principal. What becomes a very interesting fact is that the Democrats had more to lose if the bill was passed, as they were more dependent on contributions from soft money than the Republicans (Gitell (2003). However after a series of public scandals including the Enron scandal the bill was passed in 2002 after much turmoil as well as attempts of filibustering the bill. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act earned senator McCain much praise as he was viewed as a person who did not waiver (Gitell (2003). Despite it took six years from the formation of the cooperation between Senator McCain and Senator Feingold until the bill was passed, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act cemented Senator McCain’s status as a maverick (Krasno & Goldstein, 2002). To this effect Senator McCain served as the facilitator of the change in his status as maverick by the theory of behavioral psychology. In the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act passing in 2002 after a series of scandals including the Enron scandal helped validate Senator McCain’s viewpoint on the issue and for that reason validated the need and public opinion of the bill.

32 3.4. Pavlov’s Dog. According to psychological theories there is a specific term that explains why people react the way they do in certain situations. This theory is known as stimuli-response theory and is perhaps mostly known by the experiment of psychologist Ivan Pavlov’s experiment with dogs and the formation of saliva. The theory is widely used in associative learning that involves pairing an unconditioned stimulus that always triggers a reflexive response with a neutral stimulus that usually does not trigger a response. After conditioning is complete a response can be obtained for both the unconditioned stimulus as well as the neutral stimulus. In other words, by the repetition of a stimulus in close connection to the desired aspect, one will accomplish an association to the desired aspect by using a neutral stimulus. An example is the famous Pavlov’s dogs experiment as shown below. The purpose of Pavlov’s dog in this chapter is to show how learning and association by learning can take place if one repeats the same thing many times. By the use of the theory, I will then argue that Senator McCain gained the label of maverick by the media using same mechanisms as shown in the figure below.

Figure 5: Pavlov’s dogs

Source: Adaptation from McLeod (2013).

33 In image 1 of figure 5 the dog reacts to the food shown in front of him (stimulus) by producing saliva (response). In image 2 the dog does not react when the stimulus is of a neutral subject, as it does not associate the neutral stimulus with anything particular. In image 3, the dog is shown an image of the food while having the appearance of the neutral object shown at the same time. This results in the production of saliva. Over time, the dog merely needs to hear the sounds of the bell that was a neutral subject before in order to start the production of saliva as this creates an accusation to the food. This means that there is a learning process happening here by the means of condition. The dog is learning that if the bell sounds, he will receive a treat (McLeod (2013). The interesting aspect here becomes that the learning process is happening because it is immediately followed by a positive effect, a reinforcement.

3.5. Political Behavior and Pavlov’s Dog. The aspect of learning by condition can be transferred to the political aspect in a campaign as well as in political scenery that does not necessarily involve a campaign. The key aspect here becomes the learning by condition as well as the exposure and linking of a candidate to a particular subject, issue or political view. This introduces the aspect of political behavior as a tool in understanding how people vote. According to Houghton (2009), political behavior is defined by any type of activity designed to meet a particular political end (Houghton (2009), p. 6). In this broad definition, political behavior entails the seemingly everyday acts such as voting, to extreme behavior such as terrorism. Political behavior also involves answering the question of why people vote they way they do as well as the study of general decision making within politics from the voter’s point of view. It is important to note that there is a distinction between two types of processes of decision-making. One is based on the individual as a rational assumption that the human being makes a decision based on the rational outweigh of the consideration of both sides of an issue before making a well thought out decision (Houghton

34 (2009), p. 8). The other involves the opinion of groups and social constructions as the focal point in our decision-making. The latter focal point of decision-making will be the focal point in this thesis. Considering the nature of the theme, politics, it becomes essential to focus on the latter.

The study of human behavior has been a constant study within the field of psychology in the last century and to this day leaves behavioral psychologists puzzled. In reality two seemingly similar people in terms of demographical outlines can have different reactions when faced in the same situation. This is because half of our reasons for making a particular decision stems from our own experience. A war refugee who was beaten by the police would in theory have a different reaction to police officers than a person who did not experience the same thing (Houghton (2009), p. 15). Although this factor is acknowledged, it will not be the focus point. This is due to the aim of investigating the effect on outer stimulus and the effect of those in the political decision-making process. The adaptation of the experiment of Pavlov’s dog can be transferred to politics in the sense of stimulus and response learning objective. If the learning objective of Pavlov’s dog results in a satisfactory learning process in politics, it can in this way help facilitate a positive decision- making process for the candidate in question. This is illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 6: Adaptation of Pavlov’s dog to politics.

Stage 1 Stage 2

BRCA Media Candidate Media

No Response (Interest) Response (Saliva=interest)

35 Stage 3 Stage 4

Maverick-tendency Media Maverick-tendency Media + Candidate Response (Interest) Response (Interest)

Source: Adaptation from McLeod (2013) onto politics.

In stage 1 of figure 6 the media is the facilitator of the learning process. This is because the media facilitates the information to the American public, who in the end are the ones making the decision. So when the media is shown the image of the candidate, figuratively speaking, the media generates a response in the form of interest. The production of saliva in the dog in figure 5 can be translated to interest in figure 6. For the media, it is a factor of interest that a Republican Senator forms cooperation with a Democratic Senator on regulating an issue that traditionally is seen as a Republican issue. For a Republican senator wanting to regulate a seemingly Republican cause is an interesting point for the media. In stage 2 when the media is presented with a seemingly neutral stimulus, which in this case can be general information about the proposal of a bill, this does not seem to generate the same response as in stage 1. The BRCA that is mentioned here is the Bipartisan Reform Campaign Act. However in stage 3 when the proposal of a bill is linked to Senator McCain’s cooperation with Democratic Senator Feingold, it creates an interest, as this does not coincide with the general outline of Republican tendencies in politics. In this way, because it is Senator McCain who obviously goes against his own party line, he is credited with having maverick tendencies. In stage 4 it is therefore the mere mention of the word maverick that leads thought to Senator McCain and creates a response, as he in this way becomes the poster child for that term.

36

One can argue that a single instance of a candidate portraying maverick tendencies will not be enough for that candidate to become known as a maverick. For this reason it becomes that much more interesting to look at the next example mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the proposal of the tobacco bill. In this instance, Senator McCain assumed the lead in the attempt to regulate an issue that was a core Republican issue. He attempted to regulate the tobacco industry by allowing the FDA the mandate to regulate the tobacco industry. In reality, this would mean a higher tax on cigarettes and advertisements against smoking. However, the media had not forgotten his maverick tendencies and his work in attempting to regulate the tobacco industries helped cement his image of the political maverick (Renshon, 2008, p. 392). He became known as the political outsider who spoke his mind and who weighed in what was best for the American people at the expense of conventional party lines (Renshon, 2008, p.393). However the ironic twist in Senator McCain’s maverick status in the 90’ies is that he counted on it to be a helping factor as he was preparing for the 2000 presidential election. His maverick image turned however to be a hindrance as it ended up alienating the Republican conservatives (McMahon et all (2009), p.15).

3.6. Leadership Style and POW. By the late 1990’ies Senator John McCain had become synonymous with the image of a political maverick. However this image came to cost him in the 2000 Presidential election because as he was viewed as too liberal by the established Republicans (Apple (2000). However his background as a prisoner of war (POW) in Vietnam helped validate his reputation and in way, validate his maverick status. The narrative symbolic value of his story as POW of how he refused to sign a confession when he was held captive, illustrates his willingness to fight, despite the situation and despite the seemingly impossible task of succeeding. In this way, his own personal story becomes the most validating aspect of his political maverick image. It

37 shows that this is the kind of person and candidate he is, a rebel and a fighter but at the same time a candidate who possesses a great deal of experience (Renshon, 2008, p. 394). Because of this experience and willingness and ability to work across party lines, he in this way enforces the image of the change he would bring to the country. In order for Senator McCain’s narrative to be believable it needs to be authentic and reinforce his authenticity (Renshon, 2008, p. 394) and in this instance his personal story becomes the reinforcement in itself. In a very authentic way Senator McCain brings forward a plausible image of how his administration would look like with him as the Commander in Chief. The possible McCain administration would have a willingness to build bipartisan alliances on high profile and tough causes despite the adversity that might result from that. In its sheer principle, a possible McCain administration would not be restrained by conventional Republican Party line.

3.7. Chapter Conclusion. In the 1990’ies Senator McCain repositioned himself as a politician with maverick tendencies. This was done as Senator McCain took on the political task of reforming two major issues, which were considered Republican core issues. The proposal of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that was passed in 2002 seemingly closed the loophole that came in the wake of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. The Federal Election Campaign Act focused on the regulation of campaign funds within the four dominant issues; the source of the contributions, the size of the contribution, public disclosure and public financing of presidential campaigns and in this way create a transparent environment concerning campaign contributions. The loophole that was created with the Federal Election Campaign Act provided access to make donations within the so-called soft money objective, which in its essence meant renaming the contribution as a contribution to the party and not the individual candidate, the so-called soft money. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act closed this loophole by passing regulations on the soft money and the act was considered controversial as was seen as a Republican core cause. Although it took

38 seven years for the bill to get passed, Senator McCain did not falter. The work on the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act would probably not have cemented his maverick image had it not been for another task he took on against another one of the Republican Party’s core issues, the tobacco industry. The tobacco bill worked with granting the FDA more regulation power towards the industry and in essence it would result in higher taxes on cigarette and the creation of anti-smoking ads. This, with the help of media coverage, helped cement Senator McCain’s image as a political maverick that was more concerned with the American people than strong personal interest groups in Washington. His political maverick image accompanied with his own personal story helped form the persona of a candidate who was willing and able to both work across party lines as well as a candidate who was courageous enough to address the tough and difficult political issues despite it going against already established party lines.

39 4.0. Backing from Key Interests. In a presidential campaign it is important to have endorsement and backing from influential people that surround the candidate. It is important as the person endorsing a candidate is transferring his ethos to that particular candidate and in that sense it becomes a seal of approval for the candidate. For the person endorsing the candidate it becomes important that the candidate subject to the endorsement handles himself in a manner that will not hurt the ethos of the endorser. Because of this, it becomes that much more important who is endorsing the candidate as well as how the endorsement is given. It has much of a symbolic meaning who endorses a particular candidate, as the endorsement in itself is a sign of approval for that particular candidate and his views. For this reason, an endorsement can often create a shock value and give cause for questions and dialogue as to why this particular person/organization/company endorsed this particular candidate.

This chapter will argue that in order for Senator McCain to complete the image of a maverick, it was important for him to receive endorsement from non-Republican channels. This chapter will argue that Senator John McCain received a good deal of endorsement from traditional Republican affiliates, but what becomes even more important is that Senator McCain also received endorsement from traditional liberal channels. This chapter will argue that that endorsement made him more popular in the polls and hence made a contributing factor in his campaign. This chapter will argue that Senator McCain’s campaign had a strategy in making the senator look more appealing to the republican base by knowing which attributes to stress and which not to make that dominant. In conclusion, this chapter will argue that by Senator McCain gaining the endorsement from both Republican conservatives as well as from the liberals, he in this way symbolized a candidate who would potentially be able to unite both parties in Congress.

40 4.1. The Transfer Meaning Model. In order to understand what it means for a candidate to receive the endorsement of a public figure, we need to understand the theory behind endorsement. The symbolic meaning behind endorsement can best be described as transfer of meaning and attributes from person A, the endorser, to person B, the endorsee. This means that the endorser transfers his own attributes and what he stands for to the endorsee and in this way makes a stamp of approval on the endorsee. This is perhaps best illustrated in the consumer world where celebrities endorse products (McCracken, 1989). Grant McCracken, senior lecturer at Harvard Business School who has written several books about the subject, provides a clear description in the transfer-meaning model seen below.

Figure 7: The Transfer Meaning Model. Culture Endorsement Consumption

Persona Celebrity Product

Celebrity Product Consumer

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage3 Source: Adapted from McCracken, (1989), p.315.

The transfer meaning model consists of three stages, stage one, two and three and the arrows illustrate which way the meaning travels. In stage one we find the celebrity, who, shaped by the persona, the culture, around has specific attributes and is known for something. The persona can consist of an actual persona, as is the case in this chapter. However the persona can also be an

41 object, a way of life, a set of opinions etc. In order words, the celebrity is a celebrity because of the attributes awarded. The word celebrity is here used for explanation purposes, as the celebrity does not necessarily need to be an actual celebrity in order for the transfer-meaning model to take effect. Here, the culture around the celebrity makes the celebrity relevant in particular genres that have a desire to transfer the ethos from the celebrity onto their product.

In stage two, the task is to try and transfer the attributes the celebrity is known for, onto the product. Ideally, the celebrity chosen for this task should have some kind of connection to the product in order to make the transfer of meaning more natural and logical. In this stage, the most important thing is to make sure that all the good attributes from the celebrity; social, physical and personal are transferred to the desired product. In this stage there is much focus on the similarity between the celebrity and the product in order for the consumer to draw the logical conclusion that the celebrity and the product are the same, e.g. meaning transfer. This stage is complete when the consumer starts seeing the attributes of the celebrity as the attributes of the product. In stage three, if successful, the attributes of the celebrity are transferred to the product so in this stage the task becomes to sustain the meaning transfer gained in stage two. This means that it is merely not enough for the consumer to have acknowledged that the celebrity and product are one. It is about maintaining this notion by the means of repetition (McCracken (1989), p.310-318).

One of the very good examples of a successful meaning transfer is the basketball player Michael Jordan and Nike’s use of his celebrity status. Michael Jordan was a very popular basketball player for the Chicago Bulls in the 1980’ies. According to the NBA, he is “by acclimation, Michael Jordan is the greatest basketball player of all time” (NBA history, 2013). He was especially known for his leaping abilities where he could perform a slam-dunk from a free throw line as well as in slam-dunk contests. This ability earned him the nickname Air Jordan (NBA history, 2013). The shoe company Nike saw the potential in this and in 1984, the first Nike Air Jordan’s

42 were produced. Here, the meaning transfer that happened was the attributes of Michael Jordan to sneakers. Everything Michael Jordan stood for was boiled down to a pair of sneakers, symbolically transferring the reason of Michael Jordan’s success to good sneakers. In other words, if you wanted to be able to slam-dunk as Michael Jordan, the Nike Air Jordan’s will give you the possibility to do that.

4.2. The Transfer Meaning Model Applied on John McCain. The transfer-meaning model is usually used to explain the theory behind when celebrities endorse products (McCracken, 1989, p. 312). However it can also be applied in the current situation, as the factors behind remain the same. When endorsing something, whether it be a product and the endorser is a famous basketball player, or if the endorser is a United States senator, the mechanism of the endorsement is the same. By endorsing, Michael Jordan vouches for the sneakers and in Senator McCain’s case, the people who were endorsing him, vouch for him possibly leaving themselves exposed for liability (Till & Shimp (1998), p.67-70). When Senator McCain gained endorsement from prominent figures in the political spectrum, it was the same mechanics that prevailed. Below, the transfer-meaning model is illustrated to apply in the current situation.

43 Figure 8: Transfer Meaning Model revised. Culture Endorsement The Public

Endorser McCain American Public/ Republican Party

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Source: Adapted from McCracken 1989, p.315.

In the revised transfer-meaning model there are still three stages. In stage 1, there is now the endorser, which was the celebrity in figure 7. In this stage the celebrity is named the endorser, as this is the person endorsing Senator McCain. The Endorser is not a celebrity in the traditional sense but is more seen as the endorser. However the endorser is still to a certain extent a celebrity in the sense that he/she is known in the general public and the culture in which he/she is a part of. In stage 2 is where the transfer of meaning takes place. However, in McCracken’s original model (McCracken, 1989. P.315), it was the product being endorsed. In the revised model the product becomes Senator McCain, as he is the subject of the endorsement. In the revised transfer-meaning model, Senator McCain becomes “the product” that the endorser is supporting. In that sense, just as Michael Jordan and the sneakers, Senator McCain gains the attributes that the endorser has.

44 In other words, the person or object that is supporting senator McCain is by default known for something e.g. political views, ideological view or a personal standpoint. This means that the endorser, by giving Senator McCain his endorsement, is symbolically transferring his attributes to the senator. In this way the endorser gives Senator McCain their stamp of approval (Martin (1996), p.33). This becomes especially important in politics and in this Presidential election, as the candidate who is the subject of endorsement is supposed to potentially lead the country. This means that the symbolic effect of who the endorser is becomes very important as this ultimately shows how good the subject of the endorsement, the candidate, is at being an uniting factor – a necessity for a potential president. In stage 3, consumption is substituted with the American Public and Republican Party as they are ultimately the ones who will decide if the endorsement has been successful when they cast their votes or, prior to this, in the polls. The theory behind is that if the endorsement has been successful, the result will be visible in the polls.

4.3. Restructuring Inside the McCain Camp. Judging by the polls, Senator McCain’s campaign was successful in the meaning transfer through endorsement from key interests in politics. This seems evident if one examines the results in the polls before and after Senator McCain gained the endorsement from fellow candidates who withdrew from the election as well as endorsement from outside the campaign. In July 2007, only five months after Senator McCain announced he was running (McCain announces '08 bid on Letterman, (2007), the McCain campaign is struggling to raise funds and because of that, start restructuring the campaign (McCain’s Candidacy: A Timeline, NPR). At this time Senator McCain’s polls are showing around 16 per cent (Saad, (2007) A). After this period, Senator McCain’s campaign seems to start another path in which the senator starts repositioning himself.

45 On September 27th, 2007 Senator McCain’s campaign release a campaign ad with never before seen images of the senator as POW (Courage Campaign Ad, 2007). In the campaign ad, Senator McCain stresses his leadership skills while at the same time stressing that the current government is broken and the ad marked the beginning of his “No Surrender” tour, which in its essence had two purposes. In the light of Senator McCain’s recent decrease in polls, the No Surrender tour serves as a reminder that the senator is not yet out of the election while at the same time setting all sails on New Hampshire (Jones & Vassallo (2009), p. 59). It was in New Hampshire that Senator McCain gained positive feedback in the Presidential Primaries in 2000 (Jones & Vassallo (2009), p. 59) and the hope was that it would be a repeat performance this time around too. However the ad did not have the desired effect in the polls as they showed little difference that could be due to statistical margin of error (Saad, (2007) A). On October 11th, 2007 Senator McCain presents a healthcare reform plan in Iowa, which in its essence will control costs and restore personal responsibility (Gearino, (2007). This too, does not seem to have an impact on his polls, as they remain virtually the same (Saad, (2007) A).

4.4. Endorsement from Joe Lieberman. On December 17,2007 Democratic Senator of Connecticut, Joe Lieberman publicly crossed party line and endorsed Senator McCain (King & Bash, (2007). Senator Lieberman stated that Senator McCain would be the best choice for the President of The United States as the senator was able to be a facilitator and help solve problems across party lines.

"Being a Republican is important. Being a Democrat is important. But you know what's more important than that? The interest and well-being of the United States of America," – Sen. Joe Lieberman Source: (King & Bash, (2007).

46

Senator Lieberman was a prominent figure in the Democratic Party as he was the Vice-President nominee in the 2000 Presidential Election along side . In this sense, senator Lieberman had a certain ethos around his persona. Such a statement from a Democratic senator raised eyebrows on the Democratic side making Senate’s Majority Leader Harry Reid publicly state that he opposed and “strongly disagreed” with Senator Lieberman (King & Bash, (2007). Aside from the fact that this was one of the first public endorsements Senator McCain received, it also came from his political opposite. In addition to this, Senator Lieberman attended and helped Senator McCain answer questions in a town hall meeting in Derry, New Hampshire prior to the New Hampshire primaries on January 3rd, 2008 (Jones & Vassallo (2009), p. 59-61). In other words, Senator Lieberman’s endorsement went far beyond traditional endorsement for a candidate, especially endorsement from the opposite side of the political spectrum. This seemed to help Senator McCain gain momentum and focus his campaign on New Hampshire. As a result of this, as well as campaigning ferociously in New Hampshire, Senator McCain won New Hampshire and this created a domino effect in the polls as shown below.

Figure 9: Polling Results over the period of 4 weeks in January 2008.

40 35 30 25 John McCain 20 15 10 Mike 5 Huckabee 0 Week Week Mitt Romney

1, 3, Jan Jan 08 08

47 Source: Adapted from Gallup Daily: Tracking Election 2008 (2008).

What becomes an interesting observation point at this point in time is that the endorsement from Senator Joe Lieberman serves as a spark in Senator McCain’s campaign while at the same time serves as a shock effect. In the meaning-transfer model, Senator Joe Lieberman serves as the endorser for Senator McCain. By endorsing Senator McCain, Senator Lieberman aims to embody his own attributes onto Senator McCain, which serves three tasks; public endorsement from a political opposite, the shock value of the endorsement of a political opposite and changing on Senator McCain due to the endorsement. For a candidate who has been trying to position himself as a maverick, this endorsement is worth its weight in gold as it personifies, and in addition validates, that Senator McCain can be the candidate to unite the country.

4.5. Endorsement from Other Key Interests. From the looks of figure 9 above, there seems to be a correlation between prominent figures endorsing senator McCain and his following increase in the polls. There seems to be a domino effect of firstly Senator McCain gaining endorsement of a prominent figure in politics, secondly his rise in the polls to his subsequent win in that state. If one is to look at an example of in 2008. In 2008, Super Tuesday was on February 4th. Senator McCain won the states with the most delegates, namely California, New York and New Jersey. Prior to Super Tuesday, the Governor of California Arnold Schwarzenegger publicly endorses Senator McCain, praising his ability to reach across political aisles to get the job done (Bumiller & Luo (2008). Subsequent of this, Senator McCain wins Florida causing mayor Rudy Giuliani to drop out of the race and point his endorsement towards Senator McCain (Ponn (2008). The combination of these two factors, the endorsement from Governor Schwarzenegger and mayor Giuliani causes a surge in the polls for senator

48 McCain on January 27th, 2008 and in this way enabling him to win the states where his endorsers came from, namely California, New York and New Jersey.

This effect seems to have caused Senator McCain to gain momentum in the polls, and as he was gaining momentum, the domino effect seemed to have an enhancing effect causing more momentum, the more momentum he got, combined with mayor Giuliani dropping out of the election. In this way Senator McCain gained the best of both worlds; he gained momentum as well as gaining the positive attributes from mayor Giuliani through his endorsement. Because of this, by mayor Giuliani withdrawing from the election at that particular time, just before Super Tuesday, seems to have been the best thing that could have happened to Senator McCain as it practically served him the win of New York and New Jersey on a silver platter.

4.6. General Endorsement. Senator McCain gained endorsement from different parts of the political spectrum. Naming all of them would for that reason be a lengthy process and because of that this chapter has put its focus on the endorsements that validate the key points where Senator McCain has been trying to position himself. As a Republican candidate it is somewhat expected that the majority of Republican senators and representatives cast their endorsement towards their own candidate. This has also proved to be true in regards to Senator McCain. However the more prominent names in politics whose endorsement had a twofold meaning the following can be named; former President George H.W. Bush and his Secretary of State James Baker, , Lieutenant General John B. Conaway the former Chief of the National Guard Bureau. Others included R. James Woolsey, Jr., former CIA Director under President as well as Anne O. Krueger, former World Bank Chief Economist. Through their occupation, the above-mentioned endorsers all had a function that would validate Senator McCain’s positioning points.

49 Senator McCain positioned himself as a candidate who had knowledge about military strategy and for that reason endorsement from key figures in military as lieutenant general John B Conway, Henry Kissinger and former CIA director R. James Woolsey Jr. validated that fact by endorsing him. Senator McCain also positioned himself as a candidate who knew how to fix the economy and that fact was validated by the endorsement from Anne O. Krueger, former World Bank Chief Economist. Although former president George W. Bush also endorsed Senator McCain, he has not been taken into account as a validating factor by his endorsement. The reason for this is because it is somewhat expected that the incumbent President endorse the candidate from the same party as his successor.

4.7. Endorsement from Reverend John Hagee. One of the more controversial sides to Senator McCain’s endorsements was the one from reverend John Hagee. John Hagee is a reverend from Texas known for his controversial views on homosexuals, the Catholic Church and the Holocaust in his sermons. He has linked hurricane Katrina to the gay rights movement stating, “All of the city was punished because of the sin that happened there in that city." (Greenfield (2008). Senator McCain who had been seeking endorsement from the religious right in order to create a greater affiliation towards the conservative voters, initially welcomed the endorsement from reverend Hagee and guarded the endorsement by stating that "I don't have to agree with everyone who endorses my candidacy” (Greenfield (2008) but as the controversy grew over the coarse of the next three months, Senator McCain was ultimately left with no choice but to reject reverend Hagee’s endorsement (Luo (2008).

The interesting aspect of both the endorsement from reverend Hagee as well as the subsequent reject of his endorsement by Senator McCain was the sheer length of time passed from the endorsement to the rejection. It took Senator McCain three months to publically reject reverend Hagee’s endorsement (Luo (2008). It is important to notice that the length in time did not seem to hurt Senator McCain’s

50 campaign. For this reason, it seems that the correlation between the momentum Senator McCain gained by mid January 2008 until Super Tuesday in 2008 that was responsible. The endorsement from reverend Hagee came on February 29th 2008 but was formally rejected on May 22nd 2008 (Luo (2008). By February 29th 2008 senator McCain had also gained the endorsement from Mitt Romney who withdrew from the election on February 7th 2008 (Sullivan & Luo (2008) and Senator McCain had by this time more or less the nomination secured.

4.8. Chapter Conclusion. Senator McCain showed that it is important to have endorsements and especially prominent political figures for support. In this chapter Senator McCain proved that by changing strategy and different positioning along with the help of timing was an important part of his campaign. After experiencing an approval rate of 15 per cent in the summer of 2007, Senator McCain knew it was time for a restructuring of the campaign. In the wake of restructuring his campaign was re-launched with a “No Surrender” tour that in its essence had two focal points; to keep Senator McCain’s name still in top of mind and to start intense campaigning in New Hampshire. New Hampshire had proven to be very helpful to Senator McCain in the Presidential Primaries in 2000 and he was hoping for a repeat performance. In the beginning it did not seem to be transcending into the polls but this changed when senator McCain gained the endorsement from his political opposite in the form of Connecticut Senator Joe Lieberman. Senator Lieberman, who was a Democratic senator, was one of the first who endorsed Senator McCain and this particular endorsement had a high symbolic, as well as sparking, value.

The endorsement from Senator Lieberman had a contributing factor in Senator McCain’s increase in the polls. The endorsement in form of words but more importantly, the endorsement in the form of campaigning alongside Senator McCain in New Hampshire, gave McCain the momentum he needed in order to start his

51 climb in the polls. This helped create a domino effect where the more Senator McCain’s momentum grew, the more support he gained from prominent political figures such as California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. This resulted in the endorsement from Governor Schwarzenegger coming in just days before the endorsement from New York mayor Rudy Giuliani who withdrew from the race after losing in Florida. This coincidence in timing with endorsement from two prominent political figures made Senator McCain more than ready for the important Super Tuesday primaries the following week. As a result, Senator McCain won the important states of California, New York and New Jersey. In addition to this, Senator McCain also gained the endorsement from figures who, by their endorsement, helped establish and validate his positioning in politics. This included people from the military, former Secretaries of State and economists. This became an important factor as it solidified Senator McCain as a solid candidate.

52 5.0. Distancing from Bush Administration. In the previous chapters it has been argued that Senator McCain’s perceived image as a maverick, backing from key interests along with a lack of one strong counter candidate has been beneficial for the senator as it gave him the possibility to stand out and reposition himself. However, as will be argued in this chapter, Senator McCain also needed to establish a clear distance between himself and the Bush administration. The reason for the need to establish a distance can be seen as twofold; firstly, the current administration had proved to be increasingly unpopular and secondly, in order for Senator McCain’s image as a maverick to carry more weight as discussed in chapter 3, he needed to assert himself as a candidate who not only was perceived as a maverick but who also embodied the maverick spirit in terms of questioning the current administration and its policies. In this way, the demonstration of differences between the Bush administration and Senator McCain becomes more clear and outspoken due to the symbolic value of a Republican candidate publically going against the policies that he originally backed to begin with.

As a strategy, this could potentially be risky due to the nature of the strategy. The switching of stance could equivocally have a potential risk of creating the label as a flip-flop candidate and a candidate who did not stand by his policies. However, in this chapter it will be argued that due to the public opinion of the Bush administration, it was pivotal for any candidate to create a certain distance to the current administration if the Republican candidate aspired to have a chance in winning the election. Furthermore, this chapter will argue that Senator McCain took this point even further by establishing a variegated distance between himself as a candidate and the Bush administration in order to gain more support from the moderate Republicans. Senator McCain needed the moderate Republicans, as this group embodied the perceived change in him as a candidate whose support Senator McCain needed in order to win the nomination. Furthermore this chapter will argue that there was in fact a need to create a distance to the Bush administration in order

53 to have a successful candidacy and have the ability to present something new as a Republican candidate.

5.1. The Need to Create Distance. One can argue why there was a need to create a distance to the Bush administration. Towards the second term of the Bush administration, President Bush had grown very unpopular with the American people. According to a Gallup poll, the President’s approval rate was at an all time low.

Figure 10: President Bush Approval Rate.

Source: Adapted from Presidential Approval Ratings (Gallup).

Figure 10 above shows how President Bush approval rate has dropped considerably from being over 60 per cent when he got elected as president to 90 per cent after the September 11th terrorist attacks. After the September 11th terrorist attacks his approval rate slowly but surely decreases only to surge around the time of the invasion of Iraq. After that, his approval rates slowly decrease to reach an all time

54 low in 2007 of 30 per cent. This bears a great significance to Senator McCain as he is now facing two challenges; on one hand he needs to show the American people why the next four years as Commander in Chief would not be more of the same as with President Bush. However on the other hand he still needs to show that his administration would bear the markings of a Republican administration in order to satisfy the GOP.

In this case it means that Senator McCain needs to be just enough of a Republican within the Party while at the same time being just enough of a maverick. If he goes as far as denouncing everything the Bush Administration stands for, he risks biting off the hand that feeds him. On the other hand, if he stands behind the policies of the Bush Administration, it plays into the hands of his critics who would eventually use this as proof of how a possible McCain administration would not be significantly different than the current Bush Administration. With this in mind, it seems as though Senator McCain needs to place more focus on the moderate Republicans. Senator McCain had already established himself as a “different Republican” which means he has moved more towards the middle in the political spectrum. This opens the door in attracting the attention and not to mention votes from moderate Republicans.

5.2. Insurgency As The Best Strategy. The Republican Presidential nomination of 2008 was shaping out to be like no other in decades. For the first time, a candidate who was weaker than the more established candidates in the election, was leading in the polls. The other candidates who were thought to gain the most votes were established candidates who had a certain group backing them. Patriots could support mayor Rudy Giuliani, businesspeople had Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney and the Christian evangelical conservatives had Mike Huckabee as their front man. However outside their comfort zone and their narrow voters base, the other candidates proved in having difficulties with attracting and appealing to the vast majority of the

55 Republican voter base. Subsequently, similar to the game of musical chairs, Senator McCain was the last left standing (Walker, 2008, p. 1101). This combined with the fact that the Bush Administration was highly unpopular and the fact that Senator McCain had already established himself as a rebel who did not necessarily follow the party line. He was also known for bipartisan cooperation with Democrats on important issues, and this made the insurgent strategy more plausible and suitable for senator McCain’s leadership style and maverick image. In this way Senator McCain embodied his leadership style and maverick image by showing how he was planning on changing Washington.

According to Walker, 2008, the only viable strategy for any candidate was to be insurgent and challenge the status quo (Walker, 2008, p. 1098). Due to the political atmosphere where an unpopular war had dragged on, and served as an increasing reminder to the American people that they were fighting the war due to the Bush administration. However the paradox was that despite of the American people having grown tired of the partisan politics and status quo in politics, they were still holding true to their specific policy preferences (Renshon, 2008, p. 394). In other words, the American people were willing to give another Republican candidate a chance if he presented enough change to draw away comparison to the Bush administration as well as being able to present a new way to lead the country. This was good news for Senator McCain, as this meant he had the potential to tap into this pool of frustration and utilize it to his advantage through the candidate and politician he was.

On the other hand, this also meant that Senator McCain needed to go even further in creating a distance to the Bush administration in order for his candidacy to be believable and authentic. In order for Senator McCain to appear authentic, his narrative about himself must correspond with the reality. With Senator McCain, the voter experiences the narrative of a man who served his duty as an American by fighting for his country. Here the virtue of patriotism comes to play and help portray Senator McCain as the all-American hero. Furthermore, the narrative of his time as

56 POW where he suffered torture but would not succumb brings the association to a candidate who does not surrender, even in times of great stress. In accordance with this, Senator McCain’s subsequent career in American politics completes the narrative of an all American hero, who takes the values of not giving up and service for his country to a new level with a personal image as a political maverick. He takes these values and transforms them into a political agenda where he becomes known for a leadership style of independent and bipartisan policies even if they go against the conventional agendas.

For this reason, one can argue that the setting within the political atmosphere of change corresponds well with Senator McCain’s political identity. In a time where the paradox of voters seem to have built up resentment towards the conventional establishment, while at the same time tend to stay true to their political preferences, indicates that Senator McCain can utilize this frustration by being the face of radical change, while at the same time representing the backbone in the Republican party – patriotism and a great dedication to service to the country. This way, Senator McCain represents a change from the current administration but a change back to the original values. Perhaps Senator McCain embodied and represented what both the Republican Party and the country needed right at the time by both his political persona as well as his candid personal characteristics.

Unlike many political leaders, Senator McCain seems to be upfront with his failures and shortcoming, which is a factor adding to his authenticity (Renshon, 2008, p. 419). As a POW, Senator McCain was severely tortured and even though he at first did not give in to the demands of his guards, he, after being weakened by continuous torture and dysentery, eventually signed a document stating he had performed acts of an “air pirate” (Renshon, 2008, p.419). Shortly after this he attempted suicide due to the shame. Upon his return home and after he separated and later divorced his first wife, Senator McCain was very open about that the divorce was due to his own shortcomings (Renshon, 2008, p.419). As a politician it would perhaps have been in his best interest to avoid these things or even present the diplomatic answer. He

57 however chose to be open about his shortcomings. This on the other hand, rather helped than hurt him as it helped complete his authenticity as a person, a politician and a candidate for the highest office in the country. For this reason, he seems to live up to the image of a person who says it like it is without thinking about the repercussions, an image he became known for in his political career.

5.3. Senator McCain on Foreign Policy. In 2007, the Iraq war was becoming an increasingly unpopular war with the American people (Craighill & Clement (2013). Senator McCain originally supported the invasion in Iraq, although he quickly became one of its hardest critics in the aftermath. This was partially due to the turn of events the war took and Senator McCain urged for more troops. Senator McCain was known for going against common perceptions on foreign policy. He was one of the only Republicans who did not agree with President Reagan’s decision to send American troops in Lebanon in 1982 (Carpenter, (2008). In Senator McCain’s opinion, this mission did not serve American interest enough to risk the lives of American troops. Indeed, he was in some sense justified when 241 Marines lost their lives in Lebanon in 1983 (Carpenter, 2008). However, years later, Senator McCain endorsed U.S air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs in the Balkans. The United States did not have any significant stakes in the Balkans and this seemed to contradict Senator McCain’s previous stance of not wanting to involve American troops in places where there were no specific American interest being served. However, Senator McCain advocated for ground troops and not merely air strikes in the Balkans and eventually criticized the then Clinton administration of not doing enough to maintain the stability in the area.

The fact that Senator McCain’s changing stance in situations of seemingly similar nature as the case of Lebanon and the Balkans, further emphasize his ability to change his political stance according to what was thought to be the best at the time in question. However the senator has seemingly always opted for preemptive

58 strikes against what he referred to as rouge regimes, meaning and North Korea (Carpenter, 2008). In 2002, Senator McCain was disappointed that President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell publically ruled out the use of military force with North Korea. North Korea had started to gain an arsenal of nuclear weapons and senator McCain’s aim was to threaten with military strikes if North Korea did not abandon from the development of nuclear weapons (Carpenter, 2008). This point is further straightened by Senator McCain’s own proposals for a foreign policy plan in 2008 (McCain, 2007). In this Senator McCain urges for a stay in Iraq in order to succeed as well as he urges for a surge in troops in order to make the war in Iraq a success (McCain, 2007). He argues that the situation in the Middle East is far too important and would give grounds for a growth in Islamic terrorism with the eventual withdrawal of American troops. He argues that although it is politically unpopular, it is a necessity to keep the troops in Iraq.

“Whether success grows closer or more distant over the coming months, it is clear that Iraq will be a central issue for the next U.S. president (…) The war in Iraq cannot be wished away, and it is a miscalculation of historic magnitude to believe that the consequences of failure will be limited to one administration or one party.”

Source: McCain, 2007, .

With this standpoint, Senator McCain goes against the accepted opinion about the Iraq war and its unpopularity while at the same time establishing a distance with the current policy of the Bush Administration. Instead of accepting the popular belief of the unpopularity of the war, Senator McCain shows hos maverick stance once again by arguing for a surge in troops as a way of becoming successful in Iraq. His maverick qualities that the American people as well as the GOP have been witnessing for some time now, seem to substantiate that Senator McCain is not afraid of going against the established opinion concerning the war, nor is he afraid of seemingly doing what it takes to make sure the task is successful.

59 5.4. Senator McCain on Iraq War. An interesting albeit not logical turn of events that in many ways helped Senator McCain and established a clear distance between himself and the Bush administration was exactly the clear stance from Senator McCain on the issue of the Iraq war. One would draw the logical conclusion of when the war in Iraq was as unpopular as it was, it would be logical to think that the candidate who goes against the public opinion and urges for more troops, this candidate would not be a popular candidate. However for Senator McCain, this was not the case, it was rather the other way around. According to the Gallup poll below, it seems that the Iraq war would come to play a big role in the Presidential Primaries. According to this, it is likely to signify that the war would be an issue of significant importance.

Figure 11: Importance of the Iraq war.

Source: Adapted from Jones, 2007 B.

According to figure 11, both current and past stance on the issue of the war in Iraq would play an important role in the election. Out of 2000 potential voters asked, 70 per cent answered that the stance on the war in Iraq was extremely important or

60 very important (Jones (2007B). However the poll did not take into consideration whether or not the respondents were for or against the war and for this reason the only thing that can be concluded is that, one way or another, the war in Iraq shaped up to be an important issue in the upcoming election. Senator McCain had been a very strong critic of the war as well as he had been the most vocal advocate for an increase in troops on the ground. As discussed earlier, Senator McCain had taken a clear stance in which he confirmed that the war was in fact not going well but that it was of most importance that there was a success in Iraq. A success in Iraq was within reach, however only if the number of troops on the ground were increased.

“We’ve got to win, we do—still do not enough of the kind of troops we need over there, and it’s going to be a very difficult process. Well, I think it’s been well documented now that we didn’t have enough there from the beginning, that we allowed the looting, that we did not have control, particularly, of areas, such—in the Sunni Triangle, which led to us paying a very heavy price. We make mistakes in every war, and serious mistakes were made here. The question is, are we going to be able to bring the situation under control now? I still believe we can.”

Source: Meet the Press, 2006.

With this statement and the other similar statements from senator McCain concerning the war in Iraq, Senator McCain found himself in a great momentum. On one hand if the situation in Iraq did not go well, his criticism of the war strategy had the potential to make him an attractive candidate to those voters who were opposed the war. The people who opposed the war would at the same time see him as the best candidate who would be able to manage a bad situation (Norpoth & Perkins, 2011). On the other hand, if his propositions turned into a real strategy from the current administration, senator McCain would be able to claim credit for the strategy as this was something he had advocated all along.

At this point in time where the interview was established on August 20th, 2006 the increase in troops had not happen yet. President Bush eventually ordered an

61 increase of 20.000 troops on the ground in Iraq, a strategy that came to be known as the Surge (Presidents Address to the Nation (2007). With the announcing of the Surge, senator McCain gained credit, as this was something he had advocated for a long time.

5.5. Appeal to Antiwar Voters in GOP. Senator McCain gained a lot of momentum when successfully establishing a distance between his candidacy and the Bush administration concerning the war in Iraq. Senator McCain had long been an outspoken critic of the strategy in Iraq and had long pushed for an increase in ground troops in order to help the situation. However, despite the Bush administration ordering an increase in troops in January 2007, the order did not seem to help the appeal of the Bush administration (Presidential Approval Ratings (Gallup). It however served as a boost for Senator McCain and this could be read in the voter population. Senator McCain’s outspoken stance on the strategy in Iraq, the war had a potential to play out as a position issue in the Republican Primaries – which it eventually did. As a result of this, Senator McCain owned the Iraq issue and his competitors were not able to match this.

Senator McCain had great success tapping into the frustration of the Bush administration to a certain extent that he was able to appeal to the antiwar voters in the GOP (Norpoth & Perkins, 2011, p.540). For Republicans who were dissatisfied with the status quo, senator McCain became the candidate who seemed to address their anger and frustration in a manner that attracted the votes from moderate Republicans. It seems as though the more Senator McCain pressed the war and made it a clear positioning point, the more antiwar voters he appealed to (Norpoth & Perkins, 2011, p.541). This more so than anything else, seems to have been the result of the aversion towards the Bush administration that had grown considerably, which eventually allowed the voters to see Senator McCain as a candidate who would be able to solve a hard situation (Issenberg (2008). As a result

62 Senator McCain was able to attract the moderate Republicans and in that way show the GOP that he would be able to be a uniting force in the Republican Party.

5.6. Chapter Conclusion. In order for Senator McCain to have a chance of becoming a successful candidate with the hopes of winning the Republican Nomination, he needed to establish a variegated distance between his candidacy and the Bush administration. President Bush’s approval rating had decreased considerably and the only possibility any Republican candidate had, was to establish a distance in order to be able to have a chance in winning the nomination and subsequent general election. It was considered of upmost importance to be able to establish a variegated distance to the Bush administration as a presuppose to winning the general election. As a Republican candidate this seemed to be like walking on a double edged sword where on one hand if a candidate renounced too much, the candidate ends up virtually renouncing himself. On the other hand, if a candidate does not renounced anything concerning the current administration, there was a possibility that the voters would have a hard time seeing what the difference would be in a possible new republican administration.

For Senator McCain, this combined the issue of needing to attract the moderate voters in the Republican Party. Senator McCain’s strategy, which proved most successful, was to tap into the anger and frustration of the current administration while at the same time standing ground to his own maverick image. This resulted in Senator McCain’s outspoken criticism of the war strategy in Iraq to play an important role and serve as a positioning point with the voters. While on one hand being a tough and publicly outspoken critic of the war strategy, Senator McCain brought through his own personal qualities as a candidate in an amalgamated symposium of criticism and suggestion that made him stand out in a win-win situation. If the situation in Iraq did not improve, he could appeal to the antiwar voters. If, on the other hand, the situation in Iraq did improve, he could claim credit

63 to the result, as it had been something he was advocating for a long time. Because of this, and the momentum that came after the Surge had been approved, Senator McCain managed to both create a variegated distance to the Bush administration while at the same time appealing to the moderate voters by tapping into their dissatisfaction with the current administration.

6.0 Political Opportunity Structure. In the previous chapters it has been argued that Senator McCain presented an image of himself as a maverick and a candidate who was outspoken in his criticism concerning current strategies, giving caution to the wind to the consequences of the image of the Republican Party. It is argued that Senator McCain placed a higher value of the issues at hand than to stay true to party lines. This strategy earned him a lot of praise and along with his bipartisan cooperation with Democratic senators, earned and confirmed his image as a maverick and built up the idea that he would, if elected, be a different type of president than current President Bush. For this reason, along with successfully creating a variegated distance between the Bush administration, Senator McCain’s approval rate started to increase.

However, this chapter will argue that had it not been for the Surge and the credit it acclaimed to Senator McCain, he would not successfully have gained enough momentum to win the Republican Primary. This chapter will also argue that the momentum gained after the New Hampshire Primary created a stable base from which Senator McCain was able to further position himself as a maverick. These two elements combined, the Surge and momentum from the New Hampshire Primary, will argue played into Senator McCain’s agenda to be able to position himself as a true difference to President Bush while at the same time staying true to the neoconservative ideals. In order to argue that senator McCain presented a true difference to President Bush, neo-conservatism will be introduced. For the basis of this argument, this chapter will analyze to which extent President Bush’ take on neoconservative ideals differ from Senator McCain’s. The result of this will argue

64 that Senator McCain’s neoconservative ideals were more in line with his maverick image and they in this way opened the door for him to have a more aggressive stance on Iraq while at the same time being perceived more favorably.

6.1. Neoconservative Philosophy and Ideals. In order to understand why neo-conservatism plays a role in the 2008 Presidential Primaries, one needs to understand President Bush’ and Senator McCain’s affiliation to the ideology. Neo-conservatism stems primarily from the disappointment with radicalism of a relatively significant number of intellectuals. Many neocons2 have some affiliation in socialist movements in the 1930’s and 1940’s and slowly moved to the Right, largely under the motivation of the Cold War (Thompson, 2007, p.24- 25). The neo-conservatism’s relationship to the old conservatism is entirely strategic and does not necessarily share the doctrines such as neoliberal economics, budget balancing and the decrease of welfare programs – which are the most notable policies of the old conservatism. For true neocons, the foreign policy stage is their place to position themselves and which they believe will determine the course of America (IBID). After the end of the Cold War, this became an issue of particular importance for neocons, as their main goal is the export of democracy throughout the World as a means of creating a sustaining peace as well as the promotion of American national interest in international affairs, often by the use of military force (Vaïsse, 2010, p.7-10).

To the public eye there often does not seem to be a noticeable difference between old conservatives and neocons in terms of policy. This is because neocons often support the old conservative proposals and have created an alliance, despite their own philosophical standpoint, that in their view create a better opportunity to win agreements in the foreign policy spectrum (Thompson, 2007, p. 33). However this

2 Neoconservatives will hereafter be referred to as neocons.

65 does not mean that neo-conservatism does not cross party lines. Senator Joe Lieberman is the most notable example of a Democrat who is also a neocon (Right Web, 2015). To this extent, it becomes logical to see why Senator Lieberman was campaigning with Senator McCain in New Hampshire. In this sense it becomes less about a Democratic senator supporting and campaigning with a Republican senator but more of a neoconservative campaigning with a neoconservative.

6.2. President Bush’ Neoconservative ideals? When President Bush was elected president there was no signs of him wanting to adapt the kind of foreign policy that came to be the synonym for his presidency – the Bush doctrine. In fact, before he was elected, President Bush gave every indication that he would be a conventional realist when it came to foreign affairs (Owens (2009). President Bush was critical of the beforehand Clinton doctrine of humanitarian interventions where the use of military force in e.g. the Balkans where it, according to President Bush, did not serve nor involve vital national interest (Owens (2009). For this reason, President Bush was more committed to adapting a foreign policy where the United States did not play a role in foreign nations problems nor would he want to involve American troops in those problems. He would adapt a policy where the military force around the world was cut back rather than expanded (IBID). For this reason, neither President Bush nor his closest advisers in the form of his national security adviser Condoleezza Rica and Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke of spreading democracy around the world (IBID).

However shortly after he became President, the terrorist attacks on World Trade Center happened which changed the course of the policy. To the amazement of many people, President Bush abandoned his realism approach towards foreign policy and in stead embraced an approach to foreign policy that seemed to go against everything he had advocated in the beginning. The Bush doctrine was first expressed in a speech President Bush delivered nine days after the terrorist attacks, on September 20th 2001 where he adapted a new tone where it now was a question

66 of “you are with us or against us” (Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress, 2001).

“And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”

Source: Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress.

With this speech and speeches following this, President Bush marked a change in his own foreign policy and over the course of events neoconservative ideals were mixed into these foreign policy ideas. In this way, neoconservatives were more able to influence policy than other foreign policy groups in the administration. It is however important to stress that neoconservative influence did not emerge because members of the coalition were pushing President Bush over a longer period of time. It was more the case that September 11th attacks presented a sudden opportunity to utilize influence (Haar, 2010, p.973).

6.3. Senator McCain’s Neoconservative Ideals. Senator McCain was of another political ideology than the one of President Bush. According to Cullinane, 2008, Senator McCain gained much of his inspiration from President Theodore Roosevelt. Even though senator McCain did not hide the fact that President Roosevelt had sides of him that were not too attractive, however he upheld his service and loyalty towards the country as a attribute more important than his flaws (Cullinane, 2008, p. 770). Senator McCain seems to idealize the fact that despite President Roosevelt’s natural hostility and aggressive statesmanship he was always determined on the well-being and advancement of his country (IBID).

67 Senator McCain seemed to, above all, have an admiration for the combination of realist and idealist impulses and this goes well along with his own political stance. One way of assessing senator McCain’s dedication for a combination of idealism and realism in foreign policy can be through the evaluation of his career in politics. After being elected to the House of Representatives in the beginning of the 1980’s, he was faced with his first major foreign policy decision. The then Reagan administration sought congressional support for a multilateral intervention in Lebanon as briefly discussed in chapter 5. This was popular among Republicans but Senator McCain voted against deploying troops. He explained his motivation behind his decision in the quote below:

“The fundamental question is: What is the United States’ interest in Lebanon?... I acknowledge that the level of fighting will increase if we leave. I regretfully acknowledge that many innocent civilians will be hurt. But I firmly believe this will happen in any event.”

Source: Cullinane, 2008, p. 772.

With this, Senator McCain was aware of the realities and steered that course as he observed the lack of US national interest in Lebanon while he at the same time was aware of the tremendous humanitarian consequences it would entail.

With this in mind Senator McCain seems to be more influenced by neoconservative ideals than President Bush. With his time as senator, John McCain opposed the ongoing intervention in Somalia in 1992, opposed intervention in Haiti in 1994 and thought that the US nonparticipation in Rwanda was sensible in 1994 (Cullinane, 2008, p.773). His reasons for this were always the lack of national interest in the causes. In this sense, his decisions seem to be inspired by a realist-idealist approach. This approach is perhaps best illustrated with the eventual support to intervene in the Balkan War. In the beginning, Senator McCain was against the lift and strike plan that would sell arms to Bosnian soldiers and launch NATO air attacks on the Serbs. Later he also opposed the United Nations peacekeeping force as well as President

68 Clinton’s intention to send US troops in May 1994 (Cullinane, 2008, p.773). All this was done with the same reasoning behind; the lack of US national interest in the area along with a realistic approach of what was possible quoting McCain as saying “the question is what is viable. We cannot confuse a desire to do good with viable military options” (Wines, (1993). However one thing changed for Senator McCain and that was the genocide in Srebrenica in 1995. Prior to this point in time, Senator McCain was of the belief that the Balkan conflict was an issue of more interest for Europe and not the US (Cullinane, 2008, p.774). However when the idea of genocide became involved it presented a severe infringement of the idealist McCain that could not be ignored.

6.4. Summary. In the analysis of the outlook on neo-conservatism from President Bush’ and Senator McCain’s standpoint, it becomes clear that the supposed neo-conservative ideals of President Bush came to as a result of September 11th terrorist attacks rather than his own belief and ideology. September 11th formed a vacuum where it became possible for neo-conservatives to gain influence on foreign policy, something they had lacked and wanted. For this reason the desire to influence foreign policy became a matter of higher importance than to make sure the policy formed had the distinctive signature of a true neoconservative ideal. This resulted in the strategy in Iraq was deployed under the excuse of having a neo-conservative ideal while it in reality was lacking just that.

Senator McCain on the other hand presented a candidate who seemed to possess the true ideals of neo-conservatism judging by his voting record and opposition to similar foreign affairs issues in Lebanon, Somalia and Haiti as well as his subsequent stance on the intervention in the Balkans. For this reason, and judging on his previous decisions, it seemed plausible that Senator McCain would support the intervention in Iraq as it seemed to support the neo-conservative stance and ideals he stood for. When it later turned out that the war in Iraq did in fact not have a neo-

69 conservative backdrop, and hence supported a great deal of dissatisfaction with the American people, it created a vacuum which played into senator McCain’s hands from the following reasons. Senator McCain was able to both voice his dissatisfaction and criticism from the lack of necessary number of troops in Iraq, while at the same time promoting the actual reason he believed should be the basis of the war. Because of this vacuum and his approach to it, Senator McCain was able to successfully steer around the war, while at the same time making the war an asset rather than a liability he needed to explain. In this way he exercised his ability to make a seemingly bad situation better by dragging on his maverick ability no matter the cost.

6.5. New Hampshire. In the first half of this chapter it has been established that while Senator McCain’s political stance was more on the neo-conservative side President Bush’s was not. It was also established that September 11th terrorist attacks was an event that paved the way to the war in Iraq and was a reason for the adaptation of the neo- conservative approach as a means of justifying the war. Shortly after the invasion Senator McCain became its most notable critic, arguing for more troops on the ground. When President Bush in January 2007 signed a law that would increase the number of troops in Iraq it created momentum and played in the hands of Senator McCain. The result of this came to be that Senator McCain ended up having a clear message when it came to the war in Iraq, as he in this way owned that issue.

Fast forward to the primary in New Hampshire. In 2008, the primary in New Hampshire was on January 8th and by this time, as argued in previous chapters, Senator McCain’s approval rate had already started to increase. In December 2007 a Gallup poll, as illustrated below, was conducted that showed the number of people who thought the Surge made things better increased from 22 per cent in July 2007 to 40 per cent in December 2007.

70 Figure 12: Impact of U.S. Troop Surge in Iraq on Situation in Iraq.

Source: Adapted from Saad, 2007: B.

The poll and the general idea that the situation in Iraq was improving due to the Surge, played into Senator McCain’s hands because it authenticated everything he was advocating for. With this, Senator McCain had an advantage ahead of the other candidates in the election, as none of the other candidates had a major issue adapted into a government policy. In addition to this Senator McCain knew it was important to make an impression in the early primary states. This, along with his declining approval rate in the summer of 2007, made him restructure his campaign where he went on a bus tour from September 2007, on the so-called No Surrender Tour (Jones & Vassallo (2009), p. 59). The campaign tour had two purposes; to keep reminding everyone that Senator McCain was still in the election as well as strengthen and advocate his foreign policy attributes and advantages. Senator McCain knew a couple months before the primary in New Hampshire that he needed to set in all sails in order to win the state. During November and December of 2007 he worked vigorously to win support by making countless appearances in the state and holding over a 100 town-hall meetings (IBID). The reason New Hampshire was an important state for Senator McCain was because he had a lot of good reputation from the

71 Presidential Primaries in 2000, which he was hoping would be a repeat process (IBID).

The fact that Senator McCain was campaigning heavily in New Hampshire combined with the fact that mayor Giuliani’s, who was still ahead of Senator McCain in the polls, strategy to not campaign in the smaller states and in stead go all in in the bigger winner-takes-all states like Florida, proved to help senator McCain. It helped him in a way that proved most vital because the opposition from and attention for mayor Giuliani was removed with one stroke, leaving Senator McCain’s personal campaigning strategy to harvest attention that became visible in the results. Senator McCain won New Hampshire and due to this gained a momentum that would carry him in the later states, accumulating enough so that when mayor Giuliani started his campaign in the big winner-takes-all state of Florida in the end of January 2008, it did not have the same effect as Senator McCain had already gained momentum. For this reason, New Hampshire represents a state where Senator McCain gained momentum due to a change in campaign strategy months before while positioning himself as a foreign policy candidate who had one strong advantage – credit for a policy change.

6.6. Chapter Conclusion. Although both Republicans, President George W. Bush and Senator McCain had two different outlooks on foreign policy. When he was elected in 2000, President Bush originally had the outlook of reducing the presence of American troops around the world. President Bush had voiced critical opinion to former President Clinton’s strategy of interference in the Balkans among other things, and sought to change that in his presidential term. Senator McCain on the other hand, was of an opposite opinion. For Senator McCain, who was shaped by a neo-conservative outlook on foreign policy, supported former President Clinton’s decision in sending American troops to the Balkan War. At first sight, this difference of opinion and ideology would not have seemed to have much importance had it not been for the September

72 11th terrorist attacks in 2001. After this event the Bush administration adapted a more vigorous strategy that seemed to correlate to the neo-conservative foreign policy strategy advocated by Senator McCain. For this reason, and due to the fact that neoconservatives often supported old conservative proposals as a way of gaining influence, it did not come as a surprise that Senator McCain supported the invasion of Iraq. However, shortly after the invasion Senator McCain became a strong critic of the war for lacking in enough number of troops on the ground for the mission to be successful.

Senator McCain’s criticism continued for four years until the Bush administration implemented a policy in January 2007, which came to be known as the Surge, deploying more ground troops in Iraq. Senator McCain, who has been advocating this very policy for a long time, earned credit as a result, which helped him reposition himself as the candidate who was most experienced within foreign policy. This gave him an advantage over the other candidates who could not show to a similar strength. When the polls started to show that the American people believed the Surge was helping the situation in Iraq in September 2007, it further strengthened Senator McCain’s view that he owned the foreign policy issue. On the other hand, despite the credit Senator McCain was still experiencing low numbers in the polls which subsequently invoked a change in campaign strategy whose main purpose was establishing the word that the senator was not yet out of the election. With the new campaign strategy the goal was set on New Hampshire, as it was here the senator gained a positive feedback in the 2000 Primaries. A number of factors played in hand for the senator to win in New Hampshire. Mayor Giuliani, who until now was ahead of Senator McCain in the polls, chose a campaign strategy of not campaigning in the small states and in stead going all in in the bigger states such as Florida. This proved to be fortunate for senator McCain as he by his personal campaigning in New Hampshire, could draw attention to his own person as well as the position in Iraq, without virtually no competition. A subsequent win in the state gained Senator McCain enough momentum that accumulated over the next few

73 states and ultimately prepared him for Florida where mayor Giuliani’s campaign had virtually no effect.

7.0. Conclusion. Senator John McCain was not the favorite candidate in the 2008 Republican Presidential Primaries. Other candidate such as New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani was seen as a frontrunner in late 2006. However Senator McCain demonstrated that by challenging the status quo while at the same time exploring a stance of insurgency towards the current administration proved to be an important effect in the election.

The Republican Primaries had three strong candidates, namely Mitt Romney, Mike Huckabee and Rudy Giuliani. Throughout the most of 2007 former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani held a significant lead over the other candidates. Giuliani’s strength stemmed from his actions in the immediate aftermath after the terrorist attacks on September 11th. He was praised and even received an honorary knighthood from Queen Elizabeth II. Giuliani entered the election with an image of being the man who cleaned up the streets of New York with his tough stance on crime during his time as mayor. However, despite these to great strengths, Rudy Giuliani had standpoints that did not correspond with the core Republican values in terms of abortion, gun control and gay and lesbian civil rights. For this reason Rudy Giuliani had difficulties appealing to the majority of the Republican voters. In addition to this, Rudy Giuliani proved to follow a campaign strategy that made him overestimate the power of his name recognition as he virtually did not campaign in the smaller states but was waiting to start his campaign off in the larger states such as Florida, which allowed John McCain the possibility to build up momentum.

Mike Huckabee and Mitt Romney had other controversies concerning their campaigns. While Mike Huckabee, a former evangelical minister, had no difficulties appealing to the conservative Republicans, he was struggling to appeal to moderate

74 Republicans and outside the southern states, he was virtually not known. Aside from this, surrounding controversies concerning his time as governor of Arkansas where he had received and accepted three times as many pardons as his successors. The controversy arose when one of the pardoners became a police killer shortly after he was released despite seemingly strong evidence that would contradict his release. Mitt Romney on the other hand, was known as the businessman candidate with having proved his ability to turn a deficit to a large surplus through The Salt Lake Organizing Committee. However, when he became governor of Massachusetts, one of the most liberal states in the country, he was forced to compromise on core Republican values. His proposed health care program along with his seemingly wavering stance on abortion allowed the other candidates to use this which eventually left Mitt Romney in a situation where he had to defend himself rather than discuss policy issues. This combined with the fact that he was suffering from a low recognizability factor and the reputation of being somewhat of a stiff character meant that the other candidates were able to set the stage.

Although a spectrum of weaker candidates did not hurt John McCain’s chances of winning the nomination, they were not the main reason why he won. The 2008 Republican Primaries marked a change in what was largely based on the current political atmosphere in country. There was an enormous discontent with the Bush administration, which meant that if a Republican candidate was to have a real chance, he needed to present enough difference with the current administration while at the same time appealing to the moderate Republicans. Senator McCain was known for being a maverick on the political stage through engaging in bipartisan collaborations across the political aisle. In addition, he had been one of the most vocal critics of the current administration’s policy in Iraq, advocating for an increase in ground troops for the situation in Iraq to prove a success. With a background as a military man who had spent over five years as a POW, his character demonstrated courage in difficult times. Subsequently, his experience in the military caused him to focus his attention on foreign affairs as a senator in a way that would assert him as the most experienced foreign policy candidate.

75

When the Bush administration approved a policy known as the Surge, that would increase the ground troops in Iraq in January 2007, Senator McCain could claim credit and have this advantage over the other candidates. This meant that he now virtually owned the war issue. In September 2007, when polls began showing that the American people believed the Surge was helping the situation in Iraq, Senator McCain’s approval rate was still on the lower side indicating he did not utilize the results of the Surge to his best advantage. With a restructuring in his campaign, Senator McCain launched the “No Surrender” tour that had the purpose of upholding his name in the election, meant that he sought out New Hampshire. With intensive campaigning in New Hampshire along with Democratic Senator Joe Lieberman and the subsequent endorsement of Senator Lieberman, meant Senator McCain gained enough momentum to win New Hampshire in January 2008. The momentum gained in New Hampshire meant Senator McCain could focus on the credit gained from the Surge and reposition himself as the best foreign policy candidate through the perceived knowledge of how to turn a bad situation in Iraq into a success. In retrospect, this seems to substantiate the framework of a structure approach. Politics proves not to be an exact science and this aspect of how Senator McCain was able to utilize the Surge policy, seems to signify that in politics, it is a matter of being in the right place at the right time. This tells us that in order to survive in politics, it seems one needs to take the opportunities that arise and be able to utilize these to one’s own advantage.

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