Heilongjian

Jilin

Liaoning jing N NORTH N KOREA

Tianjin SOUTH KOREA Yellow brief 10 handong Sea

Jiangsu

East China Sea Peaceful Fallout: Anhui N Shanghai The Conversion NN N Zhejiang of China's i Military–Nuclear Fujian Complex to Nong TAIWAN Civilian Use

november 97 brief 10

Contents

Zusammenfassung About the Author German summary 4

Summary 5 Yitzhak Shichor (Ph.D., London School of Economics and Political Preface 6 Science) is Michael William Lipson Associate Professor of Chinese Studies and Political Science, the Hebrew University of Introduction 7 Jerusalem, Israel. He has written extensively on China’s Middle China’s Nuclear Complex Eastern policy and defense reform under Mao: Military and is currently engaged in a Predominance 9 book-length study of China’s military-to-civilian conversion. Reliance on the Soviet Union 9

Self-reliance 13

The military origins of nuclearpower 15

China’s Nuclear Complex after Mao: Military–Civilian Combination 18

Origins and organization 18

Some conversion achievements 20

Generating civilian nuclear power 22

Some international aspects of conversion 27

China’s Nuclear Conversion: Military Implications 30

Conclusion 34

References 35

List of Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 40 Cover Illustration: Bibliography 41 China's nuclear complex Annex: China’s Converted Military–Nuclear Enterprises: Selected List 44

2 B·I·C·C brief 10 Peaceful Fallout: The Conversion of China's Military– Nuclear Complex to Civilian Use by Yitzhak Shichor

november B·I·C·C97 3 brief 10

Zusammen-

Inland als auch im Ausland zu fassung vermarkten, wurden neue Holding- gesellschaften gegründet. Bis Mitte German Summary der 90er Jahre erreichte der Anteil der zivilen Produktion von über 300 Konversionsprojekten im chinesi- schen nuklear-militärischen Kom- Seit den frühen 90er Jahren ist die technik (wie die Herstellung von plex nach offiziellen Angaben 80% Volksrepublik China mehr oder gering angereichertem Uran und die der gesamten Produktion. Gleichzei- minder freiwillig einer Reihe von Entwicklung eines Reaktors für tig wurde die Produktion von internationalen Konventionen zur Atom-U-Boote) auch zur Stromer- hochangereichertem Waffen-Uran nuklearen Abrüstung beigetreten. zeugung zu nutzen. und -Plutonium drastisch reduziert Abgesehen von der Internationalen oder sogar gestoppt. Chinas wichtig- Atomenergiebehörde, bei der China Trotz anhaltender Ängste vor einer stes Entwicklungszentrum für 1984 Mitglied wurde, trat es dem äußeren Bedrohung, auch nach Maos Kernwaffen in Qinghai wurde außer Nichtverbreitungsvertrag (1991) Tod 1976, mußte in China aufgrund betrieb genommen und den zustän- sowie dessen Erweiterung, dem der Priorität, die im Land dem digen zivilen Behörden übergeben. Trägertechnologiekontroll-Regime wirtschaftlichen Wachstum und der (1992) und schließlich dem Vertrag Modernisierung eingeräumt wurde Das wichtigste Ergebnis bei der über das umfassende Verbot von u.a. die Konversion der zu wenig Konversion nuklearer Kapazitäten Nuklearversuchen (1996) bei. Einer genutzten militärisch industriellen ist jedoch der Bau und das Betreiben der Gründe für die politische und technischen Kapazitäten zu von Atomkraftwerken, die haupt- Führung, diese internationalen zivilen Zwecken vorangetrieben sächlich im Süden, Osten und Verpflichtungen zu akzeptieren, werden. Der Nuklearsektor wurde Nordosten Chinas anzutreffen sind - waren die schon seit den frühen 80er hiervon nicht ausgeschlossen. Wenn Gegenden, in denen die industrielle Jahren unternommenen Anstren- man jedoch die Konversion des Produktion gelegentlich aufgrund gungen bei der Konversion ihres chinesischen militärisch-nuklearen von Energieknappheit durch eigenen nuklear-militärischen Komplexes mit der anderer Stromausfälle unterbrochen wird. Bereiches zu zivilen Zwecken. Rüstungsunternehmen vergleicht, Zusätzlich zu den in großem erkennt man, daß dieser Prozeß um Maßstab angelegten Kernkraftwer- Während der gesamten Mao-Ära, ein vielfaches langsamer verläuft. ken werden kleinere Kernenergie- von den frühen 50er Jahren bis Ende Dies ist auf seine besonderen Cha- projekte, wie Kernfusions- 1970, wurde der kerntechnische rakteristika zurückzuführen. Der Kernspaltungs-, schnelle Neutronen- Bereich in China auf- und ausgebaut, Nuklearsektor ist ein besonders und gasgekühlte Reaktoren entwik- hauptsächlich für militärische isoliertes und hochempfindliches kelt. Obwohl ein Teil der zivilen Zwecke. Dabei verzehrte er eine System mit nur geringer Erfahrung Technologie und Ausrüstung beträchtliche Menge an zivilen im Bereich der zivilen Produktion importiert wurde, stammt viel aus Ressourcen einschließlich finanziel- und keinerlei Bewußtsein von chinesischer Produktion und wird ler Mittel, Arbeitskräfte und Marktmechanismen. Er wurde ohne sogar in andere Länder, wie z. B. Ausrüstung. Die friedliche Nutzung Berücksichtigung der Kosten, unter Pakistan, Iran, Algerien und Syrien, von Atomenergie spielte jedoch nur absoluter Geheimhaltung und exportiert. eine untergeordnete Rolle. Bis zum strengsten Sicherheitsvorkehrungen Ende der Mao-Ära hatte der zivile und unter Verwendung hochspezia- Die Konversion des militärisch- Anteil am Output des nuklear- lisierter und gefährlicher Technolo- nuklearen Bereiches in China zu militärischen Komplex, der aus gien entwickelt. Aufgrund der ziviler Nutzung scheint keineswegs Angst vor Angriffen über weit Isolation war der Sektor allerdings unumkehrbar zu sein und sie entfernte und unzugängliche Teile nicht so fortgeschritten, wie von der bedeutet auch keine Zurückstufung des Landes verstreut war, nicht Regierung später behauptet wurde. der militärischen-nuklearen Pro- mehr als 5% erreicht. Während All diese Faktoren behinderten eine gramme. Beijing führt weiterhin beträchtliche Erfolge in der Ent- reibungslose Durchführung der Nuklearwaffentests zur Entwick- wicklung und dem Bau von Kern- Konversion zu zivilen Zwecken. lung neuer Kernwaffen und waffen und Kernwaffenträger- Kernwaffenträgersystemen durch systemen erzielt wurden, begann Nach und nach begann der chinesi- und läßt verlauten, daß der Besitz man, Elemente der Kernwaffen- sche militärisch-nukleare Bereich solcher Waffen immer noch notwen- auch mit der Produktion ziviler dig sei, um sowohl die Sicherheit des Güter und der Nutzung seiner Landes als auch seine Souveränität Technologien für zivile Zwecke. zu gewährleisten. Um diese Produkte sowohl im

4 B·I·C·C summary

Summary

Yet, the most important achievement of China’s nuclear Since the early 1990s, the People’s Although external threat perception conversion is the construction and Republic of China has become was still high following Mao’s death operation of nuclear power plants, committed, willingly or otherwise, in late 1976, the priority accorded to primarily in the south, east and to a number of international economic growth and northeast where serious electricity conventions aimed at nuclear modernization called, among other shortages occasionally disrupt disarmament. In addition to the things, for the conversion of China’s industrial production. In addition International Atomic Energy underutilized military industrial to these large-scale nuclear power Agency, which China joined in and technological capacity, nuclear plants, smaller nuclear energy 1984, these include the Non-Prolife- included, to civilian use. Yet, projects such as fusion-fission, fast ration Treaty (1991) and its compared to other defense– neutron, and gas-cooled reactors are extension, the Missile Technology industrial enterprises, the being developed. While part of the Control Regime (1992) and finally, conversion of China’s military– civilian technology and equipment the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty nuclear complex has been has been imported, part is not only (1996). One of the reasons why considerably slower due to its of Chinese origin but has also been Beijing accepted these international unique characteristics: a particularly exported to other countries, such as commitments was that since the segregated and highly sensitive Pakistan, Iran, Algeria and Syria. early 1980s it had already taken system with marginal experience in steps towards the conversion of its civilian production and no However, the conversion of China’s own nuclear military complex to awareness of market mechanisms, military–nuclear complex to civilian civilian use. having been developed with little use is not by any means irreversible, regard to cost, in total secrecy and nor does it imply a downgrading of Throughout the Mao era, from the under tight security using very military–nuclear programs. As a early 1950s to the late 1970s, China’s specialized and dangerous matter of fact, while nuclear nuclear complex was launched, built technologies which, because of its conversion was going on, Beijing and expanded primarily for military isolation, had not been as advanced continued to undertake nuclear ends while absorbing considerable as Beijing later claimed. All these weapons tests, to develop new kinds civilian resources including funds, factors have defied easy conversion of nuclear weapons and delivery manpower and equipment. Though to civilian use. systems, and to claim that the on the agenda, the peaceful use of possession of such weapons was still atomic energy was marginal and by Gradually, however, China’s essential to safeguard not only its the end of this period the civilian military–nuclear complex began security but also its sovereignty. output of China’s military–nuclear producing civilian goods and using complex, deliberately spread over its technologies for civilian remote and inaccessible inland purposes. To market both, at home locations for fear of external and abroad, new trading and aggression, had reached no more industrial corporations have been than 5 percent. Still, while achieving created. By the mid-1990s, the share remarkable results in the of civilian production output value development and testing of nuclear by over 300 conversion projects weapons and delivery systems, undertaken by China’s military– Beijing had begun to consider using nuclear complex had reportedly its nuclear military technology (e.g. reached 80 percent of total output the production of low-enriched value. At the same time, the uranium and the development of a production of highly enriched nuclear submarine reactor) for weapon-grade uranium and generating electricity. plutonium had been drastically reduced or even stopped altogether, and China’s main nuclear weapon development center in Qinghai had been permanently decommissioned and handed over to civilian authorities.

B·I·C·C 5 brief 10

Preface

Foundation’s Bellagio Study and Conference Center which offered One of the ironies of the post-Cold percent of China’s total defense– me residence fellowship (May–June War era is that, while China is being industrial output, covering over 1996); to the Deutscher Akademi- increasingly considered a ‘threat,’ 15,000 products. Ostensibly scher Austauschdienst (DAAD, the not only in regional terms but also outstanding compared not only to German Academic Exchange in global ones, much of its defense the conversion agonies and failures Service) for providing me with a system has allegedly been converted of most if not all other countries, grant to spend two months at the to civilian use. Launched in the late but also to the reform agonies and Bonn International Center for 1970s, this policy had been failures of China’s own state-owned Conversion (BICC, June–August primarily motivated by domestic, industrial sector, China’s 1996); to Dr. Herbert Wulf, BICC mostly economic but also social, comprehensive defense conversion Director, for inviting me, and to the considerations, as well as by the deserves a careful study. BICC staff and especially to Dr. changing international situation Jörn Brömmelhörster who patiently which has led to a reduced threat The current study deals with the and consistently assisted not only perception within China. While conversion of China’s military– with the logistics but also with his covering cuts (in the 1980s) and a nuclear complex which, though knowledge of conversion in general, moderate real increase (in the 1990s) providing an extreme example of the and Chinese conversion in of military appropriations, a problems mentioned above, has particular. The final revisions of this demobilization of over one million allegedly managed to undergo paper were done while I was a troops (or one quarter), a regular successful conversion. Following the visiting fellow at the Sejong economic employment of part of the introduction which suggests some Institute, Korea, in April–June 1997. armed forces, and the transfer of links between the domestic and military facilities and services to international incentives for China’s I would also like to thank the civilian use, most of Beijing’s defense military–nuclear conversion, the library staff of the Hebrew conversion policy has obviously paper is divided into two main University’s Harry S. Truman centered on its military–industrial parts. Underlining the Research Institute for the complex. predominance of military Advancement of Peace, and considerations in China’s nuclear especially Mr Riccardo Schwed, The enormous problems which had policy under Mao, the first part curator of the East Asia collection; affected this complex under China’s provides the dimensions of China’s to the American Cultural Center in socialist command economy even military–nuclear infrastructure, Jerusalem which for a few years more than other state-owned organization, and development, willingly and generously provided enterprises have become more acute achieved with Soviet support and me with essential sources on China; during the post-Mao transition to then independently. It also traces to the Frieberg Fund and the market economy. These problems the origins of the post-Mao Hebrew University’s Faculty of include a huge production conversion. This conversion is the Humanity Research Fund for their overcapacity and overemployment; subject of the second part which financial support. Many out-of-print outdated technology, equipment deals with the origins and Chinese books were retrieved with and management methods; isolation, organizational adaptation to civilian the help of the Israeli Embassy staff departmentalization and nuclear production and its in Beijing, and especially through insensitivity to the market; and achievements, emphasizing its the efforts of Ms Huang Ling of the economically irrational principal accomplishment—nuclear Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. geographical distribution. power stations. A third part then The University of Hong Kong’s Nonetheless, shortly after its shows that, extensive as it may be, Universities Service Centre proved defense–industrial conversion had China’s nuclear conversion has only to be a goldmine of books and been launched, Beijing began to marginally affected its military– articles, and I am grateful to Mr Ka claim incredible success. By the mid- nuclear potential. Po Ng for his relentless assistance. 1990s civilian production had Mr Zhang Hongbo, Ms Wen Zhang, reportedly accounted for about 80 Research and writing of this study, Mr Huang Qinghong of the Hebrew in itself part of a larger project on University, and Professor Ling Jie, China’s military-to-civilian who was a visiting fellow at the conversion, have been done with the Truman Institute, made valuable support and encouragement of contributions to this study by several organizations and people. I summarizing many Chinese sources. am grateful to the Rockefeller

6 B·I·C·C introduction

Introduction

became the 113th state to be admitted to the International On 24 September 1996, China’s world’s largest laboratory for the Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister controlled use of nuclear fusion and Yet it was only in the early 1990s Qian Qichen became one of the first in conducting research into the that Beijing has practically been international leaders to sign the peaceful use of nuclear energy.2 It forced, and tempted, by the United Comprehensive [Nuclear] Test Ban was perhaps this agreement between States and Western countries to Treaty (CTBT). This act concluded the Texas Thermonuclear Fusion abide by international arms control months, if not years, of speculation Research Center and the Chinese agreements which included the Non- as to China’s nuclear disarmament Academy of Sciences which finally Proliferation Treaty (NPT, in intentions and pre-conditions for paved the way for China’s December 1991) and its extension, joining the CTBT. Beijing’s explicit acceptance of the CTBT. Indeed, in and the Missile Technology Control preconditions included a firm early June 1996, Beijing dropped all Regime (MTCR, in February 1992). international commitment to total its former preconditions and While China’s endorsement of these nuclear disarmament; the adoption objections to the CTBT, still agreements has been rather vague of a ‘no first use’ policy, which announcing its intention, and right, and its implementation of their China had proclaimed as early as to conduct one last nuclear test clauses somewhat controversial,4 October 1964, by all nuclear before September. As it turned out, there is no doubt that as the twenty- powers; better inspection of nuclear this test—China’s 45th—was first century approaches China’s sites to avoid deception; and an conducted on 29 July, shortly before international military–nuclear insistence that the treaty would the CTBT discussions were to be options have become greatly allow so-called “peaceful nuclear resumed in Geneva. Within hours, limited. explosions” which could be used not the Chinese Government issued an only for pure theoretical scientific official statement pledging an Yet, the fact that most of these research but also for applied immediate moratorium on nuclear limits have been exogenously research and a variety of practical tests.3 Less than two months later imposed on China does not civilian purposes such as predicting Beijing signed the treaty. necessarily imply that they do not earth tremors, dumping garbage, conform to its revised foreign, and mining and, last but not least, the This was another step in China’s domestic, policies. On the contrary ultimate destruction of nuclear slow and apparently painful march they do, which is probably why weapons.1 towards downgrading its military– Beijing finally agreed to accept these nuclear posture. Except for their limits in the first place. To be sure, Implicitly, Beijing has been 1964 unilateral commitment not to long before they were ‘manipulated’ concerned that, unlike the more be the first to use nuclear weapons, into joining these arms control advanced nations, which would still the Chinese for a long time declined agreements, the Chinese had already be able to simulate nuclear to join any international nuclear taken voluntary measures and made explosions under laboratory convention which had been preparations in this direction by conditions even after signing the negotiated and signed without their gradually converting part of their CTBT, China’s lower science and participation. One of the late- military–nuclear complex to civilian technology standards would lead to comers, China in January 1984 use. By the mid-1990s, after China nuclear stagnation and, therefore, to had signed the CTBT (and the other backwardness. To overcome above-mentioned conventions), both Beijing’s concerns and ‘lubricate’ its processes converged reaching their sliding towards the CTBT, climax and interdependence. Washington by late May 1996 had reportedly decided to implement an earlier agreement and help China in building what was to become the

B·I·C·C 7 brief 10

Quite a number of studies have dealt This study proposes to provide the with the international aspects of link between the international and China’s nuclear arms control and the domestic aspects of China’s disarmament policy.5 Almost none disarmament policy. The first part has exclusively dealt with less provides an overview of China’s known domestic aspects of China’s (overwhelmingly military) nuclear nuclear disarmament, not merely as establishment, infrastructure and an economic necessity but also as an programs to the end of the 1970s, essential component of its nuclear underscoring those elements which arms control policy. By ignoring had provided the basis for China’s this link we miss one of the crucial later civilian nuclear program. The explanations for Beijing’s ultimate second and principal part agreement to sign the CTBT and concentrates on China’s nuclear join other relevant agreements. conversion, its motivations, policy- “Nuclear disarmament requires, making and implementation. among other things, detailed Finally, the third part explores some planning for the economic implications of China’s conversion conversion of nuclear weapons policies on its nuclear military production facilities to purely power and programs. civilian uses.”6 In this respect, and despite their advertised reluctance to participate in these conventions, the Chinese may have been better prepared than others. Their nuclear conversion policy implying, among other things, an essential reduction of nuclear weapons and weapon- grade fissile material production, had not only expedited and legitimized China’s participation in various international nuclear disarmament conventions but, moreover, practically compelled it to do so. Or, to put it differently, according first priority to economic development and modernization, Beijing would have found it difficult, if not impossible, to proceed with simultaneous military and civilian nuclear programs without joining these conventions.

8 B·I·C·C military predominance

China’s Nuclear

Following this visit, Qian prepared Complex under a proposal for the state on the development of nuclear energy. On the basis of his proposal, in the Mao: Military autumn of 1954, just before the beginning of the Sino-Soviet governmental talks, Peng Dehuai Predominance and Li Fuchun proposed building a nuclear reactor and a cyclotron with the assistance of the Soviet Union. In line with this proposal, the China’s leadership, and Mao Zedong (PRC), no significant applied Ministry of Geology established the himself, had undoubtedly been research had been done due to the Second Office of Reconnaissance aware of the peaceful uses of nuclear almost total lack of personnel and Survey Commission in December energy and technology as early as equipment. This situation began to whose responsibility was to prepare the 1950s and had, as a matter of improve as of April 1950, when the for uranium exploration after fact, taken initial research and newly established Chinese Academy specimens of uranium ore had been development (R&D) steps in this of Sciences organized the Research investigated and analyzed direction. Yet, civilian Institute of Modern Physics (RIMP, throughout 1954. considerations have always been later renamed Institute of Atomic subordinate to Beijing’s military Energy) and started enlisting Shortly afterwards, on 14 January considerations, especially since the Chinese scientists at home and 1955, Zhou Enlai held another late 1950s, as its threat perceptions abroad. Those who returned to meeting to learn more about nuclear increased and relations with China brought with them personal reactors and weapons and the Washington as well as with Moscow connections, books, equipment and necessary conditions for the deteriorated. Consequently, the materials which provided the development of Chinese nuclear scarce economic resources were foundations for contemporary science and technology.10 By that allocated to building and expanding China’s nuclear research, soon to time, some tests and theoretical a predominantly military–nuclear acquire military implications.9 research had already been begun by complex whose civilian output had leading scientists (such as Qian reportedly reached no more than 5 Indeed, as early as May 1952, Xuesen and others) and the percent by the late 1970s, at the end Premier Zhou Enlai reportedly exploration of uranium ore was of the Mao era. Thus, while its huge chaired a meeting of the party’s about to start. Also, progress had military–nuclear human, material Central Military Commission been made in the development of and scientific infrastructure had an (CMC) with the participation of nuclear detectors, nuclear electronic enormous conversion potential, prominent People’s Liberation instruments and other equipment; China had very limited experience Army (PLA) figures including Zhu the extraction, analysis, purification, in the civilian use of nuclear energy De, Peng Dehuai, Nie Rongzhen and and measurement of uranium; and and technology.7 Su Yu, which discussed national the research and preparation of defense construction within the heavy water and high purity Reliance on the First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957). graphite. Soviet Union For the first time, the issue of developing non-conventional The next day, 15 January, Mao weapons came up, scientists were Zedong presided over an enlarged China’s military–nuclear complex is requested to forward their and crucial Chinese Communist the youngest among its defense– comments, and preparations were Party (CCP) Central Secretariat industrial enterprises.8 Although made for further development. In meeting, attended by China’s some publications and rudimentary February 1953 Qian Sanqiang, one supreme leaders (Liu Shaoqi, Zhu facilities related to theoretical of China’s foremost nuclear De, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, Peng nuclear physics had existed in half-a- physicists and RIMP Director, led Dehuai, Deng Xiaoping, Li Fuchun, dozen research and academic for the first time a 26-member and Bo Yibo), which discussed the institutes before the foundation of scientific delegation to the Soviet issue of nuclear energy. After the People’s Republic of China Union which discussed nuclear issues and visited nuclear facilities.

B·I·C·C 9 brief 10

hearing reports about China’s and nuclear industry. Its civilian use September 1956, when the CCP was uranium deposits and basic atomic was still high on China’s agenda. In holding its 8th Congress, nearly technology, the meeting passed a his “Report on the Question of forty atomic energy research centers historic resolution, kept secret for Intellectuals” on 14 January 1956, had already been founded all over many years, to develop atomic Zhou Enlai pointed out that “the China.17 Reorganization was called energy and atomic bombs.11 Mao peak of new developments in science for. Since the early 1950s, the First reportedly urged all concerned to and technology is the utilization of Ministry of Machine Building work hard and get the work done atomic energy. Atomic energy,” he (MMB) had been responsible for “with or without Soviet aid”. added, “provides mankind with an civilian production and the Second incomparably powerful new power MMB for all conventional military Still, cooperation and negotiations source, and it opens up broad production. In November 1956, with Moscow on nuclear assistance prospects for all scientific however, China’s National People’s started immediately afterwards. disciplines.”13 Congress (NPC) decided to create a Indeed, on 17 January, Moscow Third MMB to take exclusive charge announced that it would provide Consequently, in March 1956 China of China’s nuclear industry which, China (and some East European joined Moscow and ten other though usually referred to by the countries) with aid to promote socialist countries in the Chinese as “military” in essence, has research on the peaceful use of inauguration of the Joint Atomic always been civilian as well. (In atomic energy. Three days later, on and Nuclear Research Institute in February 1958, when the First and 20 January, a first Sino-Soviet Dubna, near Moscow. As a founder, the Second MMBs merged, the agreement was signed for the joint the PRC had to contribute 20 Third MMB was renamed the prospecting of uranium ores. percent of the Institute’s Second MMB to remain unchanged Uranium Ore Prospecting Teams construction and maintenance until the early 1980s.) were now organized by the Third expenses, but could use its huge Bureau of the Ministry of Geology’s advanced and sophisticated facilities, Further steps were taken in 1957. In Third Office, established in April though for peaceful (or civilian) September, a high-level Chinese 1955. On 27 April, a formal purposes only.14 While allegedly, or delegation visited Moscow. agreement on Soviet assistance to even genuinely, interested in the Following the visit, on October 15, China in tests and research in civilian application of nuclear the two governments signed an nuclear physics and using nuclear energy,15 by that time China’s ‘Agreement on Producing New energy for peaceful purposes was commitment to develop nuclear Weapons and Military Technical signed between the two weapons was spelled out clearly— Equipment and Building governments.12 Moscow agreed to though not emphasized—in a report Comprehensive Nuclear Industry in design and deliver to China from delivered by Peng Dehuai in March China.’ This is the most important 1955 to 1956 an experimental atomic 1956 at an enlarged CMC meeting. nuclear arms agreement ever signed reactor and accelerators of A month later, in his report “On between the two countries. It elementary particles; to provide Ten Major Relationships” Mao covered the supply not only of China, free-of-charge, with scientific unequivocally reiterated that China experts, technologies and materials and technical documentation related “[would] not only have more but, furthermore, of an ‘educational’ to them, as well as with fissile and aircraft and large guns, but also model of an atomic bomb which the other materials; and to assist China atomic bombs.”16 Soviets had allegedly agreed to offer in assembling them and putting Beijing. Shortly afterwards, them into action. On 17 August 1956, Moscow agreed however, in early 1958, Moscow to help China in building its nuclear secretly decided to back off.18 To take responsibility for the industries and research facilities. development of nuclear energy, the This agreement, as well as the Unaware of this decision, China’s CCP in July 1955 formed a ‘group’ previous two which covered Soviet Third MMB set up the Ninth led by Chen Yun, Nie Rongzhen, support in uranium exploration and Bureau in January 1958 to organize and Bo Yibo, while the PRC State nuclear science and technology and supervise nuclear arms research Council’s Third Office, also led by research, triggered the launching of and development.19 The Bo Yibo, assumed responsibility for China’s nuclear programs. By responsibility for receiving and overall planning and management of digesting the drawings, information, China’s evolving nuclear technology and the model atomic bomb to be

10 B·I·C·C military predominance

provided by Moscow was assigned that time the Institute of Atomic the withdrawal of all Soviet aid and to the Nuclear Weapons Research Energy (formerly the RIMP, jointly experts from China, which was to Institute which was set up in Beijing controlled by the Second MMB and take place a year later. The Chinese in July. In August, to practically the Chinese Academy of Sciences), regarded the suspension as a Soviet implement the previous agreements, had already imported Soviet excuse to back off from the 1957 Moscow and Beijing signed another equipment for the gas diffusion military–nuclear assistance one specifying in more detail the laboratory for uranium isotope agreement and thereby prevent, or scales, schedules and the supply of separation (later to be used in at least delay, Chinese efforts to materials and equipment for each producing enriched uranium for develop their own nuclear weapons. project.20 military purposes, though the Consequently in July 1959, the CCP Institute concentrated largely on decided to give up Soviet assistance Some were related to civilian basic research and peaceful (which was about to stop anyway), nuclear programs which were still applications of atomic energy). All start again from the very beginning, being promoted. In August 1958 a aspects of China’s nuclear weapon and develop an atomic bomb in national meeting concerning the (and missile) program had been eight years.23 According to this peaceful use of nuclear energy supervised since October 1958 by decision, in spring 1960 scores of discussed the popularization and the newly established Commission scientists, mobilized all over the application of isotopes and, in of Science and Technology for country for the Nuclear Weapon September, a Isotope Application National Defense (COSTND), Research Institute of the Second Committee was established under headed by Nie Rongzhen. MMB, intensified theoretical the Chinese Academy of Science explorations on atomic bombs. As (CAS). This was undoubtedly Planning for China’s nuclear priority had been given to the determined by the fact that, on 27 production infrastructure began in development of the most advanced August, China’s first experimental early 1958. On 31 May, CCP military technology, arrangements heavy-water slightly-enriched (2.5 General Secretary Deng Xiaoping had been made since late 1959 and percent) uranium nuclear research approved site selection programs for early 1960 to concentrate human, reactor (with 7,000–10,000 kilowatt China’s first eight nuclear projects: material, and financial resources on capacity, increased between 1979 five plants (the Hengyang missiles and nuclear weapons and 1980 to 15,000), together with a Hydrometallurgy Plant, Hunan; the projects. 2.4 million electron-volts cyclotron, Baotou Nuclear Fuel Element Plant, were put into operation in China’s Inner Mongolia; the Lanzhou These and other nuclear projects newly-built ‘nuclear village’ in Uranium Enrichment Plant, Gansu; suffered twice in the late 1950s and Tuoli, Fangshan County, Beijing the Jiuquan Integrated Atomic early 1960s. The first reason was Municipality. Assembled since May Energy Enterprise, near Subei, that the Great Leap Forward’s 1956 with Soviet support, according Gansu; and the Northwest Nuclear emphasis on quick results and to the April 1955 agreement, this Weapon Development Base Area, quantity output undermined the reactor had managed to produce 33 Jinyintan, Haiyan County, quality and safety norms essential isotopes by the beginning of Qinghai), and three uranium mines for the construction of China’s October 1958, within a little over (Chenxian and Hengshan Dapu, nuclear industry. For example, the one month.21 both in Hunan, and Shangrao in roof of the main shop building of Jiangxi). The area northwest of Lop the Lanzhou Uranium Enrichment China’s only known nuclear Nur in Xinjiang was approved by Plant (also known as the Lanzhou installation in 1958 (although small- the CMC in March 1959 as the test Gaseous Diffusion Plant), size experimental nuclear reactors base (see map 1). construction of which had started in may have already existed in Wuhan, 1958,24 had to be torn down and Shaanxi, and Jilin), it had been By that time Sino-Soviet relations rebuilt. originally planned to serve civilian had already deteriorated and, on 20 industrial and agricultural purposes June 1959, Moscow informed Beijing and produce electricity: allegedly, that it would “temporarily” suspend Moscow had refused to provide its commitment to supply an atomic China with nuclear arms bomb teaching model together with production technology.22 Yet by information and drawings, while it was holding negotiations with Washington over a treaty for the partial ban of nuclear weapon tests. This was the earliest indication of

B·I·C·C 11 brief 10

Map 1: China's nuclear complex SOUTH KOREA Shanghai NORTH KOREA Qingshan Nuclear Power Station Haiyan, Zhejiang Qingshan II Nuclear Power Zhejiang Yangliushan, Heilongjiang East China Sea Yellow Sea TAIWAN Wafangdian Nuclear Power Station Wafangdian Bohai, Liaoning Jilin Nuclear Power Research Institute Suzhou, Zhejang Liaoning Tianjin Jiangsu Zhejiang Uranium Mine Shangrao, Jiangxi Beijing Fujian Anhui Shandong Dayawan Nuclear Power Station Shenzhen, Guangdong Jiangxi Hebei Guangdong Uranium Mine Hengshan, Hunan Henan

Shanxi

Hubei Inner Mongolia Inner Hunan (Nuclear Village) Beijing Fangshan County, Tuoli,

Hainan Shaanxi Uranium Mine Chenxian, Hunan Chongqing Guangxi

Hydrometallurgy Plant Hengyang, Hunan Guizhou VIETNAM Ningxia Nuclear Fuel Component Plant Baotou, Inner Mongolia Ling’ao Nuclear Power Station Guangdong Uranium Enrichment Plant Lanzhou, Gansu Sichuan MONGOLIA LAOS

Gansu Yunnan Plutonium production and Separation Plant Guangyuan, Sichuan (dupl. Jiuquan) Nuclear Fuel Component Plant Sichuan (dupl. Baotou) Yibin, MYANMAR Integrated Atomic Energy Enterprise Jiuquan, Subei, Gansu Qinghai Nuclear Fuel Complex Heping, Sichuan (dupl. Lanzhou) Nuclear Weapon Research and Design Academy Nuclear Weapon Mianyang, Sichuan (dupl. Qinghai) BUTAN Reactor Engineering and Technology Institute Reactor Engineering and Technology Jiajiang, Sichuan Xinjiang Northwest Nuclear Weapon Development Base Area Northwest Nuclear Weapon Jinyintan, Haiyan, Qinghai (decommissioned 1989) Tibet Northwest Nuclear Weapon Testing Base Testing Northwest Nuclear Weapon Xinjiang Lop Nur,

NEPAL INDIA

12 B·I·C·C military predominance

Despite the negative effects of the Construction of the Atomic Energy In the spring of 1963, 126 scientists Great Leap Forward, the overall Industry,’ approved by the CCP on and technicians of the Nuclear construction of China’s eight 16 July 1961. Based on thorough Weapon Research Institute in charge principal nuclear industry projects investigations held throughout the of design, experiment and mentioned above had made good year, China’s civilian leaders (Mao, production, had been transferred to progress (too late, however, to be Zhou and Deng) in November the Northwest Nuclear Weapon used for China’s first atomic firmly adopted the military leaders’ Developing Base in Qinghai, even bomb). view that, since the construction of before it was entirely completed. In nuclear industry and the addition to the three uranium mines Still, the Great Leap Forward made development of the atomic bomb (as and five nuclear energy plants put some positive contributions to well as research on a thermo-nuclear into production or trial-production China’s nuclear development. The bomb and a nuclear submarine under the Second MMB by the end first 150 tons of uranium powerplant) had made great of 1963, over 400 factories, concentrates, used for China’s first progress, China’s first atomic bomb institutes, colleges and universities atomic bomb, were allegedly could be tested within three years, all over China contributed to the processed manually by thousands of just in time for the PRC’s fifteenth effort.29 As China’s military–nuclear peasants before the construction of anniversary in October 1964.26 program was gathering momentum, the mines could be completed.25 Yet threat perception increased, leading from July to August 1960, when Self-reliance the CSC to propose, on 31 January these projects were nearly 1964, that to improve national completed, China’s nuclear To meet this crucial deadline, a defense and uphold the principle of establishment was seriously major mobilization and “leaning on the mountains, shattered a second time when concentration of resources were decentralization, and concealment” Moscow backed off from its called for. Two new organizations (kaoshan, fensan, yinbi), the strategic commitment to supply the teaching were set up to oversee this effort. In deployment of the nuclear industry model of an atomic bomb together late November 1961 the CCP should be readjusted as quickly as with relevant information and approved the establishment of a possible to build rear-line base drawings; unilaterally tore up all National Defense Industry Office areas.30 These became known as the agreements and contracts it had (NDIO) under the State Council, ‘Third Line’ or ‘Third Front’ signed with China; abruptly while exactly a year later, in Novem- (sanxian). stopped the supply of equipment ber 1962, the CCP approved the and materials; and recalled 233 establishment of a Special Two weeks earlier, on 14 January experts who were helping China in Commission of the CCP Central 1964, the Lanzhou Plant managed to the build-up of its nuclear industry. Committee (CSC) “to strengthen obtain for the first time the highly They departed taking with them the leadership of production and enriched uranium needed for an drawings, blueprints and construction of the atomic energy atomic bomb. Preparation for the information, causing heavy losses industry and research, and testing of test began and in April, following a and many problems. nuclear weapons.”27 In a virtual huge mobilization of manpower and process of “civilian-to-military resources, the main projects of the This could not have come at a worse conversion,” over the next few years Northwest Nuclear Weapon time since in the early 1960s, much effort and organizational Developing Base were completed. following the collapse of the measures were taken to ensure the On 1 May, the first set of usable disastrous Great Leap Forward, supply of all the people, materials, enriched uranium-235 fuel Beijing had to cope with the gravest and equipment needed by the component was produced by the economic, social, and political crisis nuclear industry. Many new Nuclear Component Production since the establishment of the PRC materials which had been imported Plant of the Jiuquan Atomic Energy in 1949. The crisis also seriously in the past, were now produced in Complex. On the afternoon of disrupted the construction of the China and, to be sure, contributed October 16, a little over four years Northwest Nuclear Weapon not only to the breakthrough in since independent development had Developing Base in Qinghai. Still, missile and nuclear weapons begun, China’s first tower-mounted more determined than ever to development but also to the atomic bomb with a yield of 22,000 proceed with nuclear development development of civilian science and tons of TNT (or 22 kilotons) was independently and resolutely, other basic industries.28 successfully detonated at the Beijing despite the difficulties had to Nuclear Test Base northwest of Lop find the necessary resources. This Nur, in Xinjiang. determination was reflected in the ‘Decisions on Strengthening the

B·I·C·C 13 brief 10

Now, for the first time, the Chinese More data and experience were aspects were separated and carried government declared that China provided following 9 May 1966, out by the Ninth Bureau, renamed would never be the first to use when the detonation of China’s the Research and Design Academy nuclear weapons at any time or third atomic bomb was successfully of Nuclear Weapons, which under any circumstances. Beijing accomplished. It contained some gradually moved to a new base, also began to explore the possibility thermo-nuclear material (lithium 6) completed in 1969, in Mianyang of convening a conference of the allegedly resulting in a yield of 200– (Sichuan Province) according to the world’s heads of state to discuss the 300 kilotons (or 2–3 megatons, over ‘Third Line’ (or sanxian) policy.34 complete prohibition and total ten times as powerful as the Governed by Beijing’s anxieties elimination of nuclear weapons. Yet previous experiments). Another test, about the exposure of China’s a few weeks later, in early this time with a reduced-size H- defense–industrial complex in December, the second MMB bomb (or an H-bomb principle test) general, and nuclear complex in proposed accelerating the which yielded 122 kilotons, was particular, to external—primarily construction of a plutonium carried out on 28 December 1966.32 Soviet—aggression, this policy had production line and the been launched in the spring of 1965, development of nuclear weapons. In Less than six months later, on 17 following the establishment of a fact, by that time, the research and June 1967, China’s first full size H- special Nuclear Industry Third Line design of a nuclear aerial bomb and a bomb with a yield of 3.3 million Construction Headquarters. nuclear warhead for missile delivery tons of TNT (or 3.3 megatons) was “Several tens of thousands of people” had already begun. These projects airdropped from a retrofitted H-6A were transferred to remote Third were given a boost following bomber and successfully detonated. Line areas, less accessible but more China’s second and third nuclear Two years later, on 23 September defendable. In a retrospective view, tests (on 14 May 1965 and on 9 May 1969, China carried out its first the Chinese still think that the 1966), both with an airdropped underground (tunnel-mode) nuclear decision was correct. Yet, “the main bomb, the latter including thermo- test in Nanshan (the southern problems in Third Line nuclear materials. Only then, after mountains, in the Kuruktag ridge, construction were the influences of much preparation and many northwest of Lop Nur). Except for ‘left’ ideology and restricted levels precautions, a DF-2 (Dongfeng, or the 17 October 1976 test, all later of knowledge, excessive emphasis on East Wind, known in the West as tunnel-mode underground nuclear locating the plant sites near CSS-1) medium-range ballistic tests were carried out in Beishan (or mountains and the need for missile (MRBM) was launched from the northern mountains). China’s decentralized deployments, and low the Shuangchengzi base in the Gobi first shaft-mode underground standards for construction of living Desert northeast of Jiuquan (Gansu nuclear test (which usually produce facilities, all of which created certain Province) on 27 October 1966, higher yields than tunnel-mode forms of irrationality in production successfully delivering a 12 kiloton tests) was carried out in the Xingeer deployments and inconveniences in atomic bomb which was detonated (or Qinggir) region, also northwest work and life.”35 in the air above Lop Nur in of Lop Nur, on 14 October 1978. Xinjiang, 800km to the west. A (For a complete list of China’s According to this policy, which similar test of detonating a missile- nuclear tests, see Table 4, page 32 later complicated and slowed down delivered nuclear bomb has never below.)33 China’s nuclear conversion efforts, been attempted.31 The next stage was new facilities had been built in the to make fast progress in hydrogen Throughout these years work on inland provinces expanding and bomb (H-bomb) technology. China’s nuclear bombs continued in duplicating China’s main nuclear the Northwest Nuclear Weapon centers, most of them in Sichuan Explorations and research on the H- Developing Base which, since 1969, Province (see map in Figure 1): the bomb began in December 1960. was responsible only for Mianyang facility duplicated the Following the success of China’s production. The non-production Haiyan (Qinghai) Northwest first nuclear test, decisions were Nuclear Weapons Research and made in early 1965 to accelerate the Design Academy; the Yibin Nuclear development of the H-bomb. While Fuel Component Plant, used for China’s military–nuclear producing and processing weapon- establishment was being engaged in grade plutonium, duplicated the this project, many civilian plants Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component were mobilized to provide the Plant (in Inner Mongolia); the necessary materials and equipment. Heping Nuclear Fuel Complex

14 B·I·C·C military predominance

duplicated the Lanzhou Nuclear frustrate a decision made by Lin In August 1963 the CSC approved Fuel Complex (Gansu Province), Biao to move (rather than duplicate) the merging of existing used for gaseous diffusion uranium the nuclear fuel plants from Jiuquan organizations into the Institute of enrichment; and the Guangyuan (in Gansu) and Baotou (in Inner Submarine Atomic Energy Power plutonium production reactor and Mongolia) further inland. A serious Engineering (better known as the plutonium separation plant, the loss of nuclear fuel production was Institute of Nuclear Power, or INP), largest in China, duplicated the thereby prevented. To avoid further later to become associated with the Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex paralysis and ensure continued Second MMB. Based on the recently (Gansu).36 One of their main tasks R&D, military control was enforced adopted Third Line policy, in had been to weaponize and then over all defense industry ministries, January 1964 the Second MMB serial-produce H-bombs, which including the Second MMB, until decided to establish the Reactor were then deployed from the early the early 1970s.37 Engineering and Technology 1970s to the mid-1980s. This process Institute (Institute 194) in Jiajiang, along with many other nuclear The military origins of Sichuan Province (north Leshan and weapon achievements were nuclear power Emeishan). Yet, work on the especially remarkable since they preliminary design of the nuclear coincided with, and suffered from, power plant, which had been While most of China’s nuclear the upheavals of the Cultural resumed in early 1965 and approved military projects had been Revolution. by the CSC in July, was seriously practically irrelevant to civilian disrupted by the Cultural Revoluti- needs, one can be singled out: the It has been usually assumed that, on. ‘Emergency Measures’ R&D of nuclear power plants for unlike conventional weapon undertaken from March (when a submarines. Basically, the return of development which was more ‘nuclear submarine power reactor these pressurized-water reactors is seriously affected by the Cultural project headquarters’ was similar to that of a land-based Revolution, the predominant non- established) to November 1967, pressurized-water nuclear reactor conventional weapon development including telegrams by China’s top power station, though the former was shielded and therefore only leaders, a “Special Official Letter” provides power to turn the marginally harmed. Indeed, Mao issued by the CSC in August, and propellers while the latter generates himself pointed out clearly that the personal intervention of Mao electricity.38 The development of a plants, mines, and research institutes Zedong on 18 July 1968 finally led submarine nuclear power plant was under the Second MMB “were to the expediting the project. began as early as 1958 by the important top secret units bearing Following hard work involving Reactor Research Office of the CAS important significance to defense more than 800 INP scientists and Institute of Atomic Energy.39 construction and enhancement of technicians transferred from Beijing Having progressed slowly due to preparation for combat. Absolute to the nuclear reactor research and technical and bureaucratic safety [had to] be provided to these design base in the difficult terrain disagreements, and given a lower plants and stable production of these and climate of Jiajiang, Sichuan, and priority in view of scarce resources factories [had to] be safeguarded.” 8,000 soldiers and civilians who which were allocated primarily to Radical revolutionary Red Guard worked on the construction site, the development of nuclear weapons activities were strictly forbidden. civil engineering and installation of and missiles, the nuclear submarine Nonetheless, the research and the land-based prototype reactor project was suspended in late 1961 development of nuclear projects, were completed on 28 April 1970. by the CSC. Nevertheless, two particularly the H-bomb, were All that was needed now to test the swimming-pool type experimental disrupted by the turmoil to such a prototype was fuel. reactors were successfully built by degree that R&D personnel had to the Institute of Atomic Energy and be moved to safer sites in order to Work on researching fuel elements Tsinghua (Qinghua) University and continue their work. Later, for a submarine nuclear power plant research on low-enriched nuclear compensations were paid and began in 1958. In the early 1960s fuel and materials which were apologies rendered to many nuclear research was carried out in the CAS needed for the pressurized-water scientists and experts who had to Shenyang Metals Research Institute reactor began. endure persecution and humiliation. and in March 1963, the Second MMB Zhou Enlai reportedly managed to

B·I·C·C 15 brief 10

established a nuclear fuel research nuclear power development. subsided, the issue of nuclear power office in the Baotou Nuclear Fuel Originally, the reactor built in stations resurfaced and Zhou Enlai Element Plant (known as Plant 202, Beijing with Soviet support from stated in November 1970 that the in Inner Mongolia). In August 1967 1957 to 1958 was supposed to serve Second MMB was not only a it began to build a production civilian purposes and produce “ministry of explosions” (bu guang workshop for nuclear submarine electric power (see above). This was shi baozhabu) but that it should also power reactor fuel and in April however never accomplished due to be involved in nuclear power. As 1970, precisely when the prototype the Sino-Soviet conflict, to the CSC chairman, he listened to reactor was completed, the first priority given to military needs, and reports on the construction of batch of nuclear reactor fuel was to bureaucratic haggling. nuclear power stations on successfully produced. The fuel used December 15.44 for China’s submarine nuclear Claiming a leading role in nuclear power reactors, as well as for its power, the Ministry of Electric These reports culminated in a nuclear power station reactors is Power (set up in 1955 and combined proposal by the Shanghai low-enriched uranium-235 (with in 1958 with the Ministry of Water Municipality Nuclear Power Station content of less than 5, usually 3 Resources) began to design and Engineering Leadership Group to percent) compared to high-enriched research pressurized-water reactors build a 300,000 kilowatt (or 300 or weapon-grade uranium-235 (with as early as 1959 yet, since all relevant megawatt) pressurized-water content of 90 percent or more). information had been classified as nuclear power plant. First initiated military thus becoming practically by Zhou Enlai on 8 February 1970 The trial-run of the land-based inaccessible, progress was slow. In (hence its code-name “Project 728”), prototype began on 1 May 1970, and the 1960s the study of nuclear power it was submitted on October 25, it reached full power on July 30. By was undertaken by a division within adopted by the State Council in December 1979, when the reactor the Electric Research Institute, later August 1973, and formally approved was shut down, over 530 items had to be transformed into an by the CSC headed by Zhou Enlai been tested. An identical submarine independent Nuclear Power on 31 March 1974. On 13 April the nuclear power plant was built Research Institute in Suzhou.42 In State Planning Commission issued simultaneously and installed into a this military–civilian competition, its “Notice Concerning the submarine on 26 December 1970. which was to be settled in the early Inclusion of the Shanghai Nuclear Sea trials began on 23 August 1971, 1980s, the Ministry of Electric Power Plant in Plans” so that the after dock trials had been Power and Water Resources had Second MMB and Shanghai completed. By 1974, when China’s always been at a disadvantage Municipality incorporated “Project first nuclear submarine was compared to the Second MMB. 728” into their capital construction commissioned, a couple of steam plans for 1974. Earlier, “to adapt to generator failures had been repaired It was on 11 September 1966, that a the need for nuclear power in and China’s submarine nuclear joint report submitted by the developing the national economy, power plant proved successful, Second MMB and Shanghai development of fuel elements for though long distance and deep water Municipality to Premier Zhou Enlai nuclear reactor power stations got trials were still to come.40 proposed, for the first time, to build underway in 1973 and construction a nuclear 10,000 kilowatt of a production line for this type of The successful completion and trial pressurized-water power reactor in element began in 1975 [in Yibin, operation of these pressurized-water eastern China.43 Nothing much was southern Sichuan].”45 Progress, reactors, both on land and at sea, as done about this due to the Cultural however, was very slow and China’s well as the fuel reprocessing Revolution, though research first large-scale civilian nuclear experience, not only made a continued at the Institute of Nuclear program was disrupted and aborted considerable contribution to Energy Technology, Tsinghua mainly for political reasons and China’s military strength “but also University, and at the Shanghai bureaucratic–technical debates. At trained personnel and accumulated Nuclear Research Institute. Once the same time, China’s military– experience for the development of the Cultural Revolution had nuclear programs had made the nuclear power industry in considerable headway. China.”41 Unfortunately, this statement by no means implied any significant headway in China’s

16 B·I·C·C military predominance

By the time of Mao’s death in emphasize China’s need to have September 1976, China had atomic and hydrogen bombs as a conducted 18 nuclear tests defense measure against the United altogether, including three tower- States.47 Strategic weapon programs mounted, two underground, two had thus become “the keystone of all atmospheric, ten airdropped, and military industry, whose one missile-delivered. sophistication and competence (not to mention budgets) outdistanced all Under Mao, strategic weapon other modern economic activities in programs, as well as the industrial China.”48 Under different priorities infrastructure supporting them, and less threatening circumstances, were given a solid priority over all this accumulated production other aspects of conventional potential, and claimed weapon production. sophistication, competence, advanced technology and expertise, Twenty years before his death he could also have been used for non- had said: “If we are not to be bullied military purposes. Such in the present-day world, we cannot circumstances, domestic as well as do without the bomb. Then what is international, and a new order of to be done about it? One reliable priorities, emerged after the death of way is to cut [conventional] military Mao in September 1976 and the and administrative expenditures overthrow of the radical Gang-of- down to appropriate proportions.”46 Four leadership a month later. Meeting a Japanese Socialist Party delegation on 21 April 1957, Mao elegantly rejected its suggestion that China, like Japan, should use atomic energy only for peaceful non- military purposes. He said: “That is fine. We have no money, or other economic resources. It takes a lot of capital and electricity [to develop the atomic industry], but we have neither of them”. He went on to

B·I·C·C 17 brief 10

China’s Nuclear

defense (as well as all state-owned) Complex industries.50

To begin with, while all defense after Mao: industries in China (and elsewhere) had been secluded from the market forces for many years, the nuclear Military–Civilian industry was a particularly closed system which, because of its sensitivity, had been developed in total secrecy and under tight Combination security measures. Secondly, geared almost exclusively for military purposes, China’s nuclear industry and research complex have been so Unlike the Maoist leadership whose the late 1970s, that much of the highly specialized, and dangerous, principal preoccupation especially nuclear (and conventional) defense that “the existing production from the late 1950s to the late 1970s industry potential, used in the past facilities and equipment could not had been China’s socio-political almost exclusively for military be directly converted to civilian transformation and revolutionary production, had an underutilized production.” Also, working entirely change based on self-reliance, its human and material surplus capacity for the government and absorbing successors, led by Deng Xiaoping, which now could and, indeed, huge, and often wasteful, state have underscored economic growth should be converted for civilian financial, human and material 49 and modernization at home, and purposes. resources, “its business philosophy, stability and openness abroad. management system, economic Following these guidelines, adopted Origins and policy, operational methods, and by the crucial Third Plenum of the organization work styles all were incompatible Eleventh CCP Central Committee with the requirements of conversion in December 1978, China’s defense to civilian status.”51 industries were urged to start Foreshadowing the forthcoming experimenting with civilian policy transformation, some defense industries tentatively, boldly and Thirdly, although some of China’s production and to engage in foreign defense industries, especially Third trade, technical exchange, and almost voluntarily began to convert part of their surplus military Line enterprises, were scattered all international cooperation with over the country, two thirds of other countries. potential to civilian use as early as 1977, immediately after Mao’s China’s nuclear complex were death. Shielded and cultivated from located in deserts and mountainous It is important to note that the regions, far away from the main principal incentives for China’s above, the nuclear industry—the pearl in the crown—was apparently urban commercial and industrial military-to-civilian conversion in centers. The consequent difficulties general, and nuclear conversion in slow to detect the new drift, until 1981. It was then that Beijing in transportation, communication, particular, have been endogenous and information further rather than exogenous. decided to cut down investment in capital construction of the nuclear complicated conversion. Moreover, since the late 1970s, many talented When the initial (experimental) industry by 30 percent, as well as funds for purchasing nuclear young people have declined to study policy was put forward, China’s the nuclear science profession threat perception was still high and products, and to postpone or to partly postpone eleven large- or because of the Third Line Moscow was still regarded as the inhospitable living conditions, thus main and most immediate danger to medium-scale projects. This policy continued throughout the Sixth creating concern about training Chinese security. Nonetheless, it China’s next generations of nuclear was social and primarily economic Five-Year Plan (1981–1985), forcing considerations which had motivated the nuclear industry to concentrate the rather vague idea, put forward in its human and material resources on mining, metallurgy, and the production of nuclear fuel and civilian nuclear equipment. Yet, to successfully accomplish conversion, China’s nuclear industry had to overcome its unique problems, in addition to those shared by other

18 B·I·C·C military–civilian combination

scientists and technicians.52 Finally, example of this approach is China’s 1983), China Zhongyuan Foreign whereas other defense industries had military reprocessing plant, Engineering Company (April 1983), earlier managed to gain at least some construction of which was and the Nuclear Industry experience in civilian production completed at the Jiuquan Development Research Center which could be useful and helpful Comprehensive Atomic Energy (October 1983).56 for conversion purposes, the nuclear Base in 1970. Since the early 1980s it industry had failed to accumulate has operated according to the A number of work conferences much significant experience in principle of baojun zhuanmin, by convened in 1984 and 1985 civilian production (although a assuring military production while reiterated the long-term policy of small number of civilian reactors at the same time developing civilian transferring nuclear military and programs existed), and goods.54 technologies to civilian uses. By the practically none whatsoever in what end of 1984, much progress had was to become its principal civilian In the gradually evolving already been made.57 In January 1986 preoccupation namely, nuclear decentralized economy, marketing Beijing reconfirmed that the (former power plants. In fact, due to its these goods has become military) Ministry of Nuclear complete isolation from the rest of indispensable. One of the early Industry would remain in charge of the world, and the adverse effects of organizational measures in this China’s nuclear power construction the frequent political turmoil, direction, taken by Beijing as early and in July, in a further step China’s nuclear establishment had as 1980, was to allow each of the towards civilianization, the not been advanced as far as Beijing defense industries to establish its Ministry (along with the other later claimed, despite its remarkable own trading corporations. defense industrial ministries) was military achievements. Accordingly, the Second MMB set placed under the direct up the China Nuclear Energy administration of the State Council, Bearing in mind these difficulties Industry Corporation (CNEIC), while COSTIND remained and limitations, China’s nuclear also known as China National responsible only for their military industry managed—though at a Nuclear Corporation (CNNC).55 R&D and production. Finally, in much slower pace compared to This was the beginning of a gradual April 1988 the Ministry of Nuclear other defense industries—to make process of changing the names, and Industry was replaced by the China enormous progress in implementing nature, of the defense-industrial Nuclear Industry General Corpora- its policy of “preserving military ministries themselves. As a symbolic tion (CNIGC, Zhongguo Hegongye [needs] while converting to civilian step, the Second MBB, associated for Zonggongsi) under a newly created [production]” (baojun zhuanmin), so long with defense production, Ministry of Energy Resources, first put forward at a Second MMB became the Ministry of Nuclear which in turn replaced and working conference in April 1979.53 Industry on 4 May 1982, a name combined all the ministries dealing Now responding to the official line, intended to give it a more with energy (coal, petroleum, and a joint Second MBB and COSTND respectable and civilian look though nuclear).58 conference held on 12–13 February it still remained under firm military 1981, confirmed the earlier policy control through the Commission of By the early 1990s the CNIGC had that the nuclear industry should Science, Technology and Industry become a nationwide industrial give priority to assuring military for National Defense (COSTIND), conglomerate employing a total of needs while shifting its focus established at the same time. Shortly 200,000 (of whom 78,000 were towards the national economy. afterwards additional corporations scientists and engineers) in over 200 were established to deal with enterprises and institutions.59 Its To do this and to overcome the specific civilian aspects of China’s responsibilities cover uranium shortcomings, a variety of means nuclear industry, such as the China geology and exploration, uranium and policies were adopted leading to Isotope Company (December 1982), ore mining, nuclear fuel processing, reorganization which reduced China Nuclear Instruments and development of nuclear reactors, centralized state control, and Equipment Corporation (March production of nuclear instruments increased flexibility, and equipment, nuclear scientific decentralization, initiative, and technological research, competition, ‘civilianization,’ engineering design and construction, ‘openness’ and thereby foreign economic relations and transparency. An outstanding

B·I·C·C 19 brief 10

trade, as well as domestic and Some conversion (1991–1995), reaching 12 billion overseas engineering contracts, not achievements renminbi (RMB), the value of necessarily or directly related to civilian goods produced by nuclear nuclear technology (for example, industry enterprises increased by an By the mid-1990s, China’s nuclear undertaking a housing project in annual average of 38.3 percent industry had launched over 300 Jordan).60 It has adopted a policy of during the same period (24.4 percent projects for shifting military relying on its claimed superior in the Sixth Five-Year Plan, 1981– technology to civilian use, including technological advantages through 1985) reaching nearly 4 billion RMB the production of rare earth, improvement and modification, and in 1995 alone. concentrates on nuclear power chemical fertilizers, magnesium metal, titanium dioxide, and construction, isotope applications By that time, the share of civilian electrolytic aluminum, thereby also and radiation-technology products in the total output value of providing employment for people applications to such an extent that China’s nuclear industry had made redundant by the closing of military-to-civilian conversion has allegedly reached 80.0 percent, up military facilities.61 been occasionally referred to as the from 5.2 percent in 1979 (4.7–5.0 second founding (or second take-off) percent in 1980), when reform Indeed, while the total nuclear of China’s nuclear industry (see also began.62 This should be regarded as industrial output increased by an Annex). an outstanding accomplishment in annual average of 20 percent during view of the enormous difficulties China’s Eighth Five-Year Plan

Table 1: Civilian output value of China’s defense industries (Share in their total output value, in percent)

Nuclear Space Aviation Ordnance Electronics Shipbuilding

1979 16.8 9.0

1980 4.7 48.2 16.3 21.0 82.1 30.0

1981 35.4 21.9 26.0 89.1 60.5

1982 9.0 47.7 23.9 20.0 88.7 71.4

1983 25.0 20.0

1984 13.8 53.4 26.2 29.3

1985 16.3 65.4 40.1 33.4 92.7 77.1

1986 28.0 73.1 60.0 40.0 79.1

1987 33.0 79.1

1988 33.7 88.2 70.0 48.0 90.0 80.0

1989 40.0 74.0* 60.0 90.0

1990 60.0–70.0 75.0* 67.0 82.0

1992 61.0

1995 80.0

Source: Adapted from Paul Humes Folta, From Swords to Plowshares? Defense Industry Reform in the PRC (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 222–257. * Figures extrapolated

20 B·I·C·C military–civilian combination

mentioned above, and the By the mid-1990s China had reached consequent fact that the growth of the capability of producing and China’s nuclear industry civilian supplying over 800 varieties of production has been slow and isotopes and isotope products, gradual. In 1985 its output value which are widely used in the field of reached only 16.2 percent of China’s industry, agriculture, medicine and total nuclear industry output value, scientific research. The research, climbing to 40.0 percent by the end development and production of of 1989. It was only in 1990 that the isotopes and other nuclear output value of China’s nuclear technologies for civilian application industry civilian products exceeded, had already begun in the late 1950s for the first time, the output value (see above), but gathered of military production (see momentum since the early 1980s Table 1).63 By the end of 1994, more (see Table 2) producing outstanding than 400 civilian projects using economic benefits. “Investment is nuclear technology had been small, with rapid returns; there are established with a total high profits, and little energy is governmental investment of over 6 consumed. Therefore [the billion RMB (US $705 million). In production of isotopes and other that year, the value of CNIGC’s nuclear technologies] are called the civilian production reached 3.6 ‘light industry of nuclear billion RMB (US $423 million, industry’.”66 By the early 1990s, over reaching US $481 million in 1995), 70 civilian production lines had representing 80.0 percent of its total been built. output value. It is expected to more than double by the year 2000.64

‘Converted’ products include mini- reactors, automatic fire-warning systems, petrochemical valves, nuclear power valves, radiation immune medical packs, nuclear Table 2: China’s isotope production medical diagnostic instruments, nuclear radiation detection 1959 1965 1975 1980 1984 instruments, etc. Some of these civilian products (such as automatic Isotope products 33 33 359 483 462 fire alarms and fire-fighting equipment) are highly profitable. Delivered goods 210 6,000 33,000 51,000 132,000 One direct by-product of the nuclear military industry which has Number of users 15 80 729 1,070 1,500 civilian value is tritium, produced since May 1968 as a thermonuclear Sales value weapon charge. After 1980 a new (million RMB) 0.09 0.28 1.60 5.20 9.77 production line began to turn out tritium luminescent powder which Source: Dangdai Zhongguo de Hegongye (DZHGY) [China Today: Nuclear has been widely used in China’s Industry], 1987, p. 331. watchmaking industry. Also, tritium lamps have been developed and a sideline helium-3 isotope separation facility was launched, producing He-3 at a 99.39 percent concentration.65

B·I·C·C 21 brief 10

Nuclear medicine, though practiced species of new crops (allegedly This agricultural and industrial in Mao’s China, expanded greatly accounting for one third of the prosperity is officially explained, afterwards. By the mid-1990s world’s total of new crops), first, by the “well-developed nuclear diagnosis and treatment of increasing yields (allegedly by 5 infrastructure” including cheap certain diseases had become available million tons per year), reducing electricity, concrete roads, ready-to- in over one thousand hospitals insect damage, prolonging the use factory buildings, apartment across China, benefiting some 13 storage life of agricultural products buildings, shopping centers, theaters million patients every year. In late through radiation food preservation and cinemas, hospitals, and sports 1995, a national nuclear medicine technology, thereby creating and recreation centers; and second, laboratory was opened in Wuxi at economic benefits estimated at by the “reliable ecological the Jiangsu Atomic Medicine around 3 billion RMB and pushing environment” based on strictly Institute, dealing with research and China “to a leading position in this monitored and supervised radiation development of radioactive drugs field.”69 count which is said to be only 0.1 and diagnostic methods. A few percent of the national safety months later, the Shanghai Kexing Finally, one of the most visible standard.73 This base closure is Pharmaceutical Company was manifestations of military-to-civilian regarded by Beijing “as the world’s established. Sponsored by the China conversion is ‘base closure.’ first retired research and production Xinxing Corporation (a military base for nuclear weapons,” and as “a organization subordinate to the Chinese examples of a complete product of China’s shift of its PLA General Logistics Department) abandonment of PLA installations nuclear industry from military to and the Shanghai Nuclear Institute are not only rare but almost civilian production” which also of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, unknown. “embodies the longstanding it plans to produce nuclear-based principle of the Chinese pharmaceuticals and medicaments Among them, the best known (and Government to thoroughly prohibit and early diagnosis equipment.67 publicized) is the case of what used and dismantle all nuclear weapons.” to be known as Plant 221 in Yet, China’s most important and In addition to converting its own Qinghai. Permanently prestigious civilian project—and the facilities, the CNIGC provided decommissioned in 1987, it had been most important task in the other enterprises with military– officially called the Northwest conversion of its military–nuclear nuclear technologies and equipment Nuclear Weapons Research and industry—is the gradual which could be applied for civilian Design Academy (Xibei Hewuqi construction of China’s nuclear uses. Thus, the nuclear extraction- Yanjiu Sheji Yuan, codenamed the power stations. separation technology had a Ninth Academy), the main center revolutionary impact on the for China’s military–nuclear Generating civilian pharmaceutics industry allegedly development for nearly thirty years, nuclear power becoming as efficient as the world since it was initiated in July 1958.70 leaders. Uranium-mining geological Situated in Haiyan County 3,200m Whereas China had been faster than units “with not enough work to above sea level east of Qinghai Lake some of the most advanced nuclear keep them busy” used their (also known as Kokonor) and 103km nations in developing nuclear advanced prospecting technologies west of Xinning, Qinghai’s capital, weapons, and is one of the world’s for locating other ores and rare the base, with its 1,170sq km of largest uranium producers, it has metals. In less than three years, for forbidden zone had appeared on been lagging behind all of them in example, they delivered more than ordinary maps as grassland.71 terms of building nuclear power 50 tons of gold to the state.68 Their Handed over in June 1993 to filtering and ventilation Qinghai’s Haibei Tibetan plants. In 1990—one decade before technologies have been applied to Autonomous Prefecture, it has the end of the 20th century—China the tobacco industry. Nuclear become its new capital, now called was the only one among the world’s detectors and instruments are Xihai Town, “attracting some 5,000 five nuclear powers not to have an gradually becoming widely used in new households from other parts of operative nuclear power plant. In the medical field, the petroleum, the prefecture in only two years.” fact, for about a quarter of a century coal, and chemical industries, Xihai Township now consists of 18 after it had acquired its initial metallurgy, papermaking, industrial sectors and four nuclear capabilities (including uranium extraction and enrichment, transportation, geology, residential areas.72 environment and public security. designing and constructing reactors, Applied to agriculture, nuclear and building a variety of nuclear technology has contributed to great weapons), Beijing failed to develop progress, breeding nearly 400 of commercial nuclear power plants.

22 B·I·C·C military–civilian combination

This failure can be, and often is, impossible and inconceivable in the Xiannian approved a ‘Report on the attributed to the following reasons: 1960s and 1970s. Once the decisions Question of Constructing the 728 for one, there had been no real need had been made, the overall Nuclear Power Plant’ in February for nuclear power as China had ‘successful’ conversion of China’s 1978 written by the State Planning enough oil and enormous coal military–nuclear industry, including Commission, State Construction resources to cope with its rather the construction of large nuclear Commission, and State Science moderate industrial build-up. For power plants, was guaranteed—not Commission. Apparently, another, Chinese sources only because of the structural disagreements emerged because on occasionally mention political reform or its technological 31 January 1979, Gu Mu convened power struggle and radical ‘superiority’ but primarily because leaders of these organizations, as revolutionary opposition as the of the special treatment it still gets well as representatives of the First main reason for failing to develop from the state, not to mention MMB, the Second MMB, and the nuclear power plants. Others point exceptional funding.75 Ministry of Electric Power and to institutional contradictions, Water Resources for a conference to competition and friction among In addition to their symbolic value study issues related to the different bureaucratic authorities.74 as a manifestation of progress, construction of a 300,000 kilowatt Yet the two principal and nuclear power plants have now pressurized-water nuclear power intertwined explanations, which become essential to overcome plant in Shanghai. The nature of become even more meaningful for some economic and ecological these disagreements can be guessed today’s perspective are, on the one problems created by China’s by reading the concluding lines— hand, the overall priority given in unprecedentedly accelerated and between them: “The conference the 1960s and 1970s to military over modernization, not only in felt that the main purpose of this economic considerations and, on the Chinese terms but in global terms project was to gain an understanding other hand, the lack of sufficient as well. of nuclear power plant design and economic resources, and equipment development particularly low uranium Both the need for and the location technologies, not to build several enrichment capacity, to of China’s power plants have been nuclear power plants. The work had simultaneously support a military determined by a consistent already gotten under way so it was and a civilian nuclear program. slowdown of oil production and a not appropriate to take rash growing shortage of energy supply, actions.” 77 It has been the reversal of China’s particularly to the fast-growing order of priorities since the early economies of its southeastern Throughout 1979, the Second MMB 1980s putting economic regions. As of 1994, for example, continued to claim predominance in considerations above military ones demand for electricity outstripped the field of nuclear power. On 2 July and creating new economic supply by 20 percent. Using non- it submitted a ‘Request for Early resources that has finally enabled the nuclear energy sources, such as coal, Approval of the Construction of Chinese to become engaged in oil, or hydro-electric potential, Two Experimental Nuclear Power developing nuclear power would have led to greater expenses, Plants’ to COSTND and on 21 generating facilities. They were now pollution, road and rail September it established its ‘Nuclear in a position to employ tens of congestion—coal shipments already Power Bureau.’ It was only on 2 thousands of under-employed take up about 40 percent of China’s January 1980 that the CCP Central nuclear scientists and technicians; railroad capacity—and faster Committee agreed not only that apply their nuclear military depletion of scarce national research on nuclear power plants be experience and technology resources.76 reinforced but, moreover, that the (primarily the low-enriched Second MMB “is the ministry of uranium nuclear submarine reactor) This is why, following Mao’s death atomic energy industry” (shi for civilian purposes; divert at least and the return of Deng Xiaoping yuanzineng gongyebu) and as such part of their weapon-grade uranium ‘from the cold,’ nuclear power should assume unified responsibility enrichment production capacity to stations became a ‘hot topic.’ On 11 regarding the peaceful uses of atomic producing civilian-grade uranium August 1977, the Second MMB and energy, while organizing needed for power plants; and, last Hunan Province submitted to the cooperation.78 Consequently, on 27 but not least, import more advanced State Council a joint ‘Request for October 1981, the Second MBB nuclear power technology, Instructions for the Construction of decided to establish the China something which had been a 125,000 kilowatt Nuclear Power Qinshan Enterprise Company Plant in Hunan’ to be completed in (Zhonghua Qinshan Qiye Gongsi, 1985. While nothing much has been also known as Huaqin). heard about this request, Li

B·I·C·C 23 brief 10

Shortly afterwards, in November Foreign nuclear plant equipment Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant. 1981, “Project 728” was finally and technology should be Using a standard pressurized-water approved by the State Council and imported to combine with reactor, local technology and it is in this context that the NPC indigenous and coordinated R&D equipment, supplemented by decided on 4 May 1982, to rename efforts. knowledge gained from China’s the Second MBB “the Ministry of nuclear submarine reactor Nuclear Industry” (Hegongyebu). Its China should become self-reliant experience, as well as some imported 300,000 kilowatt nuclear power in its nuclear fuel supply, and the components (worth about US $100 plant—China’s first—would be built gas-centrifugal technique should million, or nearly 42 percent of its in Qinshan, Haiyan County, be developed as the mainstream total cost), this is a relatively small- Zhejiang Province, based on the fuel process. scale one-generator reactor with an decision of the State Economic installed capacity of 300 megawatt Commission made on 2 November Nuclear heat-production should (300,000 kilowatt). It was completed 1982. Yet, its construction was still be developed and a low- by the Chinese mainly on their own delayed by on-going debates about temperature heating prototype and went into operation on 15 technical and other issues. These reactor should be built to gain December 1991, entering the power included the reactor type experience. grid in 1992. Its annual electricity (pressurized water, heavy water, or generation increased from 1.7 gas-cooled); the strategy (self- Research work on advanced billion k/h in 1993 to 2.2 billion k/h reliance or import); the enrichment reactors such as fast breeder, high- in 1995, 26.6 percent above the plan, technology (gas diffusion or gas temperature reactors, and fusion with a high rate of efficiency and ultra-centrifugal process), and the reactors should be continued. safety, and minimal damage to the role of nuclear heat and R&D for environment. One reason for these advanced reactors (high-temperature It was on the basis of these policies achievements is Qinshan’s full or low-temperature nuclear heating that the building of China’s nuclear nuclear power generator simulator reactors). This debate over China’s power stations began. Located in set, completed for the first time in nuclear energy policy was finally Qinshan (in Hangzhouwan, or China in November 1995 at a cost of resolved in early 1983 at a joint Hangzhou Bay, Zhejiang Province, US $5.45 million. It is being used for meeting of the State Science and 100km south of Shanghai), and training operators, verifying Technology Commission and the Dayawan (or Daya Bay, near Hong procedures, obtaining information, State Planning Commission, Kong and Shenzhen, China’s most raising performance levels and attended by over a hundred experts prosperous Special Economic Zone, efficiency and for promptly and technocrats. In addition to Guangdong Province),80 the first preventing or handling problems issues of reprocessing, recycling and two power plants have flexibly and emergencies.81 safety, the policies adopted included combined China’s own experience the following:79 and technology with foreign Daya Bay, China’s second nuclear experience and technology. Profes- power plant, had been based on a The Pressurized Water Reactor sor Ouyang Yu of the Chinese joint venture approved by the should be adopted as the major Academy of Engineering, chief Nuclear Power Leadership Group reactor type for the first designer of the Qinshan Nuclear (established by the State Council on generation of Chinese nuclear Power Plant, China’s first, had September 1983 under Li Peng) on plants. successfully designed a nuclear 12 December 1983.82 Its reactor for military use in 1966. construction began on 3 October The unit capacity of each 1986. Using a US $4.2 billion commercial power reactor should Construction of Qinshan began on 1 investment, this joint venture— be in the range of 900 to 1,000 June 1983. While the initially perhaps China’s biggest to-date— megawatts. planned state investment had been between Guangdong’s Nuclear 1.3 billion RMB, China spent a total Power Company (75%) and Hong The domestically designed 300 of 1.776 billion RMB in building the Kong’s China Light and Power megawatt prototype Pressurized Company (25%), with an Water Reactor should also be investment of US $1 billion, was built in order to gain experience. planned to supply 70 percent of its

24 B·I·C·C military–civilian combination

electricity to Hong Kong and 30 Chemical Industry Corporation, it VVER 1,000 megawatt Russian percent to Guangdong. Unlike the officially went into production in reactors to be designed by the Qinshan power plant, the Daya Bay April 1994, nearly twenty years Atomenergoproyeky Institute in St. power plant relies heavily on after its construction had begun in Petersburg.86 foreign technology, imported from 1975, in cooperation with France’s France (two 985 megawatt Framatome Nuclear Power Group, Four additional power plants, to be generators) and the United on whose technical assistance it has built in the provinces of Jiangsu, Kingdom (the steam turbines and relied since the early 1990s.85 Shandong, Fujian and Jiangxi, have non-nuclear equipment). Trial passed pre-feasibility studies but are power supply to Hong Kong began Qinshan’s second-phase is the first of still waiting for governmental in August 1992 and the two reactors four new nuclear power plants with approval. Long-term plans have been became operational in February and eight generating units, to be built made to build additional nuclear May 1994 respectively. In 1995 it during China’s Ninth Five-Year power plants at Yanjiang (226km reportedly provided more than 10 Plan (1996–2000). When completed, west of Hong Kong), in Guangdong billion k/h of electricity (though they would add 6.6 million and in a number of other provinces with some breaching of safety kilowatts thus raising China’s total and cities including Hunan, Hainan, procedures) and in its first two years installed nuclear capacity to 9 Heilongjiang, Jilin, Nanjing and of operation it generated a million kilowatts. The second Chongqing. Zhao Renkai, vice combined output value of over US project, the construction of which chairman of the China National $700 million.83 began in July 1996, is Guangdong’s Nuclear Corporation said that Ling’ao Nuclear Power Plant, just China’s installed nuclear capacity The next step is the second-phase one kilometer east of the Daya Bay will reach 15,000–17,000 megawatts construction of the Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant and 60km by 2010, 30,000–40,000 megawatt by Nuclear Power Plant (or Qinshan away from Hong Kong. By the year 2020, and 150,000 megawatts of II). Approved in late 1995 following 2000, this will become China’s operating capacity by 2050.87 These a State Council decision made in second largest energy enterprise predictions are very optimistic. early 1986 with a total investment next to the Three Gorges Project. reaching 14.2 billion RMB, it was Investment in its two 985,000 It is too early to judge the long- launched on 2 June 1996, after years kilowatt generating units will reach term economic contribution of of preparation. Located in US $4.5 billion to be covered by US China’s nuclear power plants Yangliushan (126km south of $400 million of capital stock, US which is still extremely marginal Shanghai and 92km north of $2.3 billion of—mainly British and in domestic terms. Hangzhou) and based on two French—export credits, and US $1.8 power-generating units of 600,000 billion of foreign commercial loans, Of China’s total electric energy kilowatt capacity each, construction to be raised by China’s Industrial supply, around 81 percent is still of the project is planned to take six and Commercial Bank, an agent of produced by coal and oil, and years with the first power- the State Development Bank. As a around 18 percent by hydroelectric generating unit going into operation replica of the Daya Bay plant, all the power. The share of nuclear energy in June 2002. When entirely generating equipment needed will in China’s total electricity output completed in June 2003, the plant be imported, probably from France. was 0.3 percent in 1993 and 1.0 would provide 7 billion k/h of Ling’ao’s two reactors are due to be percent in 1994, or 0.1 percent of the electricity for east China to help commissioned in 2002 and 2003, the total world nuclear energy overcome its serious energy same as Qinshan II. The third production. This is far below the 17 shortage.84 project is Qinshan third-phase or percent share of nuclear power Qinshan III: two 700,000 kilowatt generation in the total world According to the policies adopted in CANDU (Canadian deuterium- electric energy production (to reach 1983 and 1984 which insisted that uranium reactor) generating units 24 percent by 2001) or other fuel for China’s nuclear power heavy water reactor, to be built countries’ achievements (such as 80 plants would come from Chinese with Canadian financial and percent of France’s total generated sources, nuclear fuel for the Qinshan technical assistance according to an power, or 22.7 percent of Japan’s). and Daya Bay as well as other agreement of cooperation on the China’s two operational nuclear nuclear power plants is to be peaceful use of nuclear energy signed power stations (0.5 percent of the provided by the converted Yibin in November 1994, and a 430 all over the world) have a Nuclear Fuel Component Plant on memorandum of understanding combined installed capacity of 2.4 the southern border of the Chengdu signed in October 1995. And the million kilowatts (less than 0.7 Basin in Sichuan (formerly known as fourth project is Wafangdian nuclear percent of the total international Plant 812). Now a subsidiary of the power plant (on the coast of Bohai capacity of approximately 345 (nuclear industry’s) Jianzhong Bay, Liaoning Province), using two

B·I·C·C 25 brief 10

million kilowatts). By 2001 China than 6 percent of China’s total north, northwest, southwest and, will have six operational nuclear electricity generating capacity.88 In until 2010, also the northeast and power stations (slightly over 1 fact, while China’s nuclear the center), and while the share of percent of a total of 558 predicted electricity generation is being nuclear electricity in the east will for the world as a whole with a expanded at a great cost, its share in remain rather small, the share of combined installed expected the national electricity generation China’s nuclear electricity in the capacity of 9 million kilowatts, 3.75 will gradually decrease because more south had already become times its current capacity, still less conventional power stations are meaningful by 1995—over 9 percent than 2 percent of the total interna- being built, and much faster. Yet, of its installed capacity and nearly tional capacity of 460 million since China is a big country, the 12 percent of its electricity kilowatts. contribution of nuclear-generated generation—and would become even electricity should be examined on a more significant by 2010 (14 percent According to official Chinese regional rather than a national basis. of installed capacity and over 17 sources, the installed capacity of Indeed, while some regions will percent of electricity generation, see nuclear power plants by the year have no nuclear power stations well Table 3). 2020 is expected to account for more into the twenty-first century (the

Table 3: China’s nuclear electricity capacity and generation (In gigawatt and trillion watt/hour)

Installed capacity Electricity generation

1995 2000 2010 1995 2000 2010

Region Gw % Gw % Gw % Twh % Twh % Twh %

North ------

Northeast - - - - 5.0 5.70 - - - - 27.5 6.20

East 0.3 0.56 0.9 1.03 5.1 2.83 1.6 0.58 5.0 1.17 28.0 3.17

Central - - - - 2.4 2.78 - - - - 13.2 3.25

South 1.8 9.21 1.8 5.34 9.8 14.00 9.9 11.78 9.9 6.84 53.9 17.08

Southwest ------

Northwest ------

China (total) 2.1 1.06 2.7 0.9 22.3 3.55 11.5 1.20 14.9 1.02 12.6 0.42

Source: Adapted from James P. Dorian, Energy in China, Foreign Investment Opportunities, Trends and Legislation (London: Financial Times Energy Publishing, Pearson Professional Ltd., 1995), pp. 107–109.

Notes: Gw – gigawatt Twh – trillion watt/hour

26 B·I·C·C military–civilian combination

In addition to these large-scale To overcome its energy shortage Some international nuclear power plants, the nuclear China also started controlled aspects of conversion complex has also worked out a long- nuclear fusion research in the 1950s. term plan for the development of Its HL-1 (Huanliu, or circulation) It should have been expected that smaller-scale nuclear energy sources, Tokamak device was completed in because of its traditional secrecy and accelerated the R&D on fast 1984 and was approved after and isolation, China’s nuclear neutron breeder reactors, high thorough examinations in Novem- complex would remain shielded temperature gas cooled reactors, and ber 1985, making much progress in from external probes and fusion-fission reactors. In 1981 nuclear fusion research.92 It is on interaction. In fact, it has become research began on nuclear-generated this basis that Germany decided to more exposed and transparent thermal energy and a number of donate an ASDEX unit, an advanced than other defense industries, for a nuclear heating experimental controlled nuclear fusion experi- number of reasons. reactors have been tested.89 China’s mental device. After renovation, it first 5 megawatt thermal low- will be used by the Southwest temperature district heating Physics Research Institute (in Endogenously, Beijing’s ‘Open reactors went critical and delivered Leshan, Sichuan) to experiment with Door’ policy, and its fundamental assumption that it could by no heat to a local grid in November electricity generation.93 1989. It is part of a larger project of Negotiations have also been held means modernize without external building safe urban heating reactors between the University of Texas support, have been particularly to satisfy a tremendous potential Thermonuclear Fusion Research applicable to the nuclear industry market demand for nuclear heating Center and Hefei’s Institute of precisely because it had been self- reactors, especially north of the Plasma Physics of the Chinese reliant and cut off from the interna- tional community for so long so Yellow River.90 Academy of Sciences to jointly upgrade its HT-7U Superconductive that it could not share the enormous An experimental fast neutron Tokamak Control Thermonuclear progress made in the field of the reactor, to be owned by the Chinese Fusion Device. Put into operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Academy of Nuclear Energy, is December 1994 in Hefei, Anhui Exogenously, it is precisely because expected to be completed by the Province, this experimental facility of the sensitivity associated with year 2000. Compared with neutron is China’s largest international nuclear industry, unlike that of reactors in ordinary nuclear power research cooperation project ever other defense industries, that foreign governments, corporations and plants, fast neutron reactors are carried out with other countries.94 capable of raising the utility international organizations have all efficiency of uranium resources These international exchanges and along insisted on ‘unpacking’ sixty- or seventy-fold. Development the involvement of foreign China’s encapsulated nuclear of fast neutron reactors is essential governments in China’s civilian establishment to facilitate for meeting China’s growing energy applications of nuclear energy in monitoring, inspection, and security needs in the next century. For the general, and particularly in nuclear safeguards—as a precondition for same purpose, researchers, mainly power plants programs (in terms of cooperation. from Qinghua University’s Nuclear providing technology, equipment, Energy Technology Design expertise and capital) highlight This is why, as early as 1980, China Research Institute, have been additional dimensions of China’s began to sign bilateral cooperation engaged in the construction of a 10 nuclear conversion policies. agreements for the peaceful use of megawatt high-temperature gas- nuclear energy with more than ten cooled experimental reactor, to be countries (including Yugoslavia, completed before the year 2000. Italy, Romania, France, the United Capable of providing high- States, Germany and Brazil, as well temperature heat effect, “this type of as Japan and Australia); to regularly reactor has great potential for participate in international activities application in China’s long-range related to this issue; and to establish energy system, because it not only trade and other relations with some generates electricity efficiently, but can also be used in the supply of thermo-electricity, heat extraction from thick oil, and coal gasification and liquefaction.”91

B·I·C·C 27 brief 10

100 firms all over the world. As produce weapon-grade uranium or It is against this background that mentioned above, following long plutonium—Algeria formally Iran turned to China. In 1987 China negotiations, the PRC in January acknowledged its existence for the began to assist Iran in establishing a 1984 became the 113th state to first time, claiming however that it 20 megawatt capacity nuclear formally join the International was a small 15 megawatt research research reactor northwest of Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reactor, fueled by slightly enriched Isfahan. Under US pressure, this which has now been allowed to uranium unsuitable for nuclear deal has reportedly been supervise all Chinese exports of weapons. This was confirmed not suspended.96 In 1991 the Chinese nuclear technology. Moreover, since only by the Chinese but, moreover, stated that their nuclear relations the early 1990s China has been party by an IAEA inspection in early with Iran (and other countries) were to the NPT, MTCR, and CTBT. 1992. Also, in November 1991 based on three preconditions, All these developments have China agreed to sell Syria a 30 namely peaceful applications only, increased the transparency of megawatt swimming-pool type IAEA approvals and inspection, and China’s nuclear enterprises and research reactor. Approved by the the customer’s commitment not to forced them to ‘open wider’ in IAEA, this small neutron reactor transfer any nuclear technology or order to increase their international can analyze neutron activity and know-how to a third party without cooperation, as well as competition. produce isotopes but can hardly Chinese permission. Following an produce weapon-grade plutonium. understanding reached in September Indeed, based on its accumulated 1992, China signed an agreement in experience, and while still importing Yet, the prospects of using civilian February 1993 to provide Iran, an nuclear power plant technology and research or power nuclear reactors NPT signatory, with two 300 equipment from Russia and the for military purposes has raised megawatt nuclear power plants and West, China began exporting nuclear Western, and especially American, to assist Iran in mineral surveying power generation technology and concern primarily in the context of and production of fuel rods needed equipment. In early 1992, for Sino-Iranian nuclear relations (see for this reactor, in addition to the example, China began building a 310 below). Iran’s nuclear power supply of nuclear technology for megawatt nuclear power station in program had originated in the late medical, scientific, research, and Chasma, 260km southwest of 1960s when the Shah announced a training purposes.97 This agreement Islamabad in Pakistan, which is plan to build a chain of 23 reactors. was later suspended and postponed, expected to become operational in Following extensive negotiations officially due to ‘technical’ and 1998 (its construction was with American, European, and ‘financial’ problems, but unofficially completed in late 1995). Based on other suppliers in the 1970s, this due to US pressure. the Qinshan model, the 205 tons 310 plan, which had already been in its megawatt turbogenerator with initial implementation stages at the Other potential Middle Eastern inner water-cooled stator and rotor, time of his downfall in 1979, was customers for China’s nuclear as well as pressure heaters, considerably slowed down technology include Egypt—which condensers, water tanks and other afterwards when US–Iran relations has negotiated with China the non-nuclear devices, were built in deteriorated. Iran’s nuclear power acquisition of a 300 megawatt power Shanghai and shipped to Pakistan infrastructure was further hit in the reactor, to be built near Alexan- under IAEA supervision, 1980s during the war with Iraq, and dria98—Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh inspection, and approval.95 again in the early 1990s when and Iraq. A Saudi diplomat who had Germany, France and Argentina defected to the United States in May Algeria provides another example. decided to suspend their nuclear 1994 claimed that as early as January In 1986, the construction of a two- cooperation programs with Iran and 1989 China had been ready to sell phase Chinese-designed research to impose more rigid restrictions on the Saudis a small nuclear research reactor was launched in Ayn the supply of nuclear technology reactor.99 Unconfirmed reports Oussera, 260km south of Algiers. In and equipment. claim that earlier, between 1984 and April 1991— following reports by 1986, Beijing had helped Baghdad to the media that the reactor could conduct a feasibility study with regard to the construction of a nuclear power plant with Chinese

28 B·I·C·C military–civilian combination

assistance. If indeed such While somewhat released from the cooperation had existed, it has been state's embrace, China’s nuclear suspended following the embargo complex not only enjoys its imposed on Iraq in retaliation for its considerable material and financial invasion of Kuwait.100 incentives but also exploits its ability to mobilize whatever To sum up the civilian dimensions resources are needed once a of post-Mao China’s nuclear system: decision is made. until the mid-1990s most of China’s nuclear complex conversion effort As it has managed to overcome had been directed towards the exceptional difficulties and production of nuclear-derived drawbacks, the slow and gradual civilian goods, equipment and process of nuclear conversion only technology. In the coming Ninth underlines this ability and Five-Year Plan (1996–2000), determination. At the same time, however, China plans to establish a the increased use of nuclear energy, new pattern of civilian production technology, manpower, and and management which would facilities for civilian purposes by no combine nuclear and non-nuclear means implies that China has given aspects; technology, industry and up, or plans to scale down, its trade; as well as combining old nuclear military arsenal. bases in the western regions with new bases along the coast. The China National Nuclear Corporati- on would be gradually reorganized into a mixed-type shareholding corporation solely funded by the state. By the year 2000 the nuclear industry civilian output, maintaining an annual growth rate of 20 percent, would have doubled compared to 1995.101

This is one of the most important explanations for China’s successful nuclear conversion.

B·I·C·C 29 brief 10

China’s Nuclear

While reluctantly joining the NPT, Conversion: MTCR and the CTBT which ostensibly limit its nuclear options, Beijing still displays no doubts as to Military the usefulness of nuclear weapons and the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. “We cannot Implications simplistically think that the emergence of high-tech weaponry has replaced the position and role of nuclear weaponry, neither can we To be sure, some of China’s weapon-grade highly enriched simplistically think that because of military leaders must have become uranium (perhaps three tons, or its extremely gigantic destructive somewhat concerned about the even more) and separated plutonium power, nuclear weaponry has totally negative implications of conversion (perhaps one ton), which is enough negated its own prospects to be used policy on arms production in to add roughly 200 nuclear weapons as a weapon.”104 Even if all the general, and nuclear weapons to its arsenal (estimated at 300) or a treaties and agreements signed by production in particular. potential increase of nearly 70 the United States and Russia (which Apparently, these concerns are well- percent.103 Put differently, China’s possess 95 percent of over 20,000 founded and reflect the growing main strategic constraint is not a nuclear warheads in the world) were indications that China is no longer shortage of nuclear weapons but a to be completely implemented, producing fissile material for shortage of adequate delivery and China could not ignore the fact that nuclear weapons and, moreover, has interception systems. they would still have a combined no intention of resuming nuclear arsenal of 7,500 warheads— production in the future. Most of To be sure, as we have seen, until equivalent to 1,600 million tons of China’s nuclear weapons factories the early 1990s, and unlike its TNT—and 1974 carrier vehicles. have reportedly closed down or other defense industries, China’s stopped operating. It appears that, nuclear industry output value was While primarily concerned by the in 1989, China’s uranium still predominantly military, nuclear arsenals of the United States enrichment facilities had begun a rather than civilian. and Russia, the Chinese have been process of conversion from military carefully watching other nuclear, or to civilian production, to provide The transfer of surplus nuclear potentially nuclear, threats. A low-enriched nuclear fuel both for resources and technology to civilian noteworthy example is Japan whose its own nuclear power stations and use, the greater decentralization of potential nuclear threat is double- for export. These two needs the civilian elements of China’s edged. On the one hand it not only possibly absorb China’s entire low- nuclear establishment, and its enjoys US nuclear protection (in a enriched uranium production increased exposure to the outside defensive as well as an offensive capacity, leaving no capacity for world, may have only marginally sense), also providing diversified producing weapon-grade high- affected China’s nuclear military support and services to US enriched uranium. Consequently, in programs or its capabilities. On the military–nuclear forces in the West 1991, China allegedly also decided contrary, it is quite possible that Pacific Ocean, now aimed at China to stop producing weapon-grade profits from the sale of civilian above all other targets. On the other plutonium in its Jiuquan, Baotou nuclear products, both at home and hand, especially since the early and Yibin facilities.102 abroad, have been used to invigorate 1990s, Japan has been blamed for military–nuclear production, which purchasing and accumulating large Yet, from the very beginning of its could have been affected by the stockpiles of uranium ores; for conversion policy Beijing has relative reduction in defense already activating a number of consistently reiterated that civilian expenditures. This had been one of uranium enrichment plants; for production would be undertaken the earliest incentives for China’s recovering plutonium through the only after satisfying military needs conversion policy. Also, the import reprocessing of nuclear waste so that defense production would of civilian nuclear technology, produced by its own 49 nuclear not be affected. Accordingly, the equipment and instruments, and the power reactors and also imported termination of fissile material greater interaction with the interna- from abroad; for exploring new production should not be regarded tional civilian nuclear scientific as nuclear fusion methods; and for as an irreversible process. At the well as commercial community using high-speed macrocomputers to same time it should be regarded as could, and probably would, benefit simulate all nuclear explosion an indication that China had already China’s nuclear weapons processes in three-dimensional space, produced a significant stockpile of development as well. thereby sidestepping the need for

30 B·I·C·C nuclear conversion

actual nuclear testing. Already Indeed, from the late 1970s and early allegedly tested their first neutron regarded as a ‘paranuclear state’ by 1980s onwards, while the PRC was bomb. “Over the next years, they international observers, Japan ‘converting’ its nuclear military achieved success in testing these and reportedly has all the key industry to civilian use, great other low-yield weapons.”111 components, including the quantitative—and especially qualita- detonation devices and missile tive—progress was made in its The ‘conversion’ of the military– technology, needed to make nuclear nuclear weapon program.108 In that nuclear industry to civilian use weapons, and could become nuclear period China conducted 27 of its 45 notwithstanding, there is no very quickly, perhaps within a nuclear tests, starting 1964 (see indication that the PRC is going year.105 Table 4),109 though the growing to give up development of nuclear international protests against weapons. In fact, development Beijing still insists that a nuclear nuclear testing, and especially may well be accelerated. confrontation is avoidable, yet Japan’s more recent decision to claims that a “nuclear environment” freeze its grant assistance to China, may emerge in the future battlefield, among other reasons, led Beijing, especially in relation to a first, to stop all atmospheric tests deterioration of local wars. “When (the last had been conducted on 16 countries possessing nuclear October 1980 while China’s official weapons and high-tech conventional announcement giving up nuclear weapons are involved in a war with testing in the atmosphere was made their conflicts intensified, the in March 1986); then to slow down possibility of using nuclear weapons its nuclear tests (for example, two cannot be ruled out. Nuclear had been conducted in 1995 and weaponry, therefore, is still a trump 1996, instead of the three predicted); card in the hands of nuclear and finally to join the CTBT. This nations.”106 International agreements was undoubtedly a difficult decision notwithstanding, the Chinese since China, one of the five nuclear believe that the scope of nuclear powers, had not managed to carry proliferation has been significantly out more than 45 tests, a little over 2 enlarged in recent years. Making percent of the total 2,035 nuclear nuclear weapons has become that tests, the same as the United much easier following the rapid Kingdom. This is why, before development of science and joining the CTBT, China wanted to technology as well as the gather as much nuclear data and disintegration of Moscow whose experience as possible. unemployed scientists and technicians have been ready to offer In addition to these nuclear tests, their services for sale abroad and nuclear weapon production whose supervision on domestic processes were improved; China’s nuclear manpower and hardware has first generation nuclear submarine eroded considerably. Under these was completed and tested;110 and the circumstances, nuclear deterrence design and development of all remains an important means to be strategic missile warheads was used particularly in high-tech local completed. Research and wars. Beijing’s Orwellian conclusion development of a new generation of is: “The stronger our national nuclear weapons began emphasizing defense muscle and the more miniaturization, maneuverability, sufficient our preparations for the penetration, safety, reliability, and high-tech warfare under the accuracy—essential requirements of condition of nuclear deterrence, the tactical nuclear weapons. It is only smaller the possibility of the break since the early 1980s that Beijing has out of nuclear wars.”107 begun to attach great importance to tactical nuclear weapons. While ‘conversion’ proceeded, much progress was made in this field and, on 19 December 1984, the Chinese

B·I·C·C 31 brief 10

Table 4: China’s nuclear weapons tests, 1964–1996

No. Date Yield Type No. Date Yield (KT) Type

1 16 Oct 1964 22 KT Tower blast 24 14 Oct 1978 ~ 20 KT Underground

2 14 May 1965 30 KT Air dropped 25 14 Dec 1978 ~ 20 KT Atmospheric

3 9 May 1966 200-300 KT Air dropped 26 13 Sep 1979 ? ?

4 27 Oct 1966 12 KT Missile 27 16 Oct 1980 0.2-1 MT Atmospheric

5 28 Dec 1966 122 KT Tower blast 28 5 Oct 1982 ? Underground

6 17 Jun 1967 3.3 MT Air dropped 29 4 May 1983 ? Underground

7 24 Dec 1967 15-25 KT Air dropped 30 6 Oct 1983 >20 KT Underground

8 27 Dec 1968 3 MT Air dropped 31 3 Oct 1984 4-8 KT Underground

9 22 Sep 1969 20-25 KT Underground 32 19 Dec 1984 Neutron? Underground

10 29 Sep 1969 3 MT Air dropped 33 5 Jun 1987 ? Underground

11 14 Oct 1970 3 MT Air dropped 34 29 Sep 1988 1-2 MT* Underground

12 18 Nov 1971 ~ 20 KT Atmospheric 35 26 May 1990 40 KT Underground

13 7 Jan 1972 ~ 20 KT Atmospheric 36 16 Aug 1990 50-200 KT Underground

14 18 Mar 1972 100-200 KT Atmospheric 37 21 May 1992 1 MT Underground

15 27 Jun 1973 2-3 MT Atmospheric 38 25 Sep 1992 50-300 KT Underground

16 17 Jun 1974 0.2-1 MT Atmospheric 39 5 Oct 1993 80-90 KT** Underground

17 26 Oct 1975 10-20 KT Underground 40 10 Jun 1994 10-40 KT Underground

18 23 Jan 1976 20 KT Atmospheric 41 7 Oct 1994 40-150 KT Underground

19 26 Sep 1976 20-200 KT Atmospheric 42 15 May 1995 40-150 KT Underground

20 17 Oct 1976 10-20 KT Underground 43 17 Aug 1995 20-80 KT Underground

21 17 Nov 1976 4 MT Atmospheric 44 8 Jun 1996 20-80 KT Underground

22 17 Sep 1977 ~ 20 KT Atmospheric 45 29 Jul 1996 Underground

23 15 Mar 1978 6-20 KT Atmospheric

Sources: Yen Chun, “Unmasking the Secrets of Communist China’s ‘Nuclear Counterattack’ Force,” Kuang Chiao Ching (Hong Kong), No. 282, 16 March 1996, pp. 32-37, in: FBIS-CHI, 10 April 1996, pp. 64-65; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 244-245.

Notes: KT – kilotons * Neutron bomb. MT – megatons ** According to other sources: 20-40 KT

32 B·I·C·C nuclear conversion

One indication is the growing Similarly, although Syria’s Chinese- strategic game indirectly used to Western, primarily American, made research reactor is very small mutually irritate the adversary, criticism of Beijing’s alleged and the deal had been concluded deter its unacceptable actions and contribution to the proliferation of indirectly through the IAEA, it still retaliate against them once taken. nuclear weapons. Such criticism had caused concern in Israel as well as in hardly emerged in Mao’s time, when the United States. Rejected initially, Apparently, China is indeed China’s nuclear program was the deal was approved in March careful not to engage in any predominantly military and hidden 1992 only after Syria, an NPT nuclear transfer of military value. from international inspection; in signatory since 1969, had signed a Yet unconfirmed reports suggest 1970, for example, China reportedly formal safeguard agreement with that such a transfer could take turned down Qadhafi’s request to IAEA. Nothing much has been place without the knowledge—let supply Libya with an atomic bomb. heard about this reactor which alone the approval—of the central Criticism has, however, emerged in could not have given Syria more leadership. the post-Mao period, when China’s than a rudimentary nuclear nuclear program is supposed to be capability. While explorations with Iraq had increasingly and predominantly been cut short by the early 1990s, civilian and is moreover exposed to Also, by the late 1980s, there had Iran is still a potential client, not to international inspection. Although been reports on China’s nuclear mention Pakistan.114 Over the years Beijing, which signed the NPT in assistance to Iraq, another NPT Beijing has been accused many times 1992, consistently denies that it has signatory, especially the supply of of providing Pakistan with nuclear provided any nuclear weapons or magnet rings and other components equipment, know-how and even a nuclear military technology and for high-speed centrifuges capable of ‘blueprint’ for a bomb or a warhead equipment to any country, producing highly enriched weapon- to be adapted to Pakistan’s Haft-1 circumstantial evidence indicates a grade uranium. Whatever the short-range missile. In late 1995, for growing interaction with a number reliability of these reports, China’s example, the ostensibly civilian of countries in the gray and fuzzy military relations with Iraq were state-owned China Nuclear Fuel borderline between military and suspended following the Gulf War. Corporation reportedly delivered civilian nuclear applications. There 5,000 ring magnets (worth no more are a number of examples.112 China has also been accused of than US $ 70,000) allegedly for supplying nuclear weapon and Pakistan’s uranium enrichment Algeria’s China-built nuclear uranium-enrichment know-how, plant at Kahuta which is off-limits research facility, discussed above, has technologies and equipment to Iran. for IAEA inspection. China may been suspected of serving military In 1992, Washington thwarted an have also helped Pakistan in its purposes. London’s Sunday Times attempt by Iran to acquire two plutonium-extraction facilities. Both alleged that, by the size of its small 20-megawatt research reactors activities and technologies are cooling chimneys, this must have from China and later almost forced clearly linked to a nuclear weapon been a much bigger 40-megawatt Beijing to suspend its agreement to program.115 nuclear reactor, potentially capable supply two nuclear power stations of producing up to 8kg of military to Iran. This US (and consequently Occasionally, China has been quality plutonium a year. Israeli) concern about China’s blamed for exporting sensitive Reiterating that the reactor was alleged involvement in Iran’s nuclear materials and for being used for civilian and peaceful nuclear military program often transferring dual-purpose research only, Algeria firmly refuted reflects political considerations technologies and equipment these allegations and, though it had rather than hard facts. For example, imported from Japan, Germany and not yet signed the NPT, offered to the Chinese cyclotron sold to Iran other European countries, to other submit the Chinese-made reactor to in the early 1990s turned out to be a destinations. Needless to say, Beijing regular IAEA supervision. Since an desk-top research model. It is has always categorically denied such inspection agreement was signed in inconceivable that China has any practices, underscoring the Chinese January 1992, little has been said or interest in Iran—or, for that matter, government’s strict control and heard about it. any other countries, including supervision with regard to end-users North Korea—becoming nuclear.113 and end use. “No Chinese company While its nuclear relations with Iran has ever violated its have primarily been motivated by commitment.”116 economic considerations, they have also been determined by political ones. In reflexive terms, Iran is Beijing’s proxy as much as Taiwan is Washington’s: both are pawns in a

B·I·C·C 33 brief 10

Conclusion

nuclear power station construction which would ultimately improve energy supply with less ecological Over the last forty years, China’s The gradual and rather slow process damage and in a cost-effective way, nuclear complex has undergone two of China’s nuclear conversion primarily in the south and processes. The first, from the mid- reflects not only a conceptual southeast. It is these civilian 1950s to the late 1970s, involved adaptation to the changing interna- achievements which had provided large-scale civilian-to-military tional situation but, moreover, the important incentives and paved the conversion. Hundreds of factories unique characteristics of China’s ground for Beijing’s agreement to and production lines; tens of military–nuclear complex. join various nuclear international thousands of workers, scientists, conventions culminating in the technicians and engineers; huge While sharing the same CTBT. This, however, does not amounts of funds, materials, disadvantages as other state-owned imply any Chinese awareness of its equipment, energy resources, defense enterprises (inefficiency, weakness or any plan to give up, or transportation facilities, and land lack of competition, waste of reduce, its nuclear military system. were indeed converted from civilian resources, over-employment, Dialectically, the fact that China has use to military use in order to unfamiliarity with the market, been willing to join these internatio- promote China’s nuclear weapon absolute dependence on state nal agreements and its military-to- program which was accorded the capital, etc.), China’s military– civilian conversion policies in highest priority. This enormous nuclear complex also suffers from general reflect China’s growing complex which, furthermore, was excessive secrecy, sense of self-confidence and extensively duplicated in the 1960s compartmentalization, sensitivity, awareness of its strength. and 1970s, created a vast surplus of isolation and limited experience in skilled manpower, R&D, and civilian applications of military production capacities which could technologies. not be fully utilized for military purposes. Recently, for example, the former Third Line Mianyang nuclear This process began to be reversed in facility in Sichuan, which had once the late 1970s, involving a gradual— been praised as a model of though equally large-scale— converting military enterprises to conversion, this time from military civilian production, was reportedly to civilian. This reverse drive had declared bankrupt. Thousands of its been motivated by intertwined workers demonstrated in protest domestic and international against the local government. Over considerations. On the one hand, the 100 were injured and 80 arrested.117 overall priority given to economic However, with a fresh start and growth and development called for based on its prestige and allegedly reactivating and greatly expanding higher technological standards, the underutilized human and some of these disadvantages have material capacity of China’s nuclear been transformed into advantages, complex. On the other hand, this leading the nuclear industry to process of diverting military impressive achievements in military- resources for civilian use was made to-civilian conversion. possible by the double assumption that China’s military–nuclear Due to the lack of precise, reliable program could be kept alive, and and consistent data, it is difficult to even modernized, if it were smaller, estimate the value of China’s nuclear and, secondly, that the perceived conversion in quantitative-economic threat had declined considerably by terms. Yet its quality is easier to the 1980s, and even more so by the assess, especially in the fields of early 1990s, following the agriculture, medicine, and nuclear disintegration of the Soviet Union. power. Using its military–nuclear technology and expertise, China has launched a long-term program of

34 B·I·C·C references

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B·I·C·C 35 brief 10

14 Sergei Goncharenko, “The 30 DZHGY, pp. 70-74, 569. Project, Carnegie Endowment Military Dimension of the Sino- for International Peace, 1995), pp. Soviet Split,” unpublished paper 31 CTDST, pp. 67-69; Lewis and 22-27. delivered at an international Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. conference on “New Evidence on 202, 209, 244. 37 CTDST, pp. 79-83, Lewis and the Cold War in Asia,” Hong Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. Kong, January 1996, pp. 32-33. 32 CTDST, pp. 232-235. According 201-206. For the harmful to Lewis and Xue, 300-500kt. implications of the Cultural 15 The peaceful use of atomic energy Revolution, including a namelist was included in the 12 key science 33 See also: Vipin Gupta, “Locating of persecuted scientists, see: and technology development Nuclear Explosions at the Wang, Chinese Communist tasks of China’s 12-Year Long- Chinese Test Site near Lop Nor,” Development, pp. 65-82. Term Plan (1956-1967). DZHGY, Science & Global Security, Vol. 5 pp. 16, 562. (1995), pp. 205-244. 38 DZHGY, p. 301. There are nevertheless enormous 16 CTDST, p. 28. See also: Stuart 34 CTDST, p. 188 and: Chiao differences. A submarine reactor Schram (Ed.), Mao Tse-tung Hui-piao, “An Unknown should be smaller, lighter, more Unrehearsed, Talks and Letters: Scientific City - Mianyang,” flexible, more tolerant to shock 1956-71 (Harmondsworth: Ta-kung Pao (Hong Kong), and vibration and especially safer Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 67-68. November 27, 1988, in Xue Litai, and more reliable. “Mao Zedong and China’s 17 Wang, Chinese Communist Nuclear Strategies and 39 Most of the information in this Development, p. 33. Capabilities,” unpublished paper paragraph is drawn from CTDST, delivered at an international pp. 321-331, DZHGY, pp. 301- 18 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the conference on “New Evidence on 307, 381-386, and: John Wilson Bomb, pp. 60-63. the Cold War in Asia,” Hong Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Kong, January 1996, p. 26, n. 46. Strategic Seapower: The Politics of 19 For the structure of China’s Force Modernization in the Nuclear nuclear establishment, see: Lewis 35 DZHGY, p. 73. For a general Age (Stanford: Stanford and Xue, pp. 46-59. background, see: Barry University Press, 1994), pp. 23-46. Naughton, “The Third Front: 20 CTDST, p. 29. Defence Industrialization in the 40 CTDST, pp. 92-95, 99-101, 321- Chinese Interior,” The China 337. 21 More details on China’s civilian Quarterly, No. 115 (September nuclear applications in: DZHGY, 1988), pp. 351-386, and: 41 DZHGY, pp. 68, 243, 306. pp. 318-320. “Industrial Policy during the Cultural Revolution: Military 42 Yingzhong Lu, Fueling One 22 Goncharenko, p. 33. Preparation, Decentralization, Billion: An Insider’s Story of and Leap Forward,” in: William Chinese Energy Policy 23 CTDST, pp. 41-42. A. Joseph, Christin P.W. Wong, Development (Washington: the and David Zweig (Eds.), New Washington Institute, 1993), p. 24 At the expense of a newly built Perspectives on the Cultural 57. aircraft factory. DZHGY, p. 168. Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 43 Information on the development 25 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the pp. 153-181. of China’s nuclear power stations Bomb, pp. 87-88. is from: DZHGY, pp. 79-97, 36 Data from: Lisbeth Gronlund, 572-582. 26 CTDST, p. 43. David Wright and Yong Liu, “China and a Fissile Material 44 Ibid., p. 574. 27 CTDST, pp. 44-45. Production Cut-off,” Survival, Vol 37, No. 4 (Winter 1995-96), p. 45 DZHGY, pp. 87, 201-203. 28 CTDST, pp. 48-52. 159; Leonard S. Spector and Mark G. McDonough, Mapping Prolif- 46 Mao, “On the Ten Major 29 CTDST, pp. 62, 182-186. eration, A Guide to the Spread of Relationships”. Nuclear Weapons in Maps and Charts (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Non-Proliferation

36 B·I·C·C references

47 John K. Leung and Michael Y.M. No. 10 (Taipei: Chinese Council 1996, pp. 18-19; Xinhua, 28 May Kau (Eds.), The Writings of Mao of Advanced Policy Studies, 1996, in: FBIS-CHI, 28 May 1996, Zedong, 1949-1976, Vol. II, 1995), pp. 5-6. p. 19. January 1956-December 1957 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 57 “Defense Production Technology 68 Cao, p. 62. 1992), p. 496. Helps Civilian Industries,” Xinhua, 27 December 1984, in: 69 For example, a new facility, the 48 Xue Litai, “Mao Zedong and JPRS-CST, 15 March 1985, Yunnan Nuclear Technology China’s Nuclear Strategies and pp. 54-55. Application Center, involving a Capabilities,” p. 6. total investment of 11.3 million 58 CTDST, p. 145. RMB and based on Canadian 49 For the background to China’s technology, has been completed conversion policy, see: Jörn 59 China’s entire nuclear industry in early 1997 in Kunming. Brömmelhörster and John employs over 300,000. Xinhua, 12 April 1996, in: FBIS- Frankenstein (Eds.), Mixed CHI, 12 April 1996, p. 32. Motives, Uncertain Outcomes: 60 Li Dingfan, “Status and Defense Conversion in China Development for the Peaceful 70 On the construction of this base (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, Uses of Nuclear Energy and area, see: DZHGY, pp. 52-53, 1997). See also: Yitzhak Shichor, Nuclear Technology,” paper 260-263. Military-to-Civilian Conversion: presented at the International from the 1980s to the 1990s, Conference on the Conversion of 71 More details in: Lewis and Xue, Working Paper No. 142 China’s Military Industries, China Builds the Bomb, (Canberra: Peace Research Beijing, June 1995, pp. 8-9 pp. 140-155. Center, Research School of (hereafter: Li). Pacific Studies, Australian 72 This and the following paragraph National University, 1993); Paul 61 Cao, p. 59; Xinhua, 10 January are based on: Sun Ninghai and Humes Folta, From Swords to 1996, in: FBIS-CHI, 24 January Wu Yu, “Opening Up the Mind Plowshares? Defense Industry 1996, pp. 23-24; Xinhua, 30 and Turning Sword into a Reform in the PRC (Boulder, January 1996, in: FBIS-CHI, 30 Plowshare - On a Visit to China’s Col.: Westview Press, 1992). January 1996, p. 31; Xinhua, 13 First Retired Nuclear Weapons June 1996, in: FBIS-CHI, 13 June Research and Development Base,” 50 The following discussion is based 1996, p. 19. Xinhua, 11 July 1995, in FBIS- on Cao Shixin (Ed.), Zhongguo CHI, 28 July 1995, pp. 14-15; Junzhuanmin [China’s Military- 62 DZHGY, p. 96; China Daily, Xinhua, 19 July 1995, in: FBIS- to-Civilian Conversion] (Beijing: 10.1.95, p. 5 (hereafter: CD); CHI, 19 July 1995, pp. 54-55, and: Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, Xinhua, 22 December 1995, in: Xinhua, 29 December 1995, in: 1994), pp. 53-65 (hereafter: Cao), FBIS-CHI, 2 January 1996, pp. 30- FBIS-CHI, 2 January 1996, p. 39. translated in FBIS-CHI, 27 July 31. 1995, pp. 27-33, and on DZHGY, 73 Although China’s nuclear pp. 79-97. 63 Cao, p. 55; Lin, p. 14; Folta, pp. program had been launched in the 222-223. mid-1950s, it was only in 1981 51 Cao, p. 54. that systematic radiation 64 CD, 10.1.95, p. 5; Xinhua, 4 assessment began, within an 80km 52 Wang Ganchang, “Wo Guo January 1996, in: FBIS-CHI, 5 perimeter from each facility. The Hekexue Jishu de Fazhan,” January 1996, p. 14. total annual average collective [China’s Nuclear Science and effective doze equivalent emitted Technology Development], in: 65 DZHGY, pp. 255-256. by the nuclear industry has been HGZW, p. 198. found to be less than 0.01 percent 66 For a detailed discussion of of that from natural radiation and 53 DZHGY, p. 80; Cao, p. 54. China’s Isotope and other nuclear far below the detriment resulted technologies application, see: from non-nuclear industries. Pan 54 DZHGY, pp. 232-236. DZHGY, pp. 317-353. Ziqiang et al., Zhongguo Hegongye Sanshinian Fushe Huanjing 55 CTDST, p. 157. 67 Xinhua, 4 January 1996, in: FBIS- Zhiliang Pingjia [Radiological CHI, 5 January 1996, p. 15; China Quality Assessment of China’s 56 DZHGY, pp. 578-581. For more Radio International, 6 February Nuclear Industry over the Past 30 details see: Chong-Pin Lin, 1996, in: FBIS-CHI, 7 February Years] (Beijing: Yuanzineng China’s Nuclear Industry Under Chubanshe, 1990). Economic Reforms, CAPS paper

B·I·C·C 37 brief 10

74 For example: Lu, Fueling One 78 DZHGY, p. 577. Cooperation and Investment with Billion, p. 56. See also: Tai Hwan Enterprises of China’s Defense Lee, Politics of Energy Policy in 79 The drafting group was headed Industry, Vol. 1 (Beijing: The Post-Mao China (Seoul: Asiatic by Yingzhong Lu himself. See Lu, China Association for Peaceful Research Center, Korea Fueling One Billion, pp. 58-59. Use of Military Industrial University, 1995), pp. 135-150. Technology, 1993), p. 30. 80 DZHGY, pp. 86-87, 201-203. For a 75 Cao, p. 64. survey of China’s nuclear power 86 Ching Chi Tao Pao (Hong Kong), stations, see: Peter D. Dresser 22 January 1996, p. 17, in: FBIS- 76 Wu Jun and Tang Hua, “Nuclear (Ed.), Nuclear Power Plants CHI, 2 February 1996, p. 19; Power: A New Dragon Head of Worldwide (Detroit: Gale Xinhua, 6 May 1996, in: FBIS- China’s Nuclear Industry,” Research Inc., 1993), pp. 169-175. CHI, 8 May 1996, pp. 21-22; Liaowang, No. 51 (19 December Xinhua, 11, 17 June 1996, in: 1994), pp. 15-17, in: FBIS-CHI, 5 81 Zhao Xiyuan, “Qinshan Nuclear FBIS-CHI, 19 June 1996, pp. 29, January 1995, pp. 26-30. See also: Power Station - The Start of 75; South China Morning Post, 7 James Reardon-Anderson, China’s Peaceful Use of Atomic July 1996, p. 3; Xinhua, 14 July “Nuclear Power Policy Debate in Energy,” Renmin Ribao Overseas 1996, in: FBIS-CHI, 15 July 1996, Mainland China, 1978-1986,” Edition, 25 December 1995, p. 3 p. 8. Issues and Studies, Vol. 23, No. 10 in: FBIS-CHI, 22 February 1996, (October 1987), pp. 34-50; pp. 18-21; Xinhua, 16 January 87 Quoted in Suttmeier and Evans, Richard P. Suttmeier and Peter 1996, in: FBIS-CHI, 25 January p. 17. C. Evans, “China Goes Nuclear,” 1996, pp. 19-20 and Xinhua, 18 The China Business Review, Vol. January 1996, in: FBIS-CHI, 23 88 Xinhua, 3 April 1996, in: FBIS- 23, No. 5 (September-October January 1996, pp. 23-24. CHI, 3 April 1996, p. 7. 1996), pp. 16-21; David Fridley, “China’s Energy Outlook,” in: 82 For background and the 89 DZHGY, pp. 214-215. Joint Economic Committee, negotiations process, see: Dori Congress of the United States Jones, “South China Project: 90 Lu, Fueling One Billion, pp. 59-60. (Ed.), China’s Economic Dilem- China’s First Nuclear Plant,” The mas in the 1990s: The Problems of China Business Review, No. 1 91 Xinhua, 8 April 1996, in: FBIS- Reforms, Modernization, and (January-February 1981), pp. 37- CHI, 19 April 1996, pp. 31-32; Interdependence (Armonk, NY: 40. Xinhua, 1 July 1996, in: FBIS- M.E. Sharpe, 1992), pp. 495-526, CHI, 1 July 1996, pp. 32-33. and Dori Jones, “Why China 83 Xinhua, 19 January 1996, in: FBIS- Wants Nuclear Power,” The CHI, 25 January 1996, pp. 17-18; 92 DZHGY, pp. 458-459. Tokamak China Business Review, No. 1 CTDST, 163-164; Lin, 11-13. On is a device for producing power (January-February 1981), pp. 34- safety problems see, for example: through controlled 35. Hongkong Standard, 20 January thermonuclear fusion. 1996, p. 1; South China Morning 77 DZHGY, p. 577. For a discussion Post, 23 January 1996, p. 3, and 93 Xinhua, 12 June 1996, in: FBIS- of the debate in the late 1970s and Eastern Express (Hong Kong), 20 CHI, 13 June 1996, p. 19. early 1980s, see: Dori Jones, March 1996, p. 4.. “Nuclear Power: Back on the 94 Xinhua, 10 April 1996, in: FBIS- Agenda,” The China Business 84 CD, 10.1.95, p. 1; Xinhua, 2 June CHI, 24 April 1996, p. 35; Review, No. 1 (January-February 1996, in: FBIS-CHI, 3 June 1996, Xinhua, 22 May 1996, in: FBIS- 1981), pp. 32-35, and Gerard p. 46; Zhejiang Ribao, 3 June 1996, CHI, 22 May 1996, p. 3, and Gourievidis (who was Nuclear p. 1, in: FBIS-CHI, 8 July 1996, Xinhua, 23 May 1996, in: FBIS- Counsellor at the French pp. 53-55. CHI, 28 May 1996, pp. 18-19. Embassy in China), “Le nucleaire en Chine,” Revue Generale 85 Zhongguo Xinwen She, 22 95 Xinhua, 7 February 1996, in: Nucleaire, No. 4 (July-August January 1996, in: FBIS-CHI, 24 FBIS-CHI, 9 February 1996, p. 8; 1984), pp. 358-368, translated in January 1996, p. 39; Dai Shuang, Xinhua, 5 June 1996, in: FBIS- JPRS-CST, 20 February 1985, pp. “For the Realization of Home- CHI, 11 June 1996, p. 39. 103-128. See also: Lin, “China’s Made Nuclear Fuel Component,” Nuclear Industry under Jiefangjun Bao, 4 March 1996, in 96 Washington Post, 17 November Economic Reforms”. FBIS-CHI, 13 March 1996, pp. 45- 1992. 46. See also: Jin Zhude (Chief Ed.), Guide to International

38 B·I·C·C references

97 Jonathan Reynhold, “China’s 105 For example: Liao Xinan and Goldstein (Ed.), Fresh Perspectives Cautious New Pragmatism in Sang Zhonglin, “A Potential on Sino-Israeli Relations, 1948- the Middle East,” Survival, Vol. Nuclear Power: Japan,” Bingqi 1998, forthcoming. 38, No. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. Zhishi [Ordnance Knowledge], 106-109. No. 6 (15 November 1995), pp. 114 On China’s nuclear relations 14-15, in: FBIS-CHI, 5 February with Pakistan, see, for example: 98 Yiftah Shapir, “Proliferation of 1996, pp. 4-6; Chu Shulong and Ashok Kapur, Pakistan’s Nuclear Nonconventional Weapons in Yang Bojiang, “U.S. Protection Development (London: Croom the Middle East,” in: Shlomo and Japan’s Nuclear Inclinations,” Helm, 1987), especially pp. 244- Gazit and Zeev Eitan (Eds.), The Renmin Ribao, 20 June 1996, p. 6, 249; B.K. Kumar, “Nuclear Nexus Middle East Military Balance 1993- in: FBIS-CHI, 25 June 1996, pp. Between Peking and Islamabad: 1994 (Tel Aviv: the Jaffe Center 11-13. See also: Selig S. Harrison An Overview of Some Significant for Strategic Studies, 1994), pp. (Ed.), Japan’s Nuclear Future: The Developments,” Issues and Studies, 223-224, 235-236. Plutonium Debate and East Asian Vol. 21, No. 8 (August 1985), pp. Security (Washington: the 140-150; Wahab Siddiqui, “Sino- 99 New York Times, 7 August 1994. Carnegie Endowment, 1996). Pak Nuclear Accord,” Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1986), 100 R. Bates Gill, Chinese Arms 106 Wu Jianguo, “The Nuclear pp. 53-59. Transfers: Purposes, Patterns, and Shadow in High-Tech Warfare Prospects in the New World Order Cannot Be Ignored.” 115 Economist, 18.5.96, pp. 59-60; (Westport: Praeger, 1992), pp. International Herald Tribune, 11, 112-113. 107 Ibid. 13, 15 May 1996.

101 Li Bin, “Civilian Products 108 See, for example: Colonel John 116 Xinhua, 12 April 1996, in: FBIS- Account for the Greater Part of Caldwell and Alexander T. CHI, 12 April 1996, p. 1. Products Turned Out by Lennon, “China’s Nuclear Nuclear Industry in China,” Modernization Program,” 117 Zhongyang Ribao (Central Daily, Xinhua, 10 January 1996, in: Strategic Review, Vol. XXIII, No. Taibei), 19 July 1997, p. 7. FBIS-CHI, 24 January 1996, p. 24. 4 (Fall 1995), pp. 27-37.

102 For more information and 109 More details in: Robert S. Norris, sources, see: Gronlund, Wright “French and Chinese Nuclear and Liu, pp. 150-151; Alastair Weapon Testing,” Security Iain Johnston, “Prospects for Dialogue, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1996), Chinese Nuclear Force pp. 48-50. Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral 110 “Nuclear Submarines - The Arms Control,” The China Decisive Force in Gaining Sea Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996), p. Supremacy,” Jianchuan Zhishi 562; and David Albright, Frans [Naval and Merchant Ships], No. Berkhout and William Walker, 9 (8 September 1995), pp. 8-9, in: Plutonium and Highly Enriched FBIS-CHI (29 January 1996), pp. Uranium 1997 (SIPRI: Oxford 27-29. University Press, 1997), pp. 76- 78, 126-130, 358-360. 111 Xue, 13-14, 25-26.

103 “China and Fissile Material,” pp. 112 The following discussion is based 150-151, and Johnston, Ibid. on: Yiftah Shapir, “Proliferation of Nonconventional Weapons in 104 These paragraphs are based on: the Middle East,” pp. 223-236. See Major General Wu Jianguo, “The also: Gill. Nuclear Shadow in High-Tech Warfare Cannot Be Ignored,” 113 For a full discussion of China’s Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [China nuclear relations with the Middle Military Science], No. 4 (20 East, see: Yitzhak Shichor, “The November 1995), pp. 107-109, in: Chinese Factor in the Middle FBIS-CHI, 18 April 1996, East Security Equation: An pp. 37-41. Israeli Perspective,” in: Jonathan

B·I·C·C 39 brief 10

List of Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations

ASDEX Advanced controlled nuclear fusion experimental device

CANDU Canadian deuterium-uranium reactor

CAS Chinese Academy of Science

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CMC Central Military Commission

CNEIC China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (also called CNNC)

CNIGC China Nuclear Industry General Corporation

CNNC China National Nuclear Corporation (also called CNEIC)

COSTIND Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense

COSTND Commission of Science and Technology for National Defense

CSC Special Commission of the CCP Central Committee

CTBT Comprehensive [Nuclear] Test Ban Treaty

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

INP Institute of Nuclear Power

MMB Ministry of Machine Building

MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

NDIO National Defense Industry Office

NPC National People’s Congress

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PRC People’s Republic of China

RIMP Research Institute of Modern Physics

RMB Renminbi (currency of the People’s Republic of China)

40 B·I·C·C bibliography

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B·I·C·C 43 brief 10

Annex:

CIAE has eight research China’s Converted institutes, over 50 research offices, five pilot-plants, the ‘Beijing Atomic Energy High Military–Nuclear Technology Development Company’, joint ventures including the ‘Beijing Enterprises: Shuangyuan Isotope Technology Company’ and ‘Beijing Keyuan Food Additives Technology Development Company’, Selected List laboratories, a foreign affairs office, an overseas engineering projects office, and various research and testing centers. 1. China’s Institute for Radia- Services include providing comprehensive environment tion Protection (CIRP) Its 4,500 employees, of which 67 evaluation, technologies for percent are scientific staff, include Founded in 1961, CIRP’s harnessing radioactivity and over 900 high-level research predecessor—the North China industrial waste, biochemical workers, over 1,000 engineers and Research Institute for Industrial preparations, bio-engineering and nearly 1,000 assistant engineers. Hygiene—was created in 1962 tissue culture techniques, through the merging of the immunodiagnosis medical kits, Services include application of Beijing Research Institute for techniques for radiation nuclear energy and radiation, Industrial Hygiene, the Taiyuan sterilization and processing, etc. development and application of North China Nuclear Research energy-saving products, environ- Institute, and the Shanxi Products include various mental science and environmental Radiation Medicine Research dosimeters, continuous protection, biological Institute. environment monitors, aerosol engineering, etc. sampling machines, rock stratum CIRP has eleven research offices stress gauges for earthquake and Products include high polymer (labor hygiene and occupational landslide forecasts, radon materials, new medicines, food disease; radiation dosemetry; education meters, nucleon scales, additives, fine chemicals, isotope radioactive organisms; and various medicines and and related instruments and measurement methods; electronic medical kits. meters, electronic components technology; radiation medicine; and devices, heavy water research radioactive waste disposal; Location: Taiyuan City, Shanxi reactors, cyclotrons, electronic application of nuclear techniques; Province. irradiation accelerators, protection and nuclear safety; radioactive solutions, sterile etc.), six administrative and 2. China Institute of Atomic generators, etc. service centers for radiation Energy (CIAE) protection, a computer service Location: China Nuclear Town, and equipment center, a technical Founded in 1950 as the Modern Tuoli, southwest Beijing. safety office, an editorial office of Physics Research Institute under books and information, hospitals, the Academy of Sciences, it was factories, etc. renamed Nuclear Energy Research Institute in 1958 after Its 1,160 employees include 856 launching a heavy water research scientists and technicians, 175 reactor and a cyclotron, and senior scientists and technicians, renamed yet again the China and 267 assistant research fellows. Institute of Atomic Energy in 1984. It has played a key role in China’s military–nuclear program.

44 B·I·C·C annex

3. Air Survey Remote Sensing ERINT has an engineering Location: Jiukeshu, Tongxian Center of Nuclear Industry technical center for purification County, Beijing. (ASRSC) filters and research offices for magnetic materials, powder 6. No. 2 Research and Design Founded in 1963, it is a multi- products, metal dust, electronic Institute of the Nuclear purpose organization of pastes, and compound materials. Industry production and scientific research for air survey, remote sensing Products include magnetic rings, Since its establishment in 1958 as application techniques, filter equipment and materials, the Beijing Nuclear Engineering computers , mapping and shaft casings, diamond blades and Research and Design Institute demarcation with radioactive grinding equipment and liquids, (BINE), it has completed the instruments. and a variety of welding and design of over 500 engineering other pastes. projects and over 1,260 scientific ASRSC has five special research projects including departments, China’s largest air Its 528 employees include 207 China’s first batch of nuclear survey team, remote sensing scientists and technicians of industry factories and bases, and technology application center, whom 44 are senior engineers. has “played an important role in radioactive survey measuring the successful development of station, and ‘special Location: Jiading County, China’s atomic bombs, hydrogen organizations.’ Shanghai. bombs and nuclear submarines.” Following the withdrawal of the Its 660 employees include 100 5. Beijing Research Institute of Soviet advisers in 1960, it was senior engineers and over 300 Chemical Engineering and assigned by the Second MMB to engineers and technicians of Metallurgy (BRICEM) work on a simplified installation various disciplines. for the production of uranium Founded in 1958 as the Beijing hexafluoride. Services include prospecting and Research Institute of Uranium appraisal of minerals; surveying Ore Dressing and Smelting, it BINE’s activities include nuclear and appraisal of urban planning, provided many technological reactor physics, reactor engineering, environmental and designs and services for China’s protection, environmental disaster geology; mapping and uranium processing plants. protection, waste disposal, analysis of land utilization; machine-building, automatic various kinds of satellite remote BRICEM has over 1,000 control, instruments and meters, sensing image processing, and employees including more than computers, geological optical, photochemical and 230 senior engineers and more prospecting, heating and computer image processing, etc. than 300 engineers. ventilation, power supply, etc. Products include various kinds of polyurethane Its main technologies are ore Its 2,035 employees include 1,678 dressing, hydrometallurgy, fine engineers and technicians, among Location: Shijiazhuang City, chemistry, organic material them 762 senior engineers. Hebei Province. synthesis, analysis and testing, environmental protection and Services include the research and 4. Eighth Research Institute of waste disposal, and the extraction design of nuclear power plants, Nuclear Industry (ERINT) and separation of individual rare nuclear heat supply, nuclear earth elements, including gold. reactors, radioactive laboratories Founded in May 1963, it deals and irradiation techniques. It has with special materials under the Main products include special also designed factories, more than Nuclear Fuels Bureau of CNNC. ion-exchange resin, ion 70 breweries, more than 20 small- An integrated complex of chromatographs, flocculants, and medium-size thermal power scientific research, technology various extractants, industrial plants, and over 70 civil and trade, it is mainly responsible acid meters, infrared moisture engineering projects including for research of applied techniques meters, hondrometers, solid state hotels, theaters, schools, waste and technical development and reference electrodes, pyrogenic disposal projects, department manufactures new products for decomposed graphite products, stores, apartment buildings, civilian use. and standard solutions. hospitals, and office buildings.

B·I·C·C 45 brief 10

BINE has set up agencies in services, assisted inland nuclear Location: East Lake New and Shenzhen, Beidaihe, and Hainan, industry enterprises in adopting High Technology Development as well as a number of new technologies and modern Zone, Wuhan City. subsidiaries, such as BINE New management and marketing Technology Development civilian products, and developed 9. Gansu Huayuan Enterprise Company, BINE Cleaning real estate and industrial parks. Corporation (GHEC) Technology Development Company, BINE Water Supply Location: Shenzhen City, Founded in 1958 as the Jiuquan and Sewage Development Com- Guangdong Province. Integrated Atomic Energy pany and the BINE Automatic Enterprise (for producing and Control Technology Institute. 8. Research Institute of processing plutonium and Nuclear Power Operations uranium hexafluoride and the Location: Huchengmenwai, (RINPO) final nuclear weapons assembly), Haidian District, Beijing. GHEC is one of China’s first Founded in April 1982, RINPO large-scale integrated nuclear 7. Shenzhen Kaili Industrial operates directly under the energy complexes under CNNC. Development Corporation administration of CNNC. It is (SKIDC) China’s only scientific research In addition to its headquarters in unit for studies of nuclear power Lanzhou it has agencies in Founded in 1990, SKIDC operation techniques, combining Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen; operates directly under the military with civilian projects. Its the Lanzhou Radiation administration of CNNC as its main task include ensuring safe, Technology Development ‘window’ in Shenzhen. It deals economic, stable and efficient Center; the Shijiazhuang Radia- mainly with the development, operations of nuclear power tion Technology Development production and marketing of plants, undertaking relevant Center; and the Shanhaiguan various high technology projects research and experimentation, Industry Company and the and products such as computers, providing technical service and Shanhaiguan Multiple-Producing machinery and electronics, support for the building and Factory in Qinhuangdao, Hebei pharmaceuticals, and fine operation of nuclear power Province. By 1993, GHEC had 15 chemicals—based on “the overall plants, and performing admin- subsidiary plants and companies superiority” of China’s nuclear istrative functions for their with a total of 33 production industry and promoting the building and running. RINPO is lines, producing 77 products. transfer of military–nuclear also responsible for designing, technologies to civilian use. testing and developing steam Of its nearly 10,000 employees, generators for nuclear power 26 percent are technicians of Based in Shenzhen, SKIDC has installations. whom 13 percent are high level branch offices and industrial bases and 30 percent medium level. in Bao’an County and Daya Bay, RINPO has nine units engaged in Guangdong; agencies in Beijing, technical research and Its products include intelligent Shanghai and Guangzhou, and 27 production: Research and automatic fire alarm systems, enterprises. Appraisal Center for Nuclear tritium products, multi- Operations; Research Center for functional ray absorbers, nuclear In the first three years since its Nuclear Power Emulation lamps, nuclear radiation establishment, SKIDC has Techniques; Nuclear Power In- application and food preservation managed to develop aeroplasma Service Testing Center; Nuclear techniques, nuclear instruments cutting machines, a macro Power Training Center; Quality and meters, one-shot injectors, information management card Control and Supervision Center; infusers, and insecticides and system, and a six-color computer CNNC Nuclear Accidents germicides. It has also been embroidering machine. It has also Emergency Technical Support engaged in a number of projects organized military industrial Center; Nuclear Power Equip- such as a production line for units in undertaking civil ment Research and Design Office; anhydrous cupric sulfate powder, engineering projects and labor Information Study Reference a high grade titanium white Room; and Pilot Factory. plant, and a citric acid project.

Over 75 percent of its 460 Location: Lanzhou City, Gansu employees are technicians, Province. including 130 high-level technicians.

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10. Research Institute of 11. China Zhongyuan Foreign Factory, Jianzhong Physio- Uranium Mining (RIUM) Engineering Corporation Chemical Research Institute, and (CZEC) Jianzhong Designing Institute. It Founded in 1962 as the Hengyang has agencies in Beijing, Shanghai, Uranium Mining and Metallurgy Founded in the early 1980s, Hainan, Chengdu, and Design and Research Academy, CZEC undertakes engineering Chongqing and its own means of its more recent multi-disciplinary contracts in the fields of geology, transportation including railway concerns focus on developing mining, surveying and designing, lines. techniques for the dipping and construction and installation, surfacing of such non-ferrous complete plants and material Its nearly 10,000 employees, metals as uranium, gold and supply. It also provides research including more than 2,300 copper. and consulting services and the engineers, technicians and other dispatching of various kinds of specialists, among them 340 RIUM has seven research offices: labor force abroad; running joint senior engineers. mining, mining geology, ventures and foreign-funded ventilation and labor protection, enterprises, and handles export JCIC’s products include nuclear mining electronics and machine- and import of various fuel, high purity non-ferrous building, electronic instruments commodities. metals (such as lithium and and meters, chemical and physio- calcium alloys, lithium salts, chemical tests, and scientific and CZEC has branch offices or lithium batteries, marble and technical information. It also has representative organizations in granite slabs, table tops and arts a plasma-cutter producing the United States, Europe, North and crafts, essential oils and factory, a radioactivity Africa, the Middle East, perfumes, lifts, medical supplies, measurement station and over 30 Southeast Asia and Hong Kong regenerated PVC leather, pure laboratories and Macao. silk and silk goods, liquors

It has 533 employees of whom Location: Haidian District, Location: Yibin City, Sichuan 337 (or 67 percent) are Beijing. Province. technicians. 12. Jianzhong Chemical 13. Huaguang Industry Products include bi-directional Industry Corporation (JCIC) Corporation (HIC) stone-cutting machines, micro- electrical carryload scrapers, arc- Originally founded in 1965, JCIC A possible facility for enriching shaped bulldozers, traveling is an industrial-commercial uranium to weapons grade, HIC hoisting machines, radioactivity company dealing with is now engaged in civilian and radio measuring instruments production, scientific research, production and has a number of and meters, hydraulic test designing, and domestic and departments including instruments, and various testing foreign trade. production and planning, devices. RIUM also offers air personnel, finance, and plasma-cutting techniques (for Its subsidiaries include the Yibin marketing. In addition to its stainless steel, copper, aluminum, Nuclear Fuel Component Hanzhong headquarters with its cast iron, and carbon steel), Factory (used for producing and own railway and highway lines, it solvent method uranium mining processing plutonium for nuclear has agencies in Beijing, Shanghai technologies, heap leaching weapons and now supplying the and Xi’an. technologies for uranium, gold Qinshan and Daya Bay nuclear and copper, various power plants with low-enriched Its 3,030 employees including 400 transportation technologies, uranium), Haikou Jianzhong technicians provide the following smelting and processing Perfurmery Industrial and services: technical development technology and equipment, and Commercial Company, and transformation of related ventilation and dust-removing Metallurgical and Chemical technologies; the designing, techniques for factories and mines Branch Factory, Chengdu construction and machining for (used, for example, by a number Jianzhong Lithium Battery civil engineering projects of of cigarette factories). Factory, Chengdu Jianzhong average industries; physico- Marble Factory, Jianzhong chemical analysis; environmental Location: Hengyang City, Hunan Perfumery, Jianzhong Elevator appraisals; waste disposal and Province. Works, Jianzhong Xinghua technical training. Industry Company, Jianzhong Silk Factory, Jianzhong Liquor

B·I·C·C 47 brief 10

HIC’s products include micro- 15. Nuclear Industry Sources: Jin Zhude (Chief Ed.), computer ionmeters, Physiochemical Engineering Guide to International Cooperation homogenizers, high-precision Research Institute and Investment with Enterprises of electric compensators, high-grade China’s Defense Industry, Vol. I cosmetics, soaps and detergents, A comprehensive applied (Beijing: The China Association for and a variety of drinks, such as technology research organization, Peaceful Use of Military Industrial fiveleaf tea, tea-bags, and cola. it was known as of 1961 as the Technology, 1993), pp. 1-36; John Gaseous Diffusion Laboratory for Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Location: Hanzhong City, Uranium Isotope Separation of Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford Shaanxi Province. the Institute of Atomic Energy, University Press, 1988). and in 1963 became the Tianjin 14. Wuzhou Industry Corpora- Physics and Chemistry Engineer- tion (WIC) ing Academy. In the late 1960s it was engaged by the Second MMB Founded in 1969, WIC is an in research on the technologies of inter-provincial and multi- gaseous diffusion for weapon- industrial enterprise integrating grade enriched uranium. Since the production, management, 1980s it has applied its military scientific research, and training technology to civilian personnel. production.

It has more than a dozen An affiliate of the China Nuclear subsidiaries including an Industrial Corporation, the electrolytic aluminum factory, a institute has 11 research offices thermal power plant, a water specializing in basic theories, works, the Hefei Fiber Spinning laser, chemicals, machinery, and Weaving General Plant, an automation, new materials, aluminum processing plant, a physiochemical analysis, and cement works, a machine- information. It also operates building factory, and a three workshops and the transportation department. The management departments. Guangxing Aluminum Company is a joint venture. WIC also has Its 800 researchers and technical business departments or agencies personnel undertake appraisals of in Beijing, Shanghai, Hefei and environmental impact, control of Chengdu. industrial waste, and treatment of radiated matters. WIC’s more than 7,800 employees include 275 medium Main products include super-pure level and 64 senior engineers and metal filter systems, oil technicians. submerged electric pumps, air pressure crushers, automatic Its main products include alumi- watering machines, automatic num ingots, aluminum wire rods control systems for flour mills, and coils, Portman cement, monosodium fluoride, fluoride diamond saws, PVC resin doors electron gas, frequency variable and windows, industrial gases, speed governors, colliders, speed and various medicines and reduction machines, revolving jet medical kits. pumps, and various meters.

Location: Chengdu City, Location: Hedong District, Sichuan. Tianjin

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B·I·C·C 49 brief 10

Publications

brief 2: Anke Habich, Werner Voß und BICC series such as brief, report report 6: Peter Wilke, Abhängigkeit der and paper are published either in Petra Opitz, Krisenmanagement in Werften im Ostseeraum von der English (with a German summary) der russischen Rüstungsindustrie - Rüstungsproduktion [Dependence of or in German (with an English Regionale und unternehmens- Shipyards in the Baltic Sea Region on summary). bezogene Konversionsstrategien Defense Production], March 1995 [Crisis Management in the Russian report 1: Defense Industry], October 1995. brief 3: Edward J. Laurance and Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, with the assistance report 7: Herbert Wulf (eds.), Coping with of Joseph DiChiaro III, Corinna Hauswedell, Paul Surplus Weapons: A Priority for Conversion and the Integration of Klemmer and Herbert Wulf (Hg.), Conversion Research and Policy, Economic and Security Dimensions, Konversion - Herausforderung für June 1995 January 1995 Wissenschaft und Forschung (Konferenzdokumentation) brief 4: report 2: [Conference proceedings], December Kees Kingma and Vanessa Sayers, Nicola Mögel, Thomas Sachse und 1995 Demobilization in the Horn of Hans-Henning Schröder, Chancen Africa, Proceedings of the IRG und Probleme der Rüstungs- report 8: Workshop, Addis Ababa, 4-7 konversion in der Gemeinschaft Ulrike Lindemann and JØrgen December 1994, June 1995 Unabhängiger Staaten: Konversions- Klußmann, Konversion militäri- profile ausgewählter Regionen - scher Liegenschaften - Eine weltweite brief 5: Nizhnij Novgorod, Republik Herausforderung, Konferenz- Werner Voß and Michael Brzoska, Udmurtien, Ekaterinenburg, reportage [Base Closures—A Global Eurofighter 2000: Consequences and Republik Belarus [Problems and Challenge, Conference proceedings], Alternatives, February 1996 Prospects of Defense Conversion in Oktober 1996 the Commonwealth of Independent brief 6: States: Conversion Profiles of report 9: Michael Renner, Cost of Selected Re-gions—Nizhnii Jörn Brömmelhörster, Disarmament: An Overview of the Novgorod, Udmurtiya, KONVER II: Konversionsförderung Economic Costs of the Yekaterinburg, and Belarus], March durch die Europäische Union/ Dismantlement of Weapons and the 1995 Fostering of Conversion by the Disposal of Military Surplus, March European Union, March 1997 1996. report 3: Joseph DiChiaro III (ed.), report 10: brief 7: Conversion of the Defense Industry Ksenia Gonchar, Research and Edward J. Laurance, The New Field in Russia and Eastern Europe, Development (R&D) Conversion in of Micro-Disarmament: Addressing Proceedings of the BICC/CISAC Russia, May 1997 the Proliferation and Buildup of Workshop on Conversion, 10-13 Small Arms and Light Weapons, August 1994, April 1995 report 11: August 1996 Keith Cunningham, Base Closure report 4: and Redevelopment in Central and brief 8: Keith Cunningham and Andreas Eastern Europe, July 1997 Pawel Wieczorek and Katarzyna Klemmer, Restructuring the US Zukrowska, Conversion in Poland: Military Bases in Germany: Scope, brief 1: The Defense Industry and Base Impacts and Opportunities, Ksenia Gonchar, Redevelopment, November 1996 June 1995 Yevgeny Kuznetsov and Alexander Ozhegov, brief 9: report 5: Conversion of the Post-Soviet Greg Bischak, US Conversion after Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma and Defense Industry: Implications for the Cold War, 1990-1997, Lessons for Herbert Wulf (eds.), Military Russian Economic Development, Forging a New Conversion Policy, Conversion for Social Development, February 1995 July 1997 July 1995

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brief 10: paper 8: books: Yitzhak Shichor, Peaceful Fallout: Denise Spencer, Demobilization and China’s Military Nuclear Complex to Reintegration in Central America, Michael Brzoska and Werner Voss Civilian Use, October 1997 March 1997 (eds.), Auswirkungen und Alternati- ven des Eurofighter 2000 paper 1: paper 9: [Consequences and Alternatives of the Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma and Stacy Larsen, An Overview of Eurofighter 2000], Nomos Verlag, Herbert Wulf, Demilitarization and Defense Conversion in the Ukraine, Baden-Baden, 1996 Conversion, World Social Summit, June 1997 Copenhagen, March 1995 BICC, Conversion Survey 1996: paper 10: Global Disarmament, paper 2: Moses Kiggundu, Retrenchment Demilitarization and Andreas Klemmer, United Nations Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Demobilization, Oxford University Publications Related to the Subject of Implications for Demobilization, Press, UK, 1996 Conversion: An Annotated July 1997 Bibliography, April 1995 BICC, Conversion Survey 1997: paper 11: Global Disarmament and Disposal of paper 3: Ian Davis and Steve Schofield, Surplus Weapons, Oxford University Yevgeny Kuznetsov (ed.), Learning Upgrades and Surplus Weapons: Press, UK, 1997 to Restructure: Studies of Lessons from the UK Disposal Agency, Transformation in the Russian August 1997 Ulrike Lindemann und Ulrich Defense Sector, June 1996 Schirowski, Truppenabbau und paper 12: Konversion in NRW, Handbuch für paper 4: Susanne Kopte, Nuclear Submarine Kommunen [Handbook for Mersie Ejigu and Tekalign Gedamu, Decommissioning and Related Communities in NRW], Conversion in Africa: Past Experience Problems, August 1997 January 1996 and Future Outlook, June 1996 paper 13: Jörn Brömmelhörster and John Peter O'Meara Evans, Destruction of Frankenstein (eds.), Mixed Motives, paper 5: Abandoned Chemical Weapons in Uncertain Outcomes—Defense Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. China, September 1997 Conversion in China, Lynne Wezeman, Dutch Surplus Weapons, Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1997 July 1996 paper 6: Joseph DiChiaro III, Conference on Dismantlement and Destruction of Nuclear, Chemical and Conventional Weapons, 19-21 May 1996, Conference Summary, December 1996 paper 7: Irmgard Nübler, Human Resources Development and Utilization in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs, January 1997

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