International Journal of Interreligious and Intercultural Studies (IJIIS) ISSN: 2654-2706, Volume 2, Number 2, October 2019

TRANSNATIONALISM AND TRANSNATIONAL IN WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON PAPUA

Ridwan Centre for Muslim States and Societies (CMSS,)The University of Western Australia (UWA), Australia

Abstract

Papua has experienced the threat of communal harmony between Christians and Muslims regarding the transnational Islam advent in Papua. The Tolikara Incident in 2015 and the latest one the banning of building the minaret of the Al-Aqsha Mosque in Sentani in 2018, to a certain degree, were part of transnational Islam influence in the region with a majority non-Muslim population. The presence of transnational Islam cannot be separated with the emergence of the public sphere in the country after the demise of the regime in 1998. This paper will explore transnational Islam in Papua by reviewing previous study and discourse on transnational . At the outset, the author will delve literature review on transnationalism and transnational Islam globally. Afterward, it will discuss the presence of transnational Islam, especially Salafi of Jafar Umar Thalib (JUT) in and Keerom that has created tension and hostilities within Muslims communities, as well as toward non-Muslim. No doubt, Salafi faction of JUT has tried to promulgate or disseminate radical Islamic teaching through dakwah (propagation) and other activities that threaten Papua Land of Peace (Papua Tanah Damai). As a result, their presence has gotten resistance from some Islamic mass organisations and non-Muslims.

Keywords: Transnationalism, Salafi, Papua Land of Peace, Religious Conflict

Introduction in the mosque. Unfortunately, these A mosque manager (takmir) at teachings of Islam have created tension Masjid Raya Baiturrahim Jayapura between fellow Muslims. Due to City told me that some Salafi-Wahabi the frequent discussions of bidh’ah preachers had taught Islamic teachings (innovations) of other Islamic groups,

42 Ridwan the takmir eventually “expel” them existed at least as long as imperialism, out from the mosque. This story above Piscatori has argued that it is only since is heart-shattering and hardly ever the 1970s that theorists of political publicly discussed. science and international relations have Furthermore, the above story taken an interest in transnationalism’s shows the phenomenon of the presence impact on nation-states: “The obvious of transnational Islamic movements common supposition was that nation- in Papua has triggered tensions with states were the decisive components of other Islamic organizations (and non- international affairs” (Piscatori cited in Muslims), especially in Jayapura City. Masud 2000, p. xiv). This needs to be studied seriously In the early 1970s, Keohane and because there is still little study about Nye (1971) drew attention to the it. Therefore, this paper will examine new processes that were resulting in the transnational Islamic movement multidirectional linkages across state in Papua by taking a case study of boundaries. In the early 1990s, the Salafi faction a la Jafar Umar Thalib. term transnationalism was introduced I will start this paper with a study of in anthropology, sociology and Transnational Islamic terms and its cultural studies to describe phenomena brief development in the world and associated with global transformation Indonesia. occurring around the world (Vertovec, 2003, 2009). Discussing Transnationalism and The increased interest in Transnational Islam transnationalism as a topic of study The term transnationalism is not has been tracked by Gustavo Cano new, but today it is more widely used (2005). Cano examined the Social in the field of social sciences. Randolp Science Abstract Database and found Bourne used the term for the first time that almost two-thirds of the articles in his (1916) article “Transnational that mentioned “transnationalism” or America,” to mean the articulation of “transnational” were published between his “visionary new form of pluralism” 1998 and 2003. The expansion of the (Nichols, 2009, p. 217), as well as study of transnationalism coincides with “cosmopolitanism” as part of the study the increased study of globalisation of transnationalism in international (Vertovec, 2009, p. 2). Stiglitz (2002, relations that focus on border-crossing p. 9) defines globalisation as “the actors or networks (Malet and closer integration of the countries Anderson, 2017, p. 4). and peoples of the world which has Even though, as Masud observes, been brought about by the enormous the phenomenon of transnationalism has reduction of costs of transportation

43 Transnationalism and Transnational Islam in Indonesia With Special Emphasis on Papua and communication, and the breaking that include persons and organisations down of artificial barriers to the flows that share common world views, of goods, services, capital, knowledge, purposes, interests, and practices which and (to a lesser extent) people across they communicate and act across borders”. In defining transnationalism, national borders and jurisdictions” Keohane and Nye (2000) emphasize (Juergensmeyer, 2005, p. 193). So, the terms “interdependence”, the definition is a cultural other than a “globalisation,” and “globalism”. political definition of transnationalism. Interdependence and globalization refer In this context, transnationalism is to “an increased sense of vulnerability applied to religion as well. to distant causes” (P.105). Meanwhile, However, studies on globalism means “a state of the world transnationalism have not devoted involving networks of interdependence much attention to religious phenomena at multicontinental distances” (p. 105). in political science and international In a similar vein, Hannerz (2000) relations. James (2017) noted that emphasised a distinction between transnational studies scholars have globalisation and transnationalism, generally ignored the role of religious pointing out that the latter refers to organisations. These studies mainly actors who are individuals, groups, focused on economic globalisation, movements, corporations, rather than political processes, migration issues, states as corporate actors as in the case terrorism, violence, organized of globalisation. However, when the crime and culture. Thus the study of processes of globalisation evolve and religious movements in the context deepen, “transnationalism” provides of transnationalism and consequently a good explanation of world politics on international relations has been carried out by an increasingly wide somewhat confused because religion range of non-governmental social forces and international relations are based organised across sovereign boundaries on two different assumptions. James (Mandaville 2010). In the same vein, (2017, p. 8-9) maintains, “First, Roudometoft (2005, p. 113) argues Western modernity is premised on that transnationalism involves “several the understanding that the world of layers ranging from the construction of government and international relations transnational spaces to the formation of is basically a secular one; second, transnational communities”. religion has always had a universalistic By recognising that tendency to operate beyond national transnationalism has a broad meaning, borders”. This is probably because I chose transnationalism in this paper the international relations literature referring to “communities of outlook dealing with transnational linkages and

44 Ridwan penetration mainly focuses on political Islam and are examples of and economic security (Haynes 2001, p. transnational religious communities, 146). both of which existed before the According to Yasmeen (2005, p. emergence of secular states. Christianity 45), study of International relations and Islam grew as world religions that has ignored the role of religion because developed throughout the world because since the end of World War II, the of colonisation, conquest and the dominant approach in the discipline, growth of worldwide trade. that is realist paradigm approach had In a similar vein, Werbner (2003, p. prioritised national interests between 897) showed that religious movements the state and political entities. In this have never been constrained by regard, religion and culture have no international boundaries, by arguing place in world politics. The rise of “Sufism and Christianity spread as neo-liberal ideas in the late 1970s, proselytizing religions, preceding as which recognised the relationship of well as following Muslim and European transnationalism between state and imperial expansion into and society did not change the situation, Africa”. According to Juergensmeyer where religion still has no a place in the (2003, pp. 7-8), “they are ‘religions of discipline of international politics. expansion’ despite their geographical Transnationalism and Religion and cultural roots being in one locality”. Scholarship on transnational This reemerged as politically important religion can be traced back to the late from the late 20 century, invigorated 1990s. Rudolf and Piscatori (1997, p. by globalization and the accompanying 1) observe: “Religious communities are communication revolution. among the oldest of the transnationals: Studies of transnationalism and Sufi orders, Catholic missionaries, and religions have developed in many Buddhist monks carried words and regions and are not limited to Islam praxis across vast spaces before those and Christianity, as explained below. places became nation states. Such Transnational religions in the United religious travellers were versions of States related to immigration have civil society playing their roles across been studied extensively by scholars the borders”. such as Ebaugh (2004) and Levitt To date, studies of transnational (2004). Ebaugh describes transnational religions have been undertaken religious ties between immigrants in by many scholars (Hayness 2001; six American religious congregations Werbner 2003; Levitt 2004; Sing 2013; in Boston. Levitt (2004, p. 2-3) also Mensah et al 2013; Juergensmeyer, discusses patterns of transnational 2003). Haynes (2001) argues that religious organisations.

45 Transnationalism and Transnational Islam in Indonesia With Special Emphasis on Papua

Some scholars (Sing 2013; Kitiarsa and cooperation between Muslim and 2010; Jaffrelot and Therwath 2007; Western governments. Roniger 2010) have studied religious However, some transnational transnationalism in Judaism, Hinduism, religious actors, such as al-Qaeda Buddhism and Sikhism. Roniger (2010) and Lashkar-e-Taiba have threatened examines the impact of transnationalism international order (Haynes 2012). The to Jewish identification and identities. impact of religious transnationalism He indicates that transnational factors on international order has attracted have maintained a presence in Latin attention in the post 9/11 era (Snyder, American Jewish life since the 2011; Ress, 2011; Sandler, 2004; establishment of the State of Israel, Yasmeen, 2005). There is growing the period of the Cold War and into acknowledgment that the study of the contemporary world. Jaffrelot and religion, including transnational Therwath (2007), using the example Islam, occupies an important place of the Hindu nationalist movement, in international relations. The Bali argue that there are the implications Bombing in 2002, the Madrid Bombing of political entrepreneurs in the in 2004 and more recent attacks in Paris, country of origin and the instrumental Barcelona, Belgium and London add dimension of long-distance nationalism. to this realization. This is reflected in Similarly, Kitiarsa (2010) maintains that the literature published on transnational Buddhism, like other world religions, Islam and its political implications. is a transnational religion, because “the Transnational Islam transnationalization of Thai Buddhism The term ‘transnational Islam’, since the late twentieth century has according to Bowen (2004, p. 880) emerged out of global cultural junctures, refers to three phenomena, namely, where missionary intent and monastic demographic movements, transnational networks have joined forces” (p.109). religious institutions, and the field of According to Haynes (2009) some Islamic reference and debate. In the transnational religious actors helped to first phenomenon, transnational Islam create international order. For instance, can be defined as ‘Muslims may move the Roman from the across national borders for social and 1980s, by using a liberation theology, economic reasons’ (p.880). The second encouraged authoritarian regimes to phenomenon of transnational Islam democratize in Latin America and parts has meant that ‘some Muslims belong of Central and Eastern Europe and to religious institutions that either Africa. Additionally, the Organization promote cross-national movements of the Islamic Conference (OIC) played as part of their religious practices or a role in helping to promote dialogue encompass and promote cross-national

46 Ridwan communication within their religious origin. In this regard, Schmidt (2005) hierarchy’ (p. 881). Then, the third used the term diasporic to describe phenomenon of transnational Islam religious activities that maintain is more focused on ‘the creation of network ties between migrants and their networks, conferences and increasingly homeland. formalized institutions for systematic Meanwhile, the third type, reflection among scholars’ (p.882). The according to Grillo (2004) transnational last two phenomena are related to each Islam as the umma, means transnational other due to the movement of religious Islam goes beyond a particular institutions involving the transfer of migration circuit or diaspora towards ideas. the imagined community of Muslims Slightly differently, Grillo (2004, at large, either within one society or p. 865) defines the three types of across many (p. 865). In this sense, transnational Islam: Transnational transnational Islam is an extension Islam=Islam within transnational of the umma, a term connected with circuits, Transnational Islam=Islam the imagined Islamic community within a bi-national/plurinational (Mandaville, 2001). The umma in some framework, and Transnational ways is an imagined community, but Islam=the umma. An example of the it also exists in reality. Allievi (2003) first type includes Muslim immigrants showed that some Turkish mosques to and France from West Africa in Germany, Switzerland and France (Mali, Mauritania and Senegal). They have assisted needy Turks in Italy to work in both countries and maintain purchase an apartment for their prayers, religious ties in West Africa. Then, the which then became the first Turkish second type refers to how “Those living mosque in Italy. Another example is and working abroad are also bound internal solidarity amongst Muslims in (legally, economically, politically) by the event of conflicts, as in Bosnia or the circumstances of two nation-states: Chechnya, not to mention Palestine. where they reside (`here’, France and In this sense, the umma works as Italy), and whence they came (`there’, a framework to maintain religious Senegal, Mali, Mauritania)” (p. 865). unity and accommodate the cultural It is not surprising that the diversities of believers. In addition, transnational Islamic practices are the umma is very much in tune with embedded in network relations between contemporary globalisation trends, as migrant setting and departed homeland. well as becoming an inherent source Muslim people and organisations send of political instability and unrest in the money back to fund mosques, schools modern Muslim world (Hassan, 2006). or charity work in their countries of With its expansion, globalisation

47 Transnationalism and Transnational Islam in Indonesia With Special Emphasis on Papua necessitates “deterritorialisation”. state and non-state actors; thereby According to Appadurai (1996), religious actors are able to spread their globalisation involves increasing messages beyond borders. In addition deterritorialisation of global flows. to that, Wajdi (2015) discusses one of In short, Appadurai’s notion of the lesser known Turkish transnational deterritorialisation is based on the piety renewal movements that have crossing of territorial boundaries, recently reached Indonesia: the and suggests that globalization is Süleymancıs, founded there in the form tied to geographical movement. In of an organisation called the United this case, globalisation had created Islamic Cultural Centre of Indonesia the deterritorialisation of Islam (Roy (UICCI). This provides an example of 2004, p. 18). Roy introduced the term how a Turkish Muslim transnational “Globalized Islam” as a new trend of organisation comes to project itself into Islam that is individualized, uprooted a new cultural environment (a non- from social and cultural contexts and context) and adapts to transnational. In other words, the main that new context. idea of this argument is that some Muslims in Europe have lost their Transnational Islam in Indonesia links to the original culture of the first Studies on Islam and politics in generation or no longer diasporic. Indonesia, including radical Islam, Recently, there is an intimate and developed rapidly after the demise of direct link between globalisation and the Suharto regime’s New Order in the rise and development of Islamic 1998 (van Bruinessen, 2002). Mubarak transnational networks. Münster (2008) shows that the New Order did (2013) mentions that the presence of not tolerate radical Islamic groups with transnational Islamic groups has some dreams of building an Islamic state. The kind of network structure; Hizbut- emergence of political liberalization in Tahrir, , Fethullah the Reform Era (1998 onward) paved Gülen movement, and others suggest the way for the emergence of radical that globalization facilitates the Islamic groups that had lain dormant formation of organized transnational during the New Order Era. groups. For instance, Mohamed Osman Basically, two types of radical (2010) mentions that Hizbut-Tahrir Islamic groups emerged during this Indonesia (HTI) has links with other post 1998 era. First were the open and Hizbut-Tahrir in other parts of Southeast visible organisations. These movements Asia, such as Malaysia and Singapore. are easily identified because their Similarly, Haynes (2009) maintains that founders, members and centres for globalization provides links between activities are transparent. In addition,

48 Ridwan they recruit membership openly. This transnational Islam emerged in the late category of open groups includes those 2000s. The term found its momentum that emerged from Indonesia and those when there was active promulgation that are affiliated with transnational of anti-democratic rhetoric by some Islam in the Middle East. Home grown Islamic groups, in particular HTI. groups, include Forum A book Ilusi Negara Islam (Illusion Komunikasi Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah of Islamic State) made the term (LJ-FKAWJ), Front Pembela Islam transnational Islam more popular (FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Wahid, 2009). The book discusses (MMI), and other small radical groups. how Wahabbi groups have operated Those with Middle Eastern ties include and infiltrated mosques, hospitals Jama’ah Ikhwanul Muslimin (JAMI) and schools belonging to NU and affiliated withIkhwanul Muslimin in Java, Indonesia. (Muslim Brotherhood) in , and In addition, it reveals that Tarbiyah Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) a branch Jemaah created the Islamist Prosperous of Hizbut-Tahrir, created by Syaikh Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Taqiyuddin Nahbani in Jerusalem in Sejahtera, PKS) in Indonesia and how 1953. The second category consists of it inherited the ideology of Ikhwanul closed or underground organisations. Muslimin from Egypt. Similarly, These groups are difficult to identify Rahmat (2005, 2017) examined the and they recruit membership secretly. influence of the ideology of PKS based Jamaah Islamiyah is included in this on Ikhwanul Muslimin, from college category. mosques to the legislature in Indonesia. Those movements above seem have Al-Makassary (2013) wrote on the no relationship with moderate Islamic infiltration of transnational Islam in groups, such as Muhammadiyah and mosques located in the government Nahdhatul (NU). According offices in and its surroundings. to Wahid (2009), the radical Islamic Some scholars have studied groups or transnational Islamic actors transnationalism that has a relationship have no connections to mainstream with Salafi-Wahhabigroups in Indonesia Islamic mass organisations in Indonesia (Hasan, 2005; Desker, 2002; Jahroni, such as Muhammadiyah and NU. The 2015; Iqbal, 2016 and Chaplin, 2018). radical groups, then, including their Generally, those studies tell us about political wings, have agendas that differ the emergence of Salafism in Indonesia, quite sharply from both mainstream its dynamics and its implications for Islamic mass organisations (Rahmat, religious intolerance, mainly in Java. 2017). Desker (2002) maintains that Jemaah In Indonesia the use of the term Islamiyah, Front Pembela Islam (FPI)

49 Transnationalism and Transnational Islam in Indonesia With Special Emphasis on Papua and Laskar Jihad exemplify the extreme movement of the Middle East, manifestation of the Salafi-Wahhabi in “Salafiyun” is a new term, and it is Indonesia all of which justify violence not easy to identify when it begins. against enemies of Islam. These Salafi is not amazhab (a school of groups identify themselves as Salafi Islamic thought) such as Mazhab and promulgate a utopian vision, the Hanafi; neither is it an organisation creation of a new caliphate or Islamic like the Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt. states through revolutionary violence. Instead, it is a spirit that has spread to The presence of these groups challenged the Islamic world since the period of moderate Islamic organisations, such as Tabi’in (…) and it was well-known Muhammadiyah and NU. as “Al-Salaf” or “Ahl Al-Atsar” that Following the typology of challenged “Ahl Al-Ra’yi” and “Al- Mandaville, as mentioned above, the Mutashawwif”. The salafi is called as rest of this section briefly describes “Ahlul Hadits”, or the followers of three transnational Islamic actors in Ahmad bin Hanbal, as opponents of Indonesia that belong to the category Ahlul kalam in aqidah (creed), and Ahl of ‘deterritorialised’ radical groups: ar’Rayi in fiqh(jurisprudence). khilafists andSalafı-jihadis , namely, Shaikh Al-Islam Ibn Taimiyya Jemaah Tarbiyah, Salafigroups and and his followers were the most active Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Here, proponents in spreading, maintaining the author only present the Salafi and creating opinions, as well as Wahhabi groups in the country. explaining salafi teachings in aqidah Salafi-Wahabbi Groups (creeds), fiqh (jurisprudence) or akhlaq One of the transnational Islamic (ethics). Imam Abdullah ibn al-Qayyim actors in Indonesia is Salafi Jemaah. It is was one of his best students. Both more appropriate to call them ‘jamaah- Shaikhs wrote a rich literature for Salafi jamaah Salafiyun’ (Salafigroups), in their period, as well as for the interest because Salafinever becomes one of Salafi followers after them. group. Historically, there is no official In the contemporary era, Salafi was institution that unites Salafiyun. In some reborn through the reformer of Salafiyah countries, there are some factions of in : Shaikh Muhammad Salafi, such as Jama’ah Anshar As- ibn Abdul Wahhab. This Salafi faction Sunnah Al-Muhammadiyah in Egypt has a distinct character that is to fight and Sudan or Jam’iyyah Ihya’ At-Turats all forms of syirk and khurafat. Ibn Al-Islami in Kuwait, or Laskar Jihad al-Wahhab wanted to free umma from (Jihad Brigade) of Jafar Umar Thalib in bid’ah where many people did not Indonesia (Hasan, 2007, 2018). follow Salafi path. In addition, Ibn In the contemporary Islamic al-Wahhab denied the interpretation of

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Qur’anic verses or hadits (the Prophet was doomed as a peripheral sayings) regarding the attributes of historical event that did not have a Allah. This was the main root of Salafi strong influence on Islamic theology. groups. In the early 20th century, Abdul Ibn al-Wahhab differed from Azis bin Saud revived salafiyah’s Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn Al-Qayyim in doctrine by joining Ihkwan, a militant understanding shari’ah. Ibn al-Wahhab rebellion, in the beginning of the inherited previous people’s tendency formation of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism to interpret shari’ah literally, by was a doctrine of limited influence denying discussion regarding various until the middle of 1970s, when a large goals, meanings and reasons behind increase in the price of oil, combined the shari’a laws. Hence, salafi groups with an aggressive approach by the denied it, Abu Fadhal said that Salafi Saudis to spread Wahhabism had and Wahhabi are the same movement. resulted a dramatic effect on the spread In the 18th Century, Muhammad ibn of Wahhabism in the Islamic world. Abdul Wahhab created Wahhabism in Wahhabism did not spread its Jazirah Arabia. He attempted to purify doctrines as an Islamic thought or Islam from syirk, bid’ah and khurafat, specific orientation in Islam, but called thereby he acknowledged had infiltrated itself “the Straight Path” of Islam. into the religion. He applied a strict Wahhabism consistently applied a literal approach that made texts as the literal approach to understanding Islam only source of valid authority and was and hence claimed an authenticity extremely hostile to intellectualism, that was believed when Islamic mysticism, and all other sects in Islam. identity was contested. In addition, At the end of 18th Century, the the advocates of Wahhabism rejected Saud family were incorporated into the being called followers of any Muslim Wahabbi movement and rebelled toward figures, including Ibn al-Wahhab. They Utsmaniyah domination in Jazirah emphasized that they only followed Arabia. This rebellion was filled with Salaf al-Shalih (the Prophet and his bloodshed because Wahhabi people companions) and hence, the Wahhabi slaughtered Muslims and non-Muslims group was able to use the category of without discrimination. At that time, the Salafism. popular ulemas were Hanafi bin Abidin As a movement in the early 20th and Malik Al-Sawi called Wahabbi as century, the term Salafi was used with modern khawarij, as well as condemned a liberal orientation by Al-Afghani, its fanaticism and intolerance. In Muhammad Abduh and Rasyid Ridha. 1818, Muhammad Ali lead an army to They used it to respond to modernity’s extinguish the rebellion and it seems demands when they called for a return

51 Transnationalism and Transnational Islam in Indonesia With Special Emphasis on Papua to al-Qur’an and Sunnah and applied in the Middle East consists of five it in interpretation of the texts. The groups (al-Qardhawi 2003). The main driver of this Salafiyah movement first group, ‘Salafiyyun Sururiyyun’ was Muhammad Rasyid Ridha (the referred to Muhammad Syurur Zen founder of Al-Manar magazine). He Al-Abidin. This group has a political was influenced by Muhammad Abduh orientation and inherited ideas of the who had an open attitude toward Brotherhood. This Salafi group resisted western ideas. This was the reason that the presence of the United States Rasyid Ridha was not acknowledged and its military intervention in Gulf by modern Salafiyun. In other words, War II. The second group, ‘Salafiyun they don’t follow Rasyid Ridha’s Al-Albaniyun’ followed Shaikh Al- reformation, although he was the true Muhaddist Nashiruddin Al-Al-Bani. leader of the enlightenment of Salafiyah. This group resisted mazhab fanaticism In the early 1970s, Wahhabi had and rejected taklid (blindly following transformed Salafism from a liberal without thinking rationally) even for modern theology into a literalist, lay people. However, at the same time, puritan and conservative theology. The this Salafi group blindly followed all rise in fuel prices in 1975 made Arab opinions of Al-Albani and proclaimed Saudi had access to a lot of money themselves as “the fifth Mazhab”. The that allowed them to promoted global third group, ‘Salafiyun Al-Jamiyun’ Wahhabism. Salafi-Wahhabi is the referred to Shaikh Rabi’ Al-Madkhali. first group calling for ‘deculturation’ This group often blamed and attacked and ‘derationalisation’ in Islamic all ulemas and dais with different ideas ideas and movements. They called to them. The fourth group, ‘Salafiyun of for Islamic purification through a Shaikh Abdurrahman Abdul Khalik’ in return to al-Qur’an and Sunnah. They Kuwait and the Fifth group ‘Salafiyun implemented an agenda to tackle local of Saikh bin Baz and Shaikh Utsaimin’ culture that had been accommodated in Arab Saudi have not yet established to by Muslims, and to the spiritualist themselves as an organised Jemaah. tradition of mysticism. At the same Salafi-Wahhabi movement was time, Salafi prohibited using rationalism promoted in Indonesia in the second and preferred literal interpretation of half of the 1980s (Hasan 2007; Rahmat al-Qur’an and Sunnah (prophet deeds). 2017). In the 1980s, this movement In addition, they even assumed that the faced an obstacle because the Suharto classic ulemas’s books had been written regime opposed Islamic groups that by humans and therefore fouled the were assumed to have had a political pristine Islam that had come from Allah. agenda, such as establishment of an The contemporary Salafiyah Islamic state, which was different

52 Ridwan to the regime. In the 1990s, Suharto Thalib and Yusuf Usman Baisa. These implemented political accommodation figures have worked on spreading salafi by approaching Islamic groups, ideology through Islamic boarding including Salafi groups that had an schools, mosques and book publications opportunity to disseminate their ideas. (Rahmat 2017). The Reformation era (1998 onward) In its development, Salafi Jemaah paved the way for Salafi groups to in Indonesia was divided into two spread their influences in Java and in camps: one group referred to Kuwaiti many cities of Indonesia, including organisations, such as Abdul Hakim, Papua. During this era, Salafi-Wahhabi Yusuf Baisa and Abu Nida, and activists in Indonesia started building the other group referred to Saudi Islamic boarding schools based on organisations, namely, Ja’far Umar Salafi ideology and used books written Thalib. The divisions occurred because by Salafi figures such as Muhammad Thalib protested the statement by Yusuf Nashiruddin Al-Bani and Bin Baz. Baisa that in order to spread Salafi a The in Indonesia system of organization similar to that of has attempted to purify Muslim’s the Ikhwanul Muslimin was required. aqidah. The movement has undertaken This should follow the wisdom of campaigns to liberate Muslims from Jemaah Tablighi and make Salafiyah as “viruses” that have contaminated aqidah underpinnings. Another reason pristine Islam, such as tasawwuf, was that Yusuf Baisa taught ideas of the tawasul, rationalism, Shi’ite teaching figures of Salafi Surruriyun that were and many religious practices that close with the Ikhwanul Muslimin. were assumed as bid’ah. Hence, the Thalib assessed this as a deviation from movement problematized and revived pristine Salafi. The peak of hostility the issues that were brought to the fore occurred when Thalib established by puritans groups in the early 20th Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah walJamaah. Century. In the camp of Yusuf Baisa, Abu Nida Salafi used three institutions to and Abdul Hakim assessed the Thalib promote and spread its ideas: Islamic act as a deviation, because it violated boarding schools, mosques and two principles of Salafi Da’wa; JUT had universities. In order to do this, they played political games and had been received donations from Saudi Arabia trapped for hizbiyyah because it created and Kuwait. Some notable figures of a mass organisation. In addition, Laskar the salafi movement in Indonesia are Jihad had been involved in communal Abdul Hakim Abdat, Yasid Jawaz, conflict in the Moluccas and Poso, Abu Nida, Farid Okbah, Ainul Harist, Indonesia (Hasan 2009, Van Klinken Abu Bakar M. Altway, Ja’far Umar 2007).

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Recently, Salafi transformed itself (GIDI) group that attacked the Tolikara to move beyond the categorization of Muslims. In addition, JUT claimed the Salafi made by Qardhawi. Despite the Government of Indonesia as a kafir general tendency of Salafi to be a non- (infidel) government (Al-Makassary, political group, they were assumed to 2017). play political games as bid’ah, which Two months after the Incident, have been supported by Saudi Arabia. JUT ordered two of his followers going There are Salafi that have radical to Papua to look for land to set up ideology, namely, Salafi Jihadis and (Islamic Boarding School). Salafi Takfiri, both of which have been In October 2015, both arrived and accused of conducting terrorist acts found a rented house in Koya Barat, in the world, including in Indonesia Muaratami District, Jayapura. The (Rahmat 2017). district is located near to the border of Overall, the Salafi Da’wa Papua New Guinea. Koya Barat can movement has spread throughout be reached by bus or car about an hour Indonesia, including to Papua because from Jayapura. For years, Muslims of the aggressive da’i. In addition, the transmigrants from Jawa have lived support of a transnational network with with indegenous Papuan Christians in facility and funding will make the Salafi communal harmony. movement stronger and will challenge Muslim community accepted mainstream moderate Muslims, JUT’s member after staying two months especially NU and Muhammadiyah as in Koya Barat, Muaratami District representative organisations for Islam in in Jayaputra city. Fauzi, one of the Indonesia. members, had given sermons frequently in mosque Al Muhajirin including eight Salafi Faction Jafar Umar Thalib mushallas. As a result, many Muslims in Papua were attracted with Fauzi’s Islamic On 15 July 2015, the Tolikara teaching. After settling in Koya, Fauzi incident occurred and drew attention contacted JUT and in November 2015, globally and nationally. Some Muslims JUT and his 40 (disciples) came in Indonesia, without knowing the secretly. case comprehensively, were angry What were the motives of JUT and condemned the event. On 20 July and his disciples to come to Papua? 2015, Jafar Umar Thalib (JUT) issued In the meeting with a team created by the declaration of Jihad Fisabilillah to the Mayor of Jayapura, JUT said his Papua. The content of the declaration presence was to establish a pesantren was firm that is the proclaiming war because morals of the Indonesian nation against the Gereja Injili Di Indonesia were broken and it will be healed from

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Papua. JUT did not mention the Tolikara and challenged traditional religious incident as a main reason that brought corpus. The understanding of the him to come to Papua. In addition, JUT Wahhabis became the foundations of stated “The Mollucas conflict was his the to learn any subject in Islam, past and now he wanted to preach to including fiqh, hadits and da’wa. Indonesian people through education JUT and his disciples not only from Papua”. teach Islamic ideas based on Wahhabi However, the Tolikara Incident understanding, but also distribute was an obvious reason for JUT to come books entitled Jihad Fisabilillah and to Papua. We noted, in responding The Black Notes of Shia Religion to the Tolikara incident, JUT echoed and videos which were related to the the declaration of Jihad Fisabillillah Wahhabi’s teaching to Muslims living to Papua, as mentioned above. In this in Koya Barat and its surroundings. sense, Abu Yahya, a member of JUT, According to my informant, JUT had justified this reason by saying that built up his prestige through teaching JUT was “seeing” Papua as a place for and distributing his books. Hence, some jihad because of the Tolikara incident. Muslims in Koya perceived him as a Fortunately, the Indonesian Government hero for Muslims in Papua. handled the incident quickly. In this On 11 June 2017, HTI held the regard, Abu Yahya said “If the Tolikara Nuzulul Quran at mosque Al Muhajirin, incident was not resolved, JUT had Koya Barat, JUT and Hizbut Tharir given command to 50 members for Indonesia (HTI) Chapter Papua were doing Jihad to burn entire churches in collaborated. On that occasion, JUT Papua”. delivered a speech which was not only JUT started preaching Islamic a normative one but also a controversial ideas based on Wahhabi in Keerom one. For example, JUT said “Muslims and its surrounding. Usually, he gives are forbidden to make contact like sermons after Subuh prayers in some riding a motorcycle or chatting in mosques, espeacially in Masjid Al- tandem with adult women who are not Muhajirin Koya Barat. Principally, muhrim, because it is illegal”. Some JUT’s teachings are based on Wahhabi of the teachings conveyed in the open teachings. In the same vein, Hasan discussion will invite tension not only (2009) stated that the education system among the Muslims, but also the non- in JUT’s pesantren in and Muslims who are the majority in Papua. some pesantren affiliated with JUT is Principally, the main idea of JUT’s conservative, thereby the educators arrival is to set up a pesantren. In doing deny teachings and activities that have so, since staying in Koya Barat, JUT been contaminated by Western culture and his disciples were busy looking

55 Transnationalism and Transnational Islam in Indonesia With Special Emphasis on Papua for a suitable place to realize the idea experience in the war in the Keerom regency that shares a against the Soviet Union. Starving for border with Papua New Guinea. This logistical support was the cause of the region has many Muslim transmigrants defeat of the Soviet army. So, JUT will especially from Java that work for establish pesantren with the concept trading, farming and fishing. Now, of agriculture, plantation and animal the percentage between Muslims and husbandry to meet their own logistical Papuan Christians is 40:60. But my needs. So, the incident that afflicted the informant said “In reality Muslims are Soviet troops in Afghanistan did not more in number than Christians”. happen”. In this regard, it seems that In the beginning, JUT planned JUT is preparing for a conflict between to buy land in Arso 1 but he faced Muslims and Christians in the future. obstacles from the land owner and the To manage the building of the leader of the ethnic tribe (ondoafi). pesantren, JUT chose his son, Amir Finally, JUT bought 26.5 hectares in Thalib. Four santris and two craftsmen Arso 14. He will be dividing the land have assisted Amir. The name of the for building of the Pesantren on five pesantren is Ihya Us Sunnah, the hectares; for agriculture, four hectares; same name of JUT’s pesantren in for plantations, ten hectares; and for Yogyakarta. However, in establishing farms, seven and a half hectares. In his first pesantren in Keerom, JUT has addition, JUT bought 200 hectares that gotten much resistance from Muslim will be used for sugar cane farming. communities. In this regard, my informant said JUT Participant’s reactions in bought land which was costly. He Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesia added, “We do not know about the Ulama Council) meeting in Jayapura sources of the funds. We heard JUT with JUT in 2015 were varied. A young got it from the political elite in Jakarta. Muslim while trembling delivered his But this needs more clarification”. In strong protest by saying JUT’s arrival addition, the purpose of buying the land will bring worry within religious also was misused by JUT. A senior staff communities in Papua. Fadhal Alhamid, at the local government in Jayapura, the name of the young Muslim, added Evert Meraudje, said “JUT bought “An attempt to maintain peace in land for farming and he changed it for Papua will be harder if JUT operates building the pesantren”. in Papua”. Another young Muslim told JUT planned, after establishing his story about his experience living pesantren in Arso 14, to establish 20 in his society at the village of Walesi, in Papua. According to my Wamena. He said, some Christians informant, “This is based on JUT’s and Muslims live in the same house

56 Ridwan together. Some participants argued that tended to claim they were more that they do not want JUT’s arrival innocent and more truthful than others to exacerbate good communications like JUT’s teachings. amongst interfaith and family relationship. In short, all participants Conclusion agreed to reject JUT’s planning to set up In the midst of the failure of the his pesantren (Al-Makassary, 2017). nation-state, with which transnational Participant’s rejection of JUT’s Islam are often seen as “enemies of arrival were based on some reasons: the state”, due to some of their actors First, JUT’s track record was filled with promote Islamic caliphate or Islamic violence and intolerant acts in Ambon state. Transnational Islamic actors and Yogyakarta. Muslims in Papua do are very diverse, from those who not want religious conflict to happen in pursue jihadist paths such as al-Qaida, Papua such as Moluccas conflict that Salafi jihadists to piety, khilfatis like involved JUT and his Laskar Jihad. Hizbut Tharir and apolitism like Second, communal harmony amongst Jemaah Tabligh. In Indonesia the term Muslim groups in Papua is good transnational Islam emerged in the late without an attempt to call them infidels 1970s and thereafter many studies have or blame other groups. Third, JUT’s been published. attitude in his declaration “War against In Papua, the study of transnational pluralism” is denying of Sunatullah Islam is still limited. Based on the above (Allah’s will) and it will create tension discussion, the presence of JUT and his with non-Muslims in Papua. disciples in Papua (Jayapura, Sentani In the same vein, the chairman of and Keerom), had sparked tension MUI Papua, Uztad Al-Payage, said, within Muslims and non-Muslims. In “We have seen that the way JUT is particular, a plan to establish pesantren doing his da’wa is not relevant with as a site of preaching Wahhabi Salafi the situation in Papua. Here people are triggered strong protest from MUI, diverse and do not blame each other. In Papuan Christians and Islamic mass one family there can be many religions. organisations. In reality, JUT and his Hence JUT’s method in da’wa is not disciples are enduring in Keerom and relevant”. teaching their Islamic ideas. Overall, considering all suggestions The current situation shows that from participants in the meeting, MUI JUT got many supporters from some Papua released the recommendation Muslims and the local government that JUT needs to leave Papua. Muslim elite and the Chief of Police in groups in Papua can maintain their Keerom. My informant told me that religion without intervention of groups JUT started working again on building

57 Transnationalism and Transnational Islam in Indonesia With Special Emphasis on Papua the construction of his pesantren. He harmony. said “A lot of materials and heavy vehicles are in the construction site”. Acknowledgement: At the same time, the third letter by This paper is part of my thesis the former Major of Keerom was not “Transnational Islam in Indonesia: applied to JUT. Hence, JUT’s presence A Study of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and his endurance to preach his radical in Papua” funded by The Indonesia Islamic ideas as perceived, will destroy Endowment Fund for Education the vision of “Papua Land of Peace”, (LPDP), an agency under the control of thereby religious leaders and society in the Indonesian government. [] Papua agreed to maintain communal

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