Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Decisive War, Elusive Peace Should Not in Any Way Detract from Their Value
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Operation IRAQI FREEDOM DecisiveDecisive WarWar,, ElusiveElusive PeacePeace Walter L. Perry • Richard E. Darilek • Laurinda L. Rohn • Jerry M. Sollinger Editors C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/rr1214 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN 978-0-8330-4192-0 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2015 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover photo at top: Sergei Grits/AP Images; cover photo at bottom: Muhammed Muheisen/AP Images Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org This work is dedicated to the memories of two of our friends and colleagues: John Y. Schrader 1940 –2005 and Nikki J. Shacklett 1953–2013 Preface Soon after Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) began in March 2003, RAND Arroyo Center began a research project at the request of the U.S. Army. This project set out to prepare an authoritative account of the planning and execution of combat and stability operations in Iraq and to identify key issues that could affect Army plans and goals, operational concepts, doctrine, and other Title 10 responsibilities. The resulting body of work will interest those involved in organizing, training, and equipping military forces to plan for, deploy to, participate in, and support joint and multinational operations. Although focused primarily on Army forces and activities, the analysis also describes other aspects of joint and multinational operations. RAND analysts collected the information in these volumes from many sources, including unit after-action reports, compilations of lessons learned, official databases, media reports, other contemporary records, and interviews with key participants in OIF. This report, which is based on unclassified source material only, presents a sum- mary of a larger, five-volume study on OIF that drew from both classified and unclas- sified sources. It traces the operation from its root causes in the first Gulf War through operations up to approximately the end of June 2004. It addresses strategy, planning, and organization for OIF; examines air and ground force operations; reports on personnel, deployment, and logistics issues; describes coalition operations; discusses the occupation that followed combat operations; and considers civil-military operations. The analysis is based on reviews of contemporary records and interviews with key participants in OIF. The research was completed in October 2004 and the final draft was submitted in January 2006. Also, since the research was completed and recommendations formulated several years ago, the situation is likely to have changed. Some recommendations might already have been implemented in whole or in part. The purpose of this analysis is to find out where problems occurred and to sug- gest possibilities to improve planning and operations in the future. The results of such analysis can seem therefore to be overly focused on the negative. This should not be taken to mean that no good was done. In fact, dedicated U.S. and coalition person- nel, both military and civilian, engaged in many positive and constructive activities, individually and collectively. That this analysis does not highlight all those activities v vi Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Decisive War, Elusive Peace should not in any way detract from their value. Our focus, however, remains on find- ing ways to improve. This research was co-sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S. Army, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, U.S. Army. It was conducted in RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center spon- sored by the United States Army. For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the Director of Oper- ations (telephone 310-393-0411, extension 6419; FAX 310-451-6952; email Marcy_ [email protected]), or visit Arroyo’s website at http://www.rand.org/ard.html. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is DAMOAX003. Contents Preface .................................................................................................. v Figures .................................................................................................xv Tables ................................................................................................ xvii Summary ............................................................................................. xix Acknowledgments ............................................................................... xxxiii Acronyms ........................................................................................... xxxv CHAPTER ONE Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 Sources of Our Data ................................................................................... 2 Timeline and Reference Map ......................................................................... 2 How the Book Is Organized .......................................................................... 8 CHAPTER TWO Genesis of the War Jefferson P. Marquis, Walter L. Perry, Andrea Mejia, Jerry M. Sollinger, Vipin Narang.... 9 Political Underpinnings ............................................................................... 9 Aftermath of the First Gulf War ..................................................................10 Uprisings .............................................................................................12 Military Reorganization and Growth of Saddam’s Security Forces .............................14 U.S. Regional Footprint Grows After First Gulf War ............................................16 A Decade of Containment and Regime Change, 1991 to 2001 .................................19 Containment: The UN Resolutions ..............................................................19 Regime Change .................................................................................... 22 The Global War on Terrorism ...................................................................... 28 CHAPTER THREE Planning the War and the Transition to Peace Walter L. Perry ....................................................................................31 The Warplan Evolves .................................................................................31 Minimizing Collateral Damage ...................................................................32 vii viii Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Decisive War, Elusive Peace Lines and Slices .....................................................................................32 A Generated or Running Start? .................................................................. 34 Weapons of Mass Destruction ....................................................................35 Emergence of the Hybrid Plan ....................................................................37 Planning for the Aftermath ......................................................................... 38 A Late Start at CENTCOM ...................................................................... 40 CFLCC Planning for Post-Hostility Operations ............................................... 42 Task Force IV ......................................................................................... 43 Planning............................................................................................. 44 Operational Challenges ........................................................................... 46 The Dissolution of Task Force IV ................................................................ 46 A Plan Without Resources ...........................................................................47 Planting the Seeds of Failure ......................................................................49 Implications for Planning Policy ..................................................................52 Summing Up the Planning Process for Iraq .......................................................55 Getting the Force Size Right ..................................................................... 56 Inverted Planning .................................................................................. 56 CHAPTER FOUR Land Operations Bruce R. Pirnie, John Gordon IV, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Forrest E. Morgan, Alexander C. Hou, Chad Yost, Andrea Mejia, David E. Mosher .............................57