Cordesman: Insurgency in Iraq 7/9/07 Page i Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775-3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457-8746 Email:
[email protected] Success or Failure? Iraq’s Insurgency and Civil Violence and US Strategy: Developments through June 2007 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
[email protected] With the Assistance of Emma Davies and Elizabeth Detwiler Working Draft: Updated: July 9, 2007 Cordesman: Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence 7/9/07 Page ii Executive Summary Two reports released to U.S. government officials by the National Intelligence Council in January 2003 predicted that establishing a stable and secure democracy in Iraq would be a long and difficult task. The reports highlighted that the competition between religious sects and ethnic groups would open the door for foreign entities such as Al Qa’ida to target U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, and encourage neighboring countries to vie for power and influence in the country. By the summer of 2007, the accuracy of these predictions became increasingly apparent. President Bush’s proposed “surge” did succeed in deploying deployed additional troops from February to mid-June 2007. The Baghdad security plan, known as Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, did not achieve quick results for two primary reasons: First, the few areas that were successfully cleared of insurgents were then held by Iraqi police and army personnel, which were largely under-prepared and under-manned to carry out such operations.