TOWSON UNIVERSITY OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES
COMBATING SOCIO-SPATIAL POLARIZATION IN A GLOBALIZING
ENVIRONMENT: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE TENSION BETWEEN PRO-
GROWTH AND PRO-POOR POLICIES IN THE HOUSING PLAN
by
Michael Strong
A thesis
Presented to the faculty of
Towson University
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts
Department of Geography and Environmental Planning
Towson University Towson, Maryland 21252
May, 2012
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I offer special thanks to my advisor and committee chair, Dr. Charles Schmitz.
Not only does he deserve recognition for his work advising me on this project and giving me the idea to pursue this topic, but he also deserves recognition for his encouragement in my decision to change graduate programs and focus on geography. For that, I am very grateful. I would also like to thank Dr. Virginia Thompson and Dr. James Smith for serving on my committee. Both have provided valuable insight to this project, introducing me to authors I would have missed on my own and insisting that my writing be the best possible. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for listening to my thoughts on world cities ad infinitum. Their tireless ears helped me through the toughest paragraphs.
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ABSTRACT
COMBATING SOCIO-SPATIAL POLARIZATION IN A GLOBALIZING
ENVIRONMENT: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE TENSION BETWEEN
PRO-GROWTH AND PRO-POOR POLICIES IN THE HOUSING PLAN
OF CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA
Michael Strong
Cities across the developing world are caught between the demands of growth- oriented globalization and pro-poor policies aimed to improve the livelihoods of impoverished residents. For world cities, like Cape Town, the dynamics of world city formation, especially the impact of socio-spatial polarization, complicates the relationship between growth and redistribution. Cape Town’s legacy as an apartheid city further exacerbates the situation. Cape Town’s government believes it can achieve both a growth agenda and a redistribution agenda to overcome the segregation inherited from the apartheid era while dealing with the socio-spatial polarization that occurs during world city formation. A textual analysis of the language used in the city’s Integrated
Development Plan and Integrated Housing Plan, however, shows the city favors growth over redistribution.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES...... vi LIST OF FIGURES...... vii ABBREVIATIONS USED THROUGHOUT THE TEXT...... viii CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ...... 1 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 4 The Nature of World City Formation...... 4 The Character of Socio-Spatial Polarization in the World City...... 12 Defining and Identifying Social Polarization...... 12 Defining and Identifying Spatial Polarization ...... 20 Housing Markets in Developing World Cities...... 25 The Situation of a Globalizing Cape Town...... 31 Apartheid in South Africa...... 32 Cape Town as a World City...... 37 The Emergence of Pro-Poor and Pro-Growth Initiatives ...... 44 Pro-Poor Policies at Work: Cape Town’s Housing Market ...... 50 Research Questions...... 55 CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY ...... 56 CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION...... 60 Describing the Pro-Poor and Pro-Growth Agendas ...... 60 The Vision of Former Executive Mayor Dan Plato...... 60 The Vision of Current Executive Mayor Patricia de Lille...... 67 The Vision of City Manager Achmat Ebrahim...... 69 A Textual Analysis of Strategic Focus Area Five: Integrated Human Settlements...... 72 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH ...... 85 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 88 CURRICULUM VITA...... 97
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LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Percentage Contribution to GVA by Economic Sector………………………..39 2.2 Cape Town Housing Projects………………………………………………….54
4.1 Strategic Focus Areas of the Cape Town Municipal Government…………….61 4.2 Pro-Growth Language Used by Former Mayor Dan Plato…………………….62 4.3 Pro-Poor Language Used by Former Mayor Dan Plato………………………..65 4.4 Three-Year Comparison of Funding Allocation to Housing Development…....74 4.5 Target Goals for Various Housing Projects…………………………………....79
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LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 GaWC’s Roster of World Cities in 2010…………………………………………7 2.2 Decentralized Economic Nodes in Cape Town…………………………………43 2.3 Location of Fringe Municipalities at Consolidation………………………….....46 2.4 Cape Town’s Central City Improvement District……………………………….48 2.5 Location of Impoverished Townships………………………………………...... 51
4.1 Lone Toilet in Backyard Community…………………………………………...78
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ABBREVIATIONS USED THROUGHOUT THE TEXT
ANC African National Congress BLA black local authority BNG Breaking New Ground CBD central business district CCID Center City Improvement District CCDS Center City Development Strategy CCT City of Cape Town CTP Cape Town Partnership FDI foreign direct investment FIRE finance, insurance, real estate GaWC Globalization and World Cities Research Network GGP gross geographic product GVA geographic value added IDP Five-Year Integrated Development Plan IHP Five-Year Integrated Housing Plan IMF International Monetary Fund IRT integrated rapid transit system LA local authority LGDB Local Government Demarcation Board R rand RSA Republic of South Africa SACN South African Cities Network SAP structural adjustment program SFA strategic focus area UN United Nations URP Presidential Urban Renewal Programme WLA white local authority
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1
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Cities across the developing world are caught between the demands of globalization development priorities and the implementation of strong domestic policies.
The response of urban centers to globalization has long fascinated researchers (Hall 1966;
Braudel 1984; Abu-Lughod 1989; Taylor 2004a). In the early 1980s, Friedmann and
Wolff (1982) announced a research agenda to explore the impact of globalization on urban centers and the process of urbanization. The “world city hypothesis” (Friedmann
1986) emerged as a prominent explanation for how urban centers respond to globalization.
Friedmann’s (1986) world city hypothesis links changes in urban structure to globalization. World cities represent nodes of articulation in the production process while serving as sites of capital accumulation. The degree to which a world city matches
Friedmann’s description determines the degree of influence globalization has on the city’s urban structure. As global command centers, the economic priorities of world cities direct the structure of the world economy (Sassen 2001). Thus, the relationship between world cities and globalization is highly interactive, each proving to be formative for the structure of the other (Friedmann and Wolff 1982).
World city formation—the process by which a particular city acquires world city status—results in increasing polarization (Friedmann 1986; Sassen 2001). Within world cities, financial resources concentrate in particular places resulting in the spatial segregation of the financial resources. Social segregation also occurs as low-income residents find themselves unable to access the high-income centers of financial
2 concentration. Socio-spatial polarization (the formation of social class structures and geographic locations into a dichotomy of polar opposites) increases as world city formation proceeds: the greater the degree of financial agglomeration, the greater the impact of socio-spatial polarization on urban morphology.
It takes determined governmental intervention to moderate the effects of socio- spatial polarization. In South Africa, the national government has devolved the power to deal directly with socio-spatial polarization to the municipal level. Cities like Cape Town have enacted numerous pro-poor policies aimed at moderating the lasting effects of apartheid while encouraging a pro-growth strategy that embraces world city formation.
The opposing forces present in Cape Town’s governmental initiatives interact with one another to (re)construct the urban environment, both socially and spatially.
Policies like Cape Town’s Five-Year Integrated Development Plan, Breaking
New Ground Initiative, Expanded Public Works Programme, and Spatial Development
Framework are designed to encourage equitable development and equal access to the city and to government services, including housing for the urban poor. Adequate housing, especially owner-occupied housing, and secure land tenure increases social security and community attachment (World Bank 2009).
Despite Cape Town’s promise to increase the availability and accessibility of housing (City of Cape Town [CCT] 2010a)—a move aligned with the post-apartheid government’s recognition of housing as a basic need (Goodlad 1996)—South Africa’s long history of apartheid makes dealing with the socio-spatial polarization of world city formation more difficult. How can a city struggling to moderate its legacy of racial segregation develop a world city identity while addressing the influence of socio-spatial
3 polarization? Cities often use planning documents to outline their goals and values as well as the methods to achieve those goals. This study uses a textual analysis of Cape
Town’s Five-Year Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and Five-Year Integrated Housing
Plan (IHP) to ascertain the priorities and bias of Cape Town’s government. Is the government pro-growth or pro-poor, or some combination between? With the housing market as a case study, this study interrogates the ability of a growing world city—like
Cape Town—to effectively deal with the severity of socio-spatial polarization.
The remainder of this study is divided into four chapters. Chapter 2 situates Cape
Town within the literature on world city formation, socio-spatial polarization, and housing provision in cities of the developing world, emphasizing Cape Town’s political and economic history. It ends with research questions that address the problem identified in this introduction: (1) How have the pro-growth and pro-poor agendas manifested in the language of the IDP and IHP? Does the language imply that one agenda supersedes the other or are the documents truly equitable, and (2) Has the City of Cape Town translated the severity of the city’s housing backlog into the language of the IDP and IHP? Chapter
3 describes textual analysis and the methodology used to answer the research questions.
Chapter 4 addresses the likely ability of Cape Town to moderate socio-spatial polarization as it acquires a world city identity, placing specific emphasis on the language and content of Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plan and Integrated Housing Plan.
Chapter 5 concludes the argument and sets the context for future field research.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Nature of World City Formation
Individual cities have intermittently dominated the world system for centuries, their relative importance fluctuating over time and with function (Abu-Lughod 1989).
Cities have served as the centers of great empires (like Rome and Constantinople), as critical nodes in international trade (like Timbuktu and Samarqand), as sites with religious importance (like Jerusalem and Mecca), and many other purposes. The world city literature describes the latest iteration of cities serving a purpose in the world system.
Beginning after 1945, geographical changes in the world economic system altered the relationship between production and place (Friedmann and Wolff 1982). When corporations reconfigured their production inputs to embrace the cost-saving measures of new technologies in the telecommunications and transportation industries, the requirement to locate production in a specific place disintegrated. A new geography emerged that eliminated the need for corporations to locate all their operations near one another (Massey 1979/1996). Free to locate anywhere in the world, corporations discovered that global economic restructuring eliminated geographical barriers, improved profits, and revolutionized the productive capacity of companies (Harvey 1989, 1990).
Friedmann and Wolff’s (1982) analysis of this global economic restructuring rescaled Wallerstein’s (1974) world systems theory from the national to the urban level.
In this rescaling of global power, certain cities exercise greater control over the world economic system; these cities are world cities, replacing Wallerstein’s core nations as the entities in direct control of world economic power. Less important cities (with
5 diminished or no control over the world economic system), act as Wallerstein’s peripheral nations—underdeveloped places independent politically but dependent upon the core areas for continued existence in the world system.
Friedmann and Wolff’s (1982) analysis also describes a framework within which to study urbanization trends connected to the global restructuring of economic relations.
Two points are central to this framework. First, urbanization is linked to the expansion of capitalism. Second, the critical explanatory variable in a study of a specific world city is its mode of integration with and within the world economy (Friedmann and Wolff 1982,
329). In essence, it is the extent and nature of a world city’s interaction with the world economy that describes any formative exchange between globalization and that city’s urban morphology and social relations.
A strong relationship exists between urbanization trends and global capitalism
(Harvey 1973, 1989). As sites of a steady labor supply, cities permit the accumulation of economic profit, or capital, from the work of a laboring class (the group responsible for production). Eventually, production reaches an equilibrium point, neither losing nor gaining additional capital. When this occurs, capitalists have several options. They may remain in their present location and continue to neither make nor lose money or they could relocate to an area where production costs are lower (Harvey 1989). Global restructuring of economic relations provided the capitalist class with a third option: move inefficient or costly operations to places with low labor costs and locate the command and control functions in cities.
As a result, cities became the primary sites for the command and control functions of the capitalist class’s economic endeavors (Friedmann 1986). Guided by this
6 observation, Friedmann produced the world city hypothesis, an attempt to theorize the urbanization trends noted earlier. Instead of simply proposing a research agenda, though, the world city hypothesis links urbanization trends to global economic forces through a series of seven theses that acknowledge the individuality of each world city while also addressing the common adjustments to urban form that all world cities experience. The first thesis connects a world city’s spatial development to the world economy, suggesting that change in one directs change in the other. The second thesis arranges world cities along a continuum of importance. The third thesis recognizes the ability of local environments to influence the intensity and nature of a world city’s linkage to the world economy. The fourth thesis gives the world city a purpose: to accumulate and concentrate international capital in specific locations for easier command and control of the world economy. The fifth thesis describes world cities as the destinations for national and international migrant laborers.
While the first five theses of Friedmann’s world city hypothesis define and describe world cities as articulation nodes in the world system, the last two explain the outcome of world city formation on the social character of a world city. The sixth thesis outlines how polarization intensifies as world city formation proceeds. The seventh thesis situates the social cost of this polarization within the national context. Unequal geographic and social investment produces greater inequality than the local and/or national governments can moderate.
Inherent within the world city hypothesis are the necessary variables whose measurement permits the arrangement of world cities (and indeed all urban centers) within a hierarchy. Some cities command greater shares of the world economy while
7 others influence the world economy on a reduced scale or not at all. Much scholarship on world cities works within this hierarchical structure. One of the most prominent indices used to measure world city status is the degree of concentration of producer services (e.g. finance, insurance, real estate, advertising, and legal services) present in the city (Sassen
2001). These services divide into three major categories (prime, major, and minor global services) and describe three clusters of cities (Beaverstock, Taylor, and Smith 1999).
Figure 2.1. GaWC's Roster of World Cities in 2010. Alpha world cities appear as blue points. Beta world cities appear as yellow points. Gamma world cities appear as pink points. In addition to the three tiers of world cities, GaWC also recognizes a roster of cities exhibiting the initial stages of world city formation and strong candidates for future world city status (GaWC 2010). Base Map: Google Maps (2012).
Alpha world cities represent those urban centers exhibiting a fully formed agglomeration economy highly integrated with and in command of the international economy (Beaverstock, Taylor, and Smith 1999). These include Sassen’s (2001) list of
New York, London, and Tokyo, plus another 44 cities (Globalization and World Cities
Research Network [GaWC] 2011; see Figure 2.1). Beta world cities are moderately important but lack the true international power of the alpha world cities. GaWC recognizes another 64 beta world cities, including Cape Town. Gamma world cities are
8 those just beginning to exhibit world city characteristics. According to GaWC, there are
67 gamma world cities.
Creating a hierarchy of alpha, beta, and gamma world cities only describes part of the relationship of one world city to the others. World cities occupy more than their place within an international hierarchy; they also serve as the sites of interaction in an international network (Taylor 2004a). World cities act as distribution nodes for capital flows through a complex network of both producer services and decision-making processes. For example, an employee in Baghdad can teleconference with his or her boss at headquarters in London while simultaneously interacting with buyers in Shanghai. As the site of the company’s headquarters, London exercises power over the production site in Baghdad and the purchasing site in Shanghai. In this sense, world cities become more than places with a concentration of corporate headquarters; they become the sites that coordinate the flow of information and finance throughout the world economy (Castells
1996).
Both the hierarchy and nodal concepts are descriptions housed within an economic framework, but other characterizations of the world city eschew economic variables. Abrahamson (2004) uses cultural production and consumption (e.g. Mumbai’s
Bollywood or the pervasiveness of “Big Apple” t-shirts) to indicate importance.
Grosfoguel (1995) connects world city status to the emergence of military and ideological power while Todd (1995) suggests world cities are manifestations of political control, not economic. Simon (1995) addresses the concentration not of economic entities but of international organizations (e.g. non-profits; see Taylor 2004b). Some authors even discard the world city label as a misnomer that ignores the power of individual places to
9 construct a unique spatiality (Smith 2001) or as a western conception with little to no efficacy in the developing world (McDonald 2008).
The various attempts to describe the world city illustrate the complexity of the concept. Hierarchical classification schemes can sometimes ignore critical local interactions (Smith 2001) as well as the influence of culture (Abrahamson 2004) and power (Grosfoguel 1995; Todd 1995); therefore, taking an economic perspective requires assuming a classification viewpoint that respects Friedmann’s (1986) hierarchical description of world cities while including Taylor’s (2004a) network of flows. In this way, world cities become nodes of capital flow where the concentration of capital
(through producer service companies) and overall network connectivity exists along a continuum (i.e. a hierarchy). Measurement of the specific place of a world city within the overall hierarchy and the extent of flows between world cities requires an economic perspective since the variables considered are economic variables. In addition, an economic perspective is necessary to make meaningful connections between individual world cities, world city networks, and the global restructuring of the world economy.
Using the economic perspective permits an understanding of world city formation, or how a city establishes economies driven by Sassen’s (2001) producer services. World city formation is a multi-step process that begins with a global dispersal of manufacturing. Multinational corporations—large businesses with operations in more than one nation—begin to strategically relocate various phases of their production process across the globe. Though there is some dissension (e.g. see Drennan 1992), according to Sassen (2001), the dispersal of manufacturing, beginning in the 1980s with numerous plant closures in industrialized nations (especially in former production
10 centers, like Detroit and Manchester), ushered in a new era in the global labor system.
Often termed the new international division of labor, multinational corporations outsourced low-skill production to laborers in developing nations while maintaining control over high-skill functions like research, development, and marketing. A class of transnational elite developed to assume the high-skill jobs in the world cities.
Some low-skill jobs, like food service, housekeeping, and even the sex industry
(see, for example, Hubbard 2010), defied the new international division of labor. These positions developed alongside the high-skill jobs as a distinct class of workers performing services for the transnational elite. Ironically, the individuals who acquired low-skill positions serving the transnational elite often comprised migrants from developing nations. Thus, the new international division of labor dispersed manufacturing from high-income to low-income places while simultaneously creating an international labor market and a network of labor flows that brought laborers from low-income to high- income places.
The high-skill jobs that remained (or, alternatively, developed) in world cities after the dispersal of manufacturing comprise the producer services critical to a world city identity. Producer services, unlike consumer services (e.g. hairdressing and supermarkets), represent corporate functions that service the operations of production.
They are intermediate activities produced for the benefit of organizations (e.g. governments, non-governmental organizations, private corporations) rather than consumers (Sassen 2001, 91).
Three main reasons explain why producer services concentrate in world cities
(Sassen 2001). First, if capital accumulates in world cities, then the services designed to
11 manage that capital will also concentrate. Second, increased technological complexity and informational flows between places in the world economy (especially between production sites and control sites) require greater supervision for the system to operate effectively. The command and control functions of a multinational corporation perform best when located near similar processes. Third, producer services are provided to multinational corporations operating concurrently across the globe within a highly integrated network rather than to isolated places at single moments. A greater concentration of producer services permits reduced costs for the entire network because corporations can share the overhead expenses when command and control functions are located together.1
The concentration of producer services initiates the third phase of world city formation: a series of changes in the landscape of world cities. A high concentration of producer services increases demand for physical infrastructure, like office space, advanced telecommunications facilities, international airports, public transportation systems, and efficient highway networks. Continued concentration of producer services also requires the availability of certain amenities that cater to the lifestyles of the transnational elite employed by the producer service companies. These amenities include golf courses, entertainment complexes, elite shopping districts, massage parlors and spas, specialty food stores, and high-end boutiques.
The three phases of world city formation describe a logical progression for changes in urban form as a result of global economic restructuring. The changes that result have a strong impact on the social character of a world city. The concentration of
1 Not only do producer services concentrate within world cities, they also concentrate within specific places of world cities: specifically, the highly visible central business districts or dispersed development nodes (see Morshidi 2000, and discussion later).
12 producer services is essential for the development of a class of transnational elite and the establishment of the new international division of labor. These latter two phenomena serve as evidence for the polarization thesis of world city formation and the intensification of polarization within a world city.
The Character of Socio-Spatial Polarization in the World City Defining and Identifying Social Polarization
In a world city, identifying polarization—the transition from a normal distribution of data to one exhibiting bi-modal data concentration with data points centered at either end of a continuum (O’Loughlin and Friedrichs 1996)—begins with an assessment of that city’s economic climate. While many different variables can exhibit bi-modal distribution, income remains a prime measure of the extent of polarization (Sassen 2001).
This measurement suggests that world city formation causes the rich and poor classes to increase in size while diminishing the importance of the middle class. Though this is usually true in a world city, using the single-variable approach (i.e. measuring only income) is far too simplistic for analysis at the societal level. It is important to remember that income is only part of the overall picture; other variables, like number of jobs, level of skill-set required in a given position, average salary, commuting costs, value of associated benefits, and many other variables, all influence the extent of polarization.
Polarization measured through economic variables results in two important social changes in world cities: a small increase in the number of different social classes and a dramatic change in the membership of those classes (O’Loughlin and Friedrichs 1996).
The change in membership of the existing social classes is critical and epitomizes the polarization of social class during world city formation. In a world city, the small class
13 of transnational elite assumes a position at the top of the social class structure while the majority of other individuals collectively comprise an underclass that services the needs of the transnational elite (Friedmann and Wolff 1982).
As already stated, to measure polarization through a single variable ignores the underlying complexity of polarization. In a producer service economy, initial assessments can generate a labor profile that consists of bi-modally distributed employment groups (the transnational elite and everyone else), but in reality the labor market often forms a highly structured hierarchy (O’Loughlin and Friedrichs 1996). The top positions are directorial positions in the producer services held by the transnational elite, but beneath that layer are several distinct groups. Other service positions (like real estate brokers, hotel managers, and private security forces) as well as positions in the international tourism industry and government represent a “middle class” of world city residents. Still lower are the low-skill service positions that increasingly comprise a greater percentage of the division of labor within a world city. Beneath these layers of the formal economy (those jobs officially recorded by the government for taxation purposes and unemployment statistics) exists the true underclass of the world city: individuals engaged in the informal economy (unofficial part-time work, domestic industry, illegal enterprises, etc.), and those without steady income or any income.
The relationship between the transition to a producer service economy and polarization is one clouded by dissent. The decline in mid-income, semi-skilled manufacturing jobs accompanies the creation of a producer services economy, but is the result the polarization of the workforce or its professionalization? Sharply contrasting
Sassen (2001, 2006), Hamnett (1994) concludes that social polarization only exists where
14 the immigration of low-skill workers is consistent; otherwise, a producer service economy provides the impetus for workers to professionalize their skills. Baum (1999) concluded that professionalization also occurs as world city formation proceeded. Baum is quick to note, though, that the local environment and national political priorities (like increased education, especially for women) were formative in the observed transition to a professional rather than polarized society. In the debate over polarization or professionalization, these points are critical. National priorities and strong emphasis on skill development, along with a steady population size with limited influx of low-skill workers, account for the apparent differences in results from the transition to a producer service economy.
Even more important is the fact that it is problematic to suggest that Singapore
(Baum 1999) and The Netherlands (Hamnett 1994) are representative of most countries, especially in the developing world. Therefore, if professionalization occurred in The
Netherlands and Singapore, is professionalization what happens as a result of the transition to a producer service economy in industrialized nations while polarization is a phenomenon experienced only in the developing world? The answer is no. Other industrialized world cities exhibit strong social polarization. Jones (1996) observed that social polarization in London assumed an ethnic identity. Residents of Outer London’s boroughs were more likely to be British while both the population size and percentage of foreign-born residents had increased in Inner London. In Toronto, Murdie (1996) noted that tenure of residency strongly influenced membership in the various occupational groups. Not surprisingly, newer immigrants held fewer managerial or high-skill positions than residents with greater tenure. Deskins (1996) described Detroit’s social polarization
15 as a factor of income highly correlated with race. The loss of manufacturing jobs in the automobile industry contributed significantly to the impoverishment of many black families. Hitz, Schmid, and Wolff (1996) interpreted social class divisions in Zürich as between those who could afford to live in the central city and those who could not. Baum
(1997) observed that local welfare policies diminished the impact of social polarization in
Sydney, implying a strong correlation between place and the type of polarization experienced.
Different manifestations of social polarization reinforce the warning against using a single variable, like income, as the only means to measure social polarization. Despite this, income data are quantifiable, relatively simple to obtain and interpret, and rather illustrative of an individual’s ability to afford various amenities. Thus, the extreme income disparity between the transnational elite and the underclass (Elliott 1999)— reflected in class income—remains the dominant measure of social polarization in a world city.2
Social polarization often manifests through differential access to centers of world city development, or the sites of world city formation. In world cities, development concessions in central business districts (e.g. abandoning height restrictions on new construction) often accompany the creation of public spaces (see Sorensen 2003). These benefits, however, do not accrue for all residents. Low-income residents of world cities find themselves increasingly marginalized from these centers. The public spaces of urban development in a world city often engage policies to prevent underclass activities
2 Other measures of social polarization include unemployment figures (Baum 1997), educational attainment (Baum 1999), percentage of residents employed through the informal sector (Sassen 2001, 2006), gendered changes in the division of labor (Bruegel 1996), and the extent of residential segregation (O’Loughlin and Friedrichs 1996).
16 (like informal street vendors) in places designed for the transnational elite (Hooper 2004;
Lemanski 2007).
In addition to adopting policies that limit activity, centers of world city development favor the economic enterprises of the transnational elite at the exclusion of informal economic activities (Dewar 2004). Street vendors, loosely conceptualized to include everything from hot dog sellers to prostitutes, comprise a significant proportion of the informal economy that emerged alongside deindustrialization and the geographic dispersal of manufacturing (Sassen 2006). With little employment opportunity available in the formal sector, low- or no-income residents have few options to earn money; they turn to informal economic activities as a way to earn a living. Policies that limit access to centers of world city development, especially to places inhabited by the high-income transnational elite, serve only to further polarize income levels and class divisions.
Residential development also segregates the transnational elite from the world city’s underclass. As Dewar (2004) has observed, residential zones in the centers of world city development seek to acquire “the ‘right’ tenant mix” (101): translated to mean members of the transnational elite. Even when residential development does not explicitly demand the separation of transnational elite from the underclass (as exemplified by the housing market in Zürich), the rapid increase in housing prices effectively segregates low-income residents from high-income residents and underlines the strong impact world city formation has on the ability of low-income residents to experience the centers of world city development (Hitz, Schmid, and Wolff 1996).
In some world cities, developers have designed measures that effectually separate the transnational elite from the city’s underclass when the two must occupy the same
17 places. Jenks (2003) describes the Skytrain mass transit system that connects places of world city development in central Bangkok approximately four stories above street level.
At a usage price exceeding 10% of the average resident’s monthly income, the system spatially and metaphorically lifts those able to pay the high cost of transit high above low-income residents who must seek transportation options at the congested street level.
Building on the work of Henri Lefebvre (1968/1996), Mitchell (2003, 17) has asserted that despite the polarizing effect of world city formation and the observed trends that favor the transnational elite over the underclass, all residents, as citizens of the state and regardless of social class membership, have a “right to the city” and its spaces. This right extends to the centers of world city development. As public spaces, the centers of world city development ought to be open to everyone, and, in theory, they are; however, without rules these public spaces become places of anarchy. Rules eliminate the anarchy of a public space but also redefine the space as distinctly non-public.
In a world city, the expectation of rules exists, especially since the city’s spaces must be organized around the usage of and access to land and services. Cities, then, are not necessarily public spaces as much as they are open to the public. They are the sites of interaction, of socialization, and of connection to and with other sentient beings.3
Mitchell’s so-called right to the city is a right to inhabit or to access the city that is distinct from the right to own property in the city or the right to govern property. Usage of the public spaces of world city development exists as a right to inhabit or access those spaces; it is not, however, a fundamental right for residents to own or control the centers of world city development.
3 For an interesting read on the interactive capabilities of urban spaces, see Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, New York: Random House, Inc. (1961/1993). The chapters on sidewalks are particularly informative.
18 Interpretations of Mitchell’s basic argument can be construed to mean that developers in a center of world city development have the exclusive right to own the space (regardless of its classification as public) and to set rules governing its usage provided those rules govern usage and not access to the space. By extension, world city governments cooperating with the developers of the centers of world city development also retain this right. This contradictory situation both permits access to and prohibits access to the centers of world city development for members of the world city’s underclass, though the prohibition is more a refusal to permit specific behaviors rather than actual access. The centers of world city development almost always engage policies that do not tolerate begging, prostitution, drug abuse, and unlicensed informal vending
(see, e.g. Lemanski 2007). The argument against harmful activities, like drug abuse, is clear-cut; however, for some residents of the world city’s underclass, informal vending
(including the often illicit activities of prostitution and drug sales) is their only means of livelihood. By prohibiting behaviors that comprise the entirety of a resident’s economic enterprise, the prohibition actually reduces that resident’s access. In reality, though, the rules limit the underclass’ access to the pocketbooks of the transnational elite and not to the centers of world city development. Limiting access to the wealth of these individuals through the prohibition of behavior is really the main challenge to the citizenry’s right to the city.
This sets the stage for further social polarization as members of the underclass recognize the abrogation of their right to the city and its spaces. Rather than create usable urban spaces for everyone, the centers of world city development serve as spaces of conflict and contestation between the transnational elite and the underclass (and, more
19 importantly, between the underclass and the world city’s government). It is no surprise that Hooper (2004) and Lemanski (2007) report the presence of zero-tolerance policies that dictate underclass usage of the centers of world city development; however, it is important to remain critical of arguments advocating an unbridled “right to the city” and to recognize that the restriction is not about access to the space but rather to the space’s ability to generate wealth for the underclass.
Perhaps the increasing number of gated communities within and surrounding a world city best exhibits the conflict over access to and usage of the world city’s spaces.
These enclaves are distinct from other spaces within the world city by their extensive incorporation of actual barrier devices (like perimeter fencing and guarded entry points) that prevent physical access to and usage of the space (Blakely and Snyder 1997;
Caldeira 2000). While gated communities represent protected space, the distinction between a residential space and a commercial space is important. The restriction imposed on the world city’s underclass against access to places like gated communities is more a matter of the underclass financing their access to the space (e.g. through the purchase of a home in the gated community) rather than their ability to walk through the space (though this ability is often prohibited, or discouraged, as well).
Truly, then, the relationship between social polarization and the right to the city is a reflection on the distribution of wealth across the world city’s social classes rather than actual spatial restrictions (see Mitchell 2003; Hooper 2004; and Lemanski (2007). This fact emphasizes the importance of income as a measurement of social polarization.
Higher incomes often permit greater access to the centers of world city development both
20 physically and economically. It is not surprising then that these centers are also the sites of financial agglomeration and differential investment.
Defining and Identifying Spatial Polarization
Spatial polarization emerges from differential investment patterns within and between spaces of a world city. Development projects reflect a global market of potential financiers. World city governments utilize their integration with the world economy to entice foreign direct investment (FDI) from multinational corporations and other international private investors. To ensure favorable returns on FDI projects, multinational corporations discriminate between investment projects and locations.
Pervasive poverty, social class violence and ethnic tension, repressive national ideology, and national resistance to globalization all discourage FDI within a world city (Short
2004). Conversely, certain factors encourage FDI; these include the presence of extensive communications networks, low wage levels, and the presence of existing FDI
(Jordaan 2008). In addition, a high population density and an agglomeration economy with a focus on producer services are also heavy draws for FDI (Yavan 2010). As sites with producer service economies, world cities are excellent locations for FDI.
The mere existence of a producer services economy, though, is not enough to draw FDI to a world city. To market a world city as a site of growth ripe for FDI, the world city’s government must establish goals that retain an emphasis on external marketing over internal urban renewal. World city officials must do whatever it takes to encourage investment, including improving the world city’s international image and reputation as a financial powerhouse. Urban redevelopment projects initiated by the world city become marketing ventures. The projects clean up blighted areas (sometimes
21 former industrial centers dormant after the dispersal of manufacturing) near the centers of world city development to improve the world city’s overall image.4 Examples include
London’s Docklands, Baltimore’s Inner Harbor, Philadelphia’s Franklin Park, and
Pittsburgh’s South Side Works.
Development projects not targeting blighted areas usually occur in already improved districts—traditionally the places of the colonial elite—described as core areas
(Lemanski 2007). Investment in core areas exacerbates existing social and spatial polarization because it concentrates capital in wealthy spaces of a world city at the expense of poorer areas; thus, the low-income spaces of a world city—or the places of the underclass—undergo ever-increasing impoverishment and acquire identities distinct from the spaces of the transnational elite. These spaces become places outside the world city; spatially they exist within the world city’s boundaries, but from the perspective of the transnational elite, these places embody another “city” completely.
Though the appearance of a space may be a primary factor determining FDI, it is not the only factor that impacts investment decisions. The presence of a strong communications network influences the locational choices of firms (Jordaan 2008).
Producer service companies require connectivity with the international economy, the sites of production, and the spatially separated nodes of development that arise within a world city. Due to differential investment patterns, many world cities experience growth not only in traditional city centers (i.e. the central business district) but also in dense nodes of commercial development throughout a broader urban region (Sassen 1995). These nodes
4 El-Khishin (2003) believes Cairo’s bid for world city status hinges upon the successful redevelopment of the riverfront, attraction of an international university campus, the elimination of unattractive billboards, and “major urban design beautification schemes” (134). This “prescription” for Cairo is an image-driven venture to make the city more desirable to the wealthy transnational elite and FDI decision-makers.
22 form pockets of producer service concentration not located within the traditional central business district. Similar to Garreau’s (1991) edge cities, these economic nodes constitute a dispersed network of centers of world city development connected through the flow of telecommunications (Sassen 1995; Castells 1996).
These dispersed nodes serve as a prime example of how the spaces of world city development can completely transform their neighborhood (Morshidi 2000). Usually located a short distance from the central business district, the nodes form at the intersection of major thoroughfares or along public transportation routes leading between the major articulation centers of the world city (i.e. the central business district, international airport, national train depot, harbor, etc.). These sites house the sectors of the producer services (most notably, information technology) that do not require face-to- face, daily interaction with clients and the other producer services (Sassen 1995). Once created, the development of these sites spills over moderately into the surrounding real estate (Sohn, Kim, and Hewings 2003). The employees housed within the decentralized nodes are still members of the transnational elite; they require transportation to and from work (via improved highway networks or public transportation) and places to eat lunch or have drinks after work. In addition, because the sites selected for the dispersed nodes are usually blighted areas, a modicum of development to increase the attractiveness of the surrounding area also occurs. It is important to remember, though, that development is limited to the immediate area and designed solely to serve the needs of the few transnational elite employed in the dispersed economic nodes.
Describing spatial polarization, though, requires more than identifying the location choices of FDI and producer service concentration. It also implies recognizing
23 the creation of a dual city (Davis 1990). In world cities, the differential investment patterns and spatial concentration trends separate spaces from one another. The highly developed spaces of the transnational elite (e.g. waterfront complexes, high-end boutiques and shopping malls, specialty grocery stores, five-star hotels, entertainment venues, golf courses, etc.) do not intersect with the neglected periphery of the world city: the ghettoes of urban blight and the peri-urban zone surrounding the world city. In the few world city spaces where the two meet (e.g. in Bangkok, see Jenks 2003), the driving forces of social polarization effectively segregate the transnational elite from the underclass, in effect, ensuring continued spatial polarization.
Thus, researchers often combine social polarization and spatial polarization into a unified concept: socio-spatial polarization. The two operate separately and simultaneously to create an environment where certain social groups and certain spaces are preferred over others. As a result of this process, polarization within the world city increases significantly. World city formation changes membership patterns in the world city’s social classes so that the low-income segment of world city society grossly outnumbers the high-income group of transnational elite. Ironically, though, power does not emanate from the group with the largest numbers. Power concentrates (in a manner reminiscent of the concentration of producer service companies, income, FDI, and other indicators of world city status) in the hands of the transnational elite.
Spatial polarization reinforces the power of the transnational elite.
Redevelopment of central slums and other blighted areas into centers of world city development forces low-income residents to the periphery of the world city. This
“forced” relocation occurs through market activity (Hitz, Schmid, and Wolff 1996;
24 Smith, Caris, and Wyly 2001), threats and violence (Sorensen 2003), and direct intervention by municipal governments (Davis 2006). Even when central neighborhoods are not slums or ghettoes, spaces deemed development worthy often succumb to forced development by the transnational elite (Sorensen 2003).
Given this last point, perhaps spatial polarization is not as much a measure of investment in spaces of the transnational elite over spaces of the underclass as it is a measure of a world city’s spatial priorities. World city governments must place greater emphasis on economic spaces (the spaces of capital exchange and concentration) than life spaces (the spaces in which the world city’s residents experience their daily life) if they are to truly enter the world economy (Friedmann 1988). The development and growth priorities of world city formation supersede the lived experiences of the world city’s residents. A world city is first and foremost a site of capital concentration. World city governments must do whatever it takes to achieve the international image that supports increased FDI, producer service agglomeration, and the status of a destination worthy of the transnational elite.
Socio-spatial polarization, then, has a compounding effect on low-income world city residents. Hit by what Briggs and Yeboah (2001) refer to as double peripheralization—geographic and economic—low-income world city residents struggle daily. As world city formation proceeds, low-income residents become increasingly marginalized. They must navigate the spatial polarization associated with physical infrastructure placement, differential investment, and concentration of high-income jobs in inaccessible spaces as well as the social polarization that benefits the transnational elite over the world city’s underclass. Socio-spatial polarization prevents low-income
25 residents from breaking free of the negative effects of world city formation. They have no choice but to inhabit the periphery of the world city (either the ghettoes or the peri- urban zone) where they must compete with large numbers of immigrants for low amounts of inadequate housing and limited access to basic services, including fresh water, sewage removal, and electricity. The housing market provides one context within which to study the explicit impact of socio-spatial polarization. The next section addresses the nature of the housing market for low-income residents in developing world cities.
Housing Markets in Developing World Cities
The present housing market, especially in the world cities of developing nations, has its roots in the post-WWII Bretton Woods institutions: the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations (UN), and the General
Agreement on Trades and Tariffs. For approximately 30 years, these agencies (led by the nations of Wallerstein’s (1974) core) dictated fiscal policy, determined growth priorities, and directed spending patterns across the world. By the late 1970s, many nations in
Wallerstein’s periphery had accrued huge debts through public works spending programs funded by monies borrowed from the World Bank and IMF (Spero 1990).
In 1982, after Mexico and Brazil announced they were unable to repay their loans, the IMF and World Bank initiated policy changes for all subsequent, new loans. Without other sources of finance for their development projects, developing nations accepted the
World Bank and IMF demand to make onerous structural adjustments in economic policy at the national level. The three major components of these structural adjustment programs (SAPs)—stabilization of the economy, liberalization of markets, and privatization of state-owned enterprises—reflected a shift from state-centered to free-
26 market economies and realigned what the IMF and World Bank saw as structural blockages hindering economic growth (Stein 2008).
Stabilization efforts focused on macroeconomic goals and were designed to ensure that fluctuations in the economy became less pronounced and less frequent.
Liberalization efforts sought deregulation of the market and elimination of price controls and tariffs. Privatization efforts emphasized selling government assets and transferring government operations to private corporations. In theory, the tenets of structural adjustment reflect sound economic principles; in reality, they operate only within an ideal economic model (Stein 2008) and rarely result in their intended outcomes (see, for example, Mengisteab and Logan 1991; Kawai 1994; Agosin and Ffrench-Davis 1995;
Ram 1996; Handa and King 1997; and Rapley 2007). Some authors even suggest that limited monitoring of private entities by the government, along with strategic reform, can result in greater efficiency and achieve the same, if not better, results than the SAP reforms (see Crane 1989-1990; Faucher 1991; Ellis 1993; and Parker and Kirkpatrick
2005).
In Africa, structural adjustment programs significantly impacted the structure of
African cities. The SAPs’ emphasis on agricultural production encouraged settlement of the peri-urban area on the cities’ periphery. Under the pro-rural policies of adjustment, many urban residents moved to the peri-urban areas where they could produce agricultural commodities while remaining close enough to the urban center to hold a job in the city (Briggs and Mwamfupe 2000). Residents who relocated to the periphery of
Africa’s world cities encountered significant difficulty locating a place to live because most African world cities have experienced housing shortages since independence.
27 Between the displaced world city residents and new immigrants, the demand for housing on the periphery has increased exponentially. The need for additional housing has also caused an increase in the general size of Africa’s world cities. In fact, today, housing consumption is likely the largest factor contributing to African world cities’ geographical growth (Briggs and Yeboah 2001).
The growth in housing demand has permitted the emergence of small, informal construction companies in many of Africa’s developing world cities. As part of the overall rise of the informal sector, these companies provide crucial housing in fringe neighborhoods either ignored by the image-driven development projects sponsored by world city governments or deemed too risky for FDI (Macoloo 1991). Though limited in their ability to service the entire underclass of a world city—the “owners” cannot perform the services for free—these informal companies are the outcome of changing government priorities under the dictates of structural adjustment.
The growth of these construction companies has been very informal, occurring mainly as a response to individual demand markets in specific world cities. As such, monitoring of the services provided by these companies has also been informal and led to overall haphazard development. New structures are typically one- or two-story dwellings constructed with little or no thought regarding sound urban planning principles or connections to existing infrastructure. Residents often build tiny walls of random materials around their houses to secure pieces of land even where it is left undeveloped for many years (Briggs and Yeboah 2001). Unless the world city’s government initiates development projects to connect these settlements, they remain unconnected to the centers of world city development (Yeboah 2003) and growth is random.
28 Even when not located in the periphery, informal housing construction has grown haphazardly. In the mid 1950s, during the initial booms of informal housing construction in South Africa, landlords added rooms to the back of existing houses (Reader 1960).
Additional rooms meant increased rent from migrants. As migration increased, landlords continued adding rooms built from random materials wherever space permitted. Rooms opening onto the shared open spaces (where cooking, laundry, and bodily ablutions occurred) were the most sought after; however, the expansion of housing structures quickly created entire sections of residential areas with housing units opening only into other housing units. This also created neighborhoods with housing units lacking access to streets as well as sewage, electricity, and water lines.
The housing market represents a dominant element in the informal economy of developing world cities (Amis 1990). People need a place to live even if it is in ramshackle houses built of substandard material on the periphery of a world city. In the developing world, structural adjustment policies prevented governments from financing industrialization, infrastructure expansion, or agricultural subsidies, but it did not stop individuals (or the “private” sector) from filling the demand for housing. Building houses to meet that demand remains one of the few safe investments for members of the world city’s underclass.
Though it is true that world city formation can instigate investment in housing production and consumption, such investment occurs with significant risk. Localized housing markets do not represent sustainable long-term investment in productive capacity, workforce improvement, technological innovation, or export capacity. The little industrial demand created—for products like bricks and cement—is intimately tied
29 to the consumption patterns of a specific world city’s residents. If this demand decreases, the small industrial sector surrounding housing construction collapses (Briggs and
Mwamfupe 2000).
Though the informal housing market can be uncertain, various elements arising from SAPs actually increase the security of this type of investment. One common condition attached to World Bank loans of the early 1990s required national governments to tacitly accept the establishment of informal squatter settlements in the peri-urban zone regardless of their impact on the world city’s image (Amis 1990). The World Bank
(1993) also supported small subsidies to private citizens willing to perform the majority of housing construction. By ignoring the outright violation of land ownership, world city governments fostered the establishment of self-help housing initiatives and focused on the provision of site upgrades and basic services for existing settlements (Malpezzi
1990). As McDonald (2008) indicates, though, the wherewithal to provide site upgrades and basic services has been grossly lacking.
Historical expectations of self-help housing—what Mike Davis (2006) terms the
“illusion of self help” (70)—has framed the shift from government-provided to user- provided housing. Davis credits this illusion to John Turner’s work in Peru. Turner advocated for a mixture of anarchy and neoliberalism that favored self-help housing, gradual construction, and legalization of spontaneous urbanization. In addition to praising the praxis of the poor, government acceptance of self-help housing also permitted an increase in the rates of owner-occupied properties. Governments welcomed the self-help housing movement because it gave low-income residents a greater stake in
30 urban society (Gilbert 1993). World Bank (2009) policy has supported this notion, concluding that home ownership increases security and community attachment.
Underneath this self-help housing imperative rests a greater problem: access to urban land. Before anyone can build a house they must have a place to build it. As governments privatized ownership of public property, land became increasingly commoditized. Governments sold off their public holdings and decreased their direct management of development activities on remaining publicly owned spaces; however, such activities did not completely eliminate government intervention in the land market.
Structural adjustment programs prevented governments from intervening in the provision of housing, but they did not dictate legislation or policy governing land access. Some governments ensured that only their political supporters succeeded in invading the land
(Gilbert 1993) while others ignored land invasions or directly supplied squatters with land deeds (Davis 2006).
For residents with even small financial reserves, investment in the urban housing market is a relatively safe investment (Briggs and Yeboah 2001). One of the more common forms of investment in the housing market is the consolidation of land holdings through the acquisition of land titles. Low-income households sell their land titles for money to survive and either pay rent to the new owners or relocate to more peripheral places where free land is still available.5 As a result, a few absentee landlords own the majority of housing (Davis 2006).
5 Though once these individuals arrive at the periphery—as Mike Davis (2006, 85-89) reports—they become the victims of land speculators, often government officials or agents of the government. Governments permit low-income residents to squat on the undeveloped land of the periphery and establish self-help housing; once a sufficient community has developed, these speculators sell the property (because it was never owned by the squatters) to individuals willing to purchase the houses, or they evict the existing residents and advertise the homes for rent.
31 This last trend is not unlike that experienced in post-industrial world cities.
Neoliberal6 housing policies have contributed to a decrease in the number of individual homeowners and an increase in the age at which a person purchases a home. This initiated a return to “private landlordism” (Forrest and Hirayama 2009, 1010) in societies where home ownership had been increasing for several decades. In both the developing and developed world, neoliberal policy has made home ownership less likely for a greater proportion of the population.
The struggle for housing—epitomized through home ownership—is a tangible outcome of socio-spatial polarization during world city formation. Many low-income residents populate world cities; these individuals reside in housing of the poorest quality located in the poorest areas disconnected or severely removed from the centers of world city development. Their neighborhoods comprise ramshackle structures built haphazardly without consideration for future urban growth or sound planning. Residents of these communities suffer increased risk for disease, fire, and natural disasters (Davis
2006). Unless governments can find a way to minimize the negative effects of world city formation, these residents only face a more dire future as the world city formation process continues to marginalize them.
The Situation of a Globalizing Cape Town
Of the world cities of Africa, Cape Town is unique: Its national government enacted neoliberal policies similar to those of structural adjustment on its own without
6 Harvey (2005) describes neoliberalism as a political economic theory. Neoliberalism suggests that humanity advances through the liberation of individual entrepreneurial spirit in an environment embodying free markets, free trade, and private property (2). Neoliberalism is perhaps best embodied by the policies supported by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan during the height of structural adjustment in the 1980s.
32 the World Bank or IMF forcing the changes.7 In addition, the city suffers from the legacy of apartheid, a political system that segregated the country’s residents by racial classification. Though apartheid predated the restructuring of the world economy by several decades, its legacy lives on in the social structure and spatial form inherited by
Cape Town’s government in 1994. Since then, world city socio-spatial polarization has exacerbated this legacy and forced the government to work harder to combat the growth of inequality in the city.
Apartheid in South Africa
To say that South Africa’s lurid history of racial segregation began with the legal enactment of apartheid is only partially true. Established in 1652 as a Dutch outpost challenging Portuguese naval supremacy, Cape Town began as a segregated society.
White settlers (the Dutch and the French Huguenots) governed the local tribes
(collectively known as the Khoisan) and lorded over slaves brought from India (the
Coloureds). After several centuries of rule (and the transfer of government from Dutch to
British hands), these general divides morphed into four distinct categories: Whites,
Coloureds, Asians (including the large Indian population as well as east and southeast
Asians), and Natives (hereafter, Africans).8 Solidified by law in 1948, these divisions formed the basis for the discriminatory legislation enacted during the apartheid era.
7 Even though South Africa is home to three world cities (GaWC 2010), Friedmann (1986) named Johannesburg a world city long before the end of apartheid and the economic transition to neoliberalism. Durban was only recently added to GaWC’s roster and has not had the time to develop the same level of socio-spatial polarization (from world city formation) as Cape Town.
8 The racial categories of the apartheid era reflect attempts to segregate specific groups (notably, the Whites from the Africans). The Coloured category included any person of mixed descent provided it excluded native African. The Asian category predominantly described the large population of Indians but also included Malay and Chinese migrant laborers (though these groups were sometimes categorized as Coloured). Government officials employed a test of ancestry to determine which category fit the individual; this resulted in some families being split into two racial groups (Ross 1999).
33 Even before the National Party established apartheid as national law there were severe racial divides9 in South African society. When the British received authority over
Cape Province they limited African franchise to wealthy and highly educated individuals; a similar law in Natal deprived Asians of the right to vote. By 1905, laws restricted
African movement, required them to carry a pass, and disenfranchised them completely.
A similar act in 1906 eliminated these rights for Asians. Unification of the four provinces in 1910 enfranchised all Whites (which included the British and the Afrikaners, the descendents of the Dutch) while simultaneously disallowing Africans the right to sit in Parliament. A series of additional acts slowly forced Africans to reside in specific locations (termed the Reserves) and removed any semblance of political authority from all groups except the Whites.
By 1948 South African society was already so divided that the National Party received little opposition to its plan for formal segregation. Africans and Asians already labored under the supervision of Whites in the diamond mines of Kimberley, the gold mines of Johannesburg, and in households of the white elite in South Africa’s major cities. Africans also comprised the majority of the labor force on white-owned industrial farms in the Transvaal. Whites across the nation, previously in opposition to one another depending upon their ancestry,10 joined forces to ensure continued domination of Whites
9 The racial divides of the pre-apartheid era reflect almost the same racial divides as the apartheid era; however, the names given to each group differed. To simplify the discussion and remain consistent, I have replaced the earlier group names with the categories assigned under apartheid.
10 The Afrikaners had struggled with the British for several decades over control of the nation. Ironically, competing reasons joined the two together. The British feared the growing population size of the Africans would eventually subsume the Whites and thought that (with sufficient mechanization) the White population could eventually eliminate the need for African labor. The Afrikaners, however, joined the National Party because they needed African labor to continue expanding industrial farming operations in the Transvaal (Ross 1999).
34 over all other racial categories. Government officials realized it was necessary to codify racial segregation in order to prevent the increasing population size of Africans from subsuming the Whites (Ross 1999).
In many places throughout South Africa, the Africans already lived in concentrated locations (in some places even predating unification). Rural Africans suffered from forced concentration in the villages of the Reserves because the government believed the Africans had overgrazed the land and the government could offer services, like education and healthcare, more easily from a central location.
Africans working the gold and diamond mines lived in highly controlled housing compounds designed to monitor the urban African population (Demissie 1998) on the periphery of Johannesburg and Kimberley. In other cities, like Cape Town and Durban, the Urban Labor Preference Policy permanently urbanized a subset of the African population. This initiative established laws preventing urban migration of new Africans until all existing African urban residents found employment. Another regulation exchanged the requirement to carry passes with a requirement to carry a reference book that detailed an African’s residency and employment history.
Known as Section 10 rights, permission to live in a city was highly desired.
Though police enforcement of the travel restrictions did not stop migration to the cities, the government revoked permission for urban residency (and the concomitant relocation to the Bantustans,11 or native homelands of the Africans) as a form of punishment for
11 The Bantustans (Bantu, meaning “people” in several Bantu languages and –stan, meaning “land” in Persian)—a renaming of the Reserves—were a product of the post-apartheid government. The National Party believed that ethnicity was under attack in South Africa and needed preservation, a prime rationale for the establishment of racial categories fixed through the Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, the Population Registration Act of 1950, and the Immorality Act of 1950. The government marketed the Bantustans as restorations of historical tribal territories designed to preserve native African culture and ensure continuation of African society (Ross 1999).
35 insubordinate urban populations. The National Party considered the Bantustans to be autonomous, and in some instances, independent nations. Forced removal from the urban centers to the Bantustans, in essence, was synonymous with deportation of illegal aliens.
In reality, though, these “independent” nations relied heavily upon the South African government for their budgets and military protection while also accepting National Party appointment of tribal leaders.
Though the South African government was the only nation to recognize the independence of the Bantustans, this recognition provided the government with a convenient excuse to monitor African population size in urban centers. Residents assigned to the Bantustans were technically foreigners in South African cities and could be readily deported at the whim of the local officials. Deportation of entire areas became common practice by the 1960s. Whenever white developers wanted African-held land for any reason, the local government simply declared all residents as foreign squatters and deported them to a Bantustan. Once there, the relocated Africans had no choice but to congregate in the Bantustans’ growing slums.
Within the cities, the Group Areas Act of 1950 required local municipalities to set aside land specifically for non-White residency. Cape Town initially opposed the Group
Areas Act (Saff 1998); however, when the city government established the first Group
Area in 1957, “slum”-clearing began with District Six (described as a Coloured bastion of middle class bourgeois culture by Ross (1999) that threatened White control of the city).
Subsequently, the city government forced thousands of African, Coloured, and Asian residents to relocate to the townships. Saff describes Cape Town of the mid-1980s as one of the most racially segregated cities in South Africa.
36 Similar abuses occurred in the backyard housing of East London, South Africa
(Bank 2007). After 1950, that city’s government forcibly removed over 8,000 residents from backyard settlements. Initially, the East London government intended to replace the wood-and-iron conglomerates with brick-and-mortar housing for the city’s newly urbanized Africans; unfortunately, state-led housing construction halted in the mid-1970s while the destruction of African informal housing continued.
Informal settlements often developed on the outskirts of the townships (the urban
Group Areas). Motivated by the extremely poor living conditions in the Bantustan slums, residents migrated to the cities despite the movement restrictions and the threat of imprisonment or relocation to another area of the country. The influx of residents was so large that the municipal court in Langa, a township on the periphery of Cape Town, deported over 100 residents every day (Ross 1999, 149). Surprisingly, this was only one of many courts in operation in Cape Town.
By the mid-1980s, Crossroads, one of Cape Town’s largest African townships, had exceeded a population of 100,000. To control such a large population of unregistered
Africans, the Cape Town government tolerated the rise of mafia-like African leaders in the townships. Johnson Ngxobongwana’s witdoeke, named for the “white scarf” worn by
Ngxobongwana’s henchmen, exercised a reign of terror over Crossroads and the surrounding townships. Their terroristic activities were so severe that one purge of residents refusing to pay tribute to Ngxobongwana resulted in the displacement of over
70,000 residents by rampant fire set by the witdoeke (Ross 1999). Figure 2.5 later in this chapter illustrates the relative location of both Langa and Crossroads.
37 Such violence increasingly characterized the urban environment of South Africa.
By the early 1990s, the National Party, led by F. W. De Klerk, realized that apartheid was a failing system. International economic sanctions and political opinion had (ironically) segregated South Africa from the rest of the world. Health and education conditions for the country’s Africans (and to a lesser extent, Asians and Coloureds) were extremely poor. Infrastructure in the townships was almost nonexistent compared to the White areas of the cities. Most settlements in the townships were unconnected to the nation’s electricity and water grids. Public transportation routes were poor and housing resembled the self-help shambles of slums in developing cities around the world.
The end of apartheid signaled the end of government-enforced segregation, but it did not signal an end to the existing socio-spatial polarization that had plagued South
Africa since the first Dutch settlers landed at Table Bay in the 1650s. The newly inaugurated South African government quickly realized that dissolving the legacy of apartheid would require very aggressive, very detailed, very committed policies. The new government also sought quick integration with the global economy denied to it because of sanctions related to apartheid.
Cape Town as a World City
Cape Town is one of South Africa’s largest cities with a population over 3.4 million comprised of approximately 904,000 households. It is also a large city by area with 2,461 km2 and a coastline of 294 km. Within the city, there are 144 parks/reserves,
108 public libraries, 62 police stations, and 29 fire stations. The city also claims 125
38 endemic species, the majestic beauty of Table Bay Mountain (CCT 2008a),12 and was home to the 2010 FIFA World Cup.
While the previous statistics reflect positive elements of urban life in Cape Town, a darker set of statistics exists. Approximately 16.9% of the population is unemployed.
More than 58% of residents never matriculated from secondary school (with another
23.6% matriculated with no further education). About 18.2% of the population lives with
HIV/AIDS and there are almost 27,000 cases of tuberculosis reported every year (with
2,122 deaths resulting). There are 108,899 informal dwellings (described previously as self-help housing) throughout the city with 6.7% having no access to safe drinking water,
5.8% having no access to adequate sanitation, 2.8% having no access to electricity for lighting, and 4.4% having no access to at least weekly refuse removal. The city recognizes 201,867 households (almost 25%) as indigent and another 38.8% of households living below the poverty line ( 3.45), though this is still much lower than the Gini coefficients for other South African cities.14 Evidence from the 2001 census reveals that there is a concentration of economic activity in the city, but a majority of the urban population lives below the government’s Minimum Living Levels (SACN 2006, 2.15). Cape Town is both a majestic beauty with much to offer the transnational elite, foreign direct investors, multinational corporations, and international tourists; however, it 12 These statistics represent data collected during the 2007 Community Survey, the last official collection of data since the 2001 Census. Another census is currently underway but Statistics South Africa will not likely release the data for another year. 13 As of this writing, one dollar is equivalent to approximately 7.64 rand (6 March 2012). 14 In 2005, the Gini coefficient for Durban, Port Elizabeth, and Pretoria was 0.72; for East Rand, 0.74; and for East London and Johannesburg, 0.75 (CCT 2011a, 2). 39 is also a city with a highly impoverished population living in inadequate housing lacking basic services. This certainly indicates polarization inherited from the apartheid era exists within the city. There is also evidence that polarization has increased in Cape Town since the end of apartheid as a result of world city formation. Table 2.1. Percentage Contribution to GVA by Economic Sector Economic Sector Percentage Contribution to GVA Financial 32% Services 19% Commerce 17% Manufacturing 16% Transport 11% Construction 3% Energy 1% Agriculture <1% Mining <1% Source: SACN (2006, 3.11). The sectoral composition of Cape Town’s economy reflects domination by the producer services. As shown in Table 2.1, the financial, commerce, and services sectors comprise the three largest contributors to Cape Town’s gross geographic value added (GVA)—a measure of the value of goods and services produced in a particular area to the overall economy (South African Cities Network [SACN] 2006, 3.8).15 Though manufacturing and construction contribute slightly to GVA, the total percentage of GVA for these two sectors is less than one-third that of the producer services. Other primary economic activities are almost nonexistent, though it is likely that producer services aimed at these sectors exists within the city (SACN 2006). 15 Gross Geographic Value Added (GVA) is used by the firm Global Insight as a basis for assessing the economic activity of a particular region. It is similar to the Gross Geographic Product (GGP) that considers compensation of employees plus the gross operating surplus in a geographic region (Campbell, Maritz, and Hauptfleisch n.d., 8). 40 The occupational structure resembles the hierarchy present in a city dominated by producer services (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw 2009). After 1980, manufacturing and service employment began to diverge; manufacturing continued to decrease in absolute numbers of employed residents while service employment started to increase. In fact, service employment in the FIRE industries (finance, insurance, and real estate) saw the greatest percentage increase of all employment categories between 1946 and 2001. The rise in managerial and professional positions, growth in the number of low- or unskilled jobs, and relative decline in middle-income, blue-collar service positions, especially within the manufacturing sector, indicate a polarizing workforce representative of a producer services economy. These data suggest that Cape Town exhibits income-based social polarization. The growth patterns observed by Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) reflect the decline in manufacturing jobs, overall growth at either end of the income scale, and the emergence of a middle level of service positions as described by O’Loughlin and Friedrichs (1996). While it is arguable that the steady influx of migrant laborers to the city has resulted in polarization rather than professionalization (see Hamnett 1996), the far likelier conclusion is that Cape Town’s sectoral shift to producer services has created a hierarchical employment structure in which income distribution concentrates around the high-skill jobs of the transnational elite rather than the under-educated, low-skilled jobs of the underclass. Cape Town’s formal employment levels remained relatively consistent (at approximately 710,000 persons) between 1994 and 2006 but the number of individuals employed by the informal sector has increased (SACN 2006). City government 41 recognizes the important contributions of the informal sector to the overall economy; according to 2008 estimations, the informal economy represents 12% of all economic output and employs 18% of the economically active residents (CCT 2011a). In recognition of the small contribution of the informal sector to the city’s economy, the city government has made informal sector employment growth and sustainability a priority (CCT 2003a). Through the Informal Trading Policy and Management Framework of 2003, the city established approved locations for informal economic activity. The city’s overall strategy contains a four-pronged approach to informal economic activity: (1) increase planning activities regarding when and where informal activity will occur, (2) ensure registration of all informal activities occurs with the proper city agencies, (3) allocate appropriate resources to those engaged in informal activity, and (4) assign values and collect rent for land upon which informal activity takes place. The city also expects to slowly turn informal economic activity into established elements of the formal economic sector by encouraging informal entrepreneurs to establish fixed location trading outposts connected to city services like electricity and water (CCT 2003a, 7-9). A prime element of the city’s informal trading initiative is the emphasis on controlling citizen access to economic space(s). As Lemanski (2007) and Hooper (2002) have both argued, only certain spaces are officially available for informal economic activity.16 The city’s policy clearly states that all informal economic activities must occur in pre-approved spaces by individuals holding a permit to trade. These vendors are also 16 Trading spaces exist in the CBD but they are limited to existing pedestrian malls and marketplaces. In non-CBD locations (like the various economic nodes dispersed throughout the city), informal trading can occur in dedicated trading bays (built for this exclusive purpose by the city) or on designated streets. There are regulations even in the informal settlements: informal trading activities must exhibit “ ‘place-making’ strategies, as trading may have the potential to generate new forms of public space” (CCT 2003, 20) 42 subject to special provisions that limit their ability to engage in economic activity during certain events as determined by the appropriate city officials. Though Cape Town’s government claims to balance the informal traders’ needs with those of the city, in reality, city policies favor the formal businesses of the city over the informal businesses. Alongside the city’s official practice of concentrating economic activity in specific places emerged lesser-controlled investment patterns that reflect the spatial concentration of capital. In 2009, the Western Cape (the province where Cape Town is located) received 15% of South Africa’s total FDI, all of which trickled down to investment within the City of Cape Town (CCT 2011a, 13). FDI inflows to the city have fluctuated between R1.6 billion in 2005 to a height of R11.8 billion in 2008 (CCT 2011a, 13). FDI investment in Cape Town is high due to its strong communications network and strength in producer services (Jordaan 2008; Yavan 2010). FDI inflows for 2009 were highest in the communications sector while software/IT services have experienced the most consistent level of FDI (CCT 2011a, 13). Though Cape Town exhibits investment patterns of a linear nature along major thoroughfares (e.g. Voortrekker Road between the CBD and Bellville, Durban Road in Tygervalley, and Main Road in the Southern Suburbs), the main form of economic development has transitioned from linear corridors to decentralized economic nodes as exhibited in Figure 2.2 (CCT 2010b). Cape Town’s decentralized economic nodes are connected to the city center via strong infrastructure, such as limited-access highways and communication networks. The city has encouraged development in these decentralized nodes (specifically in the Bellville-Tygervalley, Wynberg, 43 Claremont/Newlands, and Somerset West nodes) precisely because they are already connected to existing transportation networks (CCT 2010b). Figure 2.2. Decentralized Economic Nodes in Cape Town. This figure illustrates the decentralized nature of the growing spatial economy in Cape Town. While investment remains high the traditional CBD, increasing development is occurring along main transportation routes in specific neighborhoods and suburbs. Voortrekker Road runs between the CBD and the Bellville-Tygervalley area. Main Road connects the CBD with Westlake. Somerset West is on the eastern edge of the N2 Highway (CCT 2010b). Image Source: CCT (2010b, 7), citing K. Sinclair-Smith. Annotations added. Investment in the central business district has grown significantly since December 2000. Economic development, in the form of high-end enterprises designed for the transnational elite (e.g. high-end shopping, restaurants, hotels, spas, developed waterfront properties, etc.), has caused an overall increase in total property tax revenue from R680 per capita in 2001/2002 to R790 in 2004/2005 (citing SACN 2006, 3.35). Outside the central business district, investment has centered on enclaves like Century City and Tygervalley in the northern suburbs and Claremont and Westlake in the southern suburbs (see Figure 2.2). Both areas are former white neighborhoods that benefitted heavily 44 under apartheid’s racial planning policies. These areas remain out-of-reach financially for most of the city’s non-white residents. Given the above discussion, it is clear that both social polarization and spatial polarization (in effect, the socio-spatial polarization of world city formation) exists within Cape Town. The city has a producer services economy that attracts a high degree of FDI. Development occurs primarily in economic nodes with an emphasis on places for the transnational elite. GaWC’s (2010) assessment of Cape Town as a beta world city is accurate. Continued movement towards alpha world city status (indicated by the transition of Cape Town from gamma world city status in 2008 to beta world city status by 2010, see GaWC) will only exacerbate the present polarization. It will be up to the municipal government to deal with the polarization inherited from the apartheid era compounded by the socio-spatial polarization of world city formation. The last section considers the structure of Cape Town’s municipal government and the emergence of pro- poor and pro-growth initiatives. The Emergence of Pro-Poor and Pro-Growth Initiatives Since the post-apartheid transition of power in 1994, the South African government—led by the African National Congress (ANC)—has promoted the creation of city boundaries that encompass existing metropolitan regions. Identified by their common core of economic production, these cities ensure consistency in economic policy and sound urban planning/design throughout the inter-connected region. The national government hoped that centralized metropolitan governance would encourage integration of the unified metropolitan regions with the global economy (Pillay 2004). 45 Nevertheless, in the aftermath of apartheid, South African cities were far from unified metropolitan regions. The ANC created provincial Local Government Demarcation Boards to manage the division of former apartheid cities into local authorities (LAs) as directed by the Local Government Transition Act of 1993. Prior to consolidation in 2000, the area that became Cape Town comprised 25 distinct divisions (termed white local authorities (WLAs)—the former White, Coloured, and Asian areas— and black local authorities (BLAs) located predominantly within the former townships). The Regional Service Council governed the discontinuous urbanized areas outside the boundaries of the LAs. The demarcation process had two primary goals: (1) create economically and politically viable, contiguous urban areas and (2) create standardized units (i.e. cities) that could implement the agenda of the ANC (McDonald 2008). Not surprisingly, the demarcation process resulted in severely inefficient urban areas that did not cooperate across boundaries and routinely duplicated services. Of greater concern to the ANC, though, was that nothing really changed. WLAs had no difficulty securing the funds and power to develop the WLAs; however, the BLAs remained completely unable to deal with the new demands for infrastructure development. The obvious negative outcomes of the demarcation process prompted negotiations for a consolidated one-city model. This model eliminated the local authorities and combined all areas (WLAs, BLAs, and areas governed by the Regional Service Board) into a unicity: the metropolitan council. 46 Figure 2.3. Location of Fringe Municipalities at Consolidation. This figure shows the main built-up areas on the periphery of Cape Town that escaped consolidation (Wellington, Paarl, Franschhoek, and Stellenbosch) through loopholes in the rules governing unicity inclusion. Somerset West, another predominantly white urban area, was consolidated into the City of Cape Town against the wishes of its resident population (McDonald 2008). Base Map: Google Maps (2012). Almost immediately, individual LAs began to negotiate with the Local Government Demarcation Board for the Western Cape (LGDB) over their inclusion in the Cape Town metropolitan council. Some LAs, like Stellenbosch, Paarl, Franschhoek, and Wellington (see Figure 2.3), failed to meet the requirements determined by the LGDB for inclusion while others, like Somerset West, found themselves absorbed into the City of Cape Town despite the wishes of their residents (LGDB 1994). These residents feared the unicity would appropriate their tax dollars to upgrade impoverished areas of the unicity while neglecting the neighborhoods where the tax dollars originated. Arbiters in the LGDB feared that allowing mostly white municipalities on the periphery of the newly created unicity would result in white flight and capital flight from Cape Town, leading to an inability to enact truly redistributive reforms (McDonald 2008). 47 Thus, the City of Cape Town acquired much larger swaths of territory than would have resulted from the mere consolidation of built-up areas. Almost as soon as the LGDB determined what the Cape Town metropolitan council would look like, it devolved decision-making to newly created wards, smaller political entities within the unicity.17 This devolution aimed to spread the responsibility of township upgrading among the various affluent areas adjacent to the former townships. In effect, the ward model combined former WLAs with former BLAs to create substructures with the financial capacity to meet the needs of all areas (LGDB 1995). At the national level, the ANC government passed the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 (Republic of South Africa [RSA] 1998) that required all spatial development to be socially inclusive. The Municipal Services Act of 2000 (RSA 2000) followed; it set a minimum level of acceptability for the delivery of basic services to the wards. The final stage in the evolution of Cape Town as a unicity occurred in 2000 when seven former metropolitan councils joined together (Lemanski 2007).18 The formation of the CCT (under the slogan “one city one tax base”) was supposed to redistribute wealth and prevent the concentration of resources and capital in wealthy neighborhoods. Unfortunately, the city’s attentive response to the ANC’s global economic integration agenda has placed significant strain on this goal. Cape Town’s solution was to recognize the economic benefits of a pro-growth strategy that joined the city to the global economy while embarking on a redistributive program at the municipal level. In effect, this 17 The main difference between a ward and a local authority is its timing and composition. The LAs existed prior to the creation of the unified city whereas the wards comprise subunits of city government. In addition, the LAs tended to be homogeneous in racial composition whereas the wards were delineated purposefully to create a more heterogeneous racial composition at the most local government level. 18 These municipalities were Blaauwberg Municipality, City of Cape Town, City of Tygerberg, Helderberg Municipality, Oostenberg Municipality, South Peninsula Municipality, and the Cape Metropolitan Council (Lemanski 2007, 455). 48 decision led to the formation of antagonistic initiatives through the city’s pro-growth and pro-poor agendas. Figure 2.4. Cape Town’s Central City Improvement District. This figure outlines the four precincts that comprise the Center City Improvement District as identified by the Cape Town Partnership and City of Cape Town. Each precinct has its own manager who liaisons with the property owners and city government to ensure that Cape Town is a “clean, safe, and caring city” (CTP 2012, para. 2). The inset shows the relative location of the CCID within the CCT. Base Maps: Google Maps (2012). The Cape Town Partnership (CTP), a public-private conglomerate responsible for city center development and policy, emerged alongside the formation of the CCT. Dedicated to regenerating Cape Town’s CBD, the CTP functions as CCT’s engine for marketing to the global economy. It encourages investment and development in the CBD by selling the city as a viable location for FDI and local development (especially among private corporations). One of CTP’s most ambitious projects, the Central City Improvement District (CCID) (Figure 2.4), levies additional taxes on property owners in the CBD to fund a clean-up program (Lemanski 2007). This project has reduced crime, 49 cleaned city streets, and resulted in a CBD more amenable to FDI and the relocation of multinational corporations (Nahnsen 2003). Ironically, the CTP’s flagship program has both enhanced CCT’s pro-growth goal of attracting FDI and reduced the efforts of CCT’s pro-poor agenda of redistribution. After the CTP initiated their efforts to clean up the CBD, city officials (along with private security forces) began regular removal of the homeless, sex workers, informal vendors, beggars, and street-children. Lemanski (2007) believes the CTP aims to produce an urban core designed to exclusively cater to the transnational elite and city’s wealthy residents (see also Hooper 2002). Another cooperative goal of the CCT and CTP is densification of the central city. Their ambitious plan (part of the Central City Development Strategy [CCDS]) aims to increase this area’s resident population by 100,000 over the next ten years through the development of distinct neighborhoods they have named “character precincts.” Many residents in the targeted neighborhoods oppose the plan because they fear disintegration of their neighborhoods’ character through high-rises and larger populations (Turok 2009). Despite attempts to grow the diversity of the city and create CTP’s character precincts, the establishment of safe spaces for previously under-represented populations (like De Waterkant, South Africa’s first “gay village” on the periphery of the CBD and one of the CCDS character precincts, see Figure 2.4) remains entrenched in apartheid-like segregation. Instead of an inclusive gay Mecca, De Waterkant persists as a wealthy, White, gay male enclave. Though officially inclusive of all individuals (regardless of race), the neighborhood’s gay spaces are concentrated in former White areas (too far removed from the locations of Coloured and African residents) while also remaining too 50 expensive for any but the city’s elite (and, likewise, the gay males of the transnational elite) to afford (Visser 2003). Pro-Poor Policies at Work: Cape Town’s Housing Market It is the pervasive continuation of apartheid-like segregation that prompted the CCT to implement its pro-poor policies. These programs take many different forms and reflect attempts to mediate the legacy of apartheid. The Dignified Places Programme (an example is the Uluntu Plaza project) seeks to expand public recreation facilities and spaces. This program encourages the development of “people’s places” that are part of a citywide system of public space and market squares all located within established “zones of poverty” (CCT 2003b). The city believes it is not enough to simply beautify spaces within the city; these spaces must be important to the city’s underlying structure and reflect corridors of development able to exert spillover effects on surrounding areas. Unlike the Dignified Places Programme, which promotes the spread of pockets of development (similar to the economic nodes model, Sassen 2005) across the city, the Presidential Urban Renewal Programme (URP) targets specific neighborhoods for development. Launched by former president Thabo Mbeki in 2001, the URP aims to “enable systematic and sustained interventions [that] alleviate poverty and significantly address under-development and socio-economic exclusion (CCT 2012a, para. 3). In Cape Town, the URP focuses solely on the former townships of Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain: two of the most impoverished sections of the city (Figure 2.5). 51 Figure 2.5. Location of Impoverished Townships. This figure shows the location of the most impoverished neighborhoods in Cape Town. These neighborhoods, from left to right, are: top, Langa and Joe Slovo; middle, Gugulethu, Nyanga, and Crossroads; and bottom, Philippi, Mitchells Plain, and Khayelitsha. Spatially, these neighborhoods comprise a linear series of developments along the N2 Highway that connects the CBD with Somerset West. In the center of the image, just east of Crossroads, is the international airport. Base Map: Google Maps (2012). The Dignified Places Programme and the Presidential Urban Renewal Programme represent CCT’s pro-poor strategies aimed to improve the overall living situation of impoverished residents. While both have broad support and go far to improve the livelihoods of low-income residents, neither explicitly addresses the major problem facing the city’s underclass: the severe lack of affordable, safe housing connected to the decentralized nodes of economic development and the centers of world city formation. The post-apartheid government of South Africa (and by extension the CCT) inherited a highly racialized housing system with poor infrastructure. Goodlad (1996) reports that at the time of transition an estimated two million people nationwide lived in shacks with basic municipal services, another seven million people lived in shacks without basic municipal services, and 1.5 million households were homeless. 52 Approximately a quarter of the population had no access to piped water; almost half had no access to electricity and sanitation. A 1994 government report estimated an additional 130,000 to 150,000 new homes were needed each year to provide for new households, though one year after publication, the government had finished construction on only a third (all statistics cited in Goodlad 1996). “Without meeting basic needs, no political democracy can survive in South Africa,” directed the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (para. 2.2.1, cited in Goodlad 1996, 1636). These needs included housing for the urban poor. The Development Facilitation Act of 1995 helped national, provincial, and municipal governments acquire land for housing construction, and initiated housing programs at all three levels of government. Adequate housing, especially owner-occupied housing, creates wealth, ensures social security, and provides an outlet for local politics. Owners have a greater stake in their communities (World Bank 2009). Initially, the ANC focused on building large quantities of housing through a fixed subsidy program (i.e. a set amount of funding per unit regardless of the actual development cost), though as Goodlad (1996) has cited, after only one year, this program had done little to address the actual backlog of housing. In addition, the program’s funding procedure created its own problems. The ANC encouraged neoliberal privatization of this process, expecting municipalities to work with private developers to address the housing shortage. Developers had to work within the parameters of the market to secure sites large enough to develop a mass quantity of inexpensive units below cost; they were, after all, private entities engaged in profit maximization and not 53 philanthropists. The sites chosen for the new housing units often existed on the periphery of the city, reinforcing spatial segregation (Huchzermeyer 2003). In recognition of the failed results of their initial housing policy, in 2004 the ANC launched Breaking New Ground (BNG) (RSA 2004). Rather than deliver a set number of new housing units over a specified time frame, BNG focused on creating sustainable communities. This shift reflected a belief that housing construction could achieve dual priorities of the post-apartheid government (Newton 2009). Construction of new homes reduced the backlog of housing (creating a better environment for impoverished citizens) while also increasing the number of jobs and the economic sustainability of communities. The BNG initiative also encouraged local municipalities to act as the primary initiator of housing construction. In Cape Town, the flagship program aimed to reduce the housing backlog and the local government’s buy-in project to the BNG is the N2 Gateway project. This corridor connects white section of Somerset West with the international airport and the CBD. Ironically, some of the city’s most impoverished neighborhoods fringe this highway (see Figure 2.5). Hailed as a model program, the N2 Gateway project created thousands of new housing units in the former township, Langa, specifically in the Joe Slovo neighborhood. The city’s overall approach to reducing the housing backlog embodies 14 different programs (CCT 2012a) (see Table 2.2). The majority of these programs are managed by public-private partnerships between the city government and civic organizations. To receive housing from one of CCT’s numerous programs requires completing an application for housing and waiting until housing becomes available. Many residents do not qualify for one of the fully funded housing programs and must live 54 in gap housing, which is housing designed for individuals with incomes too high to receive government subsidies but too low to secure bank loans to purchase a home (Newton 2009). Table 2.2. Cape Town Housing Projects Housing Project Brief Description Gap Housing Private development; caters to families earning between R3.500 and R10.000 per month Community Residential Units Used to build new rental stock (including hostels) and upgrade existing rental stock Social Housing Programme Provides rental units through multi-entity agreements to families earning less than R3.500 per month Indigent Grant Rental payment assistance for individuals earning less than R3.000 per month Individual Housing Subsidies Subsidizes housing expenses for individuals earning less than R3.500 per month Enhanced Extended Discount Helps tenants buy rental units; helps debtors settle debts owed on Benefit Scheme property acquired prior to 1994 Incremental Housing Assists residents already owning home to improve their home, specifically for service delivery and upgrading Breaking New Ground Houses Wait list program that provides houses to indigent residents at no cost People’s Housing Programme Maximizes subsidy of housing for residents willing to build their home themselves Emergency Housing Provides temporary housing to victims of disasters or who are temporary Programme resettled Upgrading of Informal Provides basic services, permanent services, and houses to existing Settlements Programme informal settlements on an in situ basis; does not apply to temporary settlements Institutional Housing Subsidy Subsidizes projects that provide alternatives to immediate home Programme ownership, usually rent-to-own options Enhanced Extended Discount Discounts the cost of a home up to the prevailing subsidy amount for Benefit Scheme existing home loans occupied prior to July 1, 1993 Financed Linked Individual Housing subsidy provided via application to individual residents earning Subsidy Programme between R3.501 and R7.000 per month Source: CCT (2012). Cape Town’s government hopes its extensive pro-poor initiatives, especially in the much-needed area of housing, will mediate the legacy of apartheid while still allowing pro-growth initiatives to integrate Cape Town’s municipal economy with the global economy (Lemanski 2007). The South African Cities Network (SACN) (2006) notes: As entry points to and from the global community, cities are the spaces where the country meets the rest of the world…But cities can also be 55 problematic: [T]hey have the capacity to exclude, to marginalize, to reinforce patterns of inequality, and to create insiders and outsiders (2.2). Though the socio-spatial polarization present in Cape Town is largely a consequence of apartheid, the process of world city formation (encouraged by the ANC’s neoliberal policy initiatives) has certainly exacerbated existing polarization and continues to increase the divide between Cape Town’s wealthy and poor. This problem remains the core issue facing the governments of world cities across the globe. Cape Town’s government believes that its two policy initiatives (pro-growth and pro-poor) are compatible at the municipal level. Cape Town expects its two policy agendas to work together to effectively grow the city’s economy while redistributing wealth; however, the practical ability of a municipal government to effectively deal with socio-spatial polarization while simultaneously addressing a legacy of segregation remains untested. Research Questions As safe, affordable housing remains the greatest need among Cape Town’s residents, it represents a good case study to test the CCT’s simultaneous application of pro-growth and pro-poor initiatives in a site laden with socio-spatial polarization. These initiatives interact with one another to (re)construct the urban environment. This leads to two questions about the interaction between Cape Town’s pro-poor and pro-growth initiatives. 1. How have the pro-growth and pro-poor agendas manifested in the language of the Five-Year Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and the Five-Year Integrated Housing Plan (IHP)? Does the language imply that one agenda supersedes the other or are the documents truly equitable? 2. Has the City of Cape Town translated the severity of the city’s housing backlog into the language of the IDP and IHP? 56 CHAPTER THREE METHODOLOGY In an effort to be more open post-apartheid, Cape Town’s government publishes all public planning documents and associated budgets on its website. Included in the large database of documents is the comprehensive Five-Year Integrated Development Plan (CCT 2010a). The IDP guides planning and development across the entire city through implementation of a shared vision between residents and city officials. Upon election of a new council and mayor in the summer of 2011, city officials began to create the 2012-2017 IDP. These public meetings provided opportunities for city residents to meet with city government and discuss their understanding, expectation, and vision for the city. Meetings were held in shopping malls, sports complexes, community halls, and other public venues throughout the months of September and October 2011. Additionally, individual city wards held meetings for local residents unable to attend the larger meetings. Residents unable to attend a city meeting could submit their opinions via the city’s website (CCT 2012b). In the currently active plan (dated 2007-2012),19 the city identifies eight strategic focus goals aimed to improve the city’s urban environment. Goal five addresses the housing deficiency while other goals address the spatial context inherited from the apartheid system of government. In addition to the current IDP, the city also publishes an annual review of the plan’s progress (CCT 2010a, 2011b) and an assessment of the associated budgetary expenditures. These reviews exist from as early as 2002-2003. The 19 The city is in the development stage for the 2012-2017 IDP. The City Council is set to approve the IDP in May 2012. It becomes effective in July 2012. 57 city’s Department of Housing, in line with the IDP, has also published a five-year plan specific to the housing sector in Cape Town (CCT 2008b). As an integral part of the Integrated Development Plan (IDP), the Integrated Housing Plan (IHP) focuses attention on the housing issues within the CCT. The IHP forms the backbone for the IDP’s housing section. Erasing the backlog of housing is a priority shared by the national, provincial, and city governments. The national government sets broad policy while the city implements it. To assess the city’s success at eliminating the housing backlog (a pro-poor initiative) while simultaneously integrating the city’s economy with the global economy (a pro- growth initiative), I conducted an extensive textual analysis and evaluation of the IDP and IHP. In particular, I focused on those areas directly relating to housing and the elimination of socio-spatial polarization. By comparing my analysis and evaluation of the current plan and its budget to the city’s analysis and evaluation of previous plans and budgets (dating back to as early as 2002), I have drawn conclusions regarding the city’s success at eliminating the legacy of apartheid while growing the economy. Other planning documents, including the city’s “Draft Analysis of the Spatial Economy of Cape Town” (CCT 2010b), enrich the illustration. The foundation of any government report is an analysis of policy options. Policy analysis is a constantly changing methodology useful in a variety of disciplines (Carlson 2011). Weimer (2009) describes policy analysis as a systematic, multi-step process. First, analysts define the problem. What issue is the policy (or, in this case, the plan) expected to correct or resolve? In the second phase, social values and/or goals relevant to solving the problem are identified. During the third phase of policy analysis, the analyst 58 constructs concrete policy options, ensuring inclusion of several alternative plans that could solve the problem albeit through different means or perhaps with a different outcome. In the final stage, policy analysts make recommendations based upon an assessment of each alternative and its likely chance of success given funding, social values, organizational goals, and projected timeline for implementation (Weimer 2009, 93). This study rests upon the assumption that a competent and comprehensive policy analysis led to the present iteration of the IDP and the IHP, and that such analysis continues to inform their annual review. As one goal of this study is to understand whether or not the IDP and IHP address the severity of the housing backlog, I embarked upon a detailed textual analysis of both documents. I looked for evidence that the language used by the city in its planning documents emphasized how many residents still lack housing, how much land is required to provide the necessary housing, and whether or not the city has admitted the funding shortfalls of its current housing budget. In essence, I looked for language that showed the city was aware of the housing backlog and translated the significance of the numbers into the language of its plan. While the CCT has already identified the social values and goals relevant to the problem of a housing backlog, it remains questionable whether the city’s enumerated goals reflect the severity of the underlying issue: socio-spatial polarization remaining from the apartheid era compounded by socio-spatial polarization created as an outcome of world city formation. To answer that, I must address how pro-poor and pro-growth initiatives have manifested within the text of the IDP and IHP. Within the IDP, I analyze the word choices and sentence constructions of the two introductions and of goal five; 59 within the IHP, I focus on the entire document. Authors carefully select and orient images, charts, and graphs to influence the reader. Sentence structure and the order of ideas, indeed each individual word choice, offer the author an opportunity to infuse the text with power. Through a textual analysis, this power comes to life and is exposed. It is the recognition that “texts are inescapably political” (Aitken 2005, 234) that drives this research. Analyzing the specific language of the documents will form the basis to answer the second research question. This study does not endeavor to produce policy alternatives nor make recommendations for revision of the city’s IDP and/or IHP. Rather, this study’s purpose is to critique the text of the IDP and IHP so as to expose any bias that may exist within the documents and reflect on their resolution of the antagonism between an agenda comprised of both pro-growth and pro-poor initiatives. It is my expectation to make educated conclusions regarding the likely success of the IDP/IHP given the literature on Cape Town’s spatial economy and the extent to which the documents provide equal emphasis to both the pro-growth and pro-poor initiatives. This study does not require the collection of field data. The conclusions produced through this study will serve as preparation for future research conducted in the field. 60 CHAPTER FOUR DISCUSSION Ultimately, the City of Cape Town’s primary goal is to promote infrastructure-led economic growth that will create jobs and attract investment to Cape Town. By achieving this objective, the City will be better empowered to address the many other priorities identified by Capetonians, while ensuring that its administrative functions run effectively, and that services are provided efficiently to all residents and visitors to the city. (CCT 2010a, 2) The post-apartheid government of Cape Town inherited a highly polarized urban center. Multiple government initiatives emphasize the importance of correcting the polarized legacy this racially based system of segregation left behind. Inherent in the pledge to erase polarization is a commitment to establishing equity in service delivery and housing. Cape Town’s leaders believe they can combine this imperative with policies aimed to grow the city and enter the world economy. While the city’s attempt to integrate pro-poor initiatives with pro-growth initiatives is admirable, research results show that the city is clearly encouraging world city formation (through its pro-growth agenda) at the expense of moderating the legacy of apartheid. Describing the Pro-Poor and Pro-Growth Agendas The Vision of Former Executive Mayor Dan Plato In his introduction to the Integrated Development Plan (IDP), Executive Mayor Dan Plato stresses the importance of improving the city’s international reputation and growing the economy before he addresses improving the lives of city residents. In fact, Plato describes the IDP’s purpose as one that “direct[s] City resources in a way that facilitates…growth and development,” and, in particular, “job creation” (CCT 2010a, 2). Plato envisions economic growth as the primary outcome of the IDP. While that 61 outcome is merely implied, the quotation that began this chapter permits no ambiguity. The CCT’s primary goal is “to promote infrastructure-led economic growth that will create jobs and attract investment” (CCT 2010a, 2). The city posits eight strategic focus areas (SFA) outlined in the IDP that it believes will “change the face of Cape Town for the better” (CCT 2010a, 3). Table 4.1 lists these eight goals. Though all eight areas are necessary “to promote further economic growth and job creation in the years ahead” (CCT 2010a, 3), the document commences its assessment of Cape Town’s needs and the vision for the city’s future with a strategic focus on economic growth and development. By starting with the growth of the city’s economy, Cape Town’s government declares the pro-growth agenda to be of prime importance. Plato’s introduction reinforces this and places the power of the mayor’s office behind the city’s pro-growth initiatives. Table 4.1. Strategic Focus Areas of the Cape Town Municipal Government Goal Number Goal Title 1 Shared Economic Growth and Development 2 Sustainable Urban Infrastructure and Services 3 Energy Efficiency for a Sustainable Future 4 Public Transport Systems 5 Integrated Human Settlements 6 Safety and Security 7 Health, Social and Community Development 8 Good Governance and Regulatory Reform Source: CCT (2010a). Despite Plato’s acknowledges the importance of both growth and development (i.e. pro-growth and pro-poor) through his introduction to the strategic focus areas, he continually returns to the need to grow the city’s economy. Within his paragraph-long introduction to SFA 1, Mayor Plato promises to “create more opportunities for businesses” while also “mak[ing] engagement with the City faster and more effective” by eliminating “the amount of red tape” (CCT 2010a, 3) that exists in the economic 62 development application process. While some goals have a clear connection to the city’s economic agenda, others are not as obviously related to economic growth. Still, even these goals remain embedded within the dictates of a pro-growth agenda. For example, Plato plans to engage in the “conservation of natural areas” (CCT 2010a, 3). The primary purpose of the city’s conservation efforts is to “ensur[e that the] high-quality natural environment [will] complement and stimulate social and economic development” (CCT 2010a, 3). Were it just these two examples it might be easy to dismiss the language used by Mayor Plato as excitement geared towards improving the city’s international image. The opposite is true. Plato’s attention to economic growth remains heavy throughout his introduction to the SFAs. Table 4.2 lists the pro-growth language found in Mayor Plato’s introduction to the city’s annual review of the IDP for 2010-2011 (CCT 2010a). Table 4.2. Pro-Growth Language Used by Former Mayor Dan Plato Strategic Focus Area Pro-Growth Language Shared Economic Maintain status as world-class tourist destination Growth and Create more opportunities for businesses Development Sustainable Urban Ensure a high-quality natural environment to complement and stimulate social and Infrastructure and economic development Services Ensure clean, accessible recreational environments Public Transport Emphasize role of transport as a core element of growth and development strategy Systems Reduce peak-period travel times along selected corridors Safety and Security Recognize that crime is one of the key areas of concern for citizens and visitors Secure safe environments for communities and tourists Implement a closed-circuit television network to monitor key economic and transport locations Health, Social and Ensure city’s health for sustainable economic growth and development Community Development Source: Adapted from Five-year Plan for Cape Town, “Message from Alderman Dan Plato.” (Cape Town: Municipal Government, 2010). Note: Pro-growth language was not found in Plato’s introduction to SFA 3 (Energy Efficiency for a Sustainable Future), SFA 5 (Integrated Human Settlements), or SFA 8 (Good Governance and Regulatory Reform); however, as only SFA 5 will receive additional attention in this analysis, it remains possible— given the text of the introductory paragraphs—that pro-growth language abounds in these areas as well. 63 Though language emphasizing a reduction of crime or improved recreational facilities is not nefarious (and certainly could indicate strong favor towards pro-poor initiatives), it is not the case for an emerging world city like Cape Town. The spirit of world city formation is present in each statement in Table 4.1. Resonating throughout Plato’s introduction is an emphasis on the city’s “status as a world-class tourist destination” (CCT 2010a, 3) through a reduction of crime (specifically mentioning substance abuse and traffic violations), the implementation of a closed-circuit television network, and establishing “a high-quality natural environment…[that includes] clean, accessible recreational environments” (CCT 2010a, 3). To attract FDI, world city officials must do whatever it takes to encourage investment. This includes cleaning up the city’s image, particularly in the city center, so that drug abusers and prostitutes no longer share the spaces of the transnational elite. While this has the dual benefit of reducing crime, there is a strong economic incentive that emerges by improving the city’s international image. Residents feel safer but, more importantly, visitors and the transnational elite feel safer. World cities across the globe engage in this practice; Cape Town is no different. The overwhelming importance of a clean and safe image is precisely what Lemanski (2007) describes in the Cape Town CBD as a result of CCT’s partnership with the CTP. As these places become the only spaces that truly matter, at least to the transnational elite and foreign direct investors, they receive the brunt of emphasis in urban renewal projects. In the 2010-2011 IDP Review, the partnership with CTP to create the CCID is explicitly mentioned as the reason Capetonians have a place “to live, work and play [that is also] a safe and secure environment” (CCT 2010a, 45). Establishing the focus of the Central 64 City Development Strategy, former Mayor Helen Zille (serving in the years just before Dan Plato) wrote that the CCID must “help define the image of Cape Town” (CTP 2008, 4) for the international community. This need to create a pleasing and appealing environment for the international community appears again as one of the six indicators of success for SFA 1. Over the past three years of the current IDP, the city has strived to increase annual tourism by a minimum of 2% (for 2009/10 and 2010/11). The city aims to increase that amount by another 2.5% in the first year of the next IDP cycle (CCT 2010a, 148). While the argument exists that tourism improves revenue for local business, the image necessary to entice tourists is not for tourism alone. Image-driven development, especially in the city center, is often a large component of the prescription for increasing FDI and attracting the transnational elite (El-Khishin 2003). The emphasis on “high-quality natural environment[s]” and “clean, accessible recreational environments” (CCT 2010a, 3) tacitly permits the creation of spaces for the transnational elite. Plato’s language in this brief introduction (and throughout the remainder of the 2010-2011 IDP) do not prohibit usage of these environments by the city’s underclass; however, the language, by being joined in the same clause as “to complement and stimulate social and economic development” (CCT 2010a, 3), certainly implies a connection between these spaces and wealth creation. This implication exists throughout Plato’s introduction to the IDP. The city’s impetus to launch a rapid transit system serves to “meet the needs of citizens and visitors better” (CCT 2010a, 3, emphasis mine). Public transportation improvement projects, the creation of “dedicated public transport lanes and an improved road network” (CCT 65 2010a, 3), and a reduction in travel times along key corridors are goals that mildly improve the daily experience for the city’s poor while improving the experience for the transnational elite and international tourists. This priority to improve overall transportation systems and to designate specific high-speed transportation corridors is also indicative of world city formation. In Cape Town, economic development has occurred in economic nodes throughout the city. Linking economic nodes is a typical priority. For instance, in Cape Town, the N2 Highway connects the burgeoning CBD with the international airport. The bias towards world city formation (i.e. the pro-growth agenda) is easy to recognize in the language of Table 4.2; however, what about language initially determined to be pro-poor in nature? Table 4.3 displays language assessed as pro-poor, or that language representing an initiative aimed to improve the lives of the city’s poor residents without consideration of the transnational elite, international tourists, or FDI. Table 4.3. Pro-Poor Language Used by Former Mayor Dan Plato Strategic Focus Pro-Poor Language Area Shared Economic Develop our citizens’ skills Growth and Increase opportunities for local economic growth Development Make engagement with the City faster and more effective Reduce the amount of red tape Sustainable Provide basic services to all Capetonians Urban Invest in adequate resources and infrastructure to meet service delivery Infrastructure Provide adequate healthcare to residents and Services Enhance residents’ quality of life Public Transport Promote non-motorized transport via a network of safe pedestrian and cycling paths Systems Integrated Provide a wide range of housing opportunities that include a land banking initiative Human Create communities where people have access to good-quality public spaces and the Settlements services that will enable them to flourish Health, Social Facilitate the delivery of effective care at a local level and across all communities and Community Focus on developing drug intervention programs delivered through accessible Development substance abuse centers Source: CCT (2010a). Note: Pro-poor language was not found in Plato’s introduction to SFA 3, SFA 6, or SFA 8; however, as only SFA 5 will receive additional attention in this analysis, it remains possible—but unlikely given the prevalence of pro-growth language—that pro-poor language exists in these areas as well. 66 The majority of the phrases identified in Dan Plato’s introduction as pro-poor reflect a desire to improve the livelihoods of Cape Town’s most impoverished residents. Though this is true, even these statements resonate with the taint of the pro-growth agenda. Plato acknowledges that the city strives “to create more opportunities for businesses…for increased job creation” and that this will only be possible through “developing our citizens’ skills” (CCT 2010a, 3). While Plato references “local economic growth” as the type of growth desired, he continues to use the pro-growth language of “economic development” rather than that more equitable language of redistribution. The question arises whether or not the ultimate purpose of “developing our citizens’ skills” is for the economic well-being of the citizenry, or, more likely, the economic well-being of the producer service companies that need skilled employees. Either way, I concede that in this instance it appears that Plato aims to help the unskilled population, with economic growth for corporations merely a side benefit; however, he finishes this SFA with a desire to “make engagement with the City faster and more effective” while also “reduc[ing] the amount of red tape that still exists in the development process” (CCT 2010a, 3). Here, Plato clearly means economic engagement and economic development. Even if the reader assumes Plato means eliminating red tape or engagement time for the informal traders to set up trading posts, absolutely no clause makes provision for the government to assist these individuals to acquire the means to establish a business in the first place. Rather, what Plato likely intends is to eliminate any hindrance to initiating development projects throughout the city so as to encourage FDI on a wider scale. 67 Even a goal as seemingly benign as “provide basic services to all Capetonians” (CCT 2010a, 3) is riddled with pro-growth sentiments. McDonald (2008) has reported, and the city government has confirmed (see CTP 2008, 2012; Lemanski 2007), that a prime means to achieve universal service delivery is to engage in public-private partnerships. While not full-fledged privatization, these public-private partnerships often serve the needs of the producer service sector and the transnational elite (as well as the private companies themselves) far more than they serve the needs of the city’s underclass. The CCT engages multiple service providers and contractors to make SFA 2 a reality. Rather than evaluate each statement independently, it will be far more productive to recognize the trend. Plato’s language, even when seemingly pro-poor in nature, is still highly pro-growth in sentiment. Additionally, the pro-poor language does not stand alone but actually exists as individual clauses within the text of Plato’s introduction. Through the consideration of both these facts, the reader will see that to separate the pro-poor language from the pro-growth language—and retain meaning—is impossible. The two only make sense when considered together. Plato, whether intentionally or not, sells the IDP as a pro-growth document. The Vision of Current Executive Mayor Patricia de Lille In March 2011, Patricia de Lille beat, among others, incumbent Dan Plato in the election for mayor of Cape Town. She assumed office in June 2011, just over one month before the publication of the 2011-2012 review of the IDP (CCT 2011b). Mayor de Lille, like Dan Plato, authored an introduction to the city’s official review of the IDP. Though a wholly different individual, de Lille maintains the pro-growth language established in 68 the IDP under Plato’s administration, albeit with greater attention to the pro-poor agenda of the city. According to de Lille, the city’s “primary goal remains the promotion and facilitation of infrastructure-led economic growth…to create [employment opportunities] and attract investment” (CCT 2011b, 2). Rather than only tacitly addressing the issue as Plato did, de Lille is clear regarding the ultimate focus of the IDP. According to de Lille, the IDP begins with the SFA for “shared economic growth and development,” and it is this goal that “in many ways, underpins the other seven” (CCT 2011b, 2). Where Plato simply described the first SFA as a roadmap to “create more opportunities for business” (CCT 2010a, 3), de Lille focuses on connecting the creation of business opportunities to direct benefits that all Capetonians will see. Though seemingly trivial, recognizing the need to expand the economic benefits for all Capetonians through explicit language softens the pro-growth rhetoric and focus of the first SFA. Mayor de Lille continues to make this pro-growth, pro-poor connection throughout her introduction. For de Lille, SFA 2 (urban infrastructure and services) exists to ensure that “all Capetonians have [access] to reliable, consistent, and effective basic services” (CCT 2011b, 2). While the relationship between public-private partnerships changed little between Plato’s administration and de Lille’s administration, the language used to describe that relationship has softened. Rather than focus on the public-private connection, de Lille accepts ownership of the relationship and assures city residents that it is the City investing in the basic services (not necessarily the private corporations) so that all residents have the “necessary resources and infrastructure” that includes “effective conservation of [the] natural environment” (CCT 2011b, 2). When de 69 Lille finally accedes to “partnering with [the City’s] various stakeholders,” she does so in a manner that is subtle and focuses on the environment rather than on the economic situation. In fact, each of the eight SFAs introduced by Mayor Patricia de Lille embody a sense of pride in the city’s accomplishments and a respect for the city’s vision. She does not attempt to hide the pro-growth agenda of the city’s government but she also tempers that agenda with language that recognizes the value of improving the livelihoods of Cape Town’s poorest residents. By reading de Lille’s short introduction, it is possible to envision a future for Cape Town in which the city government successfully balances the language of pro-growth with the language of pro-poor. If that is possible, it is also possible to predict the potential to achieve a balance in policy enactment. The Vision of City Manager Achmat Ebrahim Achmat Ebrahim served as city manager under Dan Plato and continued that role under the administration of Patricia de Lille. Ebrahim uses his introduction to the 2010 IDP for clarification of purpose, stating “The IDP is essentially a five-year strategic blueprint, which serves to guide local government…in their endeavours to position Cape Town not only as a preferred international tourist destination, but also a highly attractive investment destination” (CCT 2010a, 6). At no point in his definition of the IDP does Ebrahim even hint that its purpose is to address the increasing socio-spatial polarization resulting from world city growth. There is no expectation by Ebrahim that the IDP will resolve the decades of discrimination resonating throughout Cape Town’s spatial economy. A few paragraphs later, Ebrahim describes Cape Town as “a leading African tourist destination” positioned to become “the events capital of southern Africa.” For 70 Ebrahim, the services sector has been the “major contributor to the wealth and development of Cape Town.” Thus, Ebrahim’s answer is to nurture and develop this sector for the benefit of the entire city. Ebrahim tacitly acknowledges the city’s need to engage in pro-poor planning (though he never uses this terminology). He believes that the city must utilize a “multipronged approach to the provision of housing solutions, community spaces, services, public transport, economic development, and safety and security” (CCT 2010a, 6) but not because the city has to address its highly polarized society or its legacy of apartheid. Rather, Ebrahim insists upon a plan that emphasizes “infrastructure-led economic development [in order to] preserve Cape Town’s natural beauty and biodiversity.” In fact, Ebrahim glosses over the pro-poor elements of his vision by reminding the reader that the city does not have a constitutional mandate for most of the pro-poor provisions. He promises collaboration with national and provincial governments to ensure that the “required infrastructure” (emphasis mine) becomes a reality. Whether intending to or not, Ebrahim suggests that any improvement in the housing supply or in the extent of service delivery will be recognition of federal and provincial mandates and not because the city has a policy of redistribution. In both introductions to the 2010-2011 IDP review, the executive mayor and city manager emphasize the city’s preparations for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Plato and Ebrahim acknowledge the transfer of city funds from a “number of projects” to the infrastructure necessary for meeting the demands of the sporting event (CCT 2010a, 5). Ebrahim rationalizes this diversion of funds, presumably from pro-poor initiatives (though this is not explicitly mentioned), by emphasizing how such changes will 71 “undoubtedly serve to stimulate economic growth and development” (CCT 2010a, 7) in the future. Ebrahim recognizes the importance of pro-poor initiatives in his concluding paragraphs to the 2010-2011 IDP review. He briefly mentions the planned integrated rapid transit system (IRT) that builds upon the infrastructure foundations set prior to the 2010 FIFA World Cup. More importantly, he includes a paragraph on the upgrading of 230 informal settlements across the city and the various programs to address the housing backlog. Ebrahim’s final statement attempts to validate the city’s multiple partnerships with private entities like the CTP and the Cape Town International Convention Centre. In his introduction to the 2011-2012 IDP review, Ebrahim reinforces these goals (CCT 2011b, 4). Unfortunately, knowledge of the ultimate outcomes of both projects (the IRT and the housing upgrading) betrays Ebrahim’s pro-growth emphasis. The completed phase of the IRT links business areas with nearby sporting venues. The housing upgrade occurred along the N2 Highway, the highly visible swath of land surrounding the direct route from the international airport to the soccer stadium. Both projects were marketing ventures designed to please the eye of the transnational elite during the 2010 FIFA World Cup in a hope to encourage future FDI and expand tourism. While the increase in housing supply cannot be overlooked, the ultimate motive was not redistribution but economic growth. Even when viewed in this cursory fashion these introductions to the eight strategic focus areas, and the language used in the IDP to introduce them, show how the city has attempted to mix a pro-growth agenda with a pro-poor agenda. The strength of their ability to do this effectively is housed in an assessment of a single strategic focus area. 72 As the national government has recognized basic needs as the foundation for democracy in South Africa (Goodlad 1996), the city’s emphasis on creating Integrated Human Settlements (SFA 5) proves informative for its ability to integrate pro-poor initiatives with a pro-growth agenda. A Textual Analysis of Strategic Focus Area Five: Integrated Human Settlements Strategic Focus Area Five (Integrated Human Settlements) begins with the obvious conclusion that Cape Town lacks sufficient housing, particularly for the poor. The city’s planners admit that the “challenge of providing adequate housing in integrated settlements endures” (CCT 2010a, 84) post-apartheid. The city attributes most of the housing backlog to the annual increase of about 18,000 households from steady in- migration.20 Once resident in Cape Town, these households move into the “densely occupied informal settlements and overcrowded conditions in the front and backyards of public and private formal housing” (CCT 2010a, 84). Because the city’s current budget permits the creation of only an additional 8,000 housing opportunities per annum, the city cannot provide for its existing residents much less meet the needs of the new households. While the city can do little to discourage migration from the rural areas of the Eastern Cape, it can address its method of housing delivery. In fact, this is the city’s recognized goal in evaluating SFA 5. The government’s primary conclusion is that the city needs to “promote more integrated settlement patterns in existing and new residential areas” (CCT 2010a, 84). To achieve this, the city plans to integrate community and 20 In addition to the increasing influx of residents from the rural areas, South Africa’s poor families are exhibiting some interesting demographic trends. Marriages are decreasing in the poor economic environment and families are decreasing in size. Households are smaller than in previous generations but individual families still ask for individual housing. Therefore, the demand for housing is also increasing as family demographics shift (Hunter 2012). 73 recreational facilities with housing developments, to create higher density units (both high-rise and number of dwellings per hectare), to engage in advance planning for land- banking, to unlock access to unused or underused state-owned land, to petition the national government for a greater housing provision allocation of funds, and to influence planning legislation so the city’s goals are more easily met (CCT 2010a, 84). These statements are admirable in their intent, but do they address the severity of the housing backlog? To answer the demand for housing, the city analyzed the economic situation of the current population. According to its report, 99% of the households living in backyards, overcrowded conditions, and informal settlements have a monthly household income less than R7,500 ($982 dollars as of March 6, 2012). Even though a household income of $982 per month may seem low according to American standards, the Cape Town government defines an indigent household as having a monthly income less than R2,880, approximately 48% of all households in 2008 (CCT 2010a, 33). Still, as poor households spend almost all their monthly income—an assumption made by the city government in the 2010 IDP—little remains for future planning, the purchase of periodic big items (like a car), or emergencies. Just because the CCT does not label the household as indigent does not mean the household is wealthy or even moderately well- off. Funds designed to supplement low household income derive from the provincial government. As the largest municipality in the Western Cape province, the CCT receives 72% of the annual allocation for housing sent to the Provincial Department of Human Settlements. Though this number has grown over the past few years (Table 4.4), the funding still falls short of the amount needed to erase the housing backlog. The CCT 74 recognizes this shortfall and has supplemented the budget from programs like the External Finance Fund and the Capital Replacement Reserve. Both programs and the money from the provincial allocation provide for acquisition, planning, and development of the land and housing for provision of BNG beneficiaries (CCT 2010a, 85). Table 4.4. Three-Year Comparison of Funding Allocation to Housing Development Year Amount Allocated 2009-2010 R663.5 million 2010-2011 R764.4 million 2011-2012 R901.7 million Source: CCT (2010a, 85). With approximately 400,000 households needing housing, the city estimates that it must purchase or set aside approximately 10,000 hectares (almost 100,000 acres) of land with an average density of 40 units per hectare. The geology of Cape Town limits development in many areas of the city. In addition, the value of prime land plots is very high, up to R1 million per hectare (CCT 2010a, 85). This limits the ability of the city to build housing in already connected, established neighborhoods. The city has no choice but to embark upon a land-banking program that conserves undeveloped or underdeveloped peripheral land for housing construction. Initiated in 2008-2009, the city’s first land-bank acquisition set aside 210 hectares of land for construction at a cost of about R154 million (CCT 2010a, 85). Though small, this shows a commitment to all phases of the housing development process and attention to proactive planning. The larger issue, though, is the high cost of land acquisition, even for marginal land on the periphery. A mere 210 hectares, just slightly more than 2% of the identified need, cost almost one-third of the total housing budget for the following fiscal year. In fact, during the 2009-2010 year, the city set aside only R68 million for land acquisition. Assuming land prices remain the same, the city would only be able to 75 acquire another 100 hectares or so of land. Such a slow rate of acquisition poses a large problem for a city where the population of poor residents is increasing. In fact, it does not even come close to meeting the land needs of the city’s housing programs. Still, the land-banking initiative is likely to secure some land for housing development while the cost of the land is still relatively low. This will permit the city to build future developments in areas at a reduced rate, hopefully increasing the amount of construction that the budget can allow in any given year. As the city develops, this land will rise in value (so the city hopes) and generate additional tax revenue that can be reallocated to eliminate additional backlogs. It is important to remember, though, that the city is not the only development agent in operation. Multinational corporations seek land for development, particularly for the development of economic nodes. Residential developers also seek cheap land to build their gated communities to house the growing population of transnational elite. Both sources of competition will contribute to increases in the cost of even peripheral land. A noble goal, SFA 5 requires more than land-banking and housing construction to succeed at erasing the housing backlog. As most of the in-migrants and low-income residents are unskilled employees, the city must find ways to promote skill development or growth in low-skill jobs. The introductions of Plato, de Lille, and Ebrahim emphasize the economic development of the city’s CBD and other growth nodes (plus the push for the IRT) with recognition of this need; however, it must be stressed again that the language of the IDP’s introduction reflects a bias toward the needs of the transnational elite, foreign direct investors, producer service companies, and international tourists. Economic growth from the agglomeration of capital will result in the creation of some 76 low-skill jobs, but will it be enough to offset the increasing population size of the city’s impoverished residents? It remains unlikely that the city’s increased housing stock will force growth in the low-skill job sector. Additional housing and land banking do not directly translate into improved education, healthcare, or job skills for the city’s low- income residents. It only ensures housing space for a greater proportion of individuals able to serve the needs of the transnational elite and the producer service companies. In addition, the city’s expansion of low-income housing stock does not mean that the producer service companies will increase the availability of low-income jobs. Another problem that plagues the city’s attempts to increase housing availability is its emphasis on sustainable human settlements. It is not enough for the city to simply increase the number of available housing units or expand land for housing construction. The city must also encourage the creation of concomitant entities to support these new communities (e.g. schools, road systems, community centers, recreation facilities, health clinics, parks, libraries, etc.). The city recognizes this need but admits that the “current resource and budget constraints mean that the provision and maintenance of these facilities have become increasingly dependent on partnerships and international donors” (CCT 2010a, 86). If the city can establish strong public-private partnerships that are truly equitable rather than the partnerships that exist in name only (McDonald 2008), then redistribution might be possible. What is more likely, though, is an increasing reliance on the private component of these partnerships to provide services to the city’s residents. As private corporations, these institutions’ primary motive is profit, not redistribution. Any situation where profit is the ultimate goal will result in only limited redistributive reform, and only if that is a stated goal at the outset. 77 The need for increased housing provision has led the city to focus on two broad housing objectives: (1) provide equitable community facilities and services across the city and (2) deliver housing opportunities. The first objective is beyond the scope of this analysis. The prime focus of the second objective is “to increase subsidized housing opportunities provided by the City” (CCT 2010a, 94). As indicated in Table 2.2, the CCT has a number of projects underway to erase the housing backlog. Most of these projects provide subsidies to impoverished residents using funds allocated by the national government to the provinces and subsequently filtered down to the municipal level. Unfortunately, the city lacks the authority to directly receive funds from the National Department of Human Settlements so its first move under this objective is to receive accreditation from the provincial and national governments. Accreditation will streamline the distribution of funds by allowing the city to directly petition the national government for money. This move grants the city greater autonomy (as intended by the unicity movement) to improve the local situation unimpeded by the priorities of the provincial government. It is a worthy first step towards establishing direct authority over the provision of housing at the local level and implies a willingness to achieve the city’s pro-poor vision for housing.21 Within the 2010-2011 IDP review, the city acknowledges the housing backlog’s severity through its brief mention of the situation of backyard dwellers (those residents living in substandard housing in the backyards of others). Aiming to deal with this severity, the city asserts that this emphasis is especially important because these residents “have historically been overlooked” (CCT 2010a, 94). The problem of finding houses for 21 Even after the city achieves accreditation a greater problem remains. The city has absolutely no control over the continual influx of residents from the rural areas. Unless the provincial government establishes a rural development program, there is little the city can do to stem the flow of residents into the city. 78 these families is so large that the current plan is to connect services to the existing backyard dwellings while the city works on establishing permanent housing elsewhere. Though this will cost money, it is necessary because “many of [these] families live in appalling conditions and are being exploited by cavalier Council tenants and private landlords” (CCT 2010a, 94). Figure 4.1 illustrates the severity of service delivery needs in the backyard dwellings. Many residents continue to share open-air toilets and feel happy that they have that much. Figure 4.1. Lone Toilet in Backyard Community. This single, open-air toilet represents the situation many families face when living in backyard communities. Access to basic services is severly lacking and actually represents a greater need for many residents than housing. Source: Michael Walker. Included in article by Kassiem, A’Eysha. “Toilet Choice now up to Community.” Cape Times [online edition], 24 December 2010, from http://www.capetimes.co.za (last accessed 27 December 2010). The city has not simply enumerated goals to achieve without target values for assessment. Like all sound planning documents, there are measureable, time-oriented outcomes within the 2010-2011 IDP review that address the increasing emphasis on housing provision in the CCT. Table 4.5 compares the target values for various projects over the four most recent years of the 2007-2012 IDP. Though it appears as if the city is 79 making minor progress towards increasing available housing stock (which, arguably, it is), the growth in housing provision has occurred through one program alone. The increase from 8,400 new units in 2009-2010 to 8,800 new units in 2011-2012 occurred through the Breaking New Ground (BNG) program sponsored by the national and provincial governments. Almost all other housing projects remained at the same level across the four years of assessment. Despite the limited overall growth, though, it is important to remain positive. Accreditation of the city’s housing department proves hopeful for greater increases in the annual target of housing provision. In fact, in the 2011-2012 IDP review, the city actually succeeded in providing 8,950 new housing units, 150 more than expected (CCT 2011b, 94). Table 4.5. Target Goals for Various Housing Programs Delivery Type 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 New BNG subsidy 4,100 4,200 4,500 4,700 project-linked projects Social housing 300 300 300 300 Hostels 300 300 300 300 redevelopment Upgrade of informal 2,000 2,000 2,000 projected 1,500 settlements and 1,400 reported emergency housing Land restitution 200 200 200 200 claims Gap (affordable) 500 500 500 500 housing Community 1,000 1,000 1,000 projected 1,500 residential units 1,600 reported (CRU) TOTAL 8,400 8,500 8,800 9,000 Source: Compiled from data in the 2010-2011 IDP review (CCT 2010a, 94) and the 2011-2012 IDP review (CCT 2011b, 102). Note: The data for the first two years of comparison are solely from the 2010-2011 IDP review. Data from the 2011/12 fiscal year represents, where indicated, projected numbers in the 2010-2011 IDP review and reported numbers in the 2011-2012 IDP review. In addition to a focus on backyard dwellings, the city also plans to improve the informal settlements that developed during the waning days of apartheid and in the past 15 years. Unlike the backyard dwellings that the city hopes to ultimately relocate, the 80 city plans to upgrade and develop the informal settlements in situ. Such development will “integrate informal settlements with the broader urban fabric to overcome spatial, social, and economic exclusion” (CCT 2010a, 98). The city recognizes 230 informal settlements in the city (the largest of which are Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain) but refuses to permit the growth of additional informal neighborhoods. To prevent the creation of new informal settlements and the loss of land for future city-created housing, the CCT has established an Anti-Land Invasion Unit (CCT 2010a, 100). Though the introductory paragraphs of the 2010-2011 IDP review and the 2011- 2012 IDP review are almost identical, the latter provides a context for the city’s present problem. According to the 2011-2012 IDP review, urbanization has accounted for the growth in both informal settlements and backyard housing construction (termed backyarding). Recognition of the phenomenon responsible for the significant growth permits a more mindful response. De Lille’s administration recognizes that “these physical and social trends cannot be ‘solved,’” but that government can mediate the extent of the problems through “constructive policy and investment interventions” (CCT 2011b, 95). This includes shifting from government-provided housing provision to one that relies on the private sector and individual communities. Reminiscent of the self-help policies described by Davis (2006), this initiative attempts to move housing provision from the responsibility of the government to the market. De Lille endeavors to counter the growing challenge of housing provision by allowing unfettered infill development to occur in existing informal settlements. She hopes that infill development will utilize existing infrastructure and reduce the city’s overall expense to construct the necessary elements that accompany housing construction 81 (e.g. utility service lines, roads, community centers, etc.). In a way, this plan is de Lille’s attempt to play the market to meet her pro-poor agenda. Permitting the private sector to assume the role of investor in housing provision transfers the responsibility from the city and frees the city to focus on monitoring development and establishing policy. In fact, this is de Lille’s point: the city plans to create an Urbanization Department capable of doing just that. Despite this, the city’s return to self-help housing (or, in this instance, self-help ugrading) is troubling. Historically, government reliance on self-help housing has increased residents’ investment in their local neighborhoods and actually increased the number of housing units present (through the construction market of the informal economy). While this is true, the growth in the number of housing units also relied upon the government overlooking land invasions in most circumstances and encouraging land invasion in others (see Gilbert 1993). Cape Town’s municipal government has attempted to return to self-help housing while simultaneously enacting policy to prevent land invasion. It will be interesting to see how these two initiatives interact with one another as the city moves forward with its housing goals. Regardless of how you see the city’s recent initiatives, the intent to create sustainable human settlements reflects a paradigm shift from historical methods of housing provision to a modern approach that develops the necessary elements for strong communities alongside housing. The city’s approach is multi-tiered and able to address the distinct needs of individual households across various income levels. (Again, as income is the primary means used to measure qualification for any housing initiatives, it 82 reinforces the value of using income as a measure of polarization.) It also addresses the differences between communities. The Five-Year Integrated Housing Plan serves as the guiding document in this endeavor. Unlike the IDP (for either review year), the IHP focuses mainly on the pro- poor agenda of the city. The document identifies objectives that integrate short-term goals with long-term goals to redistribute wealth. For example, the plan, as mentioned in the analysis of SFA 5, seeks to “alleviate squalor and poverty by initially providing rudimentary services to [informal and backyard] settlements” (CCT 2008b, 9). Once achieved, the city will gradually expand to provision of a “full suite of services as capacity expands” (CCT 2008b, 9). New housing units, especially under the BNG plan, are only part of the anticipated “housing options menu” (CCT 2008b, 9) the city expects to create in the coming years. Where the IDP and the IHP differ significantly is the specificity of objectives. The IDP (as a comprehensive, city-wide plan) is broader in scope; it cannot properly address all the needs for the housing market in Cape Town. The IHP, as a specific analysis of only one need, can devote significant text to the plan for housing. The IHP focuses on five strategic objectives: (1) improve organizational capacity and staffing; (2) accelerate housing delivery; (3) improve the quality of the living environments so as to develop integrated human settlements; (4) strategically manage and maintain the city’s housing assets; and (5) increase institutional capacity and governance capability (CCT 2008b, 16-17). These five objectives reflect the elements the CCT thinks are necessary to erase the backlog of housing. Each objective comprises several sub-objectives, but more importantly, multiple intervention strategies. These intervention strategies are specific 83 enough to use to set measurable targets for the city. With SFA 5 of the IDP, the number of specific interventions is limited to details of a particular program highlighted by the city. Similar to the IDP reviews, one potentially troubling element in the IHP’s series of five objectives is a strong reinforcement regarding “zero tolerance on land invasions” by providing for an increased number of “field workers to monitor informal settlements and take immediate action against land invaders” (CCT 2008b, 17). In addition, the intention to develop a stronger relationship with metropolitan police force is also present. While the city presents a valid argument that land invasions only exacerbate the extent of informal or backyard housing that must eventually be upgraded, denying citizens the right to engage in self-help housing does nothing to improve the housing backlog either. People need a place to live. If the government is unwilling or unable to provide housing, the informal economy will take over. Ironically, the IHP blames the city’s poor for the housing backlog, ascribing the issue to “the high rate of urban growth experienced over the last twenty years” (CCT 2008b, 21). Though the document does not say the poor are to blame for the problem, it connects the housing backlog to the large influx of residents that began after the fall of apartheid and the large population of urban poor living in the informal settlements. As mentioned previously, the rural poor—seeking economic opportunity in the city— comprise most of the new residents. The government does not connect the housing backlog to the increase in the number of international tourists, producer service companies, or transnational elite. It is the poor that need housing. Poor residents arrive in the city faster than the city or housing market can create new housing. Therefore, the 84 poor are to blame for the lack of housing for the poor. The continued influx is to blame for the inability of the city to erase the backlog. It is a backhanded approach that is yet another instance of the emphasis on pro-growth over pro-poor. Finally, and perhaps most importantly given the city’s past, the document lacks any significant attention to apartheid’s legacy. It might be very difficult for the government to recognize the changes in urban morphology caused by the socio-spatial polarization of world city formation. It is also unlikely the government is willing to publicly denounce the neoliberal policies of the ANC. The lack of a discussion regarding either of these influences on the housing backlog is not unexpected. What is truly surprising is that the legacy of apartheid is almost completely missing from the city’s primary housing planning documents. Ironically, given his emphasis on pro-growth, it is Dan Plato’s introduction to the IHP where recognition of the socio-spatial polarization inherited from the era of apartheid appears the strongest. Plato’s introduction admits “the apartheid urban landscape remains unchanged” and continues to “impede housing delivery” (CCT 2008b, 2). It’s important to remember that the IHP is a subsidiary document to the city’s IDP. Its intention is to expand upon SFA 5 in a manner that engenders support for housing provision without negatively impacting the pro-growth agenda. The language of both IDP reviews and the IHP suggest the city understands the severity of the housing backlog; however, it is unlikely that any city, especially one in which the planning documents exhibit a strong pro-growth bias, will ever be able to moderate the socio- spatial polarization of world city formation and apartheid. 85 CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH During the summer of 2010, Cape Town hosted the FIFA World Cup. The world turned its eyes towards South Africa, hoping to see a changed nation. It had been 16 years since the official end of apartheid. Had the ANC managed to redistribute wealth across the nation and end the extreme polarization experienced under the segregatory system? Visitors arriving at Cape Town International Airport rented or charted cars and arranged for bus transport from the runway to the CBD, traveling along the newly improved N2 Highway. As they looked out the window, they probably saw heavy construction, or maybe even the finished houses of the N2 Gateway project. Momentarily, it appeared that South Africa had achieved the impossible. Scores of new homes were under construction where previously slums had “gleamed” in the sunshine of Cape Town’s Mediterranean climate. Yet, these visitors could not know the human cost or limited scope of the construction. Long-time residents were cleared from their homes and forced to relocate to temporary relocation areas. Funds from housing and other pro-poor initiatives were reallocated so the government could build places for the transnational elite to enjoy the game. In the world market for sports, the attention of the world on South Africa’s economic situation “made place both less and more important” (McDonald 2008, 18). Just as the N2 Gateway project existed only because South Africa won its bid for the 2010 FIFA World Cup (Newton 2009), the Central City Improvement District, complete with its character precincts, was created for the benefit of a burgeoning class of transnational elite. Both projects were about improving the city’s image for foreign 86 investors and international tourists. Like the language of the IDP (especially under the review of Dan Plato and Achmat Ebrahim), these projects pretend to be pro-poor in nature while in reality emphasizing the importance of a pro-growth agenda. In many ways, nothing has really changed since the end of apartheid. Many of the initiatives (like the N2 Gateway project, Anti-Land Invasion Unit, Cape Town Partnership, etc.) exist to segregate the haves from the have nots. Under apartheid, the system was racial; under world city formation, it is financial. This study was limited in scope. Without the funding to travel to Cape Town, it sought only to assess the language of the Five-Year Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and the Five-Year Integrated Housing Plan (IHP) with a review of the literature and determine the city’s success at translating the severity of the housing backlog into the language of the city’s planning document. The assessment concluded that pro-growth language drives the text of the planning documents; however, it is important to remain critical of any analysis conducted without the benefit of first-hand experience. A strong argument could be made for multiple examples of truly redistributive programs. The brief paragraph available in a city-produced planning document is not nearly enough information to fully determine if the program was successful and, ultimately, pro-poor in intention, enactment, and outcome. Future investigations on this matter should include field research in Cape Town. The N2 Gateway project is a good starting point. The researcher should seek input from both planners and residents on their perceptions regarding the success of the project overall. The city aspires, through its IDP and IHP, to create more than housing units for impoverished residents. By creating sustainable human settlements. What does a 87 sustainable human settlement look like? How do the residents know when they have achieved the status of sustainable human settlement? What challenges have prevented or are currently preventing the city from creating sustainable human settlements? These questions, and more, underlie my final thoughts on this project. Much was learned about the theoretical nature of world city formation’s role in creating socio-spatial polarization while seated comfortably in a Baltimore row home; yet, this tells me nothing of the experiences of Cape Town’s residents. Criticism of the city’s government will only provide so much fodder for intellectual discourse. Only through field research will this study progress beyond an armchair thesis into the realm of informative theory. The ultimate question still lingering in my mind surrounds the antagonism between Cape Town’s dual agendas. Can a city ever really enact a redistributive agenda while simultaneously growing its economy to enter the world system? Still, denial of the existing facts is not an option. Cape Town is presently a world city, and continues to aspire to alpha status. Recognition of that fact will become crucial if the city wishes to escape the legacy of apartheid. World city formation causes socio- spatial polarization, a concept with which Cape Town is intimately familiar. Different reasons propelled the polarization of world city formation and the polarization of apartheid, but the end result is the same: the needs of some people are ignored in favor of others. 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Yeboah, Ian. 2003. “Demographic and housing aspects of structural adjustment and emerging urban form in Accra, Ghana.” Africa Today 50, no. 1: 107-19. 97 CURRICULUM VITA NAME: Michael Strong PERMANENT ADDRESS: 8308 Kendale Road Parkville, Maryland 21234 PROGRAM OF STUDY: Geography and Environmental Planning DEGREE AND DATE TO BE CONFERRED: Master of Arts, 2012 Secondary education: Marion Center Area High School, Marion Center, PA June 1999 Collegiate institutions attended Dates Degree Date of Degree Towson University 2010-2012 MA May 2012 Geography & Environmental Planning Widener University 2007-2010 Certificate May 2009 Applied Supervision University of Pittsburgh 2003-2005 MEd April 2005 Higher Education Administration University of Pittsburgh 1999-2003 BA August 2003 History Professional positions held Dates Location Teaching Assistant 2011-2012 Towson, PA Department of Geography & Environmental Planning Towson University Research/Graduate Assistant 2010-2011 Towson, PA Department of Secondary Education Towson University Assistant Director 2006-2010 Chester, PA University Center Administration Widener University Operations Manager 2005-2006 Philadelphia, PA Student Union Operations Drexel University Graduate Assistant 2003-2005 Pittsburgh, PA Building Management University of Pittsburgh Professional Memberships Association of American Geographers