Iraq

2016 Country Review

http://www.countrywatch.com Table of Contents

Chapter 1 1 Country Overview 1 Country Overview 2 Key Data 4 5 Middle East 6 Chapter 2 8 Political Overview 8 History 9 Political Conditions 13 Political Risk Index 302 Political Stability 316 Freedom Rankings 331 Human Rights 343 Government Functions 346 Government Structure 348 Principal Government Officials 358 Leader Biography 359 Leader Biography 359 Foreign Relations 361 National Security 382 Defense Forces 391 Chapter 3 393 Economic Overview 393 Economic Overview 394 Nominal GDP and Components 398 Population and GDP Per Capita 400 Real GDP and Inflation 401 Government Spending and Taxation 402 Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment 404 Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate 405 Data in US Dollars 406 Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units 407 Energy Consumption and Production QUADS 409 World Energy Price Summary 410 CO2 Emissions 411 Agriculture Consumption and Production 412 World Agriculture Pricing Summary 415 Metals Consumption and Production 416 World Metals Pricing Summary 418 Economic Performance Index 419 Chapter 4 431 Investment Overview 431 Foreign Investment Climate 432 Foreign Investment Index 435 Corruption Perceptions Index 448 Competitiveness Ranking 459 Taxation 468 Stock Market 469 Partner Links 469 Chapter 5 470 Social Overview 470 People 471 Human Development Index 476 Life Satisfaction Index 480 Happy Planet Index 491 Status of Women 500 Global Gender Gap Index 503 Culture and Arts 513 Etiquette 515 Travel Information 516 Diseases/Health Data 526 Chapter 6 532 Environmental Overview 532 Environmental Issues 533 Environmental Policy 534 Greenhouse Gas Ranking 535 Global Environmental Snapshot 546 Global Environmental Concepts 557 International Environmental Agreements and Associations 571 Appendices 596 Bibliography 597 Iraq

Chapter 1 Country Overview

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Country Overview

IRAQ

On the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and once known as Mesopotamia, Iraq was the site of flourishing ancient civilizations. invaded the region in the 7th century and brought the Muslim religion, and for a time Iraq was the heartland of the Islamic Empire. The 13th century Mongol invasion followed by Ottoman Turks, and Iraq became part of Ottoman Empire from the 15th century. It came under British control after World War I, and gained independence in 1932.

After a military coup that overthrew the monarchy, Iraq was declared a republic in 1958. Territorial disputes with Iran led to a costly eight-year war (1980-88).

In August 1990, Iraq seized but was expelled by -led, coalition forces during the in early 1991. Following Kuwait's liberation, the United Nations Security Council required Iraq to surrender all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles and to allow United Nations verification inspections. Claims of continued Iraqi noncompliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions over a period of 12 years led to the United States-led justification for the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the ouster of the Saddam regime. Of course, the actual legal basis for such claims remains a matter of debate.

In October 2005, approved a constitution in a national referendum and elected a Council of Representatives (CoR) in December 2005. The CoR approved most cabinet ministers in May 2006, marking the transition to a constitutional government. Elections have ensued in Iraq as the country charts the course of democratization. But the right to vote has not addressed the difficult ethno-sectarian profile of Iraq and the ensuing power struggle over who wields political influence.

While the war in Iraq was officially ended in 2011 and remaining United States troops in Iraq were withdrawn at the end of that year, the security situation remains volatile in Iraq.

Indeed, sectarian dissonance and conflict in post-invasion Iran created the conditions for exploitation. To this end, Sunni Islamist terrorists, under the aegis of the and the Levant or ISIL (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and or ISIS), have seized control over wide swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory. As a result, the United States has redeployed a limited number of United States military advisers to Iraq to assist in rescuing Iraq from slipping into

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Note: Iraq’s economy is dominated by the oil sector. The country has the world’s third-largest oil reserves and considerable gas reserves.

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Key Data

Key Data

Region: Middle East

Population: 33309836

Mostly desert; mild to cool winters and dry, hot summers, with colder Climate: conditions in the mountain regions

Arabic is the main language; Kurdish is the other major language; Assyrian, Languages: Armenian, Turkish, Turkmen, Luri, and various other Indo-Aryan languages are also spoken in various communities

Currency: 1 Iraqi dinar = 1000 fils

Holiday: Anniversary of the Revolution is 17 July (1968), Army Day is 6 January

Area Total: 437072

Area Land: 432162

Coast Line: 58

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Iraq

Country Map

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Middle East

Regional Map

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Chapter 2

Political Overview

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History

A Brief

The Ancient Civilizations

Iraq became a sovereign, independent state in 1932, and has been a republic since the 1958 coup d'etat that ended the reign of King Faisal II. Although the modern state, the Republic of Iraq, is quite young, the history of the land and its people dates back more than 5,000 years. Here, in ancient Mesopotamia (the land between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers), the first civilization, Sumer, appeared in the Near East. Iraqi history displays a continuity shaped by adaptation to the ebb and flow of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Allowed to flow unchecked, the rivers wrought destruction in terrible floods that inundated whole towns. When irrigation dikes controlled the rivers and other waterworks, the land became extremely fertile.

The Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers' potential to be destructive or productive, has resulted in two distinct legacies found throughout Iraqi history. On the one hand, Mesopotamia's plentiful water resources and lush river valleys allowed for the plentiful food and economic production. Surplus food production, joint irrigation and flood control efforts, in turn, facilitated the growth of a powerful and expanding state. In this way, an impressive evolution of culture and civilization began at Sumer, later in Babylon and Assyria, and was preserved by rulers such as Hammurabi (1792- 1750 B.C.E.), Cyrus (550-530 B.C.E.), Darius (520-485 B.C.E.), Alexander the Great (336-323 B.C.E.), and the Abbasids (750-1258 C.E.)

On the other hand, Mesopotamia could also be an extremely threatening environment, driving its peoples to seek security from the forces of nature. Throughout Iraqi history, various groups have formed autonomous, self-contained social units; and these efforts to build security-providing structures have exerted a powerful impact on Iraqi culture. Example s include: allegiance to ancient religious deities at Ur and Eridu; membership in the Shiat Ali (or Party of Ali, the small group of followers that supported Ali ibn Abu Talib as the rightful leader of the Islamic community in the seventh century); residence in the "asnaf" (guilds) or the "mahallat" (city quarters) of under the Ottoman Turks; and membership in one of a multitude of tribes.

Two factors that inhibited political centralization were the absence of stone, and Iraq's geographic

Iraq Review 2016 Page 9 of 609 pages Iraq location as the eastern flank of the Arab world. For much of Iraqi history, the lack of stone hindered the building of roads. As a result, many parts of the country have remained beyond government control. Also, because it borders non-Arab Turkey and Iran, and because of the great agricultural potential of its river valley, Iraq attracted waves of ethnically diverse migrations. Although this influx of people enriched Iraqi culture, it has disrupted the country's intern al balance and has led to deep-seated schisms.

The Ottoman Empire

Throughout Iraqi history, the conflict between political fragmentation and centralization was reflected in the struggles among tribes and cities for the food-producing flatlands of the river valleys. When a central power neglected to keep the waterworks in repair, land fell into disuse, and tribes attacked settled peoples for precious and scarce agricultural commodities. For nearly 600 years, between the collapse of the Abbasid Empire in the 13th century and the waning years of the Ottoman era in the late 19th century, government authority was tenuous, and tribal Iraq was, in effect, autonomous.

Beginning in the middle of the 19th century, the "tanzimat" reforms (an administrative and legal reorganization of the Ottoman Empire), the emergence of private property, and the tying of Iraq to the world capitalist market severely altered Iraq's social str ucture. Tribal shaykhs had traditionally provided both spiritual leadership and tribal security. Land reform and increasing links with the West transformed many shaykhs into profit-seeking landlords, whose tribesmen became impoverished sharecroppers. Moreover, as Western economic penetration increased, machine- made British textiles displaced the products of Iraq's once-prosperous craftsmen.

20th Century Iraq

At the beginning of the , Iraq's disconnected, and often antagonistic, ethnic, religious and tribal social groups professed little or no allegiance to the central government. As a result, the all-consuming concern of contemporary Iraqi history has been the forging of a nation-state out of this diverse and conflict-ridden social structure, in addition to the concurrent transformation of parochial loyalties, both tribal and ethnic, into a national identity.

During the 20th century, as the power of tri bal Iraq waned, Baghdad benefited from the rise of a centralized governmental apparatus, a burgeoning bureaucracy, increased educational opportunities, and the growth of the oil industry. The transformation of the urban-tribal balance resulted in a massive rural-to-urban migration. The disruption of parochial loyalties, and the rise of new class relations based on economics, fueled frequent tribal rebellions and urban uprisings during much of the 20th century.

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In particular, Iraq's social fabric was in the throes of a destabilizing transition in the first half of the 20th century. At the same time, because of its foreign roots, the Iraqi political system suffered from a severe legitimacy crisis. Beginning with its League of Nations mandate in 1920, the British government had laid out the institutional framework for Iraqi government and politics.

British Rule

Britain imposed a Hashimite monarchy, defined the territor ial limits of Iraq with little correspondence to natural frontiers or traditional tribal and ethnic settlements and influenced the writing of a constitution and the structure of parliament. The British also supported narrowly based groups, such as the tribal shaykhs, over the growing, urban-based nationalist movement, and resorted to military force when British interests were threatened, as in the 1941 Rashid Ali coup.

As such, between 1918 and 1958, British policy in Iraq had far-reaching effects. The majority of Iraqis were excluded from the political process, and the process itself failed to develop procedures for resolving internal conflicts other than rule by decree and the frequent use of repressive measures. Also, because the formative experiences of Iraq's post-1958 political leadership centered around clandestine opposition activity, decision making and government activity in general, customarily have been veiled in secrecy. Furthermore, because the coun try lacks deeply rooted national political institutions, a small elite-often bound by close family or tribal ties-frequently has monopolized political power.

The Era of

Between the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and the emergence of Saddam Hussein in the mid-, Iraqi history was, therefore, a chronicle of conspiracies, coups, countercoups and fierce Kurdish uprisings. Beginning in 1975, however, with the signing of the Algiers Agreement, a concord between Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran that effectively ended Iranian military support for the in Iraq, Saddam Hussein was able to bring Iraq an unprecedented period of stability.

Saddam Hussein effectively used rising oil revenues to fund large-scale development projects, to increase public sector employment, and to improve education and health care. This tied increasing numbers of Iraqis to the ruling "Ba'ath" (Arab Socialist Resurre ction) Party. As a result, for the first time in contemporary Iraqi history, an Iraqi leader successfully forged a national identity out of Iraq's diverse social structure.

Saddam Hussein's achievements and Iraq's general prosperity, however, did not last long. In

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September 1980, Iraqi troops crossed the border into Iran, embroiling the country in a costly war. The Iran- permanently altered the course of Iraqi history. It strained Iraqi political and social life and led to severe economic dislocations. Viewed from a historical perspective, the outbreak of hostilities in 1980 was, in part, just another phase of the ancient Persian-Arab conflict fueled by 20th century border disputes.

Many observers believe that Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran was a personal miscalculation based on ambition and a sense of vulnerability. Saddam Hussein, despite having made significant strides in forging an Iraqi nation-state, feared that Iran's new revolutionary leadership would threaten Iraq's delicate Sunni-Shia balance and would exploit Iraq's geo-strategic vulnerabilities (for example, its minimal access to the Persian Gulf). In this respect, Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran had historical precedent; the ancient rulers of Mesopotamia, fearing internal strife and foreign conquest, also engaged in frequent battles with the peoples of the highlands.

By November 1980, the Iraqi offensive had lost its momentum. Rejecting an Iraqi offer to negotiate, Khomeini launched a series of counter-offensives in 1982, 1983, and 1984 that resulted in the recapture of the Iranian cities of Khorramshahr and Abadan. The destruction of huge oil facilities caused sharp declines in both states' oil revenues. Nonetheless, Iraq was able to obtain substantial financial aid from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, as well as from several Western states, including the U.S., that feared the new Islamic and anti-Western government in Iran.

In early 1986, an Iranian offensive across the Shatt al-Arab resulted in the fall of the Iraqi oil- loading port of Faw and the occupation of much of the Faw Peninsula almost to the Kuwait border. The Iranians, however, could not break out of the peninsula to threaten , and their last great offensive, which began in December 1986, was ultimately repelled with heavy losses. In the spring of 1988, the freshly equipped Iraqi ground and air forces succeeded in retaking the Faw Peninsula and, through a succession of frontal assaults, continued into Iran. Iranian battlefield losses, combined with Iraqi air and missile attacks on Iranian cities, forced Khomeini to accept a cease-fire, which took effect in August 1988.

Peace in Iraq, however, was not long-lived, and within a few years, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The Gulf War in the early followed soon after. Years of sanctions by the United Nations had an effect on the economic situation in Iraq and overall living conditions. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 by a United States-led coalition, the after-effects of the war, as well as the ramifications of a dire security situation, continue to be felt today.

Editor's Note:

See "Political Conditions" in this Country Review for more recent developments.

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Note on History: In certain entries, open source content from the State Department Background Notes and Country Guides have been used. A full listing of sources is available in the Bibliography.

Political Conditions

The to 1990

From the time of Saddam Hussein's emergence as the leader of Iraq and the expanded role played by the ruling Baath Party, Iraq's sense of nationhood, as well as its general prosperity incrementally rose. From 1980 to 1988, the war between Iran and Iraq ensued, and when it finally ended, both countries had suffered massive destruction. Despite its huge losses in the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq was unchallenged as the most powerful military presence in the Gulf region. The army was weakened, but still disposed numerous troops.

The Gulf War

As a result of the war, the Iraqi economy was shattered. The need for a solution to these problems contributed to Iraq's revival of old territorial claims against oil rich Kuwait. Saddam Hussein called for the annexation of the Bubiyan and Warbah islands at the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab, and thus giving Iraq a clear passage to the Gulf. He also accused Kuwait of illegally siphoning off oil from the ar-Rumaylah field, one of the world's largest oil pools, which the two countries shared. Hussein threatened to use force against all Arab oil producers, (including Kuwait and the ) who exceeded their oil quotas, and accused them of collaborating with the United States to strangle the Iraqi economy by flooding the market with low-priced oil.

Although Iraq had accompanied its threats by moving troops to the border area, the world was largely taken by surprise when, on Aug. 2, 1990, the invaded and occupied Kuwait. A force of about 120,000 soldiers and approximately 2,000 tanks and other armored vehicles met little resistance. The Kuwaiti army was not on the alert, and those troops at their posts could not mount an effective defense. Some aircraft operating from southern Kuwait attacked Iraqi armored columns before their air base was overrun, and they sought refuge in Saudi Arabia. Of the 20,000 Kuwaiti troops, many were killed or captured, although up to 7,000 escaped into Saudi Arabia,

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Having completed the occupation of Kuwait, the Iraqi armored and mechanized divisions and the elite Republican Guard advanced south towards Kuwait's border with Saudi Arabia. Intelligence sources indicated that the Iraqis were positioning themselves for a subsequent drive toward the Saudi oil fields and shipping terminals, possibly continuing toward the other Gulf States.

In the first of a series of resolutions condemning Iraq, the United Nations Security Council on Aug. 2, 1990, called for Iraq's unconditional and immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. In the months following, a coalition force of more than 600,000 ground, sea, and air force personnel deployed to defend Saudi Arabia and to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait.

Command of the force was divided. Commander-in-Chief of the United States Central Command Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf headed American, British, and French units. Schwarzkopf's Saudi counterpart, Lt. Gen. Khalid ibn Sultan ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, commanded units from 24 non- Western countries, including troops from Saudi Arabia, , Syria, Kuwait, and the other Gulf states. In addition to 20,000 Saudi troops and 7,000 Kuwaiti troops, an estimated 3,000 personnel from the other Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) took part in the land forces of the coalition offensive, known as Operation Desert Storm.

In January 1991, Operation Desert Storm evolved into a full coalition offensive against Iraq by the coalition forces. Sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council, the offensive was then called the Gulf War. On Feb. 26, Kuwait was officially liberated. An official cease-fire was established, international sanctions against Iraq were instituted, and carefully circumscribed provisions for peace were implemented, including enforced air-exclusion ("no fly") zones in southern and northern Iraq. The "no fly" zones were put into effect to protect the Shia Muslim and Kurdish minorities in those areas. Despite the existence of these measures, Iraq was accused of contravening against the peace concord by repeatedly violating the boundaries of the zones.

The 1990s

In November 1994, another political conundrum erupted amidst the Kurdish population of Iraq. Specifically, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, or PUK, and the Kurdish Democratic Party, or KDP, signed a peace agreement, which allowed elections to be held in May 1995. In January 1995, fighting broke out and resumed until May, postponing the Kurdish National Assembly elections. Peace negotiations to resolve the conflict in northern Iraq amongst warring groups were made in October 1995, which resulted in an agreement for them to hold elections in May 1996.

On Aug. 31, 1996, Iraqi troops were deployed to the Kurdish region to give assistance to the KDP.

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With the aid of the Iraqi military, the KDP was able to capture three cities, thereby controlling all three Kurdish provinces. Subsequently, the Iraqi government declared the restoration of Iraqi rule in Kurdistan, offering amnesty to Kurdish insurgents. In September 1996, the KDP formed a coalition consisting of the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan, or IMIK, the Kurdistan Communist Party, and Assyrian and Turkoman representatives. In October, PUK forces regained much of the terrain they had capitulated to the KDP.

In May 1997, around 10,000 Turkish troops were deployed to the northern Kurdistan region where they attacked Kurdish Workers' Party, or PKK bases. The United Nations opposed the Turkish presence and demanded their withdrawal from the region. The Turkish forces complied, but later commenced air strikes on the PKK bases. The KDP withdrew from peace negotiations in March 1997. On Oct. 12, 1997, the PUK instigated its strongest military assault against the KDP. A four- day cease-fire was negotiated beginning on October 17. The fighting, however, resumed shortly after the established cease-fire ended.

On Feb. 12, 1998, two delegations of KDP and PUK met in Shaqlawa. Participants of the meeting addressed the peace process and the recently exchanged peace plans. The meeting resulted with both sides agreeing to uphold and respect the cease-fire; settle differences through discussions; avoid violence at all costs; use the media to promote the peace process; unconditionally release all prisoners; and form a joint commission to coordinate the public services in education, health, and energy.

Domestically, Iraq experienced tensions between the ruling Sunnis and the Shi'a minority. The killing of Ayatollah Sadeq al-Sadr-a prominent Shia cleric-on Feb. 17, 1999, sparked violent demonstrations. Dozens of Islamic activists and security forces were killed, and several hundred people were arrested. Human rights organizations reported that hundreds of people, including political prisoners and possible prisoners of conscience, were executed and large-scale arbitrary arrests of suspected political opponents took place. and ill treatment of prisoners and detainees were widely reported.

In the latter months of 1998, United Nations Special Commission, or UNSCOM, teams that were directed to investigate Iraqi military sites and facilities, and to destroy Iraqi weapons systems, claimed that they had found evidences of chemical warfare production. At the same time, Iraqi officials expressed their position that UNSCOM investigations were controlled by the United States and their Western allies and was an unfairly prejudiced process. The Iraqis responded by intermittently closing off sites from UNSCOM inspection, and the United States, in the interim, admitted that it had, indeed, been involved in some clandestine investigations. . The UNSCOM teams, headed at the time by Richard Butler, left Iraq. A protracted process of military proliferation and reflux in the Gulf resulted.

In December 1998, American and British forces, operating under the auspices of the United

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Nations Security Council, bombed Iraqi targets, as a result of Iraqi non-compliance with the stipulations of the existing post-Gulf War agreement. For the most part, the bombing campaign, referred to as "Operation Desert Fox," concentrated on the air-exclusion ("no fly") zones of the northern and southern parts of Iraq. The city of , the area of Basra, and the Abu al-Khasib region all suffered human casualties as a consequence of the bombing campaign.

Iraq was repeatedly accused of violating the "no fly" zone provisions. For its part, Iraq has never recognized the legitimacy of the "no fly" zones, since they were not specifically articulated by a specific United Nations resolution. Iraq vowed to unrelentingly oppose the zones, as a result. Further, Iraqi officials explicitly blamed the United States and the for the bombing campaign, which they claimed targeted civilian installations, and resulted in deaths within the civilian population. Consequently, in the face of perceived aggression, Iraq hurled anti-aircraft fire back at allied aircraft activity. In this regard, the government of Iraq contended that because several Iraqi civilians were killed in attacks by allied forces, it had the right to protect its own people. The allied response, however, was that any indiscriminate anti-aircraft fire that might have been issued, in an attempt to bring down allied aircraft -- for whatever reason -- would be potentially detrimental to Iraqi civilians. American and British forces maintained that their presence in the Gulf was authorized by the existing United Nations Security Council Resolution. They also noted that Saddam Hussein reportedly -- but not definitively -- stated that a bounty would be offered for shooting down any allied aircraft. They point to this alleged statement as evidence supporting their actions of self-defense.

In July 1999, arrangements were made for a team of experts to begin the removal of toxic substances in Iraq that were left by UNSCOM disarmament inspection teams. This team of experts included Russians, French and Chinese representatives, and excluded the original UNSCOM team. Since the launch of air strikes in December 1998, no weapons inspectors had been allowed back into Iraq. In December 1999, a new commission, the United Nation's Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission for Iraq, or UNMOVIC, was established to replace UNSCOM. The new United Nations weapons inspection team for Iraq and its director, Hans Blix, were ready to begin work in Iraq, but the ongoing disagreement between Iraq and the United Nations prevented UNMOVIC from moving into Iraq.

Meanwhile, the economic sanctions program against Iraq was repeatedly criticized, and an increasing numbers of governments and non-governmental organizations called for the lifting of the sanctions. Indeed, the sanctions regime had not brought down Saddam Hussein and Iraq's political elite, while Iraq's weapons program was no longer under international surveillance. Rather, the strict trade regulations had led to the lack of food as well as medication, consequently hurting the Iraqi population instead of the regime, as intended. UNICEF estimated that the infant mortality rate rose 160 percent since 1991. Several hundred thousands Iraqi children under five died as a result of malnutrition and lack of medication, which was directly attributable to the sanctions program. The apparent civilian sufferings and the political shortcomings increased international criticism and

Iraq Review 2016 Page 16 of 609 pages Iraq defiance of the sanctions regime. In March 2000, Hans von Sponek resigned as Director of the United Nations Humanitarian Program in Iraq, in protest of the sanctions.

2000 to 2002

In August 2000, the Saddam International Airport in Baghdad re-opened, 10 years after it was closed. A ceremony was held to mark the reopening of airport, regarded as a fresh and bold move by Iraq to counter the United Nations ban on commercial flights to and from Iraq. Also in August, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez became the first head of state to visit Iraq since the Gulf War. Since early 2000, numerous humanitarian, culture and trade delegations visited Iraq, underlining the increasingly international, and in particular Arab, opposition to the sanctions.

Encouraged by the growing opposition to the sanctions, in October 2000, Iraq demanded that oil bought under the United Nations administered "oil-for-food" program be paid in euros instead of U.S. dollars. Since November 2000, Iraq had also attempted to charge its own "oil surcharge," demanding that oil lifters pay an additional 25-40 cents for each barrel of oil bought, as well as attempting to collect a 10 percent fee on import contracts. The Iraqi regime was already benefiting from unauthorized sales of oil, made possible by corrupt border police and international oil traders. An estimated 400,000 barrels per day (almost a quarter of the two million barrels per day allowed under the sanctions), was transported through Syrian, Jordanian and Iranian pipelines, and by trucks crossing over the Turkish border. The oil was sold in a clandestine international oil market, enriching Saddam Hussein and his entourage.

On Feb. 16, 2001, American and British forces bombed five Iraqi control and command posts around Baghdad. The bombings represented the most extensive attacks since December 1998 and the first attacks close to the Iraqi capital city. The operation, described as a "routine mission" by U.S. President George W. Bush, came in response to increasingly sophisticated Iraqi attacks on planes patrolling the "no fly" zone.

Iraqi authorities claimed that two civilians were killed and more than 20 wounded in the attack, bringing the number of Iraqi civilians killed in allied bombings to over 300, and the number of people wounded to around 1,000 since December 1998. Large demonstrations took place in Baghdad the day after the raids. Iraqi press vowed to revenge the attack, and referred to President George W. Bush as "the son of the snake," accusing him of following his father's aggressive policy and hard stand towards Iraq. Saddam's continued defiance of the U.S. made him a popular leader in many Arab countries where people believed that the U.S. was playing a too influential role in the region.

Three permanent members of the U.N. Security Council -- , China and -- in addition to several other countries, also criticized the raids. France, who helped set up the "no fly" zone, but

Iraq Review 2016 Page 17 of 609 pages Iraq withdrew in 1998, condemned the bombings, and criticized U.S. and U.K. authorities for not informing NATO allies about the attack.

The February 2001 bombings again highlighted the shortcomings of the current sanctions regime. Renewed focus on the Iraq sanctions came amidst the Bush American administration's work on developing its policy towards not only Iraq, but the entire Middle East region as well. American policy and reputation was repudiated in the region, while Saddam Hussein's regime remained more entrenched than ever, while reaping the benefits of international sympathy.

Experts from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nation's nuclear agency based in Vienna, had been in Iraq since 1998. In January 2001, IAEA experts praised Iraq for its willingness to cooperate, but refused to comment on the finding of the inspections. For its part, Iraq called for an end to the sanctions, claiming that it possessed no weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations hoped to see its weapons inspectors back in Iraq to verify compliance with United Nations resolutions, prior to the lifting of any sanctions.

The United Nations Security Council's permanent members remained divided on the issue of the sanctions. Russia and China called for an end to the sanctions; France called for a change in the sanctions regime; and the United States and the United Kingdom have for long remained skeptical about any changes. Various alterations of the sanctions were proposed. Movement towards considering the implementing so-called 'smart sanctions,' focusing more tightly on arms control and removing controls on civilian goods, was taken, but no consensus was reached. On June 30, 2001, sanctions were extended for five more months. Iraq responded by withholding oil from the world market.

The sanctions regime and the Iraqi government's priorities left civilian infrastructure and oil installations in dire need of repair and upgrading. Smuggling was normative and continued unchecked, to the benefit of neighboring countries. The November 2001 trade fair in Baghdad witnessed greater Arab interest in Iraqi markets and brethren. Moves to reform the sanctions were expected to be attempted at the November 2001 United Nations General Assembly session.

While it was widely expected that Russia would refuse to support the so-called smart sanctions, the events on Sept. 11 put the entire situation on hold.

Iraq strongly condemned the terrorist attacks on the U.S., but equally formidable wording was used to condemn the bombing of . Political developments in Iraq depended on the development in the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism. Iraq involvement had not been implicated in the attacks, however, military moves were possible, as the U.S. implicated Iraq in the pursuit of the development of weapons of mass destruction.

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2002: The Road to War

In January 2002, U.S. President George Bush, in his state of the Union address, declared Iraq along with North Korea and Iran, as a member of an "axis of evil." Since then, there was widespread speculation of a U.S. offensive against Iraq. The Bush administration stated it would support a regime change in Iraq. The U.S. also stepped up its financial support of Iraqi opposition to Hussein. U.S. State Department officials met with Iraqi Kurdish opposition leaders from late 2001 until the time of the 2003 second Gulf War. It was believed that the U.S. favored stirring up instability within Iraq, as possible alternative to direct military action as a method to topple the regime.

In response to the Bush administration's threats to topple Saddam Hussein, the green light was given to Ba'ath party members to kill those people suspected of plotting to overthrow the government. Hussein has also intensified security along the northern Kurdish enclave, a well- known spot for Iraqi dissidents.

Meanwhile, in the first part of 2002, Iraq extended several invitations for the United Nations to begin a dialogue about how to implement U.N. Security Council resolutions. It also invited a United Nations envoy to review the human rights situation in the country. In February, Benon Sevan, the executive director of the UN oil-for-food program, recommended the organization make the necessary and constant adjustments to meeting the needs of the Iraqi people. The Iraqi government during this time also complained to the UN Compensations Committee that the committee was accepting too many demands from individuals or organizations, rather than from countries as a whole. On May 14, 2002, the UN extended "the oil for food program," and for a period of six months lifted restrictions on civilian goods.

Without external military intervention, Saddam Hussein's hold on power remained unchallenged. The Iraqi president had been rumored to suffer from cancer for some time, but had on several occasions appeared in public -- reportedly, in good health. In addition to the power struggle that would follow either his death or defeat, serious domestic problems continued to be identified in the Sunni-Shia divide and in the Kurdish dominated northern Iraq. Despite American financial and military support for oppositions groups such as the exile , as well as support for groups inside Iraq, there was little reason to expect these small measures would provoke change in Iraq.

The Iraqi regime continued to be one of the most repressive in the world. reported widespread use of torture, arrests of political opponents, forceful expulsions of Kurds, Turkmens and Assyrian, hundreds of executions-among them numerous political prisoners. Amnesty International, in its 2001 report, also reported human rights abuses in Iraqi Kurdistan. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights issued a resolution condemning "systematic, widespread, and extremely grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by

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Whether sanctions were lifted or reformed, it was hoped that changes would target and punish the Iraqi regime, alleviate the suffering of ordinary Iraqis, open up the country, and in a longer-term perspective, facilitate political change from within.

Meanwhile, in late July 2002, reports surfaced surrounding the United States' plan to remove Saddam Hussein as leader of Iraq. While in the past, such plans have centered on mass assaults reminiscent of "Desert Storm" over a decade ago, newer strategies seemed to center on specific key targets in Iraq, and the subsequent isolation and collapse of Hussein's government.

By late August 2002, voices in the Bush administration were stridently calling for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, citing the need for pre-emptive action against Iraq, which appeared poised on the verge of developing nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Unable to clearly link Iraq's alleged weapons program to identifiable terrorist groups, the Bush administration, bolstered by Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom, stated that the simple existence of a burgeoning nuclear program in Iraq demanded pre-emptive action.

With international outcry against unilateral -- or even bilateral -- military action against Iraq, U.S. President George W. Bush addressed the United Nations in September 2002 in an attempt to shore up support for his efforts; specifically, he called for the international body to bring Iraq back into line with the dictates of a number of resolutions against Iraq. Most of the resolutions mandate weapons inspection, and as such, the resumption of this program remained the procedure of choice among most of the global community, however, the U.S. government was hoping for a strong resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq instead. The Bush administration believed that efforts toward weapons inspections would be useless and only regime change could assure the destruction of Iraq's alleged nuclear capacity. Detracting from this claim was the discovery of the fact that the IAEA report that Bush had cited to warn about Iraq's alleged nuclear capacity turned out to be non-existent.

Meanwhile, United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair addressed the parliament at home and outlined a dossier regarding Iraq's alleged weapons program and its tactics against weapons inspections. His speech was aimed at gaining support for action against Iraq.

As the United States' Congress discussed and debated the provisions within its own draft of a resolution empowering the Bush administration to take military action against Iraq, the United Kingdom's government drafted a resolution delineating the requirements for Iraq to fully comply with international weapons inspections. This resolution was to be formally offered to the United Nations; it would then have to be approved by the United Nations General Assembly and most importantly, by the Security Council. France and Russia, both permanent members of the Security Council, stated they did not see the need for another resolution. Instead, they favored going ahead

Iraq Review 2016 Page 20 of 609 pages Iraq with inspections on the basis of prior resolutions and on the basis of a letter from the Iraqi government, which was delivered to the United Nations in mid-September 2002. China -- also a permanent member of the Security Council -- expressed great reservations about the military option posed by the United States and the United Kingdom. China warned that such action would augur dire consequences.

Complicating matters was the fact that the Iraqi government rejected the resolution drafted by the United States and the United Kingdom. Iraq also stated that it would like to comply with weapons inspections in accordance with a plan negotiated by United Nations Secretary General, . This plan did not neatly or easily coincide with the policies outlined by the Bush administration on Iraq.

In the week of Oct. 1, 2002, discussions were scheduled to commence in Austria regarding the re- admittance of weapons inspectors to Iraq. Inspectors from the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC), headed by Hans Blix, would search for biological, chemical and ballistic weapons. Meanwhile, a small delegation of United States congressmen also traveled to Iraq to lobby the Saddam Hussein's government to allow the re- admittance of weapons inspections and to examine the humanitarian situation. Their efforts, not unlike those of former weapons inspector Scott Ritter, were ridiculed by various voices in the United States' government.

These developments came after a week of intensified bombing by the United States and the United Kingdom in the "no fly zone." The bombing raids also included a civilian airport in the city of Basra. Russian officials noted that these bombing raids would be detrimental to the success of any political or diplomatic solutions regarding Iraq. The Russians, along with the French and the Chinese, continued to note that they favored a resumption of weapons inspections as the procedure of choice in dealing with Iraq.

For its part, Iraq denied any proscribed weapons capability and tentatively stated it would allow weapons inspections to resume. Members of the Arab community generally and collectively eschewed military action against Iraq, however, some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, stated that support for military action could be gained if it was sanctioned by the United Nations. Later, however, Saudi Arabian officials stated that bases on Saudi soil could not be used for any such military action.

Following United States President George W. Bush's national address on the issue of Iraq in October, a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq passed through both houses of Congress. Anti-war protests ensued across the world, a defiant declaration came from Iraq's leader, Saddam Hussein, that he would not voluntarily relinquish power, and discussions in the United Nations about a resolution on Iraq commenced.

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Debate in the United Nations continued in regard to the Iraq issue, and a resolution finally passed in November 2002. The resolution demanded unfettered access for United Nations inspectors to search for weapons of mass destruction. Although the United States claimed that military force would follow any failure on Iraq's part to comply with the resolution, the United Kingdom noted that while disarmament was inevitable, conflict was not. Nevertheless, the United States appeared to be preparing for war, by making plans that involve quarter of a million military troops.

Saddam Hussein convened a special session of parliament to consider a response to the United Nations resolution. Meanwhile, there was an emergency meeting of the Arab League. Member states expressed support for the resolution and encouraged Iraq to accept the demands stipulated in the resolution, while at the same time making it explicit that they were opposed to an attack on Iraq, which would be regarded as an attack against Arab countries. They also asked that Arabs be part of the inspection teams and that provocations by inspection teams be prevented.

In mid-November 2002, weapons inspectors returned to Iraq for the first time in four years. Led by Chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, the weapons inspection team consisted of twenty five persons, including representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and inspectors from the United Nations monitoring and verification commissions (UNMOVIC). By year's end, the team was expected to expand to 100 persons. Blix's team promised an objective and professional weapons inspection process, as well as rigorous inspections. The weapons inspection team will also be helped by the use of new technologies, which are capable of detecting the most well-hidden weapons. The Iraqi government stated it would fully comply with all United Nations dictates, for the sake of the Iraqi people, the Middle East region, and the world.

Official searches began on Nov. 27, 2002, and on Dec. 8, 2002, Iraq provided an account of banned weapons programs. Weapons inspectors' early assessment that their efforts appear unencumbered was tempered by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's cautionary words that it was too early to draw any conclusions. Striking a more pessimistic tone, United States President George Bush stated that the inspections process was "not encouraging." The developments occurred just as Iraq released its required declaration on the country's weapons programs and capabilities. United Nations weapons experts began examining the 12,000-page document, while the five United Nations Security Council permanent members were given access to the documents as well.

In late December 2002, just as United Nations nuclear specialists interviewed Iraqi scientists who might have critical information about the Iraqi weapons program, the United States military stated that Iraq shot down one of its unmanned drones. The plane, which was used for surveillance in the southern "no fly" zone, was shot at by Iraqi forces in that very region of the country. The United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, did not regard the incident as an escalation of tensions, since the Iraqi forces consistently shoot at allied aircraft patrolling the "no fly" zone.

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On the issue of Iraq's weapons inspections and ongoing inspections, however, the United States' government stated that the Iraqi's declaration on its weapons programs was not a full accounting, as was claimed. Thus, the United States asserted that the Iraqis were technically in violation of the recent United Nations' resolution. For its part, Iraq stated that the United States' accusation was levied for the sole purpose of setting the stage for an inevitable war against Iraq.

2003: The Second Gulf War Approaches

By January 2003, in a televised address in honor of Iraq's Army Day, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein claimed that weapons inspectors were functioning as intelligence operatives. While the Iraqi leader also expressed his desire for war to be avoided, he called on the Iraqi people to be prepared for its inevitability. The Iraqi leader's defiant speech came just after two senior Iraqi officials reacted with anger to their detainment for several hours at a Baghdad compound, which was contained and searched by United Nations weapons inspectors. Although Iraqi officials described the activities as "uncivilized" and "intrusive," the procedures appear consistent with the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441. Regardless of the uncomfortable tactics used by the weapons inspectors, it was imperative that Iraq be viewed as fully compliant with the weapons inspectors. For their part, weapons inspectors rejected Saddam Hussein's claim that they were involved in intelligence work and referred to his comments as "unfortunate." They insisted that they were not "exceeding their United Nations mandate" as was charged by the Iraqi leader.

With only three weeks left before the inspectors issued their report to the United Nations Security Council, analysts and correspondents in Iraq observed that there was no discernible evidence of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

Then, in mid-January 2003, 11 empty chemical warheads were discovered in Iraq. Officials reacted cautiously to the news. Dimitri Perricos, the head of the United Nations team in Baghdad, said the find "may not be a smoking gun" that indicated a violation of United Nations resolutions. But chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, described the situation in Iraq as "very dangerous," and declared that Baghdad had illegally imported arms-related material to the country. Representing the view of the Iraqi government, Hossam Amin, head of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate, said the material found was simply "forgotten."

By Jan. 20, 2003, Iraqi officials agreed to a 10-point concession accord established by Blix and El Baradei. The agreement was struck in the wake of the discovery of the empty chemical warheads, which were not accounted for in the 12,000 page weapons declaration document. The 10-point agreement included provisions to interview nuclear scientists outside of Iraq, possibly in Cyprus. Earlier, the Iraqis had not been pleased with the idea of private interviews. The stipulations of the agreement also required further documentation to be handed over by the Iraqis to the United

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Nations.

For its part, Iraq said it would also offer a response to the issues surrounding its incomplete weapons declaration. As well, Iraq stated it would appoint a team to search for munitions that may not have been declared in the original accounting under Resolution 1441.

Blix and El Baradei were both cautiously optimistic about the agreement, noting that it effectively resolved many practical issues. On Jan. 27, 2003, United Nations Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix told the United Nations that Iraq had complied with Security Resolution 1441 reluctantly. Blix also noted that many crucial issues, such as anthrax, VX nerve gas and Scud missiles, had not yet been adequately addressed, and the last set of documents from Iraq contained no new information. In addition, he cautioned that Iraq might still be in possession of biological agents and rockets. He did, however, state that the Iraqis had been cooperative in providing access to all sites. On balance, however, Blix observed that Iraq had not arrived at a genuine acceptance of the goal of disarmament. In specific terms, Blix expressed the belief that Iraq had agreed "in principle" to the dictates of Security Council Resolution 1441, which is aimed at disarmament, but in practice, Iraq had not acted on the substance of that principle.

In regard to weapons of mass destruction, Mohamed El Baradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said there was no evidence that Iraq had resumed its nuclear program, which was discontinued in the early 1990s. Notably, El Baradei disputed the alleged use of various high-strength aluminum tubes, which the United States claimed were to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. The IAEA inspection team found that the tubes were not directly suitable for uranium enrichment. Instead, their usage appeared consistent with the formulation of ordinary artillery rockets. This finding coincided, in fact, with Iraq's official explanation for the tubes. Nevertheless, El Baradei stated that his inspectors would need more time to continue their investigative efforts before reaching any absolute conclusions.

The Jan. 27, 2003, assessment would bear upon any decision to use military action against Iraq. Both the United States and the United Kingdom had said that any failure to comply with the dictates of Security Council Resolution 1441 could result in war. Indeed, the White House spokesman Ari Fleischer stated that partial compliance by Iraq did not constitute compliance in the comprehensive sense. Other key United Nations Security Council members, however, were adamant that inspections should continue. Two traditional allies of the United States and the United Kingdom, France and Germany, said that they would not support military action at that time. They believed that the inspections process should be exhausted before moving toward war footing. Meanwhile, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that more time was needed to continue inspections before any action should be taken.

The United Nations Security Council met on Jan. 29, 2003, to decide the next step in dealing with Iraq. Most parties concurred that Iraq needed to be more pro-active in its compliance with the

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Security Council Resolution 1441, however, there was no consensus on whether or not Iraq's failure to fully comply should result in military action. Further, with no evidence of nuclear weaponry, there was a general sense of wariness about going to war against Iraq. The United Stated and the United Kingdom were the obvious exceptions in this regard, however, in a recent visit to the United States, United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair noted that a new United Nations Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq would be needed before launching an attack.

Secretary of State Powell delivered a speech on Iraq to the United Nations on Feb. 5, 2003. The Bush administration promised "compelling evidence" on Iraq's weapons programs and other such violations during that speech. The substance of the speech, however, did not change minds on either side of the divide, although support for the war increased among Americans, based on the evidence espoused. Ironically, some of the very evidence from a British intelligence report was embarrassingly and remarkably discredited for being outdated, improperly altered and outdated.

Meanwhile, with the threat of war looming ahead, three key members of the United Nations Security Council -- France, Russia and China -- noted that they favored an intensified inspections regime to deal with Iraq, albeit noting that Iraq had much work to do in the realm of cooperation, compliance and disarmament. Germany and were also vocal in their reticence to go to war against Iraq. In this regard, France and Germany developed a disarmament proposal that will be offered to the United Nations, while Belgium said it would veto a request by the United States to give NATO support to Turkey in the event of a war with Iraq.

Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix and the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed El Baradei delivered their report to the United Nations Security Council on Friday, Feb. 14, 2003. The report addressed Iraqi cooperation with arms inspectors and general compliance on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441. Blix and El Baradei offered mixed reviews of Iraq's cooperation and compliance, noting that there had been some improvement since the time of the last report, when Blix famously noted that Iraq had not genuinely accepted the objective of disarmament. Notably, U2 surveillance over flights had been cleared, interviews with scientists had ensued, and Iraq had agreed to disarmament talks with . Both explained that no banned biological, chemical and nuclear weapons had been found, although they did not preclude the possibility that such weapons did, indeed, exist. Blix also made note of the fact that supplies of VX nerve agents and anthrax, as well as long range missiles were yet to be accounted for. He also noted that one particular missile with extended range was in violation of Security Resolutions. El Baradei observed that he had been presented with new documentation on weaponry and although the material did not provide new evidence, the gesture of openness suggested a notable shift on the part of the Iraqis. Significantly, Blix and El Baradei expressed the belief that inspections had been helpful and should be allowed to continue. In an unexpected development, Blix challenged aspects of the evidence that had been cited by United States Secretary of State Colin Powell in his address to the United Nations. He stated that there was no

Iraq Review 2016 Page 25 of 609 pages Iraq evidence that the Iraqis had previous knowledge of inspections, and he also said that the illicit movement arms had not been persuasively proven by satellite imagery.

The presentation was followed by passionate responses by members of the United Nations Security Council as well as the Iraqi ambassador. The address by French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin elicited a rare thunder of applause from United Nations members. Some plans were made for a new resolution on the use of force against Iraq, while French and other officials called for a follow-up report by the inspectors in early March.

In the days immediately following the February 14 inspections report, the major cities of the world saw massive protests against a possible war against Iraq. In New York City and Los Angeles protestors each numbered around three-quarters of a million, while rallies in London, Rome, and other European cities each ranged from several hundred thousand to over one and a half million. saw a two day rally as Australians railed against their country's involvement in a prospective war.

By the end of February 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom introduced a new resolution to the United Nations Security Council stating that Iraq had failed to disarm in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441. While the new resolution augured consequences, it stopped short of expressing an explicit date for military action.

On March 7, 2003, Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix and the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohamed El Baradei delivered another report to the United Nations Security Council.

Hans Blix noted that while the inspections process was not free from friction, impromptu inspections and increased surveillance had taken place. Also, despite initial reluctance, Iraq had accepted the demand to destroy its proscribed Al Samoud missiles. In this regard, the destruction of the missiles had begun. Blix did observe, however, that a country with such a highly developed administrative system as Iraq could have produced more documentary evidence regarding its weapons program. The Iraqis had provided some paperwork on anthrax, and had undertaken a significant effort to furnish information regarding biological weapons reportedly destroyed in 1991. Thus, Blix deemed that the level of Iraqi cooperation had increased and he concluded that the complete verification and disarmament process would take months to complete.

Days after the oral report by Blix, the United States drew attention to the existence of a drone aircraft which had not been mentioned in the presentation by Blix. The drone aircraft was determined to possess a wingspan wider than originally stated by Iraq, and as such, it might be capable of exceeding the 150 kilometer or 93 mile range allowed for weapons delivery systems.

Mohamed El Baradei declared that 218 nuclear inspections had been conducted, while nuclear

Iraq Review 2016 Page 26 of 609 pages Iraq inspectors had interviewed individual and groups, in both scheduled and unscheduled inspections. El Baradei also took time to explain the IAEA's investigation of the United States' claims regarding Iraqi attempts to procure high-quality aluminum tubes, presumably for the purpose of developing Iraq's nuclear ambitions. Explaining that the investigative process had been "well documented," El Baradei said that the IAEA had concluded that the overtures to purchase aluminum tubes were unrelated to the attempted manufacturing of gas centrifuges, which are used in the enrichment of uranium. In regard to magnets suspected for use in nuclear endeavors, IAEA experts concluded that they could not be used to produce nuclear material. El Baradei also refuted allegations by the United States and the United Kingdom that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger. In fact, the IAEA found that the supporting documents provided by the United States and the United Kingdom were inauthentic. On this matter, published a story about the fabricated evidence, which was exposed through the discovery of incriminating errors, such as unmatched names and titles of officials (see article titled "Some Evidence on Iraq Called Fake: U.N. Nuclear Inspector Says Documents on Purchases Were Forged" by Joby Warrick, March 8, 2003). El Baradei noted that after three months of intrusive inspections, there was no evidence of a revived nuclear program in Iraq. In particular, he stated that there was no sign of resumed nuclear activity since 1988 and no suggestion that Iraq had attempted to import uranium after 1990.

Despite the promising tone of the reports by Blix and El Baradei, the United States and the United Kingdom intended to compel a vote on their new resolution, which augmented the existing United Nations Security Resolution 1441. The new resolution was co-sponsored by Spain. Bulgaria, a non-permanent member of the Security Council, also expressed support for both the new resolution, and the use of force against Iraq. Regardless, passage of the resolution required nine votes and no vetoes from the Security Council's five permanent members -- the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France and China. The latter three countries all expressed intense opposition to military action at this time. Diplomatic efforts to shore up support from non- permanent members of the Security Council were intensified, with so many other countries were opposed to the new resolution. With the exceptions of Spain and Bulgaria, every other non- permanent Security Council member state -- Germany, Syria, Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Pakistan, Guinea and Mexico -- were either in doubt or opposed to immediate military action against Iraq.

Despite initial misgivings that the new resolution would not pass in the Security Council, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed optimism about its passage. Although he acknowledged that a positive outcome of the vote could be vitiated by a veto from a permanent Security Council member, he expressed the belief that a plurality of votes in favor of the new resolution would ensure a "moral victory."

Diplomatic negotiations, however, collapsed nonetheless. Efforts to modify elements of the draft of a second United Nations Security Council Resolution failed despite the efforts by the United Kingdom to create an agreement that would satisfy the misgivings of most of the non-permanent Security Council members. Many undecided non-permanent members wanted a clear set of

Iraq Review 2016 Page 27 of 609 pages Iraq reasonable benchmarks that Iraqi disarmament efforts could objectively be measured against. They also requested a 45-day period in which this assessment could be made before coming to the conclusion that war was the last possible option. The United States declared the 45-day time-frame to be "a non-starter" and later refused a subsequent request for three weeks. Meanwhile, France and Russia decried the provisions for an automatic trigger resulting in war if Iraq failed to accomplish various benchmarks in disarmament. Both France and Russia earlier warned that they would veto and resolution containing such language. In response, British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that "People have got to decide whether they are going to allow any second resolution to have teeth, to make it clear that there is a real ultimatum in it."

Following a meeting in the Azores between the leaders of the United Kingdom, the United States and Spain (the sponsors of the existing United Nations Resolution 1441), Blair announced there would be a final round of informal discussions to try to resolve the impasse between the three allies and the rest of the Security Council. A deadline of March 17, 2003, was given to the rest of the Security Council to decide on a possible course of action, before military force against Iraq would be exerted. France's Ambassador to the United Nations Jean Marc de la Sabliere responded that in one-on-one discussions with council members, it was clearly apparent that most did not endorse a use of force against Iraq at this time.

With no progress made in regard to a second resolution, or, in building consensus among the Security Council by the March 17 deadline, the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain reversed their original commitment to seek a vote on its passage in the Security Council and, instead, withdrew the draft resolution. In a media conference, United States President George W. Bush had promised a vote in the Security Council, whether or not the resolution passed, stating that council members would have to "show their cards." In an effort to pursue military action without overt illegality, which the defeat of a second resolution would surely signify, the allies took cover under the original United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 which augured "serious consequences" for Iraqi non-compliance. Experts on international jurisprudence, however, were not at all agreed on this reasoning.

Several hours after the withdrawal of the draft resolution, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan announced the withdrawal of United Nations personnel, including weapons inspectors, from Baghdad in preparation for an imminent war against Iraq.

In an interview on United States television, French President Jacques Chirac said "We should pursue diplomacy until we've come to a dead end." France also called for an emergency meeting at the United Nations to discuss peaceful disarmament. Also on United States television, United States Vice President Dick Cheney said that it was difficult to take the French position seriously. In spite of Cheney's disparagement of France, many other countries have expressed great dismay at the prospects of a war against Iraq. China said that the matter should be resolved through dialogue, within the parameters of the United Nations. Russia condemned military action against Iraq as

Iraq Review 2016 Page 28 of 609 pages Iraq illegal and noted that it would only jeopardize international security. Germany expressed alarm over the developments and closed its embassy in Baghdad. Greece, which holds the European Union presidency, said that the United Kingdom, the United States and Spain were working outside the United Nations. The European Union has already warned that if action is taken outside of the United Nations, it will not provide support. Pope John Paul also called for a peaceful resolution and offered the belief that there was still time left for peace.

For his part, Saddam Hussein warned that if Iraq were attacked, the battle would take place "wherever there is sky, land and water in the entire world." The Iraqi leader, however, was reported to have left Baghdad for another part of Iraq. In an interview on Arab television, the Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri said that tens of thousands of Iraqis were ready to become martyrs in a war against American enemies. Iraq had been divided into zones in preparation for the war, which was predicted to commence within days.

The Failure of Diplomacy

With not even a "moral victory" materializing in the realm of diplomacy, discussions shifted to a vision of a post-war Iraq and analysis as to why diplomacy failed.

In regard to the post-war vision, Tony Blair promised that Iraq's territorial integrity would be protected and its natural resources used for the benefit of Iraqis. George Bush said that the United States and its allies were committed to the goal of a democratic Iraq, complete with an interim authority and a representative government, however, no specific form or process was mentioned. Notably, a recently released State Department report expressed grave doubts about the successful democratization of Iraq; instead, it cautioned that destabilization and chaos was more likely to follow military action and impending occupation. Humanitarian aid and the lifting of sanctions were also promised.

The failure of diplomacy has been blamed on two constellations of issues:

The first is the matter of hegemony. Although the lack of diplomatic tact be members of the Bush administration has not helped the diplomatic efforts, many countries around the world believed that the United States has never been committed to either inspections or disarmament, and instead, has viewed "regime change" and war as an inevitability. In a globalized world that generally respects sovereignty, actively facilitating "regime change" has been viewed negatively as a new form of hegemony. As such, France (among other less powerful countries in the United Nations), have made it clear that they will challenge this modality. Viewed as intransigence by the United States and the United Kingdom, France's steadfast adherence to a diplomatic solution has been viewed as the only contestation to unbridled power by the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States and the United Kingdom, however, blame France for obstreperousness in regard to

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Iraq.

The second matter concerns credibility. When the original Security Resolution 1441 was passed unanimously in the Security Council, the United Kingdom and the United States respectively claimed an impressive dossier of Iraqi ills. Over time, that dossier has crumbled. First, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell continuously repeated the claim that Iraq was in possession of aluminum tubes that could be used for uranium enrichment, however, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohammed El Baradei maintained that the tubing could only be used for the manufacture of conventional rockets. Second, Powell also made much of unmanned drones that Chief United Nations Weapons Inspector Hans Blix did not mention in his last oral report to the United Nations. The drones turned out to have been incapable of any dire activities involving the spread of biological and chemical weapons. Third, a document used by both the United Kingdom and the United States to make their case regarding the threat posed by Saddam Hussein was discovered to have been plagiarized from a graduate student's thesis. Fourth, allegations of Iraq purchasing uranium from Niger were revealed to have been fabricated, and included a collection of forged documents. Fifth, links between al-Qaida and Iraq were discounted by the United States' own CIA. Meanwhile, the CIA, as well as a respected conservative think tank, the Cato Institute, and a seminal international relations journal, Foreign Policy, all issued reports denouncing such a connection. Indeed, many experts dismissed the likelihood that Saddam Hussein would use biological or chemical weapons, noting that such a scenario would only transpire if Hussein's power was threatened. The Cato Institute also published a number of commentaries criticizing a proposed war against Iraq. Sixth, the realization that the United States and the United Kingdom were wiretapping the United Nations, in order to gain some advantage in procuring favorable votes on its second draft resolution, diminished the two countries' credibility in the eyes of the international community.

The United States-led Coalition War Against Iraq

Following the failure of diplomacy and a subsequent 48-hour ultimatum by United States President George Bush, coalition forces began strikes against Iraq in mid-March 2003. On the basis of actionable intelligence, initial strikes were launched against leadership targets in Baghdad. Then, several days later, the start of the "shock and awe" strategy commenced. In this way, the command and control of the war was shifted so that tactical assaults on leadership targets could be played out before moving to the "shock and awe" strategy. The strategic shift was made in order to determine how the Iraqi leadership would respond to the war. Meanwhile coalition forces made their way over the Kuwaiti border into Iraq; special forces units were reported to have been functioning within Iraqi borders for some time.

Coalition forces encountered much tougher resistance from the Iraqis than had been expected. The towns of Basra, , Umm Qasr and Nassariya were particularly hit with massive attacks from

Iraq Review 2016 Page 30 of 609 pages Iraq coalition forces, while those very forces encountered fierce Iraqi resistance on the ground. In the face of criticism about the war strategy, coalition commanders insisted that they had expected these developments and the war was going according to plan.

Saddam Hussein appeared on Iraqi television several times urging the Iraqi people to keep up the fight. His appearances quelled stories of possible injury, although there remained suspicion that the person broadcasting was actually a body double of the Iraqi leader. The Iraqi government predicted disaster and death for coalition fighters. In the face of overwhelming air strikes and bombings, Iraqi defenders responded with mortars, rocket propelled grenades and anti-aircraft fire.

Several casualties on both sides were recorded among troops and also among the civilian population. Reports also registered the possible downing of one or two United States apache helicopters and British fighter pilots parachuting into Iraqi territory. British forces, in particular, were badly hit by friendly fire incidences and various mid-air accidents. As well, several prisoners of war from the United States were shown on Arab television. The videotape, which coalition forces deem to be a violation of the Geneva Convention, also showed the deceased bodies of coalition fighters. Critics, however, noted that the war on Iraq contravenes against the United Nations charter and so claims of violations of international accords were rather hypocritical. Nevertheless, George Bush warned that inhumane treatment of captives would result in war crimes prosecution; the United States is not, however, a country which accepts International Criminal Court jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, coalition convoys moved toward Baghdad and heavy bombardment of major cities by the United States and United Kingdom continued. As the war in Iraq raged on, air raids by coalition forces pounded Baghdad. Long range B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers were part of the attacks on communications and command centers in Baghdad. The assault of missiles and bombs was intended to erode Iraqi defenses before coalition forces arrived in the capital city. The presidential palace used by the son of Saddam Hussein was one of the key targets hit in aerial bombardment. The city's southern edge was particularly hammered by artillery and bombings, although explosions were also heard in the western parts of Baghdad.

As coalition forces moved closer toward the capital city, within 80 kilometers (or 50 miles) of Baghdad, they increasingly battled Iraqi Republican Guard units on their approach. Once in Baghdad, however, the Iraqi resistance was less intense than had been expected. United States forces captured two presidential compounds in Baghdad, including the palace which headquarters the Republican Guard units. The Iraqi information minister denied the capture of the compounds and instead claimed that Iraqi fighters were prevailing over United States forces. On Iraqi television, President Saddam Hussein called for a call to arms in the city and instructed fighters who could not reach their respective units to join any unit that could be located.

While heavy bombardment of Baghdad continued, United States forces positioned tanks and

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Bradley fighting vehicles near the Information Ministry and the al-Rashid Hotel. For their part, Iraqi fighters blocked bridges over the Tigris and defended key government buildings with rocket grenades. Fedayeen militia members patrolled the streets. Urban warfare and street fighting commenced. One battle zone was reported to be in central Baghdad near a residential district. United States officials said that the activity in Baghdad was intended to be "a show of force" and not a full-scale take-over and occupation. It was hoped that the demonstration of military might would convey the futility of Iraqi resistance.

The demonstration was something of a success as United States forces were able to take control of large portions of the city. After toppling a statue of Saddam Hussein in the capital city, the United States declared the regime of Saddam Hussein to have been toppled, although the fighting raged on.

Meanwhile, the most difficult challenge for civilians to deal with was the terribly degenerated state of the Baghdad hospital. The hospital was understaffed because doctors and nurses were unable to safely travel the streets of Baghdad to get to work. Insufficient medical supplies exacerbated the problem as patients arrived by the hundreds every hour.

United States forces pounded on Saddam Hussein's stronghold of . Although fierce battles ensued between remaining Iraqi army units in Tikrit, the majority of Iraqi forces had fled the town, most recently when Baghdad fell to United States forces. In Baghdad, even though it became evident that the regime of Saddam Hussein had lost power, pockets of resistance continued to engage with United States forces and widespread looting characterized a general climate of lawlessness. The Iraqi National Museum was hard hit in the looting; artifacts dating back to the earliest records of humankind were either destroyed or stolen. Joint patrols by United States forces and Iraqi civilian leaders were launched to combat the problem. Similarly, British forces were joined by in an attempt to restore security and calm to the southern town of Basra.

Violence raged in Najaf when mobs of people hacked to death two Shi'ite Muslim clerics who had aligned themselves with the United States-led war. Shi'ite factions also surrounded the home of another Shi'ite cleric and gave him forty eight hours to leave Najaf.

In Nassiriya, a meeting of Iraqis was scheduled to take place about the future of the country. Chalabi, the head of the exile group, Iraqi National Congress, has been regarded as a key player in the post-war planning process by the United States. Chalabi, however, has been critical of the lack of post-war civil unrest that gripped Iraq.

Meanwhile, the head of Iraq's scientific program was taken into United States custody; he stated that Iraq had no biological and chemical weapons and declared the war to be unnecessary. Saddam Hussein's brother was also captured close to the Syrian border. Various other members of Saddam Hussein's regime were caught and arrested.

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In a stunning positive development for United States forces, the missing prisoners of war were found alive.

Post-War Iraq

With United States President George W. Bush declaring an end to most military activities in Iraq, attention shifted to plans for a post-war Iraq. In this regard, one of the most significant developments was the arrival in Baghdad of the new administrator of Iraq -- United States General Jay Garner. Before transitioning Iraq into the realm of democratic rule, Garner's main objective was the restoration of basic services to the cities and towns of Iraq. Another key responsibility was the facilitation of the flow of oil, so that oil revenues could be used to pay for the reconstruction of the country, which was destroyed in the United States-led war against Iraq. Garner would also have to bring the Iraqi National Congress together with other Iraqi interest groups to create a new Iraqi government. This was expected to be a difficult course and would demand harmonizing Iraq's political, religious and ethnic factions.

In this regard, General Jay Garner convened a meeting of about 300 Iraqi delegates in regard to the formation of a new government. Included in the group were various Kurdish organizations, the , and members of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution - the largest Shi'a organization. Some Shi'a participants were cautiously optimistic following Garner's pledge that the oil resources of Iraq would be used to benefit the Iraqi people; however, they also cautioned that "Iraq could only be ruled by Iraqis." From the group of delegates present at the meetings, it was hoped that a nine-member governing council could be formed. This council would reportedly interface with United States officials in Iraq. Possible members of the council included Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress, of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party, Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National Accord and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution. Garner predicted that within a month, there would be a nucleus of an Iraqi government with an "Iraqi face." An agreement was forged after the meeting for participants to convene again in a month.

The nature of the "Iraqi face" of an Iraqi government, however, remained unclear. Despite the intent to create a representative council, Kurdish and exile groups expressed confidence they would dominate a future Iraqi administration, while Shi'ites, who form the majority of the population, complained they were marginalized in the process. Against this backdrop, the Kurds of Northern Iraq celebrated the arrival of the new United States administrator, while many of the Shi'a population throughout Iraq expressed anger and frustration instead. In a gathering in the Shi'a holy city of , some Shi'ites used the occasion to call for the withdrawal of the United States forces from Iraq. Others voiced the opinion that an Islamic state, rather than democracy, was desired in a post-war Iraq. Gatherings by Shi'ites at Karbala had been banned under Saddam

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Hussein's regime. With the fall of Saddam Hussein's government and the collapse of the control by the Ba'ath party, Shi'ites have been using their newfound freedom to strenuously express themselves. Rifts within the Shi'a population have also emerged with the killing of several clerics.

Dissonance has simply been of the religious variety. Violent altercations between civilians and United States forces in the town of Fajullah appear to have erupted due to frustrations with the United States' presence in Iraqi civilian institutions, such as schools. As well, some Iraqis were infuriated by the decision to retain middle-tier Ba'ath government workers in their positions. Although the measure was instituted to ensure some continuity in terms of services and operations, tensions between factions remained high. Development projects within the Iraqi infrastructure by United States contractors did not progress at all because it was still not safe enough to establish operations in Iraq, and with an ongoing power vacuum, crime was still a problem across Iraq. As such, businesses were not re-opening and popular resentment was on the rise.

Then, there was a spate of attacks against United States soldiers in Iraq during the course of one week. In one case, gunmen fired on the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment convoy near the town of Haditha, 120 miles north of Baghdad. One United States soldier was killed and a second injured in the attack. In another incident, one soldier died and three were injured when a United States military vehicle went over a landmine in what officials referred to as "the result of hostile action." In to the north of Baghdad, a United States military unit was hit in a grenade attack; however, there were no casualties. In another incident, a woman was holding a grenade and walking toward United States forces but was shot dead before she could detonate the device. At , which is close to Tikrit, a rocket propelled grenade was fired at soldiers but did not explode.

In a unique case, rocket-propelled grenades and small arms were fired at a unit from a Mosque in the aforementioned Iraqi town of . In this incident, United States forces were able to respond quickly by killing two attackers and capturing six others. The town of Fallujah was the site of an anti-American demonstration a month ago in which 15 Iraqis died when United States forces opened fire. United States forces defended the decisive use of force against the gunmen despite their presence in the Mosque; United States officials noted that while coalition forces aspired to respect the sanctity of religious sites and institutions, they also have the right to protect themselves from attack, even when the attacks originate in places such as mosques and churches. Officials from United States Central Command (Cento) observed in an official statement on the latest incident at Fallujah that "the use of a religious site, such as a mosque or church, as cover for military purposes is a violation of the law of war."

United States and United Kingdom forces on the ground in Iraq were faced with the difficult challenge of stabilizing Iraq and re-establishing order. Some reports suggested that there might be too few troops on the ground to accomplish this objective, however, coalition forces expressly stated that these concerns are being addressed. The main objective has been to deal with all sources of possible destabilization, retain control and prevent a state of lawlessness from erupting

Iraq Review 2016 Page 34 of 609 pages Iraq both in urban centers like Baghdad, and in rural areas as well.

France, Russia and China, collectively called for an end to the sanctions regime in Iraq, noting that oil revenues would be necessary to rebuild the country. They expressed caution over the lifting of sanctions, however, as the embargo was linked with United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for disarmament of Iraq. As such, there was a renewed appeal -- by various countries, the last functioning set of United Nations weapons inspectors, and the United Nations itself -- for the return of weapons inspections to Iraq. Most parties agreed that without independent international verification of the weapons inspections process, there would be a massive credibility chasm. While the United Kingdom was more amenable to the return of the United Nations weapons inspectors, as well as a generally significant role for the international body in a post-war Iraq, the United States has not been keen on the involvement of the United Nations in any manner.

Nevertheless, the United Nations was to meet on the matter and Chief Weapons Inspector, Hans Blix, would testify before the international body. Thus far, there has been no discovery of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and no such weapons were used during the war that led to the collapse of the regime of Saddam Hussein's government of Iraq.

Meanwhile, the former diplomat and terrorism expert, Paul Bremer, arrived in the Iraqi capital Baghdad after a brief visit to the southern city of Basra. Bremer's arrival in Iraq made him the most senior civilian administrator; he was charged with heading Iraq's political transition. Contradicting earlier announcements about a quick transition of power to Iraqis, Bremer said that the United States would control Iraq for some time. Presumably, the priority would be the stabilization of Iraq rather than a quick transfer of power. For its part, the United States said that it had not yet been clearly established that it was the "occupying power" of Iraq, as described by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan.

The United States also submitted a new resolution to the United Nations intended to suspend sanctions, transition jurisdiction over the Iraqi "oil for food program," and generally lend legitimacy to the invasion of Iraq. The resolution was passed, despite misgivings by countries who opposed the war in Iraq.

In a new operation dubbed "Desert Scorpion," thousands of United States troops intensified the hunt for fighters they believe to be loyalists of ousted Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. The operation, which began in June 2003, involved raids on towns and villages in central Iraq. The operation emerged in the wake of a spate of attacks on United States forces by Iraqis. During the same time period, more than 100 Iraqis were reportedly killed during raids by United States forces on suspected militia in Balad. The raids were part of an operation code named "Peninsula Strike."

Since the end of the war in April, United States forces in Iraq faced violent resistance in some areas of Iraq. There were a number of violent protests, regular attacks against United States forces,

Iraq Review 2016 Page 35 of 609 pages Iraq and occasional acts of sabotage against pipelines. In some cases, rocket-propelled grenades were hurled at forces, while in other cases, there were suicide bombings and sniper fire.

In late June 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq announced the establishment of a new Iraqi army in late June 2003. The new army of only 40,000 would be significantly smaller that the now-disbanded Iraqi army of approximately 250,000. The CPA has stated that Iraq under the former Ba'ath Party regime had been terribly "over militarized" and new institutions and forces would have to be formed instead. New army recruits would be trained by United States forces, however, not all applicants would be welcome. Apparently, allies of the former Ba'ath regime would be banned from applying for entry into the new army.

Transitioning Iraq's massive army into a smaller incarnation meant that most of the former army's fighting force would not continue their careers in the military service. Professional soldiers from the disbanded army would be given monthly payments, while conscripts would each be given a single compensation payment. Any soldiers affiliated with the former Ba'ath regime, however, would not be given any compensation. Whether or not this compensation structure for unemployed soldiers continues to function in Iraq after a transitional government is established was unknown. Disgruntled former soldiers have formed a segment of the population in Iraq opposing the United States presence in their country. Experts criticized the move to disband the army and to leave so many soldiers unemployed in Iraq.

Meanwhile, at the World Economic Forum in , The United States administrator for Iraq, Paul Bremer, said that Iraqis would create a constitution of their own. A constitutional conference was to be convened in which a new framework for Iraq's political institutions would be established. Bremer noted that sovereignty in Iraq could not exist without elections or on the basis of the existing Iraqi constitution. Bremer also said that Iraq's vast oil revenues would be directly and evenly distributed to the people of Iraq. Bremer said that oil revenues would be used to formulate a "human social safety net," which would be used to help transition Iraq into a free- market economy.

In a related development, Iraq held its inaugural meeting of the country's new governing council on July 13, 2003. The meeting signified Iraq's first major step toward autonomy in the aftermath of the war, and following several months of coalition rule. The council would function as a predecessor to a new sovereign and democratic government. The council would have the authority to appoint and/or remove cabinet ministers, draft the budget and create a new constitution. Still, it would exist under the aegis of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). For that reason, some observers referred to the structure and system as being similar to that of a constitutional monarchy, in which the crown ratifies legislation and certifies policies that are developed.

Included in the new council were several representatives from the Shi'a communities. The Shi'a representatives decided to participate in the new council at the last minute, presumably opting to be

Iraq Review 2016 Page 36 of 609 pages Iraq engaged in the political process of Iraq, rather than be left out altogether. Shi'ites comprise about 60 percent of the total Iraqi population and hold over half the seats in the council. Other groups in the council included Kurdish organizations, however, almost all the remaining seats in the council are held by exile groups.

Also in July 2003, the United States announced the deaths of two sons of Saddam Hussein. In order to preclude doubt about this claim, the pictures of the bodies said to be and were publicized in the media. The publication of the photographs and film footage garnered criticism. For the United States, their intent was to prove that the two sons of Saddam Hussein had, in fact, died. The United States was hoping that the reported deaths of the two Hussein sons would help ease the fears of Iraqis that the regime would return to power. As well, two of Saddam Hussein's daughters went into exile in Jordan.

The apparent deaths of the two Hussein sons did not significantly changed the climate within Iraq, although the number of Iraqi informants supplying information about the possible location of Saddam Hussein has increased. United States Joint Chief of Staff General Richard Meyers promised that the capture of the ousted Iraqi leader would happen in due course.

In August 2003, following a spate of attacks on Iraq's oil pipeline and infrastructure, and as concerns about the sabotage increased, the United States' administration in Iraq decided to double the number of guards around oil installations and other key facilities. The guards would likely be Iraqis, however, they would work under the aegis of a private security company contracted for reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

There were about 5,000 guards protecting the pipeline from in Iraq to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The pipeline accounts for up to 40 percent of Iraq's oil production. In addition to attacks on oil installations, there was also an attack on a water line in Baghdad, a fire at a sewage treatment plant, and a mortar attack on the Abu Gharib prison, which left six Iraqis dead and 59 injured. These attacks were predicted to affect the economic developments in Iraq. United States administrator for Iraq Paul Bremer said that attack on the pipeline would likely cost $7 million a day.

In addition to attacks on oil installations, there was also an attack on a water line in Baghdad, a fire at a sewage treatment plant, and a mortar attack on the Abu Gharib prison, which left six Iraqis dead and 59 injured.

Meanwhile, as reconstruction efforts were marred by such acts of sabotage, international media rights groups were calling for an inquiry into the death of a cameraman, Mazen Dana, who was apparently shot by United States forces in Iraq. The cameraman was filming coverage of the prison where six Iraqis were killed (aforementioned). United States authorities said that the troops mistook the Dana's camera for a rocket propelled grenade launcher, whereas another journalist on

Iraq Review 2016 Page 37 of 609 pages Iraq the ground claimed that the troops were made aware of the fact that they were in the area filming and reporting events. Regardless, media rights organizations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), as well as the head of Reuters, Tom Glocer, have all called for the "most comprehensive investigation" into the killing of Dana.

In other developments, Iraq anticipated the resumption of crude oil exports as early as mid-June 2003. The issue of Iraq's debt was also be a primary concern when the world's G8 nations met for a summit in France; the United States advocated debt relief for Iraq by Iraq's creditors.

With the situation on the ground garnering much media attention, and with the price of operating in Iraq estimated by the United States at close to $4 billion per month, coalition forces approached other countries for assistance in peacekeeping and in terms of financial assistance. and Russia both said they would not be able to help militarily -- even in terms of peacekeeping activities -- without a United Nations mandate. No progress was made on the issue of debt forgiveness or substantial financial contributions aimed at reconstructing Iraq.

As well, the International Atomic Energy Agency returned to Iraq for the first time since the start of military activities in Iraq. They were charged with examining and verifying reports of looting at nuclear sites.

Questions arose about the veracity of certain aspects of the intelligence on Iraq. Although the CIA head and other officials took responsibility for the inclusion of a spurious claim regarding an Iraqi attempt to buy uranium from Niger, the issue of deception and the lack of credible evidence in the lead up to the war caused a drop in popular support.

Attacks against United States soldiers in Iraq became an almost-daily occurrence, and troop morale was reported to be decreasing as certain units, such as the 3rd Infantry Division, were told their stay in Iraq would be extended. Families of troops began to express dismay at the situation.

Since the official end of combat in May, over 50 United States troops were killed in various guerilla-style attacks by hostile factions. The claim that the attacks were carried out by "Saddam loyalists" began losing steam. New information, according to Lieutenant General in Iraq, suggested sophisticated orchestration of attacks. As such, the blame began switching to the arena of "foreign terrorists." Other observers suggested there was a resistance movement in Iraq operating in opposition to the country's occupation by coalition forces. Although not confirmed, United States administrator in Iraq Paul Bremer said that the Ansar-al-Islam terrorist group, which is linked to al-Qaida, might become more active in Iraq. A group now known as the Iraqi Resistance said on Al-Jazeera that it had no connection to Saddam Hussein and that it would continue to oppose coalition occupation. Three other previously unknown groups -- the White Banners, Muslim Youth, and Mohammed's Army -- also disseminated similar messages on the Arabic media channel.

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Observers on the ground warned that regular Iraqi people would quickly grow tired of the search raids across Baghdad, which often affect daily life and result in the deaths of civilians. Task forces have been carrying out raids across the city in search for loyalists of the former regime. Their tactics, however, have been described as "heavy handed" by reporters and local Baghdadis. The deaths of five civilians -- witnessed by neighbors -- in the Mansur district by coalition forces has only fueled this perception. Troops from the task force, however, said they were fired upon first.

Fuel shortages and power outages led to popular unrest in Basra, resulting in several days of violent protests. A demonstrator and security guard were killed in the demonstrations, while four United States soldiers and one journalist were injured in guerrilla attacks. One soldier was reported to have been found dead in his bed, however, the cause of death was unknown. Earlier, violent altercations between British troops and about 1,000 residents resulted in several injuries.

In terms of larger acts of sabotage and terrorism, in mid-2003, a car bomb killed 19 people when it exploded at the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad.

Then, on Aug. 19, 2003, a truck bomb exploded at the United Nations headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Iraq. The explosion killed at least 23 people, including the United Nations Envoy to Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello -- a native Brazilian. Several people were thought to be trapped in the rubble. The attack was the most devastating in the 58-year history of the international body. The United States accused loyalists of the ousted regime of Saddam Hussein for the attack as well as others. Transnational terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida, as well as Ansar al-Islam, were also discussed as possible groups responsible for the attack. Nevertheless, the news agency Reuters, as well as an Arabic television station , both reported that a previously unknown group called the "Armed Vanguards of the Second Mohammed Army" took responsibility for the bombing and promised further acts of violence against foreigners in Iraq.

Discussions about how to increase security began just as the United Nations humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, Ramiro Lopes da Silva, was appointed by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, to succeed the Viera de Mello.

The body of slain envoy, Sergio Viera de Mello, was returned to his home country of Brazil to lay in state draped in the Brazilian and United Nations flags. At a private memorial service attended by the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan and Brazilian President Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva, Viera de Mello was praised as global hero and a champion of peace. Several Brazilian senators called for Viera de Mello to receive the Nobel Peace Prize posthumously, while Iraq's Governing Council called for the establishment of a monument in his memory.

By October 2003, the UN's presence in Iraq had been scaled back, with almost all staff removed from Baghdad. The decision was made on the basis on an increasingly disturbing security situation

Iraq Review 2016 Page 39 of 609 pages Iraq in the country's capital city.

Several rockets fired and hit the Rashid hotel in Iraq's capital city of Baghdad on Oct. 26, 2003. Using a van with a trailer, a rocket launcher was disguised as a generator and moved close to the hotel. Then, a timing device set off the rockets. The hotel, used by United States and other coalition officials, has been one of the most heavily guarded buildings in Baghdad. A United States colonel was killed and 17 people were injured, including American, British, Czech, Italian, Indian and Nepalese nationals. United States Deputy Defense Secretary, , escaped the attacks unscathed. A day later, a car bomb exploded outside the Red Cross building in Central Baghdad. Several other blasts were reported throughout Baghdad, including four police stations. More than 34 people were reported to have been killed in the blasts.

At the start of November 2003, 18 soldiers were killed and 21 were wounded when a Chinook helicopter was shot down near Fallujah. The incident marked the greatest loss of American lives in a single day since March 23, 2003 when 28 soldiers were killed in fighting across Iraq, 18 of whom died in a single incident in Nassiriya. Within the town of Fallujah, a bomb on the side of the road killed two United States civilian contactors. In Baghdad, a United States soldier was killed when a bomb was detonated as he drove by.

Still, the biggest news in months was to break at the close of 2003. On Dec. 14, 2003, Saddam Hussein, the ousted leader of Iraq, was reported to be in United States custody, having being found in a "spider hole" close to a mud hut near his familial town of Tikrit. The ousted Iraqi leader was found with a pistol; there were also conflicting reports about the fact that he had possession of $750,000. Although some media reports said he had been found by United States forces, other reports stated that Kurdish forces had been first to locate the ousted Iraqi leader.

Upon being discovered, Saddam Hussein offered no resistance and surrendered after identifying himself as the President of the Republic of Iraq. Later, the former president was shown on television broadcasts as he was being examined by an American military doctor. He appeared weary and disheveled, and to have grown a beard.

United States officials said Hussein refused to provide any intelligence information. Still, several media outlets cited a United States intelligence official in Iraq who stated that when Saddam Hussein was asked if his government had weapons of mass destruction, the ousted Iraqi leader replied: "No, of course not. The U.S. dreamed them up itself to have a reason to go to war with us."

Meanwhile, United States President George Bush promised that Saddam Hussein would "face the justice he denied to millions." The United States president, however, did not provide details about either the type the trial that might ensue or its possible venue. For its part, the said it wanted Saddam Hussein to be tried by Iraqi judges within Iraq. Human right

Iraq Review 2016 Page 40 of 609 pages Iraq groups, however, said that an international , without the possibility of the death penalty, would be preferable to an Iraqi trial.

Even as news of Saddam Hussein's capture spread across the globe, violence in Iraq was ongoing. At least 17 people died and 30 were wounded after a car bomb exploded at an Iraqi police station in Khalidiyah, about 35 miles (60 kilometers) west of Baghdad. A week after Saddam Hussein's capture, there was an ambush on the coalition headquarters; the head of the United States-led coalition, Paul Bremer, escaped unhurt. Days later, another oil pipeline was sabotaged by insurgents.

Developments in Early 2004

On March 8, 2004, the Iraqi Governing Council signed an interim constitution that was to remain in place until a permanent one was finalized by the end of 2005.

However, within hours, Iraq's top Shiite cleric issued a fatwa religious ruling condemning the document -- leaving some question as to whether the interim constitution was indeed final. Still, the United States called the signing a "diplomatic victory" with United States President Bush describing the event as a "historic milestone" that moved the Muslim country toward sovereignty and democratic elections.

The charter included a 13-article bill of rights that was designed to protect freedom of speech and free choice of religion. The document also stipulated the relationship between citizens and the government.

The constitution was touted as the most liberal in the Arab world and outlined the shape of a parliament and presidency as well as a federal structure for the country. It also enshrined Islam as one of the bases of law.

An interim body was to assume sovereignty from the coalition forces in Iraq on June 30, 2004. That body was to prepare for direct elections for a transitional national assembly no later than Jan. 31, 2005.

The transitional national assembly will draft a permanent constitution, which will be put to a national referendum by no later than Oct. 15, 2005. Two-thirds of the voters in any three provinces will have the power to veto the permanent constitution. A general election is scheduled to take place by Dec. 15, 2005.

Also in March 2004, Iraq's interim Public Works Minister Noreen Mustafa al-Burwari escaped an attempt in Mosul in the northern part of the country. Burwari, who is of Kurdish

Iraq Review 2016 Page 41 of 609 pages Iraq background and the only woman in cabinet, was unhurt after gunmen opened fire on her convoy while her driver and bodyguards were killed, according to various media reports.

In early April 2004, United States forces began an offensive against various targets which had become hotbeds of violent revolt. One target was al Shuala, a Shi'a district, while another was the Sunni town of Fallujah where four American contractors were brutally killed. A third area was the district of . Meanwhile, clashes were reported in Amara, Najaf and Nassiriya. British authorities reported that the governor's office had been taken over in Basra in what was described as a "peaceful sit-in." The violent resistance among the Shi'a was led by a radical cleric Moqtada Sadr who had been a vocal critic of the occupation of Iraq. One of Sadr's newspapers was shut down on the basis that it was inciting violence and one of his top aides was also arrested. United States authorities said that Sadr and his followers placed themselves outside the law. They also warned that the uprising would not be tolerated and that a strong show of military power would be needed. Several coalition fighters and scores of Iraqis were killed in bloody confrontations.

By mid-April 2004, a fragile cease-fire appeared to be in effect in Fallujah following weeks of bloody confrontations. As many as 70 coalition forces were killed in the week of April 12 while up to 600 Iraqis were reported dead. Although U.S. officials claimed Iraqi fighters constituted the bulk of the casualties, international news agencies such as the BBC reported that the deaths included civilians. The chaos in Fallujah continued when one of Saddam Hussein's generals returned to that city with approximately 200 Iraqi peacekeepers on April 30. General Jasim Saleh's arrival in Fallujah occurred among conflicting reports that he was given control of the conflict- ridden city.

In May 2004, a car bomb exploded close to the perimeter of the enforced "" of Baghdad close to coalition headquarters, killing the head of the Iraqi Governing Council -- Ezzedine Salim. Several others were also killed or wounded in the attack. There were conflicting reports about who was responsible and it was unknown as to if Salim was the target of the attack. Ghazi Ajil al-Yawer from the northern city of Mosul was appointed as Salim's successor.

Complicating the situation on the ground were reports by coalition troops that an artillery round with the nerve gas sarin was found. Reports also stated that a small amount of the agent was dispersed.

Soon thereafter, charges were levied that scores of people were killed by United States forces following wedding celebrations in the village of Makr al-Deeb, a desert area close to the Syrian border. United States officials insisted it was responding to hostile fire and had targeted foreign fighters. United States officials also said there was no evidence of a wedding but rather they had turned up evidence of cash and munitions. Local Iraqis, however, recounted a very different scenario to journalists, saying that after the wedding had ended and people had retired for the night, a bombing raid was launched, ultimately killing 40 people including 10 children.

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With two conflicting versions of what happened emerging, a videotape broadcast by the Television News appeared to show "before-and-after footage" of the situation. The videotape spliced together footage that apparently took place during a wedding celebration and footage taken after a bombing raid by United States forces. The footage in the videotape apparently showed faces of victims and survivors of the bombing raid consistent with previous footage of participants at a wedding celebration.

Meanwhile, United States forces were under fire as a result of reports and incriminating photographs of Iraqi detainees being abused in ways that, if proved true, would be in violation of the Geneva Convention and could technically be classified as torture. United States officials expressed dismay about the disturbing reports and photographs but asserted that the alleged cases did not constitute "systematic abuse" and reflected only the actions of a few. Amnesty International, however, claimed it had uncovered a "pattern of torture" and called for an independent investigation.

Amid this backdrop, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan said he expected the United Nations Security Council to authorize a multinational force for Iraq. Whether or not this authorization would actually translate into a greater contribution of troops from the international community was unknown.

New Iraqi Government

In late May 2004, Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer (a Sunni) was selected to fill the ceremonial position of president in Iraq. His selection was made after an imbroglio emerged surrounding the composition of a new Iraqi government which was scheduled to assume power on June 30. Indeed, Iraqi leaders angrily accused the United States of trying to install its own preference -- a former foreign minister, Adnan Pachachi -- despite their opposition. When Paul Bremer, the head of coalition governing forces in Iraq, threatened to veto any other appointment, Pachachi was named to the post. Faced with the reality that he commanded insufficient support among fellow council members, however, he went on the decline the position which later went to Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer.

Earlier, Iyad Allawi (a Shi'ite) was named as the new Iraqi prime minister. Media reports suggested that Allawi had been chosen to lead Iraq because of his capacity to deal with the country's dire security situation. In a statement that may have provided a hint to a negotiated settlement allowing United States-led troops to stay in Iraq, Allawi said that his country would need assistance from multinational forces to help defeat "the enemies of Iraq." Since being named as the new prime minister, Allawi presented a 30-member cabinet.

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Since the appointment of the new president, prime minister and the cabinet, the Governing Council decided to dissolve itself immediately rather than remain in office until the transfer of sovereignty to the new government. The United States-led occupation would nonetheless remain in power until the June 30 handover. These political developments, however, did nothing to abate the violence in Iraq with a spate of attacks since the political appointments were made.

In June 2004, the United Nations envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, said the United States would have to change its approach to Iraqi sovereignty, noting that complete power and control must be handed over to the interim government. Brahimi's comments followed the emergence of a new version of a Security Council resolution on Iraq from the United States and the United Kingdom. In addition to stipulating that elections be set for the following year, the new draft resolution states expressly that the United States-led multi-national force will have to leave if so requested by the Iraqi government. Given the remarks of Iraq's newly-appointed leadership, it was unlikely that the multinational force would in fact be asked to leave, however the provision for this item had been the source of consternation among Security Council members. The draft resolution also set forth an expiration date on the mandate of the multinational force following elections, but at a date no later than Jan. 31, 2005. The resolution went on to be adopted by the Security Council.

Meanwhile, Brahimi cautioned that further discussion on the role and command of troops was needed. Brahimi also clarified his earlier description of Paul Bremer as the "dictator of Iraq" by explaining that it had been a "tongue-in-cheek" remark.

In a surprise development, power was handed to the interim Iraqi government two days ahead of schedule on June 28, 2004 instead of June 30, 2004. Through the promulgation of the Transitional Administrative Law, the Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA) ceased to exist. Indeed, CPA Chief Administrator Paul Bremer left Iraq as soon as the formal handover was completed. By moving up the date of the handover of power, authorities were hoping to prevent disruption or violence by insurgents.

Although the new Iraq was described as "fully sovereign," in reality its sovereignty would be limited in scope, given the fact that it cannot create or amend basic law of the land. Moreover, the occupation by the United States-led forces would, in practice, continue. Known as a "multinational force" (MNF), it would have continuing responsibility for the country's security conditions, although its authority would be exercised in concert with a national security council, headed by a representative of the interim Iraqi government. Further complicating the situation was the fact that the new interim Iraqi government, like the previous Iraqi Governing Council, was an unelected body which was effectively installed by the United States authorities. Violence and kidnappings continued to plague Iraq since its movement to qualified sovereignty.

Note: The new United States Ambassador to Iraq was John Negroponte.

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Developments in late 2004

In August 2004, a report on terrorism by the British House of Commons concluded that Iraq had become a "battleground" for al-Qaida and that there were too few foreign troops on the ground in that country. It noted that Muslim states in the Middle East should be encouraged to send forces to Iraq since the country was unable to deal with security issues on its own. The chairman of the foreign relations committee concluded that the Iraq war may well have increased the threat of terrorism, at least in the short term.

Other findings of the report included concern over the sharing of intelligence and alleged human rights abuses as regards Iraq. It also expressed the view that the credibility of the United Kingdom had been compromised because of the inability to restore basic services, such as water and power, in Iraq. The report also made note of the situation in neighboring Iran where burgeoning nuclear activities might well contribute to the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Also in August 2004, , the head of the special tribunal charged with Saddam Hussein in Iraq, was charged with for the death of Haithem Fadhil, director-general of the Iraqi finance ministry. Away from Iraq at the time when the judge issued the arrest warrant, Salem Chalabi told the media that murder charges against him were bogus and that he had become the target of a smear campaign. He also said that although he wished to respond to the charges, he had feared for his life and was seeking assurances of his safety before he would consider returning to Iraq. While Salem Chalabi was reported to be in discussions with the Iraqi government to negotiate his return, the United Kingdom had not (yet) agreed to extradite him. A judge also issued an arrest warrant for Salem Chalabi's uncle and the head of the Iraqi National Congress, . In Ahmed Chalabi's case, the charges were focused on counterfeit money operations. Like his nephew, Ahmed Chalabi also denied the charges. He also said he wished to return to Iraq, from his vacation in Iran, to face the accusations.

Meanwhile, on the ground in Iraq, Iraqi militant Shi'a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr rejected the 's demand for his forces to leave Najaf. The demand came after several days of violence and fighting in the holy city. The resumption of fighting marked the abandonment of a cease-fire. In addition to clashed between militants and security forces, there were reports of car bombs. For his part, the militant cleric al-Sadr said he would fight on and defend Najaf "until my last drop of blood." He also said he wished that his fighters no longer be called the Mehdi Army; instead, he wished them to be referred to as "defenders of the city." There were no conclusive number of casualties available.

At the Imam Ali shrine, a delegation of notable Iraqi dignitaries hoping to bring an end to the violence were thwarted when al-Sadr refused to meet with them. Indeed, fighting intensified around the area of the sacred shrine when United States forces went on the offensive by dropping

Iraq Review 2016 Page 45 of 609 pages Iraq bombs on a cemetery where al-Sadr's militia had reportedly taken up positions. The militia of al- Sadr responded with machine gun fire as well as mortar. Ironically, the dignitaries seeking to end the violence had been sent by religious and political leaders at Iraq's national conference. The national conference in Baghdad, where delegates were charged with selecting a 100-member Interim National Council, has been overshadowed by on-going violence in Najaf and several other parts of the country. (Note: The Interim National Council might be viewed as the precursor to an elected parliament following January 2005 elections.)

In other developments, moderate Shi'a cleric Al-Sistani traveled to the United Kingdom for heart treatment. Upon his return, he successfully managed to negotiate peace with al-Sadr. His success, while welcomed, arrived only after a burst of violence in Najaf left several people dead. Moreover, it raised questions about the effectiveness of the newly-installed government in dealing with such challenges. The effectiveness of the Shi'a cleric made clear that his voice and actions held more authority and legitimacy -- at least among some communities of Iraqis.

Iraq continued to experience much violence and bloodshed in the latter half of 2004. In August, over 1,100 United States troops were wounded, more than any preceding month since coalition forces invaded Iraq. The United States also surpassed a death toll of 1000 service men and women. Many foreigners remain as hostages, and assassination attempts continue targeting prominent Iraqis. In addition, many Iraqis are being killed by either coalition troops or insurgent militias. With fighting raging in multiple towns, there were increased American air strikes on the rebel-held city of Fallujah resulting in the deaths of civilians and journalists. Baghdad was also in turmoil as fighting intensified around the coalition-held Green Zone and the impoverished suburb of Sadr City. Casualties continued to rise and there seemed to be no end in sight to the chaos.

In a related matter, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the mastermind behind much of the violence in Iraq issued a statement in October 2004. In the statement, he declared his allegiance to the terrorist group, al-Qaida, which is thought to be responsible for several bloody attacks across the globe, including the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi said that he was in agreement with al-Qaida in terms of strategy and called for unity against "the enemies of Islam."

By December 2004, Shi'a Muslim cities, such as Karbala and Najaf, suggested that insurgents were trying to incite sectarian conflict.

Developments in 2005

Violence continued through the start of 2005 following the election and the selection of new leadership. In April 2005, a gruesome discovery was made in the River Tigris when the bodies of up to 50 people were found. The discovery came a few days after a report surfaced about dozens

Iraq Review 2016 Page 46 of 609 pages Iraq of Shi'ites having been taken hostage by Sunnis in the town of Madain. Also, in the town of Hadith, close to Baghdad, around 19 soldiers were found dead in a football stadium, reportedly having been killed "execution style." Soon thereafter, at least 16 people were killed in a duet of bombings in a market near a mosque in a Shi'a area of Baghdad. In a similar double bombing of a police academy in Tikrit, at least six people were killed and 33 were wounded. Meanwhile, up to 50 people were wounded in explosions near the Ahl al-Beit mosque in Shula, north of the Iraqi capital. During the same period, bombings continued in Baghdad.

While security forces have been the primary targets of insurgents in the past, Shi'ite civilians have increasingly been the victims of violent attacks. Attacks on foreigners, particularly Americans, have also been ongoing as exemplified by the downing of a civilian Mi-8 helicopter in which all 11 passengers and crew were killed, including a survivor who was shot to death on video by insurgents.

On April 20, 2005, outgoing Iraqi interim leader Iyad Allawai narrowly escaped death after an assassination attempt on his life. A suicide bomber attacked his convoy as he was traveling home from a meeting.

In the first week of May 2005, at least 16 people were killed in a car bomb attack in a market south of Baghdad. In Tikrit, several police officers died in a bombing there. A suicide attack in the Kurdish region of Iraq left at least 25 people dead and more than 30 injured at the start of May 2005. As well, a series of car bombs in Baghdad at the start of May resulted in the deaths of scores of persons. Separate attacks in the same period elsewhere in Iraq left several policemen and civilians dead.

Meanwhile, a videotape emerged with another apparent kidnapping victim -- this time an Australian citizen. The Australian government dispatched a team for the purpose of trying to secure his release. In another development, Iraqi police said they had arrested some individuals in connection with the kidnapping and murder of British aid worker .

Around the same period, eight United States soldiers were killed bringing the total number of American forces killed in Iraq up to 1600.

In May 2005, United States forces launched a military offensive called Operation Matador in the western part of Iraq, aimed at clearing the region which is believed to be a hotbed of foreign fighters allied with al-Qaida extremists and local insurgents. As the fighting between the two sides intensified in this part of Iraq, a mass exodus of civilian Iraqis from that area ensued. Aid workers from the Iraqi Red Crescent Society said that in the border town of Qaim, up to 1,000 families had been displaced when they fled the area, trying to escape the violence. Official reports suggested that 100 insurgents had been killed in the offensive by United States troops.

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Elsewhere in Iraq, the upsurge in violence since the Iraqi election showed no signs of abating. As mid-May 2005 approached, there were reports of a car bomb attack in the town of Baquba, the killing of a policeman during patrols in western Baghdad, the killing of several soldiers at a checkpoint in Hilla, the ambush of an interior ministry official and a roadside bomb targeting a United States convoy en route to Baghdad's airport, double bombings at a market in the capital and more United States troops killed in clashes. .

On May 16, 2005, a stream of reports about the discovery of slain bodies -- around 50 -- in areas around round Baghdad were broadcast in the media. Interestingly, insurgent leader and cleric Muqtada al-Sadr emerged on that same day to deliver an incendiary verbal attack against the presence of foreign troops in Iraq, presumably for the purpose of sparking further violence.

At the close of May 2005, Iraqi security forces commenced plans for an offensive, called Operation Lightning, against insurgents in Baghdad. An estimated 40,000 security forces made up of soldiers and police established checkpoints and sealed roads at entry and exit points throughout the city. The operation was launched to deal with an upsurge in attacks by insurgents in that month, which left over 600 people dead.

In late May 2005, several multinational and Iraqi troops had been killed in Baghdad. Reports noted that three people were killed and 20 were injured after a car bomb exploded in western Baghdad, while another car bomb just south of the Iraqi capital left two police officers dead. A suicide bombing close to the oil ministry resulted in the deaths of two people and injuries to six. Attacks were reported elsewhere in the country, including Amara where a British solider was killed.

June 2005 fared no better as violence continued. At least 35 people were killed in three separate suicide attacks in the vicinity of the northern city of Mosul in Iraq on June 26, 2005. Officials said that 15 people were killed in an attack on a police station in the central area of Mosul. Then, another 15 people died when a bomber attacked civilian laborers lining up outside a military base near the city. As well, several policemen among those killed in an attack on the very hospital where some of the casualties from the other bombings had been taken. In late June 2005, there were other attacks in Samarra and Kirkuk, the killing of the deputy police chief in Baghdad, as well as several other deaths of United States soldiers and Iraqi civilians across the country.

In July 2005, the Egyptian envoy to Iraq, Ihab al-Sherif, was abducted by extremists. Efforts by the Egyptian government went into high gear as the authorities in Cairo and Baghdad worked to arrange his release, while also pleading with kidnappers to treat him as an Arab patriot. Speculation abounded that his abduction was motivated by Egypt’s intent to designate Sherif as the ambassador to Iraq. Weeks after the envoy had been abducted, reports emerged that he had been killed. It was believed that extremists were attempting to short-circuit efforts by Arab countries to consolidate ties with Baghdad.

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In another development, an aide to Iraqi Shi'a spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in July 2005. Analysts speculated that the incident was orchestrated to provoke a response from the country's majority Shi'a community.

During that very period, a suicide bomber killed at least 20 people outside a special police recruiting center in the capital city of Baghdad. As well, a suicide bombing took place outside the offices of Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari’s Shi'a .

A week later, another attack outside an army recruitment center in Baghdad by a suicide bomber left more than 40 people dead and scores injured. According to reports on the ground, the suicide bomber walked up to the queue of young men waiting to sign up for military duty and detonated the device strapped to his body. Such queues have increasingly been targeted by militants and as such, critics have asked why potential recruits for the much-needed military have been left to face such jeopardy. It is believed that the dearth of employment for young people in Iraq has meant that many are willing to deal with the risks and join the security forces anyway. Indeed, a full 50 percent of the workforce is estimated to be unemployed.

In mid-July 2005, waves of suicide attacks around the Sunni triangle region surrounding Baghdad left dozens dead and scores injured. Elsewhere in Iraq --in Kirkuk and Mosul specifically, other suicide bomb attacks left several more people dead.

In yet another incident, a gunman apparently killed eight members of a family while the slept in a Baladiyat neighborhood in Baghdad. There was no explanation for the attack other than to spur sectarian violence since the family was Shi'a Muslim.

Sectarian violence was also believed to have been the cause of a suicide bombing close to a mosque in Musayyib, which killed 90 people and injured 156. The town's inhabitants were mixed, although predominantly Shi'a. That particular attack bore the rather dubious distinction of being the worst one since a massive car bomb in February killed at least 114 people in the town of Hilla.

In a separate development, former Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, was formally indicted.

A week after a suicide bomber blew up a tanker killing close to 100 people, a suicide bomber blew up a lorry laden with explosives at a police station. At least 25 people were believed to have been killed and more than 30 people were injured. That attack took place in the Mashtal area of Baghdad.

Also in mid-2005, Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations, Samir Sumaidaie, demanded an inquiry into what he characterized as the "cold-blooded murder" of his 21-year old cousin by United States marines. Sumaidaie claimed that his cousin was shot and killed as he helped marines carrying out searches in his village within the volatile Anbar province. In a letter outlining the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 49 of 609 pages Iraq details of what happened, he stated: "All indications point to a killing of an unarmed innocent civilian - a cold blooded murder." In response, the United States military said that the allegations of the unprovoked killing roughly corresponded with "an incident involving coalition forces on that day and in that general location." United States officials promised a full investigation.

Meanwhile, the international media reported that hundreds of tons of explosives were missing from a military installation in Iraq. The National Security Advisor of the United States had been advised of this development some time before it became public knowledge. In 2003, the International Atomic Agency had warned of the dangers surrounding the explosives, were they not secured properly.

By mid 2005, in an interview on American television, United States Defense Secretary warned that it might be years before the insurgency in Iraq was defeated. In his interview, Rumsfeld said that the battle would eventually be won against insurgents by Iraqi forces, rather than by coalition troops. Rumsfeld also admitted that United States officials had held talks with the leaders of the insurgency. His statements came after a bruising congressional hearing on the matter of Iraq, and in the wake of contradictory statements made by Vice President Dick Cheney who claimed that the insurgency in Iraq was in its "last throes."

On the ground in the United States, opinion polls showed a drastic drop in support for the United States-led invasion of Iraq. In fact, according to a constellation of polls, a vast majority of Americans polls said that they no longer supported the war and did not believe it had been worth the costs.

Across the Atlantic in the United Kingdom, the publication of an internal document evoked further challenges to the stated rationale for going to war as a last resort to deal with weapons of mass destruction. The infamous "Downing Street Memo" appeared to show that United States President George Bush had planned to attack Iraq months ahead of the public discussion on the matter in late 2002. At that time, Bush claimed that he had not decided whether or not to wage war in Iraq. The memo, which was dated July 23, 2002, cited British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw saying the decision to take military action had already been made by Bush, even though the timing had yet been decided. A second memo, which was also published by the same British newspaper, suggested that British cabinet ministers were compelled to find the means to make the war in Iraq legal. Back in the United States, Democrats, led by Congressman John Conyers, were hoping to call attention to the matter, which had received little coverage in the mainstream media.

In late August 2005, a journalist from the news agency Reuters was killed by United States forces in Iraq. Soundman Waleed Khaled died and cameraman Haider Kadhem was wounded in the incident. Reuters Global Managing Editor David Schlesinger called for an impartial investigation of the incident. Schlesinger said, ""A brave journalist has lost his life and another has been wounded and detained when their only actions were as professionals reporting the facts and images of the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 50 of 609 pages Iraq war. We are deeply saddened at this loss."

In mid-September 2005, Iraq was plagued by some of the bloodiest violence since the end of the United States-led war in 2003. More than 200 people were killed in the space of three days, and close to 700 were reported to have been injured.

In the worst incident on Sept. 14, 2005, around 180 people were killed when a car bomb exploded in the Shi'a district of in Baghdad. In a separate incident in the southern Doura district a day later, 16 police commandos were killed when their patrol was attacked. Another 10 police were killed following bomb attacks and gun battles. On Sept. 16, 2004, at least 10 people were killed and more than 20 wounded in a suicide bomb attack outside a Shi'a mosque in the central Iraqi town of Tuz Khurmatu. Across Iraq, other attacks ensued.

A group claiming to be an Iraqi wing of al-Qaida issued a statement on a website saying that it was responding to attacks by United States and Iraqi forces on insurgents in the northern town of Talafar. In another development, al-Qaida affiliate, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, reportedly declared "war against Shi'as in all of Iraq." His declaration was made via an audio tape released on the Internet.

In October 2005, the Iraqi Oil Minister narrowly escaped assassination, and the human rights group, , condemned Iraqi insurgents for violating the laws of war by targeting civilians.

Also in October 2005, a military offensive by United States-led forces in in western Iraq left 70 people dead. United States officials said that the 70 people who died were militants. Eye witnesses on the ground, however, disputed the claim and said that those who died were civilians.

On Oct. 30, 2005, Ghalib Abdul Mehdi, an aide to Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari and brother of Vice-President Adel Abdul Mehdi, was shot dead en route to work in Baghdad. His driver was also killed in the attack. Also in Baghdad, Deputy Trade Minister Qais Dawoud Hassan was wounded by gunmen during an attack on his motorcade. Two of his bodyguards were killed. A day earlier, a bomb killed at least 30 people and wounded dozens more in Howaider, about 35 miles (60 kilometers) north of Baghdad. Ironically, in late October 2005, United States Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said that United States and Iraqi forces were destroying the effectiveness of insurgents.

In other developments on the security front, an award-winning journalist for newspaper, Rory Carroll, was reported to be missing in mid-October 2005. Speculation abounded that he may have been kidnapped. Carroll, a native of the , was later released by his kidnappers. Although the full details of his release remained murky, the government of Ireland said that no ransom was paid for Carroll's release. Still, there was speculation about a deal

Iraq Review 2016 Page 51 of 609 pages Iraq of some sort being struck. The kidnappers were identified by Carroll as "Shi'ite opportunists" rather than Islamic militant factions.

Ongoing violence also continued to strike Iraq by late October. During that period, three explosions at a hotel inhabited by journalists and contractors left around 17 people dead.

In late 2005, there were revelations of secret Interior Ministry prisons. Within their walls, the inmates were discovered living in poor conditions. Some inmates were even assessed as requiring immediate hospitalization as a result of allegations of torture. In a November 2005 interview with the United Kingdom's Observer, former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi said that the current level of human rights abuses in Iraq was similar to that of the period under Saddam Hussein's regime. Allawi made the remarks while calling for immediate action on recent allegations of torture. In response, President Jalal Talabani dismissed the charge as "nonsense" and pointed to the number of democratic rights that Iraqis have in the post-Saddam Hussein era. He also said that current abuses could not be compared with the exterminations, evidenced by mass graves, which took place under the regime of the former Iraqi president. Clearly, Shi'as and Kurds, who suffered under the regime of Saddam Hussein, did not take kindly to Allawi's remarks. Nevertheless, his words likely resonated with Sunnis, who have accused the new Iraqi government of torturing detainees. Earlier in November 2005, 170 people were discovered an Interior Minister detention center -- most of them reportedly suffering from starvation and other forms of abuse.

Meanwhile, four aide workers in Iraq were reportedly abducted in late November 2005. Two of those abducted were apparently Canadians, one was an American and the fourth was British.

Elections in Early 2005

In the midst of the bloodshed and the tenuous security situation, the Iraqi interim government was preparing for general elections in January 2005. A National Assembly was to be elected and charged with drafting a new constitution, and local administrations for Iraq’s 18 provinces were to be balloted. In addition, northern Iraqis were expected to cast ballots for a regional assembly in Kurdistan.

In order to ensure that the elections took place on time, the United Nations had to be able to carry out its role in laying the groundwork. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 endorsed the global body's involvement in preparing for the elections, but Secretary-General Kofi Annan said the volatility of the situation limited the presence of United Nations staff on the ground. With these limitations in mind, it remained to be seen if the ongoing violence would abate or if it would continue at its red-hot pace, disorganizing efforts for the completion of the elections.

Indeed, violence by extremist groups aligned with al-Qaida was ongoing. In fact, a report in early

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2005 suggested that the United States could not succeed in its efforts in Iraq. The focus by American troops has been on making the Iraqi military into a viable force as this has been seen as the only exit strategy the United States military can count on.

Meanwhile in Iraq, interim authorities were making preparations for the trials of Ba'ath Party members as evidenced by meetings between judges and Saddam Hussein's aides.

By early 2005, a week prior to the scheduled elections, leaders from the majority Shi'a population said that if its political coalition secured victory, it would support the idea of a secular government in the country. This declaration contradicted conventional expectations that a Shi'a government in Iraq would follow the teachings of that particular Islamic sect. It was believed that this stance taken by the Shi'a leadership was intended to assuage the anxieties of both the smaller Sunni Muslim population around Baghdad, as well as the Kurds in the north of the country.

Finally, Iraqis at home and abroad cast their ballots in democratic elections on Jan. 30, 2005. Although most voters appeared jubilant at the prospect of voting in democratic elections, many were also fearful of attacks by extremists determined to disrupt the historic event. Indeed, violent attacks by mortar and gunfire marred the occasion. Still, turnout in some areas, such as Mosul in the northern part of the country, was high. Turnout in Sunni areas around Baghdad, however, was low due to anxiety over possible violence. As well, reports were emerging that Christians, located mostly in Kurdish areas, were unable to vote. Early and unofficial returns suggest an overwhelming victory for the Shi'a political factions.

By mid-February 2005, official election results showed that the coalition of Shi'a political blocs had indeed won the election with 48 percent of the 8.5 million votes cast. The Kurdish coalition followed with 26 percent and interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's party secured about 14 percent. The winners of the election will dominate the provisional National Assembly, which will form a government and write the country's constitution.

By the end of February 2005, Ahmed Chalabi, a former favorite of the Pentagon who was later accused of ties to Iran, claimed that he had enough votes to seize the post of prime minister in Iraq. Initially, he had been the preferred pick of the Bush administration, and particularly, the Pentagon, to head the new Iraq. On the ground in Iraq, however, he was viewed with suspicion because of his favored status among the Americans, and also because of the time he had spent in exile out of the country. Over time, however, relations between Chalabi and the administration soured as allegations surfaced that he had been courting closer ties in Iran. Meanwhile, as he began to speak more openly against the administration, he began to build support among Iraqis at home. His efforts, however, came to halt when he withdrew his name from consideration.

Ultimately, Ibrahim al-Jaafari was chosen to be the new Iraqi head of government and prime minister. Ibrahim al-Jaafari is also head of the Islamic Daawa party, which is part of the Shi'a

Iraq Review 2016 Page 53 of 609 pages Iraq political alliance. Known as being a Shi'a moderate with positive ties to Iran, and also reputed to be one of the most well-respected and trusted politicians in Iraq, al-Jaafari is backed by the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani -- the spiritual leader of the majority Shi'ites in Iraq. A confirmation by two- thirds of parliament was yet to occur before the office of the prime minister is officially filled.

In April 2005, the Iraqi parliament picked Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani to be the country's new interim president. Talabani founded the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and fought for Kurdish rights through most of his life starting as early as his teenage years and the following through the regime of Saddam Hussein to the post-Hussein period. His educational background was in law; however, in 1956 he was forced into hiding as a result of his political activism as the head of the Kurdistan Student Union.

After he was sworn into office on April 7, 2005, Talabani sat as head of state with two vice presidents -- Adel Abdul-Mahdi, a Shi'ite, and Ghazi al-Yawer, a Sunni Arab. He then named Ibrahim al-Jaafari (mentioned above) as prime minister. Talks on the formation of a new constitution were to be completed by August 2005 and a referendum on the constitution was to follow (discussed below).

By October 2005, political blocs were preparing for parliamentary elections to be held on December 15, 2005. Unlike the previous elections to the interim government, Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq's leading Shi'a cleric, said that he would not endorse any ahead of the December 2005 election. Instead, a spokesperson for the Grand Ayatollah said that people should vote in accordance with their own beliefs. His lack of endorsement was expected to affect the political prospects for the United Iraqi Alliance -- the ruling Shi'a-led coalition.

The New Iraqi Constitution

Meanwhile in mid-August 2005, the date upon which the new draft constitution was to be promulgated in Iraq's parliament passed and was extended for another week. Heated discussions between various political factions continued with no conclusive resolution in sight.

The minority Sunnis said that a federal system for Iraq would not be acceptable, and they also issued concerns about the distribution of resources, including lucrative oil revenues. Meanwhile, Kurdish members of parliament called for an autonomous region within a federated system, as well as a provision for a secession referendum within ten years. As a result, there was no agreement as to what the actual administrative structure of the country might be. For Shi'a members of parliament, the principal issue at stake was the degree to which the Islamic religion would play a role in the new Iraq. Gender issues also presented a challenge with no agreement in the offing on women's rights. Agreement was, however, reached on the name of the country: Republic of Iraq.

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With so many unresolved issues still on the table, the parliament voted to extend the deadline to ensure that sufficient time was provided to form agreements. But a week later, the deadlock was still intact and it remained unknown as to whether or not the new constitution would be ready for parliamentary approval on schedule. Although there were reports that the three main communities of Iraq had bridged some of the chasms dividing them, there was still insufficient consensus upon which the drafting of a constitution could be based.

If the new draft constitution was not ready on time, another extension could have been arranged. Alternatively, parliament could still be dissolved, making the current government into caretaker government and restarting the entire political and constitutional process.

But late on Aug. 22, 2005, ahead of the expiration of the extended deadline, media reports stated that a draft constitution was ready to be put forth. In the document, Iraq has been described Iraq as a "republican, parliamentarian, democratic and federal" state. The degree and specific nature of the federalism being sought by Kurds and some Shi'ites was not detailed. Presumably, the lack of specificity was intended to act as a type of compromise for Sunni opposed to Iraq being a federal nation state.

Negotiations were ongoing to acquire Sunni approval on the draft document, rather than submitting it before parliament. In this regard, further extensions were put forth in order to win Sunni approval.

Technically, however, the draft of the constitution could be presented to parliament without concurrence from the Sunnis since the legislative body is dominated by Shi'ites and Kurds. Such a move, however, would undoubtedly alienate the Sunni population, fire the flames of ethnic and sectarian conflict, and possibly reap deleterious effects in the upcoming ratification of the constitution. Under current regulations, the constitution would be defeated if it is opposed by two- thirds of the voters in three of Iraq's 18 provinces. Because Sunnis are the majority in at least four provinces, they could conceivably defeat the ratification of the constitution. (Note: Following approval by the National Assembly, the new Iraqi constitution was to be ratified in a national referendum scheduled for Oct. 15, 2005.) Indeed, on the eve of the second deadline, Sunnis warned against such a move saying it would only wreak havoc.

By late August 2005, another option was considered. With no agreement on the draft constitution, the document would bypass parliament completely. Instead, it would face ratification or defeat with the Oct. 15 referendum.

Meanwhile, members of parliament in Iraq said that the United States was pressuring them to craft the draft of the constitution by the deadline. Presumably, the United States believed that progress on the constitution would have an effect on the state of stability in Iraq. But a leading Sunni member of the committee, Saleh Mutlak, criticized the United States for applying too much

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By September 2005, violence in Iraq was rampant (as noted above). Iraqi President Jalal Talabani tried to cool sectarian violence by saying that the new draft of the constitution could yet be modified to make it more acceptable to Sunnis. He also said that there should be no timetable set for the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq.

At the close of September 2005, Iraqi President and Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani accused Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari of making unilateral decisions in violation of a charter signed by the Kurdish and Shi’a blocs for the purpose of establishing the new government. Talabani also charged that al-Jaafari has been using much of his power as head of government for the purpose of advancing Shi’a interests. With Sunnis set to oppose the new draft constitution set for ratification by referendum, the devolving relations between the Kurds and the Shi’ites heralded damage to the Shi’a-Kurdish alliance.

Iraq voted on its draft constitution on Oct. 15, 2005. Most experts expected that the 14-article draft document would be approved via the referendum since the majority Shi'ite population, as well as the Kurdish minority, were in favor of it. As well, the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most influential Shi'ite cleric, compelled Shi'ites to vote "yes" in the constitutional referendum.

Due to specific provisions of the referendum process, a majority voting in favor of the constitution did not guarantee the constitution's passage. The fate of the document rested upon voting in three key provinces with predominantly Sunni Arab populations. If the Sunni Arab population was able to achieve the two-thirds threshold of the "no" vote against the draft constitution in three provinces, then it would be defeated. As a result, the drafting process would have to be restarted after the election of a new parliament at the close of 2005.

Ideally, the constitution has been intended to be a nation building document, drawing together Iraq's Shi'ite majority with the Kurdish and Sunni Arab minorities. As it stood, the draft constitution envisioned Iraq's existence as a federal, parliamentary democracy. Its official languages were to be both Arabic and Kurdish. The official religion was to be Islam, although religious freedoms and equal rights were to be guaranteed. The draft also provided for elections every four years and an independent judiciary.

The drafting process and concomitant negotiations went on for some time and became increasingly difficult, with Sunni Arabs feeling increasingly alienated. Indeed, the bloody insurgency, which has gone on since United States President George W. Bush declared an official end to combat operations, has been led by embittered Sunni Arab factions who oppose the changes in Iraq. They have opposed the ascendancy of the Shi'ite and Kurdish populations, which occurred at the expense of Sunni Arab political influence. Of particular concern has been the matter of federalism and the possible future formation of Shi'ite and Kurdish quasi-states in the south and

Iraq Review 2016 Page 56 of 609 pages Iraq north respectively -- areas which have been home to country's energy resources. Such an outcome has evoked fears by Sunni Arabs about the consolidation of political and economic power by the other two groups in Iraq. Other concerns have centered on the role of Islamic or Shar'iah law in Iraqi government, as well as the status of women.

Not surprisingly, then, there was a fierce "no" vote campaign by the Sunni Arabs to reach the aforementioned two-thirds threshold of the "no" vote in the western Anbar province, the northwest Nineveh province, as well as Salahuddin and Diyala in the north and northeast of the capital city of Baghdad. In most of these areas, although Sunni Arabs are the majority, there are also substantial Shi'ite and Kurdish minorities, making the mission for Sunni Arabs that much more challenging and certainly dependent on high levels of voter turnout. Elsewhere in Iraq, it was expected that the Sunni Arab vote would be split between "yes" and "no" factions. In fact, one Sunni party expressed support for the draft constitution following concessions by Shi'ites ad Kurds, which would allow changes to be made in the future. On the other hand, many Sunni parties rejected the document -- with some even characterizing it as the work of "infidels."

Accordingly, if Sunnis failed to deliver high turnout levels in the key provinces due to voter apathy, confusion and bitterness, or even because of fears of bloodshed and violence, then it was quite possible that the requisite two-thirds threshold might not be achieved, and the draft constitution would be approved. Such an end could potentially fuel the fires of ongoing violent resistance. Conversely, if the Sunni Arab population manages to drive enough voters to the polls to defeat the constitutional charter, it would signal to the rest of Iraq, and to the world as well, that it is ready to participate in the political process. Such participation, however, would be driven by the demand for better representation within the political system.

Meanwhile, although Kurds were expected to vote in favor of the draft constitution, as noted above, Kurdish leaders questioned the office of the Shi'ite prime minister for attending primarily to the interests of that group exclusively. In their case, although a "yes" vote was anticipated, low voter turnout would suggest diminishing enthusiastic about the idea of being tied to a unified Iraq with Shi'ites at the helm.

On the eve of the referendum, there was an upsurge in violence across Iraq, despite the fact that security had been increased and the country's borders had been sealed. In Baghdad, a bomb exploded just outside the Iraq Islamic Party's office. In Fallujah, the party's office was set on fire by gunmen. In Baiji, the party office was vandalized. As well, power lines were sabotaged in Baghdad leading to a massive electrical blackout in the city. Power lines were also sabotaged between the northern towns of Kirkuk and Beiji leading into the capital city.

After the votes were counted, it seemed as if Iraq's draft constitution would go on to been ratified by the referendum. Initial results suggested that despite their high levels of turnout, minority Sunni Arabs had fallen just short of securing the necessary two-thirds "no" vote in three of Iraq's 18 provinces -- the required provisions for defeating the document's passage. Media reports stated

Iraq Review 2016 Page 57 of 609 pages Iraq that although the "no" vote had won out in the predominantly Sunni Arab Anbar and Salahuddin provinces, the "yes" votes had gained a slim majority in the other two key provinces of Ninevah and Diyala. In those two provinces, the Sunni Arab majority has not been quite so overwhelming in numbers and so their "no" votes were expected to be mitigated by high support from Kurdish and Shi'ite factions.

Sunni Arab leaders reacted to the news that the constitution had been passed with furor and accused both Shi'ite political parties and United States officials of orchestrating the results. Indeed, after reviewing the referendum results, the country's independent electoral commission acknowledged that there were statistical irregularities at play, which could well indicate fraud. In particular, both turnout levels and actual results were causes for concern. Consequently, the electoral commission said that it would have to carry out an audit before finalizing the referendum results. By the close of October 2005, however, the referendum results were made official and the new draft constitution was passed.

Sheik Abdul-Salam al-Kubaisi, a prominent Sunni cleric, warned that with the passage of the constitution, the dismal security situation in Iraq was destined to get even worse. Nevertheless, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani immediately announced a date -- Dec. 15, 2005 -- for new parliamentary elections. Based on election results at that time, a new government would be formed at the very end of 2005.

Parliamentary Elections of 2005

Iraq's parliamentary elections began on Dec. 12, 2005, with hospital patients, prisoners and military personnel casting the first sets of ballots. At the Yarmuk hospital in Baghdad, as ballot boxes were brought to patients so that they could vote, one election commission worker, Yousif Ibrahim, said, "They are all looking forward to this process since this will be good for the Iraqi people."

The election process was set to commence among the general population on Dec. 15, 2005, and was expected to take several days. Security across Iraq was tightened in anticipation of the elections with up to 200,000 security forces registering to vote before taking up positions outside of polling stations. Security was a top priority given the antagonism presented by militants, insurgents and terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida, who condemned the elections as a kind of "devilish plot." On an extremist website, a message by such groups was posted as follows: "Entering the political process, taking part in the elections or voting is against Islamic laws and our constitution the Koran."

Nevertheless, many Iraqis approached the elections with a sense of jubilation. Soldiers were seen flashing the sign for victory and cheering as they patrolled areas. Indeed, even some Sunni Muslim groups declared their intent to vote in the elections.

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In a speech on Iraq, United States President George W. Bush lauded the decision by some Sunnis to participate in the democratic process. He acknowledged that the re-integration of the Sunni minority into the Iraqi political landscape was a prime consideration, saying "More Sunnis are involved because they see Iraqi democracy succeeding. They have learned a lesson of democracy: they must participate to have a voice in their nation's affairs." In a speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, Bush also commented on the challenges and struggles involved in Iraq's fledgling democracy noting, "No nation in history has made the transition to a free society without facing challenges, setbacks and false starts." He also promised that, "The year 2005 will be recorded as a turning point in the history of Iraq, the history of the Middle East and the history of freedom." During the question and answer period following the speech, Bush estimated that about 30,000 Iraqis had been killed since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. That number was markedly lower than another recent assessment of the Iraqi dead by the British medical journal, the Lancet , which estimated numbers in excess of 100,000.

United States Congressman and decorated Vietnam veteran John Murtha responded to Bush's speech during his own news conference in Philadelphia. Murtha had gained notoriety after he called for a withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq -- a position strenuously opposed by the Bush administration. In his news conference, Murtha warned that the Bush policy could result in the presence of United States troops in Iraq for another 25 years, and throughout a possible civil war. To that end, he said, "We should be redeployed to the periphery and from that periphery we can go back in if it's necessary - not to fight a civil war."

In early 2006, the fficial results for the parliamentary elections were published as follows:

United Iraqi Alliance (Shi'ite coalition) 128 seats but 10 seats short of a majority Kurdistan Alliance 53 seats 5 seats Iraqi National List (Sunni; led by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's ) 25 seats Iraqi Accord Front (Sunni) 44 Iraqi Front for National Dialogue (Sunni) 11 Other parties 9 Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi's alliance won no seats

Post-Election Government Formation

In February 2006, the dominant Shi'a bloc in Iraq's parliament selected Prime Minister Ibrahim al- Jaafari to continue to lead the country, this time as the head of Iraq's first full-term government. Jaafari has been a member of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) as well as the Islamic Dawa Party leader. He won an internal power struggle within the UIA with Vice-President Adel Abdel Mahdi by a single vote.

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Although the UIA won a plurality of seats in parliament following parliamentary elections, they did not win an outright majority. As such, their dominance has been somewhat tempered by the strong presence of Kurdish and Sunni factions in parliament. As such, if Jaafari was ultimately chosen to be Prime Minister from among parliament, he would be challenged, as before, by these two groups.

Because of the sheer number of Shi'ites in parliament, it was expected in February that he would indeed be confirmed as the head of government for a full-term, however, negotiations had still not ramped up for the formation of a coalition government. The Kurdistan Alliance was likely to be a key coalition partner, while there were questions about if and how Sunnis might be included in government.

By March 2006, things took a turn for the worse. Iraq's parliament was scheduled to convene on March 5, 2006, in anticipation of the selection process for new leaders. According to the constitution, parliament was to sit within a month of date of the certification of the last election -- in this case, February 12, 2006. President Jalal Talabani, however, was urged not to open parliament as a result of the infighting among political factions. Indeed, political leaders remained sharply divided over the country's leadership, and especially the position of prime minister.

While the majority Shi'a bloc was set to nominate Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari for another term (as noted just above), his selection was opposed by Sunnis, Kurds and secular leaders. Sunnis expressed their opposition to al-Jaafari on the basis of his failure to tackle increasing violence, and they said that the security situation in Iraq under the current prime minister went from bad to worse. Among Kurds, al-Jaafari faced opposition due to lack of cooperation about jurisdiction over oil-rich Kirkuk.

In April 2006, despite withdrawal of support from the United States government for him, Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari refused to resign. In an interview with the British Guardian newspaper, Ibrahim al-Jaafari said that the Iraqi people had the right to choose their own leader democratically. It has been the nomination of al-Jaafari by the dominant Shi'a faction in parliament that has created an obstacle in the formation of an Iraqi government months after the election.

Then, on April 21, 2006, in a turnaround, Jafaari said that he would not stand in the way of a new nominee being named. Two possible candidates for the position included political allies of Jafaari -- Ali al-Adeeb and Jawad al-Maliki.

Within 24 hours, it was announced that the choice by the Shi'a faction in government for the position of prime minister would be Jawad al-Maliki. Like Jafaari, Maliki was also a leader in the Shi'ite Daawa Party. His background included service on the committee that drafted the Iraq constitution and a stint as the Deputy Speaker of the Interim National Assembly. He fled Iraq in

Iraq Review 2016 Page 60 of 609 pages Iraq the 1980s after being sentenced to death by Saddam Hussein for his participation in Daawa. He returned after the invasion and fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003.

On April 24, 2006, President Jalal Talabani asked Maliki to form the country's next government within 30 days. The call by Talabani effectively ended the political deadlock although parliament would still have to approve each cabinet nominee to the national unity government. Competition for leadership of the key interior, foreign, defense and oil ministries was expected to be intense. In his first policy speech after being asked to form a government, Maliki called for the merging of militia groups with official security forces. To this end, he said, "Arms should be in the hands of the government. There is a law that calls for the merging of militias with the armed forces."

On May 19, 2006, Iraq's Prime Minister-designate Nouri Maliki announced that he had almost completed the task of forming a government. Maliki was set to present his cabinet for approval before parliament on May 20, 2006. Still at issue was the question of who would fill the key positions of Defense Minister and Interior Minister. In an attempt to assuage critique, Maliki warned that these two posts would be filled only on a temporary basis. To this end, Maliki was reported to have said, "We decided on the names of the ministers and we will announce them... except for interior and defense ministries. Both will be acting ministers until we will choose the best ministers for those posts."

The forming of a government had been a difficult task that stretched on for months following the elections, as a result of sectarian divisions. However, in a positive sign, some Sunni politicians said that they would support Maliki's cabinet choices, and there was little news of opposition by the Kurds at the time.

The Security Situation in 2006

Meanwhile, in January 2006, an American television journalist, Bob Woodruff, and his cameraman, Doug Vogt, were seriously wounded in a bomb attack by an "improvised explosive device" in Iraq. Woodruff and Vogt have worked for the ABC network and were travelling as embedded reporters with the 4th Infantry Division near Taji, just north of the capital city of Baghdad. They were both treated at a hospital in Iraq before being transported to Germany, and later flown back to the United States for long-term treatment.

On January 30, 2006, journalist Jill Carroll was shown weeping and veiled in a video on the al- Jazeera Arabic network. She begged for the release of all Iraqi women prisoners. The al-Jazeera network did not report a deadline or threat to kill her that have become customary with such videos.

Also at the start of 2006, a video released by News of the World showed British soldiers beating

Iraq Review 2016 Page 61 of 609 pages Iraq and verbally abusing a group of young Iraqis. While the British government condemned the action by its troops against the Iraqis, Defense Secretary John Reid called for some degree of perspective, noting that out of the 100,000 British troops in Iraq, there have been very few credible allegations of the mistreatment of civilians. As such, Reid asked that people not rush to condemn British troops at work in the hostile Iraq environment. Despite such calls, two significant regional councils in southern Iraq ended all cooperation with the and demanded an immediate handover of powers from the United Kingdom. It was hoped that an investigation into the events depicted in the video footage would result in a thawing of relations.

Insurgents in Iraq bombed the al-Askari Shi'a shrine in Samarra on February 22, 2006, badly damaging its golden dome. The attack sparked revenge killings and other forms of violence across the country with several Sunni mosques burned to the ground. Iraq's top Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani urged Shi'ites not to indulge in reprisal attacks, however, the level of anger was so intense that it was not likely to be contained.

An emergency meeting called by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani was boycotted by Sunni Arab politicians who also withdrew from coalition talks, which had been ongoing at the time. In this regard, Tareq al-Hashimi of the Iraqi Accord Front, Iraq's main Sunni Arab alliance, said, "We are suspending our participation in negotiations on the government with the Shi'a Alliance."

Subsequently, Salah al-Mutluq, leader of the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, said that there were hopes to put forth a new security plan aimed at reducing sectarian tensions. The plan would withdraw Shi'a-dominated security forces of the Interior Ministry from sensitive Sunni areas and replacing them with either the Iraqi army or multinational troops. A significant amount of outrage by the Sunni minority has been directed at the Interior Ministry police who have linked with "death squad" killings.

In order to prevent the country from devolving into chaos, a curfew was implemented in Baghdad. The decision to implement a curfew in Baghdad at first appeared to have curbed the violence, however, there were reports of several attacks across the country by February 26, 2006. Attacks included the bombing of a Shi'a shrine in Basra, mortar rounds fired in the neighborhood of Doura, a car bombing in that same district, and a bus explosion in Hilla .

The spate of violence in early 2006 carried on in unrelenting fashion with the death of scores of people in various attacks in March. , an American hostage in Iraq who had been working with Christian Peacemakers, was found dead. There was no word about his fellow captives.

Car bombs in Baghdad in the second week of March left three dozen people dead, while about 100 casualties followed twin blasts at two markets in the Shi'a district of Sadr City. The city -- a stronghold of radical Islamic cleric Moqtada Sadr -- had enjoyed relative peace for several months but the respite came to a close as with the latest attacks. A separate car bombing near a United

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States military patrol left at least six people dead. Elsewhere in Baghdad, a few people were killed when a shell fell on their house during mortar attacks. As well, three people were found shot dead in a car in southern Baghdad, while in a southeastern suburb, the bodies of eight people were found bound, blindfolded and possibly tortured. A week prior, 20 bodies were found in a western district of the capital city. Outside Baghdad, mid-March marked the death of several civilians during a suicide truck bombing at a checkpoint in Falluja, two car bombings in Samarra which left several people dead, and attacks in Tikrit which lead to the death of others in that city.

In late March 2006, violence continued unabated in Iraq. A raid by United States forces at a mosque in Baghdad left several people dead. United States forces said that the mosque was apparently a base of militants aligned with extremist Shi'a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. The matter, however, took on political proportions when members of Iraq's own ruling Shi'a Islamic bloc said that civilians taking part in prayer at the mosque had been killed. Iraq's Interior Minister Bayan Jabr railed against the incident by the United States forces saying, "Entering the mosque and the killings there are an unjustified and flagrant attack." Meanwhile, Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari said he was "deeply concerned" by the reports of what had happened and was demanding a full inquiry. As well, there were reports that the Iraqi government was going to cease dealing with coalition forces and the United States Embassy in protest against the attack. For its part, the United States military denied that the mosque was attacked noting in statement, "No mosques were entered or damaged during this operation. "

In other developments in Iraq, a raid by United States troops in Iraq led to the arrest of more than 40 Interior Ministry staff, supposedly for involvement in operations at a secret prison. As well, Iraqi security forces discovered about 30 beheaded bodies near the town of Baquba. In a third incident, approximately 40 people were killed by a suicide bomb inside a military base housing United States and Iraqi forces near the northern city of Mosul.

The level of sectarian violence was so acute that analysts warned that Iraq could be on the brink of civil war. Some analysts have blamed the bloodshed on Sunni-backed insurgents, who have sought to spark sectarian violence against the country's majority Shia population. They pointed to the bombing of a Shi'a mosque and the associated spurring of reprisal attacks. Other analysts have suggested that sectarian violence in Iraq has been age-old and, accordingly, inevitable. Yet another cadre of observers has suggested that post-war Iraq, without a strongman like Saddam Hussein at the helm to hold things together in an authoritative fashion, was bound to dissolve into the kind of chaos being experienced in so far this year. A counterpoint, however, has been offered by some Iraqis on the ground who claim that sectarian differences were never a factor during the years of rule under Saddam Hussein. They have argued that emerged only in 2003. Holding a somewhat different interpretation of events to those who have suggested that the power chasm contributed to sectarian dissonance, they say the violent insurgency is a direct result of the foreign occupation.

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Regardless of these competing claims, Iraq continued to be wracked with attacks, bloodshed and a pervasive climate of political instability. The , long thought to be a symbol of emerging freedom, democracy and accountability in Iraq, has commanded decreasing attention among Iraqis who were now more concerned about survival than anything else.

Indeed, the carnage in Iraq was unceasing. A car bomb in the holy city of Najaf on April 6, 2006, left at scores of people dead or injured. A day later on April 7, 2006, multiple suicide bomb attacks on the Buratha Shi'a mosque in Baghdad left hundreds of casualties. It was believed that at leats two of the suicide bombers were dressed as women. On April 8, 2006, a car bomb in Mussayyib, a Shi'a town south of Baghdad, left another groups of people dead. Further violence in Iraq in the third week of April occurred when a car bombing in south Baghdad left at least 34 people dead. Shootings in Mosul also took the lives of seven laborers while several United States Marines were reported to have been killed in combat. These latest attacks were expected to further intensify sectarian strife, hence advancing speculation about whether or not Iraq has slipped into a state of civil war.

In one positive development, three Christian peace activists who had been taken hostage in 2005 -- two Canadians and one British -- were rescued and returned home. The fourth hostage, an American named Tom Fox, was found dead two weeks prior as was noted above.

Further violence in Iraq in the third week of April occurred when a car bombing in south Baghdad left at least 34 people dead. Shootings in Mosul also took the lives of seven laborers while several United States Marines were reported to have been killed in combat.

The over-arching hopes that agreement on the leadership of the new government (discussed above) would bring an end to the conflict-ridden situation in Iraq was quickly dashed as sectarian violence continued to plague the country. Even as Prime Minister-designate al-Maliki vowed to unite Iraq, a spate of car bombs exploded across Baghdad. In one explosion to the south of Baghdad, five United States soldiers were killed. In other attacks at a market is Muqdadiyah, two Iraqis were killed. As well, the bodies of 32 security force recruits were discovered.

May 2006 opened with a spate of fresh violence, most notably in the capital city of Baghdad and the holy city of Karbala. Car bombs in those two cities left scores of people dead, including a large number of soldiers. In separate sectarian attacks, close to 50 men were found dead as a result of multiple gunshot wounds. The nature of the attacks spurred the observation that in addition to car bombings by Sunni insurgent groups against Shi'ites, there was also a rise in execution-style killings as well as the targeting of Shi'a religious sites. The violence coincided with the government- formation process by new Prime Minister-designate, Nouri al-Maliki.

On May 29, 2006, CBS cameraman, Paul Douglas, and CBS soundman, James Brolan, were among those killed when a car bomb exploded next to their United States military convoy in Iraq.

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CBS correspondent Kimberly Dozier was gravely injured in the attack and was reported to be in critical condition at a United States military hospital in Baghdad following surgery. CBS News said on its website that the three journalists were in Iraq to cover United States military troops for Memorial Day. They were traveling with the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division. They had just exited the armored vehicle in which they were traveling when the car bomb detonated. It was one of several attacks that ensued in Iraq in the last days of May 2006, leaving scores of people dead and hundreds of casualties.

Elsewhere in Iraq, the security situation was worsening rather than improving. On May 29, 2006, Iraq's leadership called on the new government to send a team of high-ranking negotiators to travel to Basra to resolve the conflict brewing there between rival Shi'a factions, as well as between Shi'ites and Sunnis. For his part, President Talabani referred to the situation in Basra as inflammable and warned that it required attention. Once thought to be a safer region of the country, Basra was increasingly becoming the site of both infighting as well as sectarian conflict. Altercations between Iraqis in the area and British troops, who have been based there, were also intensifying. A militant Shi'a faction, the Fadhila Party, was said to be responsible for the devolving situation in Basra.

While the situation was worsening in Basra, there was some sign of a shift elsewhere when it was announced that the Iraqi army was set to take over control from the United States military in the unstable province of Anbar.

In a move oriented toward "national reconcilation," the new prime minister said that he intended to release 2,500 prisoners, most of whom were Sunni Arabs. Excluded from the list, however, were to be individuals aligned with ousted President Saddam Hussein.

Violence in Iraq was ongoing in late May well into June 2006. In a particularly gruesome case, police reported that they had found nine severed heads near Baquba to the north of Baghdad. The discovery came only days after a similar discovery of severed heads in the capital, which included that of a local Sunni cleric. In another incident, five people died as a result of a car bomb at a funeral in Baghdad.

June 7, 2006 marked a successful day for the Iraqi authorities when a bombing raid on a safe house in Baquba resulted in the death of terrorist leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Pictures of Zarqawi's corpse were soon published in television, print and internet media. Several days later, following an autopsy, United States officials confirmed that Zarqawi was indeed dead. The report also suggested that Zarqawi was actually alive immediately following the bombing raid but died an hour later.

Meanwhile, the Mujahideen Council -- an al-Qaida group operating in Iraq that had been founded by Zarqawi -- vowed to avenge his death. In an internet statement, the group said that al-Qaida in

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Iraq would launch attacks intended to "shake the enemy from its sleep." A later statement by the Mujihideen Council said that Abu Hamza al-Muhajir would be the succesor to Zarqawi. Some observers noted that the name of the new leader belied non-Iraqi origins.

For its part, there was no immediate statement from Osama bin Laden's enclave about the death of Zarqawi. Several experts on terrorism have observed that despite Zarqawi's expressed allegiance to al-Qaida, his Mujihideen's tactics of indiscriminate killings did not neatly fit with Osama bin Laden's objectives of promoting Islamic ascendancy and getting the West out of the Middle East. Nevertheless, weeks later, communication from Bin Laden lionized Zarqawi's contributions to the Islamist cause.

In other developments in Iraq, a car bomb in the district of Baghdad left several people dead or injuted. Another bomb attack in the north of the capital injured a senior police officer and killed his driver. In oil-rich Kirkuk in the north, gunmen shot an official within President Jalal Talabani's party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. In the southern town of Amara say five civilians were killed in a gun battle between British troops and insurgents on Saturday which left one British soldier wounded.

By mid-June 2006, an attack at a Shi'a mosque in Baghdad -- said to be a shoe bombing -- left close to a dozen people dead and at least 25 people injured. It was believed that the imam of the mosque had been the ultimate target, although he escaped unscathed. That particular attack came after the announcement by the Iraqi government of a massive crackdown.

In late June 2006, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki presented a national reconciliation plan to parliament aimed at decreasing sectarian tensions and violence. The 24-point plan included plans to disarm militias that have increasingly controlled neighborhoods, proposals to increased Iraqi security in anticipation of eventual withdrawal of coalition troops, a review of the treatment of Ba'ath party members who were forced out of public life after the 2003 invasion and thus turned to the insurgency, as well as an offer of amnesty to some insurgents. Excluded from the amnesty offer were groups that have targeted civilians. The plan also did not include any overtures to radical Islamists who lie at the core of the insurgency in Iraq.

Speaking about his proposals, Prime Minister Maliki said, "The plan is open to all those who want to enter the political process to build their country and save their people as long as they did not commit crimes." Still, he made clear that there would be place in the new Iraq for the Islamic radicals.

The initial response to the plan was positive and included endorsement from Adna al-Dulaimi, the leader of the largest Sunni coalition in parliament, Adnan al-Dulaimi.

As the prime minister was putting forth his reconciliation proposals, Japan began withdrawing its

Iraq Review 2016 Page 66 of 609 pages Iraq military vehicles from Iraq as part of its planned troop withdrawal. The prime minister said when he took office that Iraq would have full control of its security situation in 18 months, however, the United States has said that it will not give a deadline for withdrawal.

In other developments, four Russian hostages were reported to have been brutally killed in Iraq three weeks after being kidnapped. A video was released showing at leats one hostage being beheaded and another being shot to death. The Mujahideen Shura Council, which has abducted and killed several individuals including two United States soldier in June 2006, said that it had executed the Russians in revenge for "torture, killing and displacement by the infidel Russian government" in Chechnya.

A spate of attacks in July 2006 prompted renewed fears of civil war in Iraq.

In the first part of July 2006, Iraq's Deputy Minister for Electricity minister, Raad al-Harith, and approximately 19 bodyguards, were kidnapped by gunmen in Baghdad. According to Iraqi officials, the deputy minister and seven bodyguards were released 12 hours later. There was no information released regarding the motive behind the abduction or the fate of the remaining bodyguards.

On July 8, 2006, a car bomb at a Shi'a mosque in Baghdad left two people dead. Some observers speculated that the incident spurred retaliatory attacks, such as the one that left at least 40 people dead a day later.

On July 9, 2006, Shi'a militants reportedly set up a fake police checkpoint in the western Jihad district of the capital city of Baghdad. At the checkpoint, the Sunni occupants of the vehicles were identified and then executed. Women and children were among those shot to death. The death toll was expected to rise beyond the initial estimate of 40 victims as more cases emerged of similar violent attacks. Indeed, there were reports of militants barging into Sunni homes and killing all those inside.

Just hours after the checkpoint killings, double car bombs exploded in the northern Kasra district of Baghdad. The attacks took place very close to a local Shi'a mosque and left more then 25 people dead. It was unclear whether or not this was a retaliatory attack, or, if it had been previously orchestrated and the timing was coincidental.

Elsewhere on July 9, 2006, an army intelligence officer was shot to death in Karbala, south of Baghdad. Separate attacks in other parts of Iraq left several people dead -- including security personnel and civilians.

On July 10, 2006, fresh attacks hit the mostly Sunni Amariya district of Baghdad when gunmen ambushed a bus and shot several people. Also on that day, a series of explosions in Baghdad left scores of people either dead or injured. One of the bombs exploded in the Shi'a section of Sadr

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City and was viewed as a reprisal for earlier attacks on Sunnis. Another bomb exploded in the center of the capital.

Moqtada Sadr, and his Mehdi Army, were named as some of the first suspects involved in the checkpoint killings against Sunnis in the Jihad district. The radical Shi'a cleric denied any responsibility, however, and instead called for both calm and unity between Sunnis and Shi'ites. Likewise, militant factions within the Interior Ministry, who were previously accused of carrying out extra-judicial killings against Sunnis, denied any wrongdoing. There was no word as to any particular group suspected of carrying out the attacks against Shi'ites in Kasra.

In order to curtail further revenge attacks, Iraq's security forces set up barricades and imposed a curfew in the Jihad district.

Meanwhile, reports emerged about the release of three Egyptians who had been abducted and were being held hostage in Iraq. Yet even as this positive news came to light, violence was rampant across Iraq and the death toll in Iraq was rising.

In one case, three people were killed and seven wounded following a suicide attack in Kirkuk. The attack ensued just outside the office of the Kurdish party of President Jalal Talabani. In another case, Iraqi police found five bodies in Suwayra, located to the south of Baghdad. In Hilla, police said that a roadside bomb had killed one policeman and four civilians. In the province of Diyala, Council Member Adnan Iskandar al-Mahdawi was killed in a drive-by shooting.

This wave of attacks occurred just after Prime Minister Nouri Maliki announced his national reconciliation plan, intended to bring an end the violence and bloodshed between Sunnis and Shi’ites in Iraq. The disturbing upsurge in sectarian violence, however, essentially rendered the prime minister's plan irrelevant, while simultaneously renewing abject fears of civil war in Iraq. To this end, Presidential Security Adviser, Wafiq al-Samaraie, said on Arabic television that the country was "at the gates of civil war." He warned that extraordinary measures would have to be taken to prevent such an outcome.

On July 16, 2006, a suicide attack at a busy cafe in northern Iraq left at least 20 people dead and several more people injured. The attack took place in a town, Tuz Khurmatu, located 50 miles (75 kilometers) from Kirkuk. The police chief, Colonel Abbas Mohammed Amin, said that the cafe was in close proximity of a Shi'a mosque and that the area was populated mostly by Turkmen. The reason for the attack seemed unclear and could not be attributed immediately to either sectarian or ethnic strife.

In the northern city of Mosul on the same day, a suicide attack left three people dead. Also, in Baghdad, one attack left four policemen dead, while another killed three people in the Karrada district. Baghdad on July 16, 2006 was also the site of the kidnapping of a senior official from the Iraqi oil ministry. The day before, Iraq's Olympic Committee chief, Ahmed al-Hadjiya, was

Iraq Review 2016 Page 68 of 609 pages Iraq kidnapped along with 30 other individuals.

On July 17, 2006, an attack on a market in Mahmoudiya, to the south of Baghdad, left around 50 people dead and more than 60 people injured. Although there were some reports that the attack was due to suicide bombers, witnesses on the ground said that mortars were fired into the market and then several gunmen opened fire on the crowd. Most of the victims were believed to be Shi'ites. The area, which has been inhabited by a mixed Sunni and Shi'a population, has been plagued by frequent shootings, bombings and other forms of violence by insurgent elements.

A day later, a car bomb in the southern city of Kufa left over 50 people dead. The bomb exploded as a group of laborers who were seeking work clustered together around a minibus, which was in close proximity to a golden-domed Shi'a shrine. The area has been regarded as a stronghold of the cleric Moqtada al Sadr and Kufa's Shi'a community have been the targets of many sectarian attacks in recent times. On this occasion, police arriving at the site of the attack were met with a barrage of stones, which residents pelted at them while accusing them of being agents of the United States.

Iraq's most prominent Shi'a cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, called for an end to the "hatred and violence," warning that it would only extend the presence of the United States foces in Iraq. His call came around the same time that the new government was attempting to advance a reconciliation plan for peace across the country.

Despite these gestures towards peace, on July 22, 2006, seven construction workers, reportedly all Shi'ites, were killed and one was injured in the Sunni district of Khadra in Baghdad. According to reports, gunmen raided the house in which they were working and opened fire on them. A roadside bomb in eastern Baghdad left both an Iraqi civilian and a United States soldier dead. Another United States soldier was shot by militants in southern Baghdad while on patrol. Elsewhere in Iraq, eight people were killed --- including United States soldiers, Iraqi police, and civilians -- in various attacks. In Baquba, there was a bombings and a shooting in the main market that left several casualties -- including the deaths of three police. In Mosul to the north of the country, gunmen opened fire leaving one civilian dead. In Kut to the south of the country, a roadside bomb killed an Iraqi soldier and wounded four.

On July 23, 2006, scores of people died in separate bomb attacks across Iraq. At a busy market in the Shi'a area of Sadr City, a bomb explosion took at least 34 lives. It was reported that a suicide bomber drove a explosives-packed minibus into the entrance of the marketplace and detonated the bomb. The market blast came on the heels of another bomb attack in which eight people died outside the townhall. Meanwhile, there were reports of fighting in Sadr City between the Shi'a militia, known as the Mehdi army, and troops from the Iraqi and United States militaries. The same area was subject to attacks approximately two weeks prior, which left over 66 people dead. In the northern city of Kirkuk, a bomb blast next to a courthouse killed at least 20 people and

Iraq Review 2016 Page 69 of 609 pages Iraq injured close to 100. It was not clear if the car bomb had been detonated by a suicide bomber or not. The city was also the site of several attacks.

The first day of August 2006 was marked by continuing violence in Iraq. A series of bomb attacks in Karrada, Tikrit, Tar Afar and Baiji left more than 50 people dead, many of whom were soldiers. In Basra. attacks on police and coalition troops left at least a dozen peopledead, including one British soldier. As well, 45 Shi'a Muslims were kidnapped as they traveled through the Sunni area of Ramadi, and the day before, on July 31, 2006, 20 people were kidnapped from an office in Baghdad.

The next day was also fraught with bloodshed. At least 12 people, most of whom were children, were killed in bomb attacks while playing football in a Shi'a district of Baghdad. Fourteen other people were injured. The attack came a few hours after a major announcement by Iraqi President Talabani saying that Iraqi forces would take over the security of the entire country by the end of 2006.

Gunmen opened fire on Shi'a Muslims on August 20, 2006, leaving at least 20 people dead and over 300 injured. Sunni extremists were thought to be responsible. The attacks came as tens of thousands of Shi'a Muslims were making a pilgrimage to the tomb of Imam Musa Kadhim in the Kadhimiya district of Bahgdad. While security was increased and a ban on cars was put into effect in anticipation of the arrival of Shi'a pilgrims in the city, the increased volume of people made the task of protection far more difficult. In one incident, pilgrims were ambushed by snipers. But on the other side of the equation, some Sunni leaders said that Shi'ites were provoking attacks and some Shi'a militias, such as the Mehdi Army, were accused of attacking Sunni homes.

On August 28, 2006, the southern Iraqi city of Diwaniya was wracked by fighting between Iraqi troops and Shi'a militias, which left dozens of people dead including 19 soldiers and 40 militia fighters. The militia fighters -- from a splinter group of the Mehdi Army and opposed to the peace process -- were reported to have taken control of sections of the city. In Baghdad, a suicide car bombing left 11 people dead at the compound of the country's Interior Ministry. Eight policemen were among the dead.

A day later, an oil pipeline explosion in southern Iraq resulted in a massive fire and the deaths of scores of people (exact numbers varied according to sources). There were also several severe injuries with victims burned terribly over the majority of their bodies. Meanwhile, at two separate sites in Baghdad, 20 bodies of gunshot victims were found. There were signs of torture on the bodies of some victims. In Baquba, two Shi'a militiamen, reportedly linked with the cleric Moqtada Sadr, were killed by insurgents Two United States troops were also among those killed in Iraq on August 29, 2006. At the close of August 2006, there were over 2,600 United States soldiers who had died in Iraq since the invasion of that country in 2003.

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On August 30, 2006, a new round of attacks left well over 50 people dead. The violence ensued at the congested Shurja marketplace in Baghdad, which had been repeatedly hit by attacks. In fact, another blast occurred there only weeks earlier. Also in Baghdad, a blast at a gas station resulted in several casualties while gunmen shot to death three textile workers in a taxi. Violence and bloodshed also ensued outside a police recruitment center in Hilla -- another popular site for attacks -- leaving a number of applicants dead. Meanwhile, a bomb exploded on a minibus in the northern city of Kirkuk, while a roadside bomb hit a car carrying a family in Buhriz.

At the start of September 2006, scores of mutilated bodies were found in Iraq. Details about the situation were yet unknown, however, many of the bodies found showed signs of torture. By mid-September 2006, more bodies were found across Baghdad. As earlier in the month, most of the bodies showed signs of being both shot and tortured. While killings have become regularized fare in Baghdad, the sheer number of bodies found -- over 100 in total -- suggested something of an abnormal nature. Around the same time, the United Nations released a report asserting that the problem of torture was far more pervasive and problematic today than under the regime of Saddam Hussein. Indeed, the report suggested that torture threatened "the very fabric of the country."

Elsewhere in Iraq, violence was ongoing with car bombs killing scores of people across the country and particularly in Sadr City. The last week of September 2006 began with the discovery of several beheaded bodies in Tikrit. In early October 2006, a spate of mass kidnappings had ensued involving the abductions of groups of people rather than single individuals. As well, further mutilated bodies were being discovered.

Meanwhile at the close of September 2006, a full curfew of Baghdad was instituted in the midst of the unfolding violence. The temporary curfew had been established in the midst of intelligence reports about a possible terror attack in the Iraqi capital scheduled for September 30, 2006.

In October 2006, as Muslims marked the period of Ramadan, death and violence had surged to a new apex. In the past few years since the [2003] United States-led invasion of Iraq, violence has typically increased during the holy month of Ramadan. In 2006, however, the number of attacks during the holy month was believed to have been unprecedented. Few analysts disagreed with the assessment that Iraq was being gripped by civil war. Argument instead focused on the question of whether Iraq was already ensconced in a low-grade civil war, or, if the country had slipped past that point.

In early October 2006, it was reported that between 600 and 700 policemen in southern Iraq were poisoned after partaking in the "iftar" -- the evening meal that ends the daily Ramadan fast. An inspector for the Environmental Ministry said that following the meal, the policemen began to bleed from the ears and nose. There were also contradictory reports about approximately a dozen policemen dying as a result of the poisoning. Meanwhile, there were suggestions that the poisoning

Iraq Review 2016 Page 71 of 609 pages Iraq was intentional and investigations were being launched to determine the cause. In this part of Iraq, most of the policemen have tended to be Shi'ites, while insurgents, who have typically targeted police, security and militant forces, have tended to be Sunnis.

Days earlier, clashes between Shi'a militants and joint United States and Iraqi troops in the town of Diwaniya left several people dead. The fighting ensued as troops tried to arrest a militant believed to have been responsible for earlier deaths. In the violence that followed, a United States tank was destroyed. While initial blame for the violence was placed on cleric Moqtada Sadr's Mehdi Army, subsequent reports suggested that more radical Shi'a militants (who were now outside the cleric's control) may have been responsible. Regardless, streets were blocked and a curfew was set.

Elsewhere in Iraq, violence was ongoing. Police were still finding scores of bodies of people who had been abducted and killed. In Kirkuk, a curfew was put into effect as a massive security operation was ongoing; it was later lifted. In that operation, close to 200 people were detained and both arms and ammunition were confiscated.

On October 9, 2006, a bomb at a market in Baghdad left 10 people dead and over 25 people injured. The attack ensued at the Shalal market in the predominantly Shi'a district of Shaab at sunset -- a time when people were ending their daily Ramadan fast.

In the early morning hours of October 12, 2006, gunmen sporting police garb stormed the offices of a television station in Baghdad and opened fire on the staff who had stayed overnight in the building. The Shaabiya satellite channel, also known as People's TV, had not yet opened for business, and was owned by the National Justice and Progress party -- a small secular political group. Among those killed was the party leader, Abdul-Rahim Nasrallah, who was also the head of the station's board of directors. The reason for that attack was unknown but followed on the heels of another attack on a television station in Baghdad almost two weeks prior when a car bomb exploded outside the al-Rafidain station, leaving two people dead.

October 12, 2006 was a deadly day filled with violence elsewhere in Iraq. Synchronized attacks in Baghdad involving a car bomb and roadside device ensued killing five people and injuring about a dozen. In the eastern part of the Iraqi capital, a suicide bomber on a motorcycle detonated the explosives strapped to his body, killing four and wounding eight people participating in a police patrol. In Samarra to the north of Baghdad, a bomb exploded in a residential area, killing one woman and injuring several others. In the province of Diyala to the north-east of Baghdad, four separate attacks left close to ten people dead. In the northern city of Kirkuk, gunmen opened fire on patrons in a coffee shop, killing two people and injuring another two. Reports stated that the victims had been quietly playing dominoes and backgammon when they were killed. Reports also suggested that the gunmen responsible for those casualties also killed an Iraqi soldier later that day. Meanwhile, in Suwayrah, less than miles from Baghdad, around 15 dead bodies were discovered. As with the many scores of bodies found in Iraq, these also showed signs of torture. Finally, the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 72 of 609 pages Iraq body of a Kurdish reporter, who had been abducted a week earlier, was identified in the Baghdad morgue.

The following days in Iraq were no less bloody. On October 13, 2006, the beheaded bodies of about 14 Shi'a workers were found in Balad, located to the west of Baghad. To the south of Baghdad in the predominantly Shi'a village of Wahda, three women and four men were killed in drive-by shootings on October 14, 2006. Also on that day, two Egyptians businessmen who happened to be married to Iraqi women were killed near Baqouba -- just over 30 miles to the northeast of Baghdad.

Then, the next day on October 15, 2006, the northern city of Kirkuk was the site of a series six bomb attacks, which left about a dozen people dead and more than 70 people injured. According to the police, some of the attacks were the result of car bombs, while others were detonated by suicide bombers. The targets of the attacks included two Iraqi police units, one United States military patrol, the local headquarters of a security agency and a crowded market. The attempted attack against the security agency instead hit a training college for female teachers, killing two students. Kirkuk -- located in an oil-producing area of the country -- has been badly hit by violence in recent years; it is home to a diverse population of Kurds, Turkmen and Arabs.

In Balad, the bodies of over 50 people were found on the same day [October 15, 2006], most of whom were said to be Sunnis. Their deaths were believed to be revenge killings of sorts, and were linked with the aforementioned discovery of the beheaded bodies of about 14 Shi'a workers two days before. Since then, furor over their deaths had resulted in bands of residents roaming the streets in search of Sunnis.

Baghdad was not spared from violence on that day. Two bombs targeted the convoy of a senior interior ministry official and left seven people dead -- four were passing by on the street and three were members of the convoy's security detail. Hala Shakr Salim, the head of finance for the interior ministry, managed to survive the attack. Elsewhere in Baghdad, another 30 corpses were found. In the Dora district of Baghdad, a mortar attack killed three people. Meanwhile on the same day, four members of a family were killed when gunmen opened fire on them in Iraq's third largest city of Mosul, over two hundred miles northwest of Baghdad.

On October 16 2006, Suweira to the south of Baghdad was the site of a car bomb that left 10 people dead and several more injured. In Baghdad, two almost-simultaneous roadside bombs were set off close to a bank in the city center. Among the 20 people reported to have died in the attacks was a policeman; there were also several people who were injured.

On October 22, 2006, police recruits and shoppers preparing for the end of the holy month of Ramadan were the principal victims of attacks on that day. Police recruits on buses in Diyala province were killed in one case, while a roadside bomb and small arms fire killed about a dozen others. There were about 25 casualties and an unnamed number of abductions as well. Other Iraq Review 2016 Page 73 of 609 pages Iraq others. There were about 25 casualties and an unnamed number of abductions as well. Other attacks across Iraq included a bomb blast at a Baghdad market that left at least three people dead, and a suicide bombing in the city center that left about six people dead.

At the close of October 2006, violence in Iraq was ongoing. In one case, an explosion in Sadr City within the Iraqi capital of Baghdad left more than 25 people dead, and over 50 people injured. The explosion was caused by a roadside bomb at Mudhafa Square in a mostly Shi'a neighborhood known for its association with Moqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army.

Amidst the many deaths of Iraqis were also the deaths of international forces in Iraq, and most notably, United States troops. On October 14, 2006 alone, five United States soldiers were killed - - four in Baghdad, and one in Falluja. A day later, two United States marines were killed in fighting in the volatile Anbar province. A week later, a Marine was killed during combat in Anbar province and a soldier was killed in fighting in Salahuddin province on October 21, 2006. Three soldiers were killed around the area of Baghdad on October 22, 2006. These were only a few example of the situation being faced by United States troops in Iraq. By mid-month, approximately 60 American soldiers had been killed in the first two weeks of October 2006 alone. Indeed, as of October 2006, since the start of the war in 2003, the number of United States soldiers killed in Iraq stood at over 2760; those injured numbered over 20,000.

With increased violence has come increased opposition to the war in the two countries that championed the -- the United States and the United Kingdom. In the United States, the war in Iraq has become increasingly unpopular and was expected to factor highly in the mid-term elections set for November 2006. In Iraq itself, there was speculation about a deadline for the possible withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq -- a possibility that United States President George W. Bush dismissed during a telephone call on October 16, 2006 with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Yet in spite of growing domestic opposition to the war in Iraq, and even after talks in the third week of october 2006 between United States President George W. Bush and top military commanders, the White House said that there would be no official change in the Iraq strategy. While the Bush administration noted that there might be flexibility in tactics used in Iraq, the overall strategy and objectives remained the same. Questions about a possible change in direction were nonetheless rampant in the United States media.

Meanwhile, the Arabic media made headlines across the world on October 21, 2006. Alberto Fernandez, a senior official with the United States Department of State, said in an interview with the al-Jazeera television network that the United States had demonstrated "arrogance and stupidity" in its approach to Iraq, which he characterized as a failure. The direct quote, according to the news agency Reuters, was as follows: "That's not the failure of the United States alone, but it is a disaster for the region. We tried to do our best but I think there is much room for criticism because, undoubtedly, there was arrogance and there was stupidity from the United States in Iraq." The State Department quickly countered with the claim that Fernandez had not been properly quoted.

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Language experts, however, countered this claim. Two days later, it was reported that Fernandez retracted his statements, saying that they did not reflect the position of the State Department.

Earlier in the month, the British commander in Iraq, General Richard Dannatt, delivered a shocking criticism. In October 2006, he said the presence of British troops in Iraq exacerbated the security crisis there. While he later finessed his commentary so as not to completely break ranks with Prime Minister Tony Blair, he nevertheless stood by the spirit of his position.

Early November 2006 was marked by the sentencing of Saddam Hussein (discussed below) and a lull in violence due to a prevailing curfew. Some days later, however, the violence resumed.

On November 12, 2006, a suicide bomber killed 35 police recruits and left approximately 60 injured in Iraq. The terrorist group, al-Qaida in Iraq, claimed victory for the attack and said that it was acting against the "Safavid" government -- an apparent historical reference to Shi'ite Iranian rulers as well as the current Iraqi government, which Sunnis accuse of being linked with present- day Iran. The suicide attack was only one of several attacks on November 12, 2006, which left over 100 people dead on that bloody day alone.

On the same day, with the country embroiled in ever-devolving and violent sectarian crisis that some analysts were already calling a civil war, Iraq's Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said in parliament that he intended to make changes in government. His remarks about an impeding cabinet shuffle came during a closed session, and were said to be aimed at under-performing ministers and intended to ensure greater competency in government. Later, the prime minister's office released a statement which read, "The prime minister called for a comprehensive ministerial reshuffle in accordance with the current situation."

Meanwhile, amidst the prime minister's announcement, Sunnis warned that they would resign from positions within the current government, unless they were given more power. Some Sunni leaders even threatened to turn to violence if their demands were not met. Prime Minister Maliki appeared undeterred by these suggestions saying, "Regrettably this suggests some of our partners are not fit for responsibility."

On November 14, 2006, gunmen disguised as police raided the Iraqi Higher Education Ministry and kidnapped over 100 of the research institute's staff -- from professors to janitorial staff. Some -- but not all -- of those kidnapped were released of a phased basis during the course of the day. Five police officers, including the police chief of the Karrada district -- the area in which the mass kidnappings ensued -- were arrested.

On November 16, 2006, five security guards were kidnapped at a bogus security checkpoint near Safwan in the country's Shi'ite south. Nine Asian drivers were also seized in the incident but were released soon after their capture. A hunt was ongoing to search for the kidnapped persons in the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 75 of 609 pages Iraq area of Dewajin. In other news on this day, a British security guard employed with a private firm was wounded in clashes with Iraqi police in Zubayr also in the country's Shi'ite south. Two policemen and a foreigner were also reported to have been killed there.

Days later, Iraq 's Deputy Health Minister Ammar al-Saffar was kidnapped from his home in a neighborhood of Baghdad. Much like the two previous cases, some of the kidnappers were gunmen dressed in police garb. Less than 24 hours after Saffar’s kidnapping, the convoy of the other Deputy Health Minister – Hakim Zanili – was attacked. The Health Ministry has enjoyed close ties with the Mehdi Army of Moqtada al-Sadr, suggesting that opponents of that entity may have been responsible for these attacks.

In other violence at the start of the third week of November 2006, there were scores of casualties a result of a suicide bomb attack in Hilla by a Sunni extremist group. In that incident, around 22 impoverished Shi'ite laborers were killed and around 50 people were injured. The suicide attacker lured the laborers toward him by promising work and then detonating the bomb strapped to his body. In another development, the bodies of close to 50 people were found in Baghdad, reportedly identified as victims of death squads.

On November 23, 2006, gunmen, believed to be Sunni insurgents, attacked the Health Ministry in Baghdad resulting in heavy clashes with guards.

The attack at the Health Ministry was soon followed by successive car bombs and mortar attacks in the largely Shi'a neighborhood of Sadr City in Baghdad, resulting in a devastating death toll. Reports suggested that over 200 people were killed and several hundreds were injured in what was being called one of the bloodiest days in the Iraqi capital city since the invasion by United States- led forces in 2003.

In response, the government imposed a curfew on Baghdad and closed key air and sea ports across the country, while leaders of the country's Shi'a, Sunni and Kurdish communities called for calm. Nevertheless, Shi'ites blamed Sunnis for the attacks and there were mortar rounds fired on Sunni areas of Baghdad, such as the Adhamiya district, resulting in about a dozen injuries. Because the site of the original attacks -- Sadr City -- had been a stronghold of Moqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army, there was some speculation that it was responsible for the retaliatory rounds of mortar fire in the Sunni areas. A day later, as Shi'ites buried their dead, there were attacks on Sunni mosques in Baghdad.

Meanwhile, across the Atlantic in the United States, there was an increasing call for the Bush administration to rethink its strategy in Iraq. This call was particularly intensified in the aftermath of the political defeat for the Republican Party in the mid-term elections of 2006, and in the face of low approval ratings from the American people on President Bush's handling of the war in Iraq. With the situation in Iraq becoming untenable, and with victorious Democrats at home calling for a shift in the Iraq strategy as well as a phased redeployment of troops, the Bush administration

Iraq Review 2016 Page 76 of 609 pages Iraq gave some indications that it was examining its options.

The United States Pentagon then issued a report about the possible prospects for American involvement in Iraq, suggesting that there were three courses of actions available: "go deep, go long, or go home." Stated another way, the United States could expand its involvement in Iraq for the short term in the hopes of a resolution within a limited time horizon. Alternatively, it could look toward ensuring long-term involvement in the hopes of stabilizing Iraq and the region in the future. Finally, it could withdraw its troops from Iraq entirely.

Another set of options on the table for the United Stateswas anticipated by the Iraq Study Group. Early indications were that the group would call for dialogue with regional powers, including Syria and Iran, but would not stipulate a timeline for withdrawal. Such a proposition appeared to be a tall order since the Bush administration in the United States had eschewed the notion of dialogue with Syria and Iran for some time. Nevertheless, in the backdrop of these developments were concerted overtures by the governments of Syria and Iran to help with the task of establishing some semblance of stability in Iraq.

A top ranking Syrian official, Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem, arrived in Iraq in for an unprecedented visit -- the first since the ousting of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime in 2003. The Syrian foreign minister offered support to the Iraqi government in dealing with its sectarian crisis and state of chaos. That said, Moualem was quick to note that his country's willingness to help Iraq was not intended to satisfy any other foreign interests. For its part, Iraq's government said it would ask Syria to prevent al-Qaida fighters from crossing the border into Iraq, to curtail the passage of the funding of insurgents by Ba'athists in Syria, and also to refuse safe haven for former members of the regime of Saddam Hussein.

Syria aside, many analysts have argued that Iraq's security situation cannot be resolved without cooperation from Iran. But the poor nature of the relationship between the United States and Iran did not augur well for productive dialogue between the two countries on the issue of Iraq. Still, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani went to Tehran for talks with his counterpart in Iran.

The call for engagement with regional powers was uttered earlier in November 2006 by former United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who, in an interview with British media, depicted a bleak picture of the scenario unfolding in Iraq. He also called for dialogue with neighboring countries -- including Iran -- if any progress in Iraq could yet be made. Also noteworthy was the fact that Kissinger said that he did not believe that military victory was possible in Iraq. In this regard, he said, "If you mean by clear military victory, an Iraqi government that can be established and whose writ runs across the whole country, that gets civil war ... and sectarian violence under control, I don't believe that is possible."

At the close of November 2006, United States President George W. Bush was scheduled to meet

Iraq Review 2016 Page 77 of 609 pages Iraq with Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki in the Middle East to discuss the crisis in Iraq. While some internationalists hailed the event as a positive development, Moqtada al-Sadr in Iraq threatened to pull out of Nouri al-Maliki's government if the Iraqi leader went through with the meeting. Such a move would destabilize the government -- and by extension, the country -- even further.

Ahead of the meeting with the Iraqi head of government, Bush placed the blame for the violence in Iraq on the terrorist group al-Qaida. In so doing, he linked Iraq with the global , and essentially disregarded the complex power struggle ensuing between rival sects, manifest in the Sunni insurgency and the rise of Shi'a death squads. Bush also resisted the label of "civil war" in his characterization of the conditions in Iraq. Finally, Bush reiterated his stance that United States forces would not withdraw from Iraq. His assertion that he had no intention of pulling troops off the battlefield in Iraq "until the mission was complete" contravened against myriad calls from Democrats, political analysts, and regional experts, for a change in strategy.

That meeting between Bush and the Iraqi leader was postponed after the inopportune leaking of a memorandum, in which United States National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley cast the Iraqi leader's competence in negative light. When the meeting eventually ensued, however, both Bush and Maliki presented the image of cooperation.

The situation on the ground in Iraq, however, remained as dire as before. December 2, 2006, for example saw a series of bombs explode in succession in a busy Shi'ite commercial area of Baghdad. More than 50 people were reported to have been killed and approximately 100 people were injured. Isolated violence took place elsewhere in Iraq, as evidenced by the gunman who opened fire on a policeman at a checkpoint in west Baghdad, and the crash of a truck to the south of Baghdad that left 20 people dead and several more injured. Meanwhile, joint United States and Iraqi forces were carrying out raids in an area of Baquba notorious for being a stronghold of insurgents.

On December 12, 2006, a large suicide bombing in Tayaran Square in Baghdad resulted in over 70 deaths and injuries to more than 230 people. The suicide bomber detonated his truck, which was packed with explosives, after calling forth throngs of impoverished Shi'a laborers from Sadr City with promises of work. This tactic had been used in previous attacks with deadly results. Because of the high rate of unemployment in Iraq, desperate laborers have been particularly soft targets for violent insurgents.

A day later, the violence continued relentlessly. In one of several attacks of the day, car bombs exploded in the vicinity of a bus shelter and close to where a crowd of Shi'a laborers were gathered in Baghdad. Those attacks left more than 10 people dead and about 25 others injured. In another bloody incident on that day, gunmen stormed a house in the south of the capital city and killed nine members of a Shi'ite family. There was also a suicide bombing at an army base in northern Iraq, which left several soldiers dead and 15 others injured.

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On December 14, 2006, gunmen dressed in military garb kidnapped up to 70 people in the Sanak area of the capital city of Baghdad. About 24 hostages were subsequently released,

Then, only days later, gunmen kidnapped a number of people from the office of the only humanitarian group functioning across Iraq -- the Red Crescent. The hostages were abducted when armed men dressed in military garb drove up to the office of the aid agency in a long convoy of cars vehicles, which looked similar to those belonging to the Iraqi police. The gunmen then entered the office, saying that they needed to carry out an inspection. Once inside, they separated the people according to gender and took the males hostage. Included in the list of hostages were a number of visitors to the aid agency, as well as three guards from the nearby embassy of the Netherlands.

Kidnappings at official institutions and agencies had become widespread in the latter part of 2006, with two now occurring within a period of less than a week in December. As before, there were accusations that Shi'a militias had infiltrated official ranks and were able to masquerade as police units. Still, some kidnappings have also been carried out by criminal gangs.

On December 16, 2006, Prime Minister Nouri Maliki called for the return of members of Saddam Hussein's army to the military fold. His call appeared to be a calculated move intended to assuage disaffected Sunnis. Indeed, the majority of Sunnis had been employed by the army of Saddam Hussein, however, they lost their positions after the United States-led invasion, when the country went through a period of de-Ba'athification. Spurned by the ascendant Shi'a leadership, they turned their loyalty to the cause of the insurgency. Now with sectarian violence threatening to destroy Iraq, the urgency for reconciliation was at its apex.

Maliki's call came at a time when moderate Kurdish, Shi'a and Sunni groups were scheduled to meet for talks aimed at decreasing the level of violence, which carried a bloody toll of more than 100 Iraqis dying on a daily basis. Absent from the talks, however, were radical Shi'a militias and Sunni insurgent groups. Regardless, there was little optimism that these discussions would yield better results in comparison with previous endeavors of the same sort.

Meanwhile, in mid-December 2006, Saudi Arabia warned that it would provide financial support to Iraq's Sunni population if a full-scale sectarian war broke out following the possible withdrawal of United States troops. The stance by the Saudis suggested that it regarded the ascendancy of Shi'ites in Iraq to be a threat requiring counterbalance. The warning was issued at a time of intense speculation about a possible shift in United States strategy in Iraq, given the record level of discontent with the war back at home on American terrain. Saudi Arabia also reportedly summoned United States Vice President Dick Cheney to Riyadh to inform him of this likely course of action, and presumably to influence whatever action the Bush administration intended to take in Iraq. (See below for details on this matter.)

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The Historic Death Toll

In May 2006, the government of Iraq said that the number of people dying violently in Baghdad was increasing. The main mortuary of the capital apparently received 1,400 bodies in May alone. There were fears that news of this disturbing trend would further enflame sectarian tensions. The record was hardly improved by mid-2006. As noted above, by October 2006, there had been a disturbing surge in the already-high rate of deaths in Iraq. Reports estimated that an average of 100 people were dying per day in violence across Iraq -- a rate that would suggest around 3,000 deaths in a single month.

As a result of the upsurge in violence, the United Nations refugee agency, known by the acronym UNHCR, said that tens of thousands of Iraqis were fleeing the country. In the latter part of 2006, the UNHCR said that in addition to the record number of Iraqis seeking asylum outside the country's borders, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were fleeing violent areas and were now essentially displaced within their own country. While media attention has been focused on the episodes of violence, it has not captured the steady stream of Iraqis out of the country in what could only described as a mass exodus. The media was also failing to capture the exponentially- increasing number of internally displaced Iraqis, which was estimated at about 300,000 since February of 2006.

The issue of the death toll in Iraq was also the subject of great consternation. In October 2006, the John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health estimated that an astronomic 655,000 civilians had died in Iraq since the start of the war in 2003. United States George W. Bush's supposition that only 30,000 civilians had died since 2003 seemed at odds with these latest findings. Indeed, the findings of this particular research, published in the British medical publication, the Lancet, have been disputed by advocates of the war, who claimed that the methodology was flawed.

For its part, the Lancet noted that the report was recommended by four expert peers with few revisions. Meanwhile, in an interview on the Pacifica Network's morning program, Democracy Now, co-author Les Roberts noted that the cluster methodology was the standard practice for research in poor countries, and that it was the same methodology used by the United States government following wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Further, Roberts noted that the United States' Smart Initiative program was expending millions of dollars annually for the purpose of teaching humanitarian workers how to use the same method for estimating mortality rates.

The cluster methodology entailed the use of mortality rates before and after the 2003 invasion from 47 areas in Iraq. Essentially, the research looked at the total number of deaths from early 2002 onward and found that 13 percent of the deaths took place in the period of 14 months before the invasion, while 87 percent ensued in the 40 months following. Extrapolating that trend

Iraq Review 2016 Page 80 of 609 pages Iraq nationwide would mean that there was an increase in annual death rates from 5.5 per 1,000 to 13.3 per 1,000. As such, 2.5 percent of Iraq's 25 million citizens were believed to have died in the last three-and-a-half years.

Iraq's government in November 2006 offered its own calculation about the numbers of deaths that took place. Indeed, it estimated that the number of people killed in the years since the United States-led invasion was more than 100,000.

Also in November 2006, the United Nations issued a statement noting that violent deaths among Iraqi civilians reached record highs in recent months due to sectarian attacks.

Not all deaths in Iraq were the result of sectarian violence. Journalists and media staff have also been victims of violence. In some cases, journalists have been kidnapped and/or killed by anti- Western terrorist factions operating in Iraq. As well, journalists and media personnel have been the unfortunate casualties of coalition forces. For example, in 2003, British journalist Terry Lloyd shot in the head and killed in the southern town of Basra. In 2006, a British inquest found that his death at the hands of United States soldiers was unlawful. It was unclear how the United States authorities would respond. Nevertheless, the media rights group, "Reporters Without Borders," has warned that there were more journalists and media staff killed in Iraq [over 65] -- since the start of the war in 2003 than during the entire 20 year conflict in Vietnam. From 1955 to 1975, 63 journalists and / or press corps were killed in Vietnam. In the former Yugoslavia, 49 journalists were killed doing their job over the course of four years from 1991 to 1995. In the civil war in Algeria, 57 journalists and 20 media assistants were killed during the period of 1993 to 1996. Iraq has thusly gained the dubious distinction of being the most dangerous place on earth for journalists in recent memory.

The Trial of Saddam Hussein

In other developments, former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein said that he was willing to sacrifice himself in the interests of the Arab people, and for the purpose of ending the foreign occupation. In a letter reportedly delivered by the International Committee of the Red Cross and heavily redacted by the United States military, Saddam Hussein wrote, "I sacrifice my soul and very existence to the Arab cause and liberation of our homeland from foreign liberation." As resistance to the foreign occupation of Iraq has grown, Saddam Hussein has increasingly been viewed more positively among certain Arab factions. The former Iraqi leader's trial was set to begin in October 2005. He was charged with .

October 2005 marked the start of the trial of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. The former Iraqi leader challenged the very legitimacy of the court but nonetheless entered his "not guilty" plea. The trial was then adjourned until late November 2005. Hussein's wanted more time to

Iraq Review 2016 Page 81 of 609 pages Iraq prepare his case, however, the postponement was actually due to problems with witness attendance.

Meanwhile, despite the reports about tight security around the court where the trial was taking place, Sadoun Nasouaf al-Janabi, an attorney defending a co-defendant of Saddam Hussein, was seized by gunmen from his office in Baghdad. His body was later found outside the Firdous mosque with a gunshot wound to his head. Janabi's client, Awad Hamed al-Bandar, had been a judge during Saddam Hussein's regime.

For its part, the Iraqi government condemned the killing. Nevertheless, the killing of Janabi sparked questions about whether or not it would be possible for Hussein and other former Ba'athist Party officials to have fair trials. Indeed, Abdel Haq Alani, an Iraqi attorney living in the United Kingdom who has acted as a defense strategist for Saddam Hussein, said: "This incident has proved what we've been all along saying, that there could be no fair trial in Iraq at this time, there could never be a fair and just trial simply because there's no authority. Meanwhile, Badie Izzat Aref, an attorney for former Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister , who is also expected to face trial, asked: "If they can't protect lawyers, how are they going to defend their clients, and how will witnesses dare to come before the ?" Echoing these sentiments, Miranda Sissons, a principal with the International Center for Transitional Justice expressed the need for an effective witness protection program for this trial.

Some observers pointed to the fact that several judges and attorneys associated with the trial of Saddam Hussein and his co-defendants were kept anonymous, however, the identities of the defense teams were not kept secret, despite threats to many of them. In the aftermath of the murder of Janabi, the Iraqi authorities offered to provide protection to defense attorneys.

A month later in November 2005, another for one of Saddam Hussein's co-defendants, Abdel al-Zubeidi, was killed when gunmen opened fire on the car in which he was driving. The other passenger in the care, Thamer Hamoud al-Khuzaie was injured.

In the aftermath of the murder of lawyers defending the former Iraqi president, Iraqi police apprehended eight Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk for allegedly plotting to kill the investigating judge, Raed Juhi, who prepared the case against Saddam Hussein. With parties on either side plotting to carry out against those believed to be their enemies, the trial became increasingly shrouded in secrecy, in order to preserve security.

The trial of Saddam Hussein resumed in late November 2005 with the arrival of for United States Attorney General , who was expected to help build a case for the defense.

In early 2006, Judge Rizgar Amin offered his resignation from the trial of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein following criticisms by the public that he was being too lenient with the former

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Iraqi leader in court.

In late January 2006, Saddam Hussein exited the court room just after his defense team walked out. The incident occurred after the new chief judge, Raouf Abdul Rahman, removed a co- defendant -- the half-brother of Saddam Hussein, Barzan al-Tikriti -- from the courtroom. The trial proceeded despite the absence of half of the defendants.

In March 2006, the testimony by three of Saddam Hussein's co-defendants regarding the 1982 massacre of close to 200 Shi'ites in Dujail received scant attention in the media amidst the coverage of widespread bloodshed and relentless attacks.

In June 2006, another member of Saddam Hussein's defense team -- senior attorney Khamis al- Obeidi -- was shot dead. His death added to the dismal record of security for the defense team.

The trial of Saddam Hussein was ongoing in early July 2006 even though the former Iraqi leader and his lawyers announced that they would boycott the trial unless security was improved. The call for improved security was motivated by the of various members of the defense team. While closing defense arguments commenced on July 10, 2006, Saddam Hussein, some co- defendants, as well as the defense lawyers, did not appear in court.

In late July 2006, Saddam Hussein, was taken to hospital as a result of his deteriorating health conditions, which was brought on by a hunger strike. Iraq's former leader commenced the hunger strike earlier in the month to protest the murder of one of his lawyers and the poor security provided to his defense team. Three members of the defense team had been assassinated during the course of the trial.

Also in July 2006, while in court, Saddam Hussein requested that if he were to be found guilty and sentenced to death, he wished for his mode of execution to be by firing squad -- consistent with the typical soldier's execution in Iraq.

In September 2006, the prosecution accused the presiding judge of being lenient with the former Iraqi leader and called for his resignation. A day later, the same judge -- Abdullah al-Amiri -- dismissed the label "dictator" in its application to Hussein. Such a position was expected to underscore the claim of the prosecutor. Indeed, soon thereafter an announcement was made stating that that the judge would be replaced by Muhammad Oreibi al-Khalifa. The new judge promptly asserted his power by dismissing Saddam Hussein for failing to remain seated as quiet as directed. Saddam Hussein and his co-defendants themselves said that they would boycott the trial. Then, only days after being appointed as the new judge for the trial, Muhammad Oreibi al- Khalifa's brother-in-law, Khadem Abdul Hussein, was shot to death.

The trial ended soon thereafter and attention turned to the conviction and sentencing stage, which

Iraq Review 2016 Page 83 of 609 pages Iraq was scheduled for early November 2006. On , 2006, Saddam Hussein and his cohorts were convicted of the killing of 148 people in the Shi'a town of Dujail. As expected, the former Iraqi leader was sentenced to death by for crimes against humanity.

Two other key members of Saddam Hussein's regime -- his half-brother Barzan al-Tikriti and the country's former chief judge Awad Hamed al-Bandar -- were also sentenced to death by hanging. , Iraq's former vice-president was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison. Three senior Ba'ath Party officials -- Abdullah Kadhem Ruaid, Abdullah Rawed Mizher, and Ali Daeem Ali -- were sentenced to 15 years in prison. Mohammed Azawi Ali, a local official from Dujail, was acquitted.

Prior to the reading of his sentence, one of his lawyers, Ramsey Clark, was dismissed from the court room after a disagreement with the judge. During his sentencing, Saddam Hussein decried the legal process and the United States-led occupation of Iraq, saying loudly and repeatedly, "God is Great! Long live Iraq! Long live the Iraqi people! Down with the traitors!"

With the conviction and sentencing completed, Saddam Hussein and his co-defendants had 10 days to issue their legal right to appeal. Following the completion of the appeals process, those convicted to death by hanging were expected to be executed within 30 days.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Malilki said the sentence was deserved and noted that the verdict represented the end to a dark era of Iraqi history. United State President George W. Bush hailed the verdict as a "milestone" for Iraq. European Union countries called for reconcilation and expressed their opposition to the death sentence for Hussein. Some critics characterized the trial as a "kangaroo court" of sorts, aimed at assuaging victims but without proper adherence to jurisprudence, while human rights groups condemned the fact that the defense team was not provided with proper security. Nevertheless, on the streets in Iraq, despite a lockdown in Baghdad, there were some celebrations in Shi'a areas, such as Sadr City, while clashes ensued in areas dominated by Sunnis, such as Saddam Hussein's home town of Tikrit.

The execution of Iraq's former leader, Saddam Hussein, appeared imminent at the close of 2006. With his final appeal rejected, Saddam Hussein could be hanged at any time within 30 days, in keeping with the sentence rendered at his trial for the killing of Shi'ites at Dujail in 1982. Although the appeals process drew to a close even as his second trial was ongoing, his execution could be carried out regardless of the progress in other cases before the court. The execution date was not disclosed, however, Iraqi law required that the death sentence against the former Iraqi leader be carried out by the 30 day deadline.

While the Bush administration in the United States hailed the prospective death sentence as a an important and positive development for Iraq, various countries across the world called for clemency instead. India warned that the execution of Saddam Hussein would delay the peace

Iraq Review 2016 Page 84 of 609 pages Iraq process in Iraq, while the European Union (EU) decried the death sentence itself.

In the early hours of December 30, 2006, Saddam Hussein was executed. Initial reports suggested that members of Iraq's predominantly Shi'ite community were jubilant over news of the death of the former Iraq leader.

The situation took a rather bizarre turn when video footage taken by a mobile telephone camera of the execution surfaced in the public purview. In that footage, it was revealed that the execution was far from a sober affair whereby justice was served in the context of law and order. Instead, the former Iraqi leader was the recipient of taunts and mocking, with many of those present chanting the name of the leader of one of Iraq's violent Shi'ite militias -- Muqtada al-Sadr. The video footage also depicted Saddam Hussein appearing incredulous at the level of impropriety as he was being prepared for execution.

Days later, attention turned to the increasing outrage of Iraq's Sunnis. They were already angered by the fact that the execution appeared to have ensued in a rather hurried manner -- only days after Saddam Hussein's conviction and sentence were upheld by an appeals court. Their anger was also not helped by the fact that the timing of the execution coincided with Sunni celebrations of Eid al-Ahda. Not only was the execution an affront to their religious custom, but it also appeared to be in violation of Iraqi law, which prevented executions from being carried out on days of religious significance. Now, the aforementioned video footage only served to infuriate them further.

Across Iraq, protests were reported in Sunni-dominated areas. In Samara, Sunnis broke the locks off a well-known Shi'ite shrine, which had already suffered damage due to the sectarian violence plaguing the country. In Sunni enclaves of Baghdad, mourners praised both the former Iraqi leader and the Ba'ath Party. In Dor, to the north of Baghdad, a giant mosaic of the former Iraqi leader was dedicated. In Saddam Hussein's home town of Tikrit, sheep were slaughtered in sacrifice to the former leader, while the town's mosque was decorated by condolence cards that were sent from as far as southern Iraq and neighboring countries.

There was intensifying anxiety that Sunnis, who had at one time only sympathized with the insurgency, would now take a more involved role in the conflict. Indeed, the intensity of the post- execution protests suggested that the insurgency was likely to take another dire turn for the worse.

The United State Policy in Iraq

December 2006 saw the release of the findings of the Iraqi Study Group (ISG) -- a blue bipartisan panel led by former United States (U.S.) Secretary of State James Baker and former United States Congressman Lee Hamilton -- which was intended to offer suggestions about United States policy regarding Iraq. Should the U.S. "stay the current course," as suggested by the Bush

Iraq Review 2016 Page 85 of 609 pages Iraq administration, or, should another path be considered, as touted by key Democrats including incoming House Speaker Nancy Pelosi? The much-anticipated report assailed the Bush administration's policies and handling of Iraq. It also warned that the situation on the ground in Iraq was rapidly devolving and that there was limited time left to reverse the dire situation. Key aspects of the ISG assessment included the following suggestions:

1. U.S. efforts in Iraq should be shifted from a primarily combat role to one of support and training of Iraqi forces 2. Withdrawal of all U.S. combat brigades not needed for force protection from Iraq by 2008 3. No open-ended commitments regarding the presence large numbers of U.S. forces in Iraq 4. Imposition of consequences if Iraq fails to strengthen its security situation 5. Dialogue with members of former regime, aimed at national reconciliation 6. Dialogue with regional powers, such as Iran and Syria, aimed at stemming the violence and preserving geopolitical stability in the Middle East

Although U.S. President George W. Bush said that he would "seriously consider" the findings of the ISG assessment, he quickly foreclosed the possibility of unconditional dialogue with Iran and Syria. As well, he seemed to reject the notion that the U.S. combat role in Iraq should be phased out. That said, following a meeting with congressional leaders in Washington D.C., Bush said that he would work with all parties to forge "a new way forward" in Iraq. To this end, Bush was expected to meet with senior State Department and military officials, and also to consult with the U.S. ambassador to Iraq as well as external experts.

Meanwhile, the leader of Iraq's Kurdish region, Massoud Barzani, criticized the ISG for being "unrealistic and inappropriate." He was particularly negative about the notion of involving regional powers and cautioned against weakening Kurdish autonomy. Iraqi President Jalal Talabani echoed Barzani's criticisms. At the same time, he specifically rejected the idea that the U.S. should withdraw its troops if Iraq failed to strengthen security. He also rejected the notion of reconciliation talks with former regime members. Earlier, however, Talibani had expressed support for the idea of talks with Iran and Syria. Talabani also objected the tenor of the report, which he said treated Iraq as if it were a colony of the U.S., subject to the imposition of external will.

In the aftermath of the dissemination of the assessment by the Iraq Study Group (ISG), United States (U.S.) George W. Bush delayed making any major decisions on Iraq until early 2007. Bush made clear that he would not be rushed into making any key decisions regarding his Iraq policy. In this regard, he said, "I will not be rushed into making a difficult decision, a necessary decision." Bush said that one reason for the delay was that he wanted to give his incoming Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, some time in the position before being required to provide his insights. There were some suggestions that Bush also wanted more time to consider the findings of three internal reviews that were still being carried out.

Earlier, as noted above, Bush had offered limited commentary about the ISG assessment, although

Iraq Review 2016 Page 86 of 609 pages Iraq he summarily foreclosed two of its key recommendations: dialogue with neighboring countries, including Iran and Syria, as well as the phasing out of the combat role for U.S. forces in Iraq. His Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, also rejected the notion of dialogue with Iran and Syria. As such, there was no comprehensive sense of what Bush's new strategy would be, and how radical a shift he was willing to make.

In interviews with the media, Bush said that he would not relinquish the objective of making Iraq into a stable democracy. Bush also made clear his intent to reject any "ideas that would lead to defeat," and reiterated his objection to "leaving before the job is done." As such, whatever policy he ultimately put forth was unlikely to include provisions for any substantial reduction in troop deployments. It was a stance unlikely to be met with resounding support by the incoming Congress, which would be dominated by Democrats, or with the American public who were becoming increasingly opposed to United States involvement in Iraq.

In another development, Republican Senator John Mc Cain of Arizona called for more United States troops to be deployed to Iraq to control the violent sectarian conflict raging in that country. Mc Cain's remarks came just as President Bush was warning that he would not be rushed into making new decisions about Iraq, and as he was indicating that troop reduction was unlikely to be part of his plan.

Mc Cain, a 2008 presidential hopeful, said that he agreed with the Iraq Study Group's (ISG) assessment that the situation in Iraq was dire. However, he broke with the suggestions outlined by the ISG in calling for the deployment of approximately 30,000 more United States troops to Iraq, for the purpose of helping with the stabilization of that country. To that end, Mc Cain, who was visiting Iraq to assess conditions personally, said, "The situation is very, very serious. It requires an injection of additional troops to control the situation and to allow the political process to proceed."

Bush subsequently said that he would issue statements about his policy on Iraq in early 2007. There were expectations that Bush's policy would be in line with the Mc Cain doctrine of escalation. Such a move would be at odds with some of the key suggestions put forth by the ISG assessment.

In a related development, polling data from the Military Times showed that only 38 percent of active duty troops agreed with the notion of escalation in Iraq. The polling data also found that only 35 percent of military personnel approved of Bush's handling of the war in Iraq -- a distinct shift from previous assessments showing strong military support for Bush's approach to Iraq. As well, the polling data showed that only 41 percent of military forces now believed that the United States should have gone into Iraq in the first place -- a significant reduction from 65 percent in 2004.

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On January 10, 2007, Bush delineated the details of his new plan for Iraq. As expected, Bush said that there would be an escalation of United States forces in Iraq. Bush said that his government was committing an additional 21,500 troops to Iraq, most of whom would be deployed to Baghdad, for the purpose of working with Iraqi troops to secure the volatile capital. About 4,000 marines, however, were to be sent to the restive al-Anbar province, which Bush said functioned as a de facto base for al-Qaida operatives.

Bush called on Congress to provide an extra $6.8 billion to cover the cost of the plan -- most of which would be used to pay for the new deployment, but some of which would be used to fund reconstruction and development in Iraq.

Bush also noted that the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had to do its part to advance progress and security. He explained that a number of benchmarks had been set against which progress by the Iraqi government would be measured. These benchmarks included legislation to share oil revenue among competing factions, an easing of de-Ba-athification policies, and further responsibility for security by Iraqi forces.

Bush additionally addressed the relationship between the United States and the Iraq government of Prime Minister al-Maliki. To this end, Bush said that he had warned the Iraqi government that United States involvement was not open-ended, but he stopped short of discussing a possible timetable for redeployment.

The United States president then directed his speech to the citizenry of his country. Bush said that, much like the vast majority of Americans, he believed the situation in Iraq to be unacceptable. For the first time, Bush also acknowledged that mistakes had been made in Iraq, and he claimed responsibility for those failings. Furthermore, he warned Americans that "trying" times were in the offing, and he suggested that victory would not be claimed in the fashion of previous generations at war.

Absent from his speech was any suggestion that he would negotiate with Iran and Syria, whom he instead blamed for firing the fuel of discord in Iraq. In fact, he appeared to have issued a subtle threat to both countries, indicating that United States forces would work to disrupt their efforts to assist insurgent groups functioning in Iraq. At the regional level, however, Bush noted that United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would travel to the Middle East to build support for Iraq's government

Bush's decision to increase the United States' military presence in Iraq was met with strong opposition in the Democratic-led Congress, among key members of the military, and within the American public at large. In Iraq, the Bush plan was met with skepticism as many Iraqis did not think it would substantially improve their situation. While the proposal for economic development was met with a bit more positive feedback, it was mitigated by strong levels of either ambivalence or antagonism about the increased presence of United States troops in Iraq. The reception to the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 88 of 609 pages Iraq plan was no better in other regions of the world, with many editorial boards of newspapers and politicians from various countries expressing strong reservations about the positive effects of a singularly military strategy, bereft of diplomatic measures and political solutions.

Days after officially declaring his new plan for Iraq, President Bush was interviewed on the American television network, CBS. The president expressed his enduring belief that going to war in Iraq was the right course of action. He said, "I am proud of the efforts we did. We liberated that country from a tyrant. I think the Iraqi people owe the American people a huge debt of gratitude, and I believe most Iraqis express that. I mean, the people understand that we've endured great sacrifice to help them." Bush was resolute in his view that more troops needed to be deployed to Iraq. He said, "There's not enough troops on the ground right now to provide security for Iraq, and that's why I made the decision I made." The president also noted that congressional opposition would not stop him from following through with his decision to increase the United States military presence in Iraq.

Meanwhile, the Bush administration appeared to issue a warning to Iran. During their respective media appearances, Bush expressly described Iran as being a threat to world peace, saying, "Failure in Iraq will embolden the enemy. And the enemy is al-Qaeda and extremists. Failure in Iraq would empower Iran, which poses a significant threat to world peace." For his part, Cheney admonished Iran for allegedly meddling in Iraq's affairs.

The latest references to Iran came on the heels of the detainment of five Iranian nationals in Irbil. The United States claimed that the five Iranians were linked with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (also known as the Pasdaran), and accused them of providing arms and training to Shi'a insurgents operating in Iraq. However, Iran said that the five detainees were diplomats working in an Iranian liaison office. The Iranian government responded to the situation by warning that the incident could evolve into a diplomatic imbroglio if the five individuals were not immediately released. The Iranian government also noted that it was seeking compensation for damage to the liaison office, which was raided and from which the five men were seized.

For its part, Iraq's government reacted with caution. Iraqi Foreign Minister said that his country was becoming the terrain for outside forces to advance their own agendas. He said that while his country valued its close ties with the United States, Iraq has its own national interests to satisfy. To this end, he said, "We fully respect the views, policies and strategy of the United States, which is the strongest ally to Iraq, but the Iraqi government has national interests of its own. We can't change the geographical reality that Iran is our neighbor."

On January 28, 2007, Iran's ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi Qumi, delineated the details of a plan to strongly expand his country's economic and military ties with Iraq. He noted that Iran was prepared to offer its neighbor military training, equipment and advisory staff in order to bolster Iraq's efforts in "the security fight." As well, Qumi said that Iran was ready to bear greater

Iraq Review 2016 Page 89 of 609 pages Iraq responsibility as regards Iraq's economic reconstruction. Qumi's remarks were made in an interview at the Iranian embassy in Baghdad, which was published by .

The Iranian ambassador also addressed the detainment of Iranians by United States forces weeks earlier, acknowledging for the first time that they were, indeed, security officials. Qumi explained that the Iranian security officials were in Iraq to meet with counterparts in the context of a bilateral agreement to resolve security. As such, he argued that the Iranians should never have been detained in the first place. Additionally, Qumi dismissed United States' claims that Iranians were involved in the orchestration of attacks against Iraqi and American forces.

For its part, however, the United States has maintained the view that there is a mountain of evidence pointing toward Iran's support for militants inside Iraq, even providing bombs and weaponry. United States President George W. Bush warned that his country's forces would "respond firmly" in response to Iran's alleged activities in Iraq. Bush also said, "It makes sense that if somebody is trying to harm our troops or stop us from achieving our goal, or killing innocent citizens in Iraq, that we will stop them," His words appeared to be evidence of the growing and very public standoff between Washington and Tehran. Bush additionally responded to the Iranian ambassador's plan to expand ties with Iraq with skepticism.

In mid-February 2007, the United States (U.S.) accused the Iranian leadership of providing Shi'a militias in Iraq with bomb-making material used to create "explosively formed penetrators" (EFPs). The U.S. claimed that some of its own troops had been killed as a result of these armor- piercing roadside bombs, which could be traced back to material originating in Iran. It also accused Tehran of providing mortar shells and rocket-propelled grenades. The U.S. said that its report was being advanced only after weeks of preparation and revision of the evidence by the military.

For its part, Iran denied the accusations, suggesting that materials could have been garnered by any party on the black market. As well, Iran disparaged the U.S. record of reliability with a Foreign Ministry spokesperson saying, "Such accusations cannot be relied upon or be presented as evidence. The United States has a long history in fabricating evidence. Such charges are unacceptable."

Meanwhile, Iraq reacted with dismay to the fact that it was increasingly caught in the war of words between Iran and the United States. As such, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki called on both parties to deal with their hostilities outside of Iraq. To this end, he said, "We have told the Iranians and the Americans, 'We know that you have a problem with each other, but we are asking you, please solve your problems outside Iraq.' "

On February 21, 2007, British Prime Minister Blair announced the withdrawal of some troops from Iraq over the course of the following months. He said that the 7,100 British troops serving in southern Iraq would be reduced to 5,500 and he hoped that another 500 troops could leave by late

Iraq Review 2016 Page 90 of 609 pages Iraq summer. He expected the remaining troops to stay in Iraq until 2008. Prime Minister Blair defined a new objective for British troops in Iraq, saying that they would be expected to provide requisite support for Iraqi forces and securing the borders. He also made clear that Iraqis would write the next chapter" in their country's history.

The announcement by the British prime minister was soon followed with news that the few Danish troops operating in Iraq would also be withdrawn. As well, Lithuania said that they were considering the removal of their troops from Iraq.

Even as the news from these three countries was being made public, the United States was moving to increase its troop presence in Iraq under President George W. Bush's controversial plan for escalation. For its part, the United States characterized Blair's announcement as a positive sign of success in Iraq. Still, the fact of the matter has been that the last year has seen an exodus of coalition troops from Iraq, as the war in that country has become ever more unpopular across the globe. Indeed, troops remaining in Iraq from countries belonging to the coalition numbered few in comparison with their United States counterparts. United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice responded to criticism of the dwindling presence of foreign forces in Iraq by saying that that the coalition "remains intact."

On March 8, 2007, the United States (U.S.) commander in Iraq, General , said that there was no military solution to ending the rampant violence plaguing Iraq. Petraeus warned that military force bereft of political action could not quell the violent insurgency in Iraq. To that end, he suggested that the prospect of peace rested on political engagement with militant and insurgent groups. He also noted that there was no immediate need for further U.S. troops in Iraq. Still, he said that those troops already committed to the ongoing effort would remain in place for several months.

A day before General Petraeus' assertion that there was no immediate need for further U.S. troops in Iraq, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced plans to send almost 5,000 additional troops to Iraq. The additional troops were expected to serve in various capacities, including that of military police. Soon thereafter, President Bush requested $3.2 billion to pay for 8,200 more U.S. troops to fight wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This request was made in addition to the troops and funding requested for the escalation in Iraq announced at the start of 2007. In conjunction with the buildup of 21,500 troops in Iraq, which was announced by the Bush administration in January 2007 as part of the escalation strategy, the total number of additional troops deployed to Iraq would top 26,000.

Democrats in both house of the United States (U.S.) Congress advanced legislation to force a deadline on the redeployment of troops operating in Iraq. Democrats set a deadline of August 2008, or even sooner, if key benchmarks measuring progress were not met. The White House threatened to veto such legislation, if it were to pass.

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By April 2007, both houses of the Democratic-led Congress of the United States (U.S.) passed legislation containing war funds as well as a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, starting later in 2007. While the legislation mandated the start of the redeployment of U.S. troops -- pending certification of progress on disarmament of militias -- in 2007, the bill did not call for a complete withdrawal. It advised such an end should take place in 2008, but it allowed that troops could remain in Iraq subsequently to work on counter-terror missions and to train Iraqi security forces.

U.S. President George W. Bush responded by reiterating his threat to veto the legislation because of the inclusion of both the timetable for withdrawal, as well as a litany of spending initiatives. Bush called on Congress to send him a "clean" bill instead and invited legislators to the White House to discuss proposals for new legislation, which would not include the provisions he deemed to be problematic. With the Democratic-led Congress unlikely to sustain enough votes to override the presidential veto, such an end appeared imminent. Nevertheless, congressional leaders pushed forward with the legislation, with key members of the Senate saying that they hoped that the bill would arrive on Bush's desk by early May 2007.

On May 2, 2007, United States President George W. Bush vetoed legislation by Congress linking funding for the war in Iraq with a timetable for the withdrawal of troops operating in that country. It was only the second time Bush had exercised his veto during his tenure in office. Bush said that the withdrawal timetable was kin to "setting a date for failure." Bush also said that he would veto further legislation from Congress of the same type and said that his surge strategy should be given an opportunity to succeed in Iraq.

Days later, eleven Republican legislators visited Bush at the White House and warned the president that he had lost credibility on the matter of Iraq. As well, several leading Republicans, including House Minority Leader John Boehner, warned that there was limited patience regarding United States military efforts in Iraq.

Late May 2007 saw United States President George W. Bush sign a new compromise bill containing war funding. This bill did not include a timetable for a United States troop withdrawal, as was the case for the legislation the president vetoed. Instead, it contained key benchmarks intended to measure progress by Iraqi leaders.

By mid-2007, amidst the ongoing escalation of United States troops in Iraq, which was intended to curb the prevailing climate of violence and bloodshed, the landscape took an ominous turn for the worse in mid-2007. On the first weekend in July 2007, more than 200 people died in various attacks across the country. In the background of these developments was the renewed clamor by Democrats in Congress for the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq. This new push came as General Petraeus in Iraq said that the fight against insurgents could take years, and after key Republicans, such as Senator Richard Lugar or Indiana and Senator Domenici of New Mexico,

Iraq Review 2016 Page 92 of 609 pages Iraq expressed doubts about the sustainability of the war effort in Iraq.

On July 12, 2007, even as the United States (U.S.) House of Representatives voted in favor of the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, a new report was released depicting limited progress in improving the security situation in that country. The report portrayed Iraq as continuing to be plagued by ethno-sectarian violence and with local security forces unable to conduct operations without significant assistance from U.S. forces. Even more disturbing was the fact that the report noted that there had been a "slight reduction" from earlier months in the number of Iraqi security units deemed operating independently. This finding was a particular blow since a central aspect of the U.S. strategy in Iraq has focused on recruitment and training of Iraqi security forces. The report additionally suggested that Iraqi security forces often resorted to ethno-sectarian bias when carrying out justice; on the other side of the equation, there had been unsatisfactory progress in reducing politically-motivated accusations against the Iraqi authorities. The report additionally made clear that the benchmarks issued by the U.S. Congress had not been met, thus evoking questions about the success of the troop escalation plan touted by the Bush administration in the U.S.

In response to the report's findings, which appeared to issue "not satisfactory" grades for the majority of benchmarks and progress criteria, President George W. Bush characterized the report as a "mixed bag" and maintained the view that the fight in Iraq would continue as before with no change in sight. Democratic politicians in the U.S. issued criticisms of Bush's Iraq strategy and for being out of touch with the reality of both Iraq and public sentiment at home. Among the greater U.S. population base, public discontent with the war was at an all-time high of approximately 70 percent, with the majority of Americans saying that the war had been a mistake and a timetable for withdrawal was needed.

Iraq's Landscape in 2007

A week after United States (U.S.) President George W. Bush announced an increase of American troops to Iraq, violence in that country continued unabated.

In mid-January, 2007, 142 Iraqis were killed or found dead on a single day. In one case, 65 students died in twin car bombings at a Baghdad university.

On January 19, 2007, there were two reported combat deaths of U.S. troops in Nineveh and Anbar respectively.

On January 20, 2007, more than 25 U.S. troops were killed in military operations in Iraq. The heavy losses on January 20, 2007 were primarily due to the crash of a U.S. Black Hawk helicopter in Diyala. The cause of the crash was unknown, however, some reports suggested that hostile fire may have been responsible. Other deaths were blamed on attack by militias in Karbala, after

Iraq Review 2016 Page 93 of 609 pages Iraq attackers entered a secure area dressed in U.S. military garb in what appeared to be military vehicles. Still other deaths were blamed on roadside bombs in Baghdad and Nineveh. In the restive Anbar province, four U.S. soldiers and one marine were killed during combat.

The day was also deadly for Iraqis. Scores of Iraqis were also found dead across Iraq -- from Baghdad to Mosul -- with the bodies showing signs of torture by death squads.

A day later, a bomb exploded on a bus transporting people to work in a mainly Shi'ite area of Baghdad; seven people were killed and 15 others were wounded as a result of the attack. As well, a bomb in a car exploded outside a restaurant in eastern Baghdad, leaving one person dead and five people injured. A suicide car bombing in the northern city of Mosul left one woman dead and five other wounded.

On January 22, 2007, bomb blasts across Iraq left over 100 people dead and close to 200 people injured. One of the bombs exploded in a busy Shi'ite marketplace north of Baghdad, while bombs exploded in a mainly Shi'ite commercial area of the capital city.

Meanwhile, U.S. and Iraqi forces were stepping up their efforts against Moqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army, which had earlier been aligned with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's ruling coalition in government. The capture of a senior aide to the radical cleric raised the ire of the group, further straining relations with al-Maliki, who promised the U.S. that he would crack-down on militias. Nevertheless, lawmakers loyal to al-Sadr announced an agreement whereby they would return to government -- both in parliament and in cabinet -- following a two-month boycott.

After the return of politicians aligned with Moqtada al-Sadr to government, the United States military said that during joint operations with Iraqi forces, it had detained 16 high level members of the radical Shi'a cleric's Mehdi Army, and had killed one commander. The announcement may have been intended to show progress in its hard-line approach to the group.

As well, parallel efforts by United States and Iraqi forces were being waged in the Dora neighborhood against an al-Qaida-linked Sunni militant group, known as the Omar Brigade. Other joint operations were being carried out against the Sunni-dominated neighborhood of Yarmouk.

On January 25, 2007, a bomb exploded at a central shopping district. The attack left 40 people dead and more than double that number injured.

A day later, a bombing at a popular pet market in Baghdad left at least 15 people dead and 35 others injured. The Ghazil market was the venue for the sale of dogs, cats, sheep, goats, birds and more exotic animals. This was the latest attack among several, which have targeted crowded market centers.

On January 27, 2007, twin suicide bombs exploded at a busy market in a Shi'a district of

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Baghdad. The attacks left more than a dozen people dead and over 50 people injured.

In another incident, eight employees of a computer company in Baghdad were abducted by kidnappers garbed in police uniforms.

Roadside bombs in the same time period killed three United States soldiers dead just north of Baghdad, two others in Diyala, and another two in east Baghdad.

Meanwhile, the United States military announced that an air strike on a building believed to be a hideout south of Baquba resulted in the deaths of 14 suspected insurgents.

On January 28, 2007, the holy city of Najaf was the site of fierce fighting for a full day between joint United States and Iraqi forces and a group of militants calling themselves "Army of Heaven." The governor of the province, Asaad Abu Gilel, explained that the clashes were sparked because the group was trying to attack Shi'a clerics and pilgrims celebrating the holy festival of Ashura. He also said that the group was well-equipped, even possessing anti-aircraft missiles. Reports stated that three Iraqi soldiers were killed and 21 were wounded in the battle. United States officials said that one of its helicopters was shot down, leading to the death of two of its troops. That said, officials also noted that over 250 militants had died as the fighting raged on.

On the same day, several schools across Baghdad and Ramadi were attacked, leaving several children dead as a result of mortar fire and bombings. As well, a car bomb in the Sadr City district of Baghdad killed approximately four people. In Kirkuk, another bomb killed at least five people outside a warehouse.

The day also saw the murder of a senior official in Iraq's Ministry of Industry ministry, when militants ambushed him as he drove to work, killing him, his daughter and two other people.

On January 30, 2007 at the close of the Ashura religious celebrations, scores of Shi'as were killed and close to 100 injured in two bombings in Iraq. In one case, a suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his body as worshippers gathered outside a mosque at Baladruz. In another case, a bomb that had been deposited into a garbage can exploded in the town of Khanaqin. Both of the two towns were home to a mixed population of Shi'as, Sunnis and Kurds.

At the start of February 2007, twin bombings at Hilla left over 45 people dead and over 100 injured.

Also in February 2007, joint United States (U.S.) and Iraqi forces were set to carry out an offensive operation aimed at bringing security to conflict-ridden Baghdad. The Iraqi government said that it intended to release the guidelines for the plan for the capital city.

With the new security strategy for Baghdad set to go forth, United States forces officials admitted

Iraq Review 2016 Page 95 of 609 pages Iraq that it had lost four of its helicopters in Iraq from late January through early February 2007 as a result of ground fire. Officials said that it was clear that they would have to use new tactics to deal with this threat, which indicated that insurgents might be using more sophisticated weaponry.

In other developments in Iraq, a market bombing in the al-Sadriya district of Baghdad on February 3, 2007, left at least 130 people dead and many more injured. It was one of the deadliest single- incident attacks since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The bodies were taken to the holy city of Najaf for burial.

A day later, attacks in Baghdad left at least 15 people dead including four policemen. As well, an ally of Shi'a extremist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr was killed by gunmen in the southern city of Basra.

On Feb. 5, 2007, mortar attacks and car bombs killed over 30 people and wounded over 100 others across Baghdad.

A week later, Feb. 12, 2007 saw a suicide bombing close to a restaurant, and three car bombs at a marketplace in a Shi'ite enclave of Baghdad, kill at least 80 people in total.

On Feb. 18, 2007, three car bombs hit Shi'a districts of Baghdad killing more than 60 people in total. Twin explosions erupted in a market close to vegetable stalls and a row of electrical good shops respectively. A third blast erupted in Sadr City. The vast majority of casualties occurred in the twin attacks at the market.

The bombings occurred after border crossings between Syria and Iran were re-opened following a three-day closure. It was unknown if the re-opening of the routes across the borders may have contributed to the latest violence. Regardless, Iraqis responding to the attacks with outrage and questioned whether the new security plan, which Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki called "a brilliant success," was really in effect. As well, there was speculation about whether or not the radical Shi'a cleric and leader of the Mehdi Army, Moqtada al-Sadr, had really left Iraq for Iran ahead of the security crackdown.

A day later, on Feb. 19, 2007, Iraq was hit by a spate of violence that left more than 40 people dead on that day alone. In one case, a mortar attack killed around a dozen people in the Shi’ite area of Dora of the capital. Also in Baghdad, a suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his body in a public bus headed for the Karradah neighborhood, killing five people. In the Shi’a neighborhood of Zafraniyah, two bombs left eight people dead. Outside of Baghdad in Mahmoudiya, a car bomb exploded in an area housing a number of automobile repair shops; two people died and two people were injured as a result. The town has been inhabited mostly by Shi’ites with Sunnis living in surrounding villages. In Ramadi, a car bomb killed at least nine bystanders at a police checkpoint following a failed suicide attack. In Sunni-dominated Duluiyah, explosives attached to a car were detonated, killing at least four people.

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Meanwhile, insurgents, including one suicide bomber, carried out an attack on a combat post to the north of Baghdad. The attack left two United States soldiers dead and 17 others wounded. In recent days, several United States soldiers were also killed. Two were killed during patrols earlier on February 17, 2007, others died while fighting in the restive Anbar province – a hotbed of Sunni insurgent activity.

On February 21, 2007, a car bomb exploded in the holy city of Najaf in central Iraq. The explosion was triggered by a suicide bomber at a policy checkpoint at a police checkpoint in Maydan Square close to the Old City. At least 13 people were killed and dozens more injured as a result of the attack. As a pilgrimage venue for Shi'a Muslims and as the site of the mausoleum of Imam Ali, Najaf has not only been distinguished as a particularly holy city among Shi'ites, but also as the home of noted clerics, including the Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.

A few days later, a car bomb exploded killing one person and injuring several others close to the Iranian embassy in Baghdad.

Also in the last week of February 2007, a female suicide bomber detonated herself at the mainly Shi'ite Mustansriyah University. More than 40 people were killed as a result. the university was the site of a spate of bombings a month prior in which 70 people died.

On February 27, 2007, the media reported that a suicide bombing at a soccer field in Ramadi on left at least 18 children dead. That report was subsequently retracted and deemed inaccurate. The mistake transpired due to confusion over two separate incidents -- an explosion at a soccer field and a suicide bombing the day before. There was, in fact, a controlled explosion at a soccer field, carried out by the United States military. About 30 people were injured in thay incident, including nine children. The day before, on February 26, 2007, an attack ensued at a nearby village, where an imam had spoken against the group, al-Qaida in Iraq. More than 50 people died in that incident, including women and several children when a car bomb exploded outside the mosque.

Meanwhile, as the United States moved to increase its presence in Iraq and as a new security plan was being implemented, the radical Shi'ite, Muqtada al-Sadr, warned that the initiatives were doomed to failure. He said that despite the new efforts, "car bombs continue to explode" and he blamed the situation on United States involvement in Iraq.

Also in late February 2007, Ammar al-Hakim, the eldest son of a key Shi'a politician, was released from United States (U.S.) custody. The U.S. said that Hakim had been arrested because the convoy in which he was travelling appeared suspicious. The U.S. also said that Hakim had been treated with "dignity and respect." However, in a press conference after his release, Hakim disputed this claim saying that he was treated "rudely," and was both bound and blindfolded. Demonstrations of angry Shi'a Iraqis ensued in Najaf to protest Hakim's arrest and treatment.

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Late February 2007 also saw the Iraqi leadership wrestle with life and death issues on a personal level. Iraqi President Jalal Talabani was taken to Jordan for medical care. There were conflicting reports about whether or not he had a heart attack. Also, one of the country's two vice presidents, Adel Abdul-Mahdi, and the minister responsible for Public Works, Riad Ghareeb, were both wounded after a bomb exploded during an official ceremony at the ministry. While the vice president's injuries were light, the cabinet minister was more seriously affected. Six others were killed in the attack.

In the first few months of 2007, scores of bodies were found on an almost daily basis in the capital alone, many showing the signs of torture -- the hallmark of sectarian hatred and violence. A spokesperson for the Interior Ministry said in an interview with the Associated Press that in the period of late January to early February 2007 alone, as many as 1,000 people had died in Iraq.

On March 2, 2007, the bodies of 14 slaughtered policemen were discovered in the streets of Baquba to the north of Baghdad. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki condemned their murders, and vowed to bring those responsible to justice. Earlier, an alliance of militant organizations had said that the missing policemen would have to be killed as a measure of retribution for the alleged of a Sunni woman. The accusation was emblematic of the deeper sectarian division plaguing the country. Sunnis have said that while the government has taken a hard-line position against Sunni insurgents, it has simultaneously ignored the human rights abuses carried out by Shi'ite dominated security units against Sunnis. In the background of these developments was the establishment of a new security plan, which included the deployment of predominantly Shi'ite police units in Sunni districts.

On March 4, 2007, a security crackdown was being implemented in the Shi'a stronghold of Sadr City within Baghdad. The operation was being carried out jointly by Iraqi and United States troops. The action in Sadr City was part of an overall security crackdown, called "," which would impact the whole country, while offering amnesty to insurgents interested in ceasing their violent activities.

On March 5, 2007, a suicide car bomb at a Baghdad market left 28 people dead and over 66 people injured. Those on the scene said they expected the death toll to rise. The attack took place in a mixed Sunni-Shi'a area and was centered in an area with several book stalls.

Also in early March 2007, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki indicated that a shuffle within his governing cabinet was imminent. There was speculation that the cabinet shuffle could center on the dismissal of six ministers with ties to radical Shi'a cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr. These proposed changes were expected even as the government was carrying out the aforementioned security crackdown, called "Operation Imposing Law."

On March 9, 2007, the United States (U.S.) military said that it had captured 16 suspected

Iraq Review 2016 Page 98 of 609 pages Iraq insurgents, included one suspected al-Qaida leader. The local al-Qaida leader was among six people captured in Mosul, and was accused of being involved with several kidnappings, beheadings and other violent actions. Other suspected insurgents were captured in Fallujah and Karmah.

On March 10, 2007, Iraq played host at a conference intended to bring together regional and world leaders to discuss bringing stability to that country, and to prevent the spreading of sectarian violence across the Middle East region. The conference presented a rare chance for Iran and Syria to sit at the same discussion table with the United States, which has accused Iran and Syria of supporting militants and extremists operating in Iraq. All countries in attendance talked about ways to end the violence in Iraq. The conference resulted in Iran's statement that it backed efforts to stop the violence plaguing Iraq, while Syria said that it supported a "political solution" in Iraq. Also present at the meeting were other Arab countries, as well as the other permanent United Nations Security Council members -- Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom.

The convening of a stability conference in Iraq came at a time when Shi'ite pilgrims journeyed to the holy city of Karbala to celebrate the holy day of Arbayeen. The second week of March 2007 was thusly a bloody one -- with more than 170 Shi'ite pilgrims killed and close to 300 injured while making their way, mostly on foot, to Karbala.

On March 11, 2007, a day after world and regional leaders met in Iraq to discuss the stability of that country, suicide bombers carried out attacks in Baghdad, killing approximately 30 people in total. In one incident, the target of attack was a truck transporting Shi'ite pilgrims in central Baghdad. In another incident, a suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his body while on a minibus. That attack, which took place near the Shi'ite stronghold of Sadr City within the Iraqi capital, left 10 people dead and several wounded.

Using a new tactic of attack and intimidation, Sunni insurgents set fire to the homes in the mixed Sunni and Shi'ite areas to the northeast of Baghdad during the same period.

In the third week of March 2007, three chlorine gas attacks were reported in Iraq. Trucks loaded with both explosives and chlorine were apparently detonated at their targets. Eight people were reported to have been killed as a result, and hundreds were injured including six United States (U.S.) troops.

Two of the attacks apparently took place close to Fallujah, while a third ensued in the vicinity of Ramadi; both locations were regarded as strongholds for al-Qaida in Iraq. There was some speculation that the attacks close to Fallujah were spurred by the fact that tribal leaders in the area had criticized al-Qaida in Iraq.

Coming a month after three similar chlorine in February 2007, there was a high degree of anxiety that the use of chlorine gas, which burns the throat and lungs of victims, and which can prove

Iraq Review 2016 Page 99 of 609 pages Iraq deadly after only a few breaths, could be a new weapon of choice.

Also in the third week of March 2007, United States (U.S.) authorities said that seven troops had been killed in recent days. In one case, a military vehicle was the target of a roadside bomb, which left four soldiers dead and a fifth soldier wounded on March 17, 2007. On that same day, an explosion in the capital of the province of Diyala left one soldier dead and five injured. As well, one U.S. marine was killed during fighting in the restive Anbar province.

On March 18, 2007, attacks in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad left several people dead. In one incident, a car bomb at a market in she Shi'a district of Sadr City killed three people and injured at least seven others.

A day later, on the fourth anniversary of the start of the war, an explosion at a Shi'ite mosque in Baghdad left about eight people dead. On the same day, a series of car bombs in the oil-rich city northern of Kirkuk killed at least 12 people.

Meanwhile, four years after the start of the war in Iraq, General David Petraeus, the United States (U.S.) commander in Iraq expressed optimism over the ongoing security effort in Iraq. Petraeus said that the extra brigades operating on the ground in Iraq had resulted in fewer sectarian attacks. U.S. Defense Secretary gates also expressed satisfaction with the thrust of the new security plan.

Ironically, even as the United States (U.S.) commander in Iraq expressed optimism over the ongoing security effort in Iraq, a survey showed that a substantial number of Iraqis were pessimistic about their future prospects. The survey showed that only 18 percent Iraqis had confidence in U.S. and coalition troops, and only half expressed confidence in their country's government. Meanwhile, an overwhelming majority -- 86 percent -- expressed serious anxiety about someone in their own household becoming a victim of violence. As well, 67 percent of respondents said that reconstruction efforts in Iraq had been ineffective. The results of the survey demonstrated a sharp disconnection with a previous study of Iraqi attitudes in 2005, which found a far more hopeful view of the future.

Note: The survey, which polled more than 2,000 respondents, was conducted by D3 Systems and was commissioned by a consortium of media outlets including the BBC, ABC News, ARD and USA Today.

On March 22, 2007, an explosion in Baghdad disrupted a news conference led by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki and United Nations (U.N.) Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. It was caused by either a mortar round or rocket landing just 330 feet (100 meters) from the building in the Green Zone of where the news conference was being held. The explosion left the U.N. chief unhurt but visibly shaken. It was his first visit to the Iraqi capital since taking office at the start of the year.

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On March 23, 2007, double bomb attacks in Baghdad left nine people dead and 15 people injured, including Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Salam Zaubai. One attack was caused by a suicide bomber and the other was due to a car bomb. Both attacks were carried off successfully despite the fact that a vehicle ban was in effect for that particular day. The attacks ensued as Zaubai, who has been a member of the Accordance Front, the main Sunni political bloc, was leaving a mosque located close to his home. He was taken to a hospital and underwent surgery.

March 24, 2007 was one of the bloodiest days in Iraq since the start of a security strategy. More than 50 people were killed in a spate of attacks across the country. In one incident in the Sunni district of Doura in Baghdad, a suicide bomber drove a truck to a police station and detonated the explosives, some of which were hidden under bricks. The attack ultimately destroyed half the building, killed 20 people, and injured at least 25 others. Meanwhile, another suicide truck bomber killed eight people at a Shi'a mosque in Iskandariya to the south of Baghdad. As well, a suicide bomber at a market in Talafar -- in the northwestern part of Iraq -- killed 10 people. There were another three suicide attacks on the roadways to the Syrian border, which resulted in the deaths of about one dozen people and injuries to another 25 individuals. In Haswa, to the south of Baghdad, a truck bomb killed four people. In Fallujah, a roadside bomb killed four Iraqi soldiers. Also in Fallujah, the bodies of 12 people were found.

On March 27, 2007, two truck bombs left more than 150 people dead and many more injured in the Iraqi town of Talafar. It was one of the deadliest days in Iraq since the start of the war. Days earlier, a suicide bomber killed ten people outside a pastry shop in the market in the same town. Ironically, United States President George W. Bush used the example of Talafar to cite progress on the security front in Iraq about a year earlier.

The same day saw the deaths of about 30 other people in other parts of Iraq. In one case, two women, believed to be nuns at the Cathedral of the Virgin in Kirkuk, were reported to have been stabbed to death. In Shi'a-dominated Abu Chir in southern Baghdad, a mortar attack left four people dead and 14 others wounded. In Iskandariya, to the south of Baghdad, gunmen open fire on a Sunni funeral procession, killing four people. In Ramadi, a suicide car bomb targeted a restaurant and killed 15 people. Meanwhile, an ambush led to the killing of a leading Sunni insurgent, Harith al-Dari.

On April 2, 2007, a suicide truck bomb in Kirkuk left at least 13 people dead and dozens more injured. The attack appeared to have targeted a police station, although children at a nearby school were also among the casualties. A day later on April 3, 2007, 22 shepherds were abducted by gunmen in the desert located close to the city of Karbala.

On April 5, 2007, a United States military helicopter came under attack near Latifita, 25 miles (40 kilometers) south of Baghdad, and was brought down by heavy fire. Four people were confirmed to have been injured as a result. On that same day, eight coalition troops and 10 Iraqi soldiers died

Iraq Review 2016 Page 101 of 609 pages Iraq in attacks across the country. The Iraqis were killed during an attack by gunmen at a checkpoint in Mosul; four British troops were killed in a roadside bomb attack in western Basra; the Americans were killed in separate incidences in Baghdad.

In Ramadi on April 6, 2007, a truck loaded with chlorine and explosives was rammed into a police checkpoint. The bomb attack left at least 35 people dead and more than 50 injured. In Diwaniya, clashes between joint United States-Iraqi forces and militants from the radical Shi'a Mehdi Army, with high casualty numbers affecting both combatants and civilians. Diwaniya was the site of several killing in the early part of the month.

On April 8, 2007, an explosion in Mahmudiya, to the south of Baghdad, left close to 20 people dead and close to 30 wounded. Authorities said the explosion was caused by a car bomb, which apparently targeted those close to the militant Shi'a cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr. For his part, Moqtada al-Sadr urged his backers to convene mass protests in the Shi'a holy city of Najaf to mark the fourth anniversary of the fell of Baghdad, and to call for the withdrawal of coalition troops from Iraq. On the same day, a car bomb in Ilam, an area in Baghdad, left five people dead and six injured. As well, six United States troops died in various attacks across Iraq.

On April 12, 2007, an attack was carried out on the Iraqi parliament. The suicide bombing resulted in the death of one parliamentarian and approximately 25 people injured. A day later, insurgents allied with the terrorist enclave al-Qaida in Iraq claimed responsibility, although there was no confirmation about the legitimacy of the statement. Regardless, the attack raised serious questions about how a suicide bomber was able to enter into the highly-fortified Green Zone of Baghdad at a time when a United States-led security strategy was ongoing.

In other developments, the Sarafiya bridge, one of Baghdad's main bridges linking the banks of the Tigris River, was hit by explosives a day earlier.

On April 14, 2007, a suicide car bombing in the holy city of Karbala killed at least 40 people and injured scores more. Women and children were among the dead. The attack ensued at a bus station close to a Shi'ite shrine and a crowded marketplace. Meanwhile, in Baghdad, another suicide car bombing killed 10 people. That attack took place close to a checkpoint at the Jadriyah bridge.

April 18, 2007 saw a string of attacks in Baghdad that left more than 180 dead. It was deemed the worst day of violence since the start of the highly-touted security operation, and spurred serious questions about whether or not the United States troop "surge" was actually curbing insurgent attacks. Ironically, this paticularly deadly day in Baghdad came just as Prime Minister al-Maliki said that the authorities were hoping to transfer security responsibility to local forces -- on a "province by province" basis -- by the end of the year.

Among the string of attacks was the particularly bloody car bombing at a busy food market in the

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Shi'a-dominated Sadriya district, which resulted in the deaths of 120 people. Women and children made up a large portion of the victims. That same market had been hit by a bombing two months earlier and was in the process of being repaired. Meanwhile, a car bomb at a checkpoint in Sadr City killed 35 people, another car bomb at a hospital in Karrada killed around a dozen people, and a third bomb killed at least two people on a minibus. Two other attacks in Baghdad accounted for the rest of the deaths.

On the political front, by mid-April 2007, a cadre of lawmakers allied with radical Shi'a cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, decided to quit the government. The implications for the stability of the government, or the effects on the dire security situation, were not yet known at the time of writing.

On April 22, 2007, the violence in Iraq took a strange twist when members of the Yazidi minority were murdered in the northern city of Mosul. The area, which has been inhabited by Muslims, Christians, and Yazidis -- an ancient sect of ethnic Kurds, has typically been marked by peaceful coexistence. However, that climate of calm changed in the village of Bashika where a Yazidi woman converted to Islam and eloped with a Sunni Muslim man. The woman's relatives responded by abducting the woman, returning her to the village, and stoning her to death. Sunni Muslims and village police called on the villagers to identify those responsible for her killing, but gained little cooperation. Then, in an apparent act of retaliation, a bus transporting workers was stopped, 23 Yazidis were identified, and then shot to death. The culprits were assumed to be Sunnis. The situation augured negatively for Iraq's ethno-sectarian conflict, by adding another dimension of hostility and revenge killing.

On April 23, 2007, three separate car bombs in the Iraqi city of Ramadi left between 20 and 30 people dead. Civilians and police officers were among those killed. The day also saw blasts in the area of the Iranian embassy in the capital city of Baghdad. One person was reported to have died as a result. Also in Baghdad, at least seven people died in a suicide attack close to the boundary of the Green Zone. A police station in Baqouba was also hit by blasts, killing at least ten people. Meanwhile, ten people died at the hands of a suicide bomber in Tal Uskuf, to the north of Mosul, just outside the office of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. It was the first time the predominantly Christian town was hit by attacks since the start of the violent insurgency. In addition to the long litany of people killed across Iraq on this bloody day, more than 150 people were reported to have been injured.

A day later, on April 24, 2007, Ramadi was again hit by violence when a suicide truck bombing killed at least 20 people and wounded 25 others. A suicide bomb attack at a military base close to Baqouba killed nine United States soldiers -- the highest number of ground deaths of American troops in one incident since late 2005. The area around the Iranian embassy was also the site of violence in Baghdad a day later when two bombs exploded, injuring at least four people. In a Baghdad suburb of Zafaraniya, there were at least a dozen casualties (four deaths included), as a

Iraq Review 2016 Page 103 of 609 pages Iraq result of a mortar attack. There was also another attack close to the boundary of the Green Zone. Roadside bombs and other such attacks elsewhere in Iraq also claimed further lives and caused injury. Meanwhile, at a for dental training, a bomb exploded in the locker of the son of the Minister of Electricity.

A few days later, three U.S. soldiers and two Marines died in the restive Anbar province during combat operations, and four more U.S. soldiers were killed as a result of roadside bombs to the south and south-west of Baghdad.

On April 28, 2007, the holy city of Karbala was the site of a powerful and bloody attack, which left at least 55 people dead and more than 70 people injured. The attack, which ensued close to the mosque of the Imam Abbas shrine with its famed golden dome, appeared aimed at people on their way to worship. Incensed by-standers railed at the police for failing to protect their fellow Iraqis, while others searched feverishly for relatives and friends in the unfolding chaos.

On May 1, 2007, Iraq's Interior Ministry said that Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, had been killed in an internal conflict involving extremists. Abu Ayyub al-Masri was the leader of the group since the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in an air strike in mid-2006. While officials appeared to have varying levels of confidence about claims of Masri'd death, al-Qaida in Iraq issued a denial via an Internet statement.

On May 4, 2007, the United States military said that two other senior members of al-Qaida in Iraq had been killed during operations in the northern part of the capital, Baghdad.

A day later, 10 people were killed and 13 were injured as a result of a suicide bombing at an Iraqi army recruiting center on the outskirts the capital.

During the first week of May 2007, the bodies of several Iraqi police officers were found just outside the city of Baiji. As well, a roadside bomb in Kirkuk, which appeared to have been aimed at a police patrol, left one individual dead. In the Baghdad district of Yarmuck, a suicide bombing left a police officer dead, while a mortar round in the Bayaa district killed one woman.

On May 8, 2007, United States forces in helicopters fired on suspected insurgents in the province of Diyala to the north-east of Baghdad. The attack, however, killed several children at an elementary school.

On May 10, 2007, the extremist group, Islamic State of Iraq -- seemingly a group operating under the aegis of al-Qaida in Iraq, announced that it had broadcast a video over the Internet, allegedly depicting the killing of nine Iraqi police and security personnel. The group had earlier threatened the deaths of the nice victims if Sunni Muslim women were not released from prisons in Iraq.

On May 13, 2007, at least 45 people were killed and dozens more wounded as a result of a suicide

Iraq Review 2016 Page 104 of 609 pages Iraq truck bombing in Makhmur in the Irbil Province in the north of Iraq. The attack was aimed at the office of the Kurdistan Democratic Party while a meeting was taking place. It was the second such attack in the Kurdish north in a short space of time. Days earlier, a truck bomb killed 14 people in Irbil. The back-to-back attacks in the Kurdish north came at a time while legislation was being drafted to redistribute oil revenue among the country's three ethno-sectarian groups.

In other violence during this period, a car bomb at a marketplace in the Sadriya district of Baghdad left at least 10 people dead and several more wounded.

Meanwhile, on May 12, 2007, three United States soldier were reported to be missing following an attack on their patrol. That attack killed four Americans on the patrol, as well as an Iraqi interpreter. A day later, the extremist group, Islamic State of Iraq, which was now operating in association with al-Qaida in Iraq, claimed responsibility for the attack. The group also warned that the three missing soldiers were now in its custody.

On May 16, 2007, a chlorine bomb attack at a marketplace in the village of Abu Sayda in Diyala left at least 32 people dead and more than 50 people wounded.

On May 18, 2007, the town of Samarra, which was under a curfew, was said to be suffering from a shortage of food and fuel. A shortage of power at the town's hospital was responsible for the deaths of four babies in incubators. Two patients in advanced years also died at the hospital. The town had been placed on a curfew following a bloody attack twelve days prior. Residents demanded that Iraqi authorities and United States forces end the curfew and associated restrictions so that supplies and aid could get into Samarra.

On May 19, 2007, the United States commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, claimed to know who was responsible for the capture of three American soldiers close to Mahmudiya less than a week earlier. He said that the kidnappers had connections to the terrorist enclave, al-Qaida. Petraeus also suggested that two of the three troops abducted might still be alive. Meanwhile, the United States military said that the search for the missing troops was ongoing.

On that same day, several United States troops were killed during an attack by insurgents in Iraq. The United States military said on May 20, 2007 -- one day later -- that six soldiers and one interpreter were among those killed by a roadside bomb in western Baghdad. The soldiers and the interpreter were working on an operation to retrieve caches of weapons and bomb-making equipment.

On May 20, 2007, the United States military said that one soldier was killed and two were injured as a result of an explosion in Diwaniya, to the south of Baghdad.

Meanwhile, in other attacks, car bombs left five people dead in Baghdad, while a car explosion in the Shi'a area of Sadr City left four people dead. An explosion close to the office of the Ministry

Iraq Review 2016 Page 105 of 609 pages Iraq of the Interior killed one person and injured at leas seven others. In the western part of the country, a truck exploded as it approached a police a checkpoint just outside Ramadi. One policeman was killed and several others were injured as a result of the truck bomb, which authorities said involved the use of chlorine gas.

On May 24, 2007, a body recovered from the River Euphrates to the south of Baghdad was identified as one of the three missing United States soldiers.

On that same day, a suicide bomber drove a car packed with explosives into a crowd of funeral mourners. The ensuing explosion killed at least 40 people and injured more than 70 others in Fallujah. The funeral was for a tribal leader, Allawi al-Isawi, who was working in an alliance with the Iraqi authorities to repel al-Qaida in Iraq. The incident suggested a high level of conflict between al-Qaida operatives and tribal elements in the Sunni-dominated province of Anbar.

In a separate incident in a Shi'a district of northern Baghdad, gunmen constructed a fake checkpoint where they stopped a bus and killed 11 passengers. The gunmen then concealed an explosive device among the bodies of the dead passengers, which detonated upon the arrival of police officers at the scene. The explosion resulted in the deaths of two more people and injuries to several others.

On the political front, Prime Minister Maliki named six new cabinet ministers to replace those who were aligned with radical Shi'a cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, and who resigned several weeks earlier.

On May 25, 2007, the United States military reported the deaths of five soldiers in Iraq.

A day later, five separate atacks across Iraq led to the deaths of eight United States troops -- seven soldiers and one marine. In one incident, three soldiers were killed and two others were injured during a patrol in the province of Salahaddin to the north of Baghdad. The other deaths occurred in Baghdad and in the province of Anbar.

On May 28, 2007 -- Memorial Day in the United States -- ten American soldiers were reported to have been killed as a result of roadside bombings and a helicopter crash in Diyala. The same day saw two car bombings, which left 40 people dead and scores more injured, and also resulted in the destruction of a mosque in Baghdad.

A day later, five Westerners were reported to have been kidnapped from the Iraqi Finance Ministry office in Baghdad. The British Foreign Office subsequently noted that the five foreign nationals were British, and included a businessman and four bodyguards. As well on May 29, 2007, a bomb on a parked bus in central Baghdad left 38 people dead. A car bomb also exploded at congested marketplace in a Shi'a district.

Meanwhile, days earlier Moqtada al-Sadr, expressed support peace plan with Sunni factions for

Iraq Review 2016 Page 106 of 609 pages Iraq the purpose of reducing the country's ongoing ethno-sectarian strife, and in order to create a "united and democratic Iraq." The radical Shi'ite cleric also said that anger should instead be directed collectively against the United States occupation.

On May 31, 2007, a suicide bombing at a newly-opened police recruitment center in Falluja left 20 people dead and dozens injured. Ten policemen were among the dead. The suicide bomber wore a vest with explosives and managed to move beyond several security checkpoints before detonating the explosive device.

On June 1, 2007, mortar fire in the residential neighborhood of Umm al-Maarif in Baghdad left at least a dozen people dead, along with damage and destruction to homes and cars. After the initial mortar hit, a crowd gathered and were hit by the following three mortars, resulting in further deaths. Children were among the dead. Meanwhile, in the western part of the capital city, joint United States and Iraqi forces battled with suspected al-Qaida militants.

On June 3, 2007, roadside bombings in Iraq was said to have left 14 United States troops dead. A day later, the military identification for two of the soldiers abducted in Iraq earlier, were shown on an Islamic website. The authenticity of the identification was not immediately verified.

On June 5, 2007, a suicide car bomb in Amiriya close to Falluja left at least 15 people dead and more wounded at a marketplace. The attack appeared to have targeted al-Buissa elders belonging to a predominantly anti-al-Qaida tribe. The attack came after a United States security review admitted that despite its ongoing escalation of forces in Baghdad, there remained insufficient control of the capital's neighborhoods.

In another incident, an attempted suicide bombing was thwarted by police at a recruitment center. The would-be suicide bomber -- a woman -- was shot by police, however, the bullets than triggered the explosive belt strapped to her body.

On June 8, 2007, two car bombs close to Basra left at least 16 people dead and more than double that number of people injured. Women and children were among the dead. One bomb exploded at a bus station and another at a market.

Meanwhile, the day saw attacks allegedly by Shi'a militia men on two Sunni mosques in Baghdad. The violence forced many Sunnis to flee the area of the Rahman and Fataah Basha mosques. There was no comment from the predominantly Shi'a government regarding the situation. For their part, Sunnis have long complained that their mosques have been under threat and that the government has done little to resolve the situation.

As well, June 8, 2007 saw the murder of the wife of a senior police chief and the abduction of three of his children. Thirteen others were also killed in the attack on the home of Colonel Ali al- Jurani, the head of emergency police in Kanaan, located in the restive Diyala province.

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On June 9, 2007, six civilian prisoners were killed and more than 50 were injured in an attack on a detention camp in southern Iraq. Also, reports on that day noted that at least 12 Iraqi soldiers were killed and 30 (mostly soldiers) were wounded as a result of a car bombing at a military base in Hilla.

In other violence, a car bomb in the Shaab neighborhood of the capital left two people dead -- including one policeman -- and 12 hurt. In the district, an area under Iraqi army control, a car bomb killed two national police officers and wounded one. A third policeman was killed in the following small-arms fire. In the Shi'a district of Baladiyat in Baghdad, a minibus was struck by a roadside bomb; seven people were killed and 12 injured as a result. Elsewhere in Iraq, one person was killed and four wounded as a result of a mortar in Fallujah. A mortar was responsible for the deaths of three people and injuries to five others in a residential neighborhood of Salaheddin province.

Also on that day, United States-led coalition forces were carrying out raids on suspected al-Qaida in Iraq terrorists.

On June 10, 2007, a suicide bombing left seven Iraqi policemen dead and more than 36 wounded. The attack took place close to Tikrit, which was the home town of former Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein.

On June 13, 2007, Iraq's sacred al-Askar shrine in Samarra was bombed once again, resulting in the destruction of two golden minarets. The shrine, which is the site of the tombs of two revered imams, was attacked in 2006. Sunni militants aligned with al-Qaida in Iraq were believed to be responsible a year ago; it was not known if they were again to blame in 2007. The bombing of the shrine in Samarra in 2006 was widely believed to have escalated the ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq, ultimately resulting in the belief that the country had spiraled downward into a state of civil war.

Iraq's leading Shi'a cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, along with other political and religious figures, condemned the attack but called for restraint. To this end, Sistani's office issued a statement characterizing the bombing as a "heinous crime" while also urging people to refrain from responding with violence. As well, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that Iraqis should "stand together against those who want to stir strife."

Nevertheless, Iraqi authorities anticipated a violent backlash and following meetings with both Iraqi and United States security chief, Prime Minister Maliki said that an indefinite curfew would be established in Baghdad. As well, a state of emergency was declared in the holy city of Najaf, which was another site of a sacred shrine. More troops were also deployed to the streets, however, enraged Shi'a militias were already reported to be on the ground.

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On June 19, 2007, a massive truck bomb in Baghdad killed at least 75 people and injured more than 200. The attack took place close to a Shi'a al-Khilani mosque in the commercial Sinak district of Baghdad. The attack ensued during a busy time of day when worshippers were leaving afternoon prayers, according to the imam, Sheikh Saleh al-Haidari.

The attack, with its sizable death toll, was able to be carried out despite the prevailing curfew, which had been instituted on the heels of the attack on the reverred Shi'a mosque in Samarra only days before. Since then, a number of reprisal attacks against Sunni mosques and interests were ongoing.

Violence was not centered only on mosque attacks. In Nasiriya in the south of the country, more than 35 people died over the course of a few days, due to battles between Iraqi security forces and Shi'a militiamen loyal to the militant cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

In other developments, United States-led forces lauched a major offensive operation against al- Qaida in Iraq militants around the city of Baquba in the province on Diyala -- a known "hot spot" of extremist Sunnis.

On June 21, 2007, the United States (U.S.) military announced that four attacks across the Iraqi capital of Baghdad in the space of two days had left at least 12 soldiers dead. In one case of a roadside bomb, five soldiers, three Iraqi civilians and one Iraqi interpreter were killed. In the west of the capital a bomb attack killed four soldiers. In two other strikes, three more soldiers were killed. There were also deaths of soldiers elsewhere in Iraq. For example, in the Anbar province to the west, a bomb attack killed two soldiers.

On June 23, 2007, at least seven U.S. troops died as a result of roadside bombs and other attacks, while on patrol in Iraq. In one case, four soldiers and their Iraqi interpreter were killed as a result of a roadside bomb in the north-west of Baghdad. In the city center, a bombing and subsequent shooting left two soldiers dead and three injured. In Tikrit, a roadside explosion killed an airman.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military surge was ongoing, with major operations being carried out against insurgents and terror groups affiliated with al-Qaida in Iraq. The U.S. commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus said that he had expected increased attacks on U.S. forces by terror groups. In an interview with the newspaper, the Times, he said, "They wanted to make sure that the headlines about the launch of the offensive don't create too much hope." He also reiterated oft-made claims of the U/S. military that terrorists were crossing the border into Iraq from Syria, and that some extremist groups had links to Iran.

During the third week of June 2007, a suicide truck bomb destroyed homes and part of a local council office in northern Iraq, close to Kirkuk, before leaving 15 people dead and 40 others injured. Women and children factored highly among the casualties.

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On June 25, 2007, a suicide bombing at a hotel in central Baghdad left at least 12 people dead, and more than 15 people were injured. The attack took place in the lobby of the well-known Mansour Hotel, which has often been frequented by Westerners and Iraqi officials. Among the dead were six Sheikhs and a senior Sunni tribal leader from Iraq's Anbar province. The tribal leader, Fasal al-Koud, was said to have had contact with the United States-led coalition in Iraq. It was believed that he was targeted because he, like many tribal leaders, had turned against radical Sunni groups and al-Qaida-like organizations operating in the region.

In the southern city of Hilla, an explosion outside the governor's office killed at least eight people; that attack appeared to have been aimed at police recruits. In the north of the country, a blast on an oil tanker at the headquarters for the police in Baiji killed at least ten people.

During this period of June 2007, a United States advisory team on patrol with Iraqi soldiers discovered more than two dozen emaciated children at an orphanage in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. Images of the children were broadcast by the United States media company, CBS News. The children were naked, starving, and covered in their own excrement -- with some in such dire health that they were close to death -- despite the presence of sufficient food and clothes in the compound.

On June 28, 2007, a roadside bomb in Basra left three British soldiers dead and a fourth soldier seriously injured. A day later on June 29, 2007, five United States soldiers were attacked and killed while on patrol in the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad; seven others on patrol were wounded as a result of a roadside bomb. That day also saw an oil pipeline to the south of Baghdad explode and ignite into a massive fire.

On June 30, 2007, the United States military said that it had carried out an offensive in Sadr City, killing 26 militants and detaining 17 others. But an Iraqi hospital said the death toll was smaller and included civilians in their homes. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki condemned the operation, which he said was carried out without permission from his government.

By late June 2007, a number of investigations and cases were in the offing involving the killings of Iraqis allegedly by United States soldiers. On June 30, 2007, two United States soldiers were charged with the murder of three Iraqis earlier in the year in Iskandariya. The soldiers were also charged with placing weapons by the bodies of the victims. The military released a statement saying that the soldiers were to be considered innocent until proven guilty.

Also at the close of June 2007, the United Nations Security Council voted to bring a close to the weapons inspections program that had been ongoing in Iraq for several years. Indeed, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (Unmovic) had been established in 1999 to monitor the arsenal of former leader, Saddam Hussein, and to ensure that Iraq did not possess any weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Inspections by Unmovic permanently ceased

Iraq Review 2016 Page 110 of 609 pages Iraq in 2003 before the United States-led invasion, and the hunt for WMDs was then assumed by the United States-led . To date, no such weapons were ever found in Iraq.

On July 2, 2007, a car bomb exploded at a market in northern Baghdad, resulting in the deaths of nine people and injuries to another 33. The area targeted in the Iraq was inhabited by a mix of ethno-sectarian groups.

On July 7, 2007, Iraq saw one of its bloodiest days since the United States-led invasion of that country in 2003. A truck bomb at a public market in the town off Armirli, to the north of the capital city of Baghdad, wrought massive devastation. The death toll ranged from 115 to 150, according to various sources. Those killed were mostly Shi'ite Turkmen -- an ethno-sectarian minority who dominate the area.

Given the ethno-linguistic connection between Turkmen and the Turkish people, the Turkish military evacuated several people who had been injured in the attack and transported them by air ambulances to hospitals in Turkey. Other injured people were moved to the town of Tuz Khurmato, located nearby, as well as the larger city of Kirkuk.

The United States military responded to the attack by condemning the violence against civilians. United States Ambassador and United States military commander Generall David Petraeus issued a joint statement which characterized the attack in Armirli as "another sad example of the nature of the enemy and their use of indiscriminate violence to kill innocent citizens."

However tragic such terrorist tactics might be, the situation in Armirli made it clear that with the increased United States troop presence in Baghdad, extremists -- including al-Qaida -- were now transferring their attention to less protected terrain.

Armirli certainly fit the bill for less protected terrain, according to a Shi'ite Turkmen legislator -- Abbas al-Bayati -- who criticized the lack of security in the town, and pointed to the fact that the police force was composed of only 30 officers. Indeed, the Interior Ministry had responded to calls for more forces only days before. Angered by the situation in Armirli, al-Bayati spoke at a news conference a day after the bloody attack and called on authorities to assist residents to "arm themselves" for self-defense purposes against extremists.

This call was also made by Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni Arab, who said that civilians might have to deal directly with the violence plaguing the country. To this end, he said, "People have a right to expect from the government and security agencies protection for their lives, land, honor and property. But in the case of inability, the people have no choice but to take up their own defense." He suggested that the Iraqi government provide money, weapons and training to communities for this purpose.

This concept of local or community-based security was not without merit, given the relative

Iraq Review 2016 Page 111 of 609 pages Iraq success of Sunni Arab tribes in the restive Anbar province. There, the tribes armed themselves and managed to drive out al-Qaida factions from within their midst. There has been increasing attention on the Anbar model by both Iraqi authorities and United States officials, both of whom were hoping to apply the notion of community-based security initiatives across the country, in tandem with some degree of governmental regulation.

With the security situation in Iraq taking a turn for the worse, CBS News reported on July 7, 2007, that a significant bloc of Sunni politicians would call for a parliamentary vote of no-confidence against the government of Prime Minister Maliki. That non-confidence vote was tentatively expected to take place later in the month.

In an interview with the Associated Press, Adnan al-Dulaimi, a leading Sunni legislator said that the situation in Iraq had terribly deteriorated and that the al-Maliki government had failed to provide both key services and basic security. While Adnan al-Dulaimi warned that all options were on the table, he did not indicate involvement in the non-confidence vote. Instead, he said, "The situation has become terribly bad. All options are open for us. We are going to study the situation thoroughly, and we are going to look into the possible measures which go with the interests of the Iraqi people. We will also consider whether to keep on with the government or not."

Mouwaffak al-Rubaie, the Shi'a National Security Adviser of Iraq, took a different view on CNN on July 8, 2007. He insisted that the Maliki government enjoyed broad popular support, and suggested that there would be dire consequences if political factions attempted to take down the government of Maliki.

July 8, 2008 was marked by bloodshed across Iraq. A bomb attack aimed at a truck transporting newly-recruited Iraqi soldiers left 15 people dead and 20 wounded on the outskirts of Baghdad.

In the predominantly Shi'ite district of Karradah in the capital city, two car bombs exploded, killing eight people in total and wounding several others. One explosion took place in close proximity to a restaurant, while the other explosion ensued near to a bank of clothing and shoe stores. These explosions were regarded with some degree of alarm since they took place in Karradah -- the site of the largest Shi'a party in parliament, the Supreme Islamic Council in Iraq, and thusly, one of the safer parts of the capital.

On that same day, three people died and five people were injured when a bomb concealed under a car exploded at the entrance of the Shorja market, located in a predominatly Shi'ite are of Baghdad. Several shootings were also reported to have taken place in Baghdad, resulting in several deaths.

Meanwhile, bodies of up to 29 people were discovered in various locations across Baghdad. The victims were presumed to have been killed by ethno-sectarian death squads roaming the city. As well, twelve Sunnis were abducted on route to work; their bodies were found a day later on July 9,

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2007 close to the village of Ja'arah. Also on July 9, 2007, bomb attacks across the country left at least eight people dead.

On the first weekend in July 2007, the death toll among Western troops in Iraq included two United States soldiers outside of Baghdad and in Salahuddin respectively, as well as a British soldier killed during an offensive against Shi'ite militias.

Days later, 11 people were killed after being confined inside a house in Anbar province, which was later demolished using explosives. Officials said that the incident was a "vendetta attack" against villagers from Karmah who had been supportive of the military in the efforts against extremists. Indeed, the house was owned by a member of the community's security forces.

On July 15, 2007, a car bomb exploded in a square in central Baghdad, leaving 10 people dead and more than two dozen wounded.

July 16, 2007 was a particularly bloody day in Iraq when more than 80 people died and at least 180 were injured as a result of a series of bombings in Kirkuk. In the largest of the attacks, a massive suicide truck bomb exploded close to the headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The area outside the office was hard-hit and part of the roof was destroyed. As well, the fencing of the historic Kirkuk Castle was damaged. But the most tragic outcome were the deaths of scores of people and the injuries to even more. Soon after that blast, a car bomb was detonated at the Haseer market. There were fewer casualties at that scene since there were few people in the market area, presumably because of the timing right after the aforementioned truck bomb. A third attack ensued hours later in the form of another car bomb in the Domiz area of Kirkuk. In that case, one police officer was killed and six others were wounded.

On July 17, 2007, two separate roadside bombs in south east Baghdad left at least six people dead. As well, the United States authorities reported on the deaths of two American soldiers in the western part of the Iraqi capital city. A day later, the United States military said that four American soldiers and their Iraqi interpreter died on patrol as a result of a roadside bomb in eastern Baghdad.

July 18, 2007 also saw the United States report that it had captured Khaled Mashhadani -- a senior al-Qaida leader in Iraq. Mashhadani was said to have been apprehended in the northern city of Mosul.

July 23, 2007 was marked by three successive car bombs in a Shi'a area of Baghdad All three attacks involved parked cars that exploded. More than 12 people died and several more were injured as a result. In one case, police officers on patrol and pedestrians were the victims. In another attack -- very close by -- civilians were the victims at a market. A third parked car with explosives detonated close to an entry checkpoint into the Green Zone, which has been under

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United States control. Local Iraqis were reported to be the victims in that case.

As well, a bomb on a minibus in Baghdad exploded killing one person and wounding several others, while a roadside bomb hit an Iraqi army patrol in the restive Diyala province, killing five troops as a result. Close to the Iranian border, a convoy of trucks was ambushed resulting in several deaths and kidnappings. In the Anbar province to the west, a female suicide bomber at a checkpoint caused the deaths of two police officers and injuries to several people.

On July 24, 2007, a suicide car bomb at a crowded market in the mainly Shi'a town of Hilla left at least 25 people dead and more than 60 others injured. According to the authorities, most of the victims were women and children.

On July 26, 2007, a series of attacks left more than 40 people dead across Iraq. In one particularly deadly case, a car bomb at a market in the Karrada district of Baghdad killed at least 25 people and injured scores more. Attacks ensued elsewhere in the country, including Kirkuk where six people died, and in the capital and Diyala province where United States troops were killed. As well, Iraqi police said that 20 bodies had been discovered; the apparent murders were attributed to death squads.

The incidences made clear that the drop-off in violence in the previous weeks was temporary, and could easily be interrupted by a mix of determined insurgent, extremist and terrorist movements now active in Iraq. Analysts also noted that attacks were moving to areas outside the capital, perhaps as a result of the increased presence of United States troops in Baghdad. In an effort to deal with the security crisis, the Iraqi government was hosting talks on the matter, which were attended by representatives of both the United States and Iran.

Meanwhile, on July 25, 2007, Iraqis shared a rare moment of joy over their country's national football team's victory over South Korea at the Asian Cup tournament. The victory cleared the way for Iraq to enter into the final match against Saudi Arabia. But this happy occasion, which was marked by national unity between Shi'as, Sunnis and Kurds, was quickly spoiled when two bombings left at least 50 football fans dead and more than 135 injured, as they celebrated in the streets of Baghdad. One attack occurred in the district of Mansour while the other attack ensued at a checkpoint in the eastern portion of Baghdad. Authorities said that people celebrating in the streets had been targeted deliberately. Despite this bittersweet episode, Iraqis returned to the streets days later after their football team won victory over Saudi Arabia to win the Asian Cup.

At the start of August 2007, two attacks in Baghdad left around 70 people dead and scores more injured on a particularly bloody day in Iraq. In one case, 50 people died when a fuel tanker exploded close to a gas station in the Sunni area of Mansour. In the other attack, which occurred earlier, a bomb in a parked car exploded in the Shi'a district of Karrada close to popular shops. That attack left close to 20 people dead. Karrada had been the site of a spate of car bombs in the previous week. As well, the United States and United Kingdom both saw losses of their troops on

Iraq Review 2016 Page 114 of 609 pages Iraq the ground.

On Aug. 5, 2007, mortar attacks left at least 11 people dead and more than 15 wounded in the eastern portion of the capital city of Baghdad. Mortar rounds also resulted in casualties to another six people in an area close by to the original site of the mortar attacks. A day later, a suicide truck bomber killed 28 people and wounded scores more in a Shi’a residential area of the northern city of . The majority of the victims were women and children.

These deaths came at a time when the United States authorities said that the surge was showing signs of success, as evidenced by a lower death toll for its troops serving in Iraq. But at the same time, the Iraqi authorities were announcing a higher death toll of Iraqi civilians.

Also in the first week of August 2007, United States officials in Iraq said they had killed the mastermind behind the bombings of the sacred al-Askaria Shi'a shrine in Samarra, which destroyed its golden dome and minarets in 2006 and 2007 respectively. The attack in 2006 was blamed for igniting a wave of ethno-sectarian violence, which ultimately led to speculation about Iraq devolving into a state of civil war. United States officials said that in addition to orchestrating the bombings at the shrine, Haitham al-Badrie had also functioned as the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq for the province of Salahuddin.

During the same period, the United States military said it could not account for close to 200,000 weapons. At stake were 190,000 AK-47 assault rifles and pistols that were intended for use by Iraqi security forces, but which the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said could not completely be tracked by the Pentagon. For its part, the Pentagon said it would look into its arms deliveries procedures. Meanwhile, analysts warned that the missing weapons perhaps made it into the hands of insurgents and extremists now fighting against United States forces in Iraq.

On August 10, an explosion at a market in northern Iraq left at least seven people dead and several more injured. The attack was caused by a car bomb, which exploded at a busy fruit and vegetable market in the ethnically-mixed city of Kirkuk. Two days later, an operation aimed at stopping the movement of weapons among militant groups was ongoing. Four United States troops and two civilians were reported to have been killed. As well up to 30 individuals were detained for their alleged connections to the terror group al-Qaida, while a house in Kufa belonging to an associate of the radical Shi'a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr was raided.

Also on Aug. 10, 2007, the United Nations unanimously approved a resolution put forth jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom, which provided for an increased role by the international entity in Iraq. The resolution not only extended the United Nations' mission in Iraq, but it also provided for a stronger role in the process of national reconciliation, and increased the number of personnel. Since 2003, when a truck bomb killed head envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello and 21 other United Nations personnel at the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, most of

Iraq Review 2016 Page 115 of 609 pages Iraq the staff was withdrawn from Iraq.

Ironically, the decision by the United Nations to increase its role in Iraq came only days after the United Nations Staff Council said that all its personnel should be withdrawn from the country until a future date when the security situation in Iraq might be improved. The United Nations Staff Council said that its personnel could not be adequately protected by United States-led forces in Iraq. The staff union could ostensibly block the further deployment of staff to Iraq.

Meanwhile, on the political front in the first week of August 2007, the Iraqi government was weakened by the decision of the main Sunni Arab bloc, the Iraqi Accordance Front, to withdraw from the cabinet. Six members of the group who held cabinet posts announced their decision to resign from the government, saying that the Shi'a-dominated administration had not met its demands, which included dealing with Shi'a militias and having more influence in matters related to security. Their exit meant that the government was hardly representative of the country's ethno- sectarian complexity. Presumably in an attempt to preclude the situation from devolving further, Prime Minister Maliki refused to accept the resignation of the six cabinet ministers from the Iraq Accordance Front, and instead called on them to return to the fold.

Nevertheless, with almost all Sunni members of the Iraqi cabinet resigning from their positions, and with others boycotting meetings, the Iraqi government appeared to be in a state of crisis. On August 12, 2007, Prime Minister Maliki called for a crisis conference to be held, for the purpose of resolving the political impasse. To this end, Prime Minister Maliki said, "I have called the political leaders for a meeting to discuss the main issues in the political process." While Kurds were expected to participate in the summit, as evidenced by the arrival of a senior Kurdish leader, Massoud Barzani, it was unknown as to the level of Sunni involvement, or whether they would be brought back into government. Should the Sunni parties decided to go into the opposition, the result would be a significantly weakened Maliki administration at the helm, and one that could hardly claim the title of "unity government."

On August 14, 2007, coordinated bombings in Iraq devastated two Yazidi villages close to Mosul. Officials said that a fuel tanker and three cars were used in the terror attacks on the villages of Qataniya and Adnaniya. With a devastating death toll of approximately 350 people, and with more than 400 injured, according to the Iraqi Interior Ministry, the bombings held the dubious distinction of being among the worst attacks in Iraq over the course of the last several years. Making matters worse was the fact that the regional governor warned that as many as 200 people were likely buried in the remaining rubble. As well, up to 600 local residents were now homeless.

Prime Minister Maliki, as well as President Talabani, condemned the bombings. The United States placed the blame for the terror attacks on al-Qaida, noting that the coordinated and "spectacular" nature of the bombings fit the profile of the notorious and violent extremist group. Meanwhile, correspondents on the ground in Iraq observed that as the United States was carrying out its

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"surge" around Baghdad, violent elements, including terrorists and insurgents, were seeking softer targets elsewhere in the country.

Yet unknown was the reason why the minority Yazidi community was targeted. There was heavy speculation by correspondents on the ground that a forthcoming referendum may have spurred the attacks on the basis of politics. At issue was the question of whether or not the Yazidis and Kurds currently living outside the Kurdish semi-autonomous region would join the grouping. Regardless, in a show of solidarity, a spokesperson for the authorities governing Kurdistan characterized the Yazidis as "a threatened minority" who might have been protected by Kurdish forces. Instead, he blamed the Iraqi government for the Yazidis fate saying, "But because of the inaction of the government in Baghdad and their inability to protect the population they are suffering the way they are now." he added. The Yazidis entered the public purview months earlier due to ethno-sectarian tensions with local Muslims in the area.

In the days that followed, violence continued to plague Iraq. A bombing at a central square in Baghdad left several people dead, while United States forces announced the deaths and injuries to some of their troops in the north of the city. On August 19, 2007, a mortar attack in a predominantly Shi'a suburb of Baghdad left seven people dead and 31 others wounded. The incident apparently occurred as a result of fighting between militias and United States troops. As well, at the time of writing, news was emerging about the possible death of an Iraqi governor as a result of a roadside bomb. The death of the governor of the province of Muthanna marked the second such killing in only weeks, with the governor of the province of Diwaniya also killed.

In the background of these developments was the political crisis unfolding in which almost half of Prime Minister Maliki's cabinet (mostly the Sunni members) had resigned. Talks were scheduled to take place for the purpose of addressing the issue of national unity. In the last week of August 2007, Shi’a, Sunni and Kurdish leaders in Iraq signed a reconciliation accord. The agreement came after four Shi'a and Kurdish parties formed an alliance. The moves were oriented toward presenting a show of national unity; however, left unresolved was the problem of reconstructing a broad-based unity government.

The last week of August 2007 saw Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki lash out in reaction to United States critics regarding his leadership abilities. At issue were the calls by some United States politicians for his removal from office, given what they perceived as poor progress on the political front in Iraq. Notably, Democratic Senator and then-presidential contender Hillary Clinton said that while United States forces were seeing some progress as a result of the surge in Iraq, their efforts had not yielded the desired effect, which was to provide the Iraqi government with "breathing room" to advance security and stability. Clinton's assessment roughly followed the same line of analysis of a new National Intelligence Estimate, which also noted some degree of progress militarily, juxtaposed against political instability in Iraq. But for his part, Prime Minister Maliki accused Clinton, and her colleague, Democratic Senator Carl Levin, of acting in a proprietary manner toward Iraq, and

Iraq Review 2016 Page 117 of 609 pages Iraq called on them to "respect democracy."

Also in the last week of August 2007, clashes at a Shi'a festival in the holy city of Karbala led to the deaths of more than 50 people, and injuries to scores more. Moqtada al-Sadr's Shi'a militia, known as the Mehdi Army, was attributed the lion's share of blame for the violence. Sadr denied that his cadre was responsible for the deaths, however, he nevertheless called for a suspension of the Mehdi Army's activities for approximately six months. One of his aides read a statement, which included the following assertion: "We declare the freezing of the Mehdi Army without exception in order to rehabilitate it in a way that will safeguard its ideological image within a maximum period of six months starting from the day this statement is issued."

The announcement was welcomed by the government of Prime Minister Maliki, which came under frequent fire often for its inability to control Shi'a militias in Iraq. As well, the prospective effect on American troops was welcomed, since another statement issued by the Mehdi Army in Najaf noted that the group would also freeze its efforts against "occupiers."

Nevertheless, the originating conflict in Karbala raised some anxieties about the growing prevalence of Shi'a violence against fellow Shi'as, indicating something of an internal schism. As well, there have been accusations that certain factions are trained by the United States yet armed by Iraq. Together, these factors have clearly complicated the basic ethno-sectarian divisions upon which most analysts and policy-makers have focused to date.

On September 15, 2007, at least ten people died as a result of a car bomb that exploded just outside a bakery. Some victims included people line up to purchase bread following the daily Ramadan fast that ends at sunset.

A day later, 14 people were killed in the province of Diyala, to the north of Baghdad, as a result of attacks by about 100 militants on two villages. The militants also set about a dozen shops on fire. In Tuz Khurmato, located close to the northern city of Kirkuk, a bomb at a cafe left at least six people dead. The cafe was reported to be serving food during the daytime -- a period normally observed by fasting among Muslims during the Ramadan period. In Baghdad, a car bomb in the district of Mansour left two people dead.

The violence and bloodshed in Iraq marked the start of the holy month of Ramadan. Indeed, the al-Qaida allied terror group called the Islamic State in Iraq warned that it intended to carry out a series of attacks in the country during Ramadan.

Meanwhile, on the very day that United States President George W. Bush announced his plans for a continued presence in Iraq, drawing attention to success in fighting al-Qaida in the restive province of Anbar, a tribal leader in that region was assassinated close to his home in Ramadi. Bush had met with Abdul Sattar Abu Risha only a week before during a surprise trip to Iraq. Abdul Sattar Abu Risha gained attention when he changed sides from supporting al-Qaida to

Iraq Review 2016 Page 118 of 609 pages Iraq leading the Sunni opposition to that group in the province of Anbar. As the leader of the Anbar Salvation Council, also known as Anbar Awakening, he supported the United States-led efforts to stabilize Anbar province. A suspect in the assassination of the Sunni tribal leader was soon detained by United States forces in Iraq. The suspect was named to be Fallah Khalifa Hiyas Fayyas al-Jumayli and intelligence reports noted that he was involved in a plot to assassinate leaders within Anbar Awakening.

Mid-September 2007 saw radical Shi'a cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, withdraw his group from the governing Shi'a alliance in Iraq. The move, which was announced during a news conference in the holy city of Najaf, came months after Sadr's group withdrew its ministers from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's cabinet. This decision would, therefore, affect the situation in parliament where Prime Minister Maliki's government would now command about 30 less votes.

Sadr's group had long criticized the Maliki government for failing to consult with them over key decisions, such as the inclusion of some former members of Saddam Hussein's regime in the new administration. As well, their calls for a timetable for the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq have gone unheeded by the Maliki government. There was also some speculation that Sadr wanted to create distance between his group and Maliki, who has charted an overtly pro-American course.

Also in mid-September 2007, nine Iraqi civilians were killed by United States military contractors working for the firm . The incident was sparked when a sniper shot at the diplomatic convoy that the Blackwater military contractors were protecting. They returned fire and a shootout ensued, ultimately resulting in the civilians being shot to death. A public outcry followed and the Iraqi government responded to the incident by revoking Blackwater's permit to operate in Iraq. United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice expressed her regret to Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki over the tragic turn of events. An investigation into the incident was also announced.

Following that investigation, the Iraqi Interior Ministry issued a report in which it found Blackwater entirely culpable for the incident in which the civilians were killed. The Interior Ministry's report also recommended that legal immunity of foreign security forms in Iraq be lifted. For its part, Blackwater maintained that its military contractors were acting in self defense. The United States embassy had no comment on the matter other that noting that it was carrying out its own investigation.

Meanwhile, only days after the incident in which the civilians were killed, Blackwater resumed limited operations in Iraq despite the earlier decision to revoke the firm's permit. A spokesperson for the United States embassy said that the decision to allow Blackwater to return to work, albeit in a limited capacity, was reached after meetings with the Iraqi government.

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It was unknown as to whether that decision would be maintained for the long term. Indeed, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki characterized the killings by Blackwater as a "criminal act" and said that it would not be tolerated. In an interview that took place in the United States on September 23, 2007, the Iraqi prime minister did not appear to moderate his view. He said that the killing of civilians by United States security contractors was unacceptable. He did not limit his comment to that incident, but also criticized the arrest of an Iranian citizen by United States forces, noting that the detained Iranian had been invited to visit Iraq. In both cases, Prime Minister Maliki emphasized the importance of Iraq's sovereignty, noting that his government was accountable only to the Iraqi people.

In October 2007, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice tightened the reins of control over private security contractors in Iraq. The new measures were enacted following an investigation into the shooting deaths of about a dozen Iraqi civilians at the hands of Blackwater USA a month prior. The measures ordered by Secretary Rice included attaching video cameras and other recording devices to vehicles used by security contractors, the deployment of diplomatic security agents to oversee security operations, and improved coordination with the United States military. In a related development, following congressional testimony by Blackwater CEO Erik Prince into its practices, the United States House of Representatives passed legislation placing private contractors working on behalf of the United States government under the auspices of United States jurisprudence.

Meanwhile, in the third week of September 2007, two aides of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani -- Iraq's senior Shi'a cleric -- were shot to death in two separate incidents. Both shootings ensues in southern Iraq. In one case, Amjad al-Janabi, was shot after exiting a mosque near Basra. In the other case, Ahmad al-Barqawi was shot in his car as he traveled home to Diwaniya. They were the latest casualties in a spate of apparent assassinations of aides to Sistani that were ongoing since June 2007. While those responsible were unknown, there was speculation that the deaths may have been due to an ongoing internal conflict between Shi'ites in the southern part of the country.

On October 15, 2007, militants were responsible for attacking a Polish military base at Diwaniyah, located to the south of Baghdad. Five civilians were killed as a result, while 25 others, including two Polish soldiers, suffered injuries. Two days later on October 17, 2007, a roadside bomb left seven Iraqi policemen dead close the city of Diwaniya. Reports suggested that the bomb exploded just as three police vehicles traveled from Diwaniya to a police station in Ifak. It was not know if rival militias were responsible for the attack in the predominantly Shi'a city. On the same day, a bomb exploded near Zafaraniyah, in south eastern Baghdad. Among the dead were two civilians.

On October 21, 2007, the United States (U.S.) military said that close to 50 "criminals" were killed in three raids on Sadr City in the capital of Baghdad. The impoverished Sadr City was known to be a stronghold of the radical Shi'a cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, and was the notorious site of clashes between militants and U.S. troops. The U.S. military said the main target of the operation was "an

Iraq Review 2016 Page 120 of 609 pages Iraq individual reported to be a long-time member specializing in kidnapping operations." The U.S. military also said that as American troops began its operation, they were faced with attacks from people in buildings close by and were forced to return fire. A spokesperson for al-Sadr described the actions by the U.S. military as "barbaric." As well, local Iraqis reported that women and children were among the dead, however, the U.S. authorities denied such reports.

Late October 2007 saw a car bomb explode in the oil-rich city of Kirkuk in the north of Iraq, which is dominated by Kurds but also home to Arabs and Turkmen. At least eight people died and more than 20 people were wounded as a result of the suicide bombing.

Also in late October 2007, approximately ten tribal leaders were abducted by gunmen in the mainly Shi'a district if Shaab in Baghdad. The tribal leaders, who formed a mixed Shi'a and Sunni alliance against al-Qaida, were seized as they were returning home to the province of Diyala following a meeting with a government official. The tribal leaders were subsequently released, however, officials would not disclose any details.

On October 29, 2007, a suicide bombing in Baquba left close to 30 people dead. The target of the attack appeared to be a group of police recruits. The scene was particularly gruesome since iron balls were packed with the explosives that detonated.

The close of October 2007 was also marked by the handover of control in Karbala from United States forces to Iraqi forces. Iraqi officials expressed confidence about the responsibility being placed on their own troops. That said, United States troops were expected to stay in reserve positions in cases of emergency. The holy city was the site of violent clashes between security forces and Shi'a fighters in August 2007, however, since that time, there has been increasing calm.

Meanwhile, in late October 2007, as Turkey threatened to launch incursions into Iraq to deal with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Iraq warned of serious consequences. At issue has been the spate of attacks on Turkish military carried out by PKK, allegedly from within Iraqi terrain. Turkey's government, backed by the parliament, since threatened to carry out strikes and launch a ground assault into Iraq to squash the PKK, which it deemed to be a terrorist enclave. Indeed, Turkey deployed up to 100,000 military troops to the border with Iraq in preparation for action against the PKK.

Iraq reacted by warning of "disastrous consequences" for the region if Turkey were to take military action in Iraq. Indeed, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said that Iraqis were united against the notion of their "territorial integrity undermined by a friendly neighboring country." Zebari also accused Turkey of failing to seek a peaceful solution and making impossible demands, such as the handover of senior PKK members in Iraq. To that latter end, he said, "They are not under our control, in fact. They are up in the mountains, they are armed." The situation raised the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 121 of 609 pages Iraq specter of violence between Turkish troops and Iraqi Kurdish forces.

On December 16, 2007, Turkey carried out air strikes against Kurdish rebels in Iraq. Around 50 Turkish jets pummeled 10 villages inside Iraqi terrain but close to the border with Turkey. The move was apparently sanctioned by the United States (U.S.), according to Turkey's top general, Yasa Buyukanit, who said that the U.S. opened air space in northern Iraq in order for the operation to be carried out. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan characterized the air offensive as a "success." For its part, Iraq has condemned the air strikes as "unacceptable." Iraq's Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said in an interview with the British media, "There has been previous understanding that any such action should be coordinated with the Iraqi government or with the multinational forces. From what we've learned, they gave a very late notice for their operation, and those targeted villages... were not PKK infrastructure."

Meanwhile, Iraq was experiencing a downturn in the level of violence on the ground. The relocation of insurgent strongholds from one place to another, in conjunction with the ethnic cleansing in previously mixed Baghdad neighborhoods, suggested that the dropoff in violence could well be fragile rather than long-lasting. Nevertheless, Iraqi officials said that while 887 people were killed in October, the death toll among civilians fell to 606 in November. Many analysts attributed that decrease to the escalation of U.S. troops in key areas of Iraq, such as Baghdad. Following this aforementioned lull in violence in Iraq and as the military "surge" was being touted as a success, the period starting in late November 2007 was marked by a spate of violent attacks.

On November 22, 2007, attacks by extremists in two central Iraqi villages left dozens of people dead, including three Iraqi soldiers and 10 members of a local militia that had been intent on fighting al-Qaida elements. Those responsible for the attacks were believed to be extremists with links to the terror enclave, al-Qaida. In the village of Hawr Rajab to the south of Baghdad, the attack was initially carried out at an army checkpoint. Those responsible then stole an armored vehicle, dressed in Iraqi army uniforms and then carried out a secondary attack against the headquarters of the Hawr Rajab Awakening Council. Such councils have been instrumental in stemming the tide of violence by al-Qaida allied entities. In a village east of Baquba, attacks left two civilians dead along with several militants.

In a separate incident, mortars were fired into the Green Zone. A day later, a bomb exploded at a popular pet market in Baghdad leaving more than a dozen people dead and at least 50 others wounded. That attack was blamed on Iranian-backed militant Shi'ites, although United States authorities said that those responsible wanted Sunni al-Qaida factions to be blamed instead.

On December 5, 2007 as United States (U.S.) Defense Secretary Robert Gates was visiting Iraq, three car bombs exploded across the country. The attacks ensued in Mosul, soon after Gates arrived there to see the progress on the security front, as well as in Baquba and Kirkuk. Eight

Iraq Review 2016 Page 122 of 609 pages Iraq people were killed as a result of these attacks.

On December 7, 2007, two explosions in the province of Diyala left at least 26 people dead and several more injured. One attack was carried out by a female suicide bomber who stuck an office of one of the local "Awakening Councils" (local Sunni militias fighting al-Qaida), and the other was due to a suicide car bombing at a security checkpoint. Both attacks appeared to target local groups that have been fighting al-Qaida in Iraq. Recent reports suggested that because of the U.S.-led "surge," insurgents who had once operated in Baghdad and Anbar province were now based in Diyala instead. Meanwhile, two raids aimed at rounding up al-Qaida operatives north of Baghdad resulted in the arrest of up to 55 suspected militants.

On December 9, 2007, a roadside bomb near Hilla -- in the predominantly Shi'a area to the south of Baghdad -- led to the death of a police chief. Two of the police chief's guards were also killed in the attack. In recent months, a number of senior security and political officials have been assassinated in southern Iraq, including two governors and another police chief. Analysts surmised that the violence in the south of the country was likely due to a power struggle between Shi'a groups there. British troops who are due to exit Basra have said that the situation in the south of the country has not been stabilized due to such intra-sect conflict. One day later, the Iraqi Defense Ministry said that there would be a crackdown against militants operating in Diyala, presumably because it was the new locus of insurgents.

Around the same period, to the north of Baghdad, a suicide car bomb at an army checkpoint left at least two soldiers dead and others injured. It was the second such attack in the same region within days.

On December 10, 2007, attacks using mortar shells left at least seven people dead and 23 wounded -- most of them inmates at an Interior Ministry prison in Baghdad. The area of the prison most affected housed inmates accused of either civil offenses of terror-related offenses.

The southern Iraqi city of Amara was the site of violence on December 12, 2007 when three car bombs exploded, killing close to 40 people and injuring more than 100. Two bombs exploded in a parking area where laborers gathered as they awaited transportation for work; the third bomb exploded in the same area but several minutes later as people converged on the scene of the first two attacks. In this way, it seemed clear that the triple bombings were orchestrated to yield maximum damage. The city of Amara, which is located in the province of Maysan, is predominantly inhabited by Shi'ites. The area is marked by increasing intra-sectarian dissonance as various militant factions jockey for political influence and power. The attacks were part of a wave of violence in Iraq in December 2007.

Mid-December 2007 was marked by the handover of control in Basra from the United Kingdom (U.K.) to Iraq. The handover was a keystone of the U.K.'s withdrawal from southern Iraq. At a

Iraq Review 2016 Page 123 of 609 pages Iraq ceremony in Basra, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband promised that despite its exit, the U.K. would remain a "committed friend" to Iraq. The remaining 4,500 British troops in Iraq were expected to take on the limited role of training Iraqi forces, and further troop reductions were anticipated in the spring of 2008. Meanwhile, Iraq's National Security Adviser, Mowaffak al- Rubaie, characterized the day as an "historic" one for Iraq.

The last day of 2007 saw a suicide truck bombing at a checkpoint to the north of Baghdad kill close to a dozen people. Most of the victims appeared to be people allied with a United States- backed "Awakening Council" -- a Sunni group opposed to al-Qaida in Iraq. In a separate roadside bombing in Diyala, two Iraqi security forces were killed. The first day of 2008 was marked by a suicide bombing in Baghdad in which 30 people were killed and another 32 were injured. The site of the attack was a funeral for a Shi'ite army officer. The next day, a female suicide bomber killed herself and 10 other people in Iraq. Ironically, these attacks took place at a time when Iraqi authorities were releasing information about the decline in civilian deaths in Iraq.

Iraq's Landscape in 2008

Despite oft-repeated claims of the success of the surge in Iraq, the country's security situation continued to be pressed in early 2008. On Jan.7, 2008, a double bombing in Baghdad left at least 14 people dead. Included in the list of fatalities was the head of an American-backed group that had been opposing al-Qaida in Sunni Muslim strongholds. The blame was placed on hard-line Sunni insurgents not eager to seek reconciliation. Violence across other parts of the country left five people dead on the same day.

Two bombs at animal markets in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad on Feb. 1, 2008, exacted a death toll of approximately 100 people. Around 200 people were also said to have been injured as a result of the attacks. Officials said that two mentally disabled women were unwittingly used to carry the explosives, which were detonated remotely. In response, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki condemned those behind the attacks, saying, "The terrorists used disabled women in this crime. This shows the moral degradation of these criminal gangs and how much they hate mankind."

On Feb. 10, 2008, a car bombing in the market town of Balad left at least 33 people dead, more than 45 injured and several more missing. The blast was said to have occurred near an Iraqi army checkpoint when a a suicide bomber driving an explosives-laden truck. The explosion caused the collapse of several buildings and the death toll was expected to rise as a consequence of people buried in the rubble.

In the last week of February 2008, at least 40 people died and more than 60 were were injured as a result of a suicide bombing in the town of Iskandariya, to the south of Baghdad. The attack appeared to have been aimed at Shi'a pilgrims headed for Karbala, where the religious festival of

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Arbaeen was to be held. Another attack against Shi'a pilgrims took place on the same day in the Doura district of Baghdad. In that attack, militants detonated a roadside bomb and gunmen opened fire on pilgrims. Three people died and close to 50 were wounded as a result. In the background of these developments was an announcement by militant Shi'a cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, that the ceasefire his powerful Mehdi army was observing would continue.

These massive and bloody bombings fractured the growing sense of security in the Iraqi capital, recently touted to be evidence of the success of the United States troop "surge" in Iraq.

Also in February 2008, Iraq's parliament approved legislation that would pave the way for provincial elections later in the year. The legislation was yet to be approved by the presidential council, comprised of the president and two vice presidents.

Late February 2008 saw Turkey carry out a cross-border military campaign against Kurdish rebels into northern Iraq. While Turkish military carried out its operations, Kurdish rebels reported that they shot down a Turkish attack helicopter close to the border; there was no independent verification of the claim. For its part, the Iraqi government warned that an escalation of the ongoing operation by the Turks could destabilize the country as well as the region at large.

On March 10, 2008, two separate attacks in Iraq -- in Diyala and Baghdad -- left eight American troops and one interpreter dead. A day later on March 11, 2008, a roadside bomb in southern Iraq killed at least 16 people and injured more than 22 others. Most of those killed were Shi'a pilgrims on a bus traveling on the Basra-Nasiriya road. On the same day, four policemen, four rebels and one civilians died in a gun fight in Mosul in northern Iraq.

On March 13, 2008, the body of the Chaldean Catholic Archbishop of Mosul, Paulos Faraj Rahho, was discovered in a shallow grave two weeks after he was kidnapped. A day later, the funeral was held for the murdered Iraqi archbishop in the village of Kremlis, close to the northern city of Mosul. Cardinal Emmanuel III Delly, the patriarch of the Chaldean church in Iraq, described the archbishop as loved by all Iraqis and said, "He was a man of honesty, loyalty and peace." The archbishop's murder was condemned by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, a number of Sunni and Shi'a leaders in Iraq, and Pope Benedict XVI in the .

On March 23, 2008, the number of United States (U.S.) military forces killed in Iraq since the invasion five years prior crossed the 4,000 mark. The threshold was crossed when four soldiers on patrol in southern Baghdad were killed by a bomb.

The period was marked by violence elsewhere in Iraq. A spate of suicide attacks, shootings and rocket strikes across Iraq left dozens dead and even more wounded. A suicide bombing left 13 Iraqi soldiers dead and more than 40 injured in Mosul. Heavy mortar and rocket attacks killed at least 15 people dead in the heavily-fortified Green Zone in the centre of Bagdad. Gunmen opened

Iraq Review 2016 Page 125 of 609 pages Iraq fire on shoppers at a Baghdad market killing at least seven people. In the Shula district of Baghdad, a suicide bomber hit a queue of people outside of a gas station, killing five. Near Samara, three people died when a a suicide car bomb rammed into the house of a tribal leader. Close to Kirkuk, five Iraqi soldiers died as a result of a roadside bomb. Days earlier, a female suicide bomber killed six people at a bus station in Diyala. However there was better news from Diyala on March 23, 2008, when U.S. military said they had killed 12 men during a raid who appeared to preparing for suicide operations.

The violence came at a time when United States and Iraqi officials were discussing long-term cooperative arrangements, including the United States military presence in Iraq. At issue were the United Nations mandate under which United States troops were operating in Iraq; that mandate was set to end at the close of 2008.

The close of March 2008 saw an explosion of violence between security forces and militias in Iraq. The sudden destabilization, which included an attack on the heavily-fortified Green Zone in Baghdad, came at a time when the United States military was drawing attention to the success of its "surge" in Iraq. That surge was aimed at decreasing violence. But the improved security situation in Iraq was also attributed to a formal ceasefire by the Shi'a militia known as the Mehdi Army, which has been aligned with radical Shi'ite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr. The uptick in violence has drawn that ceasefire into question. It was also evoked questions as to why the Mehdi Army suddenly decided to go on the offensive.

The violence was not limited to the Iraqi capital and included the southern oil-rich city of Basra, and spread to a number of other towns and cities across the country, such as Karbala, Hilla, Kut, Diwaniya and Nasiriya. There was no conclusive number of casualties but some estimates placed the death toll at 250 -- with more than 100 dead in Baghdad and more than 50 dead in Basra. However, there was much debate about the number of dead in Basra, with local medical agencies noting that close to 300 had died in that city alone. Aid and humanitarian agencies warned that the situation on the ground was "critical."

With the violence increasing, the United States military carried out air strikes in Basra and Baghdad on March 29, 2008. Meanwhile, the Iraqi parliament convened an emergency session to discuss the emerging crisis; however, that session was not well attended since the area around the Green Zone was being bombarded with mortar and rocket attacks. One missile attack hit the office of Vice President Tareq Hashemi.

For its part, the government instituted a three-day curfew in the capital. As well, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki called on the Mehdi Army to lay down their arms in exchange for money. To this end, the Iraqi leader set a 72-hour deadline for the Mehdi Army and warned of penalties if the Shi'ite militia did not cooperate. Despite this warning, there was no sign of cooperation from the insurgent Shi'ite militia and, as such, Prime Minister Maliki extended the deadline further. While

Iraq Review 2016 Page 126 of 609 pages Iraq the U.S. government applauded Prime Minister Maliki for taking the lead in trying to resolve the situation, analysts noted that the deadline extension revealed that the militias were not apt to acquiesce easily.

The situation seemed to reveal an internal Shi'ite power struggle between Maliki, who came to power with the help of Sadr's power base in 2005, and Sadrists who were now hoping to gain political influence in forthcoming elections.

Moqtada al-Sadr entered the fray on March 30, 2008, by instructing his militia to cease its fight with security forces and end the bloodshed. While this move was welcomed by the government, analysts noted it would not result in the disarmament of the Mehdi Army. Indeed, Sadr's directives appeared to indirectly suggest a more complicated calculus was at play. Indeed, while the violence was winding down, there was no sustainable resolution to the internal fight in anticipation of the October 2008 elections.

A day after Sadr called on militia members to stop fighting, Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone was bombarded with mortar fire. It was surmised that rogue elements of the extremist Shi'ite militia may have disregarded Sadr's directives.

On April 15, 2008, blasts in several cities across Iraq killed scores of people; it was one of the bloodiest days in recent times. One attack -- just outside a restaurant in Baquba -- was caused by an explosives-packed bus and killed more than 50 people and left close to 100 wounded. The death toll there was expected to rise. In Ramadi, a restaurant frequented by policemen was the apparent target of a suicide bombing that left 13 dead. That city had claimed a decline in violence until this day. In Mosul, three people died in an attack. But days earlier, 17 people died in a separate incident in that city, located in the northern part of the country. Among the 17 dead were 12 members of the Kurdish Peshmerga security force, who had since been integrated into the Iraqi army. Another person died in Baghdad. Immediate suspicion for the spate of attacks fell upon extremists Sunni groups aligned with al-Qaida.

Two days later, on April 17, 2008, a suicide attack targeted a crowd of funeral mourners in the Sunni village of Bu Mohammed, located to the north of the capital. That attack left at least 30 people dead and many more wounded. Because the funeral was for two members of an enclave opposed to al-Qaida in Iraq, whose bodies were discovered days earlier, the blame quickly fell again on extremists Sunni groups aligned with al-Qaida.

Despite much-vaunted successes of the United States troop "surge" in Iraq, violence had been on a markedly increasing trend.

A report by hospital officials in Baghdad in late April 2008 noted that more than 400 people had been killed, and more than 2,500 were injured, in violent clashes over the course of the month. The situation caused a grave strain on hospital resources. The fighting, which was largely due to

Iraq Review 2016 Page 127 of 609 pages Iraq clashes between Shi'a militias and joint United States-Iraq forces in the Sadr Cit district of the capital city. The area was a known stronghold of the Mehdi Army militia, led by the extremist cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr. The month of April was also deemed significant for United States troops, which endured close to 50 deaths -- the highest number since September 2007 when 65 soldiers were killed in Iraq.

In the background of these developments was an emerging conflict between Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki and Shi'a militia leader, Moqtada al-Sadr. Maliki had attained power in part thanks to backing from the cleric but that bond was now crumbling. While Maliki promised to crush all militias -- Shi'a and Sunni alike, Sadr urged his supporters to continue their resistance of the United States occupation but without fighting fellow Iraqis. Maliki was not helped when a bloc of Iraqi parliamentarians aligned with Moqtada al-Sadr issued a denunciation of the government using Koranic verse. The dissonance promised to complicate efforts to stabilize Baghdad.

By the start of May 2008, violence was on the rise in Iraq. Twin suicide bombings ensued in Balad Ruz, to the east of Baquba, as a party of wedding guests traveled through the area. One suicide bombing was detonated by an explosives-laden belt worn by a woman; the other was detonated by a man among bystanders. These attacks were blamed on Sunni extremists aligned with al-Qaida in Iraq. At least 35 people were killed and more than 65 were injured. Elsewhere in Iraq, a bomb exploded in Baghdad killing nine people; the target appeared to be United States troops. Meanwhile, Sadr City was the site of further violence and bloodshed.

On May 2, 2008, a roadside bomb in the Sunni western province of Anbar left four United States marines dead. Then, on May 4, 2008, the wife of President Jalal Talabani narrowly escaped unscathed when an improvised explosive device went off close to her convoy in Baghdad, as she traveled to a festival at the National Theatre. On the same day, Serwa Abdul-Wahab, a female journalist, was dragged from her car and shot to death in the northern city of Mosul.

In mid-May 2008, Ahmed Ali Ahmed, known as Abu Omar -- a key leader of al-Qaida in Iraq -- was sentenced to death for the murder of Archbishop Paulos Faraj Rahho. The body of the Chaldean Catholic Archbishop was discovered close to Mosul two weeks after he was kidnapped in February 2008. The murder of Archbishop Paulos Faraj Rahho was one of several attacks on Christian interests in Iraq by both Sunni and Shi'ite groups. Due to the insecurity Christians were now facing in Iraq, many fled to other countries. Those remaining in Iraq have accused the government of Prime Minister Maliki of not doing enough to protect the Christian minority in Iraq from persecution.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki visited Tehran in early June 2008 and met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as well as Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. The Iraqi leader offered assurances that his country would not be used to launch attacks against Iran. The Iranian state-controlled media reported Maliki as saying, "We will not allow Iraq to become a

Iraq Review 2016 Page 128 of 609 pages Iraq platform for harming the security of Iran and neighbors." Maliki also reportedly said, "A stable Iraq will be a benefit to the security of the region and the world." On the other side of the equation, Ahmadinejad promised to assist with Iraq's security. Trade and economic issues also factored highly during the meeting.

In the backdrop of these developments was the fact that the United States and Iraq were in the process of discussing the provisions of a treaty on the future of the United States military in Iraq. While the Iranian leader did not directly discuss this issue during talks with his Iraqi counterpart, President Ahmadinejad presented an oblique reference to United States' influence in Iraq saying, "Iraq must reach a certain level of stability so that its enemies are not able to impose their influence."

Thus, the meeting in Tehran was likely to have repercussions for Iraq-United States relations, given the already acrimonious nature of the relationship between its neighbor, Iran, and its ally, the United States. In addition to the possibility of a continued United States military presence in Iraq, the United States has also accused Iran of supporting militants in Iraq. Furthermore, the United States has been the leading voice against Iran's burgeoning nuclear program. These issues have caused the already-poor bilateral relations between Iran and the United States to devolve into even more hostile territory. As such, Iraq has stood in the awkward position of being an ally of the United States, while also strengthening its bonds with its Shi'a Muslim neighbor in the post-Saddam Hussein era.

In the third week of June 2008, a female suicide bomber in the northern Iraqi city of Baquba killed at least 15 people and injured close to 40 others. Both policemen and civilians were among the victims. The attack took place at the front of a local government and court complex when the suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to her body. While there was no conclusive information about who was behind the attack, previous bombings in Baquba have been attributed to Sunni militants aligned with al-Qaida. Indeed, Baquba, to the north of Baghdad and located in the restive province of Diyala, has been a notorious flashpoint for violence, and a stronghold of al- Qaida militants The attack in Baquba came less than a week after 60 people died as a result of a car bomb in Baghdad. That bombing was blamed on Shi'a militia and appeared to be aimed at stirring sectarian strife.

The period of late July saw a female suicide bomber detonate the explosives strapped to her body at a military checkpoint again in the town of Baquba. Her attack yielded eight deaths and more than 20 injuries as a result. The attack came weeks after yet another suicide bomber killed nine people in a market in the same city. .

Following the Baquba bombings, female suicide bombers carried out attacks in Baghdad, killing at least 25 Shi'ites participating in a pilgrimage to the Kadhimiya shrine. Close to 100 people were injured as well. Meanwhile, the country's northern city oil city of Kirkuk was hit by a suicide

Iraq Review 2016 Page 129 of 609 pages Iraq bombing that killed at least 22 people and injured more than 150 others. That attack took place as demonstrators protested the election law (discussed directly following) that has further strained ethno-sectarian in the diverse city made up of Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen.

Also in late July 2008, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani denounced the draft election legislation that caused strong disagreement between various factions of the Iraqi government. The parliament adopted the election law ahead of provincial elections, despite protest from the Kurdish bloc. Indeed, the 54 Kurdish parliamentarians, along with some Shi'a members of parliament, boycotted the vote. President Talibani -- a Kurd -- said he would not sanction the new election law and doubted that the three-member presidential council -- upon which he served with the Sunni and Shi'a vice-presidents -- would approve it. One cause of consternations among Kurds was the proposal for power-sharing in the ethnically-mixed oil city of Kirkuk.

By early August 2008, Iraqi leaders decided to postpone a parliamentary vote on a revised draft of the election legislation. Talks intended to resolve differences on the proposed election law were not met with success and could prevent provincial elections from taking place as scheduled in October 2008. That said, the United Nations had proposed that voting in Kirkuk be delayed pending a resolution, while provincial elections take place on schedule elsewhere across the country. This suggestion was received with mixed reviews; while some leaders suggest the compromise, others had said a delay of any kind would not be acceptable.

On Aug. 3, 2008, a truck bomb close to a passport office in a Sunni portion of Baghdad left at least a dozen people dead and more than 14 injured. A day later, a roadside bomb in the capital killed two United States soldiers and injured a third. These bombings occurred in the wake of attacks carried out by female suicide bombers noted above.

On Aug. 8, 2008, a car bomb at a vegetable market in Tal Afar left more than 20 people dead and approximately 70 others injured. Ironically, Tal Afar was touted as an example of success in Iraq in 2006 by United States President George W. Bush. A year later in 2007, however, the situation had changed with the town being the site of a deadly truck bombing that killed more than 150 people. As of 2008, it was clear that Sunni militants were still functioning in Tal Afar. The town, located close to Mosul in northern Iraq, has become a new stronghold of al-Qaida in Iraq since the United States' military "surge" in Baghdad forced militants from the capital city.

On Aug. 14, 2008, a suicide bombing in the town of Iskandariya left close to 20 people dead and about 75 injured. The suicide bomber was female – consistent with a growing trend in Iraq, perhaps due to the fact that women were less likely to be viewed with suspicion. The suicide bomber in southern Iraq appeared to have targeted a group of Shi'a pilgrims traveling to the holy city of Karbala for a religious festival. The area, including Iskandariya, had enjoyed a marked reduction in violence thanks to the increased presence of troops in the region, in conjunction with increasing local antipathy to al-Qaida.

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On Aug. 17, a suicide bomber on a motorcycle stuck the Abu Hanifa mosque in the Sunni- dominated Adhamiya district of Baghdad. The attack took place just after evening prayers, killing at least 15 people and injuring close to 30 others. Included in the death toll was a local leader of "" -- one of several "Awakening Councils," which are paid by the United States to protect neighborhoods resisting al-Qaida in Iraq. As such, there was speculation that the attack was motivated by revenge.

On Aug. 24, 2008, a suicide bomber attacked a celebration at the home of tribal sheikh in Baghdad's western Abu Ghraib district, killing at least 25 people. The sheikh was a member of the Sunni "Awakening" that opposes al-Qaida in Iraq. Because of the group's anti-militant activism, which has been financially supported by the United States, it has been targeted by al-Qaida in Iraq.

On Aug. 29, 2008, it was reported that at least 25 people were killed and more than 40 others injured when a suicide bombing ensued in the town of Jalawlah in the Iraqi province of Diyala. The suicide bomber charged into a queue of police recruits before detonating the explosives strapped to his vest. The province of Diyala has become increasingly violent even as another hot spot -- the province of Anbar -- has seen a decrease in bloodshed by Sunni extremists aligned with al-Qaida. In this way, experts have surmised that Sunni militants had simply shifted their base of attacks from Anbar, where security had been tightened, to softer targets, such as Diyala.

Once a hotbed of insurgent violence, the Iraqi province of Anbar was returned to the control of Iraq on Sept. 1, 2008, at a ceremony in the provincial capital. A significant portion of United States' troops deaths have taken place in Anbar, however, security increased in 2006 when former insurgents decided to ally themselves with the United States and tribal leaders. United States President George W. Bush hailed the development, characterizing it as a major achievement and praising United States forces, as well as the tribal leaders, and other civilians, who worked to stabilize the restive area. He said, "Today, Anbar is no longer lost to al-Qaeda - it is al-Qaeda that lost Anbar." He continued, "Anbar has been transformed and reclaimed by the Iraqi people." Yet to be seen however, was whether or not the Sunni tribesmen allied with the United States could be able to cooperate with the Shi'a dominated national government of Iraq.

In late September 2008, the Islamic holy period of Ramadan was met with intense violence in Baghdad. A spate of bombings in the Iraqi capital left more than 30 people dead and in excess of 100 others wounded. These attacks came a week after eight children and 35 members of a joint police-Sunni Arab Awakening patrol were killed in an ambush in the al-Qaida stronghold of Diyala. Ironically, the increase in violence occurred at a time when a senior United States military commander said Iraq was witnessing its least violent Ramadan in three years.

In October 2008, a suicide bombing in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul left close to a dozen people dead including three women, three children, and five militants. The attack took place during a raid

Iraq Review 2016 Page 131 of 609 pages Iraq of the city by United States forces. There was some confusion about the actual cause of death since an official at the city morgue noted there were bullet wounds on some of the victims. United States officials acknowledged exchanging fire with gunmen before the actual suicide bombing ensued. Meanwhile, a gunman opened fire at a funeral in Mosul, killing four people. As well, a drive-by attack in Zanjili district left several people injured. In Baghdad, United States forces said they had killed a senior al-Qaida bomb-making expert.

On Oct. 9, 2008, Saleh al-Ogaili -- a parliamentarian from the Shi'a bloc aligned with cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr -- was killed in an apparent bomb attack. Two other people were also killed in the explosion in the Habibiyah district, located close to Moqtada al-Sadr's stronghold of Sadr City. The bomb had been placed on a motorcycle and was detonated as the convoy of Saleh al-Ogaili passed by in the streets of Baghdad. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki imitated an inquiry into the apparent assassination of Saleh al-Ogaili saying, "We reaffirm our determination to get at the hotbeds of terrorism and crime, and arrest and prosecute the killers and bring them to justice."

Also on the same day, a roadside bombing to the north of Baghdad, a leader of a militant Sunni "Awakening" group, Abbas Khudair, was killed along with two of his children and another young relative. As has been the case with other Sunni "Awakening" groups, this one headed by Abbas Khudair had been working with coalition forces against al-Qaida militants in the region. His activities may well have made him a favored target of al-Qaida in Iraq.

One day after the two assassinations took place, a bombing in Baghdad left more than a dozen people dead and close to 30 other injured. Women and children were among the dead. The bomb exploded at a market in the mainly Shi'a area of Abu Dshir, located within the larger Sunni district of Dora. The complicated ethnic makeup of the area had contributed to much ethnic strife there, however, there were signs in recent times that the security situation was improving. Such a view was likely to be revised since, on the same day, another bomb exploded in the same area, leaving one person dead and 12 others wounded.

On Oct. 11, 2008, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki promised he would protect the Christian population of Mosul after 12 people -- all Christians -- were murdered by Sunni militants in a period of two weeks. The prime minister said, "We will take immediate action to resolve the problems and difficulties faced by Christians in Mosul." Despite the government's decision to deploy 1,000 policemen to the northern city of Mosul in an effort to curb the violence, already hundreds of Christians had fled the city, seeking refuge in villages elsewhere. Policemen were nevertheless establishing checkpoints at churches and orchestrating street patrols in Christian areas of Mosul.

The second week of November 2008 saw dozens killed and many more injured as a result of a spate of attacks across Iraq. The bombings were carried out by militants in some of the most volatile regions of the country. In one case, a bomb attached to a motorcycle was detonated in a

Iraq Review 2016 Page 132 of 609 pages Iraq crowded marketplace in the town of Khalis in the restive Diyala province. In another case, a female suicide bomber was responsible for an attack on a hospital close to the city of Fallujah. Close to Ramadi, in Anbar province, where violence has seen a downturn, a suicide bombing left eight people dead, including several policemen. Sunni tribal militias working with joint United States and Iraqi government forces have contributed to security gains in Anbar; as such, the recent violence was a significant blow.

The Iraqi capital city of Baghdad was not spared and suffered consecutive days of bomb attacks during rush hour traffic starting on Nov. 10, 2008. On that day, a suicide bombing and two car bombings left about 30 people dead and close to 70 injured in the capital. North of Baghdad in Baquba, six people died as a result of a female suicide car bomber. But Nov. 12, 2008 was also a particularly deadly day in Baghdad with 21 people dead and more than 85 wounded as a result of a series of bombs that exploded across the Iraqi capital city. In one case, at least a dozen people died and 60 others were injured when car and roadside bombs exploded simultaneously in the eastern part of Baghdad.

Days later, two bomb attacks struck Baghdad and Diyala respectively, as the Iraqi cabinet met to discuss the security pact with the United States (discussed below). Around 20 people were killed and many more were wounded as a result of the attacks.

On Dec. 11, 2008, a suicide bombing at restaurant in Kirkuk left at least 50 people dead and more than 100 injured. The attack in the ethnically mixed northern Iraqi city took place as Kurdish officials dining with Arab tribal leaders. The timing of the attacks coincided with the Islamic celebration of Eid-al-Adha.

Late December 2008 was marked by other attacks including a car bombing.

Special Report: Indications of Post-Bush Era Foreign Policy

Despite frequent assertions by the Bush administration in the United States that there be no fixed timeline for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the United States and Iraq agreed in July 2008 to establish a "time horizon" for the reduction of United States troops in Iraq. The agreement was part the formal Status of Forces Agreement forged between President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which would allow a continued presence of United States forces in Iraq after the expiration of the existing United Nations mandate at the close of 2008. The agreement came a week after the Iraqi leader said that he wanted a timetable for the United States troop withdrawal -- something the Bush administration has not endorsed.

For its part, the United States has been reluctant to advance such a timetable out of fear that security gains could be erased. President Bush has said that a fixed timetable would embolden

Iraq Review 2016 Page 133 of 609 pages Iraq violent insurgents. That said, the current "time horizon" offering appeared to be a compromise in the security deal being negotiated. While the actual distinction between a timetable and a time horizon would inevitably provide fodder for debate, the Bush administration was nonchalant about the idea that it was reversing its previous hard line position on the matter. Instead, the White House said that troop reductions in the future would be "based on continued improving conditions on the ground and not an arbitrary date for withdrawal."

After the news broke about a "time horizon" for the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq, Prime Minister al-Maliki expressed support for the troop withdrawal plans proposed by presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, , during an interview with Der Spiegel.

In reference to Obama's 16-month withdrawal timetable (barring complications), Maliki said, "That, we think, would be the right timeframe for a withdrawal, with the possibility of changes." The Iraqi prime minister did not expressly endorse presumptive Democratic presidential nominee's candidacy, saying instead, "who they [Americans] choose as their president is the Americans' business." He then continued, "But it's the business of Iraqis to say what they want." Nevertheless, Maliki's views on the notion of a timeline appeared to be in line with Obama's stance on the issue.

A spokesperson for the Iraq government somewhat backtracked from these remarks, suggesting that Der Speigel had "misunderstood and mistranslated" the Iraqi prime minister. The spokesperson did not, however, specify how precisely this misunderstanding or mistranslation might have occurred. Regardless, the German publication, Der Speigel, issued a strong assertion stating it "stands by its version of the conversation."

Soon thereafter, Der Speigel provided an audio recording of the Maliki interview to the New York Times, which appeared to bear out the fact that Maliki found Obama's 16-month withdrawal timetable to be illustrative of the Democratic contender's understanding of the situation on the ground in Iraq.

In the direct translation from Arabic, as published by the New York Times, Maliki said: "Obama’s remarks that — if he takes office — in 16 months he would withdraw the forces, we think that this period could increase or decrease a little, but that it could be suitable to end the presence of the forces in Iraq." He continued: "Who wants to exit in a quicker way has a better assessment of the situation in Iraq."

This synergy could well help shore up support for Obama's foreign policy credentials, particularly in regard to the difficult question of how to (if possible) disengage from Iraq. Obama has consistently said that he would end the war in Iraq and withdraw United States troops from that country in a careful manner. He has called for a 16 month phased withdrawal timetable pending given conditions on the ground. (Note: Obama was also helped by the fact that British Prime

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Minister Gordon Brown also expressed concurrence for the notion of a 16-month timetable.)

By contrast, Maliki's suggestion that Obama had "a better assessment of the situation in Iraq" was not expected to help the presumptive Republican nominee, John McCain. For his part, McCain has opposed a withdrawal timeline and has said that he expects United States troops to be in Iraq for a long time, assuming that the Iraqi government sanctions the American presence in that country. McCain's presidential hopes have largely rested on his own heroic military experience and perceived understanding of foreign policy, both of which have strong resonance at home in the United States.

An agreement outlining such an exit came to the fore in late August 2008. The draft agreement, which was yet to be approved by the Iraqi parliament and presidency, called for a withdrawal of United States combat troops from Iraq by 2011, although an absolute final date would be dependent on the security situation. The objective of the concord was to ultimately hand over responsibility for security to Iraqi forces. Also included in the 27-point was a provision for American soldiers to receive some immunity under Iraqi law. For its part, the Bush administration in the United States said that the details of the deal were still under discussion.

By October 2008, top political leaders in Iraq were considering the draft of the security pact with the United States. With discussions continuing in the Political Council for National Security, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki delayed a scheduled trip to Australia. As noted above, the Status of Forces Agreement would provide for continued presence of United States troops in Iraq until 2011. Also included in the concord was limited jurisdiction for Iraq over the prosecution of troops.

For its part, the dominant alliance of Shi'a and Kurdish parties in the Iraqi government indicated that it would table adjustments to the draft agreement. Indeed, they suggested that their prevailing reservations prevented them from approving the deal wholesale. A statement by the United Iraqi Alliance noted, "Besides the positive points that were included in this pact, there are other points that need more time, more discussion, more dialogue and amendments to some articles."

At issue in particular was the matter of limited Iraqi jurisdiction over the prosecution of troops. Iraqis have not been keen on the notion of immunity from prosecution of United States troops. Also at issue was the schedule, including the 2009 date set provisionally for the withdrawal of some United States troops from some cities, as well as the 2011 date set for the final withdrawal from Iraq.

This development augured potential challenges in the process of ultimately approving the agreement, specifically because officials from Iraq and the United States had previously asserted that the draft was final and not subject to changes. But without approval from the Political Council for National Security, the agreement was unlikely to gain parliamentary approval.

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Meanwhile, outside the governing arena, some Iraqis were taking to the streets of Baghdad to protest the agreement and to demand the exit of United States troops from Iraq. Among the demonstrators were about 50,000 supporters of the radical Shi'a cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, chanting anti-American slogans, such as "Get out occupier!"

In mid-November 2008, the Iraqi cabinet approved the Status of Forces Agreement, which provided for the continued presence of 150,000 United States troops in Iraq until 2011. As aforementioned, the security pact has been a source of consternation in Iraq because it included in the concord was limited jurisdiction for Iraq over the prosecution of troops. Nevertheless, it appeared to have crossed one hurdle in its passage into law. Yet to be determined was the matter of whether it would be approved in parliament.

Note: The existing United Nations mandate for the United States-led coalition in Iraq was set to expire at the end of 2008.

In December 2008, United States President George W. Bush arrived on Air Force One at the Baghdad International Airport on a surprise visit to Iraq. For his first order of business, Bush met with Iraqi head of state, President Jalal Talabani, at the presidential palace in the Green Zone. Describing United States' efforts in Iraq, which would no doubt shape his political legacy for generations to come, Bush said, "The work hasn't been easy but it's been necessary for American security, Iraqi hope and world peace."

But the political legacy of the 43rd president of the United States was likely to be mired by criticisms about the rationale for war, such as the non-existent weapons of mass destruction, the Bush Doctrine of pre-emption, the steep death toll among Iraqis and American troops, the financial costs of what some have called "an optional war," as well as a lack of planning and progress on the reconstruction front. To that latter end, a United States government report cast a scathing depiction of the power struggles and lack of cultural knowledge among the American planners of the war of the Iraqi landscape. According to the New York Times, the report also pegged the astronomical cost of the reconstruction effort alone at more than $100 billion.

Nevertheless, with United States troops now in Iraq, attention was on their future role and their potential withdrawal. As such, Bush's primary rationale for his trip to Iraq was to formalize a new security agreement with that country. Bush, along with the Iraqi head of government, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, signed the Status of Forces Agreement between their respective countries. That agreement provides for the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq in 2011. The Status of Forces Agreement notes that an absolute final date would be dependent on the security situation. The objective of the concord is to ultimately hand over responsibility for security to Iraqi forces.

Bush, who was in Iraq five weeks before the handover of power to his successor, President-Elect

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Barack Obama, said that the war in Iraq was not at an end and that there was further work to be done. This statement, however, was somewhat at odds with a statement by United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates who said that the Iraq mission was in its "endgame."

The surprise visit by Bush, as well as the formalization of Status of Forces Agreement, were both overshadowed by an incident involving a journalist who threw shoes at the American president during a news conference. As shown in media broadcasts of the incident, an Iraqi journalist shouted, "This is a goodbye kiss from the Iraqi people, dog" and then threw two of his shoes at the American president. Security guards subsequently escorted the journalist out of the news conference.

Referring to a person as a "dog" is considered derogatory in Islamic circles while the soles of shoes are regarded as a sign of insult in Arab culture. Indeed, Iraqis threw shoes at Saddam Hussein's statue in Baghdad after the Iraqi leader was ousted from power. Thus, it could be said that the journalist was passionately -- and symbolically -- registering his discontent with the presence of Bush in Iraq for the signing ceremony.

For his part, Bush demonstrated quick reflexes and was able to dodge the incoming footwear. Bush also expressed good humor about the incident saying to the Associated Press, "All I can report is a size 10."

Note: President George W. Bush's successor, President-Elect Barack Obama, has said that United States combat troops will come home from Iraq in approximately one year after he takes office.

Parliamentarians set to vote on status of non-U.S. forces in Iraq

A week after United States President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki signed into law the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) allowing United States forces to remain in Iraq until 2011, attention was focused on a similar pact affecting non-United States forces in Iraq. There was a vote in Iraq's parliament on a resolution that would allow non-American forces to remain in Iraq until the end of July 2009. The matter was the source of much consternation in Iraq, with Iraqi parliament rejecting legislation on the matter because the terms set forth were not as circumscribed as those enshrined in the SOFA with the United States.

Developments in 2009

In early January 2009, a female suicide bomber killed at least 35 Shi'a pilgrims close to a shrine in the Kadhimiya area of the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad. There were 16 Iranians among the dead. As well, more than 70 people were injured in the attack. Most of the victims were women and

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Authorities said the suicide bomber detonated an explosive device strapped to her body at a checkpoint just outside the Imam Moussa al-Kadhim shrine. As such, she appeared to target pilgrims gathering for a religious ceremony, which was associated with the Ashura holiday that marks the 7th century death of Imam Hussein -- the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed. Convoys and processions of Shi'a pilgrims have often been targeted by Sunni militants across the country.

The third week of January 2009 was marked by a spate of violent attacks across Iraq. The attacks appeared to precede provincial elections scheduled to be held at the end of the month. Previous provincial elections were boycotted by Sunni Arabs and some Shi'a groups, resulting in what some have viewed as unrepresentative provincial government in Iraq.

In the northern part of the country, a senior Sunni politician, Hassan Zaidan al-Luhaibi, died as a result of a suicide bombing. Hassan Zaidan al-Luhaibi, the vice- president of the Sunni National Dialogue bloc (one of the groups within the Sunni Muslim Accordance Front), was killed during a campaign meeting that was being held to the south of Mosul. He had been a candidate in the forthcoming elections.

In other developments, a series of bombings wracked Baghdad in the same period, leaving several people killed and even more injured as a result. Policemen and soldiers were among the victims and appeared to have been the main targets, but civilians were among those killed in an attack in the commercial district of Karrada.

At the close of January 2009, Iraqis went to the polls to vote in provincial elections. Turnout across the country was over 50 percent -- lower than had been expected, but with higher than average turnout in predominantly Sunni areas of the country, such as the province of Ninevah. High Sunni voter turnout was in sharp contrast to previous elections when Sunnis participated in voting boycotts. These provincial contests were regarded as test cases in anticipation general elections to be held in 2010.

According to High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC), results showed that the political coalition backed by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki enjoyed the most success in the elections to provincial councils in Baghdad and in eight predominantly Shi’ite provinces. Meanwhile, the results also showed that Sunni Arabs gained ascendancy in the provinces of Nineveh and Diyala -- two areas that remained volatile as United States troops battled al-Qaida militants.

While the provincial elections went off in a climate that was notably free of chaos, the early election results in one province were cause for alarm. At issue was the apparent victory for a

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Sunni religious party, the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), in the large western Anbar province. Known as the site of many attacks by the Sunni insurgency against United States troops, Anbar was subsequently distinguished as a success zone when tribal units, known as Awakening Councils, worked with American forces to drive out al-Qaida extremists from the area. Tribal sheikhs who participated in those Awakening Councils were now alleging fraud in the voting, which indicated victory for the IIP. Hamid al-Hais, head of the Anbar Tribes, warned of a violent backlash if the IIP was declared to be the winner of the election. But such an end was diminished when the final result showed that the tribal leaders in Anbar came second to a Sunni secular party, while the IIP came third.

Note: There were no elections in the three provinces that make up the semi-autonomous Kurdish region. As well, elections were postponed in oil-rich Kirkuk.

In early March 2009, the United States announced that 12,000 troops would be withdrawn from Iraq within six months. The reduction in troop strength was part of United States President Barack Obama's plan to end the combat mission in Iraq by a deadline of August 2010.

But as that announcement was being advanced, a suicide bomber attacked a police recruitment center in Baghdad. Around 30 people were killed and double that number were injured as a result of the attack, which was carried out by a motorcyclist with explosives strapped to his belt. Most of the victims were police recruits or police officers. This suicide bombing occurred only two days after a car bomb killed a dozen people at a cattle market in the province of Babil.

At the close of March 2009, the arrest of a local Sunni militia leader in Baghdad has spurred clashes between joint United States/Iraqi troops and militants. At the heart of the matter was Adil Mashadani -- the leader of the Fadil Awakening Group for whom the Iraqi government had issued an arrest warrant. The charges against Mashadani included bomb attacks on Iraq's security forces, links to al-Qaida in Iraq, collusion with the terrorist network known asJaysh al-Islami, and extortion of Fadil's residents. The situation appeared to have resulted in unrest in Fadil. Troops were patrolling the Fadil district and calling on people to relinquish their weapons or risk being treated as terrorists.

United States President Barack Obama made a surprise trip to Baghdad in early April 2009. He arrived in Iraq during his return trip from Europe where he attended the G-20, NATO and European Union summits. In an address to cheering United States troops serving in Iraq, he reiterated his 2010 intended timetable to withdraw most United States troops from Iraq, and he noted that the time had come for Iraqis "to take responsibility for their country."

Hours before President Obama's arrival in Iraq, a series of coordinated car bombings in Baghdad left at least 34 people dead. A few days later, another Baghdad bombing killed nine people. Then, on April 9, 2009, a bomb exploded at a shopping area in a predominantly Shi'ite Kadhamiya part of

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Baghdad. Seven people were reported to have died and more than 20 others were injured as a result of the blast. The location of the attack was in proximity to the tomb of Imam Mousa al- Kazim -- a significant Shi'a shrine -- thus suggesting a sectarian motive.

The last week of April 2009 was marred by a spate of suicide bombings in Iraq. On April 24, 2009, Baghdad's main Shi'a holy site, the Imam Moussa al-Kadhim shrine, was hit by suicide attacks. The violence was carried out by two female suicide bombers and left at least 60 people dead and 125 others wounded. The attack took place as worshippers gathered for prayer.

That attack took place a day after two separate suicide attacks in Baghdad and Baquba left around 85 people dead. Most of the victims in the attack on a Baquba restaurant were Iranian pilgrims. Iranian cleric condemned the attacks on the pilgrims and former Iranian President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani said, The incident yesterday was a very, very hateful example of those who harm religion in the name of religion." He continued, "We feel sorry for the Iraqi people because such corrupt groups have penetrated into Iraq. We also criticize America for not having the serious will to preserve Iraq's security." Meanwhile, displaced families were the victims in the Baghdad bombing.

On May 20, 2009, the Iraqi capital of Baghdad was the site of a large car bombing that left around 35 people dead and more than 70 others injured. The attack occurred close to a restaurant in a predominantly Shi'a area of the city. The attack was one of similar such attacks on civilians at crowded tea shops and gathering points around the city in the same time period, although this particular case was the most violent over the course of several weeks. Another large attack occurred in late April 2009 when three bombs went off in the capital city. Almost a month later, there was something of a repeat performance.

On May 21, 2009, Baghdad was again struck. A blast at an outdoor marketplace left around several people dead -- both Iraqis and Americans -- and even more injured. Three United States soldiers were among those killed. In most cases, Shi'ites were the apparent targets, thus indicating a rise in ethno-sectarian tensions at a time when United States troops were expected to soon leave several major Iraqi cities including Baghdad. There was some speciation that the attacks were linked with the government's decision to carry out a crackdown on Sunni paramilitary groups, and were aimed at undercutting Shi'a Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his Shi'ite support base.

On June 8, 2009, a bomb exploded on a minibus, resulting in the deaths of seven people and injuries to around 25 others. The attack took place in the Shi'a Muslim enclave within the predominantly Sunni neighborhood of Dora in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. The location, which has seen much violence in the years since the invasion on Iraq, thusly indicated a possible sectarian motive for the attack.

In the third week of June 2009, a suicide truck bomb killed at least 72 people and left close to 160

Iraq Review 2016 Page 140 of 609 pages Iraq others injured close to the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk. The attack took place as the predominantly Turkmen worshippers exited the Shi’a al-Rasoul mosque in the town of Taza. In addition to the human casualty list, approximately one dozen homes made of mud bricks were destroyed in the blast. Indeed, the force of the explosion was so great that a crater was left in its wake. It was one of Iraq’s worst attacks of the year.

The suicide truck bomber struck on the heels of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki’s announcement that the withdrawal of United States troops from most of Iraq’s cities and towns would take place as scheduled on June 30, 2009, with a complete end to combat operations in September 2010. The Iraqi leader encouraged the Iraqi people to expect occasional difficulties in the time of transition, saying: "Don't lose heart if a breach of security occurs here or there.” But just hours later, the Kirkuk truck bombing ensued, making evident the high stakes at play. In a statement following the truck bombing, Prime Minister Maliki said, "This ugly crime is an attempt to harm security and stability and spread mistrust of the Iraqi forces.”

Note: Kirkuk is Iraq’s main oil city and is inhabited by a diverse ethno-sectarian mix of people, including Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Muslims and Christians.

On June 22, 2009, around 30 people died in various attacks in Baghdad. In the Shaab district in the north of the capital, three people died including a child, while five people died in the Karrada district of Baghdad.

On June 24, 2009, at least 70 people died and more than 130 were injured after a bomb exploded in the Sadr City enclave of Baghdad. Authorities said that a bomb was hidden under a cart carrying vegetables on sale in a marketplace in the mostly Shi'a part of the Iraqi capital. It was one of the deadliest attacks in Baghdad in 2009 and came ahead of the scheduled withdrawal of United States troops from Iraqi cities, towns and military bases within days by a deadline of June 30, 2009.

Then, on June 26, 2009, more than a dozen people were killed and scores more wounded as a result of a bomb attack in Baghdad. The bomb was placed on a motorcycle in the city center.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki responded to the spate of bombings by trying to calm the Iraqi people and offering assurances that Iraqi forces would be able to protect them when United States troops withdrew. The Iraqi leader said that the spate of attacks were intended to "awaken sectarianism and create chaos, and prevent the Iraqi people from standing on their own feet." It was not known if such statements would assuage the people who were becoming increasingly anxious and angry about the security situation in Iraq and the ability of Iraqi security forces to do enough to protect them.

United States troops withdrew from Iraq's cities, towns and military bases on June 30, 2009, in keeping with a prevailing bilateral agreement. Iraqi security forces were now charged with keeping

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Iraqi politicians of various ethno-sectarian backgrounds lauded the move as a sign of progress is the path of sovereignty. Hashim al-Taie of the Accordance Front said, "The pullout is a very good step on the path to independence and sovereignty and Iraqis are glad of that." Mahmoud Othman, from the main Kurdish alliance in parliament, said, "We have concerns. Some towns still have trouble -- mixed areas -- but those concerns should not prevent the withdrawal."

For his part, United States President noted that "Sovereignty Day" was a significant milestone for Iraq, but warned that Iraq would yet be faced with "difficult days" in the future. Indeed, there were some anxieties that the withdrawal of United States troops could well act as a trigger for increasing ethno-sectarian violence across the country.

To that end, June 30, 2009 was also marked by yet another attack ensued in the northern oil city of Kirkuk. Around 30 people were killed as a result of a car bomb at a market in the Shurja district.

On July 8, 2009, twin car bombings hit the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. Both attacks took place within minutes of one another close to Shi'a mosques. The second bombing left at least nine people dead. Elsewhere in Mosul, which has been home to a mix of various ethnicities and religious groups, an Iraqi soldier was shot to death at a checkpoint. As well, a bombing at a wedding to the south of Baghdad left two people dead. From the evening of July 11, 2009, through to the daytime hours of July 12, 2009, several bombings were reported to have taken place across Iraq, leaving an extensive casualty list. The most dangerous of all the attacks was a car bombing outside a Christian church in eastern Baghdad, which left four people dead and 21 others injured.

While the level of violence in Iraq has generally declined over the course of the last year -- indeed to the lowest levels since the post-invasion insurgency began -- it was clear that attacks by insurgents were on the rise. The new wave of violence has notably targeted the country's Christian community, effectively sparking anxieties about the safety of ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq. Indeed, it was clear that in the aftermath of the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraqi cities and towns, the country has been plagued by almost constant deadly violence, raising questions about the Iraqi authorities' ability to keep the country secure. That said, a senior general in Iraq's military noted that such attacks should be expected to continue for years to come.

Earlier, the Iraqi health ministry released data showing that since 2005, more than 87,000 Iraqis have been killed in the bloodshed and violence gripping the country. That high death toll was sure to fuel the debate over the human cost of the war.

Mosques were targeted in a series of bombings in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad on July 31, 2009. Around 30 people were killed and more than 130 wounded in total, following six seemingly coordinated bombs exploded at five Shi'a mosques. The bombs appeared to have been intended

Iraq Review 2016 Page 142 of 609 pages Iraq to go off just as worshippers were exiting the mosques after Friday prayers, thereby exacting maximum carnage. In a separate attack, two people died as a result of a car bomb at a market in the northern city of Kirkuk.

Ironically, these attacks came only just days after United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Iraq and lauded the improved security situation there. Gates had also said that the United States might accelerate its anticipated withdrawal from Iraq ahead of schedule.

Multiple bombs exploded at the end of the first week of August 2009, leaving 36 people dead and scores more injured. The attacks apparently targeted Shi'a Muslims. In one case, 30 people died when a car bomb exploded outside a mosque where a funeral was being held in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. In Baghdad, three bombs left six people dead who were returning home from a pilgrimage in Karbala. The attacks coincided with a significant Shi'a religious holiday, which marks the birth of the Hidden Imam Mohammed al-Mehdi. Two days earlier, a Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad was the target of a separate bombing. Accordingly, these attacks indicated an ethno- sectarian motivation in a country marred with strife between Shi'ites and Sunnis.

Days later, Iraq was plagued by further violence. A series of violent bomb attacks across Iraq exacted a heavy death toll of 40 people on Aug.10, 2009. More than 200 people were also injured in the blasts, which included two truck bombs in a Shi'a village close to the northern city of Mosul, as well as a spate of explosions across the capital city of Baghdad.

Two car bombs in eastern Baghdad in the second week of August 2009 left at least eight people dead. One bomb exploded close to a residential building while the second bomb exploded in proximity to a cafe., Both explosions occurred within minutes of one another in a Shi'a district of al-Amin. The day before, a roadside bomb was discovered in al-Amin. Accordingly, suspicion rested on Sunni insurgents linked with al-Qaida in Iraq, who were believed to behind a spate of attacks in Iraq that targeted Shi'a and Christian enclaves, as well as multi-ethnic cities such as Mosul.

The attacks appeared to coincide with the United States' plans to reduce and eventually withdraw its troops from Iraq, and came ahead of the 2010 elections. To this end, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki sought to calm fears that the country was exploding into a renewed state of civil conflict when he noted that insurgents would try to destabilize the country by exploiting public fears. In a news conference, the Iraqi leader warned that insurgents would "try in any way they can to give the impression that the political process is not stable." But, in a bid to show that Iraqi security forces were up to the task, Prime Minister Maliki noted that the Iraqi authorities would exert great effort to reduce the insurgents the ability to do harm to the country. Reporters in the field have noted that the Iraqi public was not particularly confident in the government capacity to maintain stability in Iraq.

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In other developments, elections were held in late July 's autonomous region of Kurdistan. At the presidential level, Masood Barzani was re-elected with close to 70 percent of the vote share. Kurdistan's two-party ruling alliance retained control of the legislative body, albeit with a smaller majority, taking 57 percent of the vote share. The two-party ruling alliance was made up of Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). To date, Kurdistan has endured some tensions with the central government of Iraq over the control of oil as well as territorial issues.

Also on the domestic political front, a cadre of Iranian-backed Shi'ite political parties announced a new coalition on Aug. 23, 2009 that excluded Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki from its ranks. The new coalition, named the Iraqi National Alliance, included the large Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, or SIIC, as well as the bloc led by anti-Western cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr's bloc, along with some smaller parties. It was a clear re-alignment on Iraq's political landscape, where a grand coalition of Shi'ite parties had held sway since the end of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

The political implications for Prime Minister Maliki were clear, since if he wanted to stay on as head of government after the parliamentary elections set for January 2010, he would be compelled to forge some sort of alliance himself, likely with Sunni and Kurdish political parties. Should he be unsuccessful in forging such a new alliance, then the Iraqi National Alliance could potentially shift the geopolitical scene in Iraq. Indeed, a victory by the new Shi'ite bloc in January 2010 would intensify Iran's influence in Iraq at a time when United States forces would be withdrawing from the scene. A victory by the new Shi'ite bloc could also enflame tensions further, with Sunnis feeling increasing alienation from the dominant Shi'a population.

The political development -- an ethno-sectarian complication in and of itself -- came at a time when ethno-sectarian violence was plaguing the country. On the same day of the announcement of the Shi'a alliance, bombs on buses exploded in mainly Shi'a city of Kut in southern Iraq, leaving about a dozen people dead. That attack came days after the deadliest strike of 2009, when two massive truck bombs left at least 95 people dead in central Baghdad.

On Aug. 19, 2009, close to 100 people died as a result of a wave of attacks across the capital city. The most brutal of the attacks occurred as a result of two massive truck bombs in central Baghdad. The country's foreign ministry and finance ministry buildings appeared to have been targeted in the attacks and bore the brunt of the destruction. It was the deadliest day in Iraq since the start of the year.

In the aftermath of the bloody attacks, Iraq's Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari charged that the militants must have been assisted by insiders in order to get past checkpoints to foreign and finance ministry buildings. In an interview with the media, Zebari said, "According to our information, there has even been collaboration between security officers and the murderers." To that end, 11 security officers were arrested of the basis of negligence. Zebari also mentioned the timing and

Iraq Review 2016 Page 144 of 609 pages Iraq orchestration of the attacks in central Baghdad, and noted that trucks had somehow managed to reach the city center even though heavy vehicles were not normally permitted in this area. Zebari also took aim at Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's recent decision to remove most blast walls protecting government buildings and shopping centers in Baghdad. He said, "The removal of blast walls and checkpoints due to a false sense of security is also a reason [for the attacks]."

As before, the spate of attacks came at a time when the United States' has moved to reduce and eventually withdraw its troops from Iraq, and came ahead of the 2010 elections. They have raised questions about the ability of Iraqi security forces to maintain the stability of the country, in the absence of the United States forces on the ground. The attacks have also compromised one of Prime Minister Maliki's election platform issues, that he has presided over the stabilization of the country while at the same time ensuring the exit of the United States military from Iraq.

In the aftermath of the deadly attack discussed just above, Iraq and Syria respectively recalled their ambassadors. At issue was a deepening diplomatic row over Baghdad's claim that Damascus was giving safe haven to militants responsible for the aforementioned attacks on Baghdad, and particularly, the brutal bombings that targeted the foreign and finance ministries and left close to 100 people dead. Iraq recalled its envoy from Syria after a taped confession was broadcast, indicating that recent violent attacks in Baghdad had been ordered by Syria-based Iraqi Baathists. In retaliation for the move, Syria said it was also recalling its envoy from Iraq. Syria also rejected any involvement in the violence. Syria's declaration of innocence was somewhat bolstered by a claim of responsibility by al-Qaida wing called Islamic States of Iraq. Turkey was set to mediate the dispute.

On Sept. 10, 2009, a truck bomb in the Kurdish northern village of Wardek left around 20 people dead and 30 more injured including women and children. Several homes were decimated in the explosion and the authorities warned that as the search of the rubble was carried out, the casualty list was sure to increase. It was the latest attack on the ethnically-mixed region of northern Iraq, which has given rise to the belief that al-Qaida in Iraq has been intent on provoking ethno-sectarian violence in this region. To that end, Iraqi, Kurdish and United States officials were reportedly working on a plan to increase security in the area.

On Sept, 15, 2009, United States Vice President arrived on an unannounced visit to Iraq. His arrival coincided with an attack by militants firing rockets and mortars at the heavily fortified Green Zone. During his third visit to Iraq in 2009, Vice President Biden met with key Iraqi officials in Baghdad, including Vice President Adi Abdul-Mahdi the next day. After greeting Abdul- Mahdi, Vice President Biden jokingly said, "You can't get rid of me. I keep coming back, coming back." United States President Barack Obama has charged his second-in-command with providing "sustained, high-level focus" on Iraq, according to the White House.

By the start of October 2009, the United States had accelerated its military withdrawal from Iraq

Iraq Review 2016 Page 145 of 609 pages Iraq and intended to redeploy 4,000 troops within a month. Accordingly, the number of United States troops in Iraq was expected to go from 124,000 to 120,000 by the close of October 2009. The top American commander in Iraq, Army General Ray Odierno, explained that it was the latest move aimed at ending the United States' engagement in that country. In an eight-page statement intended to be delivered at a Congressional committee, he said, "We have already begun deliberately drawing down our forces - without sacrificing security." Odierno continued, "As we go forward, we will thin our lines across Iraq in order to reduce the risk and sustain stability through a deliberate transition of responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces."

Odierno expressed tentative optimism about the prospects of a stable Iraq in the future, while acknowledging the reality of continued violence, as evidenced by the Aug,19, 2009, bombings at two Iraqi government ministries. He also noted that ethnic, sectarian and regional divisions continued to plague the country. He observed that unresolved tensions between the Arab and Kurdish populations promised to present problems in the 2010 parliamentary elections, with various groups seeking control over regional oil wealth. That said, Odierno suggested that most Iraqis sought peace and security, while opposing militancy and violence. He said, "The overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people have rejected extremism," Odierno said. "We see no indications of a return to the sectarian violence that plagued Iraq in 2006-2007."

Note: Odierno's congressional testimony was obtained by the Associated Press and the plan to reduce the number of brigades in Iraq was confirmed by the Defense Department.

Meanwhile, the start of October 2009 was also marked by the domestic political scene. On October 1, 2009, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki formed a new political bloc to contest the parliamentary elections due to take place in January 2010. The Maliki bloc was composed of 40 political parties from across Iraq's complex ethno-sectarian milieu, and included Sunni, Shi'ite and minority groups. A senior official from Maliki's Dawa Party said that about 30 other political movements were also thinking of joining the coalition.

While the new political bloc was expected to assist Maliki in staying in power, while eschewing the prevailing ethno-sectarian divisions, it was also borne out of necessity. Months earlier in August 2009, a cadre of Iranian-backed Shi'ite political parties announced the formation of their own new coalition, which excluded Prime Minister Maliki from its ranks. As discussed above, the formation of the Iraqi National Alliance, along with this new and diverse Maliki bloc, illuminated a clear re- alignment on Iraq's political landscape. For the pro-Iranian alliance, it meant that the grand coalition of Shi'ite parties, which had held sway since the end of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003, would now have a serious challenge. At the same time, the political implications for Prime Minister Maliki were clear. If he wanted to stay on as head of government after the parliamentary elections set for January 2010, he had no choice but to forge some sort of alliance himself, as discussed above.

The elections of 2010 would answer the question of whether or not Iraq was undergoing some sort

Iraq Review 2016 Page 146 of 609 pages Iraq of socio-political transformation. Would the hardened Shi'ite forces prevail and be able to form the next government without Maliki, and thus, with a new head of government at the helm? Indeed, a victory by the new Shi'ite bloc in January 2010 would intensify Iran's influence in Iraq at a time when United States forces would be withdrawing from the scene. A victory by the new Shi'ite bloc could also enflame tensions further, with Sunnis feeling increasing alienation from the dominant Shi'a population. Or would Maliki hold on to power, albeit with a new bloc of support? That new bloc was marked by the inclusion of a diverse collection of players and parties on the Iraqi political scene, and could herald a government that is no longer reliant on any one ethnic or sectarian enclave having undue power in this complicated society.

On Oct.11, 2009, three car bombs killed at least 26 people and injured more than 80 others in the Iraqi city of Ramadi. Two of the three detonated within 10 minutes of each other outside Ramadi police headquarters, killing at least eight police officers. Within an hour, the third attack ensued when a suicide car bomb exploded at a hospital in Ramadi. Just after the attacks were carried out in the predominately Sunni city, which is also the capital of Anbar province, Iraqi authorities closed off all the entrances to the city and instituted a curfew. While there was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attacks, al-Qaida in Iraq was named as the likely suspect. Anbar police Chief Gen. Tariq Yusuf placed the blamed on generic "terrorists" and warned of further violence ahead of the 2010 parliamentary elections. He said, "They want to destabilize the situation in Anbar generally before the election."

On Oct. 19, 2009, United States defense officials said that they would cancel the expected deployment of 3,500 soldiers to Iraq as a result of the improving security situation in that country. Those soldiers were set to deploy to Iraq at the start of 2010 but, based on the assessment by General Raymond Odierno, the Pentagon said that Iraqi security forces should be able to protect their citizens and institutions without the addition of the United States troops.

Ironically, this announcement came a week before suicide bombings in Baghdad left more than 150 people dead and another 500 people wounded. The attacks on Oct. 25, 2009, were carried out by suicide bombers who detonated a truck bomb at a busy intersection and a car bomb in a parking area. The attacks appeared to be coordinated and targeted the Justice Ministry, the headquarters of the provincial government, as well as local government ministries. It was the worst violence in a single day in the Iraqi capital city since April 2007 when close to 200 people died in truck bombings in Baghdad.

For his part, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki placed the blame on the terror enclave al-Qaida, as well as loyalists of former president Saddam Hussein. He said, "These cowardly terrorist attacks must not affect the determination of the Iraqi people to continue their struggle against the remnants of the dismantled regime and al-Qaeda terrorists." Iran's foreign ministry said the attacks "aim to wreck stability and the process of reinforcing democratic structures." The attacks appeared to be part of the increased violence plaguing the country ahead of democratic elections set for early

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2010. Indeed, the bombs exploded just as senior politicians were meeting to try to resolve a standoff on laws related to those election.

The rising tide of violence was also linked with the anticipated withdrawal of United State combat troops from Iraq in 2010, with a full withdrawal in 2012. In a statement, United States President Barack Obama said: "I strongly condemn these outrageous attacks on the Iraqi people, and send my deepest condolences to those who have lost loved ones. The American president expressed outrage over the attacks, saying, “These bombings serve no purpose other than the murder of innocent men, women and children, and they only reveal the hateful and destructive agenda of those who would deny the Iraqi people the future that they deserve."

At the start of November 2009, Iraqi parliamentarians were unable to agree on amendments related to a national election law, essentially placing the prospects of elections scheduled for Jan. 16, 2010, in doubt. At issue was a disagreement over the voting system. There was little concurrence among Iraqi parliamentarians on whether to use the closed system of only party tickets on the ballot, as was the case in the 2005 elections, or, if an open system using the name of candidates contesting parliamentary seats should be used instead. Also of concern has been a dispute over seat allocation of rival Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen in ethnically-diverse Kirkuk.

But by the close of the first week of November 2009, the Iraqi parliament was able to find some agreement on the structure of the national election law. Central to the election reform deal were two provisions. First, electoral lists would contain the name of politicians and not anonymous party tickets. Second, results would be provisional in Kirkuk and other provinces where there were ethnically complex populations.

The spirit of optimism over this breakthrough was short-lived since the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq decided to boycott the country's national elections, in order to protest the treatment of parliamentary seat allocation for the provinces. Then, Sunni Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi vetoed a section of the election law affecting seat allocation of refugees, minority ethnic groups, and smaller parties. Hashemi said he took the action out of concern for his Sunni constituents. These two developments contributed to the decision by the Iraq's election committee to halt all of its activity and refer the situation to the parliament for reconsideration.

The electoral timeline conundrum met its most substantial roadblock on Nov. 25, 2009, when Iraq's Independent Electoral Commission announced that it was now too late to meet the constitutional requirement for passage of an electoral bill ahead of the January 2010 elections. Specifically, it was now past the 60 day threshold to pass such legislation. Consequently, the holding of the January 2010 elections appeared to be out of reach.

But the volatile "on again/off again" saga of the Iraqi elections took a turn for the better in early December 2009 when the Iraqi parliament unanimously approved a new electoral law, following a

Iraq Review 2016 Page 148 of 609 pages Iraq special late-night session in which legislation was finally passed only minutes before the midnight deadline. The foundation for the new electoral law was brokered jointly by the United Nations and the United States embassy. It included a veto withdrawal from Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi thanks to the inclusion of a new amendment, which was characterized as containing fair provisions for Iraq's minority groups.

The deputy speaker of parliament first announced that the election might now take place on Feb. 27, 2009 -- a month after the original election schedule. Days later, on Dec. 9, 2009, a three-panel council approved the changes to the electoral law but delayed election further until March 7, 2009. It was yet to be seen if this new election date would indeed come to pass. If no agreement was forged, the elections would have been delayed, and the stability of the country would have been at stake. The United Nations has warned it would not endorse the election without the passage of a national election reform bill, while there have been worries that without such legislation, the expected timeline for the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq could be affected.

On Dec. 8, 2009, a series of bombings in the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad yielded a heavy death toll with at least 112 people dead and around 200 people injured, according to the Iraqi Interior Ministry. The first explosion was due to a car bomb in the Dora district and was followed by four other car bombs across Baghdad. The second explosion was at the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, then two more explosions occurred in the commercial centers of Nahdha and al-Qashla Square, with the fifth explosion taking place just outside the Civil Court in Baghdad the .

On Dec. 18, 2009, Iran briefly seized control over an Iraqi oil well. Reports stated that Iranian troops entered the southern part of Iraq and raised the Iranian flag over the Fakkah oil field. Iraq's Deputy Interior Minister Ahmed Ali al-Khafaji first denied these actions took place but subsequently confirmed that the Iranian troops were in Iraq and had control of the oil well. Iraqi officials then appeared to downplay the incident by saying that the area at stake was a disputer border region. On the other side of the equation, Iran denied taking control of any oil well inside Iraqi territory.

On Dec. 30, 2009, twin suicide blasts in a high security area of Ramadi in the Iraqi province of Anbar left 24 people dead. Most of the victims were police although the provincial governor, Qassim Mohammed, was among the 60 people who were wounded. The attacks appeared to have targeted the provincial government infrastructure. In the first attack, a suicide bomber in a car caused the first blast at a security checkpoint close to administrative buildings. In the second attack, a suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his body under an army uniform as he charged into a crowd surrounding the governor. The location of the attack -- Ramadi in Anbar - - was of particular note since it was at the center of the Sunni insurgency until tribal leaders turned against al-Qaida in Iraq, and instead began working with joint Iraqi and American authorities to improving the security situation. While Anbar was touted as a model of increasing stability within

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Iraq, the upsurge of attacks here in recent times -- ahead of the 2010 elections -- has been a source of concern. Months earlier in October 2009, Ramadi was the site of a triple bombing that also exacted a sizable casualty list.

Note: In a separate attack, a roadside bomb left six Shi'ite pilgrims in Khalis dead.

Recent Developments

On Jan. 25, 2010, a series of car bombs left at least 36 people dead and 71 others wounded at three hotels and an apartment building in Baghdad. The coordinated attacks struck the Palestine, Sheraton and Hamra hotels of the capital city. It was unclear as to if the attacks were carried out by Sunni insurgents in response to the execution of Ali Hassan al-Majid or "Chemical Ali," the cousin of former Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, who orchestrated the poison gas attacks that killed more than 5,000 Kurds in 1988.

Also in January 2010, the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission ordered that more than 500 Iraqi politicians be prohibited from contesting the March 2010 parliamentary elections due to their supposed links to Saddam Hussein's Baath party. That decision left several Sunni secular leaders, as well as some Shi'a politicians, out of contention, and earned criticism from the international community.

On Feb. 3, 2010, an Iraqi appeals panel ruled in favor of allowing hundreds of candidates with alleged ties to former President Saddam Hussein's regime to participate in the country's parliamentary elections set for March 2010. The ruling postponed a review of the politicians on the "banned" list, essentially allowing them the ability to contest the elections, and effectively nullifying the decision by the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission.

But a day after the appeals panel ruled in favor of the banned candidates, the Iraqi government weighed into the equation. The government said that allowing politicians with ties to Saddam Hussein's regime to contest the country's elections was both "illegal" and "unconstitutional."

By Feb. 11, 2010, the situation remained unresolved and still volatile since the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission moved forward with the printing of the ballots despite the fact that the appeals process in the courts was not completed. Then, a day later, the situation grew more tense as an advocacy group accused Iraqi soldiers and members of the national police of violating election law by distributing campaign propaganda. Ultimately, the ban on those believd to be associated with the Ba'ath Party prevailed on election day, as discussed below.

During the third week of February 2010, the Sunni wing of Iraq's main non-sectarian political coalition announced that it was likely withdrawing from the elections. The Iraqi Front for National Dialogue charged that the vote would be illegitimate, given the aforementioned ballot purge. While

Iraq Review 2016 Page 150 of 609 pages Iraq the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue did not expressly urge Sunnis to boycott the impending parliamentary elections, it did nonetheless call on other political parties to withdraw from the vote. That call was quickly heeded by at least one other party -- the National Council for Tribes of Iraq.

Earlier, on February 3, 2010, a series of suicide bombings in the Iraqi city of Karbala left at least 20 Shi'a pilgrims dead and scores more injured. The pilgrims were traveling to the Imam Hussein shrine to commemorate Arbaeen when the suicide bomber drove a car laden with explosives into the crowd, detonating the bomb. The attack occurred two days after a female suicide bomber killed more than 40 people and wounded at least 100 others in north-eastern Baghdad. The violence was thought to be linked to impending parliamentary elections, now set for March 2010.

The second week of February 2010 saw the Iraqi Shi'a holy city of Najaf subjected to a spate of bombings. The city has been a important stopping point for Shi'a pilgrims. The attacks, which left scores of people injured, appeared to be the latest evidence of violence against Shi'a Muslims. Earlier in the month, coordinated bombings left more than a dozen people dead in Karbala. In both cases, Sunni Ba'athist militias that could be affiliated with al-Qaida have been blamed.

Around a dozen people were killed and 20 others were wounded as a result of a suicide bombing in the Iraqi city of Ramadi -- the capital of the western Anbar province -- in the third week of February 2010. Four policemen and one girl were reportedly among those who died. The attack took place a a checkpoint in close proximity to government offices and courts. Meanwhile, in the northern city of Mosul, a car bombing close to a police station injured more than 20 people, including 15 police. While overall violence across Iraq has seen a decline in the last year, there has been something of an uptick as the country prepares for elections later in 2010. Indeed, the political situation in Iraq has become more tense as Shi'ites and Sunnis spar over the issue of a possible ban against some candidates associated with the Ba'ath Party that held sway during the regime of Saddam Hussein, when the minority Sunni population controlled the balance of power in Iraq. Without resolution on this matter, the country risked backsliding into sectarian conflict and violence.

Meanwhile, on February 10, 2010, Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani ordered employees of the United States security firm, Blackwater, to leave the country within seven days. As reported by al-Iraqiya television, the Iraqi cabinet minister said, "About 250 guards working for the security company Blackwater have been dismissed and given seven days to leave Iraq."

Blackwater, now called Xe Services, gained notoriety due to its role as a private security contractor in Iraq with clients including personnel of the United States Department of State. Blackwater became a source of controversy with its reputation was severely tarnished due to accusations that it had used excessive force. Indeed, in once case in September 2007, in the aftermath of a car bombing, Blackwater guards reportedly opened fire on unarmed Iraqi civilians at Nissor Square in Baghdad, ultimately leaving 17 people dead.

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The incident fueled the rage of local Iraqis and the perceived climate of impunity in which Blackwater had been allowed to operate. To that end, Blackwater's guards charged with protecting American embassy personnel were given immunity from prosecution in Iraqi courts. On the United States side of jurisdiction, the United States government accused five Blackwater guards of causing the deaths of unarmed civilians. However, that case did not progress due to a ruling by a United States judge who decided to drop the criminal charges against them. The matter re-ignited Iraqi outrage and resulted in the decision to attempt to sue the company.

At the start of March 2010, attention was on the impending parliamentary vote. With violence on the rise in the months leading up to the much anticipated elections, security was increased across the country, with close to one million military and police personnel deployed to key areas. Notably, 200,000 security personnel were to be deployed in Baghdad alone. As well, internal travel was restricted across the country, with vehicles banned and the border with Iran closed. For some time, there have been fears that security gains made in the last year could well be reversed. Indeed, there were prevailing anxieties that Iraq could backslide into a state of ethno-sectarian war.

While one Sunni militant group, Army of Naqishbandi, said it was laying down arms for two weeks so that Iraqis could participate safely in the parliamentary elections, it was clear that other groups did not hold such a view. Indeed, on March 3, 2010, two car bombs exploded close to government buildings in Baquba, to the north of Baghdad. In the first attack, the suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden vehicle at a checkpoint close to a government housing office and a police station. In the second attack, another car bomb exploded at the headquarters of the provincial council. More than 30 people died as a result and dozens more were wounded. After injured victims were taken to a hospital for treatment from these two bombings, the hospital itself found itself to be a target of a third attack when a suicide bomber -- dressed in a police uniform -- detonated the explosives strapped to his body.

On the first day of early voting, several people were killed. Suicide bombers targeted polling stations in various locations across Baghdad such as Mansur and the city center. In one case, a mortar attack was apparently aimed at a polling station and landed in a crowded market. Early voting -- ahead of the official March 7, 2010 date -- was scheduled to allow government employees, prisoners, and hospital patients to cast their ballots.

2010 Parliamentary Elections and Government Formation

Summary --

Iraqi citizens went to the polls on March 7, 2010, to vote in the second parliamentary elections since the 2003 United States-led invasion of that country. Iraq has been without a new government since that time as a result of an ongoing power battle between the main political factions. While the

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Sunni-backed secular Iraqiya bloc won the most votes, ahead of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's , Maliki was able to form an alliance with the followers of Shi'ite cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, effectively positioning the incumbent prime minister to remain in office. The Iraqiya bloc rejected the notion of a government dominated by the Shi'a alliance, leading to consternation among the parties with vested interests. By November 2010, efforts were afoot to form a government of national unity and avoid re-igniting ethno-sectarian tensions. However, despite optimistic hopes, the opening of parliament was marked by a walkout of key members of the Iraqiya bloc.

Background --

Iraqi citizens went to the polls on March 7, 2010, to vote in the second parliamentary elections since the 2003 United States-led invasion of that country. The elections occurred at a significant moment in Iraq's political landscape, with United States military forces due to withdraw most of its combat troops by the middle of the year, and a full withdrawal anticipated by 2011. With varied political blocs expected to win representation in parliament, a coalition would likely have to be forged. Whether or not this complicated political terrain would result in more diverse and representative governance was yet to be seen. Without a clear winner, there was speculation that an alternative scenario would involve heightened ethno-sectarian tensions, effectively setting the stage for a resurgence of conflict.

The main coalitions contesting the elections were as follows --

- State of Law Coalition (Shi'ite dominated bloc includes Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Dawa Party, several Sunni tribal leaders, Kurds and several individuals)

- Iraqi National Alliance (major Shiite-dominated bloc including Ammar al-Hakim's Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), followers of anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, leading members of Dawa Party, and former Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress)

- Iraqiya List (multi-sectarian alliance led by former Prime Minister , a secular Shiite, and including Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi and Salah al-Mutlak's National Dialogue Front, which earlier threatened to withdraw from the election on the basis of discrimination)

- Iraq's Unity Coalition (headed by Shi'ite Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani but includes key Sunni figures, such as Ahmad Abu-Risha, the leader of Sunni militia "Awakening Councils" of Anbar province.

- Kurdistan Alliance (composed primarily of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Kurdistan Autonomous Region's President Massud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani)

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- Iraqi Accordance Front (Sunni-dominated bloc that includes Iraqi Islamic Party, parliament speaker Ayad al-Samarrai, along with several other Sunni politicians)

The State of Law Coalition's strongest challenges were expected to come from the Iraqi National Alliance and Iraqiya List. The Unity Coalition was also expected to gain seats in the parliament, while the Kurdistan Alliance was expected to retain control over several parliamentary seats. By contrast, the Iraqi Accordance Front was expected to suffer diminished representation.

In the background of these prognostications resided the controversy surrounding a move to prohibit certain parties from contesting the elections. At issue was the January 2010 decision by the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission, which prohibited more than 500 Iraqi politicians from contesting the elections due to alleged ties to Saddam Hussein's Baath party. That decision left politicians out of contention and garnered criticism from the international community. A month later, a court overturned the ban; however, this ruling was itself ultimately reversed. As a result, Salah al-Mutlak of National Dialogue Front was banned from contesting the election due to connections with the Ba'ath Party of which he was a former member. His party had threatened to withdraw from the election as a result. The matter exacerbated already strained tensions between the main ethno-sectarian groups, with Sunnis alleging discrimination.

Voting Day --

On the official voting day -- March 7, 2010 -- Iraqis went to the polls amidst the threat of violence with bombings and mortar attacks across the country -- from Baghdad to Mosul, Fallujah, Baquba and Samarra -- killing more than 35 people. Indeed, voter participation was reported to be more than 60 percent. United States President Barack Obama hailed the elections as a "milestone" in the recent history of Iraq, saying: "Today's voting makes it clear that the future of Iraq belongs to the people of Iraq." He continued, "Today, in the face of violence from those who would only destroy, Iraqis took a step forward in the hard work of building up their country."

The United States president also reiterated his expressed intent to withdraw combat troops from Iraq in August 2010, with a full withdrawal expected by the close of 2011. United States Army General Ray Odierno echoed the president's stance in saying that the election was, indeed, a milestone would set the path forward towards the goal of withdrawing troops from Iraq. Odierno said, "Unless there's a catastrophic event, we don't see that changing." He continued, "We believe we're right on track."

On the domestic front, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki dismissed the attacks, characterizing them as "only noise to impress voters," and asserting that "Iraqis are a people who love challenges" and whose morale would not be weakened. He also called for full participation in the country's fledgling democracy, and urged all politicians and parties to accept the election results saying, "He who wins today may lose tomorrow and he who loses today may win tomorrow." Those words were not likely to be easily accepted by some factions. Notably, former Prime Minister Ayad

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Allawi of the Iraqiya List registered his discontent with the conduct of the elections, charging: "There was major confusion inside and outside Iraq in the voting centers and that leaves a question mark over the [electoral commission's] role."

Election results --

As the initial vote count ensued, there appeared to be a close contest between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's bloc and the coalition of his secular challenger, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. The preliminary tallies from Iraq's 18 provinces were a setback to hard-line religious Shi'ite political leaders who saw al-Maliki's State of Law coalition enjoying victories in two southern provinces of Basra and Najaf. The incumbent prime minister's bloc was also said to be leading in Babil, Muthanna, Karbala, as well as the capital region of Baghdad. The outcome of the vote count in Baghdad was expected to be pivotal due to high number of parliamentary seats there. At the same time, Allawi appeared to be drawing on Sunni support north of Baghdad, and also in former Sunni insurgent strongholds of Anbar, Diyala and Salahuddin. His Iraqiya bloc was leading in several other provinces such as Nineveh. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Alliance won eight of the 12 seats in the ethnically divided province of Kirkuk, although Allawi's bloc was also performing well there. The Kurdistan Alliance was also performing well in Irbil and Dahuk.

It should also be noted that there were a number of election complaints that had been issued, according to international election monitors on the ground. Seizing upon this news, Allawi's coalition, Iraqiya, said there were incidences of fraud, which were described as "unjustifiable and illegal procedures to distort the will of the people."

The general view during the ongoing vote count was that some sort of coalition government was likely to be formed. As well, there was some chance that Prime Minister Maliki would retain power at the helm of a Shi'ite dominated coalition. However, he would also be tasked with bringing the Sunni minority into the fold of his government, or risk them feeling alienated from the power base in Iraq. Such an end would only imperil the country's security by igniting already- festering ethno-sectarian tensions.

During the third week of March 2010, election results showed a shift of fortune for those in political power in Iraq. Prime Minister Maliki was running neck and neck with former Prime Minister Allawi. President Jalal Talabani and Prime Minister Nouri Maliki supported calls for a manual recount of the votes. This call was rejected by election officials. In an interview with BBC News, Saad el-Rawi of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) said, "It can't be done, it can't, we can't start all over again and count the votes manually." He continued, "We don't say it's impossible but it will take a lot of time."

By late March 2010, with the vote count complete, it was announced that former Iraqi Prime

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Minister Iyad Allawi's secular bloc had won the most seats in Iraq's parliamentary elections. His coalition garnered a small but significant advantage of•two more seats than the coalition of incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki -- 91 seats to 89 seats.•With this advantage Allawi was expected to be positioned to form the new government, although it would inevitably be a coalition government because he did not have an outright majority. At stake was control over at least 163 seats in the 325-seat parliament.

But the main focus has been on the Sadrist bloc -- those linked with militant Shi'a Moqtada al-Sadr -- who garnered 40 seats in parliament. Their surprisingly strong performance at the polls positioned them to potentially play kingmaker in the government formation process. To that end, the Sadrists said they would conduct a non-binding referendum to determine their supporters' preference for Iraq's new prime minister. While they were unlikely to support Allawi, whose secular bloc included many Sunnis, they were not keen on Maliki keeping his job. In fact, reports suggested that the Sadrists were offering to give their support to Maliki's State Law Coalition only if the incumbent prime minister promised to step down from office. Ultimately, in the Sadrists' vote, both Allawi and Maliki finished in the bottom rungs of that poll. Instead, the non-binding referendum resulted in a win for former Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who has said that he would ally himself with Maliki. Meanwhile, Iraqiya's small lead was itself compromised by the fact that several of its victorious candidates have been accused of having ties to the banned Ba'ath Party, and were at risk of being disqualified.

By late April 2010, election officials in Iraq ordered a manual recount of the votes cast in Baghdad following claims by Prime Minister Maliki that the electronic vote count system was unreliable. Maliki filed a legal challenge on the basis of this charge and the court ruled in his favor. It was not yet known if the recount in Baghdad would alter the final results of the election. Not surprisingly, pro-Maliki factions were touting the possibility of a shift in fortune, while Allawi warned of ramifications if the election results were overturned. He said, "If this happens, there will be very big problems in the country."

Shi'a dominated coalition formed; recount confirms victory for Sunni-backed bloc --

Following Iraq's inconclusive parliamentary elections, attention was on the vote count, recounts and the formation of possible ruling coalitions. To that end, by May 4, 2010, the State of Law alliance, led by Iraq's incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, reportedly formed a coalition with the Iraqi National Alliance (INA). According to initial results, the State of Law won 89 seats and the Iraqi National Alliance garnered 70 seats in the recent parliamentary elections. Together, the two blocs would have control over 159 seats -- effectively bringing them closer to the requisite 163 seats to form a new government. This potential coalition would be a serious threat to the governing aspirations of former interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, whose cross-sectarian Iraqiya List bloc won 91 seats in the elections and the largest single bloc in the parliament. In addition to the purely political tensions that were likely to rise from shutting Allawi and his substantial parliamentary members out of office, ethno-sectarian dissonance was likely to be sparked by the notion of a Shi'a

Iraq Review 2016 Page 156 of 609 pages Iraq dominated coalition taking power and alienating the Sunni minority that cast its lot with the Allawi bloc. In the background of these developments were the ongoing unresolved election disputes, including the disqualifications of some seat-winning candidates and a recount of ballots in Baghdad province.

While the formation of the Shi'a coalition discussed above would position Maliki to retain the reins of power, his case would not be helped by developments in mid-May 2010. Following the completion of a partial recount of the votes cast, Iraq's electoral commission confirmed the close victory of a Sunni-backed secular bloc led by former Prime Minister Allawi -- the Iraqiya List. This official victory served to legitimize Allawi’s competing claim on power. Even if Maliki was able to reach another agreement to secure the handful of seats needed to command a majority in parliament, he would be faced by an infuriated rival bloc that actually won the plurality of seats (not including possible coalition partners). Was Maliki willing to risk possible repercussions? Indeed, the ethno-sectarian dimension of the equation would be of key importance, making the landscape in Iraq fertile ground for a resurgence of conflict.

Post-election developments --

On June 1, 2010, Iraq's Supreme Court approved the results of landmark elections, effectively clearing the way for the convening of the country's new parliament. While this development reified the slim victory of the secular Iraqiya alliance, headed by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, there was still no end to the coalition-building process with an eye on a future government of Iraq. At issue were the inconclusive results of the March 2010 parliamentary election, which produced no outright winner, and has failed to facilitate the formation of a coalition government. By mid-June 2010, the 325 members of the Council of Representatives were sworn into office, but the session was immediately suspended pending the election of a new speaker. Deciding who would hold that particular position, along with that of prime minister, would be part of the complex negotiations aimed at producing a power-sharing deal.

In August 2010, the al-Iraqiya bloc of former Prime Minister Allawi announced that it was suspending talks with the Shi'a-led State of Law alliance of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, which garnered the second most seats following the elections. The reason for the suspension of the negotiations appeared to reside with a television interview in which Maliki characterized al-Iraqiya as being the Sunni party of Iraq. In fact, although Allawi's al-Iraqiya bloc contains some senior Sunni politicians such as Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi, it has always been expressly secular in its orientation. Thus, al-Iraqiya interpreted Maliki's statement as a blatant attempt to heighten ethno-sectarian tensions. The result has been a political realm fraught with uncertainty about Iraq's future government, within a larger context of insecurity, especially manifest in a rise in violent attacks.

On Oct. 1, 2010, the Iraqi Shi'ite National Alliance nominated incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki as its candidate for the position of prime minister position. With militant Shi'ite cleric,

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Muqtada al-Sadr -- in self-imposed exile in Iran -- agreeing to support Maliki, it was all but certain that the incumbent prime minister would head the new government. The state-run television station of Iraq referenced Hassa al-Senied, a member of the Shi'ite allied bloc, as saying, "The National Alliance picked the head of the State of Law Coalition Nouri al-Maliki as its candidate to head the next government." Senied also hinted that a new government, headed by Maliki, would be one marked by "national unity and partnership," including various factions of the political sphere of Iraq.

Such an inclusive government was not immediately regarded as a realistic goal since the secular bloc, headed by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, said it would not join any government headed by Maliki. Indeed, following the closely-contested elections several months earlier, it was Allawi's Iraqiya bloc that won the most seats -- 91 -- while Maliki's bloc garnered two seats less in the 325- seat parliament. Allawi also made it clear that he would not recognize the Shi'ite National Alliance, which has been composed of Maliki's State of Law coalition (89 seats) and the Iraqi National Alliance (70 seats), which together would have control over 159 seats in parliament. According to a ruling by the federal court, which Allawi rejected, the largest bloc in parliament -- whether by single party or coalition of parties -- could be positioned to form a government.

On Oct. 17, 2010, former Prime Minister Allawi took aim at the Shi'ite National Alliance's relationship with Iran. He accused Iran of attempting to manipulate the political process, saying, "I can say categorically that Iran is trying even to bring about change to the political process according to their wishes and requirements." He condemned rival Iraqi politicians -- a veiled reference to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki -- for gaining Tehran's approval prior to forming the next government. To this end, Prime Minister Maliki was expected to travel to Iran in what some have characterized as an effort to shore up Shi'ite support for an Iraqi government with him at the helm. During an interview on al-Arabiya television, Allawi said, "I won't be begging Iran to agree upon my nomination." He also demanded that Iran stay out of the Iraqi political scene and "not impose or support one faction over the other."

At the international level, there have been anxieties about a Shi'a dominated government in Iraq, with close ties to Iran. Several Sunni Arab countries have indicated some worries about two Shi'a government leading large Middle Easter countries. Notably, Jordan's King Abdullah -- a Sunni Arab -- conspicuously refused to endorse Maliki for a second term in office. Western powers have worried that Iraq's Sunni and other minority communities would not react well to being left out of the power equation, especially after a strong election performance, and possibly igniting ethno- sectarian tensions. Nevertheless, as noted by the Associated Press, the Maliki political faction was reported to be dismissing advice by the United States that the government formation process be deliberate and inclusive, and instead looking to Iran for sanction. Accordingly, the geopolitical balance in the region was in a transitional mode.

Pressure was brought to bear on the political process when in October 2010, Iraq's high court ruled

Iraq Review 2016 Page 158 of 609 pages Iraq that parliament would have to resume its sessions, the political infighting notwithstanding. With the knowledge that they were legally bound to resume parliament and proceed with the political formation process, there were reinvigorated efforts to find a political resolution.

Government formation process --

On Nov. 10, 2010, the political impasse was breached as the Sunni-backed Iraqiya alliance, headed by Allawi, agreed to participate in the new Shi'a dominated government. In so doing, they were also agreeing to a second term in office as head of government for incumbent Prime Minister Maliki. The decision Allawi's Iraqiya Alliance to join the government was quite a reversal on positioning, given the secular bloc's strong negative pronouncements about a Shi'a dominated government headed by Maliki. But such a reversal had already occurred among the Shi'a ranks with Sadrists formerly rejecting the idea of Maliki staying on as prime minister, yet later backing such a plan. Earlier, the Kurdish alliance expressed support for the new government, headed by Maliki.

With the Sunni-backed Iraqiya secular bloc, as well as the Kurdish factions, now backing the proposed Maliki leadership, Iraq was actualizing the United States' recommended path of forming an inclusive government. Thus, there were high hopes that participation from a wider cross-section of ethno-sectarian groups would ease brewing sectarian divisions. In specific terms, this would mean that a government of national unity was in the offing, presumably with tops posts shared among Shi'as, Sunnis, and Kurds among others. As already discussed here, Maliki would carry on as prime minister, but Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, would also continue on as president. The post of parliamentary speaker would go to the Iraqiya bloc. Speaking with an air of optimism on Nov. 10, 2010, Prime Minister Maliki said of impending government formation processes, "Tomorrow in parliament, it will be the beginning of forming not just the government, but forming the Iraqi state." He continued, "God willing, we will go ahead.

But despite this hopeful tone, later in the month, when the government formation process actually moved forward in the parliament, key members of the Iraqiya bloc walked out of the chamber in process. At issue for the Sunni-backed secular bloc was a demand (ultimately rejected) that the first vote involve the official dissolution of the decisions made by the de-Baathification program, which led to three members of the Iraqiya bloc being banned from taking government positions. Instead, the first vote dealt with the presidency and soon thereafter, with Allawi gone from parliament, Talabani was inaugurated as president. Clearly, political tensions continued to prevail on the Iraqi scene. Nevertheless, by Dec. 21, 2010 -- several months since the elections and the ongoing political stalemate that emerged from it, the Iraqi parliament finally approved a unity government with Maliki at the helm as prime minister. The government included representatives of the three major groups in Iraq -- Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds.

Editor's Note --

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Iraq was without a new government since the time of the parliamentary elections, several months earlier in 2010, through close to the end of the year. The power battle between the main political factions had been ongoing since the March 2010 elections. In June, an attempt to move forward with the government formation process was short-circuited in parliament. The October 2010 announcement about the Shi'a alliance only served to underline the sectarian and political divisions. But also in October 2010, Iraq's high court ruled that parliament would have to resume its sessions, the political infighting notwithstanding. It was believed that the court decision placed pressure on all the parties with vested interests to find common ground and a resolution to the political deadlock. As well, the rise in attacks on Christians in Iraq may have reminded the people of Iraq of the kind of bloodshed and violence that plagued the country in the years following the ousting of Saddam Hussein from office. That reminder may have also served to pressure the parties at stake to reach an agreement, in the interests of national security. As discussed here, a coalition government with incumbent Prime Minister Maliki at the helm was formed by the end of 2010.

Other Post-Election Developments (2010)

The government formation process -- the matter of which parties would join the coalition government -- as discussed above, was complicated by rising anxieties about the rise of ethno- sectarian violence. Indeed, only hours before the election results were announced, two bombs exploded in the town of Khalis in Diyala province, killing at least 40 people and leaving more than 60 injured. Meanwhile, Maliki again alleged irregularities and called for a recount; he also defiantly declared that his bloc would move forward with its own plans to form a government.

The city center of Iraq's capital of Baghdad was hit by three suicide car bombs on April 4, 2010. More than 40 people died as a result and at least 200 others were injured. The bombs appeared to have targeted foreign embassies and came a month after Iraq's parliamentary elections. The embassies of Egypt, Germany, Spain and Syria in the Mansour district appeared to have been affected. At the time of writing, it was not known who was responsible, however, there were suggestions that insurgents may have wanted to show that Iraq was still an unstable country, even as the sensitive post-election government formation process was ongoing. Indeed, the day before, on April 3, 2010, a village to the south of Baghdad was the site of another attack when gunmen open fire on people linked with an anti- al-Qaida militia. About 25 people died in that incident. Then, on April 6, 2010, at least 35 people died and 140 were injured when seven massive bomb exploded at residential buildings in a predominantly Shi'ite part of Baghdad. The spate of attacks raised the specter of a return to ethno-sectarian strife in Iraq, which was still waiting to determine who would form the next government of the country.

In the third week of April 2010, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki and United States Vice President Joe Biden respectively announced the death of two al-Qaida leaders in Iraq, as a result of a successful joint Iraqi-American operation. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki described the operation

Iraq Review 2016 Page 160 of 609 pages Iraq as follows: "The attack was carried out by ground forces which surrounded the house, and also through the use of missiles." He continued, "During the operation computers were seized with e- mails and messages to the two biggest terrorists, Osama bin Laden and [his deputy] Ayman al- Zawahiri." The deaths of Abu Ayyub al-Masri -- the leader of Iraqi al-Qaida -- and Abu Omar al- Baghdadi -- the leader of an affiliate group -- were characterized as "potentially devastating blows" to al-Qaida in Iraq, according to Vice President Biden. The American vice president also noted that the joint operation was illustrative of the improved security capacity of Iraqi forces. Soon thereafter, these claims were boosted by the announcement of the killing of a third al-Qaida player -- Ahmed al-Obeidi who has been an al-Qaida leader in the northern province of Nineveh.

Clearly, the deaths of al-Masri, al-Baghdadi and al-Obeidi were the most notable from among the al-Qaida leadership in Iraq since 2006 when the former leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was killed. At the time, Zarqawi's death was hailed as a milestone in the fight against the terrorist group's insurgency, however, it was only with the escalation of United States troops in Iraq after that there was any substantial abatement of the violence plaguing that country.

As if to signal a similar fate, only days after the Iraqi and United States authorities announced these three deaths, scores of people died in a spate of bomb attacks on April 23, 2010 in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. More than 100 others were injured in the bomb blasts that occurred close to Shi'a mosques during prayer time. Indeed, two bombs were detonated close to the offices of radical Shi'a cleric Moqtada Sadr. The locations and targets of the attacks suggested that al-Qaida in Iraq may have been retaliating against the deaths of the three members of their leadership. However, even if al-Qaida in Iraq was not to blame, it was clear that the attacks would likely inflame ethno- sectarian tensions between Shi'ites and Sunnis in Iraq ahead of the anticipated withdrawal of United States forces from that country.

On May 10, 2010, more than 100 people died and 350 were injured after Iraq was struck by a spate of deadly shootings and suicide bombings. Indeed, May 10 garnered the dubious distinction of being the worst day of violence in Iraq in the first part of 2010.

The central city of Hilla was the site of the worst violence with 45 people dead and 140 wounded as a result of three bomb attacks at a textiles factory. The first two bombings occurred in succession, but as bystanders and emergency personnel sought to help the victims, a third suicide bomber detonated explosives in a third attack. In the capital of Baghdad, there was a series of drive-by shootings that targeted police and members of the armed forces. Most of those attacks ensued at checkpoints and were carried out by gunmen using silencers attached to their weapons. In other violence across Iraq, there was a double suicide bombing in a crowded market in the town of Suwayra, which left at least 11 people and wounded more than 40 others. In the southern oil hub of Basra, three car bomb attacks killed at least 20 people and wounded dozens. In Falluja -- a predominantly Sunni enclave, two bombs left four people dead. Attacks were also reported in Iskandiriya to the south of Baghdad, and in the northern city of Mosul.

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There was speculation that the political stalemate following the inconclusive parliamentary elections (discussed above) may have set a foundation for the violence, with al-Qaida seeking to exploit the political instability. Indeed, most of the violence on May 10, 2010, was blamed on al- Qaida in Iraq. The situation showed that although authorities successfully killed two high ranking members of the terrorist organization only a month before, al-Qaida was still a powerful and destructive force on the Iraqi scene.

At least 15 people died and more than 50 others were injured as a result of an attack on Iraq's central bank in Baghdad on June 13, 2010. Band employees were among those killed although there were also suggestions that five gunmen also detonated explosives strapped to their bodies. Reports from the ground indeed indicated bomb blasts. There were also reports that gunmen tried to storm the building, becoming embroiled in violent clashes with police. The attack occurred ahead of the convening of the new Iraqi parliament; this timing suggested that the attack may have been carried out by insurgents intent on disrupting the political process.

On June 20, 2010, a twin suicide car bombing in the Yarmouk district of Baghdad left more than 30 people dead and at least 50 others injured. The attacks ensued when the two vehicles exploded simultaneously in close proximity of a state-owned Trade Bank, severely damaging not only that building but also nearby office buildings, including an office of the Interior Ministry. While suspicion quickly fell on al-Qaida in Iraq as being the group behind the attacks, the target of the attack yielded suggestions that it may have been a means of covering up a money laundering operation. That being said, the suicide car bombings came in the aftermath of an attack on the Iraqi Central Bank, and a day after three roadside bombs exploded in the Shi'a district of Hurriya, killing two people and wounding several more.

On July 9, 2010, a suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden car at a military checkpoint in Baghdad leaving at least five people dead, including three soldiers. The attack took place in western Baghdad's mainly Sunni district, which was once regarded as a stronghold for militants.

The bombing came after a succession of attacks on Shi'a pilgrims in Baghdad left approximately 60 people dead. In the most deadly case, a suicide bomber targeted Shi'a pilgrims in a Sunni district called Adhamiya yielding a death toll of 35. Elsewhere in the capital city, bomb attacks left two dozen people dead. Despite the clear danger, Shi'a pilgrims appeared undeterred and continued to gather at the shrine of Imam Musa Kadhim, a Shi'ite saint believed to have been assassinated while in captivity in 799.

On July 18, 2010, a suicide bomber killed more than 40 people and injured another 40 in the Radwaniya neighborhood to the southwest of the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad. The target of the attacks appeared to be members of the Sunni Awakening Councils or Sahwa, which turned against al-Qaida and allied themselves with the government in recent years. In fact, the reduction in the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 162 of 609 pages Iraq overall level of violence in Iraq has been attributed to the cooperation of the Awakening Councils or Sahwa. But clearly, this alliance with government forces has also brought with it a high risk of revenge-oriented attacks from al-Qaida in Iraq, the type of which have been on the rise in 2010. Indeed, in this case, the suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his vest just as the council members were lining up at the main gate of a military base, waiting to receive their salaries. Among the dead were council members, soldiers and accountants. Elsewhere in Iraq, a separate suicide attack left three people dead at a meeting of Sunni leaders.

In late July 2010, an Al-Qaida affiliate claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Baghdad headquarters of the Al-Arabiya television station. At least six people died on July 26, 2010, during that attack. On its website, the Islamic state of Iraq said that the operation had been carried out by a "hero of Islam" and characterized Al-Arabiya as "corrupt." Based in Dubai, the Arabic-language channel commands popularity across the Middle East despite the perception that it has a pro- Western orientation. Days later on July 29, 2010, four soldiers were killed and at least 10 others were injured when a suicide attacker drove a bomb-laden bus through the entrance of an Iraqi army base close to Tikrit -- the hometown of former Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein.

In mid-August 2010, gunmen killed four Iraqi police officers during a spate of shootings at security checkpoints across the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad. Days later, an attack on an army recruitment center yielded a higher casualty list. Taken together, these events were the latest examples of increased violence in Iraq since the parliamentary elections were held months earlier and ahead of the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq.

On August 11, 2010, eight Iraqi soldiers died when the house they were about to raid exploded in the northern province of Diyala. Just days later on August 14, 2010, the capital city of Baghdad saw a series of attacks at security checkpoints. In one of the checkpoint attacks, two off-duty police officers were shot to death as they slept in their car, which was itself set ablaze. In another attack, two members of the Sahwa "awakening council" or government-backed militia were killed in an attack at a security checkpoint. In these cases, the blame rested on al-Qaida terrorists who have carried out revenge attacks in recent times.

On August 17, 2010, around 60 people died and more than 100 others were wounded as a result of a suicide attack on an army recruitment center in the center of Baghdad. Soldiers were among the victims at the recruitment center, which was once used as the defense ministry during the rule of former President Saddam Hussein and which saw a series of small bombings only a week earlier. The suicide bomber approached the army recruitment center where hundreds of people were lined up for several hours in desperate hope of forging an army career in a country wracked by high unemployment. While there was no immediate claim of responsibility, as before suspicion fell on al-Qaida in Iraq.

The timing of this suicide bombing on August 17, 2010 appeared to coincide with the al-Iraqiya

Iraq Review 2016 Page 163 of 609 pages Iraq bloc's decision to suspend talks on forming a coalition government, following Iraq's parliamentary elections. In those elections held five months earlier, the secular al-Iraqiya bloc, led by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, narrowly won the most seats but the government formation process since that time has been laborious and without clear signs of resolution.

Indeed, on August 15, 2010, the al-Iraqiya bloc announced that it was suspending talks with the Shi'a-led State of Law alliance of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, which garnered the second most seats following the elections. The reason for the suspension of the negotiations appeared to reside with a television interview in which Maliki characterized al-Iraqiya as being the Sunni party of Iraq. In fact, although Allawi's al-Iraqiya bloc contains some senior Sunni politicians such as Vice- President Tariq al-Hashemi, it has always been expressly secular in its orientation. Thus, al- Iraqiya interpreted Maliki's statement as a blatant attempt to heighten ethno-sectarian tensions. The result has been a political realm fraught with uncertainty about Iraq's future government, within a larger context insecurity, especially manifest in a rise in violent attacks.

It should be noted that there has, indeed, been a dramatic decrease in the level of violence plaguing Iraq in recent times with a clear decline from the peak of the sectarian conflict in 2006- 2007. However, attacks have continued to occur with disturbing regularity, and there have been fears that incidences of violence were creeping up in numbers. By way of illustration, the United Nations released a report on July 8, 2010 noting that in 2009, 4,068 civilians were killed and 15,935 injured in violence in Iraq, demonstrating a decline in violence, according to the country's Ministry of Human Rights. However, since the latter part of 2009, the trend has been going in a somewhat negative direction. The United Nations report stated: "This represents an overall decrease in comparison to 2008. However, the second half of 2009 saw a large increase in the number of injured civilians when compared to the first half."

While the checkpoint attacks do not compare in scope to the truck bombings and suicide attacks, all such incidents appeared aimed at destabilizing the political landscape after the elections and ahead of the end to combat operations in Iraq at the close of August 2010, which was to be followed by the withdrawal of all United States troops -- including those in support and advisory roles -- from that country at the end of the year.

On August 25, 2010, a spate of more than two dozen attacks by bombers and gunmen across Iraq left at least 60 people dead. The attacks appeared to target security forces -- police officers and soldiers -- sparking suspicions that militant extremist insurgents wanted to intimidate Iraqi forces tasked with keeping the country stable after the exit of United States forces. An added rationale for the attacks on security forces might reside in the desire to destabilize the country as the political factions struggled to form a government in the aftermath of close parliamentary elections earlier in the year. Other analysts have suggested a desire by insurgents to translate political chaos into political influence. As noted by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari: "Here you have a government paralysis, you have a political vacuum ... you have the U.S. troop withdrawal. "And,

Iraq Review 2016 Page 164 of 609 pages Iraq in such (an) environment, these terrorist networks flourish." It should be noted that in recent times, attacks on security forces have increased with August 2010 holding the dubious distinction of being the deadliest month for police and military in Iraq in two years. According to a calculation by the Associated Press, approximately 265 security personnel — Iraqi military, police and police recruits, and bodyguards — died from June through August in 2010; this was a marked increase from the180 killed in the previous five months.

On September 19, 2010, two car bombs exploded almost simultaneously in the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad, leaving at least two dozen people dead and more than 100 others wounded. One of the blasts occurred in the residential district of Mansur in the western part of Baghdad, while the other blast took place at the Aden junction close to a national security office in the northern part of the capital. Earlier in the day, central Baghdad saw violence also as rockets were fired in the direction of the Green Zone where government and military installations are located, along with embassies of several countries.

On September 26, 2010, a car bomb in the former insurgent stronghold of Fallujah left four policemen dead. Fallujah -- once a hotspot at the height of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq years ago, had in the last few years been touted as an example of improved security. However, in recent weeks, Fallujah had been the site of a number of clashes between Iraqi security forces and Sunni extremist insurgents. As such, there was growing anxiety that the insurgents might be attempting to regain control of their former turf. Meanwhile, in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, a government worker died as a result of an ambush along a highway at the hands of militants. As well, an explosion in Baghdad's religiously mixed Karradah neighborhood left one person dead and several others injured. Elsewhere in Iraq, in the northern city of Mosul, a drive-by shooting by a gunman resulted in the deaths of two brothers.

On October 1, 2010, the Iraqi Shi'ite National Alliance nominated incumbent Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki as its candidate for the position of prime minister position. With militant Shi'ite cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr -- in self-imposed exile in Iran -- agreeing to support Maliki, it was all but certain that the incumbent prime minister would head the new government. The state-run television station of Iraq referenced Hassa al-Senied, a member of the Shi'ite allied bloc, as saying, "The National Alliance picked the head of the State of Law Coalition Nuri al-Maliki as its candidate to head the next government." Senied also hinted that a new government, headed by Maliki, would be one marked by " national unity and partnership," including various factions of the political sphere of Iraq.

But such an inclusive government may not actually be a realistic goal since the secular bloc, headed by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, said it would not join any government headed by Maliki. Indeed, following the closely-contested elections several months earlier, it was Allawi's Iraqiya bloc that won the most seats -- 91 -- while Maliki's bloc garnered two seats less in the 325-seat parliament. Allawi has also made it clear that he would recognize the Shi'ite National Alliance

Iraq Review 2016 Page 165 of 609 pages Iraq which has been composed of Maliki's State of Law coalition (89 seats) and the Iraqi National Alliance (70 seats), which together would have control over 159 seats in parliament. According to a ruling by the federal court, which Allawi rejected, the largest bloc in parliament -- whether by single party or coalition of parties -- could be positioned to form a government.

On October 17, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, the leader of the secular Iraqiya bloc that garnered the most votes in the March 2010 parliamentary elections, accused Iran of trying to destabilize Iraq. In an interview with Fareed Zakaria on CNN, Allawi said that Iran was fomenting unrest in Iraq, Lebanon and among Palestinians. He said countries in the region of the Middle East were "falling victim to ... terrorists who are definitely Iran-financed." He continued, "We know that unfortunately, Iran is trying to wreak havoc on the region."

Allawi also said that Iran was attempting to manipulate the political process, saying, "And definitely in Iraq, I can say categorically that Iran is trying even to bring about change to the political process according to their wishes and requirements" He condemned rival Iraqi politicians -- a veiled reference to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki -- for gaining Tehran's approval in forming the next government. To this end, Prime Minister Maliki was expected to travel to Iran in what some have characterized as an effort to shore up Shi'ite support for holding onto his post as head of government. Such support was clearly needed as Jordan's King Abdullah -- a Sunni Arab -- conspicuously refused to endorse Maliki for a second term in office. During an interview on al- Arabiya television, Allawi said, "I won't be begging Iran to agree upon my nomination." He also demanded that Iran stay out of the Iraqi political scene and "not impose or support one faction over the other."

Nevertheless, as noted by the Associated Press, the Maliki political faction was reported to be dismissing advice by the United States that the government formation process be deliberate and inclusive, and instead looking to Iran for sanction. Accordingly, the geopolitical balance in the region was in a transitional mode.

In late October 2010, a suicide bombing left at least 25 people dead and dozens more injured in the town of Balad Ruz in Diyala province to the town north of Baghdad. The area has been home to ethnic Kurds of Shi'ite background. The suicide bomber had explosives strapped to his body, which he detonated at a cafe as patrons sipped tea and played dominoes.

Around the same period, gunmen held dozens of people hostage at a Catholic Church in Baghdad, demanding the release of jailed militants from the terror enclave, al-Qaida. The dire situation got worse when Iraqi authorities decided to storm the church with an eye on rescuing the hostages since there had been threats that they would be killed by their captors. According to Iraqi authorities, the gunmen released a statement asserting that Iraqi Christians would be "exterminated" if Muslims in Egypt were not released. The gunmen were acting on behalf of the Islamic State of Iraq, which claimed responsibility for the incident.

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As noted just above, when Iraqi authorities decided to storm the church to rescue the hostages, more than 50 people died in what was described as a botched rescue attempt; included in the death toll were six of the gunmen. In an interview with BBC News, Iraqi Defense Minister Abdul-Qadr al-Obeidi explained the government's decision as follows: "We took a decision to launch a land offensive, and in addition an airdrop, because it was impossible to wait - the terrorists were planning to kill a large number of our brothers, the Christians who were at Mass." He continued, "So the operation was successfully done. All terrorists were killed. And we now have other suspects in detention." From the Vatican, Pope Benedict XVI condemned the actions of the hostage takers.

Days later on November 3, 2010, Islamic extremists characterized Christians in the Middle East as "legitimate targets," essentially encouraging attacks on people belonging to that minority religion in the region. As reported by CNN, the group released a message that read as follows: "The Ministry of War of Islamic State of Iraq declares that all the centers, organizations and bodies of Christian leaders and followers have become legitimate targets for the mujahedeen (holy warriors), wherever our hands will reach them.

Meanwhile, on November 2, 2010, a series of about 10 bombings in Baghdad left around 65 people dead and more than 280 others wounded. The attacks, most of which were car bombs although there was at least one roadside bomb, took place in predominantly Shi'a areas of the Iraqi capital city. Taken together, this spate of attacks was the worst violence to plague Iraq in the latter part of 2010. As before whenever violent attacks have surged in Iraq, questions arose about the country's security forces' ability to keep Iraq stable and united.

A week later on November 10, 2010, a series of bombs and mortar attacks were launched against targets in Christian areas of Baghdad. Several people were killed as a result, and scores were injured in violence that stretched across six districts in the capital city. The rise in violence targeting Christians in Iraq has sparked debate among Christian Iraqi communities about whether or not they should remain in the country or emigrate elsewhere. Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the size of Iraq's Christian population has been reduced to half its original size. As before, the Vatican and the United Nations condemned the attacks on Iraq's Christian civilian population.

On December 12, 2010, two separate suicide attacks in Iraq left more than a dozen people dead. In one case, a suicide car bomb exploded close to government offices in Ramadi, located in western Iraq's Anbar province. Policemen and civilians were among the victims. More than ten people died in that attack, while at least 40 others were injured. In the second case, a suicide bomber killed two Shi'a pilgrims in the central Iraqi town of Baquba. Both victims -- a father and son -- were preparing to mark the Shi'a celebration of Ashura. The two attacks occurred at a time when Iraqi Nouri Maliki has been ensconced in the process of forming a government several months after a close and contentious election.

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On December 27, 2010, two suicide bombers detonated explosives in front of a government office in the western Anbar province of Iraq. In one case, a suicide bomber drove an explosives-packed bus into the government compound in Ramadi. The second attack occurred when a suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his body as bystanders gathered in the aftermath of the original explosion. Nine people were killed as a result and at least 50 others were wounded. The site of the bombings -- Anbar provincial headquarters -- saw bloodshed only weeks prior, and was hit twice even earlier in the year. Blame for these two successive suicide attacks quickly rested on al-Qaida in Iraq, which has sought to destabilize the Iraqi authorities, given the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq. In a separate incident on the same day, three members of the same family died as a result of a roadside bomb just outside the town of Dujail, to the north of Baghdad.

Special Report:

U.S. ends combat operations in Iraq after seven and a half years

In the early hours of August 19, 2010 (Iraq time) the last major combat brigade of United States forces left Iraq and crossed the border into Kuwait. They were protected from above by Apache helicopters and F-16 fighters, and on the ground by both American military and the very that they helped to train. The exit of the United States forces ensued in a phased basis over the course of several days. The final convoy of the United States Army’s 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, was carrying 14,000 United States combat forces in Iraq, according to Richard Engel of NBC/MSNBC News, who was embedded with the brigade. A small number of United States combat troops were yet to depart Iraq, and approximately 50,000 troops would remain in Iraq until the end of 2011 in a support role to train Iraqi forces. Indeed, by Aug. 24, 2010, less than 50,000 United States troops were reported to be "in country" -- the very lowest level since the start of the war in 2003.

While violence continued in Iraq -- even in the days after the last American combat brigade left Iraq -- it was apparent that the Obama administration in the United States would not be deterred from the schedule for withdrawal, these fragile and chaotic conditions on the ground in Iraq notwithstanding. This decision has been a source of consternation among some quarters. In fact, a top military official in Iraq has questioned the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq, warning that local security forces were not able to handle the security challenges on their own for at least a decade. Echoing a similar tone, military officials from the United States said in an interview with the Los Angeles Times that it was highly unlikely that Iraqi security forces were capable of maintaining Iraq's fragile stability after the exit of United States troops from Iraq in 2010. Nevertheless, the citizenry in the United States was war-weary and concerned over the costs of war at a time of economic hardship, while President Barack Obama was intent on making good on his promises made while as a candidate and later, as president, to end the war.

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The withdrawal of the last major combat brigade was regarded with great symbolism as an end to the combat mission of the war in Iraq that has gone on for seven and a half years. It also made clear that President Obama was fulfilling his central campaign promise to end the war in Iraq -- a vow that was reiterated in 2009 when President Obama set the deadline for the end of the combat mission in Iraq as Aug. 31, 2010. To this end, President Obama was fulfilling this promise even though Iraq was yet to form a new government several months after its parliamentary elections. It should be noted that the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq was set forth in the Status of Forces agreement signed two years ago.

President Obama gave a televised address on August 31, 2010 regarding the end of the active phase of United States operations in Iraq. That was the official deadline set by President Obama for the exit of combat forces from Iraq and the end to the war.

In this address to the nation from the Oval Office, President Obama asserted: "Operation Iraqi Freedom is over, and the Iraqi people now have lead responsibility for the security of their country." President Obama paid tribute to the military who carried out their mission, saying that he was "awed" by the sacrifices made by the men and women in uniform in service of the United States. President Obama additionally noted that the United States itself paid a high price for the Iraq War saying, "The United States has paid a huge price to put the future of Iraq in the hands of its people." The president noted that he disagreed with his predecessor, former President George W. Bush, on the very premise of the war, but urged the nation to "turn the page" on that chapter of recent history. To these ends, he said: "We have sent our young men and women to make enormous sacrifices in Iraq, and spent vast resources abroad at a time of tight budgets at home... Through this remarkable chapter in the history of the US and Iraq, we have met our responsibility. Now, it is time to turn the page."

For his part, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki noted that his country was "independent" and said that Iraqi security forces would now confront all the security threats facing the nation. Maliki said in his own address to the nation, "Iraq today is sovereign and independent. Our security forces will take the lead in ensuring security and safeguarding the country and removing all threats that the country has to weather, internally or externally." He also sought to reassure Iraqis that the security forces were "capable and qualified to shoulder the responsibility" of keeping Iraq safe and secure.

Special Entry

United Nations lifts sanctions on Iraq

It should also be noted that in December 2010, the United Nations Security Council lifted sanctions against Iraq. The vote ended most of the measures comprising a harsh sanctions regime that had been held in place for almost two decades, starting with the time of Iraq's 1991 invasion

Iraq Review 2016 Page 169 of 609 pages Iraq of Kuwait during the era of Saddam Hussein. In its statement, the United Nations Security Council said that it "recognizes that the situation now existing in Iraq is significantly different from that which existed at the time of the adoption of Resolution 661." Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said of the move, "Today Iraq will be liberated from all sanctions caused by wars and misdeeds of the former regime.” Meanwhile, United States Vice President Joe Biden, who acted as chairman of the meeting, said: "Iraq is on the cusp of something remarkable -- a stable, self-reliant nation." Striking a more pragmatic tone, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon noted that Iraq would yet have to forge an agreement with Kuwait in regards to its border, and would also have to resolve the matter of war reparations. To date, five percent of Iraq's oil revenues have been used to pay war reparations to Kuwait.

Developments in 2011:

On Jan. 19, 2011, a suicide bomber used an ambulance to target Iraq police during an attack in Baquba. As many as 14 people died as a result. A day earlier, a suicide bomber killed approximately 60 people at a police recruitment centre in Tikrit -- the home of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Both attacks took place in an area known as the "Sunni Triangle" -- a stronghold of Iraq's insurgency. Around the same time, a third suicide bombing ensued in the town of Ghalbiyah, as a crowd of Shi'a pilgrims walked from Baghdad to the holy city of Karbala. In this case, at least two people were killed and more than 15 others were injured. Karbala was the site of further bloodshed on Jan. 20, 2011, when car bombs left at least 50 people dead and more than 150 others wounded. Those blasts occurred along routes used by Shi'a pilgrims participating in the Shi'a Muslim commemoration of Arbaeen.

Then, on Jan. 23, 2011, a series of car bombings across Baghdad left several people dead or injured. One car bombing took place close to a hotel; a second attack seemed to target a bus carrying Iranian pilgrims, while a third car bomb appeared to target a police patrol.

On Jan. 27, 2011, a car bomb at a funeral in a predominantly Shi'a area of Baghdad left more than 40 people dead and several scores more injured. It was the latest attack on Shi'ites in a relatively short space of time as Shi'a pilgrims made their way to the holy city of Karbala. Several victims on the scene in this case attacked police for failing to provide adequate protection.

On Feb. 9, 2011, the northern Iraqi oil city of Kirkuk was hit by three bomb attacks. At least seven people died, including two policemen, and more than 70 others were wounded in the bombings that exploded in succession close to the Kurdish security headquarters. In the first attack, a suicide bomber drove a truck into the surrounding wall of the aforementioned Kurdish security headquarters. The second attack was marked by an explosion close to a gas station. The third attack occurred on the same street as the initial bombing. While there was no immediate responsibility for the bombings, theBBC has noted that in recent times, the militant terrorist group,

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Ansar al-Islam, has threatened to carry out attacks. Kirkuk, a multi-ethnic city composed of Kurds, Turkmen, and Arabs, and noted for its oil reserves, has been a particularly favored targets for various insurgent and terrorist groups operating in Iraq.

On Feb. 12, 2011, a suicide bomb attack on a bus close to the Sunni-dominated city of Samarra left close to 30 people dead. Most of the victims were Shi'a pilgrims, with women and children among the victims; they were about to leave a Shi'a shrine to the 9th century imam Hassan al- Askari. Two days earlier, at least eight people were killed in Dujail when a car bomb exploded as Shi'a pilgrims journeyed to Samarra to mark the anniversary of the aforementioned imam's death. The city of Samarra has been particular target of Sunni militant insurgents since it was home to the famous gold-domed mosque, which was destroyed in a brutal bombing attack in 2006. That event is believed to have sparked the 2006-2007 wave of massive sectarian violence and bloodshed.

While violence has generally decreased, attacks still plague the country. The latest flare-up of violence was a test for the newly-established Iraqi government, which was trying to show the world that the security situation in this country was improving. Indeed, Iraq was planning to host an Arab summit in March 2011 and hoped to showcase the country as one on the road to stabilization. Clearly, such attacks only serve to undermine the government. Note that United States forces completed their combat operations in Iraq in August of 2010 and their complete withdrawal remained on track for later in 2011.

On Feb. 25, 2011, coming on the heels of the successful "Jasmine Revolution" in Tunisia and the "Nile Revolution" in Egypt, as well as the uprising in , thousands of protesters took to the streets in cities across Iraq to participate in anti-government demonstrations. Approximately 10 people were killed in what was being referred to as Iraq's "day of rage." In Baghdad, the city was under lock down with no traffic allowed to move through the city and soldiers patrolling the streets. The previous day, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had asked people to stay away from the protests for security reasons, and blamed extremist elements of trying to destabilize the country with their calls for mass action. That being said, some people participated in small-scale protests in Baghdad where the call was for reform rather than regime change. The main demands of the protesters included improved law and order, more job opportunities, as well as better infrastructure. Overall, the protests in Baghdad were not violent -- perhaps due to the security precautions taken; however, elsewhere in the country, such as Mosul, Falluja, and Kirkuk, things turned violent with at least ten people reported to have died across Iraq.

Meanwhile, on Feb. 5, 2011, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki announced that he would not seek a third term term in office after his mandate expires in 2014. Prime Minister Maliki acquired his latest mandate following inconclusive parliamentary , which spurred a contentious and difficult government formation process that lasted a full nine months. As political turmoil brewed in the Middle East region -- with protesters taking to the streets in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and to demand democratic reform -- it was possible that Prime Minister Maliki was trying

Iraq Review 2016 Page 171 of 609 pages Iraq to foreclose any further contretemps over his leadership role.

For his part, Prime Minister Maliki indicated that two four-years terms were sufficient and also promised the inclusion of a new clause in the constitution ensuring term limits for prime ministers in Iraq. He said, "I support the insertion of a paragraph in the constitution that the prime minister gets only two turns, only eight years, and I think that's enough." Prime Minister Maliki also directly addressed the unrest in the region saying, "One of the characteristics of a lack of democracy is when a leader rules for 30 or 40 years. It is a difficult issue for people, it is intolerable and change is necessary." In further moves aimed at showing good faith with the Iraqi people, Prime Minister Maliki additionally announced that he would return half his salary to the country's treasury. The prime minister said that it was a gesture intended to acknowledge the income gap between the rich and the poor in Iraq.

See above for special coverage of the 2010 parliamentary elections in Iraq, as well as the government formation process. As discussed above, by December 2010, a new coalition government had been formed, with incumbent Prime Minister Maliki positioned to stay on at the helm of government. The government included representatives of the three major groups in Iraq -- Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds.

At the close of March 2011, violence returned to the fore in Iraq. On March 29, 2011, a group of men carried out an audacious assault on a government building in Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit. The attack began with a car explosion aimed at creating a diversion before the gunmen launched an assault on the provincial council building in Salahuddin. The gunmen, who were dressed in military uniforms, identified themselves as soldiers at a security checkpoint; once on the premises of the provincial council office, they opened fire on security guards and hurled grenades. The attack evolved into a five-hour standoff and ended when the gunmen blew themselves up with the explosives strapped to the insides of their uniforms. Up to 56 people died and close to 100 others were injured as a result. Included among the dead were 15 hostages whom the attackers subjected to execution-style killings, an elderly legislator on the religious affairs committee of the provincial council, the chairman of the health committee, a councilman who was known to have expressed opposition to extremism, and a journalist who has worked for al-Arabiya, Reuters and CNN. The attackers also set fire to the bodies of three victims. United States troops in the area on an advisory mission responded to the scene but were eventually relieved by Iraqi soldiers. The brutal assault appeared to be partially intended to intimidate civilians and demonstrate the ability of al-Qaida aligned insurgents to carry out attacks. Perhaps not surprisingly, the parliament of Iraq called for an investigation into the attack and the disturbing breach of security.

At the close of April 2011, a suicide bomber killed at least eight people and injured dozens more inside a mosque in Iraq's Diyala province. The blast ensued following evening prayers in Balad Ruz, located to the northeast of Baghdad.

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In the first part of May 2011, a prison revolt at a Baghdad jail left at least 14 people dead. On May 8, 2011, inmate Huthaifa al-Batawi was being moved from his cell to an office for questioning when the al-Qaida militant grabbed a gun from a prison guard, shot him, and effectively sparked a gun battle that went on for several hours. Batawi, the aforementioned prison guard, a general and a lieutenant colonel, were among the dead when the bloody clash was over. Batawi had been in prison for orchestrating the massacre at a Baghdad Roman Catholic church in October 2010 which ended in a heavy death toll.

Around the same period, five people died and another five were injured in gun and bomb attacks in Baghdad and Iraq's Diyala province. In Diyala, gunmen dressed in military uniforms broke into a house in the provincial capital city of Baquba, and executed two men there. To the north of Baquba, a bomb attached to a minibus exploded and left at least one person dead and others injured. In a separate incident, a shepherd was killed when gunmen opened fire on him outside the town of Qara-Taba to the northeast of Baghdad.There, in the capital city, a roadside bomb exploded in the Doura district, killing a civilian and wounding three others.

Then, on May 19, 2011, three bombs exploded in the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk. The attacks appeared to have targeted security forces and left around 30 people dead and scores more wounded. Surrounding buildings and cars were damaged in the explosions. Two bombs were detonated in succession close to a police station; some of the victims of those attacks were police who rushed out of the police compound in response to the first of those two explosions. Blame was quickly placed on al-Qaida for these attacks.

In the third week of June 2011, suicide bombers and gunmen attacked a provincial council building in Baquba, leaving at least eight people dead.

As June entered its final week, two car bombs rocked central Iraq, leaving at least 25 people dead. The attacks occurred in mainly Shi'a Diwaniya, to the south of Baghdad, and appeared to target police checkpoints just outside the provincial governor's compound. Provincial Governor Salim Hussein Alwan escaped unharmed, however, a number of police were among the 25 victims. According to security officials, the bombs were scheduled to be detonated as the governor's convoy departed for work; the governor's life may have been spared because he was delayed inside the garage when the car bombs exploded.

Elsewhere in the country on June 21, 2011, a bomb exploded in a restaurant in Mussayab, killing five people and injuring 10 others. At a joint United States-Iraqi base in Baghdad, three civilians were injured when militants fired rockets at the facility. In Ramadi, in the mainly Sunni Anbar province, there were reports of two car bombs. Police were able to defuse only one of the two bombs.

On June 26, 2011, a suicide bomber in a wheelchair detonated the explosives strapped to his vest at a police station on the northern outskirts of Baghdad, leaving about two people dead and at least

Iraq Review 2016 Page 173 of 609 pages Iraq a dozen others injured, including nine policemen.

In the first week of July 2011, there were dual attacks on a government building in the town of Taji close to Baghdad; at least 35 people died as a result and dozen others were wounded. The first bombing occurred at the parking lot of the municipal office. Once witnesses and emergency responders arrived on the scene, a second explosion occurred as a result of a car bombing. Meanwhile, there was a rocket attack on the heavily fortified Green Zone, which left three women and two children people dead and at least ten people injured. The rocket landed on the compound of the al-Rasheed hotel at the edge of the Green Zone just as United States officials convened at the nearby embassy for Independence Day celebrations.

On July 16, 2011, separate attacks in Iraq's eastern Diyala province, the holy city of Karbala, and the capital of Baghdad, left an Iraqi police officer dead and several civilians wounded. In one case, gunmen ambushed a police officer close to his residence in Jalula; the police officer died at a hospital during treatment. In another case, a roadside bomb hit a minibus near to Andalus Square in central Baghdad; that attack left six people injured. In a third case, a roadside bomb exploded at central Baghdad's Allawi Square, wounding two civilians on board.

In the holy city of Karbala, nine people died and 70 others were wounded as a result of car bombs. These attacks occurred as Shi'a pilgrims gathered for a religious festival of Shabaniya, which marks the birthday of the last imam, Mohammed Ibn Hassan al-Mahdi. Only a day earlier, two car bombs killed six people just north of Karbala. The sectarian nature of the gathering in Karabala cast blame on Sunni al-Qaida in Iraq as the likely culprits in those cases.

Then, on July 23, 2011, two successive roadside bombs exploded in western Baghdad, leaving two people dead, including one police officer, and eight others wounded. A day later, a police officer was killed and two others were wounded in a bomb explosion in the southern city of Ramadi in the Anbar province, while in Baghdad, gunmen shot a traffic officer dead in the central Karrada district of the capital. In a separate incident in the same area, two police officers and a civilian were wounded in a bombing. In Diyala, a roadside bomb and a gun attack left one civilian dead and three others injured.

On July 29, 2011, 15 people died in the Iraqi town of Tikrit when two suicide bombers carried out attacks in the home town of former leader, Saddam Hussein. The attack occurred just as police and soldiers were collecting their salaries at a local bank. The attack was illustrative of a recent tendency to target local Iraqi security forces at a time when the remaining United States troops were preparing to withdraw from Iraq. While Tikrit is home to a majority Sunni Muslim population, the suspected assailants were Sunni Islamists allied with al-Qaida who have targeted the town repeatedly.

On Aug. 15, 2011, Iraq was his by a spate of deadly attacks. The most deadly of the attacks

Iraq Review 2016 Page 174 of 609 pages Iraq ensued in the southeastern city of Kut where two near-simultaneous bomb attacks targeted the bustling city core and left 34 people dead and injured more than 60 others. The first explosion was caused by a roadside bomb planted in a freezer. Then, as rescuers and witnesses gathered on the scene, the second attack occurred as a car bomb exploded close by. Other attacks took place elsewhere in the country. In the province of Diyala, five bombs left at least 10 people dead. In the holy Shi'a city of Najaf, a suicide car bombing at a police checkpoint killed at least four people. An Iraqi counter-terrorism unit in Tikrit, the hometown of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, was the site of yet another attack. In that case, three policemen were killed and several other individuals were wounded at the hands of attackers wearing explosives-laden vests. An explosion in Kirkuk in the north left at least one person dead, while a bombing in Karbala killed at least two people. In Taji, a car bomb left one person dead, while an explosion in Balad injured more than a dozen people. Baghdad was not immune from the violence as five bombs exploded in the capital. There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the spate of attacks.

On Aug. 26, 2011, a series of attacks swept across Iraq, with Basra, Falluja, and Baghdad among the targets. More than a dozen people were killed as a result. Then, on Aug. 28, 2011, a suicide bomber attacked the Umm al-Qura mosque in the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad, killing around 30 people and leaving at least another 30 others wounded. According to the Associated Press, a member of parliament -- Khalid al-Fahdawi -- was among the dead. The suicide bomber targeted the biggest Sunni mosque in Baghdad during prayers at the close of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

On Sept. 14, 2011, a spate of bomb attacks plagued Iraq, leaving at least 17 people dead and dozens wounded. The most deadly of the attacks occurred in the central city of Hilla where a car bomb was detonated close to a restaurant frequented by security forces; as many as 15 people were killed there including two policemen. At a military base in Habaniya, to the west of the capital, a bomb placed on a bus left two troops dead. In addition to the bombings, gunmen also went on a attack at a Baghdad security checkpoint, killing two policemen.

On Sept. 25, 2011, the Iraqi Shi'a holy city of Karbala was hit by a series of bomb blasts, leaving at least 10 people dead and close to 100 others wounded. One bomb exploded just outside a local government office responsible for supplying identity cards and passports. The attackoccurred as people were gathered outside the building. Then, as emergency personnel arrived on the scene, another series of three bombs exploded around the scene. On the same day, two roadside bombs exploded in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province; at least one person died as a result while six others were injured.

On Oct. 27, 2011, the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad was struck by two explosions, which left close to 20 people dead and about 40 others wounded. The first bomb attack occurred in the predominantly Shi'a district of Ur, while the second blast occurred in the vicinity as emergency responders were evacuating the victims. There was no immediate claim of responsibility.

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On Oct. 30, 2011, Iraq was hit by a number of bombing and gun attacks in the central and eastern parts of the country; four people were killed and eight others were injured as a result. In the area of Abu Ghraib to the west of Baghdad, two soldiers were killed and three others injured when a roadside bomb struck their patrol. In a separate incident, two policemen and two civilians were wounded when a car exploded a police patrol in the central the city of Fallujah. In Iraq's eastern province of Diyala, gunmen opened fire on a house in the town of Bani Sa'ad, killing two men and a woman identified as their mother.

On Nov. 3, 2011, 12 people were killed and another 35 were wounded in separate gunfire and bomb attacks. In Iraq's eastern province of Diyala, a suicide bomber blew up his explosive vest among a group of Awakening Council members at the entrance of an Iraqi army base near the provincial capital city of Baquba. (Note: The Awakening Council group, or Sahwa in Arabic, was composed of armed groups, including influential Sunni insurgent groups, which have opposed al- Qaida militants in the Sunni Arab areas.) As Iraqi security forces gathered at that site to investigate the crime scene, a booby-trapped car exploded at a garage outside the base. On the same day, gunmen attacked an Iraqi army checkpoint in Baghdad's northwestern district of Hurriyah, killing one soldier and wounding another. As well, four people were wounded in two bomb attacks in eastern and southwestern Baghdad. In Iraq's northern province of Nineveh, one person died and another one was wounded when gunmen attacked an Iraqi army patrol in the city of Baaj. In the same province, two individuals were wounded when a gunman hurled a hand grenade close to a police patrol in a marketplace in central Mosul, to the north of Baghdad. In Salahudin province, a soldier was wounded when a roadside bomb exploded close to an Iraqi army patrol in the city of Tuz- Khurmato.

Two days later on Nov. 5, 2011, four people died and about a dozen others were injured in bomb attacks to the north of Baghdad on the house of the leader of the local Awakening Council. The group leader was not at home and so escaped the attack; his brother and wife were among the dead, though, and his home was completely decimated. On the same day, central Iraq was hit by bomb and gunfire attacks. In one case, a bomb on a bus carrying passengers exploded in Baghdad's eastern district of Sadr City, killing one civilian and wounding four others. Meanwhile, three civilians were injured when a bomb exploded inside a residential building in a southwestern Baghdad neighborhood. Also in Baghdad, two civilians were injured when a sticky bomb attached to their car exploded. In Salahudin province, gunmen entered the home of a policeman in the city of Tuz-Khurmato and shot him to death.

On Nov. 6, 2011, at least eight people died and more than 20 others were injured as a result of a series of blasts at the sprawling Shurja market in the Iraqi capital Baghdad, as people were buying food for the major Muslim festival of Eid al-Adha.

On Nov. 26, 2011, a series of bomb explosions around the Iraqi capital of Baghdad left at least 15

Iraq Review 2016 Page 176 of 609 pages Iraq people dead and wounded more than 20 others. As many as three bombs exploded in the commercial district of Bab al-Sharqi in central Baghdad; eight people died as a result of those blasts. On the road between Baghdad and Falluja, two bombs targeted a truck transporting construction workers; the rest of the victims died in those two explosions.

On Dec. 22, 2011, the Iraqi capital of Baghdad was rocked by a spate of coordinated bomb attacks -- 16 in total -- spread across the city from al-Amil in the south to Karrada in the city center. The death toll after these 16 explosions was reported to be close to 70 with at least 185 people sustaining injuries. Several buildings in the areas affected were destroyed by the blasts, which were caused by a mixture of car-bombs and improvised explosive devices. The timing of the attacks -- some of the most deadly in months -- occurred just as the last of the United States troops had departed from Iraq, marking the end of the United States' engagement in that country.

Iraq has seen an increase in attacks since the summer months of 2011, many of which have specifically targeted police and military personnel and interests. In fact, violence spiked from May and continued to date -- now, well into the latter part of 2011. In a general sense, the spate of attacks in Iraq in recent times have been attributed to insurgents seeking to undermine the burgeoning security forces system in Iraq at a time when United states troops were withdrawing from the country. But there were competing theories as to who was responsible for the higher incidence of violence in Iraq against government and security targets. The government placed the blame on al-Qaida in Iraq; however, the United States warned that the surge in violence was partially attributable to Iranian-backed militias.

Regardless of the veracity of any of these claims, the spate of attacks raised questions about the capability of Iraqi forces to maintain the country's security. Indeed, in a report by the United States Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), the Iraqi defense chief, Lieutenant General Babakir Zebari, said that his country would not be fully able to defend itself from external threats until at least 2020. It should be noted that despite the volatile conditions on the ground "in country" and the disturbing acknowledgment from Zebari, United States President Barack Obama announced the redeployment of all American troops from Iraq by the close of 2011. With United States forces setting that date-certain deadline of the close of 2011 to withdraw all troops from Iraq, there have been increased fears about the deterioration of the already-grim security situation in that country.

Special Report

Special Report: It's officially over; United States ends Iraq War

Summary: On Dec. 15, 2011, the flag of United States forces in Iraq was lowered in Baghdad, officially bringing the war to a close. As promised by President Barack Obama, the United States

Iraq Review 2016 Page 177 of 609 pages Iraq military would complete a full withdrawal of its troops from Iraq by the close of 2011. The move, as discussed here, would provide President Obama with the opportunity to assert that he kept of one his most important 2008 campaign promises: to bring the controversial war in Iraq to a responsible conclusion. Speaking at a ceremony at Fort Bragg in North Carolina for troops returning home the previous day, President Obama declared: "The war in Iraq will soon belong to history, and your service will belong to the ages." He additionally noted that his country had left behind a "sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq." At home, Americans were sure to applaud the fact that there would be no more expenditure on former President George Bush's Iraq War, which cost some one trillion USD. Meanwhile, the future course of Iraq -- in terms of political stability, national security, and economic development -- was now in the hands of the Iraqi people.

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U.S. ends combat operations in Iraq after seven and a half years

In the early hours of Aug. 19, 2010, (Iraq time) the last major combat brigade of United States forces left Iraq and crossed the border into Kuwait. They were protected from above by Apache helicopters and F-16 fighters, and on the ground by both American military and the very Iraqi armed forces that they helped to train. The exit of the United States forces ensued in a phased basis over the course of several days. The final convoy of the United States Army’s 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, was carrying 14,000 United States combat forces in Iraq, according to Richard Engel of NBC/MSNBC News, who was embedded with the brigade. A small number of United States combat troops were yet to depart Iraq, and approximately 50,000 troops would remain in Iraq until the end of 2011 in a support role to train Iraqi forces. Indeed, by Aug. 24, 2010, less than 50,000 United States troops were reported to be "in country" -- the very lowest level since the start of the war in 2003.

While violence continued in Iraq -- even in the days after the last American combat brigade left Iraq -- it was apparent that the Obama administration in the United States would not be deterred from the schedule for withdrawal, these fragile and chaotic conditions on the ground in Iraq notwithstanding. This decision has been a source of consternation among some quarters. In fact, a top military official in Iraq has questioned the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq, warning that local security forces were not able to handle the security challenges on their own for at least a decade. Echoing a similar tone, military officials from the United States said in an interview with the Los Angeles Times that it was highly unlikely that Iraqi security forces were capable of maintaining Iraq's fragile stability after the exit of United States troops from Iraq in 2010. Nevertheless, the citizenry in the United States was war-weary and concerned over the costs of war at a time of economic hardship, while President Barack Obama was intent on making good on his promises made while as a candidate and later, as president, to end the war.

The withdrawal of the last major combat brigade was regarded with great symbolism as an end to the combat mission of the war in Iraq that has gone on for seven and a half years. It also made

Iraq Review 2016 Page 178 of 609 pages Iraq clear that President Obama was fulfilling his central campaign promise to end the war in Iraq -- a vow that was reiterated in 2009 when President Obama set the deadline for the end of the combat mission in Iraq as Aug. 31, 2010. To this end, President Obama was fulfilling this promise even though Iraq was yet to form a new government several months after its parliamentary elections. It should be noted that the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq was set forth in the Status of Forces agreement signed two years ago.

President Obama gave a televised address on Aug. 31, 2010, regarding the end of the active phase of United States operations in Iraq. That was the official deadline set by President Obama for the exit of combat forces from Iraq and the end to the war.

In this address to the nation from the Oval Office, President Obama asserted: "Operation Iraqi Freedom is over, and the Iraqi people now have lead responsibility for the security of their country." President Obama paid tribute to the military that carried out their mission, saying that he was "awed" by the sacrifices made by the men and women in uniform in service of the United States. President Obama additionally noted that the United States itself paid a high price for the Iraq War saying, "The United States has paid a huge price to put the future of Iraq in the hands of its people." The president noted that he disagreed with his predecessor, former President George W. Bush, on the very premise of the war, but urged the nation to "turn the page" on that chapter of recent history. To these ends, he said: "We have sent our young men and women to make enormous sacrifices in Iraq, and spent vast resources abroad at a time of tight budgets at home... Through this remarkable chapter in the history of the US and Iraq, we have met our responsibility. Now, it is time to turn the page."

For his part, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki noted that his country was "independent" and that Iraqi security forces would now confront all the security threats facing the nation. Maliki said in his own address to the nation, "Iraq today is sovereign and independent. Our security forces will take the lead in ensuring security and safeguarding the country and removing all threats that the country has to weather, internally or externally." He also sought to reassure Iraqis that the security forces were "capable and qualified to shoulder the responsibility" of keeping Iraq safe and secure.

United Nations lifts sanctions on Iraq

It should also be noted that in December 2010, the United Nations Security Council lifted sanctions against Iraq. The vote ended most of the measures comprising a harsh sanctions regime that had been held in place for almost two decades, starting with the time of Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait during the era of Saddam Hussein. In its statement, the United Nations Security Council said that it "recognizes that the situation now existing in Iraq is significantly different from that which existed at the time of the adoption of Resolution 661." Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said of the move, "Today Iraq will be liberated from all sanctions caused by wars and misdeeds of the former regime.” Meanwhile, United States Vice President Joe Biden, who acted as chairman of the meeting, said: "Iraq is on the cusp of something remarkable -- a stable, self-reliant

Iraq Review 2016 Page 179 of 609 pages Iraq nation." Striking a more pragmatic tone, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon noted that Iraq would yet have to forge an agreement with Kuwait in regards to its border, and would also have to resolve the matter of war reparations. To date, five percent of Iraq's oil revenues have been used to pay war reparations to Kuwait.

U.S. President Obama announces complete withdrawal of troops by close of 2011

On Oct. 21, 2011, United States President Barack Obama announced the complete withdrawal of all American troops from Iraq by the close of 2011. President Obama said his country's nine-year military engagement in Iraq would officially come to an end at that time. He noted that the United States had fulfilled its commitment in Iraq and would bring all American troops home "in time for the holidays."

With the end of United States' combat operations in Iraq in August 2010, the end of the war was believed to be in the offing. That being said, at the time in mid-2010, approximately 50,000 troops remained in Iraq in a support role to train Iraqi forces. Negotiations have been ongoing since that time to forge a deal that would allow them to stay in Iraq to work with Iraqi security forces. However, the United States and Iraq were unable to find concurrence on an agreement allowing United States trainers to remain "in country" and still enjoy immunity. Thus, United States President Obama and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki concluded that the time had come to shift the nature of their bilateral relationship to one marked by respect for mutual sovereignty.

The end of the Iraq war would close a controversial chapter in the story of American foreign policy, which began with George W. Bush's doctrine of "pre-emptive war," undertaken in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Indeed, the invasion of Iraq -- the defining policy decision of former President Bush -- resulted in the ousting of former Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, from office. The invasion of Iraq was criticized as a violation of international law by many, and condemned as ill-conceived foreign policy by others who argued that Iraq had nothing to do with the terror attacks in the United States of 2001, and that Iraq was not home to weapons of mass destruction -- the two expressed reasons for going to war in Iraq, according to the Bush administration. Analysts further warned that the deleterious consequence of the war and the unintended result of the ousting of Saddam Hussein would be ethno-sectarian strife and a strengthened Iran. Of course, on the other side of the equation, the Bush administration insisted on the necessity of the war in the interests of national security. These competing viewpoints notwithstanding, the war in Iraq ultimately left more than 4,400 American soldiers and tens of thousands of Iraqis dead.

As President Bush's successor to the presidency, President Obama has stood as a vocal critic of the Iraq war whose political influence in the war-weary United States intensified due to his pledge to bring an end to the controversial military engagement in Iraq. Clearly, now in 2011, President Obama was honoring a 2008 campaign promise to end the war in Iraq in a responsible manner. Indeed, President Obama said: "The U.S. leaves Iraq with our heads held high." He continued,

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"That is how America's military efforts in Iraq will end."

It should also be noted that the Obama administration has emphasized the fact there will be no permanent military bases in Iraq -- even after the withdrawal of all remaining troops from Iraq at the end of 2011. As well, as stated in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2010 passed by Congress and signed by President Obama on Oct. 28, 2009: "No funds appropriated pursuant to an authorization of appropriations in this Act may be obligated or expended ... to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq." That being said, Iraq is home to one of the United States' most significant embassies.

Flag of U.S. forces in Iraq lowered in Baghdad bringing the war to a close

On Dec. 15, 2011, the flag of United States forces in Iraq was lowered in Baghdad, officially bringing the war to a close. The small, somber, and symbolic ceremony in Baghdad, which focused on the military tradition of retiring or "casing" the flag, marked the end of the Iraq War. On this historic day, only 4,000 troops remained "in country," and were expected to depart Iraq within two weeks. At the height of the United States-led occupation of Iraq, there were as many as 170,000 American troops in that country.

Speaking of the momentous occasion, United States Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said: "To all of the men and women in uniform today your nation is deeply indebted to you." Secretary Panetta paid tribute to the sacrifices of United States' troops saying that they could leave Iraq with great pride. He declared, "After a lot of blood spilled by Iraqis and Americans, the mission of an Iraq that could govern and secure itself has become real."

As promised by President Barack Obama, the United States military would complete a full withdrawal of its troops from Iraq by the close of 2011. The move, as discussed here, would provide President Obama with the opportunity to assert that he kept of one his most important 2008 campaign promises: to bring the controversial war in Iraq to a responsible conclusion.

Speaking at a ceremony at Fort Bragg in North Carolina for troops returning home the previous day, President Obama declared: "The war in Iraq will soon belong to history, and your service will belong to the ages." He additionally noted that his country had left behind a "sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq." The American president also asserted that United States troops had left "with their heads held high" and he lauded their "extraordinary achievement." President Obama said, "Everything that American troops have done in Iraq, all the fighting and dying, bleeding and building, training and partnering, has led us to this moment of success." He continued, "You have shown why the U.S. military is the finest fighting force in the history of the world." At home, Americans were sure to applaud the fact that there would be no more expenditure on former President George Bush's Iraq War, which cost some one trillion USD.

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Iraq -- while now liberated from the dictatorial hand of Saddam Hussein -- was not fully stabilized. Indeed, an insurgency continues to plague the country, which is culturally and politically characterized by ethno-sectarian tensions. There are enduring questions about the Iraqis' ability to maintain security in this country. Nevertheless, Iraq has made it clear that the time had come to end the occupation of their country. Indeed, as stated by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Hussain al- Shahristani, "I think we are all happy that the American soldiers are returning home safely to their families and we are also confident that the Iraqi people and their armed forces, police, are in a position now to take care of their own security."

Clearly, the future course of Iraq -- in terms of political stability, national security and economic development -- was now in the hands of the Iraqi people. That agenda would not be achieved with ease. On Dec. 20, 2011, only one day after the United States withdrew its last combat troops from Iraq, the Shi'a-dominated government of that country ordered the arrest of Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni, on grounds of terrorism. The Iraqi authorities accused al-Hashimi of directing a death squad that assassinated police officers and government officials. The serious charges were sure to damage the coalition government, and indeed, already a Sunni-backed political coalition said that its ministers would resign from their posts, effectively leaving several Iraqi agencies in disarray. While the charges themselves, if true, could not be understood as anything by highly disturbing, another school of thought was warning that the the Shi'a dominated government might be abusing its authority to persecute the minority Sunni in leadership positions, in a bid to consolidate power. For his part, Vice President Hashemi denied any wrongdoing and said he was ready to defend himself against the accusations of terrorism. Vice President Hashemi also wasted no time in accusing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shi'a, of orchestrating a sensational plot to debase him and to undermine the process of national reconciliation. He also warned that the situation could send Iraq -- an incredibly young and fragile democracy characterized by complex ethno-sectarian tensions -- into a state of sectarian war.

Update (late 2011- 2012)

On Dec. 22, 2011, the Iraqi capital of Baghdad was rocked by a spate of coordinated bomb attacks -- 16 in total -- spread across the city from al-Amil in the south to Karrada in the city center. The death toll after these 16 explosions was reported to be close to 70 with at least 185 people sustaining injuries. Several buildings in the areas affected were destroyed by the blasts, which were caused by a mixture of car-bombs and improvised explosive devices.

On Jan. 5, 2012, Shi'ites in Nasiriya and Baghdad were targeted in attacks by insurgents killed about 70 people. In Baghdad, explosives attached to a motorcycle were detonated close to a gathering of day laborers the in Shi'a-dominated Sadr City section of the capital. As rescuers sought to transport victims, further explosions were reported in the area, including a roadside bomb close to a tea shop. Several people died or were injured as a result of these attacks. Only an hour

Iraq Review 2016 Page 182 of 609 pages Iraq later, two car bombs exploded in the largely Shi'a neighborhood of Kadhimiya, leaving 15 people dead and more than 30 others wounded. The deadliest attacks took place close to when a suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his vest in a crowd of Shi'ite pilgrims at a security checkpoint; more than 35 people died and 72 people were injured in that incident alone. The pilgrims were en route to the holy city of Karbala where they were to mark the Shi'a festival of Arbaeen.

The timing of these attacks in late 2011 and early 2012 -- some of the most deadly in months -- occurred just as the last of the United States troops had departed from Iraq, marking the end of the United States' engagement in that country. With the withdrawal of the American forces from Iraq, there has been increased anxiety about the security situation in the country, and heightened fears of the country devolving once again into unmitigated ethno-sectarian conflict. In this case, while there was no conclusive evidence as to who might be behind the spate of brutal attacks, speculation rested on the Sunni terror group, al-Qaida in Iraq, as beingthe likely culprits . The coordinated nature of the attacks, cross-cut by the fact that Iraq was now in a state of fractious politics between the Shi'a prime minister and the Sunni vice president (discussed below), bolstered the belief that al-Qaida was very likely behind the attacks.

In regards to the state of fractious politics in Iraq, , only one day after the United States withdrew its last combat troops from Iraq, the Shi'a-dominated government of that country ordered the arrest of Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni, on grounds of terrorism. The Iraqi authorities accused al-Hashimi of directing a death squad that assassinated police officers and government officials. The serious charges were sure to damage the coalition government, and indeed, already a Sunni-backed political coalition said that its ministers would resign from their posts, effectively leaving several Iraqi agencies in disarray. As well, the entire main Sunni bloc in parliament, al- Iraqiya, was soon boycotting the assembly in protest.

While the charges themselves, if true, could not be understood as anything by highly disturbing, another school of thought was warning that the Shi'a dominated government might be abusing its authority to persecute the minority Sunni in leadership positions, in a bid to consolidate power.

For his part, Vice President Hashemi denied any wrongdoing and said he was ready to defend himself against the accusations of terrorism. Vice President Hashemi also wasted no time in accusing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shi'a, of orchestrating a sensational plot to debase him and to undermine the process of national reconciliation. He also warned that the situation could send Iraq -- an incredibly young and fragile democracy characterized by complex ethno-sectarian tensions -- into a state of sectarian war.

The vice president was reported to be in Irbil, under the protection of the autonomous regional government of Iraqi Kurdistan. Speaking at a news conference there, Vice President Hashimi again denied the charges against him and promised to be vindicated in court. On the other side of the equation, Prime Minister Maliki was calling on the Kurdish region to hand over Hashimi to the

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Iraqi authorities in Baghdad; however, the regional government of Iraqi Kurdistan was not quick to respond. By the start of 2012, officials in Iraqi Kurdistan were indicating that they had no intention of turning over Hashimi to the federal authorities.

Meanwhile, the Sunni al-Iraqiya bloc maintained its boycott of the National Assembly and its representatives continued the walkout from cabinet posts, highlighting the ongoing state of political crisis in Iraq.

On Jan. 24, 2012, four car bombs and a roadside bomb exploded in predominantly Shi'a districts of Baghdad; at least 10 people died and more than 70 others were injured. Two attacks occurred in Sadr City; in one case, a car bomb exploded near a group of laborers; in the second case, a car bomb exploded close to a gas station. The al-Hurriya neighborhood was hit by a car bomb. As well, a roadside bomb exploded in the northwestern Baghdad close to Adan Square. A car bomb in the Shulaa neighborhood marked the fifth attack. Two days later on Jan. 26, 2012, a bomb attack in Kirkuk left at least three people dead. On the same day, two brothers who worked at policemen and several members of their family were killed in a house bombing in Musayyib to the south of Baghdad. Since the start of 2012, more tha 200 people have died in sectarian attacks in Iraq.

On Feb. 19, 2012, a spate of gun and bomb attacks hit the cities of Baghdad, Baquba, and Abu Khamis in Iraq. In a suicide bombing close to the Iraqi Police Academy in the eastern part of the capital city of Baghdad, at least 18 people were killed and more than 25 others were injured as a result. Most of the victims were new recruits to the police force. In the city of Baquba, to the north of Baghdad, four police informants were killed by apparent al-Qaida gunmen. At a checkpoint in Abu Khamis, to the north of Baquba, gunmen killed one policeman and two members of the Awakening Council.

The spate of attacks came after the exit of United States troops in totality from Iraq (at the close of 2011), as well as the early 2012 celebration of the Shi'a holy festival of Arbaeen.

On March 5, 2012, about 40 gunmen disguised in police uniforms drove trucks painted to like police vehicles and launched an attack in the Sunni Muslim city of Haditha in western Iraq. They invaded homes, lobbed grenades, and engaged with security forces in battles at security checkpoints. While one of the gunmen was reported to have died in the attack, most of the others escaped, but not before at least 20 police officers were killed in the carefully planned assault.

On March 20, 2012, Iraq was hit by a spate of suicide attacks and car-bombings that left at least 45 people dead and close to 200 injured across the country. As noted by the New York Times, the wide range of target sites ranged from a Shi'a pilgrimage site in the south to the ethnically diverse oil wealth base in the north. Indeed, the cities of Baghdad, Kirkuk, Karbala, Hilla, Tikrit, Baiji, Ramadi and Falluja were all hit by the wave of attacks. One of the Baghdad explosions occurred

Iraq Review 2016 Page 184 of 609 pages Iraq outside the gates of the Foreign Ministry but fortifications prevented that attack from exacting excessive damage. In the home of a holy Shi'a shrine in Karbala, the news was more grim as a car bomb left a death toll of more than a dozen. Likewise, the oil-rich northern city of Kirkuk saw ten people die in an explosion outside a police station. In Falluja, a bomb at the home of a police officer killed a pregnant woman and wounded her young son.

While there was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attacks, a day later on March 21, 2012, the Islamic State of Iraq -- an entity aligned with the terror enclave, al-Qaida, claimed responsibility for the rash of deadly attacks in a statement published on an Islamic website. "In a new coordinated wave, the lions of Sunnis in Baghdad and other [Islamic State of Iraq] states simultaneously carried out strikes against the security plan announced by the government of the fools in the Green Zone in preparation for the meeting of the Arab tyrants in Baghdad," the statement said. In this way, the statement made direct reference to the Arab League summit, which was to be convened in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad to following week.

It should be noted that March 2012 marked the ninth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, led by the Bush administration in the United States. The subsequent Obama administration made good on its promise to close down the long-running war in Iraq with the complete withdrawal of combat troops and the end of the war at the end of 2011.

On April 4, 2012, Tarik al-Hashimi, the fugitive Sunni vice , arrived in Saudi Arabia. He earlier met with officials in Qatar. It was not known if Hashimi was taking political refuge in Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Since the end of 2011 when Iraqi authorities issued an arrest warrant for him on terrorism charges, Hashimi had been living in the semi-autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq.

At issue was the fact that the Shi'a-dominated government of Iraq accused al-Hashimi of directing a death squad that assassinated police officers and government officials. The serious charges damaged the coalition government. Indeed, a Sunni-backed political coalition at the time in 2011 said its ministers would resign from their posts. As well, the entire main Sunni bloc in parliament, al-Iraqiya, was soon boycotting the assembly in protest.

While the charges themselves, if true, could not be understood as anything by highly disturbing, another school of thought warned that the Shi'a-dominated government might be abusing its authority to persecute minority Sunni leaders in a bid to consolidate power.

For his part, Vice President Hashemi denied any wrongdoing and said he was ready to defend himself against the accusations of terrorism and running a death squad. Vice President Hashemi also wasted no time in accusing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shi'a, of orchestrating a sensational plot to debase him and to undermine the process of national reconciliation. He also warned that the situation could send Iraq -- an incredibly young and fragile democracy characterized by complex ethno-sectarian tensions -- into a state of sectarian war. Hashemi has

Iraq Review 2016 Page 185 of 609 pages Iraq also said that he was not seeking exile outside Iraq; indeed, he has expressed a willingness to face trial in Iraq's northern Kurdish region, although Iraqi judicial authorities have rejected the transfer of the case.

As noted here, the vice president was, for some time, under the protection of the autonomous regional government of Iraqi Kurdistan. At the start of 2012, officials in Iraqi Kurdistan indicated they had no intention of turning over Hashimi to the federal authorities. Now in the spring of 2012, the government of Qatar was similarly refusing to oblige the Iraqi government's demand that Hashimi be handed over to Baghdad. "Diplomatic norms and the post of al-Hashimi prevent Qatar from doing such a thing," said Khalid Al Attiyah, Qatar's state minister for foreign affairs.

It should be noted that Hashemi was greeted in Saudi Arabia by that country's foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, at the Red Sea port city of Jeddah. No further information was available as to the purpose of the visit.

The fate of Hashemi was further internationalized a week later when the president of the Kurdistan regional government, Massoud Barzani, was scheduled to meet with the Iraqi vice president during a visit to Turkey. Hashemi was reportedly in Turkey seeking political support from that country. Presumably, Turkey was the latest destination in the region for the vice president following his visits to Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, fugitive Sunni Vice President Hashimi made news when he accused the Shi'a dominated government of Iraq of torture. At issue, according to Hashimi, were the deaths of his detained bodyguards. In a statement posted on his official website, Hashimi's office claimed that evidence derived from "reliable sources" showed that two of Hashimi's bodyguards died "as a result of severe torture at the hands of the security services to extract false confessions." The statement of Hashimi's website also called for the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) to look into their deaths, as well as the earlier death of a third bodyguard allegedly due to torture during interrogations.

On April 19, 2012, a spate of deadly bomb blasts struck a number of major Iraqi cities including the capital city of Baghdad, as well as Kirkuk, Baquba, Samarra, Dibis, Taji, and Mosul. In Baghdad, five blasts struck a number of Shi'a neighborhoods In Kirkk, two car bombs reported exploded there. In Baquba, a suicide bomber killed a police officer. In Samarra, security forces were targeted in two car bombs in that city. Both Mosul and Taji were subject to roadside device explosions. As well, there was an attack on a convoy in which Health Minister Majeed Hamad Amin was traveling; the Iraqi politician was not injured in that incident. These seemingly coordinated attacks unfolded over the course of less than two hours and left at least 35 people dead and more than 100 others injured.

Iraqi authorities placed the blame for the violence and bloodshed on al-Qaida in Iraq. To that end, an Iraqi military command spokesman, Colonel Dhia al-Wakeel, said in an interview with BBC

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News: "They [al-Qaida] want to send a message that they can target the stability that has been achieved recently. This will not discourage our security forces."

On April 26, 2012, at least eight people died and more than 15 others were injured as a result of two bomb explosions in Iraq's province of Diyala. The attacks ensued in the location of a cafe in a Sunni village near the town of Baquba. The first bomb was detonated outside the cafe by a suicide car bomber; the second bomb was planted inside the cafe.

The cafe bombings occurred a week after a series of blasts struck several Iraqi cities, killing at least 35 people and injuring 100 others. In Baghdad, five blasts struck a number of Shi'a neighborhoods In Kirkuk, two car bombs reported exploded there. In Baquba, a suicide bomber killed a police officer. In Samarra, security forces were targeted in two car bombs in that city. Both Mosul and Taji were subject to roadside device explosions. As well, there was an attack on a convoy in which Health Minister Majeed Hamad Amin was traveling; the Iraqi politician was not injured in that incident. These seemingly coordinated attacks unfolded over the course of less than two hours and left at least 35 people dead and more than 100 others injured.

Iraqi authorities placed the blame for the spate of violence and bloodshed on al-Qaida in Iraq. To that end, an Iraqi military command spokesman, Colonel Dhia al-Wakeel, said in an interview with BBC News: "They [al-Qaida] want to send a message that they can target the stability that has been achieved recently. This will not discourage our security forces." That being said, the attacks close to Baquba appeared to target Sunnis (vis a vis Shi'as), raising the question of whether those attacks were in retaliation for the nationwide attacks the previous week, which did include Shi'a neighborhoods.

On June 4, 2012, suicide bomber reportedly detonated an explosives-packed car in the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad, killing more than two dozen people and injuring several scores more. The bomb attack appeared to target the offices of the Shi'a entity, Waqf (Endowment), which manages Shi'a religious sites and was blamed on al-Qaida in Iraq. Security officials on the ground said that the explosives-laden vehicle was parked close to the Waqf building when it was detonated and caused the collapse of that office structure. According to the deputy chief of Wafq, Sami al-Massudi, the bombing occurred amidst a brewing dispute over the al-Askari shrine. That golden-domed mosque in Sunni-dominated Samarra, has been long regarded as an important Shi'a Islamic sites. It was targeted during attacks in 2006 and 2007, which were attributed to driving Iraq almost to the brink of civil war at that time. In more recent years, as the the government of Shia Prime Minister Nouri Maliki has expressed a more dominant stance against the Sunni Iraqiya political bloc, there has been an uptick in attacks against Sunni targets.

It should be noted that only a week prior in late May 2012, when a spate of bombings struck Baghdad and left close to 20 people dead.

On June 13, 2012, Iraq was struck by a wave of bombs that left scores of people dead and close to

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300 injured in the bloodiest day the country's seen since the withdrawal of United States troops from that country in 2011. The bombs ensued in at least ten locations across the country and appeared to target Shi'a pilgrims gathering to mark the anniversary of the death of Imam Moussa al-Kadhim. In Hilla, to the south of Baghdad, the blasts appeared to have targeted a restaurant frequented by security forces. In Taji, to the north of Baghdad, the blast targeted a procession of pilgrims as they traveled to a shrine. Baghdad itself was hit by a series of four blasts, one of which targeted a group of pilgrims as they gathered at refreshment tents, and a car bomb that appeared to target pilgrims but also hit city workers. There were also three bomb blasts in Kirkuk, one of which targeted the headquarters of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani. There were also bomb attacks in Mosul, Balad, and Karbala.

On June 16, 2012, two car bombs targeted Shi'a pilgrims in Baghdad and killed at least 30 people on that day. Then, on June 18, 2012, a suicide attack at a Shi'a funeral in Baquba left at least 15 people dead and scores more wounded. That Baquba suicide bombing occurred at a funeral gathering to mourn a tribal chief. According to the Associated Press, that gathering included as many as 150 people including the head of the Iraqi army's ground forces, Lieutenant General Ali Ghaidan, who escaped unhurt. Blame was placed on Sunni extremist militants linked with the terror enclave, al-Qaida.

Then on June 28, 2012, a series of deadly car bombings in Iraq left more than a dozen people dead and around 50 other victims wounded. One bomb exploded outside a market in a mainly Shi'a district of the capital of Baghdad. Another car bombing occurred in the Sunni city of Taji; in that case, a government building was the target.

This spate of attacks in June 2012 began at a time when Shi'a pilgrims were gathering to mark the anniversary of the death of Imam Moussa al-Kadhim. The bombings continued days later and continued to target Shiites. Blame was placed on Sunni extremist militants linked with the terror enclave, al-Qaida.

In an important political development in the last week of June 2012, members of the Iraqi parliament were considering a confidence vote against Prime Minister Maliki. At issue was the growing discontent from the opposition ranks, including the Sunni-backed Iraqiya bloc, the Kurdish coalition, the Ahrar bloc loyal to radical Shi'ite cleric Muqtada Sadr, and independents, over the prime minister's policies, which the opposition views as contrary to the interests of a country with a diverse ethno-sectarian composition. They also expressed bitterness over the fact that the prime minister never lived up to his obligation to implement the power-sharing deal that he signed with rival political parties after the previous contested elections that yielded no clear winner.

By the end of June 2012, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki was calling for early parliamentary elections, presumably in a move to vitiate the looming no-confidence motion. In a statement posted on his website, the office of the Iraqi head of government asserted the following: "When the other party

Iraq Review 2016 Page 188 of 609 pages Iraq refuse to sit on negotiation table and insists on provoking successive crises, including heavily damaging the higher interests of the Iraqi people, the prime minister found himself obliged to call for early elections of which the final word will be for the Iraqi people."

On July 3, at least 25 people were killed and 40 others were wounded in a truck bombing at a market close in the Iraqi city of Diwaniya. The violence extended to other sites across the country where dozens more fatalities were reported to have taken place. For example, in the central city of Karbala, four people were killed as a result of two car bombs, while as many as 30 people were injured in an earlier spate of explosions on the outskirts of the city. The locations of the attacks -- in Diwaniya and Karbala -- offered clues as to the motivation for the violence. In the case of the Diwaniya blast, the attack ensued at a market in close proximity to near a Shi'a mosque where pilgrims were gathered to travel onto Karbala (the location of a number of bombings) where the religious Shabaniyah festival was set to take place. It was apparent that both Shi'a pilgrims were the targets of attack in both case.

Meanwhile, Taji -- the Sunni-dominated city that was hit by a car bombing days before -- was again plagued by violence, with at least one policeman left dead and more than a dozen people injured. Attacks were also reported in Tuz Khurmatu, to the north of Baghdad.

A wave of bombings appeared to be aimed at Muslim Shi'a pilgrims and religious sites and left more than 200 people dead in Iraq since the beginning of June 2012. Indeed, June 2012 was the bloodiest month in Iraq since the departure of United States troops from that country at the end of 2011. The violence occurred at a time when the political sphere in Iraq has become more imbued by religious tension as the Shi'a-dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has increasingly exerted its power -- usually to the detriment of Kurds and Sunnis.

July 23, 2012, though, marked one of the deadliest days of violence in Iraq over the course of 2012, Indeed, over 100 people were killed and double that number (more than 200) were wounded in a spate of bombs and shootings around the capital city of Baghdad on that day. The Sunni-dominated city of Taji to the north of Baghdad was badly-hit with scores of people dying there. Shi'a districts in Baghdad were also targeted with a car bombing in Sadr City killing more than 16 people. But the attacks were spread over more than a dozen towns and cities in what appeared to be a coordinated effort against security and government interests including checkpoints, army bases, and government offices. Five car bombs exploded in the northern oil city of Kirkuk, while bombs and shootings hit the northern city of Mosul, the province of Diyala, among other venues. As well, 15 soldiers died at an attack on an army base in Salaheddin province.

It should be noted that the attacks occurred only day after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self- proclaimed leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, said that his terror enclave would be carrying out a new offensive in Iraq, with an eye on regaining control over areas from which United States withdrew

Iraq Review 2016 Page 189 of 609 pages Iraq at the close in 2011. The general consensus was that al-Qaida in Iraq was trying to exploit the aforementioned ethno-sectarian tensions to re-exert its power in Iraq.

In September 2012, Iraq's fugitive vice-president, Tariq al-Hashemi, was found guilty on terrorism charges of organizing death squads and sentenced to death. The court case was carried out against the vice president in absentia, since he had taken refuge in the semi-autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq. It should be noted that the court ruling occurred as a wave of violence rocked Iraq with 100 people killed.

The case against Vice President Hashemi, a Sunni, dated as far back as late 2011 when Iraqi authorities issued an arrest warrant for him on terrorism charges. At stake was the fact that the Shi'a-dominated government of Iraq accused Hashemi of directing a death squad that assassinated police officers and government officials. These extraordinarily serious charges damaged the coalition government. Indeed, a Sunni-backed political coalition at the time in 2011 said its ministers would resign from their posts. As well, the entire main Sunni bloc in parliament, al- Iraqiya, was soon boycotting the assembly in protest. While the charges themselves could not be understood as anything but highly disturbing, another school of thought warned that the Shi'a- dominated government might be abusing its authority to persecute minority Sunni leaders in a bid to consolidate power.

For his part, Vice President Hashemi has consistently denied any wrongdoing and said he was ready to defend himself against the accusations of terrorism and running a death squad. Hashemi has also said that he was not seeking exile outside Iraq; indeed, he has expressed a willingness to face trial in Iraq's northern Kurdish region, although Iraqi judicial authorities (based in Baghdad) rejected the transfer of the case. The Sunni vice president has vociferously accused Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shi'a, of orchestrating a sensational plot to debase him and to undermine the process of national reconciliation. That accusation could find resonance since Hashemi was one of Iraq's highest ranking Sunni Muslims. He warned that the situation could send Iraq -- an incredibly young and fragile democracy characterized by complex ethno-sectarian tensions -- into a state of sectarian war.

Meanwhile, fugitive Sunni Vice President Hashemi made news when he accused the Shi'a dominated government of Iraq of torture. According to Hashimi, the deaths of his detained bodyguards formed the basis of his accusations. In a statement posted on his official website in the spring of 2012, Hashemi's office claimed that evidence derived from "reliable sources" showed that two of Hashemi's bodyguards died "as a result of severe torture at the hands of the security services to extract false confessions." The statement of Hashemi's website also called for the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) to look into their deaths, as well as the earlier death of a third bodyguard allegedly due to torture during interrogations.

As noted here, the vice president was, for some time, under the protection of the autonomous

Iraq Review 2016 Page 190 of 609 pages Iraq regional government of Iraqi Kurdistan. At the start of 2012, officials in Iraqi Kurdistan indicated they had no intention of turning over Hashemi to the federal authorities. By the spring of 2012, the government of Qatar was similarly refusing to oblige the Iraqi government's demand that Hashimi be handed over to Baghdad when Hashemi visited that country. "Diplomatic norms and the post of al-Hashemi prevent Qatar from doing such a thing," said Khalid Al Attiyah, Qatar's state minister for foreign affairs. Along a similar vein, Hashemi was greeted in Saudi Arabia by that country's foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, at the Red Sea port city of Jeddah during the Iraqi vice president's spring 2012 trip to that country. The Saudi royal family's welcome of Hashemi delivered a powerful symbolic message that it was also unlikely to assist the Iraqi government in its efforts against the Iraqi vice president. The fate of Hashemi was further internationalized a week later when the president of the Kurdistan regional government, Massoud Barzani, was scheduled to meet with the Iraqi vice president during a visit to Turkey. Hashemi was reportedly in Turkey seeking political support from that country. Presumably, Turkey was another destination in the region for the vice president following his visits to Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Turkey indicated little interest in handing over Hashemi to central Iraqi authorities.

As of September 2012, irrespective of the positions taken by semi-autonomous Kurdistan and other sovereign governments in the region, the Iraqi authorities had moved forward with their case against Vice President Hashemi. To that end, prosecutors asserted Hashemi was involved in 150 killings and drew upon testimony from some of Hashemi's former bodyguards. However, given the vice president's claims that some of his entourage had been tortured into giving false confessions, there were suspicions surrounding this particular evidence.

Ultimately, Tariq al-Hashemi was found guilty in absentia on terrorism charges of organizing death squads; he was sentenced to death by hanging as a result. Hashemi offered no immediate feedback on the case or the ruling from Turkey, where he was carrying out talks with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Instead, he said he would in the future, "tackle this issues in a statement." Other Sunni politicians, along with secular voices, entered the fray and excoriated the Iraqi government of Shi'a Prime Minister Maliki for provoking sectarian conflict.

Meanwhile, even as the court case and ruling went forward, a wave of violence rocked Iraq with deathly consequences for around 100 people. At the start of the month, at least eight people died at Shi'a Muslim shrines and mosques in Kirkuk in northern Iraq. Then, on Sept. 9, 2012, car bombs killed around 25 people in Baghdad, while a dozen soldiers were killed in an attack on an army base in Balad to the north of the capital city. Another ten soldiers died in a dawn raid on a military base in Dujail. On the same day, two car bomb in the southern city of Amara outside a Shi'a shrine left at least 14 people dead and more than 60 others wounded. In the northern city of Kirkuk, seven police officers died as they applied for jobs in the oil industry, while attacks were also reported in Tuz Khurmatu, Baquba, Basra, and Samarra. Also on Sept. 9, 2012, a bomb exploded outside the French honorary consulate in the southern city of Nasiriya, in the south, leaving one person dead.

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On Sept. 30, 2012, a series of car bombings in Iraq targeted Shi'ite Muslims and security forces and left more than 30 people dead and about 100 others wounded. In the predominantly Sunni town of Taji, to the north of Baghdad, four consecutive car bombs killed about eight people. The location of these bombs were reportedly in close proximity to homes of Shi'ites and police checkpoints. In the southern town of Madain, a bomb exploded close to a Shi'a shrine and left Iranian pilgrims injured. Several other cities also saw violence, including Mosul, Baquba, and Kut where a car bombing targeted a police patrol.

On Oct. 20, a spate of bombings and shootings rocked Iraq, leaving about a dozen people dead and close to 50 others injured. The explosions and shootings took place across the country, with the worst of the violence occurring as a result of twin bomb explosions close to a Shi'a shrine in the capital city of Baghdad. Also in Baghdad, gunmen opened fire on a police patrol in the capital, killing two police officers. In the northern city of Mosul, a soldier was targeted and killed. The attacks were thought to be the work of al-Qaida affiliated Sunni extremist groups that were intent on fomenting ethno-sectarian tensions and, therefore, undermining the authority of the Shi'a-led government of Iraq. On Oct. 23, 2012, at least nine people died in car bomb and mortar attacks in predominantly Shi'a districts of the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad. These attacks coincided with the Islamic holiday of Eid al-Adha.

In the last week of November 2012, a series of bomb attacks plagued Iraq, leaving approximately 43 people dead and more tha 100 others wounded in total. The attacks appeared to target the predominantly Shi'a Muslim areas south of the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad. The city of Hilla saw the brunt of the violence with a double bombing in a busy commercial area taking the lives of 28 people. In the holy city of Karbala, a car bomb left at least five people dead. On the Basmaia Highway to the north of the capital, a car bomb exploded outside a popular restaurant, killing two people and wounding 11 others. While there was no immediate claim of responsibility, the general consensus was that the culprits behind these attacks were likely to be Sunni militants who have, in the past, targeted the Shi'ites in this country still divided by ethno-sectarian strife.

Around the same period of late November 2012, a suicide bomber targeted security forces at a police checkpoint in Fallujah, killing three police officers and wounding 11 others. As well, in the northern city of Mosul, a bomb planted in a parked car was detonated just as a police patrol traveled by, killing two people, one of whom was a policeman. In Taji, to the south of Baghdad, two roadside bombs exploded close to an Iraqi army base, killing one person and wounding six others.

A series of blasts struck the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk on Dec. 16, 2012, killing between six and ten people and wounding dozens more. Three roadside bombs reportedly were detonated close to a Shi'ite mosque, while a car bomb and another roadside bomb exploded next to a television station. The city -- a center for Iraq's oil reserves -- has been inhabited by an ethnically

Iraq Review 2016 Page 192 of 609 pages Iraq complicated population of Arabs, Kurds, cross-cut by Sunni and Shi'ite religious backgrounds. While there was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attacks, the bombings occurred at a time when tensions between the Arab-led government in Baghdad and the Kurdish authorities of semi-autonomous Kurdistan were on the increase. At issue has been security control over after the internal boundary between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq.

Update (2013)

On Jan. 3, 2013, a car bombing left at least 20 Shi'a Muslim pilgrims dead and many more injured in the town of Musayyib, to the south of the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad. Children were reported to be among the dead, according to reports from Iraqi officials. While there were some suggestions of a suicide bomber, subsequent reports indicated that the bomb may have have been planted in a vehicle in a parking lot. The bomb was detonated at a time when pilgrims were returning from the holy city of Karbala where they were observing the festival of Arbaeen. While there was no immediate claim of responsibility for this attack, as in the past, suspicion rested on Sunni militants.

On Jan. 5, 2013, spate of bombings and shootings in Iraq's eastern province of Diyala left five people dead and 10 others injured. In one case, a car bomb exploded at a market to the north of the provincial capital city of Baquba, killing three people and wounding six others. Separately, a roadside bomb struck an army convoy near the town of Sa'diyah, killing one soldier and wounding four others. Elsewhere in Diyala, a man was shot to death by gunmen in front of his house in Baquba.

The start of 2013 was also marked by Iraqi Sunnis staging demonstrations to protest against discrimination by the Shi'a-dominated government. The demonstrations took place across Iraq in town such as Ramadi in the west, Mosul in the north, as well as the capital city of Baghdad. The protests were intended to draw attention to the claim of many Sunnis that they are now treated as second-class citizens in their own country and to condemn Iran's influence on Iraq's affairs. Cognizant of the sensitivity of the issue, Prime Minister Nouri Maliki called on Iraqi security forces to show restraint in dealing with Sunni protesters.

On Jan. 22, 2013, a series of car bombings struck the capital city of Baghdad. Then, on Jan. 23, 2013, a suicide bombing on a Shi'a mosque in the village of Tuz Khurmato in Iraq left at least two dozen people dead and scores more wounded. The attack appeared to target Shi'a adherents who were attending a funeral at the mosque in Tuz Khurmato. A report by Agence France Presse indicated that the suicide bomber entered the mosque and detonated the explosives strapped to his body in the midst of the funeral mourners. As has often been the case with such attacks on Shi'ites, blame rested on Sunni militants in this country that has been rocked by ethno-sectarian strife since the fall of Saddam Hussein. That said, it should be noted that the town of Tuz Khurmato is located to the north of the capital city of Baghdad and its jurisdiction has been under

Iraq Review 2016 Page 193 of 609 pages Iraq contestation between the Iraqi federal central government and the semi-autonomous Kurdish government in the north of the country. It should also be noted that the ethno-sectarian composition of Tuz Khurmato is a bit more complicated than the usual Sunni/Shi'a religious divide since it is inhabited predominantly by ethnic Turkmen.

On Feb. 3, 2013, suicide bombers and gunmen launched an attack on police headquarters in the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk. At least two off the attackers were disguised in police uniforms, while being armed with guns, grenades and suicide vests. They appeared to have been trying to take control over the police compound but were thwarted in that effort. Nevertheless, at least 16 people died and more than 90 others were injured, including a police chief, when a bomb exploded as the gates of the police headquarters. There was no immediate claim of responsibility although Kirkuk has been a frequent target for attack due to its diverse ethnic and sectarian composition, as well as the fact that control over the oil-rich city has been a source of consternation between the Iraqi government in Baghdad and Kurds who inhabit the semi-autonomous Kurdistan of the north.

Ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased from its heights in 2006 and 2007, when the country was on the verge of collapsing into civil war; however, since the exit of United States troops from Iraq, bombings and shootings have become more frequent. Political conflicts have cross-cut sectarian tensions in recent times, setting the stage for a particularly volatile and complicated political and social terrain.

That conflicted terrain sunk to a new nadir in 2012 when Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni, was sentenced to death in absentia on charges of running death squads. For his part, Hashemi denied the charges but took refuge in the semi-autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq and later, Turkey. The situation was not helped by the arrest of the bodyguards of the Finance Minister Rafa al-Essawi, the most high-profile Sunni in the Iraqi cabinet and a vociferous opponent of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. After the arrest of his bodyguards, Essawi called for the head of government to resign, saying that Maliki "did not behave like a man of the state." The political turmoil in Iraq reached new levels on Jan. 13, 2013, when there was an attempt on the life of the finance minister himself, during an attack to the west of Baghdad. Essawi survived the apparent assassination attempt.

In mid-February 2013, there was no cessation of political turmoil rocking Iraq. In the Sunni Muslim stronghold of Fallujah, protesters took to the streets to demand the ousting of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The demonstrations in Fallujah were just the latest in a spate of protests in various Sunni area of the country. As well, a commander of Iraqi pro-government and anti-al- Qaida Sahwa forces in Iraq's Diyala province was reported to have been assassinated. Unidentified gunmen opened fire on Khaled al-Lahibi in Baquba, leading to his death and injury to one of his sons. Note that the Sahwa forces hae functioned as an unofficial paramilitary force in Diyala province since 2007 and have been instrumental in the fight against al-Qaida type terrorists in Iraq.

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On Feb. 16, 2013, the head of Iraq's intelligence academy, Ali Aouni, along with two of his bodyguards, were killed in a suicide blast in the northern town of Tal Afar. Aouni was not believed to be the original target since he died during an attack on his neighbor, Lieutenant Habib Amin Ilias -- a rapid response commander who had been a target of attack before. As the bombers fled the home of Ilias, one of them was killed by a bodyguard while the other detonated the explosives strapped to his body, killing Aouni as he walked out of his house. Then, on Feb. 17, 2013, a series of car bombs rocked the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, leaving at least 20 people dead and scores more injured. (It should be noted that some estimates by Iraqi officials indicated the death toll was twice as high.) The bombs reportedly occurred across the mainly Shi'a neighborhoods of the city and thus raised suspicions that extremist Sunni militants were responsible.

By the start of March 2013, Finance Minister Rafa al-Essawi -- the Sunni member of government and victim of an attempted assassination only weeks before -- announced his resignation from the Shi'a dominated cabinet of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Essawi's spokesperson, Aysar Ali, said the finance minister was resigning due to prevailing Sunni grievances with the Shi'a-dominated administration, and Prime MInister Maliki's failure to address the second-class treatment of Sunnis in Iraq.

Around this time in March 2013, not only were fears arising about the emergence of increased ethno-sectarian violence, but also that political strife and conflict in Iraq could lead to a fractured country. According to IraqiNews.com, a member of the Iraqi parliament was articulating the possibility of a partitioned Iraq in the future. Adel Abdullah of the Kurdistan Alliance was reported to have said, "The situation in Iraq is close to partition" with the possibility of three countries in the offing. But Abdullah cautioned that many members of parliament simply did not comprehend the nuances of federalism or fracture, saying, "Many of the politicians do not know the concept of the federalism and think that it leads to the partition." Presumably, Abdullah envisioned two possibilities -- Iraq broken up into three countries (Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurdish) or Iraq divided into three entities but still connected under a federal rubric. He issued a tone of qualified optimism saying that partition could be avoided "if the political sides adhere to the dialogue." Abdullah also foreclosed the notion of Iraq being subject to an uprising of the type that has affected other Arab countries since the so-called "Arab Spring" of 2011, saying: "The change that took place in the Arab countries will not take place in Iraq because the regime in Iraq is elected and the power was peacefully changed."

On March 14, 2013, coordinated bomb and gun attacks targeted government ministries in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, leaving close to 20 people dead and several others injured. The attacks took place close to the heavily fortified Green Zone where several foreign embassies and Iraqi government offices are located. Witnesses said that three explosions were heard emanating from around the Justice Ministry, while security forces said that six gun men disguised as police officers were part of the assault on the building that housed ministry offices. The death toll could have

Iraq Review 2016 Page 195 of 609 pages Iraq been higher; however, security guards quickly evacuated workers from the four level building through a back door, ultimately saving their lives.

While there was no immediate claim of responsibility for the violence, suspicion rested on Sunni militants with links to al-Qaida militants, who have often targeted Iraqi government offices.

On March 18, 2013, bomb blasts were reported in the main Iraqi port city of Basra, which is home to a predominantly Shi'a population. One explosion occurred close to a bus station in Garmat Ali,while the other bomb exploded in an area to the west of the city. As in the case of the Baghdad attacks, suspicion rested on Sunni militants with links to al-Qaida militants, who have serious grievances against the Shi'a population -- especially on the 10th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq.

On March 19, 2013, Shi'a neighborhoods of Baghdad were struck by car bombings, sticky bombs, gun shootings, and other attacks. At least 50 people died as a result and as many 160 others were injured. The areas targeted for attack included the Sadr City, close to the heavily fortified Green Zone. As well, in Iskandariyah to the south of Baghdad, a suicide bomber drove an explosives- laden truck through the entrance of an Iraqi army base, killing at least two people and wounding more than 10 others. To the north of Baghdad in Tarmiyah, a car bombing wounded four soldiers. Given the targeting of Shi'a neighborhoods in the Iraqi capital, blame for the violence on this day rested -- again -- on Sunni insurgents linked with al-Qaida.

Those suspicions of blame on Sunni militants were bolstered by the fact that the wave of attacks took place around the 10th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq by United States-led coalition forces, which resulted in the ousting of former President Saddam Hussein from office. The end of the regime of Saddam Hussein essentially ripped away any power held by the Sunni minority of Iraq, and repositioned the majority Shi'a population at the helm of political influence in Iraq. The end of the regime of Saddam Hussein also exposed complex ethno-sectarian tensions between the majority and minority demographic groups, ultimately heralding a violent conflict and nasty insurgency that has continued to date.

In the background of these attacks on the 10th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq in March 2013 were rising fears about not only increased ethno-sectarian violence, but also that political strife and conflict in Iraq could lead to a fractured country. According to IraqiNews.com, a member of the Iraqi parliament was articulating the possibility of a partitioned Iraq in the future. Adel Abdullah of the Kurdistan Alliance was reported to have said, "The situation in Iraq is close to partition" with the possibility of three countries in the offing. Abdullah cautioned that many members of parliament simply did not comprehend the nuances of federalism or fracture, saying, "Many of the politicians do not know the concept of the federalism and think that it leads to the partition." Presumably, Abdullah envisioned two possibilities -- Iraq broken up into three countries (Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurdish) or Iraq divided into three entities but still connected under a federal rubric. He

Iraq Review 2016 Page 196 of 609 pages Iraq issued a tone of qualified optimism saying that partition could be avoided "if the political sides adhere to the dialogue." Abdullah also foreclosed the notion of Iraq being subject to an uprising of the type that has affected other Arab countries since the so-called "Arab Spring" of 2011, saying: "The change that took place in the Arab countries will not take place in Iraq because the regime in Iraq is elected and the power was peacefully changed."

Still, the issue of fragmentation for Iraq was emerging elsewhere. In an article published by the Washington Post, Rajiv Chandresekar observed that the so-called "surge" in 2007, which was intended to cool down the bloody sectarian civil war plaguing the country, may have accomplished that temporary objective, while failing to achieve the other goal of forging a political compromise among the three major demographic groups in Iraq. Chandresekar suggested that rather than setting the path for ethno-sectarian compromise and stability between the Shi'a Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and ethnic Kurds, Iraq years later was beset by intensified ethno-sectarian dissonance. Shi'ites -- happy to finally to have secured political power -- were unwilling to share it with Sunnis and Kurds. The result was a divided country whereby the Shi'ites controlled wide swaths of the country and the center of government, Sunnis in the central part of the country were railing against their enforced position as a political minority (or even participating in the insurgency), and Kurds were isolated to the exertion of power only in the semi-autonomous north. But the geographic division aside, there was also increasing political conflict as Shi'ites were accusing Sunnis -- even those in government, such as Vice President Tariq l-Hashemi -- of terrorism, and Sunnis were protesting against oppression by the Shi'a dominated government. The result was a particularly volatile and complicated political and social terrain.

On April 6, 2013, a suicide bomb and a grenade attack at a political rally in the eastern Iraqi city of Baquba left more than 20 people dead and around 50 others injured. The attacks constituted the latest manifestation of violence in the period leading up to the local elections; indeed, more than 11 candidates standing for election had already been shot to death, resulting in the decision to delay the polls in some provinces on the grounds of security concerns. This particular incident in Baquba -- the province of Diyala -- occurred as one Sunni candidate, Muthana al-Jourani, was meeting with his supporters. Although he escaped unhurt, some of his supporters were among the victims.

On April 15, 2013, Iraq was again struck by violence as a series of deadly bombs exploded in cities across Iraq, leaving more than 30 people dead and more than 200 others injured. The bombs exploded in cities including Baghdad, Tikrit, Fallujah and Nasariya in the south, as well as Tuz Khurmatu and Kurkuk in the north, and appeared to be a coordinated effort using car bombs and roadside bombs. The bombs were seemingly intended to be detonated during the early morning rush hour.

On April 18, 2013, a suicide bombing ensued at a Baghdad cafe with deadly consequences. A suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his body just inside the cafe, killing close to 30

Iraq Review 2016 Page 197 of 609 pages Iraq people, including two children. Dozens of other victims were injured in the blast. The force of the explosion destroyed part of the building, causing a collapse and trapping some persons in the rubble.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the series of attacks on April 15, 2013, or the suicide bombing at the Baghdad cafe days later, although with the flare of ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq in recent times, all expectations were that they were related to this reality. As well, this spate of violence occurred just as Iraq was set to soon hold provincial elections.

A spate of violence erupted in the late spring to early summer of 2013 as ethno-sectarian attacks plagued cities across Iraq.

In the third week of May 2013, 10 policemen were kidnapped in the western province of Anbar and found dead. Around the same time, Sunni Muslim areas in Baghdad were subject to bombings that left 60 people dead.

Then, on May 20, 2013, close to 80 people died as many as 200 others were injured as bombs exploded in a number of Iraqi cities. The worst of the attacks occurred in Baghdad with multiple explosions occurring at markets and bus depots in Shi'a Muslim districts of the capital. In the Baghdad neighborhood of Shaab, for example, a car bomb exploded close to a crowded market killing at least a dozen people and wounding a score more. Samarra to the north of Baghdad, and the southern cities of Basra and Hilla were also sites of bloodshed and violence. In Samara, an explosion occurred in close proximity to a meeting of members of the Sunni militia, the Awakening Council, which has fought back against terror attacks and has often been targeted by Sunni extremists as a result. The bomb attack on Hilla targeted two Shi'a mosques during evening prayers and left a dozen people dead. Several Shi'a Iranian pilgrims were also killed on this day.

While May 20, 2013, was regarded as one of the most violent days in recent times in Iraq, May 21, 2013, fared only a little better. A car bombing close to the Sunni Muslim Abu Ghraib Grand Mosque left eight people dead and 15 people injured. On the same day, three Iraqi soldiers were killed and seven more were wounded when armed gunmen stormed the army base in Tarmiya to the north of Baghdad. As well, three people died and more than 40 were wounded when two car bombs exploded in Tuz Khormato to the north of Baghdad. Northern Iraq was not exempt from the bloodshed with one person killed and 25 others were injured as a result of three successive bombs attacks at a sheep market in Kirkuk.

In response to this most recent outbreak of violence in Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki vowed to make immediate changes to Iraq's security strategy and told Iraqis that militants "will not be able to return us to the sectarian conflict."

But sectarian strife was displayed in full relief less than a week later. Indeed, on May 27, 2013, a

Iraq Review 2016 Page 198 of 609 pages Iraq series of car bombs in Baghdad left more than 65 people dead. These explosions appeared to target the Shi'a-dominated areas of the capital city, including Sadr City.

Then, on May 29, 2013, bomb blasts in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad left more than two dozen people dead. In one incident, a wedding party appeared to be badly hit by a bomb attack with many guests as the unfortunate victims of the violence. A day later on May 30, 2013, further violence in the form of a series of car bombs hit not only the capital of Baghdad but also the northern city of Mosul. More than 20 people were reported to have died as a result.

June 10, 2013, was marked by a wave of bombing attacks across Iraq. The attacks targeted the central and northern part of the country and left more than 70 people dead and several more wounded. In the largely Shi'a town of Judaida al-Shat in Diyala province , two car bombs exploded at a market killing a dozen people there. In the northern part of Baghdad, a car bomb struck a fish market and killed seven people there. In the predominantly Sunni city of Mosul, car bombs at security checkpoints later killed at least two dozen people. Other attacks ensued in Kirkuk, Taji, Tikrit and Tuz Khurmato.

In mid-June 2013, there was a wave of attacks across Iraq, this time apparently targeting Shi'ite Muslims. As many as 30 people died on June 16, 2013, as a result of car bomb attacks in the southern oil city of Basra, the holy city of Najaf, as well as other bomb attacks in Nassiriya, Kut, Hilla, Tuz Khurmato, and Mahmudiya in southern Baghdad. At a checkpoint in Hadhar, close to the northern city of Mosul, gunmen shot six policemen to death.

The close of June was also marked by violence as Iraq was struck by a wave of bombings. On June 25, 2013, a spate of car bombs left as many as 30 people dead in the capital city of Baghdad. Then on June 27, 2013, a series of bombings appeared to target crowded cafes in the capital city, which were packed with young people watching football on televised screens. More than 15 people died as a result and several others were injured. A similar attack on football viewers ensued on June 29, 2013 and killed seven people. Then, on June 30, 2013, a bomb planted close to a field where people were playing football in the town of Nahrawan, left a dozen people dead.

Iraq in mid-2013 was plagued by ethno-sectarian violence. On July 1, 2013, a suicide bombing at a Shi'a mosque in the town of Muqdadiyah in the volatile Diyala province left more than 20 people dead. The attack took place during a funeral ceremony for a police officer. On the same day, eight people died and 20 more were wounded in a separate attack on a cafe in the central city of Baquba

Days later on July 5, 2013, more than 20 people died and double that number were wounded as a result of a series of attacks targeting Shi'as to the north of Baghdad. In one incident in Baghdad's Kiraiyat neighborhood, a suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his body at the Hussienieh Ali Basha mosque as people gathered for Friday prayers. As many as 15 people died in

Iraq Review 2016 Page 199 of 609 pages Iraq that attack alone. In Samarra, a man disguised as an army officer carried out a car bombing close to a mosque on the same day during Friday prayers. There were also attacks reported in Kut, Falluja, and Jubail. In Hawija, two militants died as they attempted to situate a bomb.

On July 11, 2013, a spate of bomb explosions and gun battles across the country left more than 75 people dead across Iraq. In one incident alone -- a car bombing at a Shi'ite mosque in Dujail to north of Baghdad -- about ten people were killed. Then, a day later on July 12, 2013, a bomb attack on a tea house in Kirkuk left more than 30 people dead. The attack in the oil rich and ethnically mixed Iraqi city occurred just as people broke their fast for the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

Mid-July 2013 saw fresh violence erupt in Iraq as explosions were reported in Shi'a areas of the country. On July 13, 2013, six people died as a result of bombings in northern Iraq. On the same day, two policemen were shot to death in the city of Mosul, in the predominantly Sunni province of Nineveh. In Baghdad, more than 20 people died at bomb attacks on Sunni mosques. Then, on July 14, 2013, as many as 15 people were killed, with eight victims dying as a result of a bombing close to the headquarters of a political party in the southern city of Basra. Other attacks were reported in this period of Karbala, Nasiriya and six in Musayyib.

Significantly, these episodes of violence occurred just as the United Nations missions in Iraq released an alarming report indicating that as many as 2,500 people had died due to violence attacks in Iraq from April 2013 to the start of July 2013. The high point in the attacks over the three-month period appeared to be May 2013 when more than 1,000 people were killed in that month alone; however, the spring-summer period was clearly marked by a disturbing level of bloodshed overall.

On July 20, 2013, a wave of car bombs struck the capital of Baghdad, killing at least 30 people. The attacks targeted commercial areas such as the districts of Karrada, , Shurta, Tobchi, and Zafaraniya and occurred just as Iraqis broke their fast for the day, again during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Then on July 22, 2013, Iraqi officials said that a suicide car bombing in Mosul -- in the northern part of the country -- targeted an army patrol and left a dozen people dead.

As many as 30 people died across Iraq on July 23, 2013. In one incident, a group of armed gunmen opened fire on a police station in northern Iraq, killing nine police officers. The initial attack took place to the south of the city of Mosul, but was not the end of the intended violence as a roadside bomb exploded in the area -- presumably planted to target emergency personnel unfortunate enough to be responding to the initial gun attack. An ambulance driver and a nurse were injured as a result. In Baquba, gunmen shot a man death at a police station. Then on July 28, 2013, a suicide bomber killed eight Kurdish police in the town of Tuz Khurmatu in northern Iraq. Nine other police officers were wounded in the incident.

Iraq Review 2016 Page 200 of 609 pages Iraq

It should be noted that there was no immediate claim of responsibility for this series of attacks discussed above, although there was a flare of ethno-sectarian violence between Sunni Muslims and Shi'a Muslims in Iraq in recent times, reflecting the dramatic and escalating political conflict between the Shi'a dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the increasingly alienated Sunni opposition. Given this restive and volatile landscape, the United Nations envoy to Iraq, Martin Kobler, warned that "systemic violence" was about to explode "at any moment" in that country. Kobler called on Iraq's political leaders to "engage immediately to pull the country out of this mayhem."

In the last week of July 2013, the "mayhem" facing Iraq saw little relief when gunmen stormed two prisons in Baghdad, allowing hundreds of inmates -- many of them Islamist extremists and terrorists -- to escape. The two jail breaks affected the Taji and Abu Ghraib (which gained notoriety in 2004 over the abuse of Iraqi detainees at the hands of United States guards) and were said to have been carried out by an al-Qaida affiliated entity called "the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant." At the end of these jail breaks at Taji and Abu Ghraib, at least 20 security guards were dead and hundreds of freed prisoners were on the loose. At first Iraqi authorities dismissed the reports of the prisoner escape but eventually acknowledged the news and the Iraqi interior ministry also alleged that the jail break as accomplished with the complicity of some prison guards inside the two facilities. Meanwhile, Reuters news agency reported that some of the escaped inmates had immediate plans to go to Syria and join the rebel movement in that country.

The Islamic celebration of Eid -- marking the end of the holy month of Ramadan -- was marred by a spate of attacks in Iraq. On Aug. 10, 2013, 60 people died as a result of a series of bombings and shootings in Iraq. On this day, most of the attacks were car bombings that targeted cafes, restaurants, and markets in the capital city of Baghdad. Together with the other killings that occurred during the Ramadan period, the death toll was more than 670. As such, Ramadan was proving to be the bloodiest and most violent in several years.

Security experts said that the attacks appeared to be work of al-Qaida in Iraq. Accordingly, a search was on for the leader of the group - Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi -- who was also linked to attacks on two prisons -- Taji and Abu Ghraib (which gained notoriety in 2004 over the abuse of Iraqi detainees at the hands of United States guards). In those prison attacks in late July 2013, al-Qaida in Iraq reportedly stormed the jails and released hundreds of inmates -- many of them Islamist extremists and terrorists.

Promises from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to escalate operations against militants were not positively received, with many Iraqi citizens accusing him of accentuating the ethno-sectarian conflict gripping the country. With those ethno-sectarian tensions on the rise, speculation was surfacing about a possible plan to partition the country. This controversial plan has, at times, been subject to criticism by advocates of a united Iraq; however, recent developments in Iraq suggest a

Iraq Review 2016 Page 201 of 609 pages Iraq deeply divided country, subject to ongoing violence, and with no serious political solution at hand to address the turbulence and turmoil.

On Aug. 25, 2013, the Iraqi cities of Baghdad and Baquba were struck by a series of bomb attacks that left close to 50 people dead. It was the latest manifestation of ethno-sectarian violence between Shi'ites and Sunnis that has plagued Iraq since the time of the United States-led invasion more than a decade earlier. While Iraq did see some calm after the escalation of international troops years prior, in more recent times with the exit of United States combat forces from Iraq, the country has seen an alarming increase in violence and bloodshed. In this case, there were four bombs that exploded in Baquba alone while several more bombings hit Baghdad. In the northern city of Mosul, gunmen opened fire on a vehicle at a phony checkpoint, resulting in the deaths of five soldiers.

It should be noted that in August 2013, the United Nations released casualty figures for the previous month -- July 2013 -- which showed that more than 1,000 people died in that month alone. Indeed, July 2013 now had the dubious distinction of being the bloodiest and most violent month in five years.

On Sept. 3, 2013, ethno-sectarian violence flared again when a series of car bombs and shootings in the predominantly Shi'a districts of Baghdad left at least 60 people dead. The worst hit area was the northern district of Husseiniya where two successive bombs targeted people at restaurants in the area. Other bombs exploded in the Talbiya, Sadiya, and Karrada areas of the city. In the southern part of Baghdad, gunmen opened fire on victims. Suspicion rested on Sunni militants with ties to al-Qaida.

On Sept. 11, 2013, explosions close to a Shi'a mosque in Baghdad killed at least 35 people, and injured another 55 individuals. The attack ensued in the predominantly Shi'a district of Kasra as worshippers departed the mosque following evening prayers. As before, suspicion for the attack fell on Sunni extremists and most observers agreed that the flare of violence was another manifestation of the ethno-sectarian violence plaguing the country.

On the same day, a bomb exploded in the northern city of Mosul killing a policeman and injured three others. Mosul was again the site of violence on Sept. 14, 2013, when a suicide bombing at a funeral in northern Iraq left more than 20 people dead and scores more injured. This attack also entailed overtones of ethno-sectarian differences as the funeral was for a member of the culturally distinctive Shabak people with some religious connections to Shi'a Islam. As such, the Shabak often endure attacks by extremist Sunnis.

On Sept. 13, 2013, two roadside bomb attacks outside a Sunni mosque in the central Iraqi city of Baquba left at least 30 people dead. The attack ensued as people were departing the mosque following Friday prayers. This attack did not bear the typical hallmark of Sunni extremists as the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 202 of 609 pages Iraq mosque itself catered to Sunni Muslim worshippers. Suspicion, therefore, rested on Shi'a extremists likely drawn back into ethno-sectarian hostilities with Sunnis as a result of the recent flare of communal violence. On the same days, a car bombing in Samarra killed three Shi'ite Muslim pilgrims traveling from Iran.

On Sept. 21, 2013, as many as 60 people were killed and another 120 others were wounded during an attack at a funeral in the mainly Shi'a district of Baghdad known as Sadr City. Women and children were among the dead. Two explosions -- possibly car bombings -- struck the tent where people were gathered to mourn. A third explosion occurred as first responders -- police, medics, and other emergency personnel -- arrived on the scene. On the same day, a separate bombing in the Baghdad neighborhood of Ur left several people dead. As well, a police station in Baiji to north of Baghdad was the scene of violence as five police officers were killed in an attack there.

It should be noted that on Sept. 29, 2013, as the month came to a close, a series of deadly explosions targeted the interior ministry and the headquarters of the security forces in the Kurdish city of Irbil. The attacks killed six security officers and wounded more than 35 other individuals. The bomb attacks were a shocking development in the normally quiet region of northern Iraq, which has not endured the constant barrage of violence seen elsewhere in the country. There were some suggestions that the attacks may have been linked with recent legislative elections in the Kurdistan region. However, the government of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki indicated that the attacks may have been connected with the spill-over violence from neighboring Syria, since there have been instances of battles between Islamist jihadists from al-Nusra Front and Kurds.

Sept. 30, 2013 saw violence and bloodshed plague the Iraqi capital of Baghdad as a wave of car bombings left close to 50 people dead and scores more injured. The bombs appeared to target crowded areas of markets and parking lots during rush hour in Shi'a districts of the capital. While there was no claim of responsibility, the location of the attacks in Shi'a areas of Baghdad indicated that Sunni extremists were the likely culprits in a country hard-hit by ethno-sectarian conflict. The Interior Ministry released a statement following the latest bout of violence in which it promised to continue the "war on terrorism" in Iraq.

On Oct. 5, 2013, Shi'a pilgrims were the target of an attack in Baghdad that left more than 50 people dead and another 100 wounded. This attack occurred in the Adhamiyah district as the pilgrims proceeded to a Shi'a shrine. Around the same time period, the mainly Shi'a town of Balad was the site of bloodshed when a suicide bomber targeted a cafe and killed a dozen patrons. In Mosul, two journalists were shot to death. In Muqdadiyah, a roadside bomb killed one person and injured three others.

The relentless wave of violence continued on Oct. 7, 2013 when Baghdad was again struck by series of deadly blasts that killed close to two dozen people and injured scores more. The

Iraq Review 2016 Page 203 of 609 pages Iraq coordinated attacks appeared to have targeted the commercial center of the capital city.

On Oct. 17, 2013, at least 60 people -- including children -- died across Iraq as a result of a spate of attacks targeting Shi'ite Muslims. In the Iraqi capital of Baghdad alone, as many as ten bombs exploded in Shi'ite-dominated districts, with deadly results. In the northern province of Nineveh, a suicide truck bombing ensued with the country's Shabak minority as the victims.

Days later on Oct. 20, 2013, a suicide bombing at a cafe in Baghdad's Amil area -- dominated by Shi'ite Muslims -- left more than 40 people dead. Another 40 people were injured as a result of the attack. According to Iraqi police, the assailant detonated his explosives-vehicle as he rammed into the cafe, which was a popular venue for youth.

On the same day -- Oct. 20, 2013 -- government buildings in western Anbar province were the targets of attack when five suicide bombers carried out an assault and killed two policemen and three government officials. In one incident, the police headquarters in the town of Rawa was targeted; in another incident, the local administrative headquarters was struck; a third incident involved an army checkpoint. As was the case in the other attacks that ensued in this period, suspicion rested on Sunni Islamic extremist insurgents. North of Baghdad, in the city of Samarra, a suicide bomber targeted the home of a senior police officer; at least six people -- mostly family members -- died in that incident.

On Oct. 25, 2013, a series of bombs left at least 16 people dead across Iraq as Shi'ite Muslims celebrated the Al-Gadeer festival. That festivals marks Shi'ites' loyalty to Imam Ali -- a highly respected Islamic figure for Shi'ite Muslims. Given the timing of the bombings at a time of significance for Shi'ite Muslims, the attacks were blamed on Sunni insurgents. The worst attack involved two roadside explosions at a market in the Shi'ite town of Yousufiya to the south of Baghdad; seven people were reported to have died there. Roadside bombs also exploded close to the homes of Shi'ite families in Baquba; four people were reported to have died in that case. Another four people died in a Shi'ite neighborhood of western Baghdad as a result of a roadside bomb attack there.

Two days later on Oct. 27, 2013, a spate of car bombings across the Iraqi capital of Baghdad left around 40 people dead. Iraqi officials said the bombs were planted in parked cars in Shi'ite areas of the capital city and detonated on a phased basis over a 30-minute period. Separately, the northern city of Mosul was also hit by violence on the same day as a suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his body as people were queuing at a bank. More than a dozen people were killed as a result.

On Oct. 30, 2013, Iraq was struck again by a fresh series of bomb attacks -- this time leaving as many as 30 people dead. Two blasts ensued to the north of Baghdad, when suicide bombers targeted about a group compose of about a dozen police officers and militia members as they

Iraq Review 2016 Page 204 of 609 pages Iraq gathered at an orchard. The militia members were from the Sahwa movement or "Awakening Council" that was formed in 2007 as a moderate Sunni anti-insurgency movement aimed at ending violence in Iraq. The Sahwa movement has more recently come under attack from Sunni extremists who view them as traitors to their cause. Meanwhile, in the northern city of Mosul, a suicide bomber rammed a security checkpoint with his car, killing three police officers and four civilian by-standers. In Tikrit, the target of a roadside bomb was the vehicle belonging to a police captain. In that attack, the police captain was wounded while a civilian was killed.

A week later on Nov. 6, 2013, a suicide bomber rammed an oil tanker packed with explosives into a police station to the north of Baquba. At least six police officers died as a result of this attack. Because security forces have been a prime target for al-Qaida in Iraq, all expectations were that Sunni Islamist extremists aligned with the notorious terror group was likely responsible. On the same day in Baghdad's Sadr City district, a police was shot to death while on patrol by a sniper. In Baghdad's Abu Ghraib district, a roadside bomb exploded, killing two members of the aforementioned "Sahwa" or "Awakening Council."

On Nov. 13, 2013, Iraq was struck by a string of bombings that appeared to have targeted Shi'a pilgrims and police or other security personnel. At least 20 people were killed and dozens more were wounded as a result. The worst attack occurred close to Tikrit when a suicide bomber drove his explosives-laden car into a police checkpoint. Ten people died in that incident alone. Another deadly attack involved three bombings in Baquba, which targeted a gathering of Shi'a pilgrims, and left at least eight people dead. The other attacks occurred in the capital of Baghdad and Falluja.

Because the bombings ensued around the time of the religious festival of Ashura, which marks the martyrdom of Prophet Muhammad's grandson, Hussein, at the in 680 CE, most observers surmised that the attacks were a manifestation of continuing ethno-sectarian conflict in Iraq.

A day later on Nov. 14, 2013, there were further manifestations of sectarian violence as a series of attacks targeting Shi'a Muslims marking the festival of Ashura left more than 40 people dead across Iraq. The vast majority of the victims died in the province of Diyala. In the Wasit province, around ten people died when two bomb exploded close to a religious procession. Five people were wounded in the ethnically diverse city of Kirkuk when two blasts struck that city.

On Nov. 20, 2013, the Iraqi capital of Baghdad was struck by a series of bomb attacks in mostly Shi'a areas, leaving several people dead and scores injured, The worst incident occurred in the Sadriya district where a car bomb was exploded at an crowded market. But bombs exploded in various other parts of the city.

As November 2013 came to a close, at least 10 people died and another 25 were injured as a result of a suicide bomb attack in northern Iraq. The attack took place in Muqdadiyah, to the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 205 of 609 pages Iraq north-east of Baghdad, and targeted the mourners at a funeral the son of a tribal leader and a Sunni fighter. That Sunni fighter -- a member of the Awakening Council or "Sahwa" that opposes al-Qaida and other terrorists in Iraq -- was himself killed in a roadside bombing the day before. As such, the attack on the funeral was being interpreted as a clear warning to Sunnis daring to oppose he extremist Sunni insurgency in Iraq.

On Dec. 24, 2013, a convoy carrying Iraqi Defense Minister Saadoun al-Dulaimi was targeted in roadside bomb attack. The roadside bomb was planted on the main thoroughfare connecting the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi in the province of Anbar. While the vehicle carrying Saadoun al- Dulaimi was damaged and two bodyguards were wounded, the defense minister did not sustain any injuries. Although no group claimed responsibility for the attack, suspicion rested on Sunni Islamic insurgents who have been embroiled in ongoing ethno-sectarian conflict with the Shi'a Islamic- dominated government.

The escalation in violence in Iraq since the spring of 2013 appeared to have been sparked by an army raid on a Sunni Muslim anti-government protest camp close to Hawija, just to the north of Baghdad. The raid was viewed as the latest example of persecution of Sunnis by the Shi'a dominated government and served only to deepen already-heightened ethno-sectarian grievances with clearly deleterious consequences.

The Shi'a dominated government has responded to the disturbing rise in ethno-sectarian violence by launching a crackdown against extremists, rounding up hundreds of people believed to be linked with al-Qaida in the Baghdad area as part of its "revenge for the martyrs" campaign. The campaign was being branded as a security operation by Iraqi authorities, who said that it was being carried out by the Baghdad Operation Command in cooperation with the Air Force and the Anti- Terrorism Directorate. But such a crackdown -- as intimated by its very name -- which has focused on largely Sunni districts, was likely to breed even more ethno-sectarian hatred and likely only inspire further violence.

Update (as of 2014)

As the year 2014 began, Iraq was reeling from the news that a convoy carrying Iraqi Defense Minister Saadoun al-Dulaimi was targeted in a roadside bomb attack in late 2013. The roadside bomb was planted on the main thoroughfare connecting the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi in the province of Anbar. While the vehicle carrying Saadoun al-Dulaimi was damaged and two bodyguards were wounded, the defense minister did not sustain any injuries. Although no group claimed responsibility for the attack, suspicion rested on Sunni Islamic insurgents who have been embroiled in ongoing ethno-sectarian conflict with the Shi'a Islamic-dominated government.

The escalation in violence in Iraq since the spring of 2013 appeared to have been sparked by an army raid on a Sunni Muslim anti-government protest camp close to Hawija, just to the north of Iraq Review 2016 Page 206 of 609 pages Iraq army raid on a Sunni Muslim anti-government protest camp close to Hawija, just to the north of Baghdad. The raid was viewed as the latest example of persecution of Sunnis by the Shi'a dominated government and served only to deepen already-heightened ethno-sectarian grievances with clearly deleterious consequences.

The Shi'a dominated government has responded to the disturbing rise in ethno-sectarian violence by launching a crackdown against extremists, rounding up hundreds of people believed to be linked with al-Qaida in the Baghdad area as part of its "revenge for the martyrs" campaign. The campaign was being branded as a security operation by Iraqi authorities, who said that it was being carried out by the Baghdad Operation Command in cooperation with the Air Force and the Anti- Terrorism Directorate. But such a crackdown -- as intimated by its very name -- which has focused on largely Sunni districts, was likely to breed even more ethno-sectarian hatred and likely only inspire further violence.

Violence plagued Iraq at the beginning of the new year with a suicide car bomb in the town of Baladruz on Jan. 2, 2014, which left a dozen people dead. Also, a bomb exploded in the mainly Shi'a district of Shaab in Baghdad , and a separate attack in Latifiya, to the south of the capital, yielded its own death toll. These acts of violence were probably being interpreted as less disturbing as the news that the Iraqi government was losing control over Anbar province where Sunni Islamic militant extremism was on the rise.

With ethno-sectarian tensions reaching new heights, speculation was surfacing about a possible plan to partition the country. This controversial plan has, at times, been subject to criticism by advocates of a united Iraq; however, recent developments in Iraq suggest a deeply divided country, subject to ongoing violence, and with no serious political solution at hand to address the turbulence and turmoil.

In fact, at the start of January 2014, Iraq had sunk even further into its morass of turbulence and turmoil with the news that al-Qaida allied Sunni Islamic fighters from the entity known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (also known by the acronyms, ISIS and ISIL) were taking control over two major Iraqi cities -- Fallujah and Ramadi -- in that very province of Anbar. Hadi Razeij, the head of the provincial police force for Anbar, said the police had fled the city. In an interview with al-Arabiya News, he said: "The walls of the city are in the hands of the police force, but the people of Fallujah are the prisoners of ISIS."

The newest burst of violence appeared to have been sparked by further incidences of the Shi'a government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki flexing its muscle against the Sunni population. Reminiscent of the army raid on the Sunni Muslim anti-government protest camp close to Hawija in the spring of 2013, the Iraqi authorities in early 2014 carried out a raid on a Sunni Muslim anti- government protest camp in Ramadi. That action left at least ten people dead and sparked the unrest there. The arrest of a Sunni member of parliament added to the sentiment that the Shi'a

Iraq Review 2016 Page 207 of 609 pages Iraq government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was persecuting the Sunni Arab population of the country. The result -- as before -- was an intensified effort by Sunni extremists to fight back. Their efforts were rewarded with the apparent advance of al-Qaida linked Sunni extremists on Fallujah and Ramadi.

Iraqi military forces were deployed to both cities -- where the black flags of the militants were now flying -- to fight these Sunni Islamic militants from ISIS. However, from the point of view of the Iraqi government, the situation in the strategic city of Fallujah -- - only 50 miles from Baghdad -- was dire. According to Reuters News Agency, military troops were shelling parts of the city, presumably with the intent of regaining its hold. While security forces were trying to wrest back control over Fallujah, the fact of the matter was that on Jan. 5, 2014, the Iraq government had lost control of the city. Militants with allegiances to al-Qaida held control over the southern part of Fallujah while tribesmen allied with al-Qaida controlled the rest of the city. Indeed, the Iraqi government was being described in the international media as having "lost" Fallujah.

By Jan. 7, 2014, the government as launching an operation on Ramadi, with an eye on retaking control. That battle involved air strikes that killed at least 25 al-Qaida aligned militants. Those militants were urging Sunni tribes in the area to assist them in their fight against the government forces; however, several tribes in the area have, for some time, been supportive of the government effort to rid the area of terrorism, participating instead on pro-government "Awakening Councils." Meanwhile, residents were fleeing Ramadi to escape the shelling and air strikes by government forces, despite orders from the Sunni militants that they remain in their homes.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was at the same time promising to rid Iraq of the presence of Sunni al-Qaida aligned terrorists and warned that a major assault was afoot in the city of Fallujah. In a national address, Maliki on Jan. 8, 2014 said, "We are moving on the right course and that the result will be clear and decisive: uprooting this corrupt organization." He continued, "We will continue this fight because we believe that al-Qaida and its allies represent evil."

Indeed, on Jan. 9, 2014, the Iraqi army had deployed tanks and artillery around Fallujah in preparation for an offensive operation there. There were suggestions that a hardline approach in Fallujah would exacerbate the ethno-sectarian tensions. Indeed, it was highly unlikely that militants who had seen their biggest success in years would relinquish Fallujah without a fierce fight. At the same time, Maliki and the Shi'a dominated government had their own reasons for fomenting ethno- sectarian divisions since they would need to consolidate the Shi'ite vote in parliamentary elections set for later in the year. Exploiting that Sunni-Shi'a division (as opposed to going easy on Sunnis who were from the religious group terrorizing the country) would be politically beneficial to Maliki who wanted to hold onto power, the national security and national (dis)unity risks notwithstanding.

Meanwhile, with the threat of violence from ISIS, the al-Qaida aligned group, the United States was ramping up its military support of Iraq by providing military equipment, including surveillance

Iraq Review 2016 Page 208 of 609 pages Iraq drones and more Hellfire missiles. According to United States Secretary of State John Kerry, despite such assistance, there were no plans afoot for the return of United States military forces to Iraq.

It should be noted that even though attention was focused on Ramadi and Fallujah, violence was continuing elsewhere in Iraq. A suicide bombing in the northern city of Kirkuk left at least two people dead in the same period. In Tikrit, a car bomb exploded near a local health department, killing an ambulance driver and injuring several other people. As well, another suicide bombing resulted in the deaths of about two dozen Iraqi army recruits in Baghdad. There was no immediate claim of responsibility for these attacks, however, the suicide bombing in Baghdad that targeted the army recruits occurred only one day after Prime Minister Maliki promised to eradicate al-Qaida linked terrorists.

By mid-January 2014, the violence in Iraq was ongoing. A series of bombings in central Iraq killed more than 70 people. One attack targeted a funeral for a pro-government Sunni militiaman in a village to the south of Baquba in Diyala province. Nine car bombs meanwhile exploded across the capital of Baghdad -- mostly hitting busy marketplaces in predominantly Shi'a and religiously mixed districts. The northern city of Mosul was also the site of violence as attacks there killed more than a dozen people, most of whom were soldiers.

On Jan. 20, 2014, more than 20 people were killed and twice those numbers were injured in a series of bomb blasts across the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. The worst attack occurred at a busy market where at least seven people were killed. Both Shi'a and Sunni districts of Baghdad were among the targets struck in this spate of bombings. Blame nevertheless quickly rested on Sunni extremists intent on destabilizing the Shi'a-dominated government of Prime Minister Maliki. Meanwhile, turmoil continued to characterize the scenarios in Fallujah and Ramadi.

As January 2014 entered its final week, the unrest in Iraq's Anbar province was ongoing. After a full month of conflicts in the region, Iraqi authorities said that as many as 125 people had died and more than 500 others were injured. As discussed here, the main battleground venues were the flashpoint cities of Ramadi and Fallujah.

Of course, violence was occurring elsewhere in the country as shootings plagued Baghdad with deadly consequences, and with other attacks in Baquba, Kirkuk, Mishahda, and Mosul. Of particular note was an attack by gunmen on the Transport Ministry building in Baghdad. Security forces responded to the incident, which ended with the elimination of all the assailants. Unfortunately, at least two employees were also killed. Elsewhere in Baghdad, two bombings close to a marketplace left at least six people dead. Estimates were that in the month of January 2014, more than 900 people died in attacks across Iraq.

February 2014 was not off to an improved start in the realm of violence. On Feb. 3, 2014, a series

Iraq Review 2016 Page 209 of 609 pages Iraq of car bombings in the Hurriya and Baladiyat districts of the capital of Baghdad, as well as the nearby town of Mahmoudiya, left as many as 14 people dead. Among the dead were four bodies marked by gunshot wounds to the head and bearing signs of torture. Days later on Feb. 6, 2014, another series of car bombs plagued Baghdad, with more than a dozen people dying as a result. Because these attacks targeted the predominantly Shi'ite neighborhoods of Sadr City, Karrada, Hurriya, Ubaidi, and Shaab, blame rested on Sunni insurgents.

By the last week of February 2014, the western Anbar province continued to be struck by violence as a car packed with explosives rammed the entrance of the governor's compound in Ramadi, killing three soldiers and wounding close to 20 others. Violence was ongoing elsewhere in Iraq. On Feb. 26, 2014, a car bomb at a crowded Baghdad market killed at least 14 people and injured dozens more. In the same period, three policemen were killed by gunmen at a police checkpoint close to Baiji in northern Iraq. In the town of Himreen in the eastern Diyala province, a car bombing at a market and killed three people, while gunmen opened firing killing three people in Diyala's capital of Baquba. A day later on Feb. 27, 2014, bombings across Baghdad killed more than two dozen people. One blast occurred at a motorbike market in the eastern Sadr City district which has been home to a mostly Shi'a population; another occurred on a minibus also in Sadr City. Blame in most cases rested on Sunni militants.

On March 9, 2014, violence continued to plague Iraq with a suicide bombing leaving scores of people dead and more than 150 dead in the southern Iraqi city of Hilla. The suicide bomber appeared to have packed a minibus with explosives and rammed it into a checkpoint at the entrance of the predominantly Shi'ia city. Given the sectarian tensions and the Shi'a target, blame for this particularly bloody attack was placed on Sunni terrorists aligned with al-Qaida in Iraq. Observers noted that the attack was likely a matter of spillover bloodshed from the neighboring Anbar province, where Sunni terrorists and extremists from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have being trying to hold control over the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah.

In a separate attack on the border of Anbar province and western Baghdad in the first part of March 2014, gunmen attacked an army check point in the Sunni area of Abu Ghraib, killing four soldiers. Close to the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk, three employees of an oil company were killed and seven others were wounded when gunmen shot at the bus transporting them.

Meanwhile, with the government forces were carrying out an offensive in Fallujah with an effort to recapture that town. The city was reportedly under shelling from the Iraqi military, as part of a preparatory moved ahead of an expected ground assault. An Iraqi official said in an interview with Reuters News (on condition of anonymity): "We believe that storming Fallujah as soon as possible is much better than the current situation. Yes, there will be many casualties, but it's better than this strain on army resources." A similar effort was also underway in Ramadi.

On April 21, 2014, an attack at a polling station in northern Iraq left 10 guards dead. According to Iraqi authorities, the gunman wore Iraqi military garb and targeted a facility just outside the city of Iraq Review 2016 Page 210 of 609 pages Iraq

Iraqi authorities, the gunman wore Iraqi military garb and targeted a facility just outside the city of Kirkuk, and which was intended to be used in parliamentary elections set to take place on April 30, 2014. Due to the nature of the target, it was assumed that the attack was intended to disrupt the polls. Elsewhere in Iraq, the pre-election scene was marked with violence and bloodshed as a spate of attacks left more than 30 more people dead. Meanwhile, with Sunni Islamic extremists holding sway over portions of Anbar province, it was unlikely that voting could even take place in that part of the country.

On April 25, 2014, series of explosions killed approximately 30 people and wounded 40 more at a political rally for the Shi'ite group, Asaib Ahl Haq (League of the Righteous), in eastern Iraq. The group was presenting its candidates for the impending elections at the end of the month when three bombs exploded in succession. One explosion was caused by a roadside bomb, another was caused by a suicide car bomb, and the nature of the third explosion was unspecified. The terror group, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), claimed responsibility for the attack via the Internet. ISIL, which is aligned with the terror enclave, al-Qaida, declared that the bombings had been carried out in retaliation for the "murder, torture and displacement" of Sunni Muslims in Iraq by Shi'ite militias. Clearly, it was the latest manifestation of the ethno-sectarian strife that has plagued Iraq since the invasion by United-States-led forces in 2003.

Primer on Iraq's 2014 parliamentary elections

-- Some portions of this section includes information covered above --

Parliamentary elections were set to take place in Iraq on April 30, 2014. At stake would be the matter of which party or bloc would have the right to form the next government of Iraq. Typically, the party or bloc with the control over the most seats in parliament would form the government, and the leader of that party or bloc would become the prime minister.

According to the constitution of Iraq, there is a bicameral legislature. That legislature is composed of a Council of Representatives (325 seats consisting of 317 members elected by an optional open- list, proportional representation system and 8 seats reserved for minorities; members serve four- year terms), and an upper house, the Federation Council, which is yet to be established. As such, the election action is in the Council of Representatives.

The previous parliamentary elections were held in 2010. When the vote count was complete in that contest, it was announced that former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's secular bloc had won the most seats in Iraq's parliamentary elections. His coalition garnered a small but significant advantage of two more seats than the coalition of incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki -- 91 seats to 89 seats. While Allawi had the seat advantage in terms of plurality, he would still have to form a coalition government because he did not have an outright majority. Meanwhile, Maliki was able to form his own Shi'a bloc coalition that could compete for the right to form a government, Iraq Review 2016 Page 211 of 609 pages Iraq able to form his own Shi'a bloc coalition that could compete for the right to form a government, despite his seat disadvantage. As such, Maliki was able to remain on at the helm of government following the 2010 elections.

In 2014, the political landscape in Iraq was quite different from 2010. Indeed, Iraq in 2014 was marked by ethno-sectarian violence between Shi'a Muslims and Sunni Muslims, with attacks occurring on an almost daily basis. At the political level, there was no shortage of ethno-sectarian enmity between the Shi'a dominated government and the rest of the country composed of Sunnis, secularists, Kurds, and members of other ethnic and religious minorities. With ethno-sectarian tensions reaching new heights, speculation was surfacing about a possible plan to partition the country. This controversial plan has, at times, been subject to criticism by advocates of a united Iraq; however, recent developments in Iraq suggest a deeply divided country, subject to ongoing violence, and with no serious political solution at hand to address the turbulence and turmoil.

In fact, at the start of January 2014, Iraq had sunk even further into its morass of turbulence and turmoil with the news that al-Qaida allied Sunni Islamic fighters from the entity known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (also known by the acronyms, ISIS and ISIL) were taking control over two major Iraqi cities -- Fallujah and Ramadi -- in that very province of Anbar. Hadi Razeij, the head of the provincial police force for Anbar, said the police had fled the city. In an interview with al-Arabiya News, he said: "The walls of the city are in the hands of the police force, but the people of Fallujah are the prisoners of ISIS."

The newest burst of violence appeared to have been sparked by further incidences of the Shi'a government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki flexing its muscle against the Sunni population. Reminiscent of the army raid on the Sunni Muslim anti-government protest camp close to Hawija in the spring of 2013, the Iraqi authorities in early 2014 carried out a raid on a Sunni Muslim anti- government protest camp in Ramadi. That action left at least ten people dead and sparked the unrest there. The arrest of a Sunni member of parliament added to the sentiment that the Shi'a government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was persecuting the Sunni Arab population of the country. The result -- as before -- was an intensified effort by Sunni extremists to fight back. Their efforts were rewarded with the apparent advance of al-Qaida linked Sunni extremists on Fallujah and Ramadi.

Iraqi military forces were deployed to both cities -- where the black flags of the militants were now flying -- to fight these Sunni Islamic militants from ISIS. However, from the point of view of the Iraqi government, the situation in the strategic city of Fallujah -- - only 50 miles from Baghdad -- was dire. According to Reuters news, military troops were shelling parts of the city, presumably with the intent of regaining its hold. While security forces were trying to wrest back control over Fallujah, the fact of the matter was that on Jan. 5, 2014, the Iraq government had lost control of the city. Militants with allegiances to al-Qaida held control over the southern part of Fallujah while tribesmen allied with al-Qaida controlled the rest of the city. Indeed, the Iraqi government was

Iraq Review 2016 Page 212 of 609 pages Iraq being described in the international media as having "lost" Fallujah.

At the end of the first week of January 2014, the government was launching an operation on Ramadi, with an eye on retaking control. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki was at the same time promising to rid Iraq of the presence of Sunni al-Qaida aligned terrorists and warned that a major assault was afoot in the city of Fallujah. In fact, the Iraqi army had deployed tanks and artillery around Fallujah in preparation for an offensive operation there.

There were suggestions that a hardline approach in Fallujah would exacerbate the ethno-sectarian tensions. Indeed, it was highly unlikely that militants who had seen their biggest success in years would relinquish Fallujah without a fierce fight. At the same time, Maliki and the Shi'a dominated government had their own reasons for fomenting ethno-sectarian divisions since they would need to consolidate the Shi'ite vote in parliamentary elections set for later in the year. Exploiting that Sunni-Shi'a division (as opposed to going easy on Sunnis who were from the religious group terrorizing the country) would be politically beneficial to Maliki who wanted to hold onto power, the national security and national (dis)unity risks notwithstanding.

On April 21, 2014, an attack at a polling station in northern Iraq left 10 guards dead. According to Iraqi authorities, the gunman wore Iraqi military garb and targeted a facility just outside the city of Kirkuk, and which was intended to be used in parliamentary elections set to take place on April 30, 2014. Due to the nature of the target, it was assumed that the attack was intended to disrupt the polls. Elsewhere in Iraq, the pre-election scene was marked with violence and bloodshed as a spate of attacks left more than 30 more people dead. Meanwhile, with Sunni Islamic extremists holding sway over portions of Anbar province (as discussed above), it was unlikely that voting could even take place in that particular part of the country.

On April 25, 2014, a series of explosions killed approximately 30 people and wounded 40 more at a political rally for the Shi'ite group, Asaib Ahl Haq (League of the Righteous), in eastern Iraq. The group was presenting its candidates for the impending elections at the end of the month when three bombs exploded in succession. One explosion was caused by a roadside bomb, another was caused by a suicide car bomb, and the nature of the third explosion was unspecified. The terror group, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), claimed responsibility for the attack via the Internet. ISIL, which is aligned with the terror enclave, al-Qaida, declared that the bombings had been carried out in retaliation for the "murder, torture and displacement" of Sunni Muslims in Iraq by Shi'ite militias. Clearly, it was the latest manifestation of the ethno-sectarian strife that has plagued Iraq since the invasion by United-States-led forces in 2003.

On April 28, 2014, with the elections only days away, suicide bombers carried out a spate of attacks against security personnel -- police and military troops -- who were voting early at polling stations in Baghdad and northern Iraq. The assailants appeared to be Sunni militants disguised in army and police uniforms. As many as 20 people died as a result of the clear attempt to disrupt

Iraq Review 2016 Page 213 of 609 pages Iraq the elections. By April 29, 2014, a curfew was implemented -- presumably in an attempt to preserve the state of security ahead of the elections the next day.

Voting finally went forward in the highly anticipated elections on election day in Iraq -- April 30, 2014 -- amidst high security. Soldiers and police were highly visible across the country, charged as they were with protecting voters as they exercised their democratic right to cast their ballots. As expected, in Anbar where Sunni militants have seized control over key cities, voter turnout was quite light. Elswehere in the country, some polling stations had to close early due to security threats. Indeed, suicide attacks across the country -- including in Diyala and Salahuddin -- exacted a death toll of more than a dozen people. Nevertheless, Iraq saw a respectable voter turnout overall with millions of Iraqi citizens defying the security threats and proudly displaying ink stained thumbs to show that they had cast their ballots.

While no official results were available at the time of writing, Prime Minister Maliki was predicting victory for his State of Law party, and a return to the helm of leadership for him. Striking an ultra- confident tone, he said, "Definitely our expectations are high. Our victory is confirmed but we are still talking about how big this victory will be." Conspicuously absent from him comments were any suggestion of ethno-sectarian reconciliation or national unity.

In truth the parliamentary contest could be understood as a dichotomized experience. In Shi'ite areas of the country, voters were being driven by a desire to choose the person they believed to be capable to staving off the Sunni extremist threat from the al-Qaida aligned group, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In Sunni regions, voters were motivated by their feeling of being bullied by the Shi'ite authorities, along with their fears of the ISIL threat.

Note:

Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission announced that the election results would be confirmed later in the month of May 2014. Tallies at that time in late May 2014 indicated that Maliki's State of Law party won a plurality of seats -- approximately 92 -- but short of an outright majority. Note that the 92 seat plurality was boosted to 94 seats with the addition of two seats through candidates aligned with Maliki.

The Muwatin Coalition was on track to carry about 48 seats, Al-Hadba was carrying about 33 seats, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq had 29 seats, the (of Muqtada Sadr- - a Shi'ite rival of Maliki) was close behind with 28 seats, the Iraqi National Accord appeared to secure about 25 seats, the Kurdistan Democratic Party had 20 seats, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan looked to carry 14 seats, the Civil Democratic Alliance, the Iraqi National Dialogue Front and National Reform Trend each were on track to secure 10 seats. Other parties made up the rest.

It was to be seen if these preliminary numbers would hold sway once the formal announcement of

Iraq Review 2016 Page 214 of 609 pages Iraq the results were made. However, it was clear that Maliki had performed well in the southern Shi'a provinces and would look to other Shi'a parties to cobble together a ruling coalition. Left to be seen was the matter of whether or not those other Shi'a parties would want to move forward with Maliki as prime minister, or, if they would seek new leadership. In truth, though, Maliki's leadership was clearly validated at the polls with the performance of his party and he would thus have a legitimate argument to hold onto the reins of power.

Special Report

Terror group Islamic State carries out rampage of horror from Syria to Iraq; United States President Obama outlines strategy to to "degrade and ultimately destroy" the Jihadist terror group alternatively referred to as ISIL and ISIS

--- Some portions of this entry are replicated from above ---

Summary: Sunni Islamic extremist militants, under the aegis of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS), have seized control over wide swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory. In Iraq, ISIL held sway -- from Fallujah and Ramadi in Anbar province, to Mosul in Nineveh, as well as Tikrit -- the hometown of the ousted and late Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Across the border in Syria, ISIL was proving to be the most successful anti- government force in that country. It was consolidating territory held either by the Assad regime or by rival rebel entities, even ousting other Islamist insurgent and terrorist groups in the process. These gains collectively constituted a spectacular victory for ISIL, which seeks to establish a Sunni Islamic Caliphate in territory that includes Iraq and Syria.

As Syria and Iraq respectively grappled with the tumultuous security landscapes within their borders, their political spheres were also mired by turmoil. In Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki's treatment of the Sunni minority, including his persecution of former Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni, and raids on anti-government protest camps, had alienated even the more moderate Sunni elements in that country. As a result, Salafist Sunni Jihadists from home and abroad were answering the call to fight on Iraqi soil. At the same time, the power vacuum from the had provided fertile ground for ISIL to take root, not simply challenging the Assad regime but also attracting Jihadists from across the world seeking a "cause" upon which to concentrate. ISIL's ascendancy thus mitigated Assad's control over wide swaths of Syrian territory while simultaneously delivering a remarkable blow across the border to the Iraqi leader at the time, Shi'a Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

The year 2014 saw Iraq rocked by the worst violence and bloodshed in recent years. The violence in Iraq was the result of the aforementioned ethno-sectarian dissonance between Sunni Muslims

Iraq Review 2016 Page 215 of 609 pages Iraq and Shi'a Muslims, and the dramatic and escalating political conflict between the Shi'a dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the increasingly alienated Sunni opposition. In the month of June 2014 alone, more than 2,000 people -- mostly civilians -- had been killed in the violence rocking Iraq, according to the United Nations. It was the bloodiest and most deadly month in Iraq since the peak of ethno-sectarian warfare in Iraq in 2007.

Given this restive and volatile landscape, the United Nations envoy to Iraq, Martin Kobler, warned that "systemic violence" was about to explode "at any moment" in that country. Kobler called on Iraq's political leaders to "engage immediately to pull the country out of this mayhem." As stated by Gyorgy Busztin, the United Nation's Iraq representative, "The impact of violence on civilians remains disturbingly high." He also called on Iraq's leadership to take steps to end the violence saying, "Iraq's political leaders must take immediate and decisive action to stop the senseless bloodshed."

The summer of 2014 was marked by devolving chaos in Iraq as ISIL expanded their control from Fallujah and Ramadi in Anbar province, to Mosul in Nineveh, as well as Tikrit -- the hometown of the ousted and late Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, making significant territorial gains.

Across the border in Syria, the Assad regime had been grappling with an ongoing uprising that started in the Arab Spring of 2011. President Bashar al-Assad's brutal tactics aimed at quelling that uprising against various rebel factions served only to create an even more tumultuous landscape, and eventually set the path for a full-blown civil war. That civil war pitted the Assad forces, backed by Lebanon-based Hezbollah, against a disparate cabal of anti-government entities, ranging from the rebel Free Syrian Army to several Islamist terrorist enclaves. As noted above, the power vacuum from the Syrian civil war provided a breeding ground for extremism that ISIL could exploit and use to both challenge the Assad regime and function as a recruitment tool for Jihadists.

The result was a series of strategic victories across Syria and Iraq for ISIL. Then, at the start of July 2014, the security crisis in the region was at acute levels as ISIL had declared itself to be the sovereign power over a "caliphate" ranging from Syria to Iraq and renamed itself the "Islamic State."

Throughout, the United States-trained Iraqi forces proved themselves to be ineffectual in fighting ISIL. In fact, Iraqi troops abandoned their positions, thus allowing the terrorists to make off with heavy military equipment provided to the Iraqi military by the United States. Indeed, the only defense being provided against ISIL in Iraq were the Kurds who were now having to face ISIL terrorists armed with stolen American weaponry. While Kurdish peshmerga forces were far more engaged in the fight to save Kurdistan, they were nonetheless no match for ISIL, which now had in its possession United States-provided weapons that had been abandoned by Iraqi forces.

President Barack Obama of the United States was not eager to re-enter into a military engagement

Iraq Review 2016 Page 216 of 609 pages Iraq in Iraq, and as such, he advocated that leaders in Iraq work towards a political solution. That political solution remained elusive as Prime Minister Maliki refused to form an inclusive national unity government and as members of parliament failed to agree on a new government. Given the frustration over the failure of the Iraqi government in Baghdad to address the political and security crisis facing Iraq, the Kurdish president called for an independence referendum. The Kurds were also taking advantage of the power chasm by seizing control over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

But the scene in Iraq took an ominous turn in August 2014 as Islamic State was now pushing Kurdish peshmerga fighters into retreat. ISIL (or the so-called Islamic State) was exerting its self- declared power and authority as it carried out a rampage of barbaric violence, brutally targeting some of Iraq's historic minority communities. Certainly, Islamic State's persecution of Iraq's minority populations, particularly Christian and Yazidis, could be understood as nothing less than gross human rights abuses, even as it triggered a humanitarian crisis.

Initially, United States President Barack Obama dispatched military advisers to Iraq but ruled out renewed military engagement in that country; instead, as noted above, he called for a political solution. As the author of the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq, President Obama was not keen to be drawn back into the Iraqi quagmire. But having recognized the dire landscape for religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq, on Aug. 7, 2014, United States President Barack Obama ordered limited strikes in northern Iraq, released a supply of arms to Kurdish peshmerga fighters resisting Islamic State, and provided humanitarian relief supplies to civilians forced to flee their homes.

The presence of Maliki at the helm of Iraq had stood as another obstacle, as the United States was unwilling to be the unofficial military support of a Shi'a government known to have persecuted the Sunni minority population of Iraq. But the subsequent replacement of the Maliki government with a more inclusive Abadi government set the tone for an improved domestic scenario in Iraq, to the relief of the United States and the wider world. It also provided a more hospitable climate for increased United States' engagement in Iraq to fight ISIL.

That being said, the barbaric beheadings of two American journalists by ISIL fundamentally changed the calculus both for the war-weary American public as well as the American president. As a consequence, on Sept. 10, 2014, President Barack Obama outlined a counter-terrorism strategy to "degrade and ultimately destroy" ISIL -- not only in Iraq where the United States was already engaged in a limited manner, but also in Syria. To that end, the Obama administration was rallying a coalition of Western and Middle Eastern partners -- including Jordan -- to take on the threat posed to global security by ISIL.

In truth, the advance of ISIL in not only Iraq but also Syria had compounded the geopolitical crisis facing the Middle East. Suddenly, anti-Assad countries in the region were finding themselves in the uncomfortable position of sharing with Syria the goal of eliminating ISIL. For their part, Arab

Iraq Review 2016 Page 217 of 609 pages Iraq countries in the region were slow to respond to ISIL. Nevertheless, the Arab League was slowly coming to terms with the fact that it would have to have to engage in the regional security crisis and that its objectives would likely, at times, overlap with that of the Assad regime. Indeed, in September 2014, the Arab League endorsed the effort to confront Islamic States at a time when the United States was rallying allied countries to join the effort to repel and eradicate ISIL.

For his part, United States President Barack Obama made clear that his country was committed to eliminating the leadership of Islamic State (also known as ISIL or ISIS), while noting that a coalition of NATO allies and Middle Eastern partners was prepared to join the campaign against the brutality of these extremist Islamist Jihadists, and to take on the threat posed to global security by this dangerous terrorist group.

Accordingly, on Sept. 22, 2014, international coalition forces, led by the United States and including both European and Arab partner countries, commenced a campaign of air strikes against Islamist terror groups in Syria.

By October 2014, despite the active international air campaign over Iraq and Syria, ISIL continued to carry out its campaign of terror -- even extending the battlefield to Kurdish areas bordering Turkey. Irrespective of the fact that the town of Kobane (alternatively called Kobani and predominantly inhabited by Kurds) on the Turkish border was under siege, and regardless of legislation passed in Turkey's parliament authorizing action against ISIL, Turkey -- a NATO country -- showed little interest in joining the fight against ISIL, even with the protection of its own territory at stake.

Nevertheless, the United States-led global coalition was intensifying its strikes against ISIL targets; it was also air dropping weapons and military supplies to Kurdish forces.

The latter part of 2014 saw an intensification of the active air campaign over Iraq and Syria against ISIL by United States-led coalition forces. As well, United States President Obama called for more troops to be deployed to the region to assist with the training and advising of Iraqi forces.

At the start of 2015, Japan and Jordan were beset by tragedy when citizens of their countries that were being held by ISIL, were brutally killed. As has become a pattern, ISIL proudly released videotaped footage depicting their vicious acts of murder. In response, Japan promised to do its part in the international fight against ISIL while Jordanian King Abdullah warned of a "relentless war" on the Islamist terror group as it commenced a campaign of air strikes against ISIL targets in Syria.

In February 2015, the horrific killings of more than 20 Egyptian Christians working in Libya marked a new front in the war against Islamic State. Post-Arab Spring Libya was on the brink of political collapse with Islamist extremists taking advantage of the power void. The result was an

Iraq Review 2016 Page 218 of 609 pages Iraq emerging satellite Islamic State venue in Libya. However, Egypt -- like Jordan -- was prepared to respond to the threat posed by these Islamist Jihadists to its citizens and commenced its own air strike campaign against ISIL targets in Libya.

It was to be seen if the Jordanian and Egyptian responses would mark a turning point for the Arab and Islamic worlds, regarding the international effort to degrade and ultimately destroy the Islamist terror group, known in derogatory Arabic parlance as "Daesh."

Meanwhile, in February 2015, President Barack Obama of the United States called on the legislative branch of government in that country to advance new legislation authorizing military action against the terror group calling itself Islamic State. It was to be seen if partisan rivalries in the would impede the process of passing a new authorization intended to carefully circumscribe the United States' military effort to degrade and destroy Islamic State.

Also at stake was a looming effort to retain control over the key Iraqi city of Mosul from Islamic State. To that end, United States military advisers were training joint Iraqi and Kurdish forces to achieve this end in what was expected to be a spring offensive operation. But before the could move forward, the United States-led coalition continued to carry out air strikes in Iraq, supporting Kurdish fighters, with the goal being to drive Islamic State from the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

In mid-April 2015, the United States Pentagon confirmed that Islamic State lost more than a quarter of the territory in Iraq it held prior to the air campaign that was launched in August 2014. With the intent to build on this success, Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi traveled to the United States to request more assistance in the air campaign against Islamic State. However, before the United States could even process this request, in mid-April 2015 - on the heels of their victory in Tikrit - Islamic State was carrying out an advance on the city of Ramadi, ultimately seizing control of that city in May 2015. It was apparent in the spring of 2015 that even if Islamic State was under pressure, it was still a functional and aggressive terrorist entity.

By the start of June 2015, with Islamic State still posing a threat in Iraq and Syria, as well as to the wider Middle Eastern region, and even the global community, United States President Barack Obama acknowledged that his country's strategy to defeat the terror group remained "incomplete." He indicated that a comprehensive strategy could only be advanced with the concurrence of the government of Iraq, and intimated there was a need for Iraqis to commit to the process of saving their own country.

It should be noted that whereas some progress had occurred in Iraq, the prevailing dynamics remained in place in Syria where Islamic State continued to hold sway over large swaths of that country.

Iraq Review 2016 Page 219 of 609 pages Iraq

That being said, by mid-2015, with Islamic State posing a direct security threat to Turkey, the Turkish government shifted its calculus regarding its engagement in the international fight against the terror group. Turkey had to this point refrained from involving itself in the global coalition against Islamic State, and has instead focused its energies on seeing the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria come to an end. Now, the United States and Turkey was announcing a campaign of close cooperation in the effort against Islamic State. But the Turkish government raised eyebrows when it announced it would also go after strongholds of Kurdish extremists as part of its burgeoning campaign against terrorism -- a move sure to raise the ire of Syrian Kurdish fighters, the YPG, who were to be distinguished from the PKK and who had led the local charge against Islamic State.

In November 2015, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters launched an effort against Islamic State, with an eye on liberating the area of Sinjar.

In mid-November 2015, the world was faced with a global security crisis at the hands of the notorious terror group, Islamic State. At issue was the fact that Islamic State was claiming responsibility for a bomb that exploded on a Russian jet flying from the Egyptian resort of Sharm- el-Sheikh, killing more than 200 Russians on board. Also at issue was the Islamic State claim of responsibility for a spate of appalling terror attacks in the French capital city of Paris, which killed approximately 130 people.

At the start of December 2015, Islamic State-inspired terrorists carried out an attack in the United States, killing 14 people and injuring 21 others. Even before this act of bloodshed, though, the Obama administration in the United States had already augmented the air strike campaign against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria with the deployment of military advisors, and at the start of December 2015, President Obama supplemented these forces with a special operations expeditionary force to fight Islamic State. While this deployment collectively could actually be defined as ground forces, it was clearly being interpreted by hardline conservatives as insufficient. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter outlined the goals the special operations expeditionary force as follows: "These special operators will over time be able to conduct raids, free hostages, gather intelligence and capture ISIL leaders." For the Obama administration, the imperative was to exploit the special operations expertise in a targeted strategy against Islamic State.

At the close of December 2015, Iraqi forces saw success in retaking control over Ramadi, which has for some time been a key stronghold of Islamic State. In the same period, United States-led air power eliminated 10 Islamic State leadership figures while going after oil resources used by the terror group.

By the start of 2016, United States air power successfully targeted banking facility used by ISIL, essentially depriving the terror group of the funds used to finance their activities. The United

Iraq Review 2016 Page 220 of 609 pages Iraq

States-led coalition was also seeing success going after Islamic State leadership and resources. As well, having come off their victory in taking back control over Ramadi from Islamic State, Iraqi forces were refocusing their attention on Mosul.

In Detail

As the year 2014 began, Iraq was reeling from the news that a convoy carrying Iraqi Defense Minister Saadoun al-Dulaimi was targeted in a roadside bomb attack in late 2013. The roadside bomb was planted on the main thoroughfare connecting the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi in the province of Anbar. While the vehicle carrying Saadoun al-Dulaimi was damaged and two bodyguards were wounded, the defense minister did not sustain any injuries. Although no group claimed responsibility for the attack, suspicion rested on Sunni Islamic insurgents who have been embroiled in ongoing ethno-sectarian conflict with the Shi'a Islamic-dominated government.

The escalation in violence in Iraq since the spring of 2013 appeared to have been sparked by an army raid on a Sunni Muslim anti-government protest camp close to Hawija, just to the north of Baghdad. The raid was viewed as the latest example of persecution of Sunnis by the Shi'a dominated government and served only to deepen already-heightened ethno-sectarian grievances with clearly deleterious consequences.

The Shi'a dominated government has responded to the disturbing rise in ethno-sectarian violence by launching a crackdown against extremists, rounding up hundreds of people believed to be linked with al-Qaida in the Baghdad area as part of its "revenge for the martyrs" campaign. The campaign was being branded as a security operation by Iraqi authorities, who said it was being carried out by the Baghdad Operation Command in cooperation with the Air Force and the Anti- Terrorism Directorate. But such a crackdown -- as intimated by its very name -- which has focused on largely Sunni districts, was likely to breed even more ethno-sectarian hatred and only inspire further violence.

With ethno-sectarian tensions reaching new heights, speculation was surfacing about a possible plan to partition the country. This controversial plan has, at times, been subject to criticism by advocates of a united Iraq; however, recent developments in Iraq suggest a deeply divided country, subject to ongoing violence, and with no serious political solution at hand to address the turbulence and turmoil.

In fact, at the start of 2014, Iraq had sunk even further into its morass of turbulence and turmoil with the news that al-Qaida allied Sunni Islamic fighters from the entity known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL (also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS) were taking control over two major Iraqi cities -- Fallujah and Ramadi -- in that very province of Anbar. Hadi Razeij, the head of the provincial police force for Anbar, said the police had fled the city. In an interview with al-Arabiya News, he said: "The walls of the city are in the hands of the police force,

Iraq Review 2016 Page 221 of 609 pages Iraq but the people of Fallujah are the prisoners of ISIS."

The newest burst of violence appeared to have been sparked by further incidences of the Shi'a government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki flexing its muscle against the Sunni population. Reminiscent of the 2013 army raid on the Sunni Muslim anti-government protest camp at Hawija mentioned above, the Iraqi authorities in early 2014 carried out a raid on a Sunni Muslim anti- government protest camp in Ramadi. That action left at least ten people dead and sparked the unrest there. The arrest of a Sunni member of parliament added to the sentiment that the Shi'a government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was persecuting the Sunni Arab population of the country. The result -- as before -- was an intensified effort by Sunni extremists to fight back. Their efforts were rewarded with the apparent advance of al-Qaida linked Sunni extremists on Fallujah and Ramadi.

Iraqi military forces were deployed to both cities -- where the black flags of the militants were now flying -- to fight these Sunni Islamic militants from ISIS. However, from the point of view of the Iraqi government, the situation in the strategic city of Fallujah -- - only 50 miles from Baghdad -- was dire. While security forces were trying to wrest back control over Fallujah, the fact of the matter was that the Iraq government had lost control of the city. Militants with allegiances to al- Qaida held control over the southern part of Fallujah while tribesmen allied with al-Qaida controlled the rest of the city. Indeed, the Iraqi government was being described in the international media as having "lost" Fallujah.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was nevertheless promising to rid Iraq of the presence of Sunni al-Qaida aligned terrorists and warned that a major assault was afoot in the city of Fallujah. In a national address, Maliki said, "We are moving on the right course and that the result will be clear and decisive: uprooting this corrupt organization." He continued, "We will continue this fight because we believe that al-Qaida and its allies represent evil."

The Iraqi army soon deployed tanks and artillery around Fallujah in preparation for an offensive operation there. There were suggestions that a hardline approach in Fallujah would exacerbate the ethno-sectarian tensions. In fact, it was highly unlikely that militants who had seen their biggest success in years would relinquish Fallujah without a fierce fight. At the same time, Maliki and the Shi'a dominated government had their own reasons for fomenting ethno-sectarian divisions since they would need to consolidate the Shi'ite vote in parliamentary elections set for later in the year. Exploiting that Sunni-Shi'a division (as opposed to going easy on Sunnis who were from the religious group terrorizing the country) would be politically beneficial to Maliki who wanted to hold onto power, the national security and national (dis)unity risks notwithstanding.

The government then launched an operation on Ramadi, with an eye on retaking control. That battle involved air strikes that killed at least 25 al-Qaida aligned militants. Those militants were urging Sunni tribes in the area to assist them in their fight against the government forces; however,

Iraq Review 2016 Page 222 of 609 pages Iraq several tribes in the area were more supportive of the government's effort to rid the area of terrorism, participating instead in pro-government "Awakening Councils." Meanwhile, residents were fleeing Ramadi to escape the shelling and air strikes by government forces, despite orders from the Sunni militants that they remain in their homes.

Meanwhile, with the threat of violence from ISIS, the al-Qaida aligned group, the United States was ramping up its military support of Iraq by providing military equipment, including surveillance drones and more Hellfire missiles. According to United States Secretary of State John Kerry, despite such assistance, there were no plans afoot for the return of United States military forces to Iraq.

It should be noted that even though attention was focused on Ramadi and Fallujah in Anbar province, violence was continuing elsewhere in Iraq and continued to rock the country through the first half of 2014. While the main battleground venues were the flashpoint cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, attacks by Sunni extremist insurgents plagues every corner of the country from the northern cities of Kirkuk and Mosul to ousted President Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit, not to mention a relentless wave of violence in and around the capital of Baghdad, and even to the south of Baquba in Diyala province.

Ahead of the parliamentary elections in April 2014, an attack at a polling station in northern Iraq left 10 guards dead. According to Iraqi authorities, the gunman wore Iraqi military garb and targeted a facility just outside the city of Kirkuk, with an eye on disrupting the polls. In eastern Iraq, a series of explosions at a political rally for the Shi'ite group, Asaib Ahl Haq (League of the Righteous), exacted its own destructive results in the form of further death and suffering. Elsewhere in Iraq, the pre-election scene was marked with violence and bloodshed as a spate of attacks left a heavy death toll. Meanwhile, with Sunni Islamic extremists holding sway over portions of Anbar province, it was unlikely that voting could even take place in that part of the country. The aforementioned terror group, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), claimed responsibility for many of the attacks via the Internet. ISIL declared that the bombings had been carried out in retaliation for the "murder, torture and displacement" of Sunni Muslims in Iraq by Shi'ite militias. Clearly, it was the latest manifestation of the ethno-sectarian strife that has plagued Iraq since the invasion by United-States-led forces in 2003.

Following the elections that yielded victory for Prime Minister Maliki's State of Law party, despite criticism that his hardline approach against Sunnis has only accentuated ethno-sectarian conflict, the violence and bloodshed continued unabated. An attack by extremist militants on a military base close to the northern city of Mosul in Iraq left 20 soldiers dead on May 10, 2014. Most of the soldiers, who were responsible for guarding an oil pipeline, appeared to have been shot to death at close range; the hands of some of the dead soldiers were reportedly tied behind their backs. As such, the conclusion was that the killings were done execution-style. Sunni Islamic extremist militants who have been carrying out a fierce insurgency against the Shi'a government were the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 223 of 609 pages Iraq prime suspects for the brutal violence. On the same day of the apparent execution of these soldiers, about a dozen people died in the western city of Fallujah. Those deaths were due to a combination of a car explosion and government shelling.

Action by Sunni extremist militants moved to the city of Samarra in the adjacent province of Salahuddin on June 5, 2014, where the ISIL black banner was raised at a university and two mosques there. The government used aerial bombardment to subdue the Islamist militants in that city dispersing them but not eradicating the threat posed in that area.

On June 7, 2014, several car bombs exploded across Baghdad, killing more than 60 people. The attacks -- numbering dozens in total -- struck Shi'ite districts of the capital. As before, Sunni extremist insurgents were suspected of being behind the violence. Meanwhile, in the Ramadi and Fallujah where militants already held sway, they consolidated control by taking control of the campus of Anbar University in Ramadi. The target was likely not so much the university itself as the area behind the campus, known as Humaira, which would facilitate c,ontrol over supply lines between Ramadi and Fallujah.

Security experts made clear that with Iraq now ensconced in a security crisis, the solution was not via military action but rather via a political pathway. Shwan Mohammed Taha, a member of the security and defense committee in the Iraqi parliament, was on the record with international media as he said, "The Iraqi government now relies on using force to solve things, that is why security will get worse." He continued, "This is not only deterioration, it is a failure to manage the security file."

That failure to manage the "security file" had taken on more dire proportions a day earlier. On June 6, 2014, dozens of people were killed in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul in the province of Nineveh as a result of fighting between government troops and Sunni Islamist insurgents. Militants initially moved into Mosul, killing four riot police and three soldiers. In a separate incident, five assailants stormed an arms depot in the southern part of the city and killed close to a dozen soldiers before being neutralized themselves. In the village of Muwaffakiya, located close to Mosul, two suicide car bombings ended in the deaths of six Shabaks – a minority group often targeted by Sunni extremists. Authorities in Mosul said the city was filled with corpses.

In response to the mass attacks, Iraqi forces carried out an assault in the area of Mosul and claimed to kill more than 100 insurgents. While the government assault ensured that Mosul returned to government control in fairly short order, the threat posed by increasingly brazen extremists was not quelled with any degree of finality. Indeed, most of the Sunni Islamist insurgents simply withdrew from the scene of the action to the desert or other towns and would be available to fight another day.

That new day came on June 10, 2014, when the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

Iraq Review 2016 Page 224 of 609 pages Iraq regrouped, engaged in fierce fighting with Iraqi security forces, and ultimately seized control of Mosul. The militants also managed to capture the Ghizlani army base, and set free more than 1,200 inmates from two high-security prisons. Iraqi security forces were forced to flee while the Sunni Islamic militants were able to claim a spectacular victory in a city with two million inhabitants.

A local military commander was quoted by Reuters News as saying, "We have lost Mosul this morning... Army and police forces left their positions and ISIL terrorists are in full control." He continued with a dismal assessment as follows: "It’s a total collapse of the security forces." Other security forces were reported to be saying that they were no match for the ISIL fighters, armed with anti-aircraft weapons and rocket-propelled grenades, who appeared to be prepared for the type of street battles. By contrast, the military had been trained in conventional warfare. The situation offered a clear advantage to the militants. One army officer was quoted by Reuters news as saying of the militants, "They're like ghosts: they appear, strike and disappear in seconds."

Meanwhile, residents of Mosul were fleeing in droves, taking refuge in the semi-autonomous Kurdish region. Of note was the fact that Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani of Kurdistant said his semi-autonomous region had attempted to coordinate a protection plan for Mosul, however, the federal government -- led by Maliki-- rendered that effort ineffectual. Prime Minister Maliki himself entered the fray, issuing a seemingly tone deaf and defiant reaction, characterizing the as a "conspiracy" and threatening to punish security forces who abandoned their posts.

Things were no less depressing for the Maliki government in Hawija, located in Kirkuk province, where Sunni extremist Islamist militants were engaged in battles with security forces, ultimately driving military troops and police way. Then, on June 11, 2014, the news emerged that the city of Tikrit had also fallen to Sunni extremist militants with the fighters from ISIL now controlling the provincial government headquarters and raising their signature black flag. Also of note was the fact that they were advancing on the country's largest oil refinery at Baiji.

The victory in Tikrit augmented the gains for ISIL and delivered a massive blow to Prime Minister Maliki who has not been restrained in his hardline crackdown on Sunni Islamists. As such, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari called on the country's leadership to unite in the face of a "mortal" threat.

For its part, ISIL, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, claimed victory in the group's Mosul offensive, which was titled, "Enter Upon Them Through The Gates." It should be noted that while ISIL has been aligned with the notorious global Jihadist terror enclave, al-Qaida, Baghdadi broke ranks with al-Qaida leader, Ayman al-Zawahri. He has also clashed with Sunni extremist militants fighting the Assad regime in Syria. Indeed, Baghdadi has urged like-minded Sunni extremists to join the fight against Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and his so-called pro-Iranian "Safavid" army, popularizing slogans such as, "Join the ranks oh brothers!" and "Maliki's tyrannical strength no match for pious

Iraq Review 2016 Page 225 of 609 pages Iraq believers." His aim was to ultimately establish a Sunni Islamic Caliphate from Iraq to Syria.

The United States again renewed its commitment to assist the Iraqi government in wresting control from the insurgents -- albeit without an actual military re-engagement in Iraq -- but it also echoed the words of the Iraqi parliamentarian, Mohammed Taha, in noting that Prime Minister Maliki and the government would have to address the grievances of the alienated Sunni Islamic population of Iraq. Essentially, the only long-term solution to Iraq's security emergency would be a political one.

It should be noted that the violence at the start of June 2014 was a continuation of the bloodshed seen in Iraq during the previous month of May 2014. The United Nations said that as many as 800 people had been killed in violence across Iraq in May 2014, making it the worst month for fatalities in the first part of the year. Close to 200 of the dead were members of the Iraqi security forces, while the vast majority of the victims were and civilians who died at the hands of Sunni Islamist extremist insurgents.

This dubious record was actually worse than indicated by these specific numbers since it did not include the death toll for the province of Anbar where Sunni Islamist extremist insurgents had seized control over key cities. According to the United Nations report, the worst hit part of the country was Baghdad; however, bloodshed was also at high levels in Nineveh, followed by Salahaddin, Kirkuk and Diyala.

At the broader level, the uptick in ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq peaked in 2013 with more than 8,000 people being killed in that year alone. It was the highest death toll in Iraq since 2007. That escalation in violence in Iraq in 2013 appeared to have been sparked by an army raid on a Sunni Muslim anti-government protest camp close to Hawija, just to the north of Baghdad. The raid was viewed as the latest example of persecution of Sunnis by the Shi'a dominated government and served only to deepen already-heightened ethno-sectarian grievances with clearly deleterious consequences.

The Shi'a dominated government responded to the disturbing rise in ethno-sectarian violence by launching a crackdown against extremists, rounding up hundreds of people believed to be linked with al-Qaida in the Baghdad area as part of its "revenge for the martyrs" campaign. The campaign was being branded as a security operation by Iraqi authorities, who said that it was being carried out by the Baghdad Operation Command in cooperation with the Air Force and the Anti- Terrorism Directorate. But such a crackdown -- as intimated by its very name -- which has focused on largely Sunni districts, was likely to breed even more ethno-sectarian hatred and likely only inspire further violence.

Given the disturbing security landscape in Iraq, United Nations envoy to Iraq, Nikolay Mladenov, said, "I strongly deplore the sustained level of violence and terrorist acts that continues rocking the country... I urge the political leaders to work swiftly for the formation of an inclusive government

Iraq Review 2016 Page 226 of 609 pages Iraq within the constitutionally mandated timeframe and focus on a substantive solution to the situation in Anbar."

But before any resolution could be forged for Anbar, it was clear that the security emergency facing Iraq was expanding; the fall of Mosul and Tikrit were watershed developments on the political landscape and augured a nationwide crisis.

State of the Iraqi security landscape in mid-2014:

The security crisis in Iraq was at acute levels on June 12, 2014, as ISIL rebels advanced on Baghdad. With security and military troops fleeing their positions, Sunni militants from ISIL had taken control of towns only 60 miles to the north of Baghdad. The rapid advance of the Islamic extremist militants shocked the world.

Complicating the already extremely complicated political landscape was the fact that the semi- autonomous Kurdish authorities were reporting that they had seized control over the oil city of Kirkuk. The Kurdish security forces, know as "peshmerga" (a word that roughly translates into "those who face death") had taken control over several military bases in Kirkuk that had been abandoned by the military. A peshmerga spokesperson, Jabbar Yawar, said: "The whole of Kirkuk has fallen into the hands of peshmerga. No Iraqi army remains in Kirkuk now." For some time, the Kurds have eyed the oil town as a desirable interest but they have not had control over Kirkuk under the federal system. Now, however, they were taking advantage of the clear power vacuum.

The reality was that the Iraqi military and security forces had collapsed, with ISIL extremists controlling wide swaths of the country to the west and north of Baghdad, and with the Kurds now controlling the northern most zones, including the strategic town of Kirkuk, which was home to significant oil deposits. This left the Maliki government securely in control only of the predominantly Shi'a south. As for Baghdad -- government forces had established a security presence but it was not known if they would be able to hold the capital against a highly motivated ISIL movement that was emboldened by its recent -- and meteoric -- gains.

In an ironic twist, the landscape in Iraq in mid-June 2014 represented the divided (Sunni, Shi'a and Kurdish) state that United States Vice President Joe Biden had, at one time, envisioned as the only practical solution for an Iraq divided by ethno-sectarian tensions.

Meanwhile, the Obama administration in the United States suggested it would aid the Maliki government in trying to take back control of the country. For his part, President Obama was on the record saying of the situation in Iraq, "I don't rule anything out." However, it was unlikely that President Barack Obama would bow to the pressure by neo-conservative Republicans in Congress and return the United States to any serious engagement in Iraq. The president elected to power initially in 2008 to bring a close to the Iraq war was in no mood to return the war-weary country to

Iraq Review 2016 Page 227 of 609 pages Iraq a renewed military quagmire in Iraq. He was also reticent about making the United States responsible for civilian casualties in Iraq.

In fact, in a speech on June 13, 2014, President Obama made it known that no United States combat troops would be sent to Iraq. More likely was the notion of air strikes, either with warplanes or unmanned drones, the delivery of weaponry, and intelligence on the location of Sunni insurgents that would be gathered via drone flights over Iraq. It was also soon announced by the Pentagon that a United States carrier, the USS George H.W. Bush and its strike group, were already in the region, and thus ready for the kinds of targeted missions favored by President Obama.

Another option would be the entry of Shi'a Iran into the ethno-sectarian fray as it offered assistance to the Maliki government in regaining full control over the country. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani also expressed support for the idea of working with the United States to assist the Iraqi government in its stabilization thrust. At a news conference on June 14, 2014, President Rouhani said, "We all should practically and verbally confront terrorist groups."

Also possible was the prospect of multilateral assistance for Iraq, given the regional threat posed by ISIL. To that end, the United Nations Security Council could consider possible multilateral options, such as air strikes, which would place the endeavor under the aegis of international law.

Note that as of mid-June 2014, Sunni extremists insurgents reported to be advancing towards Baghdad appeared to have slowed in their progress. Government troops were reported to be successful in regaining control over some territory.

Also being reported was the fact that Iraq's counter-terrorism forces carried out aerial bombardment in Diyala province of the banned Baath party leadership (allied with the former government of Saddam Hussein and aligned thusly with Sunni insurgents). Some 50 insurgents were reportedly killed as a result of this bombing campaign.

Major-General Qassim al-Moussawi, a spokesperson for the Iraqi military command, said, "Our security forces have regained the initiative to launch qualitative operations on various fronts over the past three days and have achieved remarkable victories with the help of volunteers." He continued, "We have regained the initiative and will not stop at liberating Mosul from ISIL terrorists, but all other parts."

In truth, though, it was to be seen if the Iraqi authorities would be able to sustain their effort to repel the Sunni extremist insurgents. The question of sustained effort by Iraqi government forces was at the forefront of the international purview on June 15, 2014, as Sunni insurgents continued to exert control over wide swaths of the country.

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In fact, by June 16, 2014, ISIL extremists had seized control of other cities and towns in Iraq. Among them was the predominantly Turkmen northern city of Tal Afar as well as the town of Saqlawiya to the west of Baghdad. Making matters worse were reports that the Islamist extremist militants had massacred hundreds of Iraqi soldiers and executed more than 1,500 Shi'a recruits in Tikrit. In fact, the Iraqi army confirmed that photographs depicting the bodies of around 200 executed persons were legitimate.

On behalf of the United States Department of State, spokesperson Jen Psaki condemned the extrajudicial summary killings, saying. "The claim by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) that it has massacred 1,700 Iraqi Shi'ite air force recruits in Tikrit is horrifying and a true depiction of the bloodlust that these terrorists represent."

It should be noted that on the same day, another United States vessel, the USS Mesa verde, moved into the Gulf carrying 550 United States Marines. (The USS H.W. Bush carrier was already in the region, as noted above). The actual role of those marines was yet to be publicized. There were also deployments of military personnel for the purpose of protecting the United States embassy in Baghdad. President Obama was set to notify Congress of these collective moves, which were authorized on the War Powers Resolution.

By June 17, 2014, the United States and Iran were in discussions regarding the Iraq security crisis. Discussions, however, were to be distinguished from military coordination. Of concern for the United States was the perception that it was aligned with Shi'a Iran to the consternation of Sunni Saudi Arabia at a time that the entire Islamic Middle East was erupting in a sectarian conflict. On the other side of the equation, Iranian Ayatollah Khamenei indicated that he was in no hurry to cooperate with the United States on Iraq, indicating his opposition to American intervention into "the domestic affairs of Iraq."

On the issue of air strikes -- the most popularly discussed option -- United States Secretary of State John Kerry said, "They're not the whole answer, but they may well be one of the options that are important. When you have people murdering, assassinating in these mass massacres, you have to stop that. And you do what you need to do if you need to try to stop it from the air or otherwise."

On June 19, 2014, following discussions with his national security team, President Obama made clear that while he was prepared to dispatch 300 military advisers to Iraq to assist the government there in repelling ISIL extremists, the United States would not be renewing its military engagement in Iraq. He emphasized this point noting that "American forces will not be returning to combat in Iraq." The president refrained from ordering air strikes against any segment of the Iraqi population -- specifically Sunnis -- as he said, "The United States will not pursue military actions that support one sect inside of Iraq at the expense of another." Still, the president noted that the United States was prepared for "targeted and precise military action" against Sunni extremist Islamists in Iraq "if and when the situation on the ground requires it." In response to questions about the viability of

Iraq Review 2016 Page 229 of 609 pages Iraq the Maliki government, President Obama made clear that it was not up to the United States to make leadership decisions for another country; however, he urged the Maliki government to pursue an "inclusive agenda" and warned that there was "no military solution" to the Iraq crisis.

President Obama’s stance was interpreted as a test for Maliki. It was to be seen if the Iraqi head of government would pass the test by pursuing an inclusive political solution to his country’s crisis, or, if he would continue along a path that has only fueled ethno-sectarian hostilities.

Meanwhile, in the United States, President Obama’s neoconservative critics continued to criticize him for not doing enough to rescue Iraq from its current crisis and questioning his leadership capacity. But President Obama’s Democratic supporters in Congress were becoming increasingly vocal in noting that the Iraq crisis had been crafted and created by the very Republicans issuing criticisms of the Obama administration, and should thus be regarded with grave skepticism.

Recent Developments in the fight to hold Iraq --

In the last week of June 2014, there was no sign that Iraq's security crisis was abating. Instead, Sunni extremist insurgents had consolidated their gains in Anbar province, capturing the town of Rutba -- located on the main thoroughfare between Iraq and Jordan -- while advancing on Haditha. The militants also captured strategic border crossings into Syria and Jordan. As well, ISIL militants had seized the towns of Rawa and Anah along the Euphrates river. Another site of contention was the Baiji oil refinery where it was unknown as to who was actually in control.

Despite the fact that Iraq was in the throes of a devastating national security crisis, Prime Minister Maliki was unwilling to assent to the United States' call for a political solution. It should be noted that United States Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Iraq to personally call for that political solution, noting that it was in Iraq’s interests to bring an end the Sunni insurgency. But Maliki defiantly rejected the notion of a national unity government outright. In a national address that was covered by the media, Maliki said, "The call to form a national salvation government constitutes a coup against the constitution and the political process." Seemingly oblivious to the reality that he was quite literally losing Iraq to extremist militants, Maliki declared, "The dangerous goals of forming a national salvation government are not hidden. It is an attempt by those who are against the constitution to eliminate the young democratic process and steal the votes of the voters." But the truth of the matter was that irrespective of his desire to follow a normal constitutional process in the aftermath of the April 2014 elections that returned Maliki to power, Iraq was in the midst of an eminently abnormal crisis.

The battle in Tikrit was ongoing by the end of June 2014 and into the start of July 2014, with government forces yet unable to wrestle control back from the Sunni extremist militants and with the civilian population caught in the crossfire of violence. A particular problem for government troops was the fact that ISIL militants had booby-trapped several building in that town and planted

Iraq Review 2016 Page 230 of 609 pages Iraq roadside and car bombs throughout Tikrit.

In the first week of July 2014, the Iraqi military was able to take credit for a significant victory as it reclaimed control over the birthplace of Saddam Hussein -- Awja, to the south of Tikrit.

But not all the news for the Iraqi military was good. On July 5, 2014, a senior Iraqi general, Najm Abdullah Sudan, was killed as a result of "hostile shelling" in the town of Ibrahim bin Ali close to Ramadi. As well, ISIL terrorists destroyed about one dozen shrines and holy sites in Nineveh province in northern Iraq. The imagery of Shi'a, Sunni, and Christian shrines and holy sites being destroyed was well-publicized and thus raised the ire of several cultural communities. It also reminded the world of the campaign of cultural destruction attributed to the Taliban in Afghanistan in the early .

In the realm of human destruction, the Islamist extremists also struck Baghdad in the first week of July 2014, with a spate of suicide bombings that left several people dead.

Overall, as July 2014 commenced, it was fair to say that ISIL had made further dramatic gains, now controlling a wide swath of territory from Aleppo in Syria to the area to the west of Baghdad in Iraq.

With the collapse of the Iraqi nation state at stake, attention was on the matter of forming a government. Whereas the government formation process was to be determined by the outcome of the April 2014 elections that gave victory for Prime Minister Maliki's Shi'a bloc, now in mid-2014, the objective was to form a stable national government that could withstand the ethno-sectarian strife rocking the country at crisis levels.

On July 4, 2014, as Iraq's new parliament was convened with the goal of choosing a new prime minister, the process ended in failure as Sunnis and Kurds abandoned the chamber during recess. There was no concurrence on the matter of who would be the head of government, with no sign as to whether or not the candidate would be Maliki. Indeed, the entire climate in the parliamentary chamber was fractious, beset by petty conflicts and marked by disturbing discord. For example, a loud argument erupted from Kurdish lawmakers who accused the government of withholding salaries for their autonomous region, while a Shi'a parliamentarian aligned with Maliki accused the Kurds of removing Iraqi flags. Kadhim al-Sayadi screamed at his Kurdish counterparts: "The Iraqi flag is an honor above your head. Why do you take it down?" Illustrating the brewing Shi'a- Kurdish tensions, he added, "The day will come when we will crush your heads."

A new parliamentary session was not expected anytime soon; indeed, there was no new meeting of parliament scheduled until mid-August 2014. However, given the urgency of the need to move the country along politically, there was a rising chorus for the next session to be brought forward earlier. As noted by the acting speaker of the new parliament, Mehdi al-Hafidh, "Any delay in this

Iraq Review 2016 Page 231 of 609 pages Iraq could jeopardize the security of Iraq and its democratic course and increase the suffering of the Iraqi people."

With the political scene in Iraq marked by chaos and discord, former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi urged Maliki to relinquish his bid to hang onto power in the interests of national unity. In an interview with Reuters News, Allawi said, "I think it is time for Mr. Maliki to leave the scene. If he stays on, I think there will be significant problems in the country and a lot of troubles. I believe that Iraq would go the route of dismemberment, ultimately, if this happens." He continued, "Definitely there will be more violence, the security situation will deteriorate."

For his part, Maliki showed no interest in heeding Allawi's call, and instead reaffirmed his intent to seek a third term in office. In a statement on July 4, 2014, Maliki said, "I will never give up on my candidacy for the post of prime minister." He continued, " I have vowed to God that I will continue to fight by the side of our armed forces and volunteers until we defeat the enemies of Iraq and its people."

The possible fragmentation of Iraq became more of a reality when Kurdish President Massoud Barzani called on members of the Kurdish parliament to start the process of holding an independence referendum. In a closed session of the Kurdish legislative body, Barzani said, "The time has come for us to determine our own fate and we must not wait for others to determine it for us." He continued, "For that reason, I consider it necessary ... to create an independent electoral commission as a first step and, second, to make preparations for a referendum."

Barzani appeared to be acting in the aftermath of the fiasco that erupted in the first session of the new Iraqi parliament’s in Baghdad (discussed above). That botched session that failed to end with the nomination of a new prime minister and a new government (ideally in the eyes of Sunnis and Kurds -- one that would not be headed by Maliki) was something of a "last straw" for Kurds who were now concluding that the best path forward was independence rather than being wedded to a weak Baghdad federal government unable to make basic governing decisions in the interests of national unity, and certainly unable to vanquish Sunni extremist militants. Addressing those frustrations, Barzani said, "We will not deal with those who have sabotaged the country...Iraq has divided itself and we are not responsible for that."

By mid-July 2014, there was some limited progress in the political sphere as the Iraqi legislative chamber managed to name a moderate Sunni Islamist as the speaker of the parliament. But there was no guarantee that the election of Salim al-Jabouri as speaker would act as the catalyst for the establishment of a broader unity government. The next step would entail the election of a president, followed by the nomination of the candidate for prime minister. All expectations were that Maliki was still intent on holding onto power as prime minister -- a move that would preserve the climate of ethno-sectarian hostility and dissonance.

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At the broadest level, there was little sign that the leadership question would soon be settled. Those charged with governing the country seemed oblivious to the fact that the country was in a state of dire crisis. The result was a feckless government at the helm of a country on the verge of collapse and at the mercy of extremist terrorists.

On the matter of those extremist terrorists, ISIL, also known as ISIS, was making it clear that they were the new leaders of the region from Syria to Iraq, which they deemed to be a new Islamic Caliphate. The extremists Sunni militants also declared that their new name was "Islamic State" -- a move that seemed to imbue these extremist terrorists with a broad Islamist and Jihadist mandate unlikely to be limited to their existing territory. Indeed, the leader of the so-called "Islamic State," Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, demanded that Muslims across the world take up arms and descend on his self-declared caliphate, while also promising to move onto to Baghdad.

Indeed, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of "Islamic State" -- the self-declared Jihadist and medieval-style caliphate including swaths of Syrian and Iraqi territory -- released a videotaped message in which he demanded obedience from Muslims. His message cast him as a reluctant leader, as he said, "I am your leader, though I am not the best of you, so if you see that I am right, support me, and if you see that I am wrong, advise me." It should be noted that many of the fighters aligned with Baghdadi and "Islamic State" were from other countries in the region. In many ways, Baghdadi was surpassing Osama Bin Laden's successor, Ayman al-Zawahri, as the new Sunni pan-Islamic and Jihadist leader on the world scene.

On the battlefield in mid-July 2014, Iraqi forces were faced with failure as they were unable to recapture territory from the Islamist extremists in Tikrit, Mosul, and other Iraqi cities.

On July 19, 2014, a spate of bombings struck the predominantly Shi'ite Muslim areas of the capital of Baghdad. Almost 30 people were reported to have died as a result. One explosion was caused by a suicide car bomber drove and struck a police checkpoint in the Abu Dsheer district. Another car bomb struck the Bayaa district; a third car bomb hit the western district of Jihad; the fourth and fifth bombs exploded in the northern Baghdad are of Kadhimiya; a sixth attack took place in the mixed Sunni-Shi'ite district of Saydiya in the southern part of Baghdad later. While there was no immediate claim of responsibility, suspicion rested with the terror group, Islamic State (formerly known as ISIS and ISIL), which has been waging a brutal and bloodthirsty battle for control in Iraq, and as discussed above, had gained control over wide swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory.

Meanwhile, the government was carrying out an offensive on militants in the Islamic State stronghold of Fallujah, presumably in an effort to wrest back control there. But this operation was far from targeted with government forces firing artillery and dropping barrel bombs on the city and killing dozens of civilians in the process on July 21 and 22, 2014. It was to be seen how this unrefined approach would resonate with the beleaguered Iraqi people already suffering the plague

Iraq Review 2016 Page 233 of 609 pages Iraq and horror of Sunni Islamist extremists. Now, even the government "defense forces" constituted a power base to be regarded with fear.

On July 24, 2014, a bus transporting prisoners from a military base in Taji to Baghdad was struck by combined roadside bombs and shooting assaults. The violent attacks left more than 50 prisoners and approximately nine police officers dead. While there was no immediate claim of responsibility, suspicion rested on Islamic State terrorists (formerly known by the acronyms ISIS and ISIL).

On July 28, 2014, the corpses of 15 people -- including three women -- were discovered by Iraqi police in various locations across Baghdad. The bodies showed signs of being subject to execution-style elimination.

Around the same period in late July 2014, a car bomb in the predominantly Shi'ite Baghdad district of Sadr City left 16 people dead. A separate car bomb in the Baghdad district of Ameen left another five people dead.

As July 2014 moved through its last week, Kurdish peshmerga fighters battled Islamic State terrorists in the northern part of the country. Kurdish fighters have shown themselves to be more effective than the Iraqi government forces in staving off the threat posed by Sunni extremist militants. Indeed, the Kurdish peshmerga fighters in this case were able to seize complete control over the town of Jalawla. Iraqi government troops (trained by the United States) have, at times, been at odds with the Kurdish regional guards over control of the area; however, with Islamic State posing such a dire threat, and Iraqi troops showing themselves to be inept at crucial moments, the Kurds were not wasting the opportunity to fill the power vacuum. Indeed, the Kurds had already taken control over the northern oil city of Kirkuk a month earlier in June 2014.

But Islamic State was also able to enjoy some victories against the Kurdish pershmerga forces, seizing control over the Mosul Dam, capturing the town of Zumar, and holding sway over two oil fields in the area on Aug. 2, 2014. To the west, Islamic State was also successful in wresting control over the town of Sinjar close to Syria. Of note was the fact that Sinjar was home to a significant Kurdish Yazidi community, whom Sunni extremists view as heretics and thus have repeatedly targeted for attack.

Not willing to relinquish territory and interests to Islamic State, the Kurds soon announced that they would regroup and reinforce their pershmega fighters with an eye on moving forward with a counter-offensive in northern Iraq. To that end, pershmerga fighters were said to be shelling the eastern districts of Mosul at the start of August 2014 in a bid to regain control there.

The Maliki government continued with its broad (read: far from targeted) approach to striking Islamic State as it carried out an air strike in Mosul aimed at eliminating Jihadist militants at a court

Iraq Review 2016 Page 234 of 609 pages Iraq house. However, medical response teams on the ground said that the strike -- quite possibly by a drone -- hit a prison instead. Elsewhere in Iraq, car bombs struck Baghdad, killing close to 50 people in the increasingly unstable Iraqi capital

It should be noted that while Islamic State was carrying out its advance, which was marked by its own particularly brutal brand of violence and oppression, Shi'ites militias were also active in Iraq. In late July, Shi'ite militias kidnapped and executed 15 Sunni Muslims. Then, in a thoroughly horrific display, the militants used cables to hang the dead bodies from electrical poles in the public square of the Iraqi city of Baquba. It was believed that the gruesome vista was intended to send a message to Sunnis in the city of what might come their way if they sided with Islamic State. Of course, the measure was as likely to have the opposite effect in a country beset by ethno-sectarian tensions and conflict, and with the minority Sunni population already feeling alienated due to Prime Minister Maliki's hardline moves in recent times.

In the first week of August 2014, fighting was going on in Makhmur close to Arbil -- the capital of the Kurdish autonomous region. As well, the predominantly Christian town of Tilkaif, along with the town of Al Kwair, had fallen to Islamic State, who wasted no time in flying their black flags and purging the towns of Christians and other minority groups. Also hard hit was the town of Qaraqosh, where the Christian population was forced leave and seek refuge elsewhere. As they left, Islamic State destroyed churches and burned religious manuscripts.

Meanwhile, the international community continued to advocate the notion that a new inclusive government (and one without Maliki at the helm) might help to stabilize Iraq, and certainly help to persuade moderate Sunnis to reject the hardline extremist agenda of Islamic State. While an inclusive government might certainly help ease tensions in Iraq, where Maliki has only enraged Sunnis and inflamed ethno-sectarian conflict, it was unclear that such a government would have much effect on the success of government military forces in repelling Islamic State.

For his part, Maliki had only deaf ears for the international sphere, declaring on Aug. 5, 2014, that any outside interference or unconstitutional moves intended to form a new government would open "the gates of hell" in the country.

International Interests --

With the threat of Sunni terrorists descending on Baghdad, the United States increased its earlier pledge to send 300 special forces advisers to Iraq. Now an additional 300 troops were being deployed to Iraq to help secure the United States embassy and the Baghdad airport. A Pentagon spokesperson, Rear Admiral John Kirby, explained the additional 300 troops as follows: "These forces are separate and apart from the up to 300 personnel the president authorized to establish two joint operations centers and conduct an assessment of how the U.S. can provide additional support to Iraq's security forces."

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Meanwhile, Iraq was turning into a proxy war for several regional and international powers with their own stakes as Saudi Arabia -- a Sunni power -- deployed 30,000 soldiers to its border with Iraq. Saudi Arabia said it was protecting its own country against terrorists due to the fact that Iraqi soldiers abandoned the area; however, Iraqi authorities insisted that the boundary with Saudi Arabia was under its full control. As well, Russia had supplied Iraq with 1970s-era Soviet style Su- 25 ground attack airplanes. As well, according to imagery by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Iran supplied Iraq with what appeared to be Sukhoi warplanes. The collective aircrafts from Russia and Iran would presumably be used to bolster the air power of Iraq's forces as they pursued the Islamic State militants, formerly known as ISIL and ISIS. That being said, it was unclear who would be operating and maintaining these jets. As stated by Joseph Dempsey from IISS, “It seems increasingly unlikely that Iraq retains the capacity to operate this type of aircraft in any significant number without some level of external support.”

By August 2014, Islamic State controlled vast swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory, including key interests, such as the Mosul Dam. Their ascendancy had left the Iraqi army abandoning their positions and thus allowing Islamic State terrorists to make off with heavy weaponry and tanks supplied by the United States military. Armed with such assets, the militant Islamic terrorist entity was pushing Kurdish peshmerga fighters into retreat. As such, the fact of the matter was that Iraq was on the verge of collapse.

Although the international community was not keen to re-engage in Iraq -- the site of the unpopular 2003 invasion by United States-led forces -- the world likely could not afford the security risk of allowing Islamic State to flourish in the Middle East with impunity. Indeed, Islamic State was itself commonly known as more dangerous than the notorious terror enclave al-Qaida, which was behind the tragic terror attacks in the United States in 2001.

Meanwhile, Islamic State's persecution of Iraq's Christian and Yazidi populations could be understood as nothing less than gross human rights abuses, while that very persecution was triggering a humanitarian crisis. The scene was hence ripe for action.

United States President Barack Obama had already dispatched military advisers to Iraq, but he had also ruled out renewed military engagement in that country, preferring instead to advocate a political solution. As the author of the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq, President Obama was not keen to be drawn back into the Iraqi quagmire. But with a political resolution nowhere on the horizon, and having recognized the dire landscape for religious minorities in Iraq, on Aug. 7, 2014, the United States president ordered targeted air strikes on Islamic State militants in Iraq.

President Obama was also moving forward with a humanitarian response. To that end, the Defense Department said it had dropped more than 70 packages of food and water to the Iraqis fleeing

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Islamic State militants.

The White House was adamant in noting there would be no United States ground forces in Iraq. As stated by President Barack Obama, "Even as we support Iraqis as they take the fight to these terrorists, American combat troops will not be returning to fight in Iraq." Still, it was clear that the human rights crisis unfolding in Iraq had created an imprimatur for the United States government to take action.

In an address to the nation, President Obama said of the plight of the Yazidi people, "When we face a situation like we do on that mountain, with innocent people facing the prospect of violence on a horrific scale, when we have a mandate to help in this case -- a request from the Iraqi government, and when we have the unique capabilities to help avert a massacre, then I believe the United States of America cannot turn a blind eye." President Obama added, "We can act carefully and responsibly to prevent a potential act of ."

Strikes by United States fighter jets were underway by Aug. 8, 2014, with Islamic State terrorists in their crosshairs. Indeed, those United States fighter jets pounded rebel positions around Irbil, the capital of the Kurdish semi-autonomous region. With this air assistance from the United States, Kurdish peshmerga fighters were able to regain control over Gwer and Makmur in Nineveh province.

A day later, President Obama emphasized that the air strikes he ordered would not be a short-term operation, but instead they would go on for months. In an interview with the media, he said, “I don’t think we’re going to solve this problem in weeks. This is going to be a long-term project.” Again, the president made it clear that the United States' engagement in Iraq would not constitute a fully renewed war with combat troops on the ground in that country. However, President Obama noted that the United States and other countries would not turn a blind eye to the fact that Islamic terrorists were gaining ground in Iraq, while also persecuting certain communities there.

As noted above, Iraqi army personnel had collectively abandoned their positions, thus allowing Islamic State terrorists to take possession of the heavy weaponry and tanks supplied by the United States military. Armed with such assets, the militant Islamic terrorist entity was making it difficult for Kurdish peshmerga fighters to defend territory in northern Iraq. With the Kurdish peshmerga fighters standing as the only functional defense entity in Iraq, Iraqi Kurdish leader, Massoud Barzani, called for the international community to provide military assistance in the effort to defeat Islamic State. Barzani noted the gravity of the battle against Islamic State as he said, "We are not fighting a terrorist organization, we are fighting a terrorist state." He called for the international community to provide the kind of weapons needed to put up a credible fight, saying, "The weapons they possess are more advanced than what the Peshmerga have. What we are asking our friends to do is to provide support and to co-operate with us in providing the necessary weapons that would enable us to defeat these terrorist groups."

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On Aug. 10, 2014, United States fighter jets and drones continued to strike Islamic State targets close to Irbil while also striking targets near Sinjar -- the town from which Yazidis were forced to flee to the surrounding mountains. In the following days, United States forces continue to pound Islamic State targets from the air, facilitating efforts by Kurdish fighters against the terror group. However, the Pentagon warned that such air support could help slow -- but not ultimately stop -- the advance of Islamic State. On Aug. 11, 2014, United States air strikes hit Islamic State checkpoints and destroyed vehicles close to Mount Sinjar where thousands of Yazidis had taken refuge.

In addition to providing air strikes, the United States was also supplying weapons to Kurdish fighters, via the Central Intelligence Agency. Further arms were to be provided via the Pentagon. The Kurds were certainly in need of heavy armaments capable of confronting the heavy weaponry being used by Islamic State, and which ironically had been provided by the United States to the Iraqi military, which was now essentially missing in action.

Several European governments, including France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands soon announced that they would also supply arms to Iraq to aid in the fight against Islamic State. announced that it would dispatch two military transport planes for the purpose of delivering weapons to the Kurds.

New governance for Iraq --

In addition to providing air power reinforcements in northern Iraq as well as weapons to the Kurds, the United States continued to push for an inclusive Iraqi government (read: one without Maliki as prime minister) to be formed. But as before, Maliki remained defiant, delivering a vociferous national address on Aug. 10, 2014, in which he emphasized his entitlement to another term in office. Furthermore, special forces loyal to Maliki were deployed in Baghdad's Green Zone that houses most government buildings -- a move apparently intended to show that Maliki would hold the capital regardless of external pressures.

But the United States was delivering the message that it supported the "new guard" in Iraq. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Brett McGurk, the State Department's main representative on Iraq, said via Twitter: "Fully support President of Iraq Fouad Masoum as guarantor of the Constitution and a (prime minister) nominee who can build a national consensus." To that end, the United States was making it clear that it was looking to the new President Masoum to ensure a new prime minister was chosen.

On Aug. 11, 2014, President Masoum named the deputy speaker of parliament, Haider al-Abadi, as the new prime minister. Following a parliamentary vote that ended in the ratification of Abadi's candidacy for the job of head of government, President Masoum and asked Abadi to form a new

Iraq Review 2016 Page 238 of 609 pages Iraq government. Masoum said: "The country is now in your hands."

As expected, Maliki and some of his supporters in parliament rejected the move. Conveniently ignoring the fact that the internal parliamentary vote in favor of Abadi included members of Maliki's own Shi'a National Alliance, Maliki declared that the parliamentary approval of Abadi "had no value." He added that it would take a ruling from the courts to force him to relinquish power. To this end, Maliki said, "I confirm that the government will continue and there will not be a replacement for it without a decision from the Federal [Supreme] Court." This assertion set the stage for a political impasse in turmoil-ridden Iraq.

Nevertheless, many leaders in the global community were ready to move forward with the new Iraqi government, to be headed by Abadi. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon lauded the naming of Abadi as prime minister and called on him to form a broad-based government reflective of Iraq's cultural diversity. Likewise, United States President Barack Obama called Abadi to congratulate him for becoming Iraq's new prime minister and to urge him to form a diverse government representative of Iraq's religious and ethnic communities; he also noted that the establishment of a new head of government constituted an important step for Iraq in the fight against Islamic State militants. Meanwhile, Secretary of State John Kerry warned Maliki not to "stir the waters" by trying to hold onto power. Kerry said, "There should be no use of force, no introduction of troops or militias in this moment of democracy for Iraq. The government formation process is critical in terms of sustaining stability and calm in Iraq and our hope is that Mr. Maliki will not stir those waters." The United States' top diplomat also warned, "There will be little international support of any kind whatsoever for anything that deviates from the legitimate constitution process that is in place and being worked on now."

International pressure on Maliki appeared to have yielded the desired result. On Aug. 14, 2014, it was announced that despite his earlier discussed obstreperousness, Maliki had agreed to end his legal challenge to the nomination of his replacement, and was stepping down from office to make way for Abadi.

For his part, Abadi was moving forward in his new capacity as head of government, saying in an address that the country had to unify in the fight against the "barbaric" Islamic State. He said, "We all have to cooperate to stand against this terrorist campaign launched on Iraq and to stop all terrorist groups."

Of note was the fact that Sunni tribal leaders and clerics have "blessed" the government, suggesting (with caution) that they would be interested in working with incoming Prime Minister Abadi if his administration was respectful of the rights of Iraq's Sunni community. Also of note was the fact that Kurdish members of government, who suspended their participation under the Maliki administration, announced their return. While the cabinet composition was likely to change regardless with Abadi at the helm of a new inclusive government, the fact that Kurdish politicians

Iraq Review 2016 Page 239 of 609 pages Iraq were now participating again in the political process augured well for the political sphere.

As of September 2014, the parliament of Iraq had approved a new government led by Prime Minister Haider Abadi.

Recent Battlefield Developments:

In mid-August 2014, Islamic State was making further territorial gains, including across the border in Syria. In Iraq, Islamic State drove out the regional government of Jalawla and seized that town to the north east of Baghdad. Islamic State was also continuing its persecution of the Yazidi people, killing hundreds of men from that sect, burying others alive, and taking the women as sex slaves, claiming that they would be given to the terrorist fighters as "wives." These barbaric actions by Islamic State were reminiscent of warfare during the Dark Ages.

The effort against Islamic State appeared to be largely carried out by Kurdish forces, although on Aug. 13, 2014, it was reported that a group of about 100 United States special forces were on Mount Sinjar assessing the humanitarian situation of Yazidis taking refuge there. They determined that Kurdish forces were handling the rescue missions with repeated dangerous flights over terrain controlled by Islamic State and to the mountain top where they could provide food and water supplied and rescue people. According to United States President Barack Obama himself, the siege of Mount Sinjar in northern Iraq had been broken although Islamic States' genocidal terrorist mission continued to plague the country at large.

Indeed, even amidst the positive developments for the Yazidis on Mount Sinjar came further heartbreaking news for them. At issue was the massacre of scores of Yazidis (80 men in total) and the abduction of women and children by Islamic State in the village of Kawju (also known as Kocho) in the northern part of the country. According to sources inside Iraq, Islamic State terrorist spent several days there trying to force the local Yazidis to convert to but ultimately ending with a killing spree that lasted for one hour.

Although the United States had ended its operation at Mount Sinjar, United States forces continued to carry out strikes in northern Iraq in mid-August 2014. These strikes were aimed at protecting the Kurdish capital of Irbil, and assisting Kurdish fighters to retake control over the strategic Mosul Dam, which had been lost to Islamic State weeks prior. Located on the River Tigris about 30 miles from the city of Mosul, the Mosul Dam was of core strategic interest since it provides water and electricity to northern Iraq. On Aug. 17, 2014, after a lengthy battle in which Kurdish fighters encountered fierce resistance from Islamic State, control over the Mosul Dam changed hands. With the support of United States air power, Kurdish fighters were able to gain control over the Mosul Dam, although a lengthy process of clearing the area of mines and booby traps was ongoing.

Next on the agenda for Kurdish forces would be the effort to regain control over Nineveh to the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 240 of 609 pages Iraq east of the Mosul Dam and then to areas west towards Sinjar. Their efforts would be aided by the United States forces, who were now continuing (and even expanding) their support efforts in the fight against Islamic States in Iraq. Also stepping up their involvement in the security crisis to repel Islamic State was the United Kingdom, which said that it would aid in the transportation of weapons and ammunition to the Kurdish peshmerga fighting forces. United Kingdom fighter pilots would also be carrying out intelligence gathering missions aimed at determining Islamic State positions in Iraq.

Meanwhile, Iraqi forces -- -- now somewhat revitalized by the successes experienced by Kurdish fighters -- were regrouping and re-entering the fray. An effort by Iraqi forces to recapture Tikrit on Aug. 19, 2014, was stymied to some degree by particularly fierce resistance from Islamic state fighters. Although the operation in Tikrit appeared to be temporarily stalled, the fact of the matter was that Iraqi forces had returned to the battlefield.

Aug 19, 2014, was marked by the grim news that , an American journalist, had been killed by Islamic State in retaliation for the United States' strikes in Iraq. It was, as such, the day in which Islamic State had effectively carried out its first terrorist attack against the United States.

Islamic State released a gruesome video recording, titled " A Message to America," in which the photojournalist, who was abducted in Syria in 2012, was shown reading out a prepared statement by his captors before being horrifically beheaded. The disturbing video recording included footage of United States President Barack Obama announcing that he had authorized strikes in Iraq. A subtitled message, conveniently translated into both Arabic and English, was shown on the screen, noting: "Obama authorizes military operations against the Islamic State effectively placing America upon a slippery slope towards a new war front against Muslims."

For its part, the White House declared that it was "appalled by the brutal murder" of Foley. Weeks earlier before this horrific and barbaric development, United States intelligence officials had warned that Islamic State was benefiting from its territorial gains in Syria and Iraq by attracting more Muslim extremists to its ranks. Once believed to be a movement totaling around 10,000 fighters, the militant Islamist Jihadist entity was now significantly larger in size. United States intelligence officials also warned that Islamist State was attempting to establish terror cells outside Iraq and Syria, with operatives believed to be in Western countries. Those external terrorism ambitions were causing grave anxieties for the countries of the West, including the United States, regarding existing or future plots to carry out terror attacks. At a time when the United States and the countries of the West were hoping to withdraw from "war footing" in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the reality was that the Islamic Jihadist terror threat continued to present a global security crisis.

Tikrit was the site of violence on Aug. 22, 2014, when an explosives-laden vehicle targeted soldiers and Shi'ite militia and ended in bloodshed. On the same day, an attack by gunmen on a

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Sunni mosque close to Baquba in the Diyala province left more than 65 people dead. Because the victims were Sunnis, suspicion rested on Shi'ite militias -- presumably in retaliation for all the attacks being carried out by Islamic State. However, some sources suggested that even with Sunnis as the victims, the likely culprits were Islamic State militants who were willing to murder or persecute any individual or group not adhering precisely to their hardline Salafist and Jihadist notions of Sunni Islam.

On Aug. 23, 2014, bombings plagued Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Irbil. Eight people died and two dozen were wounded when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden vehicle by driving through the perimeter of the Interior Ministry compound in Baghdad. In the northern city of Kirkuk, security posts and a marketplace were targeted during near simultaneous bombings that killed 15 people. An attack also took place in the Kurdish capital of Irbil although reports of casualties from that center were unavailable.

On Aug. 24, 2014, a suicide attack on a Shi'a mosque in , left several people dead. A day later on Aug. 25, 2014, Karbala and Hillah to the south of the capital were struck by a series of car bombings that caused the deaths of two dozen people. At the end of the month, violence continued to plague the country with a suicide car bombing to the south of Baghdad that killed about a dozen people.

Also in the last week of August 2014, Kurdish Peshmerga forces were seeing some success as they regained control over the oilfields near Mosul in northern Iraq from Islamic State, and slowly recouping ground elsewhere. Of note was the fact that joint Kurdish and Iraqi forces had recaptured several key towns, such as Zumar and Suleiman Bek.

As discussed earlier, joint Iraqi and Kurdish forces, supported by United States air strikes, were able to take back some terrain including the important Mosul Dam. Still, the advances for the anti-Islamic State forces were not without harsh costs. Islamic State released videotaped footage of a Kurdish man being beheaded in Mosul -- presumably as a warning to Kurdish Peshmerga forces.

As August 2014 was coming to a close, Islamic State added a new group to its list of cultures needing to be "purified" (read: persecuted). According to the United Nations, in addition to apostate Sunnis, Shi'ites, Yazidis, Shabaks, Kakai, Sabaeans, and Christians, the Turkmen of Amerli were also being targeted for attack. Indeed, in the town of Amerli, as many as 15,00 residents were said to be trapped and the largely Turkmen population was under siege. The United Nations said that the Shi'ite Turkoman community of Amerli was cut off from government-held territory and at risk of being massacred. As noted by a United Nations envoy, Nickolay Mladenov, "The situation of the people in Amerli is desperate and demands immediate action to prevent the possible massacre of its citizens." Iraq's most important Shi'ite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al- Sistani, issued his own call for Iraqi forces to confront the horror unfolding in Amerli and "save its

Iraq Review 2016 Page 242 of 609 pages Iraq peoples from the dangers of terrorists."

On Sept. 1, 2014, United States President Barack Obama formally notified Congress that he had authorized targeted air strikes in Iraq aimed at facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid to the besieged town of Amerli. A statement from the National Security Council described the operation as follows: "This operation is consistent with the military missions we have outlined to date in Iraq –- to protect U.S. personnel and facilities and to address the humanitarian situation on the ground."

Around the same time in early September 2014, the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights declared that Islamic State's campaign of terror, barbarism, and destruction had occurred on "unimaginable scale," and included targeted killings, forced conversions, sexual abuse, and torture in Iraq. As stated by United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Flavia Pansieri, "The reports we have received reveal acts of inhumanity on an unimaginable scale." She expressed grave concern over the persecution of a wide variety of minority groups by Islamic State, saying that "ethnic and religious cleansing" would constitute "crimes against humanity."

In the future record detailing those crimes against humanity would be the aforementioned beheading of American journalist, James Foley. But a second American journalist, , suffered the same kind of horrific fate in early September 2014, with Islamic State again releasing another gruesome and shocking videotape depicting his beheading.

Around the same time, Islamic State terrorist kidnapped 40 men in northern Iraq while Amnesty International said that it discovered mass graves in the city of Tikrit. Violence continued to plague Iraq with two bombs on Sept. 4, 2014, in the capital of Baghdad killing about 20 people in total. One car bomb in the Shi'a area of Kadhamiya left about a dozen people dead while a suicide bomber charged a police checkpoint in the center of the city, killing several other people.

The Syrian dimension in the Islamic State's rampage of terror:

On Aug. 24, 2014, following several days of fighting that left close to 500 people dead, terrorists from Islamic State stormed an air base in Tabqa in northeast Syria, taking control there at the expense of government forces. The victory at Tabqa was a significant one was it constituted the last stronghold for pro-government forces in that region of Syria. Two other Syrian military bases were taken in recent weeks in addition to the latest loss at Taqba, thus delivering a painful blow to President Bashar al-Assad's regime. In the nearby city of Raqqa, Islamic State militants celebrated their victory in their increasingly familiar and barbaric manner by displaying severed heads of Syrian soldiers in the city center while chanting "God is great." It was clear that whether Islamic State operated in Iraq or Syria, its tactics of bloodshed and brutality were being applied with enthusiastic conviction across its self-declared Caliphate.

Critics have suggested that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has avoided becoming overly-

Iraq Review 2016 Page 243 of 609 pages Iraq embroiled in a conflict with Islamic State, preferring to concentrate on his fight with other rebel groups opposed to him. They have intimated that Assad was counting on his neighbors in the Middle East, as well as the West more broadly, to come to terms with the brutality of Islamic State. Accordingly, they would be forced to confront the terror group, which was proving itself to be the most dangerous threat to global security in recent times.

That calculation was proving to hold some relevance in late August 2014. At issue were emerging reports that the United States was preparing its military options to deal with Islamic State -- not only in Iraq but also in Syria. While the United State authorities made clear that there was no immediate plan to extend the current engagement of limited air strikes in Iraq, they were not foreclosing other possibilities, especially since Islamic State had now brutally assassinated a United States national (as discussed above), also because the terror group was expressly conveying its threats against the United States. A spokesperson for General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said "With Central Command, (Dempsey) is preparing options to address ISIS both in Iraq and Syria with a variety of military tools including air strikes."

It was to be determined whether or not United States President Obama would re-examine his policy regarding Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, given the advance of Islamic State into Syria. President Obama was on the record calling for Assad to step down from power given his hardline and often brutal fight against rebels in Syria. Suddenly, the United States, the West, and several countries of the Middle East who had staked out anti-Assad stances were finding themselves aligned with unlikely countries, such as Syria and Russia, in wanting to see an end to Islamic State's rampage of terror in the region.

Note that on Aug. 25, 2014, Syria's foreign minister, Walid Muallem, said that his country would welcome a joint effort with the United States to fight Islamic State. Muallem said Syria was "the center of the international coalition to fight Islamic State" and called on the United States to coordinate with Syria as to any possible air strikes on its terrain. Muallem. however, warned that "Anything outside this is considered aggression."

For its part, the Obama administration in the United States made clear that if it chose to move forward with any engagement in Syria aimed at quelling the threat posed by Islamic State, it would not clear its plans with the Assad regime in Syria.

On Aug. 26, 2014, it was announced that President Obama approved air surveillance of Islamic State in Syria. The general consensus was that while this initial effort was aimed as intelligence reconnaissance, it could easily set the table for an expansion of air strikes against Islamic State -- not only in Iraqi territory but also on Syrian terrain.

Note: At the start of September 2014, the human rights watchdog group, Human Rights Watch, alleged there was "credible evidence" that the terror group, Islamic State, had used ground-fired

Iraq Review 2016 Page 244 of 609 pages Iraq cluster munitions in northern Syria. As well, videotaped footage of the mass execution of Syrian soldiers at the hands Islamic State was released to the world.

Special note on human rights abuses and cultural destruction --

In mid-2014, the United Nations published a comprehensive review of conditions in Iraq in which it accused Islamic State (formerly known via the acronyms ISIS and ISIL) of massive human rights violations and gross abuses ranging from execution to rape and the forced conscription of child soldiers. The report read as follows: "ISIL and associated armed groups have also continued to perpetrate targeted assassinations of community, political, and religious leaders, government employees, education professionals, health workers." The United Nations also detailed other crimes, making note of "sexual assault, rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls, forced recruitment of children, kidnappings, executions, robberies." Thus, the United Nations issued the following succinct conclusion: "This may also amount to war crimes." The United Nations, via this review, also had harsh words for the Iraqi government forces, which the United Nations said had done little to protect the civilian population.

The horrific security conditions in Iraq were described by Navi Pillay, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in the following manner: "Every day we receive accounts of a terrible litany of human rights violations being committed in Iraq against ordinary Iraqi children, women and men, who have been deprived of their security, their livelihoods, their homes, education, healthcare and other basic services."

The bloodshed and death aside, there was also a humanitarian disaster in the making for those who managed to survive the wrath of Islamic State. In northern Iraq, as many as 200,000 people have been displaced in mid-2014 alone, according to the United Nations, as Islamic State has consolidated territory.

While Iraq's Shi'a population constituted the main target of Islamic State's wrath, Christian Iraqis were also on its target list. In fact, as of mid-July 2014, Christians -- typically Chaldeans and Assyrians -- were fleeing the culturally diverse city of Mosul in droves. Many were said to be taking refuge in the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan.

This mass exodus followed an ultimatum by the Sunni Islamist terror group that Christians either convert to Islam and pay a "jizya" protection tax or be faced with death. The ultimatum by Islamic State was announced in mosques and read as follows: "We offer them three choices: Islam; the dhimma contract -- involving payment of jizya; if they refuse this they will have nothing but the sword." Soon, these three choices were reduced to two, with the payment of jizya removed and Christians being forced to either convert or be killed; in several instances in Syria, even Christians who converted to Islam at the command of Islamic State were subject to brutal extermination via beheadings.

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In an interview with Agence France Presse, a senior Christian cleric, Patriarch Louis Sako, sadly noted, "For the first time in the history of Iraq, Mosul is now empty of Christians." Indeed, Iraq had been home to one of the world's most ancient Christian communities but since the United States-led invasion in 2003, the numbers have been on a downward spiral. The takeover of Mosul by Islamic State in 2014 was essentially ensuring that the ancient stamp of Christianity in Iraq was blotted out.

The blotting out of the ancient stamp of Christianity was also taking place in Qaraqosh -- known as Iraq's Christian center. The Christian population was forced to abandon that town. Joseph Thomas, the Chaldean archbishop of Kirkuk, described the scenario as such: "It's a catastrophe, a tragic situation: tens of thousands of terrified people are being displaced as we speak." Meanwhile, Islamic State militants set upon the task of destroying the churches, the religious artifacts within them, as well as the ancient religious manuscripts that stood as sacred testaments to Iraq's rich cultural history.

Also in the crosshairs of Islamic State's rampage of terror was the Kurdish Yazidi community, whom the brutal Sunni extremists have viewed as heretics and have thus repeatedly targeted for attack. As noted above, Islamic State had managed to wrest control over the town of Sinjar -- the ancestral home of the Yazidis -- driving them to desperately seek refuge in the mountains -- but also effectively trapping them there without food, water, or means of survival. For all intents and purposes, a de facto siege was underway with the Yazidis as the victims.

Because the Yazidis faced imminent death, there was an urgent call for international humanitarian intervention. As noted by Jabbar Yawar, the secretary-general of the Kurdistan Regional Government ministry: "Urgent international action is needed to save them. Many of them -- mainly the elderly, children and pregnant women -- have died." Indeed, the United Nations reported that as many as 40 Yazidi children had died "as a direct consequence of violence, displacement and dehydration" in the space of days.

There was a different kind of misery in the works for young female Yazidis who were kidnapped by Islamic State militants. These young women were forced into sexual slavery under the guise of "marriage" in the same manner as Islamic terrorists, who have abducted and oppressed young women in Nigeria.

Other victims of persecution at the hands of Islamic State included apostate Sunnis, Shi'ites, Shabaks, Kakai, Sabaeans, Christians, and ethnic Turkmen minorities from towns and villages in Nineveh.

Navi Pillay, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, has condemned Islamic State, accusing its members of "appalling, widespread" crimes that could easily be classified as

Iraq Review 2016 Page 246 of 609 pages Iraq crimes against humanity Iraq. Among the list of abuses and human rights violations believed to have been carried out by Islamic State were targeted killings, kidnappings, trafficking, slavery, sexual abuse, forced conversions, destruction of cultural sites, and the persecution of entire communities. As noted by Pillay, "They are systematically targeting men, women and children based on their ethnic, religious or sectarian affiliation and are ruthlessly carrying out widespread ethnic and religious cleansing in the areas under their control."

As the Sunni extremist terrorists from Islamic State were continuing their aggression across Iraq, they were directing their campaign of abuse not only at people but also at Iraq's cultural and historic heritage. At issue was the destruction of the tomb of Jonah -- burial site of the Prophet Jonah revered by Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike. Militants from Islamic State reportedly planted explosives around the mosque that houses Jonah's burial site and detonated them remotely. The tomb of Biblical Daniel was also reported to have been decimated. Several other heritage sites around Mosul, such as the centuries-old shrine to Seth -- believed to be the son of Adam and Eve, the Prophet Jirjis Mosque, and the Awn al-Din Shrine, were also demolished. To the west of Mosul in the town of Tal Afar, several Shi'ite shrines and mosques were destroyed by Islamic State.

The actions were reminiscent of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as well as al-Qaida-aligned Ansar Dine in Mali in 2012. Both extremist Islamist enclaves have been aligned with the terror enclave, al-Qaida, and were responsible for cultural and historic destruction in these two countries, for the purpose of obliterating any monuments they viewed as insufficiently Islamic. Often, such holy sites are declared by Islamist zealots to be places of "apostasy" instead of prayer, thus resulting in their destruction. Of note is the fact that global analysts view Islamic State as being even more extreme than al-Qaida, which was responsible for the 2001 terror attacks in the United States.

Damage to Iraq’s cultural and historic legacy was not a new phenomenon in a country beset by war for more than a decade. The United states-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 resulted in the looting of Baghdad’s National Museum and National Archives. But such incidences constituted the tragic consequences of warfare, and were to be distinguished from Islamic State's deliberate and nefarious campaign of cultural and historic destruction, which was intended to erase all cultural and archaeological remnants of Iraq's rich heritage -- precisely because they did not suit the extremist Salafist interpretations of Islam.

In addition to Islamists' campaign of human rights violations and cultural destruction was the emerging goal of eradicating Western-style education. In September 2014, the self-described Islamic State banned the study of Mathematics, Social Studies, and Civics (which includes learning about elections and democracy) in its self-declared caliphate. References towards science, such as evolution, were also to be removed completely, while laws of physics and chemistry were to be explained as "the result of Allah's rules and laws." Notions of ethnic and national identity were to

Iraq Review 2016 Page 247 of 609 pages Iraq be excised and replaced with "belonging to Islam" and the "denunciation of infidels." Sports were to be entirely prohibited. The anti-education edict ended with the following warning: "This is an obligatory announcement, and all violators will be punished." Reminiscent of the anti-education stance adopted by the Islamist terror group, Boko Haram, in Nigeria, it was apparent that such Islamist extremists were intent on purging their ranks of intellectualism and replacing it with ideological zealotry.

Western allies form coalition to fight Islamic State:

In the fight against Islamic State, there were emerging reports that air strikes on the northern city of Mosul in the first week of September 2014 killed Abu Alaa al-Iraqi, a senior Islamic State military commander from the city of Tal Afar.

The United States was also carrying out a series of air strikes using bomber and fighter aircraft against Islamic State targets in the area of the Haditha Dam in western Iraq. The aim of those strikes was to protect the strategic dam at Haditha, which has functioned as a key source of energy in Iraq. Meanwhile Iraqi troops were active east of Haditha as they sought to regain control over Barwana, while Kurdish forces worked to liberate the area of Mount Zarta. These actions showed some success for the effort against Islamic State terrorists.

That effort would be bolstered as the United States announced it was rallying allied countries to join the campaign to repel and destroy Islamic State. Speaking from a NATO summit in Wales in the first week of September 2014, United States President Barack Obama reiterated his country's commitment to eliminating the leadership of Islamic State, while noting that NATO allies were prepared to join the campaign against the brutality of Islamic State. To this end, President Obama formed what he termed "a core coalition" of allied Western countries to fight against the threat posed by Islamic State, albeit without the so-called "boots on the ground."

That coalition, according to United States Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, consisted of the following NATO allies: United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, , Poland, and Turkey. The task of this bloc, according to United States Secretary of State John Kerry, would be as follows: "We need to attack them in ways that prevent them from taking over territory, to bolster the Iraqi security forces and others in the region who are prepared to take them on, without committing troops of our own."

President Obama received criticism from remarks he made about not having a strategy to deal with the threat posed by Islamic State. While his remarks were actually focused on the Syrian dimension of the equation, they nonetheless fueled condemnations from neoconservatives who believed that President Obama was not moving fast enough as regards a confrontation with Islamic State.

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Speaking on the NBC television show, "Meet the Press," President Obama sought to address concerns that he was not acting with sufficient urgency against Islamic State as he said: "We are going to be able to not just blunt the momentum of ISIL. We are going to systematically degrade their capabilities. We're going to shrink the territory that they control. And ultimately we're going to defeat them."

The particulars of his strategy would be detailed in a speech to be delivered on Sept. 10, 2014. President Obama said that in that address, his intent would be to "prepare the country" for the impending fight against Islamic State or ISIL. As before, however, he emphasized that the United States would not be returning to the battlefield on the ground in Iraq.

President Obama explained, "This is not the equivalent of the Iraq war. What this is, is similar to the kinds of counter-terrorism campaigns that we've been engaging in consistently over the last five, six, seven years. I just want the American people to understand the nature of the threat and how we're going to deal with it and to have confidence that we'll be able to deal with it."

On Sept. 9, 2014, one day before the highly-anticipated address in which he would prepare the country for the effort against Islamic State or ISIL, President Obama met with congressional leaders to apprise them of his plans. President Obama indicated that he already had the authority expand ongoing action against Islamic terrorists in Iraq and Syria without Congressional approval; however, the president suggested that he would he welcomed action from Congress in support of plan aimed at reversing and repelling Islamic State, also known as ISIL and ISIS.

Attention was also focused on the regional Arab powers in the Middle East who would most likely be affected by the territorial gains of Islamic State, but who have hitherto been largely "missing in action." In the first week of September 2014, the Arab League was meeting in Egypt. From Cairo, the Arab League issued its own support for the fight against Islamist extremist groups in Iraq and Syria, while indirectly endorsing the United States' campaign of aerial bombardment against Islamic State.

The head of the Arab League, Nabil al-Arabi, also warned that the ascendancy of Islamic State posed a serious challenge to the authority of Iraq, threatening "its very existence and the existence of other states." Thus, he urged that a military, political, economic, and cultural plan be advanced to confront the dire threat of terrorism posed by Islamic State. It was to be seen how the Arab League concretely envisioned its military, political, economic, and cultural involvement in the fight against Islamic State.

United States President Barack Obama outlines strategy to "degrade and ultimately destroy" ISIL - -

On Sept. 10, 2014, President Barack Obama called on Americans to support a campaign to repel

Iraq Review 2016 Page 249 of 609 pages Iraq and eliminate the brutal and barbaric terrorist group that named itself Islamic State and declared a caliphate over broad swaths of Syrian and Iraqi terrain. President Obama said of his proposed campaign in Iraq and Syria: “Our objective is clear: We will degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counter-terrorism strategy."

The president offered a scathing excoriation of the terror group that he has consistently referred to by the acronym ISIL rather than by their preferred name, Islamic State. President Obama said, "Now let's make two things clear: ISIL is not 'Islamic.' No religion condones the killing of innocents, and the vast majority of ISIL's victims have been Muslim. And ISIL is certainly not a state. It was formerly al-Qaida's affiliate in Iraq, and has taken advantage of sectarian strife and Syria's civil war to gain territory on both sides of the Iraq-Syrian border. It is recognized by no government, nor the people it subjugates. ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple. And it has no vision other than the slaughter of all who stand in its way."

President Obama made it clear that his proposal for a campaign to fight and defeat this terrorist organization (ISIL, also known as ISIS and Islamic State) was to be distinguished from the invasion and occupation of Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. He emphasized that the endeavor would not involve United States ground troops, declaring: "We will not get dragged into another ground war."

President Obama indicated that the military structure of the effort in Iraq and Syria would involve United States air strikes with regional forces providing the military forces on the ground. Stated differently, the United States would provide air power and air support to Kurdish and Iraqi forces on the ground in the fight against ISIL. To this end, he said, “This counter-terrorism campaign will be waged through a steady, relentless effort to take out ISIL wherever they exist using our air power and our support for partner forces on the ground.”

Nevertheless, President Obama announced that he would deploy 475 more United States troops to shore up allied forces, bringing the total American military personnel to just over 1,500. While their mission would be arm and train local forces to fight ISIL, and while these troops could not be properly be understood as "combat troops," President Obama acknowledged that these United States troops would nonetheless be at risk.

As indicated here, the counter-terrorism effort against ISIL would also include Syria. To be precise, the United States would extend assistance to select (read: "moderate") Syrian opposition forces. That assistance would include the training of Syrian anti-ISIL forces. It should be noted that Saudi Arabia confirmed that it would provide bases to train these "moderate" Syrian opposition fighters. Still, there would be no assistance for the Assad regime. As stated by the president, "In the fight against ISIL, we cannot rely on an Assad regime that terrorizes its people: a regime that will never regain the legitimacy it has lost."

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Throughout, President Obama has been hesitant to enter into an engagement of any kind in Syria, largely due to the fact that it was difficult to distinguish between rebel forces. While the Obama administration has been willing to aid the Free Syrian Army and it has backed the official Syrian opposition in the civil war against the Assad regime in Syria, it has been careful about allowing weapons and aid to fall into the hands of anti-Assad terror groups, such as al-Nusra Front and even ISIL, which have increasingly held sway in Syria.

Now, however, with ISIL on an advance and posing a serious threat to global security interests, President Obama was prepared to strike them in Syria. To this end, he said, “That means I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.”

Other elements of President Obama's counter-terrorism strategy would include intensified measured aimed at cutting off terrorist funding for ISIL, stemming the tide of Jihadist fighters into the region, increased intelligence operations, and increased humanitarian assistance to civilians affected by ISIL's rampage of terror. President Obama also announced that he would chair a meeting of the United Nations Security Council that would be intended "to further mobilize the international community" around the effort to degrade and destroy ISIL.

Critics of the president have complained that the campaign outlined by President Obama offered no definitive goal lines for victory. Instead, a long-term effort to strike at terrorist targets, potentially lasting several years, lay ahead. Indeed, President Obama was making no pretense of this reality. Instead, he clearly indicate that the fight against ISIL might be a long and difficult one as he said, “It will take time to eradicate a cancer like ISIL." To be sure, the mission of eliminating terrorist threats in any country or region in the world would inevitably be a long-term endeavor.

Other critics -- predominantly in Congress -- were affronted by the president's claim that he already had the executive authority to expand military operations in Syria and Iraq. At issue was the prevailing 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) that the Obama administration said provided the legal basis for extending anti-terrorist operations in Syria. Given the existence of that legislation, which was broadly used by the previous Bush administration to carry out its own activities, the Obama administration intimated that it would not need to secure further legislation authorizing military engagement. Of course, there was a certain irony regarding the fact that President Obama would be relying on the very same AUMF that he said should be "refined and ultimately repealed" a year earlier. To be sure, President Obama suggested that he would welcome congressional support -- possibly on votes regarding funding rather than another grand authorization. Of course, there was no guarantee that members of Congress would agree with this stance. It was to be seen if an executive versus legislative showdown loomed ahead.

It should be noted that President Obama drew on examples of limited counter-terrorism

Iraq Review 2016 Page 251 of 609 pages Iraq engagements in Yemen and Somalia using drone strikes and special operations to show that models of such counter-terrorism campaigns were already being utilized.

Some critics have balked at this reference by President Obama to the counter-terrorism strategies in Yemen and Somalia as templates for the proposed strategy in Iraq and Syria to deal with ISIL. Their argument, picked up and advanced by the media, has been that the situation in Iraq-Syria with ISIL was to be distinguished from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and al-Shabab in Somalia. That distinction, in the view of these critics, was due to the fact that ISIL had control over actual territory. However, President Obama's examples of targeted counter-terrorism approaches in Yemen and Somalia may not be wildly off the mark.

Much like Iraq and Syria, Yemen has a fragile government at the helm of a fractured country confronting multiple threats to its national security -- from Islamist terrorists from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, to a Shi'ite Zaidi rebellion in the north, and a secessionist movement in the south. The United States has concentrated its efforts via drone strikes on terrorist strongholds in Yemen, keeping in mind that al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula poses a threat to global security; the United States, however, plays no role in addressing the other domestic rebellions in Yemen. Likewise, President Obama has shown little interest in intervening significantly into the Syrian civil war; however, he was now willing to go down the select counter-terrorism path in Syria, in much the same as the United States has been involved in Yemen.

In Somalia, al-Shabab, much like ISIL, began with a domestic Islamist agenda and took hold in a failed state mired by fragile governance and a security crisis. Over the course of years, even after being driven from the capital of Mogadishu, al-Shabab was able to consolidate territory in the south of Somalia, and at time controlled as much as half the country. It also extended its domestic Islamist agenda to one with a more global Jihadist orientation, going after targets in Kenya. One could argue that al-Shabab has been, at least, a contender for bloodthirsty barbarism following its horrific attack on a Kenyan shopping mall in 2013. The United States has been carrying out a targeted counter-terrorism campaign in Somalia in recent years, going after the leadership successfully in 2013 and most recently in 2014. A similar strategy -- albeit one requiring years of targeted engagement -- could potentially yield results against ISIL in Syria and Iraq.

The determinations and evaluations of success will be decided by history; however, the fact of the matter was that there were at least some templates available for the United States to pursue a "no boots on the ground" campaign against terrorist threats in hot spots across the world, including in Iraq and Syria. That campaign in the Middle East would be coordinated by retired Marine Corps General John Allen, who would be named as the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition against ISIL.

It should be noted that on Sept. 11, 2014, following a series of meetings in the Middle East, United States Secretary of State John Kerry won the backing of several Arab countries for the campaign

Iraq Review 2016 Page 252 of 609 pages Iraq to degrade and destroy ISIL. According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Brett McGurk, these countries included: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Lebanon.

Although the non-Arab nation state, Turkey, attended the meetings hosted by Kerry, it was left out of the reports. At issue were sensitivities regarding 46 Turkish hostages held by Islamist terrorists. (Note that in the latter part of September 2014, the Turkish hostages were released; it was not known if this development would create the imprimatur for Turkey to do its part, as a NATO state, to support the efforts of other NATO countries in the global fight against terrorism.)

Secretary of State Kerry described the roles of the participating regional powers as follows: "Arab nations play a critical role in that coalition, the leading role really across all lines of effort: military support, humanitarian aid, our work to stop the flow of illegal funds." He continued, "The participating states agreed to do their share in the comprehensive fight against ISIL, including ... as appropriate, joining in the many aspects of a coordinated military campaign against ISIL." State Department personnel subsequently said that some Arab countries went so far as to offer to conduct air strikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Secretary of State Kerry said that he was "extremely encouraged" by pledges of military assistance by the international community to fighting the dire threat posed by ISIL.

That dire threat was highlighted by another brutal assassination by Islamic militants on a Westerner; the third victim was a British aid worker, David Haines. It was apparent that ISIL was trying to intimidate the West into retreating from their (re-)engagement in Iraq and surrounding countries. Of course, these acts of barbarism were more likely to build public support in the United States and across the Atlantic in Europe for concerted effort to diminish and ultimately defeat these extremist Islamist terrorists.

On Sept. 16, 2014, during Congressional hearings in Washington D.C., Secretary of State Chuck Hagel said that the tactical approach against ISIL would involve striking the terror group's safe havens, essentially destroying its infrastructure and command capabilities. General Martin Dempsey noted that a "shock and awe" approach akin to the 2003 invasion of Iraq would not work against ISIL, given that terror group's particular organization. Instead, Dempsey promised a "persistent and sustainable campaign." According to Dempsey, that targeted approach would presumably take time but it would also be against more effective in the long term.

Indeed, in the middle of September 2014, the United States military was intensifying its air strikes on ISIL targets in Iraq, with targets being struck to the southwest of Baghdad. A statement from United States Central Command read as follows: "The air strike southwest of Baghdad was the first strike taken as part of our expanded efforts beyond protecting our own people and humanitarian missions to hit (Islamic State) targets as Iraqi forces go on offense."

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Note that on Sept. 17, 2014, President Barack Obama's plan for confronting and defeating Islamist terrorists known as ISIL/ISIS gained congressional support with the House of Representatives approving a "stop gap" spending measure to train and arm moderate Syrian rebels. The measure was passed with bipartisan support -- 273-156 -- but also garnered bipartisan opposition. Despite the passage of the bill by a healthy margin, it was clear that re-engagement in the Middle East -- albeit in a limited capacity -- remained a controversial matter more than a decade after the 2003 invasion of Iraq led by the previous Bush administration. A more decisive vote was taken in the Senate a day later and saw strong bipartisan support with 78 Senators voting in favor of a measure to train and arm Syrian rebels in the fight against ISIL, and only 22 voting against the measure.

International coalition launches air strikes in Iraq and Syria aimed at ISIL/ISIS targets --

On Sept. 19, 2014, the global coalition to fight the brutal and homicidal entity known as ISIS or ISIL was in force with French jets hitting Islamic terrorist targets in Iraq. According to French President Francois Hollande, his country's fighter jets struck "a logistics depot of the terrorists" near the city of Mosul, which was under ISIL control for several months. The active involvement by France was illustrative of the expanding global coalition, led by the United States, to "degrade and destroy" the Islamic terrorist movement, as promised by United States President Barack Obama.

Already, the United States was carrying out air strikes in northern Iraq and the area close to the capital of Baghdad. There, in the Iraqi capital, terrorist bombings were becoming regular fare; however, car bombings were taking place elsewhere in Iraq -- even in the Kurdish city of Kirkuk.

One of Iraq's major Shi'ite leaders appeared to sanction the international intervention, although warning against subservience to foreign entities. Via a spokesperson, Grand Ayatollah Ali al- Sistani issued the following statement: "Even if Iraq is in need of help from its brothers and friends in fighting black terrorism, maintaining the sovereignty and independence of its decisions is of the highest importance,"

Air strikes by foreign powers were having an effect, even as United States war hawks complained that a ground operation would be necessary to defeat ISIL/ISIS. In fact, air strikes provided Kurdish fighters with the support to regain control over portions of the northern province of Nineveh in Iraq. Still, control by the group that self-declared itself as Islamic State was being consolidated in the region, with the terrorists establishing a police force tasked with enforcing the dictates of the religious judiciary.

On the other side of the border in Syria, Islamic State terrorists targeted the residents of the town of Ayn al-Arab (known as Kobani in Kurdish), and the surrounding villages. Facing a likely massacre at the hands of brutal Islamist terrorists, tens of thousands of the mainly Kurdish population sought refuge in Turkey before the authorities in Ankara closed the border.

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On the evening of Sept. 22, 2014, the international coalition to hit ISIL/ISIS commenced its operations in Syria. Led by the United States, a coalition of allies launched air strikes against the self-declared Islamic State terrorists in the Syrian city of Raqqa (a known Islamic State stronghold) and along the eastern border with Iraq.

Significantly, the coalition included several Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar. It was something of a coup for United States President Barack Obama and his top diplomat, Secretary of State John Kerry, that they had done what no American president in recent memory had managed to do with regard to global security threats emanating from the Middle East. They had forged a truly global coalition with Arab countries not only standing as major stakeholders, but also with these Arab partners actively engaged in the military operations. It should be noted that Israel was contributing its intelligence in the global fight against ISIL/ISIS.

Rear Admiral John Kirby, the Pentagon press secretary, issued an official confirmation of the operation via the following statement: “I can confirm that U.S. military and partner nation forces are undertaking military action against ISIL terrorists in Syria using a mix of fighter, bomber and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles." He continued, “Given that these operations are ongoing, we are not in a position to provide additional details at this time." Kirby added, “The decision to conduct these strikes was made earlier today by the U.S. Central Command commander under authorization granted him by the commander in chief.”

Indeed, American warplanes, such as F-22 Raptors, B-1 Bombers, as well as armed Predator and Reaper drones, along with fighter jets from allied Arab countries, conducted a sustained campaign of aerial bombardment on the ISIL/ISIS infrastructure in the Syrian city of Raqqa. As well, Tomahawk cruise missiles unleashed a flurry of precision-guided bombs from United States navy vessels located in the area. The relentless strikes were collectively aimed at stationary targets, such as weapons depots, militants' barracks, and command and control buildings. Ultimately, the goal was to deprive ISIL/ISIS of its safe haven in Syria.

Rear Admiral Kirby made it clear that the air strikes on Sept. 22, 2014, were only the start of a long campaign against Islamic terrorists. He said, "I can tell you that last night's strikes were only the beginning."

The air strikes made clear that President Obama was making good on his promise to "degrade and ultimately destroy" the terror enclave known as ISIL/ISIS not only in Iraq but also Syria. This development was to be viewed amidst complaints from the right-wing neo-conservative flank of the political spectrum in the United States, which has argued that the Obama administration had "no strategy" for dealing with ISIL/ISIL in Syria.

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For his part, United States President Barack Obama on Sept. 23, 2014 offered comment on the expanded military effort against ISIL/ISIS. During a televised broadcast, President Obama said that the wide global coalition, including several Arab nation states, showed the United States was not alone in its campaign against Islamist terrorists known as ISIL/ISIS. To this end, the United States leader said, "This is not America's fight alone." President Obama also lauded partner countries in the coalition, saying, that the United States was "proud to stand shoulder to shoulder with these nations."

Reports soon emerged that the United States had notified Syria of its impending campaign of aerial bombardment against Islamic State targets in Syrian territory. There was no condemnation from Syria, which was likely tacitly blessing the actions of the international community. In fact, state- controlled Syrian media confirmed that the air strikes were taking place; it also emphasized that the strikes were not being treated as an act of aggression since the Syrian government had notified in advance. A Syrian analyst, Ali al-Ahmad, noted that while Syria was not part of the alliance carrying out the air campaign against ISIL/ISIS, there was nonetheless a "common enemy." Meanwhile, the Syrian opposition was more forthright in its applause for international intervention into Syria, especially since Hadi al-Bahra, the president of the Syrian Opposition Coalition, had urged such action.

It should be noted that the day after strikes commenced in Syria, the United States announced that its efforts were not limited to ISIL/ISIS, but also to a hitherto unknown terror group, known as the Khorasan Group, which was planning an imminent threat against Western targets, including the United States homeland. The Khorasan Group was believed to be an offshoot of the notorious terror enclave, al-Qaida. The Khorasan Group was reportedly relying on innovative means to obfuscate explosive materials in their effort to carry out another 9/11-type attack. Of note was the possibility that bomb makers responsible for the so-called "underwear" and "printer cartridge" bombing plots were making further strides; indeed. There were suggestions that they were now innovating new means to hide explosives in toiletries that a passenger might carry onto a civilian aircraft.

President Obama addressed this ancillary operation against the Khorasan Group, saying, "Once again, it must be clear to anyone who would plot against America and do Americans harm that we will not tolerate safe havens for terrorists who threaten our people." On a related note, there were unconfirmed reports that the leader of the Khorosan Group, Mohsin al-Fadhli, was killed in the air strikes. Such a development would be considered a notable blow against the terror group. That being said, the threat posed by this terror group to the United States homeland remained in place. The Department of Homeland Security issued a national security bulletin warning law enforcement agencies to be on heightened alert for lone-wolf terror attacks.

Meanwhile, the full array of the results -- including human casualties -- from Day 1 of the air strikes on Syria was yet to be revealed. However, a third terrorist group in the Middle East was

Iraq Review 2016 Page 256 of 609 pages Iraq affected by the aerial bombardment campaign in Syria. On Sept. 23, 2014, there were unconfirmed reports that the air strikes the night before killed leader as Abu Yousef al-Turki, also known as "the Turk" -- the leader of the al-Nusra terror group that has long been engaged in the fight against the Assad regime in Syria.

On Sept. 24, 2014, United States President Barack Obama was scheduled to address the United Nations General Assembly in New York. There, he was scheduled to make his case to the world of the imperative to defeat brutal and barbaric Islamist militant groups that seek to terrorize the world. It should be noted that while United Nations Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon did not explicitly back the action against ISIL/ISIS, he nonetheless emphasized the fact that Islamic extremist groups in Syria "pose an immediate threat."

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Obama issued a strenuous defense of his policy to "degrade and ultimately destroy" ISIL, noting that military engagement was the only rational option. He declared: “There can be no reasoning, no negotiation, with this brand of evil. The only language understood by killers like this is the language of force.”

It was the type of muscular foreign policy stance not often associated by the president who was elected to end the United States' lengthy wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But as history has often taught, leaders are compelled by circumstance to respond to the realities on the domestic and international scene and not the agenda items envisioned in election campaigns years prior.

In this case, President Obama was responding to the grim reality that an Islamist terrorist group was destabilizing the Middle East while, also sparking an eruption of Islamic zealotry and global Jihadism across the world. In response to this dangerous development, the United States leader said, “We must take concrete steps to address the danger posed by religiously motivated fanatics...No God condones this terror. No grievance justifies these actions."

President Obama reminded his fellow Americans that the mission to rout ISIL would not involve United States ground forces, and did, in fact, involve a global coalition of partner countries from Europe and the Arab world. To this end, he said, “We do not act alone. Nor do we intend to send U.S. troops to occupy foreign lands. Instead, we will support Iraqis and Syrians fighting to reclaim their communities.” President Obama also had a stark warning for the Islamic terrorists as he said. “Those who have joined ISIL should leave the battlefield while they can.”

Later on the same day, President Obama chaired a meeting of the United Nations Security Council. As the leader of the United States, which held the rotating presidency of the 15-member Security Council at the time, President Obama was in the prime position to direct the agenda, which in this case was focused on the global terrorism and the associated flow of foreign fighters to conflict zones across the world. In that session, President Obama called for the adoption of a measure mandating that member states of the United States cooperate in efforts to address the

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The resolution called on member states to “prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and the financing of their travel and of their activities.” It also made specific mention of the Islamic terror groups functioning in the Middle East, such as ISIL, al-Nusra Front, and all groups associated with al-Qaida.

It should be noted that the United Nations Security Council is often a venue for controversial impasse when it comes to making major decisions. Veto-wielding permanent members invariably divide themselves into bifurcated blocs with the West on one side and the Russia-China duo on the other side. But in a rare moment of concurrence, the draft of this measure on the threat posed for the flow of foreign fighters gained unanimous support at the United Nations Security Council and was thus decisively adopted.

On the battlefield, the fight continued with the international coalition striking targets in Iraq and Syria. Among the targets of the air strikes on Sept. 25, 2014, were oil refineries controlled by ISIL in eastern Syria. Clearly, the objective in this case was tactical as the strikes would deprive the terror group of its crucial access to oil and, thus, its ability to operate over wide expanses of land.

As well, Kurdish forces were doing their part and had managed to push back ISIL forces advancing on the town of Kobani (mentioned above), where a mass exodus had taken place days earlier as the mainly Kurdish population fled in fear of being ISIL's latest victims.

Nevertheless, ISIL was seeing success of its own, as it managed to take over a military base in the western Anbar province of Iraq. It was also attracting more extremists to the fold, with an Algeria-based terror group being the latest example. But while ISIL was attracting like-minded militants, its actions were also reinforcing President Obama's call to action for the world to unite in fighting global Jihadists. One illustration of this phenomenon was the brutal decapitation of a French tourist in Algeria by the Islamic terror groups pledging allegiance to ISIL. That act of blood lust only served to strengthen France's resolve in the fight against this particularly barbaric brand of terrorism.

Note: The brutal beheadings by ISIL of a British tax driver, Alan Henning, and a British aid worker, David Haines, who were in the region to provide aid and assistance to civilians, likely had the same effect of bolstering the United Kingdom's stance against ISIL and other such inhumane Islamic terror groups.

Meanwhile, with the United Nations Security Council receiving an emphatic request from Iraq for foreign intervention in the fight against ISIL, other countries were joining the campaign. Belgium

Iraq Review 2016 Page 258 of 609 pages Iraq announced it would seek parliamentary consent to contribute fighter jets, while the Netherlands said it would not only carry out air strikes, but also train Iraqi and Kurdish forces. Prime Minister David Cameron announced he was recalling parliament and would seek legislative approval to actively enter the aerial bombardment campaign against ISIL. Australia had already issued its fulsome declaration to support the effort in the same manner.

An anti-terrorism message was also emanating from within the Islamic intelligentsia with more than 120 Islamic scholars across the world advancing an open letter condemning ISIL and using a barrage of sophisicated theological arguments to challenge the Islamist terror organization for its warped interpretation of their religion, which they described as "a great wrong and an offense to Islam, to Muslims and to the entire world." The open letter also included this excoriation of ISIL members: "You have misinterpreted Islam into a religion of harshness, brutality, torture and murder."

The Seige of Kobane and the Turkish Dimension:

By October 2014, despite the active international air campaign over Iraq and Syria, ISIL continued to carry out its campaign of terror, even extending the battlefield to Turkish Kurdish areas. Irrespective of the fact that the Syrian town of Kobane (alternatively called Kobani and predominantly inhabited by Kurds) on the border with Turkey was under siege, and regardless of legislation passed in Turkey's parliament authorizing action against ISIL, Turkey showed little interest in joining the fight against ISIL. Even with the protection of its own territory at stake, with access to its own sophisticated military might including signficant air power, and despite its standing as a NATO country, Turkey was positioned on the sidelines of the conflict with ISIL.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan acknowledged that Kobane was likely to fall to ISIL; however, he said his country would not involve itself in the conflict raging across Syria and Iraq against ISIL unless the United States did more to oust Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power. Erdogan's calculation appeared to be predicated on the belief that ISIL would not dare to actually penetrate the Turkish border, and so he was attempting to draw the United States more actively into the effort in Syria to remove Assad from power. Given Turkey's explicit and long- standing support for Syrian rebels -- many of whom could not be classified as moderate by any stretch of the imagination -- it was evident that the NATO country was not against the notion of intervening into another country's affairs in the region. The obvious conclusion was that, in a stunning display of self-interest matched by recklessness, Turkish President Erdogan was willing to risk his country's security at the border, in order to wrest concessions from the United States, and thus further the goals of his pet project: regime change in Syria.

The geopolitical risks notwithstanding, there was also a domestic gamble President Erdogan was making with regard to the Kurdish people who do not necessarily and neatly fit within any existing territorial borders. The Turkish nation state has had a fractious relationship with the Kurds, and

Iraq Review 2016 Page 259 of 609 pages Iraq has branded the Turkish Workers Party, which aims to establish an autonomous Kurdish state, to be a terrorist entity. However, in recent years, some progress has been made between the two sides in the path towards rapprochement. Now, Kurdish fighters in the battle zone were calling for reinforcements in the face of certain death, and the Turkish government was making it abundantly clear that it would not willingly heed that call. The repercussions promised to be long-standing. The Kurds were unlikely to forget Erdogan's selective humanitarian stances. While the Turkish leader favored going to great lengths to help Syrian civilians aligned with anti-Assad factions, he was apparently willing to watch a Kurdish blood bath unfold on his own border.

With pressure mounting for Turkey to move more pro-actively against ISIL, President Erdogan suggested that further action could not be taken unless a no-fly zone over Syria was established. However, United States officials pointed out that with the heavy air strike activity ongoing in the region, a de facto no-fly zone was already in place. Other officials excoriated Turkey for failing to act like a NATO member state. They railed against Turkey for not taking a leadership position when turmoil was unfolding on its doorstep.

By the second week of October 2014, progress was made in securing assistance from Turkey -- at least in limited form. Turkey agreed to allow the United States use of its military bases in the campaign against ISIL. According to United States National Security Adviser Susan Rice, Turkey agreed to allow the United States to access Turkish bases and territory "to train moderate Syrian opposition forces" and "engage in activities inside of Iraq and Syria." Rice said of Turkey's accommodation in these regards, "That's the new commitment, and one that we very much welcome."

Meanwhile coalition air strikes were being carried out against ISIL positions in Kobane. It was to be determined if the intensified air campaign would be enough to assist Kurdish fighters who said they were running out of ammunition and exhausting their troop strength.

Status Update --

In the second week of October 2014, Iraqi troops abandoned their positions once again at military bases in that country. It was clear that even with aerial support from the international coalition, the Iraqi military was an ineffectual entity, very likely ill-equipped to actually defend the country (or what was left of it).

The continued poor performance of the Iraqi army was actually an argument in favor of President Barack Obama's original position to end the war in Iraq and withdraw United States troops from that country. Unless the United States was prepared to retain an endless military presence in Iraq, not only limited to training Iraqi troops -- a fruitless exercise that had already been attempted -- but rather functioning as Iraq's proxy army, it was difficult to argue that even a limited residual force would have much of a purpose.

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If Iraq was to stand as a sovereign nation state, it could not indefinitely rely on international intervention to save it from nefarious forces that came into being partially because of the power vaccum created by the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the ousting of Saddam Hussein, and partially because of political mismagament under the Maliki government. Perhaps Vice President Joe Biden's plan to partition Iraq along Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi'ite lines might be the only viable solution to calm the ethno-sectarian strife and end a political climate clearly hospitable to the rise of Islamic militants, such as ISIL.

Meanwhile, bombings and other attacks continued to plague Iraq, as ISIL continued its campaign of terror. One attack in Iraq's Anbar province resulted in the death of the police chief when a bomb targeted his convoy close to the provincial capital of Ramadi. In response to the alarming level of violence and the advance of ISIL, neoconservatives in the United States intensified their argument in favor of ground forces in Iraq, even as the Obama administration insisted that the United States would not re-engage in a ground campaign in that country.

President Obama's 2008 rival in the presidential campaign of that year, Senator John McCain, said in an interview with CNN that the administration's targeted air strike strategy against ISIL was failing. He said, “They’re winning and we’re not. Pinprick bombing is not working."

During a meeting of military commanders from the countries* that make up the anti-ISIL coalition, President Obama indirectly addressed such criticism, reminding people that a "long-term campaign" against ISIL was afoot in Syria and Iraq. He noted, "There are going to be periods of progress and setbacks." Underlining President Obama's point was the fact that a positive turning point was underway in Kobane.

Indeed, the United States-led global coalition had intensified its air strikes in the conflict zone, and particularly in Kobane. ISIL had the advantage there for several weeks, but with the expanded air strikes, suddenly the momentum shifted towards the Kurds and more success was being seen in holding off the onslaught from ISIL.

Asya Abdullah, the co-chairman of the Kurdish political party in Syria, conveyed thanks to the United States-led global coalition against ISIL, noting that the latest spate of air strikes had been "extremely helpful." He said, "They are hitting Islamic State targets hard and because of those strikes we were able to push back a little." However, he added , "They [ISIL militants] are still shelling the city center."

A similar report on Kobane also came from United States Central Command, which made the following assertion via a statement: "Combined with continued resistance to ISIL on the ground, indications are that these strikes have slowed ISIL advances into the city, killed hundreds of their fighters and destroyed or damaged scores of pieces of ISIL combat equipment and fighting

Iraq Review 2016 Page 261 of 609 pages Iraq positions." Central Command nevertheless noted that Kobane remained at risk of falling to the Islamist terror group, as it added the following warning: "However, the security situation in Kobani remains fragile as ISIL continues to threaten the city and Kurdish forces continue to resist."

For his part, President Obama emphasized the global dimension of the effort against ISIL, pointing to the number of countries* joining the fight against the barbaric terror group. Of significance was the fact that the aforementioned meeting of military commanders included representatives from the countries that make up the international anti-ISIL coalition. *That international coalition in October 2014 included: Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Netherlands, , Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Meanwhile, crisis conditions were unfolding in Iraq's Anbar province -- an ISIL stronghold -- as the Islamic terrorist expanded their control over yet another town there. At issue was control over the road running through Anbar to Baghdad. ISIL militants wanted an open route from the Syrian border to Baghdad and consolidating control over Anbar was the way to accomplish that goal. The genesis of the ISIL crisis really began when they took over Ramadi and Fallujah in Anbar several months prior, and have systematically expanded their terrain in the area. With the Iraqi military continuing to be an ineffectual entity, remaining "hold out" parts of Anbar not already under ISIL control were being protected by tribal fighters. However those fighters were warning that they were outgunned and likely to be overrun by ISIL without weapons and external assistance.

President Obama has promised that the effort would continue both in Kobane on the Syrian- Turkish border and in Iraq's Anbar province as he said, "Coalition air strikes will continue in both of these areas." To that end, the United States-led coalition carried our air strikes in Iraq close to Fallujah.

Even as the fighting was afoot in hotspots in Syria and Iraq, the Iraqi capital city was not immune from violence. On Oct. 17, 2014, a series of car bombings and mortar strikes in Shi'ite sections of Baghdad and in the rural areas to the south of the capital left close to 50 people dead and about 125 others injured. Because the targets of attacks were Shi'ite areas, suspicion rested on Sunni militants, likely ISIL itself or Sunni allies of the terror group. On Oct. 22, 2014, a series of bombings across Baghdad left more than 20 people dead and scores more injured. The attacks targeted restaurants in various districts in the capital city.

Iraqi authorities viewed these attacks as malicious messages from ISIL, intended to remind Shi'a Iraqis that even with a global coalition offering air support to Iraqi forces, they were able to target Shi'ites across the country at will. It was to be seen if that message was received, or, if Iraqis would heed the words of Iraqi's new Prime Minister Abadi who said in a televised speech at a military compound, "Baghdad is safe and the vicious terrorists cannot and will not reach it. Our brave security forces have managed to secure Baghdad and its perimeter."

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Another disturbing development was the news that Iraqi pilots who joined ISIL were training militants to fly the fighter jets that the terror group was able to capture. Reports suggested that the militants were undergoing training at the captured al-Jarrah military airport to the east of Aleppo in Syria. While the move indicated that ISIL was trying to move into the arena of air power, the fact of the matter was that three fighter jets were not likely to present that much of a threat to the far more sophisticated air forces of various countries now functioning as part of the anti-ISIL international coalition.

On Oct. 20, 2014, the United States military was air dropping weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies to Kurdish forces in the area of Kobane. According to announcements by United States Central Command, C-130 transport aircraft had made "multiple" drops of supplies. A statement from the United States Central Command explained that the air drop mission was "intended to enable continued resistance against ISIL's attempts to overtake Kobane." United States Central Command noted that all aircraft used in the mission had returned safely.

Turkey expressed displeasure regarding the United States' role in air dropping supplies to Kurdish fighters, whom they associate with the outlawed Kurdish Workers Party. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that he would not allow Kurdish fighters to receive any transfers of United States arms. However, it was clear that the air drop had gone forward anyway. An official from the Obama administration explained the decision to carry out the air drop mission in the face of Turkish objections, saying: "President Obama spoke to Erdogan yesterday and was able to notify him of our intent to do this and the importance that we put on it. We understand the longstanding Turkish concern with the range of groups, including Kurdish groups, that they have been engaged in conflict with. However, our very strong belief is that both the United States and Turkey face a common enemy in ISIL and that we need to act on an urgent basis."

That argument from the Obama administration -- that the United States and Turkey faced a common enemy in ISIL -- apparently gained traction. On Oct. 20, 2014, Turkey reversed its stance to some degree and said it would allow Kurdish peshmerga fighters from Iraq cross the Syrian border to fight ISIL terrorists in Kobane. The shift in policy would allow Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighters safe passage through Turkey into Kobane. Then, on Oct. 22, 2014, members of the Iraqi Kurdish parliament approved a proposal that would result in the deployment of their fighters to Kobane. Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighters would offer support to fellow Kurds who were trying to hold Kobane on the Syrian-Turkish border from falling to ISIL.

In the last week of October 2014 fierce fighting was ongoing in Kobane. ISIL fighters had the upper hand in Tal Shair, to the west of the town. Tal Shair had actually flipped between ISIL and Kurdish fighters, suggesting that conditions remained tense. Despite allied air support, Kobane and the surrounding area on the Syria-Turkish border certainly remained at risk of falling to ISIL.

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In Iraq, joint Iraqi forces and Shi'ite militias saw a strategic victory, taking control over the strategic town of Jurf al-Sakhar near Baghdad. Since ISIL was housing weapons and supplies, and also moving fighters, though tunnels close to Jurf al-Sakhar, control over the town essentially meant a disruption of a key network for ISIL. It was a notable success for Iraqi forces, which have not shown themselves to be much of a match for ISIL. Although ISIL fighters and allied Sunni insurgents had retreated to nearby villages, they were continuing to fire on Iraq and Shi'ite rivals in the area. Nevertheless, Jurf al-Sakhar was also the site of despair in late October 2014 as a suicide bombing killed close to 30 Shi'ites and wounded 60 others.

Kurds in Iraq were also seeing success against ISIL, retaking control over Zumar in Nineveh and several villages in the area, thanks to allied international air support. Kurdish intelligence sources told international media that despite encountering strong ISIL resistance, Kurdish peshmerga forces were able to advance on Zumar from several directions ultimately overwhelming ISIL fighters there. Success in Zumar could position Kurdish peshmerga fighters to go after Sinjar -- a particular flashpoint since ISIL forces laid siege on the local Yazidis in the region.

But despite these strategic gains, the region remained mired by violence and strife. In late October, central Baghdad was struck with violence as a car bomb left 15 people dead in the Karrada district of the city center. ISIL militants also attacked the town of al-Mansuriyah, to the northeast of Baghdad, killing six Iraqi security forces.

In Syria, the fight against ISIL continued, with news arising that United States-led coalition forces were carrying out air strikes there.

Spillover violence from Syria was at the same time arising in Lebanon where Islamic militants were engaged in battles with Lebanese military forces in the northern city of Tripoli. Fierce battles went on for days and left Lebanese soldiers, civilians, and Islamic extremist fighters dead. However, Lebanese authorities were ultimately able to gain the upper hand and re-assert control over the city. Of concern was the fact that the Islamist militants appeared to be a mix of Lebanese and Syrian fighters aligned with ISIL and the al-Nusra Front. This development pointed to a closer alliance between the two extremist entities than previously thought.

As October 2014 was drawing to a close, estimates from the ground in Syria suggested that approximately 550 people had been killed in United States-led air strikes in Syria -- the vast majority of them being Islamic State and other militant fighters operating in the region.

As November 2014 began, Iraqi Kurdish fighters had joined the battle against ISIL terrorists in Kobane and were backed by United States-led coalition air strikes. Kurdish peshmerga fighters from Iraq were using long-range artillery and semi-heavy weaponry, which was aiding the effort. In the first week of November 2014, fighting was reported as being heavier than in the past.

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As the world was focused on Kobane, ISIL was making gains elsewhere in Syria, particularly with regard to the control over a gas field in the central province of Homs.

That being said, there was a glimmer of hope for the Syrian civil war in the second week of November 2014. At issue was a United Nations proposal for a truce in the northern flashpoint city of Aleppo, which has been Ground Zero of the Syrian civil war and remained divided between rebel and government control at the time. According to United Nations envoys, the Assad regime showed genuine and constructive interest in the plan that would include a ceasefire and access for humanitarian aid. It was to be seen if this truce proposal -- admittedly to be applied in a limited form only to Aleppo -- would actually progress beyond the theoretical stage.

Meanwhile, joint coalition forces were also conducting air strikes against ISIL units in Anbar province close to Baghdad. There, ISIL's reign of terror was continuing. A disturbing report emerged in late October 2014 regarding the massacre of 300 members of the Albu Nimr tribe -- including women and children -- in the village of Zauiyat Albu Nimr in western Anbar. According to the Iraqi government, ISIL terrorists killed them because they resisted control. They then dumped all the bodies into a well. It was yet another manifestation of the barbarism that had come to characterize the Islamic terror group.

Regional human rights observers were watching the impending religious festival of Ashura dubiously, with fears arising that Sh'ite pilgrims would undoubtedly be favored targets for ISIL -- an extremist Sunni terror group. Indeed, on Nov. 2, 2014, almost 40 Shi'ite pilgrims died in a series of bomb attacks in Baghdad.

A week later on Nov. 8, 2014, a car bomb in Baghdad's mostly Shi'ite Sadr City left eight people dead, although in conjunction with other attacks in the capital, in Baquba to the northeast of Baghdad, and in the western city of Ramadi, the total death toll was closer to 30.

On Nov. 11, 2014, the Iraqi city of Bayji was the site of violence as a suicide bomber killed eight people, including six soldiers. Of note was the fact that the attack ensued even as United States- led air strikes targeted the city, with an eye on wresting control from ISIL fighters who have surrounded the oil refinery there. A separate attack ensued on the same day when a suicide bomber rammed his vehicle into a military outpost in the Baghdad district of Tarmiyah. Seven soldiers died as a result of that attack while at least a dozen others were injured.

In the third week of November 2014, a suicide car bombing occurred in Irbil -- the capital of Iraq's Kurdistan region. The suicide bomber and five victims died in the attack. Typically, Kurdistan has been somewhat insulated from the types of suicide bombings that plague Baghdad and other parts of the country. Thus, this act of violence was a warning to the Kurds that despite being under pressure by coalition-led air strikes, ISIL was still capable of striking at the heart of the Kurdish semi-autonomous region. Meanwhile, around the same period, at least three bomb attacks ensued

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U.S.-led strikes on the battle zone and U.S. foreign policy relating to the campaign --

In the second week of November 2014, there were news reports that United States-led airstrikes were targeting gatherings of Islamic State or ISIL leadership in Iraq close to the border with Syria. There were soon suggestions by Iraq's Defense and Interior Ministries that ISIL leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, may have been injured in the strikes; however, United States officials were not prepared to comment on the matter. Later, ISIL itself was releasing videotaped footage purportedly proving that the leader of the terrorist group was still alive.

That being said, the United States continued aerial bombardment of ISIL targets in Syria and Iraq, offering air support to anti-ISIL operations on the Syrian town of Kobane where Kurds were under attack, in Sinjar where the minority population there was also under attack, and on other Iraqi targets in Mosul, Bayji, Falluja, and Ramadi. Iraqi forces, with United States support, were wresting control of the strategic oil refinery at Bayji back from ISIL. Another key aspect of the United States' operations in Iraq involved United States military advisers in Anbar -- an ISIL stronghold -- and their effort there to train Iraqi forces.

As well, the United States acknowledged that it was going after the al-Qaida linked terror entity, known as the Khorosan Group, based in Syria. A highly skilled group of al-Qaida specialist terrorists, the Khorosan Group initially operated in the Afghan-Pak region before relocating to Syria and resuming operations under one of the main al-Qaida linked groups in Syria -- al-Nusra Front. The area hit by the strikes included Sarmada in Idlib province, close to the border with Turkey and to the west of the Syrian city of Aleppo. A key target in that operation was a French- born militant and Islamic convert, David Drugeon, who was known to be a bomb maker. United States officials were not prepared to comment in detail on the matter. Instead, the military was said to be assessing the success of the strikes.

For his part, the United States appeared to be intensifying its footprint in the region and in the fight against ISIL with President Barack Obama approving the deployment on an additional 1,500 more troops to Iraq, for the purpose of advising and training Iraqi forces to fight the Islamic State terrorists. The additional troops effectively doubled the presence of United States military forces in Iraq, irrespective of the official stance that United States troops were not in Iraq to carry out active combat roles.

In the aftermath of mid-term elections that left President Obama with hostile Republican Congress in control of both chambers, the United States leader nonetheless looked to close ranks in the interests of national security. To that end, President Obama announced he would ask the Republican-controlled Congress to move forward with a fresh authorization for the use of military force against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Speaking of this push for congressional approval,

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President Obama said, "The world needs to know we are united behind this effort and the men and women of our military deserve our clear and unified support." President Obama added that the fight against Islamic militants and terrorists in the region had reached a "new phase." He explained, "We now have a different type of enemy. The strategy is different, and how we partner with Iraq and other Gulf countries and the international coalition, that has to be structured differently." As such, he noted that there was a need for a new "Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF)" that would reflect the existing challenges and the associated strategy moving forward.

On Nov. 17, 2014, it was confirmed that ISIL had brutally decapitated yet another American hostage. The videotaped footage depicting the gruesome remains of Peter Kassig was released by ISIL, who also ominously promised to "slaughter" Americans at home "in the streets." United States President Barack Obama reacted to the latest act of barbarism from the Islamic group by casting it as "an act of pure evil by a terrorist group that the world rightly associates with inhumanity." Of note that Kassig was actually a convert to Islam and known by the name Abdul- Rahman. His killing by ISIL suggested that the terror group was not simply targeting non-Muslims or apostates, but that they were interested in killing Western nationals for supremely political and Jihadist reasons.

While the death of Kassig cast a shadow on the global anti-ISIL effort, the United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded the world that the United States-led global effort against the terror group was yielding results. During a surprise visit to Baghdad, General Martin Dempsey said that the United States' military re-engagement had helped rescue Iraq "from the precipice" and now the momentum was with joint international anti-ISIL forces. He said, "And now, I think it's starting to turn. So well done."

As November 2014 was drawing to a close, part of the United States' plan to fight ISIL in Iraq included a proposal to fund weapons for Sunni tribesmen willing to oppose the Islamic militant terrorists in Anbar province. The price tag for the weaponry was around $24 million and illustrated the view from the United States Pentagon that Sunni tribesmen would have to play an integral role in the anti-ISIL strategy in Anbar -- a Sunni enclave where Iraqi security forces would not be particularly welcomed. It should be noted that the procurement of the weaponry would go through the government of Iraq, in keeping with existing policy.

Other United States foreign policy developments related to the fight against ISIL in December 2014 included an effort from the Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to advance a fresh authorization for the use of military force against that terror group in Iraq and Syria.

At the defense level, an additional 1,500 troops were being deployed to Iraq, bringing the total to 4,600, according to Lieutenant General James Terry, who was responsible for the fight against ISIL. Terry offered a cautiously optimistic view of the engagement in the region, and specifically the effort to build up Iraqi security forces as he said: "While [the Iraqi security forces] have a long

Iraq Review 2016 Page 267 of 609 pages Iraq way to go I think they're becoming more capable every day." He continued, "When you start now to balance the different capabilities out across the coalition, I think we're doing pretty well in terms of boots on the ground."

Meanwhile, in the first half of December 2014, the United States-led coalition continued to carry out air strikes against ISIL targets inside Syria and Iraq. Indeed, as of mid-December 2014, the United States-led coalition continued to conduct air strikes against ISIL militants in Iraq and Syria.

Other recent developments with regard to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran --

As November 2014 drew to a close, Syrian forces had carried out aerial bombardment of ISIL targets in Raqqa. The strikes reportedly hit an industrial zone and a marketplace, killing 60 people -- half of whom were believed to be civilians.

In the first part of December 2014, three journalists from a Syrian opposition television channel, known as Orient News, died while reporting the war in the southwestern part of Syria. Orient News accused the Assad regime's forces of targeting the journalists. Regardless of the reliability of this claim, the fact of the matter was that as many as 70 journalists -- most of them being local reporters -- have been killed while covering the war in Syria since its start in 2011.

Also in early December 2014, suggestions emerged that Iran was carrying out air strikes on ISIL targets in Iraq. While Iran officially dismissed the claims, there was videotaped footage from the media outlet, , of a jet identified by Jane's Defense as an F-4 Phantom striking ISIL in Diyala province. Because only Iran and Turkey were known to operate F-4 Phantom jets regionally, and because of Turkey's reluctance to become engaged in the fight against ISIL, all indications were that the strikes were carried out by Iran. United States Secretary of State John Kerry was reticent about commenting on the matter, saying, "I am not going to make any announcements or confirm or deny the reported military action of another country in Iraq. It is up to them (the Iranians) or up to the Iraqis to do that if it did indeed took place.” HOwever, Kerry later noted that any Iranian action against ISIL in Iraq should be regarded as a "positive" development. To this end, he said, "If Iran is taking on (IS) in some particular place... and it has an impact, then it's going to be net effect (that) is positive."

Around the same time in early December 2014, Lebanon's interior ministry said that its security forces apprehended a woman believed to be the wife of ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, along with a child born to the couple. The detainment actually took place months earlier, but Lebanon was only now acknowledging the development. It should also be noted that Iraqi sources poured doubt on the claim that Saja al-Dulaimi was actually Baghdadi's wife, suggesting she was more likely to be the sister of a man convicted of bombings in southern Iraq. Lebanese sources nevertheless cast her detainment as part of a foreign intelligence operation. They said that the detainment of Dulaimi would be used as levearge in negotiations aimed at releasing 27 members of

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Recent developments in the battlefields --

In December 2014, the United States-led coalition continued to carry out air strikes against ISIL targets inside Syria and Iraq. But despite the pressure being placed on ISIL, Islamist terrorists continued to carry out a campaign of horror in Iraq and Syria at the end of 2014 .

In Iraq, a car bombing in Kirkuk left 15 people dead and 20 others injured in that city. Two car bombings in the Shi'ite district of Sadr City in Baghdad killed 15 people and wounded more than 50 others. Separately, a bomb exploded close to the Green Zone of the Iraqi capital, which is home to government and security offices; two people died as a result. To the north of Baghdad on Dec. 10, 2014, a suicide bomb and mortar attack by ISIL terrorists killed a dozen Shi'ite militia, while bombings in the Iraqi capital killed six people and injured two dozen more. In the western Anbar province, ISIL attacked an army post in the town of Garma.

By the third week of December 2014, there was some good news in the fight against ISIL as Kurdish peshmerga fighters, backed by United States air strikes, took victory for liberating hundreds of people trapped on Iraq's Sinjar mountain. For months, Iraqi Yazidis have been trapped on Sinjar mountain, living in desperate conditions and under siege by murderous ISIL forces. Now, however, relief was at hand. According to Masrour Barzani, the head of the Iraqi Kurdish region's national security council, said, "The peshmerga have managed to reach the mountain. A vast area has been liberated." He continued, "All those Yazidis that were trapped on the mountain are now free." The actual town of Sinjar was yet to be liberated, however, Barzani expected further gains, adding, "Now a corridor is open and hopefully the rest of the (Sinjar) region will be freed from Islamic State."

Meanwhile, the toll of the war in Syria was increasing. As 2014 came to a close, the United Kingdom-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that more than 30,000 civilians had been killed during the year in the civil war in Syria. Including fighters, the death toll for the year was more than 76,000. According to United Nations, the number of people killed since the start of the conflict in 2011 was 191,000.

At the start of 2015, progress was being made in the effort against ISIL. Iraqi Kurdish forces, backed by United States air power, had regained control over most of the territory lost since the summer of 2014. This claim was made by Falah Mustafa Bakir, the head of the department of foreign relations for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), in an interview with Voice of America. But Bakir indicated that the Iraqi army continued to present a weak point in the fight against ISIL. He posed the following question: “Where is the Iraqi army and where are the Sunnis?” Of course, the fact of the matter was that the Iraqi city of Mosul remained in ISIL hands and Bakir was urging an effort to liberate that city as he said, “Mosul is key.” The defeat of ISIL

Iraq Review 2016 Page 269 of 609 pages Iraq at the location where the terror group declared its caliphate would make it easier to dislodge them from across the region.

United States Pentagon Press Secretary Navy Rear Admiral John Kirby appeared to share a similar assessment as Bakir. At a press briefing, Kirby said, “What we haven't seen in the last several weeks has been any renewed offensive moves by ISIL of any significance. They have largely taken a defensive posture in the last several weeks.” Kirby cautioned that “nobody is taking that progress for granted.” Instead, Kirby noted that ISIL retained control over Mosul, Baiji, wide swaths of Anbar province, and remained a threat to the Yazidi minority in the region of Mount Sinjar. With an eye on a possible offensive on ISIL in Mosul, the Pentagon said it would train 12 new army brigades in Iraq including three in the Kurdish region.

As of Jan. 21, 2015, the United States was leading air strikes on Mosul.

An effort in Syria was also in the offing with the United States military set to deploy approximately 400 soldiers to train Syrian rebels to fight ISIL. Several countries, including Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have expressed interest in hosting the training. The United States government of Barack Obama had already authorized the deployment of some 3,000 troops to advise and train Iraqi and Kurdish forces.

While Syria has welcomed the United States' effort to fight ISIL in the region, it draws the line at training Syrian rebels, regarding all such groups as a threat to its power, and has a blanket assessment of all opponents, from Syrian moderate rebels to ISIL, as terrorists. Thus, the Syrian state news agency. SANA, accused the United States of "continuing to support terrorism in Syria."

But in the last week of January 2015, Syrian President Assad called for an agreement with the United States over the air strikes against ISIL targets in Syrian territory. In an interview with the magazine, Foreign Affairs, Assad said, "With any country that is serious about fighting terrorism, we are ready to make cooperation, if they [the United States] are serious." He continued, noting that the United States should "make legal cooperation with Syria and start by asking permission from our government to make such attacks." Assad also said that Washington should urge Turkey to refrain from funding and arming rebels in northern Syria.

For Washington, it was quite conceivable that it believed its obligations were fulfilled when it informed Damascus of its impending air strikes on ISIL in Syria in the autumn of 2014.

On Jan. 26, 2015, it was announced that the Kurdish city of Kobane, where a long-standing battle with ISIL was ongoing, had finally come under Kurdish control. Kurdish forces had driven Islamic State militants from the city and were flying their flag high. Kurdish fighters were proceeding carefully into the city due to fears about landmines planted by the Islamic terrorists; however, Kurds were seen celebrating in the streets and jets were seen flying over Kobane. The recapture of

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Kobane was a significant and hard-fought victory in the Kurds' fight against ISIL.

By the start of February 2015, Kurdish forces, backed by United States-led air strikes, were advancing on the rural areas surrounding Kobane, driving Islamic State militants further away. In an interview with Reuters News, Redur Xelil, a spokesperson for the Syrian Kurdish militia, said: "The fighting organization of Daesh ... is in a state of complete collapse at present and cannot hold ground." (Note: "Daesh" is a pejorative term for Islamic State which that terror group rejects, but while the anti-Islamic State activists have used in defiance.)

Complex Geopolitcs --

Not all the news was positive. A complex hostage crisis was playing out as ISIL continued its campaign of barbarism and terror, threatening to kill two Japanese hostages -- Kenji Goto, a freelance journalist and film-maker, and Haruna Yukawa, a self-declared security consultant. ISIL terrorists demanded an unrealistically high ransom demand of $200 million for the Japanese hostages, while the government of Japan warned that it would not negotiate with terrorists. Indeed, while some countries have been prepared to pay ransoms to secure the release of their kidnapped nationals, other countries, such as the United States, have argued that the ransom funds are used to pay for continued terrorism. Regardless, with a ransom left unpaid by Japan in this case, the pattern of tragedy and terror unfolded as a 72-hour deadline passed, and ISIL released a gruesome video depicting the beheading death of Yukawa.

Soon thereafer, a twist on the hostage sage occurred as ISIL suggested it might consider releasing Goto and a Jordanian pilot, Moaz al-Kasasbeh, if Jordan were to consider a prisoner exchange. Kasasbeh was shot down over Syria in December 2014 on a mission to support the United State- led military coalition effort against Islamic State.

At the center of the prisoner exchange for ISIL was a female Iraqi militant, Sajida al-Rishawi. She and her husband, Hussein Ali al-Shamari, attempted to carry out double suicide bombings at the Radisson hotel in the Jordanian capital of Amman in 2005. While her husband completed his mission, and 60 people died as a result, the explosives failed to detonate in her case and she was arrested, imprisoned, and sentenced to death. She remained alive only because in 2006, Jordan imposed a moratorium on the death penalty. Of note is the fact that the moratorium expired at the close of 2014 and executions have resumed in Jordan. Rishawi is regarded as a high value prisoner by ISIL due to the fact that she was the sister of the "right hand man" of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. For ISIL, any one in Zarqawi's inner circle was regarded highly since he was leader of al-Qaida in Iraq -- the terror group that ultimately gave birth to ISIL.

At the end of January 2015, the Jan. 29, 2015, deadline imposed by ISIL passed. Two days later, another gruesome video, typical of the Islamist terror group, was released showing a British ISIL terrorist beheading Goto. While the Japanese government has expressed horror and outrage over

Iraq Review 2016 Page 271 of 609 pages Iraq the horrific killing of two of its citizens, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has nonetheless maintained a resolute stance, as he declared that Japan "would not give in to terrorism." Moreover, Prime Minister Abe vowed that Japan would do more in the global effort against ISIL.

Meanwhile, Jordanian officials said they were exploring all their options related to the release of Kasasbeh. However, they were calling for some sort of proof of life sign. By the start of February 2015, Jordan made clear that because Kasasbeh was a military asset, and because Rishawi had not been successful in her attempted act of terrorism, it was willing to pursue the prisoner exchange path. As noted by Mohammed al-Momeni, a Jordanian spokesperson in an interview with the official Petra news agency, the government was doing "everything it can to save the life and secure the release of its pilot." Momeni continued, "All state organizations have been mobilized to secure the proof of life that we require so that he can be freed and returned to his home."

On Feb. 3, 2015, however, the tragic news emerged that although ISIL had been using Kasasbeh as a bargaining chip, they had actually burned him to death in a cage a month earlier. As before, Islamic State terrorists released another highly-produced but entirely gruesome video depicting their vicious act of cruelty and horror.

King Abdullah of Jordan, who was in the United States for security talks, cut short his visit but was sure to meet with President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden before returning home to deal with what had become a national tragedy. The Obama White House condemned the killing of Kasasbeh and Vice President Joe Biden reinforced "America's ironclad support" for Jordan. The European Union issued a statement of solidarity with Jordan over the killing of Kasasbeh, while Japan, whose constitution prevents it from being militarily engaged, nonetheless vowed to do its part in the fight against Islamic State. Japan also made clear that it shared the pain of Jordan having similarly suffered the brutal beheadings of two of its own citizens by the hand of ISIL terrorists.

Several Arab countries were compelled to issue statements on the murder of Kasasbeh. The Saudi Arabian state news agency described the killing as a "barbaric, cowardly act, which is not sanctioned by the principles of tolerant Islam... and cannot be perpetrated except by the bitterest enemies of Islam." From Egypt, Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar University in Egypt and one of the leading authorities on Sunni Islam, made it clear that burning Kasasbeh to death was a violation of Islam, which prohibits the mutilation of bodies. As well, Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Arabi said the killing of Kasasbeh was "brutal" and "beyond belief." Arabi noted that Islamic State was "a menace which should be stopped."

At home in Jordan, citizens took the streets in spontaneous demonstrations to denounce the terror group, ISIL, which anti-extremist Arabs derisively refers to as "Daesh," and demanded revenge. Among those calling for a harsh response by Jordan was Kasasbeh's father, Safi al-Kasasbeh, who said, "I demand Islamic State should be wiped out... I call for [ISIL] to be eliminated completely."

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Clearly, Jordan's outrage was being felt globally, with the civilized world angered that ISIL clearly had no intention of acting in good faith on their proposed prisoner exchange, since Kasasbeh had been killed a full month prior. The terror group had essentially been negotiating in bad faith and clearly were willing to manipulate and exploit the circumstances to their benefit. While this tactic may have worked -- with tragic consequences for the two Japanese hostages and the lone Jordanian hostage -- it was not something that could easily be replicated. First, there were only a limited number of Western hostages known to be in ISIL hands, and second, the cruel murder of Kasasbeh had motivated the global community to take more decisive action against the terror group. As noted by United States President Barack Obama, "I think it will redouble the vigilance and determination on the part of the global coalition to make sure they [Islamic State terrorists] are degraded and ultimately defeated."

Upon arriving back home in Jordan on Feb. 4, 2015, King Abdullah made his voice -- and that of his country -- heard as he declared: "The blood of martyr Moaz al-Kasasbeh will not be in vain and the response of Jordan and its army after what happened to our dear son will be severe." King Abdullah essentially declared relentless war on Islamic State in the following statement: "Jordan and its Arab army's response to what its son had suffered in the criminal and cowardly act, will be harsh, because this terrorist organization is not only fighting us, but fighting the true Islam and its values. We are fighting this war to protect our faith, our values and humanitarian principles, and our fight for these values will be relentless, we will be on the lookout for the criminals and hit them in their own homes."

It was assumed that response would involve a greater military involvement by Jordan in the global effort against Islamic State. To that end, President Barack Obama's nominee for defense secretary, Ashton Carter, said he would resolve a delay in the sale of arms from the United States to Jordan.

Note that on Feb. 5, 2015, Jordanian fighter jets were pounding ISIL targets in Syria. According to media sources, the strikes were on the eastern province of Deir al-Zor and near the Islamic State stronghold of Raqqa where Kasasbeh was executed. This news appeared to be verified by King Abdullah himself, who was overheard by witnesses telling the family of Kasasbeh that the Jordanian forces were striking at the heart of ISIL territory in Raqqa.

On Feb. 8, 2015, Jordan continued to carry out air strikes against Islamic State bases and hideouts in Syria. Jordanian Air Force chief, General Mansour al-Jbour, said, "We achieved what we aimed at." He added that as many as 20 percent of all the sorties by the United States-led coalition in Syria had been carried out by Jordan, and that a sgnificant portion of Islamic State's capacities had been degraded.

For its part, Islamic State announced that one of the Jordanian air strikes had killed a United States aid worker, , the remaining American hostage being held by the terror group.

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Mueller's death was soon verified; however, United States officials said there was no evidence to support ISIL's claims that that aid worker was killed in a Jordanian air strike. United States authorities also made clear that the only group responsible for the death of Mueller was ISIL.

In mid-February 2015, a new battleground of Islamic State merged in Libya when more than 20 Coptic Christians from Egypt were brutally killed. In keeping with the terror group's favorite mode of assassination, the victims were beheaded. As with the horrific immolation of a Jordanian pilot by Islamic State at the start of 2015 in Syria, the decapitations of the Egyptian Christian workers in Libya stood as an imprimatur for yet another Arab country to enter the global effort to defeat the Islamist Jihadist terror group.

Six weeks earlier at the start of January 2015, masked gunmen kidnapped the 13 Coptic Christians in northern Libya. The Coptic Christians were workers from Egypt living at a residential compound in the city of Sirte. The gunmen entered the compound and demanded to see identification papers of the workers; Christians and Muslims were separated with the Christians being taken away in handcuffs. A week prior, a group of seven Christians from Egypt were similarly attacked and kidnapped from a phony checkpoint in the very same Libyan city of Sirte. In a separate attack, an Egyptian-born Coptic Christian doctor and his wife were attacked and killed in their own home in Sirte. These acts of kidnapping and murder, with Coptic Christians as the targets, appeared to be the latest manifestation of the manifold instability plaguing Libya. In the post-Qadhafi era, Libya was now beset by violence at the hands of rival militias, and a stronghold for extremist fighters aligned with Islamic State for whom Christians present a prime target for attack.

The ghastly targeting of Christians by Islamic State reached a new nadir in mid-February 2015. As discussed here, videotaped footage emerged depicting the gruesome beheadings of the more than 20 Coptic Christians from Egypt who had been kidnapped by Islamic State terrorists in Libya. As has become a favored pattern by Islamic State, the revolting footage showed the victims dressed in orange jumpsuits, forced to kneel down, and then decapitated in a barbaric theatre of horror. Adding to the tradgedy was the fact that most of the victims were from poor villages in Upper Egypt who were forced to work in Libya due to their socio-economic plight.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi made a point of visiting St Mark's Cathedral in Cairo to offer his condolences to the Coptic Christian Pope Tawadros II. For its part, the Coptic Christian Church of Egypt expressed grave sadness over the deaths of the victims but said it was "confident" that the Egyptian authorities would respond appropriately. To that end, the Egyptian government declared a week of mourning and banned all travel by Egyptian citizens to Libya.

It should be noted that Egyptian President Sisi condemned the repugnant murders of Coptic Christians, calling their assassins "inhuman criminal killers." The Egyptian leader wasted little time in asserting that it was his country's prerogative to exact retribution. Sisi also made clear that there was a global war emerging as the world confronted Islamist Jihadists. He said, "Egypt and the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 274 of 609 pages Iraq whole world are in a fierce battle with extremist groups carrying extremist ideology and sharing the same goals."

Soon, Egyptian forces were striking various Islamic State satellite targets in Libya -- from terror training camps and sites to weapons depots in the city of Derna. Meanwhile, Libya forces -- under the instruction of the internationally-recognized government of that country and in coordination with Egypt -- were hitting Islamic State targets in Sirte and Bin Jawad. Egyptian authorities soon said that the plan would be to target all Islamic State locations in Libya. Egyptian authorities also called on the United States-led international coalition against Islamic State to provide support to Egypt in its efforts against the bloodthirsty Islamist Jihadist terror group. Moreover, President Sisi called for a United Nations resolution facilitating an international intervention into Libya. In an interview with French media, the Egyptian leader explained that there was no other alternative, saying, "We will not allow them to cut off the heads of our children."

Following the commencement of Egypt's air strike campaign, Libya was struck by violence when Islamic State militants launched a spate of suicide attacks. The terrorists packed cars with explosives, which were then detonated in the eastern town of Qubbah, ultimately killing 40 people. Islamic State said that the attacks were being carried out in retaliation for Egyptian air strikes on pro-ISIL targets in Derna, Libya (as discussed above). The claim of responsibility statement by Islamic State of Cyrenaica read as follows: "They killed and wounded tens in revenge for the bloodshed of Muslims in the city of Derna."

President Obama seeks new military authorization in campaign against Islamic State --

In the geopolitical sphere, on Feb. 11, 2015, President Barack Obama of the United States called on the legislative branch of government in that country to advance new legislation authorizing military action against the terror group calling itself Islamic State. President Obama's request, which was issued via a letter to Congress, included a provision that would prevent any large-scale invasion by United States ground troops, while nonetheless allowing for the use of special forces in rescue operations and special strikes based on key intelligence. President Obama also advocated limiting the military operations to a period of three years.

Republicans in Congress immediately railed against the request by the United States president, angered that it precluded the use of massive ground forces to fight Islamic State. They insisted that a more muscular policy was needed with "boots on the ground" as well as an open-ended engagement. But some Democrats had their own objections, calling for a far more circumscribed authorization to be crafted, and specifically, one without broad war powers at stake.

It was to be seen if partisan rivalries in the United States Congress would impede the process of passing a new authorization intended to carefully circumscribe the United States' military effort to degrade and destroy Islamic State. For his part, President Obama said he was committed to

Iraq Review 2016 Page 275 of 609 pages Iraq working with both parties in Congress to enacting new legal authorization aimed at fighting the Islamic State terror group. In an address broadcast by the media, and intended to complement his letter to Congress, President Obama warned that the fight against Islamic State terrorists would be difficult, but he insisted that the United States-led coalition was seeing success in its campaign. He said, "But our coalition is on the offensive. ISIL is on the defensive, and ISIL is going to lose."

Other recent developments --

The fight against ISIL in Iraq and Syria was ongoing in mid-February 2015. On Feb. 13, 2015, Iraqi security forces repelled an attack by ISIL on an air base in Anbar province in Iraq where United States Marines were providing training to Iraqi troops. Fighting was also going on in the town of al-Baghdadi. Days later on Feb. 17, 2015, that town was the site of a massacre when ISIL terrorists burned 45 people to death.

Around the same period in Syria, pro-Assad military forces were advancing on the rebel-held northern stronghold of Aleppo, capturing several villages in the area, and engaging in heavy battles. Backed by Hezbollah forces from Lebanon, the Assad army was also launching a serious assault in southern Syria.

For his part, Syrian President Assad said in an interview with BBC News that although there was no direct cooperation with the United States, third parties, such as Iraq, had been passing on information to Damascus about the United States-led air campaign against ISIL in Syria. Assad said: "Through third parties, more than one party, Iraq and other countries, sometimes they convey a message, a general message, but there is nothing tactical." He added that there was no actual dialogue with the United States via third parties, saying, "There is no dialogue. There is, let's say, information, but not dialogue."

In the same interview, Assad denied that Syria was turning into a failed state, insisting that Syrian government institutions continued to fulfill "their duty toward the Syrian people." He also dismissed that his forces were dropping barrel bombs on insurgents. He said, "They're called bombs. We have bombs, missiles and bullets ... There is no barrel bombs, we don't have barrels."

Note that in February 2015, United States-led air strikes in Syria was bearing fruit with the recapture of several villages, previously held by Islamic State, in the terrorist-held stronghold of Raqqa province.

In the battlefields in Iraq and Syria in late February 2015, ISIL continued its campaign of terror. In northern Syria, the terror group abducted at least 150 Assyrian Christians, including women, children, and senior citizens. There was no word on their condition. On the Iraqi side of the border, as many as 100 Sunni tribesmen were abducted near the city of Tikrit. Also in Iraq, the capital of Baghdad was struck with terrorism when bombs exploded in the district,

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In a more positive development, United States officials charged with training fighters in Syria have said that a more significant number of moderates have come forward with a willingness to fight Islamic State. Along a similarly encouraging note, Kurdish YPG militia fighters -- already in the trenches in Syria -- have seen increasing success in their efforts to go after Islamic State targets in northeastern Syria, with the notable capture of the town of Tel Hamis. Backed by United States- led air strikes, the Kurdish YPG militias have also managed to regain control over several other villages in the region.

At the start of March 2015, with all the attention focused on a forthcoming operation in Mosul (discussed below), Iraqi authorities launched a military assault on Tikrit aimed at retaking control of that town from from ISIL. Regaining control of Tikrit was of vital significance -- partially due to its symbolic value as the hometown of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, partially because it would the offensive would be a key test for Iraqi forces in the battle against ISIL, and also because it was related to the larger mission of moving north and retaking control over Mosul.

The assault, which was being carried out by Iraqi forces and without support from the United States, was somewhat stymied by roadside bombs and mines laid by Islamic State. As well, there were attacks with ISIL carrying out a suicide bombing against a camp outside of al-Dour, which left the head of the Iranian-backed Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia dead. That being said, Iraqi army forces were making progress, having been able to take control of the village of al-Maibdi, located between Tikrit and the Kurdish-controlled city of Kirkuk, as well as the villages of Siha and Mazraat al-Rahim, to the north of Tikrit. As Iraqi forces moved towards Tikrit, Islamic State terrorists set fire to to the Ajil oil field, presumably to ward off encroaching Iraqi forces.

Sunni Arab countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, were expressing concern over the involvement of Shi'a Iran's Revolutionary Guard in the eastern flank operations against ISIL, and specifically in the operation in Tikrit. At issue was an intensifying sectarian schism in the Middle East between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims. Prince Saud al-Faisal, the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, was on the record saying, "The situation in Tikrit is a prime example of what we are worried about. Iran is taking over the country."

Elsewhere in Iraq, Iraqi forces were showing some strength as they were able to advance on ISIL in the town of al-Baghdadi -- close to the site of the Ain al-Asad air base where United States Marines were training Iraqi military troops. With this success, Iraqi forces were positioned to retake al-Baghdadi.

Meanwhile, attacks were ongoing elsewhere in Iraq, with a series of bombing and mortar attacks in the first week of March 2015 targeting Baghdad and leaving at least 10 peope dead.

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By the second week of March 2015, Iraqi forces backed by Iranian-backed Shi'a militias were making progress in their assault on the town of Tikrit. First they were able to subdue ISIL forces in the nearby town of al-Alam, and then they gained dominion over the northern Qadisiya district in Tirit, going street by street in their mission. Iraqi forces appeared to have control over the general hospital while heavy fighting was reported close to the presidential palace. This apparent success in Tikrit showed some degree of an impressive "turnaround" for the Iraqi forces, which were pilloried for abandoning their posts and their military weapons when first confronted by ISIL forces in 2014.

Perhaps in a show of its own strength, intended to demonstrate that it was not actually under pressure, Islamic State carried out a series of suicide car bomb attacks on army and security positions in Ramadi -- the provincial capital of Anbar province and a stronghold of the terror group. Islamic State also struck the northern town of Sinjar, hitting the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Meanwhile, car bomb killed half a dozen people in the predominantly Shi'ite district of Hurriya in the capital city, Baghdad.

Across the border in Syria, bombing and ground attacks by anti-Assad rebels targeted a government security building in Aleppo. That attack on the Air Force Intelliigence compound left dozens of people dead and the building destroyed.

But pro-Assad Syrian forces enjoyed significant success when an air strike hit the commander of the militant Islamist rebel group, al-Nusra Front. According to reports on social media, Abu Homam al-Shami was eliminated along with three other al-Nusra leaders in the strike; although that aspect of the news emerging from Syria remained unconfirmed.

In the Syrian civil war, spurred by the Arab Spring, al-Nusra Front emerged as one of the most powerful anti-government entities in the battlefield. Nusra Front's ties to the terror group, al- Qaida, have been at the forefront of the calculations of the United States government, which has been reluctant to offer unlimited support to anti-Assad rebels due to its fears that they might be inadvertently assisting this terror affiliate. Now, however, with the death of the Nusra Front commander, the edge was with the Syrian Assad forces who had managed to stake out a strategic victory in what they called a "unique operation."

Of note, however, was the fact that with the rise of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, al-Nusra has lost its Jihadist cachet to some degree. In fact, al-Nusra was reported to be interested in cutting ties with al-Qaida and currying favor with certain Arab Gulf states, such as Qatar, known for funding anti-Assad rebels.

In the third week of March 2015, the Tikrit offensive was on pause. Iraqi Interior Minister Mohammed al-Ghaban explained the decision as follows: "We have decided to halt military operations in Salahuddin in order to reduce casualties among our heroic forces... and to preserve

Iraq Review 2016 Page 278 of 609 pages Iraq the remaining infrastructure." He continued, "The situation is under control and we will choose the appropriate time to attack the enemy and liberate the area."

It seemed that despite the success seen by Iraqi forces against ISIL, they were yet to dislodge the Islamist terror entity from the central districts of Tikrit. With an eye on weakening Islamic State, Iraqi military officials called for intensified air strikes in the area. In an interview with Reuters News, Iraqi Deputy Minister of Defense Ibrahim al-Lami said, "We need air support from any force that can work with us against IS." Rafid al-Jaboori, a spokesperson for Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, issued the same call for air strikes, saying, "We have been saying we need more air support for all operations. We welcome air support for all our campaigns against IS."

By the last week of March 2015, those intensified air strikes in Tikrit were happening, thanks to United States warplanes targeting Islamic State positions in that town. Of note was the fact that joint Iraqi and Iranian forces had argued that they could retake Tikrit without United States support. Now, however, it was apparent that with Islamic State still holding central Tikrit, United States air support was needed to dislodge Islamic State from that city.

As March 2015 came to a close, Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi said that Islamic State forces had driven out of central Tikrit. A statement from the prime minister read as follows: "Our security forces have reached the center of Tikrit and they have liberated the southern and western sides and they are moving towards the control of the whole city." By the start of April 2015, in the aftermath of the liberation of the city, Tikrit was beset by violence, vandalism, and looting.

The United States-led global coalition was meanwhile carrying out air strikes in the northern part of Iraq, with the goal being to drive Islamic State from the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. That operation was being carried out by Kurdish forces, who have throughout fiercely battled Islamic States and often paying a high price in so doing. To this end, Kurdish military officials reported that their forces were exposed to chlorine gas attacks. General Aziz Waisi described one such chlorine gas bomb as follows: "When it exploded we realized it was not a normal smoke because it caused unconsciousness and vomiting."

It should be noted that in mid-April 2015, the United States Pentagon confirmed that Islamic State lost more than a quarter of the territory in Iraq it held prior to the air campaign that was launched in August 2014. While it was deemed too early to confirm that the momentum was no longer with the brutal terror group, according to United States Pentagon spokesperson, Colonel Steve Warren, "some damage" had been inflicted and Islamic State was "slowly being pushed back." To this end, Colonel Warren noted that the frontlines of the zone held by Islamic State was being forced further to the south and to the west in Iraq.

With the intent to build on this success, Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi traveled to the United States to request more assistance in the air campaign against Islamic State. However, before the United

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States could even process this request, in mid-April 2015, on the heels of their victory in Tikrit, Islamic State was carrying out an advance on the city of Ramadi. In fact, reports emerged on April 15, 2015 that Ramadi was about to fall to Islamic State.

By April 22, 2015, Iraqi officials announced that Iraqi security forces were seeing success in their efforts to regain control over Ramadi. In truth, circumstances in the western city continued to be dire for residents, who continued a mass exodus out of Ramadi due to safety concerns. However, the fact of the matter was that Iraqi security forces had rapidly responded to the alarm sounded about Ramadi being on the verge of falling to Islamic State. Moreoever, they were making progress in the effort to regain control of Ramadi.

Meanwhile, violence continued elsewhere in Iraq, including two car bombings in Baghdad on April 17, 2015, that resulted in the deaths of around 30 people, as well as an attack using an improvised explosive device in the Kurdish city of Irbil that appeared to target the United States consulate there.

It should be noted that whereas progress had been noted in Iraq, the prevailing dynamics remained in place in Syria where Islamic State continued to hold sway over large swaths of that country. United States Pentagon spokesperson Colonel Steve Warren said that while Islamic State had been defeated in Kobane on the Turkish border, it had nonetheless made gains around Damascus and Homs.

Plans for a Mosul Offensive:

The emerging success in Tikrit, as well as the Anwar operation, both of which are discussed above, was part of a broader plan to regain vital territory from Islamic State. At stake was a looming effort to retain control over the key Iraqi city of Mosul from Islamic State. Regaining dominion over Tikrit was of vital significance for three reasons. First, there was the symbolic value of Tikrit as the hometown of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Second, it would be regarded as redemption of sorts for the Iraqi forces, who were strenuously criticized for their initial cowardly response to the advance of ISIL. Third, recapturing Tikrit was related to the larger mission of moving north and retaking control over Mosul. Fourth, the new offensive in Anbar was aimed at reversing the earliest tide of Islamic State's success in Iraq, which really catapulted the terror group from being a regional menace into the world's newest and one of its most notorious terror enclave.

In regards to the Mosul offensive, United States military advisers were training joint Iraqi and Kurdish forces to achieve this end in what was expected to be a spring offensive operation. Mosul -- Iraq's second largest city -- had been under the control of Islamic State since mid-2014. The takeover of Mosul was regarded as one of the darkest chapters in the story of an ascendant Islamic State in 2014. Realizing that regaining control over Mosul would stand as a pragmatic and symbolic development in the fight against the Islamist terror group, a plan was afoot involving Iraqi

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To that end, United States military advisers were taking a central role in preparing these forces for the impending operation, while Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi confirmed that an offenisve operation was in the works to liberate Mosul. Analysts have questioned the wisdom of telegraphing the timeline for the assault, noting that it would give the terrorists time to prepare; however, the United States military has insisted that with Islamic State forces in retreat, it was essential to show that the offensive against the terrorists was moving forward.

Note that in anticipation of the so-called Mosul offensive, a caches of United States-made weapons, ammunition, body armor, and other military supplies were dispatched to Iraq.

Landscape in the Spring and Summer of 2015

In Iraq, despite the fact that Islamic State was being pushed back, the terror group continued to punish the people of the region. In the first week of May 2015, it was reported that the Islamist terror group had murdered hundreds of Yazidi captives in the Mosul region where Islamic State holds sway. For the Medievalist terror state, Yazidis have been viewed as apostates and have been targeted for attack and even extermination. For the surviving female Yazidis, life promised to be one of misery as the women were forced into servitude as sex slaves. This latest bout of heinous abuse of the Yazidi people reminded the world that Islamic State remained capable of carrying out its campaign of horror.

In other developments in May 2015, Islamic State was advancing on the strategic Baiji oil refinery in central Iraq. For its part, Iraqi authorities refused to offer significant commentary on the situation in Baiji. Nevertheless, all reports from the region indicated that the ISIL terrorists had breached the perimeter, taken control of half the compound, and cut supply lines to Iraqi government troops inside the facility. The assault by Islamic State was able to take place despite a campaign of aerial bombardment by a United States-coalition, highlighting the reality that the fight against the world's worst terror enclave continued to be a monumental task. Indeed, the view of military specialists has been that there are simply too few elite Iraqi fighting forces to combat Islamic State, which holds sway over wide swaths of territory from Iraq to Syria.

That being said, the United States-led coalition and Iraqi forces were enjoying some success in their effort against Islamic State. Of note was the announcement on May 13, 2015 that the deputy leader of the terror group was killed in an air strike in northern Iraq. According to Iraqi authorities, Abdul Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli, also known as Abu Alaa al-Afari -- the second most senior leader of Islamic State -- was eliminated as a result of a United States-led air strike on a mosque near Tal Afar in Nineveh. While the United States had no comment on the matter beyond acknowledging that an air strike had been conducted at Tal Afar, Iraqi defense sources released videotaped footage purportedly showing the strike that killed Qaduli (also known as Afari) and

Iraq Review 2016 Page 281 of 609 pages Iraq several other militants with whom he was meeting.

In the background of this news was the claim by Iraqi sources that Islamic State leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, had been sidelined with injuries following an air strike in March 2015. Since that time, Afari had reportedly taken over control of the terror group's operations. Assuming this news of Afari's death is confirmed, it would be regarded as a major accomplishment in the fight against Islamic State. Indeed, with the leader incapacitated and the deputy dead, the terror group would have suffered two successive blows at the very top of its Islamist terror institution.

Of course, it should be noted that these two claims by Iraqi authorities of the incapacitation of Baghdadi and the eimination of Afari were yet to be confirmed by United States authorities. The Iraqi government's record on announcing high profile deaths of militants has been spotty, with many claims being refuted when the said militants emerge alive and well later. To this end, on May 14, 2015, Islamic State released videotaped footage depicting Baghdadi alive and well -- presumably in an attempt to disprove claims that the terror group's leader was injured and unable to function.

At the end of May 2015, even as the discussion of retaking control over Mosul was ongoing, Islamic State was making gains in Iraq. Indeed, Islamic State was carrying out an advance on the city of Ramadi, ultimately seizing control of that city. This development constituted a huge blow for Iraqi and global coalition forces who were hoping to reduce the terror group's imprint in Iraq and reverse their gains. That being said, Shi'a militias -- largely backed by Iran -- were launching an operation to retake control over Ramadi. It was to be seen if this effort would be successful. in addition to Ramadi in the Iraqi province of Anbar, Islamic State had managed to capture the Syrian town of Tadmur and the historic site of Palmyra.

Around the same time in late May 2015, the Iraqi capital of Baghdad was struck by violence with bombs exploding at two luxury hotels in the Iraqi capital. The bombs -- of which at least one was a suicide attack -- went off at the Babylon Hotel and the Ishtar Hotel (the former Sheraton), both of which were known to be popular with foreign nationals. Ten people died as a result of the blasts. While there was no claim of responsibility, blame rested with Islamic State.

Then, on June 1, 2015, Islamic State carried out an attack on military vehicles in Iraq's Anbar province, killing at least 45 police officers. Islamic State suicide bombers used captured Humvee vehicles packed with explosives to target the headquarters of a battalion of the Iraqi Federal Police. The attack, which took place in the region of Tharthar between Fallujah and Samarra, exacted a heavy death toll on the Iraqi federal police officers who happened to be deployed at the base as the ultimate victims. Several senior officers were among the dead while a Brigade commander was among the wounded.

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The suicide attacks on the base in Anbar at the start of June 2015 occurred as a report emerged that about 2,000 Humvee vehicles supposedly under Iraqi control had been stolen by Islamic State. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi officially admitted the loss in an interview with Iraqi media as he said, "In the collapse of Mosul, we lost a lot of weapons... We lost 2,300 Humvees in Mosul alone." It seemed that the Anbar attacks occurred using three of these very vehicles at stake.

On June 8, 2015, with Islamic State still posing a threat in Iraq and Syria, not to mention the wider Middle Eastern region, United States President Barack Obama acknowledged that his country's strategy to defeat the terror group remained "incomplete." President Obama made his remarks from Germany where he was attending the G-7 summit of the world's most developed coutries and in the aftermath of a meeting on the sidelines with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. President Obama explained that there could be no comprehensive strategy by the United States without a full commitment by the Iraqis to rescue their own country from the hands of Islamic State. To this end, the United States leader explained, "We don't have, yet, a complete strategy, because it requires commitments on the part of Iraqis."

President Obama added that the United States Pentagon was in the process of reviewing the plan to to train and militarily equip Iraq. He said, "We want to get more Iraqi security forces trained, fresh, well-equipped and focused and Abadi wants the same thing so we're reviewing a range of plans for how we might do that." But the United States president admitted that the plan was being complicated by a notable lack of Iraqi troops to be trained. President Obama noted that while he had ordered 3,000 United States military forces to Iraq, those personnnel often found themselves with "more training capacity" than actual recruits. This pointed observation appeared to bolster his claim that there was only so much the United States could either plan for or actually do without the participation of Iraqis themselves. Indeed, it would require the personal investment of Iraqis themselves to save their own country from being overrun by the world's most notorious terror group. Only a month prior, the new United States Defense Secretary Ashton Carter made the significant claim that the loss of Ramadi to Islamic State was at least partially due to the Iraqis' lack of a "will to fight."

Yet even with his call for Iraq to demonstrate more commitment to the process of fighting Islamic State, President Obama nonetheless ordered the deployment of an additional 450 United States troops to Iraq to train and assist Iraqi forces on the front lines.

General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained the move as being an extension of the existing strategy to assist in the fight against the Islamist terror group. He noted that the United States was providing training and support to Iraqi forces on the ground in Iraq, while ensuring that there were no American ground forces on the front lines. Dempsey said, "We’ve made some recommendations on potential enhancements to the training and equip

Iraq Review 2016 Page 283 of 609 pages Iraq mission." Dempsey also shutdown criticism that the existing approach was defective or lacking, as he said that President Obama had not asked for military options that "would imply the strategy is ineffective."

For his part, President Obama acknowledged that the effort to degrade and ultimately defeat Islamic State was going slowly, as he said, "But it has not been happening as fast as it needs to." Nevertheless, President Obama insisted that while the terror group could rightly be understood as "nimble, aggressive and opportunistic," he was "absolutely confident" the terror group would ultimately be vanquished in Iraq.

In the first part of July 2015 during the holy Muslim period of Ramadan, Islamic State was ramping up attacks in Iraq. In fact, a spate of bombings in the capital of Baghdad during this time period left approximately 30 people dead . Most of the violence took place in Shi'a areas of the city, and ranged from car bombings to suicide attacks. Islamic State was proud to take responsibility for the bloodshed, stating via social media that the bombings constituted the "pounce of the monotheists on the chests of the apostates."

By mid-July 2015, the government of Iraq announced that it was launching a large-scale military offensive in Anbar province, with an eye on defeating Islamic State there. However, such announcements have taken place in the past without any actual follow-through. It was to be determined if the assault on Islamic State in Anbar would actually proceed.

On July 17, 2015, the terror group, Islamic State, carried out a brutal attack in the eastern province of Diyala in Iraq. The powerful car bomb exploded at a busy market in the town of Khan Bani Saad in Diyala, killing at least 80 people, including women and children, and utterly destroying several buildings in the area. It was one of the worst attacks by Islamic State in Iraq since the Islamist terror group seized swaths of Itaqi territory. The timing of the attack coincided with the end of the Muslim hold month of Ramadan, and clearly dampened what should have been a joyful celebration of the Eid ul-Fitr holiday.

In mid-August 2015, as Iraq's government was in the process of enacting structural reforms to its system of governance, the country's landscape was struck by violence when a truck bomb struck the largely Shi'a district of Sadr City in Baghdad, killing close to 70 people. The truck bomb targeted the crowded Jameela marketplace Islamic State claimed responsibility and made clear its intent was to target Shi'ites. The attack constituted the worst act of terrorism in Iraq since Prime Minister Abadi took office and raised questions as to whether Iraq was adequately addressing the regional threat posed by Islamic State.

In the same period of mid-August 2015, Prime Minister Abadi's predecessor, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, was facing political and legal consequences for his role in fomenting ethno-sectarian tensions in Iraq that led to Sunni support for Islamic State. That terror group went

Iraq Review 2016 Page 284 of 609 pages Iraq on to seize control over wide swaths of Iraqi territory as the country moved from a national ethno- sectarian crisis to a national security emergency. At issue was the decision by a parliamentary panel to call for Maliki to face trial over his role in the fall of the strategic city of Mosul to Islamic State. Maliki was not the only Iraqi official or former official named in the parliamentary report, which was approved by a parliamentary committee and which would be submitted for a vote by the entire parliament. As noted by Parliamentary Speaker Salim al-Jaburi: "No-one is above the law and accountability to the people. The judiciary will punish perpetrators and delinquents."

For his part, Prime Minister Abadi was signaling his interest in improving stewardship of Iraq's defense forces by approving court martial procedures that would apply to military commanders and officers who notoriously abandoned their posts during the assault of Islamic State on the city of Ramadi earlier in 2015. The fall of Ramadi in 2015 -- almost a year Islamic State began its assault of aggression in Iraq -- was regarded as a devastating blow to the anti-terrorism effort, and stalled any and all discussion of an Iraqi campaign to regain control over the strategic city of Mosul that was lost a year prior. This move to force members of the Iraqi forces to be accountable for their actions, which included allowing a massive cache of weapons and military equipment to fall into the hands of Islamic State terrorists -- was regarded as a significant shift in Iraqi political dynamics.

Meanwhile, with the ongoing threat posed by Islamic State, the United States army's outgoing chief of staff, General Ray Odierno, said that his country should consider a plan to embed United States troops with Iraqi forces if significant progress was not advanced in the battle against Islamic State. To this end, he said, "I believe that if we find in the next several months that we're not making the progress that we have, we should probably absolutely consider embedding some soldiers with them, and see if that would make a difference." Odierno noted that United States forces should take on a support role rather than a combat role; however, it was not clear that there was any appetite by the Obama administration in the United States for increased military engagement in Iraq. Odierno acknowledged that his proposal would only work in the short term and that regional forces should take the lead role in the effort against Islamic State. To this end, he admitted, "We'd probably be right back where we are today six months later. I absolutely believe that the region has to solve this problem. The US cannot solve this problem for the region."

Deputy leader of Islamic State killed in air strike amidst continuing threat posed by terror group

In mid-August 2015 as Iraq's government was in the process of enacting structural reforms to its system of governance, the country's landscape was struck by violence when a truck bomb struck the largely Shi'a district of Sadr City in Baghdad, killing close to 70 people. The truck bomb targeted the crowded Jameela marketplace Islamic State claimed responsibility and made clear its intent was to target Shi'ites. The attack constituted the worst act of terrorism in Iraq since Prime Minister Abadi took office and raised questions as to whether Iraq was adequately addressing the regional threat posed by Islamic State.

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In the same period of mid-August 2015, Prime Minister Abadi's predecessor, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, was facing political and legal consequences for his role in fomenting ethno-sectarian tensions in Iraq that led to Sunni support for Islamic State. That terror group went on to seize control over wide swaths of Iraqi territory as the country moved from a national ethno- sectarian crisis to a national security emergency. At issue was the decision by a parliamentary panel to call for Maliki to face trial over his role in the fall of the strategic city of Mosul to Islamic State. Maliki was not the only Iraqi official or former official named in the parliamentary report, which was approved by a parliamentary committee and which would be submitted for a vote by the entire parliament. As noted by Parliamentary Speaker Salim al-Jaburi: "No-one is above the law and accountability to the people. The judiciary will punish perpetrators and delinquents."

For his part, Prime Minister Abadi was signaling his interest in improving stewardship of Iraq's defense forces by approving court martial procedures that would apply to military commanders and officers who notoriously abandoned their posts during the assault of Islamic State on the city of Ramadi earlier in 2015. The fall of Ramadi in 2015 -- almost a year Islamic State began its assault of aggression in Iraq -- was regarded as a devastating blow to the anti-terrorism effort, and stalled any and all discussion of an Iraqi campaign to regain control over the strategic city of Mosul that was lost a year prior. This move to force members of the Iraqi forces to be accountable for their actions, which included allowing a massive cache of weapons and military equipment to fall into the hands of Islamic State terrorists -- was regarded as a significant shift in Iraqi political dynamics.

In the third week of August 2015, the deputy leader of Islamic State (IS), Fadhil Ahmad al-Hayali, was killed in a military strike by United States forces in northern Iraq. United States officials confirmed the elimination of the terrorist deputy leader, Hayali, also known as Hajji Mutazz, who was the second-in-command to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. (Hayali functioned as the main weapons and military coordinator for Islamic State, but he was also a key player as regards the group's wider operations including media and basic logistics. As such, his death struck a strategic blow to the terrorist group. As noted by Ned Price of the United States National Security Council, "Hayali's death will adversely impact IS's operations given that his influence spanned IS's finance, media, operations, and logistics."

It should be noted that the title "Islamic State second-in-command" has also been attributed by Iraqi officials to Abdul Rahman Mustafa Mohammed, whom the Iraqi government said was killed as a result of an air strike in northern Iraq months prior. According to Iraqi authorities, Mohammed, also known as Abu Alaa al-Afari, acted as an interim leader of the terror group when Baghdadi was widely reported to have been incapacitated.

Meanwhile, with the ongoing threat posed by Islamic State, the United States army's outgoing chief of staff, General Ray Odierno, said that his country should consider a plan to embed United States

Iraq Review 2016 Page 286 of 609 pages Iraq troops with Iraqi forces if significant progress was not advanced in the battle against Islamic State. To this end, he said, "I believe that if we find in the next several months that we're not making the progress that we have, we should probably absolutely consider embedding some soldiers with them, and see if that would make a difference." Odierno noted that United States forces should take on a support role rather than a combat role; however, it was not clear that there was any appetite by the Obama administration in the United States for increased military engagement in Iraq. Odierno acknowledged that his proposal would only work in the short term and that regional forces should take the lead role in the effort against Islamic State. To this end, he admitted, "We'd probably be right back where we are today six months later. I absolutely believe that the region has to solve this problem. The U.S. cannot solve this problem for the region."

Recent Developments in effort against Islamic State

In October 2015, a series of bombings across Iraq left scores of people dead. In one attack in the southern town of al-Zubair, located close to the oil city of Basra, a car bombing left at least 10 people dead. In the capital of Baghdad, bombings resulted in more than a dozen people being killed. In the town of Khalis, located in the restive eastern province of Diyala, at least 40 people were killed in attacks there. Islamic State, proudly claimed responsibility for the al-Zubair bloodshed alone; however, all the other attacks were also attributed to the Islamist terror group. With the concerted coalition engagement in Iraq against Islamic State ongoing in Iraq, the terror group was now resorting to sporadic acts of terrorism, such as car bombings and suicide missions.

The Kurdish effort against Islamic State was going into high gear in the second week of November 2015 as Kurdish Peshmerga fighters launched an offensive operation aimed at retaking the northern Iraqi town of Sinjar. The immediate objective was to establish a buffer zone for the protection of civilians. Kurdish authorities told international media that their fighters had successfully taken control of villages in the area surrounding Syria, as well as part of a strategic transportation route, known as Highway 47, between Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria used by Islamic State to transport military supplies. Meanwhile, the United States-led international coalition was carrying out sustained air strikes in northern Iraq. These developments indicated that that there was a concerted effort afoot to place increasing pressure on Islamic State in Iraq. That effort saw some success when only days after the operation was launched, it was announced that Sinjar had been liberated from the clutches of Islamic State.

U.S. augments anti-terror strategy for Iraq and Syria --

Recent terror attacks on Lebanese, Russian, and French targets constituted a terrorist trifecta for Islamic State, and could only be understood as manifestations of the terror group's effort to demonstrate its relevance and resilience -- even as it was being subject to strikes from various international actors.

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Indeed, the terror enclave was certainly under pressure from a United States-led international coalition, as well as a bombing campaign by Russia. Earlier in November 2015 Islamic State lost control of Sinjar in Iraq as a result of a fierce offensive by Kurdish peshmerga fighters backed by United States air power. In the same period, as discussed above, the United States Pentagon reported that it had targeted the "face" of Islamic State in a drone strike -- the notorious terrorist "" who was shown in barbaric videotaped footage with international hostages who were executed via decapitation. The Pentagon indicated that the drone strike was very likely successful, thus inflicting a symbolic blow against the terror group. Around the same period, Islamic State was reported to be losing control in Aleppo in Syria.

While these losses were recent, the downward trajectory for Islamic State had been occurring for several months. As such, the terror enclave's evolving imperative might be to show that it still had power and influence. No longer able to expand its territorial advances, Islamic State was very likely transforming its efforts. Rather than concentrating on building and expanding its so-called Caliphate, Islamic State could be refocusing its ambitions in the direction of international Jihadism. Should this working theory gain support , it would suggest an acute threat to global security.

Given this burgeoning global security threat, neoconservative critics of President Obama in the United States were clamoring for him to articulate a more muscular foreign policy in regard to Islamic State. At the G20 summit in Turkey, an unusually angry President Obama dismissed the notion of warfare without careful consideration, saying, It’s best that we don’t shoot first and aim later." In response to the call for him to extrovert American hegemony and leadership in a robust manner, President Obama said, “If folks want to pop off and have opinions about what they want to do, present a specific plan. What I am not interested in doing is posing, or pursuing some notion of American leadership or America winning or whatever other slogans they come up with ... I’m too busy for that.” He added, “What I do not do is to take actions either because it is going to work politically or somehow make America look tough, or make me look tough. And maybe part of the reason is that every few months I go to Walter Reed [a military hospital] and I see a 25- year-old kid who is paralysed or has lost his limbs. And some of those are people who I have ordered into battle. So I can’t afford to play some of the political games that others play.”

One flashpoint issue in the discussion of United States policy regarding Islamic State was President Obama's claim that the terror group had been "contained." Asked how he could make that claim given the ongoing terror activity by Islamic State, President Obama explained, “When I said that we are containing their spread in Iraq and Syria -– in fact, they control less territory than they did last year. The more we shrink that territory, the less they can pretend they are somehow a functioning state and the more it becomes apparent that they are simply a network of brutal killers.” He also insisted that it was vital that Islamic State not be treated as a conventional state enemy but rather as a terrorist network. President Obama said, “Our goals here have to be aggressive and leave no stone here, but also recognize this is not conventional warfare. We play

Iraq Review 2016 Page 288 of 609 pages Iraq into the ISIL narrative when we act as if they are a state and we use routine military tactics that are designed to fight a state that is attacking another state. That’s not what’s going on here.”

In December 2015 when the United States was struck by a massacre in the California city of San Bernardino. President Barack Obama said that the assailants were inspired by Islamic State. In his national address on Dec. 6, 2015, President Obama cast the bloodshed in San Bernardino as "an act of terrorism designed to kill innocent people" and promised to "hunt down terrorist plotters" anywhere they are. At the same time, he insisted that there would be no renewed ground war using United States blood and treasure in the Middle East as he declared, "We should not be drawn once more into a long and costly ground war in Iraq or Syria."

President Obama's address spurred his hardline conservative rivals to blast his anti-terrorism strategy and argue for a more aggressive approach, marked by a massive ground force engagement in the region. However, President Obama had already augmented the air strike campaign against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria with the deployment of military advisors, and at the start of December 2015, he supplemented these forces with a special operations expeditionary force to fight Islamic State. United States Defense Secretary Ashton Carter outlined the goals the special operations expeditionary force as follows: "These special operators will over time be able to conduct raids, free hostages, gather intelligence and capture ISIL leaders." For the Obama administration, the imperative was to exploit the special operations expertise in a targeted strategy against Islamic State, rather than the conventional warfare.

Iraqi forces make progress against ISIL in Ramadi --

It should be noted that in December 2015, there was some success against Islamic State as Iraqi military forces managed to recapture a district in the city of Ramadi, which has long been under the control of the terror group. The operation in Tamim was carried out by Iraq's Counter-Terrorism Service and was the result of a long process of planning. The capture of Ramadi by Islamic State has been regarded as a notable humiliation for the Iraqi government, making the success in Tamim to be both a strategic and symbolic victory. The rest of the operation in Ramadi promised to be difficult as the city center was very likely booby-trapped with bombs and subject to attacks by sniper fire and suicide bombers.

Nevertheless, by the last week of December 2015, Iraqi forces had successfully liberated a former government compound in Ramadi from Islamic State, effectively returning it to complete government control. The Iraqi forces on the ground were aided by coalition air power, with an eye on releasing the city from the grip of the Islamist terror group.

This strategic victory marked the defeat of Islamic State in Ramadi after several weeks of fierce fighting. Iraqi defense officials said that aerial surveillance suggested that there was no further human activity of the type that would indicate the presence of ISIL fighters. As noted by an Iraqi

Iraq Review 2016 Page 289 of 609 pages Iraq military spokesperson, Sabah al-Numani, in an interview with Reuters News: "The complex is under our complete control, there is no presence whatsoever of [IS] fighters in the complex. By controlling the complex this means that they have been defeated in Ramadi. The next step is to clear pockets that could exist here or there in the city." A joint operations command spokesperson, Yahia Rasool, said in an interview with Reuters News that after Ramadi was fully secured and cleared of any possible pockets of resistance, it would be transferred to the control of Anbar police and local tribes.

While there were some voices disputing the success of Iraqi forces in Ramadi, and warning that remnants of resistance remained in the area, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi took something of a "victory lap" as he erected the national tri-color flag in Ramadi. Prime Minister Haider al- Abadi also said there would be further efforts of this type to come, with the country's defense forces refocusing their efforts on the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. Given the fact that Mosul was a large population center under the control of Islamic State, it promised to be another difficult battle.

By the start of 2016, Iraqi forces, backed by United States-led coalition strikes, targeted extremists in the Iraqi city of Haditha, killing approximately two dozen people.

United States-led coalition targets ISIL leadership and resources --

Meanwhile, the United States led an air offensive against Islamic State in the same period of late December 2015, killing 10 Islamic State leaders. Included in the list of targets were Abdul Qader Hakim and Charaffe al Mouadan, who linked with the terror attacks that took place in Paris a month earlier and left as many as 130 people dead at the hands of ISIL-linked terrorists. United States Army Colonel Steve Warren, a spokesperson for the United States-led campaign against the Islamist terror group, outlined the development, saying, "Over the past month, we've killed ten ISIL leadership figures with targeted air strikes, including several external attack planners, some of whom are linked to the Paris attacks. Others had designs on further attacking the West." Army Colonel Warren was clear in noting that the increased successes against Islamic State was due to the fact that the coalition was making progress in decapitating the terror group's leadership. He said, "Part of those successes is attributable to the fact that the organization is losing its leadership." Still, he acknowledged there remained much work to do as he added, "It's still got fangs."

Also during this period, the United States' air strike effort was aggressively geared towards hitting Islamic State's oil producing resources, which essentially funds the terror group. The air strike campaign, called "Tidal Wave II," was thus concentrating on oil tanker trucks, oil rigs, pumps and storage tanks. The objective was the hit the targets so as to disrupt the oil related activities for a significant period of time, but without either destroying these oil facilities completely or just inflicting minor damage that could be repaired in short order.

In mid-January 2016, United States air power and military might successfully targeted a banking

Iraq Review 2016 Page 290 of 609 pages Iraq facility in Mosul used by ISIL. Two 2,000 pound bombs were reportedly used in the operation, which resulted in the banking compound being decimated in via aerial bombardment. The bank was believed to house millions in funds accrued through oil sales, looting, and extortion. The operation thus deprived Islamic State of the funds used to finance the terror enclave. United States commanders acknowledged that because the bank was located in a civilian area, there was a chance of civilian casualties; however, they opted to move forward with the strike "due to the importance of the target." As noted by Lieutenant Commander Ben Tisdale, a spokesperson for the United States Central Command, said, "The bulk cash distribution site was used by ISIL to distribute money to fund terrorist activities."

By February 2016, United States authorities were reporting that the effort against Islamic State was yielding results. Of note was the fact that the estimate of terrorists in Iraq and Syria was declining, likely due to a stall in the influx of foreign fighters, and with the terror group having to resort to forced conscription and child soldiers. As well, payments to the terrorists by the leadership were being reduced due to financial woes. As noted by United States Army Colonel Steve Warren, "We believe that Daesh is now beginning to lose. We see them in a defensive crouch." Warren also made note of the fact that Islamic State was losing significant portions of territory in Iraq.

Ongoing Violence by ISIL --

Even as these successes were being registered, Islamic State continued to be active. Of note was a suicide bomb attack on the former United States base of Camp Speicher, just outside Tikrit, on Jan. 3, 2016. That attack left a dozen members of the Iraqi security forces dead and at least 20 others injured.

In mid-January 2016, Islamic State claimed responsibility for carrying out an elaborate terror assault in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. This double attack involve suicide bombers targeting the Jawaher shopping complex in a predominantly Shi'ite area of the city, and a car bombing on a commercial street. Together, the two incidences resulted in a death toll of 18, with another 40 people being wounded. A suburb of Baghdad was also struck with an explosion killing seven people. Separately in the town of Muqdadiya, at attack killed almost two dozen people and injured more than 50 others, while a car bombing at a restaurant in Baquba took the lives of three people.

Iraqi forces look to target Islamic State in Mosul --

In February 2016, following their victory in taking back control over Ramadi from Islamic State two months before, Iraqi forces were refocusing their attention on Mosul. That city fell to the terror group in June 2014 and marked a breakthrough moment in Islamic State's campaign to control territory from Syria to Iraq. Now, in the first part of 2016, the Iraqi army was deploying

Iraq Review 2016 Page 291 of 609 pages Iraq troops to a base in northern Iraq, with an eye on retaking control of Mosul from ISIL. There had been earlier plans to retake control over Mosul but they were postponed due to concerns that the battle would be difficult, and that Iraqi forces were not quite ready to achieve their objectives. According to statements from the Iraqi army, the troops had been trained by coalition forces near Baghdad, while officials from the United States-led coalition indicated that the actual schedule for the Mosul offensive operation remained undecided at this time, despite the deployment of troops, as discussed here. The United States-led coalition also noted that any operation to take back Mosul would be difficult and likely would not be finished by the end of the year.

Charges of "genocide" being advanced in regard to Islamic State

United States Secretary of State John Kerry in late February 2016 indicated that considerations were being made as to whether or not to formally accuse Islamic State of genocide. Secretary of State John Kerry made this suggestion during testimony before a House Committee hearing on Capitol Hill in which he said that the Obama administration “will make a decision on this" after evaluations were made regarding the process of making a declaration of genocide against the Islamic State. To this end, Kerry indicated that there had to be a rigorous review of the "legal standards and precedents.” Clearly, if the United States wanted to move forward with such a serious accusation against the terror group, it wanted to do so on solid juridical ground. Of significance was the fact that "crimes against humanity" has been regarded as an easier legal bridge to cross as compared with genocide. As such, there were some administration voices suggesting that the "crimes against humanity" designation might be a preferable path to traverse.

On March 14, 2016, the United States House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly to declare the actions of Islamic States to be genocide. The United States Department of State would thus be compelled to respond with a decision as to whether or not they concur with this designation, or, if another characterization was in order.

Days later on March 17, 2016, United States Secretary of State John Kerry declared that Islamic State -- referred to as "Daesh" -- Whipps Jr., against several ethnic and religious minority groups, including Christians, Yazidis, and Shi'ite Muslims. Secretary of State Kerry said, "The fact is that Daesh kills Christians because they are Christians. Yazidis because they are Yazidis. Shi'ites because they are Shi'ites."

While the declaration could add weight to the argument in favor of more hardline action against Islamic State, the designation was not expected to significantly change United States policy toward the terror group. As noted by State Department spokesperson, Mark Toner: "Acknowledging that genocide or crimes against humanity have taken place in another country would not necessarily result in any particular legal obligation for the United States." Along the same vein, Jon Alterman, the director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in an interview with Reuters News conveyed a similar sentiment. He said,

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"It may strengthen our hand getting other countries to help. It may free us against some (legal) constraints, but the reality is that when you are fighting somebody, you don't need another reason to fight them."

Iraqi forces announce that they have commenced their anticipated operation to recapture Mosul

In late March 2016, the Iraqi military, backed by United State-led coalition air power, commenced a long-anticipated operation to recapture the northern city of Mosul from Islamic State terrorists. The operation began with Iraqi forces retaking control over several villages in the area, although an arduous and complex effort was in the offing to go after Mosul itself. As Iraq's second-largest city, which was lost to Islamic State in 2014, its recapture has been considered a priority in the effort agains the terror group both in terms of battleground strategy and symbolically.

Islamic State continues its campaign of terror with attack at football match

Meanwhile, however, even as the operation was afoot to go after Islamic State in Mosul, the fact of the matter was that the terror group continued to be active in Iraq. Of note was a suicide bombing attack during a football match at the al-Shuhadaa stadium in the city of Iskandariya in Babil province. More than 30 people were killed and scores more injured as a result. Islamic State claimed responsibility.

At the start of April 2016, Iraq was being rocked by no shortage of violent attacks. In one incident, Islamic State claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in the southern city of Basra, which killed five people and injured 10 others. In another attack, the target was a coalition of Shi'ite militias in Mashahdeh to the north of Baghdad, and resulted in the deaths of another five people. At a security checkpoint in northern Baghdad, a bombing left four people dead, while a bombing at a restaurant in Nasiriyah killed three people. In Anbar Province, west of Baghdad, two Iraqi security personnel were killed in a suicide car bombing. To the south of Baghdad, a police officer died as a result of an explosives device to the Baghdad. Meanwhile in Abu Ghraib to the west of Baghdad, mortar rounds struck and killed two individuals.

Islamic State shifts to terror attacks after losing territory

In the spring of 2016, Islamic State was under intensified pressure, faced with significant territorial losses, and thus accelerating its terror attacks. In the first part of 2016, there had been close to 890 attacks, according to reports, which killed more than 2,000 people, As noted by Matthew Henman, the head of IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center, which produced the report, "The group is resorting more and more to mass-casualty violence as it comes under heavy pressure from multiple angles."

Meanwhile, the United States Department of Defense said that Islamic State's territory in Iraq has

Iraq Review 2016 Page 293 of 609 pages Iraq shrunk by about 40 percent and by 20 percent in Syria. Of note was the fact that Iraq's military had success retaking control over the western city of Ramadi and advancing west towards the Syrian border. The northern effort, in the direction of Mosul, was slower but ongoing nonetheless. Across the border in Syria, Russian-backed government forces captured significant territory from Islamic State, including the historic city of Palmyra.

As noted by Henman, the aforementioned head of IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center, "High profile, mass casualty attacks are a tried and tested method of changing the narrative and deflecting attention away from the problems it is facing." He added, "This is done for internal consumption just as much as external."

Note that in May 2016, three car bombings struck the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, and left scores of people dead. The most bloodshed occurred at a car bombing at a market in largely Shi'a Muslim area of Sadr City where more than 60 people died. Two other attacks ensued in the northern district of Kadhimiya and the western area of Jamia, in the west, where the remaining deaths occurred. Islamic State claimed victory.

Also in mid-May 2016, a series of successive bomb blasts in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad left more than 60 people dead. The explosions occurred in three cases in predominantly Shi'a Muslim districts, while a fourth struck an area known for a mixed Shi'a and Sunni population. Blame rested on Islamic State for the carnage.

Note that Syrian cities of Jableh and Tartous on Syria's Mediterranean coast were struck by bombings that killed 150 people and injured more than 200 others at the end of May 2016. Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attacks and made clear that it was targeting members of President Bashar al-Assad's Alawite minority.

Iraqi military targets Falluja in anti-ISIL operation; attacks plague Baghdad

As May 2016 came to a close, Iraqi government forces were battling Islamic State terrorists close to Falluja as part of a long-anticipated effort to regain control over the ISIL stronghold. An Iraqi military spokesperson, Brigadier General Yahya Rasool, speaking on state television, said the operation would involve a "careful" advance. Of note was the fact that Iraqi forces have surrounded Falluja for a year; however, they have refrained from an all-out assault, preferring instead to concentrate on operations against ISIL to the west and north.

Meanwhile, in Baghdad, suicide bombers using both a car and a motorcycle, detonated explosives. A third attack ensued involving a car bomb. In total, more than 20 people were killed and scores more were injured. The attacks targeted the Shi'ite districts of the capital -- Shaab and Sadr City -- thus raising speculation that they were likely carried out by Islamic State. However, a government building in the predominantly Sunni suburb, Tarmiya, to the north of Baghdad, was

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Campaign of Cultural Destruction -

Amidst the intensified effort to vanquish Islamic State, the fact of the matter was that the Islamist Jihadist terror group was still in control of vast swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory, and thus able to continue its disturbing campaign of cultural destruction.

Since 2014, the barbaric terror group has been carrying out this campaign, targeting historic objects and sites deemed to be violations of its strict notions of Islam. In 2014, Islamic State destroyed the tomb of the Prophet Jonah revered by Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike. The tomb of Biblical Daniel was also reported to have been decimated. Several other heritage sites around Mosul, such as the centuries-old shrine to Seth -- believed to be the son of Adam and Eve, the Prophet Jirjis Mosque, and the Awn al-Din Shrine, were also demolished. To the west of Mosul in the town of Tal Afar, several Shi'ite shrines and mosques were destroyed by Islamic State.

Now, in 2015, the latest targets were the cultural treasures of the ancient Assyrian city of Nimrud, dating back 13 centuries. Once the cultural treasures of Nimrud were either destroyed or stolen, Islamic State moved on to the ancient city of Hatra, which was founded by the Parthian Empire over 2,000 years ago. Also in the crosshairs of ISIL were the ancient carvings, statues, and other historic valuables at the museum in Mosul. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) responded by condemning Islamic State, and characterizing the terror group's actions as both "cultural cleansing" and a . UNESCO"s head, Irina Bokova, decried the "deliberate destruction of cultural heritage," which she said should be regarded as "the heritage of the whole of humanity."

Undeterred, by the spring of 2015, Islamic State was advancing on the Syrian town of Tadmur, the location of one of the world's most significant archaeological sites was located. Dating back to the 1st and 2nd centuries of the Common Era when the area was under the rule of the Romans, Palmyra was home to the temple of Baal while also bearing elements of the Roman imprint. Antiquities and historic experts were fearful that Islamic State would target Palmyra in its latest barbaric act of cultural and historic destruction.

The actions of Islamic State were reminiscent of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as well as al-Qaida-aligned Ansar Dine in Mali in 2012. Both extremist Islamist enclaves have been aligned with the terror enclave, al-Qaida, and were responsible for cultural and historic destruction in these two countries, for the purpose of obliterating any monuments they viewed as insufficiently Islamic. Often, such holy sites are declared by Islamist zealots to be places of "apostasy" instead of prayer, thus resulting in their destruction. Clearly, Islamic State was yet another Islamist terror group dedicated to the task of decimating some of the world's greatest archaeological artifacts and historic sites.

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It should be noted that Islamic State retained some mercenary instincts, looting several artifacts, presumably to be sold to blackmarket antiquities merchants to raise money to fund the activities of the terror group.

Editor's Note on Islamic State

Islamic State (alternatively referred to as ISIL and ISIS), has gained notoriety for its particularly brutal tactics, ranging from the abductions and mass murders of religious and ethnic minorities, which they view as apostates, and their beheadings of soldiers and journalists. The group has said that it aims to establish an Islamic "caliphate" that would be ruled according to Islamic Shari'a law. Its ambitions are Jihadists and not simply limited to Iraq and Syria; in fact, ISIL has made clear that it intends to extent its control to Jordan and Lebanon. A satellite venue of Islamic State has opened up in post-Arab Spring Libya as extremists have taken advantage of the power chasm there. Another ambition for ISIL is the cause of Palestine. Adherents are required to swear their allegiance to the ISIL leader, Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, known in the public sphere as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Baghdadi's appeal has, to some degree, been fed by his mystery as he has only rarely been seen in public.

In terms of legacy, ISIL is actually an outgrowth of al-Qaida in Iraq, led by the Jordanian-born terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. After Zarqawi's death in 2006, al-Qaida in Iraq transposed itself into Islamic State in Iraq. Although it was weakened by the United States-led "surge" in Iraq to deal with the Sunni insurgency, and which included the involvement of Sahwa (Awakening) councils by Sunni Arab tribesmen , Islamic State in Iraq experienced a resurgence in 2010 under Baghdadi. Once Syria was embroiled in a civil war in 2011, Islamic State was able to establish a foothold in Syria, essentially uprooting other extremist and terror groups, such as al-Nusra Front and al-Qaida, by 2013, and ultimately holding control over wide swaths of territory from Syria to Iraq as of 2014, and extending to Libya as of 2015. ISIL's ability to take over Anbar province and then the northern city of Mosul in Iraq in 2014 were key developments in the entrenchment of ISIL in the region.

ISIL's genocidal practices have been characterized most acutely by their infamous and gruesome beheadings of foreign nationals and apostates, but have also included other revolting and repugnant means of execution, such as crucifixions, immolations, and mass shootings. These bloodthirsty techniques of terror and tactics of murder, which are professionally videotaped and disseminated for maximum effect, have been so ghastly that other militant Islamist movements have sought to distance themselves from ISIL. Indeed, the Yemeni wing of al-Qaida (known as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula) went so far as to note that beheadings, and the videotaping of decapitations, were to be regarded as un-Islamic. Meanwhile, Lebanon-based Hezbollah, which has been deemed to be a terrorist organization by some countries of the West, made clear that ISIL's tactics of terror were inhumane. These stances by al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and Hezbollah suggested that

Iraq Review 2016 Page 296 of 609 pages Iraq even among extremists, militants, Jihadists, and Islamist terrorists, there remained some degree of a "code" that ISIL had apparently violated.

It should be noted that ISIL's barbarism and brutality has had a double effect. First, the brutality appears to have functioned as a recruitment tool for other murderous Islamist extremists across the world. To date, it is not known how many ISIL fighters exist in the Middle East although estimates suggest that as many as 30,000 Islamic State fighters are in the Iraq-Syria region. These fighters come from across the world although, as Libya has slipped further into failed state status, it is believed to be the largest single source of terrorists to the cause. That being said, ISIL has attracted disgruntled youth from Europe and the Americas as well, with recruits often traveling through Turkey to enter ISIL-controlled territory. Second, even as ISIL's barbarism has been a recruitment tool, it has simultaneously stimulated the reluctant engagement of a United States-led international coalition in an anti-Islamic State mission.

Socio-economic strife is a popular -- and often facile -- explanation for extremism and activism. It certainly applies to the roots of the Arab Spring and specifically the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, for example, but does not apply to ISIL. Yes, the power chasms created in the wake of the Arab Spring -- specifically in Libya but also in other countries in the region -- certainly created the conditions for recruitment. But creating fertile ground for recruitment still does not address the reason why people would be attracted to ISIL.

Likewise, the call for more education may have resonance in countries where young people are educated only about Islam in Madrassas, or in impoverished regions where people simply have no access to education at all. But these cases do not properly apply to ISIL recruits and sympathizers. The problem is not a lack of education -- most of these recruits are computer savvy and were recruited via the Internet while using their own laptops or in Internet cafes. Indeed, many youth ISIL recruits were from middle class or even wealthy families -- certainly not backgrounds without marked by socio-economic hardship.

Of note was the revelation that the so-called "Jihadi John" shown in the gruesome beheading propaganda videos used by Islamic State was actually a well-educated and well-heeled Kuwaiti- born man, Mohammed Emwazi, who later settled in the United Kingdom where he graduated from the University of Westminster with a degree in computer programming. The theory that extremists, such as Emwazi, would be drawn to terrorism as a result of economic strife or due to a lack of education, is simply inoperable in such cases. (Note that Emwazi was killed in a United States' drone strike in November 2015.)

It should also be noted that recruits and sympathizers to the Islamic State cause are also not necessarily from strict Muslim families; indeed, there were reports that many ISIL recruits were actually fairly new to hardline Islam with translations of instructional introductory texts on Islam being a particularly popular purchase for them.

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It would seem that many recruits to ISIL appeared to be the same type of profile as vulnerable youth likely to join gang or cults, susceptible to brainwashing, and thus excellent candidates for adherence to Islamic State's religious ideology.

That being said, to properly understand the attraction of ISIL, it is imperative to address the ideological appeal of hardline and regressive Islam, which embraces barbaric practices of execution, such as beheadings and crucifixion, while integrating socio-governing practices such as conquest and the enslavement of women. Well-meaning public figures have cast these tactics of terror and abuses of humanity as "perversions" of Islam. Left unsaid is that fact that they are actually clear dictates that come from historic Islam, and which have been embraced by ISIL as the "true" path to salvation, irrespective of the fact that their practices are a violation of modern understandings of human rights.

Indeed, Islamic State must be an apocalyptic and millenarian death cult, with a strict Medieval interpretation of Islam at the core and a gruesome theatre of murder as the main attraction for persons with a sense of psychopathic piety. Relying on apocalyptic prophesies of Islamic Jihadist ascendancy and an ultimate "Day of Judgement," the expansion of Islamic State territory in Iraq and Syria, and even Libya, was being understood as a sign of "victory." Stated differently, the rapid rate of expansion (read: victory) by ISIL in Iraq and Syria in 2014 functioned to empower sympathizers and recruits to the ISIL cause.

Given this paradigm, the only prescription for defeat would be the disruption of what looks like an unstoppable juggernaut by ISIL. That being said, the texture of that defeat would have to be carefully -- and globally -- crafted since ISIL militants believe in the apocalyptic prophesy of a "final" confrontation with the West. Rather than facilitating that end, international stakeholders have noted that the preferable path would be to target this Islamist Jihadist terror entity as part of a global coalition. With United States-led air strikes only going so far to destroy ISIL, there would ultimately be a need for ground forces. An effective strategy against ISIL would be one that looks to Arab "boots on the ground" rather than feeding the hunger by Islamists for a Crusades-style war with the West. It was to be seen if the attacks by Islamic State on a Russian jetliner and in Paris, which yielded hundreds of deaths, would change this calculus.

It should be noted that Islamic State is sometimes pejoratively referred to as "Daesh." Islamic State rejects this term of reference, which sounds roughly in Arabic to the words "Daes" which means "one who crushes something underfoot" and "Dahes" which means "one who sows discord." For precisely these negative associations, the enemies of Islamic State have increasingly used the term "Daesh" to describe the terror group in defiance.

Special Note on Government in Iraq

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Iraqi parliament approves significant overhaul of government; executive government structure and judicial system to be reformed --

In August 2015, the Iraqi parliament approved a significant overhaul of the government, effectively reforming the structure of the government, ameliorating the judicial system, reducing bureacracy and corruption, in addition to expanding the powers of the prime minister. These moves have been broadly applauded across partisan and secterian lines in Iraq, as well as being lauded internationally.

Under the comprehensive overhaul, the provisions for multiple vice presidents and deputy prime ministers would be eliminated. This layer of executive posts had been created to offer political influence to the main ethnic and sectarian groups in Iraq -- Shi'ites, Sunnis, and Kurds -- and thus build a more inclusive government in a country with complex ethno-sectarian divisions. However, in the years after the invasion and occupation of Iraq, these posts had actually been transposed into arenas for patronage and corruption.

The move would effectively remove former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki from the reins of power since he had continued to hold office as vice president even after he was forced to step down from power as the head of government in 2014 when the terror group, Islamic State, gained control over wide swaths of the country in the escalating ethno-sectarian crisis. Sidelining Maliki held significant political symbolism as he has been largely been blamed for fomenting the ethno- sectarian tension that gave rise to Sunni support for Islamic State in 2014. Symbolism aside, a parliamentary panel was now calling for Maliki to face trial over the fall of the city of Mosul to Islamic State, making clear that there would be no shortage of political consequences for Maliki in the offing.

In addition to Maliki being stripped from executive power entirely by the elimination of the vice president role, the hand of the new head of government, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, would be strengthened. Of note would be the prime minister's new power to fire various provincial and regional officials. But Prime Minister Abadi started the work of sacking officials within his own cabinet and from among his own aides. In this way, he was acting in good faith on his commitment to streamline cabinet ministries and reduce the country's bureacracy.

Prime Minister Abadi was also signaling his interest in improving stewardship of Iraq's defense forces by approving court martial procedures that would apply to military commanders and officers who notoriously abandoned their posts during the assault of Islamic State on the city of Ramadi earlier in 2015. The fall of Ramadi in 2015 -- almost a year Islamic State began its assault of aggression in Iraq -- was regarded as a devastating blow to the anti-terrorism effort, and stalled any and all discussion of an Iraqi campaign to regain control over the strategic city of Mosul that was lost a year prior. This move to force members of the Iraqi forces to be accountable for their

Iraq Review 2016 Page 299 of 609 pages Iraq actions, which included allowing a massive cache of weapons and military equipment to fall into the hands of Islamic State terrorists -- was regarded as a significant shift in Iraqi political dynamics.

Other key changes involved the amelioration of the judicial system, with an eye on targeting manifold corruption. Prime MInister Abadi acknowledged that tackling corruption would be difficult. In a nationally-broadcast speech, he anticipated opposition, saying, "The corrupt will not sit idly by. Those with interests and privileges will defend their interests and privileges. Some of them will even fight for them. They will attempt to sabotage every step we take towards it." He would be helped in his reformist task by support from Iraq's most powerful Shi'a cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who gave his blessing to the reforms. To this end, Grand Ayatollah Ali al- Sistani urged Prime Minister Abadi to "strike with an iron fist" against corruption.

Note that by the end of August 2015, Baghdad and southern Iraq were subject to no shortage of demonstrations as people took to the streets to demand better public services, including improving electrical power supplies. But the demonstrations were also supportive of Prime Minister Abadi's reform agenda as people also demanded greater accountability for corrupt politicians.

Supporters of Shi'ite Muslim cleric Moqtada al-Sadr storm parliament inside Baghdad's Green Zone --

At the end of April 2016, Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone was rocked by turmoil. At issue was the fact that supporters of Shi'ite Muslim cleric Moqtada al-Sadr stormed and occupied the parliament inside the capital's Green Zone. Critics pointed to security failures as the protesters were able to breach the fortified zone. While the Green Zone was placed under lockdown, security forces fired teargas and bullets into the air to try to disperse crowds. As well, the capital city was placed under a state of emergency.

It should be noted that the Sadrist protesters were motivated by failures to implement reforms and delays in approving a new cabinet. They were also railing against corruption in government.

For his part, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi called for the arrests of the individuals who had stormed the parliament. He also said that the political turbulence would serve only to help Islamic State, which still held sway over portions of northern and western Iraq. In addition, the prime minister warned that the terror group could take advantage of the turmoil to step up their attacks.

Protesters vacated the parliament and relocated to Celebration Square in the Green Zone on May 1, 2016. By May 2, 2016, Baghdad's Green Zone was returning to normal; however, the uprising by the Sadrists evoked questions of internal conflict among Iraq's dominant Shi'ite population. Indeed, there were concerns over confrontations between Shi'a brigades which were formed after the Iraqi army collapsed in mid-2014. The general consensus, though,was that there were

Iraq Review 2016 Page 300 of 609 pages Iraq divisions among Shi'a political parties, which were manifesting ahead of elections expected to be held in 2018.

While the Green Zone episode was ensuing, so too was violence at the hands of extremists. On May 1, 2016, Sunni extremists carried out a suicide bomb attack against Shi'ite pilgrims in a southeastern Baghdad suburb, killing almost 20 people. On May 3, 2016, Baghdad was struck by three bombs at the hands of Islamic State. At least 14 people, including Shi'ite Muslim pilgrims, were among the dead.

-- June 2016

Written by Dr. Denise Coleman, Editor in Chief, www.countrywatch.com

General sources used in all Country Reviews listed in Bibliography.

General supplementary sources: BBC, CNN, NPR, Associated Press, Reuters, the Globe and Mail, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, ABC News, CBS News, NBC News, MSNBC, , Independent, Telegraph, Guardian, Le Monde, Agence France Presse, The Nation, Stratfor, the Economist, the Financial Times, Military Times.

Specific sources cited or referenced above: see Cato Institute's "Why the United States Should Not Attack Iraq" by Ivan Eland and Bernard Gourley; Cato Institute's The Case Against A War With Iraq" by William Niskanen; Cato Institute's "Faulty Justifications for a War Against Iraq" by Ted Galen; among other Cato Institute commentaries. See also "An Unnecessary War" by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt in Foreign Policy; see "Some Evidence Called Fake" by Joby Warrick in Washington Post; see "UK Nuclear Evidence a Fake" by Ion Trainor in the Guardian; see "Blix Likely to Order Destruction of Missiles" by Edith Lederer in the Associated Press. See various UNSCOM/IAEA records; see "Terrorism Experts Doubt bin Laden-Baghdad Link" by Timothy Appleby in the Globe and Mail; see also various articles in news sources listed above. See United States Department of State: Domino Theory; see United Nations High Commission for Refugees; see Reporters Without Borders, see Democracy Now! (interview between Amy Goodman and Les Roberts); Der Spiegel, New York Times.

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Political Risk Index

Political Risk Index

The Political Risk Index is a proprietary index measuring the level of risk posed to governments, corporations, and investors, based on a myriad of political and economic factors. The Political Risk Index is calculated using an established methodology by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on varied criteria* including the following consideration: political stability, political representation, democratic accountability, freedom of expression, security and crime, risk of conflict, human development, jurisprudence and regulatory transparency, economic risk, foreign investment considerations, possibility of sovereign default, and corruption. Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the highest political risk, while a score of 10 marks the lowest political risk. Stated differently, countries with the lowest scores pose the greatest political risk. A score of 0 marks the most dire level of political risk and an ultimate nadir, while a score of 10 marks the lowest possible level of political risk, according to this proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries contain complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to greater risk.

Country Assessment

Afghanistan 2

Albania 4

Algeria 6

Andorra 9

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Angola 4

Antigua 8

Argentina 4

Armenia 4-5

Australia 9.5

Austria 9.5

Azerbaijan 4

Bahamas 8.5

Bahrain 6

Bangladesh 3.5

Barbados 8.5-9

Belarus 3

Belgium 9

Belize 8

Benin 5

Bhutan 5

Bolivia 5

Bosnia-Herzegovina 4

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Botswana 7

Brazil 7

Brunei 7

Bulgaria 6

Burkina Faso 4

Burma (Myanmar) 4.5

Burundi 3

Cambodia 4

Cameroon 5

Canada 9.5

Cape Verde 6

Central African Republic 3

Chad 4

Chile 9

China 7

China: Hong Kong 8

China: Taiwan 8

Colombia 7

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Comoros 5

Congo DRC 3

Congo RC 4

Costa Rica 8

Cote d'Ivoire 4.5

Croatia 7

Cuba 4-4.5

Cyprus 5

Czech Republic 8

Denmark 9.5

Djibouti 4.5

Dominica 7

Dominican Republic 6

East Timor 5

Ecuador 6

Egypt 5

El Salvador 7

Equatorial Guinea 4

Iraq Review 2016 Page 305 of 609 pages Iraq

Eritrea 3

Estonia 8

Ethiopia 4

Fiji 5

Finland 9

Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia 5

France 9

Gabon 5

Gambia 4

Georgia 5

Germany 9.5

Ghana 6

Greece 4.5-5

Grenada 8

Guatemala 6

Guinea 3.5

Guinea-Bissau 3.5

Guyana 4.5

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Haiti 3.5

Holy See (Vatican) 9

Honduras 4.5-5

Hungary 7

Iceland 8.5-9

India 7.5-8

Indonesia 6

Iran 3.5-4

Iraq 2.5-3

Ireland 8-8.5

Israel 8

Italy 7.5

Jamaica 6.5-7

Japan 9

Jordan 6.5

Kazakhstan 6

Kenya 5

Kiribati 7

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Korea, North 1

Korea, South 8

Kosovo 4

Kuwait 7

Kyrgyzstan 4.5

Laos 4.5

Latvia 7

Lebanon 5.5

Lesotho 6

Liberia 3.5

Libya 2

Liechtenstein 9

Lithuania 7.5

Luxembourg 9

Madagascar 4

Malawi 4

Malaysia 8

Maldives 4.5

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Mali 4

Malta 8

Marshall Islands 6

Mauritania 4.5-5

Mauritius 7

Mexico 6.5

Micronesia 7

Moldova 5

Monaco 9

Mongolia 5

Montenegro 6

Morocco 6.5

Mozambique 4.5-5

Namibia 6.5-7

Nauru 6

Nepal 4

Netherlands 9.5

New Zealand 9.5

Iraq Review 2016 Page 309 of 609 pages Iraq

Nicaragua 5

Niger 4

Nigeria 4.5

Norway 9.5

Oman 7

Pakistan 3.5

Palau 7

Panama 7.5

Papua New Guinea 5

Paraguay 6.5-7

Peru 7

Philippines 6

Poland 8

Portugal 7.5

Qatar 7.5

Romania 5.5

Russia 5.5

Rwanda 5

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Saint Kitts and Nevis 8

Saint Lucia 8

Saint Vincent and Grenadines 8

Samoa 7

San Marino 9

Sao Tome and Principe 5.5

Saudi Arabia 6

Senegal 6

Serbia 5

Seychelles 7

Sierra Leone 4.5

Singapore 9

Slovak Republic (Slovakia) 8

Slovenia 8

Solomon Islands 6

Somalia 2

South Africa 7

Spain 7.5

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Sri Lanka 5

Sudan 3.5

Suriname 5

Swaziland 5

Sweden 9.5

Switzerland 9.5

Syria 2

Tajikistan 4.5

Tanzania 6

Thailand 6.5

Togo 4.5

Tonga 7

Trinidad and Tobago 8

Tunisia 6

Turkey 7

Turkmenistan 4.5

Tuvalu 7

Uganda 6

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Ukraine 3.5-4

United Arab Emirates 7

United Kingdom 9

United States 9.5

Uruguay 8

Uzbekistan 4

Vanuatu 7

Venezuela 4

Vietnam 5

Yemen 3

Zambia 4.5

Zimbabwe 3

*Methodology

The Political Risk Index is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the combined scoring of varied criteria as follows --

1. political stability (record of peaceful transitions of power, ability of government to stay in office and carry out policies as a result of productive executive-legislative relationship, perhaps with popular support vis a vis risk of government collapse)

2. political representation (right of suffrage, free and fair elections, multi-party participation, and influence of foreign powers)

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3. democratic accountability (record of respect for political rights, human rights, and civil liberties, backed by constitutional protections)

4. freedom of expression (media freedom and freedom of expression, right to dissent or express political opposition, backed by constitutional protections)

5. security and crime (the degree to which a country has security mechanisms that ensures safety of citizens and ensures law and order, without resorting to extra-judicial measures)

6. risk of conflict (the presence of conflict; record of coups or civil disturbances; threat of war; threats posed by internal or external tensions; threat or record of terrorism or insurgencies)

7. human development (quality of life; access to education; socio-economic conditions; systemic concern for the status of women and children)

8. jurisprudence and regulatory transparency (the impartiality of the legal system, the degree of transparency within the regulatory system of a country and the durability of that structure)

9. economic conditions (economic stability, investment climate, degree of nationalization of industries, property rights, labor force development)

10. corruption ( the degree of corruption in a country and/or efforts by the government to address graft and other irregularities)

Editor's Note:

As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -- has affected the ratings for several countries across the world.

North Korea, Afghanistan, Somalia, and -- retain their low rankings.

Several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. The worst downgrades affected Syria where civil war is at play, along with the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamist terrorists who have also seized control over part of Syrian territory. Iraq has been further downgraded due to the rampage of Islamist terrorists and their takeover of wide swaths of Iraqi territory. Libya has also been downgraded further due to its slippage into failed state status; at issue in Libya have been an ongoing power struggle between rival militias. Yemen continues to hold steady with a poor ranking due to continued unrest at the hands of Houthi rebels,

Iraq Review 2016 Page 314 of 609 pages Iraq secessinionists, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and Islamic State. Its landscape has been further complicated by the fact that it is now the site of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Conversely, Tunisia and Egypt have seen slight upgrades as these countries stabilize.

In Africa, Zimbabwe continues to be one of the bleak spots of the world with the Mugabe regime effectively destroying the country's once vibrant economy, and miring Zimbabwe with an exceedingly high rate of inflation, debilitating unemployment, devolving public services, and critical food shortages; rampant crime and political oppression round out the landscape. Somalia also sports a poor ranking due to the continuing influence of the terror group, al-Shabab, which was not operating across the border in Kenya. On the upside, Nigeria, which was ineffectively dealing with the threat posed by the terror group, Boko Haram, was making some strides on the national security front with its new president at the helm. Mali was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. But the Central African Republic was downgraded due to the takeover of the government by Muslim Seleka rebels and a continued state of lawlessness in that country. South Sudan -- the world's newest nation state -- has not been officially included in this assessment; however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and economic challenges. Burkina Faso, Burundi and Guinea have been downgraded due to political unrest, with Guinea also having to deal with the burgeoning Ebola crisis.

In Europe, Ukraine was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. Russia was also implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Strains on the infrastructure of southern and eastern European countries, such as Serbia, Croatia, and Hungary, due to an influx of refugees was expected to pose social and economic challenges, and slight downgrades were made accordingly. So too, a corruption crisis for the Romanian prime minister has affected the ranking of that country. Meanwhile, the rankings for Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy were maintained due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation, was earlier downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, no further downgrade was added since the country was able to successfully forge a bailout rescue deal with creditor institutions. Cyprus' exposure to Greek banks yielded a downgrade in its case.

In Asia, Nepal was downgraded in response to continuous political instability and a constitutional crisis that prevails well after landmark elections were held. Both India and China retain their rankings; India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic representation and accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in Pakistan resulted in a downgrade for this country's already low rating. Meanwhile, Singapore retained its strong rankings due to its continued effective stewardship of the economy and political stability.

In the Americas, ongoing political and economic woes, as well as crime and corruption have

Iraq Review 2016 Page 315 of 609 pages Iraq affected the rankings for Mexico , Guatemala, and Brazil. Argentina was downgraded due to its default on debt following the failure of talks with bond holders. Venezuela was downgraded due to its mix of market unfriendly policies and political oppression. For the moment, the United States maintains a strong ranking along with Canada, and most of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean; however, a renewed debt ceiling crisis could cause the United States to be downgraded in a future edition. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the Unitd States.

Source:

Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

2015

Political Stability

Political Stability

The Political Stability Index is a proprietary index measuring a country's level of stability, standard of good governance, record of constitutional order, respect for human rights, and overall strength of democracy. The Political StabilityIndex is calculated using an established methodology* by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's record of peaceful transitions of power, ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk credible risks of government collapse. Threats include coups, domestic violence and instability, terrorism, etc. This index measures the dynamic between the quality of a country's government and the threats that can compromise and undermine stability. Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the lowest level of political stability and an ultimate nadir, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of political stability possible, according to this proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries contain complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to greater stability.

Country Assessment

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Afghanistan 2

Albania 4.5-5

Algeria 5

Andorra 9.5

Angola 4.5-5

Antigua 8.5-9

Argentina 7

Armenia 5.5

Australia 9.5

Austria 9.5

Azerbaijan 5

Bahamas 9

Bahrain 6

Bangladesh 4.5

Barbados 9

Belarus 4

Belgium 9

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Belize 8

Benin 5

Bhutan 5

Bolivia 6

Bosnia-Herzegovina 5

Botswana 8.5

Brazil 7

Brunei 8

Bulgaria 7.5

Burkina Faso 4

Burma (Myanmar) 4.5

Burundi 4

Cambodia 4.5-5

Cameroon 6

Canada 9.5

Cape Verde 6

Central African Republic 3

Chad 4.5

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Chile 9

China 7

China: Hong Kong 8

China: Taiwan 8

Colombia 7.5

Comoros 5

Congo DRC 3

Congo RC 5

Costa Rica 9.5

Cote d'Ivoire 3.5

Croatia 7.5

Cuba 4.5

Cyprus 8

Czech Republic 8.5

Denmark 9.5

Djibouti 5

Dominica 8.5

Dominican Republic 7

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East Timor 5

Ecuador 7

Egypt 4.5-5

El Salvador 7.5-8

Equatorial Guinea 4.5

Eritrea 4

Estonia 9

Ethiopia 4.5

Fiji 5

Finland 9

Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia 6.5

France 9

Gabon 5

Gambia 4.5

Georgia 5

Germany 9.5

Ghana 7

Greece 6

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Grenada 8.5

Guatemala 7

Guinea 3.5-4

Guinea-Bissau 4

Guyana 6

Haiti 3.5-4

Holy See (Vatican) 9.5

Honduras 6

Hungary 7.5

Iceland 9

India 8

Indonesia 7

Iran 3.5

Iraq 2.5

Ireland 9.5

Israel 8

Italy 8.5-9

Jamaica 8

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Japan 9

Jordan 6

Kazakhstan 6

Kenya 5

Kiribati 8

Korea, North 2

Korea, South 8.5

Kosovo 5.5

Kuwait 7

Kyrgyzstan 5

Laos 5

Latvia 8.5

Lebanon 5.5

Lesotho 5

Liberia 3.5-4

Libya 2

Liechtenstein 9

Lithuania 9

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Luxembourg 9.5

Madagascar 4

Malawi 5

Malaysia 8

Maldives 4.5-5

Mali 4.5-5

Malta 9

Marshall Islands 8

Mauritania 6

Mauritius 8

Mexico 6.5-7

Micronesia 8

Moldova 5.5

Monaco 9.5

Mongolia 6.5-7

Montenegro 8

Morocco 7

Mozambique 5

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Namibia 8.5

Nauru 8

Nepal 4.5

Netherlands 9.5

New Zealand 9.5

Nicaragua 6

Niger 4.5

Nigeria 4.5

Norway 9.5

Oman 7

Pakistan 3

Palau 8

Panama 8.5

Papua New Guinea 6

Paraguay 8

Peru 7.5

Philippines 6

Poland 9

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Portugal 9

Qatar 7

Romania 7

Russia 6

Rwanda 5

Saint Kitts and Nevis 9

Saint Lucia 9

Saint Vincent and Grenadines 9

Samoa 8

San Marino 9.5

Sao Tome and Principe 7

Saudi Arabia 6

Senegal 7.5

Serbia 6.5

Seychelles 8

Sierra Leone 4.5

Singapore 9.5

Slovak Republic (Slovakia) 8.5

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Slovenia 9

Solomon Islands 6.5-7

Somalia 2

South Africa 7.5

Spain 9

Sri Lanka 5

Sudan 3

Suriname 5

Swaziland 5

Sweden 9.5

Switzerland 9.5

Syria 2

Tajikistan 4.5

Tanzania 6

Thailand 6

Togo 5

Tonga 7

Trinidad and Tobago 8

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Tunisia 5

Turkey 7.5

Turkmenistan 5

Tuvalu 8.5

Uganda 6

Ukraine 3.5-4

United Arab Emirates 7

United Kingdom 9

United States 9

Uruguay 8.5

Uzbekistan 4

Vanuatu 8.5

Venezuela 4.5-5

Vietnam 4.5

Yemen 2.5

Zambia 5

Zimbabwe 3

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*Methodology

The Political Stability Index is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the combined scoring of varied criteria as follows --

1. record of peaceful transitions of power ( free and fair elections; adherence to political accords)

2. record of democratic representation, presence of instruments of democracy; systemic accountability

3. respect for human rights; respect for civil rights

4. strength of the system of jurisprudence, adherence to constitutional order, and good governance

5. ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk credible risks of government collapse (i.e. government stability versus a country being deemed "ungovernable")

6. threat of coups, insurgencies, and insurrection

7. level of unchecked crime and corruption

8. risk of terrorism and other threats to national security

9. relationship with regional powers and international community; record of bilateral or multilateral cooperation

10. degree of economic strife (i.e. economic and financial challenges)

Editor's Note:

As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -- has affected the ratings for several countries across the world. The usual suspects -- North Korea, Afghanistan, and Somalia -- retain their low rankings. The reclusive and ultra-dictatorial North Korean regime, which has terrified the world with its nuclear threats, has exhibited internal instability. Of note was a cut-throat purge of hundreds of high ranking officials deemed to be a threat to Kim Jung-un. Despite their attempts to recover from years of lawlessness, war, and warlordism, both Afghanistan and Somalia continue to be beset by terrorism and turmoil. In Afghanistan, while international forces have seen success in the effort against the terror group, al- Qaida, the other Islamist extremist group, the Taliban, continues to carry out a vicious insurgency using terrorism. In Somalia, while the government attempts to do the nation's business, the terror

Iraq Review 2016 Page 328 of 609 pages Iraq group, al-Shabab continues to make its presence known not only in Somalia, but across the border into Kenya with devastating results/ Also in this category is Iraq, which continues to be rocked by horrific violence and terrorism at the hands of Islamic State, which has taken over wide swaths of Iraqi territory.

Syria, Libya, and Yemen have been added to this unfortunate echelon of the world's most politically unstable countries. Syria has been mired by the twin hazards of 1. a civil war as rebels oppose the Assad regime; and 2. the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamic State, which also seized control over vast portions of Syrian territory. Meanwhile, the post-Qaddhafi landscape of Libya has devolved into chaos as rival militias battle for control -- the elected government of the country notwithstanding. Rounding out this grim triad is Yemen, which was dealing with a Houthi rebellion, secesionists in the south, as well as the threat of terrorism from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula as well as Islamic State, while also being the site of a proxy war between Shi'a Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. All three of these countries have stabilized in recent years and have been upgraded accordingly. In Bahrain, the landscape had calmed. In Egypt, the secular military-backed government has generated criticism for its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood; however, the country had ratified the presidency via democratic elections and were on track to hold parliamentary elections as the country moved along the path of democratization. Perhaps the most impressive story was coming out of Tunisia -- the country whose Jasmine Revolution sparked the entire Arab Spring -- and where after a few years of strife, a new progressive constitution was passed into law and a secular government had been elected to power. Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain have seen slight upgrades as these countries stabilize.

In Africa, the Central African Republic was downgraded the previous year due to the takeover of the government by Muslim Seleka rebels. Although the country has been trying to emerge from this crisis, the fact of the matter was that it was difficult to halt the precipitous decline into lawlessness in that country. Zimbabwe has maintained its consistently poor ranking due to the dictatorial regime of Mugabe, who continues to hold a tight grip on power, intimidates the opposition, squashes dissent, and oppresses the white farmer population of the country. Moving in a slightly improved direction is Nigeria, which has sported abysmal ratings due to the government's fecklessness in dealing with the threat posed by the Islamist terror group, Boko Haram. Under its newly-elected government, there appears to be more of a concerted effort to make national security a priority action item. Mali was also slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. Political instability has visited Burkina Faso and Burundi as the leaders of those countries attempted to side-step constitutional limits to hold onto power. In Burundi, an attempted

Iraq Review 2016 Page 329 of 609 pages Iraq coup ensued but quelled, and the president won a (questionable) new term in office; unrest has since punctuated the landscape. In Burkina Faso, the political climate has turned stormy as a result of a successful coup that ended the rule of the president, and then a putsch against the transitional government. These two African countries have been downgraded as a result.

It should be noted that the African country of South Sudan -- the world's newest nation state -- has not been officially included in this assessment; however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and economic challenges. Guinea has endured poor rankings throughout, but was slightly downgraded further over fears of social unrest and the Ebola heath crisis.

In Europe, Ukraine was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. Russia was also implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Serbia and Albania were slightly downgraded due to eruptions of unrest, while Romania was slightly downgraded on the basis of corruption charges against the prime minister. Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy were downgraded due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation, was downgraded the previous year due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, the country successfully forged a rescue deal with international creditors and stayed within the Euro zone. Greek voters rewarded the hitherto unknown upstart party at the polls for these efforts. As a result, Greece was actually upgraded slightly as it proved to the world that it could endure the political and economic storms. Meanwhile, Germany, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries continue to post impressive ranking consistent with these countries' strong records of democracy, freedom, and peaceful transfers of power.

In Asia, Nepal was downgraded in response to continuous political instability well after landmark elections that prevails today. Cambodia was very slighly downgraded due to post-election instability that has resulted in occasional flares of violence. Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in Japan in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the resulting nuclear crisis -- and the appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain therein, this country has only slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to be transient, the government remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both India and China retain their rankings; India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic representation and accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in Pakistan resulted in a downgrade for this country's already low rating.

In the Americas, Haiti retained its downgraded status due to ongoing political and economic woes. Mexico was downgraded due to its alarming rate of crime. Guatemala was downgraded due to charges of corruption, the arrest of the president, and uncertainty over the outcome of elections. Brazil was downgraded due to the corruption charges erupting on the political landscape, the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 330 of 609 pages Iraq stalling of the economy, and the increasingly loud calls for the impeachment of President Rousseff. Argentina was downgraded due to its default on debt following the failure of talks with bond holders. Venezuela was downgraded due to the fact that the country's post-Chavez government is every bit as autocratic and nationalistic, but even more inclined to oppress its political opponents. Colombia was upgraded slightly due to efforts aimed at securing a peace deal with the FARC insurgents. A small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the Unitd States. Meanwhile, the United States, Canada, Costa Rica, Panama, and most of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean retain their strong rankings due to their records of stability and peaceful transfers of power.

In the Pacific, Fiji was upgraded due to its return to constitutional order and democracy with the holding of the first elections in eight years.

In Oceania, Maldives has been slightly downgraded due to the government's continued and rather relentless persecution of the country's former pro-democracy leader - former President Nasheed.

Source:

Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

2015

Freedom Rankings

Freedom Rankings

Freedom in the World

Editor's Note: This ranking by Freedom House quantifies political freedom and civil liberties into a single combined index on each sovereign country's level of freedom and liberty. The initials "PR"

Iraq Review 2016 Page 331 of 609 pages Iraq and "CL" stand for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, respectively. The number 1 represents the most free countries and the number 7 represents the least free. Several countries fall in the continuum in between. The freedom ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results.

Trend Country PR CL Freedom Status Arrow

Afghanistan 6 ? 6 Not Free

Albania* 3 3 Partly Free

Algeria 6 5 Not Free

Andorra* 1 1 Free

Angola 6 5 Not Free

Antigua and Barbuda* 3 ? 2 Free

Argentina* 2 2 Free

Armenia 6 4 Partly Free

Australia* 1 1 Free

Austria* 1 1 Free

Azerbaijan 6 5 Not Free

Bahamas* 1 1 Free

Bahrain 6 ? 5 Not Free ?

Bangladesh* 3 ? 4 Partly Free

Iraq Review 2016 Page 332 of 609 pages Iraq

Barbados* 1 1 Free

Belarus 7 6 Not Free

Belgium* 1 1 Free

Belize* 1 2 Free

Benin* 2 2 Free

Bhutan 4 5 Partly Free

Bolivia* 3 3 Partly Free

Bosnia-Herzegovina* 4 3 Partly Free

Botswana* 3 ? 2 Free

Brazil* 2 2 Free

Brunei 6 5 Not Free

Bulgaria* 2 2 Free

Burkina Faso 5 3 Partly Free

Burma 7 7 Not Free

Burundi* 4 5 Partly Free ⇑

Cambodia 6 5 Not Free ⇓

Cameroon 6 6 Not Free

Canada* 1 1 Free

Iraq Review 2016 Page 333 of 609 pages Iraq

Cape Verde* 1 1 Free

Central African Republic 5 5 Partly Free

Chad 7 6 Not Free

Chile* 1 1 Free

China 7 6 Not Free

Colombia* 3 4 Partly Free

Comoros* 3 4 Partly Free

Congo (Brazzaville ) 6 5 Not Free ⇓

Congo (Kinshasa) 6 6 Not Free ⇓

Costa Rica* 1 1 Free

Cote d’Ivoire 6 5 Not Free

Croatia* 1 ? 2 Free

Cuba 7 6 Not Free

Cyprus* 1 1 Free

Czech Republic* 1 1 Free

Denmark* 1 1 Free

Djibouti 5 5 Partly Free

Dominica* 1 1 Free

Iraq Review 2016 Page 334 of 609 pages Iraq

Dominican Republic* 2 2 Free ⇓

East Timor* 3 4 Partly Free

Ecuador* 3 3 Partly Free

Egypt 6 5 Not Free

El Salvador* 2 3 Free

Equatorial Guinea 7 7 Not Free

Eritrea 7 7 ? Not Free

Estonia* 1 1 Free

Ethiopia 5 5 Partly Free ⇓

Fiji 6 4 Partly Free

Finland* 1 1 Free

France* 1 1 Free

Gabon 6 5 ? Not Free ?

The Gambia 5 5 ? Partly Free

Georgia 4 4 Partly Free

Germany* 1 1 Free

Ghana* 1 2 Free

Greece* 1 2 Free

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Grenada* 1 2 Free

Guatemala* 4 ? 4 Partly Free

Guinea 7 6 ? Not Free

Guinea-Bissau* 4 4 Partly Free

Guyana* 2 3 Free

Haiti* 4 5 Partly Free

Honduras 4 ? 4 ? Partly Free

Hungary* 1 1 Free

Iceland* 1 1 Free

India* 2 3 Free

Indonesia* 2 3 Free

Iran 6 6 Not Free ⇓

Iraq 5 ? 6 Not Free

Ireland* 1 1 Free

Israel* 1 2 Free

Italy* 1 2 Free

Jamaica* 2 3 Free

Japan* 1 2 Free

Iraq Review 2016 Page 336 of 609 pages Iraq

Jordan 6 ? 5 Not Free ?

Kazakhstan 6 5 Not Free ⇓

Kenya 4 4 ? Partly Free

Kiribati* 1 1 Free

Kosovo 5 ? 4 ? Partly Free ?

Kuwait 4 4 Partly Free

Kyrgyzstan 6 ? 5 ? Not Free ?

Laos 7 6 Not Free

Latvia* 2 1 Free

Lebanon 5 3 ? Partly Free

Lesotho* 3 ? 3 Partly Free ?

Liberia* 3 4 Partly Free

Libya 7 7 Not Free

Liechtenstein* 1 1 Free

Lithuania* 1 1 Free

Luxembourg* 1 1 Free

Macedonia* 3 3 Partly Free ⇑

Madagascar 6 ? 4 ? Partly Free

Iraq Review 2016 Page 337 of 609 pages Iraq

Malawi* 3 ? 4 Partly Free

Malaysia 4 4 Partly Free

Maldives* 3 ? 4 Partly Free

Mali* 2 3 Free

Malta* 1 1 Free ⇓

Marshall Islands* 1 1 Free

Mauritania 6 5 Not Free

Mauritius* 1 2 Free

Mexico* 2 3 Free

Micronesia* 1 1 Free

Moldova* 3 ? 4 Partly Free

Monaco* 2 1 Free

Mongolia* 2 2 Free ⇑

Montenegro* 3 2 ? Free ?

Morocco 5 4 Partly Free ⇓

Mozambique 4 ? 3 Partly Free

Namibia* 2 2 Free

Nauru* 1 1 Free

Iraq Review 2016 Page 338 of 609 pages Iraq

Nepal 4 4 Partly Free

Netherlands* 1 1 Free

New Zealand* 1 1 Free

Nicaragua* 4 4 ? Partly Free

Niger 5 ? 4 Partly Free

Nigeria 5 4 Partly Free ⇓

North Korea 7 7 Not Free ⇓

Norway* 1 1 Free

Oman 6 5 Not Free

Pakistan 4 5 Partly Free

Palau* 1 1 Free

Panama* 1 2 Free

Papua New Guinea* 4 3 Partly Free

Paraguay* 3 3 Partly Free

Peru* 2 3 Free

Philippines 4 3 Partly Free ⇓

Poland* 1 1 Free

Portugal* 1 1 Free

Iraq Review 2016 Page 339 of 609 pages Iraq

Qatar 6 5 Not Free

Romania* 2 2 Free

Russia 6 5 Not Free ⇓

Rwanda 6 5 Not Free

Saint Kitts and Nevis* 1 1 Free

Saint Lucia* 1 1 Free

Saint Vincent and

Grenadines* 2 1 Free

Samoa* 2 2 Free

San Marino* 1 1 Free

Sao Tome and Principe* 2 2 Free

Saudi Arabia 7 6 Not Free

Senegal* 3 3 Partly Free

Serbia* 2 ? 2 Free

Seychelles* 3 3 Partly Free

Sierra Leone* 3 3 Partly Free

Singapore 5 4 Partly Free

Slovakia* 1 1 Free ⇓

Slovenia* 1 1 Free

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Solomon Islands 4 3 Partly Free

Somalia 7 7 Not Free

South Africa* 2 2 Free

South Korea* 1 2 Free

Spain* 1 1 Free

Sri Lanka* 4 4 Partly Free

Sudan 7 7 Not Free

Suriname* 2 2 Free

Swaziland 7 5 Not Free

Sweden* 1 1 Free

Switzerland* 1 1 Free ⇓

Syria 7 6 Not Free

Taiwan* 1 ? 2 ? Free

Tajikistan 6 5 Not Free

Tanzania 4 3 Partly Free

Thailand 5 4 Partly Free

Togo 5 4 ? Partly Free

Tonga 5 3 Partly Free

Iraq Review 2016 Page 341 of 609 pages Iraq

Trinidad and Tobago* 2 2 Free

Tunisia 7 5 Not Free

Turkey* 3 3 Partly Free ⇓

Turkmenistan 7 7 Not Free

Tuvalu* 1 1 Free

Uganda 5 4 Partly Free

Ukraine* 3 2 Free

United Arab Emirates 6 5 Not Free

United Kingdom* 1 1 Free

United States* 1 1 Free

Uruguay* 1 1 Free

Uzbekistan 7 7 Not Free

Vanuatu* 2 2 Free

Venezuela 5 ? 4 Partly Free

Vietnam 7 5 Not Free ⇓

Yemen 6 ? 5 Not Free ?

Zambia* 3 4 ? Partly Free

Zimbabwe 6 ? 6 Not Free

Iraq Review 2016 Page 342 of 609 pages Iraq

Methodology: PR and CL stand for political rights and civil liberties, respectively; 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free rating. The ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results.

? ? up or down indicates a change in political rights, civil liberties, or status since the last survey. ⇑ ⇓ up or down indicates a trend of positive or negative changes that took place but that were not sufficient to result in a change in political rights or civil liberties ratings of 1-7.

* indicates a country’s status as an electoral democracy.

Source:

This data is derived from the latest edition of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2010 edition. Available at URL: http://www.freedomhouse.org

Updated:

Reviewed in 2015

Human Rights

Overview of Human Rights in Iraq

The Republic of Iraq is a transitional democracy on the cusp of collapsing into civil war. In October 2005 a draft constitution was adopted by national referendum. The constitution contains protections for individual rights, but many of them are left to the implementation of subsequent legislation. At this time, constitutional protections appear to be a theoretical exercise.

Improving the human rights situation is difficult due to a myriad of factors currently at play. Domestic terrorism, insurgency, political instability, and high levels of violence all negatively affect the government’s human rights performance. The prime minister renewed the ‘state of emergency’ throughout the country based on the dangers brought forth by the ongoing violence in the region.

Iraq Review 2016 Page 343 of 609 pages Iraq

Insurgent groups, such as al-Qaida, Ansar al-Sunna and the Islamic Army, have continued to attack civilian areas. Abductions, executions, massive car bombings and suicide bombings in markets, mosques, and bus stations are frequently perpetrated by these groups.

Torture and ill-treatment of detainees in Iraqi custody are rising in incident. Beatings, sleep deprivation, electric shocks, prolonged suspension from the wrist and hands, and lack of food and water for long periods of time are some of the abuses reported. There is no mechanism set up for the monitoring of abuses by law enforcement officials, nor is there a system for bringing those accused of perpetrating those abuses.

Thousands of people are being held without charge on suspicion of anti-state or terrorist activities. Many of these are being held in harsh conditions and without access to family and/ or lawyers.

Recently, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) said the human rights situation in Iraq was dire. According to reports, there are "continuing concerns about military operations conducted by the Multinational Force in the north and northwest of Iraq, resulting in civilian deaths, injury and displacement from excessive or apparently indiscriminate use of force.” It is known that thousands of Iraqi civilians have been killed by United States-led forces when they launched major attacks in major cities and towns in Iraq.

Human Development Index (HDI) Rank:

See full listing of the Human Development Index located in the Social Overview of this report for this country's current rank.

Human Poverty Index Rank:

Not Ranked

Gini Index:

N/A

Life Expectancy at Birth (years):

69.62 years

Unemployment Rate:

25-30%

Iraq Review 2016 Page 344 of 609 pages Iraq

Population living on $1 a day (%):

N/A

Population living on $2 a day (%):

N/A

Population living beneath the Poverty Line (%):

N/A

Internally Displaced People:

1,000,000

Note-Some 22,700 refugees from the Palestinian Territories are currently in Iraq

Total Crime Rate (%):

N/A

Health Expenditure (% of GDP):

Public: N/A

% of GDP Spent on Education:

N/A

Human Rights Conventions Party to:

• International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide • International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights • International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights • Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women • Conventions on the Rights of the Child

*Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the level of well-being in

Iraq Review 2016 Page 345 of 609 pages Iraq

177 nations in the world. It uses factors such as poverty, literacy, life-expectancy, education, gross domestic product, and purchasing power parity to assess the average achievements in each nation. It has been used in the United Nation’s Human Development Report since 1993.

*Human Poverty Index Ranking is based on certain indicators used to calculate the Human Poverty Index. Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40, adult literacy rate, population without sustainable access to an improved water source, and population below income poverty line are the indicators assessed in this measure.

*The Gini Index measures inequality based on the distribution of family income or consumption. A value of 0 represents perfect equality (income being distributed equally), and a value of 100 perfect inequality (income all going to one individual).

*The calculation of the total crime rate is the % of the total population which has been effected by property crime, robbery, sexual assault, assault, or bribery (corruption) related occurrences.

Government Functions

Editor's Note:

The Iraqi government structure under the 1968 constitution no longer applies in the wake of the 2003 war in Iraq; the new structure of the Iraqi government is still in development. A handover of authority to Iraqi sovereignty took place on June 30, 2004. Elections were held in January 2005 and determined the new government's formation. The new government was made official in April 2005.

Constitution:

The new constitution was drafted and ratified with provisions for governance on October 15, 2005. However, it is subject to review by the Constitutional Review Committee and a possible public referendum.

See Update below.

Iraq Review 2016 Page 346 of 609 pages Iraq

Executive Authority:

At this time, Iraq is ruled at the executive level by a president and two vice presidents in the roles of heads of state. The president is a Kurd; the two vice presidents are respectively Sunni and Shi'a, for the purpose of representing the country's sectarian and ethnic divide. The government is headed by a prime minister, who is the head of government, and two deputy premiers, as well as a cabinet.

See Update below.

Legislative Authority:

At the legislative level, there is an Iraqi National Assembly or "Council of Representatives" made up of 325 seats consisting of 317 members elected by an optional open-list, proportional representation system and 8 seats reserved for minorities; members serve four-year terms). Technically, the legislative body is bicameral and also includes a Federation Council, although membership is not established and its authorities remain undefined.

Legal System and Judiciary:

The legal system is based on European civil and Islamic law under the framework outlined in the Iraqi Constitution. The Iraqi Constitution calls for the Federal Judicial Authority, comprised of the Higher Juridical Council, Supreme Federal Court, Federal Court of Cassation, Public Prosecution Department, Judiciary Oversight Commission and other federal courts that are regulated in accordance with the law.

See Update below.

Special Update on Government in Iraq

Iraqi parliament approves significant overhaul of government; executive government structure and judicial system to be reformed -- In August 2015, the Iraqi parliament approved a significant overhaul of the government, effectively reforming the structure of the government, ameliorating the judicial system, reducing bureacracy and corruption, and expanding the powers of the prime minister.

Under the comprehensive overhaul, the provisions for multiple vice presidents and deputy prime

Iraq Review 2016 Page 347 of 609 pages Iraq ministers would be eliminated. These posts had been created to offer political influence to the main ethnic and sectarian groups in Iraq -- Shi'ites, Sunnis, and Kurds -- and thus build a more inclusive government in a country with complex ethno-sectarian divisions. However, in the years after the invasion and occupation of Iraq, these posts had actually been transposed into arenas for patronage and corruption. The move would effectively remove former Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki from the reins of power since he had continued to hold office as vice president even after he was forced to step down from power in 2014 when Islamic State gained control over wide swaths of the country in the escalating ethno-sectarian crisis. Of course, with Maliki out of executive power, the hand of the new head of government, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, would be strengthened. Of note would be the prime minister's new power to fire various provincial and regional officials.

Other key changes involved the streamlining of cabinet ministries, which was aimed at reducing bureaucracy, as well as the amelioration of the judicial system, with an eye on targeting manifold corruption. On that latter issue, Iraq's most powerful Shi'a cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, gave his blessing to the reforms, while also urging Prime Minister Abadi to "strike with an iron fist" against corruption.

Government Structure

Names: conventional long form: Republic of Iraq conventional short form: Iraq local long form: Al Jumhuriyah al Iraqiyah local short form: Al Iraq

Type: Parliamentary democracy

Note:

Iraq Review 2016 Page 348 of 609 pages Iraq

Until the United States-led invasion in 2003, Iraq was a personalist regime; almost all government functions were under the authority of President Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi government structure under the 1968 constitution no longer applies in the wake of the ensuing war in Iraq. A handover of authority to Iraqi sovereignty took place on June 30, 2004, and a new constitution was developed and ratified. Elections were held in January 2005 and determined the government's formation. The new government was made official in April 2005. Since then, elections have taken place in Iraq, as discussed below.

Executive Branch: Note on Executive Leadership: The Iraqi government structure under the 1968 constitution no longer applies in the wake of the 2003 war in Iraq; the new structure of the Iraqi government is still in development. A handover of authority to Iraqi sovereignty took place on June 30, 2004, and a new constitution was developed and ratified. Elections were held in January 2005 and determined the government's formation. The new interim government was made official in April 2005. Since then, elections have taken place in Iraq, as discussed below.

Head of State: President Fuad Masum (as of July 2014). Typically, the president is elected by Council of Representatives (parliament) to serve a four-year term (eligible for a second term).

Note on Head of State: Fuad Masum -- a veteran Iraqi politician and a Kurd -- was overwhelmingly elected in July 2014 as the president of Iraq. He succeeded Jalal Talabani who was the first president of Iraq in the post- Saddam Hussein era.

Head of Government: Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi (incoming as of August 2014); succeeding Nouri al-Maliki (2006- 2014). Typically, the prime minister is the leader of the party or coalition in parliament with the most seats.

Note on Head of Government and Government Formation: In 2014, Iraq was grappling with a tumultuous security landscape. At the same time, the political sphere was also mired by turmoil. At issue were the ethno-sectarian tensions, which had been fueled by the hard-line anti-Sunni stance of caretaker Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and which had contributed to the security crisis at the hands of Sunni terrorists from Islamic State who were persecuting Iraqis and taking control over wide swaths of Iraqi territory.

With an eye on calming the political dissonance, there was a call for a unity government with a new consensus prime minister at the helm. This call was echoed by the international community,

Iraq Review 2016 Page 349 of 609 pages Iraq including the United States. After a period of in-fighting, in August 2014, a new Iraqi prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, had been asked to form a new government.

Maliki made it clear that he was not about to voluntarily relinquish power, insisting that the performance of his Shi'a National Alliance in the last elections (held in April 2014) entitled him to his mandate on power. However, international pressure on Maliki appeared to have yielded the desired result; the political stalemate eased in mid-August 2014 when Maliki agreed to step down and make way for a new Abadi government.

For his part, Abadi was moving forward in his new capacity as head of government, saying in an address that the country had to unify in the fight agains the "barbaric" Islamic State. He said, "We all have to cooperate to stand against this terrorist campaign launched on Iraq and to stop all terrorist groups."

Cabinet: Appointed by prime minister

Note on Iraqi Government: Parliamentary elections were held in 2014. The Shi'a National Alliance of Nouri al-Maliki won the most seats and were positioned to form a government. However, a security crisis plaguing Iraq (as discussed above) set the course for the formation of a unity government to be headed by Haider al- Abadi, as noted above. See "Elections Primer" below for more information about the 2014 elections.

Legislative Branch: Bicameral legislature: 328 seats; 320 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote and 8 seats reserved for minorities; members serve 4-year terms); note that Iraq's constitution calls for the establishment of an upper house, the Federation Council, but it has not been instituted.

Note: Until 2003, there was a unicameral National Assembly or "Majlis al-Watani" and a Kurdistan Parliament. The Iraqi government structure under the 1968 constitution no longer applies in the wake of the 2003 war in Iraq. A handover of authority to Iraqi sovereignty took place on June 30, 2004, and a new constitution was developed and ratified. Elections were held in January 2005 and determined the government's formation. The new transitional government was made official in April 2005. New elections were held in December 2005 for full-term government. Elections have since been held in 2010 and 2014.

Primer on Iraq's 2014 parliamentary elections:

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Parliamentary elections were set to take place in Iraq on April 30, 2014. At stake would be the matter of which party or bloc would have the right to form the next government of Iraq. Typically, the party or bloc with the control over the most seats in parliament would form the government, and the leader of that party or bloc would become the prime minister.

According to the constitution of Iraq, there is a bicameral legislature. That legislature is composed of a Council of Representatives (325 seats consisting of 317 members elected by an optional open- list, proportional representation system and 8 seats reserved for minorities; members serve four- year terms), and an upper house, the Federation Council, which is yet to be established. As such, the election action is in the Council of Representatives.

The previous parliamentary elections were held in 2010. When the vote count was complete in that contest, it was announced that former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's secular bloc had won the most seats in Iraq's parliamentary elections. His coalition garnered a small but significant advantage of two more seats than the coalition of incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki -- 91 seats to 89 seats. While Allawi had the seat advantage in terms of plurality, he would still have to form a coalition government because he did not have an outright majority. Meanwhile, Maliki was able to form his own Shi'a bloc coalition that could compete for the right to form a government, despite his seat disadvantage. As such, Maliki was able to remain on at the helm of government following the 2010 elections.

In 2014, the political landscape in Iraq was quite different from 2010. Indeed, Iraq in 2014 was marked by ethno-sectarian violence between Shi'a Muslims and Sunni Muslims, with attacks occurring on an almost daily basis. At the political level, there was no shortage of ethno-sectarian enmity between the Shi'a dominated government and the rest of the country composed of Sunnis, secularists, Kurds, and members of other ethnic and religious minorities. With ethno-sectarian tensions reaching new heights, speculation was surfacing about a possible plan to partition the country. This controversial plan has, at times, been subject to criticism by advocates of a united Iraq; however, recent developments in Iraq suggest a deeply divided country, subject to ongoing violence, and with no serious political solution at hand to address the turbulence and turmoil.

In fact, at the start of January 2014, Iraq had sunk even further into its morass of turbulence and turmoil with the news that al-Qaida allied Sunni Islamic fighters from the entity known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (also known by the acronyms, ISIS and ISIL) were taking control over two major Iraqi cities -- Fallujah and Ramadi -- in that very province of Anbar. Hadi Razeij, the head of the provincial police force for Anbar, said the police had fled the city. In an interview with al-Arabiya News, he said: "The walls of the city are in the hands of the police force, but the people of Fallujah are the prisoners of ISIS."

The newest burst of violence appeared to have been sparked by further incidences of the Shi'a government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki flexing its muscle against the Sunni population.

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Reminiscent of the army raid on the Sunni Muslim anti-government protest camp close to Hawija in the spring of 2013, the Iraqi authorities in early 2014 carried out a raid on a Sunni Muslim anti- government protest camp in Ramadi. That action left at least ten people dead and sparked the unrest there. The arrest of a Sunni member of parliament added to the sentiment that the Shi'a government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was persecuting the Sunni Arab population of the country. The result -- as before -- was an intensified effort by Sunni extremists to fight back. Their efforts were rewarded with the apparent advance of al-Qaida linked Sunni extremists on Fallujah and Ramadi.

Iraqi military forces were deployed to both cities -- where the black flags of the militants were now flying -- to fight these Sunni Islamic militants from ISIS. However, from the point of view of the Iraqi government, the situation in the strategic city of Fallujah -- - only 50 miles from Baghdad -- was dire. According to Reuters news, military troops were shelling parts of the city, presumably with the intent of regaining its hold. While security forces were trying to wrest back control over Fallujah, the fact of the matter was that on Jan. 5, 2014, the Iraq government had lost control of the city. Militants with allegiances to al-Qaida held control over the southern part of Fallujah while tribesmen allied with al-Qaida controlled the rest of the city. Indeed, the Iraqi government was being described in the international media as having "lost" Fallujah.

At the end of the first week of January 2014, the government was launching an operation on Ramadi, with an eye on retaking control. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki was at the same time promising to rid Iraq of the presence of Sunni al-Qaida aligned terrorists and warned that a major assault was afoot in the city of Fallujah. In fact, the Iraqi army had deployed tanks and artillery around Fallujah in preparation for an offensive operation there.

There were suggestions that a hardline approach in Fallujah would exacerbate the ethno-sectarian tensions. Indeed, it was highly unlikely that militants who had seen their biggest success in years would relinquish Fallujah without a fierce fight. At the same time, Maliki and the Shi'a dominated government had their own reasons for fomenting ethno-sectarian divisions since they would need to consolidate the Shi'ite vote in parliamentary elections set for later in the year. Exploiting that Sunni-Shi'a division (as opposed to going easy on Sunnis who were from the religious group terrorizing the country) would be politically beneficial to Maliki who wanted to hold onto power, the national security and national (dis)unity risks notwithstanding.

On April 21, 2014, an attack at a polling station in northern Iraq left 10 guards dead. According to Iraqi authorities, the gunman wore Iraqi military garb and targeted a facility just outside the city of Kirkuk, and which was intended to be used in parliamentary elections set to take place on April 30, 2014. Due to the nature of the target, it was assumed that the attack was intended to disrupt the polls. Elsewhere in Iraq, the pre-election scene was marked with violence and bloodshed as a spate of attacks left more than 30 more people dead. Meanwhile, with Sunni Islamic extremists holding sway over portions of Anbar province (as discussed above), it was unlikely that voting

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On April 25, 2014, a series of explosions killed approximately 30 people and wounded 40 more at a political rally for the Shi'ite group, Asaib Ahl Haq (League of the Righteous), in eastern Iraq. The group was presenting its candidates for the impending elections at the end of the month when three bombs exploded in succession. One explosion was caused by a roadside bomb, another was caused by a suicide car bomb, and the nature of the third explosion was unspecified. The terror group, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), claimed responsibility for the attack via the Internet. ISIL, which is aligned with the terror enclave, al-Qaida, declared that the bombings had been carried out in retaliation for the "murder, torture and displacement" of Sunni Muslims in Iraq by Shi'ite militias. Clearly, it was the latest manifestation of the ethno-sectarian strife that has plagued Iraq since the invasion by United-States-led forces in 2003.

On April 28, 2014, with the elections only days away, suicide bombers carried out a spate of attacks against security personnel -- police and military troops -- who were voting early at polling stations in Baghdad and northern Iraq. The assailants appeared to be Sunni militants disguised in army and police uniforms. As many as 20 people died as a result of the clear attempt to disrupt the elections. By April 29, 2014, a curfew was implemented -- presumably in an attempt to preserve the state of security ahead of the elections the next day.

Voting finally went forward in the highly anticipated elections on election day in Iraq -- April 30, 2014 -- amidst high security. Soldiers and police were highly visible across the country, charged as they were with protecting voters as they exercised their democratic right to cast their ballots. As expected, in Anbar where Sunni militants have seized control over key cities, voter turnout was quite light. Elswehere in the country, some polling stations had to close early due to security threats. Indeed, suicide attacks across the country -- including in Diyala and Salahuddin -- exacted a death toll of more than a dozen people. Nevertheless, Iraq saw a respectable voter turnout overall with millions of Iraqi citizens defying the security threats and proudly displaying ink stained thumbs to show that they had cast their ballots.

While no official results were available at the time of writing, Prime Minister Maliki was predicting victory for his State of Law party, and a return to the helm of leadership for him. Striking an ultra- confident tone, he said, "Definitely our expectations are high. Our victory is confirmed but we are still talking about how big this victory will be." Conspicuously absent from him comments were any suggestion of ethno-sectarian reconciliation or national unity.

In truth the parliamentary contest could be understood as a dichotomized experience. In Shi'ite areas of the country, voters were being driven by a desire to choose the person they believed to be capable to staving off the Sunni extremist threat from the al-Qaida aligned group, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In Sunni regions, voters were motivated by their feeling of being bullied by the Shi'ite authorities, along with their fears of the ISIL threat.

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Note:

Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission announced that the election results would be confirmed later in the month of May 2014. Tallies at that time in late May 2014 indicated that Maliki's State of Law party won a plurality of seats -- approximately 92 -- but short of an outright majority. Note that the 92 seat plurality was boosted to 94 seats with the addition of two seats through candidates aligned with Maliki.

The Muwatin Coalition was on track to carry about 48 seats, Al-Hadba was carrying about 33 seats, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq had 29 seats, the Sadrist Movement (of Muqtada Sadr- - a Shi'ite rival of Maliki) was close behind with 28 seats, the Iraqi National Accord appeared to secure about 25 seats, the Kurdistan Democratic Party had 20 seats, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan looked to carry 14 seats, the Civil Democratic Alliance, the Iraqi National Dialogue Front and National Reform Trend each were on track to secure 10 seats. Other parties made up the rest.

It was to be seen if these preliminary numbers would hold sway once the formal announcement of the results were made. However, it was clear that Maliki had performed well in the southern Shi'a provinces and would look to other Shi'a parties to cobble together a ruling coalition. Left to be seen was the matter of whether or not those other Shi'a parties would want to move forward with Maliki as prime minister, or, if they would seek new leadership. In truth, though, Maliki's leadership was clearly validated at the polls with the performance of his party and he would thus have a legitimate argument to hold onto the reins of power. However, the role Maliki in the ethno- sectarian dissonance was ultimately prevent him from holding onto power, as discussed below.

Note on Head of Government and Government Formation: In 2014, Iraq was grappling with a tumultuous security landscape. At the same time, the political sphere was also mired by turmoil. At issue were the ethno-sectarian tensions, which had been fueled by the hard-line anti-Sunni stance of caretaker Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and which had contributed to the security crisis at the hands of Sunni terrorists from Islamic State who were persecuting Iraqis and taking control over wide swaths of Iraqi territory.

With an eye on calming the political dissonance, there was a call for a unity government with a new consensus prime minister at the helm. This call was echoed by the international community, including the United States. After a period of in-fighting, in August 2014, a new Iraqi prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, had been asked to form a new government.

Maliki made it clear that he was not about to voluntarily relinquish power, insisting that the performance of his Shi'a National Alliance in the last elections (held in April 2014) entitled him to his mandate on power. However, international pressure on Maliki appeared to have yielded the desired result; the political stalemate eased in mid-August 2014 when Maliki agreed to step down

Iraq Review 2016 Page 354 of 609 pages Iraq and make way for a new Abadi government.

For his part, Abadi was moving forward in his new capacity as head of government, saying in an address that the country had to unify in the fight agains the "barbaric" Islamic State. He said, "We all have to cooperate to stand against this terrorist campaign launched on Iraq and to stop all terrorist groups."

Special Note on Government in Iraq Iraqi parliament approves significant overhaul of government; executive government structure and judicial system to be reformed --

In August 2015, the Iraqi parliament approved a significant overhaul of the government, effectively reforming the structure of the government, ameliorating the judicial system, reducing bureacracy and corruption, and expanding the powers of the prime minister.

Under the comprehensive overhaul, the provisions for multiple vice presidents and deputy prime ministers would be eliminated. These posts had been created to offer political influence to the main ethnic and sectarian groups in Iraq -- Shi'ites, Sunnis, and Kurds -- and thus build a more inclusive government in a country with complex ethno-sectarian divisions. However, in the years after the invasion and occupation of Iraq, these posts had actually been transposed into arenas for patronage and corruption. The move would effectively remove former Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki from the reins of power since he had continued to hold office as vice president even after he was forced to step down from power in 2014 when Islamic State gained control over wide swaths of the country in the escalating ethno-sectarian crisis. Of course, with Maliki out of executive power, the hand of the new head of government, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, would be strengthened. Of note would be the prime minister's new power to fire various provincial and regional officials.

Other key changes involved the streamlining of cabinet ministries, which was aimed at reducing bureaucracy, as well as the amelioration of the judicial system, with an eye on targeting manifold corruption. On that latter issue, Iraq's most powerful Shi'a cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, gave his blessing to the reforms, while also urging Prime Minister Abadi to "strike with an iron fist" against corruption.

Judicial Branch: The Iraq Constitution calls for the Federal Judicial Authority, comprised of the Higher Juridical Council, Supreme Federal Court, Federal Court of Cassation, Public Prosecution Department, Judiciary Oversight Commission and other federal courts that are regulated in accordance with the law

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Note: Until 2003, there was a Court of Cassation. The Iraqi government structure under the 1968 constitution no longer applies in the wake of the 2003 war in Iraq. A handover of authority to Iraqi sovereignty took place on June 30, 2004, and a new constitution was developed and ratified. As of 2005, the new constitution provided judicial instruments, mechanisms and institutions.

Constitution: Ratified on October 15, 2005 (subject to review by the Constitutional Review Committee and a possible public referendum in 2007)

Note: Until the war of 2003, a constitution was created Sept. 22, 1968, effective July 16, 1970 (provisional constitution); new constitution drafted in 1990 but not adopted. The Iraqi government structure under the 1968 constitution no longer applies in the wake of the 2003 war in Iraq. A handover of authority to Iraqi sovereignty took place on June 30, 2004, and a new constitution was developed and ratified. The new post-war constitution was drafted and ratified by referendum in 2005.

Legal System: Based on European civil and Islamic law under the framework outlined in the Iraqi Constitution

Note: Until the war of 2003, based on Islamic law in special religious courts, civil law system elsewhere; had not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction. The Iraqi government structure under the 1968 constitution no longer applies in the wake of the 2003 war in Iraq. As of 2005, the new constitution provided legal instruments, mechanisms and institutions.

Political Parties and Leaders: Parties -- Anbar Loyalty Party [Qasim al-AHADAWI] Awakening Conference [Ahmad al-RISHAWI] [Hadi al-AMIRI] Civil Democratic Alliance Da'wa Party (Islamic) [Vice President Nuri al-MALIKI] Da'wa Tanzim [Hashim al-MUSAWI branch] Fadilah Party [Ammar TUAMA] Goran (Change) List (also known as the Movement for Change) [Nushirwan MUSTAFA] Iraq Coalition [Abd al-Salam al-HAMMUDI]

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Iraqi Front for National Dialogue [Deputy Prime Minister Salih al-MUTLAQ] Iraqi Islamic Party or IIP [Ayad al-SAMARRA’I] Iraqi Justice and Reform Movement [Shaykh Abdallah al-YAWR] Iraqi National Congress or INC [Ahmad CHALABI] Iraqi Turkoman Front [Arshad al-SALIHI] Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq or ISCI [Ammar al-HAKIM] Kurdistan Democratic Party or KDP [Kurdistan Regional Government President Masud BARZANI] Kurdistan Islamic Group (also called Islamic Group of Kurdistan) [Ali BAPIR] Kurdish Islamic Union [ Mohammed FARAI] Coalition/ Al Wataniyah [Vice President Ayad ALLAWI] National Future Gathering [Dhafir al-ANI] National Movement for Reform and Development [Muhammad al-KARBULI] National Reform Trend [Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-JAFARI] Patriotic Union of Kurdistan or PUK [former President Jalal TALABANI] Sadrist Trend [Muqtada al-SADR] Shia Independents [Higher Education Minister Husayn al-SHAHRISTANI] United for Iraq/Muttahidun Party [Vice President Usama al-NUJAYFI]

Coalitions and Leaders: Al Ahrar Coalition/Sadrist Trend [Muqtada al-SADR -- Al-Arabiyah Coalition [Deputy Prime Minister Salih al-MUTLAQ] Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) Coalition/Muwatin [Ammar al-HAKIM] Kurdistan Alliance [Muhsin al-SADUN] Nationalism Coalition/Al Wataniyah [Vice President Ayad ALLAWI] State of Law Coalition [Vice President Nuri al-Maliki] United for Reform Coalition/Muttahidun Party [Vice President Usama al-NUJAYFI]

Note: There are numerous smaller local, tribal, and minority parties.

Political pressure groups and leaders: Sunni militias; Shia militias, some associated with political parties

Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal

Administrative Divisions:

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18 governorates (muhafazat, singular - muhafazah); Al Anbar, Al Basrah, Al Muthanna, Al Qadisiyah, An Najaf, Arbil, As Sulaymaniyah, At Ta'mim, Babil, Baghdad, Dahuk, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Karbala', Maysan, Ninawa, Salah ad Din, Wasit

Principal Government Officials

Government of Iraq

Pres. Fuad MASUM Vice Pres. Ayad ALLAWI Vice Pres. Nuri al-MALIKI Vice Pres. Usama al-NUJAYFI Prime Min. Haydar al-ABADI Dep. Prime Min. Baha al-ARAJI Dep. Prime Min. Salih al-MUTLAQ Dep. Prime Min. Rowsch SHAWAYS Min. of Agriculture Falah al-ZAYDAN Min. of Communications Kazim Hasan al-RASHID Min. of Culture Firyad RAWANDUZI Min. of Defense Khalid al-UBAYDI Min. of Displacement & Migration Jasim Muhammad ALI Min. of Education Muhammad IQBAL Min. of Electricity Qasim al-FAHDAWI Min. of Environment Qutaybah al-JABURI Min. of Finance Hoshyar ZEBARI Min. of Foreign Affairs Ibrahim al-JAFARI Min. of Health Adilah HUSAYN Min. of Higher Education & Scientific Research Husayn al-SHAHRISTANI Min. of Housing & Construction Tariq al-KHAYKANI Min. of Human Rights Muhammad al-BAYATI Min. of Industry & Minerals Nasir Kazim Ubayd al-ISSAWI Min. of Interior Muhammad al-GHABAN Min. of Justice Haydar al-ZAMILI Min. of Labor & Social Affairs Muhammad Shia al-SUDANI Min. of Municipalities & Public Works Abd al-Karim Yunis ILAN Min. of Oil Adil ABD AL-MAHDI

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Min. of Planning Salman al-JUMAYLI Min. of Science & Technology Faris Yusif JAJU Min. of Tourism Adil Fahid al-SHIRSHAB Min. of Trade Milas Abd al-Karim al-Kasnazani al-HUSAYNI Min. of Transportation Bayan Baqir JABR al-Zubaydi Min. of Water Resources Muhsin Usfur al-SHAMMARI Min. of Youth & Sports Abd al-Husayn Abd al-Ridha ABTAN Min. of State Saman Abdallah SAID Min. of State for Provincial & Legislative Affairs Ahmad al-JABURI Min. of State for Women's Affairs Bayan Nuri TAWFIQ Governor, Central Bank of Iraq (Acting) Ali al-ALLAQ Ambassador to the US Luqman Abd al-Rahim FAYLI Permanent Representative to the UN, New York Muhammad Ali al-HAKIM

-- as of 2015

Leader Biography

Leader Biography

Leadership of Iraq

Executive Branch: Note on Executive Leadership: The Iraqi government structure under the 1968 constitution no longer applies in the wake of the 2003 war in Iraq; the new structure of the Iraqi government is still in development. A handover of authority to Iraqi sovereignty took place on June 30, 2004, and a new constitution was developed and ratified. Elections were held in January 2005 and determined the government's formation. The new interim government was made official in April 2005. Since then, elections have taken place in Iraq, as discussed below.

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Head of State: President Fuad Masum (as of July 2014). Typically, the president is elected by Council of Representatives (parliament) to serve a four-year term (eligible for a second term).

Note on Head of State: Fuad Masum -- a veteran Iraqi politician and a Kurd -- was overwhelmingly elected in July 2014 as the president of Iraq. He succeeded Jalal Talabani who was the first president of Iraq in the post- Saddam Hussein era.

Head of Government: Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi (incoming as of August 2014); succeeding Nouri al-Maliki (2006- 2014). Typically, the prime minister is the leader of the party or coalition in parliament with the most seats.

Note on Head of Government and Government Formation: In 2014, Iraq was grappling with a tumultuous security landscape. At the same time, the political sphere was also mired by turmoil. At issue were the ethno-sectarian tensions, which had been fueled by the hard-line anti-Sunni stance of caretaker Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and which had contributed to the security crisis at the hands of Sunni terrorists from Islamic State who were persecuting Iraqis and taking control over wide swaths of Iraqi territory.

With an eye on calming the political dissonance, there was a call for a unity government with a new consensus prime minister at the helm. This call was echoed by the international community, including the United States. After a period of in-fighting, in August 2014, a new Iraqi prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, had been asked to form a new government.

Maliki made it clear that he was not about to voluntarily relinquish power, insisting that the performance of his Shi'a National Alliance in the last elections (held in April 2014) entitled him to his mandate on power. However, international pressure on Maliki appeared to have yielded the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 360 of 609 pages Iraq desired result; the political stalemate eased in mid-August 2014 when Maliki agreed to step down and make way for a new Abadi government.

For his part, Abadi was moving forward in his new capacity as head of government, saying in an address that the country had to unify in the fight agains the "barbaric" Islamic State. He said, "We all have to cooperate to stand against this terrorist campaign launched on Iraq and to stop all terrorist groups."

Cabinet: Appointed by prime minister

Note on Iraqi Government: Parliamentary elections were held in 2014. The Shi'a National Alliance of Nouri al-Maliki won the most seats and were positioned to form a government. However, a security crisis plaguing Iraq (as discussed above) set the course for the formation of a unity government to be headed by Haider al- Abadi, as noted above.

Foreign Relations

General Relations

For most of the 1990s, Iraq maintained offensive relations with much of the Western world. The United Nations (U.N.) imposed sanctions on Iraq in 1990 after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The sanctions prohibit air travel to and from the country and restrict the sale of oil under the U.N. administered "oil-for-food" program. Non-oil exports were not forbidden. After 1998, Iraq refused to cooperate with the U.N. weapons inspectors. In the early 2000s, regional sentiments towards Iraq improved, and Iraq enjoyed increasing international support for its opposition to the sanctions, mainly due to the difficult living conditions ordinary Iraqis have been living under. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, the ousting of President Saddam Hussein, and the presence of international forces in Iraq have dominated not only the local and regional arena, but also the global world of

Iraq Review 2016 Page 361 of 609 pages Iraq international relations in the last decade. Iraq's place in the global community in a post-was period without Saddam Hussein at the helm is yet to be determined.

See "Special Entry" below for more information related to the 2003 war in Iraq as well as the post-war landscape in this country.

The Global Community

With the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath regime, Iraq has taken steps toward re-engagement on the international stage. Iraq has established diplomatic relations with over 60 countries and organizations.

The Republic of Iraq belongs to the following international organizations: United Nations (UN); Arab League (AL); World Bank (WB); International Monetary Fund (IMF); International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Nonaligned Movement (NAM); Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Interpol; World Health Organization (WHO); G-19; G-77; Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA); Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD); Arab Monetary Fund (AMF); Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU); Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); Intern ational Community for Radionuclide Metrology (ICRM); International Development Association (IDA); International Development Bank (IDB); International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); International Finance Corporation (IFC); International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCS); International Labor Organization (ILO); International Maritime Organization (IMO); Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC); International Organization for Standardization (ISO); International Telecommunication Union (ITU); Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO); Universal Postal Union (UPU); World Customs Organization (WCO); World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU); World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); World Meteorological Organization (WMO); World Tr ade Organization (WTO) observer.

On June 22, 2005, more than 80 countries and organizations gathered in Brussels in a renewed international partnership with Iraq, to support Iraq’s political transition process, to encourage its economic recovery, and to help establish the and public order.

Regional Relations

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Relations with most countries in the Middle East and Iraq were strained for some time, especially after the invasion of Kuwait. The ousting of Saddam Hussein from power will have an invariably impact on regional relations.

Discord between Iraq and Iran ostensibly goes back to the war in the 1980s. Although both countries are still technically at war, no cease-fire agreement was signed, and relations are strained, Iran and Iraq have made steps to ease tensions including the exchange of thousands of prisoners of war.

In 2007, Iran's ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi Qumi, delineated the details of a plan to strongly expand his country's economic and military ties with Iraq. He noted that Iran was prepared to offer its neighbor military training, equipment and advisory staff in order to bolster Iraq's efforts in "the security fight." As well, Qumi said that Iran was ready to bear greater responsibility as regards Iraq's economic reconstruction. Iran's desire to move closer to Iraq evoked negative responsed from the United States. In this way, Iraq-Iran relations promised to be of a complex variety.

See "History" and "Political Conditions" for details related to Iraq's relationship with Iran.

The Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Sudan and Yemen initially supported Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, due to his clear anti-Israeli criticism, and his willingness to confront the West.

The invasion of Kuwait and the resulting Gulf War were also responsible for the deterioration of relations between Iraq and most nations in the region and the wider world. Despite the notion of Islamic brotherhood and Arab identity connections, the violation of Kuwaiti sovereignty was not well-received by the wider international community.

Developments in the latter part of the 1990s improved the regional climate; Iraq developed closer relationships with Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt and Iran. The improved relations were in part based on Arab sympathy for suffering Iraqi civilians, admiration for Saddam Hussein's anti-Israeli rhetoric, but also on the more pragmatic need for trade under as well as outside of the U.N. admini stered "oil-for-food" program.

Over the course of 2001, Iraq signed free trade agreements with Jordan, United Arab Emirates and Egypt. A comprehensive agreement covering economic, commercial, scientific and cultural fields was signed between Syria and Iraq in August 2001.

Saddam Hussein remained an ardent supporter of the Palestinians, and a harsh critic of Israel and its Western allies. The Iraqi president established a fund which compensates victims and families of victims in the last Palestinian Intifada. Iraq maintained the role of a pariah in the region but has actively worked to improve its position and relations with regional states. Iraq also led a month-

Iraq Review 2016 Page 363 of 609 pages Iraq long oil embargo against the United States (U.S.) and Israel in protest of the intensified Israeli offensive in 2002.

For years Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had a strong distrust of Iraq. However, during the Arab Summit in March 2002, Saudi Crown Pr ince Abdullah and Iraqi Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri publicly embraced and kissed each other in the Arab manner on the cheek as a sign of reconciliation between the two countries. The warm feelings between the Crown Prince and the Iraqi Deputy also signaled warmer relations between all Arab countries and Iraq. There also have been discussions between the two countries on the establishment of a free trade agreement.

During the summit, Iraq also agreed to respect Kuwait's sovereignty and security as well as the release of 600 Kuwaiti prisoners of war. However, Kuwait has since expressed frustration with Iraq as Iraq has yet to follow through with agreements made at the summit. It seemed unlikely, given the poor history between the two nations, that Kuwait would resume diplomatic relations with Iraq anytime soon. However, with Saddam Hussein gone from office, and with a government favorable to the West, bilat eral relations were likely to improve.

In mid-March 2005, Jordan withdrew its diplomatic staff from Iraq. Jordanian authorities said that they had recalled Charge d'Affaires Damai Haddad due to anti-Jordanian protests outside its Baghdad embassy, which indicated that he would be unsafe if he remained. In those demonstrations, Shi'a protestors burned Jordanian flags outside the Jordanian embassy and raised an Iraqi flag over the building. Shi'a protesters in Iraq claimed that a Jordanian, Raed Mansour al- Banna, played a role in a suicide bombing on February 28, 2005, in which 125 people were killed in the town of Hillah. They claimed that al-Banna held celebrations after orchestrating an attack in Iraq. The family of al-Banna, however, said that he was not responsible for the particular attack in Hillah.

Regardless of who was responsible, the incident grew into a minor diplomatic imbroglio. In respon se for Jordan's withdrawal of its diplomat from Baghdad, Iraq recalled its own envoy from Amman for "consultations" and characterized diplomatic relations as being "in crisis mode."

Also by 2005, insurgent attacks in Iraq were being carried out by a Jordanian national with ties to the terrorist group, al-Qaida. The bombing of hotels in Jordan orchestrated by this individual, and related to Jordanian policy toward Iraq, was likely to have long-term effects.

On December 16, 2007, Turkey carried out air strikes against Kurdish rebels in Iraq. Around 50 Turkish jets pummeled 10 villages inside Iraqi terrain but close to the border with Turkey. The move was apparently sanctioned by the United States (U.S.), according to Turkey's top general, Yasa Buyukanit, who said that the U.S. opened air space in northern Iraq in order for the operation to be carried out. For its part, Iraq condemned the air strikes as "unacceptable."

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At issue has been the spate of attacks on Turkish military carried out by the rebel enclave -- the Kurdistan Workers Party, known by the acronym, PKK -- allegedly from within Iraqi terrain. Turkey's government, backed by the parliament, earlier threatened to carry out strikes and launch a ground assault into Iraq to squash the PKK, which it deemed to be a terrorist enclave. Indeed, Turkey had earlier deployed up to 100,000 military troops to the border with Iraq in preparation for action against the PKK. Iraq reacted by warning of "disastrous consequences" for the region if Turkey were to take military action in Iraq.

In 2009, Iraq and Syria respectively recalled their ambassadors, as a diplomatic row deepened over Baghdad's claim that Damascus was giving safe haven to militants responsible for attacks on Baghdad. At issue were a wave of particularly brutal bombings in Iraq, which targeted the foreign and finance ministries in Baghdad that left close to 100 people dead. Iraq recalled its envoy from Syria after a taped confession was broadcast, indicating that recent violent attacks in Baghdad had been ordered by Syria-based Iraqi Baathists. In retaliation for the move, Syria said it was also recalling its envoy from Iraq. Syria also rejected any involvement in the violence. Syria's declaration of innocence was somewhat bolstered by a claim of responsibility by al al-Qaida wing called Islamic States of Iraq. Turkey was set to mediate the dispute.

Other Significant Relations

Relations with Russia Russia remains closer to Iraq than many other international players, and enjoys some political clout in the Gulf country. Russia has for frequently called for the lifting of the sanctions while trying to persuade Iraq to resume dialogue with the United Nations on arms inspections. Russia has sent several planes with humanitarian aid to Iraq, clearly defying the sanctio ns. As reported by the Washington Post on Jan. 16, 2002, Russia has been the top importer of Iraqi goods for the past five years. The country reportedly signed an agreement with Iraq to export 600, 000 barrels of oil a day. As Iraq is heavily indebted to Russia after purchasing billions of dollars worth of arms during the 1980s, Russia has been undoubtedly anxious to recover that debt and fought to ease or lift Iraqi sanctions. With a new government supported by the United States, it is unknown how Russia and Iraq will relate to one another, in particular in regards to the issue of debt. The United States has called for debt forgiveness from Russia and other lender nations.

Relations with the United States

Iraq had highly tense relations with most of the West throughout the 1990s, and with the United States (U.S.) in particular. American forces were the backbone of the military operations during the Gulf War, and the U.S. since used its influence to impose trade restrictions against Iraq.

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In 1997 and 1998, Iraq denounced the involvement of U.S. personnel on the weapons inspection team searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, declaring that the American inspectors were spies. In late 1999, the U.S. (with the United Kingdom or U.K.) launched a series of air strikes against Iraq.

The Clinton administration's foremost goal, to bring about a regime change in Iraq, led to the allocation of $97 million to support Iraqi opposition groups active outside Iraq. In February 2001, the Bush administration approved that four million dollars be used by the Iraqi National Congress to collect information on alleged violations of human rights and U.N. resolutions inside Iraq. President George W. Bush's first military action in office was the Feb. 16, 2001, bombing of targets around Baghdad.

U.S. and British milit ary planes continued to patrol the "no fly zones" and occasionally bomb Iraqi defense sites in 2002 and the first months of 2003. Iraq claimed to hit a number of unmanned planes, though U.S. and British officials denied these claims.

Meanwhile, over the course of 2001, the U.S. joined the campaign for reforming the current sanctions into "smart sanctions" that target the regime, the military and security apparatuses more efficiently, and makes ordinary peoples lives easier. Two of the permanent members of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council, China and Russia, wanted to lift the sanctions all together.

The events on Sept. 11, 2001, and the political and military aftermath were of significant importance to U.S. foreign policy in general, and toward Iraq in particular. The threat of widening the actions had severe repercussions for Iraq, as well as the entire region. A statement by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on N ovember 8 marked a shift in U.S. rhetoric. For the first time, Powell mentioned Iraq as a possible target in the U.S-led campaign against terrorism.

In late January 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush, in his first State of the Union address, declared Iraq along with North Korea and Iran, as a member of an "axis of evil." The U.S. government adamantly maintained that Iraq was pursuing the development of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Since that State of the Union address, the Bush administration repeatedly stated that the U.S. was examining a full range of options in dealing with Iraq, and analysts believed that future military action against Iraq was imminent. However, unlike the war against terror in Afghanistan, the U.S. stood largely alone in its military policy against Iraq.

U.K. Prime Minister Blair continued to strongly support the U.S. in its position against Iraq both through military intervention and UN sanctions, though it was, at first, unclear the role the British military would play in the possibility of a U.S-led offensive as the idea of British military action is highly unpopular in the UK.

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Iraq responded by stating that it was ready for a U.S. military strike and also accused the U.S. of state terrorism.

Special Entry: War in 2003

In late August 2002, voices in the Bush administration were stridently calling for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, citing the need for pre-emptive action against Iraq, which appeared poised on the verge of developing nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

With international outcry against unilateral -- or even bilateral -- military action against Iraq, U.S. President George W. Bush addressed the United Nations in September 2002 in an attempt to shore up support for his efforts; specifically, he called for the international body to b ring Iraq back into line with the dictates of a number of resolutions against Iraq. Most of the resolutions mandate weapons inspection, and as such, the resumption of this program remains the procedure of choice among most of the global community, however, the U.S. government is hoping for a strong resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq instead. This resolution would be offered to the United Nations; it would then have to be approved by the United Nations General Assembly and most importantly, by the Security Council.

France and Russia, both permanent members of the Security Council, stated they did not see the need for another resolution. Instead, they favored going ahead with inspections on the basis of the letter from the Iraqi government, which was delivered to the United Nations in mid-September. Members of the Arab community generally and collectively eschewed military action against Iraq, however, some Arabic countries, such as Saudi Arabia, said that support for military action could be gained if it is sanctioned by the United Nations.

By the spring of 2003, the war in Iraq was in full force and regime change had been realized. With U.S. and U.K. forces controlling Iraq, the landscape of foreign relations radically changed.

Even with a return to official Iraqi political control and quasi-sovereignty in 2004, coalition forces continued to operate in Iraq and the theme of "foreign occupation" continues to resound across the global spectrum to date.

In this regard, Syria and Jordan called in August 2004 for a complete withdrawal of "occupation forces" from Iraq, noting that continued occupation of Iraq by foreign forces had only served to destabilize the already-volatile Middle East region of the world.

By 2005 and well into 2008, political voices from the United States -- many of them opponents of the Bush administration -- were calling for a withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq. It was an issue of political magnitude both in Washington and in Baghdad.

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United States troops withdrew from Iraq's cities, towns and military bases on June 30, 2009, in keeping with a prevailing bilateral agreement. Iraqi security forces were now charged with keeping the peace. Iraqi politicians of various ethno-sectarian backgrounds lauded the move as a sign of progress is the path of sovereignty. Hashim al-Taie of the Accordance Front said, "The pullout is a very good step on the path to independence and sovereignty and Iraqis are glad of that." Mahmoud Othman, from the main Kurdish alliance in parliament, said, "We have concerns. Some towns still have trouble -- mixed areas -- but those concerns should not prevent the withdrawal."

For his part, United States President Bush noted that "Sovereignty Day" was a significant milestone for Iraq, but warned that Iraq would yet be faced with "difficult days" in the future. Indeed, there were some anxieties that the withdrawal of United States troops could well act as a trigger for increasing ethno-sectarian violence across the country.

Since 2009, President Barack Obama has championed a phased withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq. By mid-2009, United States troops were alread withdrawing from towns and cities of Iraq. That said, the violence in Iraq, after seeing some improvement, was seeing an increase, which was largely based on the limited capacity of Iraqi forces to stabilize the country, as discussed elsewhere in this report.

Indeed, at the start of October 2009, the United States had accelerated its military withdrawal from Iraq and intended to redeploy 4,000 troops within a month. Accordingly, the number of United States troops in Iraq was expected to go from 124,000 to 120,000 by the close of October 2009. The top American commander in Iraq, Army General Ray Odierno, explained that it was the latest move aimed at ending the United States' engagement in that country. In an eight-page statement intended to be delivered at a Congressional committee, he said, "We have already begun deliberately drawing down our forces - without sacrificing security." Odierno continued, "As we go forward, we will thin our lines across Iraq in order to reduce the risk and sustain stability through a deliberate transition of responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces."

Odierno expressed tentative optimism about the prospects of a stable Iraq in the future, while acknowledging the reality of continued violence, as evidenced by the August 19, 2009 bombings at two Iraqi government ministries. He also noted that ethnic, sectarian and regional divisions continued to plague the country. He observed that unresolved tensions between the Arab and Kurdish populations promised to present problems in the 2010 parliamentary elections, with various groups seeking control over regional oil wealth. That said, Odierno suggested that most Iraqis sought peace and security, while opposing militancy and violence. He said, "The overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people have rejected extremism," Odierno said. "We see no indications of a return to the sectarian violence that plagued Iraq in 2006-2007."

Note: Odierno's congressional testimony was obtained by the Associated Press and the plan to

Iraq Review 2016 Page 368 of 609 pages Iraq reduce the number of brigades in Iraq was confirmed by the Defense Department.

Special Report: U.S. ends combat operations in Iraq after seven and a half years

In the early hours of Aug. 19, 2010 (Iraq time) the last major combat brigade of United States forces left Iraq and crossed the border into Kuwait. They were protected from above by Apache helicopters and F-16 fighters, and on the ground by both American military and the very Iraqi armed forces that they helped to train. The exit of the United States forces ensued in a phased basis over the course of several days. The final convoy of the United States Army’s 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, was carrying 14,000 United States combat forces in Iraq, according to Richard Engel of NBC/MSNBC News, who was embedded with the brigade. A small number of United States combat troops were yet to depart Iraq, and approximately 50,000 troops would remain in Iraq until the end of 2011 in a support role to train Iraqi forces. Indeed, by Aug. 24, 2010, less than 50,000 United States troops were reported to be "in country" -- the very lowest level since the start of the war in 2003.

While violence continued in Iraq -- even in the days after the last American combat brigade left Iraq -- it was apparent that the Obama administration in the United States would not be deterred from the schedule for withdrawal, these fragile and chaotic conditions on the ground in Iraq notwithstanding. This decision has been a source of consternation among some quarters. In fact, a top military official in Iraq has questioned the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq, warning that local security forces were not able to handle the security challenges on their own for at least a decade. Echoing a similar tone, military officials from the United States said in an interview with the Los Angeles Times that it was highly unlikely that Iraqi security forces were capable of maintaining Iraq's fragile stability after the exit of United States troops from Iraq in 2010.

The withdrawal of the last major combat brigade was regarded with great symbolism as an end to the combat mission of the war in Iraq that has gone on for seven and a half years. It also made clear that President Obama was fulfilling his central campaign promise to end the war in Iraq -- a vow that was reiterated in 2009 when President Obama set the deadline for the end of the combat mission in Iraq as Aug. 31, 2010. To this end, President Obama was fulfilling this promise even though Iraq was yet to form a new government several months after its parliamentary elections. It should be noted that the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq was set forth in the Status of Forces agreement signed two years ago.

President Obama gave a televised address on August 31, 2010 regarding the end of the active phase of United States operations in Iraq. That was the official deadline set by President Obama for the exit of combat forces from Iraq and the end to the war.

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In this address to the nation from the Oval Office, President Obama asserted: "Operation Iraqi Freedom is over, and the Iraqi people now have lead responsibility for the security of their country." President Obama paid tribute to the military who carried out their mission, saying that he was "awed" by the sacrifices made by the men and women in uniform in service of the United States. President Obama additionally noted that the United States itself paid a high price for the Iraq War saying, "The United States has paid a huge price to put the future of Iraq in the hands of its people." The president noted that he disagreed with his predecessor, former President George W. Bush, on the very premise of the war, but urged the nation to "turn the page" on that chapter of recent history. To these ends, he said: "We have sent our young men and women to make enormous sacrifices in Iraq, and spent vast resources abroad at a time of tight budgets at home... Through this remarkable chapter in the history of the US and Iraq, we have met our responsibility. Now, it is time to turn the page."

For his part, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki noted that his country was "independent" and said that Iraqi security forces would now confront all the security threats facing the nation. Maliki said in his own address to the nation, "Iraq today is sovereign and independent. Our security forces will take the lead in ensuring security and safeguarding the country and removing all threats that the country has to weather, internally or externally." He also sought to reassure Iraqis that the security forces were "capable and qualified to shoulder the responsibility" of keeping Iraq safe and secure.

Special Update

United Nations lifts sanctions against Iraq

It should also be noted that in December 2010, the United Nations Security Council lifted sanctions against Iraq. The vote ended most of the measures comprising a harsh sanctions regime that had been held in place for almost two decades, starting with the time of Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait during the era of Saddam Hussein. In its statement, the United Nations Security Council said that it "recognizes that the situation now existing in Iraq is significantly different from that which existed at the time of the adoption of Resolution 661." Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said of the move, "Today Iraq will be liberated from all sanctions caused by wars and misdeeds of the former regime.” Meanwhile, United States Vice President Joe Biden, who acted as chairman of the meeting, said: "Iraq is on the cusp of something remarkable -- a stable, self-reliant nation." Striking a more pragmatic tone, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon noted that Iraq would yet have to forge an agreement with Kuwait in regards to its border, and would also have to resolve the matter of war reparations. To date, five percent of Iraq's oil revenues have been used to pay war reparations to Kuwait.

Special Report:

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It's officially over; United States ends Iraq War

Summary: On Dec. 15, 2011, the flag of United States forces in Iraq was lowered in Baghdad, officially bringing the war to a close. As promised by President Barack Obama, the United States military would complete a full withdrawal of its troops from Iraq by the close of 2011. The move, as discussed here, would provide President Obama with the opportunity to assert that he kept of one his most important 2008 campaign promises: to bring the controversial war in Iraq to a responsible conclusion. Speaking at a ceremony at Fort Bragg in North Carolina for troops returning home the previous day, President Obama declared: "The war in Iraq will soon belong to history, and your service will belong to the ages." He additionally noted that his country had left behind a "sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq." At home, Americans were sure to applaud the fact that there would be no more expenditure on former President George Bush's Iraq War, which cost some one trillion USD. Meanwhile, the future course of Iraq -- in terms of political stability, national security, and economic development -- was now in the hands of the Iraqi people.

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U.S. ends combat operations in Iraq after seven and a half years

In the early hours of Aug. 19, 2010, (Iraq time) the last major combat brigade of United States forces left Iraq and crossed the border into Kuwait. They were protected from above by Apache helicopters and F-16 fighters, and on the ground by both American military and the very Iraqi armed forces that they helped to train. The exit of the United States forces ensued in a phased basis over the course of several days. The final convoy of the United States Army’s 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, was carrying 14,000 United States combat forces in Iraq, according to Richard Engel of NBC/MSNBC News, who was embedded with the brigade. A small number of United States combat troops were yet to depart Iraq, and approximately 50,000 troops would remain in Iraq until the end of 2011 in a support role to train Iraqi forces. Indeed, by Aug. 24, 2010, less than 50,000 United States troops were reported to be "in country" -- the very lowest level since the start of the war in 2003.

While violence continued in Iraq -- even in the days after the last American combat brigade left Iraq -- it was apparent that the Obama administration in the United States would not be deterred from the schedule for withdrawal, these fragile and chaotic conditions on the ground in Iraq notwithstanding. This decision has been a source of consternation among some quarters. In fact, a top military official in Iraq has questioned the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq, warning that local security forces were not able to handle the security challenges on their own for at least a decade. Echoing a similar tone, military officials from the United States said in an interview with the Los Angeles Times that it was highly unlikely that Iraqi security forces were capable of maintaining Iraq's fragile stability after the exit of United States troops from Iraq in 2010. Nevertheless, the citizenry in the United States was war-weary and concerned over the costs

Iraq Review 2016 Page 371 of 609 pages Iraq of war at a time of economic hardship, while President Barack Obama was intent on making good on his promises made while as a candidate and later, as president, to end the war.

The withdrawal of the last major combat brigade was regarded with great symbolism as an end to the combat mission of the war in Iraq that has gone on for seven and a half years. It also made clear that President Obama was fulfilling his central campaign promise to end the war in Iraq -- a vow that was reiterated in 2009 when President Obama set the deadline for the end of the combat mission in Iraq as Aug. 31, 2010. To this end, President Obama was fulfilling this promise even though Iraq was yet to form a new government several months after its parliamentary elections. It should be noted that the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq was set forth in the Status of Forces agreement signed two years ago.

President Obama gave a televised address on Aug. 31, 2010, regarding the end of the active phase of United States operations in Iraq. That was the official deadline set by President Obama for the exit of combat forces from Iraq and the end to the war.

In this address to the nation from the Oval Office, President Obama asserted: "Operation Iraqi Freedom is over, and the Iraqi people now have lead responsibility for the security of their country." President Obama paid tribute to the military that carried out their mission, saying that he was "awed" by the sacrifices made by the men and women in uniform in service of the United States. President Obama additionally noted that the United States itself paid a high price for the Iraq War saying, "The United States has paid a huge price to put the future of Iraq in the hands of its people." The president noted that he disagreed with his predecessor, former President George W. Bush, on the very premise of the war, but urged the nation to "turn the page" on that chapter of recent history. To these ends, he said: "We have sent our young men and women to make enormous sacrifices in Iraq, and spent vast resources abroad at a time of tight budgets at home... Through this remarkable chapter in the history of the US and Iraq, we have met our responsibility. Now, it is time to turn the page."

For his part, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki noted that his country was "independent" and that Iraqi security forces would now confront all the security threats facing the nation. Maliki said in his own address to the nation, "Iraq today is sovereign and independent. Our security forces will take the lead in ensuring security and safeguarding the country and removing all threats that the country has to weather, internally or externally." He also sought to reassure Iraqis that the security forces were "capable and qualified to shoulder the responsibility" of keeping Iraq safe and secure.

United Nations lifts sanctions on Iraq

It should also be noted that in December 2010, the United Nations Security Council lifted sanctions against Iraq. The vote ended most of the measures comprising a harsh sanctions regime that had been held in place for almost two decades, starting with the time of Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait during the era of Saddam Hussein. In its statement, the United Nations Security Council

Iraq Review 2016 Page 372 of 609 pages Iraq said that it "recognizes that the situation now existing in Iraq is significantly different from that which existed at the time of the adoption of Resolution 661." Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said of the move, "Today Iraq will be liberated from all sanctions caused by wars and misdeeds of the former regime.” Meanwhile, United States Vice President Joe Biden, who acted as chairman of the meeting, said: "Iraq is on the cusp of something remarkable -- a stable, self-reliant nation." Striking a more pragmatic tone, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon noted that Iraq would yet have to forge an agreement with Kuwait in regards to its border, and would also have to resolve the matter of war reparations. To date, five percent of Iraq's oil revenues have been used to pay war reparations to Kuwait.

U.S. President Obama announces complete withdrawal of troops by close of 2011

On Oct. 21, 2011, United States President Barack Obama announced the complete withdrawal of all American troops from Iraq by the close of 2011. President Obama said his country's nine-year military engagement in Iraq would officially come to an end at that time. He noted that the United States had fulfilled its commitment in Iraq and would bring all American troops home "in time for the holidays."

With the end of United States' combat operations in Iraq in August 2010, the end of the war was believed to be in the offing. That being said, at the time in mid-2010, approximately 50,000 troops remained in Iraq in a support role to train Iraqi forces. Negotiations have been ongoing since that time to forge a deal that would allow them to stay in Iraq to work with Iraqi security forces. However, the United States and Iraq were unable to find concurrence on an agreement allowing United States trainers to remain "in country" and still enjoy immunity. Thus, United States President Obama and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki concluded that the time had come to shift the nature of their bilateral relationship to one marked by respect for mutual sovereignty.

The end of the Iraq war would close a controversial chapter in the story of American foreign policy, which began with George W. Bush's doctrine of "pre-emptive war," undertaken in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Indeed, the invasion of Iraq -- the defining policy decision of former President Bush -- resulted in the ousting of former Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, from office. The invasion of Iraq was criticized as a violation of international law by many, and condemned as ill-conceived foreign policy by others who argued that Iraq had nothing to do with the terror attacks in the United States of 2001, and that Iraq was not home to weapons of mass destruction -- the two expressed reasons for going to war in Iraq, according to the Bush administration. Analysts further warned that the deleterious consequence of the war and the unintended result of the ousting of Saddam Hussein would be ethno-sectarian strife and a strengthened Iran. Of course, on the other side of the equation, the Bush administration insisted on the necessity of the war in the interests of national security. These competing viewpoints notwithstanding, the war in Iraq ultimately left more than 4,400 American soldiers and tens of thousands of Iraqis dead.

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As President Bush's successor to the presidency, President Obama has stood as a vocal critic of the Iraq war whose political influence in the war-weary United States intensified due to his pledge to bring an end to the controversial military engagement in Iraq. Clearly, now in 2011, President Obama was honoring a 2008 campaign promise to end the war in Iraq in a responsible manner. Indeed, President Obama said: "The U.S. leaves Iraq with our heads held high." He continued, "That is how America's military efforts in Iraq will end."

It should also be noted that the Obama administration has emphasized the fact there will be no permanent military bases in Iraq -- even after the withdrawal of all remaining troops from Iraq at the end of 2011. As well, as stated in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2010 passed by Congress and signed by President Obama on Oct. 28, 2009: "No funds appropriated pursuant to an authorization of appropriations in this Act may be obligated or expended ... to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq." That being said, Iraq is home to one of the United States' most significant embassies.

Flag of U.S. forces in Iraq lowered in Baghdad bringing the war to a close

On Dec. 15, 2011, the flag of United States forces in Iraq was lowered in Baghdad, officially bringing the war to a close. The small, somber, and symbolic ceremony in Baghdad, which focused on the military tradition of retiring or "casing" the flag, marked the end of the Iraq War. On this historic day, only 4,000 troops remained "in country," and were expected to depart Iraq within two weeks. At the height of the United States-led occupation of Iraq, there were as many as 170,000 American troops in that country.

Speaking of the momentous occasion, United States Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said: "To all of the men and women in uniform today your nation is deeply indebted to you." Secretary Panetta paid tribute to the sacrifices of United States' troops saying that they could leave Iraq with great pride. He declared, "After a lot of blood spilled by Iraqis and Americans, the mission of an Iraq that could govern and secure itself has become real."

As promised by President Barack Obama, the United States military would complete a full withdrawal of its troops from Iraq by the close of 2011. The move, as discussed here, would provide President Obama with the opportunity to assert that he kept of one his most important 2008 campaign promises: to bring the controversial war in Iraq to a responsible conclusion.

Speaking at a ceremony at Fort Bragg in North Carolina for troops returning home the previous day, President Obama declared: "The war in Iraq will soon belong to history, and your service will belong to the ages." He additionally noted that his country had left behind a "sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq." The American president also asserted that United States troops had left "with their heads held high" and he lauded their "extraordinary achievement." President Obama said, "Everything that American troops have done in Iraq, all the fighting and dying, bleeding and

Iraq Review 2016 Page 374 of 609 pages Iraq building, training and partnering, has led us to this moment of success." He continued, "You have shown why the U.S. military is the finest fighting force in the history of the world." At home, Americans were sure to applaud the fact that there would be no more expenditure on former President George Bush's Iraq War, which cost some one trillion USD.

Iraq -- while now liberated from the dictatorial hand of Saddam Hussein -- was not fully stabilized. Indeed, an insurgency continues to plague the country, which is culturally and politically characterized by ethno-sectarian tensions. There are enduring questions about the Iraqis' ability to maintain security in this country. Nevertheless, Iraq has made it clear that the time had come to end the occupation of their country. Indeed, as stated by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Hussain al- Shahristani, "I think we are all happy that the American soldiers are returning home safely to their families and we are also confident that the Iraqi people and their armed forces, police, are in a position now to take care of their own security."

Clearly, the future course of Iraq -- in terms of political stability, national security and economic development -- was now in the hands of the Iraqi people. That agenda would not be achieved with ease. On Dec. 20, 2011, only one day after the United States withdrew its last combat troops from Iraq, the Shi'a-dominated government of that country ordered the arrest of Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni, on grounds of terrorism. The Iraqi authorities accused al-Hashimi of directing a death squad that assassinated police officers and government officials. The serious charges were sure to damage the coalition government, and indeed, already a Sunni-backed political coalition said that its ministers would resign from their posts, effectively leaving several Iraqi agencies in disarray. While the charges themselves, if true, could not be understood as anything by highly disturbing, another school of thought was warning that the the Shi'a dominated government might be abusing its authority to persecute the minority Sunni in leadership positions, in a bid to consolidate power. For his part, Vice President Hashemi denied any wrongdoing and said he was ready to defend himself against the accusations of terrorism. Vice President Hashemi also wasted no time in accusing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shi'a, of orchestrating a sensational plot to debase him and to undermine the process of national reconciliation. He also warned that the situation could send Iraq -- an incredibly young and fragile democracy characterized by complex ethno-sectarian tensions -- into a state of sectarian war.

Special Report

Terror group Islamic State carries out rampage of horror from Syria to Iraq; United States President Obama outlines strategy to to "degrade and ultimately destroy" the Jihadist terror group alternatively referred to as ISIL and ISIS --

Summary:

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Sunni Islamic extremist militants, under the aegis of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS), have seized control over wide swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory. In Iraq, ISIL held sway -- from Fallujah and Ramadi in Anbar province, to Mosul in Nineveh, as well as Tikrit -- the hometown of the ousted and late Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Across the border in Syria, ISIL was proving to be the most successful anti- government force in that country. It was consolidating territory held either by the Assad regime or by rival rebel entities, even ousting other Islamist insurgent and terrorist groups in the process. These gains collectively constituted a spectacular victory for ISIL, which seeks to establish a Sunni Islamic Caliphate in territory that includes Iraq and Syria.

As Syria and Iraq respectively grappled with the tumultuous security landscapes within their borders, their political spheres were also mired by turmoil. In Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki's treatment of the Sunni minority, including his persecution of former Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni, and raids on anti-government protest camps, had alienated even the more moderate Sunni elements in that country. As a result, Salafist Sunni Jihadists from home and abroad were answering the call to fight on Iraqi soil. At the same time, the power vacuum from the Syrian civil war had provided fertile ground for ISIL to take root, not simply challenging the Assad regime but also attracting Jihadists from across the world seeking a "cause" upon which to concentrate. ISIL's ascendancy thus mitigated Assad's control over wide swaths of Syrian territory while simultaneously delivering a remarkable blow across the border to the Iraqi leader at the time, Shi'a Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

The year 2014 saw Iraq rocked by the worst violence and bloodshed in recent years. The violence in Iraq was the result of the aforementioned ethno-sectarian dissonance between Sunni Muslims and Shi'a Muslims, and the dramatic and escalating political conflict between the Shi'a dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the increasingly alienated Sunni opposition. In the month of June 2014 alone, more than 2,000 people -- mostly civilians -- had been killed in the violence rocking Iraq, according to the United Nations. It was the bloodiest and most deadly month in Iraq since the peak of ethno-sectarian warfare in Iraq in 2007.

Given this restive and volatile landscape, the United Nations envoy to Iraq, Martin Kobler, warned that "systemic violence" was about to explode "at any moment" in that country. Kobler called on Iraq's political leaders to "engage immediately to pull the country out of this mayhem." As stated by Gyorgy Busztin, the United Nation's Iraq representative, "The impact of violence on civilians remains disturbingly high." He also called on Iraq's leadership to take steps to end the violence saying, "Iraq's political leaders must take immediate and decisive action to stop the senseless bloodshed."

The summer of 2014 was marked by devolving chaos in Iraq as ISIL expanded their control from Fallujah and Ramadi in Anbar province, to Mosul in Nineveh, as well as Tikrit -- the hometown of the ousted and late Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, making significant territorial gains.

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Across the border in Syria, the Assad regime had been grappling with an ongoing uprising that started in the Arab Spring of 2011. President Bashar al-Assad's brutal tactics aimed at quelling that uprising against various rebel factions served only to create an even more tumultuous landscape, and eventually set the path for a full-blown civil war. That civil war pitted the Assad forces, backed by Lebanon-based Hezbollah, against a disparate cabal of anti-government entities, ranging from the rebel Free Syrian Army to several Islamist terrorist enclaves. As noted above, the power vacuum from the Syrian civil war provided a breeding ground for extremism that ISIL could exploit and use to both challenge the Assad regime and function as a recruitment tool for Jihadists.

The result was a series of strategic victories across Syria and Iraq for ISIL. Then, at the start of July 2014, the security crisis in the region was at acute levels as ISIL had declared itself to be the sovereign power over a "caliphate" ranging from Syria to Iraq and renamed itself the "Islamic State."

Throughout, the United States-trained Iraqi forces proved themselves to be ineffectual in fighting ISIL. In fact, Iraqi troops abandoned their positions, thus allowing the terrorists to make off with heavy military equipment provided to the Iraqi military by the United States. Indeed, the only defense being provided against ISIL in Iraq were the Kurds who were now having to face ISIL terrorists armed with stolen American weaponry. While Kurdish peshmerga forces were far more engaged in the fight to save Kurdistan, they were nonetheless no match for ISIL, which now had in its possession United States-provided weapons that had been abandoned by Iraqi forces.

President Barack Obama of the United States was not eager to re-enter into a military engagement in Iraq, and as such, he advocated that leaders in Iraq work towards a political solution. That political solution remained elusive as Prime Minister Maliki refused to form an inclusive national unity government and as members of parliament failed to agree on a new government. Given the frustration over the failure of the Iraqi government in Baghdad to address the political and security crisis facing Iraq, the Kurdish president called for an independence referendum. The Kurds were also taking advantage of the power chasm by seizing control over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

But the scene in Iraq took an ominous turn in August 2014 as Islamic State was now pushing Kurdish peshmerga fighters into retreat. ISIL (or the so-called Islamic State) was exerting its self- declared power and authority as it carried out a rampage of barbaric violence, brutally targeting some of Iraq's historic minority communities. Certainly, Islamic State's persecution of Iraq's minority populations, particularly Christian and Yazidis, could be understood as nothing less than gross human rights abuses, even as it triggered a humanitarian crisis.

Initially, United States President Barack Obama dispatched military advisers to Iraq but ruled out renewed military engagement in that country; instead, as noted above, he called for a political solution. As the author of the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq, President Obama was

Iraq Review 2016 Page 377 of 609 pages Iraq not keen to be drawn back into the Iraqi quagmire. But having recognized the dire landscape for religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq, on Aug. 7, 2014, United States President Barack Obama ordered limited strikes in northern Iraq, released a supply of arms to Kurdish peshmerga fighters resisting Islamic State, and provided humanitarian relief supplies to civilians forced to flee their homes.

The presence of Maliki at the helm of Iraq had stood as another obstacle, as the United States was unwilling to be the unofficial military support of a Shi'a government known to have persecuted the Sunni minority population of Iraq. But the subsequent replacement of the Maliki government with a more inclusive Abadi government set the tone for an improved domestic scenario in Iraq, to the relief of the United States and the wider world. It also provided a more hospitable climate for increased United States' engagement in Iraq to fight ISIL.

That being said, the barbaric beheadings of two American journalists by ISIL fundamentally changed the calculus both for the war-weary American public as well as the American president. As a consequence, on Sept. 10, 2014, President Barack Obama outlined a counter-terrorism strategy to "degrade and ultimately destroy" ISIL -- not only in Iraq where the United States was already engaged in a limited manner, but also in Syria. To that end, the Obama administration was rallying a coalition of Western and Middle Eastern partners -- including Jordan -- to take on the threat posed to global security by ISIL.

In truth, the advance of ISIL in not only Iraq but also Syria had compounded the geopolitical crisis facing the Middle East. Suddenly, anti-Assad countries in the region were finding themselves in the uncomfortable position of sharing with Syria the goal of eliminating ISIL. For their part, Arab countries in the region were slow to respond to ISIL. Nevertheless, the Arab League was slowly coming to terms with the fact that it would have to have to engage in the regional security crisis and that its objectives would likely, at times, overlap with that of the Assad regime. Indeed, in September 2014, the Arab League endorsed the effort to confront Islamic States at a time when the United States was rallying allied countries to join the effort to repel and eradicate ISIL.

For his part, United States President Barack Obama made clear that his country was committed to eliminating the leadership of Islamic State (also known as ISIL or ISIS), while noting that a coalition of NATO allies and Middle Eastern partners was prepared to join the campaign against the brutality of these extremist Islamist Jihadists, and to take on the threat posed to global security by this dangerous terrorist group.

Accordingly, on Sept. 22, 2014, international coalition forces, led by the United States and including both European and Arab partner countries, commenced a campaign of air strikes against Islamist terror groups in Syria.

By October 2014, despite the active international air campaign over Iraq and Syria, ISIL continued

Iraq Review 2016 Page 378 of 609 pages Iraq to carry out its campaign of terror -- even extending the battlefield to Kurdish areas bordering Turkey. Irrespective of the fact that the town of Kobane (alternatively called Kobani and predominantly inhabited by Kurds) on the Turkish border was under siege, and regardless of legislation passed in Turkey's parliament authorizing action against ISIL, Turkey -- a NATO country -- showed little interest in joining the fight against ISIL, even with the protection of its own territory at stake.

Nevertheless, the United States-led global coalition was intensifying its strikes against ISIL targets; it was also air dropping weapons and military supplies to Kurdish forces.

The latter part of 2014 saw an intensification of the active air campaign over Iraq and Syria against ISIL by United States-led coalition forces. As well, United States President Obama called for more troops to be deployed to the region to assist with the training and advising of Iraqi forces.

At the start of 2015, Japan and Jordan were beset by tragedy when citizens of their countries that were being held by ISIL, were brutally killed. As has become a pattern, ISIL proudly released videotaped footage depicting their vicious acts of murder. In response, Japan promised to do its part in the international fight against ISIL while Jordanian King Abdullah warned of a "relentless war" on the Islamist terror group as it commenced a campaign of air strikes against ISIL targets in Syria.

In February 2015, the horrific killings of more than 20 Egyptian Christians working in Libya marked a new front in the war against Islamic State. Post-Arab Spring Libya was on the brink of political collapse with Islamist extremists taking advantage of the power void. The result was an emerging satellite Islamic State venue in Libya. However, Egypt -- like Jordan -- was prepared to respond to the threat posed by these Islamist Jihadists to its citizens and commenced its own air strike campaign against ISIL targets in Libya.

It was to be seen if the Jordanian and Egyptian responses would mark a turning point for the Arab and Islamic worlds, regarding the international effort to degrade and ultimately destroy the Islamist terror group, known in derogatory Arabic parlance as "Daesh."

Meanwhile, in February 2015, President Barack Obama of the United States called on the legislative branch of government in that country to advance new legislation authorizing military action against the terror group calling itself Islamic State. It was to be seen if partisan rivalries in the United States Congress would impede the process of passing a new authorization intended to carefully circumscribe the United States' military effort to degrade and destroy Islamic State.

Also at stake was a looming effort to retain control over the key Iraqi city of Mosul from Islamic State. To that end, United States military advisers were training joint Iraqi and Kurdish forces to achieve this end in what was expected to be a spring offensive operation. But before the Mosul

Iraq Review 2016 Page 379 of 609 pages Iraq offensive could move forward, the United States-led coalition continued to carry out air strikes in Iraq, supporting Kurdish fighters, with the goal being to drive Islamic State from the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

In mid-April 2015, the United States Pentagon confirmed that Islamic State lost more than a quarter of the territory in Iraq it held prior to the air campaign that was launched in August 2014. With the intent to build on this success, Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi traveled to the United States to request more assistance in the air campaign against Islamic State. However, before the United States could even process this request, in mid-April 2015 - on the heels of their victory in Tikrit - Islamic State was carrying out an advance on the city of Ramadi, ultimately seizing control of that city in May 2015. It was apparent in the spring of 2015 that even if Islamic State was under pressure, it was still a functional and aggressive terrorist entity.

By the start of June 2015, with Islamic State still posing a threat in Iraq and Syria, as well as to the wider Middle Eastern region, and even the global community, United States President Barack Obama acknowledged that his country's strategy to defeat the terror group remained "incomplete." He indicated that a comprehensive strategy could only be advanced with the concurrence of the government of Iraq, and intimated there was a need for Iraqis to commit to the process of saving their own country.

It should be noted that whereas some progress had occurred in Iraq, the prevailing dynamics remained in place in Syria where Islamic State continued to hold sway over large swaths of that country.

That being said, by mid-2015, with Islamic State posing a direct security threat to Turkey, the Turkish government shifted its calculus regarding its engagement in the international fight against the terror group. Turkey had to this point refrained from involving itself in the global coalition against Islamic State, and has instead focused its energies on seeing the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria come to an end. Now, the United States and Turkey was announcing a campaign of close cooperation in the effort against Islamic State. But the Turkish government raised eyebrows when it announced it would also go after strongholds of Kurdish extremists as part of its burgeoning campaign against terrorism -- a move sure to raise the ire of Syrian Kurdish fighters, the YPG, who were to be distinguished from the PKK and who had led the local charge against Islamic State.

In November 2015, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters launched an effort against Islamic State, with an eye on liberating the area of Sinjar.

In mid-November 2015, the world was faced with a global security crisis at the hands of the notorious terror group, Islamic State. At issue was the fact that Islamic State was claiming responsibility for a bomb that exploded on a Russian jet flying from the Egyptian resort of Sharm-

Iraq Review 2016 Page 380 of 609 pages Iraq el-Sheikh, killing more than 200 Russians on board. Also at issue was the Islamic State claim of responsibility for a spate of appalling terror attacks in the French capital city of Paris, which killed approximately 130 people.

At the start of December 2015, Islamic State-inspired terrorists carried out an attack in the United States, killing 14 people and injuring 21 others. Even before this act of bloodshed, though, the Obama administration in the United States had already augmented the air strike campaign against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria with the deployment of military advisors, and at the start of December 2015, President Obama supplemented these forces with a special operations expeditionary force to fight Islamic State. While this deployment collectively could actually be defined as ground forces, it was clearly being interpreted by hardline conservatives as insufficient. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter outlined the goals the special operations expeditionary force as follows: "These special operators will over time be able to conduct raids, free hostages, gather intelligence and capture ISIL leaders." For the Obama administration, the imperative was to exploit the special operations expertise in a targeted strategy against Islamic State.

At the close of December 2015, Iraqi forces saw success in retaking control over Ramadi, which has for some time been a key stronghold of Islamic State. In the same period, United States-led air power eliminated 10 Islamic State leadership figures while going after oil resources used by the terror group.

By the start of 2016, United States air power successfully targeted banking facility used by ISIL, essentially depriving the terror group of the funds used to finance their activities. The United States-led coalition was also seeing success going after Islamic State leadership and resources. As well, having come off their victory in taking back control over Ramadi from Islamic State, Iraqi forces were refocusing their attention on Mosul.

NOTE:

See "Special Report" in the "Political Conditions" of this Country Review for more information related to the takeover of wide swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory by Islamist extremists known as "Islamic State" since 2014. Also included in that report is coverage of the regional and international dyanamics.

Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, www.countrywatch.com . See Bibliography for list of general research sources.

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National Security

External Threats

Years after the United States-led invasion of Iraq, the situation has remained critical. Instability within Iraqitself is a central problem, leading analysts to wonder if the country has slipped into a state of low grade civil war. Insurgents loyal to the recently-ousted regime, various factions vying for power, foreign terrorists, and rampant crime have continued to challenge coalition forces and the Iraqi administration in their bid to restore order to the country. Internal disorder has inhibited the resolution of territorial disputes and the establishment of maritime boundaries with neighboring countries.

Iraq is also involved in a maritime boundary dispute with Iran over the jurisdiction of territory beyond the mouth of the Shatt al Arab in the Persian Gulf. Turkey is also concerned over the status of the ethnic Kurds who reside in Iraq.

Crime

Despite the presence of coalition forces in Iraq and regardless of claims that local Iraqi security forces are increasingly being placed on the streets, crime has remained rampant. Developing a domestic law enforcement apparatus capable of effectively combating crime has been one of many challenges before Iraq's government on the road to fostering long-term stability in the country. Crimes ranging from petty theft to car-jacking to kidnapping are all cause of concern for those in Iraq.

Insurgencies

Militants continue to challenge the authority of coalition forces and Iraq's interim administration. On a broader scale, lingering hostilities between various domestic groups threaten to propel the country into civil war. Iraqi elements loyal to the ousted regime and foreign Islamic extremists have continued to attack coalition and Iraqi government forces, as well as non-combatants, since the declaration of an end to hostilities in Iraqon May 1, 2003. The insurgent elements have perpetrated bombings, targeted assassinations, and kidnappings, several of which have ended with gruesome videotaped executions.

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But the ranks of the insurgency are increasingly being populated by Iraqis who have become radicalized, almost by accretion, as a consequence of the horrendous conditions in Iraqsince 2003. Once supportive of the ousting of Saddam Hussein's regime, this cadre of insurgents is increasingly anti-American in orientation as the human conditions of foreign occupation takes its toll. The symbolic return to self-rule in 2004 had little effect on assuaging these factions as the Iraqi interim government was viewed as illegitimate and imposed from the West. The elections that took place in early 2005 have neither stemmed the political violence nor assuaged the factions within Iraq.

The amount of civilian deaths has actually increased since the election. In 2005, one estimate suggested that there have been over 8000 Iraqi civilian, police, and troop deaths in the first half of that year from insurgent attacks. United States troop deaths number approximately 300 in the same time span (first part of 2005). A year later in 2006, approximately 60 American soldiers had been killed in the first two weeks of October 2006 alone. Indeed, in October 2006, since the start of the war in 2003, the number of United States soldiers killed in Iraq stood at over 2760; those injured numbered over 20,000. By 2007, that number had surpassed 3,000.

The issue of the civilian death toll in Iraq was also the subject of great consternation. In May 2006, the government of Iraq said that the number of people dying violently in Baghdad was increasing. The main mortuary of the capital apparently received 1,400 bodies in May alone. There were fears that news of this disturbing trend would further enflame sectarian tensions. The record was hardly improved by mid-2006. Then, by October 2006, there had been a disturbing surge in the already-high rate of deaths in Iraq. Reports estimated that an average of 100 people were dying per day in violence across Iraq -- a rate that would suggest around 3,000 deaths in a single month.

In October 2006, the John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health estimated that an astronomic 655,000 civilians had died in Iraq since the start of the war in 2003. United States George W. Bush's supposition that only 30,000 civilians had died since 2003 seemed at odds with these latest findings.

As a result of the upsurge in violence, the United Nations refugee agency, known by the acronym UNHCR, said that tens of thousands of Iraqis were fleeing the country. In the latter part of 2006, the UNHCR said that in addition to the record number of Iraqis seeking asylum outside the country's borders, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were fleeing violent areas and were now essentially displaced within their own country. While media attention has been focused on the episodes of violence, it has not captured the steady stream of Iraqis out of the country in what could only described as a mass exodus. The media was also failing to capture the exponentially- increasing number of internally displaced Iraqis, which was estimated at about 300,000 since February of 2006.

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Also significant, the highly classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) has painted an extremely pessimistic picture of Iraq. Despite the document's sensitive nature, the press managed to obtain, and widely report, hints of its contents to the public (see Supplementary Source at the bottom of this review). The previous NIE considered the period between July 2004 and the end of 2005. Amongst other dire predictions, it reported the possible eruption of a civil war in Iraqwithin that timeframe. Even prior to the period of the United States led-invasion, internal discord between different ethnic and religious groups in Iraqwas widely cited as a possible impediment to long-term stability there.

On September 23, 2006, the New York Times reported that the new NIE concluded that the threat of global terrorism had actually worsened rather than improved in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. The NIE -- an authoritative assessment of national security concerns -- attributed the United States-led invasion and occupation of Iraq to be the primary reason for this increased threat, largely because of its role in spurring Islamic radicalism and "jihadism." To this end, the initial portion of the NIE report commenced with a discussion titled, "Indicators of the Spread of the Global Jihadist Movement." The actual NIE, for which research began in 2004 and ended in April 2006, has remained classified. However, those familiar with the NIE agreed to talk to the New York Times about the details on condition of anonymity.

While there has been a dramatic decrease in the level of violence plaguing Iraq since the escalation of United States troops to Iraq (known as 'the surge'), attacks continue to occur with disturbing regularity, and there have been fears that incidences of violence were creeping up in numbers. By way of illustration, the United Nations released a report on July 8, 2010 noting that in 2009, 4,068 civilians were killed and 15,935 injured in violence in Iraq, demonstrating a decline in violence, according to the country's Ministry of Human Rights. However, since the latter part of 2009, the trend has been going in a somewhat negative direction. The United Nations report stated: "This represents an overall decrease in comparison to 2008. However, the second half of 2009 saw a large increase in the number of injured civilians when compared to the first half."

It was yet to be seen how the exit of United States forces from Iraq would affect the security scenario in that country.

Terrorism

In the aftermath of the United States-led invasion of Iraq, terrorism has become a central threat to the country's stability. In addition to Saddam loyalists, Islamic extremists of both foreign and domestic origin have continued to perpetrate spectacular acts of violence in Iraqon a frequent basis; including bombings, targeted assassinations, and kidnappings, several of which have ended with gruesome videotaped executions. The anti-coalition, anti-Iraqi administration militants have

Iraq Review 2016 Page 384 of 609 pages Iraq targeted combatants as well as civilians.

Iraqis party to five of the twelve international conventions and protocols pertaining to terrorism.

Key Insurgent and Terrorist Groups in Iraq

Key insurgent groups include Ba'athists loyal to Saddam Hussein, Sunni nationalists, and the Mujahideen Shura Council. Shi'ites are also responsible for insurgent activities and include Shi'a militias, the Badr Brigade and Moqtada al Sadr's Mehdi Army, which appears to be lessening its violent activities. Other groups include the Islamic Army of Iraq.

Al-Qaida-inspired elements are reportedly amongst those responsible for the strikes. Key among these is Al-Qaeda of Jihad Organisation in the Land of the Two Rivers or "Al-Qaida in Iraq," led by the now-deceased Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. This group gained notoriety for its broadcasts of butal beheadings of kidnapped victimes.

The only sizable group known to have been functioning prior to the invasion in 2003 is Ansar al- Islam. Comprised of Iraqi Kurds and Arabs that seek to establish and independent Islamic state in Iraq, the group emerged in December 2001. The United States Department of State estimates its total membership at between 700 and 1,000. Some of its members may have taken refuge in neighboring Iran.

Note: In recent years, the terrorist group posing the most significant threat to Iraq was the Sunni Islamic extremist militant movement, under the aegis of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS). In 2014, that group seized control over wide swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory, declared itself to be an Islamic Caliphate, and carried out genocidal acts against the minority populations in the region. Not satisfied to target that region of the Middle East, the well-finded Islamic State terror movement warned of its Jihadist ambitions against the countries of the West, including the United States.

Special Entry

It's officially over; United States ends Iraq War

Summary: On Dec. 15, 2011, the flag of United States forces in Iraq was lowered in Baghdad, officially bringing the war to a close. As promised by President Barack Obama, the United States military would complete a full withdrawal of its troops from Iraq by the close of 2011. The move, as discussed here, would provide President Obama with the opportunity to assert that he kept of one his most important 2008 campaign promises: to bring the controversial war in Iraq to a

Iraq Review 2016 Page 385 of 609 pages Iraq responsible conclusion. Speaking at a ceremony at Fort Bragg in North Carolina for troops returning home the previous day, President Obama declared: "The war in Iraq will soon belong to history, and your service will belong to the ages." He additionally noted that his country had left behind a "sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq." At home, Americans were sure to applaud the fact that there would be no more expenditure on former President George Bush's Iraq War, which cost some one trillion USD. Meanwhile, the future course of Iraq -- in terms of political stability, national security, and economic development -- was now in the hands of the Iraqi people.

NOTE:

See "Special Report" in the "Political Conditions" of this Country Review for more information related to the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq, followed by latest development related to the national security landscape of Iraq.

Special Report

Terror group Islamic State carries out rampage of horror from Syria to Iraq; United States President Obama outlines strategy to to "degrade and ultimately destroy" the Jihadist terror group alternatively referred to as ISIL and ISIS --

Sunni Islamic extremist militants, under the aegis of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS), have seized control over wide swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory. In Iraq, ISIL held sway -- from Fallujah and Ramadi in Anbar province, to Mosul in Nineveh, as well as Tikrit -- the hometown of the ousted and late Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Across the border in Syria, ISIL was proving to be the most successful anti- government force in that country. It was consolidating territory held either by the Assad regime or by rival rebel entities, even ousting other Islamist insurgent and terrorist groups in the process. These gains collectively constituted a spectacular victory for ISIL, which seeks to establish a Sunni Islamic Caliphate in territory that includes Iraq and Syria.

As Syria and Iraq respectively grappled with the tumultuous security landscapes within their borders, their political spheres were also mired by turmoil. In Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki's treatment of the Sunni minority, including his persecution of former Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni, and raids on anti-government protest camps, had alienated even the more moderate Sunni elements in that country. As a result, Salafist Sunni Jihadists from home and abroad were answering the call to fight on Iraqi soil. At the same time, the power vacuum from the Syrian civil war had provided fertile ground for ISIL to take root, not simply challenging the Assad regime but also attracting Jihadists from across the world seeking a "cause" upon which to concentrate. ISIL's ascendancy, thus, mitigated Assad's control over wide swaths of Syrian

Iraq Review 2016 Page 386 of 609 pages Iraq territory while simultaneously delivering a remarkable blow across the border to the Iraqi leader at the time, Shi'a Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

The year 2014 saw Iraq rocked by the worst violence and bloodshed in recent years. The violence in Iraq was the result of the aforementioned ethno-sectarian dissonance between Sunni Muslims and Shi'a Muslims, and the dramatic and escalating political conflict between the Shi'a dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the increasingly alienated Sunni opposition. In the month of June 2014 alone, more than 2,000 people -- mostly civilians -- had been killed in the violence rocking Iraq, according to the United Nations. It was the bloodiest and most deadly month in Iraq since the peak of ethno-sectarian warfare in Iraq in 2007.

Given this restive and volatile landscape, the United Nations envoy to Iraq, Martin Kobler, warned that "systemic violence" was about to explode "at any moment" in that country. Kobler called on Iraq's political leaders to "engage immediately to pull the country out of this mayhem." As stated by Gyorgy Busztin, the United Nation's Iraq representative, "The impact of violence on civilians remains disturbingly high." He also called on Iraq's leadership to take steps to end the violence saying, "Iraq's political leaders must take immediate and decisive action to stop the senseless bloodshed."

The summer of 2014 was marked by devolving chaos in Iraq as ISIL expanded their control from Fallujah and Ramadi in Anbar province, to Mosul in Nineveh, as well as Tikrit -- the hometown of the ousted and late Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, making significant territorial gains.

Across the border in Syria, the Assad regime had been grappling with an ongoing uprising that started in the Arab Spring of 2011. President Bashar al-Assad's brutal tactics aimed at quelling that uprising against various rebel factions served only to create an even more tumultuous landscape, and eventually set the path for a full-blown civil war. That civil war pitted the Assad forces, backed by Lebanon-based Hezbollah, against a disparate cabal of anti-government entities, ranging from the rebel Free Syrian Army to several Islamist terrorist enclaves. As noted above, the power vacuum from the Syrian civil war provided a breeding ground for extremism that ISIL could exploit and use to both challenge the Assad regime and function as a recruitment tool for Jihadists.

The result was a series of strategic victories across Syria and Iraq for ISIL. Then, at the start of July 2014, the security crisis in the region was at acute levels as ISIL had declared itself to be the sovereign power over a "caliphate" ranging from Syria to Iraq and renamed itself the "Islamic State."

Throughout, the United States-trained Iraqi forces proved themselves to be ineffectual in fighting ISIL. In fact, Iraqi troops abandoned their positions, thus allowing the terrorists to make off with heavy military equipment provided to the Iraqi military by the United States. Indeed, the only defense being provided against ISIL in Iraq were the Kurds who were now having to face ISIL

Iraq Review 2016 Page 387 of 609 pages Iraq terrorists armed with stolen American weaponry. While Kurdish peshmerga forces were far more engaged in the fight to save Kurdistan, they were nonetheless no match for ISIL, which now had in its possession United States-provided weapons that had been abandoned by Iraqi forces.

President Barack Obama of the United States was not eager to re-enter into a military engagement in Iraq, and as such, he advocated that leaders in Iraq work towards a political solution. That political solution remained elusive as Prime Minister Maliki refused to form an inclusive national unity government and as members of parliament failed to agree on a new government. Given the frustration over the failure of the Iraqi government in Baghdad to address the political and security crisis facing Iraq, the Kurdish president called for an independence referendum. The Kurds were also taking advantage of the power chasm by seizing control over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

But the scene in Iraq took an ominous turn in August 2014 as Islamic State was now pushing Kurdish peshmerga fighters into retreat. ISIL (or the so-called Islamic State) was exerting its self- declared power and authority as it carried out a rampage of barbaric violence, brutally targeting some of Iraq's historic minority communities. Certainly, Islamic State's persecution of Iraq's minority populations, particularly Christian and Yazidis, could be understood as nothing less than gross human rights abuses, even as it triggered a humanitarian crisis.

Initially, United States President Barack Obama dispatched military advisers to Iraq but ruled out renewed military engagement in that country; instead, as noted above, he called for a political solution. As the author of the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq, President Obama was not keen to be drawn back into the Iraqi quagmire. But having recognized the dire landscape for religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq, on Aug. 7, 2014, the United States President Barack Obama ordered limited strikes in northern Iraq, released a supply of arms to Kurdish peshmerga fighters resisting Islamic State, and provided humanitarian relief supplies to civilians forced to flee their homes.

The presence of Maliki at the helm of Iraq had stood as another obstacle, as the United States was unwilling to be the unofficial military support of a Shi'a government known to have persecuted the Sunni minority population of Iraq. But the subsequent replacement of the Maliki government with a more inclusive Abadi government set the tone for an improved domestic scenario in Iraq, to the relief of the United States and the wider world. It also provided a more hospitable climate for increased United States' engagement in Iraq to fight ISIL.

That being said, the barbaric beheadings of two American journalists by ISIL fundamentally changed the calculus both for the war-weary American public as well as the American president. As a consequence, on Sept. 10, 2014, President Barack Obama outlined a counter-terrorism strategy to "degrade and ultimately destroy" ISIL -- not only in Iraq where the United States was already engaged in a limited manner, but also in Syria. To that end, the Obama administration was rallying a coalition of Western and Middle Eastern partners -- including Jordan -- to take on the

Iraq Review 2016 Page 388 of 609 pages Iraq threat posed to global security by ISIL.

In truth, the advance of ISIL in not only Iraq but also Syria had compounded the geopolitical crisis facing the Middle East. Suddenly, anti-Assad countries in the region were finding themselves in the uncomfortable position of sharing with Syria the goal of eliminating ISIL. For their part, Arab countries in the region were slow to respond to ISIL. Nevertheless, the Arab League was slowly coming to terms with the fact that it would have to have to engage in the regional security crisis and that its objectives would likely, at times, overlap with that of the Assad regime. Indeed, in September 2014, the Arab League endorsed the effort to confront Islamic States at a time when the United States was rallying allied countries to join the effort to repel and eradicate ISIL.

For his part, United States President Barack Obama made clear that his country was committed to eliminating the leadership of Islamic State (also known as ISIL or ISIS), while noting that a coalition of NATO allies and Middle Eastern partners was prepared to join the campaign against the brutality of these extremist Islamist Jihadists, and to take on the threat posed to global security by this dangerous terrorist group.

Accordingly, on Sept. 22, 2014, international coalition forces, led by the United States and including both European and Arab partner countries, commenced a campaign of air strikes against Islamist terror groups in Syria.

By October 2014, despite the active international air campaign over Iraq and Syria, ISIL continued to carry out its campaign of terror -- even extending the battlefield to Kurdish areas bordering Turkey. Irrespective of the fact that the town of Kobane (alternatively called Kobani and predominantly inhabited by Kurds) on the Turkish border was under siege, and regardless of legislation passed in Turkey's parliament authorizing action against ISIL, Turkey -- a NATO country -- showed little interest in joining the fight against ISIL, even with the protection of its own territory at stake.

Nevertheless, the United States-led global coalition was intensifying its strikes against ISIL targets; it was also air dropping weapons and military supplies to Kurdish forces.

The latter part of 2014 saw an intensification of the active air campaign over Iraq and Syria against ISIL by United States-led coalition forces. As well, United States President Obama called for more troops to be deployed to the region to assist with the training and advising of Iraqi forces.

At the start of 2015, Japan and Jordan were beset by tragedy when citizens of their countries that were being held by ISIL, were brutally killed. As has become a pattern, ISIL proudly released videotaped footage depicting their vicious acts of murder. In response, Japan promised to do its part in the international fight against ISIL while Jordanian King Abdullah warned of a "relentless war" on the Islamist terror group as it commenced a campaign of air strikes against ISIL targets in

Iraq Review 2016 Page 389 of 609 pages Iraq

Syria.

In February 2015, the horrific killings of more than 20 Egyptian Christians working in Libya marked a new front in the war against Islamic State. Post-Arab Spring Libya was on the brink of political collapse with Islamist extremists taking advantage of the power void. The result was an emerging satellite Islamic State venue in Libya. However, Egypt -- like Jordan -- was prepared to respond to the threat posed by these Islamist Jihadists to its citizens and commenced its own air strike campaign against ISIL targets in Libya.

It was to be seen if the Jordanian and Egyptian responses would mark a turning point for the Arab and Islamic worlds, regarding the international effort to degrade and ultimately destroy the Islamist terror group, known in derogatory Arabic parlance as "Daesh."

Meanwhile, in February 2015, President Barack Obama of the United States called on the legislative branch of government in that country to advance new legislation authorizing military action against the terror group calling itself Islamic State. It was to be seen if partisan rivalries in the United States Congress would impede the process of passing a new authorization intended to carefully circumscribe the United States' military effort to degrade and destroy Islamic State.

Also at stake was a looming effort to retain control over the key Iraqi city of Mosul from Islamic State. To that end, United States military advisers were training joint Iraqi and Kurdish forces to achieve this end in what was expected to be a spring offensive operation. But before the Mosul offensive could move forward, the United States-led coalition continued to carry out air strikes in Iraq, supporting Kurdish fighters, with the goal being to drive Islamic State from the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

It should be noted that in mid-April 2015, the United States Pentagon confirmed that Islamic State lost more than a quarter of the territory in Iraq it held prior to the air campaign that was launched in August 2014. With the intent to build on this success, Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi traveled to the United States to request more assistance in the air campaign against Islamic State. However, before the United States could even process this request, in mid-April 2015, on the heels of their victory in Tikrit, Islamic State was carrying out an advance on the city of Ramadi. It was apparent in the spring of 2015 that even if Islamic State was under pressure, it was still a functional and aggressive terrorist entity.

It should be noted that whereas progress had been noted in Iraq, the prevailing dynamics remained in place in Syria where Islamic State continued to hold sway over large swaths of that country.

NOTE:

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See "Special Report" in the "Political Conditions" of this Country Review for more information related to the takeover of wide swaths of Iraqi and Syrian territory by Islamist extremists known as "Islamic State" in 2014. Also included in that report is coverage of the regional and international dyanamics.

Defense Forces

Military Data

Military Branches:

Ministry of Defense: Iraqi Army (includes Army Aviation Directorate), Iraqi Navy, Iraqi Air Force; Counterterrorism Service

Eligible age to enter service:

18

Mandatory Service Terms:

No conscription

Manpower in general population-fit for military service: males age 16-49: 6,591,185 females age 16-49: 6,421,717

Manpower reaching eligible age annually: male: 332,194 females: 322,010

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Military Expenditures-Percent of GDP:

8.7%

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Chapter 3

Economic Overview

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Economic Overview

Overview

Iraq’s economy is dominated by the oil sector, which has traditionally provided about 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings. The country has the world’s third-largest oil reserves and considerable gas reserves. But Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the subsequent international economic sanctions, and military action by an international coalition against Iraq following the invasion reduced the economic activity tremendously. With implementation of the U.N.’s oil-for-food program beginning in late 1996, conditions improved for the average Iraq citizen. Then, the U.S.- led war against Iraq, which began in early 2003, resulted in the shutdown of much of the central economic administrative structure, and looting, insurgent attacks and sabotage undermined efforts to rebuild the economy.

Following installation of the Iraq interim government in June 2004, and with support of the international community, economic activity has recovered with the oil sector as the main engine. Iraq has also made progress in integrating itself into the international economic system. In September 2004, Iraq was approved to receive Emergency Post Conflict Assistance (EPCA) by the International Monetary Fund, which opened the way to the normalization of Iraq’s external public debt situation. Following the EPCA, Iraq completed two Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) programs with the IMF, aiming at maintaining macroeconomic stability and improving the conditions for sustainable growth. In May 2007, the Iraqi government formally endorsed the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) with the help of the United Nations to develop a medium- term framework for comprehensive political, security and economic reform. Despite the difficult security situation, the Iraqi government has demonstrated its commitment and ability to implement sound macroeconomic policies and advance structural reforms. Iraq enjoyed a strong economic performance in 2008 supported by record oil prices and improved security. However, Iraq’s economy was seriously affected by the global economic crisis through a sharp drop in oil prices, which led to weakening external and fiscal positions. While Iraq’s longer-term economic outlook is strong as oil prices and production are expected to increase markedly in the coming years, major challenges remain in the short term with large fiscal and balance of payment gaps. As such, the government’s economic program for 2010-2011 aimed to maintain macroeconomic stability and deepen structural reforms, particularly in the areas of public financial management, the financial system, and oil sector transparency. In the political front, as an important step forward in rebuilding the country, Iraq held parliamentary elections in early March 2010 as scheduled despite attacks that killed more than 30 people. Also in 2010, the country forged a new agreement with the IMF and World Bank for conditional aid programs designed to strengthen Iraq’s economic institutions. The

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Iraqi government is working to get more foreign investment in the economy through efforts such as an amendment to the National Investment Law, multiple international trade and investment events, as well as potential participation in joint ventures with state-owned enterprises.

Ordinary Iraqis have not seen their lives substantially improve despite some macroeconomic gains. And, unemployment remains a problem throughout the country. In March 2011, the IMF noted that while Iraq has maintained macroeconomic stability under difficult external and internal circumstances, decisive efforts to rebuild key economic institutions and improve governance will be critical for private sector development. In September 2011, the country was under pressure to reopen negotiations with foreign companies and give up the original crude production target that would have rivaled Saudi Arabia’s. In an interview with Reuters, Iraq’s head of parliamentary energy committee said Iraq should revise future production targets due to export and infrastructure limits. Iraqi officials were also working on an oil and gas draft law that had been delayed due to disputes over who controls oil resources.

By March 2012, Iraq said its oil output had climbed more than 3 million barrels per day (bpd) for the first time in over three decades. The country’s goal was to double output over the next three years with an ambitious, long-term goal of 12 million barrels per day. With the gains in oil output, Iraq’s economy was expected to grow in coming years. Indeed, GDP growth averaged less than 4 percent in the six years through 2010. It nearly hit 10 percent in 2012, according to the IMF, which predicted that average growth would climb above ten percent through 2016. The IMF also expects annual oil exports to almost double to $139 billion by 2016, giving the country the potential to turn its 2011 budget deficit into a large surplus by 2016.

Overall, there were signs in 2012 that foreign investment in the country was finally gaining momentum. For example, Dubai-based property developer Range Hospitality in 2012 began construction on a $175 million hotel and residential complex in Iraq's holy city of Karbala. In a recent report to potential Chinese investors cited by Reuters, Citi predicted that “Iraq could become one of the world’s wealthy sovereigns.” Citi also predicted that Iraq’s net government assets, now almost $50 billion in the red, would be nearly $100 billion in the black by 2020. Meanwhile, Reuters also noted that Dunia Frontier Consultants, a Dubai- and Washington-based consultancy which specializes in Iraq, estimates the value of foreign commercial activity reached $55.7 billion in 2011, involving 276 companies from 45 countries. That was up significantly from the below $7 billion annually seen in the previous five years. However, it’s important to note that not all projects get completed so the numbers could be misleading. The two countries who did the most business in Iraq in 2011 were South Korea and the United States, according to Dunia.

As of 2013, Iraq continued to suffer from severe structural weaknesses, such as a small non-oil sector, a dominating role of the government in all areas of the economy, and a poor business environment. Still, partly thanks to the increase in oil production since 2003, Iraq saw its GDP per capita climb to $6,300 in 2012 from $1,300 in 2004 despite a very difficult security and political

Iraq Review 2016 Page 395 of 609 pages Iraq environment. Overall, economic growth in 2012 was strong and expected to climb even more in 2013 as oil production increased. Meanwhile, inflation declined from about 6 percent at the end of 2011 to 3.6 percent at the end of 2012. Meanwhile, international reserves of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) rose from $61 billion at the end of 2011 to $70 billion at the end of 2012.

In 2012, Iraq boosted oil exports to a 30-year high of 2.6 million barrels per day, a significant increase from its average of 2.2 million in 2011. Government revenues climbed as global oil prices remained persistently high for much of 2012. In May 2013, the IMF predicted that oil production would rise gradually by about 400,000 to 500,000 barrels per day per year. In September 2013, the Iraqi government unveiled a five-year economic plan aimed at diversifying beyond oil production and developing the industrial sector. The ambitious plan faced challenges such as an increasing level of sectarian violence and political infighting. Specifically, the plan called for about a $357 billion investment in development projects across the country focusing on: building and services, agriculture, education, transport and communications, and energy. Nearly 80 percent of that investment total would come from the government and the rest from the private sector.

Iraq maintained macroeconomic stability in 2013, despite lower than projected oil production and exports. Growth remained solid, thanks to non-oil activity of about 7 percent, driven by construction and retail trade. Inflation declined slightly from 2012, reflecting stable world food and fuel prices. The exchange rate remained stable, and international reserves grew by $7 billion to $78 billion at end-2013, or about 10 months of imports of goods and services. The budget deficit rose largely because of the difficult security situation.

Economic activity was projected to strengthen in 2014. However, by mid-2014, the country appeared to be descending into all-out sectarian war. Besides increasing the price of crude oil globally, the number of civilian casualties was expected to be even higher in 2014 than the nearly 8,000 seen in 2013.

There were reports of food prices rising as people started hoarding amid the violence. In June 2014, the Financial Times reported that the Iraqi government said it expected to harvest enough wheat and barley to cover domestic demand and scale back imports of the grains, a move that would help reduce downward pressure on the deficit. However, on-the-ground reports of Isis setting fire to large areas of agricultural land put that at risk.

Plus, since Iraq relies on crude exports for more than 90 percent of government revenues, the fiscal balance was at further risk if Isis gained control of key oil fields and export infrastructure, or if the country fragmented under sectarian divisions.

During 2014, worsening security and financial stability throughout Iraq - driven by an ongoing insurgency, decreasing oil prices, and political upheaval - decreased the prospects for improving the country's economic environment and securing much-needed foreign investment. Long-term fiscal health, a strengthened investment climate, and sustained improvements in the overall standard of

Iraq Review 2016 Page 396 of 609 pages Iraq living still depend on the central government passing major policy reforms. Oil exports in 2014 remained relatively flat at 2.4 million barrels per day on average, despite new production coming online at the West Qurna 2 and Badrah oilfields, because repeated attacks on the Iraq-Turkey pipeline reduced export capacity. During the second half of 2014, government revenues decreased as global oil prices fell by more than 30 percent. Iraq's contracts with major oil companies have the potential to further expand oil exports and revenues, but Iraq will need to make significant upgrades to its oil processing, pipeline, and export infrastructure for these deals to reach their economic potential.

In late June 2015, Al-Monitor reported that the Iraqi Ministry of Planning was estimating that nearly 30 percent of Iraq’s population of more than 33 million lived below the poverty line in part because of Iraq’s conditions following Islamic State taking control of more than a third of the country’s area in June 2014.

There were a couple of other factors behind the rise in poverty rates, according to Al-Monitor, including the mass displacement of Iraqis from IS-controlled areas, unemployment and the decline in crude oil global prices to less than $60 per barrel, particularly since 90 percent of Iraq's federal budget relies on oil revenues.

In September 2015, Reuters reported that economic activity in the first quarter of shrank by 6.7 percent compared with the same period in 2014, excluding most economic activity for areas occupied by Islamic State. Total public debt rose to $39.5 billion at the end of June from $33.3 billion at the end of 2014, Reuters reported. Also, foreign exchange reserves had dropped to $61.2 billion in July from $66.3 billion at the end of 2014.

In early September 2015, Reuters revealed that Iraq would use the proceeds of an international bond issue to fund salaries as well as infrastructure projects in the oil and gas, electricity and transportation sectors.

Ultimately, officials were hoping to raise up to $6 billion in a series of U.S. dollar bond sales.

(See Political Conditions for more details)

Economic Performance

Aided by record oil prices and improved security, Iraq’s economic growth increased substantially in 2008. But growth declined sharply in 2009 and 2010 with a large drop in oil prices as a result of the global economic crisis. Inflation climbed in 2008 driven by higher food prices, but fell rapidly, and deflating, in 2009. Growth was strong in 2011 before slowing some in 2012.

According to CountryWatch estimated calculations for 2014:

Real GDP growth rate was: 6.5 percent

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The fiscal deficit/surplus as percent of GDP (%) was: 3.9 percent Inflation was measured at: 17.6 percent

Updated in 2015

*Please note that the figures in our Economic Performance section are estimates or forecasts based on IMF-based data that are formulated using CountryWatch models of analysis.

Supplementary Sources: International Monetary Fund, Al-Monitor, Financial Times and Reuters

Nominal GDP and Components

Nominal GDP and Components

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Nominal GDP 217,327.11 254,225.49 271,091.78 257,109.63 192,456.40 (LCU billions)

Nominal GDP Growth Rate 34.099 16.978 6.634 -5.1577 -25.1462 (%)

Consumption 110,518.88 141,173.40 154,557.77 146,586.11 122,938.26 (LCU billions)

Government Expenditure 36,999.56 49,129.24 58,284.73 55,278.57 46,360.81 (LCU billions)

Gross Capital Formation 33,593.88 42,235.24 46,239.48 43,854.58 28,357.22 (LCU billions)

Exports of Goods & 96,531.32 113,102.00 110,536.80 104,835.62 82,672.21 Services (LCU

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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

billions)

Imports of Goods & 60,316.54 91,414.40 98,527.00 93,445.25 87,872.10 Services (LCU billions)

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Population and GDP Per Capita

Population and GDP Per Capita

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Population, total 31.760 32.578 33.417 34.278 35.161 (million)

Population 2.577 2.576 2.575 2.577 2.576 growth (%)

Nominal GDP per Capita 6,842,793.05 7,803,594.16 8,112,391.22 7,500,718.43 5,473,575.89 (LCU 1000s)

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Real GDP and Inflation

Real GDP and Inflation

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU 142,700.47 162,587.77 173,272.51 167,324.81 169,647.32 billions 2005 base)

Real GDP Growth Rate 7.546 13.936 6.572 -3.4326 1.388 (%)

GDP Deflator 152.296 156.362 156.454 153.659 113.445 (2005=100.0)

Inflation, GDP 24.690 2.670 0.0588 -1.7865 -26.1709 Deflator (%)

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Government Spending and Taxation

Government Spending and Taxation

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Government Fiscal 94,253.00 109,041.14 131,242.20 118,216.40 114,979.60 Budget (billions)

Fiscal Budget Growth 17.312 15.690 20.360 -9.9250 -2.7380 Rate (percentage)

National Tax Rate Net of 48.114 46.986 42.575 40.600 36.606 Transfers (%)

Government Revenues Net of 104,563.99 119,449.32 115,417.55 104,385.70 70,450.83 Transfers (LCU billions)

Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) 10,310.99 10,408.18 -15824.6500 -13830.6980 -44528.7740 (LCU billions)

Government

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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Surplus(+) 4.744 4.094 -5.8374 -5.3793 -23.1371 Deficit(-) (%GDP)

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Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment

Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Money and Quasi- Money (M2) (LCU 74,098.03 77,142.20 89,378.88 92,637.74 69,342.90 billions)

Money Supply 20.694 4.108 15.863 3.646 -25.1462 Growth Rate (%)

Lending Interest Rate 13.607 13.034 13.126 11.289 14.182 (%)

Unemployment Rate 8.000 8.569 8.539 8.495 7.754 (%)

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Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate

Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Official Exchange Rate 1,170.00 1,166.00 1,166.00 1,150.34 1,166.00 (LCU/$US)

Trade Balance NIPA ($US 30.953 18.600 10.300 9.902 -4.4596 billions)

Trade Balance % of GDP 16.664 8.531 4.430 4.430 -2.7019

Total Foreign Exchange 61.033 70.327 77.747 66.369 79.090 Reserves ($US billions)

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Data in US Dollars

Data in US Dollars

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Nominal GDP ($US billions) 185.750 218.032 232.497 223.508 165.057

Exports ($US billions) 82.506 97.000 94.800 91.135 70.902

Imports ($US billions) 51.553 78.400 84.500 81.233 75.362

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Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units

Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Petroleum Consumption 668.194 733.702 750.000 741.684 738.823 (TBPD)

Petroleum Production 2,624.46 2,959.36 3,040.73 3,288.96 3,452.11 (TBPD)

Petroleum Net Exports 1,956.27 2,225.66 2,290.73 2,547.28 2,713.28 (TBPD)

Natural Gas Consumption 31.077 22.813 41.636 41.527 42.335 (bcf)

Natural Gas Production 31.108 22.888 41.757 43.676 47.780 (bcf)

Natural Gas Net Exports 0.0303 0.0743 0.1209 2.149 5.445 (bcf)

Coal Consumption (1000s 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 st)

Coal Production (1000s st) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Coal Net Exports (1000s st) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Nuclear Production (bil 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 kwh)

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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Hydroelectric Production 4.099 5.370 4.740 4.134 4.145 (bil kwh)

Renewables Production (bil 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 kwh)

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Energy Consumption and Production QUADS

Energy Consumption and Production QUADS

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Petroleum Consumption (Quads) 1.427 1.567 1.601 1.584 1.578

Petroleum Production (Quads) 5.603 6.362 6.514 7.183 5.892

Petroleum Net Exports (Quads) 4.176 4.795 4.912 5.600 4.314

Natural Gas Consumption (Quads) 0.0317 0.0233 0.0425 0.0424 0.0432

Natural Gas Production (Quads) 0.0317 0.0233 0.0425 0.0452 0.0417

Natural Gas Net Exports (Quads) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0028 -0.0015

Coal Consumption (Quads) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Coal Production (Quads) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Coal Net Exports (Quads) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Nuclear Production (Quads) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Hydroelectric Production (Quads) 0.0410 0.0537 0.0474 0.0413 0.0415

Renewables Production (Quads) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

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World Energy Price Summary

World Energy Price Summary

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Petroleum-WTI ($/bbl) 95.054 94.159 97.943 93.112 48.709

Natural Gas-Henry Hub ($/mmbtu) 3.999 2.752 3.729 4.369 2.614

Coal Thermal-Australian ($/mt) 121.448 96.364 84.562 70.130 57.511

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CO2 Emissions

CO2 Emissions

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Petroleum Based (mm mt C) 31.875 35.000 35.778 35.381 35.245

Natural Gas Based (mm mt C) 0.5042 0.3701 0.6755 0.6737 0.6869

Coal Based (mm mt C) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Total CO2 Emissions (mm mt C) 32.379 35.370 36.453 36.055 35.931

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Agriculture Consumption and Production

Agriculture Consumption and Production

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Corn Total Consumption 337.727 505.235 842.864 884.370 744.513 (1000 metric tons)

Corn Production 335.088 501.858 827.958 879.248 819.465 (1000 metric tons)

Corn Net Exports (1000 -2.6393 -3.3769 -14.9061 -5.1224 74.951 metric tons)

Soybeans Total Consumption 8.338 0.4420 0.4160 0.2950 0.2427 (1000 metric tons)

Soybeans Production 0.0511 0.0549 0.0596 0.0590 0.0556 (1000 metric tons)

Soybeans Net Exports (1000 -8.2869 -0.3871 -0.3564 -0.2360 -0.1871 metric tons)

Rice Total

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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Consumption 235.118 361.339 451.849 435.920 357.019 (1000 metric tons)

Rice Production 235.277 361.333 451.651 435.749 429.187 (1000 metric tons)

Rice Net Exports (1000 0.1586 -0.0059 -0.1981 -0.1714 72.168 metric tons)

Coffee Total Consumption 28.000 11.000 11.000 7.963 6.893 (metric tons)

Coffee Production 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (metric tons)

Coffee Net Exports (metric -28.0000 -11.0000 -11.0000 -7.9626 -6.8930 tons)

Cocoa Beans Total 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Consumption (metric tons)

Cocoa Beans Production 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (metric tons)

Cocoa Beans Net Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (metric tons)

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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Wheat Total Consumption 5,697.73 5,487.69 6,420.06 6,187.93 4,806.93 (1000 metric tons)

Wheat Production 2,802.66 3,078.52 4,171.83 3,812.53 3,367.06 (1000 metric tons)

Wheat Net Exports (1000 -2895.0729 -2409.1702 -2248.2276 -2375.3990 -1439.8712 metric tons)

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World Agriculture Pricing Summary

World Agriculture Pricing Summary

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Corn Pricing Summary 291.684 298.417 259.389 192.881 169.750 ($/metric ton)

Soybeans Pricing Summary 540.667 591.417 538.417 491.771 390.417 ($/metric ton)

Rice Pricing Summary ($/metric 458.558 525.071 473.989 425.148 386.033 ton)

Coffee Pricing Summary 5.976 4.111 3.076 4.424 3.526 ($/kilogram)

Cocoa Beans Pricing Summary 2.980 2.392 2.439 3.062 3.135 ($/kilogram)

Wheat Pricing Summary 316.264 313.242 312.248 284.895 203.177 ($/metric ton)

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Metals Consumption and Production

Metals Consumption and Production

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Copper Consumption (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Copper Production (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Copper Net Exports (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Zinc Consumption (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Zinc Production (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Zinc Exports (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Lead Consumption (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Lead Production (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Lead Exports (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Tin Consumption (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Tin Production (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Tin Exports (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Nickel Consumption (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Nickel Production (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Nickel Exports (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Gold Consumption (kg) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Gold Production (kg) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Gold Exports (kg) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Silver Consumption (mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Silver Production (mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Silver Exports (mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

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World Metals Pricing Summary

World Metals Pricing Summary

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Copper ($/mt) 8,828.19 7,962.35 7,332.10 6,863.40 5,510.46

Zinc ($/mt) 2,193.90 1,950.41 1,910.26 2,160.97 1,931.68

Tin ($/mt) 26,053.68 21,125.99 22,282.80 21,898.87 16,066.63

Lead ($/mt) 2,400.81 2,064.64 2,139.79 2,095.46 1,787.82

Nickel ($/mt) 22,910.36 17,547.55 15,031.80 16,893.38 11,862.64

Gold ($/oz) 1,569.21 1,669.52 1,411.46 1,265.58 1,160.66

Silver ($/oz) 35.224 31.137 23.850 19.071 15.721

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Economic Performance Index

Economic Performance Index

The Economic Performance rankings are calculated by CountryWatch's editorial team, and are based on criteria including sustained economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits, budget surplus, unemployment and structural imbalances. Scores are assessed from 0 to 100 using this aforementioned criteria as well as CountryWatch's proprietary economic research data and models.

Econ.GNP Bank Monetary/ growth or stability Currency Government Empl./ decline/ risk stability Finances Unempl. forecast

0 - 100 0 - 100 0 - 100 0 - 100 %

North Americas

Canada 92 69 35 38 3.14%

United States 94 76 4 29 3.01%

Western Europe

Austria 90 27 30 63 1.33%

Belgium 88 27 19 23 1.15%

Cyprus 81 91 16 80 -0.69%

Denmark 97 70 45 78 1.20%

Finland 89 27 41 33 1.25%

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France 87 27 18 27 1.52%

Germany 86 27 22 21 1.25%

Greece 79 27 5 24 -2.00%

Iceland 90 17 2 34 -3.04%

Italy 85 27 37 24 0.84%

Ireland 92 27 11 10 -1.55%

Luxembourg 99 27 28 66 2.08%

Malta 77 27 41 51 0.54%

Netherlands 91 27 26 74 1.30%

Norway 98 44 10 76 1.08%

Portugal 77 27 13 20 0.29%

Spain 83 27 9 3 -0.41%

Sweden 94 72 54 32 1.23%

Switzerland 97 86 55 77 1.53%

United Kingdom 85 12 9 37 1.34%

Central and Eastern Europe

Albania 44 60 33 6 2.30%

Armenia 45 59 49 30 1.80%

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Azerbaijan 56 4 84 99 2.68%

Belarus 59 21 83 98 2.41%

Bosnia and Herzegovina 34 68 69 N/A 0.50%

Bulgaria 58 75 88 49 0.20%

Croatia 69 68 94 9 0.18%

Czech Republic 80 89 29 70 1.67%

Estonia 72 90 66 92 0.80%

Georgia 36 60 53 56 2.00%

Hungary 70 66 26 54 -0.16%

Latvia 67 100 65 44 -3.97%

Lithuania 65 91 87 79 -1.65%

Macedonia (FYR) 53 69 56 2 2.03%

Moldova 23 36 81 67 2.50%

Poland 74 74 38 12 2.72%

Romania 62 56 70 62 0.75%

Russia 73 18 90 8 4.00%

Serbia 48 49 52 5 1.97%

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Montenegro 39 27 73 1 -1.70%

Slovak Republic 80 62 30 14 4.06%

Slovenia 81 27 36 65 1.12%

Ukraine 41 11 57 N/A 3.68%

Africa

Algeria 57 18 96 7 4.55%

Angola 49 1 97 N/A 7.05%

Benin 19 91 20 N/A 3.22%

Botswana 68 58 76 N/A 6.33%

Burkina Faso 16 91 13 N/A 4.41%

Burundi 2 91 6 N/A 3.85%

Cameroon 26 91 91 N/A 2.58%

Cape Verde 52 87 4 N/A 4.96%

Central African Republic 9 91 32 N/A 3.18%

Chad 22 91 89 N/A 4.42%

Congo 52 87 87 N/A 12.13%

Côte d’Ivoire 25 91 82 28 2.98%

Dem. Republic

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Congo 4 91 47 N/A 5.44%

Djibouti 31 76 50 N/A 4.47%

Egypt 37 20 24 69 5.01%

Equatorial Guinea 82 91 85 N/A 0.94%

Eritrea 1 3 1 18 1.81%

Ethiopia 6 45 8 N/A 6.96%

Gabon 64 91 96 N/A 5.36%

Gambia 8 48 86 N/A 4.82%

Ghana 9 11 69 N/A 4.50%

Guinea 10 7 91 N/A 3.03%

Guinea-Bissau 5 91 46 N/A 3.47%

Kenya 20 41 59 N/A 4.11%

Lesotho 13 40 12 N/A 2.98%

Liberia 12 73 74 N/A 5.92%

Libya 73 2 94 N/A 5.22%

Madagascar 4 22 24 N/A -1.02%

Malawi 7 25 55 N/A 5.96%

Mali 20 91 82 N/A 5.12%

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Mauritania 15 13 93 N/A 4.58%

Mauritius 65 52 56 55 4.10%

Morocco 37 72 48 26 3.23%

Mozambique 12 23 71 N/A 6.45%

Namibia 40 39 62 N/A 1.70%

Niger 10 91 21 N/A 4.41%

Nigeria 30 6 61 N/A 6.98%

Rwanda 21 40 68 N/A 5.39%

Sao Tome & Principe 1 61 100 N/A 3.40%

Senegal 24 91 63 N/A 3.44%

Seychelles 60 67 97 N/A 4.01%

Sierra Leone 5 10 39 N/A 4.77%

Somalia 2 38 59 N/A 3.19%

South Africa 61 37 70 N/A 2.59%

Sudan 16 5 73 N/A 5.52%

Swaziland 32 44 79 N/A 1.09%

Tanzania 15 45 32 N/A 6.17%

Togo 8 91 92 N/A 2.56%

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Tunisia 50 61 44 39 4.00%

Uganda 11 17 54 N/A 5.59%

Zambia 29 20 49 N/A 5.84%

Zimbabwe 0 8 16 N/A 2.24%

South and Central America

Argentina 66 3 80 36 3.50%

Belize 47 76 80 N/A 1.00%

Bolivia 32 51 61 81 3.99%

Brazil 71 47 78 11 5.50%

Chile 78 25 92 73 4.72%

Columbia 47 52 34 47 2.25%

Costa Rica 60 42 39 57 3.45%

Ecuador 43 76 75 64 2.51%

El Salvador 35 76 67 N/A 1.04%

Guatemala 46 59 58 N/A 2.52%

Honduras 27 47 58 N/A 2.00%

Mexico 69 42 52 61 4.07%

Nicaragua 23 49 42 N/A 1.75%

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Panama 66 76 72 45 5.00%

Paraguay 35 46 66 16 5.27%

Peru 59 66 75 22 6.33%

Suriname 58 26 81 59 4.02%

Uruguay 70 26 27 N/A 5.71%

Venezuela 55 1 28 13 -2.63%

Caribbean

Antigua & Barbuda 72 76 15 N/A -2.01%

Bahamas 74 76 45 87 -0.50%

Barbados 67 76 33 15 -0.50%

Bermuda N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Cuba 45 76 18 95 0.25%

Dominica 53 76 65 N/A 1.40%

Dominican Republic 54 39 43 4 3.50%

Grenada 63 76 48 N/A 0.80%

Guyana 28 56 17 N/A 4.36%

Haiti 11 27 89 N/A -8.50%

Jamaica 42 9 85 19 -0.28%

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St Lucia 55 76 67 N/A 1.14%

St Vincent & Grenadines 49 76 95 N/A 0.50%

Trinidad & Tobago 82 37 77 72 2.13%

Middle East

Bahrain 84 76 62 91 3.48%

Iran 51 19 40 58 3.01%

Iraq 48 9 8 N/A 7.27%

Israel 87 62 12 48 3.20%

Jordan 41 51 3 N/A 4.10%

Kuwait 96 4 99 N/A 3.10%

Lebanon 63 54 2 N/A 6.00%

Oman 76 16 88 N/A 4.71%

Qatar 99 16 83 N/A 18.54%

Saudi Arabia 76 8 98 N/A 3.70%

Syria 61 24 40 N/A 5.00%

Turkey 75 23 27 60 5.20%

United Arab Emirates 96 24 98 94 1.29%

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Yemen 28 2 78 N/A 7.78%

Asia

Afghanistan 17 70 74 N/A 8.64%

Bangladesh 13 43 25 N/A 5.38%

Bhutan 24 55 5 N/A 6.85%

Brunei 78 19 99 75 0.48%

Cambodia 18 67 42 N/A 4.77%

China 54 90 19 68 11.03%

Hong Kong 89 76 14 82 5.02%

India 31 38 34 35 8.78%

Indonesia 42 46 37 31 6.00%

Japan 88 89 6 71 1.90%

Kazakhstan 62 13 76 42 2.40%

Korea North 18 65 23 N/A 1.50%

Korea South 83 63 22 85 4.44%

Kyrgyz Republic 24 15 84 88 4.61%

Laos 17 54 7 N/A 7.22%

Macao 91 76 14 82 3.00%

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Malaysia 68 65 44 90 4.72%

Maldives 44 55 17 N/A 3.45%

Mongolia 33 5 77 93 7.22%

Myanmar 3 41 72 N/A 5.26%

Nepal 3 14 25 N/A 2.97%

Pakistan 19 15 31 41 3.00%

Papua New Guinea 75 50 11 N/A 7.96%

Philippines 30 48 53 43 3.63%

Singapore 93 75 63 40 5.68%

Sri Lanka 38 22 10 N/A 5.50%

Taiwan 84 88 35 89 6.50%

Tajikistan 6 6 60 97 4.00%

Thailand 56 64 90 96 5.46%

Turkmenistan 51 53 68 N/A 12.00%

Uzbekistan 40 10 60 100 8.00%

Vietnam 25 12 20 N/A 6.04%

Pacific

Australia 96 63 31 46 2.96%

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Fiji 46 53 3 N/A 2.06%

Marshall Islands 27 76 46 N/A 1.08%

Micronesia (Fed. States) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

New Caledonia 96 73 51 52 2.00%

New Zealand 98 73 51 52 2.00%

Samoa 34 88 64 N/A -2.77%

Solomon Islands 14 71 1 N/A 3.36%

Tonga 26 57 38 N/A 0.60%

Vanuatu 33 58 47 N/A 3.80%

Source:

CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

This material was produced in 2010; it is subject to updating in 2012.

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Chapter 4

Investment Overview

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Foreign Investment Climate

Background

Decreased insurgent attacks and an improved security environment are helping to spur economic activity, particularly in the retail sector. Since 2010, however, violence was on the rise, with effects possible in the economic sphere. Continued economic improvement, long-term fiscal health, and sustained increases in standard of living still depend on the government passing major policy reforms, developing Iraq's massive oil reserves, and stabilizing the security situation in Iraq. Potential foreign investors viewed Iraq with much more interest in 2009, but were still hampered by difficulties in acquiring land for projects and other regulatory impediments.

Iraq is making modest progress in building the institutions needed to implement economic policy. Iraq has held serious discussions with both the IMF and World Bank for new programs that would help further strengthen Iraq's economic institutions. Some reform-minded leaders within the Iraqi government are seeking to pass laws to strengthen the economy. This legislation includes a package of laws to establish a modern legal framework for the oil sector and a mechanism to equitably divide oil revenues within the nation, although these and other important reforms are still under contentious and sporadic negotiation. Iraq's recent contracts with major oil companies have the potential to greatly expand oil revenues, but Iraq will need to upgrade its refinery and export infrastructure to enable these deals to reach their potential.

The Government of Iraq is pursuing a strategy to gain foreign investment in Iraq's economy. This includes an amendment to the National Investment Law, multiple international trade and investment events, as well as potential participation in joint ventures with state-owned enterprises. Provincial Councils also are using their own budgets to promote and facilitate investment at the local level. The Central Bank has successfully held the exchange rate at approximately 1170 Iraqi dinar/US dollar since January 2009. Inflation has decreased consistently since 2006 as the security situation has improved. However, Iraqi leaders remain hard pressed to translate macroeconomic gains into improved lives for ordinary Iraqis. Unemployment remains a problem throughout the country. Reducing corruption and implementing structural reforms, such as bank restructuring and developing the private sector, would be important steps in this direction.

Foreign Investment Assessment

Openness to Foreign Investment

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The long war with Iran and the more recent U.N. sanctions as result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the subsequent bombing of Iraq have devastated its economy and put a hold on foreign investment.

Transparency of Regulatory System

There is no information available at this time.

Labor Force

Total: 7.7 million estimated

By occupation: N/A

Agriculture and Industry

Agriculture products: wheat, barley, rice, vegetables, dates, cotton; cattle, sheep, poultry

Industries: petroleum, chemicals, textiles, construction materials, food processing, fertilizer, metal fabrication/processing

Import Commodities and Partners

Commodities: food, medicine, manufactures

Partners: Turkey 18.7%, Jordan 12.3%, Vietnam 11%, US 7.1%, Germany 5.2%, UK 4.9%

Export Commodities and Partners

Commodities: crude oil (83.9%), crude materials excluding fuels (8.0%), food and live animals

Partners: US 54.7%, Canada 9.8%, Italy 8.8%, Taiwan 4.2%, Jordan 4.2%

Telephone System

Telephones- main lines in use: 675,000; note - an unknown number of telephone lines were damaged or destroyed during the March-April 2003 war

Telephones- mobile cellular: 20,000

General Assessment: the 2003 war severely disrupted telecommunications throughout Iraq including international connections; USAID is overseeing the repair of switching capability and the construction of mobile and satellite communication facilities

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Domestic: repairs to switches and lines destroyed in the recent fighting continue, but sabotage remains a problem; cellular service is expected to be in place within two years

International: country code - 964; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean), 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region), and 1 Arabsat (inoperative); coaxial cable and microwave radio relay to Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, and Turkey; Kuwait line is probably non- operational

Internet

Internet Hosts: N/A

Internet users: 25,000

Roads, Airports, Ports and Harbors

Railways: 1,963 km

Highways: 45,550 km

Ports and harbors: Umm Qasr, Khawr az Zubayr, and Al Basrah have limited functionality

Airports: 111 (not known how much were damaged during the 2003 war); w/paved runways: 79

Legal System and Considerations

Iraq’s legal system is based on civil and Islamic law under the Iraqi Interim Government (IG) and Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).

Dispute Settlement

There is no information available at this time.

Corruption Perception Ranking

See list elsewhere in this Country Review, as reported by Transparency International, for Iraq rank. Typically, Iraq is ranked as one of the most corrupt nations in the world (according to this index).

Cultural Considerations

It is important to adhere to Islamic customs and behaviors while in Iraq. For example, women should observe the Muslim dress code, and all visitors should respect the five daily times of prayer.

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For More information see:

United States’ State Department Commercial Guide

Foreign Investment Index

Foreign Investment Index

The Foreign Investment Index is a proprietary index measuring attractiveness to international investment flows. The Foreign Investment Index is calculated using an established methodology by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's economic stability (sustained economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits, budget surplus), economic risk (risk of non-servicing of payments for goods or services, loans and trade-related finance, risk of sovereign default), business and investment climate (property rights, labor force and laws, regulatory transparency, openness to foreign investment, market conditions, and stability of government). Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the lowest level of foreign investment viability, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of foreign investment viability, according to this proprietary index.

Country Assessment

Afghanistan 2

Albania 4.5

Algeria 6

Andorra 9

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Angola 4.5-5

Antigua 8.5

Argentina 5

Armenia 5

Australia 9.5

Austria 9-9.5

Azerbaijan 5

Bahamas 9

Bahrain 7.5

Bangladesh 4.5

Barbados 9

Belarus 4

Belgium 9

Belize 7.5

Benin 5.5

Bhutan 4.5

Bolivia 4.5

Bosnia-Herzegovina 5

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Botswana 7.5-8

Brazil 8

Brunei 7

Bulgaria 5.5

Burkina Faso 4

Burma (Myanmar) 4.5

Burundi 4

Cambodia 4.5

Cameroon 5

Canada 9.5

Cape Verde 6

Central African Republic 3

Chad 4

Chile 9

China 7.5

China: Hong Kong 8.5

China: Taiwan 8.5

Colombia 7

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Comoros 4

Congo DRC 4

Congo RC 5

Costa Rica 8

Cote d'Ivoire 4.5

Croatia 7

Cuba 4.5

Cyprus 7

Czech Republic 8.5

Denmark 9.5

Djibouti 4.5

Dominica 6

Dominican Republic 6.5

East Timor 4.5

Ecuador 5.5

Egypt 4.5-5

El Salvador 6

Equatorial Guinea 4.5

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Eritrea 3.5

Estonia 8

Ethiopia 4.5

Fiji 5

Finland 9

Former Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia 5

France 9-9.5

Gabon 5.5

Gambia 5

Georgia 5

Germany 9-9.5

Ghana 5.5

Greece 5

Grenada 7.5

Guatemala 5.5

Guinea 3.5

Guinea-Bissau 3.5

Guyana 4.5

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Haiti 4

Holy See (Vatican) n/a

Hong Kong (China) 8.5

Honduras 5.5

Hungary 8

Iceland 8-8.5

India 8

Indonesia 5.5

Iran 4

Iraq 3

Ireland 8

Israel 8.5

Italy 8

Jamaica 5.5

Japan 9.5

Jordan 6

Kazakhstan 6

Kenya 5

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Kiribati 5.5

Korea, North 1

Korea, South 9

Kosovo 4.5

Kuwait 8.5

Kyrgyzstan 4.5

Laos 4

Latvia 7

Lebanon 5

Lesotho 5.5

Liberia 3.5

Libya 3

Liechtenstein 9

Lithuania 7.5

Luxembourg 9-9.5

Madagascar 4.5

Malawi 4.5

Malaysia 8.5

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Maldives 6.5

Mali 5

Malta 9

Marshall Islands 5

Mauritania 4.5

Mauritius 7.5-8

Mexico 6.5-7

Micronesia 5

Moldova 4.5-5

Monaco 9

Mongolia 5

Montenegro 5.5

Morocco 7.5

Mozambique 5

Namibia 7.5

Nauru 4.5

Nepal 4

Netherlands 9-9.5

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New Zealand 9.5

Nicaragua 5

Niger 4.5

Nigeria 4.5

Norway 9-9.5

Oman 8

Pakistan 4

Palau 4.5-5

Panama 7

Papua New Guinea 5

Paraguay 6

Peru 6

Philippines 6

Poland 8

Portugal 7.5-8

Qatar 9

Romania 6-6.5

Russia 6

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Rwanda 4

Saint Kitts and Nevis 8

Saint Lucia 8

Saint Vincent and Grenadines 7

Samoa 7

San Marino 8.5

Sao Tome and Principe 4.5-5

Saudi Arabia 7

Senegal 6

Serbia 6

Seychelles 5

Sierra Leone 4

Singapore 9.5

Slovak Republic (Slovakia) 8.5

Slovenia 8.5-9

Solomon Islands 5

Somalia 2

South Africa 8

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Spain 7.5-8

Sri Lanka 5.5

Sudan 4

Suriname 5

Swaziland 4.5

Sweden 9.5

Switzerland 9.5

Syria 2.5

Tajikistan 4

Taiwan (China) 8.5

Tanzania 5

Thailand 7.5-8

Togo 4.5-5

Tonga 5.5-6

Trinidad and Tobago 8-8.5

Tunisia 6

Turkey 6.5-7

Turkmenistan 4

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Tuvalu 7

Uganda 5

Ukraine 4.5-5

United Arab Emirates 8.5

United Kingdom 9

United States 9

Uruguay 6.5-7

Uzbekistan 4

Vanuatu 6

Venezuela 5

Vietnam 5.5

Yemen 3

Zambia 4.5-5

Zimbabwe 3.5

Editor's Note:

As of 2015, the global economic crisis (emerging in 2008) had affected many countries across the world, resulting in changes to their rankings. Among those countries affected were top tier economies, such as the United Kingdom, Iceland, Switzerland and Austria. However, in all these cases, their rankings have moved back upward in the last couple of years as anxieties have eased. Other top tier countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy, suffered some

Iraq Review 2016 Page 446 of 609 pages Iraq effects due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation, was also downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, Greece's position on the precipice of default incurred a sharper downgrade than the other four euro zone countries mentioned above. Cyprus' exposure to Greek bank yielded a downgrade in its case. Slovenia and Latvia have been slightly downgraded due to a mix of economic and political concerns but could easily be upgraded in a future assessment, should these concerns abate. Meanwhile, the crisis in eastern Ukraine fueled downgrades in that country and neighboring Russia.

Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in Japan in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the resulting nuclear crisis -- and the appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain therein, this country has only slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to be transient, the government remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both India and China retain their rankings; India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic representation and accountability.

There were shifts in opposite directions for Mali and Nigeria versus the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, and Burundi. Mali was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. Likewise, a new government in Nigeria generated a slight upgrade as the country attempts to confront corruption, crime, and terrorism. But the Central African Republic was downgraded due to the takeover of the government by Seleka rebels and the continued decline into lawlessness in that country. Likewise, the attempts by the leaders of Burundi and Burkina Faso to hold onto power by by-passing the constitution raised eybrows and resulted in downgrades.

Political unrest in Libya and Algeria have contributed to a decision to marginally downgrade these countries as well. Syria incurred a sharper downgrade due to the devolution into de facto civil war and the dire security threat posed by Islamist terrorists. Iraq saw a similar downgrade as a result of the takeover of wide swaths of territory and the threat of genocide at the hands of Islamist terrorists. Yemen, likewise, has been downgraded due to political instability at the hands of secessionists, terrorists, Houthi rebels, and the intervention of external parties. Conversely, Egypt and Tunisia saw slight upgrades as their political environments stabilize.

At the low end of the spectrum, devolving security conditions and/or economic crisis have resulted in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe maintaining their low ratings.

The United States continues to retain its previous slight downgrade due to the enduring threat of default surrounding the debt ceiling in that country, matched by a conflict-ridden political climate. In the case of Mexico, there is limited concern about default, but increasing alarm over the security situation in that country and the government’s ability to contain it. In Argentina, a default to bond holders resulted in a downgrade to that country. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the

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Unitd States.

Source:

CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

2015

Corruption Perceptions Index

Corruption Perceptions Index

Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index

Editor's Note:

Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index is a composite index which ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials. This index indicates the views of national and international business people and analysts about the levels of corruption in each country. The highest (and best) level of transparency is indicated by the number, 10. The lower (and worse) levels of transparency are indicated by lower numbers.

Rank Country/Territory CPI 2009 Surveys Confidence Score Used Range

1 New Zealand 9.4 6 9.1 - 9.5

2 Denmark 9.3 6 9.1 - 9.5

3 Singapore 9.2 9 9.0 - 9.4

3 Sweden 9.2 6 9.0 - 9.3

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5 Switzerland 9.0 6 8.9 - 9.1

6 Finland 8.9 6 8.4 - 9.4

6 Netherlands 8.9 6 8.7 - 9.0

8 Australia 8.7 8 8.3 - 9.0

8 Canada 8.7 6 8.5 - 9.0

8 Iceland 8.7 4 7.5 - 9.4

11 Norway 8.6 6 8.2 - 9.1

12 Hong Kong 8.2 8 7.9 - 8.5

12 Luxembourg 8.2 6 7.6 - 8.8

14 Germany 8.0 6 7.7 - 8.3

14 Ireland 8.0 6 7.8 - 8.4

16 Austria 7.9 6 7.4 - 8.3

17 Japan 7.7 8 7.4 - 8.0

17 United Kingdom 7.7 6 7.3 - 8.2

19 United States 7.5 8 6.9 - 8.0

20 Barbados 7.4 4 6.6 - 8.2

21 Belgium 7.1 6 6.9 - 7.3

22 Qatar 7.0 6 5.8 - 8.1

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22 Saint Lucia 7.0 3 6.7 - 7.5

24 France 6.9 6 6.5 - 7.3

25 Chile 6.7 7 6.5 - 6.9

25 Uruguay 6.7 5 6.4 - 7.1

27 Cyprus 6.6 4 6.1 - 7.1

27 Estonia 6.6 8 6.1 - 6.9

27 Slovenia 6.6 8 6.3 - 6.9

30 United Arab Emirates 6.5 5 5.5 - 7.5

31 Saint Vincent and the 6.4 3 4.9 - 7.5 Grenadines

32 Israel 6.1 6 5.4 - 6.7

32 Spain 6.1 6 5.5 - 6.6

34 Dominica 5.9 3 4.9 - 6.7

35 Portugal 5.8 6 5.5 - 6.2

35 Puerto Rico 5.8 4 5.2 - 6.3

37 Botswana 5.6 6 5.1 - 6.3

37 Taiwan 5.6 9 5.4 - 5.9

39 Brunei Darussalam 5.5 4 4.7 - 6.4

39 Oman 5.5 5 4.4 - 6.5

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39 Korea (South) 5.5 9 5.3 - 5.7

42 Mauritius 5.4 6 5.0 - 5.9

43 Costa Rica 5.3 5 4.7 - 5.9

43 Macau 5.3 3 3.3 - 6.9

45 Malta 5.2 4 4.0 - 6.2

46 Bahrain 5.1 5 4.2 - 5.8

46 Cape Verde 5.1 3 3.3 - 7.0

46 Hungary 5.1 8 4.6 - 5.7

49 Bhutan 5.0 4 4.3 - 5.6

49 Jordan 5.0 7 3.9 - 6.1

49 Poland 5.0 8 4.5 - 5.5

52 Czech Republic 4.9 8 4.3 - 5.6

52 Lithuania 4.9 8 4.4 - 5.4

54 Seychelles 4.8 3 3.0 - 6.7

55 South Africa 4.7 8 4.3 - 4.9

56 Latvia 4.5 6 4.1 - 4.9

56 Malaysia 4.5 9 4.0 - 5.1

56 Namibia 4.5 6 3.9 - 5.1

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56 Samoa 4.5 3 3.3 - 5.3

56 Slovakia 4.5 8 4.1 - 4.9

61 Cuba 4.4 3 3.5 - 5.1

61 Turkey 4.4 7 3.9 - 4.9

63 Italy 4.3 6 3.8 - 4.9

63 Saudi Arabia 4.3 5 3.1 - 5.3

65 Tunisia 4.2 6 3.0 - 5.5

66 Croatia 4.1 8 3.7 - 4.5

66 Georgia 4.1 7 3.4 - 4.7

66 Kuwait 4.1 5 3.2 - 5.1

69 Ghana 3.9 7 3.2 - 4.6

69 Montenegro 3.9 5 3.5 - 4.4

71 Bulgaria 3.8 8 3.2 - 4.5

71 FYR Macedonia 3.8 6 3.4 - 4.2

71 Greece 3.8 6 3.2 - 4.3

71 Romania 3.8 8 3.2 - 4.3

75 Brazil 3.7 7 3.3 - 4.3

75 Colombia 3.7 7 3.1 - 4.3

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75 Peru 3.7 7 3.4 - 4.1

75 Suriname 3.7 3 3.0 - 4.7

79 Burkina Faso 3.6 7 2.8 - 4.4

79 China 3.6 9 3.0 - 4.2

79 Swaziland 3.6 3 3.0 - 4.7

79 Trinidad and Tobago 3.6 4 3.0 - 4.3

83 Serbia 3.5 6 3.3 - 3.9

84 El Salvador 3.4 5 3.0 - 3.8

84 Guatemala 3.4 5 3.0 - 3.9

84 India 3.4 10 3.2 - 3.6

84 Panama 3.4 5 3.1 - 3.7

84 Thailand 3.4 9 3.0 - 3.8

89 Lesotho 3.3 6 2.8 - 3.8

89 Malawi 3.3 7 2.7 - 3.9

89 Mexico 3.3 7 3.2 - 3.5

89 Moldova 3.3 6 2.7 - 4.0

89 Morocco 3.3 6 2.8 - 3.9

89 Rwanda 3.3 4 2.9 - 3.7

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95 Albania 3.2 6 3.0 - 3.3

95 Vanuatu 3.2 3 2.3 - 4.7

97 Liberia 3.1 3 1.9 - 3.8

97 Sri Lanka 3.1 7 2.8 - 3.4

99 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.0 7 2.6 - 3.4

99 Dominican Republic 3.0 5 2.9 - 3.2

99 Jamaica 3.0 5 2.8 - 3.3

99 Madagascar 3.0 7 2.8 - 3.2

99 Senegal 3.0 7 2.5 - 3.6

99 Tonga 3.0 3 2.6 - 3.3

99 Zambia 3.0 7 2.8 - 3.2

106 Argentina 2.9 7 2.6 - 3.1

106 Benin 2.9 6 2.3 - 3.4

106 Gabon 2.9 3 2.6 - 3.1

106 Gambia 2.9 5 1.6 - 4.0

106 Niger 2.9 5 2.7 - 3.0

111 Algeria 2.8 6 2.5 - 3.1

111 Djibouti 2.8 4 2.3 - 3.2

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111 Egypt 2.8 6 2.6 - 3.1

111 Indonesia 2.8 9 2.4 - 3.2

111 Kiribati 2.8 3 2.3 - 3.3

111 Mali 2.8 6 2.4 - 3.2

111 Sao Tome and Principe 2.8 3 2.4 - 3.3

111 Solomon Islands 2.8 3 2.3 - 3.3

111 Togo 2.8 5 1.9 - 3.9

120 Armenia 2.7 7 2.6 - 2.8

120 Bolivia 2.7 6 2.4 - 3.1

120 Ethiopia 2.7 7 2.4 - 2.9

120 Kazakhstan 2.7 7 2.1 - 3.3

120 Mongolia 2.7 7 2.4 - 3.0

120 Vietnam 2.7 9 2.4 - 3.1

126 Eritrea 2.6 4 1.6 - 3.8

126 Guyana 2.6 4 2.5 - 2.7

126 Syria 2.6 5 2.2 - 2.9

126 Tanzania 2.6 7 2.4 - 2.9

130 Honduras 2.5 6 2.2 - 2.8

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130 Lebanon 2.5 3 1.9 - 3.1

130 Libya 2.5 6 2.2 - 2.8

130 Maldives 2.5 4 1.8 - 3.2

130 Mauritania 2.5 7 2.0 - 3.3

130 Mozambique 2.5 7 2.3 - 2.8

130 Nicaragua 2.5 6 2.3 - 2.7

130 Nigeria 2.5 7 2.2 - 2.7

130 Uganda 2.5 7 2.1 - 2.8

139 Bangladesh 2.4 7 2.0 - 2.8

139 Belarus 2.4 4 2.0 - 2.8

139 Pakistan 2.4 7 2.1 - 2.7

139 Philippines 2.4 9 2.1 - 2.7

143 Azerbaijan 2.3 7 2.0 - 2.6

143 Comoros 2.3 3 1.6 - 3.3

143 Nepal 2.3 6 2.0 - 2.6

146 Cameroon 2.2 7 1.9 - 2.6

146 Ecuador 2.2 5 2.0 - 2.5

146 Kenya 2.2 7 1.9 - 2.5

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146 Russia 2.2 8 1.9 - 2.4

146 Sierra Leone 2.2 5 1.9 - 2.4

146 Timor-Leste 2.2 5 1.8 - 2.6

146 Ukraine 2.2 8 2.0 - 2.6

146 Zimbabwe 2.2 7 1.7 - 2.8

154 Côte d´Ivoire 2.1 7 1.8 - 2.4

154 Papua New Guinea 2.1 5 1.7 - 2.5

154 Paraguay 2.1 5 1.7 - 2.5

154 Yemen 2.1 4 1.6 - 2.5

158 Cambodia 2.0 8 1.8 - 2.2

158 Central African Republic 2.0 4 1.9 - 2.2

158 Laos 2.0 4 1.6 - 2.6

158 Tajikistan 2.0 8 1.6 - 2.5

162 Angola 1.9 5 1.8 - 1.9

162 Congo Brazzaville 1.9 5 1.6 - 2.1

162 Democratic Republic of 1.9 5 1.7 - 2.1 Congo

162 Guinea-Bissau 1.9 3 1.8 - 2.0

162 Kyrgyzstan 1.9 7 1.8 - 2.1

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162 Venezuela 1.9 7 1.8 - 2.0

168 Burundi 1.8 6 1.6 - 2.0

168 Equatorial Guinea 1.8 3 1.6 - 1.9

168 Guinea 1.8 5 1.7 - 1.8

168 Haiti 1.8 3 1.4 - 2.3

168 Iran 1.8 3 1.7 - 1.9

168 Turkmenistan 1.8 4 1.7 - 1.9

174 Uzbekistan 1.7 6 1.5 - 1.8

175 Chad 1.6 6 1.5 - 1.7

176 Iraq 1.5 3 1.2 - 1.8

176 Sudan 1.5 5 1.4 - 1.7

178 Myanmar 1.4 3 0.9 - 1.8

179 Afghanistan 1.3 4 1.0 - 1.5

180 Somalia 1.1 3 0.9 - 1.4

Methodology:

As noted above, the highest (and best) level of transparency with the least perceived corruption is indicated by the number, 10. The lower (and worse) levels of transparency are indicated by lower numbers.

According to Transparency International, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) table shows a

Iraq Review 2016 Page 458 of 609 pages Iraq country's ranking and score, the number of surveys used to determine the score, and the confidence range of the scoring.

The rank shows how one country compares to others included in the index. The CPI score indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory.

The CPI is based on 13 independent surveys. However, not all surveys include all countries. The surveys used column indicates how many surveys were relied upon to determine the score for that country.

The confidence range indicates the reliability of the CPI scores and tells us that allowing for a margin of error, we can be 90% confident that the true score for this country lies within this range.

Note:

Kosovo, which separated from the Yugoslav successor state of Serbia, is not listed above. No calculation is available for Kosovo at this time, however, a future corruption index by Transparency International may include the world's newest country in its tally. Taiwan has been listed above despite its contested status; while Taiwan claims sovereign status, China claims ultimate jurisdiction over Taiwan. Hong Kong, which is also under the rubric of Chinese sovereignty, is listed above. Note as well that Puerto Rico, which is a United States domain, is also included in the list above. These inclusions likely have to do with the size and fairly autonomous status of their economies.

Source:

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index; available at URL: http://www.transparency.org

Updated:

Uploaded in 2011 using most recent ranking available; reviewed in 2015.

Competitiveness Ranking

Competitiveness Ranking

Editor's Note:

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The Global Competitiveness Report’s competitiveness ranking is based on the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), which was developed for the World Economic Forum. The GCI is based on a number of competitiveness considerations, and provides a comprehensive picture of the competitiveness landscape in countries around the world. The competitiveness considerations are: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication, and innovation. The rankings are calculated from both publicly available data and the Executive Opinion Survey.

GCI 2010 GCI 2010 GCI 2009 Change Country/Economy Rank Score Rank 2009-2010

Switzerland 1 5.63 1 0

Sweden 2 5.56 4 2

Singapore 3 5.48 3 0

United States 4 5.43 2 -2

Germany 5 5.39 7 2

Japan 6 5.37 8 2

Finland 7 5.37 6 -1

Netherlands 8 5.33 10 2

Denmark 9 5.32 5 -4

Canada 10 5.30 9 -1

Hong Kong SAR 11 5.30 11 0

United Kingdom 12 5.25 13 1

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Taiwan, China 13 5.21 12 -1

Norway 14 5.14 14 0

France 15 5.13 16 1

Australia 16 5.11 15 -1

Qatar 17 5.10 22 5

Austria 18 5.09 17 -1

Belgium 19 5.07 18 -1

Luxembourg 20 5.05 21 1

Saudi Arabia 21 4.95 28 7

Korea, Rep. 22 4.93 19 -3

New Zealand 23 4.92 20 -3

Israel 24 4.91 27 3

United Arab Emirates 25 4.89 23 -2

Malaysia 26 4.88 24 -2

China 27 4.84 29 2

Brunei Darussalam 28 4.75 32 4

Ireland 29 4.74 25 -4

Chile 30 4.69 30 0

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Iceland 31 4.68 26 -5

Tunisia 32 4.65 40 8

Estonia 33 4.61 35 2

Oman 34 4.61 41 7

Kuwait 35 4.59 39 4

Czech Republic 36 4.57 31 -5

Bahrain 37 4.54 38 1

Thailand 38 4.51 36 -2

Poland 39 4.51 46 7

Cyprus 40 4.50 34 -6

Puerto Rico 41 4.49 42 1

Spain 42 4.49 33 -9

Barbados 43 4.45 44 1

Indonesia 44 4.43 54 10

Slovenia 45 4.42 37 -8

Portugal 46 4.38 43 -3

Lithuania 47 4.38 53 6

Italy 48 4.37 48 0

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Montenegro 49 4.36 62 13

Malta 50 4.34 52 2

India 51 4.33 49 -2

Hungary 52 4.33 58 6

Panama 53 4.33 59 6

South Africa 54 4.32 45 -9

Mauritius 55 4.32 57 2

Costa Rica 56 4.31 55 -1

Azerbaijan 57 4.29 51 -6

Brazil 58 4.28 56 -2

Vietnam 59 4.27 75 16

Slovak Republic 60 4.25 47 -13

Turkey 61 4.25 61 0

Sri Lanka 62 4.25 79 17

Russian Federation 63 4.24 63 0

Uruguay 64 4.23 65 1

Jordan 65 4.21 50 -15

Mexico 66 4.19 60 -6

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Romania 67 4.16 64 -3

Colombia 68 4.14 69 1

Iran 69 4.14 n/a n/a

Latvia 70 4.14 68 -2

Bulgaria 71 4.13 76 5

Kazakhstan 72 4.12 67 -5

Peru 73 4.11 78 5

Namibia 74 4.09 74 0

Morocco 75 4.08 73 -2

Botswana 76 4.05 66 -10

Croatia 77 4.04 72 -5

Guatemala 78 4.04 80 2

Macedonia, FYR 79 4.02 84 5

Rwanda 80 4.00 n/a n/a

Egypt 81 4.00 70 -11

El Salvador 82 3.99 77 -5

Greece 83 3.99 71 -12

Trinidad and Tobago 84 3.97 86 2

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Philippines 85 3.96 87 2

Algeria 86 3.96 83 -3

Argentina 87 3.95 85 -2

Albania 88 3.94 96 8

Ukraine 89 3.90 82 -7

Gambia, The 90 3.90 81 -9

Honduras 91 3.89 89 -2

Lebanon 92 3.89 n/a n/a

Georgia 93 3.86 90 -3

Moldova 94 3.86 n/a n/a

Jamaica 95 3.85 91 -4

Serbia 96 3.84 93 -3

Syria 97 3.79 94 -3

Armenia 98 3.76 97 -1

Mongolia 99 3.75 117 18

Libya 100 3.74 88 -12

Dominican Republic 101 3.72 95 -6

Bosnia and Herzegovina 102 3.70 109 7

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Benin 103 3.69 103 0

Senegal 104 3.67 92 -12

Ecuador 105 3.65 105 0

Kenya 106 3.65 98 -8

Bangladesh 107 3.64 106 -1

Bolivia 108 3.64 120 12

Cambodia 109 3.63 110 1

Guyana 110 3.62 104 -6

Cameroon 111 3.58 111 0

Nicaragua 112 3.57 115 3

Tanzania 113 3.56 100 -13

Ghana 114 3.56 114 0

Zambia 115 3.55 112 -3

Tajikistan 116 3.53 122 6

Cape Verde 117 3.51 n/a n/a

Uganda 118 3.51 108 -10

Ethiopia 119 3.51 118 -1

Paraguay 120 3.49 124 4

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Kyrgyz Republic 121 3.49 123 2

Venezuela 122 3.48 113 -9

Pakistan 123 3.48 101 -22

Madagascar 124 3.46 121 -3

Malawi 125 3.45 119 -6

Swaziland 126 3.40 n/a n/a

Nigeria 127 3.38 99 -28

Lesotho 128 3.36 107 -21

Côte d'Ivoire 129 3.35 116 -13

Nepal 130 3.34 125 -5

Mozambique 131 3.32 129 -2

Mali 132 3.28 130 -2

Timor-Leste 133 3.23 126 -7

Burkina Faso 134 3.20 128 -6

Mauritania 135 3.14 127 -8

Zimbabwe 136 3.03 132 -4

Burundi 137 2.96 133 -4

Angola 138 2.93 n/a n/a

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Chad 139 2.73 131 -8

Methodology:

The competitiveness rankings are calculated from both publicly available data and the Executive Opinion Survey, a comprehensive annual survey conducted by the World Economic Forum together with its network of Partner Institutes (leading research institutes and business organizations) in the countries covered by the Report.

Highlights according to WEF --

- The United States falls two places to fourth position, overtaken by Sweden and Singapore in the rankings of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 - The People’s Republic of China continues to move up the rankings, with marked improvements in several other Asian countries - Germany moves up two places to fifth place, leading the Eurozone countries - Switzerland tops the rankings

Source:

World Economic Forum; available at URL: http://www.weforum.org

Updated:

2011 using most recent ranking available; reviewed in 2015.

Taxation

Information regarding Iraq's corporate tax structure is not available at this time.

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Stock Market

The stock exchange in Iraq is the Capital Market Authority in Baghdad.

Partner Links

Partner Links

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Chapter 5 Social Overview

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People

Social Demography

The general trajectory of Iraqi population dynamics in modern times can be largely be characterized by urbanization, with a steady movement of people from the rural (especially southern) region to the urban (especially central) region.

The basic trends of the 1980s were rooted in the particularly exploitive character of agricultural practices used on the land itself and the people who farmed the land. Declining productivity of the land, stemming from the failure to develop drainage along the irrigation facilities and the living conditions of the producers, resulted in both the depopulation of rural areas and declining productivity in the agricultural sector.

After World War II, this urbanization trend was accelerated, and during the war of the 1980s, migration from heavily bombed areas of the south, such as Basra, resulted in the influx of people int o Baghdad. The government, however, tried to deal with the demographic issues by resettling refugees in less populated parts of the country.

Ethnicity

The vast majority of Iraq's more than 37 million people -- approximately 77 percent of the total population -- are Arabs. Arabs are the predominant ethnic group of the Middle East and are believed to have originated in the area of present-day Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Centuries of intermarriage and migration along caravan routes has resulted in the fact that Arabs cannot be particularly regarded as a pure ethnic group. There is, however, a shared Arab culture in the Middle East, which can be identified in the Arabs of Iraq.

Kurds make up a substantial minority, numbering up to 20 percent of the Iraqi population. Kurds also live in Turkey, Syria and Iran. Once mainly nomadic or semi nomadic, Kurdish society was characterized by a combination of urban centers, villages, and pastoral tribes dating back to the time of the Ottoman period. Historical sources indicate that from the eighteenth century onward Kurds in Iraq were mainly peasants engaged in agriculture and arboriculture. By the nineteenth

Iraq Review 2016 Page 471 of 609 pages Iraq century, about 20 percent of Iraqi Kurds lived in historic Kurdish cities such as Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, and Irbil. The gradual migration to the cities, particularly of the young intelligentsia, helped nurture Kurdish nationalism. Historically, the Kurds have lived under foreign rule for centuries, and in recent years, there have been attempts to create a sovereign Kurdistan.

The rest of the Iraqi population includes ethnic communities of Turkmen, Lurs, Armenians and Assyrians. Small pockets of Iranians also live along the Iraq-Iran border.

Religion

Islam is the major religion practiced by about 97 percent of the total population. Iraqi Muslims are divided amongst Shi'a and Sunni practitioners; Shi'a Muslims make up the majority Muslim sect in Iraq. There i s also a small Christian minority within the Iraqi population. The Christian churches in the Middle East tend to be patriarchal and hierarchical, often operating with a great deal of independence. Of the Christian population, there is a small surviving Gnostic sect called the Mandeans, who also live in southern Iraq between Baghdad and Basra. This sect is sometimes referred to as the Christians of St. John, although some origins of the religion are thought to pre- date Christianity. There are also Yazidis in the north of Iraq around Mosul. Although close to the Kurdish culture in social structure, this religion is not well accepted by followers of Shi'a and Sunni Islam. Yazidism integrates aspects of Zoroastrianism, Manicheism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Reports also suggest that there is a tiny minority of Jews in Baghdad.

Language

Arabic is the official language of Iraq, although Kurdish is officially recognized in Kurdish regions. While Arabic is deri ved form the Afro-Asiatic family of languages, Kurdish is sourced in the Indo- European family of languages. Azerbaijani, Armenian, Assyrian, Farsi, Turkish, and Turkman languages are also spoken. In addition, ethnologists have recorded the use of languages from the other Neo-Aramaic or Neo-Syriac linguistic groups belonging to the Afro-Asiatic family of languages. Indo-European languages such as Behdini, Domani and Luri have also been reported.

Throughout the Arab world, the Arabic language exists in three forms: (1) Classical Arabic of the Koran; (2) the literary language developed from the classical version, which is referred to as Modern Standard Arabic, and which has virtually the same structure wherever used; and (3) the spoken language, which, in Iraq, is Iraqi Arabic. Educated Arabs tend to be bilingual in both Modern Standard Arabic and in their own dialect of spoken Arabic. Even uneducated Arabic speakers, however, can usually understand the meaning of something said in Modern Standard Arabic, although they may be unable to speak the language itself. Classical Arabic, apart from Koranic texts, is predominantly the domain of scholars.

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Cultural Diversity and Divisions

The major cultural conflicts in Iraq today are said to center on ethnicity and religion. In recent decades, international attention has been paid to the differences between Iraq's Arab majority and its Kurdish minority who predominate the north of Iraq. Kurds have become increasingly adamant about expressing the distinctiveness of their Kurdish identity, and the need for their own self- government. The politics of this issue remain a matter of debate. In a post-war Iraq, Kurds hope for an autonomous Kurdistan under a federal Iraqi system. They have promised not to pursue absolute independence thus rupturing Iraqi territorial integrity, so long as they are granted strong measures of self-government. Neighboring Turkey has worried that greater Kurdish auton omy would be a threat making the Kurdish issue a contentious one in the region.

In the realm of religion, the major divide lies between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims, Although Shi'a Muslims constitute the clear majority in Iraq, the country has been politically controlled by Sunnis, albeit within the context of a secular political system. The schism between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims go back to the death of the Islamic prophet Mohammed, and his desire for his son, Ali, to carry on the Muslim tradition. This result did not occur as planned and over decades, followers of Ali, and his son Hassan, became the predecessors to Shi'a Islam. The central division between the two Muslim sects lies in the Shi'a view that the Caliphate was illegitimate because it did not follow the desires of Mohammed for Ali to lead Muslims. Shi'a Islam over time has become associated with alienation and thus many non-Arab Muslims follow this sect. Martyrdom and self-flagellation are interesting components of Shi'a practice. For their part, Sunnis contend that Shi'a Islam does not follow Koranic principles, as well as associated theological and juridical schools. Indeed, they regard Shi'as as innovators of Islam to a degree. Sunni Islam is fundamentally predicated on the Hadiths (collective sayings and principles of Mohammed) and as such, Sunnis claim to be the correct practitioners of Islam. In practice, the ritual differences between the two sects, such as the importance of the Hadj (pilgrimage to Mecca) have developed over time.

In Iraq, though, despite the frequent references to the Shi'a / Sunni divide, the fact remains that national loyalty has tied these two sects together. National loyalty has not been a constant factor, however, since the 1980s, nationalism has been one of the basic determinants of affiliation. Also noteworthy is the fact that Iraq's Shi'as are Arabs and not from other ethnic groups, and so regardless of sectarian differences, there has been a shared an tipathy of the Persians to the east for many centuries. The Iraqi government has skillfully exploited this age-old enmity in its propaganda, publicizing the war of the 1980s with Iran as part of the ancient struggle between the Arab and Persian empires. The war compelled Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party to integrate Shi'a into Iraqi society for practical purposes. The war placed inordinate demands on the regime for manpower, which could only be met by levying the Shi'a community. Although this process of integration was neither perfect, nor fully manifested, it does suggest that the so-called Shi'a / Sunni

Iraq Review 2016 Page 473 of 609 pages Iraq divide in Iraq is far more nuanced than is often suggested, and the tension has often been mitigated by national interests.

Perhaps the most overlooked conflict in Iraqi society is between the religious factions of society (regardless of sect) and the secular Ba'athists. Under the regime of Saddam Hussein, religious values were present, but always subordinated to the interests of the regime. As Iraq emerges from that regime, there have been reports of Iraqis denouncing the replacement of Saddam Hussein's government with that of Western powers, with declarations that Iraq is a Muslim country. This sort of declaration was largely silenced during the rule of Saddam Hussein, however, it is increasingly being recorded. Indeed, in early discussions of a post-war Iraq, tribal elders, Iraqi exiles, and other interest groups, have expressed differing visions of their future government. Those differences are largely illustrated by divisions between whether or not Iraqi should be a secular nation state.

Human Development

In the realm of human development, the literacy rate for the total population is about 74 percent with the rate for males at 84 percent and a 64 percent rate for females, according to recent estimates. The population of Iraq has generally been well-educated and with a reasonably high literacy rate in comparison with other countries in the region. Iraq has a well-developed public school infrastructure. Typically, there are six years of primary (elementary) education, followed by three years of intermediate secondary, and then, three years of intermediate preparatory education.

Iraq's academic infrastructure is quite sophisticated, with a developed scientific community, 44 teacher training schools and institutes, three colleges and technical institutes, and eight universities, the oldest of which was established in 1957. Each of these institutions has been government owned and operated. Iraq is also home to a number of cultural centers, such as historic museums. In the late 1970s, the numbers of students in technical fields rose by 300 percent, while the number of female student rose by 45 percent. Since the war with Iran in the 1980s, however, the quality of Iraq's educational system was drastically affected. Notably, primary school enrollment, which was an impressive 100 percent in 198 0, had decreased by 15 percent by 1988. The Gulf War and its after-effects further decreased access to education and the quality of education that was provided.

In terms of health and welfare, the infant mortality rate in Iraq is 45.42 deaths per 1,000 live births. Life expectancy at birth for the total population is 69.62 years of age (males: 68.32 years; females: 70.99 years) . According to various sources, population growth was estimated at 2.7 percent in the last few years, while the fertility rate was estimated to be 4.28 children per woman.

Since the Gulf War of 1991, one of the areas where international embargoes have had the strongest and most deleterious effect is on the health services. As a consequence of sanctions, medication

Iraq Review 2016 Page 474 of 609 pages Iraq and medical equipment became increasingly difficult to obtain and almost impossible to fund. The destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure in 1991 also had significant effects on public health. Food supplies were drastically decreased, sanitary conditions deteriorated, water quali ty was compromised so that it was sometimes unable to be used in towns. Consequently, the capacity to stop the spreading of diseases was terribly compromised. A survey from April 1997 showed that 27 percent Iraqi children of five years of age or younger suffered from chronic malnutrition as a result of these living conditions. As well, in 2000, UNICEF reported that infant mortality had risen by 160 percent since 1991.

Note: In recent years, about 9.7percent of GDP in this country has been spent on health expenditures. Access to water and sanitation in this country is regarded to be average, with notable obstacles in rural areas.

Human Rights

Under the regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraqis have suffered a catalogue of human rights abuses. Indeed, the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein suppressed several groups. The regime typically used discrimination in public life, at work, and at school to control and organize society at its whim. The regime also arrested and detained countless Iraqis, some of whom remain incommunicado. In addition, the regime tortured Iraqis suspected of crimes, staged trials for those under arrest, and sentenced prisoners to extended imprisonment -- usually under terrible conditions. Execution using horrendous methodology was also customary.

Most of the people persecuted in Iraq were opponents of the ruling regime as free speech in Iraq under Saddam Hussein was severely curtailed. The legal system of Iraq under the regime of Saddam Hussein did not comply with international jurisprudence, and the judges and other legal practitioners were often military officers and civil servants without adequate training in matters of law.

Human rights conditions in Kurdish areas were generally better than those elsewhere in Iraq because of the lack of control over Kurdish areas by Saddam Hussein's regime.

As of 2007, in a country wracked by ongoing violence and instability, and with power-brokers seeking to assert their authority, human rights groups have continued to decry the state of human rights in Iraq. In 2005, 170 people were discovered at an Interior Minister detention center -- most of them reportedly suffering from starvation and other forms of abuse. The matter gave rise to questions about the moral authority of the new Iraqi leadership. The revelation of apparent torture of political detainees at the hands of United States-led coalition forces at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison contributed to the argument that human rights abuses continue to characterize the Iraqi political landscape, regardless of those in power.

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Indeed, in a November 2005 interview with the United Kingdom's Observer, former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi said the current level of human rights abuses in Iraq was similar to that of the period under Saddam Hussein's regime. Allawi made the remarks while calling for immediate action on recent allegations of torture. In response, President Jalal Talabani dismissed the charge as "nonsense" and pointed to the number of democratic rights that Iraqis had attained in the post- Saddam Hussein era. He also said that current abuses could not be compared with the exterminations, evidenced by mass graves, which took place under the regime of the former Iraqi president.

Clearly, Shi'as and Kurds, who suffered under the regime of Saddam Hussein, did not take kindly to Allawi's remarks. Nevertheless, his words likely resonated with Sunnis, who have accused the new Iraqi government of torturing detainees.

Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, www.countrywatch.com. See Bibliography for list of general research sources.

Human Development Index

Human Development Index

Human Development Index (Ranked Numerically)

The Human Development Index (HDI) is used to measure quality of life in countries across the world. The HDI has been compiled since 1990 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on a regular basis. The HDI is a composite of several indicators, which measure a country's achievements in three main arenas of human development: longevity, education, and economic standard of living. Although the concept of human development is complicated and cannot be properly captured by values and indices, the HDI offers a wide-ranging assessment of human development in certain countries, not based solely upon traditional economic and financial indicators. For more information about the methodology used to calculate the HDI, please see the "Source Materials" in the appendices of this review.

Very High Human High Human Medium Human Low Human

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Development Development Development Development

1. Norway 43. Bahamas 86. Fiji 128. Kenya

2. Australia 44. Lithuania 87. Turkmenistan 129. Bangladesh

88. Dominican 3. New Zealand 45. Chile Republic 130. Ghana

4. United States 46. Argentina 89. China 131. Cameroon

132. Myanmar 5. Ireland 47. Kuwait 90. El Salvador (Burma)

6. Liechtenstein 48. Latvia 91. Sri Lanka 133. Yemen

7. Netherlands 49. Montenegro 92. Thailand 134. Benin

135. 8. Canada 50. Romania 93. Gabon Madagascar

9. Sweden 51. Croatia 94. Surname 136. Mauritania

137. Papua 10. Germany 52. Uruguay 95. Bolivia New Guinea

11. Japan 53. Libya 96. Paraguay 138. Nepal

12. South Korea 54. Panama 97. Philippines 139. Togo

13. Switzerland 55. Saudi Arabia 98. Botswana 140. Comoros

14. France 56. Mexico 99. Moldova 141. Lesotho

15. Israel 57. Malaysia 100. Mongolia 142. Nigeria

16. Finland 58. Bulgaria 101. Egypt 143. Uganda

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17. Iceland 59. Trinidad and Tobago 102. Uzbekistan 144. Senegal

18. Belgium 60. Serbia 103. Micronesia 145. Haiti

19. Denmark 61. Belarus 104. Guyana 146. Angola

20. Spain 62. Costa Rica 105. Namibia 147. Djibouti

21. Hong King 63. Peru 106. Honduras 148. Tanzania

149. Cote 22. Greece 64. Albania 107. Maldives d'Ivoire

23. Italy 65. Russian Federation 108. Indonesia 150. Zambia

24. Luxembourg 66. Kazakhstan 109. Kyrgyzstan 151. Gambia

25. Austria 67. Azerbaijan 110. South Africa 152. Rwanda

26. United 68. Bosnia and Kingdom Herzegovina 111. Syria 153. Malawi

27. Singapore 69. Ukraine 112. Tajikistan 154. Sudan

28. Czech 155. Republic 70. Iran 113. Vietnam Afghanistan

71. The former Yugoslav 29. Slovenia Republic of Macedonia 114. Morocco 156. Guinea

30. Andorra 72. Mauritius 115. Nicaragua 157. Ethiopia

158. Sierra 31. Slovakia 73. Brazil 116. Guatemala Leone

159. Central

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32. United Arab 117. Equatorial African Emirates 74. Georgia Guinea Republic

33. Malta 75. Venezuela 118. Cape Verde 160. Mali

161. Burkina 34. Estonia 76. Armenia 119. India Faso

35. Cyprus 77. Ecuador 120. East Timor 162. Liberia

36. Hungary 78. Belize 121. Swaziland 163. Chad

164. Guinea- 37. Brunei 79. Colombia 122. Laos Bissau

123. Solomon 165. 38. Qatar 80. Jamaica Islands Mozambique

39. Bahrain 81. Tunisia 124. Cambodia 166. Burundi

40. Portugal 82. Jordan 125. Pakistan 167. Niger

168. Congo 41. Poland 83. Turkey 126. Congo RC DRC

127. Sao Tome 42. Barbados 84. Algeria and Principe 169. Zimbabwe

85. Tonga

Methodology:

For more information about the methodology used to calculate the HDI, please see the "Source Materials" in the appendices of this Country Review.

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Reference:

As published in United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report 2010.

Source:

United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index available at URL: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/

Updated:

Uploaded in 2011 using ranking available; reviewed in 2015

Life Satisfaction Index

Life Satisfaction Index

Life Satisfaction Index

Created by Adrian G. White, an Analytic Social Psychologist at the University of Leicester, the "Satisfaction with Life Index" measures subjective life satisfaction across various countries. The data was taken from a metastudy (see below for source) and associates the notion of subjective happiness or life satisfaction with qualitative parameters such as health, wealth, and access to basic education. This assessment serves as an alternative to other measures of happiness that tend to rely on traditional and quantitative measures of policy on quality of life, such as GNP and GDP. The methodology involved the responses of 80,000 people across the globe.

Rank Country Score

1 Denmark 273.4

2 Switzerland 273.33

3 Austria 260

4 Iceland 260 Iraq Review 2016 Page 480 of 609 pages Iraq

4 Iceland 260

5 The Bahamas 256.67

6 Finland 256.67

7 Sweden 256.67

8 Iran 253.33

9 Brunei 253.33

10 Canada 253.33

11 Ireland 253.33

12 Luxembourg 253.33

13 Costa Rica 250

14 Malta 250

15 Netherlands 250

16 Antiguaand Barbuda 246.67

17 Malaysia 246.67

18 New Zealand 246.67

19 Norway 246.67

20 Seychelles 246.67

21 Saint Kitts and Nevis 246.67

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22 United Arab Emirates 246.67

23 United States 246.67

24 Vanuatu 246.67

25 Venezuela 246.67

26 Australia 243.33

27 Barbados 243.33

28 Belgium 243.33

29 Dominica 243.33

30 Oman 243.33

31 Saudi Arabia 243.33

32 Suriname 243.33

33 Bahrain 240

34 Colombia 240

35 Germany 240

36 Guyana 240

37 Honduras 240

38 Kuwait 240

39 Panama 240

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40 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 240

41 United Kingdom 236.67

42 Dominican Republic 233.33

43 Guatemala 233.33

44 Jamaica 233.33

45 Qatar 233.33

46 Spain 233.33

47 Saint Lucia 233.33

48 Belize 230

49 Cyprus 230

50 Italy 230

51 Mexico 230

52 Samoa 230

53 Singapore 230

54 Solomon Islands 230

55 Trinidad and Tobago 230

56 Argentina 226.67

57 Fiji 223.33

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58 Israel 223.33

59 Mongolia 223.33

60 São Tomé and Príncipe 223.33

61 El Salvador 220

62 France 220

63 Hong Kong 220

64 Indonesia 220

65 Kyrgyzstan 220

66 Maldives 220

67 Slovenia 220

68 Taiwan 220

69 East Timor 220

70 Tonga 220

71 Chile 216.67

72 Grenada 216.67

73 Mauritius 216.67

74 Namibia 216.67

75 Paraguay 216.67

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76 Thailand 216.67

77 Czech Republic 213.33

78 Philippines 213.33

79 Tunisia 213.33

80 Uzbekistan 213.33

81 Brazil 210

82 China 210

83 Cuba 210

84 Greece 210

85 Nicaragua 210

86 Papua New Guinea 210

87 Uruguay 210

88 Gabon 206.67

89 Ghana 206.67

90 Japan 206.67

91 Yemen 206.67

92 Portugal 203.33

93 Sri Lanka 203.33

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94 Tajikistan 203.33

95 Vietnam 203.33

96 Bhutan 200

97 Comoros 196.67

98 Croatia 196.67

99 Poland 196.67

100 Cape Verde 193.33

101 Kazakhstan 193.33

102 South Korea 193.33

103 Madagascar 193.33

104 Bangladesh 190

105 Republic of the Congo 190

106 The Gambia 190

107 Hungary 190

108 Libya 190

109 South Africa 190

110 Cambodia 186.67

111 Ecuador 186.67

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112 Kenya 186.67

113 Lebanon 186.67

114 Morocco 186.67

115 Peru 186.67

116 Senegal 186.67

117 Bolivia 183.33

118 Haiti 183.33

119 Nepal 183.33

120 Nigeria 183.33

121 Tanzania 183.33

122 Benin 180

123 Botswana 180

124 Guinea-Bissau 180

125 India 180

126 Laos 180

127 Mozambique 180

128 Palestinian Authority 180

129 Slovakia 180

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130 Myanmar 176.67

131 Mali 176.67

132 Mauritania 176.67

133 Turkey 176.67

134 Algeria 173.33

135 Equatorial Guinea 173.33

136 Romania 173.33

137 Bosnia and Herzegovina 170

138 Cameroon 170

139 Estonia 170

140 Guinea 170

141 Jordan 170

142 Syria 170

143 Sierra Leone 166.67

144 Azerbaijan 163.33

145 Central African Republic 163.33

146 Republic of Macedonia 163.33

147 Togo 163.33

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148 Zambia 163.33

149 Angola 160

150 Djibouti 160

151 Egypt 160

152 Burkina Faso 156.67

153 Ethiopia 156.67

154 Latvia 156.67

155 Lithuania 156.67

156 Uganda 156.67

157 Albania 153.33

158 Malawi 153.33

159 Chad 150

160 Côte d'Ivoire 150

161 Niger 150

162 Eritrea 146.67

163 Rwanda 146.67

164 Bulgaria 143.33

165 Lesotho 143.33

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166 Pakistan 143.33

167 Russia 143.33

168 Swaziland 140

169 Georgia 136.67

170 Belarus 133.33

171 Turkmenistan 133.33

172 Armenia 123.33

173 Sudan 120

174 Ukraine 120

175 Moldova 116.67

176 Democratic Republic of the Congo 110

177 Zimbabwe 110

178 Burundi 100

Commentary:

European countries, such as Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria resided at the top of the ranking with highest levels of self-reported life satisfaction. Conversely, European countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine ranked low on the index. African countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe and Burundi found themselves at the very bottom of the ranking, and indeed, very few African countries could be found in the top 100. Japan was at the mid-way point in the ranking, however, other Asian countries such as Brunei and Malaysia were in the top tier, while Pakistan was close to the bottom

Iraq Review 2016 Page 490 of 609 pages Iraq with a low level of self-identified life satisfaction. As a region, the Middle East presented a mixed bad with Saudi Arabians reporing healthy levels of life satisfaction and Egyptians near the bottom of the ranking. As a region, Caribbean countries were ranked highly, consistently demonstrating high levels of life satisfaction. The findings showed that health was the most crucial determining factor in life satisfaction, followed by prosperity and education.

Source:

White, A. (2007). A Global Projection of Subjective Well-being: A Challenge To Positive Psychology? Psychtalk 56, 17-20. The data was extracted from a meta-analysis by Marks, Abdallah, Simms & Thompson (2006).

Uploaded:

Based on study noted above in "Source" ; reviewed in 2015

Happy Planet Index

Happy Planet Index

The Happy Planet Index (HPI) is used to measure human well-being in conjunction with environmental impact. The HPI has been compiled since 2006 by the New Economics Foundation. The index is a composite of several indicators including subjective life satisfaction, life expectancy at birth, and ecological footprint per capita.

As noted by NEFA, the HPI "reveals the ecological efficiency with which human well-being is delivered." Indeed, the index combines environmental impact with human well-being to measure the environmental efficiency with which, country by country, people live long and happy lives. The countries ranked highest by the HPI are not necessarily the ones with the happiest people overall, but the ones that allow their citizens to live long and fulfilling lives, without negatively impacting this opportunity for either future generations or citizens of other countries. Accordingly, a country like the United States will rank low on this list due to its large per capital ecological footprint, which uses more than its fair share of resources, and will likely cause planetary damage.

It should be noted that the HPI was designed to be a counterpoint to other well-established indices of countries' development, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which measures overall

Iraq Review 2016 Page 491 of 609 pages Iraq national wealth and economic development, but often obfuscates the realities of countries with stark variances between the rich and the poor. Moreover, the objective of most of the world's people is not to be wealthy but to be happy. The HPI also differs from the Human Development Index (HDI), which measures quality of life but not ecology, since it [HPI] also includes sustainability as a key indicator.

Rank Country HPI

1 Costa Rica 76.1

2 Dominican Republic 71.8

3 Jamaica 70.1

4 Guatemala 68.4

5 Vietnam 66.5

6 Colombia 66.1

7 Cuba 65.7

8 El Salvador 61.5

9 Brazil 61.0

10 Honduras 61.0

11 Nicaragua 60.5

12 Egypt 60.3

13 Saudi Arabia 59.7

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14 Philippines 59.0

15 Argentina 59.0

16 Indonesia 58.9

17 Bhutan 58.5

18 Panama 57.4

19 Laos 57.3

20 China 57.1

21 Morocco 56.8

22 Sri Lanka 56.5

23 Mexico 55.6

24 Pakistan 55.6

25 Ecuador 55.5

26 Jordan 54.6

27 Belize 54.5

28 Peru 54.4

29 Tunisia 54.3

30 Trinidad and Tobago 54.2

31 Bangladesh 54.1

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32 Moldova 54.1

33 Malaysia 54.0

34 Tajikistan 53.5

35 India 53.0

36 Venezuela 52.5

37 Nepal 51.9

38 Syria 51.3

39 Burma 51.2

40 Algeria 51.2

41 Thailand 50.9

42 Haiti 50.8

43 Netherlands 50.6

44 Malta 50.4

45 Uzbekistan 50.1

46 Chile 49.7

47 Bolivia 49.3

48 Armenia 48.3

49 Singapore 48.2

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50 Yemen 48.1

51 Germany 48.1

52 Switzerland 48.1

53 Sweden 48.0

54 Albania 47.9

55 Paraguay 47.8

56 Palestinian Authority 47.7

57 Austria 47.7

58 Serbia 47.6

59 Finland 47.2

60 Croatia 47.2

61 Kyrgyzstan 47.1

62 Cyprus 46.2

63 Guyana 45.6

64 Belgium 45.4

65 Bosnia and Herzegovina 45.0

66 Slovenia 44.5

67 Israel 44.5

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68 South Korea 44.4

69 Italy 44.0

70 Romania 43.9

71 France 43.9

72 Georgia 43.6

73 Slovakia 43.5

74 United Kingdom 43.3

75 Japan 43.3

76 Spain 43.2

77 Poland 42.8

78 Ireland 42.6

79 Iraq 42.6

80 Cambodia 42.3

81 Iran 42.1

82 Bulgaria 42.0

83 Turkey 41.7

84 Hong Kong 41.6

85 Azerbaijan 41.2

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86 Lithuania 40.9

87 Djibouti 40.4

88 Norway 40.4

89 Canada 39.4

90 Hungary 38.9

91 Kazakhstan 38.5

92 Czech Republic 38.3

93 Mauritania 38.2

94 Iceland 38.1

95 Ukraine 38.1

96 Senegal 38.0

97 Greece 37.6

98 Portugal 37.5

99 Uruguay 37.2

100 Ghana 37.1

101 Latvia 36.7

102 Australia 36.6

103 New Zealand 36.2

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104 Belarus 35.7

105 Denmark 35.5

106 Mongolia 35.0

107 Malawi 34.5

108 Russia 34.5

109 Chad 34.3

110 Lebanon 33.6

111 Macedonia 32.7

112 Republic of the Congo 32.4

113 Madagascar 31.5

114 United States 30.7

115 Nigeria 30.3

116 Guinea 30.3

117 Uganda 30.2

118 South Africa 29.7

119 Rwanda 29.6

120 Democratic Republic of the Congo 29.0

121 Sudan 28.5

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122 Luxembourg 28.5

123 United Arab Emirates 28.2

124 Ethiopia 28.1

125 Kenya 27.8

126 Cameroon 27.2

127 Zambia 27.2

128 Kuwait 27.0

129 Niger 26.9

130 Angola 26.8

131 Estonia 26.4

132 Mali 25.8

133 Mozambique 24.6

134 Benin 24.6

135 Togo 23.3

136 Sierra Leone 23.1

137 Central African Republic 22.9

138 Burkina Faso 22.4

139 Burundi 21.8

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140 Namibia 21.1

141 Botswana 20.9

142 Tanzania 17.8

143 Zimbabwe 16.6

Source: This material is derived from the Happy Planet Index issued by the New Economics Foundation (NEF).

Methodology: The methodology for the calculations can be found at URL: http://www.happyplanetindex.org/

Status of Women

Overview

In the early years of Saddam Hussein’s rule, status and rights were formalized for women through legislation and laws. In 1970, the constitution granted women and men equality under the law and women were allowed access to education, a right to vote, the ability to run for political offices, freedom to drive and the ability to work outside the home. By 1990, women in Iraq were considered to be among the most educated and professional in the Arab world.

After Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the country’s economy took a downward turn and women were severely affected on all fronts. Their physical and physiological health, their economic independence, and the burden of their domestic responsibilities all took turns for the worse. During this time, Saddam Hussein started enacting anti-women legislation that reversed the porgressive path charted during the previous two decades. The 2003 war further harmed women, who became the victims of war crimes such as abduction and/or rape.

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Though women made up 31 percent of the new National Assembly, which was elected in after the new constitution and post-Baathist government was instituted, many problems at the economic and social level prevail. Both Christian and Muslim women continue to live in fear of criminal actions perpetrated by soldiers, militants and insurgents on all sides. Human rights and women’s rights groups in the international community have voiced concern about the continuing trend of violence against women in the region.

Gender Related Development Index (GDI) Rank:

Not Ranked

Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) Rank:

Not Ranked

Female Population:

13.1 million

Female Life Expectancy at birth:

71 years

Total Fertility Rate:

5.0

Maternal Mortality Ratio:

250

Total Number of Women Living with HIV/AIDS:

N/A

Ever Married Women, Ages 15-19 (%):

21%

Mean Age at Time of Marriage:

22

Iraq Review 2016 Page 501 of 609 pages Iraq

Contraceptive Use Among Married Women, Any Method (%):

N/A

Female Adult Literacy Rate:

64 %

Combined Female Gross enrollment ratio for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary schools:

N/A

Female-Headed Households (%):

N/A

Economically Active Females (%):

9%

Female Contributing Family Workers (%):

N/A

Female Estimated Earned Income:

N/A

Seats in Parliament held by women (%):

Lower or Single House: N/A

Upper House or Senate: N/A

Year Women Received the Right to Vote:

1948

Year Women Received the Right to Stand for Election:

N/A

Iraq Review 2016 Page 502 of 609 pages Iraq

*The Gender Development Index (GDI) is a composite index which measures the average achievement in a country. While very similar to the Human Development Index in its use of the same variables, the GDI adjusts the average achievement of each country in terms of life expectancy, enrollment in schools, income, and literacy in accordance to the disparities between males and females.

*The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) is a composite index measuring gender inequality in three of the basic dimensions of empowerment; economic participation and decision-making, political participation and decision-making, and power over economic resources.

*Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is defined as the average number of babies born to women during their reproductive years. A TFR of 2.1 is considered the replacement rate; once a TFR of a population reaches 2.1 the population will remain stable assuming no immigration or emigration takes place. When the TFR is greater than 2.1 a population will increase and when it is less than 2.1 a population will eventually decrease, although due to the age structure of a population it will take years before a low TFR is translated into lower population.

*Maternal Mortality Rate is the number of deaths to women per 100,000 live births that resulted from conditions related to pregnancy and or delivery related complications.

*Economically Active Females are the share of the female population, ages 15 and above, whom supply, or are able to supply, labor for the production of goods and services.

*Female Contributing Family Workers are those females who work without pay in an economic enterprise operated by a relative living in the same household.

*Estimated Earned Income is measured according to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in US dollars.

Global Gender Gap Index

Global Gender Gap Index

Editor's Note:

The Global Gender Gap Index by the World Economic Forum ranks most of the world’s countries in terms of the division of resources and opportunities among males and females. Specifically, the ranking assesses the gender inequality gap in these four arenas:

Iraq Review 2016 Page 503 of 609 pages Iraq

1. Economic participation and opportunity (salaries and high skilled employment participation levels) 2. Educational attainment (access to basic and higher level education) 3. Political empowerment (representation in decision-making structures) 4. Health and survival (life expectancy and sex ratio)

2010 rank 2010 2010 2009 2009 2008 2008 2007 among rank score rank score rank score rank 2009 countries

Country

Iceland 1 0.8496 1 1 0.8276 4 0.7999 4

Norway 2 0.8404 2 3 0.8227 1 0.8239 2

Finland 3 0.8260 3 2 0.8252 2 0.8195 3

Sweden 4 0.8024 4 4 0.8139 3 0.8139 1

New 5 0.7808 5 5 0.7880 5 0.7859 5 Zealand

Ireland 6 0.7773 6 8 0.7597 8 0.7518 9

Denmark 7 0.7719 7 7 0.7628 7 0.7538 8

Lesotho 8 0.7678 8 10 0.7495 16 0.7320 26

Philippines 9 0.7654 9 9 0.7579 6 0.7568 6

Switzerland 10 0.7562 10 13 0.7426 14 0.7360 40

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Spain 11 0.7554 11 17 0.7345 17 0.7281 10

South Africa 12 0.7535 12 6 0.7709 22 0.7232 20

Germany 13 0.7530 13 12 0.7449 11 0.7394 7

Belgium 14 0.7509 14 33 0.7165 28 0.7163 19

United 15 0.7460 15 15 0.7402 13 0.7366 11 Kingdom

Sri Lanka 16 0.7458 16 16 0.7402 12 0.7371 15

Netherlands 17 0.7444 17 11 0.7490 9 0.7399 12

Latvia 18 0.7429 18 14 0.7416 10 0.7397 13

United 19 0.7411 19 31 0.7173 27 0.7179 31 States

Canada 20 0.7372 20 25 0.7196 31 0.7136 18

Trinidad and 21 0.7353 21 19 0.7298 19 0.7245 46 Tobago

Mozambique 22 0.7329 22 26 0.7195 18 0.7266 43

Australia 23 0.7271 23 20 0.7282 21 0.7241 17

Cuba 24 0.7253 24 29 0.7176 25 0.7195 22

Namibia 25 0.7238 25 32 0.7167 30 0.7141 29

Luxembourg 26 0.7231 26 63 0.6889 66 0.6802 58

Mongolia 27 0.7194 27 22 0.7221 40 0.7049 62

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Costa Rica 28 0.7194 28 27 0.7180 32 0.7111 28

Argentina 29 0.7187 29 24 0.7211 24 0.7209 33

Nicaragua 30 0.7176 30 49 0.7002 71 0.6747 90

Barbados 31 0.7176 31 21 0.7236 26 0.7188 n/a

Portugal 32 0.7171 32 46 0.7013 39 0.7051 37

Uganda 33 0.7169 33 40 0.7067 43 0.6981 50

Moldova 34 0.7160 34 36 0.7104 20 0.7244 21

Lithuania 35 0.7132 35 30 0.7175 23 0.7222 14

Bahamas 36 0.7128 36 28 0.7179 n/a n/a n/a

Austria 37 0.7091 37 42 0.7031 29 0.7153 27

Guyana 38 0.7090 38 35 0.7108 n/a n/a n/a

Panama 39 0.7072 39 43 0.7024 34 0.7095 38

Ecuador 40 0.7072 40 23 0.7220 35 0.7091 44

Kazakhstan 41 0.7055 41 47 0.7013 45 0.6976 32

Slovenia 42 0.7047 42 52 0.6982 51 0.6937 49

Poland 43 0.7037 43 50 0.6998 49 0.6951 60

Jamaica 44 0.7037 44 48 0.7013 44 0.6980 39

Russian 45 0.7036 45 51 0.6987 42 0.6994 45 Federation

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France 46 0.7025 46 18 0.7331 15 0.7341 51

Estonia 47 0.7018 47 37 0.7094 37 0.7076 30

Chile 48 0.7013 48 64 0.6884 65 0.6818 86

Macedonia, 49 0.6996 49 53 0.6950 53 0.6914 35 FYR

Bulgaria 50 0.6983 50 38 0.7072 36 0.7077 25

Kyrgyz 51 0.6973 51 41 0.7058 41 0.7045 70 Republic

Israel 52 0.6957 52 45 0.7019 56 0.6900 36

Croatia 53 0.6939 53 54 0.6944 46 0.6967 16

Honduras 54 0.6927 54 62 0.6893 47 0.6960 68

Colombia 55 0.6927 55 56 0.6939 50 0.6944 24

Singapore 56 0.6914 56 84 0.6664 84 0.6625 77

Thailand 57 0.6910 57 59 0.6907 52 0.6917 52

Greece 58 0.6908 58 85 0.6662 75 0.6727 72

Uruguay 59 0.6897 59 57 0.6936 54 0.6907 78

Peru 60 0.6895 60 44 0.7024 48 0.6959 75

China 61 0.6881 61 60 0.6907 57 0.6878 73

Botswana 62 0.6876 62 39 0.7071 63 0.6839 53

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Ukraine 63 0.6869 63 61 0.6896 62 0.6856 57

Venezuela 64 0.6863 64 69 0.6839 59 0.6875 55

Czech 65 0.6850 65 74 0.6789 69 0.6770 64 Republic

Tanzania 66 0.6829 66 73 0.6797 38 0.7068 34

Romania 67 0.6826 67 70 0.6805 70 0.6763 47

Malawi 68 0.6824 68 76 0.6738 81 0.6664 87

Paraguay 69 0.6804 69 66 0.6868 100 0.6379 69

Ghana 70 0.6782 70 80 0.6704 77 0.6679 63

Slovak 71 0.6778 71 68 0.6845 64 0.6824 54 Republic

Vietnam 72 0.6776 72 71 0.6802 68 0.6778 42

Dominican 73 0.6774 73 67 0.6859 72 0.6744 65 Republic

Italy 74 0.6765 74 72 0.6798 67 0.6788 84

Gambia, 75 0.6762 75 75 0.6752 85 0.6622 95 The

Bolivia 76 0.6751 76 82 0.6693 80 0.6667 80

Brueni 77 0.6748 77 94 0.6524 99 0.6392 n/a Darussalem

Albania 78 0.6726 78 91 0.6601 87 0.6591 66

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Hungary 79 0.6720 79 65 0.6879 60 0.6867 61

Madagascar 80 0.6713 80 77 0.6732 74 0.6736 89

Angola 81 0.6712 81 106 0.6353 114 0.6032 110

Bangladesh 82 0.6702 82 93 0.6526 90 0.6531 100

Malta 83 0.6695 83 88 0.6635 83 0.6634 76

Armenia 84 0.6669 84 90 0.6619 78 0.6677 71

Brazil 85 0.6655 85 81 0.6695 73 0.6737 74

Cyprus 86 0.6642 86 79 0.6706 76 0.6694 82

Indonesia 87 0.6615 87 92 0.6580 93 0.6473 81

Georgia 88 0.6598 88 83 0.6680 82 0.6654 67

Tajikistan 89 0.6598 89 86 0.6661 89 0.6541 79

El Salvador 90 0.6596 90 55 0.6939 58 0.6875 48

Mexico 91 0.6577 91 98 0.6503 97 0.6441 93

Zimbabwe 92 0.6574 92 95 0.6518 92 0.6485 88

Belize 93 0.6536 93 87 0.6636 86 0.6610 94

Japan 94 0.6524 94 101 0.6447 98 0.6434 91

Mauritius 95 0.6520 95 96 0.6513 95 0.6466 85

Kenya 96 0.6499 96 97 0.6512 88 0.6547 83

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Cambodia 97 0.6482 97 104 0.6410 94 0.6469 98

Malaysia 98 0.6479 98 100 0.6467 96 0.6442 92

Maldives 99 0.6452 99 99 0.6482 91 0.6501 99

Azerbaijan 100 0.6446 100 89 0.6626 61 0.6856 59

Senegal 101 0.6414 101 102 0.6427 n/a n/a n/a

Suriname 102 0.6407 102 78 0.6726 79 0.6674 56

United Arab 103 0.6397 103 112 0.6198 105 0.6220 105 Emirates

Korea, Rep. 104 0.6342 104 115 0.6146 108 0.6154 97

Kuwait 105 0.6318 105 105 0.6356 101 0.6358 96

Zambia 106 0.6293 106 107 0.6310 106 0.6205 101

Tunisia 107 0.6266 107 109 0.6233 103 0.6295 102

Fiji 108 0.6256 108 103 0.6414 n/a n/a n/a

Guatemala 109 0.6238 109 111 0.6209 112 0.6072 106

Bahrain 110 0.6217 110 116 0.6136 121 0.5927 115

Burkina 111 0.6162 111 120 0.6081 115 0.6029 117 Faso

India 112 0.6155 112 114 0.6151 113 0.6060 114

Mauritania 113 0.6152 113 119 0.6103 110 0.6117 111

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Cameroon 114 0.6110 114 118 0.6108 117 0.6017 116

Nepal 115 0.6084 115 110 0.6213 120 0.5942 125

Lebanon* 116 0.6084 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Qatar 117 0.6059 116 125 0.5907 119 0.5948 109

Nigeria 118 0.6055 117 108 0.6280 102 0.6339 107

Algeria 119 0.6052 118 117 0.6119 111 0.6111 108

Jordan 120 0.6048 119 113 0.6182 104 0.6275 104

Ethiopia 121 0.6019 120 122 0.5948 122 0.5867 113

Oman 122 0.5950 121 123 0.5938 118 0.5960 119

Iran 123 0.5933 122 128 0.5839 116 0.6021 118

Syria 124 0.5926 123 121 0.6072 107 0.6181 103

Egypt 125 0.5899 124 126 0.5862 124 0.5832 120

Turkey 126 0.5876 125 129 0.5828 123 0.5853 121

Morocco 127 0.5767 126 124 0.5926 125 0.5757 122

Benin 128 0.5719 127 131 0.5643 126 0.5582 123

Saudi Arabia 129 0.5713 128 130 0.5651 128 0.5537 124

Côte 130 0.5691 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a d'Ivoire*

Mali 131 0.5680 129 127 0.5860 109 0.6117 112

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Pakistan 132 0.5465 130 132 0.5458 127 0.5549 126

Chad 133 0.5330 131 133 0.5417 129 0.5290 127

Yemen 134 0.4603 132 134 0.4609 130 0.4664 128

Belarus n/a n/a n/a 34 0.7141 33 0.7099 23

Uzbekistan n/a n/a n/a 58 0.6913 55 0.6906 41

*new country 2010

Commentary:

According to the report’s index, Nordic countries, such as Iceland, Norway, Finland, and Sweden have continued to dominate at the top of the ranking for gender equality. Meanwhile, France has seen a notable decline in the ranking, largely as a result of decreased number of women holding ministerial portfolios in that country. In the Americas, the United States has risen in the ranking to top the region, predominantly as a result of a decreasing wage gap, as well as higher number of women holding key positions in the current Obama administration. Canada has continued to remain as one of the top ranking countries of the Americas, followed by the small Caribbean island nation of Trinidad and Tobago, which has the distinction of being among the top three countries of the Americans in the realm of gender equality. Lesotho and South African ranked highly in the index, leading not only among African countries but also in global context. Despite Lesotho still lagging in the area of life expectancy, its high ranking was attributed to high levels of female participation in the labor force and female literacy. The Philippines and Sri Lanka were the top ranking countries for gender equality for Asia, ranking highly also in global context. The Philippines has continued to show strong performance in all strong performance on all four dimensions (detailed above) of the index. Finally, in the Arab world, the United Arab Emirates held the highest-rank within that region of the world; however, its placement near the bottom of the global list highlights the fact that Arab countries are generally poor performers when it comes to the matter of gender equality in global scope.

Iraq Review 2016 Page 512 of 609 pages Iraq

Source:

This data is derived from the latest edition of The Global Gender Gap Report by the World Economic Forum.

Available at URL: http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetwork/index.htm

Updated:

Based on latest available data as set forth in chart; reviewed in 2014

Culture and Arts

Cultural Summary

The Middle Eastern country of Iraq, which in the last decade has experienced the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s rule and years of war, is actually about 169,000 square miles, twice the size of the state of Idaho.

The estimated Iraqi population has exploded in the past decade – from about 22,675,617 people in 2000 to 37,027,692 in 2010. Arabs make up about 75 percent of the population, and Kurds make up about 20 percent.

As in most other Middle Eastern nations, Islam is the officially recognized religion of Iraq and is practiced by 95 percent of the population. Islam itself does not distinguish between church and state, so any distinctions between religious and secular law are the result of more recent developments. There are two forms of Muslims in Iraq, with Shias (Shiites) making up the majority and Sunnis serving as the minority.

Although there are women in politics, the legitimacy of their authority is often questioned. In Islam, the state religion, women do not hold any leadership roles. Many are forbidden to pray at mosques, and if they do, they are segregated from the men. It is largely due to the strong Islamic influence that women do not enjoy the same social rights and privileges as men, and if gender reform is to take place, it will have to be within the context of Islamic law.

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For Iraqis, family and honor are of utmost importance. The extended family or tribe is seen as both a political and social force. Family members must keep in mind at all times that anything they do is a commentary on the whole family so if they do something wrong, then the whole family is shamed.

The overall culture of Iraq was impacted by the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Hussein had glorified violence in his efforts to shape Iraqi culture and society. It has been reported that Hussein adopted a model of power that glorified terror. On television, he hugged a father who killed his own son for disloyalty to the president. The regime actively suppressed any expression of human creativity not in conformity with the dogmatic and often capricious nature of the regime.

With his fall, Iraqis suddenly faced much less strict control. But it remains under question as to how much conditions have truly changed for the Iraqi people.

At least in the world of soccer, nationals players felt freer to just play their sport without fear of repercussions.

The government supports artists, provided they are chosen by the state and do works requested by the state. For example, all writers, when commissioned by the state, in the past were forced to include praise to Saddam Hussein in their work. In general, artistic forms of thought and expression have been banned and artists are generally unable to express themselves freely.

Islamic art is very important, as are ceramics, carpets, and Islamic-style fashion design. The Iraqi Fashion House opened in 1970. Music festivals important, such as the Babylon International Music and Arts Festival. International orchestras and performance troupes were invited to perform in the restored sites of Babylon, and people from all over the world attended.

Research sources include: http://www.everyculture.com/Ge-It/Iraq.html http://www.kwintessential.co.uk/resources/global-etiquette/iraq.html http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1120/p01s02-woiq.html http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-165165392.html

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***

Etiquette

Cultural Dos and Taboos

1. Traditional Muslims will not shake hands with members of the opposite sex.

2. Do not take pictures in the country with out permission.

3. Only certain international hotels have alcohol available. Drinking alcohol in public is a crime.

4. Political and religious discussions should be avoided.

5. Do not show the bottom of your foot to a Muslim unless you wish to offend.

6. Always remove your shoes before entering a person's home or a mosque. Women may be required to cover their heads before entering mosques.

7. Women should observe the Muslim dress code.

8. The "thumps up" sign can be viewed as a vulgar gesture in Iraq.

9. Western-style interaction between the sexes is ill-advised. Flirting is a serious breech of etiquette.

10. Do not offer gifts that have anything to do with swine (such as footballs).

11. A person found with illegal drugs is subject to the death penalty.

12. Always respect the five daily times of prayer.

13. Never eat, drink, or smoke in public during Ramadan.

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14. Given the conflicts in the Gulf in 1991 and 2003, it is ill-advised to enter into a political discussion in Iraq. Confine conversation to travel, culture, sightseeing, sports and other general topics.

15. Given the ongoing violence in Iraq and the general state of political unrest, the "liberation" of Iraq may not be the best choice of discourse. Moreover, the particular issue of "liberation" by foreign forces may be one where the perspective held by Iraqis may well differ from that of Westerers -- particularly those with security forces serving in Iraq.

Travel Information

Please Note:

This is a generalized travel guide and it is intended to coalesce several resources, which a traveler might find useful, regardless of a particular destination. As such, it does not include travel warnings for specific "hot spot" destinations.

For travel alerts and warnings, please see the United States Department of State's listings available at URL: http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings.html

Please note that travel to the following countries, based on these warnings, is ill-advised, or should be undertaken with the utmost precaution:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Honduras, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories of West Bank and Gaza, Philippines areas of Sulu Archipelago, Mindanao, and southern Sulu Sea, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yemen.

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***

Please Note:

The Department of State warns U.S. citizens against all but essential travel to Iraq. Travel within Iraq remains dangerous given the security situation. U.S. citizens in Iraq remain at high risk for kidnapping and terrorist violence. Methods of attack have included roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) including explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), magnetic IEDs placed on vehicles, human and vehicle-borne IEDs, mines placed on or concealed near roads, mortars and rockets, and shootings using various direct fire weapons. When such attacks occur, they frequently take place in public gathering places such as cafes, markets, and other public venues.

Numerous insurgent groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), remain active and terrorist activity and violence persist in many areas of the country. ISIL controls Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, as well as significant territory in northern, western, and central Iraq, particularly along the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, and the group continues to attack Iraqi security forces in those areas. Terrorist attacks within the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) occur less frequently than in other parts of Iraq, although the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), U.S. Government facilities, and western interests remain possible targets, as evidenced by the April 17 bombing in the public area outside U.S. Consulate General Erbil. In addition, several anti-U.S. sectarian militia groups, such as the Shia Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) are operating throughout Iraq and may present a threat to U.S. citizens.

Due to the potential for political protests and demonstrations to become violent, U.S. citizens in Iraq are strongly urged to avoid protests and large gatherings.

The U.S. government considers the potential threat to U.S. government personnel in Iraq to be serious enough to require them to live and work under strict security guidelines. All U.S. government employees under the authority of the U.S. Chief of Mission must follow strict safety and security procedures when traveling outside the Embassy and Consulates.

U.S. citizens should avoid areas near the Syrian, Turkish, or Iranian borders, which are especially dangerous and not always clearly defined. The Governments of Turkey and Iran continue to carry out military operations against insurgent groups in the mountainous regions bordering Iraq. These operations have included troop movements and both aerial and artillery bombardments. Extensive unmarked minefields also remain along these borders.

***

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International Travel Guide

Editor's Note

At this time, voluntary travel to Iraq is highly discouraged.

Tips for Travelers to Iraq

The Republic of Iraq was governed by the regime of Saddam Hussein for several years. Iraq's economy was seriously damaged in the 1991 Gulf War. The Iraqi government's spending and distribution priorities implemented under United Nations sanctions have also affected the economy, including increased crime and decreased availability of medical services. The subsequent war in 2003 has further deteriorated services and the quality of life.

Tourist facilities are not widely available. Practically, they are limited to Baghdad and some major cities.

The workweek in Iraq is Sunday through Thursday.

Should you travel to Iraq, despite the travel warnings, passports and visas are required.

When making a decision regarding health insurance, you should consider that many foreign doctors and hospitals require payment in cash prior to providing service and that a medical evacuation to your country may be very expensive. Uninsured travelers who require medical care overseas often face extreme difficulties. When consulting with your insurer prior to your trip, please ascertain whether payment will be made to the overseas healthcare provider or if you will be reimbursed later for expenses that you incur.

While in a foreign country, you may encounter road conditions that differ significantly from those in your country. The information below concerning Iraq is provided for general reference only, and may not be totally accurate in a particular location or circumstance.

Safety of Public Transportation: Poor Urban Road Conditions/Maintenance: Fair Rural Road Conditions/Maintenance: Poor, often unmaintained

Availability of roadside assistance: Available in the cities, occasionally on large highways and at main exits.

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Buses run irregularly and frequently change routes. Poorly-maintained city transit vehicles are often involved in accidents. Long distance buses are very slow but in good condition. Jaywalking is common. Drivers usually do not yield to pedestrians at crosswalks and ignore traffic lights, traffic rules and regulations. Some motorists drive at excessive speeds, tailgate and force other drivers to yield the right of way.

Telecommunications are very poor. There are no public telephones in the cities; however, calls may be made from hotels, restaurants or shops. Calls may be monitored. The cellular telephone system in Iraq is not available to regular citizens. Cell phones may be confiscated or lead to arrest and serious charges. Internet can only be accessed through the use of a satellite telephone. However, with the exception of journalists, no one is allowed to carry a satellite telephone during their trip. Satellite phones must be deposited at the border with no guarantee of their return. All efforts to obtain connection with the server by use of a land line will fail because the connections are terminated immediately by the Iraqi operators. Use of the Internet Cafe in Baghdad is restricted to Iraqis with a special security clearance for access to the Internet.

Note: This information is directly quoted from the United States Department of State Consular Information Sheet.

Sources: United States Department of State Consular Information Sheet

Business Culture: Information for Business Travelers

For general information on etiquette in Iraq see our Cultural Etiquette page.

General Checklist for Travelers

1. Take out travel insurance to cover hospital treatment or medical evacuation. Overseas medical costs are expensive to most international travelers, where one's domestic, nationalized or even private health insurance plans will not provide coverage outside one's home country. Learn about "reciprocal insurance plans" that some international health care companies might offer. 2. Make sure that one's travel insurance is appropriate. If one intends to indulge in adventurous activities, such as parasailing, one should be sure that one is fully insured in such cases. Many traditional insurance policies do not provide coverage in cases of extreme circumstances. 3. Take time to learn about one's destination country and culture. Read and learn about the place one is traveling. Also check political, economic and socio-cultural developments at the destination by reading country-specific travel reports and fact sheets noted below. 4. Get the necessary visas for the country (or countries) one intends to visit - but be aware that a visa does not guarantee entry. A number of useful sites regarding visa and other entry requirements

Iraq Review 2016 Page 519 of 609 pages Iraq are noted below. 5. Keep in regular contact with friends and relatives back at home by phone or email, and be sure to leave a travel itinerary. 6. Protect one's personal information by making copies of one's passport details, insurance policy, travelers checks and credit card numbers. Taking copies of such documents with you, while leaving another collection copies with someone at home is also good practice for travelers. Taking copies of one's passport photograph is also recommended. 7. Stay healthy by taking all possible precautions against illness. Also, be sure to take extra supplies of prescription drugs along for the trip, while also taking time to pack general pharmaceutical supplies, such as aspirin and other such painkillers, bandages, stomach ailment medication, anti- inflammatory medication and anti-bacterial medication. 8. Do not carry illicit drugs. Understand that the punishment for possession or use of illegal drugs in some countries may be capital punishment. Make sure your prescription drugs are legal in the countries you plan to visit. 9. Know the laws of one's destination country and culture; be sure to understand the repercussions of breaking those laws and regulations. Often the transparency and freedoms of the juridical system at home is not consistent with that of one's destination country. Become aware of these complexities and subtleties before you travel. 10. For longer stays in a country, or where the security situation is volatile, one should register one's self and traveling companions at the local embassy or consulate of one's country of citizenship. 11. Women should take care to be prepared both culturally and practically for traveling in a different country and culture. One should be sure to take sufficient supplies of personal feminine products and prescription drugs. One should also learn about local cultural standards for women, including norms of dressing. Be aware that it is simply inappropriate and unsafe for women to travel alone in some countries, and take the necessary precautions to avoid risk-filled situations. 12. If one is traveling with small children, one should pack extra supplies, make arrangements with the travel carrier for proper seating that would adequately accommodate children, infants or toddlers. Note also that whether one is male of female, traveling with children means that one's hands are thus not free to carry luggage and bags. Be especially aware that this makes one vulnerable to pickpockets, thieves and other sorts of crime. 13. Make proper arrangements for accommodations, well in advance of one's arrival at a destination. Some countries have limited accommodation, while others may have culturally distinctive facilities. Learning about these practicalities before one travels will greatly aid the enjoyment of one's trip. 14. Travel with different forms of currency and money (cash, traveler's checks and credit cards) in anticipation that venues may not accept one or another form of money. Also, ensuring that one's financial resources are not contained in one location, or by one person (if one is traveling with others) can be a useful measure, in the event that one loses a wallet or purse. 15. Find out about transportation in the destination country. In some places, it might be advisable to hire a local driver or taxi guide for safety reasons, while in other countries, enjoying one's travel

Iraq Review 2016 Page 520 of 609 pages Iraq experience may well be enhanced by renting a vehicle and seeing the local sights and culture independently. Costs may also be prohibitive for either of these choices, so again, prior planning is suggested.

Online Resources Regarding Entry Requirements and Visas

Foreign Entry Requirements for Americans from the United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1765.html

Visa Services for Non-Americans from the United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/visa/visa_1750.html

Visa Bulletins from the United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_1360.html

Visa Waivers from the United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html - new

Passport and Visa Information from the Government of the United Kingdom http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/

Visa Information from the Government of Australia http://www.dfat.gov.au/visas/index.html

Passport Information from the Government of Australia https://www.passports.gov.au/Web/index.aspx

Passport Information from the Government of Canada http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/passport_passeport-eng.asp

Visa Information from the Government of Canada http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/visas-eng.asp

Online Visa Processing by Immigration Experts by VisaPro http://www.visapro.com

Sources: United States Department of State, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government of Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Canada

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Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Useful Online Resources for Travelers

Country-Specific Travel Information from United States http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1765.html

Travel Advice by Country from Government of United Kingdom http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/

General Travel Advice from Government of Australia http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/General

Travel Bulletins from the Government of Australia http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/TravelBulletins/

Travel Tips from Government of Australia http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/tips/index.html

Travel Checklist by Government of Canada http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/checklist_sommaire-eng.asp

Travel Checklist from Government of United Kingdom http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/staying-safe/checklist

Your trip abroad from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/brochures/brochures_1225.html

A safe trip abroad from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/safety/safety_1747.html

Tips for expatriates abroad from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/living/residing/residing_1235.html

Tips for students from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/living/studying/studying_1238.html http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/brochures/brochures_1219.html

Medical information for travelers from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/health/health_1185.html

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US Customs Travel information http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/travel/

Sources: United States Department of State; United States Customs Department, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government of Australia; Government of Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Other Practical Online Resources for Travelers

Foreign Language Phrases for Travelers http://www.travlang.com/languages/ http://www.omniglot.com/language/phrases/index.htm

World Weather Forecasts http://www.intellicast.com/ http://www.wunderground.com/ http://www.worldweather.org/

Worldwide Time Zones, Map, World Clock http://www.timeanddate.com/ http://www.worldtimezone.com/

International Airport Codes http://www.world-airport-codes.com/

International Dialing Codes http://www.kropla.com/dialcode.htm http://www.countrycallingcodes.com/

International Phone Guide http://www.kropla.com/phones.htm

International Mobile Phone Guide http://www.kropla.com/mobilephones.htm

International Internet Café Search Engine http://cybercaptive.com/

Global Internet Roaming http://www.kropla.com/roaming.htm

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World Electric Power Guide http://www.kropla.com/electric.htm http://www.kropla.com/electric2.htm

World Television Standards and Codes http://www.kropla.com/tv.htm International Currency Exchange Rates http://www.xe.com/ucc/

Banking and Financial Institutions Across the World http://www.123world.com/banks/index.html

International Credit Card or Automated Teller Machine (ATM) Locator http://visa.via.infonow.net/locator/global/ http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/cardholderservices/atmlocations/index.html

International Chambers of Commerce http://www.123world.com/chambers/index.html

World Tourism Websites http://123world.com/tourism/

Diplomatic and Consular Information

United States Diplomatic Posts Around the World http://www.usembassy.gov/

United Kingdom Diplomatic Posts Around the World http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/embassies-and-posts/find-an-embassy-overseas/

Australia's Diplomatic Posts Around the World http://www.dfat.gov.au/missions/ http://www.dfat.gov.au/embassies.html

Canada's Embassies and High Commissions http://www.international.gc.ca/ciw-cdm/embassies-ambassades.aspx

Resources for Finding Embassies and other Diplomatic Posts Across the World http://www.escapeartist.com/embassy1/embassy1.htm

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Safety and Security

Travel Warnings by Country from Government of Australia http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/

Travel Warnings and Alerts from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/pa/pa_1766.html

Travel Reports and Warnings by Government of Canada http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/menu-eng.asp http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/updates_mise-a-jour-eng.asp

Travel Warnings from Government of United Kingdom http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/ http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/? action=noTravelAll#noTravelAll

Sources: United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the United States Department of State, the Government of Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Other Safety and Security Online Resources for Travelers

United States Department of State Information on Terrorism http://www.state.gov/s/ct/

Government of the United Kingdom Resource on the Risk of Terrorism http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front? pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1044011304926

Government of Canada Terrorism Guide http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/terrorism-terrorisme.aspx?lang=eng

Information on Terrorism by Government of Australia http://www.dfat.gov.au/icat/index.html

FAA Resource on Aviation Safety http://www.faasafety.gov/

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In-Flight Safety Information for Air Travel (by British Airways crew trainer, Anna Warman) http://www.warman.demon.co.uk/anna/inflight.html

Hot Spots: Travel Safety and Risk Information http://www.airsecurity.com/hotspots/HotSpots.asp

Information on Human Rights http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/

Sources: The United States Department of State, the United States Customs Department, the Government of Canada, the Government of United Kingdom, the Government of Australia, the Federal Aviation Authority, Anna Warman's In-flight Website, Hot Spots Travel and Risk Information

Diseases/Health Data

Please Note: Most of the entry below constitutes a generalized health advisory, which a traveler might find useful, regardless of a particular destination.

As a supplement, however, reader will also find below a list of countries flagged with current health notices and alerts issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Please note that travel to the following countries, based on these 3 levels of warnings, is ill-advised, or should be undertaken with the utmost precaution:

Level 3 (highest level of concern; avoid non-essential travel) --

Guinea - Ebola Liberia - Ebola

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Nepal - Eathquake zone Sierra Leone - Ebola

Level 2 (intermediate level of concern; use utmost caution during travel) --

Cameroon - Polio Somalia - Polio Vanuatu - Tropical Cyclone zone Throughout Middle East and Arabia Peninsula - MERS ((Middle East Respiratory Syndrome)

Level 1 (standard level of concern; use practical caution during travel) -

Australia - Ross River disease Bosnia-Herzegovina - Measles Brazil - Dengue Fever Brazil - Malaria Brazil - Zika China - H7N9 Avian flu Cuba - Cholera Egypt - H5N1 Bird flu Ethiopia - Measles Germany - Measles Japan - Hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD) Kyrgyzstan - Measles Malaysia -Dengue Fever Mexico - Chikungunya Mexico - Hepatitis A Nigeria - Meningitis Philippines - Measles Scotland - Mumps Singapore - Hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD) South Korea - MERS ((Middle East Respiratory Syndrome) Throughout Caribbean - Chikungunya Throughout Central America - Chikungunya Throughout South America - Chikungunya Throughout Pacific Islands - Chikungunya

For specific information related to these health notices and alerts please see the CDC's listing available at URL: http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices

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Health Information for Travelers to Iraq

The preventive measures you need to take while traveling in the Middle East depend on the areas you visit and the length of time you stay. You should observe the precautions listed in this document in most areas of this region. However, in highly developed areas of Israel, you should observe health precautions similar to those that would apply while traveling in the United States.

Travelers' diarrhea, the number one illness in travelers, can be caused by viruses, bacteria, or parasites, which can contaminate food or water. Infections may cause diarrhea and vomiting (E. coli, Salmonella, cholera, and parasites), fever (typhoid fever and toxoplasmosis), or liver damage (hepatitis). Make sure your food and drinking water are safe. (See below.)

Malaria is a preventable infection that can be fatal if left untreated. Prevent infection by taking prescription antimalarial drugs and protecting yourself against mosquito bites (see below). A low risk for malaria exists in parts of Iran, Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Travelers to risk areas of Oman, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen should take mefloquine for malaria prevention. Travelers to risk areas of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey should take chloroquine. For specific locations, see Malaria Information for Travelers to the Middle East (http://www.cdc.gov/travel/regionalmalaria/mideast.htm). A certificate of yellow fever vaccination may be required for entry into certain of these countries, but only if you are coming from a country in tropical South America or sub-Saharan Africa. (There is no risk for yellow fever in the Middle East.) For detailed information, see Comprehensive Yellow Fever Vaccination Requirements (

Dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, onchocerciasis, and plague are diseases carried by insects that also occur in this region. Protecting yourself against insect bites (see below) will help to prevent these diseases.

CDC Recommends the Following Vaccines (as Appropriate for Age):

See your doctor at least 4-6 weeks before your trip to allow time for shots to take effect.

• Hepatitis A or immune globulin (IG). • Hepatitis B, if you might be exposed to blood (for example, health-care workers), have sexual contact with the local population, stay longer than 6 months, or be exposed through medical treatment. • Meningococcal vaccine is required for pilgrims to Mecca for the annual Hajj. However, CDC currently recommends the vaccine for all travelers to Mecca, including those traveling for the Umra. (For more information, please see Meningococcal Disease Among Travelers to Saudi Arabia

Iraq Review 2016 Page 528 of 609 pages Iraq at URL • Rabies, if you might be exposed to wild or domestic animals through your work or recreation. • Typhoid, particularly if you are visiting developing countries in this region. • As needed, booster doses for tetanus-diphtheria and measles, and a one-time dose of polio for adults. Hepatitis B vaccine is now recommended for all infants and for children ages 11-12 years who have not completed the series.

All travelers should take the following precautions, no matter the destination:

• Wash hands often with soap and water. • Because motor vehicle crashes are a leading cause of injury among travelers, walk and drive defensively. Avoid travel at night if possible and always use seat belts. • Always use latex condoms to reduce the risk of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. • Don't eat or drink dairy products unless you know they have been pasteurized. • Don't share needles with anyone. • Eat only thoroughly cooked food or fruits and vegetables you have peeled yourself. Remember: boil it, cook it, peel it, or forget it. • Never eat undercooked ground beef and poultry, raw eggs, and unpasteurized dairy products. Raw shellfish is particularly dangerous to persons who have liver disease or compromised immune systems.

Travelers visiting undeveloped areas should take the following precautions:

To Stay Healthy, Do:

• Drink only bottled or boiled water, or carbonated (bubbly) drinks in cans or bottles. Avoid tap water, fountain drinks, and ice cubes. If this is not possible, make water safer by BOTH filtering through an "absolute 1-micron or less" filter AND adding iodine tablets to the filtered water. "Absolute 1-micron filters" are found in camping/outdoor supply stores. • If you visit an area where there is risk for malaria, take your malaria prevention medication before, during, and after travel, as directed. (See your doctor for a prescription.) • Protect yourself from insects by remaining in well-screened areas, using repellents (applied sparingly at 4-hour intervals), and wearing long-sleeved shirts and long pants from dusk through dawn. • To prevent fungal and parasitic infections, keep feet clean and dry, and do not go barefoot.

To Avoid Getting Sick:

• Don't eat food purchased from street vendors. • Don't drink beverages with ice. • Don't handle animals (especially monkeys, dogs, and cats), to avoid bites and serious diseases

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(including rabies and plague). (For more information, please see the Animal-Associated Hazards on the Making Travel Safe page at URL • Don't swim in fresh water. Salt water is usually safer. (For more information, please see the Swimming Precautions on the Making Travel Safe page.)

What You Need To Bring with You:

• Long-sleeved shirt and long pants to wear while outside whenever possible, to prevent illnesses carried by insects (e.g., malaria, dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, and onchocerciasis). • Insect repellent containing DEET (diethylmethyltoluamide), in 30%-35% strength for adults and 6%-10% for children. • Over-the-counter antidiarrheal medicine to take if you have diarrhea. • Iodine tablets and water filters to purify water if bottled water is not available. See Do's above for more details about water filters. • Sunblock, sunglasses, hat. • Prescription medications: make sure you have enough to last during your trip, as well as a copy of the prescription(s).

After You Return Home:

If you have visited an area where there is risk for malaria, continue taking your malaria medication weekly for 4 weeks after you leave the area. If you become ill-even as long as a year after your trip-tell your doctor the areas you have visited.

For More Information:

Ask your doctor or check the CDC web sites for more information about protecting yourself against diseases that occur in the Middle East, such as:

For information about diseases-

Carried by Insects Dengue, Malaria, Plague Carried in Food or Water Cholera, Escherichia coli, diarrhea, Hepatitis A, Schistosomiasis, Typhoid Fever

Person-to-Person Contact Hepatitis B, HIV/AIDS

For more information about these and other diseases, please check the Diseases ( section and the Health Topics A-Z

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(

Note:

Iraq is located in the Middle East health region.

Sources:

The Center for Disease Control Destinations Website:

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Chapter 6

Environmental Overview

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Environmental Issues

General Overview:

Iraq 's major environmental issues are directly related to government water control issues. Specifically, water control projects have drained most of the inhabited marsh areas east of Nasiriyah by drying up, or diverting, the feeder streams and rivers. These measures have resulted in the displacement of inhabitants of the region, and have exacerbated water scarcity issues.

Current Issues:

- water control issues - inadequate supplies of potable water - water pollution - destruction of the natural habitat of bio-diversity in the region - serious threats to the area's wildlife populations - air pollution - soil degradation (salinization) - soil erosion - desertification

Note: The effects of the war of 2003 (with violence continuing into 2004) on the ecology of Iraq is not yet known. As is the case in many war-torn countries, recovering from the environmental toll of war will be a profoundly difficult endeavor.

Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Mtc):

27.2

Country Rank (GHG output):

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46th

Natural Hazards:

-dust storms -sandstorms -floods

Environmental Policy

Regulation and Jurisdiction:

Until the 2003 ousting of Saddam Hussein's regime from power, the regulation and protection of the environment in Iraq was under the jurisdiction of the following:Ministry of Health, Labor and Social Affairs;Higher council for Environmental Protection and Improvement. Since then, the Iraqi Governing Council established a Ministry of Environment.

Major Non-Governmental Organizations:

N/A

International Environmental Accords:

Party to:

Law of the Sea

Nuclear Test Ban

Signed but not ratified:

Environmental Modification

Kyoto Protocol Status (year ratified):

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Iraq is not a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol

Greenhouse Gas Ranking

Greenhouse Gas Ranking

GHG Emissions Rankings

Country Country Rank

1 United States

2 China

4 Russia

5 Japan

6 India

7 Germany

8 United Kingdom

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9 Canada

10 Korea, South

11 Italy

12 Mexico

13 France

14 South Africa

15 Iran

16 Indonesia

17 Australia

18 Spain

19 Brazil

20 Saudi Arabia

21 Ukraine

22 Poland

23 Taiwan

24 Turkey

25 Thailand

26 Netherlands

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27 Kazakhstan

28 Malaysia

29 Egypt

30 Venezuela

31 Argentina

32 Uzbekistan

33 Czech Republic

34 Belgium

35 Pakistan

36 Romania

37 Greece

38 United Arab Emirates

39 Algeria

40 Nigeria

41 Austria

42 Iraq

43 Finland

44 Philippines

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45 Vietnam

46 Korea, North

47 Israel

48 Portugal

49 Colombia

50 Belarus

51 Kuwait

52 Hungary

53 Chile

54 Denmark

55 Serbia & Montenegro

56 Sweden

57 Syria

58 Libya

59 Bulgaria

60 Singapore

61 Switzerland

62 Ireland

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63 Turkmenistan

64 Slovakia

65 Bangladesh

66 Morocco

67 New Zealand

68 Oman

69 Qatar

70 Azerbaijan

71 Norway

72 Peru

73 Cuba

74 Ecuador

75 Trinidad & Tobago

76 Croatia

77 Tunisia

78 Dominican Republic

79 Lebanon

80 Estonia

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81 Yemen

82 Jordan

83 Slovenia

84 Bahrain

85 Angola

86 Bosnia & Herzegovina

87 Lithuania

88 Sri Lanka

89 Zimbabwe

90 Bolivia

91 Jamaica

92 Guatemala

93 Luxembourg

94 Myanmar

95 Sudan

96 Kenya

97 Macedonia

98 Mongolia

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99 Ghana

100 Cyprus

101 Moldova

102 Latvia

103 El Salvador

104 Brunei

105 Honduras

106 Cameroon

107 Panama

108 Costa Rica

109 Cote d'Ivoire

110 Kyrgyzstan

111 Tajikistan

112 Ethiopia

113 Senegal

114 Uruguay

115 Gabon

116 Albania

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117 Nicaragua

118 Botswana

119 Paraguay

120 Tanzania

121 Georgia

122 Armenia

123 Congo, RC

124 Mauritius

125 Nepal

126 Mauritius

127 Nepal

128 Mauritania

129 Malta

130 Papua New Guinea

131 Zambia

132 Suriname

133 Iceland

134 Togo

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135 Benin

136 Uganda

137 Bahamas

138 Haiti

139 Congo, DRC

140 Guyana

141 Mozambique

142 Guinea

143 Equatorial Guinea

144 Laos

145 Barbados

146 Niger

147 Fiji

148 Burkina Faso

149 Malawi

150 Swaziland

151 Belize

152 Afghanistan

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153 Sierra Leone

154 Eritrea

155 Rwanda

156 Mali

157 Seychelles

158 Cambodia

159 Liberia

160 Bhutan

161 Maldives

162 Antigua & Barbuda

163 Djibouti

164 Saint Lucia

165 Gambia

166 Guinea-Bissau

167 Central African Republic

168 Palau

169 Burundi

170 Grenada

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171 Lesotho

172 Saint Vincent & the Grenadines

173 Solomon Islands

174 Samoa

175 Cape Verde

176 Nauru

177 Dominica

178 Saint Kitts & Nevis

179 Chad

180 Tonga

181 Sao Tome & Principe

182 Comoros

183 Vanuatu

185 Kiribati

Not Ranked Andorra

Not Ranked East Timor

Not Ranked Holy See

Not Ranked Hong Kong

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Not Ranked Liechtenstein

Not Ranked Marshall Islands

Not Ranked Micronesia

Not Ranked Monaco

Not Ranked San Marino

Not Ranked Somalia

Not Ranked Tuvalu

* European Union is ranked 3rd Cook Islands are ranked 184th Niue is ranked 186th

Global Environmental Snapshot

Introduction

The countries of the world face many environmental challenges in common. Nevertheless, the nature and intensity of problem vary from region to region, as do various countries' respective capacities, in terms of affluence and infrastructure, to remediate threats to environmental quality.

Consciousness of perils affecting the global environment came to the fore in the last third or so of the 20th century has continued to intensify well into the new millennium. According to the United Nations Environment Programme, considerable environmental progress has been made at the level of institutional developments, international cooperation accords, and public participation. Approximately two-dozen international environmental protection accords with global implications have been promulgated since the late 1970s under auspices of the United Nations and other international organizations, together with many additional regional agreements. Attempts to address and rectify environmental problems take the form of legal frameworks, economic instruments,

Iraq Review 2016 Page 546 of 609 pages Iraq environmentally sound technologies and cleaner production processes as well as conservation efforts. Environmental impact assessments have increasingly been applied across the globe.

Environmental degradation affects the quality, or aesthetics, of human life, but it also displays potential to undermine conditions necessary for the sustainability of human life. Attitudes toward the importance of environmental protection measures reflect ambivalence derived from this bifurcation. On one hand, steps such as cleaning up pollution, dedicating parkland, and suchlike, are seen as embellishments undertaken by wealthy societies already assured they can successfully perform those functions deemed, ostensibly, more essential-for instance, public health and education, employment and economic development. On the other hand, in poorer countries, activities causing environmental damage-for instance the land degradation effects of unregulated logging, slash-and-burn agriculture, overgrazing, and mining-can seem justified insofar as such activities provide incomes and livelihoods.

Rapid rates of resource depletion are associated with poverty and high population growth, themselves correlated, whereas consumption per capita is much higher in the most developed countries, despite these nations' recent progress in energy efficiency and conservation. It is impossible to sequester the global environmental challenge from related economic, social and political challenges.

First-tier industrialized countries have recently achieved measurable decreases in environmental pollution and the rate of resource depletion, a success not matched in middle income and developing countries. It is believed that the discrepancy is due to the fact that industrialized countries have more developed infrastructures to accommodate changes in environmental policy, to apply environmental technologies, and to invest in public education. The advanced industrialized countries incur relatively lower costs in alleviating environmental problems, in comparison to developing countries, since in the former even extensive environmental programs represent a rather minuscule percentage of total expenditures. Conversely, budget constraints, lagged provision of basic services to the population, and other factors such as debt service and militarization may preclude institution of minimal environmental protection measures in the poorest countries.

A synopsis for the current situation facing each region of the world follows:

Regional Synopsis: Africa

The African continent, the world's second-largest landmass, encompasses many of the world's least developed countries. By global standards, urbanization is comparatively low but rising at a rapid rate. More heavily industrialized areas at the northern and southern ends of the continent experience the major share of industrial pollution. In other regions the most serious environmental problems typically stem from inefficient subsistence farming methods and other forms of land

Iraq Review 2016 Page 547 of 609 pages Iraq degradation, which have affected an increasingly extensive area under pressure of a widely impoverished, fast-growing population. Africa's distribution of natural resources is very uneven. It is the continent at greatest risk of desertification, especially in the Sahel region at the edge of the Sahara but also in other dry-range areas. Yet at the same time, Africa also harbors some of the earth's richest and most diverse biological zones.

Key Points:

Up to half a billion hectares of African land are moderately to severely degraded, an occurrence reflecting short-fallow shifting cultivation and overgrazing as well as a climatic pattern of recurrent droughts.

Soil degradation is severe along the expanse directly south of the Sahara, from the west to the east coasts. Parts of southern Africa, central-eastern Africa, and the neighboring island of Madagascar suffer from serious soil degradation as well.

Africa contains about 17 percent of the world's forest cover, concentrated in the tropical belt of the continent. Many of the forests, however, are severely depleted, with an estimated 70 percent showing some degree of degradation.

Population growth has resulted in continuing loss of arable land, as inefficient subsistence farming techniques affect increasingly extensive areas. Efforts to implement settled, sustainable agriculture have met with some recent success, but much further progress in this direction is needed. Especially in previously uninhabited forestlands, concern over deforestation is intensifying.

By contrast, the African savanna remains the richest grassland in the world, supporting a substantial concentration of animal and plant life. Wildlife parks are sub-Saharan Africa's greatest tourist attraction, and with proper management-giving local people a stake in conservation and controlling the pace of development-could greatly enhance African economies.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of northern, southern and eastern Africa are currently threatened, while the biological diversity in Mauritania and Madagascar is even further compromised with over 20 percent of the mammal species in these two countries currently under threat.

With marine catch trends increasing from 500,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 3,000,000 metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life, should this trend continue unabated.

Water resource vulnerability is a major concern in northeastern Africa, and a moderate concern across the rest of the continent. An exception is central Africa, which has plentiful water supplies.

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Many Africans lack adequate access to resources, not just (if at all) because the resources are unevenly distributed geographically, but also through institutional failures such as faulty land tenure systems or political upheaval. The quality of Africa's natural resources, despite their spotty distribution, is in fact extraordinarily rich. The infrastructure needed to protect and benefit from this natural legacy, however, is largely lacking.

Regional Synopsis: Asia and the Pacific

Asia-earth's largest landmass-and the many large and nearly innumerable small islands lying off its Pacific shore display extraordinarily contrasting landscapes, levels of development, and degrees of environmental stress. In the classification used here, the world's smallest continent, Australia, is also included in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Asia-Pacific region is home to 9 of the world's 14 largest urban areas, and as energy use for utilities, industry and transport increases in developing economies, urban centers are subject to worsening air quality. Intense population density in places such as Bangladesh or Hong Kong is the quintessential image many people have of Asia, yet vast desert areas such as the Gobi and the world's highest mountain range, the Himalayas, span the continent as well. Forested areas in Southeast Asia and the islands of Indonesia and the Philippines were historically prized for their tropical hardwood, but in many places this resource is now severely depleted. Low-lying small island states are extremely vulnerable to the effects of global warming, both rising sea levels and an anticipated increase in cyclones.

Key Points:

Asian timber reserves are forecast to be depleted in the next 40 years. Loss of natural forest is irreversible in some areas, but plantation programs to restore tree cover may ameliorate a portion of the resulting land degradation.

Increased usage of fossil fuels in China and other parts of southern Asia is projected to result in a marked increase in emissions, especially in regard to carbon dioxide. The increased usage of energy has led to a marked upsurge in air pollution across the region.

Acidification is an emerging problem regionally, with sulfur dioxide emissions expected to triple by 2010 if the current growth rate is sustained. China, Thailand, India, and Korea seem to be suffering from particularly high rates of acid deposition. By contrast, Asia's most highly developed economy, Japan, has effected substantial improvements in its environmental indicators.

Water pollution in the Pacific is an urgent concern since up to 70 percent of the water discharged

Iraq Review 2016 Page 549 of 609 pages Iraq into the region's waters receives no treatment. Additionally, the disposal of solid wastes, in like manner, poses a major threat in a region with many areas of high population density.

The Asia-Pacific region is the largest expanse of the world's land that is adversely affected by soil degradation.

The region around Australia reportedly suffers the largest degree of ozone depletion.

The microstates of the Pacific suffer land loss due to global warming, and the consequent rise in the levels of ocean waters. A high-emissions scenario and anthropogenic climate impact at the upper end of the currently predicted range would probably force complete evacuation of the lowest-elevation islands sometime in this century.

The species-rich reefs surrounding Southeast Asia are highly vulnerable to the deleterious effects of coastal development, land-based pollution, over-fishing and exploitative fishing methods, as well as marine pollution from oil spills and other activities.

With marine catch trends increasing from 5,000,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 20,000,000 metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life, should this trend continue unabated.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of China and south-east Asia are currently threatened, while the biological diversity in India, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia and parts of Malaysia is even further compromised with over 20 percent of the mammal species in these countries currently under threat.

Water resource vulnerability is a serious concern in areas surrounding the Indian subcontinent.

Regional Synopsis: Central Asia

The Central Asian republics, formerly in the Soviet Union, experience a range of environmental problems as the result of poorly executed agricultural, industrial, and nuclear programs during the Soviet era. Relatively low population densities are the norm, especially since upon the breakup of the U.S.S.R. many ethnic Russians migrated back to European Russia. In this largely semi-arid region, drought, water shortages, and soil salinization pose major challenges.

Key Points:

The use of agricultural pesticides, such as DDT and other chemicals, has contributed to the contamination of soil and groundwater throughout the region.

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Land and soil degradation, and in particular, increased salinization, is mostly attributable to faulty irrigation practices.

Significant desertification is also a problem in the region.

Air pollution is prevalent, mostly due to use of low octane automobile fuel.

Industrial pollution of the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, as a result of industrial effluents as well as mining and metal production, presents a challenge to the countries bordering these bodies of water.

One of the most severe environmental problems in the region is attributable to the several billion tons of hazardous materials stored in landfills across Central Asia.

Uzbekistan's particular problem involves the contraction of the Aral Sea, which has decreased in size by a third, as a consequence of river diversions and poor irrigation practices. The effect has been the near-total biological destruction of that body of water.

Kazakhstan, as a consequence of being the heartland of the former Soviet Union's nuclear program, has incurred a high of cancerous malignancies, biogenetic abnormalities and radioactive contamination.

While part of the Soviet Union, the republics in the region experienced very high levels of greenhouse gas emissions, as a consequence of rapid industrialization using cheap but dirty energy sources, especially coal.

By contrast, however, there have recently been substantial reductions in the level of greenhouse gas emissions, especially those attributable to coal burning, with further decreases anticipated over the next decade. These changes are partially due to the use of cleaner energy technologies, such as natural gas, augmented by governmental commitment to improving environmental standards.

Regional Synopsis: Europe

Western Europe underwent dramatic transformation of its landscape, virtually eliminating large- scale natural areas, during an era of rapid industrialization, which intensified upon its recovery from World War II. In Eastern Europe and European Russia, intensive land development has been less prevalent, so that some native forests and other natural areas remain. Air and water pollution from use of dirty fuels and industrial effluents, however, are more serious environmental problems in Eastern than in Western Europe, though recent trends show improvement in many indicators. Acid rain has inflicted heavy environmental damage across much of Europe, particularly on forests.

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Europe and North America are the only regions in which water usage for industry exceeds that for agriculture, although in Mediterranean nations agriculture is the largest water consumer.

Key Points:

Europe contributes 36 percent of the world's chlorofluorocarbon emissions, 30 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, and 25 percent of sulfur dioxide emissions.

Sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions are the cause of 30 to 50 percent of Central and Eastern Europe's deforestation.

Acid rain has been an environmental concern for decades and continues to be a challenge in parts of Western Europe.

Overexploitation of up to 60 percent of Europe's groundwater presents a problem in industrial and urban areas.

With marine catch trends increasing from 5,000,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 20,000,000 metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life, should this trend continue unabated.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of western Europe, Eastern Europe and Russia are currently threatened, while the biological diversity on the Iberian Peninsula is even further compromised with over 40 percent of the mammal species in this region currently under threat. As a result, there has been a 10 percent increase in protected areas of Europe.

A major environmental issue for Europe involves the depletion of various already endangered or threatened species, and most significantly, the decline of fish stocks. Some estimates suggest that up to 50 percent of the continent's fish species may be considered endangered species. Coastal fisheries have been over-harvested, resulting in catch limits or moratoriums on many commercially important fish species.

Fortunately, in the last few years, these policies have started to yield measurable results with decreasing trends in marine fish catch.

Recently, most European countries have adopted cleaner production technologies, and alternative methods of waste disposal, including recycling.

The countries of Eastern Europe have made air quality a major environmental priority. This is exemplified by the Russian Federation's addition to the 1995 "Berlin Mandate" (transnational legislation based on resolutions of the Rio Earth Summit) compelling nations to promote "carbon

Iraq Review 2016 Page 552 of 609 pages Iraq sinks" to absorb greenhouse gases.

On a relative basis, when compared with the degree of industrial emissions emitted by many Eastern European countries until the late 1980s, there has been some marked increase in air quality in the region, as obsolete plants are closed and a transition to cleaner fuels and more efficient energy use takes place.

Regional Synopsis: The Middle and Near East

Quite possibly, the Middle East will exemplify the adage that, as the 20th century was a century fixated on oil, the will be devoted to critical decisions about water. Many (though far from all) nations in the Middle East rank among those countries with the largest oil and gas reserves, but water resources are relatively scarce throughout this predominantly dry region. Effects of global warming may cause moderately high elevation areas that now typically receive winter "snowpack" to experience mainly rain instead, which would further constrain dry-season water availability. The antiquities and religious shrines of the region render it a great magnet for tourism, which entails considerable economic growth potential but also intensifies stresses on the environment.

Key Points:

Water resource vulnerability is a serious concern across the entire region. The increased usage of, and further demand for water, has exacerbated long-standing water scarcity in the region. For instance, river diversions and industrial salt works have caused the Dead Sea to shrink by one-third from its original surface area, with further declines expected.

The oil industry in the region contributes to water pollution in the Persian Gulf, as a result of oil spills, which have averaged 1.2 million barrels of oil spilt per year (some sources suggest that this figure is understated). The consequences are severe because even after oil spills have been cleaned up, environmental damage to the food webs and ecosystems of marine life will persist for a prolonged period.

The region's coastal zone is considered one of the most fragile and endangered ecosystems of the world. Land reclamation, shoreline construction, discharge of industrial effluents, and tourism (such as diving in the Red Sea) contribute to widespread coastal damage.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of the Middle East are currently threatened.

Since the 1980s, 11 percent of the region's natural forest has been depleted.

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Regional Synopsis: Latin America and the Caribbean

The Latin American and Caribbean region is characterized by exceedingly diverse landforms that have generally seen high rates of population growth and economic development in recent decades. The percentage of inhabitants residing in urban areas is quite high at 73.4 percent; the region includes the megacities of Mexico City, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. The region also includes the world's second-highest mountain range, the Andes; significant expanses of desert and grassland; the coral reefs of the Caribbean Sea; and the world's largest contiguous tropical forest in the Amazon basin. Threats to the latter from subsistence and commercial farming, mineral exploitation and timbering are well publicized. Nevertheless, of eight countries worldwide that still retain at least 70 percent of their original forest cover, six are in Latin America. The region accounts for nearly half (48.3 percent) of the world's greenhouse gas emissions derived from land clearing, but as yet a comparatively minuscule share (4.3 percent) of such gases from industrial sources.

Key Points:

Although Latin America is one of the most biologically diverse regions of the world, this biodiversity is highly threatened, as exemplified by the projected extinction of up to 100,000 species in the next few decades. Much of this loss will be concentrated in the Amazon area, although the western coastline of South America will also suffer significant depletion of biological diversity. The inventory of rainforest species with potentially useful commercial or medical applications is incomplete, but presumed to include significant numbers of such species that may become extinct before they are discovered and identified.

Up to 50 percent of the region's grazing land has lost its soil fertility as a result of soil erosion, salinization, alkalinization and overgrazing.

The Caribbean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean have all been contaminated by agricultural wastes, which are discharged into streams that flow into these major waters. Water pollution derived from phosphorous, nitrates and pesticides adversely affects fish stocks, contributes to oxygen depletion and fosters overgrowth of aquatic vegetation. Marine life will continue to be severely compromised as a result of these conditions.

Due to industrial development in the region, many beaches of eastern Latin America and the Caribbean suffer from tar deposits.

Most cities in the region lack adequate sewage treatment facilities, and rapid migration of the rural poor into the cities is widening the gap between current infrastructure capacity and the much greater level needed to provide satisfactory basic services.

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The rainforest region of the Amazon Basin suffers from dangerously high levels of deforestation, which may be a significant contributory factor to global warming or "the greenhouse effect." In the late 1990s and into the new millennium, the rate of deforestation was around 20 million acres of rainforest being destroyed annually.

Deforestation on the steep rainforest slopes of Caribbean islands contributes to soil erosion and landslides, both of which then result in heavy sedimentation of nearby river systems. When these sedimented rivers drain into the sea and coral reefs, they poison the coral tissues, which are vital to the maintenance of the reef ecosystem. The result is marine degradation and nutrient depletion. Jamaica's coral reefs have never quite recovered from the effects of marine degradation.

The Southern Cone of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) suffers the effects of greatly increased ultraviolet-B radiation, as a consequence of more intense ozone depletion in the southern hemisphere.

Water resource vulnerability is an increasingly major concern in the northwestern portion of South America.

Regional Synopsis: North America

North American nations, in particular the United States and Canada, rank among the world's most highly developed industrial economies-a fact which has generated significant pollution problems, but also financial resources and skills that have enabled many problems to be corrected. Although efforts to promote energy efficiency, recycling, and suchlike have helped ease strains on the environment in a part of the world where per capita consumption levels are high, sprawling land development patterns and recent preferences many households have demonstrated for larger vehicles have offset these advances.

Meanwhile, a large portion of North America's original forest cover has been lost, though in many cases replaced by productive second-growth woodland. In recent years, attitudes toward best use of the region's remaining natural or scenic areas seem to be shifting toward recreation and preservation and away from resource extraction. With increasing attention on the energy scarcity in the United States, however, there is speculation that this shift may be short-lived. Indeed, the energy shortage on the west coast of the United States and associated calls for energy exploration, indicate a possible retrenchment toward resource extraction. At the same time, however, it has also served to highlight the need for energy conservation as well as alternative energy sources.

Despite generally successful anti-pollution efforts, various parts of the region continue to suffer significant air, water and land degradation from industrial, vehicular, and agricultural emissions and

Iraq Review 2016 Page 555 of 609 pages Iraq runoff. Mexico, as a middle-income country, displays environmental problems characteristic of a developing economy, including forest depletion, pollution from inefficient industrial processes and dirty fuels, and lack of sufficient waste-treatment infrastructure.

Key Points:

Because of significantly greater motor vehicle usage in the United States (U.S.) than in the rest of the world, the U.S. contribution of urban air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, especially carbon dioxide, is disproportionately high in relation to its population.

Acid rain is an enduring issue of contention in the northeastern part of the United States, on the border with Canada.

Mexico's urban areas suffer extreme air pollution from carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and other toxic air pollutants. Emissions controls on vehicles are in their infancy, compared to analogous regulations in the U.S.

The cities of Mexico, including those on the U.S. border, also discharge large quantities of untreated or poorly treated sewage, though officials are currently planning infrastructure upgrades.

Deforestation is noteworthy in various regions of the U.S., especially along the northwest coastline. Old growth forests have been largely removed, but in the northeastern and upper midwestern sections of the United States, evidence suggests that the current extent of tree cover probably surpasses the figure for the beginning of the 20th century.

Extreme weather conditions in the last few years have resulted in a high level of soil erosion along the north coast of California; in addition, the coastline itself has shifted substantially due to soil erosion and concomitant landslides.

Agricultural pollution-including nitrate contamination of well water, nutrient runoff to waterways, and pesticide exposure-is significant in various areas. Noteworthy among affected places are California's Central Valley, extensive stretches of the Midwest, and land in the Chesapeake Bay watershed.

Inland waterways, especially around the Great Lakes, have substantially improved their water quality, due to concentrated efforts at reducing water pollution by governmental, commercial and community representatives. Strict curbs on industrial effluents and near-universal implementation of sewage treatment are the chief factors responsible for this improvement.

A major environmental issue for Canada and the United States involves the depletion of various

Iraq Review 2016 Page 556 of 609 pages Iraq already endangered or threatened species, and most significantly, the decline of fish stocks. Coastal fisheries have been over-harvested, resulting in catch limits or moratoriums on many commercially important fish species. In the last few years, these policies have started to yield measurable results with decreasing trends in marine fish catch.

Due to the decay of neighboring ecosystems in Central America and the Caribbean, the sea surrounding Florida has become increasingly sedimented, contributing to marine degradation, nutrient depletion of the ecosystem, depletion of fish stocks, and diseases to coral species in particular.

Polar Regions

Key Points:

The significant rise in sea level, amounting 10 to 25 centimeters in the last 100 years, is due to the melting of the Arctic ice sheets, and is attributed to global warming.

The Antarctic suffers from a significant ozone hole, first detected in 1976. By 1985, a British scientific team reported a 40 percent decrease in usual regeneration rates of the ozone. Because a sustained increase in the amount of ultraviolet-B radiation would have adverse consequences upon all planetary life, recent environmental measures have been put into effect, aimed at reversing ozone depletion. These measures are projected to garner significant results by 2050.

Due to air and ocean currents, the Arctic is a sink for toxic releases originally discharged thousands of miles away. Arctic wildlife and Canada's Inuit population have higher bodily levels of contaminants such as PCB and dioxin than those found in people and animals in much of the rest of the world.

Global Environmental Concepts

1. Global Warming and Greenhouse Gases

The Greenhouse Effect:

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In the early 19th century, the French physicist, Jean Fourier, contended that the earth's atmosphere functions in much the same way as the glass of a greenhouse, thus describing what is now understood as the "greenhouse effect." Put simply, the "greenhouse effect" confines some of the sun's energy to the earth, preserving some of the planet's warmth, rather than allowing it to flow back into space. In so doing, all kinds of life forms can flourish on earth. Thus, the "greenhouse effect" is necessary to sustain and preserve life forms and ecosystems on earth.

In the late 19th century, a Swedish chemist, Svante Arrhenius, noticed that human activities, such as the burning of coal and other fossil fuels for heat, and the removal of forested lands for urban development, led to higher concentrations of greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide and methane, in the atmosphere. This increase in the levels of greenhouse gases was believed to advance the "greenhouse effect" exponentially, and might be related to the trend in global warming.

In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, after industrial development took place on a large scale and the total human population burgeoned simultaneously with industrialization, the resulting increase in greenhouse gas emissions could, many scientists believe, be significant enough to have some bearing on climate. Indeed, many studies in recent years support the idea that there is a linkage between human activities and global warming, although there is less consensus on the extent to which this linkage may be relevant to environmental concerns.

That said, some scientists have argued that temperature fluctuations have existed throughout the evolution of the planet. Indeed, Dr. S. Fred Singer, the president of the Science and Environment Policy Project has noted that 3,000-year-old geological records of ocean sediment reveal changes in the surface temperature of the ocean. Hence, it is possible that climate variability is merely a normal fact of the planet's evolution. Yet even skeptics as to anthropogenic factors concur that any substantial changes in global temperatures would likely have an effect upon the earth's ecosystems, as well as the life forms that inhabit them.

The Relationship Between Global Warming and Greenhouse Gases:

A large number of climatologists believe that the increase in atmospheric concentrations of "greenhouse gas emissions," mostly a consequence of human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels, are contributing to global warming. The cause notwithstanding, the planet has reportedly warmed 0.3°C to 0.6°C over the last century. Indeed, each year during the 1990s was one of the very warmest in the 20th century, with the mean surface temperature for 1999 being the fifth warmest on record since 1880.

In early 2000, a panel of atmospheric scientists for the National Research Council concluded in a report that global warming was, indeed, a reality. While the panel, headed by Chairman John Wallace, a professor of atmospheric sciences at the University of Washington, stated that it

Iraq Review 2016 Page 558 of 609 pages Iraq remained unclear whether human activities have contributed to the earth's increasing temperatures, it was apparent that global warming exists.

In 2001, following a request for further study by the incoming Bush administration in the United States, the National Academy of Sciences again confirmed that global warming had been in existence for the last 20 years. The study also projected an increase in temperature between 2.5 degrees and 10.4 degrees Fahrenheit by the year 2100. Furthermore, the study found the leading cause of global warming to be emissions of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, and it noted that greenhouse gas accumulations in the earth's atmosphere was a result of human activities.

Within the scientific community, the controversy regarding has centered on the difference between surface air and upper air temperatures. Information collected since 1979 suggests that while the earth's surface temperature has increased by about a degree in the past century, the atmospheric temperature five miles above the earth's surface has indicated very little increase. Nevertheless, the panel stated that this discrepancy in temperature between surface and upper air does not invalidate the conclusion that global warming is taking place. Further, the panel noted that natural events, such as volcanic eruptions, can decrease the temperature in the upper atmosphere.

The major consequences of global warming potentially include the melting of the polar ice caps, which, in turn, contribute to the rise in sea levels. Many islands across the globe have already experienced a measurable loss of land as a result. Because global warming may increase the rate of evaporation, increased precipitation, in the form of stronger and more frequent storm systems, is another potential outcome. Other consequences of global warming may include the introduction and proliferation of new infectious diseases, loss of arable land (referred to as "desertification"), destructive changes to existing ecosystems, loss of biodiversity and the isolation of species, and concomitant adverse changes in the quality of human life.

International Policy Development in Regard to Global Warming:

Regardless of what the precise nature of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming may be, it seems that there is some degree of a connection between the phenomena. Any substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and global warming trends will likely involve systematic changes in industrial operations, the use of advanced energy sources and technologies, as well as global cooperation in implementing and regulating these transformations.

In this regard, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stipulated the following objectives:

1. To stabilize "greenhouse gas" concentrations within the atmosphere, in such a manner that would preclude hazardous anthropogenic intervention into the existing biosphere and ecosystems of the world. This stabilization process would facilitate the natural adaptation of ecosystems to

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2. To ensure and enable sustainable development and food production on a global scale.

*** See section on "International Environmental Agreements and Associations" for information related to international policies related to limiting greenhouse gases and controlling climate change emanating from historic summits at Kyoto, Copenhagen, Doha, and Paris. ***

2. Air Pollution

Long before global warming reared its head as a significant issue, those concerned about the environment and public health noted the deleterious effects of human-initiated combustion upon the atmosphere. Killer smogs from coal burning triggered acute health emergencies in London and other places. At a lower level of intensity motor vehicle, power plant, and industrial emissions impaired long-range visibility and probably had some chronic adverse consequences on the respiratory systems of persons breathing such air.

In time, scientists began associating the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides released from coal burning with significant acid deposition in the atmosphere, eventually falling as "acid rain." This phenomenon has severely degraded forestlands, especially in Europe and a few parts of the United States. It has also impaired some aquatic ecosystems and eaten away the surface of some human artifacts, such as marble monuments. Scrubber technology and conversion to cleaner fuels have enabled the level of industrial production to remain at least constant while significantly reducing acid deposition. Technologies aimed at cleaning the air and curtailing acid rain, soot, and smog may, nonetheless, boomerang as the perils of global warming become increasingly serious. In brief, these particulates act as sort of a sun shade -- comparable to the effect of volcanic eruptions on the upper atmosphere whereby periods of active volcanism correlate with temporarily cooler weather conditions. Thus, while the carbon dioxide releases that are an inevitable byproduct of combustion continue, by scrubbing the atmosphere of pollutants, an industrial society opens itself to greater insolation (penetration of the sun's rays and consequent heating), and consequently, it is likely to experience a correspondingly greater rise in ambient temperatures.

The health benefits of removing the sources of acid rain and smog are indisputable, and no one would recommend a return to previous conditions. Nevertheless, the problematic climatic effects of continually increasing emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases pose a major global environmental challenge, not as yet addressed adequately.

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3. Ozone Depletion

The stratospheric ozone layer functions to prevent ultraviolet radiation from reaching the earth. Normally, stratospheric ozone is systematically disintegrated and regenerated through natural photochemical processes. The stratospheric ozone layer, however, has been depleted unnaturally as a result of anthropogenic (man-made) chemicals, most especially chlorine and bromide compounds such as chloroflorocarbons (CFCs), halons, and various industrial chemicals in the form of solvents, refrigerants, foaming agents, aerosol propellants, fire retardants, and fumigants. Ozone depletion is of concern because it permits a greater degree of ultraviolet-B radiation to reach the earth, which then increases the incidences of cancerous malignancies, cataracts, and human immune deficiencies. In addition, even in small doses, ozone depletion affects the ecosystem by disturbing food chains, agriculture, fisheries and other forms of biological diversity.

Transnational policies enacted to respond to the dangers of ozone depletion include the 1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Montreal Protocol was subsequently amended in London in 1990, Copenhagen in 1992 and Vienna in 1995. By 1996, 155 countries had ratified the Montreal Protocol, which sets out a time schedule for the reduction (and eventual elimination) of ozone depleting substances (OPS), and bans exports and imports of ODS from and to non- participant countries.

In general, the Protocol stipulates that developed countries must eliminate halon consumption by 1994 and CFC consumption by 1996, while developing countries must eliminate these substances by 2010. Consumption of methyl bromide, which is used as a fumigant, was to be frozen at the 1995 in developed countries, and fully eliminated in 2010, while developing countries are to freeze consumption by 2002, based on average 1995-1998 consumption levels. Methyl chloroform is to be phased out by 2005. Under the Montreal Protocol, most ODS will be completely eliminated from use by 2010.

4. Land Degradation

In recent decades, land degradation in more arid regions of the world has become a serious concern. The problem, manifest as both "desertification" and "devegetation," is caused primarily by climate variability and human activities, such as "deforestation," excessive cultivation, overgrazing, and other forms of land resource exploitation. It is also exacerbated by inadequate irrigation practices. Although the effects of droughts on drylands have been temporary in the past, today, the productivity and sustainability of these lands have been severely compromised for the long term. Indeed, in every region of the world, land degradation has become an acute issue.

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Desertification and Devegetation:

"Desertification" is a process of land degradation causing the soil to deteriorate, thus losing its nutrients and fertility, and eventually resulting in the loss of vegetation, known as "devegetation." As aforementioned, "desertification" and "devegetation" are caused by human activities, yet human beings are also the greatest casualties. Because these forms of land degradation affect the ability of the soil to produce crops, they concomitantly contribute to poverty. As population increases and demographic concentrations shift, the extent of land subject to stresses by those seeking to wrest subsistence from it has inexorably risen.

In response, the United Nations has formed the Convention to Combat Desertification-aimed at implementing programs to address the underlying causes of desertification, as well as measures to prevent and minimize its effects. Of particular significance is the formulation of policies on transboundary resources, such as areas around lakes and rivers. At a broader level, the Convention has established a Conference of Parties (COP), which includes all ratifying governments, for directing and advancing international action.

To ensure more efficacious use of funding, the Convention intends to reconfigure international aid to utilize a consultative and coordinated approach in the disbursement and expenditure of donor funds. In this way, local communities that are affected by desertification will be active participants in the solution-generation process. In-depth community education projects are envisioned as part of this new international aid program, and private donor financing is encouraged. Meanwhile, as new technologies are developed to deal with the problem of desertification, they need to be distributed for application across the world. Hence, the Convention calls for international cooperation in scientific research in this regard.

Desertification is a problem of sustainable development. It is directly connected to human challenges such as poverty, social and economic well-being and environmental protection as well. Broader environmental issues, such as climate change, biological diversity, and freshwater supplies, are indirectly related, so any effort to resolve this environmental challenge must entail coordinated research efforts and joint action.

Deforestation:

Deforestation is not a recent phenomenon. For centuries, human beings have cut down trees to clear space for land cultivation, or in order to use the wood for fuel. Over the last 200 years, and most especially after World War II, deforestation increased because the logging industry became a globally profitable endeavor, and so the clearing of forested areas was accelerated for the purposes of industrial development. In the long term, this intensified level of deforestation is considered problematic because the forest is unable to regenerate itself quickly. The deforestation that has

Iraq Review 2016 Page 562 of 609 pages Iraq occurred in tropical rainforests is seen as an especially serious concern, due to the perceived adverse effects of this process upon the entire global ecosystem.

The most immediate consequence of deforestation is soil degradation. Soil, which is necessary for the growth of vegetation, can be a fragile and vital property. Organically, an extensive evolution process must take place before soil can produce vegetation, yet at the same time, the effects of natural elements, such as wind and rain, can easily and quickly degrade this resource. This phenomenon is known as soil erosion. In addition, natural elements like wind and rain reduce the amount of fertile soil on the ground, making soil scarcity a genuine problem. When fertile topsoil that already exists is removed from the landscape in the process of deforestation, soil scarcity is further exacerbated. Equally significant is the fact that once land has been cleared so that the topsoil can be cultivated for crop production, not only are the nutrient reserves in the soil depleted, thus producing crops of inferior quality, but the soil structure itself becomes stressed and deteriorates further.

Another direct result of deforestation is flooding. When forests are cleared, removing the cover of vegetation, and rainfall occurs, the flow of water increases across the surface of land. When extensive water runoff takes place, the frequency and intensity of flooding increases. Other adverse effects of deforestation include the loss of wildlife and biodiversity within the ecosystem that supports such life forms.

At a broader level, tropical rainforests play a vital role in maintaining the global environmental system. Specifically, destruction of tropical rainforests affects the carbon dioxide cycle. When forests are destroyed by burning (or rotting), carbon dioxide is released into the air, thus contributing to an intensified "greenhouse effect." The increase in greenhouse gas emissions like carbon dioxide is a major contributor to global warming, according to many environmental scientists. Indeed, trees themselves absorb carbon dioxide in the process of photosynthesis, so their loss also reduces the absorption of greenhouse gases.

Tropical rainforest destruction also adversely affects the nitrogen cycle. Nitrogen is a key nutrient for both plants and animals. Plants derive nitrogen from soil, while animals obtain it via nitrogen- enriched vegetation. This element is essential for the formation of amino acids, and thereby for proteins and biochemicals that all living things need for metabolism and growth. In the nitrogen cycle, vegetation acquires these essential proteins and biochemicals, and then cyclically returns them to the atmosphere and global ecosystem. Accordingly, when tropical rainforest ecosystems are compromised, not only is vegetation removed; the atmosphere is also affected and climates are altered. At a more immediate level, the biodiversity within tropical rainforests, including wildlife and insect species and a wealth of plant varieties, is depleted. Loss of rare plants is of particular concern because certain species as yet unknown and unused could likely yield many practical benefits, for instance as medicines.

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As a result of the many challenges associated with deforestation, many environmental groups and agencies have argued for government policies on the sustainable development of forests by governments across the globe. While many countries have instituted national policies and programs aimed at reducing deforestation, and substantial research has been advanced in regard to sustainable and regenerative forestry development, there has been very little progress on an international level. Generally speaking, most tropical rainforests are located in developing and less developed countries, where economic growth is often dependent upon the exploitation of tropical rainforests. Timber resources as well as wildlife hunting tend to be particularly lucrative arenas.

In places such as the Amazon, where deforestation takes place for the construction of energy plants aimed at industrialization and economic development, there is an exacerbated effect on the environment. After forests are cleared in order to construct such projects, massive flooding usually ensues. The remaining trees then rot and decay in the wake of the flooding. As the trees deteriorate, their biochemical makeup becomes more acidic, producing poisonous substances such as hydrogen sulphide and methane gases. Acidified water subsequently corrodes the mechanical equipment and operations of the plants, which are already clogged by rotting wood after the floodwaters rise.

Deforestation generally arises from an economically plausible short-term motivation, but nonetheless poses a serious global concern because the effects go beyond national boundaries. The United Nations has established the World Commission on Forest and Sustainable Development. This body's task is to determine the optimal means of dealing with the issue of deforestation, without unduly affecting normal economic development, while emphasizing the global significance of protecting tropical forest ecosystems.

5. Water Resources

For all terrestrial fauna, including humans, water is the most immediate necessity to sustain life. As the population has increased and altered an ever-greater portion of the landscape from its natural condition, demand on water resources has intensified, especially with the development of industrialization and large-scale irrigation. The supply of freshwater is inherently limited, and moreover distributed unevenly across the earth's landmasses. Moreover, not just demand for freshwater but activities certain to degrade it are becoming more pervasive. By contrast, the oceans form a sort of "last wilderness," still little explored and in large part not seriously affected by human activity. However, coastal environments - the biologically richest part of the marine ecosystem-are experiencing major depletion due to human encroachment and over-exploitation.

Freshwater:

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In various regions, for instance the Colorado River in the western United States, current withdrawals of river water for irrigation, domestic, and industrial use consume the entire streamflow so that almost no water flows into the sea at the river's mouth. Yet development is ongoing in many such places, implying continually rising demand for water. In some areas reliant on groundwater, aquifers are being depleted at a markedly faster rate than they are being replenished. An example is the San Joaquin Valley in California, where decades of high water withdrawals for agriculture have caused land subsidence of ten meters or more in some spots. Naturally, the uncertainty of future water supplies is particularly acute in arid and semi-arid regions. Speculation that the phenomenon of global warming will alter geographic and seasonal rainfall patterns adds further uncertainty.

Water conservation measures have great potential to alleviate supply shortages. Some city water systems are so old and beset with leaking pipes that they lose as much water as they meter. Broad- scale irrigation could be replaced by drip-type irrigation, actually enhancing the sustainability of agriculture. In many areas where heavy irrigation has been used for decades, the result is deposition of salts and other chemicals in the soil such that the land becomes unproductive for farming and must be abandoned.

Farming is a major source of water pollution. Whereas restrictions on industrial effluents and other "point sources" are relatively easy to implement, comparable measures to reform hydraulic practices at farms and other "nonpoint sources" pose a significantly knottier challenge. Farm- caused water pollution takes the following main forms:

- Nitrate pollution found in wells in intensive farming areas as a consequence of heavy fertilizer use is a threat to human health. The most serious danger is to infants, who by ingesting high-nitrate water can contract methemoglobinemia, sometimes called "blue baby syndrome," a potentially fatal condition.

- Fertilizer runoff into rivers and lakes imparts unwanted nutrients that cause algae growth and eventual loss of oxygen in the body of water, degrading its ability to support fish and other desirable aquatic life.

- Toxic agricultural chemicals - insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides - are detectable in some aquifers and waterways.

In general, it is much easier to get a pollutant into water than to retrieve it out. Gasoline additives, dry cleaning chemicals, other industrial toxins, and in a few areas radionucleides have all been found in water sources intended for human use. The complexity and long time scale of subterranean hydrological movements essentially assures that pollutants already deposited in aquifers will continue to turn up for decades to come. Sophisticated water treatment processes are available, albeit expensive, to reclaim degraded water and render it fit for human consumption. Yet

Iraq Review 2016 Page 565 of 609 pages Iraq source protection is unquestionably a more desirable alternative.

In much of the developing world, and even some low-income rural enclaves of the developed world, the population lacks ready access to safe water. Surface water and shallow groundwater supplies are susceptible to contamination from untreated wastewater and failing septic tanks, as well as chemical hazards. The occurrence of waterborne disease is almost certainly greatly underreported.

Marine Resources:

Coastal areas have always been desirable places for human habitation, and population pressure on them continues to increase. Many types of water degradation that affect lakes and rivers also affect coastal zones: industrial effluents, untreated or partially treated sewage, nutrient load from agriculture figure prominently in both cases. Prospects for more extreme storms as a result of global warming, as well as the pervasiveness of poorly planned development in many coastal areas, forebode that catastrophic hurricanes and landslides may increase in frequency in the future. Ongoing rise in sea levels will force remedial measures and in some cases abandonment of currently valuable coastal property.

Fisheries over much of the globe have been overharvested, and immediate conservation measures are required to preserve stocks of many species. Many governments subsidized factory-scale fishing fleets in the 1970s and 1980s, and the resultant catch increase evidently surpassed a sustainable level. It is uncertain how much of the current decline in fish stocks stems from overharvesting and how much from environmental pollution. The deep ocean remains relatively unaffected by human activity, but continental shelves near coastlines are frequently seriously polluted, and these close-to-shore areas are the major biological nurseries for food fish and the smaller organisms they feed on.

6. Environmental Toxins

Toxic chemical pollution exploded on the public consciousness with disclosure of spectacularly polluted industrial areas such as Love Canal near Buffalo, New York. There is no question that pollutants such as organophosphates or radionucleides can be highly deleterious to health, but evidence to date suggests that seriously affected areas are a localized rather than universal problem.

While some explore the possibilities for a lifestyle that fully eschews use of modern industrial chemicals, the most prevalent remediative approach is to focus on more judicious use. The most efficient chemical plants are now able to contain nearly all toxic byproducts of their production processes within the premises, minimizing the release of such substances into the environment.

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Techniques such as Integrated Pest Management (IPM) dictate limited rather than broadcast use of pesticides: application only when needed using the safest available chemical, supplemented as much as possible with nontoxic controls.

While heightened public awareness and growing technical sophistication suggest a hopeful outlook on limiting the damage from manmade environmental toxins, one must grant that previous incidents of their misuse and mishandling have already caused environmental damage that will have to be dealt with for many years to come. In the case of the most hazardous radioactive substances, the time scale for successful remediation actually extends beyond that of the recorded history of civilization. Moreover, in this era of high population density and rapid economic growth, quotidian activities such as the transport of chemicals will occasionally, seemingly inevitably result in accidents with adverse environmental consequences.

7. "Islandization" and Biodiversity

With increased awareness regarding the adverse effects of unregulated hunting and habitat depletion upon wildlife species and other aspects of biodiversity, large-scale efforts across the globe have been initiated to reduce and even reverse this trend.

In every region of the world, many species of wildlife and areas of biodiversity have been saved from extinction. Nationally, many countries have adopted policies aimed at preservation and conservation of species, and one of the most tangible measures has been the proliferation of protected habitats. Such habitats exist in the form of wildlife reserves, marine life reserves, and other such areas where biodiversity can be protected from external encroachment and exploitation.

Despite these advances in wildlife and biodiversity protection, further and perhaps more intractable challenges linger. Designated reserves, while intended to prevent further species decline, exist as closed territories, fragmented from other such enclaves and disconnected from the larger ecosystem. This environmental scenario is referred to as "islandization." Habitat reserves often serve as oversized zoos or game farms, with landscapes and wildlife that have effectively been "tamed" to suit. Meanwhile, the larger surrounding ecosystem continues to be seriously degraded and transformed, while within the islandized habitat, species that are the focus of conservation efforts may not have sufficient range and may not be able to maintain healthy genetic variability.

As a consequence, many conservationists and preservationists have demanded that substantially larger portions of land be withheld as habitat reserves, and a network of biological corridors to connect continental reserves be established. While such efforts to combat islandization have considerable support in the United States, how precisely such a program would be instituted, especially across national boundaries, remains a matter of debate. International conservationists and preservationists say without a network of reserves a massive loss of biodiversity will result.

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The concept of islandization illustrates why conservation and preservation of wildlife and biodiversity must consider and adopt new, broader strategies. In the past, conservation and preservation efforts have been aimed at specific species, such as the spotted owl and grizzly bear in North America, the Bengal tiger in Southeast Asia, the panda in China, elephants in Africa. Instead, the new approach is to simultaneously protect many and varied species that inhabit the same ecosystem. This method, referred to as "bio-regional conservation," may more efficaciously generate longer-term and more far-reaching results precisely because it is aimed at preserving entire ecosystems, and all the living things within.

More About Biodiversity Issues:

This section is directly taken from the United Nations Environmental Program: "Biodiversity Assessment"

The Global Biodiversity Assessment, completed by 1500 scientists under the auspices of United Nations Environmental Program in 1995, updated what is known (or unknown) about global biological diversity at the ecosystem, species and genetic levels. The assessment was uncertain of the total number of species on Earth within an order of magnitude. Of its working figure of 13 million species, only 13 percent are scientifically described. Ecological community diversity is also poorly known, as is its relationship to biological diversity, and genetic diversity has been studied for only a small number of species. The effects of human activities on biodiversity have increased so greatly that the rate of species extinctions is rising to hundreds or thousands of times the background level. These losses are driven by increasing demands on species and their habitats, and by the failure of current market systems to value biodiversity adequately. The Assessment calls for urgent action to reverse these trends.

There has been a new recognition of the importance of protecting marine and aquatic biodiversity. The first quantitative estimates of species losses due to growing coral reef destruction predict that almost 200,000 species, or one in five presently contributing to coral reef biodiversity, could die out in the next 40 years if human pressures on reefs continue to increase.

Since Rio, many countries have improved their understanding of the status and importance of their biodiversity, particularly through biodiversity country studies such as those prepared under the auspices of UNEP/GEF. The United Kingdom identified 1250 species needing monitoring, of which 400 require action plans to ensure their survival. Protective measures for biodiversity, such as legislation to protect species, can prove effective. In the USA, almost 40 percent of the plants and animals protected under the Endangered Species Act are now stable or improving as a direct result of recovery efforts. Some African countries have joined efforts to protect threatened species through the 1994 Lusaka Agreement, and more highly migratory species are being protected by

Iraq Review 2016 Page 568 of 609 pages Iraq specialized cooperative agreements among range states under the Bonn Agreement.

There is an emerging realization that a major part of conservation of biological diversity must take place outside of protected areas and involve local communities. The extensive agricultural areas occupied by small farmers contain much biodiversity that is important for sustainable food production. Indigenous agricultural practices have been and continue to be important elements in the maintenance of biodiversity, but these are being displaced and lost. There is a new focus on the interrelationship between agrodiversity conservation and sustainable use and development practices in smallholder agriculture, with emphasis on use of farmers' knowledge and skills as a source of information for sustainable farming.

Perhaps even more important than the loss of biodiversity is the transformation of global biogeochemical cycles, the reduction in the total world biomass, and the decrease in the biological productivity of the planet. While quantitative measurements are not available, the eventual economic and social consequences may be so significant that the issue requires further attention.

******

Specific sources used for this section:

Bendall, Roger. 1996. "Biodiversity: the follow up to Rio". The Globe 30:4-5, April 1996.

Global Environmental Change: Human and Policy Implications. 1995. Special issue on "People, Land Management and Environmental Change", Vol. 3, No. 4, September 1995.

Golubev, Genady N. (Moscow University) In litt. 29 June 1996.

Heywood, V.H. (ed.). 1995. Global Biodiversity Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Heywood, V.H. 1996. "The Global Biodiversity Assessment". The Globe, 30:2-4, April 1996.

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Reaka-Kudla, Marjorie. 1996. Paper presented at American Association for Advancement of Science, February 1996. Quoted in Pain, Stephanie. "Treasures lost in reef madness". New Scientist, 17 February 1996.

Uitto, Juha I., and Akiko Ono (eds). 1996. Population, Land Management and Environmental Change. The United Nations University, Tokyo.

USFWS. 1994. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service report to Congress, cited in news release 21 July 1994.

Online resources used generally in the Environmental Overview:

Environmental Protection Agency Global Warming Site. URL: http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming

Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations: Forestry. URL: http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/sofo/en/

Global Warming Information Page. URL: http://globalwarming.org

United Nations Environmental Program. URL: http://www.unep.org/GEO/GEO_Products/Assessment_Reports/

United Nations Global Environmental Outlook. URL: http://www.unep.org/geo/geo4/media/

Note on Edition Dates:

The edition dates for textual resources are noted above because they were used to formulate the original content. We also have used online resources (cited above) to update coverage as needed.

Information Resources

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For more information about environmental concepts, CountryWatch recommends the following resources:

The United Nations Environmental Program Network (with country profiles)

The United Nations Environment Program on Climate Change

The United Nations Environmental Program on Waters and Oceans

The United Nations Environmental Program on Forestry: "Forests in Flux"

FAO "State of the World's Forests"

World Resources Institute.

Harvard University Center for Health and the Global Environment

The University of Wisconsin Center for Sustainability and the Global Environment http://sage.aos.wisc.edu/

International Environmental Agreements and Associations

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International Policy Development in Regard to Global Warming:

Introduction

Regardless of what the precise nature of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming may be, it seems that there is some degree of a connection between the phenomena. Any substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and global warming trends will likely involve systematic changes in industrial operations, the use of advanced energy sources and technologies, as well as global cooperation in implementing and regulating these transformations.

In this regard, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stipulated the following objectives:

1. To stabilize "greenhouse gas" concentrations within the atmosphere, in such a manner that would preclude hazardous anthropogenic intervention into the existing biosphere and ecosystems of the world. This stabilization process would facilitate the natural adaptation of ecosystems to changes in climate.

2. To ensure and enable sustainable development and food production on a global scale.

Following are two discusssions regarding international policies on the environment, followed by listings of international accords.

Special Entry: The Kyoto Protocol

The UNFCCC was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and entered into force in 1994. Over 175 parties were official participants.

Meanwhile, however, many of the larger, more industrialized nations failed to reach the emissions' reduction targets, and many UNFCCC members agreed that the voluntary approach to reducing emissions had not been successful. As such, UNFCCC members reached a consensus that legally binding limits were necessitated, and agreed to discuss such a legal paradigm at a meeting in Kyoto, Japan in 1997. At that meeting, the UNFCCC forged the Kyoto Protocol. This concord is the first legally binding international agreement that places limits on emissions from industrialized countries. The major greenhouse gas emissions addressed in the Kyoto Protocol include carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and methane.

The provisions of the Kyoto Protocol stipulate that economically advanced nations must reduce their combined emissions of greenhouse gases, by approximately five percent from their 1990

Iraq Review 2016 Page 572 of 609 pages Iraq levels, before the 2008-2010 deadline. Countries with the highest carbon dioxide emissions, such as the United States (U.S.), many of the European Union (EU) countries, and Japan, are to reduce emissions by a scale of 6 to 8 percent. All economically advanced nations must show "demonstrable progress" by 2005. In contrast, no binding limits or timetable have been set on developing countries. Presumably, this distinction is due to the fact that most developing countries - - with the obvious exceptions of India and China -- simply do not emit as many greenhouse gases as do more industrially advanced countries. Meanwhile, these countries are entrenched in the process of economic development.

Regardless of the aforementioned reasoning, there has been strong opposition against the asymmetrical treatment assigned to emissions limits among developed and developing countries. Although this distinction might be regarded as unfair in principle, associations such as the Alliance of Small Island States have been vocal in expressing how global warming -- a result of greenhouse gas emissions - has contributed to the rise in sea level, and thus deleteriously affected their very existence as island nation states. For this reason, some parties have suggested that economically advanced nations, upon returning to their 1990 levels, should be required to further reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by a deadline of 2005. In response, interested parties have observed that even if such reductions were undertaken by economically advanced nations, they would not be enough to completely control global warming. Indeed, a reduction in the rate of fossil fuel usage by developing nations would also be necessary to have substantial ameliorative effect on global warming. Indeed, a reduction in the rate of fossil fuel usage by developing nations would also be necessary to have substantial ameliorative effect on global warming.

As such, the Protocol established a "Clean Development Mechanism" which permits developed countries to invest in projects aimed at reducing emissions within developing countries in return for credit for the reductions. Ostensibly, the objective of this mechanism is to curtail emissions in developing countries without unduly penalizing them for their economic development. Under this model, the countries with more potential emissions credits could sell them to other signatories of the Kyoto Protocol, whose emissions are forecast to significantly rise in the next few years. Should this trading of emissions credits take place, it is estimated that the Kyoto Protocol's emissions targets could still be met.

In 1999, the International Energy Outlook projected that Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Newly Independent States, as well as parts of Asia, are all expected to show a marked decrease in their level of energy-related carbon emissions in 2010. Nations with the highest emissions, specifically, the U.S., the EU and Japan, are anticipated to reduce their emissions by up to 8 percent by 2012. By 2000, however, the emissions targets were not on schedule for achievement. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Energy estimates forecast that by 2010, there will be a 34 percent increase in carbon emissions from the 1990 levels, in the absence of major shifts in policy, economic growth, energy prices, and consumer trends. Despite this assessment in the U.S., international support for the Kyoto Protocol remained strong, especially among European countries

Iraq Review 2016 Page 573 of 609 pages Iraq and island states, who view the pact as one step in the direction away from reliance on fossil fuels and other sources of greenhouse gases.

In 2001, U.S. President, George W. Bush, rejected his country's participation in the Kyoto Protocol, saying that the costs imposed on the global economic system, and especially, on the US, overshadowed the benefits of the Protocol. He also cited the unfair burden on developed nations to reduce emissions, as another primary reasons for withdrawal from the international pact, as well as insufficient evidence regarding the science of global warming. Faced with impassioned international disapproval for his position, the U.S. president stated that his administration remained interested in dealing with the matter of global warming, but would endorse alternative measures to combat the problem, such as voluntary initiatives limiting emissions. Critics of Bush's position, however, have noted that it was the failure of voluntary initiatives to reduce emissions following the Rio Summit that led to the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol in the first place.

In the wake of the Bush administration's decision, many participant countries resigned themselves to the reality that the goals of the Kyoto Protocol might not be achieved without U.S. involvement. Nevertheless, in Bonn, Germany, in July 2001, the remaining participant countries struck a political compromise on some of the key issues and sticking points, and planned to move forward with the Protocol, irrespective of the absence of the U.S. The key compromise points included the provision for countries to offset their targets with carbon sinks (these are areas of forest and farmland which can absorb carbon through the process of photosynthesis). Another compromise point within the broader Bonn Agreement was the reduction of emissions cuts of six gases from over 5 percent to a more achievable 2 percent. A third key change was the provision of funding for less wealthy countries to adopt more progressive technologies.

In late October and early November 2001, the UNFCC's 7th Conference of the Parties met in Marrakesh, Morocco, to finalize the measures needed to make the Kyoto Protocol operational. Although the UNFCC projected that ratification of the Protocol would make it legally binding within a year, many critics noted that the process had fallen short of implementing significant changes in policy that would be necessary to actually stop or even slow climate change. They also maintained that the absence of U.S. participation effectively rendered the Protocol into being a political exercise without any substance, either in terms of transnational policy or in terms of environmental concerns.

The adoption of the compromises ensconced within the Bonn Agreement had been intended to make the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol more palatable to the U.S. In this regard, it failed to achieve its objective as the Bush administration continued to eschew participation in the international accord. Still, however, the Bonn Agreement did manage to render a number of other positive outcomes. Specifically, in 2002, key countries, such as Russia, Japan and Canada agreed to ratify the protocol, bringing the number of signatories to 178. The decision by key countries to

Iraq Review 2016 Page 574 of 609 pages Iraq ratify the protocol was regarded as "the kiss of life" by observers.

By 2005, on the eve of a climate change conference in London, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was hoping to deal with the problems of climate change beyond the provisions set forth in the Kyoto Protocol. Acknowledging that the Kyoto Protocol could not work in its current form, Blair wanted to open the discussion for a new climate change plan.

Blair said that although most of the world had signed on to Kyoto, the protocol could not meet any of its practical goals of cutting greenhouse gas emissions without the participation of the United States, the world's largest polluter. He also noted that any new agreement would have to include India and China -- significant producers of greenhouse gas emissions, but exempt from Kyoto because they have been classified as developing countries. Still, he said that progress on dealing with climate change had been stymied by "a reluctance to face up to reality and the practical action needed to tackle problem."

Blair also touted the "huge opportunities" in technology and pointed toward the possibilities offered by wind, solar and nuclear power, along with fuel cell technology, eco-friendly biofuels, and carbon capture and storage which could generate low carbon power. Blair also asserted that his government was committed to achieving its domestic goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20 percent by 2010.

In the United States, President George W. Bush has said that global warming remained a debatable issue and despite conclusions reached by his own Environmental Protection Agency, he has not agreed with the conclusion that global warming and climate change are linked with human activities. Bush has also refused to ratify Kyoto on the basis of its economic costs.

Australia, an ally of the United States, has taken a similarly dim view of the Kyoto Protocol. Ahead of the November 2005 climate change meeting in Canada in which new goals for the protocol were to be discussed, Australia 's Environment Minister, Ian Campbell, said that negotiating new greenhouse gas emission levels for the Kyoto Protocol would be a waste of time. Campbell said, "There is a consensus that the caps, targets and timetables approach is flawed. If we spend the next five years arguing about that, we'll be fiddling and negotiating while Rome burns." Campbell, like the Bush administration, has also advocated a system of voluntary action in which industry takes up new technologies rather than as a result of compelling the reduction of emissions. But the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) has called on its government to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, to establish a system of emissions trading, and to set binding limits on emissions. Interestingly, although it did not sign on to Kyoto , Australia was expected to meet its emissions target by 2012 (an 8 percent increase in 1990 levels in keeping with the country's reliance on coal). But this success has nothing to do with new technologies and is due to state- based regulations on land clearing.

Note: The Kyoto Protocol calls for developed nations to cut greenhouse emissions by 5.2 percent

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Special Entry: Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen (2009) --

In December 2009, the United Nations Climate Change Summit opened in the Danish capital of Copenhagen. The summit was scheduled to last from Dec. 7-18, 2009. Delegates from more than 190 countries were in attendance, and approximately 100 world leaders, including British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and United States President Barack Obama, were expected to participate. At issue was the matter of new reductions targets on greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.

Despite earlier fears that little concurrence would come from the conference, effectively pushing significant actions forward to a 2010 conference in Mexico City, negotiators were now reporting that the talks were productive and several key countries, such as South Africa, had pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The two main issues that could still lead to cleavages were questions of agreement between the industrialized countries and the developing countries of the world, as well as the overall effectiveness of proposals in seriously addressing the perils of climate change.

On Dec. 9, 2009, four countries -- the United Kingdom, Australia, Mexico and Norway -- presented a document outlining ideas for raising and managing billions of dollars, which would be intended to help vulnerable countries dealing with the perils of climate change. Described as a "green fund," the concept could potentially help small island states at risk because of the rise in sea level. Bangladesh identified itself as a potential recipient of an assistance fund, noting that as a country plagued by devastating floods, it was particularly hard-hit by climate change. The "green fund" would fall under the rubric of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, for which developed countries have been committed to quantifying their emission reduction targets, and also to providing financial and technical support to developing countries.

The United Kingdom, Australia, Mexico and Norway also called for the creation of a new legal treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol. This new treaty, which could go into force in 2012, would focus largely on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. But Australia went even further in saying that the successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol, should be one with provisions covering all countries. Such a move would be a departure from the structure of the Kyoto Protocol, which contained emissions targets for industrialized countries due to the prevailing view that developed countries had a particular historic responsibility to be accountable for climate change. More recently, it has become apparent that substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions demanded by scientists would only come to pass with the participation also of significant developing nation states, such as China and India. Indeed, one of the most pressing critiques of the Kyoto Protocol was that it was a "paper tiger" that failed to address the impact of the actions of emerging economies like China and India, with its focus on the developed economies.

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Now, in 2009, China -- as the world's biggest greenhouse gas emitter -- was responding this dubious distinction by vocalizing its criticism of the current scenario and foregrounding its new commitments. Ahead of the Copenhagen summit, China had announced it would reduce the intensity of its carbon emissions per unit of its GDP in 2020 by 40 to 45 percent against 2005 levels. With that new commitment at hand, China was now accusing the United States and the European Union of shirking their own responsibilities by setting weak targets for greenhouse gas emissions cuts. Senior Chinese negotiator, Su Wei, characterized the goals of the world's second largest greenhouse gas emitter -- the United States -- as "not notable," and the European Union's target as "not enough." Su Wei also took issue with Japan for setting implausible preconditions.

On Dec. 11, 2009, China demanded that developed and wealthy countries in Copenhagen should help deliver a real agreement on climate change by delivering on their promises to reduce carbon emissions and provide financial support for developing countries to adapt to global warming. In so doing, China's Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei said his country was hoping that a "balanced outcome" would emerge from the discussions at the summit. Echoing the position of the Australian government, He Yafei spoke of a draft agreement as follows: "The final document we're going to adopt needs to be taking into account the needs and aspirations of all countries, particularly the most vulnerable ones."

China's Vice Foreign Minister emphasized the fact that climate change was "a matter of survival" for developing countries, and accordingly, such countries need wealthier and more developed countries to accentuate not only their pledges of emissions reduction targets, but also their financial commitments under the aforementioned United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. To that end, scientists and leaders of small island states in the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, have highlighted the existential threat posed by global warming and the concomitant rise in sea level.

China aside, attention was also on India -- another major player in the developing world and a country with an industrializing economy that was impacting the environment. At issue was the Indian government's decision to set a carbon intensity target, which would slow emissions growth by up to 25 percent by the 2020 deadline. This strong position was resisted by some elements in India, who argued that their country should not be taking such a strong position when developed wealthy countries were yet to show accountability for their previous commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The matter grew so heated that the members of the opposition stormed out of the parliament in protest as Indian Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh defended the policy. But the political pressure at home in India was leaving the Indian delegation in Copenhagen in a state of chaos as well. In fact, India's top environmental negotiator refused to travel to Copenhagen in protest of the government's newly-announced stance.

China and India were joined by Brazil and South Africa in the crafting of a draft document calling for a new global climate treaty to be completed by June 2010. Of concern has been the realization

Iraq Review 2016 Page 577 of 609 pages Iraq that there was insufficient time to find concurrence on a full legal treaty, which would leave countries only with a politically-binding text by the time the summit at Copenhagen closed. But Guyana's leader, President Bharrat Jagdeo, warned that the summit in Denmark would be classified as a failure unless a binding document was agreed upon instead of just political consensus. He urged his cohorts to act with purpose saying, "Never before have science, economics, geo-strategic self-interest and politics intersected in such a way on an issue that impacts everyone on the planet."

Likewise, Tuvalu demanded that legally binding agreements emerge from Copenhagen. Its proposal was supported by many of the vulnerable countries, from small island states and sub- Saharan Africa, all of whom warned of the catastrophic impact of climate change on their citizens. Tuvalu also called for more aggressive action, such as an amendment to the 1992 agreement, which would focus on sharp greenhouse gas emissions and the accepted rise in temperatures, due to the impact the rise in seas. The delegation from Kiribati joined the call by drawing attention to the fact that one village had to be abandoned due to waist-high water, and more such effects were likely to follow. Kiribati's Foreign Secretary, Tessie Lambourne, warned that the people of Kiribati could well be faced with no homeland in the future saying, "Nobody in this room would want to leave their homeland." But despite such impassioned pleas and irrespective of warnings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that the rise in sea level from melting polar ice caps would deleteriously affect low-lying atolls such as such as Tuvalu and Kiribati in the Pacific, and the Maldives in the Indian Ocean, the oil-giant Saudi Arabia was able to block this move.

Meanwhile, within the developed countries, yet another power struggle was brewing. The European Union warned it would only agree to raise its target of 20 percent greenhouse gas emissions reductions to 30 percent if the United States demonstrated that it would do more to reduce its own emissions. It was unknown if such pressure would yield results. United States President Barack Obama offered a "provisional" 2020 target of 17 percent reductions, noting that he could not offer greater concessions at Copenhagen due to resistance within the United States Congress, which was already trying to pass a highly controversial "cap and trade" emissions legislation. However, should that emissions trading bill fail in the Senate, the United States Environment Protection Agency's declaration that greenhouse gases pose a danger to human health and the environment was expected to facilitate further regulations and limits on power plants and factories at the national level. These moves could potentially strengthen the Obama administration's offering at Copenhagen. As well, President Obama also signaled that he would be willing to consider the inclusion of international forestry credits.

Such moves indicated willingness by the Obama administration to play a more constructive role on the international environmental scene than its predecessor, the Bush administration. Indeed, ahead of his arrival at the Copenhagen summit, President Barack Obama's top environmental advisors promised to work on a substantial climate change agreement. To that end, United States

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Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lisa Jackson said at a press conference, "We are seeking robust engagement with all of our partners around the world." But would this pro- engagement assertion yield actual results?

By Dec. 12, 2009, details related to a draft document prepared by Michael Zammit Cutajar, the head of the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action, were released at the Copenhagen climate conference. Included in the document were calls for countries to make major reductions in carbon emissions over the course of the next decade. According to the Washington Post, industrialized countries were called on to make cuts of between 25 percent and 40 percent below 1990 levels -- reductions that were far more draconian than the United States was likely to accept. As discussed above, President Obama had offered a provisional reduction target of 17 percent. The wide gap between the released draft and the United States' actual stated position suggested there was much more negotiating in the offing if a binding agreement could be forged, despite the Obama administration's claims that it was seeking greater engagement on this issue.

In other developments, the aforementioned call for financial support of developing countries to deal with the perils of climate change was partly answered by the European Union on Dec. 11, 2009. The European bloc pledged an amount of 2.4 billion euros (US$3.5 billion) annually from 2010 to 2012. Environment Minister Andreas Carlgren of Sweden -- the country that holds the rotating presidency of the European Union at the time of the summit -- put his weight behind the notion of a "legally binding deal." Meanwhile, Yvo de Boer, a top United Nations climate change official, focused less on the essence of the agreement and more on tangible action and effects saying, "Copenhagen will only be a success if it delivers significant and immediate action that begins the day the conference ends."

The division between developed and developing countries in Copenhagen reached new heights on Dec. 14, 2009, when some of the poor and less developed countries launched a boycott at the summit. The move, which was spurred by African countries but backed by China and India, appeared to be geared toward redirecting attention and primary responsibility to the wealthier and more industrialized countries. The impasse was resolved after the wealthier and more industrialized countries offered assurances that they did not intend on shirking from their commitments to reducing greenhouse gases. As a result, the participating countries ceased the boycott.

Outside the actual summit, thousands of protestors had gathered to demand crucial global warming, leading to clashes between police and demonstrators elsewhere in the Danish capital city. There were reports of scattered violence across Copenhagen and more than 1,000 people were arrested.

Nevertheless, by the second week of the climate change summit, hopes of forging a strong deal were eroding as developed and developing nations remained deadlocked on sharing cuts in greenhouse gases, and particularly on the matters of financing and temperature goals. In a bid to

Iraq Review 2016 Page 579 of 609 pages Iraq shore up support for a new climate change, United States President Barack Obama joined other world leaders in Copenhagen. On Dec. 14, 2009, there was a standoff brewing between the United States and China. At issue was China's refusal to accept international monitoring of its expressed targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The United States argued that China's opposition to verification could be a deal-breaker.

By the close of the summit, the difficult process eventually resulted in some consensus being cultivated. A draft text called for $100 billion a year by 2020 to assist poor nations cope with climate change, while aiming to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius compared with pre- industrial levels. The deal also included specific targets for developed countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and called for reductions by developing countries as a share of their economies. Also included in the agreement was a mechanism to verify compliance. The details of the agreement were supported by President Barack Obama, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.

This draft would stand as an interim agreement, with a legally-binding international pact unlikely to materialize until 2010. In this way, the summit in Copenhagen failed to achieve its central objective, which was to negotiate a successor to the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions.

Editor's Note

In the background of these developments was the growing global consciousness related to global warming and climate change. Indeed, as the Copenhagen summit was ongoing, it was clear there was enormous concurrence on the significance of the stakes with an editorial on the matter of climate change being published in 56 newspapers in 45 countries. That editorial warned that without global action, climate change would "ravage our planet." Meanwhile, a global survey taken by Globescan showed that concern over global warming had exponentially increased from 1998 -- when only 20 percent of respondents believed it to be a serious problem -- to 64 percent in 2009. Such survey data, however, was generated ahead of the accusations by climate change skeptics that some climate scientists may have overstated the case for global warming, based on emails derived in an illicit manner from a British University.

Special Entry: Climate change talks in Doha in Qatar extend life of Kyoto Protocol (2012)

December 2012 saw climate talks ensue in the Qatari city of Doha as representatives from countries across the world gathered to discuss the fate of the Kyoto Protocol, which seeks to minimize greenhouse gas emissions. The summit yielded results with decisions made (1) to extend the Kyoto Protocol until 2020, and (2) for wealthier countries to compensate poorer countries for the losses and damage incurred as a result of climate change.

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In regards to the second matter, Malia Talakai of Nauru, a leading negotiator for the Alliance of Small Island States, explained the necessity of the compensation package as follows: “We are trying to say that if you pollute you must help us.”

This measure was being dubbed the "Loss and Damage" mechanism, and was being linked with United States President Barack Obama's request for $60 billion from Congress to deal with the devastation caused by Hurricane Sandy months before. The sight of a hurricane bearing down on the northern Atlantic seaboard, along with the reality of the scope of reconstruction, appeared to have illustrated the economic costs of climate change -- not so much as a distant environmental issue -- but as a danger to the quotidian lives of people. Still, there was blame to be placed on the United States and European countries -- some of world's largest emitters -- for failing to do more to reduce emissions.

To that latter end, there was in fact little progress made on the central issue of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Had those emissions been reduced, there would have been less of a need to financially deal with the devastation caused by climate change. One interpretation was that the global community was accepting the fact that industrialization was contributing to global warming, which had deleterious effects on the polar ice caps and concomitantly on the rise of sea level, with devastating effects for small island nations. Thus, wealthier countries were willing to pay around $10 billion a year through 2020, effectively in "damages," to the poor countries that could be viewed as the "collateral damage" of industrial progress. But damages today could potentially be destruction tomorrow, leaving in place the existential challenges and burdens to be born by some of the world's smallest and least wealthy island countries.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the representative for the small island nation states at the Doha summit responded with ire, characterizing the lack of progress on reducing emissions as follows: "We see the package before us as deeply deficient in mitigation (carbon cuts) and finance. It's likely to lock us on the trajectory to a 3,4,5C rise in global temperatures, even though we agreed to keep the global average temperature rise of 1.5C to ensure survival of all islands. There is no new finance (for adapting to climate change and getting clean energy) -- only promises that something might materialize in the future. Those who are obstructive need to talk not about how their people will live, but whether our people will live."

Indeed, in most small island countries not just in the Pacific, but also the Caribbean and Indian Ocean, ecological concerns and the climate crisis have been dominant themes with dire life and death consequences looming in the background for their people. Small island nations in these region are already at risk from the rise of sea-level, tropical cyclones, floods. But their very livelihoods of fishing and subsistence farming were also at risk as a result of ecological and environmental changes. Increasingly high storm surges can wipe out entire villages and contaminate water supplies. Accordingly, the very existence of island nations, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, are at severe risk of being obliterated from the map. Yet even with the existential threat of being wiped

Iraq Review 2016 Page 581 of 609 pages Iraq off the map in the offing, the international community has been either slow or restrictive in its efforts to deal with global warming, climate change, economic and ecological damage, as well as the emerging global challenge of environmental refugees.

A 2012 report from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the Pacific Regional Environment Program underlined the concerns of small island nations and their people as it concluded that the livelihoods of approximately 10 million people in Pacific island communities were increasingly vulnerable to climate change. In fact, low-lying islands in that region would likely confront losses of up to 18 percent of gross domestic product due to climate change, according to the report. The report covers 21 countries and territories, including Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa and Tonga, and recommended environmental legislation intended to deal with the climate crisis facing the small island countries particularly. As noted by David Sheppard, the director general of the Pacific Regional Environment Program that co-sponsored this study: “The findings... emphasize the need more than ever to raise the bar through collective actions that address the region's environmental needs at all levels."

Regardless of the failures of the summit in Qatar (discussed above), the meeting did facilitate a process starting in 2015, which would bind both wealthy and poor countries together in the mission of forging a new binding treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol and tackle the central causes of climate change.

For more information on the threats faced in small island nations by climate change and the measures being undertaken to lobby for international action, please see the Alliance for Small Island States available online at the URL: http://aosis.org/

Special Report

COP 21 summit in Paris ends with historic agreement to tackle climate change; rare international consensus formed on environmental crisis facing the planet (2015) --

In mid-December 2015, the highly-anticipated United Nations climate conference of parties (COP) in Paris, France, ended with a historic agreement. In fact, it would very likely be understood as the most significant international agreement signed by all the recognized countries of the world since the Cold War. Accordingly, the Paris Agreement was being distinguished as the first multilateral pact that would compel all countries across the world to cut its carbon emissions -- one of the major causes of increasing greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to global warming, and its deleterious effects ranging from the dangerous rise in sea level to catastrophic climate change.

The accord, which was dubbed to be the "Paris Agreement," was the work of rigorous diplomacy

Iraq Review 2016 Page 582 of 609 pages Iraq and fervent environmental advocacy, and it aimed to address the climate change crisis facing the planet. As many as 195 countries were represented in the negotiations that led to the landmark climate deal. Indeed, it was only after weeks of passionate debate that international concurrence was reached in addressing the environmental challenges confronting the world, with particular attention to moving beyond fossil fuels and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

The success of the COP 21 summit in Paris and the emergence of the landmark Paris Agreement was, to some extent, attributed to the efforts of France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius who presided over the negotiations. The French foreign minister's experience and credentials as a seasoned diplomat and respected statesman paid dividends. He skillfully guided the delegates from almost 200 countries and interest groups along the negotiations process, with ostensibly productive results and a reasonably robust deal to show for it.

On Dec. 12, 2015, French Foreign Minister Fabius officially adopted the agreement, declaring: "I now invite the COP to adopt the decision entitled Paris Agreement outlined in the document. Looking out to the room I see that the reaction is positive, I see no objections. The Paris agreement is adopted." Once Foreign Minister Fabius' gavel was struck, symbolically inaugurating the Paris Agreement into force, the COP delegate rushed to their feet with loud and bouyant cheers as well as thunderous applause.

In general, the Paris Agreement was being hailed as a victory for enviromental activists and a triumph for international diplomats, while at the same time being understood as simply an initial -- and imperfect -- move in the direction of a sustainable future. China's chief negotiator, Xie Zhenhua, issued this message, saying that while the accord was not ideal, it should "not prevent us from marching historical steps forward."

United States President Barack Obama lauded the deal as both "ambitious" and "historic," and the work of strenuous multilateral negotiations as he declared, "Together, we've shown what's possible when the world stands as one." The United States leader acknowledged that the accord was not "perfect," but he reminded the critics that it was "the best chance to save the one planet we have. "

Former United States Vice President Al Gore, one of the world's most well known environmental advocates, issued a lengthy statement on the accompishments ensconced in the Paris Agreement. He highlighted the fact that the Paris Agreement was a first step towards a future with a reduced carbon footprint on Planet Earth as he said, "The components of this agreement -- including a strong review mechanism to enhance existing commitments and a long-term goal to eliminate global-warming pollution this century -- are essential to unlocking the necessary investments in our future. No agreement is perfect, and this one must be strengthened over time, but groups across every sector of society will now begin to reduce dangerous carbon pollution through the framework of this agreement."

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The central provisions of the Paris Agreement included the following items:

- Greenhouse gas emissions should peak as quickly as possible, with a move towards balancing energy sources, and ultimately the decrease of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century - Global temperature increase would be limited to 1.5 degrees Centigrade above pre-industrial levels and would be held "well below" the two degrees Centigrade threshold - Progress on these goals would be reviewed every five years beginning in 2020 with new greenhouse gas reduction targets issued every five years - $100 billion would be expended each year in climate finance for developing countries to move forward with green technologies, with further climate financing to be advanced in the years beyond

It should be noted that there both legally binding and voluntary elements contained within the Paris Agreement. Specifically, the submission of an emissions reduction target and the regular review of that goal would be legally mandatory for all countries. Stated differently, there would be a system in place by which experts would be able to track the carbon-cutting progress of each country. At the same time, the specific targets to be set by countries would be determined at the discretion of the countries, and would not be binding. While there was some criticism over this non-binding element, the fact of the matter was that the imposition of emissions targets was believed to be a major factor in the failure of climate change talks in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2009.

In 2015, the talks faced challenges as several countries, such as China and India, objected to conditions that would stymie economic and development. In order to avoid that kind of landmine, a system Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) was developed and formed the basis of the accord. As such, the Paris Agreement would, in fact, facilitate economic growth and development, as well as technological progress, but with the goal of long-term ecological sustainability based on low carbon sources. In fact, the agreement heralded as "the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era." As noted by Nick Mabey, the head of the climate diplomacy organization E3G, said, "Paris means governments will go further and faster to tackle climate change than ever before. The transition to a low carbon economy is now unstoppable, ensuring the end of the fossil fuel age."

A particular sticking point in the agreement was the $100 billion earmarked for climate financing for developing countries to transition from traditional fossil fuels to green energy technologies and a low carbon future. In 2014, a report by the International Energy Agency indicated that the cost of that transition would actually be around $44 trillion by the mid-century -- an amount that would render the $100 billion being promised to be a drop in the proverbial bucket. However, the general expectation was that the Republican-controlled Senate in the United States, which would have to ratify the deal in that country, was not interested in contributing significant funds for the cause of climate change.

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A key strength of the Paris Agreement was the ubiquitous application of measures to all countries. Of note was the frequently utilized concept of "flexibility" with regard to the Paris Agreement. Specifically, the varying capacities of the various countries in meeting their obligations would be anticipated and accorded flexibility. This aspect presented something of a departure from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which drew a sharp distinction between developed and developing countries, and mandated a different set of obligations for those categories of countries. Thus, under Kyoto, China and India were not held to the same standards as the United States and European countries. In the Paris Agreement, there would be commitments from all countries across the globe.

Another notable strength of the Paris Agreement was the fact that the countries of the world were finally able to reach consensus on the vital necessity to limit global temperature increases to 1.5 degrees Centrigrade. Ahead of the global consensus on the deal, and as controversy continued to surface over the targeted global temperature limits, the leaders of island countries were sounding the alarm about the melting of the Polar ice caps and the associated rise in seal level. Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga of Tuvalu issued this dismal reminder: “Tuvalu’s future … is already bleak and any further temperature increase will spell the total demise of Tuvalu. No leader in this room carries such a level of worry and responsibility. Just imagine you are in my shoes, what would you do?” It was thus something of a victory for environmental advocates that the countries of the world could find cnsensus on the lower number -- 1.5 degrees rather than 2 degrees.

A significant weak point with regard to the Paris deal was a "loss and damage" provision, which anticipates that even with all the new undertakings intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and move to a low carbon future, there would nonetheless be unavoidable climate change consequences. Those consequences ranged from the loss of arable land for farmers as well as soil erosion and contamination of potable water by sea water, to the decimation of territory in coastal zones and on small islands, due to the rise in sea level, with entire small island countries being rendered entirely uninhabitable. The reality was that peoples' homes across the world would be destroyed along with their way of life.

With that latter catastrophic effect being a clear and present danger for small island countries, the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) demanded that the developed world acknowledge its responsibility for this irreversible damage.. Despite the fact that greenhouse gas emissions and the ensuing plague of global warming was, indeed, the consequence of development in the West (the United States and Europe) and the large power house countries, such as Russia, China and India, there was no appetite by those countries to sign on to unlimited liability. Under the Paris Agreement, there was a call for research on insurance mechanisms that would address loss and damage issues, with recommendations to come in the future.

The call for research was being regarded as an evasion of sorts and constituted the weakest aspect of the Paris Agreement. Not surprisingly, a coalition of small island nations demanded a "Marshall

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Plan" for the Pacific. Borrowing the term "Marshall Plan" from the post-World War II reconstruction effort, the coalition of Pacific island nation, which included Kiribati, Tuvalu, Fiji, and the Marshall Islands, called for an initiative that would include investment in renewable energy and shoreline protection, cultural preservation, economic assistance for economies in transition, and a plan for migration and resettlement for these countries as they confront the catastrophic effects of the melting of the Polar ice caps and the concomitant rise in sea level. The precise contours of the initiative remained unknown, unspecified, and a mere exercise in theory at the time of writing. Yet such an initiative would, at some point, have to be addressed, given the realities of climate change and the slow motion calamity unfolding each day for low-lying island nations across the world.

As noted by Vice President Greg Stone of Conservation International, who also functions as an adviser to the government of Kiribati, “Imagine living in a place where you know it’s going to go away someday, but you don’t know what day that wave’s going to come over and wash your home away." He added, “It’s a disaster we know is going to happen.” Meanwhile, the intervening years promised to be filled with hardship for small island nations, such as Kiribati. Stone explained, “For every inch of sea-level rise, these islands lose 10 feet of their freshwater table to saltwater intrusion,” Stone explained. “So it’s not just about the day the water finally goes over the island; it’s also about the day that there’s just not enough water left and everyone has to move off the island.” Presaging the future for island nations that could face submersion, Stone said, “If you look ahead 50 years, a country like Kiribati could become the first aqueous nation. possibility of migration. That is, they own this big patch of ocean, and they administer it from elsewhere.”

Foreign Minister Minister Tony Debrum of the Marshall Islands emerged as the champion advocating on behalf of small island nation states and a loose coalition of concerned countries from the Pacific to the Caribbean, but with support from the United States. He addressed the comprehensive concerns of small island nations regarding the weaknesses of the deal, while simultaneously making clear that the Paris Agreement signified hope for the countries most at risk. In a formal statement, Debrum declared: "We have made history today. Emissions targets are still way off track, but this agreement has the tools to ramp up ambition, and brings a spirit of hope that we can rise to this challenge. I can go back home to my people and say we now have a pathway to survival.” Debrum highlighted the imperatives of Pacific island nations, saying, “Our High Ambition Coalition was the lightning rod we needed to lift our sights and expectations for a strong agreement here in Paris. We were joined by countries representing more than half the world. We said loud and clear that a bare-bones, minimalist agreement would not fly. We instead demanded an agreement to mark a turning point in history, and the beginning of our journey to the post-carbon era.”

Debrum of the Marshall Islands espoused the quintessential synopsis of the accord and its effects for those most likely to be affected by climate change as he noted, “Climate change won’t stop

Iraq Review 2016 Page 586 of 609 pages Iraq overnight, and my country is not out of the firing line just yet, but today we all feel a little safer.”

Editor's Entry on Environmental Policy:

The low-lying Pacific island nations of the world, including Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Fiji, among others, are vulnerable to the threats posed by global warming and cimate change, derived from carbon emissions, and resulting in the rise in sea level. Other island nations in the Caribbean, as well as poor countries with coastal zones, were also at particular risk of suffering the deleterious effects of climate change.

Political policy in these countries are often connected to ecological issues, which have over time morphed into an existential crisis of sorts. Indeed, ecological concerns and the climate crisis have also been dominant themes with life and death consequences for the people of island nations in the Pacific. Indeed, the very livelihoods of fishing and subsistence farming remain at risk as a result of ecological and environmental changes. Yet even so, these countries are threatened by increasingly high storm surges, which could wipe out entire villages and contaminate water supplies. Moreover, because these are low lying island nations, the sustained rise in sea level can potentially lead to the terrain of these countries being unihabitable at best, and submerged at worst. Stated in plain terms, these countries are at severe risk of being obliterated from the map and their plight illuminates the emerging global challenge of environmental refugees. In these manifold senses, climate change is the existential crisis of the contemporary era.

Since the time of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, there have been efforts aimed at extending the life of that agreement, with an eye on minimizing greenhouse gas emissions, and thus minimizing the effects of climate change. Those endeavors have largely ended in failure, as exemplified by the unsuccessful Copenhagen talks in 2009 and the fruitless Doha talks in 2012 respectively. The success of the COP 21 talks in France, with the adoption of the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, was regarded as the first glimmer of hope. Not only did the Paris Agreement signify the triumph of international diplomacy and global consensus, but it also marked the start of the end of the fossil fuel era, with the path forward toward a low carbon future reliant on greener technologies. Most crucially, the Paris Agreement stood as the first significant response in recent times to the central challenge of climate change and its quotidian effects on the lives of real human beings across the world.

1. Major International Environmental Accords:

General Environmental Concerns

Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 1991.

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Accords Regarding Atmosphere

Annex 16, vol. II (Environmental Protection: Aircraft Engine Emissions) to the 1044 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Montreal, 1981

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), Geneva, 1079

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), New York, 1002

Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 1985 including the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Depleted the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 1987

Accords Regarding Hazardous Substances

Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movements and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Bamako, 1991

Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, 1989

Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention), Basel, 1989

Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 1992

Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacific Region (Waigani Convention), Waigani, 1995

European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), Geneva 1957

FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, Rome, 1985

2. Major International Marine Accords:

Global Conventions

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Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention 1972), London, 1972

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by Protocol of 1978 relation thereto (MARPOL 73/78), London, 1973 and 1978

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (1969 CLC), Brussels, 1969, 1976, and 1984

International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 (1971 Fund Convention), Brussels, 1971

Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), London 1996

International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Co-operation (OPRC), London, 1990

International Convention Relation to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (Intervention Convention), Brussels, 1969

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Montego Bay, 1982

Regional Conventions

Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo Convention), Oslo, 1972

Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources (Paris Convention), Paris, 1974

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention), Paris, 1992

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1974 Helsinki Convention), Helsinki 1974

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1992 Helsinki Convention), Helsinki 1992

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Conventions within the UNEP Regional Seas Programme

Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, Bucharest, 1992

Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, Cartagena de , 1983

Convention for the Protection, Management, and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region, Nairobi, 1985

Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, Kuwait, 1978

Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment and Coastal Region of the Mediterranean Sea (Barcelona Convention), Barcelona, 1976

Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, Jeddah, 1982

Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, Noumea, 1986

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific, Lima, 1981

Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region, Abidjan, 1981

3. Major Conventions Regarding Living Resources:

Marine Living Resources

Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), Canberra, 1980

International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), Rio de Janeiro, 1966

International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), Washington, 1946

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Nature Conservation and Terrestrial Living Resources

Antarctic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 1959

Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention), Paris, 1972

Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Nairobi, 1992

Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), Bonn, 1979

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Washington, D.C., 1973

Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention), Ramsar, 1971

Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD), Paris 1994

FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Rome, 1983

International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994 (ITTA, 1994), Geneva, 1994

Freshwater Resources

Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Helsinki, 1992

4. Major Conventions Regarding Nuclear Safety:

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention), Vienna, 1986

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Notification Convention), Vienna, 1986

Convention on Nuclear Safety, Vienna, 1994

Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1963

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5. Major Intergovernmental Organizations

Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)

European Union (EU): Environment

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

Global Environment Facility (GEF)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

International Labour Organization (ILO)

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds)

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Environment Policy Committee (EPOC)

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

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World Bank

World Food Programme (WFP)

World Health Organization (WHO)

World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

World Trade Organization (WTO)

6. Major Non-Governmental Organizations

Atmosphere Action Network East Asia (AANEA)

Climate Action Network (CAN)

Consumers International (CI)

Earth Council

Earthwatch Institute

Environmental Liaison Centre International (ELCI)

European Environmental Bureau (EEB)

Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)

Friends of the Earth International (FoEI)

Greenpeace International

International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)

International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)

International Solar Energy Society (ISES)

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IUCN-The World Conservation Union

Pesticide Action Network (PAN)

Sierra Club

Society for International Development (SID)

Third World Network (TWN)

Water Environment Federation (WEF)

Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO)

World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)

World Federalist Movement (WFM)

World Resources Institute (WRI)

World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF)

7. Other Networking Instruments

Arab Network for Environment and Development (RAED)

Global Legislators for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE)

Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC)

United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UN-NGLS)

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Appendices

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Bibliography

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sources: Key Data

Altapedia. URL: http://www.atlapedia.com/online/country_index.htm

Ethnologue. URL: http://www.ethnologue.com

Geobase Global Statistics. URL: http://www.geoba.se

Infoplease: URL: http://www.infoplease.com

The Statesman's Year Book 2006. Barry Turner, ed. London: St. Martin's Press.

United States Department of State, Background Notes. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.htm

United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html

World Bank. URL: http://www.worldbank.org/

World Climate Data Online. URL: http://www.worldclimate.com

Methodology Note for Demographic Data:

The demographic numbers for cities and national populations listed in CountryWatch content are derived from the Geoba.se website, which analyzes data from the World Bank. The current demographic numbers displayed on the Countrywatch website are reflective of the latest available estimates.

The demographic information for language, ethnicity and religion listed in CountryWatch content is

Iraq Review 2016 Page 597 of 609 pages Iraq derived from a mix of sources including the Altapedia, Central Intelligence Agency Factbook, Infoplease, and State Department Background Notes.

Sources: Political Overview

Agence France Presse. URL: http://www.afp.com/en/

BBC International News. URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)

Britannica Book of the Year. 1998-present. David Calhoun, ed. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.

Britannica Online URL :http://www.eb.com

Britannica Year in Review. URL: http://www.britannica.com/browse/year

Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/index.html

Christian Science Monitor. URL: http://www.csmonitor.com/ (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)

CNN International News. URL:http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/ (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)

Current Leaders of Nations. 1997. Jennifer Mossman, ed. Detroit: Gale Research

The Economist Magazine. (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)

The Economist Country Briefings. URL: http://www.economist.com/countries/

Eldis Country Profiles. URL: http://www.eldis.org/country/index.htm

Elections Around the World. URL: http://www.electionworld.org/

Election Resources. URL: http://electionresources.org/

Europa World Yearbook 1999. Vols. I & II. 1999. London: Europa Publications Ltd.

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Europe World Online. URL: http://www.europaworld.com/pub/

Financial Times. URL: http://www.financialtimes.com

Foreign Government Resources. URL: http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/foreign.html

Human Rights Watch. URL: http://www.hrw.org

IFES Election Guide. URL: http://www.electionguide.org

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. URL: http://www.idea.int/

International Who's Who 1997-1998, 61st Edition. 1997. London: Europa Publications Ltd.

Leadership Views, Chiefs of State Online. URL : http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/index.html

Library of Congress Country Studies. URL: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html

New Encyclopedia Britannica. 1998. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.

New York Times. URL: http://www.nytimes.com (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)

Patterns of Global Terrorism. n.d. United States Department of State. Washington D.C.: United States Department of State Publications.

Political Handbook of the World. n.d. Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, ed. Binghamton, New York: CSA Publications.

Political Reference Almanac Online. URL: http://www.polisci.com/almanac/nations.htm

Reuters News. URL: http://www.reuters.com/

Rulers. URL: http://rulers.org/

The Guardian Online. URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/ (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)

The Statesman's Year-Book 2006. Barry Turner, ed. London: St. Martin's Press.

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United Nations Development Programme. URL: http://hdr.undp.org

United Nations Refugee Agency. URL: http://www.unhcr.org

United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook.Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html

United States Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) URL : http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_ac/reports_ac.html

United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. URL: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18245.htm

United States Department of State, Background Notes. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html

Virtual Library: International Relations Resources. URL: http://www.etown.edu/vl/countgen.html

World Bank: Governance Indicators. URL: http://info.worldbank.org/governance

-- See also list of News Wires services below, which are also used for research purposes. --

Note on Edition Dates:

The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original Country Reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.

Sources: Economic Overview

BP Statistical Review of World Energy. URL: http://www.bp.com/genericsection.do? categoryId=92&contentId=7005893

BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 1998. 1998 to present. Page 1.C. London: The British Petroleum Company.

International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.

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International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 1998 to present. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.

International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 1999 to present. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.

International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, May 1999. 1999 to present. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.

International Labour Office, World Employment Report, 1998-99. 1998 to present. Geneva: International Labour Office.

United Nations Statistical Division Online. URL: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm

United Nations Statistics Division, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (MBS On Line), November 1999 Edition. 1999 to present. New York: United Nations.

United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 43rd Issue. 1999. 1999 to present New York: United Nations.

United Nations, Food & Agricultural Organization, FAOSTAT Database. URL : http://apps.fao.org/ United Nations, Comtrade Data Base, http://comtrade.un.org/

United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL:http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html

United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Database

United States Geological Service, Mineral Information

United States Department of State, Country Commercial Guides. Washington, D.C. United States of America. URL:http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/index.html

The World Bank, Global Development Finance, Country Tables. 1999 to present. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators. 1999 to present. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, World Tourism Organization. 1998 to present. Madrid: The World Tourism Organization.

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Note on Edition Dates:

The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.

Methodology Notes for Economic Data:

Estimates by CountryWatch.com of GDP in dollars in most countries are made by converting local currency GDP data from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook to US dollars by market exchange rates estimated from the International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics and projected out by the CountryWatch Macroeconomic Forecast. Real GDP was estimated by deflating current dollar values by the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator.

Exceptions to this method were used for: • Bosnia-Herzegovina • Nauru • Cuba • Palau • Holy See • San Marino • Korea, North • Serbia & Montenegro • Liberia • Somalia • Liechtenstein • Tonga • Monaco • Tuvalu

In these cases, other data and/or estimates by CountryWatch.com were utilized.

Investment Overview

Corruption and Transparency Index. URL: http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html#cpi

Deloitte Tax Guides. URL: http://www.deloittetaxguides.com

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Trade Policy Reviews by the World Trade Organization . URL: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#bycountry

United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html

United States Department of State, Background Notes. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html

United States Department of State, Country Commercial Guides. 1996-2006. Washington, D.C. United States of America. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/index.html

World Bank: Doing Business. URL: http://www.doingbusiness.org

World Bank: Governance Indicators. URL: http://info.worldbank.org/governance

Social Overview

Borden, G.A., Conaway, W.A., Morrison, T. 1994. Kiss, Bow, or Shake Hands: How to do Business in Sixty Countries. Holbrook, Massachusetts, 1994.

Center for Disease Control. URL: http://www.cdc.gov

Eldis Country Profiles. URL: http://www.eldis.org/country/index.htm

Ethnologue. URL: http://www.ethnologue.com/

Government of Australia Department of Foreign Affiars and Trade. URL: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo

Government of Canada Foreign Affairs and International Trade. URL: http://www.voyage.gc.ca/consular_home-e.htm

Library of Congress Country Studies. URL: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html

Lonely Planet. URL: http://www.lonelyplanet.com/worldguide/

Steve Kropla's Online Help For World Travelers. URL: http://www.kropla.com/

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United Kingdom Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Office. URL: http://www.fco.gov.uk/

United Nations Human Development Report. URL: http://www.undp.org/hdro

UNICEF Statistical Database Online. URL: http://www.unicef.org/statis/atoz.html

United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. 2001. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html

United States Department of State, Background Notes. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html

United States Department of State, Commercial and Business Affairs: Travel Tips. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/cba_travel.html

United States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. URL: http://travel.state.gov/

World Health Organization. URL: http://www.who.int/home-page/

World News Connection, National Technical Information Service. Springfield, Virginia, USA.

Internet News Service, Xinhua News Agency (U.S.) Inc. Woodside, New York. URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/

Note on Edition Dates:

The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.

Methodology Notes for the HDI:

Since 1990, the United Nations Development Programme, in concert with organizations across the globe, has produced the Human Development Index (or HDI). According to the UNDP, the index measures average achievement in basic human development in one simple composite index, and produces from this index a ranking of countries. The HDI is a composite of three basic components of human development: longevity, knowledge and standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy. Knowledge is measured by combination of adult literacy and mean

Iraq Review 2016 Page 604 of 609 pages Iraq years of schooling. Standard of living is measured by purchasing power, based on real GDP per capita (in constant US$) adjusted for differences in international living costs (or, purchasing power parity, PPP). While the index uses these social indicators to measure national performance with regard to human welfare and development, not all countries provide the same level of information for each component needed to compute the index; therefore, as in any composite indicator, the final index is predicated on projections, predictions and weighting schemes. The index is a static measure, and thus, an incomplete measure of human welfare. In fact, the UNDP says itself the concept of human development focuses on the ends rather than the means of development and progress, examining in this manner, the average condition of all people in a given country.

Specifically, the index is calculated by determining the maximum and minimum for each of the three components (as listed above) and then measuring where each country stands in relation to these scales-expressed as a value between 0 and 1. For example, the minimum adult literary rate is zero percent, the maximum is 100 percent, and the reading skills component of knowledge in the HDI for a country where the literacy rate is 75 percent would be 0.75. The scores of all indicators are then averaged into the overall index.

For a more extensive examination of human development, as well as the ranking tables for each participating country, please visit: http://www.undp.org

Note on History sections

In some CountryWatch Country Reviews, open source content from the State Department Background Notes and Country Guides have been used.

Environmental Overview

Environmental Profiles: A Global Guide to Projects and People. 1993. Linda Sobel Katz, Sarah Orrick, and Robert Honig. New York: Garland Publishing.

The Environment Encyclopedia and Directory, 2nd Edition. 1998. London: Europa.

Environmental Protection Agency Global Warming Site. URL: http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming

Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations: Forestry. URL: http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/sofo/en/

Global Warming Information Page. URL: http://globalwarming.org

Introduction to Global Environmental Issues, 2nd Edition. 1997. Kevin Pickering and Lewis Owen.

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London: Routledge.

Trends: Compendium of Data on Global Change. URL: http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/trends/emis/em_cont.htm

United Nations Environmental Program. URL: http://www.unep.org/GEO/GEO_Products/Assessment_Reports/

United Nations Global Environmental Outlook. URL: http://www.unep.org/geo/geo4/media/

United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html

World Climate Data Online. URL: http://www.worldclimate.com

World Directory of Country Environmental Studies. 1996. The World Resource Institute.

World Factbook. US Central Intelligence Agency. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group.

1998-1999 World Resources Guide to the Global Environment by the World Resources Institute. May, 1998.

1998/1999 Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development. 1998. London: Earthscan Publications.

Note on Edition Dates:

The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.

Other Sources:

General information has also been used in the compilation of this review, with the courtesy of governmental agencies from this country.

News Services:

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CANA Daily Bulletin. Caribbean Media Agency Ltd., St. Michael, Barbados.

Central and Eastern Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa.

Daily News, Panafrican News Agency. Dakar, Senegal.

PACNEWS, Pacific Islands Broadcasting Association. Suva, Fiji.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Washington D.C. USA.

Reuters News. Thomson Reuters. New York, New York. USA.

Southern Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa.

Voice of America, English Service. Washington D.C.

West Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa. 1998-1999

Note: Some or all these news services have been used to research various sections of this Country Review.

USING COUNTRYWATCH.COM AS AN ELECTRONIC SOURCE:

MLA STYLE OF CITATION

Commentary

For items in a "Works Cited" list, CountryWatch.com suggests that users follow recommended patterns forindentation given in the MLA Handbook, 4th edition.

Individual Works

Basic form, using an Internet protocol:

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Author/editor. Title of Print Version of Work. Edition statement (if given). Publication information (Place of publication: publisher, date), if given. Title of Electronic Work. Medium. Available Protocol (if applicable):Site/Path/File. Access date.

Examples:

Youngblood-Coleman, Denise. Country Review: France. 2003. Houston, Texas: CountryWatch Publications, 2003. Country Review:France. Online. Available URL: http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_country.asp?vCOUNTRY=61 October, 12, 2003. Note: This is the citation format used when the print version is not used in the reference.

Parts of Works

Basic form, using an Internet protocol:

Author/editor. "Part title." Title of Print Version of Work. Edition statement (if given). Publication information (Place of publication: publisher, date), if given. Title of Electronic Work. Medium. AvailableProtocol (if applicable): Site/Path/File. Access date.

Examples:

Youngblood-Coleman, Denise. "People." CountryWatch.com: France. 2003. Houston, Texas: CountryWatch Publications, 2003. CountryWatch.com: France. Online. Available URL : http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp? vCOUNTRY=61&SECTION=SOCIAL&TOPIC=CLPEO&TYPE=TEXT. October 12, 2003.

Note: This is the citation format used when the print version is not used in the reference.

For further source citation information, please email: [email protected] or [email protected].

Iraq Review 2016 Page 608 of 609 pages CountryWatch

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ISBN: 1- 60523- 696-9 Iraq Country Review 2016

ISSN: 1- 60523- 893-5

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