Notes

Chapter 1 1. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National , Summer 1989, pp. 3–18. 2. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology and Other Essays (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960). See also Edward Shils, The Torment of Secrecy (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956); Nathan C. Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1951); and Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1952). 3. E.g., and perhaps most notoriously, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

Chapter 2 1. Smith’s phrasing of the questions he wished to study may be found on p. 26. 2. The literature of the pluralist approach to American politics is immense and con- tinues to proliferate. The best recent work in the genre is Arnold Rose, The Power Structure: The Political Process in American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967). Other well-known examples of this approach are Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956) and Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Nelson W. Polsby, Com- munity Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); Daniel Bell, “Is There a Ruling Class in America? The Power Elite Reconsidered,” in his The End of Ideology, rev. edn. (New York, 1965); David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), Part II; Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The in Historical and Comparative Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. 318–348; Talcott Parsons, “The of Power in American Society,” World Politics, x (October, 1957), pp. 123–143; , Ameri- can Capitalism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952); and David Truman, The Gov- ernmental Process: Political and Public Opinion (New York: Knopf, 1953). For an interesting and somewhat different viewpoint, see William Kornhauser, 206 ● Notes

“Power Elite or ‘Veto Groups,’” in Seymour Martin Lipset and Leo Lowenthal, eds., Culture and Social Character (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1961). 3. Among the many works calling into question various aspects of the pluralist approach are the following: Theodore Lowi, “The Public Philosophy: Interest- Group Liberalism,” American Political Science Review LXI (March 1967), pp. 5–24, and “American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political The- ory,” World Politics XVI (July 1964), pp. 677–715; Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967) and, with Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science Review liv (December 1962), pp. 947–952; Henry Kariel, The Promise of Politics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), esp. Chapter 4; Robert S. Lynd, “Power in American Soci- ety as Resource and Problem,” in Arthur W. Kornhauser, ed., Problems of Power in American (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1957); S. Ono, “The Lim- its of Bourgeois Pluralism,” Studies on the Left, v (Summer 1965), pp. 46–72; and Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1966). 4. Intensity of , which also affects influence on outcomes, is also distrib- uted unequally–at least with regard to the ability to express it in relevant ways. On the prerequisites and problems of participation, see Dahl, Preface, p. 71ff. 5. For example, the cases of COMSAT or the 1962 cut or the continuing oil depletion allowance are evidence of this. It should be observed that even where access to decision-making processes is distributed equally, compromise outcomes may be highly unequal because the prevailing social context favors one group or another in bargaining. Some demands may simply not be made because a group sees no hope in making them or thinks of them as “illegitimate”; some demands may not have to be made because the desiderata contained in them are auto- matically granted by custom or long-settled law. On this point, see Bachrach and Baratz. 6. And even when presidential or party leadership is most centralizing, voter control through representatives or parties is not always technically possible. Some of the technical problems of majority voting and voter control are discussed in Dahl’s Preface, Chapter 4. See also Herbert McCloskey and others, “Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers,” American Political Science Review liv (March 1960), pp. 405–427, on the divergence of interests and goals between political leaders and political followers. 7. McConnell, Private Power, and Lowi, “The Public Philosophy,” contain especially good accounts and critiques of this process. 8. P. 488. 9. Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), Chapter 11. 10. For an exhaustive critique of those assumptions and of deterrence policy itself, see Philip Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966); and Amitai Etzioni, The Hard Way to Peace (New York: Crowell-Collier, 1962). 11. See Green, Deadly Logic, esp. Chapters 2–4 and 7, and “Method and Substance in the Arms Debate,” World Politics, xvi (July 1964), pp. 642–667. Smith expresses Notes ● 207

one caveat on the question of -neutrality: “There have doubtless been occa- sions when analytic studies have made unrealistic assumptions, drawn false or misleading inferences from empirical data, and failed to take into consideration vital aspects of a broad problem. But this is not an argument against the advisory function in principle; this is an argument for more and better analysis and an increased professionalism in the advisory ranks” (pp. 315–316). Unfortunately, the notion that professionals are especially adept at avoiding unrealism, falsity, and narrowness is one for which little evidence has ever been offered, at least with regard to the social sciences. What is needed, though not provided by RAND, is an analytic method that generates varying assumptions about the political world and calls forth the full range of its practitioners’ political wisdom and moral judgment. 12. This point was made first by Sol Stern in his “Who Thinks in a Think Tank?” New York Times Magazine (April 16, 1967), p. 28. The quotations cited here are taken from p. 122 of Stern’s article. 13. These are, of course, the titles of RAND-sponsored works by Leites and Selznick on Soviet ideology and politics. 14. Apparently RAND personnel are able to live with the following passage from an internal U.S. Air Force study, written about 1952, and quoted by Smith: “‘The lawyer-client relationship of RAND to the Air Force places upon RAND certain restrictions. It is inevitable that the three Departments of the National Military Establishment will compete for budgets, facilities, and military responsibilities. As a result, it is inappropriate for RAND to “represent” more than one of the services’” (p. 83). 15. The quotation is from Stern's article, p. 119, and is apparently based on an inter- view with Amron Katz of RAND. Stern also mentions other RAND studies related to the war effort, at least one of which has generated useful scholarly data that are being kept secret for political reasons. 16. It is important to note that Smith never questions whether the words “academic,” “university,” and such, are done justice by the close ties between such scientific research centers as MIT—which has a retired U.S. Air Force general as its vice president—and the government. One must at least ask whether the presence on the RAND board of such men as the presidents of Rice University and Case Institute, the provost of MIT, the director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, or the vice president of the Brookings Institution actually adds to the board any viewpoint unique to academia. 17. The Politics of Oil (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), Chapter 12. 18. At p. 97, Smith does emphasize RAND’s attempt “to avoid identification with parti- san causes.” The apparent assumption that “nonpartisan” causes, whatever they may be, are somehow free of the taint of politics is an assumption that can be supported only by the narrowest view of what constitutes political life and political action. 19. Some discussions of democratic theory have seemed to suggest that what is meant by “pluralism” is contention over particular policies, but consensus on basic beliefs; when one attempts to act outside that consensus, one can only expect to be ignored or thwarted. (See, for example, Dahl’s Who Governs?, Chapter 28.) 208 ● Notes

It may be that Smith, Glenn Snyder, and others have some such view in mind with regard to the “foreign policy consensus,” as Gabriel Almond calls it in his The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960). However, I do not think that point is applicable to this discussion. Descriptively, no doubt, the proposition about consensus is unexceptionable and even tautological— depending, however, on what one means by “basic beliefs.” My own suggestion is that such a phrase becomes highly normative if it is taken to mean anything more than the words and symbols that are considered legitimate as descriptions of the goals one seeks or the actions one undertakes. The “democratic creed” thus refers to no particular (i.e., operational) ends—except for those for whom the word “un-American” has an intimate meaning. 20. The ultimate significance of the RAND bases study only became obvious to outsiders with the publication of Albert Wohlstetter’s “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs, xxxvii (January 1959), 234, which made quite clear that RAND theorists envisaged a secure deterrent as being both immense and multipurposed. 21. I have not emphasized this point, but in a way Smith’s refusal to deal with it is astonishing. Are scholarship and “creative research” at all compatible with secrecy? Are we to consider classified work a contribution to knowledge or simply, until it is made public, a fiction? Can a scholar or scientist accept the military’s rationalizations for secrecy and remain true to his or her vocation? Perhaps there is a responsible argument to be made for mixing military secrecy with civilian research (though I have never seen one that was not merely self-serving on the part of the military), but surely the whole question deserves a chapter in a book such as Smith’s, rather than relegation to a footnote.

Chapter 3 1. On that point see Mark Green and Norman Waitzman, “Cost, Benefit, and Class,” Working Papers, May/June 1980, pp. 39–51. 2. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), and , Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). 3. Friedman, Capitalism, p. 2. 4. Nozick, Anarchy, p, 26. 5. Edward Hallett Carr, The New Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951). 6. Friedman, Capitalism, p. 165. 7. Mill is one of several inconvenient liberal philosophers whom Nozick manages never to mention throughout Anarchy, State, and Utopia. 8. , “Principles of ,” in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vols. 2 and 3, eds. J. M. Robson and F. E. L. Priestly (Toronto: Uni- versity of Toronto Press, 1965). 9. See Mill’s essay “Bentham,” in Collected Works, vol. 10, pp. 99–100. 10. Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), Ch. 5. 11. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), pp. 46–47. Notes ● 209

12. G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 128, section 195. 13. This discussion of what is in effect Marx’s notion of surplus value proceeds with- out any judgment as to whether Marx was correct in his assertion that labor cre- ates all value. It is not necessary for the egalitarian to concur in that judgment, nor in the particular judgments that Marxists are prone to make as to whether managers, middlemen, and other “nonproductive” workers deserve a living for their efforts, or the suppliers of (be they individuals or collectives) some return for the benefits they have foregone by supplying finance to others. To understand the political significance of surplus value, we need only look at what happens after the reasonable rewards of all labor, maintenance, and replacement of plant and equipment has been replenished, and have been repaid at a (unanimously) agreed-on “reasonable” rate of interest. What is left over— “undistributed” or “retained” , amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars annually in the U.S. economy—is what we are talking about. 14. , Early Writings, trans. T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 122. 15. See Marx, Capital, vol. I (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, I926), parts 7 and 8; W. G. Hoskins, The Age of Plunder: The England of Henry VIII I500–I547 (London: Longman, Green, 1976. 16. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 231. 17. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Par- sons (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), p. 62. 18. From Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation” in Essays in Sociology, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. (New York: Macmillan, 1946), p. 26. 19. The relationship between the division of labor and equality is discussed at greater length in Chapter 4 of my book The Pursuit of Inequality (New York: Pantheon, 1981). 20. Throughout Western Europe, social democratic legislation has modified and lim- ited the “right” of corporations to close down plants, move operations, lay off workers, etc. The United States remains what Nozick and Friedman might call a “free society” in this regard—i.e., the right to do injury to other people remains unlimited if you have the power to do it. 21. “You may not be interested in politics, but politics is interested in you”: the last sentence of The Politics of Authenticity: Radical individualism and the emergence of modern society (New York: Atheneum, 1970). 22. Nozick, Anarchy, p. 272. 23. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality” in Rousseau, The First and Second Discourses, ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964), p. 159–160. 24. Marx, The Communist Manifesto, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), p. 43. 25. Nozick, Anarchy, p. ix. 26. Marx, The Communist Manifesto, p. 36. 27. See Inquiry, September 4, 1978. 210 ● Notes

Chapter 4 1. Gutmann’s is an indispensable discussion of the liberal egalitarian—and inegalitarian—tradition, to which I am greatly indebted. 2. Ackerman claims that “she (the Commander) has no intention of forcing us to do her bidding,” but “will simply impose certain ground rules upon the conversation” (p. 32). Only a theorist profoundly imbued with the spirit of Millian liberalism, I think, could manage this distinction; it will be invisible to most other people. 3. Ackerman, who does defend initial equality of resources, gives a devastating cri- tique of first-come-first-served arguments. Of course, with respect to both Acker- man’s voyagers and Dworkin’s survivors, principles of unequal division can be rejected only because the state of nature has been carefully contrived to prevent whatever hierarchies may have existed and been legitimized among their pioneers from being carried over into “the state of nature.” 4. Even Mill, in those passages of his Principles of Political Economy in which he defends “communism” (Mill, 1965), reduces the “good” of Communism to indi- vidual states of wellbeing­ that are undoubtedly a large part of our experience of the good, but certainly not all of it. On this point, see Wolff (1968, Chapter 5). 5. For a more extended argument about the centrality of a democratic division of labor to any version of political equality, see Green, 1985. 6. Admittedly this outcome may seem predetermined, since the authors of those definitions, William Ryan and myself, are certainly closer to Walzer than to the rational theorists methodologically. On the other hand, the advanced welfarism of Rawls and Ackerman, and what little we can deduce about Dworkin’s political preferences from his essays as well, are not strikingly different. In fact, the predi- lection of the rational-choice theorists for “simple equality” ends, as I have noted, where the transition from the original position begins: it is an analytic device only. No less than Walzer, are they liberal egalitarians. 7. There is of course a literature, associated with the names Arthur Jensen and Wil- liam Shockley, that asserts the innate intellectual inferiority of American blacks, and thus their comparative inadequacy at the kind of for place that liberal individualism requires. This literature has by now been thoroughly dis- credited, and we may hope that it will disappear forever into the underworld of pseudoscience, where it properly belongs. (See Gould, 1981; Green, 1981, Chapters 2–4; and Lewontin et al., 1984.) As for Rawls’s own views about race, it is noteworthy that a full-page ad, emanating from Harvard, in favor of affirmative action programs, was rumored to have been written by Rawls. 8. We must note that this is not Nozick’s position; Nozick is a genuine, classical liberal.

Chapter 6 1. Robert Dahl is an important exception to this generalization. Having introduced the term “polyarchy” to register the distance between actually existing representa- tive government and “democracy,” he then somewhat elided the distance between the two in works ranging from A Preface to Democratic Theory to Dilemmas of Notes ● 211

Pluralist Democracy. More recently, however, as in his How Democratic Is the American Constitution? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), he has become much more skeptical about the connection and sharply critical of the American system as a faux democracy. 2. Among the most important of these are Iris Young’s Justice and the Politics of Dif- ference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), Lani Guinier’s The Tyranny of the Majority (New York: The Free Press, 1994), and Wil Kymlicka’s Multicul- tural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 3. See Ronald Dworkin’s Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of EqualityBos ( - ton: Harvard University Press, 2000), Chapter 10. 4. See, e.g., James Bohman, “The Democratic Minimum and Global Justice,” Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 19 no. 1 (2005), pp. 102–116. 5. The omnibus appropriations bill of 1996 was 3,000 pages long. 6. See Dan Clawson et al., Dollars and Votes: How Business Campaign Contributions Subvert Democracy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), p. 69. Given the various other similar provisions that were slipped into that bill, it might well have wound up costing taxpayers, even workers, more than the rise in the mini- mum wage benefitted the latter. The chapter in which this anecdote is embedded, “What a Typical Bill Is Like,” tells more about the political process of representa- tive oligarchy than almost any imaginable textbook on American government. It is also important to note that the worst instance of corruption Clawson et al. give comes courtesy of Democratic senator, John Breaux, demonstrating the reality of the one-party system at work. 7. Peter Bachrach’s The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Washington DC: University Press of America, 1967, 1980) is the classic critique of this neo-realism. 8. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin’s Sovereign Virtue (note 4 above), Philip Green, Equal- ity and Democracy (New York: The New Press, 2000), and Carol Gould, Rethink- ing Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Gould’s “social ontology” has much in common with Cornell’s conception of “the social imagi- nary;” see below, note 14. 9. On the difference between legitimate protection and “racketeering,” see Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Reuschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 170–171. 10. The developing nationalist consensus in , for example, is stifling rather than empowering, and race-inflected rather than democratic. See Judith Ezekiel, “Magritte meets Mahgreb: This is not a veil,” Australian Feminist Studies, vol. 20, no. 47, 2005. 11. Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), Chapter 24. 12. See Rawls’s The Law of Peoples with the Idea of Public Reason Revisited (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). On “overlapping consensus,” see Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993). 13. There is no evidence so far that cyberspace in any way promises to be a satisfac- tory substitute for the real spaces in which speaking and publishing take place. On television and the monopolization of opinion, see Philip Green, Primetime 212 ● Notes

Politics: The Truth about Conservative Lies, Corporate Control, and Television Cul- ture (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). 14. On the necessity of debate within the context of American idealism, see the “Introduction” to Rogers M. Smith’s Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizen- ship in U.S. History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). 15. See Drucilla Cornell, The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography, and Sexual Harassment (New York: Routledge, 1995). 16. Recall, for example, the antiwar and, therefore, anti-Bush ads that were censored by CBS during the 2004 Super Bowl, even though Moveon.org raised the neces- sary funds for this most prized of all commercial spaces; one could multiply such examples endlessly. Of course there are exceptions, Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 911 being the most well known. But it is so notorious precisely because it escaped the fate that otherwise awaits all products of the political documentary ghetto. 17. See Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy, “Class and Income in the United States,” New Left Review, 30 (second series), November–December 2004, pp. 105–133, for the best current analysis of U.S. income distribution. 18. Compare our analysis with that of, e.g., Sheldon Wolin in the “Expanded Edition” of his Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). Wolin describes the American pol- ity as already a system of “inverted totalitarianism,” in which only the struggles of a “fugitive democracy” are possible. This approach, we think, surrenders ground that has not yet been permanently lost.

Chapter 7 1. No one, for example, raises any concern about immigrants from the subcontinent of coming to the United States to do high-tech jobs or provide skilled medi- cal services. 2. This generalization is not intended to be comprehensive, since there are obviously more than two kinds of states in the world, the chief addition being the East Asian states that used to be major exporters of human capital but are now pro- ductive and demographically stable societies. It should also be understood that “non-white” is a sociopolitical status, not a biological condition. In the Western world Arabs are “non-white,” whatever a geneticist might say. At different times in American history, for example, Irish, Italian, Polish, and Jewish immigrants have been “nonwhite.”­ In English-speaking countries, “swarthy” is a word often used to indicate, very discreetly, the lower status of people from Mediterranean nations, Arabs, etc. And is an anomalous state that once belonged more or less to the economically advanced white core and now is caught between a dying past and a future yet to be born. 3. Even when a myth or other useful belief has come to be generally accepted, the elites whose position it supports still need to spend millions or billions of dollars and control major institutions of communication to continue propagating it, or Notes ● 213

its hold on the electorate will weaken. We should never lose sight of this central feature of political life, in the midst of decrying the apparent power of myths. 4. See Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. His- tory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). 5. The best description of this ideology of liberal, or in this case liberal “feminist,” nationalism in situ is Judith Ezekiel’s account of laicite, in “French Dressing: Race, Gender, and the Hijab Story,” Australian Feminist Studies (spring 2005). See also Joe Carens, “Muslim Minorities in Contemporary : The Limits of Liberal Toleration,” Chapter 6 of Culture, Citizenship, and Community (New York: Oxford, 2000). 6. Alyson Cole notes that “The [Bush] White House’s commitment to women’s ‘rights and dignity’ . . . remains exclusively reserved for women in Afghanistan. Less than a year after [President] Bush’s self-congratulatory announcement about the [Afghan Women and Children Relief Act], for instance, he refused to sign the international treaty prohibiting discrimination against women, The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).” Cole, The Cult of True Victimhood: From the War on Welfare to the War on Terror (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006). 7. A comparison of the treatment of African-Americans, or gay persons, or women, in visual culture during the 1930s and the beginning of the eighteenth century would astonish anyone who had died during the earlier period and “come back” today. E.g., it is possible for a resident of the state of Connecticut to see every home game of the University of Connecticut’s women’s basketball team on television—but not the men’s, even though the men have contended for or won the national championship for the past several years. 8. In a wonderful and entertaining essay, C. Wright Mills pointed out that sociol- ogy courses in “deviance” (“Nuts and Sluts,” as they were affectionately called by Harvard undergraduates), were originally created by middle-American Prot- estants appalled by the social order of immigrant-dominated New York City. See Mills’s “The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists,” in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., Power Politics and People: the Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills (New York: Galaxy Books, 1974). 9. The problem of imagining the state as an “ethical” entity is most apparent in the most profound of all philosophical attempts to do just that, namely Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969; translated by T. M. Knox). In his closing disquisition on “the Oriental realm,” “the Greek realm,” “the Roman realm,” and, especially, “the Germanic realm,” ethical discourse trails off into a deliriously racialized vocabulary, as in his description of “the unity of the divine nature and the human: the reconciliation of objective truth and freedom appear within self-consciousness and subjectivity, a reconcilia- tion with the fulfillment of which the principle of the north, the principle of the Germanic peoples, has been entrusted.” (Section 358, p. 222). 10. See Joe Carens, “Multiple Political Memberships, Overlapping National Identi- ties, and the Dimensions of Citizenship,” Chapter 7 of Culture, Citizenship, and 214 ● Notes

Community (see note 3 above), for a persuasive dissection of the unitary concep- tion of citizenship. 11. Refugees from persecution and violence may be an exception to these generaliza- tions; in any event, their status raises different issues. 12. The alleged propensity of illegal immigrants to commit crimes in the United States is taken seriously by anti-immigrant groups, but it is less than a myth; it is an invention out of whole cloth. As the Immigrant Policy Center sums up the evidence: “Numerous studies by independent researchers and government commissions . . . have consistently found that immigrants are less likely to com- mit crimes than the native-born. This holds true for both legal immigrants and undocumented, regardless of their country of origin or level of education.” See Ruben G. Rumbaut and Walter A. Ewing, “The Myth of Immigrant Criminality,” published on May 23, 2007, at http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/RumbaultEwing/ .html as quoted in the Arizona Daily Star, September 22, 2008. But this is obvious: no ordinary person endures the sometimes incredible hardships an illegal entrant into the United States must undergo in order to pursue a life of usually unrewarding casual crime that could just as easily be pursued in the home country. 13. See the report by The Americas Society and Council of the Americas, “U.S. Busi- ness and Hispanic Integration: Expanding the Economic Contributions of Immi- grants,” July 23, 2008; this report references almost every serious contemporary study.

Chapter 8 1. “Sailing to Byzantium,” 1928. 2. See David Bordwell, The Way Hollywood Tells It: Story and Style in Modern Movies, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004, p. 106. 3. Ibid., especially Chapters 4 and 5. 4. In her definitive study of the traditional horror film and the “slasher movie” that Psycho inaugurated, Clover argues that both have been “subversive” of conven- tional cinematic and social values. Among the “subversive” elements Clover finds in the slasher movies of the seventies and eighties is the appearance, in response to the dynamic of seventies feminism, of the character of “the Final Girl” who, through “her femaleness, however qualified,” redefines the genre as “a standard one of tale and epic” in which her point of view is a substitute for that of the traditional male rescuer, now “either dismissably marginal or dispensed with alto- gether.” See Carol Clover, Men, Women, and Chainsaws: Gender in the Modern Horror Film, Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1992, p. 48, n. 36. 5. See Elizabeth Young, “The Silence of the Lambs and the Flaying of Feminist Theory,” Camera Obscura 27 (September 1992), pp. 5–35. 6. For some statistically revealing studies, see Nick Browne et al., “American Film Violence: An Analytic Portrait,” Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 17(4), 2002, pp. 351–370; and David L. McArthur et al., “Violence and its Injury Notes ● 215

Consequences in American Movies: A Public Health Perspective,” Western Jour- nal of Medicine, 173(3), 2000, pp. 164–168. The point about “injury conse- quences,” of course, is how rare or improbably minor they are. 7. See Susan Faludi, The Terror Dream: Fear and Fantasy in Post-9/11 America, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2007. Dargis’s comments are in the Arts and Leisure supplement on “Summer Movies,” The New York Times, May 4, 2008. 8. On Hollywood’s flirtation with feminism from the seventies through the ­nineties, see Green, Cracks in the Pedestal: Ideology and Gender in Hollywood, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998. 9. Linda Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the Frenzy of the Visible, Berke- ley: University of California Press, 1989. 10. See my Primetime Politics: The Truth about Conservative Lies, Corporate Control, and Television Culture, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, Chapters 3 and 5, for a detailed critique of what I unapologetically call “the Big Lie” of conserva- tive media criticism. 11. See Mark Harris, Pictures at a Revolution: Five Movies and the Birth of the New Hollywood, New York: Penguin Press, 2008, pp. 338–339. 12. ThatThere Will Be Blood and No Country for Old Men were both nominated for “Best Picture of 2007,” and that the former was, as noted earlier, hailed by many critics as a “masterpiece,” proves nothing in and of itself; but that fact at least forces us to contemplate the notion that there might be other criteria for attribut- ing excellence than the ones by which those same critics likely rate Citizen Kane, On the Waterfront, or Vertigo as “masterpieces” as well. 13. I have Elizabeth Young to thank for this formulation. 14. See Chapter 4 of Primetime Politics, from which this analysis is adapted. See also Cracks in the Pedestal, Chapters 3 and 5. 15. See Judith Mayne, in “L.A. Law and Prime Time Feminism,” Discourse, 10(2), 1988, pp. 30–47. The exception to this generalization is the case of tolerance and intolerance; the latter on the whole gets short shrift in mass media, for total inclu- sion is their ultimate goal. Obviously who gets incorporated under the rubric of “inclusion” has changed over time, but always in the direction of more rather than less. For an entertaining account of how “balance” on TV is actually achieved, see Tad Friend, “You Can’t Say That,” The New Yorker, November 19, 2001, pp. 44–49. My own analysis of “having it both ways” is in Primetime Politics, Chapter 4. 16. See Robert Ray, A Certain Tendency of the Hollywood Cinema, 1930–1980, Princ- eton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Rick Blaine in Casablanca can stand for all these heroes. I have analyzed the “lonely town” genre at greater length in Cracks in the Pedestal, pp. 131ff. 17. The Sarah Connor Chronicles was a brief off-season series on Fox in the spring of 2008. It was not renewed. As for defense attorneys, James Spader and William Shatner of the satirical—and often over-the-top—Boston Legal may be described with many epithets, but “heroic” is not one of them. And Julianna Margulies of Canterbury’s Law, from the same short season as The Sarah Connor Chronicles, was more a bundles of neuroses and frantic sexcapades than Perry Mason or Mat- lock could have dreamed. (This was also true, though not quite as insistently, as 216 ● Notes

the short-lived Philly, starring Kim Delaney as a defense attorney, of a few years back.) It is no accident that the only two unofficial heroes remaining on TV’s schedule at this point were sexy women who, as such, can be slotted into typically “masculine” roles even while ostensibly defying them. [Author’s Note: As of this writing, 2014, the long-running The Good Wife, again starring Julianna Margu- lies, must be added to that short list.] 18. As the late Iris Marion Young put it, writing about “police brutality”: “The idea that the state is nothing but on the legitimate use of violence slides eas- ily for many people into the idea that the use of violence by legitimate agents of a legitimate state is itself legitimate.” In Global Challenges: War, Self-Determination and the Responsibility for Justice, Malden: Polity Press, 2007, p. 98. On the neces- sary distinction between Law and Justice, see Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit, New York: Routledge Chapman and Hall, 1992, especially Chapters 4–6. 19. This is a somewhat odd criticism, in that the screenwriter for High Noon, Carl Foreman, was blacklisted for refusing to testify about his alleged Communist Party membership and was about to go into exile in Great Britain. He thought he was attacking conformity and cowardice; he certainly did not think he was mak- ing a “Cold War liberal” statement. Nor did that larger-than-life non-liberal John Wayne miss the point, calling High Noon “the most un-American movie” he had ever seen (as can be seen on the DVD). 20. Among them George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau; see especially J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power, New York: Random House, 1966. 21. A list will include not only the obvious Westerns, but also war movies, “social problem” and political dramas, film noir, gangster movies, even a few comedies and children’s movies. Among others: The Wizard of Oz, The Ox-Bow Incident, Mr. Smith Goes To Washington, Red River, Rio Bravo (Howard Hawks’s and John Wayne’s answer to the supposed “anti-Americanism” of High Noon), The Searchers, The Gunfighter, Along the Great Divide, Shane, Gentleman’s Agreement, To Kill a Mockingbird, Man of the West, Born Yesterday, Gilda, From Here to Eternity, High Sierra, Knock on Any Door, The Hoodlum Priest, Twelve Angry Men, Spartacus, Viva Zapata!, Whistle at Eaton Falls, Run Silent Run Deep, Meet John Doe, The Informer, Command Decision, Twelve O’ Clock High, Attack!, Uncertain Glory, The Rack, Young Mr. Lincoln, Decision at Sundown, Home of the Brave, The Purple Heart, It’s a Wonderful Life, Out of the Past, The Fugitive, Force of Evil. . . . It should be noted that with fewer (literally) than a handful of exceptions, the bearers of urgent choice in these films are all white men. It is clearly a gain for liberal pluralism that in contemporary cinema women and black men, are equally capable of being the protagonists of morally irrelevant narratives of violence; whether that change represents overall historical progress is another question entirely.

Chapter 9 1. The classic discussion of this movement is Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transforma- tion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). Speaking of the Industrial Revolution and the Notes ● 217

consequent rise of “the free ” in England. Polanyi wrote that “human soci- ety would have been annihilated but for protective countermoves which blunted the action of this self-destructive mechanism. . . . Society protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system”; and “the principle of social protection (aimed) at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization.” (pp. 76, 132). The annihilation of human society appears today to be the deepest desire of the plutocracy. 2. For an extended version of this argument, see Philip Green and Drucilla Cornell, “Rethinking Democratic Theory: The American Case,” Journal of Social Philoso- phy, vol. xxxvi, no. 4 (Winter 2005), 517–535. The paragraph that follows is adapted from this essay. 3. On competing ideologies of democracy and equality in the United States, see Michael J. Thompson, The Politics of Inequality: A Political History of the Idea of Economic Inequality in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 4. Green and Cornell, op. cit., 528–529. See Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, Peter B. Evans, Diet- rich Reuschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 170–171. 5. See Jonathan Kwitny, Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World (New York: Congdon and Weed, 1984); and Chalmers A. Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 2nd edn. (New York: Holt, 2004). Anyone who may still believe that the Empire’s enemies are not “endless” might read The New York Times article by Thom Shanker, “News of the Week in Review,”December ­ 12, 2010, p. 3: “Rare minerals. Food and water. Arable soil. Air-cleansing­ forests. In the intellectual heart of the American military and policy-making world, these are emerging not just as environmental issues, but as the potential stuff of conflict in the 21st century.” So much for those who scoff at the word “Empire.” 6. Polanyi, op. cit., note 1 above. 7. As Ishmael Reed nicely put it, capturing the true nature of the Tea Party in a ­nutshell, the belief that “the Tea Party is a grass-roots uprising against Wall Street (is) a curious reading since the movement gained its impetus from a rant against the president delivered by a television personality on the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.” The New York Times “News of the Week in Review,” December 12, 2010, p. 10. 8. Marx’s Third Thesis on Feuerbach—“The coincidence of the changing of circum- stances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionizing practice”—places rational debate in the context of class struggle but hardly dismisses it, as my emphasis makes clear. 9. On authoritarian populism, see Stuart Hall et al., Policing the Crisis: “Mugging,” the State and Law and Order (London: Macmillan, 1978); and Stuart Hall, The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left (London: Verso Books, 1988). 10. Faces of the Enemy (1987), a documentary for PBS, produced by Bill and Sam Keen, written and directed by Sam Keen. 11. For current and often little-known examples of plutocracy (and kleptocracy) at work, see the January/February 2011 issue of The American Interest, especially the section on “Plutocracy and Democracy: Law”, with articles on the courts, 218 ● Notes

lobbying, and tax evasion. The best account of the great financial crash and the criminal activities that led up to it, is Matt Taibbi, Griftopia: Bubble Machines, Vampire Squids, and the Long Con that Is Breaking America (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2010). 12. The wonderfully descriptive phrase is Hannah Arendt’s, from The Origins of Total- itarianism, with new prefaces (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Evans, 1973), p. xiv. For more examples, see Jonathan Schell, “And Now: Anti-Semitism,” The Nation, December 20, 2010, 20–22. But here scholarly footnoting is pointless. Tune in to any television or radio outlet of the Right at any time, and you will soon discover a parallel world of non-factuality. 13. For lengthier discussions of television’s colonization of the life-world, see Jeffrey Scheuer, The Sound Bite Society: Television and the American Mind (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1999) and Thomas de Zengotita, Mediated: How the Media Shapes Your World and the Way You Live in It (New York: Bloomsbury, 2005), and my own (overly complacent) Primetime Politics: The Truth about Con- servative Lies, Corporate Control, and Television Culture (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), especially Chapter 4, pp. 121ff. Overall, the best and most com- pelling of the many works exposing the real nature of the mass media structure are: Robert McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communications Politics in Dubious Times (New York: New Press, 2000); and Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Like my own, both these works have been somewhat overtaken by the ferocity of the contemporary Right’s invasion of the public sphere. 14. For an extended explication of the concept of “surplus inequality,” see Philip Green, Equality and Democracy (The New Press: 2000), pp. 69ff. 15. Hendrik Hertzberg, “The Talk of the Town,” The New Yorker, November 15, 2010, p. 32. 16. On this, one of the grossest of all the Right’s big lies, see Primetime Politics, op. cit., and especially Eric Alterman, What Liberal Media?: The Truth about Bias and the News (New York: Basic Books, 2003). Alterman’s as yet uncollected biweekly articles in The Nation are an essential compendium of the pernicious nonsense that passes for conventional beliefs about and on the media. 17. Ross McKibbin, writing about the Tories in the London Review of Books, Novem- ber 18, 2010. 18. None of this happened by accident; billions of dollars have been spent to make it happen. For an indispensable history and analysis, see John Ehrenberg, Servants of Wealth: The Right’s Assault on Economic Justice (New York: Rowman and Little- field, 2006). 19. See Talks: Corporate PACs and Political Influence, by Dan Clawson et al. (New York: Basic Books, 1992). The author’s note (Chapter 7, p. 191), that if the determinative influence of corporate PACS and their front organizations disap- peared, “they might start running it strictly for the votes.” This one-time defini- tive account of democracy for sale it is now almost obsolescent in the wake of Citizens United. Notes ● 219

20. As is evidenced by the recent establishment of an executive dictatorship in the state of Michigan, everything that past generations of political science gradu- ate students were taught about “state and local government” has about as much relevance to “democracy” today as an institutional analysis of the Hapsburg Monarchy. 21. For an elaboration of this argument, see Philip Green, “Cultural Rage and the Right-Wing Intellectuals,” in Michael J. Thompson, ed., Confronting the New Conservatism: The Rise of the Right in America (New York: NYU Press, 2007), pp. 31–55. 22. To be fair, The Nation—the editorial board of which I am member—is an abso- lutely necessary source of expose and resistance; see the issue of December 27, 2010, for example, or Johann Hari’s February 21, 2011 report, “The UK’s Left- Wing Tea Party.” But compared to Rupert Murdoch’s, its reach is sadly limited. 23. From the “Introduction” to the “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philoso- phy of Right.”

Chapter 10 1. See, for example, Irving Kristol’s remarks in his Two Cheers for Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1978), Chapter 22. 2. It is extraordinary how many defenders of “the people,” when the latter are in a conservative mood, propose to ground their own adherence to the majority view in public opinion polling data. Public opinion polls, however, only counterfeit the democratic process. Substituting momentary opinion for sustained reflection, and costless verbal behavior for meaningful political participation, they generate a “democracy” without citizens. 3. Ibid., Chapter 23; Richard L. Herrnstein, “On IQ, Occupational Status and Equality,” Dissent, 24 (1977), pp. 297–300; and Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 167. 4. See Malcolm Sawyer, “Income Distribution in O.E.C.D. Countries,” Occasional Studies (Paris: OECD, 1976), and John Stephens, The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980), Chapter 4. 5. Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), p. 81. 6. For a fuller discussion of the complicity of the state with private capital, see Philip Green, The Pursuit of Inequality (New York: Pantheon, I98l), pp. 227–237. 7. Perhaps we are not entirely without guidance in this area. One observer has recently remarked that, given various options, his college students consistently say that “the maximum spread between the best paid members of our society and the most poorly paid” should be no more than in a ratio of 10:1 or 15:1. They are always surprised to learn that the actual maximum is more in the neighbor- hood of 100:1. As he notes, these are students who “have grown up in a society in which vast income differentials are taken for granted”; and since he teaches at a private university, they are almost certainly themselves better off than the average. 220 ● Notes

Yet in this one respect at least, their sense of the justice of a division of labor is far from an endorsement of the status quo. See Reo M. Christenson, “On Taxing the Rich,” Dissent, 28 (1981), pp. 395–399. 8. In the machine-tool industry, one observer notes, “there is nothing inherent in (numerical control) technology . . . that makes it necessary to assign programming and machine tending to different people (that is, to management and workers respectively): the technology merely makes it possible. Management philosophy and motives alone make it necessary that the technology be deployed in this way, and this is another form of necessity entirely, namely, the (to their minds, forced) social choices of the powerful.” See David F. Noble, “Social Choice in Machine Design: The Case of Automatically Controlled Machine Tools, and a Challenge for Labor,” Politics and Society, 8 (1978), p. 340. 9. See, for example, Herbert C. Reid, “Appalachian Policy, The Corporate State, and American Values: A Critical Perspective,” Policy Studies Journal, 9 (1980–1981), pp. 622–633; Henry D. Shapiro, Appalachia on Our Mind (Chapel Hill: Uni- versity of North Carolina Press, 1978); and John Gaventa, Power and Powerless- ness (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1980). The definitive study of regional misallocation in capitalist societies is Stuart Holland, Capital Versus the Regions (London: Macmillan, 1976). Since these words were written, in 1983, the rise of environmental concerns has made “coal” a dirty word in some quarters. Still, it remains central to energy generation in 2013, and political realities make it almost untouchable, even as areas dependent on coal mining remain poverty-stricken and subject to the rape of the land. 10. On “capital flight,” see Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, Capital and Com- munities: The Causes and Consequences of Private Disinvestment (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1980). See also Shutdown: Economic Dislocation and Equal Opportunity, a report prepared by the Illinois Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, June 1981. The study points out that capital flight also aggravates barriers of caste, as minorities suffer from its conse- quences disproportionately. 11. John Rawls’s attempt to establish his “Difference Principle” is an example of this difficulty. The Difference Principle, which, Rawls argues, would be adopted by us if we were all in “the original position” behind “the veil of ignorance,” holds that no inequality can be justified unless it also improves the position of the worst-off in society. The problem is that fairness and general are confounded in this principle, as a multitude of Rawls’s critics have shown. It is unclear—and seems to be necessarily unclear—whether the principle requires that the position of the worst-off be improved relative to that of the best-off, regardless of what happens to the latter; or that it be improved relative to their own position before the new inequality is introduced. In the first case we would be asserting some independent standard of distributive justice; but in the second we would only be asserting a principle of the maximization of general social utility, which the free-market conservative will also cheerfully embrace in the familiar guise of “trickle-down” theory. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Notes ● 221

Press, 1971), Chapter 11, Sec. 13, pp. 75–83. And see the critiques of A Theory of Justice by Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973); Robert Paul Wolff, Understanding Rawls (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Norman Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls (New York: Basic Books, n.d.); and especially the contributions of James Fishkin and Douglas Rae to “Justice: A Spectrum of Responses to John Rawls’s Theory,” American Political Science Review, LXIX (1975), pp. 615–647. 12. American labor law has been summarized in a definitive Supreme Court rul- ing as follows: “[I]n establishing what issues must be submitted to the process of bargaining, Congress has no expectation that the elected union representa- tive would become an equal partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the union’s members are employed. . . . [I]n view of an employer’s need for unencumbered decision-making, bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.” First National Maintenance Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 101 S. Ct. 2579-2581 (1981). American labor law is not extreme in this regard; roughly the same rules apply in most capitalist societies, except where social democracy has departed farthest from the usual ground rules of capitalism. See Karl Klare, “Labor Law and the Liberal Imagination,” Socialist Review, 12 (March–April 1982), pp. 45–71. 13. Robert M. Cook, “Work in the Construction Industry: A Report from the Field,” Research in Social Problems and Public Policy, 2 (1982), p. 230. Cook, who has been both an academic sociologist and (for many years) a construction worker, goes on to give this example: “The safe ironworker is more relaxed and able to concentrate on his job. If he’s protected by nets and doesn’t have to constantly hang on with his toes and worry about falling fifty feet he’s going to·have more energy to put into his work. I’ve watched ironworkers move about on open steel partly protected by nets. No matter how good they are, there is a perceptible change in their stride when they go from a netted to an unnetted area and back. Over the nets their pace is always faster and more confident.” 14. For an overview, see Carolyn Teich Adams and Katharyn Teich Winston, Mothers at Work (New York: Longman, 1980). 15. I am indebted for this account to Duane Lockard of Princeton University, who is engaged on a full-length study of the history and politics of coal mining in the United States. 16. See the summary by Stephen J. Ross, Social Stratification in the United States (Baltimore: Social Graphics Company, 1979), pp. 27–28. 17. The term is from Peter Drucker, The Unseen Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1976). 18. Braverman, Chapter 10, and pp. 411–412. These words were written, again, before the visible metastasis of the financial sector of American capitalism, which has raised unproductivity to heights not even dreamed of by Braverman—or Marx. 222 ● Notes

19. Not only capitalism is characterized by swollen, unproductive bureaucracies. So is Communism or state socialism, even more so, but its bureaucracy is of a different nature, being populated instead by planners and their entourages, party cadres, middlemen, and expediters, etc. 20. In Capital, vol. 1, Chapter XIV, “Toward the end of the division of labor in manufacturing and in society.” 21. The peculiar tax laws of corporate capitalism had an effect on the history of Cen- tre Point, but only to the extent of supporting its owner in his obsessive desire to rent it to a single tenant. 22. Emma Rothschild, “Reagan and the Real America,” New York Review of Books, 28 (February 5, 1981), pp. 12–18. See also Bob Kuttner, “Growth with Equity,” Working Papers, 8 (September–October 1981), pp. 32–43. 23. R. H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1920), p. 130. 24. See David Noble, America by Design (New York: Knopf, 1977); and Alfred Chan- dler, The Visible Hand (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1977). See also Stephen A. Marglin, “What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production,” in The Review of Radical Political Economics, 6 (Summer 1974), 60–112, and Katherine Stone, “The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry,” ibid., pp. 113–173. 25. Braverman, p. 193. 26. Ibid., p. 384. Cf. Robin Blackburn and Michael Mann, The Worker in the Labor Market (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 180, who note that 80 percent of several hundred workers studied by them in one job market “exercise less skill at work than they would if they drove to work. Indeed, most of them expend more men- tal effort and resourcefulness in getting to work than in doing their jobs.” 27. Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little Brown, 1974), Chapter 3. For a critique of the erroneous notion that IQ testing has demon- strated the existence of variations in human “intelligence” that are both immense and innate, see Green, The Pursuit of Inequality, Chapters 2–4, and Stephen J. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981). 28. See Chapter 2 of John Stuart Mill’s “Utilitarianism,” in J. M. Robson, ed., Col- lected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), vol. 10.