Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov The Political Elite of : Historical and Sociological Analysis

UDC 321.015, 329.05 VALERII PYLYPENKO, Doctor of Sciences in Sociology, Principal Re - search Fellow of the Department of History and Theory of Sociology, Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine

YURII PRYVALOV, Candidate of Sciences in Philosophy, Senior Re - search Fellow of the Social Expertise Depart - ment, Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine

The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis

Abstract

The paper discusses the main problems of the national political elite and specific features of their functioning. Special attention is paid to the process of coming into being of Ukraine’s political elite, which is described in the context of formation of the Ukrainian statehood.

Keywords: elite, politics, state, government, political parties, political activity, analysis

Orig i nally in French, the word “elite” meant just a choice. But later this word was used to desig nate excep tional (top quality) products and also mil i tary or sec- ular elite that had been estab lished in a so ci ety. Their posi tions were so strong and mean ing ful that seemed unlikely to evoke any doubt. The pio neers of modern elite studies Italian so cial sci en tists Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto noted that in the period be tween the late 19th and early 20th cen turies in Europe class con fronta tions were replaced by steady remote ness of ruling circles, or meri toc racy asso ci ated with them (persons and fami lies possess - ing a high so cial sta tus due to ori gin, for tune, ad min istra tive or eco nomic power and in fluence, in telli gence, tal ents, spiri tual author ity, etc.) from the rest of the pop u la tion. The pop u la tion be comes poorly dif fer en ti ated mass, which only can

Соціологія: теорія, мето ди, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3 171 Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov flock af ter the elite, support it or “unseat”, but in any case it will have to en coun - ter a new rule of the minor ity. Ideolog i call y, the concept of elite has always been ultra-con ser va tive and anti-rad i cal, which seems hardly to be compat i ble with dem ocratic ide als. Yet the exis tence of an elite stra tum selected in a par tic ular mo ment in a rel a tively stable social envi ron ment is an indis put able socio log i cal fact. Research ers of the elite phenom e non in mod ern countries — both crit ics and apol ogists — are con cerned not so much about the exis tence of the “se lect” (who con trol every one owing to their posi tion) as about trends in their renewal, whether they closed or open to new com peten cies, tal ents, merits or cap i tal, which in their turn should be en - sured by demo cratic mecha nisms. For ex am ple, the Span ish phi loso pher Jose Ortega y Gasset was worried about possi bil ity of “the revolt of the masses” and de struction of the very founda - tions of the elite’s exis tence in the 1930s, while the rad i cal Amer i can so ci ol o gist Charles Wright Mills high lighted the grow ing ri gid ity and clo sure of the US “gov erning elite” in the 1950s. V. Pareto no ticed the dif ference be tween govern ing and non-gov erning elite. The first one seems to easily change it self under dem ocratic con di tions. Iner tia of the second one is higher; be sides, it is formed in other ways. Money and polit i cal mach i na tions are only some of the mecha nisms that sup port the elite’s domi - nance. The merits are deter mined by edu ca tional background, profes sional achieve - ments, loyalty to pub lic duty and voca tion, talents and spiri tual power, public opin ion and rec og ni tion. Atti tudes towards the elite also vary from culture to cul ture. The prob lem of for ma tion and trans for ma tion of the na tional po lit i cal elite of Ukraine in the 21st century is consid ered to be one of the most “Euro - pean” and pressing problems of the present-day soci ol ogy and polit i cal sci ence, which has also been con firmed by both recent social prac tices and events un- folded in Ukraine’s po lit i cal spec trum. The process of forma tion of the national polit i cal elite, which started in 1988–1989, has not finished yet. Therefore, the polit i cal elite have been un der go - ing con stant changes in recent de cades. These changes are rather grad ual than dra matic. They oc cur through the process of muta tion within some groups or their mixing with other ones, as well as through changes in polit i cal slo gans and lead er ship. Ba si cally, the pro cess of for ma tion of Ukraine’s po lit i cal (rul ing) elite can be di vided into the fol low ing stages [Shul’ha, 2011]. The first ma jor stage lasted from 1989 to 1994. It was char ac terised by si mul- taneous exis tence of both “old” so viet elite and “new” na tional one, which had just begun forming. At that time, the old elite’s po lit i cal and ad min is trative cap i - tal was be ing con verted into eco nomic one. Fur thermore, fi nan cial capi tal was being ac cu mulated in the hands of crime bosses. Pri vate me dia, which were get - ting es tablished in that pe riod, served as a ba sis for le git i mating big pri vate prop- erty. Trying to justify the unjust redis tri bu tion of property, Ukrainian intel lec tu - als (mainly socio-hu man is tic) high lighted the fact that there were no al terna - tives to reforms and Ukraine as an in de pend ent state needed re con struction; al - though their speeches were noth ing but rheto ric. During the second stage (1994–2000), the three main groups of Ukraine’s po lit i cal elite (the old rul ing, the new rul ing and the crim i nal) con tin ued to ac cu -

172 Соціологія: теорія, методи, маркетинг, 2016, 3 The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis mulate cap i tal in their hands. The shadow econ omy rapidly de vel oped, ma fia bosses joined the power elite, and the ma jor oli gar chic clans (from Dnipro - petrovs’k1, Donets’k and ) came into be ing. The repre sen ta tives of polit i cal elite be gan both to confront each other and fight over con trol of the cen tral power. During the third stage (2000–2004), the above-mentioned groups (the old, the new and the crim i nal) were merged into one named pro-Kuchma group. The lat ter served as a basis for power ful oli gar chic clans, where power and prop erty fuse with each other. The rul ing elite are criminalised while the crim i nal elite are respectalised. The fourth stage (late 2004) meant that a part of the oligar chic elite and big business owners became ma ture enough to get rid of the patron age of senior gov - ernment offi cials and thus of ille gal redis tri bu tion of income (between them and govern ment offi cials) through the mecha nism of corrup tion. During the 2004 presi den tial elec tion a cleav age be tween the two compet ing groups of power elite deep ened even further and even tually grew into con fronta tion. The period from 2005 to 2010 (known as the reign of ) can ac tually be regarded as the fifth stage of devel opment of the national ruling elite. The most impor tant event of that pe riod was the “Or ange Rev olu tion”, which man aged to in spire hope in Ukrai ni ans. Un for tu nately, their ex pec ta tions ended up in dis appoint ment. Fi nally, the sixth stage (since 2010) began with the reign of Viktor Yanu- kovych, who was the chief repre sen ta tive of the “Donets’k clan”. It is a well- known fact that Yanukovych’s rule was inter rupted by the “Revo lu tion of Dig- nity” and ended up with his escape to Russia where he was taken under the wing of Vladimir Putin. A more detailed anal ysis of forma tion of the national polit i cal elite has re - vealed their con tinu ity as the most es sential fea ture. In 1996, for exam ple, 75% of the old com munist nomenklatura2 worked in the new power structures. There- fore, con tinu ity of Ukraine’s polit i cal elite is mostly ensured by their “no- menklatura” or i gin. The process of elite cir cula tion took place on the basis of “Kyiv-cen trism” and dom i nance of “Dnipropetrovians” in all of the power structures during the Brezhniev — Shcherbyts’kyi era. Elite re cruitment under the rule of Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi was not open to the public; in stead, it was a semi-closed pro cess. A future leader had to go through all career stages. But in the early 1980s oppor - tuni ties for promo tion were restricted owing to “geron tocracy” of so viet power elite and ab sence of changes within them. Top posi tions in the nomenklatura were given for a life time. Moreover, the party elite were “afraid” of com peti tion and therefore they used to recruit those who would be just “perform ers”. At the

1 Since 19 May 2016 Dnipropetrovs’k has officially been named Dnipro. 2 The word “nomenklatura” is derived from the term “nomenclature” (which in turn means a system for giving names to things within a particular profession or field) and used to designate a population stratum in the states of former socialist camp, which occupied various key administrative positions in the Communist Party, central and local authorities, as well as in the spheres of industry, agriculture, education and health care.

Соціологія: теорія, мето ди, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3 173 Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov begin ning of “peres troika”, sev eral at tempts were made to reju venate the elite: about 25% were replaced by new cad res while the “old” staff was “trans ferred” to other posi tions. Kin ship and fam ily ties, be long ing to the same region and loy alty to chief served as a ba sis for the elite’s rota tion at that time. In 1989, an other source of elite recruit ment — elec tion — was in troduced within the soviet polit i cal system. But that source was not always better than se- lec tion within the nomenklatura. Career ists, bribe tak ers and crim i nals came to power quite often. It should be noted that the year 1989 was marked by the emer - gence of a po lit i cal “counter-elite”, which aspired to power because of its commit - ment to a market econ omy. Ac quisi tion of public cap i tal, emer gence of poorly con trolled business and dis in tegra tion of the CPSU monolith under pressure from a new gen era tion of pol i ticians also started in 1989. Be sides, Ukraine’s “coun ter-elite” be gan ac tively forming just at that time (at first, they gathered around the Ukrai nian Culturological Club). The re nowned Ukrai nian poet Ivan Drach, who a short time later be came a na tional dem ocrat, noted that the club “should be treated” as an asso ci a tion of former polit i cal pris on ers [Lytvyn, 1994]. Indeed, most mem bers of the club were formerly dis sidents; therefore, they had no chance of en tering the elite of “peres troika”. In 1988, the Ukrai nian Hel sinki Union (UHU) re started its activ ity. UHU was an overtly anti-commu nist or- gani sation whose lead ers had been in prison camps or exile for many years. At the party meeting held in Novem ber 1988, Kyiv writers formed a group to fa vour “perestroika”. Ivan Drach and Dmytro Pavlychko, who were for merly an- tago nists of dissi dence, joined the group. It was called “Peo ple’s Movement of Ukraine for Re con struc tion”1 (“Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy za perebudovu”). The group consisted only of the Commu nist Party members (among them were such fa mous figures as Oleh Yemets’, Volodymyr Yavorivs’kyi, Borys Oliinyk, Pavlo Movchan, Yurii Mushketyk), who from then on became fight ers for “Gor- bachev’s path”. When Mikhail Gorbachev visited Kyiv in Febru ary 1989, he met with Rukh’s founders, which was a sig nif i cant polit i cal support since “Kyiv author i - ties” had al ready adopted a reso lu tion de clar ing the estab lish ment of that group “il le git i mate”. The fact that the Ukrai nian in tel li gen tsia en joyed Gorbachev’s support indi cated the end of the rule of Shcherbyts’kyi’s group in the Commu nist Party of Ukraine (CPU) and the be gin ning of “chaos” in the elite. The writ ers, who were known as repre sen ta tives of cultural elite, became the ma jor ide olo gists com peting with Kyiv nomenklatura’s elite, where mis under standing was also hap pen ing. In the spring of 1989, Ukrainian “coun ter-elites” united. Writers and ac a - demic cir cles, which demanded “deep ening of perestroika” and fol lowed the ex- am ple of Moscow, al lied them selves with a UHU’s “dissi dent” elite and cul tural organi sation “Tovarystvo Leva” (“The Lion So ci ety”)2. In 1991, Viacheslav Chornovil noted that these two movements “are stick ing together at the mo- ment, which al lows a rela tively small number of people to di rect the national dem o cratic move ment in Ukraine”.

1 Also known as “Popular Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction”. 2 The organisation was established in L’viv, which is also often called the City of Lion(s).

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The elite of NRU (“Peo ple’s Movement of Ukraine”) have gone a long way from struggle against presi den tial structures to support for the presi dent as a guaran tor of nation hood and im ple menta tion of reforms. Among all of the polit i - cal parties and asso ci a tions estab lished during that period, the People’s Move- ment was the only one polit i cal force that was able to con duct its own policy. In April 1991, the Great Council of the Move ment stated that a person can not be both a member of the NRU and a Com munist Party member. The 2nd Meeting of the People’s Movement showed that the or gani sation began be ing radi cal ised as it had re pudi ated a prom ise to co oper ate with the Commu nist Party and stopped talk ing about social ism. “Writ ers” as old lead ers of the Movement were grad ually replaced by “dis sidents”: most partic i pants expressed their will to elect Mykhailo Horyn’ as the NRU leader in stead of Ivan Drach. Be sides, Myroslav Popovich, who was one of the NRU founders, had left the or gani sation, which in fluenced the process of its radi cal isation even more. The Movement began to rely on anti-Soviet-minded Galician peo ple (from West Ukraine) rather than on the “Kyiv in tel li gen tsia”. The year 1991 began with the so-called “pre senti ment of dic tator ship”. Dra - matic events in the Baltic re publics, which were hap pening at that time, urged the Commu nist Party to begin prepa ra tions for a counter-of fen sive. In August 1991, a group of eight high-rank ing gov ernment offi cials (called the State Com- mittee on the State of Emergency, or GKChP) made a coup d’etat attempt, which is known as the Kremlin “putsch”. The Peo ple’s Council 1 and the Peo ple’s Move- ment of Ukraine called the na tion to withstand “com munist impe ri al ism’s” at - tempts to rewrite history and bring Ukrai ni ans to their knees. The resis tance bases were created in Western Ukraine and in the city of Kyiv. The National Dem ocrats got a real chance to seize the power (by taking it away from the Com- munist Party of Ukraine) and start a resis tance move ment against putschists. The procla ma tion of Ukraine’s in de pend ence in Au gust 1991 was pos sible because of con fusion in the govern ment, in ac tivity of the Commu nist Party and in tense pressure from national dem ocratic forces. In or der to retain power in Ukraine, the rul ing elite made an in stant deci sion to de clare in de pend ence, thus secur ing themselves against heated crit i cism of their op ponents. The autumn of 1991 became a cru cial mo ment in Ukraine’s his tory as Ukrai- ni ans had to de cide the fate of their state and “elect” the elite. Be ing daz zled by “sudden” vic tory of the Au gust 1991, new national dem ocratic lead ers, as well as lead ers of other parties and move ments were unable to properly eval uate the cur- rent polit i cal sit ua tion and ra tio of the “Eastern” worldview to “West ern” one in Ukrainian public opinion. Imme di ately after “August victory”, when the former “coun ter-elite” suddenly (and for a short time) got an op portu nity to be a part of the po lit i cal elite of in de pend ent Ukraine, they dem on strated their in abil ity to act within “big pol i tics”. There was no lon ger unity between their members, which used to be their main ad van tage. Because of their “polit i cal na ivety” the Na tional Dem ocrats were forced out of the national bourgeoi sie, which had just started forming. Be long ing to the era of “polit i cal roman ti cism” (1989–1991), they neither allowed themselves to es-

1 At that time, the People’s Council (“Narodna Rada”) was a parliamentary opposition.

Соціологія: теорія, мето ди, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3 175 Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov tablish any con tacts with crim i nal business nor beat a path to “red direc tors’1 door”, who could ac tually sponsor the elec tion cam paign. The na tional dem o - cratic elite only re lied on en thusi asm and de votion of the masses, as well as Ukrai - nian di aspora’s in forma tion support and sponsor ship, which would be enough, for exam ple, for Lviv re gion, but not for the whole of Ukraine. Ukraine’s dem o cratic movement eventu ally split into three di rec tions: rad i cal (Levko Luk’yanenko), dem o cratic, which was the closest to the People’s Movement (Viacheslav Chor - novil) and mod erate lib eral (Ihor Yukhnovs’kyi). It should be noted that some econ o mists and di rec tors thought that Ihor Yukhnovs’kyi would be a “lesser evil” if the soci ety was becom ing radi cal ised. In gen eral, that part of the polit ico-eco - nomic elite was not con fi dent in its strength and abil ity to influ ence the masses; they did not propose anyone who could be an ad vocate of re forms and pri - vatisation. The elite that had been formed by the au tumn of 1991 were guided by the idea of statehood (taken over from the Peo ple’s Movement) and con cept of mar ket transfor ma tions adopted from the Dem o crats and some bourgeois ide olo gists. Being left without origi nal oppositional ideol ogy, the National Demo crats failed to cre ate a new one and so had to co oper ate with the central power for the sake of build ing Ukraine as an in de pend ent state. Their dreams of manag ing that process remained un attain able. Most of the parties emerged in Ukraine were closer to the so-called “pres sure groups”, to protoparties which were or gani sation ally weak, had no clear pro grams, tended to be pop ulist and en joyed support from a rela - tively small group of people. The former “coun ter-elite” be came de moc ra tised in late 1991 be cause the state nomenklatura (which fol lowed Leonid Kravchuk) had in tercepted their slo gans (for in de pend ence, de moc racy and mar ket econ omy). A cer tain part of the oppo si tion believed (or was forced to be lieve) that the nomenklatura had re - ally rethought its prior i ties and so commu nist function ar ies had suddenly be- come the na tional elite. But that step meant defeat of national forces since they refused to fight for the leader ship in the in de pend ent Ukraine and over the mem - bership in the state elite. After the Commu nist Party’s col lapse and ban, there emerged a “party in power” as the main fo cus of the polit i cal elite. That party acted not publicly but “be hind the scenes”, there fore it was dif fi cult to iden tify. In 1991, the “party of power” clustered around Leonid Kravchuk and some times tried to unite “heteropolar forces” which shared a com mon ori gin (as they came from the nomenklatura). There were the so-called “na tional com munists”, the Dem o crats (more over, some of them did not have a cer tain polit i cal ori en tation while oth ers still had Com munist Party cards), mem bers of the Party of Demo - cratic Re vival of Ukraine (PDVU), which had been just cre ated, some di rec tors of large in dustrial en terprises and those who held key po sitions in the Agro-In- dustrial Complex — pragmat i cally minded po liti cal forces, who liked call ing themselves “reform ers” (al though some of them were really in terested in re- forms).

1 Persons who held a position of a head or deputy head of a state-owned enterprise in the .

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The period from the autumn of 1991 to the spring of 1992 can be de scribed as a con flict-free pe riod in the life of Ukraine’s polit i cal elite. At that time, pro vin - cial elite, which con sisted mainly of Commu nists, were grad ually transformed into the state elite. For many polit i cal forces, it was a pe riod of con fusion and ex - pecta tions, unre solved fates and missed oppor tu ni ties. Zbigniew Brzezinski once char ac terised the processes that occurred then in Ukraine’s po lit i cal life and were linked to a multi-party system as “chaos” in the elite (the first phase of post-com- munist transfor ma tion), as suring that it would not last longer than five years [Brzezinski, 1994: p. 7]. Thus, from 1989 to1994 the Soviet soci ety under went funda mental changes that led to the fall of the USSR, proc la ma tion of Ukraine’s in de pend ence, emer - gence of a multi-party sys tem and dis solu tion of the CPSU — CPU. The next stage was forma tion of “capi tal ist rela tions”. Global transfor ma tions were di - rected by a new elite that had “sprouted” from the old one but com pletely re- nounced its ide ol ogy, hav ing adopted the ide ol ogy of counter-elite in stead. It was an unprec e dented po lit i cal pro cess in the his tory of Ukraine, which hap pened be - cause of some disad van tages of the counter-elite. The latter, being dis united, or - gani sation ally weak and non-ag gressive by nature, could not find strength to fight, nor did they ever plan to do it. In 1994, Ukrai ni ans had to make a choice again. The old power with the first presi dent Leonid Kravchuk at their head had lost a vote of con fi dence. “Krav - chuk’s team” could nei ther fix Ukraine’s eco nomic cri sis nor prevent fragmen ta - tion in the polit i cal en vi ronment. Therefore, it was de cided to hold an early presi - den tial elec tion in June 1994. The “leftists” — the old po lit i cal elite — nom i nated Oleksandr Moroz as a presi den tial can di date. Volodymyr Lanovyi, the Presi dent of the Centre for Mar- ket Re forms, was the “right wing” nom i nee. At that time, the “rightists” rounded up poli ti cians who shared nation al ist views, patri otic reform ers and entre pre - neurs. “New” bureau cratic elite, i. e. the “party in power”, proposed two can di - dates — the Pres i dent of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk and the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrai nian par lia ment) Ivan Pliushch. But Kravchuk’s main ri val in that presi den tial race was , who had begun to prepare for vic tory 18 months ear lier, as the then Prime Min ister. Kuchma was backed by power ful groups of indus tri al ists, business men and “pragmatic” reform ist forces that competed with the cen tral elite (the nomenklatura). In fact, re gions of Ukraine op posed the Centre. Both ordi nary Ukrai ni ans and most of the elite voted for Kuchma. Hav ing be come the sec ond Pres i dent of Ukraine, he con tin- ued what that Kravchuk began — struggling for power and against a het ero ge - neous parlia men tary elite that, despite some ideolog i cal differ ences, wanted to limit the Pres i dent’s pow ers. Leonid Kravchuk was only tar geted by parlia mentar i ans who belonged to the state (Kyiv) nomenklatura led by Ivan Pliushch, while Kuchma had to con - front the “left-wing” op posi tion, which brought together numer ous oppo nents of “bourgeois reforms”. The “leftist” parlia men tary elite simul ta neously were “coun ter-elite” outside the Verkhovna Rada. Kuchma climbed “Kyiv Olympus” without having any support ers (includ ing army). The “leftists” disap proved his program for reforms while the “rightists” (the Na tional Dem ocrats) boycotted his can di dacy at the elec tion in 1994, call ing him an “ad herent of Moscow”.

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It is also worth mention ing that Leonid Kuchma “per sonally” con tributed to win ning the presi dency in 1994. Mak ing an eval ua tion of Kuchma’s rule in gen - eral (in clud ing his be ing the Prime Min ister of Ukraine), we can say that he proved himself a bad strate gist but a brilliant tacti cian [Vrublevs’kyi, 2005]. As the Presi den tial Press Sec retary Aliona Hromnyts’ka once aptly noted, Kuchma “per fectly” sim u lated sit u a tions. In the be gin ning of his pres i dency, Kuchma mainly fa mil iar ised him self with the current situ a tion, which was ex tremely diffi - cult — ad verse eco nomic con di tions had led to the im pover ish ment of most Ukrai ni ans and to overwhelm ing so cial ap a thy. At the same time, his team (there were, for exam ple, a re nowned econ omist Anatolii Hal’chyns’kyi, the “fa ther” of Ukrai nian hryvnia Vadym Het man and other expe ri enced func tionar ies) was ac - tively work ing on the project “In de pend ent Ukraine”. Each of them was plough - ing his field. Be sides, there was quite a strong “socio log i cal” sup port during the pres i den tial cam paign. The elite of Ukrai nian par lia ment were strictly against granting ad di tional powers to the Presi dent and sign ing the Consti tu tional Agree ment as a “small con stitu tion of Ukraine”. For ex am ple, the “left ist” elite thought that those steps would lead to the Par lia ment’s dis tanc ing from par tic i pation in solv ing ma jor eco nomic and po lit i cal prob lems and thus transform it into a merely repre sen ta - tive body like the State Duma in the Russian Fed era tion. Con fron ta tion be tween the Pres i dent and par lia ment con tin ued to grow. In May 1995, still being trusted by most Ukrai ni ans, Kuchma of fered to con duct a na tionwide survey to define the public’s level of trust in the Presi dent and in the Verkhovna Rada. In fact, had the survey been conducted the Par lia ment might have been dis solved1. On 8 June, 1995, the Presi dent and the Par lia ment2 signed the Consti tu tional Agree ment, which be came a “small con stitu tion” — the law in force. Ac cord ing to the Agreement, the exec utive branches of govern ment (both cen tral and lo cal au thori ties) were fully ac countable to the Presi dent. Besides, he was enti tled to appoint a prime min ister without the Parlia ment’s con sent. Thus, the Agreement lim ited the powers of the head of govern ment, who from then on could not act in de pend ently. The fight for the Consti tu tion united the National Dem ocrats with cen trists and presi den tial team. As Leonid Kuchma rightly pointed, “... to day mak ing Ukraine a par lia mentary repub lic will turn into a ca tastro phe” [Kudriachenko, 1996]. The present-day events clearly dem onstrate that he was not wrong. After resig na tion of the Cabi net of Minis ters headed by Vitalii Masol and ap - pointment of as a prime min ister, the in fluence of “left con ser- va tors” from the former nomenklatura weak ened while Kuchma’s “cen trists” gained full con trol over the exec utive branch of gov ernment. Marchuk’s Cabi net performed its functions for less than a year — from June 1995 to May 1996. During that time, Kuchma man aged to strengthen the posi tions of his “Dnip-

1 According to the results of sociological surveys conducted at that time, Ukrainians were not satisfied with the performance of Verkhovna Rada and did not trust parliamentarians so much. 2 The Speaker of Verkhovna Rada Oleksandr Moroz was acting on behalf of the Parliament.

178 Соціологія: теорія, методи, маркетинг, 2016, 3 The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis ropetrovian” team1: min isters and dep uty minis ters were appointed by presi den - tial de crees. Marchuk was prac tically “re moved” from power, so he could not lead “his own team” into the Cabi net of Minis ters. Being just a “fic titious” prime min- ister, Yevhen Marchuk started seek ing support from the parlia mentary elite. But a new group led by the Head of Ukraine’s Pres i den tial Ad min istra tion Dmytro Tabachnyk was in terven ing in the pro cess of redis tribu tion of the “spheres of in- fluence”. The con flict be tween Marchuk and Tabachnyk had not been re solved in fa vour of the then prime min ister. In the 1990s, Kuchma succeeded in solv ing the “Cri mean is sue” by pushing aside “pro-Russian” elite, which had been formed in the Cri mean Pen in sula dur- ing 1992–1994, and abol ish ing in March 1995 with the help of Cri mea’s Par lia - ment the Crimean presi dency (Yurii Meshkov, who had been hold ing the of fice of Presi dent since Feb ruary 1994, was the first and only Presi dent of the Repub lic of Crimea). In the summer of 1997, Crimea’s par lia ment (named the Supreme Council of Cri mea) was stripped of powers and transformed from a leg isla tive into a repre sen ta tive body. The early months of 1995 were marked by a seri ous conflict be tween parlia - mentar i ans and the Head of the Presi den tial Admin is tra tion Dmytro Tabach - nyk, who was not favoured by many of them because of being too young and seem- ing to have quite a strong in fluence on the Pres i dent. But Tabachnyk enjoyed support from Kyiv’s “new” business elite. It should also be mentioned that Tabachnyk (together with an expe ri enced poli ti cian Ivan Kuras, nota ble ana lyst Oleksandr Razumkov and “di rec tor” Oleksandr Volkov) had played a sig nif i cant role in the 1994 presi den tial cam paign. That was a very cohe sive team. Besides, being af fil i ated with Kyiv “Dem o cratic Bloc”, Dmytro Tabachnyk was elected to Kyiv City Council in 1994. He be came a mem ber of the Commu nist fac tion in the Council and ad vocated the preser va tion of the USSR. As noted before, con fronta tion between the state elite and Dmytro Ta- bachnyk ended in fa vour of the latter. Tabachnyk was unlikely to be un seated. The Pres i dent’s As sis tants for Na tional Se cu rity and Mil i tary Af fairs Yurii Havrylov and Vadym Hrechaninov were re moved from posts. A short time later, the Presi dent’s First Assis tant Oleksandr Razumkov faced the same fate. The Presi dent’s coun cil lors Dmytro Vydrin and Anatolii Hal’chyns’kyi re signed in protest against Tabachnyk’s “dic tator ship”. The order to dis perse the Patri arch of Ukrai nian Or thodox Church of Kyiv Pa triarch ate Volodymyr Romaniuk’s fu- neral pro ces sion on 18 July, 1995, might also have been given by Tabachnyk. In the summer of 1996, Kyiv hills were “cap tured” by “Dnipropetrovians” (Lazarenko, Pustovoitenko, Tihipko, and Horbulin). Dmytro Tabachnyk was the only one “stranger” to remain in Kuchma’s in ner cir cle. He was both the founder of Kyiv team and its “hos tage”. Pavlo Lazarenko be came Ukraine’s new prime min ister. He ac tively promoted his clan by transfer ring them from provin - cial towns to key posi tions in the Cabi net of Minis ters. But in Octo ber 1996 (by the time when Lazarenko had thor oughly “entrenched” him self in Kyiv), the fight for power between the Presi dent and Prime Min ister broke out again. The

1 It is well known that Leonid Kuchma spent most of his career at “Yuzhmash”, the Soviet Union’s largest missile factory located in Dnipropetrovs’k.

Соціологія: теорія, мето ди, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3 179 Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov fight got even more in tense after a group of the Pres i dent’s “close sup porters” was formed and he be gan to exert pressure on the regional elite. There were es tab- lished po si tions of state ad min is tra tion dep uty heads for po lit i cal and le gal af - fairs — the so-called pres i den tial “com mission ers”, who were supposed to con trol the local elite. “Donets’k clan” as Kuchma’s support ers came into con flict with Lazarenko’s group. Donets’k Oblast gov ernor Volodymyr Shcherban’ was accused of in spiring coal min ers’ strikes and re moved from of fice. “The So cial Market Choice” fac tion (Kyiv clan) headed by Marchuk was in oppo si tion to Lazarenko. At that time, Ukraine’s oil re fin eries were being re dis tributed between Kuchma, Lazarenko and Shcherban’. Peo ple close to Lazarenko tried to cap ture Donbas by pushing aside Donets’k “lib erals”. Lazarenko had been head ing the Cabi net of Minis ters for four months when (in Oc tober 1996) he came into con - flict with the Pres i dent, which re sulted in his resig na tion in July 1997. Moreover, Pavlo Lazarenko was re moved from the office of Prime Min ister because he seemed to be a pretender to abso lute power in Ukraine, as the leader of the party “Hromada” (“The Com mu nity”). Be ing an au thor i ta tive leader and fa vour ing those who belonged to the same region as him, Lazarenko an tagonised most of new govern ment offi cials and parlia men tar i ans. During 1996–1997 the Presi - dent in creased his own in fluence on the re gional elite, which caused con flicts with the Mayor of Kyiv and the Gov ernor of Kherson Oblast. There was es tab- lished a po sition of dep uty gover nor for polit i cal af fairs (in fact, a pres i den tial “com mis sioner”) in each re gion. Par lia men tary fac tions be came the mech a nism for in volve ment of polit i cal par ties in “big pol i tics” and for ma tion of power struc - tures. The role of Verkhovna Rada in re la tionships between branches of govern - ment, as well as its author ity in public opin ion was grad ually weak en ing. An other rea son for that sit u a tion was un cer tainty of stra te gic course for de vel op ment of parliamentarism in Ukraine. The years 1997–1998 were also marked by “polit i cal par tisan ship” of Uk - raine’s po lit i cal elite. A party list elec toral system prompted the elite to switch from “non-publicness” to affil i a tion with a cer tain polit i cal party. Such a sponta - ne ous “cen tralism” served as a way of self-preser va tion in situ a tion of vagueness in pol i tics and in the system of ethi cal val ues. Senior polit i cal circles be came aware of the fact that the available system of values was under go ing a cri sis and civil so ci ety had not been formed yet, which was dem onstrated by the election re- sults in 1998. De feat of the National Dem ocratic Party (NDP) in the 1998 par lia mentary elec tion led to ma jor per sonnel changes within the re gional elite, which had not been able to ensure good perfor mance of the party. In May 1998, Leonid Kuchma an nounced that regional au thori ties (first of all, lead ing cad res) would be al most com pletely reno vated. These changes were nec essary for the Presi dent to in- crease his in fluence on the re gional elite shortly before the upcom ing presi den tial elec tion in Ukraine. Per sonnel changes in the re gional elite took place si multa neously with staff reshuf fle at the Centre: Volodymyr Radchenko (Marchuk’s team), who had been head ing up the Secu rity Service of Ukraine (SBU), was replaced by . There fore, SBU’s top manage ment began to be replaced by new cad res. Derkach had known Kuchma for about 25 years; they had worked to gether at

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“Yuzhmash” for a long time. In the late 1990s, a “new” Ukraine obvi ously felt the effect of so-called “gener a tion factor”. Clans, parties and parlia men tary groups formed in the years 1991–1998 had a def i nite “gen era tional code”. From then on, the further Ukraine’s “new elite” evolved, the more no tice able “gen era tion fac - tor” became, which was clearly dem on strated by parties like the Con gress of Ukrai nian Na tional ists, “Re forms and Order”, “Hromada”, “Ukraine — For - ward!”, UNA — UNSO (“Ukrai nian Na tional Assem bly — Ukrai nian Peo ple’s Self-De fence”), etc. The “post-perestroika” nomenklatura is a “prod uct” of the last decade of the 20th cen tury. The phe nom e non of po lit i cal gen er a tion (a com mu nity con sist ing of people of the same age) is char ac teris tic of the 20th century’s elite. The Sixtiers co hort (they were born in the mid-1930s to 1940s and started their ca reers in 1960s) came to Ukrai nian pol i tics from the two completely differ ent spheres: 1) the Com mu nist Party ap pa ra tus, 2) dis si dent, lib eral or ed u ca tional move ments. They were too politi cised but did not fo cus much on economic prob lems. The next group is “post-Sixtiers”, whose mana ge rial ca reers began in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They consti tute the sec ond tier of Ukrai nian pol i ticians. The third gen era tion of Ukraine’s po lit i cal elite came into be ing dur ing the era of Brezhnevian stagna tion. They are former Komsomol (Young Commu nist League) function ar ies, who started their careers in the early 1980s and got ample oppor tu ni ties for career growth due to “perestroika”. The last co hort is repre - sented by those who were born in the 1960s — early 1970s and began their ca reers at the end of “perestroika”. Their world view, val ues and goals are completely dif- ferent from the other three groups. They were mainly business men. However, in this group there are some repre sen ta tives of the “polit i cal elite” — young pragma - tists who neither have ties to the old nomenklatura nor to the National Dem o- crats, and they are “search ing” a place in poli tics. For Ukraine, the pe riod be tween 1991 and 1998 was marked by intense elite cir cu la tion and, in par tic u lar, fre quent changes of prime min is ters. For ex am ple, Pavlo Lazarenko re mained in of fice for about 12 months. His pre de ces sors were short-term prime minis ters too: Yevhen Marchuk headed the govern ment for 11 months, Vitalii Masol — for 9, Yukhym Zviahil’s’kyi — for 10, Leonid Kuchma — for 12 months; Vitol’d Fokin was the only prime minis ter to govern the country for nearly two years (from Octo ber 1990 to Octo ber 1992). Constant govern - ment re shuf fles led to per ma nent fight in po lit i cal cir cles and ir re spon si bil ity of pol i ticians. By 1998, the aver age turnover rate among high-rank ing gov ernment offi cials had reached 46%. Vitol’d Fokin re placed 66.7% of the old cad res in the govern ment with new ones, Leonid Kuchma — about 44%, Yukhym Zviahil’s’ - kyi — 19.4%, Vitalii Masol — 53.9%, Yevhen Marchuk — 43.9%, Pavlo Lazaren - ko — 59%, Valerii Pustovoitenko (Lazarenko’s suc ces sor) — 30.9%. Lazarenko’s gov ern ment un der went a fun da men tal per son nel change: among those rep re- sented the “old” team, there were only two “tertiary” minis ters (the Minis ter of Timber Indus try and the Minis ter of Emergen cies, who worked for the gov ern- ment during 1987–1992), and Min ister for the Cabi net of Minis ters Valerii Pustovoi tenko, who had oc cupied that posi tion in 1993. Marchuk’s govern ment was the last to employ the “old” of fi cials [Shul’ha, Boiko, 1998: p. 101]. That period (mid to the late 1990s) was also marked by forma tion of the so-called “cli en tele” around in flu en tial pol i ti cians in Rus sia (Aleksandr Rutskoi,

Соціологія: теорія, мето ди, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3 181 Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov

Anatolii Chubais) and Ukraine (Pavlo Lazarenko, Anatolii Kinakh, etc.). The “clien tele” were repre sented by conglom er ates of enter prises, compa nies and groups from vari ous areas of the econ omy, which de rived po lit i cal and eco nomic support from their “patron”. Another phenom e non started taking place in Uk - raine’s po lit i cal life at that time was de scribed as lobby groups vying for their in- terests. Those structures were related to min istries, man age ment boards, fi nan - cial-in dustrial groups, stock ex changes and banks. Some groups of business men as early as 1992–1994 began to real ise their polit i cal in terests (both basic and vari able). The so-called “corpo rate think ing” started to in creas ingly pre vail in Ukraine from 1994 on wards. “Cor pora tions”, which brought together polit i cal and business lead ers, were the core of an or gani sation; moreover, they could be transformed into polit i cal structur es. The “patron — cli ent” system worked in those “cor pora tions”, which meant that a member of the corpo ra tion in exchange for loy alty and service com mitment gets new polit i cal and eco nomic op portu ni ties from a group of patrons. Thus, the “clients” became inter ested in raising their prestige and succeed ing in polit i cal and economic aspects, which promoted the “corpo ra tion’s” devel op ment. On the other hand, “corpo rate thinking” contrib uted to isola tion or rela tive sepa ra tion of some branches of the econ omy and to fierce com peti tion between polit i - cal/busi ness groups. It was “cor porate con science” that fa voured region ali sation of business and pol i tics, as well as for ma tion of clans both at the Centre and in re gions. Heads of cen tral/re gional au thor i ties and per sons close to them cre ated ad min is tra tive and business clans across Ukraine, un der the auspices of the gov ernment and structures related to the Centre, in or der to protect polit i cal and eco nomic in ter- ests of high-ranking of fi cials. 1995–1996 were the years when both central and re gional groups fin ished forming and then di vided be tween themselves the major sources of raw mate ri als, prod uct markets and key po sitions in the govern ment and lo cal au thori ties, as well as mo nopolised the main branches of Ukraine’s indus try. Those groups somewhat weak ened the in fluence of sec toral ad min istra - tive-eco nomic groups, which protected in terests of the “direc torate” in some branches of in dustry. However, the ma jor in dustry clusters remained sta ble and served the inter ests of the “big league”: mil i tary-indus trial com plex, metal lurgy, chem i cal in dus try and ag ri cul ture. Busi ness struc tures in volv ing for eign in vest ment made some at tempts to cre ate their own clans, fo cusing on the cap i tal of Russia or other coun tries. But Russian big busi ness did not seem to have sat is fied its ap petites and so was unable to start economic ex pan sion. Privatisation of Ukrai nian in dustry was con trolled in both the Centre and re gions, while Rus sian business used the tactics of “in flu- ence” on Ukraine through the big-league pol i tics. So, at that time the ma jor trend in Ukrai nian pol i tics and busi ness was char - acter ised by consol i da tion of capi tal, party appa ra tus and poli ti cians in groups (that ac tually meant clans). As a re sult, they were fighting, though “qui etly”, to gain to tal power in the state. Both high-rank ing civil ser vants and pol i ti cians ben e fit ted not only from le git i mate business but also from “shadow” sec tor, where “black money” cir cu lated and prof its from il le gal busi nesses were con cen - trated and then re dis tributed.

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Being aimed at strengthen ing con trol over the regional elite, the cen tral groups of polit i cal-eco nomi c elite actively inter vened in govern ment insti tu tions and big busi ness. They freely inter preted laws and reg ula tions, man ag ing at the same time the processes of redis tribu tion of power and privatisation. Compet ing groups were focused on dif ferent polit i cal fig ures, which of ten led to con flicts be - tween branches of govern ment and fights between fac tions or parties. Priva - tisation of state-owned enter prises became a means for ex erting po lit i cal and eco - nomic pres sure, or “protec tionism ma chin ery”, where all rules were for sale. The repre sen ta tives of regional elite contended for infor mal immu nity. In fact, they were some kind of “fiefdom” or “seig niory”, where full power over re - gions was granted in ex change for po lit i cal loy alty and elec toral support of their “pa tron”. Thus, the regional elite of ten became a source of con flicts. Re gional groups or, rather, clans be came the ma jor el e ment of polit i cal and eco nomic re la tions in Ukraine. These “clans” were usu ally headed by per sons who worked in munic i pal author i ties, central or local govern ments [Ohorodnyk, 1996: p. 86]. In Ukraine, un like the West, cap i tal does not cre ate power; on the con trary, power creates capi tal. Therefore, if the cap i tal shows disloy alty to the gov ernment or regional “clans”, it can be le gally alien ated. Conver sion of power com peten cies for privatisation into tangi ble outcomes is one of the reasons why power is reg ularly (usually once a year) re-di vided. It (con version) also con tributes to the fact that the class of power hold ers is closed to the public and power is mo nopolised by clans. Thus, a “new ar istoc racy” is com ing into be ing. Region ali sation of Ukraine’s po lit i cal elite oc curs not only due to polit i cal pecu liar i ties or differ ences in ethnic structure and mental ity, but also to uneven economic devel op ment and unequal capa bil i ties of the local elite. There are no polit i cal con flicts in Ukraine, un like Rus sia, when the “cen tre” and re gions fight against each other. There is no “Belarusian” prob lem ei ther, when the “provinces” fully cap ture the centre. The polit i cal elite of Ukraine have “ap propri ated” their re gions and man age business in each of them. Now they are trying to com pete for polit i cally neu tral regions. Ac tually, there are two ma jor re - gions in Ukraine: “poor” East and “rich” South, and the po lit i cally sea soned West act ing as a “neu tral cen tre” between them. The elec tion to Ukraine’s par lia ment in 1998 con tributed to further region- ali sation of the soci ety and polit i cal cir cles. At that time, the Eastern region had three main cen tres with their own polit i cal and economic in terests: Dnipro- petrovs’k, Donets’k, Kharkiv and sev eral mi nor (but not depend ent on the neigh- bours) ones — Odesa, Zaporizhia, Luhans’k. The Auton o mous Repub lic of Cri - mea acted as a sep a rate unit and its inter ests were far from those of in dustrial East. The three above-mentioned cen tres recruited the bulk of Ukraine’s po lit i - cal elite, thus sharing the “burden” of power with Kyiv. During the 1994 presi den tial elec tion, the phenom e non of “red zone” was ob - served (ar eas voting for the Commu nists and the Social ists). That zone mainly com prised eastern and south-eastern regions of Ukraine. The 1998 par lia men- tary elec tion dem on strated growing in fluence of the “left ists” in the above-men- tioned re gions and a “left ward swing” of vot ers in Ukraine as a whole. Even in Chernivtsi Oblast situ ated in the west of Ukraine 20.2% of the popu la tion voted for the Commu nists. It should be noted that the “leftists” (espe cially the So cial ist Party of Ukraine) were in volved in the for ma tion of Ukraine’s par lia mentary

Соціологія: теорія, мето ди, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3 183 Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov elite and com mittees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU), but ideo log i - cally be longed to a “coun ter-elite”. The princi ples of nepo tism and tribal ism had taken root among Ukraine’s po - lit i cal elite by then. The ruling elite were re cruited on the basis of kin ship or be- long ing to the same region. The presi dent promoted his rel a tives to the top po si - tions in polit i cal hi erar chy, and other of fi cials were trying to do the same thing. Nepo tism was a conse quence of the weaken ing of presi den tial powers, when member ship in polit i cal par ties and move ments was replaced by fam ily ties. The lat ter eventu ally led to iso la tion of the elite. This is the most notice able trend among the elite in Cen tral Asia, Kazakhstan and Russia. Polit i cal scien tists usu ally include in the “family” not only rela tives but also close friends and “courtiers”. For ex am ple, the Yel’tsin fam ily’s in fluence on po - lit i cal and so cial life in Rus sia exceeded all rea sonable lim its. The elite were prac- tically re duced to “The Fam ily”or “Fam ily Corpo ra tion”. In Ukraine, the Kuch - ma fam ily was asso ci ated with bril liant ca reers of the Franchuks and Oleksandr Kuz’muk, who, be ing a corps com mander be came the De fence Min ister in one year. It is worth mention ing that high-rank ing of fi cials com ing from the same re- gion be gan to form their own groups as early as the Khrushchev era. Those groups com peted with each other for power. The Brezhniev era (which lasted al most 20 years) can be de scribed as a reign of his own “clan” uniting of fi cials from Dnipropetrovs’k and Dniprodzerzhyns’k. Dnipropetrovs’k Oblast ac tually be- came a “breed ing ground” for po lit i cal elite of the USSR and So viet Ukraine. “Dnipropetrovians” en joyed support from Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi as the First Sec retary of the Commu nist Party of Ukraine. Leonid Kravchuk strove to neutral ise the influ ence of “old Dnipropetrovians” belong ing to Shcherbyts'kyi’s team. But as soon as Leonid Kuchma became prime min ister, a new gener a tion of “Dnipropetrovians” ar rived in Kyiv to fi nally reach the top of the power hier ar - chy in 1994. As a team, “Dnipropetrovians” strengthened their posi tions in the years 1990–1993 (the Fokin Gov ernment) and in 1996–1998 (gov ernments headed by Lazarenko and Pustovoitenko). “Odesians” were in fluen tial under Zviahil’- s’kyi’s and Lazarenko’s premier ship while “Donets’k team” was as soci ated with govern ments headed by Kuchma, Zviahil’s’kyi and Yanukovych. The Zviahil’ - s’kyi Gov ernment is often mentioned as the govern ment of “Donets’k team”. On the other hand, there was “Lviv team” repre sented by . Lviv “in- tellec tuals” also had their own ar eas of influ ence. For ex am ple, “Lvivians” were the second win ner in the number of seats in the Kuchma Govern ment, as well as under Masol’s and Lazarenko’s pre mier ships. But they were the least influ en tial in the Pustovoitenko Govern ment. However, “Lvivians” were the only team from the west of Ukraine to focus both on pro-Ukrainian na tional pol icy and “pro-West ern” eco nomic re forms. An other phe nom e non worth con sid er ing is so cial or i gin of Ukraine’s lead ers. Most of them (40–45%) came from peasants, rural in telli gen tsia and state offi - cials. Pres i dents Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, as well as prime minis ters Pavlo Lazarenko, Yevhen Marchuk and Valerii Pustovoitenko can be included in this group. About 30% of Ukraine’s elite iden tify their parents as urban in telli - gen tsia or white-collar work ers. So, these people have grown up in fami lies of a

184 Соціологія: теорія, методи, маркетинг, 2016, 3 The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis good in come and de cent social sta tus. A signif i cant part of them are descen dants of the Soviet nomenklatura, where power had been in herited from par ents and grand parents for over 70 years [Pylypenko, Pryvalov, Nikolaievs’kyi, 2008: p. 76–77]. In fact, of fi cials of ru ral or i gin es tablished a tra di tion of promot ing those who belonged to the same region (city, town, oblast, etc.), thus forming “clans” within the govern ment. As previ ously mentioned, nearly half of Ukraine’s po lit i cal elite were of rural or i gin. That might be the main reason why the princi ples of tribal - ism and nep otism became so eas ily in grained in them. As early as the begin ning of “perestroika”, some of fi cials be came en trepre neurs and then started to capture markets and derive consid er able profits. Using their offi cial posi tions, they could do the things that were forbid den to others. Voucher privatisation changed the na ture of polit i cal elite as the “au thors” of privatisation. The elite began to split into several groups of inter ests: depart men - tal bureau cracy, regional nomenklatura, direc tor ate, private entre pre neurs, mu- nic i pal coun cils in big cities, etc. They com peted with each other to take con trol over privatisation. Some of them (for exam ple, di rec tors of large in dustrial en ter- prises) were in terested in slow ing down the privatisation process. Ukraine’s elite be gan to undergo ma jor changes as early as 1994, when busi - ness elite and “new Ukrai ni ans” expressed inter est in poli tics. Dur ing Kravchuk’s presi dency they managed to form “lobby groups”, “cli en tele” and “pres sure groups”, trying to make pol i tics serve their business inter ests. In fact, all the pro- cesses that occurred in Ukraine’s po lit i cal life were a re flec tion of what was tak- ing place in Rus sia at that time, where in 1993 business rushed into poli tics, started invest ing in par ties and par lia mentary lead ers and took an ac tive part in parlia mentary elec tions. Both in Russia and in Ukraine, the “party of capi tal” was fi nan cially strong enough to get their hands on power. But in Ukraine, it was not the only one. There were differ ent regional busi ness clans (Donbas, Cri mea, Dnipropetrovs’k, Odesa, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Halychyna), sec toral asso ci a tions (mil i - tary-indus trial com plex, “agrar i ans”, “oil work ers”, etc.) and sev eral groups polit - ically oriented towards Moscow, Kyiv, Europe or certain polit i cal parties. Pas sive par tic i pa tion of big cap i tal in pol i tics was grad u ally re placed by ac - tive. At first, newborn entre pre neurs were busy selling and re sell ing state-owned assets or convert ing them into private property. Then they started to consol i date their “achieve ments” and legal ise property. The 1998 parlia mentary election led to the destruc tion of the previ ous polit i - cal and fi nan cial sys tem, which con sisted of primi tive clans. Fi nan cial and po lit i - cal groups took the first step towards being civil ised: they started being called parties [Mostovaia, 1998]. But many of them were not able to compre hend the dif ference be tween parties and firms and therefore, in stead of cre ating a sin gle bloc to ac com plish the goals at a regional level, the “firm” tried to support “their” party. Ac tually, the pe riod of rapid de vel opment of Ukraine’s elite (at least, its pow - erful start) fell on Kuchma’s reign. As it is well known, he was nom i nated for a sec ond presi den tial term. But he started prepar ing for the elec tion ahead of time by shuffling the staff and build ing a con tain ment and counter mea sure system. The main task that Kuchma iden tified was to retain power at any cost.

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Undoubt edly, it was quite a chal leng ing task: the gap be tween the rich and the poor kept widen ing and thus provoked anti-Kuchma moods. At the same time, “left ist” parties were gain ing strength, espe cially the So cial ist Party led by Oleksandr Moroz. But Kuchma’s tac tical tal ent came into play again; and there was a turning point in that presi den tial cam paign. He man aged to split the “left-wing” elec torate due to an “eternal op posi tion ist” Petro Symonenko, who, using the reso lu tion of the CPU Congress as a cover (how ever, he real ised that people would rather have gone to hell than vote for the “red”), ran in the elec tion (some people still be lieve that a fact of brib ery took place there). But the chance had been lost. If all the “left-wing” forces had clus tered around Moroz, they would proba bly have won the presi den tial elec tion and put an end to Kuchma’s author i tar ian regime. The next presi den tial elec tion, which took place in 2004, had a strong im pact on Ukraine’s po lit i cal elite. Dur ing the elec tion cam paign, the “guar an tor” (Leonid Kuchma) per formed multi-move com bi na tion in the elec toral field to provoke a clash be tween the two rival can di dates Viktor Yushchenko and , which could have led to chaos and could have posed a real threat to Ukraine’s sov ereignty. Balanc ing on a “ra zor’s edge”, Kuchma might have thought that he would wait until there was no other option but to call him as the “res cuer of the nation”. So, he might have planned to run for a third term [Vrublevs’kyi, 2005: p. 32–33]. On the one hand, Kuchma was bluff ing when chose his “suc ces sor” (vol un- tarily or under pressure of “Donets’k clan”) since he knew in ad vance that this fig - ure would not pass. On the other hand, he dem on strated his favour able dis posi - tion towards Viktor Yushchenko in or der to earn div i dends (as a “dem ocrat”) in the West. Polit i cal scien tists and soci ol o gists have contin u ously analysed those force ma jeure events of late 2004 — early 2005, and all of them ar rived at the con clu sion that the “Orange Revo lu tion” had largely deter mined a new config u ra tion of power elite. Owing to Yuschenko’s vic tory in the presi den tial elec tion of 2005, the “Or - ange Team” en joyed an unprecedently high de gree of trust from Ukrai ni ans. But they failed to cap i tal ise on this oppor tu nity in a proper way. The pe riod im medi - ately after the elec tions was marked by con tinu ous battles inside the “Or ange Team”, in clud ing the fight over the office of prime min ister. The Presi dent Viktor Yushchenko re garded as the most ac cept able can di - date. But having bowed to pressure of “revo lution ary” masses, he had to appoint YuliiaTymoshenko to this posi tion (who was, in her turn, the most “talented” ap - prentice of Pavlo Lazarenko). There fore, as soon as the “Orange Team” came to power, the public wit nessed numer ous conflicts be tween the Presi dent Viktor Yushchenko and the Prime Min ister Yuliia Tymoshenko. Once Yushchenko man aged to win an in terim vic tory and gave the Prime Minis ter’s posi tion to Viktor Yanukovych. How ever, a bit later Tymoshenko became the Prime Min is - ter again. A new round of the battle between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko reached its peak in the win ter of 2009–2010, when the “gas issue” came onto the agenda. Being un able to work con structively and co he sively, the “Or ange Team” largely pre de termined Yanukovych’s vic tory at the 2010 presi den tial elec tion.

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Tymoshenko made unprec e dented ef forts to win the presi dency but her chances were obvi ously slender. Hav ing risen to power, Yanukovych started seek ing to strengthen presi den - tial pow ers. All of the key posi tions in cen tral, re gional and lo cal au thori ties were oc cu pied by “Donets’k” clan. A strik ing ex am ple of this policy was the ca reer of the Presi dent’s el dest son Oleksandr (also known as “Den tist Sasha”), who even had the author ity to control the Minis try of Home Affairs. Appli cants for police chief in each re gion had to be per sonally ap proved by him. It was immensely arro - gant and fi nan cially ag gressive pol icy of “Donets’k clan” headed by Yanukovych that eventu ally led to the “Rev o lution of Dig nity” in the winter of 2013–2014. Being unable to settle protests in a peaceful way (which re sulted in Maidan Mas- sacre), Yanukovych was ousted from power and then escaped to Russia where he was taken under the wing of his “big brother” Vladi mir Putin. Russia’s an nex- ation of Crimea and further dramatic events in Donbas were the outcomes of the anti-Ukrai nian pol icy that Yanukovych pursued as a Kremlin puppet. A snap presi den tial elec tion was held in the spring of 2014, af ter Russia began its mil i tary aggres sion against Ukraine. Petro Poroshenko won the vic tory in the first round. We delib er ately did not make an analy sis of polit i cal life in Ukraine after the 2014 presi den tial elec tion. First, it is too early to draw any substan tial (fi nal) con clu sions about changes that have occurred there. There is a saying that goes, “The big is better seen from a distance”. Sec ond, this pe riod should be studied sepa rately in order to make a more substan tial and thor ough anal ysis. Giv ing an over all eval u a tion of be hav iour of the rul ing po lit i cal elite dur ing the years of Ukraine’s in de pend ence, the au thors would like to draw at tention to the fact that the poli ticians have nei ther acted ad e quately enough to meet the chal lenges of a new his tori cal ep och nor be haved re sponsi bly enough to ensure the future of Ukraine and Ukrai ni ans. De popu la tion, ex port of capi tal, lack of fi - nan cial and economic as soci a tions whose members will ingly bind their per sonal plans and the future of their fami lies to Ukraine, short-sighted de ci sion-mak ing in the sphere of geopol i tics (with out taking their long-term con sequences into ac count), etc. clearly indi cate that there is no respon si ble ruling elite in Ukraine so far. All they can do is care about the things happen ing “here” and “now”, and only when they pose a threat to poli ticians them selves rather than to the soci ety on the whole or some of its sectors [Shul’ha, 2011: p. 171]. De spite the fact that Ukraine’s polit i cal elite ex ist, they are usu ally not open to the public. They do not de clare their fu ture plans or inten tions openly. They do not inform Ukrai ni ans about social pro jects that are going to be im ple mented. They content themselves with mak ing gen erous promises as soon as each elec tion cam paign be gins. One of the main inter nal problems of Ukraine related to the forma tion of re- sponsi ble polit i cal elite co in cides with the global problem of elite’s “offen sive” against social rights of citi zens. So, the national polit i cal elite, not being sure of the safety of their assets in Ukraine, transfer them offshore. However, the elite of de veloped countries are also threaten ing to move their assets abroad if the governments in tro duce high taxes and high so cial in sur ance con tri bu tions.

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Some research ers explain both of these cases as the fact that the national elite are moving to the global ist posi tion, chang ing their status from national to global and refus ing to protect national inter ests. At present, one of the key issues on the agenda is the polit i cal elite’s con sol i - da tion. De spite the fact that this issue has been rele vant ever since Ukraine gained its in de pend ence, the split in the na tional elite has never been as seri ous as now. All at tempts to unite the elite on the princi ples of com mon vi sion of history, lan guage policy, un mask ing of the total i tarian past, etc. have ended with lit tle success so far. This problem can be solve only if we go be yond the old par a digm and find a new plat form for con sol i da tion of the national elite. Per haps it will be possi ble on the basis of overcom ing cur rent problems and solv ing chal lenges for the future. In this regard, effec tive inter ac tion between poli tics and business, ability of Ukrainian business men to act effec tively within the current polit i cal conjunc - ture assume great impor tance. Politicisation of busi ness in Ukraine oc curs in the con text of the so ci ety’s politicisation. But entre pre neurs organ ise their social and economic inter ests faster than other social strata. Trying to in fluence pol i tics, big busi ness not only uses conven tional forms of polit i cal ac tion but also resorts to lobby ing pol i ti- cians. In fact, busi ness cir cles pos sess con sid er able po ten tial for po lit i cal ac tiv ity, which can be used in crit i cal sit ua tions. The main task of business is to create an in de pend ent eco nomic space. En tre- preneurs will be able to become ad e quate social ac tors only if the civil so ci ety is built, where econ omy and pol i tics exist as auton o mous spheres of life and there is a mecha nism ensur ing repre sen ta tion of differ ent social inter ests at polit i cal level. In today’s Ukraine, new born entre pre neurs seem to feel solid ground and ac cu - mu late re sources, turn ing into a real so cial and po lit i cal force. En tre pre neur ship as a phe nom e non emerges in a spe cific po lit i cal, eco nomic and so cial en vi ron ment. On the other hand, social, po lit i cal and economic con junc ture though does not di - rectly influ ence vari ous social movements can stimu late or inhibit them. At present, the old state is practi cally de stroyed and a new one needs to be built. Val ues vac uum is ex ist ing in par al lel with power vac uum. Po lit i cal in sta bil - ity, un cer tain leg is la tion in her ited from the pre vi ous to tal i tar ian re gime, re lent- less con flict be tween the legis la tive and ex ec utive branches (along with weak and cor rupt ju di cial sys tem) are fac tors con trib ut ing to un fa vour able po lit i cal en vi ron ment for de vel op ment of na tional busi ness in Ukraine. Ukrai ni ans’ dis trust in govern ment is so strong that any govern ment policy or ini tia tive is met with increas ing scep ticism. The econ omy is still laden with state monop o lies. Corrup tion, mafia, unfair tax system and high infla tion rates make even the most success ful entre pre neurs feel pessi mis tic. They have to strug - gle to survive in stead of being fo cused on their own de vel opment. Therefore, Ukrai nian busi ness men are sig nif i cantly in volved in pol i tics. There is no point in trying to find com mon polit i cal in terests among Ukrai- nian en trepre neurs. On the contrary, they are being di vided into a num ber of groups hav ing dif fer ent po lit i cal ori en ta tions, dif fer ent de grees of in ter ac tion with po lit i cal or gani sa tions and in sti tu tions, dif fer ent forms and meth ods of po- lit i cal pres sure.

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The 2004 presi den tial election led to signif i cant changes in the config u ra tion of business groups, sta tus of differ ent oli gar chic groups in the so ci ety and de gree to which the property was secured by state. Thus, Ukraine’s eco nomic elite had to inten sify their polit i cal activ i ties. Almost all of the economic elite’s members took part in funding the parlia mentary elec tion cam paign in 2006, pro vid ing fi - nancial support to certain polit i cal parties. Because of propor tional repre sen ta - tion, big busi ness owners could not stand as can di dates in the elec tion di rectly. There were polit i cal par ties between cap i tal and vot ers. The oligarchs (pow erful business men) who had not taken care to cre ate their own parties before the cam - paign had to col lab orate with other parties in the parlia ment [Shul’ha, 2006: p. 29–30]. Studying polit i cal activ i ties that Ukrainian entre pre neurs are involved in, a researcher should pay special at tention to the two follow ing con flicts which can be resolved through polit i cal means. The first one is a con flict be tween the exec u- tive branch and en trepre neurs and it is related to the imple menta tion of eco - nomic re forms in public sec tor (privatisation, cor porati sa tion), as well as tough anti-in fla tionary and anti-cri sis measures. It is diffi cult to assess how seri ously and deeply this con flict af fected the in terests of entre pre neurs and predict what ac tions they will take in the future. The second con flict is re lated to grow ing con - tradic tions both within the stra tum of entre pre neurs and between the national and for eign cap i tal. Some en trepre neurs seek to equa lise while the oth ers want to choose ini tial con di tions that exist at the begin ning of real eco nomic re forms. Therefore, it is im portant to inves ti gate into causes of the conflict, try to assess how seri ous this conflict is and whether it is pos sible to reach con sensus within the corps of Ukrainian entre pre neurs by polit i cal methods. Fi nally, it is es sential to make short-term forecasts con cern ing po lit i cal ac - tiv i ties pre ferred by dif fer ent groups of en tre pre neurs and de velop rec om men da - tions aimed at rais ing the ef fi ciency of re verse impact of gov ernment author i ties on business. The feedback is nec essary for consol i da tion of social ba sis and search of po lit i cally rea son able com pro mise that will fa cil i tate prog ress in im ple ment ing eco nomic re forms and thus ensure the process of mod erni sation.

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