Servizio Diplomatico Europeo

XVI legislatura Servizio diplomatico europeo

giugno 2008 n. 19

ufficio ricerche nel settore della politica estera e della difesa Servizio Studi Direttore Daniele Ravenna

Segreteria tel. 6706_2451

Uffici ricerche e incarichi Documentazione

Settori economico e finanziario Documentazione economica Capo ufficio: ------Emanuela Catalucci _2581 M. Magrini _3789 Silvia Ferrari _2103 Simone Bonanni _2932 Questioni del lavoro e della salute Luciana Stendardi _2928 Capo ufficio: M. Bracco _2104 Michela Mercuri _3481 Domenico Argondizzo _2904 Attività produttive e agricoltura Capo ufficio: ------Documentazione giuridica Vladimiro Satta _2057 Ambiente e territorio Letizia Formosa _2135 Capo ufficio: R. Ravazzi _3476 Anna Henrici _3696 Gianluca Polverari _3567 Infrastrutture e trasporti Chiara Micelli _3521 Capo ufficio: F. Colucci _2988 Antonello Piscitelli _4942

Questioni istituzionali, giustizia e cultura Capo ufficio: ----- A. Sansò _3435 S. Biancolatte _3659 S. Marci _3788

Politica estera e di difesa Capo ufficio: ------A. Mattiello _2180

Questioni regionali e delle autonomie locali, incaricato dei rapporti con il CERDP Capo ufficio: F. Marcelli _2114

Legislazione comparata Capo ufficio: V. Strinati __3442

______I dossier del Servizio studi sono destinati alle esigenze di documentazione interna per l'attività degli organi parlamentari e dei parlamentari. Il Senato della Repubblica declina ogni responsabilità per la loro eventuale utilizzazione o riproduzione per fini non consentiti dalla legge. I contenuti originali possono essere riprodotti, nel rispetto della legge, a condizione che sia citata la fonte. XVI legislatura Servizio diplomatico europeo

giugno 2008 n. 19

a cura di: A. Mattiello ha collaborato: L. Formosa

Classificazione Teseo: Unione Europea. Trattato dell’Unione Europea. Personale diplomatico e consolare.

I N D I C E

NOTA INTRODUTTIVA ...... 7

1. IL PROBLEMA DELLA RAPPRESENTANZA DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA NEL MONDO...... 7

2. LA SITUAZIONE ATTUALE: LE DELEGAZIONI DELLA COMMISSIONE E GLI ALTRI ORGANI DI RAPPRESENTANZA ESTERNA DELL’UNIONE...... 9

3. L’EVOLUZIONE STORICA DEL SISTEMA DI RELAZIONI ESTERNE DELL’UNIONE ...... 11

4. STRUTTURA DELL’ATTUALE SERVIZIO PER LE RELAZIONI ESTERNE DELLA COMMISSIONE...... 13

5. ATTUALE RUOLO DEL CONSIGLIO E RAPPORTI TRA COMMISSIONE E CONSIGLIO IN MATERIA DI POLITICA ESTERA E DI SICUREZZA COMUNE...... 14

6. RIFLESSIONE SULL’IMPATTO DELLA ISTITUZIONE DEL SERVIZIO DIPLOMATICO EUROPEO SUGLI STATI MEMBRI E SULLE ISTITUZIONI DELL’UE...... 15

7. POSSIBILI VANTAGGI DELL’ISTITUZIONE DI UN SERVIZIO DIPLOMATICO EUROPEO ...... 20

DOCUMENTAZIONE...... 23

Parlamento Europeo, Commissione per gli affari esteri, i diritti dell'uomo, la sicurezza comune e la politica di difesa, Relazione sulla diplomazia comune comunitaria (2000/2006(INI), A5-0210/000,luglio 2000 ...... 25

DOTTRINA ...... 41

The EU Foreign Service: how to build a more effective common policy, EPC Working Paper n. 28, November 2007 ...... 43

Neznamova N., Does the European Union need a Common Diplomatic Service?, Master Thesis in Advanced European and International Studies, Insitut européen des Hautes études internationales, academic Year 2006/2007 ...... 139

Hocking B., Spence D., Towards a European Diplomatic System?, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, Clingendael, 2005...... 209 Rayner L., The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies, Foreign Policy Center, June 2005 ...... 231 Dossier n. 19

NOTA INTRODUTTIVA

1. IL PROBLEMA DELLA RAPPRESENTANZA DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA NEL MONDO

Per quanto concerne l'azione esterna dell'Unione, il trattato di Lisbona, rispetto al trattato che adotta una Costituzione per l'Europa (2004), apporta modifiche strutturali mediante la separazione del Titolo V del Trattato sull'Unione europea − contenente disposizioni generali sull'azione esterna dell'Unione, disposizioni specifiche sulla politica estera e di sicurezza comune (PESC) e disposizioni sulla politica comune di sicurezza e di difesa (PESD) − dalla Parte V del Trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea, contenente disposizioni generali sull'azione esterna dell'Unione, la politica commerciale comune, la cooperazione con i paesi terzi e l'aiuto umanitario, le misure restrittive, gli accordi internazionali, le relazioni con le organizzazioni internazionali, i paesi terzi e le delegazioni dell'UE, e la clausola di solidarietà. Nonostante le differenze strutturali nel settore della politica estera, di sicurezza e di difesa, il trattato di Lisbona è nella sostanza molto simile al trattato costituzionale del 2004. In rapporto alle relazioni internazionali dell'Unione, il nuovo trattato intende apportare un significativo miglioramento delle disposizioni attualmente in vigore, accrescendo il profilo internazionale dell'Unione e promuovendone la capacità di agire in modo efficace nelle questioni mondiali.

In materia di politica estera comune, il trattato di Lisbona prevede alcune innovazioni istituzionali importanti: oltre alla creazione della carica di Presidente del Consiglio europeo -che garantirà la rappresentanza esterna dell'Unione nella PESC- la creazione dell'importante carica di Alto rappresentante dell'Unione per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza -che sarà Vicepresidente della Commissione europea e Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri degli Affari esteri e dirigerà altresì la PESC e la PESD- e l’istituzione di un Servizio europeo per l'azione esterna (EEAS), che assisterà l'Alto rappresentante1 sono gli strumenti con cui il Trattato intende garantire la coerenza dell'azione esterna dell'Unione.

1 L’art. 27, comma 3 del TUE nella versione consolidata recita: “Nell'esecuzione delle sue funzioni, l'alto rappresentante si avvale di un servizio europeo per l'azione esterna. Il servizio lavora in collaborazione con i servizi diplomatici degli Stati membri ed è composto da funzionari dei servizi competenti del segretariato generale del Consiglio e della Commissione e da personale distaccato dai servizi diplomatici nazionali. L'organizzazione e il funzionamento del servizio europeo per l'azione esterna sono fissati da una decisione del Consiglio. Il Consiglio delibera su proposta dell'alto rappresentante, previa consultazione del Parlamento europeo e previa approvazione della Commissione.

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Tuttavia le disposizioni del nuovo trattato lasciano ampio spazio ad interpretazioni e a futuri negoziati tra gli attori principali, Stati membri ed istituzioni, portatori di propri interessi e di visioni diverse dell’azione diplomatica comune2. Aree di potenziale tensione possono emergere tra Stati membri, che possono presentarsi divisi sia per diversi modi di intendere l’integrazione europea sia per specifici interessi nazionali o resistenze burocratiche. Anche la Commissione, con le sue Direzioni generali specializzate e la sua rete di Delegazioni, teme, per effetto di una contaminazione intergovernativa dell’azione diplomatica, di trasformarsi in mero organo di supporto tecnico. Così il Consiglio, dal canto suo, cerca di sviluppare la propria Policy unit e di accrescere il proprio ruolo nella formulazione degli obiettivi politici.

In effetti, già in seno alla Conferenza intergovernativa, sono emerse diffidenze da parte di alcuni Stati membri che hanno mostrato di voler tenere separate PESC e PESD da un lato e altri aspetti dell'azione esterna dall'altro, nonché hanno tentato di diluire gli effetti pratici della decisione di sviluppare politiche comuni e di mettere in comune le risorse in tale settore. A tal riguardo interviene la dichiarazione n. 13 allegata al Trattato di Lisbona che afferma che le disposizioni PESC non incidono sulle attuali responsabilità degli Stati membri per la formulazione e la direzione della loro politica estera né sulla loro rappresentanza nazionale nei paesi terzi e in seno agli organismi internazionali, e in particolare sulle responsabilità primarie dei membri del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite. Inoltre la dichiarazione n. 14 afferma che la PESC non inciderà sulle basi giuridiche esistenti, le responsabilità e i poteri di ciascuno Stato membro in relazione alla propria politica estera3.

La maggiore coerenza dell’azione esterna dell’UE sembra dipendere in ultima analisi dalla capacità degli attori coinvolti, a livello nazionale e comunitario, di consolidarne tre fattori fondamentali: dimensione esterna della Comunità, PESC propriamente detta e politiche estere nazionali. D’altronde, la crescente importanza dell’Unione europea come protagonista sulla scena internazionale, in particolare tramite la Politica estera e di sicurezza comune e i vari programmi di assistenza allo sviluppo, ha fatto emergere con maggior rilievo il problema già da tempo avvertito di assicurare migliore rappresentanza all’Unione nel mondo. Si ricorda che fin dall’inizio della storia della Comunità europea, a metà degli anni Cinquanta, furono create strutture di relazione con soggetti esterni,

2 Si noti che un noto think tank, lo European Policy Center, suggerisce l’istituzione di un gruppo di riflessione, formato dai principali attori coinvolti ma allargato al Parlamento europeo e ad esperti esterni, che affronti tempestivamente le aree di potenziale attrito e metta a punto un piano, una sorta di road map, per la creazione del Servizio diplomatico comune. 3 Parlamento europeo, Commissione per gli Affari costituzionali, Relazione sul Trattato di Lisbona (2007/2286/INI) A6-0013/2008, 29 gennaio 2008.

8 Dossier n. 19 soprattutto in occasione dei primi Accordi di associazione, scambio e cooperazione con altri Stati, ciascuna per rispondere ad esigenze precise.

Se si cerca di analizzare la situazione attuale, osservando le strutture attraverso cui si esplica l’azione dell’UE nelle relazioni esterne, la prima cosa che si deve sottolineare è che l’Unione non ha avuto finora una personalità giuridica. Finora sono state sempre le ‘Comunità europee’ a vedersi riconosciuta tale personalità giuridica, con relativa attribuzione di poteri nella sfera internazionale. Ormai questi poteri si sono estesi a molteplici aree: politica commerciale, relazioni con paesi associati e territori d’oltremare, con organizzazioni internazionali, ricerca e sviluppo scientifico e tecnologico, politica ambientale, istruzione, formazione professionale, cultura, ecc. In alcuni settori, come la politica commerciale, i relativi poteri ‘esterni’ sono gestiti in modo esclusivo dall’Unione, in altri casi in tandem con gli Stati membri (e questa è – in genere – la regola).

Il ruolo centrale nell’azione esterna dell’Unione viene attualmente svolto dalla Commissione, che rappresenta l’Unione nelle relazioni esterne ed è responsabile dell’attuazione degli accordi anche dal punto di vista finanziario. Nella Commissione le Direzioni generali coinvolte sono, oltre alla DG Relazioni esterne, le seguenti DG: Sviluppo, Commercio, Allargamento, Aiuti umanitari, nonché il Servizio unificato della Commissione per le relazioni esterne.

2. LA SITUAZIONE ATTUALE: LE DELEGAZIONI DELLA COMMISSIONE E GLI ALTRI ORGANI DI RAPPRESENTANZA ESTERNA DELL’UNIONE

Le Delegazioni della Commissione, pur essendo incardinate nella struttura della Commissione, di fatto sono al servizio degli interessi dell’intera Unione Europea all’esterno, stabilendo e mantenendo le relazioni con Paesi terzi ed organizzazioni internazionali nella sfera delle relazioni (principalmente economiche) dell’Unione. I problemi relativi alla politica estera e di sicurezza comune (PESC) sono più strettamente di competenza della Presidenza del Consiglio. La Presidenza infatti rappresenta l’Unione, insieme alla Commissione. Essa è assistita dal Segretario generale del Consiglio, che esercita anche le funzioni di Alto rappresentante per la politica estera e di sicurezza comune. Anche lo Stato membro che esercita la presidenza di turno svolge assistenza in queste funzioni di rappresentanza. (articolo 18 del Trattato sull’Unione europea). Inoltre, il Consiglio può nominare rappresentanti speciali con mandati specifici in relazione a particolari affari politici. Di converso, nell’ambito delle politiche comunitarie sono le Delegazioni della Commissione a detenere il monopolio della rappresentanza dell’Unione. Nessuno

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Stato membro, neanche quello che esercita la presidenza di turno ha gli stessi poteri di rappresentanza. Queste delegazioni si sono moltiplicate in modo eccezionale, raggiungendo il numero di 128 (123 presso Stati terzi, e 5 presso organismi internazionali: OCSE, OSCE, WTO, ONU, FAO). Le delegazioni svolgono compiti di tipo diplomatico perché espongono, illustrano, presentano all’esterno le politiche dell’Unione, e ne danno applicazione. Inoltre analizzano e riferiscono circa le politiche e gli sviluppi degli affari nei paesi presso cui sono accreditate; infine possono condurre negoziati nei limiti del mandato ricevuto. Ciò significa che le Delegazioni esercitano presso i Paesi terzi, i poteri attribuiti dal trattato alla Comunità europea, promuovendo gli interessi della Comunità nell’ambito delle politiche settoriali comuni, soprattutto politica commerciale, ma anche molte altre quali agricoltura, pesca, ambiente, trasporti, ecc…. In alcuni casi la competenza si amplia a settori in cui le Comunità non hanno poteri esclusivi, quali la giustizia e gli affari interni. Una delle importanti funzioni svolte dalle Delegazioni riguarda l’assistenza allo sviluppo, attività nella quale esse godono anche di una certa autonomia nella gestione e programmazione degli interventi, come conseguenza di una politica di devoluzione delle responsabilità nel complessivo quadro della politica comune, messa in atto dalla Commissione a partire dagli anni 2000 al fine di rendere più efficace e rapido l’intervento in collaborazione con i paesi beneficiari. Le Delegazioni, in questo ambito e di concerto con la Presidenza, assumono spesso la guida delle attività di emergenza che necessitano di coordinamento al fine di attuare gli interventi di assistenza multilaterale e bilaterale, di realizzare efficaci sinergie e – non ultimo – di aumentare la visibilità dell’Unione. Gli interventi possono andare dall’assistenza umanitaria al sostegno alla democrazia e diritti umani, dalla libertà di espressione al sostegno alla ricostruzione, ai vari settori tradizionali dell’aiuto allo sviluppo. Le Delegazioni della Commissione svolgono altresì un ruolo nel settore della politica estera e di sicurezza comune PESC (o, in inglese, CFSP: Common foreign and security policy), fornendo regolarmente analisi politiche, effettuando insieme alle ambasciate degli Stati membri approfondite valutazioni e contribuendo così al processo di ‘policy making’. Infine esse supportano ed assistono in ogni necessità le altre istituzioni e organi dell’Unione. In primo luogo l’Alto rappresentante per la PESC/Segretario generale del Consiglio, che può contare sulla loro rete logistica per le sue missioni, e riceve tutti i loro rapporti. Nei confronti del Parlamento europeo le Delegazioni svolgono un ruolo di supporto per organizzare le visite e le missioni all’estero delle Commissioni e dei parlamentari. In accordo con gli uffici centrali della Commissione europea le delegazioni possono prendere contatto con le Commissioni del Parlamento per riferire sui più recenti sviluppi della situazione nei vari paesi ospiti, o sull’attuazione delle politiche comunitarie nei confronti di quegli stessi paesi.

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In tutte queste aree di attività le Delegazioni svolgono compiti di informazione sempre più rilevanti nelle due direzioni: dai Paesi terzi verso l’Unione e viceversa. Esse svolgono dunque un importante ruolo di rappresentanza politica della Comunità, benché molti aspetti della loro attività rimangano indeterminati. Non è neppure chiaro il loro status giuridico, e regna non poca confusione sul fatto se esse rappresentino la Comunità o l’Unione. Spesso le delegazioni e soprattutto i capi delegazione sono visti come rappresentanti dell’Unione nel suo complesso, talvolta persino dell’Europa genericamente intesa. Di fatto la Commissione è solo una delle istituzioni della Comunità, e non ha nemmeno una sua personalità giuridica. Per di più le Delegazioni dipendono unicamente dalla Commissione, ma di fatto hanno legami anche con il Consiglio e il Parlamento e perciò possono svolgere funzioni di rappresentanza in nome della Comunità nel suo complesso, aggravando la confusione sui ruoli. In effetti i ruoli e le funzioni delle Delegazioni non sono sempre stati omogenei, né uguali nel tempo. Alcune hanno sempre avuto, tradizionalmente, funzioni di tipo più ‘politico’ e di rappresentanza come quelle negli Stati Uniti, in Giappone o – un tempo – nel Regno unito. Altre hanno avuto funzioni più tecniche, come gestire il Fondo europeo di sviluppo nei Paesi del gruppo ACP.

Attualmente si deve registrare anche l’esistenza di undici Rappresentanti speciali dell’Unione europea (nominati dal Segretario Generale/Alto Rappresentante) in particolari aree del mondo. Essi hanno il compito di promuovere le politiche e gli interessi dell’Unione in queste regioni e di operare attivamente per stabilizzare la situazione politica, sostenere la pacificazione e la legalità. Le aree su cui hanno competenza questi rappresentanti speciali sono l’Afghanistan, la regione africana dei Grandi laghi, l’Unione africana, la Bosnia Erzegovina, l’Asia centrale, la Repubblica di Macedonia, il Kosovo, il Medio Oriente, la Moldavia, il Caucaso meridionale e il Sudan (si segnala anche l’Inviato speciale dell’UE in Birmania). Di fatto il ruolo di questi Rappresentanti speciali è tipicamente diplomatico perché essi servono a sostenere e a sviluppare un’attiva e coerente presenza politica europea sulla scena mondiale. Essi inoltre coadiuvano nello svolgimento dei suoi compiti l’Alto rappresentante per la politica estera e di difesa comune.

3. L’EVOLUZIONE STORICA DEL SISTEMA DI RELAZIONI ESTERNE DELL’UNIONE

Per comprendere meglio la situazione attuale del sistema di relazioni esterne dell’Unione europea bisogna rivolgersi indietro, alle origini. Nel 1993 il Trattato di Maastricht definì con precisione il quadro diplomatico dell’Unione, dando al contempo un sostegno politico al cambiamento nella

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natura della governance della politica estera europea. L’articolo J.6 del Trattato affermava: “Le missioni diplomatiche e consolari degli Stati membri e le delegazioni della Commissione nei paesi terzi e nelle conferenze internazionali, nonché le loro rappresentanze presso le organizzazioni internazionali, si concertano per garantire il rispetto e l'attuazione delle posizioni comuni e delle azioni comuni adottate dal Consiglio. Esse intensificano la loro cooperazione procedendo a scambi di informazioni e a valutazioni comuni e contribuendo all'attuazione delle disposizioni previste dall'articolo 8 C del trattato che istituisce la Comunità europea”. Nel 1994 pertanto le responsabilità in materia di relazioni esterne furono trasferite dal Segretariato generale alla nuova Direzione Generale per gli affari esterni, ufficio responsabile delle Delegazioni e del loro personale, all’interno di un “Servizio unificato per le relazioni esterne”. Quando fu chiara la necessità che la Commissione creasse un corpo omogeneo di diplomatici in servizio all’estero, l’interesse verso il Servizio unificato per le relazioni esterne si intensificò e il miglioramento di tale servizio divenne un punto importante per la Commissione. Il dibattito divenne sempre più attuale e urgente verso il 2000, dopo che il Parlamento europeo ebbe adottato una risoluzione sulla diplomazia comune europea (5 settembre 2000)4. Il Parlamento osservava che: “per quanto riguarda le politiche comunitarie, le delegazioni della Commissione hanno il monopolio della rappresentanza della Comunità nello Stato beneficiario. Quando invece ci si muove nell'ambito delle competenze concorrenti, è necessaria un'associazione fra le delegazioni e le missioni degli Stati membri”, e che: “la funzione di queste delegazioni si è incentrata sul settore economico e commerciale, ma col tempo hanno assunto funzioni non strettamente economiche. Nei paesi industrializzati e davanti alle organizzazioni internazionali esercitano una funzione fondamentale di rappresentanza politica della Comunità. Nei paesi in via di sviluppo e in quelli candidati all'adesione la funzione politica delle delegazioni è aumentata notevolmente. Tale fenomeno si è accentuato con la PESC”. Inoltre in materia di politica estera e di sicurezza il Parlamento, nella proposta di risoluzione, osservava che il TUE aveva compiuto “un passo fondamentale nel superamento del carattere economico dell'attività esterna. Per anni, e in virtù di una distinzione artificiosa, le competenze esterne in ambito economico spettavano alla Comunità, mentre il resto della politica estera era di competenza degli Stati membri”. Dopo la riforma di Maastricht, l'Unione partecipa anche alla politica estera non economica. Questa, pur continuando ad essere di competenza degli Stati membri, è oggetto di concertazione nel quadro della PESC”. Quindi con la PESC l'Unione ha superato definitivamente l'ambito economico. Le istituzioni sono diventate partecipi di una nuova sfera, quella della politica estera non economica, delle relazioni internazionali classiche, della diplomazia.

4 (A5-210/2000).

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Se nella sfera comunitaria la rappresentanza esterna è compito soprattutto delle Delegazioni della Commissione, nell'ambito della PESC tale compito spetta principalmente alla Presidenza del Consiglio. In tale ambito il ruolo delle Delegazioni è minore, ma anch'esse partecipano, poiché si è detto che le Delegazioni cooperano con le missioni diplomatiche degli Stati membri. Nella relazione in vista della risoluzione del 2000, il Parlamento considerava necessario volgersi alla creazione di un Servizio diplomatico comunitario, professionale, permanente ed adeguato alle nuove circostanze, per assicurare efficacemente il perseguimento degli obiettivi dell'Unione nella sfera internazionale. Essenzialmente il Parlamento europeo chiedeva di operare: • la formazione di funzionari comunitari destinati ad occuparsi dell'attività esterna ed il contributo dei servizi diplomatici degli Stati membri; • la chiarificazione e lo sviluppo dello status giuridico delle delegazioni della Commissione europea, del loro ruolo e della loro relazione con le istituzioni comunitarie; • il coordinamento tra le delegazioni ed i servizi esterni degli Stati membri.

4. STRUTTURA DELL’ATTUALE SERVIZIO PER LE RELAZIONI ESTERNE DELLA COMMISSIONE

Il Servizio unificato per le relazioni esterne, istituito all’interno della Direzione Generale per le relazioni esterne della Commissione, rappresenta l’organo comunitario più simile ad un servizio diplomatico ‘tradizionale’. La prima rappresentanza fu aperta a Londra dall’Alta autorità della Comunità europea del carbone e dell’acciaio. Nel 1967 dopo la fusione delle tre comunità (CEE, Euratom e CECA), la Commissione unificata inglobò le Delegazioni già esistenti e nel corso degli anni successivi insediò rappresentanze in tutte le più importanti capitali e nelle sedi delle maggiori organizzazioni internazionali. Contemporaneamente fu creato una rete di Delegazioni al fine di attuare la cooperazione e i vari ‘partnership agreements’ conclusi via via con i vari Stati o gruppi di Stati. Data la sempre crescente importanza delle Delegazioni e il corrispondente numero di compiti ad esse attribuiti, nel tempo è divenuto necessario organizzare meglio il Servizio relazioni esterne, in modo integrato e con criteri di gestione unificati. La Commissione ha deciso infatti di riunire amministrativamente tutto il personale sotto la Direzione Generale relazioni esterne, e di istituire il Servizio unificato che funziona come organo centralizzato di amministrazione per tutte le Delegazioni che operano nei paesi terzi e presso gli organismi internazionali.5

5Sulle articolazioni interne della Direzione Servizio Esterno ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili alla URL: (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/delegations/intro/mgm.htm)

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Ciascuna Delegazione ha lo status di missione diplomatica, compresi i privilegi e le immunità previste dalla Convenzione di Vienna sulle relazioni diplomatiche e rappresenta la Commissione europea presso gli Stati terzi. Il Capo delegazione è accreditato formalmente come rappresentante ufficiale della Commissione europea presso il governo ospitante, ed ha lo status di Ambasciatore. Le Delegazioni più grandi e importanti hanno anche un Vice capo delegazione e una struttura amministrativa responsabile dei servizi e della gestione di risorse finanziarie, nonché dei rapporti con le autorità del Paese ospitante. Vi possono essere inoltre uffici settoriali, quali quello preposto agli affari economici e finanziari, agli affari politici, ai rapporti commerciali, culturali e scientifici, ecc… Quello che le Delegazioni della Commissione europea non curano affatto sono gli aspetti consolari (passaporti, documenti..) ed altri quali il turismo che tradizionalmente sono gestiti dagli appositi uffici delle Ambasciate di ciascuno Stato membro. Molte Delegazioni hanno una struttura più semplice ma tutte hanno il compito di rappresentare ufficialmente la Commissione europea e di funzionare almeno come punto di contatto per iniziative comuni di tipo economico o culturale. Esse collaborano molto strettamente con le rappresentanze diplomatiche degli Stati membri ed in particolare con lo Stato che riveste il ruolo di Presidente di turno dell’Unione.

5. ATTUALE RUOLO DEL CONSIGLIO E RAPPORTI TRA COMMISSIONE E CONSIGLIO IN MATERIA DI POLITICA ESTERA E DI SICUREZZA COMUNE

L’articolo 3 del Trattato sull’Unione europea affermava che l'Unione assicura in particolare la coerenza globale della sua azione esterna nell'ambito delle politiche in materia di relazioni esterne, di sicurezza, di economia e di sviluppo. Il Consiglio e la Commissione hanno la responsabilità di garantire tale coerenza e cooperano a tal fine. Essi provvedono, nell'ambito delle rispettive competenze, ad attuare dette politiche. Il Consiglio europeo definisce i princìpi e le linee generali della PESC, nonché le strategie comuni che devono essere messe in atto dalle istituzioni comunitarie. Sulla base di tali linee guida il Consiglio dei ministri adotta le azioni comuni o le posizioni comuni. Il Trattato indica – inoltre - che le funzioni di Alto rappresentante per la politica estera e di sicurezza comune sono esercitate dal Segretario generale del Consiglio, il quale assiste lo Stato membro che detiene la Presidenza di turno in tutte le attività che attengono ad aspetti riguardanti la PESC. Se è il caso egli conduce il dialogo politico con le parti terze e agisce in nome e per conto del Consiglio dei ministri, dietro richiesta della Presidenza. La cooperazione tra Commissione e Consiglio in materia di politica estera e sicurezza comune, indicata dal Trattato, si manifesta in due fondamentali e ampie modalità. In primo luogo la Commissione, che è ‘pienamente associata’ al

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Consiglio nei compiti di politica estera e di sicurezza gode – insieme con gli Stati membri – del diritto di iniziativa politica, gestisce i flussi finanziari associati alle relative attività, interviene nelle decisioni di politica estera quando esse riguardano affari in cui essa ha un ruolo proprio chiaramente definito. In secondo luogo esiste un ruolo di rappresentanza esterna della Commissione in tutte le aree di competenza comunitaria, sia a livello delle istituzioni centrali, dove vengono formulate le politiche comuni, sia nella tutela dei vari interessi della Comunità nel mondo tramite la rete delle Delegazioni. La Commissione può – come ogni Stato membro – richiedere al Consiglio chiarimenti su aspetti della politica estera e di sicurezza comune, e anche avanzare proposte (tuttavia questa capacità di iniziativa non è esclusiva, come avviene invece per gli altri aspetti degli affari comunitari). La Commissione può altresì, come gli Stati membri, chiedere alla Presidenza di riunire un Consiglio straordinario per decidere le linee politiche da intraprendere. La Commissione inoltre partecipa al finanziamento della PESC attraverso il bilancio comunitario. Il Consiglio e la Commissione sono responsabili congiuntamente di garantire la coerenza dell’insieme delle attività esterne dell’Unione nel contesto delle politiche europee di sicurezza, di sviluppo, di relazioni esterne ed economiche. In tale quadro, le istituzioni europee, prime fra tutte la Commissione e il Consiglio sono profondamente coinvolte in attività di diplomazia internazionale.

6. RIFLESSIONE SULL’IMPATTO DELLA ISTITUZIONE DEL SERVIZIO DIPLOMATICO EUROPEO SUGLI STATI MEMBRI E SULLE ISTITUZIONI DELL’UE

Grande innovazione istituzionale prevista dal Trattato di Lisbona6 nel settore della Politica estera e di sicurezza comune (PESC), oltre all’istituzione dell’Alto Rappresentante per la politica estera e gli affari di sicurezza, è la creazione del Servizio europeo per l’Azione esterna, embrione di un corpo diplomatico europeo, di cui l’Alto Rappresentante si avvalga. Il Trattato prevede che esso sia formato da funzionari del Consiglio, della Commissione e da personale distaccato dai servizi diplomatici nazionali e non sostituirà i servizi diplomatici nazionali. L’organizzazione e il funzionamento del Servizio saranno oggetto di una decisione del Consiglio, su proposta dell’Alto Rappresentante e previa consultazione del Parlamento europeo ed approvazione della Commissione.

La riflessione in atto si concentra, a livello interno, sull’impatto della riforma sul ruolo e le prospettive dei Ministeri degli esteri degli Stati membri, ma anche

6 Tale previsione era già contenuta nel Trattato Costituzionale.

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su altri Ministeri o Dipartimenti che ad esempio si occupano di visti o di cooperazione allo sviluppo, mentre a livello delle istituzioni europee, sull’impatto sul ruolo svolto dalla Commissione, tramite la famiglia delle Direzioni Generali RELEX e le delegazioni, o dal Consiglio, essenzialmente tramite il Segretariato Generale. La riflessione si estende, invero, alla nozione stessa di politica estera comune, in particolare, se debba estendersi a ricomprendere l’intervento umanitario, la cooperazione allo sviluppo o meno. Inoltre la Commissione si interroga sul fatto se le sue Direzioni Generali per le relazioni esterne e le sue Delegazioni (che con la loro squadra di project managers già costituiscono un embrione di servizio diplomatico) costituiranno la componente maggiore del futuro Servizio europeo o se invece saranno relegate ad un mero ruolo di assistenza tecnica nel settore del commercio e della cooperazione allo sviluppo, mentre la direzione politica verrà assicurata dal Segretariato del Consiglio o dai Ministri degli esteri degli Stati Membri. Indipendentemente dai cambiamenti a livello di Servizi RELEX, a livello di delegazioni -che diverrebbero delegazioni dell’Unione con personale fornito dal Servizio europeo per l’Azione esterna- potrebbe rendersi necessaria una divisione interna in sezioni tale per cui a capo della sezione politica sarebbe posto un Ambasciatore rappresentante l’Unione Europea, mentre allo staff della Commissione sarebbero preclusi i posti politici di primo piano e competerebbero solo quelli tecnici. Gli Stati membri devono riflettere sull’impatto sui servizi diplomatici nazionali e in particolare sia sulla riorganizzazione del Ministero degli Esteri a livello centrale (in relazione anche ad altri Ministeri o Dipartimenti) sia sulla capillarità della rappresentanza dello Stato all’esterno dell’UE. Quanto al primo aspetto, la valutazione riguarda sia il modo in cui cambierebbero i percorsi di carriera all’interno del Servizio diplomatico nazionale per i diplomatici distaccati presso le delegazioni dell’Unione, sia il tipo di formazione atta a fornire diplomatici europei sia su chi ricada la responsabilità di assicurare tale formazione – un’Accademia diplomatica europea? Positivamente sarà invece accolto dai Ministeri degli esteri nazionali il potenziale aumento di posti e di prospettive di carriera per i propri diplomatici, offerto dal Servizio diplomatico europeo. Il secondo aspetto su cui soffermarsi deve partire dalla constatazione che i Paesi più piccoli non sono rappresentati in tutte le capitali estere e quindi potrebbero sentirsi sollevati dall’esistenza di una delegazione dell’UE (le Delegazioni della Commssione dovrebbero trasformarsi in Delegazioni dell’UE, sebbene la questione del titolo formale che ad esse verrà attribuito rimanga una questione aperta). Altri Stati invece vorranno mantenere una loro presenza capillare all’esterno, in quanto rispondente a tradizioni o obiettivi strategici cui non vogliono rinunciare. Certamente l’istituzione di un Servizio diplomatico europeo con Delegazioni dell’UE non significherà la scomparsa delle ambasciate

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degli Stati membri. Di qui l’ipotesi di una “rappresentanza a geometria variabile”. Il vero problema a livello nazionale sembra, tuttavia, essere rappresentato dalla prospettiva che l’istituzione del Servizio europeo preluda ad un trasferimento di competenze nazionali come gli affari consolari, ma anche in futuro la cooperazione allo sviluppo.

Per quanto riguarda la composizione del futuro Servizio diplomatico europeo, nonché il suo rapporto la Commissione e il Consiglio, la questione è stata a lungo dibattuta. Javier Solana, nel suo indirizzo al Gruppo di lavoro sulle Relazioni esterne della Convenzione nell’ottobre 2002, scegliendo un approccio pragmatico alla questione, auspicò la creazione di un pool di risorse costituito da diplomatici nazionali insieme con funzionari del Segretariato del Consiglio e della Commissione, tale da consentire un proficuo scambio di idee, di informazione e di fiducia. A seguito del dibattito nell’ambito del gruppo suddetto, si registrò ampio consenso su tre punti: la composizione del Servizio, che sarebbe stato formato da funzionari della DG Relex, funzionari del Segretariato generale e diplomatici dei servizi diplomatici nazionali degli Stati membri; la collocazione del Servizio alle dipendenze del Ministro degli esteri europeo (ora Alto rappresentante dell'Unione per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza); la necessità che all’Unione Europea fosse attribuita personalità giuridica, in modo tale da consentirle di avere proprie ambasciate, formate dalle delegazioni della Commissione e in più dotate di un certo numero di funzionari della Commissione, del Segretariato del Consiglio e dei servizi diplomatici nazionali. Il Presidente della Commissione Prodi nel maggio 2003 innanzi al Parlamento europeo suggerì che il Servizio formasse parte integrante dei dipartimenti della Commissione, almeno da un punto di vista amministrativo, al fine di ottimizzare le conoscenze e le risorse e di evitare duplicazioni intergovernative. Anche l’orientamento della Commissione è nel senso di non separare il Servizio dalle dai dipartimenti della Commissione e dal Segretariato del Consiglio, affinché possano lavorare in stretto raccordo, come pure di fare in modo che le future delegazioni dell’UE continuino a dipendere dalla Commissione da un punto di vista amministrativo, per ragioni pratiche e finanziarie. Alcuni Stati Membri, durante i lavori della Convenzione, avevano avanzato la proposta che il futuro Servizio si avvalesse della DG della Commissione e di un’istituenda Foreign Policy Unit, formata dai servizi del Segretariato del Consiglio rafforzati da funzionari inviati dagli Stati membri e dalla Commissione. Il raccordo tra Commissione e Segretariato del Consiglio dovrebbe in ultima istanza essere assicurato dall’Alto rappresentante dell'Unione per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza che riassume in sé le cariche di vice Presidente della Commissione e Alto Rappresentante per la PESC.

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In sintesi, potrebbe affermarsi che riguardo alla organizzazione del futuro Servizio, sono state esaminate essenzialmente due ipotesi. La prima concerne l’incorporazione del Servizio nella Commissione o nel Segretariato del Consiglio, con una significativa riorganizzazione degli organi coinvolti. A tal proposito un elemento su cui riflettere è la differenza di risorse umane che le due Istituzioni destinano alle relazioni esterne: quasi 5000 persone operano nella Commissione nell’ambito delle Delegazioni, contro le poche centinaia del Consiglio comprese le unità del personale militare (European Military Staff). La seconda ipotesi concerne l’istituzione del Servizio in maniera autonoma dalle strutture preesistenti, cercando di evitare duplicazioni con le strutture esistenti. Più in dettaglio, sono state dibattuti varie scenari. Si era ipotizzato di incorporare solo la Direzione Affari esteri del Segretariato del Consiglio e la Direzione generale Relazioni Esterne della Commissione, ma un Servizio diplomatico comune con uno staff così limitato sarebbe troppo debole per poter assicurare coerenza e solidità alla politica estera dell’Unione. In alternativa si era ipotizzato che tutti i funzionari impegnati nelle relazioni esterne, dal Consiglio alla Commissione, affiancati dai funzionari rappresentanti l’Unione nei Paesi terzi confluissero nel Servizio Comune : è stato notato che se da un lato quest’ultimo non avrebbe problemi di risorse, dall’altro diventerebbe difficile la supervisione di tutte le attività da esso svolte persino per l’Alto Rappresentante dell'Unione per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza. Infine, grazie all’accordo mediato da Solana e Barroso nel 2005 la maggioranza degli Stati membri ha convenuto su una organizzazione del Servizio che includesse i servizi connessi alla PESC della Commissione (DG RELEX) del Consiglio (Policy unit, DG-E e Military Staff7). Secondo quanto concordato nell’ambito dei negoziati condotti nel 2004-2005 tra Segretariato Generale e Commissione8, dovrebbe essere istituito un Servizio sui generis, diverso da quanto esistente, ma caratterizzato da stretti legami con la Commissione ed il Segretariato. Infine si ricorda che il Trattato di Lisbona, come già il Trattato costituzionale, prevede che il Servizio diplomatico europeo comprenda, oltre a funzionari delle due istituzioni, personale dei servizi diplomatici nazionali degli Stati membri. Per quanto riguarda il problema della rotazione del personale all’interno del Servizio diplomatico europeo, il rapporto congiunto del Segretariato Generale e della Commissione del giugno 20059 raggiungeva il consenso solo su alcuni punti: regolare rotazione del personale; rigetto del pricipio delle quote di personale in base alla nazionalità e affermazione del principio dell’adeguata

7 Nell’ambito del Segretariato Generale, la Direzione generale E è competente in materia di PESC, come pure nell’ambito del Gabinetto, la Policy Planning and Early warning Unit ovvero Policy Unit. 8 In proposito si veda il Joint Progress Report to the European Council by the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission (9 june 2005). 9 Joint Progress Report to the European Council…,cit.

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rappresentanza e dell’equilibrio geografico; uguaglianza di status per tutti i membri; nomina per merito; appropriate procedure di selezione. Alcuni commentatori avvertono tuttavia che tensioni possano emergere nei nuovi negoziati in relazione ad eventuali modalità di rotazione che tendano a delineare un “centro” ed una “periferia” all’interno del Servizio diplomatico europeo, come ad esempio nel caso fosse proposta una rigida separazione amministrativa e gerarchica tra personale delle istituzioni comunitarie e dei ministeri degli esteri nazionali

Altra questione concernente il Servizio diplomatico comune riguarda le dimensioni che esso debba assumere. Al riguardo due sono le ipotesi. I sostenitori di un modello minimalista vorrebbero configurare un corpo di diplomatici, alle dipendenze dell’Alto Rappresentante, che facciano parte delle Delegazioni ufficiali dell’UE e che siano responsabili davanti alla Commissione e al Consiglio. Anche in tal caso la collocazione del quartier generale dovrebbe essere tale da consentire il raccordo con la Commissione e il Consiglio. Un altro modello potrebbe configurare una dotazione maggiore di risorse materiali e soprattutto umane, che abbiano ricevuto una formazione ad hoc in un’Accademia diplomatica europea, all’uopo istituenda (o in un College simile allo European Security and Defence College10). Sul dibattito circa l’opportunità di istituire una scuola diplomatica europea vanno ricordati i risultati del Gruppo di lavoro della Convenzione. Nell’ambito della Convenzione, infatti, fu istituito un gruppo di lavoro incaricato di affrontare la questione dell’adattamento delle istituzioni e delle procedure esistenti nell’Unione alla trasformazione della realtà e di fare proposte sul futuro servizio diplomatico comune. Tale gruppo di lavoro adottò le seguenti raccomandazioni: • adottare una definizione più precisa di principi e obiettivi; • fondere il ruolo di Alto Rappresentante/Segretario Generale e di Commissario per le Relazioni esterne in un'unica figura di rappresentante dell’Unione all’esterno che fosse anche vice-Presidente della Commissione; • istituire un consiglio azione esterna distinto dall’attuale consiglio affari generali e relazioni esterne; • istituire un punto focale per le relazioni esterne presso la Commissione ed istituire un Servizio europeo per l’azione esterna; • istituire una Accademia diplomatica europea ed un corpo diplomatico europeo; • estendere il voto a maggioranza qualificata in ambito PESC, dietro decisione unanime del Consiglio europeo.

10 Istituito nel 2005, rappresenta un modello un modello maggiormente decentrato rispetto all’Accademia diplomatica europea. Cionostante finora non si è registrato l’accordo tra gli Stati membri per applicare tale modello dalla difesa alla diplomazia comune.

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Dunque nell’ambito dei lavori della Convenzione emergeva un ampio sostegno all’istituzione di una scuola diplomatica dell’Unione europea che sviluppasse una cultura del servizio diplomatico europeo. Nel 2000 lo stesso Parlamento europeo richiamava ad un “servizio diplomatico comune, professionale e permanente” per il quale era fondamentale l’istituzione di un’accademia di formazione diplomatica dell’UE. Tuttavia, data la ristrettezza delle risorse e in considerazione dei costi iniziali dell’istituzione di un servizio diplomatico europeo, l’idea della scuola diplomatica dell’UE sembra oggi cedere il passo, in considerazione della maggiore fattibilità, alla via del rafforzamento del ruolo europeo delle scuole diplomatiche nazionali, tramite l’integrazione nei curricula di moduli di studi europei.

7. POSSIBILI VANTAGGI DELL’ISTITUZIONE DI UN SERVIZIO DIPLOMATICO EUROPEO

In conclusione, si può ritenere con la Commissione11 che i fattori in grado di concorrere ad una migliore rappresentazione esterna della UE e una maggiore coerenza, visibilità ed efficacia della sua azione esterna possano essere: il potenziamento della diplomazia dell’UE, il rafforzamento della visibilità della sua azione esterna tramite un più alto grado di coinvolgimento del Parlamento europeo e dei parlamenti nazionali; una migliore cooperazione tra istituzioni europee e Stati membri (tramite moduli di formazione diplomatica nazionali, doppi cappelli di rappresentante speciale e capo delegazione12, cooperazione tra Stati membri nell’area dell’assistenza consolare, scambi di personale tra servizi diplomatici nazionali, ecc.). Dunque l’istituzione del Servizio diplomatico europeo dovrebbe contribuire a rispondere a questa sfida per una maggiore coerenza dell’azione esterna della UE. In generale, numerosi osservatori ritengono che la creazione di un Servizio diplomatico europeo, che unirebbe gli aspetti comunitari con quelli intergovernativi della PESC, contribuirebbe ad una maggiore affidabilità e coerenza delle politiche esterne dell’Unione; tra l’altro, contribuirebbe a risolvere il problema della debolezza e mancanza di incisività dell’azione esterna della UE, derivante dal gran numero di organi attualmente competenti per le relazioni esterne.

11 Communication form the Commission to the European council “Europe in the world – Some practical proposals for greater coherence, effectiveness and visibility, 10325/06. 12 Viene spesso portato ad esempio di razionalizzazione e coordinamento tra Consiglio e Commissione in materia di relazioni esterne il caso del Rappresentante speciale dell’UE in Macedonia che era anche il capo della Delegazione della Commissione in loco.

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Ulteriori vantaggi potrebbero derivare dall’istituzione di un Servizio diplomatico europeo soprattutto per gli Stati membri di piccole dimensioni che potrebbero trovare nelle ambasciate congiunte una soluzione ai loro problemi di scarse risorse finanziarie tali da precludere loro una capillare rappresentanza diplomatica all’estero. Altri vantaggi cui in prospettiva potrebbe condurre il Servizio diplomatico comune per gli Stati membri si potrebbero presentare in materia consolare e di cooperazione allo sviluppo. Riguardo al primo aspetto, considerando che una volta ottenuto un visto d’ingresso per un Paese dell’area Schengen i cittadini di Stati terzi possono muoversi liberamente nell’area Schengen, la Commissione ha avviato una seria discussione sulla possibilità di istituire un’Agenzia europea per gli affari consolari ed i visti nell’ambito del Servizio diplomatico europeo, che consentirebbe di ridurre il personale impiegato negli adempimenti consolari dei ministeri degli esteri, degli interni e nelle ambasciate all’estero. Inoltre, la sperimentazione di forme di cooperazione e divisione del lavoro tra le Delegazioni dell’UE e le ambasciate bilaterali in tema di affari consolari e visti potrebbe costituire un’esperienza di stimolo a forme di cooperazione da attuarsi in altre sfere dell’azione diplomatica. Riguardo al secondo aspetto, il Servizio diplomatico europeo potrebbe contribuire a rafforzare il ruolo di donatore dell’Unione Europea. Com’è noto, attualmente l’attuazione della cooperazione allo sviluppo della UE è affidata alla DG EuropeAid, alla DG Sviluppo e all’Ufficio per l’Aiuto umanitario della Commissione. Il Servizio diplomatico comune potrebbe rivelarsi prezioso nel raccogliere le informazioni dai paesi terzi, aiutare ad individuare aree di interesse comune, negoziare con i paesi beneficiari degli aiuti ed organizzare missioni di funzionari della UE. Inoltre, tramite il raccordo con le rete diplomatiche nazionali potrebbe portare ad un miglior coordinamento e razionalizzazione degli interventi di cooperazione tra UE e Stati membri.

DOCUMENTAZIONE

PARLAMENTO EUROPEO

�� 1999 � � 2004 ��

Commissione per gli affari esteri, i diritti dell'uomo, la sicurezza comune e la politica di difesa Documento di seduta

FINALE A5-0210/000 24 luglio 2000

RELAZIONE

sulla diplomazia comune comunitaria (2000/2006(INI)

commissione per gli affari esteri, i diritti dell'uomo, la sicurezza comune e la politica di difesa

Relatore: Gerardo Galeote Quecedo

RR\418758IT.doc PE 285.624

IT 25 IT

PE 285.624 2/15 RR\418758IT.doc

IT 26 INDICE

Pagina

PAGINA REGOLAMENTARE...... 4

PROPOSTA DI RISOLUZIONE ...... 5

MOTIVAZIONE ...... 10

RR\418758IT.doc 3/15 PE 285.624

27 IT PAGINA REGOLAMENTARE

Nella seduta del 21 gennaio 2000, la Presidente del Parlamento ha comunicato che la commissione per gli affari esteri, i diritti dell'uomo, la sicurezza comune e la politica di difesa era stata autorizzata a elaborare una relazione di iniziativa, a norma dell’articolo 163 del regolamento, sulla diplomazia comune comunitaria (2000/2006 INI).

Nella riunione del 23 settembre 1999 la commissione per gli affari esteri, i diritti dell'uomo, la sicurezza comune e la politica di difesa aveva nominato relatore Gerardo Galeote Quecedo.

Nelle riunioni del 21 marzo 2000, 8 maggio 2000, 5 giugno 2000 e 11 e 12 luglio 2000, la commissione ha esaminato il progetto di relazione

In quest'ultima riunione ha approvato la proposta di risoluzione con 43 voti favorevoli, 5 contrari e 5 astensioni.

Erano presenti al momento della votazione Elmar Brok (presidente); Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne (vicepresidente); William Francis Newton Dunn, (vicepresidente); Catherine Lalumière, (vicepresidente); Gerardo Galeote Quecedo (relatore); Alexandros Baltas, Bastiaan Belder, Andre Brie, John Walls Cushnahan, Karel C.C. Dillen, Michael Gahler, Per Gahrton, Jas Gawronski, Alfred Gomolka, Klaus Hänsch, Magdalene Hoff, Franco Marini, Pedro Marset Campos, Hugues Martin, Emilio Menéndez del Valle, Philippe Morillon, Pasqualina Napoletano, Raimon Obiols i Germa, José Pacheco Pereira, Hans-Gert Poettering, Jacques F. Poos, Luís Queiró, Jannis Sakellariou, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Pierre Schori, Elisabeth Schroedter, Ioannis Souladakis, Ursula Stenzel, Hannes Swoboda, Freddy Thielemans, Paavo Väyrynen, Jan Marinus Wiersma, Matti Wuori, Sir Robert Atkins (in sostituzione di Silvio Berlusconi), María Carrilho (in sostituzione di de Rosa M. Díez González), Joseph Daul (in sostituzione di The Lord Bethell), Proinsias De Rossa (in sostituzione di Claudio Martelli), Olivier Dupuis (in sostituzione di Emma Bonino), Giovanni Claudio Fava (in sostituzione di Sami Naïr), Cristina García-Orcoyen Tormo (in sostituzione di Ingo Friedrich), Vitalino Gemelli (in sostituzione di Marietta Giannakou-Koutsikou), Giorgos Katiforis (in sostituzione di Mário Soares), Christoph Werner Konrad (in sostituzione di Alain Lamassoure), Cecilia Malmström (in sostituzione di Francesco Rutelli), Jan Mulder (in sostituzione di Pere Esteve), Doris Pack (in sostituzione di Jacques Santer) e Lennart Sacrédeus (in sostituzione di Johan Van Hecke).

La relazione è stata presentata il 24 luglio 2000.

Il termine per la presentazione di emendamenti sarà indicato nel progetto di ordine del giorno della tornata nel corso della quale la relazione sarà esaminata.

PE 285.624 4/15 RR\418758IT.doc

IT 28 PROPOSTA DI RISOLUZIONE Risoluzione del Parlamento europeo sulla diplomazia comune comunitaria (2000/2006(INI))

Il Parlamento europeo,

- visto l'articolo 3, paragrafo 2 del trattato sull'Unione europea,

- visto l'articolo 20 del trattato sull'Unione europea,

- vista la sua risoluzione del 18 maggio 1995 sullo sviluppo della PESC nel 19941,

- vista la sua risoluzione del 18 luglio 1996 sullo sviluppo della PESC nel 19952,

- vista la sua risoluzione del 12 giugno 1997 sullo sviluppo della PESC nel 19963,

- vista la sua risoluzione del 28 maggio 1998 sulla PESC nel 19974,

- vista la sua risoluzione del 5 maggio 1999 sulla PESC nel 19985,

- visto l’articolo 163 del suo regolamento,

- vista la relazione della commissione per gli affari esteri, i diritti umani la sicurezza comune e la politica di difesa (A5-0210/2000),

A. considerando che dagli anni '50 fino ad oggi l'attività esterna della Comunità non ha cessato di crescere, superando progressivamente il suo carattere strettamente economico per abbracciare sempre più gli aspetti politici e diplomatici,

B. considerando che i numerosi funzionari incaricati in seno al Consiglio e alla Commissione europea delle relazioni esterne sono specialisti ma, in generale, mancano della formazione diplomatica necessaria per esercitare questa crescente attività esterna,

C. considerando che le relazioni esterne esigono personale specializzato, con una solida formazione tecnica e diplomatica, e che la situazione resta insoddisfacente malgrado i progressi realizzati dalla Commissione in materia di formazione dei suoi funzionari destinati a occuparsi dell'attività esterna,

D. considerando positivi gli sforzi compiuti dal comitato politico che ha approvato il 26 novembre 1999 il "Programma diplomatico europeo" aperto ai diplomatici nazionali e ai

1 GU C 151 del 19.6.1995, pag. 223. 2 GU C 181 del 24.6.1996, pag. 21. 3 GU C 200 del 30.6.1997, pag. 148. 4 GU C 195 del 22.6.1998, pag. 35. 5 GU C 279 del 1.10.1999, pag. 218.

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29 IT funzionari della Commissione e del Consiglio, onde contribuire alla creazione di un'identità europea in politica estera, ma il cui scarso sviluppo in concreto esige uno sforzo di ridefinizione ed incitamento,

E. considerando necessario volgersi alla creazione di un servizio diplomatico comunitario, professionale, permanente ed adeguato alle nuove circostanze, che contribuisca efficacemente al perseguimento degli obiettivi dell'Unione nella sfera internazionale,

F. considerando che, date le caratteristiche dello stesso servizio esterno, il carattere delle sue competenze e la vasta tradizione esistente in materia negli Stati membri, risulta imprescindibile stabilire un legame tra i diplomatici degli Stati membri e il nascente servizio diplomatico comunitario, permettendo così che l'Unione si avvantaggi della loro ricca e vasta esperienza,

G. considerando che, nonostante i progressi compiuti, continuano a sussistere disparità in seno alle delegazioni della Commissione e che è necessario chiarire e sviluppare la loro situazione giuridica, il loro ruolo e le loro relazioni con il Parlamento europeo e il Consiglio,

H. considerando che, sebbene le delegazioni formalmente dipendano in modo esclusivo dalla Commissione europea, sono collegate di fatto con il Consiglio e il Parlamento europeo e svolgono in pratica un lavoro di rappresentanza più ampio, ossia di tutta la Comunità, per cui sarebbe auspicabile dar forma giuridica a tale realtà,

I. considerando che la trasformazione delle delegazioni della Commissione in delegazioni della Comunità non richiede un nuovo trasferimento di competenze, dato che nell'ambito della PESC le delegazioni della Comunità agirebbero soltanto a norma delle disposizioni del trattato, rispettando le competenze della Presidenza e dell'Alto rappresentante della PESC,

J. considerando che in tale nuovo contesto le delegazioni della Comunità debbono disporre dei mezzi umani ed economici necessari, per cui devono avere a disposizione il bilancio necessario,

K. considerando adeguato l'insediamento di delegazioni regionali, che svolgano le loro funzioni rispetto ai vari Stati vicini, qualora opportuno a patto di garantire in seno alle stesse la presenza di personale specializzato in funzione degli interessi comunitari nell'area, e più particolarmente, per quanto riguarda l'appoggio ai processi di democratizzazione e di rispetto dei diritti umani, che deve essere incrementato,

L. considerando che, nonostante il livello di integrazione raggiunto dagli Stati membri, i loro servizi esterni soffrono in talune occasioni di mancanza di coordinamento, e che sarebbe opportuno garantire il coordinamento tra le ambasciate degli Stati membri e le delegazioni, proprio come disposto dall'articolo 20 del trattato sull'Unione europea,

M. considerando che il coordinamento è necessario al fine di mantenere la coerenza tra le questioni economiche (in cui la rappresentanza esterna corrisponde principalmente alla Commissione europea) e quelle politiche (in cui corrisponde alle missioni degli Stati membri e, in particolare, alla Presidenza); e che risulta un elemento essenziale per

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IT 30 garantire la visibilità ed efficacia della PESC,

N. considerando la necessità di stabilire un sistema basato sulla trasparenza e sullo spirito di collaborazione che garantisca la complementarità dell'azione diplomatica della Comunità e degli Stati membri, al fine di raggiungere gli obiettivi stabiliti nel trattato,

O. considerando che l'obiettivo previsto non consiste assolutamente nella creazione di una diplomazia unica che sostituisca i servizi esterni degli Stati membri mediante servizi propriamente europei bensì si tratta, semplicemente, di migliorare la qualità del servizio esterno comune della Comunità e trovare un coordinamento più stretto con i servizi esterni degli Stati membri, rispondendo così alla nuova realtà europea e internazionale,

P. considerando che non si deve dimenticare la possibilità in futuro, dopo il riconoscimento della personalità giuridica dell'Unione, di compiere passi più ambiziosi in tale ambito, costituendo, come richiesto ripetutamente dal Parlamento, ambasciate dell'Unione composte dalla delegazione della Comunità e dalle missioni degli Stati membri che desiderano essere presenti nel paese terzo,

Q. considerando che per dotare di maggiore efficacia gli strumenti al servizio dell'azione esterna comunitaria, ritiene necessario avanzare principalmente in tre direzioni: la formazione specializzata dei funzionari della Commissione europea destinati al servizio esterno; la chiarificazione e lo sviluppo del quadro giuridico che regola il funzionamento delle delegazioni della Commissione europea, nonché le loro relazioni con il Parlamento europeo e il Consiglio; la collaborazione più stretta tra tali delegazioni e le ambasciate degli Stati membri,

Sulla formazione dei funzionari comunitari destinati ad occuparsi dell'attività esterna ed il contributo dei servizi diplomatici degli Stati membri

1. propone l'obiettivo di costituire una Scuola diplomatica comunitaria, che garantisca ai funzionari comunitari impegnati nell'attività esterna, tanto della Commissione europea (nelle delegazioni e nelle DG RELEX) quanto del Consiglio (nella DG delle relazioni esterne del Segretariato generale del Consiglio e della cellula di programmazione politica e tempestivo allarme), non soltanto la preparazione tecnica relativa alle politiche comunitarie, bensì una formazione prettamente diplomatica e in relazioni internazionali; la Scuola diplomatica comunitaria potrebbe altresì essere aperta agli Stati membri che volessero eventualmente fornire una formazione supplementare ad alcuni dei loro diplomatici nonché offrire una formazione ai diplomatici dei paesi candidati come parte della loro preparazione all’adesione e fornire programmi di studio, di ricerca e di formazione in collaborazione con istituzioni universitarie europee;

2. propone che, fino a quando non esisterà una Scuola diplomatica comunitaria, i funzionari comunitari e i diplomatici degli Stati membri che lo desiderano possano perfezionare la propria formazione attraverso programmi e seminari approfonditi, ove possibile in collaborazione con le istituzioni universitarie europee di riconosciuto prestigio e, in particolare, con quelle finanziate dalla Comunità e con le scuole diplomatiche degli Stati membri;

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31 IT 3. invita il Consiglio e la Commissione ad esaminare le diverse procedure mediante le quali si possa articolare un sistema efficace di ponte tra i servizi esterni nazionali e quello comunitario, in modo da prevedere l'integrazione temporanea dei diplomatici degli Stati membri nel servizio esterno comunitario;

4. propone infine che l’approfondimento della formazione dei funzionari e il primo passo verso la creazione di una Scuola diplomatica comunitaria ricevano finanziamenti adeguati nell’ambito del bilancio generale e che entro la fine di quest’anno sia convocato un incontro delle scuole diplomatiche e degli istituti diplomatici europei con gli organi competenti della Commissione, onde avanzare nei programmi di formazione dei funzionari della Commissione, nella creazione della Scuola diplomatica comunitaria e nello sviluppo di un sistema di ponti tra i servizi esterni della Comunità e degli Stati membri;

Sulla chiarificazione e lo sviluppo dello status giuridico delle delegazioni della Commissione europea, del loro ruolo e della loro relazione con le istituzioni comunitarie

5. ritiene che, benché il Parlamento abbia già espresso in ripetute occasioni la volontà che le delegazioni si trasformino in ambasciate dell'Unione, dato che attualmente essa non dispone di personalità giuridica, e onde realizzare i cambiamenti in modo graduale, propone che si avanzi trasformando le delegazioni della Commissione in delegazioni della Comunità (la quale gode di personalità giuridica internazionale), affinché, pur mantenendo il loro spazio nell'organigramma della Commissione, si possa sviluppare giuridicamente il loro legame con il Parlamento e il Segretariato generale del Consiglio;

6. propone di regolamentare le relazioni delle delegazioni con le commissioni parlamentari e le delegazioni interparlamentari onde promuovere una maggiore informazione e controllo politico, ed assicurare nella pratica che i capi delegazione compaiano davanti alle istanze parlamentari quando le circostanze politiche lo richiedano;

7. propone di prevedere che i capi delegazione compaiano sistematicamente davanti alla commissione per gli affari esteri del Parlamento europeo prima di assumere le loro funzioni, per esporre e discutere il loro piano di lavoro;

8. propone che la delegazione UE condivida sistematicamente la responsabilità per le visite in occasione di missioni ufficiali del PPE e che si impegni a prestare assistenza durante visite/missioni ufficiali di singoli deputati del PPE;

9. chiede che ogni anno la Commissione presenti al Parlamento europeo e al Consiglio una relazione sul funzionamento delle delegazioni;

10. propone di regolare le relazioni delle delegazioni con l'Alto rappresentante della PESC, includendo il loro dovere di assistenza sia allo stesso Alto rappresentante della PESC sia ai membri del Parlamento europeo quando visitino la zona nell'esercizio delle loro funzioni;

11. propone che la Commissione presenti all'esame del Parlamento una ristrutturazione delle geografia delle sue delegazioni all'estero, nel quadro della loro trasformazione in delegazioni della Comunità, e in funzione degli interessi che abbia nei vari Stati;

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IT 32 Sul coordinamento tra le delegazioni ed i servizi esterni degli Stati membri

12. propone la redazione di relazioni comuni in cui le ambasciate degli Stati membri (in particolare quella della Presidenza di turno) e la delegazione esprimano in modo congiunto i loro punti di vista;

13. ritiene che la diplomazia comunitaria comune debba assicurare una rappresentanza coordinata dell'Unione europea in seno a organizzazioni internazionali come l’ONU, l’FMI e simili, nonché a livello regionale in America centro-meridionale, Africa, ecc.;

14. propone di promuovere l'informazione in comune del Consiglio e tramite esso delle capitali (segnatamente nel caso delle rappresentanze davanti agli organismi internazionali in cui si sono registrati casi di sovrapposizione d'attività che potrebbero essere ridotti) e del Parlamento europeo;

15. propone di regolamentare gli eventuali raggruppamenti delle missioni diplomatiche degli Stati che lo desiderino con le delegazioni, il che risulterebbe in un migliore coordinamento dell'attività esterna e nella riduzione dei costi essendo condivise le infrastrutture;

16. propone di far sì che gli Stati membri che lo auspichino possano utilizzare nei paesi terzi in cui non dispongano di rappresentanza diplomatica, le attuali delegazioni della Commissione per destinare in quella sede alcuni dei loro diplomatici che, oltre a contribuire con il loro apporto all'arricchimento della politica esterna comunitaria, si occuperebbero del mantenimento delle relazioni bilaterali;

17. incarica la sua Presidente di trasmettere la presente risoluzione alla Commissione e al Consiglio.

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33 IT MOTIVAZIONE I. SULL'ATTIVITÀ ESTERNA DELL'UNIONE

I. 1. L'attività esterna della Comunità europea

1. Fin dall'origine, l'attività esterna della Comunità ha avuto un carattere marcatamente economico, incentrandosi sulle relazioni commerciali, in cui la Comunità ha competenze esclusive, e sull'aiuto allo sviluppo.

2. Una netta separazione, nella pratica, tra gli aspetti economici e gli altri aspetti della politica esterna è tuttavia impossibile. L'attività esterna comunitaria presenta anche un aspetto politico fondamentale e crescente.

3. D'altronde, le successive riforme hanno progressivamente ampliato le competenze comunitarie, tanto che attualmente il trattato attribuisce espressamente alla Comunità competenze esterne nei seguenti ambiti: politica commerciale, associazione di paesi e territori d'oltremare, relazioni con altri organizzazioni internazionali, ricerca e sviluppo tecnologico, politica ambientale, istruzione, formazione professionale e gioventù, cultura, sanità pubblica, reti transeuropee, unione economica e monetaria, cooperazione allo sviluppo.

4. Il risultato è un amplissimo e variegato ventaglio di competenze esterne, principalmente ma non esclusivamente economiche, che la Comunità esercita in modo esclusivo o in concorso con gli Stati membri.

5. È opportuno analizzare chi sono gli attori che si occupano della gestione interna e della rappresentanza esterna di questa attività.

La gestione interna

6. La Commissione e il Consiglio partecipano alla conclusione degli accordi internazionali. Il Parlamento europeo interviene in varie fasi del processo, esercitando una funzione fondamentale di controllo politico. Nell'attuazione degli accordi e nella gestione dei fondi un ruolo decisivo è svolto dalla Commissione.

7. I funzionari del Consiglio e della Commissione partecipano alla definizione e all'attuazione di questa attività esterna. Nella Commissione partecipano alla gestione delle relazioni esterne le seguenti Direzioni generali: Relazioni esterne, Commercio, Sviluppo, Allargamento, Servizio comune per le relazioni esterne e Ufficio per gli aiuti comunitari. Nell'ambito del Segretariato del Consiglio le competenze in materia sono specialmente della Direzione generale E, Relazioni esterne.

La rappresentanza esterna

8. Per esercitare queste competenze è sorta la necessità di mantenere relazioni permanenti con Stati terzi ed organizzazioni internazionali. Così, la Commissione ha creato delegazioni che,

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IT 34 di fatto, hanno esercitato finora la funzione di rappresentanza esterna della Comunità.

9. Per quanto riguarda le politiche comunitarie, le delegazioni della Commissione hanno il monopolio della rappresentanza della Comunità nello Stato beneficiario. Quando invece ci si muove nell'ambito delle competenze concorrenti, è necessaria un'associazione fra le delegazioni e le missioni degli Stati membri.

10. Le delegazioni sono andate incontro ad una spettacolare espansione: attualmente se ne contano 111 (oltre a 17 uffici).

11. La funzione di queste delegazioni si è incentrata sul settore economico e commerciale, ma col tempo hanno assunto funzioni non strettamente economiche. Nei paesi industrializzati e davanti alle organizzazioni internazionali esercitano una funzione fondamentale di rappresentanza politica della Comunità. Nei paesi in via di sviluppo e in quelli candidati all'adesione la funzione politica delle delegazioni è aumentata notevolmente. Tale fenomeno si è accentuato con la PESC.

I. 2. La politica estera e di sicurezza comune

12. Con il TUE si è compiuto un passo fondamentale nel superamento del carattere economico dell'attività esterna. Per anni, e in virtù di una distinzione artificiosa, le competenze esterne in ambito economico spettavano alla Comunità, mentre il resto della politica estera era di competenza degli Stati membri. Dopo la riforma di Maastricht l'Unione partecipa alla politica estera non economica la quale, pur continuando ad essere di competenza degli Stati membri, è oggetto di concertazione nel quadro della PESC.

13. Tale trasformazione si riflette in un miglior coordinamento tra l'attività esterna della Comunità e la politica estera, nonostante la separazione mantenuta attraverso la struttura dei pilastri. Il coordinamento, su cui insiste l'articolo 3 del TUE, è imprescindibile, poiché la politica commerciale e la politica di aiuto allo sviluppo sono strumenti fondamentali della politica estera.

14. Con la PESC l'Unione riveste una nuova dimensione, superando definitivamente l'ambito economico. Le istituzioni saranno ora partecipi di una nuova sfera, quella della politica estera non economica, delle relazioni internazionali classiche, della diplomazia.

15. È opportuno analizzare in che modo le istituzioni e i loro funzionari partecipano alla gestione interna e alla rappresentanza esterna della PESC.

Gestione interna

16. Il Consiglio europeo definisce i principi e gli orientamenti generali della PESC e adotta le strategie comuni. In sede di Consiglio gli Stati si consultano, e adottano le azioni e le posizioni comuni, la cui attuazione spetta principalmente alla Presidenza. La Commissione è pienamente associata ai lavori della PESC, ha facoltà d'iniziativa ed è associata alla Presidenza nella rappresentanza e nell'attuazione della PESC. il Parlamento europeo è

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35 IT consultato e informato, presenta interrogazioni e discute sui progressi compiuti.

17. Dato il carattere intergovernativo della PESC, il peso del sistema ricade sul Consiglio. È però opportuno rilevare che il baricentro politico del processo decisionale si sposta dalle capitali verso Bruxelles.

18. Tutto ciò comporta la partecipazione dei funzionari del Consiglio e della Commissione alla politica estera. Il Segretario generale del Consiglio esercita la funzione di Alto rappresentante della PESC ed è responsabile di una cellula di programmazione politica e tempestivo allarme. La Commissione è pienamente associata alla PESC e pertanto le Direzioni generali competenti per le relazioni esterne e le delegazioni partecipano all'attuazione della politica estera.

La rappresentanza esterna

19. Nella cooperazione politica la Presidenza rappresenta l'Unione e la Commissione le è associata, con l'assistenza dell'Alto rappresentante per la PESC e, se necessario, dello Stato membro che eserciterà la Presidenza successiva.

20. Se nella sfera comunitaria la rappresentanza esterna è compito soprattutto delle delegazioni della Commissione, nell'ambito della PESC tale compito spetta principalmente alla Presidenza del Consiglio. In tale ambito il ruolo delle delegazioni è minore, ma anch'esse partecipano poiché la Commissione è associata alla funzione di rappresentanza, e l'articolo 20 del TUE dispone che le delegazioni cooperino con le missioni diplomatiche degli Stati membri.

II. SULLA FORMAZIONE DEI FUNZIONARI COMUNITARI DESTINATI AD OCCUPARSI DELL'ATTIVITÀ ESTERNA

II. 1. Situazione attuale dei funzionari

21. Negli Stati dell'Unione i membri del corpo diplomatico vengono reclutati mediante concorsi specifici e ricevono una formazione specializzata. Al contrario, nella Comunità, i funzionari destinati all'attività esterna, a Bruxelles e nelle delegazioni, sono reclutati mediante concorsi generali. Attualmente, non esiste una categoria specializzata di funzionari incaricati di politica estera, né una formazione specifica a loro destinata.

22. Fino al 1994, né il personale delle delegazioni né quello delle DG RELEX, riceveva alcuna formazione specifica.

23. Per molto tempo è stato applicato un sistema di rotazione volontaria. I funzionari delle DG RELEX non avevano l'obbligo di prestare servizio presso le delegazioni, e quando lo facevano, era frequente che restassero per molti anni nella stessa sede di destinazione.

24. Tali carenze hanno impedito una resa maggiore della rappresentanza esterna. Nel 1994, la Commissione ha deciso di creare un servizio esterno unificato ed ha costituito un gruppo di

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IT 36 lavoro incaricato di individuare le necessità a lungo termine del servizio esterno, la cui attività si è concretizzata nella relazione Williamson approvata il 27.3.1996. Grazie a queste iniziative vi sono stati cambiamenti che hanno consentito un certo progresso, a nostro giudizio insufficiente.

25. Si è provveduto ad organizzare un programma di formazione interna (che si svolge principalmente durante o dopo il periodo delle vacanze estive), alcuni corsi preliminari all'assegnazione nella nuova sede per i funzionari che andranno ad occupare un posto all'estero, e si sta preparando un corso per l'assunzione delle funzioni specifico per i funzionari delle DG RELEX e del servizio esterno.

26. È stato istituito un sistema di rotazione obbligatoria, in virtù del quale i funzionari A delle DG RELEX dovranno prestare servizio in delegazione.

27. La Commissione ha cercato di migliorare il coordinamento con i servizi diplomatici degli Stati membri, cercando di far sì che alcuni diplomatici degli Stati membri prestino servizio presso le DG RELEX a presso le delegazioni. Tuttavia, i progressi conseguiti in questo campo sono quasi insignificanti.

II.2. Il corpo diplomatico comunitario

28. Riteniamo che attualmente la formazione specializzata offerta ai funzionari comunitari destinati alla politica esterna sia motto limitata a che il coinvolgimento dei diplomatici degli Stati membri sia minimo.

29. Riteniamo necessario avanzare verso la creazione di un vero corpo diplomatico comunitario professionale, permanente a adeguato alle nuove circostanze. A tal fine, sarebbe necessario modificare lo statuto dei funzionari, creando una categoria specializzata e rendendo la formazione continua un elemento obbligatorio dell’evoluzione della carriera.

30. Dovrebbe essere creata una Scuola diplomatica comunitaria in modo da garantire ai funzionari non solamente una preparazione tecnica nelle politiche comunitarie, ma anche una formazione pienamente diplomatica e una formazione in materia di relazioni internazionali. La Scuola dovrebbe essere inoltre aperta agli Stati membri che volessero fornire ai propri diplomatici una formazione supplementare nonché offrire una formazione ai diplomatici dei paesi candidati come parte della loro preparazione all’adesione. Identificando ed adeguando le “migliori pratiche” di formazione in uso nelle scuole diplomatiche nazionali ed introducendo elementi europei innovativi di formazione, la Scuola potrebbe svolgere un ruolo guida nello sviluppo di pratiche comuni del servizio esterno e di una “cultura comune” per i funzionari dell’Unione europea e degli Stati membri impegnati nei servizi esterni. La creazione di una tale Scuola implica che la Comunità fornisca formazione anche ai diplomatici nazionali e ai diplomatici dei paesi candidati.

31. Per le caratteristiche proprie del servizio esterno a la lunga tradizione esistente in tale campo negli Stati membri, è necessario creare un legame fra i diplomatici degli Stati membri e il nascente carpo diplomatico europeo. A tal fine è imprescindibile stabilire un sistema di ponti tra il servizio esterno nazionale a quello comunitario.

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37 IT

III. SULLA NECESSITÀ DI CHIARIRE LO STATUS GIURIDICO DELLE DELEGAZIONI, IL LORO RUOLO E LA LORO RELAZIONE CON LE ISTITUZIONI COMUNITARIE

32. È necessario chiarire ed uniformare l'organizzazione e le funzioni delle delegazioni della Commissione. Le delegazioni rappresentano a livello internazionale la Commissione, ma essa non è dotata di personalità giuridica internazionale, il che porta a confusione. D'altronde, sebbene formalmente dipendano esclusivamente dalla Commissione, sono associate di fatto al Consiglio e al Parlamento europeo a compiono in pratica un lavoro di rappresentanza più ampio, ossia di tutta la Comunità. Appare quindi necessario formalizzare tale fatto, trasformando le delegazioni della Commissione in delegazioni della Comunità, il che supererebbe lo scoglio della mancanza di personalità giuridica internazionale.

33. Le delegazioni della Comunità manterrebbero la loro sede nell'organigramma della Commissione, ma verrebbero chiarite a rese più strette le loro relazioni con il Consiglio e con il Parlamento europeo secondo i termini previsti nella proposta di risoluzione.

34. Non possiamo non sottolineare l'esistenza di importanti deficit a livello di risorse umane nelle delegazioni a causa della mancanza di sostegno finanziario. Ciò è provato dal fatto che le delegazioni sono costituite soltanto da 693 funzionari, rispetto ai quasi 2000 agenti locali ai quali la Commissione fa ricorso in gran misura per deficit di bilancio.

35. Il nuovo contesto richiede un appoggio finanziario. Tale questione deve essere affrontata nella proposta di bilancio che presenterà la Commissione per i prossimi esercizi a dev'essere tenuta presente dal Parlamento nelle sue discussioni.

IV. SULLA NECESSITÀ DI COORDINARE L'ATTIVITÀ DELLE DELEGAZIONI E DEI SERVIZI ESTERNI DEGLI STATI MEMBRI

36. La rappresentanza esterna dell'Unione risulta confusa ed è necessario promuovere un maggior coordinamento tra le ambasciate degli Stati membri a le delegazioni, a norma dell'articolo 20 del TUE.

37. Solo in tal modo sarà possibile mantenere la coerenza fra gli affari economici, per i quali la rappresentanza esterna spetta in misura assai rilevante alle delegazioni, a quelli politici, per i quali essa spetta alle missioni degli Stati membri a alla Presidenza. Per promuovere il coordinamento, sarebbe opportuno promuovere la redazione periodica di relazioni comuni, nonché l'informazione comune delle capitali e, qualora necessario, del Parlamento europeo.

38. La stretta cooperazione tra le ambasciate degli Stati membri a la delegazione può risultare fondamentale per risolvere talune difficoltà attualmente incontrate dai ministeri degli affari. esteri. I servizi esterni subiscono drastici tagli di bilancio, mentre, al contempo, aumentano le necessità di rappresentanza nel mondo. Alcuni Stati si vedono nell'impossibilità di adempiere la funzione di rappresentanza che incombe Toro durante la loro presidenza poiché mancano di ambasciate in numerosi paesi.

39. Per ovviare a tali difficoltà a promuovere la necessaria cooperazione nel servizio esterno

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IT 38 man mane che si avanza sulla via di una politica estera europea, sarebbe opportune prevedere l'accorpamento delle ambasciate nazionali che lo decidano con le delegazioni, il che comporterebbe infrastrutture in comune, consentendo una riduzione di costi. È altresì possibile che gli Stati membri che non dispongano di rappresentanza diplomatica utilizzino la delegazione per destinarvi un diplomatico, disponibile a rappresentare il sue paese nelle relazioni bilaterali.

40. Non si esclude che in future, dopo il riconoscimento della personalità giuridica dell'Unione, possano farsi passi più ambiziosi, costituendo ambasciate dell'Unione, secondo i termini precisati nella proposta di risoluzione.

41. Il Parlamento europeo è intervenuto in ripetute occasioni su tali questioni secondo i termini del documento di lavoro.

42. Lo scopo della presente relazione non è quello di perorare la causa di una diplomazia unica che sostituisca i servizi esterni degli Stati membri con i servizi propriamente europei, bensì proporre una serie di adeguamenti dei servizi esterni alla nuova realtà europea e internazionale attraverso diverse procedure che assicurino una maggiore efficienza per contribuire in mode migliore alla politica estera comune dell'Unione europea.

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Mission Statement

The European Policy Centre is an independent, not-for- profit think tank, committed to making European integration work. The EPC works at the ‘cutting edge’ of European and global policy-making providing its members and the wider public with rapid, high-quality information EPC WORKING PAPER No.28 and analysis on the EU and global policy agenda. It aims to promote a balanced dialogue between the different The EU Foreign Service: constituencies of its membership, spanning all aspects of how to build a more effective economic and social life. common policy

Graham Avery Antonio Missiroli Jolyon Howorth Anne-Marie Le Gloannec David Rijks Richard Whitman Simon Duke Stephan Keukeleire Cornelius Adebahr Giovanni Grevi Julia Lieb Andreas Maurer

November 2007

European Policy Centre Résidence Palace 155 Rue de la Loi 1040 Brussels Tel: 32 (0)2 231 03 40 Fax: 32 (0)2 231 07 04 In strategic partnership with the King Baudouin Foundation Email: [email protected] and the Compagnia di San Paolo www.epc.eu

EU43 INTEGRATION & CITIZENSHIP With the support of the European Commission EUROPE IN THE WORLD EPC WORKING PAPER No.28

The EU Foreign Service: how to build a more effective common policy

EPC Working Papers represent the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the EPC.

November 2007

Graham Avery Antonio Missiroli Jolyon Howorth Anne-Marie Le Gloannec David Rijks Richard Whitman Simon Duke Stephan Keukeleire Cornelius Adebahr Giovanni Grevi Julia Lieb Andreas Maurer

EU INTEGRATION & CITIZENSHIP ISSN-1782-2424 44 EUROPE IN THE WORLD 4 November 2007 Annexes Executive summary Avery Graham by and recommendations conclusions Maurer Towards aEuropeanForeign Service: Andreas and Lieb Julia by timelines priorities, variables, oftheEEAS: The ‘how’ Cornelius by Keukeleire whatlessonsfortheEEAS? The EUSpecialRepresentatives: Stephan and Duke Simon by Liaison GroupsandEUforeignpolicy David by Gloannec trends andoptions Le inthirdcountries: representation European diplomatic Anne-Marie and Howorth Jolyon by logicbehindtheEEAS The institutional Missiroli Antonio by andanarch – oftwo pillars Atale Introduction: Av Graham by Foreword Richard Whitman Richard and Rijks Adebahr and Giovanni Grevi Grevi Giovanni and Adebahr ery and and ery Antonio Missiroli Antonio AL FCONTENTS TABLE OF 45 80 79 74 65 56 48 35 28 9 6 Centre’s EUNeighbourhoodForum. and ModernLanguages,University ofBathandChairtheEuropeanPolicy Richard Whitman isProfessorofPolitics, Department ofEuropeanStudies of Cambridge. David RijksisaPh.D. Candidate,CentreofInternational Studies,University Antonio MissiroliisDirectorofStudiesattheEuropeanPolicy Centre. German InstituteforInternationalandSecurity Affairs (SWP). Andreas MaurerisHeadoftheResearch UnitonEUintegration atthe Institute forInternationalandSecurity Affairs (SWP). Julia Liebworks intheResearch UnitonEUintegration attheGerman de Recherches Internationales),Paris. Anne-Marie LeGloannecisDirectorofResearch atCERI(Centred'Etudeset University ofLeuven, and Visiting ProfessorattheCollegeofEurope(Bruges). Stephan Keukeleire isJean MonnetProfessorinEuropeanForeign Policy atthe and Jean MonnetProfessorofEuropeanPolitics attheUniversity ofBath. Jolyon Howorth is Visiting ProfessorofPolitical Scienceat Yale University Studies, Paris. Giovanni GreviisSeniorResearch Fellow attheEUInstituteforSecurity Maastricht. Simon DukeisaProfessorattheEuropeanInstituteofPublic Administration, Commission official. the EuropeanPolicy Centre’s BalkanEuropeForum, andaformerEuropean Graham Avery isaSenior Adviser totheEuropeanPolicy CentreandChairof Auswärtige Politik (DGAP)–theGermanCouncilonForeign Relations,Berlin. Cornelius Adebahr isProgramme OfficerattheDeutsche Gesellschaft für About theauthors 46

5 November 2007 6 November 2007 the Constitutional Treaty initstracks. There was clearlyaneedtoresume published in April 2005,shortlybeforethereferendathatstopped on fromanIssuePaper onthistopic,entitled on ‘EUIntegration andCitizenship’‘Europeinthe World’, follows This Working Paper, publishedunder theauspicesofEPC’s programmes for doingthis. practice –notleastbecausethe Treaty isvague ontheprecisearrangements detail how thechanges enshrinedinthe Treaty mightbestbeimplementedin useful toreflectfurtheronthisreformofEU‘foreignpolicy’ andconsideredin In thecontextofnew Treaty, theEuropeanPolicy Centrefeltitwould be continued toattract universal support. having anEUforeignpolicy ‘chief’ backed by his orherown ‘foreign service’ ‘clarifications’ oftheprecisearrangements notwithstanding,thenotionof Presidency –thereforecameasasurprisetomany. ButtheBritishrequestsfor Conference (IGC)–andinthesubsequentnegotiationsunderPortuguese 2007 Summitwhich agreedadetailedmandatefortheIntergovernmental The UKgovernment’s decisiontoreopenthisissueintherun-upJune and analysts. of revision.Onthecontrary, ithadbeenwidelypraised by themainactors Constitution which beganinJanuary 2007.Norwas itconsideredinneed cause any realdifficultiesinthenegotiationsonareplacementfor and Dutch referendumcampaignsof2005,andwas notexpectedto This sectionofthe Treaty was notasource ofcontroversy intheFrench the leastcontentiousaspectsofConstitutional Treaty. and SecurityPolicy andtheCommissionerforExternalRelations,was oneof roles andfunctionsofthecurrentHighRepresentative forCommonForeign to supportthefuture“UnionMinisterforForeign Affairs”, combiningthe Indeed, theproposaltoestablisha“EuropeanExternal Action Service”(EEAS) voice wherever possibleby developing acommonforeignpolicy. Union toplay astrongroleontheinternational stageandspeakwithone Missiroli Opinion pollsconsistentlyshow highlevels ofpublicsupportfortheEuropean Antonio and Avery Graham by Foreword 47 Towards an EU Foreign Service Foreign EU an Towards , h ru’ ok n éôeBcua includealltherelevant articlesfrom the group’s work, andJérôme Bacquias– and thenfinalisedby hersuccessorsMariusOsswald, who alsocoordinated The Annexes –puttogetherinitially by EPCProgramme Assistant Sofie Thorin foreign policy. and allframe theEEASissuewithinbroaderdiscussiononEuropean function atBrussels‘Headquarters’andontheground inthirdcountries– highlight, atleastimplicitly, thedifferencebetweenway theEEASwill institutions have adapted(orhave toadapt)thisnewcontext. All tendto implications fortheestablishmentofEEAS,othersonway common Some dwell onthemaintrendsamongMemberStatesandtheirpossible ideas andrecommendations. preferably becalledaEuropeanForeign Service–andincludeanalyses, the keyissuesrelatedtoestablishmentofthisnewservice–which should its meetingsandfurtherrefinedinlightofthosediscussions. They tackle This Working Paper includesthemainpaperspresentedby thegroupduring force (assumingasuccessfulratification process). eventual ratification, ifitistobeestablishedassoonthe Treaty comesinto in moredetailsoonafterthesignatureofnew Treaty, andwellbeforeits this sincethecreationofEEASwillneedtobediscussedandnegotiated implementation ofthenewprovisions. Itfelttherewas anurgentneedtodo main findingsandproposalsintimeforthestartofdebateon outcome oftheIGC,groupdecidedtofinaliseapublicationwithits As aconsequence,despitesomeremaininguncertaintyover thefinal Common Foreign andSecurityPolicy. Security Policy’) andareaffirmationofthedistinctive natureoftheUnion’s of ‘Foreign Minister’(renamed‘HighRepresentative forForeign Affairs and policy provisions oftheConstitutional Treaty –apartfromachange inthetitle The mandatefortheensuingIGCincludednexttonochange totheforeign European Councilof22-23June onthenewReform Treaty. issues, andthentoreassessthestateofplay in thelightofagreementat before thesummerbreak,firsttoexchange viewsonandanalysetherelevant To thisend,a‘projectgroup’was convened inMay 2007andmetthreetimes of expertsandofficialsinvolved intheprocessvarious capacities. that reflectioninlightofthenewsituation,andtoextenditanumber 48

7 November 2007 8 November 2007 Antonio Missiroli is Director ofStudiesattheEuropeanPolicyAntonio MissiroliisDirector Centre. Commission official. the EuropeanPolicy Centre’s Balkan Graham Avery isaSenior Adviser totheEuropean Policy CentreandChairof the rightdirection. phase ofthedebateonthisissueandguidingsubsequentdecisionsin It isourhopethatthis Working Paper willcontributetofosteringthenext in May 2005,beforethereferendathatputan endtothatphaseofthedebate. High Representative andtheCommissionPresident totheEuropeanCouncil the newReform Treaty aswelltheProgressReportdelivered jointlyby the 49 uoeFrm andaformerEuropean Europe Forum, of specificforeign In otherwords, theissueof‘dualism’isquitearecentone,sincenumber in otherinternationalorganisationsliketheUnitedNationsorNATO. individual foreignpoliciesoftheMemberStates,includingtheirengagement Moreover, theyhave longcoexisted–moreorlesshappilywiththe developed separately alongparallel lines,withalmostnooverlap ordualism. It isalsotrue,however, thatforalongtimethesetwo dimensionshave the internationalstage. the EuropeanUnionfirstbegantohave anexternalpresence andacton Maastricht Treaty intoformal‘pillars’.Indeed,thishasbeenthecasesince Community andintergovernmental dimensions,laterturnedby the long suffered(andstillsuffers)fromanintrinsic‘dualism’betweenits It isfrequentlyarguedthatEurope’s commonforeign policy has Missiroli Antonio By Introduction: Ataleof two pillars–andanarch programmes, ofteninconnectionwithprivileged trade agreements. countries andregionswhere theCommunityran development aid stemmed, ofcourse,fromtheneedtobepresenton groundinallthose The gradual expansionofthe EuropeanCommission’s externalrepresentation Where from? TheEuropean Commission debate oninstitutionalarchitecture. involved, while alsotakinganoriginalangleintheongoingEuropean an interestingway ofhominginonthesubstancepolicy (orpolicies) opportunities theEUfacestoday. Focusing ontheforeignserviceistherefore In fact,ithascometoepitomisethecomplexityofchallenges andthe common European‘foreignservice’–intoapoliticalone. turning anapparentlytechnical issue–theexpectedcreationofasingle increasingly difficulttokeepallthoseboxesseparate) hascontributedto international stage)andtheonsetofglobalisation(which hasmadeit demands ontheUniontoactmoreeffectively anddecisively onthe The combinedeffectofprogressinEuropeanintegration (withgrowing politically aswellbureaucratically. policies were previouslycarriedoutinseparate ‘boxes’, 50

9 November 2007 10 November 2007 new structures. as wellageneral staffingfreezethathamperedthedevelopment ofthe headquarters, namelyfromrecurrentturfbattlesbetween Commissioners Tensions andproblemsalsocamefrominsidetheCommission’s Berlaymont structures inBrusselsandtheMemberStates’embassies inthirdcountries. also highlightingforthefirsttimepotential‘dualism’ withtheCouncil Heads ofStaterather thanForeign Ministers–strengthenedthistrend,while Heads ofDelegationstoambassadorialstatus–throughaccreditationby necessarily becamemuch morediverse. The simultaneousupgrading ofthe This hadclearrepercussions forthecompositionoftheirstaff,which Service (1994),thescopeofDelegations’tasksbroadenedsignificantly. external economicaffairs)–andwiththeensuingcreationofaUnifiedExternal dedicated Commissioner(Hansvan denBroek)–asdistinctfromDGIproper(for With thecreationofDGIA(forexternalpoliticalaffairs)underauthoritya Security Policy (CFSP). structures inthedomainofnewlyestablishedCommonForeign and which was alsointendedto‘match’ theparallel development ofCouncil The signingoftheMaastricht Treaty promptedafurtherreorganisation, 90 officesonsixcontinentswithanincreasinglyprofessionalisedstaff. on trade andpoliticalaffairs.Bytheendofdecade,itencompassedsome the Delegations’network beganevolving intoastructurewithmoreemphasis because oftheparallel development ofEuropeanPolitical Cooperation (EPC), In the1980s,inpartbecauseofEU’s Iberianenlargementandinpart New York (UN),where ittookup‘observer’ status. offices inmultilateral organisations–inParis (OECD),Geneva (GATT), and New Delhi,Bangkok,Caracas and Tokyo, andopeneditsfirst‘diplomatic’ European Communityalsoextendeditsrepresentationtoplacessuch as However, duringtheera ofCommissionerClaudeCheysson(1973-81)the putting analmostexclusive emphasisonproject management. had aprimarilytechnical profile(engineers,agronomists,administrators), Lomé Convention. At thatpoint,however, mostoftheDelegations’personnel the wake oftheEU’s 1973enlargementtotheUKandsignatureof1975 Development) thatthenetwork ofDelegationsbegantakingrootandshape,in This explainswhy itwas in thethenDG VIII (today’s Directorate-General for 51 2 1 3 The interaction betweenthe two menandthe CFSP andSecretary-General oftheCouncilJavier Solana. new player on the othersideofRuedelaLoi,HighRepresentative for Chris Patten’s approach andattitudealsohelpedsmoothrelationswiththe individual Commissionerstobe‘coordinated’by afellow Collegemember. This newset-upworked reasonablywell,despitethereluctanceof structures intheCouncil. functional units,withaviewto‘matching’, onceagain,theemergingESDP Directorate forCFSPwas alsosetupwithinDGRELEXandarranged infour European SecurityandDefencePolicy (ESDP)was launched, aseparate Moreover, when the Amsterdam Treaty enteredintoforce andthenew for trade. for development aid,Günther Verheugen forenlargement,andPascal Lamy Director-General, andtheappointmentofChrisPatten asa resulting inthecreationofDGRELEX(ExternalRelations)properwithanew With theProdiCommission(1999-2004)cameanotherinternalreorganisation, which itwas “fullyassociated”–forfearofantagonisingtheMemberStates. hesitant orreluctanttouseitshard-won sharedrightofinitiative inCFSP–to of projectmanagement.Ontheotherhand,sameCommissionseemed enhancing itsroleinthefledglingCFSPthanonmoretraditional domain On theonehand,Commissionappearedmorefocusedonpreservingor was incharge of,amongotherthings,humanitarianaffairs. and, moregenerally, unnecessaryfragmentation: CommissionerEmmaBonino in thenewset-up,withoverlapping zonesofcompetence(forexample,intrade) with coordinatingexternalpolicies.However, therewerestillmany greyareas An internalCollegecommitteechaired by Jacques Santerhimselfwas tasked and ACP countries/Lomé(Joao deDeusPinheiro). Latin America/Mediterranean/Middle East/developing Asia (ManuelMarin) Commissioner Hansvan denBroek),industrialisedworld (LeonBrittan), geographical responsibilities:Central Europe/Russia/CIS(under economic affairs,andestablishedfourseparate DGswithmainly As aresult,theSanterCommission(1995-99)reunitedpoliticaland between theirstaffsprevented thepotential‘dualism’fromnegatively pares’ among theCommissionersincharge ofexternalrelations:Poul Nielson 52 modus vivendi modus ‘primus inter inter ‘primus established 11 November 2007 12 November 2007 ‘hibernation’ oftheConstitutional Treaty inJune 2005. The crisis triggered by theFrench the Commission). ENP (andpossiblysitonthenewForeign Affairs Councilonbehalfof proper, while BenitaFerrero-Waldner would remainCommissionerforthe new “UnionMinisterforForeign Affairs” would takeover theRELEXservices formal decisionwas takenatthattime,butitwas envisioned thatthe Treaty would enterintoforce, asplanned,on1November 2006.No This partialreorganisationwas basedontheassumptionthatConstitutional European NeighbourhoodPolicy). and BenitaFerrero-Waldner (externalrelationsandtherecentlyestablished (enlargement), Peter Mandelson(trade), LouisMichel (development aid), group ofCommissionersdealingwithexternalpolicies:OlliRehn were retained,butthePresidenttookback theroleofchairing the on themake-upofBarrosoCommission(2004-09). The existingDGs Constitutional Treaty inRomeon29October2004,hadadirectimpact The outcomeofthesubsequentIGC,withofficialsigning ofthe so tospeak,withthepossibleadditionofEEAS. suppressed –itwas onlycontainedand‘concentrated’ intooneindividual, union. The intrinsicdualismofEU’s foreignpolicy, inotherwords, was not chair anewlyestablishedForeign Affairs Council; Commission asoneofits Vice-Presidents (which Patten was not);would combining the‘hats’ofbothSolanaandPatten. Heorshewould beinthe Constitutional Treaty –toappointa“UnionMinisterforForeign Affairs” That eventually ledtotheproposal–laterincorporated intheEU Convention ontheFutureofEurope(2002-03). fed moreorlessdirectlyintothediscussionsoninstitutionalreformin of “Pattana” –asitwas half-jokinglylabelled–fortheUnion. This, inturn, time. Iteven promptedmany analyststoadvocate theappointmentofasort affecting theoverall conductoftheUnion’s ‘foreignpolicy’ atadifficult the two rolesandfunctions,thenewfigurewas andis,basically, a by a“EuropeanExternal Action Service”(EEAS).Infact,farfrom‘merging’ quite defensively onanumberofrelevant issues,even afterthe somewhat by surprisein2003-04andhadsinceacted(orrather reacted) extent, thiscameasarelieftotheCommission,which hadbeencaught Constitutional Treaty inspring2005putallthisonholdforawhile. To some 6 53 non and theDutch 4 5 and would besupported nee personal de facto de to the Where from? TheCouncil only fortheCommission. Here clearlylie,atthesametime,achallenge andanopportunity–not or energy. broadened them:sufficeittothinkofjusticeandhomeaffairs,environment, with externalimplicationsthanCFSPproper, butrecentdevelopments have (both legalandprofessional)thatcover amuch widerspectrumofpolicies and patchy. Ontheotherhand,notonlydotheyalready have competences and securitymatterstotheirBrussels‘headquarters’remainslimited,uneven As aresult,theDelegations’abilitytoprovide goodreportingonpolitical still predominantlyoneofprojectmanagementandtrade. modern diplomacy andinternationalcrisismanagement,astheircultureis the onehand,theymostlylack thespecificknow-how and expertiseof More generally, itsofficialsfindthemselves inanambivalent situation.On relations outofatotalroughly25,000intheentireCommission. included andfourthifnot,withmorethan7,000staffinvolved inexternal (compared tothatoftheMemberStates)ranks seventh ifconsulatesare ‘diplomatic’ representationoutsidetheUnion’s territory, itsnetwork covering over 150countriesandinternationalorganisations.Intermsof This said,theCommissioncancurrentlyrelyonmorethan120delegations to ‘ExternalandPolitico-Military Affairs’ underRobertCooper. onset ofESDP, finally, thiswas transformed intoanexpandedDGEdevoted unit, while anotherwas incharge ofexternaleconomicrelations. With the Brian Crowe. Oneofhisdeputies(PierreChampenois)ledthenewCFSP In 1994,anewDirectorate-General forExternalRelationswas setupunder Political Cooperation (EPC). into force oftheSingleEuropean Act, which institutionalisedEuropean a dedicatedEPCSecretariathadbeenestablishedin1987,aftertheentry before that,by virtueoftheCouncil’s own rulesofprocedure.Inparticular, Mentioned forthefirsttimeinMaastricht Treaty, itactuallyexistedlong Secretariat (CGS),basedintheJustus Lipsiusbuildingsince1995. foreign policy-making isinfact,moreoftenthannot,theCouncilGeneral What isnormallyreferredtoasthe‘Council’inspecificcontextofEU 54 6 13 November 2007 14 November 2007 ‘Brusselisation’ ofEuropeanforeignpolicy thathadbeguninthelate1980s. structures –includingtheCommitteeonCivilian Aspects ofCrisis With thepartialexceptionofPSC,virtuallyallthesenewESDP-related (PSC), foreseen by theNice Treaty, such asthePolitical andSecurityCommittee This was followed by theestablishment,from2001,ofnewESDPbodies Warning Unit),asforeseenby the Amsterdam Treaty. creation ofhisdedicatedPolicy Unit(formallythePolicy PlanningandEarly CFSP andSecretary-General oftheCouncil(HR/SG)Javier Solanaandthe 1999/2001, firstofall,withtheappointmentHighRepresentative for The sizeandscopeofCGSstructuresweregiven asignificantboostin They wereallpartoftheCFSP the rotatingPresidency. were –andstillarechaired directlyby theCGS;others(themajority)by shaping withnationalforeignministries.Some(mostlyofatechnical nature) Secretariat andprovided apermanentchannel ofconsultationanddecision- Taken together, thesebodiescomplemented thework oftheCouncil the Permanent RepresentationsandtheCommission. periodically inBrussels,mostlypreparedby theRELEX/CFSPCounsellorsin or thevarious Council Working Groups/Parties and Task Forces convened ‘correspondents’ basedinnationalforeignministries(andtheCommission); Committee (PoCo) intheframework oftheEPC/CFSP, preparedby European have takenshapeover theyears: theregularmeetingsofPolitical number ofmoreinformalfora, functions,preparatory bodiesandgroups has beenoccurringsincethe1990s.Beforeandalongsidethem,however, a progressive institutionalisationofforeignpolicy bodiesandproceduresthat CFSP/ESDP-related structures,inotherwords, originatedmostlyfromthe culture) ofnationaldiplomacies. horizontal andvertical ‘Europeanisation’inthebureaucratic machinery (and incorporate beforejoiningtheEU. As such, theyinducedacertaindegreeof Union (WEU)totheEU. existence throughthetransfer ofmostfunctionsthe Western European like mostofthemilitarybodiesandnewCouncilagencies, thatcameinto Commission) todealwithinternationalcrisismanagement; andalsothose, composed ofambassador-level diplomatsfromtheMemberStates(and de facto de replacing thePoCo butpermanentlybasedinBrussels,and 10 acquis 8 They alsofurtherreinforced thecreeping 55 that theapplicantcountrieshadto 7 9 loyalties have emergedsofar, eitherintheCouncilorCommission number ofsecondedemployees. Still,nomajorcasesofconflicting Germany, UK)andtheNordic MemberStateswhich have thehighest and itmay benoaccidentthatittendstothebiggestcountries(France, on itsown budget. This risksdiscriminatingamongtheMember States, Last butnotleast,aministrymustalsobeabletoafford tosecondpeople little ‘Europeanisation’. may facilitateupward mobility. Inthisarea,however, therehasbeenvery a role,especiallyincountrieswhere astintintheEUinstitutions Existing staffrulesandcareerpatternsinnationalforeignservicesalsoplay off spentforces andgettingridofdifficultpeople. then returnandthrive; or, conversely (butfortunatelylessandoften),sending to offeringopportunitiesforprofessionalgrowth topromisingofficialswho can Union does,exercising influenceandhaving ‘feelers’intheappropriateplaces; their salaries)tendtovary. They range fromkeepingsome‘control’over what the others todispatch theirown diplomatstoEUbodies(andsometimeseven cover The reasonswhy somenationalministrieswere–andstillaremorepronethan cases, however, certainprofessionalstandardshave tobemet. CGS torelyonadditionalstaffwithouthaving topay forthem.Even inthese place). Furthersecondments,especiallyfromsomecapitals,alsoenablethe and inDGE(where morestringentselectionprocedureshave beenputin designed explicitlytothiseffect,withanimplicitsystemofnationalquotas) operational capabilities. This hashappenedinthePolicy Unit(which was given theCouncilSecretariatanotherway tobolsteritsanalyticaland More generally, thepractice ofresortingtodiplomatsfromthecapitalshas supported by secondedofficials fromtheircountriesoforigin. Commission asSpecial Advisers (atDirector-General level), andoften Interestingly, theyarenominatedby theCouncil,temporarily hiredby the shortage ofspecialisedandseniordiplomatsatthedirectserviceEU. launched, astheyoffered a pragmatic and relatively ‘light’solutiontothe the Maastricht Treaty) –wereusedever morefrequentlyaftertheESDPwas regions ofparticularrelevance fortheUnion’s CFSP(asalready foreseenby Last butnotleast,Council‘SpecialRepresentatives’ –roving ambassadors to (EDA) –weresetupthroughsimpleCouncil decisionsorJoint Actions. Management, theSITCENand,lateron,EuropeanDefence Agency 56 11 15 November 2007 16 November 2007 formula werewellknown: inhisview, itwould makeitimpossibleforthe hope. MrSolana’s allegedpersonalreservations aboutthe‘double-hatting’ Charlemagne, homeoftheCommissionservices)was oneofsatisfactionand reaction intheJustus Lipsiusbuilding(asdistinctfromtheBerlaymont and This may helpexplainwhy, when theConstitutional Treaty was signed,the management fromwhich itwillbedifficulttobacktrack. Iran); andoperational (thevarious ESDPmissions)–ininternationalcrisis the 2003EuropeanSecurityStrategy); diplomatic(inUkraine, Montenegro, modus operandi modus it hasalsotranslated intoashiftaway fromapurely‘intergovernmental’ decade, andthisgrowth hasnotbeensimplyinstitutionalandquantitative: policy-related bodiesandstructuresintheCouncilSecretariatover thepast Overall, however, therehasbeenaremarkablegrowth intheforeign vary enormouslyevery year. capitals orcontracted locallyforshortperiodsoftime,andwhose numbers on thegroundinESDPoperations, who aremostlysecondedfromthe To thesemustbeaddedthepersonnel–bothmilitaryandcivilian –working which theyareexpectedtoreturntheirministries. structures. Few ofthemhave assignmentslastinglongerthanfive years, after of 500Brussels-basedindividuals, includingthoseinthepolitico-military positions andthehybrid character ofsomearrangements, butitisintheorder to quantifythemprecisely, notleastbecauseofthehighturnover incertain in DGRELEXproper, letaloneintheCommissionDelegations.Itisquitedifficult relevant personnelintheCouncilGeneral Secretariatremainswellbelow that Even afterthelatestEUenlargements,however, thesizeofCFSP/ESDP- smaller scale. itself –where similararrangements arealso inplace,althoughonamuch Instead, theyhave helpedbuildadistinctive haunted andhamperedthedevelopment oftheEPCandCFSP. well beyond thelowest commondenominatorapproach which previously reflect theindividual interestsofalltheMemberStates,andhave oftengone very closetothecommonEuropeaninterest,even when thisdidnotfully CFSP/ESDP player intheirown right. At times,theyhave shapedsomething The HighRepresentative, thePolicy UnitandDGEhave becomea . 57 acquis 12 – doctrinal(startingwith generis remain difficulttodefine:someregionalandalso functionaldesks In themeantime,working relationsbetweenthetwo sidesofRuedelaLoi extremely sensitive debatewithoutacompellinglegalobligationtodoso. main players (including theMemberStates)werereluctanttoengageinan the fateofConstitutional Treaty anditsprovisions, andpartlybecauseallthe could onlyidentifyafewagreedprinciples. These startedwiththe outcome ofthereferendainFrance andtheNetherlands,ProgressReport In thesecircumstances, exacerbatedby themountinguncertaintyover the would “assist”theMinister. components (“relevant” Council,CommissionandMemberStatesofficials) alone theCommissionDelegations.Itsimplystatedthatitwould includethree relations withtheexistingstructuresandbodiesinCGSDGRELEX,let The Constitutional Treaty, infact,saidvery littleaboutitspreciseset-upand led totheMay 2005ProgressReportonestablishing theEEAS. Declaration attached totheConstitutional Treaty, conductedthetalksthat COREPER’s Antici Group),following theinstructionsenshrinedina the climateandway inwhich CommissionandCouncil(includingthe Such expectations–equally evidentonbothsidesofRuedelaLoi–affected foreign policy chief” –astheinternationalpressgenerally referredtohim. crowning histenureasthefirstHighRepresentative forCFSP and“European being nominatedtobecomethefirstsuch ‘Minister’on1November 2006,thus Mr Solanahimselfhaddonesosuccessfully. Butthisdidnotprevent himfrom ‘Minister’ totravel extensively andcarryouton-sitepersonaldiplomacy as World’ exception oftheCommission’s June 2006Communicationon‘Europeinthe Furthermore, therehasbeenlittleornoreflectiononthisissue–withthelimited drawbacks ofthepersisting‘dualism’. souring theatmosphereinBrusselsand,above all,tohighlightingthe European foreignpolicy toagrindinghalt,buttheyhave contributedto reflection” have thereforehadasignificantimpact:theyhave notbrought The two ‘No’votes totheConstitutional Treaty andtheensuing“pausefor of theEEAS–unanswered (see Annex 2). of convergence, butleftmany crucialquestions–such asthescopeandsize 14 (unique) natureofthenewserviceandcovered somegeneral points – sincethen. This ispartlybecauseoftheprolonged uncertaintyover 58 13 sui 17 November 2007 18 November 2007 slight change inthe Nevertheless, takentogether, thetwo changes inthetextseemtoherald a reiterates existingnorms. change iseven lesssignificant,inlegalterms,asitstatestheobvious and that itaimstodispelthefearsterm“Minister”triggers. The second The change inthetitleispurelycosmeticor, moreprecisely, symbolic,in security anddefencepolicy oftheMemberStates”. organisations”; neitherdothey“prejudicethespecificcharacter ofthe nor oftheirnationalrepresentationinthirdcountriesandinternational they currentlyexist,fortheformulationandconductoftheirforeignpolicy EEAS), provisions “donotaffecttheresponsibilitiesofMemberStates,as In particular, thesemaintainthat,even withthenewset-up(including subject tospecificproceduresandrules”. new Declarations attached tothetreatyunderline, Representative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs andSecurityPolicy”; andtwo minor changes: the“UnionMinisterforForeign Affairs” isrenamed“High all theCFSP/ESDP-relevant provisions oftheConstitutional Treaty, withonlytwo As already mentionedintheForeword, thenewReform Treaty retainsvirtually Where next? TheUnion world remaininplace. separate systemsofreportingfrom,andcommunicatingwith,theoutside policy-making, even insidesingleinstitutions.Ontopofthat,two quite call “inter-agency” debate,butwhich isalsooftensotypicalofEU mix ofcooperation andcompetitionwhich Americans euphemistically cooperate wellandcomplementoneanother, while othersindulgeinthat definitely moreworkable thanHRUFASP) willoperate. of theCommission(theacronym HR/VPseemsbothmoreappropriateand institutional ‘environment’ inwhich theHighRepresentative and Vice-President Before consideringthis,however, itmay beworthwhile toexaminethenew on theEEAS. between theoldEU‘pillars’.Itremainstobeseenhow allthismay impinge new HighRepresentative andmaintainingthetraditional separation contribute tocontainingthepossiblespill-over effectsof‘double-hatting’the on defendingits‘redlines’inthetreatynegotiations,theymay infact context . InsertedmainlyattherequestofUK,keen 59 inter alia inter , that“theCFSPis a newinformalone(theEuropeanCouncilPresident, theHR/VPand and theoldformal raincoat andumbrella.Itwillbevery crowded indeedatthetopofEU, As aresult,alongwiththetwo ‘hats’,theHR/VPmay alsohave to carrya COREPER, unquestionablyamajorplayer inforeignpolicy matters. Affairs Council(which alsodealswithenlargementissues)andthe all, therotatingPresidency islikelytoremaininplaceforboththeGeneral seems unlikelythattheywillleave theinternationalstagealtogether. After This may wellvary fromcountrytoandleaderleader:butit in thisfield,atleasttermsofvisibility, astheirrolewillbegreatlydiminished. their stintinthechair untilnow –may wellbetemptedto(re)gainsomeground Council Presidency –who have generally beenincharge of allEUaffairsduring Head ofStateandGovernment andForeign Ministerofthecountryholding Finally, withthedemiseofrotatingPresidency inexternalrelations,the even internalmarketormonetarymattersareinvolved. whenever issuesrelatedtoenlargement,trade, justiceandhomeaffairs, difficult todraw alineandkeepitsPresidentoutofthisgame,especially so many policy areaswhich have anexternaldimensionthat itwillbe entirely fromintervening inforeignrelations. The Commissionisinvolved in Moreover, itseemsunlikelythattheCommissionPresidentwillrefrain degree ofduplicationbetweentheirrespective staff. of EuropeanCouncildecisionsandevents. At best,thiswillentailsome closely withtheholderofthispostonallmatterslinkedtopreparation event ofacrisis). As aresult,theHR/VPwillhave toliaiseconstantlyand summits (includingthepossibilityofconvening extraordinary onesinthe some formofexternalcoordinationandrepresentationinrelationtoEU responsibilities –andarguablystaffoftheCouncilSecretariat,ensure President oftheEuropeanCouncil,who willtakeover someofthe Reform Treaty introduceanothernewinstitutionalfigure,namelythe Yet thismay notbetheendofstory. BoththeConstitutionaland (thus oftenturnedintoa‘Sextet’)tootherdiplomaticoccasions. representatives atinternationalmeetings, from theMiddleEast‘Quartet’ problems: therewillnolongerbetwo oreven threedistinctEU could solve mostofthecurrentsystem’s fragmentation and‘dualism’ The endoftherotatingPresidency inexternalrelationsandthedouble‘hat’ troika of Presidency countriesmay wellbesucceededby 60 19 November 2007 20 November 2007 lack isapoliticalsynthesisandjoined-upframework. European foreignpolicy have proved quitecomplementary:what theystill Also, insofarastheyhave notcompetedwitheach other, thetwo ‘pillars’of synergy andcoordination,rather thanseparate boxes,approaches andstaffs. requires avaried andcomplexsetofinstrumentsahighdegree Afghanistan andIraq hasshown thatinternationalcrisismanagement This isapity, becausetheexperienceofpastfewyears inplacessuch as EU externalpolicy. legally –to‘mingle’thetwo inordertoachieve amorecoherentandeffective Community one. This willmakeitmoredifficult–politicallyrather than above insistontheseparation betweentheCFSP/ESDPpillarproperand greater extentthanpreviouslyassumed. The newDeclarations mentioned considers theimplicationsofchairing theForeign Affairs Council–toa The HR/VPwillalsohave tojugglethetwo ‘hats’–oreven three,ifone have tobemade. inevitably beatrialperiodforall,inwhich adjustmentsandarrangements will competence doesnotloseouttopoliticalexpediency. There will,atany rate, and West, couldproduceunpredictableresults. The hopeisthatpolicy ‘families’, b)bigandsmallcountries,c)NorthSouth,aswellEast If so,theneedforsomepoliticalbalanceandtrade-offs betweena)party being madeinonecomprehensive bundle. temporary HR/VP),infact,thechoice ofthenewEUtopteamcouldendup Presidencies willlingeronthesidelines. ad hoc ad within thissortofnewEU At theendofday, theprecisedivision oflabourandeven thechemistry Commission President),while thenew hl h eomTet sepce oetrit oc n1January 2009(and While theReform Treaty isexpectedtoenterintoforce on1 of 2009,inthewake oftheEuropeanParliamentary elections,orpossiblyearlier. especially ifitcomesdown toa‘package deal’tobestruck, say, in thesummer The modalitiesforappointingthethreetopEUofficialswillalsomatter, treaty language. this rolemattersmorethanhisorheractualcompetencesandeven the in which anofficialinterpretswhat isvery much ablanksheetanddefines personalities oftheincumbents.MrSolanahasalready shown thattheway arrangements have beenagreedforthepossibleappointmentofa troika 61 will alsodependontheprofilesand 15 trio of successive Council to have asingle In ordertomanagesuch a near-impossible briefbetter, theHR/VPmay have even theMay 2005jointProgressReportsays very littleinthisrespect: itis composition, sizeandinternalset-uparenotspeltout inthe Treaty, and HR/VP what thePolicy UnithasbeentotheHR/SG. Yet itsprecise to becomebothawalking stick andasatellitenavigator: itwillbetothe For thefuture European‘foreignpolicy chief’, theEEASisarguablyexpected HR/VP infulfillinghis/hermandate). of theMemberStates”–remainsame,asdoestheirtask(to“assist” the Commissionaswellstaffsecondedfromnationaldiplomaticservices from relevant departmentsoftheGeneral SecretariatoftheCounciland the wording inthe Treaty hasnotchanged: thethreecomponents–“officials How willallthisimpactonthepossiblemake-upofEEAS?Incase, Building anarch –theEEAS external actionintheReform Treaty, attherequestofFrance. has beeninsertedintothelistofobjectives oftheUnion’s common and pillars;and,now, also“theprotectionof[EU]citizens”abroad,which coordination ofthefightagainstterrorism,which cutsacrosscompetences Last butnotleast,itremainstobeseenwhere exactlytoplacethe shares outportfoliosandresponsibilities. depend primarilyontheway inwhich thenextCommission(2009-14) ‘contamination’ may benotonlyinevitablebutalsonecessary. Yet thiswill between pillars,withmixedandoverlapping competencesandwhere some possibly, alsodevelopment aid–thatlieinthegreyareaacrossand Other deputiescoulddealwiththoseotherpolicies–such astheENPand, the EuropeanCouncilPresidency. she wearsthethirdhat,chairing theForeign Affairs Councilandliaisingwith but adeputyspecificallyforCFSPcouldalsoassisttheHR/VPwhen heor specifically CFSP(diplomatic)dimensionfromtheESDP(operational) one, aspect ofCFSP),andcouldalsochair thePSC. military componentwillremainmore‘compartmentalised’thanany other Defence Policy (CSDP)–andcrisismanagementproper(whose specifically One could,forinstance,cover ESDP–now renamedCommonSecurityand deputies. Buthow many andwhat roleswould theyplay? cabinet – toensurecoherence 62 17 16 This risksseparating the – andalsotoappoint 21 November 2007 22 November 2007 could wellbecalledupontoensurethenecessarycoherence and common policiesoutsidethesphereofHR/VP, theCommissionPresident If italsocameto‘coordinate’relevant aspectsoftrade, enlargementandother external ramifications. service intothefunctional‘hub’forallthosecommon policiesthathave impossible. Bydoingso,theHR/VPwould turntheCommission’s RELEX experience showed, thisiseasiersaidthandone,althoughcertainlynot taken “inagreementwiththe Vice-President”. However, asChrisPatten’s instance, certaindecisionsby individual Commissionerscouldonlybe To achieve that,itwould sufficetoreformsomeinternalrulessothat,for gives the VP atangiblecoordinatingandsupervisoryroleinsidetheCollege. accountability –forexample,onbudgetaryandadministrative matters–that hierarchical internal‘chain ofcommand’,atleastanidentifiableline On theotherhand,Commissionmustestablish,ifnotarigidly, and coherenceofitspolicy towards Africa. wants toincreasetheoverall effectiveness the EEAS,especiallyifEU way undertheauthorityofHR/VPandthereby insomeconnectionwith externalaidprogrammes) shouldalsobeputinsome manages theEU DG RELEX.ButDevelopment and AIDCO (thededicatedofficethat ready tointegrate withtheEEAS–starting,ofcourse,thosein together. Ontheonehand,itshouldidentify‘core’policy areasitis In ordertodoso,however, theCommissionshouldfirstgetitsown act Charlemagne seizetheopportunityandplay totheirstrengths. importance andinfluence,especiallyifstaffintheBerlaymont and Union’s externalaction.Ifso,the‘Vice-Presidential’ hatwillgainin DG RELEXand,moreindirectly, otherCommissionservices relevant tothe obvious thatthebulkofEEASwould comefrom(and/orrelyupon) external actionmachinery (regardlessofwhere exactlyitisplaced),seems politico-military structures)remainsneatlyseparated fromtherestof moves tothenewPresidency oftheEuropeanCouncil,andifanotherpart(the Commission’s sidethaninitiallyimagined.IfpartoftheCouncil Secretariat negotiations may bethattheEEAS,inend, clingsmuch moreontothe Paradoxically, oneunintendedconsequenceoftheUKdemandsintreaty unclear what itcouldorshould beabout. reasonably clearwhat the EEASwillprobably 63 not be about,butquite arbitrage . Member States. only: fromtheCommission,CouncilGeneral Secretariat,and the of inventing anewstatusforitsstaffcouldbebasedonsecondments In thisvein, thefirstbuildingblocks oftheEEAScouldincludeallmain from allthreecomponentsandtrain themtobemore‘interoperable’. from nationaldefenceministries,however, itwould bringtogetherofficials into apropervault. UnliketheEDA, which essentiallyonlyhostsofficials more stablestructure:thisinitialarch betweenthetwo pillarscouldthusturn least atthebeginning–butifproven effective, itcouldeasilyevolve intoa Defence Agency (EDA), itwould nothave any tenuredstaffofitsown –at between allthemainEuropeanforeignpolicy actors.LiketheEuropean The EEAS,inotherwords, couldbecomeasortoffunctional tenures andcontracts, totestthefacilitiesandappliancesfirst. would beginhostingafewselectedtenantsfromallofthem,withtemporary older ones,which would remaininplaceandcontinuetooperate. Butit The EEAScouldwellbesuch anewbuilding:itwould notemptyany ofthe allow ittoexpandandbeextendedasrequired. one tostartwith,butbasedonamodular, LEGO-likescheme thatwould to buildabrand newsettlement-acondominium,probably, andasmall than tryingtomakethemallcompatiblewithoneanother, itwould bebetter 27 assortedapartmentblocks), heorshewould probablysuggestthatrather buildings withdifferenttenants,specificationsandappliances,flankedby foreign policy (atale,ifnotoftwo cities,thenoftwo radically different developer wereconfrontedwiththecurrentstateofaffairsinEuropean And what oftheinstitutional basefortheEEAS?IfaBrusselsproperty geographical would preserve its that willgovern theEEASatoutset,however, apossiblesolutionthat grab theheadlines.Consideringtransitional natureofthearrangements issues tendtobethoserelatingpersonnel,although they donotnormally And what statuswould the‘tenants’ofEEAShave? The mostintractable the General Affairs Counciltoensurethenecessarycoherence. European CouncilPresidency andassistingtherelevant officialsinpreparing Following the‘interface’model,thisshouldalsoincludeliaisingwith some streamliningandcoordinationisbothinordernecessary. where therehasbeenalotofduplicationover thepastfewyears, andwhere desks ofboththeCommissionandCouncil. This isanarea sui generis sui nature withoutopeningthePandora’s box 64 interface 23 November 2007 24 November 2007 but rather anew, hybrid agency, be thatofanEUagency: neitheraCommissionnorCounciloneliketheEDA, Finally, thespecific‘material’usedtoconstructnewEEASbuildingcould small ‘pioneergroup’,tobegradually andprogressively expandedover time. States, andinpartonthefunding.Bothlogicexperiencesuggestaninitial existing imbalancebothbetweenCGSandDGRELEXamongtheMember depend inpartonthesharingcriteriatobeagreedupon,consideringalso Exactly how many ‘Indians’may endupservingunderthenew‘chief’ will This said,itisrather prematuretomentionapossible(orideal)sizefortheEEAS. process forselectingcandidatesbasedontheirprofessionalism. of nationalquotaswould betacitlyusedbutmatched withahomogenous all, whichever ‘component’theycomefromand,presumably, somesystem officials concerned. The lengthofthesecondmentshouldbesamefor the servicewithouthaving asignificantimpact onthe‘EUloyalty’ ofthe co-financing thatwould significantlyalleviatetheinitialcostsofsettingup As aresult,EU or takeninassecondednationalexperts,throughaformof Officials fromtheMemberStatescouldeitherbe‘lent’astemporary agents salaries, andwould simplybe‘located’withtheEEASforanumberofyears. Delegations, althoughprobablyonlyover time. personality. This islikelytohave asignificantimpacton the roleof Under thetermsofReform Treaty, theUnionwillacquireafulllegal about itsramifications inthirdcountries? All thiswould applytotheBrusselsheadquartersofEEAS.Butwhat towards theestablishmentofaEuropean“foreignservice”worthy ofthename. position. This meansthattheEEASagency would constituteonlyafirststep foreseen by thenew Treaty for2014willalsohave animpactontheHR/VP’s have tobeadopted,buttheone-thirdreductioninsizeofCommission whole set-upmay have tobereviewedagain:notonlywillanewEUbudget covered withalimited‘mortgage’ontheoldbuildings.By2013,however, the The rent,basicfurnitureandrunningcosts,inotherwords, would beinitially the currentFinancial Perspectives expire. budget, thusalsoinvolving theEuropeanParliament –atleastuntil2013,when instrument) andhave anadministrative budgetfundedprimarilyby theEU simple Councildecision(notaJoint Action, which isaquintessentialCFSP fonctionnaires would preserve theirstatus,careerpathand sui generis sui 65 . Itcouldbeestablishedthrougha de facto de Michel Barnier, promptedby the Asian a reporttotheCouncilandCommissionby formerEuropeanCommissioner abroad. Someproposalsalongtheselineswereputforward inMay 2006in ‘cascading’ effectsonotheraspectsoftheUnion’s externalmachinery. Last butnotleast,theprovisions oftheReform Treaty may alsohave While thereisnoneedforonesingle,rigid‘template’,some example, inmost Asian countries). could have amuch strongerpolitico-diplomaticprofileandbackground (for some ACP countries,forinstance),while inotherstheHeadofDelegation (predominance oftheoldCommunity‘pillar’andprojectmanagement,in could begoodreasonsforcontinuingalongmoretraditional lines affairs inthethirdcountryquestion.Insomecases,forinstance,there may vary, dependingontherelative importanceofeconomicorpolitical introduced hereaswell,althoughhow itisarticulatedandimplemented As aconsequence,degreeof‘double-hatting’may wellhave tobe with theEEAS. authority oftheHR/VP, butdoesnotexplicitlymentiontheminconnection Constitutional Treaty beforeit)statesthattheywillbeplacedunderthe instruments ofDGRELEX.Onceagain,theReform Treaty (likethe way theirHeadscannotbeseen–atleastforthetimebeingsimplyas as theyalready dealwithtrade, development andotherissues.Inthesame In fact,theycannotbeconsideredmereinstrumentsofforeignpolicy proper, EEAS toacompletelydifferentlevel. experimental “EuropeanConsulates”would certainlyraise thedebateon issues nobody wanted toaddressatthattime,thecreationofleastafew While littleconsideration was given totheseideas,astheyraised sensitive context ofthepossiblecreationaEuropeancivil protectionforce. of thecurrent Treaty given responsibilityforconsularrepresentation,buildingonboth Article 20 It willalsobeinterestingtoseewhether thefutureUnionDelegationsare European CouncilPresident’s services. established withalltherelevant CommissionDGstoo,aswellwiththe missions, and Brussels headquarterswillhave tobewellconnectedwiththelocal could beputinplaceandtested–theunifiedregionaldesks vice versa vice 18 and thenewcommitmentto“protect”EUcitizens . Goodcommunicationlineswillhave tobe 19 66 tsunami of December2005,inthe pilot formats 25 November 2007 26 November 2007 .For afirstformulation fromoutsidetheinstitutionsseeG. Andreani, C.Bertram, C.Grant, (2001) 4. In2001aninternalCommissionReportclarified thatHeadsofECDelegationshadtobeseenasrepresentatives 3. Lateron,ECrepresentationoffices would beopenedin Rome(FAO) and Vienna (OSCE). 2. .For mostoftheinformation inthissectionseecf.David Spence’s chapters 14and15inD. Spence,G.Edwards 1. Endnotes ofStudiesattheEuropeanPolicyAntonio MissiroliisDirector Centre. delivering anever moreincisive andcoherentforeignpolicy fortheUnion. the nexttwo years –mindsthat,instead,shouldremainconcentrated on disputes onstatusfromabsorbingthemindsofBrussels-basedofficialsover debate onthisissuemay helptoprevent turfbattlesandcumbersome which itwillbeputinplacemattersagreatdeal. An earlyandconstructive The EEASisanimportantelementofthisnewarchitecture, andtheway in adequate internationalrole. for giving theUnion‘politicsofscale’thatwould permitittoplay an Union. The Reform Treaty provides agoodlegalbasisforachieving thisand European foreignpolicy andastrongerdemandforit,insideoutsidethe In conclusion,thereisnow bothgreatpotentialforajoined-upcommon Joined-up thinking requested by theUKwillaffectalltheseaspectsofnewset-up. the UnitedNations),anditisstillunclearwhether thenewDeclarations to happen,however, insuch placesas Washington, Moscow orNew York (at to theHR/VP, who inturnwillchair theForeign Affairs Council. This isunlikely local HeadoftheEUDelegation? After all,heorshewould beaccountable Under thenewsystemenshrinedinReform Treaty, couldthisjobfalltothe States have anembassyorconsulate:theUnitedStates,Russia andChina). present, thereareonlythree‘third’countriesintheworld where all27Member capitals andregionsinwhich thecountrychairing theEUisnotrepresented(at such tasksfalltotherotating Presidency, withadditionalarrangements for States’ ambassadorsinthirdcountriesorinternationalorganisations?Currently, Just tonameone:who willchair thecoordinatingmeetingsofEUMember .Until2002,theForeign Ministers hadonlyconvened formallyas theGeneral Affairs Council,themost‘senior’ 5. of theCommissionasawhole, notofthespecificinterestsindividual DGs. in 1954–anditsfirstheadwas an American citizen,formerlyaMarshallPlanofficial. third countrywas theinformationofficeopenedin Washington by theEuropeanCoalandSteelCommunity (eds.) (2006) Military Revolution Military The European Commission European The , London:CER. The ideawas embraced anddeveloped by aConvention Working Group. 20 , London:John Harper. Interestingly, thefirst-ever representationina 67 Europe’s Europe’s 5 The 15. 9 The 19. The articlestatesthat “every citizen of theUnionshall,interritoryathirdcountrywhich theMember 18. This ESDP‘deputy’couldbeappointedby theCouncilorelectedby (andfromwithin)thePSCitself,possibly 17. .‘Europeanisation’isavery broadconcept,useddifferentlyby differentauthors:itgenerally alludestothe 8. .SeealsoB. Hocking, D. Spence(2005) 6. 4 The Communication,however, essentiallyreferredtopossibleimprovements withinthe 14. Accordingtosuch ascenario,inNovember 2006,Solana’s deputyasSecretary-General oftheCouncil– 13. Total staffnumberintheCouncilSecretariat–includingallitsDGs(currentlyeight,pluslegalservice) 12 Bycontrast, ‘Personal Representatives’ areCouncilofficialswho areassignedaspecifictask–normallyof 11. .For anoverview seeF. Hayes-Renshaw, Helen Wallace, (2006) 7. 6 For ananalysisofthisconcept,see.S.Nuttall,CoherenceandConsistency, inC.HillandM.Smith(eds.)(2005) 16. 0 SeeJ.Howorth (2007) 10. 0 Interestingly, such anotion–thatcommunicatesquitewellanintuitive visionofEurope’s actingtogether,20. and .‘Brusselisation’isanotherlooseconceptthatcombinespoliticalgeography (NATO, too,isbasedinBrussels) 9. Communication oftheCommissiontoEuropeanCouncil,8June 2006. ‘Europe inthe World –SomePractical ProposalsforGreaterCoherence,Effectiveness and Visibility’, (1989) RELEX Commissioner. The the incumbent(andpossiblysuccessor, althoughthishardlyhappenedinpractice), theHR/SG,and incumbent andthesuccessorMemberStateinPresidency. With the Amsterdam Treaty, itcametoinclude D. Allen, ‘The EuropeanRescueofNationalForeign Policy?’, inC.Hill(ed.)(1996), Foreign Policy Foreign authorities ofany MemberState,onthesameconditionsasnationalsofthatstate”. State ofwhich heisanationalnotrepresented,beentitledtoprotectionby thediplomaticorconsular the EuropeanCouncilfortwo andahalf,thechairman oftheMilitaryCommitteeforthree. presently, forinstance,theHR/SGandCommissionpresidentareappointedfive years, thepresidentof mandate. Itisworth consideringsome‘standardisation’ofthetermstopofficialsacrossEUinstitutions: following theprecedentofEUMilitaryCommitteein2001,alsotermsprocedure(secretballot)and R. Wong, ‘The EuropeanisationofForeign Policy’, inC.Hill,M.Smith(eds.)(2005) adaptation ofnationalstructuresandprocedurestothedemandsEUpolicy-making. For anoverview see Macmillan, especiallypp.68ff. The International Relations of the European Union European the of Relations International The to EuropeanCouncilsessions–butwithoutspecifyingwhich ministersshouldtakepartineach configuration. from theoldGeneral Affairs Council,responsiblefor‘consistency’ aswellthepreparation ofandfollow up over two days. The Constitutional Treaty (andnow theReform Treaty) separated thenewForeign Affairs Council coordinating role,theyhave convened astheGeneral Affairs andExternalRelationsCouncil,normallyspread increasing numberofforeignpolicy issuesontheagendatodetrimentoftheiroverarching Council of allCouncilformations.Sincethen,inresponsetocriticismthattopdiplomatstendconcentrate onthe Niels Ersboll(1980-94)andJürgen Trumpf (1994-99). General, thusseparating thetwo functionsonceagainandrestoringthebureaucratic tradition establishedby former French Permanent Representative PierredeBoissieu–would thenhave succeededhimasSecretary amounts toapproximately3,000. functional nature–by theHR/SG himself. especially pp.61ff. pre-Maastricht era. Itwas coined(withspecificreferencetotheEPC the European Union European the Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan;especiallythe Annex. may alsoshareouttasksamongthemselves over aperiodof18months. renders equallywelltheFrench ideaofEuropeas regions tostartwith:theBalkans,Caribbean, West Africa, andtheIndianOcean. and institutionalvagueness –butitdefinitelyexcludesthepossibilityofa‘ Barnier Report Barnier troika Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale of Politics The Community: European the of Actions Policy Foreign system forexternalrepresentationadoptedwiththeMaastricht Treaty includedthepreceding, , London-New York: Routledge;pp.188-304. (‘For aEuropeanCivil ProtectionForce: Europe Aid’, 9May 2006) mentionedfourpossible , Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press;pp.134-153. Security and Defence Policy in the European Union European the in Policy Defence and Security trio , instead,isonlyatCouncillevel: threecountriescoordinatetheiragendasand Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats Integrating Union: European the in Ministries Foreign , Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press;quot.in8, pp.91-112. 68 multiplicateur de puissance de multiplicateur The Council of Ministers of Council The acquis , Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan; communautarisation’ ) by aUSscholar: seeR.Ginsberg , Boulder:Lynne Rienner. International Relations and Relations International The Actors in Europe’s Europe’s in Actors The , Basingstoke:Palgrave – datesback tothe existing of CFSP. See framework: , 27 November 2007 28 November 2007 foreign andsecuritypolicy. institutions facilitates–orcomplicatestheprocessof devisingaEuropean set or, toputitmoreexplicitly, towhat extentthelogicofthese new deliver. The key questionistowhat extent theyfulfilltheoverall objective require genuineefficiency inoutput. They areunderscrutiny andneedto Last butnotleast,withtheirlegitimacy atstake,thesenewinstitutions and securitypolicy decision-makingprocess. This isoneofthemostimportantproducts,orby-products, oftheEUforeign processes andoutlooksrequiredwhen decisionsaretobetakencollectively. socialisation processamongparticipants–the‘Europeanisation’ofpolicy unfulfilled forawhile. Butonthepositive side,itproducesandsustainsa act beforeitisready todosoandsuch expectationsmay thereforebeleft There is,ofcourse,ariskinthisapproach thattheEUmay berequiredto also raises expectationswhich inturngenerate newobligations. provide toolsfordeveloping policiesandimplementingthem,theircreation action. Institutionscreatetheirown needs.Besidestheobvious factthatthey There aremany meritstothisapproach ofcreatinginstitutionsbeforetaking skeleton withoutmuch fleshandblood. engineering, while thefledglingdefencedimensionwas mainlyaninstitutional As such, inthe1990sCFSPwas primarilyanexercise ininstitutional to addresscommonforeignpolicy questions. devise aCommonForeign andSecurityPolicy (CFSP)and newmechanisms time, institutionswerethemostplausibleanswer tothepressingneed Rationalisation ofthesystemseemsdesirable, ifnotinevitable.For along Commission’s overseas delegations. decision-shaping andmaking–thatdoesnotincludetheEuropean Common Foreign andSecurityPolicy/European SecurityandDefencePolicy Alongside the Gloannec Le The dynamicsof institutionalisation Anne-Marie and Howorth Jolyon By The institutionallogicbehindtheEEAS are currentlynofewerthan22 national bodies thatshapeforeignandsecuritypolicy, there European 69 bodies which have aninputinto (WEU) coincidedwithitsformaltransfer toBrusselsenableitcarry out The reference intheMaastricht Treaty tothe Western EuropeanUnion lead toacommondefence”. the eventual framing ofacommondefencepolicy […]which might intime “shall includeallquestionsrelatingtothesecurityof the Union,including Maastricht, exceptforatentative andconvoluted formulation whereby it However, the‘security’componentofCFSPwas lefthighanddryat and Brussels-basedcoordination. for CFSP, whose underlyingdynamic was two-fold: externalrepresentation ‘Maastricht left-overs’) was thecreationofpostHighRepresentative few innovations inthe1997 Amsterdam Treaty (designedtotackle the major players, buttheywereclearlygoingtoprove inadequate.Oneofthe that couldbeachieved atthetime,given theconstraints facingsomeofthe need, andenshrinedinthe1992Maastricht Treaty, wereprobablythebest The intergovernmental structuresandproceduresdevisedtorespondthis demanded ever greatercoordination. EU foreignpolicy, now understoodasgoingfarbeyond trade talks, end oftheCold War. Given auni-polarworld andachaotic ‘nearabroad’, politics, was –moreimportantlyaquasi-inevitableconsequenceofthe The CFSP, atonelevel aFranco-German trade-off betweenmoneyand establishment oftheCouncilSecretariat. primarily aboutmarkets.Itwas this,atleastinpart,which ledtothe with onevoice where possible–even ifthosediscussionswerestill Brussels) was aseriousobstacletoeffortsspeaktherestofworld Internal Market,thattheabsenceofacentral coordinationmechanism (in during thediscussionson1986SingleEuropean Act which createdthe circus’ mode,theEuropeanPolitical Cooperation (EPC)eventually decided, defence policy, asimilar, andpowerful, At each junctureinthedevelopment ofa European foreign,securityand Institution-building and‘Brusselisation’: thehistorical record After several decadesofoperating in leads inexorably tothecreationofaBrussels-basedinstitution. among andbetweennationalcapitalseventually proves inadequate,and form oranotherof‘Brusselisation’–hasprevailed. Policy coordination ad hoc ad 70 institutional intergovernmental ‘travelling logic –involving some 29 November 2007 30 November 2007 ‘events’ –predominantly The same institutional logicwas at work inallof thesedevelopments: The institutionallogic are likelytoprove tooexhausting,complicatedandcostly. logic. ‘Rolling’roadshows may have theirattractions, butsoonerorlaterthey Member Statesbalkatthenotionofapermanentcollege,ithasaninherent more logicalthanthattheyshouldgettoknow each other? Although certain If troopsfromalltheEUMemberStatesaretooperate together, what couldbe 2002 andthenattheBelgianMilitary Academy in2003. Européenne des Académies Militaires(CEAM),which firstmetatStCyrin project faded,itwas resurrectedinanew(security)formby theConférence institution toescapethelogicofBrusselisation. Although thatinitialIHEDN gave risetotheEUInstituteforSecurityStudies–dateonlyCFSP Défense Nationale(IHEDN)metinParis inOctober1988and(indirectly) the Cold War. The first WEU sessionoftheInstitutdesHautesEtudesde The logicoftheEuropeanSecurityandDefenceCollegepredates theendof Military CommitteeandtheStaffbecamefunctionallyindispensable. Security Committee(PSC)replacedtheperipateticPolitical Committee, andthe Declaration, which rapidly gave risetomore Brusselisation:thePolitical and itself hadtobecomethekeyplayer. Hencethe Anglo-French Saint-Malo political decision-shaping,andsomeautonomousmilitarycapacity. The EU What was neededwas much strongerinstitutionalcapacityinBrusselsfor The creationoftheESDPbecameinescapablebecauseESDIdid notwork. WEU was partoftheproblem,notsolution. Brussels-based inputs. What onlybecameclearwithhindsightwas thatthe involved thatforeignandsecuritypolicy coordinationrequiredstrong Meeting), proved toogreatfortheinstitutionitself.Itwas clear tothose of theentireESDIstory(especiallyafterJune 1996BerlinMinisterial But theexpectationsplacedon WEU, which founditselfthecornerstone and theEUbutalsobetweennationalcapitalsBrussels. capitalising onthisBrussels-basedcoordinationnotonlybetweenNATO European SecurityandDefenceIdentity(ESDI),invented asaway of UK andtheEU–moreeffectively. Beforelong,thiswas followed by the its fewseriousduties–liaisingbetweenFrance andNATO, andbetweenthe external ones –required 71 internal policy coordination; European External Action Service. The lessonsofthishistoryneedtobelearnedandappliedinrelation tothe (COREPER) andthePSC:moreoftenthannotcompetitionhascreptin. similar level, such astheCommitteeofPermanent Representations cooperation betweentwo institutionsworking onsimilarproblemsatafairly Another majorproblemhasbeenthequestionofcoordinationand have notdisappeared. the Political Committeewas notaninstitutionbutanetwork anditsmembers exception andwas certainlynotcharacteristic ofthewhole process.Infact, discarded. The replacementofthePolitical Committeeby thePSCwas an The politicallogic Very fewinstitutionswere setback requireditsown, specificsolution. if each newproblem,each newquestion,each pushforward oreach the mostobvious ispreciselythatofinstitutionalproliferation. Itseemedas However, institutionalengineeringhasanumberofseriouspitfalls:one effectively toexternalpressures. world, buttheyhadtobecreatedcentrally (inBrussels)torespondmore new institutionshadtobecreatedmeetthepressingdemandsofoutside Planning Cell–firstinrelationtoitsvery existence,andthenover itssizeand the PSC. And itwas evidentyet againinthenegotiationsonCivil-Military It was evidentagaininthedebateover thelevel ofseniorityambassadorsto remained unfilledformorethantwo years). Representative forCFSP(ajobwhich, forthisreasonamongothers, control. This was evidentinthediscussionsonappointingHigh suspects’, themainimperative was fornationalcapitalstomaintaintight A debateensuedonthelevel ofsenioritythesenewbodies.For the‘usual own creativity. others –thantheyfoundthemselves wrestlingwiththeimplicationsoftheir institution –theCouncilSecretariat,HighRepresentative forCFSP, and sooner hadtheMemberStatesdecidedtoestablishanewBrussels-based There isalsoanother–countervailing –logicatplay: politicallogic.No replaced by newones;very fewwereactually 72 31 November 2007 32 November 2007 approaches, anotherdualismexists:apoliticallogic Besides thisdichotomy betweentheintergovernmental andCommunity for someofthem,butitisinevitable. assume thattheywillchange course. This may beanuncomfortablereality this samepathforthepastquarterofacentury, andthereislittlereasonto The MemberStateshave inched theirway nervously butirreversibly down but ofthemostpractical way tomakethemwork inharmony. fact, intertwine.Itisnotaquestionofinter-governmental well-known, thedistinctionbetweentwo isfarfromclear-cut andthey, in exemplified intheCFSP)andCommunityapproach –although,asis This certainlyreflectstwo differentlogics–theinter-governmental logic(as (Community policies),duplicationbecameunavoidable. (Common Foreign andSecurityPolicy) andtheneedtowork withthefirst Political Cooperation. Yet withtheconsolidationofsecondpillar Commission atarm’s lengthandtoprevent itfrominterferinginEuropean structure. Onthecontrary, governments soughtatfirsttokeepthe Duplication didnotensuefromtheadditionofnew‘pillars’toUnion in controlofforeignandsecuritypolicy. This derives fromgovernments’ (entirelylegitimate)determinationtoremain nervousness innationalcapitals andcausesacertainamountofduplication. The logicofBrusselisationiscompelling,butitcreatescountervailing EU MinisterforForeign Affairs, forcing achange inthename. reference (andbudget),andin2007,over thetitleandremitofproposed remit. The sametensionsaroseover theEuropeanDefence Agency’s termsof greater inter-pillar synergy. Itwas thiswhich ledEuropeanHeadsofState choice ofpost-holder),butalsorecognisedthatcoherencedemandedever creation ofthepostHighRepresentative forCFSP(and,particularly, the the whole process. Thus, MemberStatesnotonlyeventually acceptedthe has always prevailed –ashasthesameinstitutional logicwhich hasdriven To date,commonsense(assistedby clever politicalfootwork inkeyareas) whole EUpolicy process. political bodies,theonlydemocratically electedpoliticalactorsinthe logical communitarisationofforeignandsecuritypolicy. They arealso approach. Governments arenotjustobstaclesintheway ofanallegedly 73 versus versus a moretechnical supranational, certainly performavery importantfunctionthatothersimilarEUinstitutions Aside frominformingforeignpolicy-making andaction,theEEASwillalmost policy system,orwillitbelookeduponasacompetitor? powerful andresilientenoughtofostercoherenceinsidetheoverall foreign the ground(forinstance,development aidinthirdcountries)? Will itbe EEAS andEUSpecialRepresentatives? Will itbeabletocoordinatework on relationship bebetweennationaldelegationsandEEAS,orthe proactive intermsofforeignpolicy initiatives. Inparticular, what willthe to theentireEUsystem.Itisalsodoubtfulthatitwillprove strongly It isdoubtfulthatitwillprovide moreinformationthaniscurrentlyavailable what ‘added-value’ canitbring? the serviceprovides theUnionwithcapacitiesithasnothadtodate.So The EEASwillstrengthentheEU’s capacitytoactasaforeignpolicy agentif sets ofministries.Every MemberStatewelcomesthis. progressively narrowed theknowledge andunderstandinggapbetween27 years. Virtual communitieslinkedby e-mail,telephoneandair-miles have Exchanges ofdiplomatsandotherofficialshave takenplaceforalmost20 strengthen andemphasiseitscapacityasaforeignpolicy agent. seems necessaryfortheEUtohave aspecificservicewhich could call forsuch aforeignservice,emulatingthoseofstates.Inotherwords, it Obviously, thecreationofequivalent ofaForeign Ministerappearsto The dynamics behindtheEEASfollow thesameinstitutionallogic. The dynamicsbehindtheEEAS take placewithouttheBrussels-basedinstitutions. stakes inKosovo and Afghanistan beingratcheted upever higher)couldnot PSC hasalready establisheditselfasirreplaceable.ESDPmissions(withthe entirely attheircommand. The factis–andtheyallrecognisethisthatthe occasionally give theimpressionthatthey regard thePSCasaninstrument growing Commissioninputstothework ofthePSC.Somegovernments Similarly, wehave witnessedtheacceptanceby allMemberStatesof by appointingafamiliarfigure tothepositioneven beforeitexisted). Minister forForeign Affairs (althoughtheyimmediatelyreassuredthemselves and Government toagree(in2004)thecreationofa(cross-pillar)Union 74 33 November 2007 34 November 2007 oiius Paris. Politiques, desSciences FondationNationale et deRecherches Internationales), LeAnne-Marie ofResearch Gloannec isDirector atCERI(Centred'Etudes and JeanMonnetProfessor ofEuropeanPolitics ofBath. attheUniversity Jolyon Howorth isProfessorVisiting Scienceat ofPolitical Yale University achieved by working together. significant resultsintheforeignandsecurityfield,thesearemostoftenbest If Europeans–asindividual MemberStatesorcollectively -wishtoachieve their own contributions;itissimplytherecognitionofagrowing reality. and actalikewho areeffective. This isnoslurontheMemberStatesor challenges –demandsEuropeanpersonnelwho work together, who think The externalworld –intheshapeofdiplomaticopportunitiesandsecurity value here,althoughitobviously cannotsolve thisproblemonitsown. areas, itislessvisiblethanotherforeignpolicy agents. The EEASshouldadd matched by visibility:despitetheEUinitiatives intheMiddleEastandother Union’s practical actionsontheground. Yet thispresencehasnotbeen Commission DelegationsandEUSpecialRepresentatives, aswellby the This presencehascertainlyalready beenstrengthenedby theEuropean It isalsolikelytoreinforce theEU’s presenceandvisibilityinthirdcountries. might eventually contributetoharmonisingtheforeignpolicy process. of devisingEuropeanways ofthinking,habits,codesandprocedures–which have nurtured–thatofcreatinganEUmould,fosteringa Europeanspirit, 75 the EEASwilllargelydependonwhether ornotitcanmakeaneffective These suggestions arebasedontwo assumptions.First, thatthesuccessof experience withenhanceddiplomaticcooperation inthirdcountries. practice ofnationaldiplomaticrepresentationsandfromprevious To thisend,paperaimstomakeafewsuggestions drawn fromthe division oflabourbetweenthedifferentactorsinthirdcountries. Reform Treaty willbeafirstbutcrucialstepinworking outthefuture distinctly national,interests.Giving theEUalegalpersonalityinnew interests andforeignpolicy prioritiesrelatetoMemberStates’ongoing, This reflectsarelative neglectofthefundamentalquestionhow theEU’s new service. and nationaldiplomaticservices,thusonthescoperemitof far lessagreementonhow todivide competencesbetweentheEEAS coherent representationoftheUnionabroadisnecessary. There is,however, Most expertsagreethattheEUneedsthiscapacityandamore national foreignpolicy prioritiesandinterests. potentially challenges thecurrentseparation ordistinctionofEuropeanand EU’s externalrelations,theenvisaged EuropeanExternal Action Service(EEAS) By creatingadedicateddiplomaticcapacitytosupporttheconductof third countries. EU function,mainlyinrepresentingtheUnion’s rotatingPresidency in of theEU’s MemberStateshave gradually alsocometoassumean diplomatic system.Over thepastfewdecades,however, theembassies between statesandremainoneofthemaincharacteristics ofthe of ambassador, arethetraditional channel forconductingrelations ‘Resident’ diplomaticmissions,headedby adiplomatwiththerank interests abroad. role: theyserve bothtorepresentthe‘sending’stateandhelpprotectits Member States’embassiesinthirdcountriescurrentlyperformadual Whitman Richard and Rijks David By trends andoptions European diplomatic representation inthird countries: 76 35 November 2007 36 November 2007 geographic region. groups andthevariation inthenumberofreceiving statesper coefficient isusedasacontrolforthedifferentsizesoftwo to theEU. especially Poland –andthisdespite(orpossiblybecauseof?)theiraccession stagnation amongtheEU-15andanincrease Visegrad countries, is aclearupward trend.Morespecifically, andinterestingly, therehasbeen ministries would sparkadecreaseinthenumberofembassiesabroad,there In contrast tothewidely-heldassumptionthatfinancialpressuresonforeign (sub) regions. shows majordifferencesinMemberStates’diplomaticpresencedifferent remain betweenregionsintherate ofexpansion. The tablebelow also Despite thisgeneral increase,however, importantgeographical differences as agrouparecatching upwiththeolderonesinalmostevery region. patterns arerather similar, butinabsolutetermsthenewMemberStates embassies ofboththeEU-10andEU-15aroundworld. The relative The datadecisively pointstoanincreaseintheabsolutenumberof the Unionin2004and‘old’EU-15as Table 1below comparesthetrendsintenMemberStateswho joined the then25EUMemberStatesfrom2000to2006atthree-year intervals. This sectionsurveys thegeneral keytrendsinpatternsofrepresentation Patterns of national representation Developments inMemberStates’ diplomatic representation resident embassy. perceive theirintereststobestrongenoughopenor maintaina analysis, astheseprovide insightintowhere MemberStatesgenerally Trends innationalrepresentationarethestartingpointforour most effective. interest. This cantakevarious forms,ofwhich theresidentembassyis representations inthirdcountrieswhere theyperceive somesortofnational services. Second,thatstateswant tomaintainoropentheirown diplomatic EU MemberStatesandavoiding competitionwiththeirown diplomatic contribution toEUforeignpolicy, while alsoproviding addedbenefitsfor 1 77 groups . A standardised . A Table 1: Comparison of representation coefficients between EU-10 and EU-15 in third states for 2000-2006. 2000 2003 2006 EU-10 EU-15 EU-10 EU-15 EU-10 EU-25 November 2007 November AFRICA 9.73 38.44 10.42 38.28 11.44 38.32 Eastern Africa 6.47 36.09 5.88 36.47 4.71 39.22 Middle Africa 3.33 28.14 3.33 28.14 4.44 29.63 Northern Africa 25.71 61.90 28.57 62.86 34.29 61.90 Southern Africa 10.00 37.33 10.00 36.00 10.00 33.33 Western Africa 3.13 28.75 4.36 27.92 3.75 27.50 AMERICAS 26.64 54.41 29.21 53.66 31.60 54.06 Caribbean 0.77 18.46 3.08 17.44 3.08 18.46 Central America 7.50 44.17 8.75 43.33 10.00 45.00 South America 18.30 58.33 20.00 57.22 18.33 56.11 Northern America 80.00 96.67 85.00 96.67 95.00 96.67 ASIA 17.39 43.82 19.21 45.79 26.57 49.30 Central Asia 8.00 20.00 10.00 25.33 20.00 26.67 Eastern Asia 30.00 52.22 35.00 53.33 43.33 56.67 Southern Asia 16.67 45.19 14.44 44.44 16.67 51.11 South-east Asia 15.50 46.67 17.27 52.12 19.09 53.33 Western Asia 15.63 55.00 19.36 53.75 33.75 58.75 EUROPE 38.75 68.33 40.42 71.09 47.08 73.89 Eastern Europe 48.33 67.78 46.67 65.55 65.00 70.00 EFTA states 40.00 75.56 40.00 77.78 40.00 77.78 Southern Europe 21.67 42.22 30.00 52.22 38.33 58.89 OCEANIA 7.50 20.97 7.50 20.14 10.00 18.89 Australia/NZ 30.00 70.00 30.00 66.67 40.00 63.33 Melanesia 0.00 11.67 0.00 11.67 0.00 10.00 Micronesia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Polynesia 0.00 2.22 0.00 2.22 0.00 2.22 TOTAL 19.42 44.82 20.76 45.45 24.76 46.61

Streamlining national representation

This is not to say that budget cuts are irrelevant, although the main question is how Member States respond to these challenges. Importantly, most countries find ‘solutions’ within their own diplomatic services and thus they 78 37 38 November 2007 downgrading oftheirimportance. have reservations aboutthisformofrepresentation, interpretingitasa with roving ambassadorsinparticular–isthatsomereceiving statesmay the mainproblemsassociatedwiththeseaccreditations ingeneral – and Although thisapproach isincreasinglyfavoured by MemberStates, oneof travel totheassignedcountry periodically, buttheirofficeisinthehomecapital. or morecountriesbutarebasedintheMinistryofForeign Affairs athome. They Taking thisconceptonestepfurther, roving ambassadorsareaccreditedtoone state’s interestsareregionalrather thancountry-specific. This canbringimportantbenefitsofscale,especiallywhen thesending regional embassies,withonediplomaticmissioncovering several countries. a cost-effective formofrepresentation,andisoftenusedinconjunctionwith ambassador toonecountryisalsoaccreditedormoreothers. This is a thirdstateistouse‘side’(ormultiple)accreditations,where aresident An alternative tohaving apermanentand/orextensive physical presencein diplomatic representationsisthereforequestionable. conducting bilateral affairs.Usingthemassubstitutesfor(political) representation, butdonotcarrythesameweightasresidentembassiesin commercial interests.Consulatesensuresomesortofpermanent citizens ofthe‘sending’statein‘receiving’ stateandpromoting subordinate toembassiesandtheirtasksaregenerally restrictedtoassisting consulates. Headedby aconsulrather thananambassador, theyare Another way ofmaintaininganationalpresenceinthirdcountriesisvia office space,localsupportstaffandsecuritymeasures. are lesssignificant,astherestillconsiderable costsinvolved inproviding are mainlypolitical-thefinancialbenefitscomparedtoresidentembassies simply ‘representation’arethemostcommon. The advantages ofthisoption This arrangement goesby various names,ofwhich ‘embassyoffice’or option istohave anembassyheadedby a representation isnotpossibleorappropriate.Inthesecases,afrequently-used physical diplomaticpresenceinacountryeven thoughambassador-level In somesituations,MemberStatesdeemitdesirable tomaintainapermanent embassy isnotpossibleordesirable, avariety ofoptionshave developed. have a national character. Inplaceswhere openingormaintainingaresident 79 chargé d’affaires chargé . the majorityofprojectsinvolving onlytwo tothreepartners. arrangements todatehave beenlimitedtofive MemberStatesatmost,with Although thenumberofcountriesinvolved tendstodiffer, successfulsharing problems, andmutualmaterialpractical assistance. security measures,thepoolingofinformationonadministrative orpractical Other examplesincludethejointuseofcommunications(i.e.diplomaticbags), together withotherMemberStatesorrentingofficespacetoEUdiplomats. location’), which involves eitherconstructinganewembassycompound The formerincludestheshareduseofembassypremises(oftenreferred toas‘co- sharing ofdiplomatic levels oflocalcooperation: thesharingofdiplomatic arrangements inthirdcountries. This paperdistinguishesbetweentwo main and masksimportantdifferencesinthescopeintensityofjoint The term“diplomaticcooperation”, asitisoftenused,rather ambiguous these, 77werehometoatleastoneresidentembassyoftheEU-15. 90 thirdcountrieswhere none ofthenewEUmemberswas represented;of representation throughoneofthe‘old’membersabound:in2006,therewere Member States,forexample,opportunitiestoensuresomesortof significant reductionsinoverhead andinfrastructure costs.For thenewer with otherEUmembers’bilateral embassies,which canpotentiallyyield Many MemberStateshave studiedthepossibilityofenhancingcooperation Joint representation inthird countries space inanotherMemberState’s mission.Furthermore,inpolitically for examplethroughlower buildingcostsormoving tolessexpensive office importantly, itreducesthecostsofa(semi-)permanentnationalpresence, Sharing diplomaticfacilitieshasanumberofdistinct advantages. Most Member Stateshave participatedintheselargerprojects. Development andtheCommissionDelegation. To date,noneofthenew Embassies, theUKHighCommission,DepartmentofInternational second largestproject,inDarEsSalaam,involves theGermanandDutch the EuropeanCommissionarecurrentlylocatedinnewcompound. The of theprojectsinceitwas firstproposedin2001,andonlyfourstates has notproducedtheintendedresults.Many MemberStateshave optedout The mostambitiousplan,foranEUembassycompoundin Abuja, Nigeria, capabilities . 80 facilities 2 and the 39 November 2007 40 November 2007 procedures, hierarchy and culturearejustsomeofthem.Othernotorious capabilities very difficult.Differencesinforeignservices’administrative practical obstaclesoftenmaketheeffective sharingofdiplomatic disadvantages. Apart fromobvious concernsabout sovereignty, arange of Few examples ofthistypecooperation canbefound,asithasnoticeable previous presencethroughanothermember’s residentmission. organise someformofrepresentationinathirdcountrywhere ithadno What definesthistypeofcooperation isthataMemberStateready to embassies intheplaceswhere theywerenotpreviouslypresent. successful, asboththeUKandFrance have sinceopenedfullseparate possibility ofactingonbehalfeach other. The experimentwas notvery at thetime)andCôted’Ivoire (which hadnoBritishEmbassy)withthe not represented,andtoexperimentinGhana(which hadnoFrench Embassy between localembassies,inparticularwhere oneortheotherpartnerwas In thiscase,thetwo countriesagreedtointensifytheexchange ofinformation in Africa aspartoftheDecember1998Saint-MaloDeclaration. states, such astheJoint Declaration by theUKandFrance oncooperation representation. This requiresanexplicitagreementbetweentwo ormore the poolingofdiplomaticcapabilitiescanbeconsideredaformcommon As asubstitutefornationalpresenceintheformofresidentmission,only of officialstoeach other’s missionsorexchanging politicalinformation. representative tasksinthirdcountries,forexamplethroughthesecondment involve diplomaticcapabilities,i.e.thesharingofand The vast majorityofcooperation initiatives concernfacilities.Far fewer national diplomaticpresence. meetings. Sharingdiplomaticfacilitiescannotinpractice substitutefora increase inbothfinancialexpenditureandthetimespentjointNordic representation abroad,the‘commonNordicdimension’inBerlinledtoan though thisprojectwas initiated withtheaimofreducingcosts has asymbolicfunction:theembassies’operations arestilldistinct.Even as resources. Their jointembassybuildinginBerlin,forexample,mainly In thecaseofNordiccountries,symbolismisjustasimportant to enhancethesafetyofembassies. unstable areas,co-locationandjointsecuritymeasureshave proved useful 3 81 access tomaterialwhich theydidnotpreviouslyreceive. give someMemberStateswithoutrepresentationinthatcountry/region of informationfromthefield. The availability of‘EU-made’informationwill Similarly, themainbenefitsformostMemberStatesrelatetogathering boost thecoherenceandeffectiveness ofEUforeignpolicy. both theUnion’s first(Community)andsecond(CFSP)pillars,theEEAScould numbers. Furthermore,by beingabletodraw moreeasilyonresources from having asingleEU‘ambassador’rather than27rotatingnamesandtelephone important arethebenefitsforEU’s externalrepresentationresultingfrom ‘EU-made’ informationtofueltheUnion’s foreignpolicy-making. Equally Some oftheexpectedkeybenefitsEEASlieinitscapacitytoprovide Strengthening common representation ability toaccommodatethesechanges. in nationalforeignservices,asthesuccessofEEASmay dependonits general. At thesametime,carefulattentionshouldbepaidtodevelopments service’s strengthsinmuch thesameway as fromEUforeignpolicy in question. This issignificantasMemberStatescouldbenefitfromthe trends innationalforeignservicesanddiplomacy arekeyinanswering this Although oftenneglectedindiscussionsaboutinstitutionalcompetence, service’s eventual success. cement cooperation betweenthemandtheEEAS,thusfavours the complementarity withMemberStates’diplomaticrepresentations,helps on thecomplexquestionofhow toconstructtheEEASinaway thatensures Service? The following debatingpointsareacontributiontothediscussion How aretheseexperiencesrelevant fortheEuropeanExternal Action Implications andoptions capabilities seemstohave takenpriorityinrecentyears. international system,developing anationalnetwork ofdiplomatic Having onlyrelatively recentlyregainedindependenceasactorsinthe the importanceofwaving thenationalflagshouldnotbeunderestimated. For theMemberStateswhich joinedtheEUin2004and2007particular, sharing ofsensitive information. stumbling blocks include security protocolsandregulationsregardingthe 82 41 November 2007 42 November 2007 ■ ■ ■ three broadcategories: individual MemberStatesindifferentgeographical locations. These fallinto considerable variation intherange ofdiplomaticcapabilitiesrequiredby reduce theriskofduplication,itisimperative totakeintoaccountthe To makethebestpossibleuseofpotentialstrengthsEEASandto capabilities,Maximising minimisingduplication ambassadors ofsmallerMemberStatesdonotroutinelyenjoy. ambassador islikelytohave accesstoahoststate’s government atalevel that information orconveying theEUpositiontoforeigninterlocutors, for allnationalambassadorstoduplicatetheseefforts. When requesting Ministry ofForeign Affairs onbehalfoftheUnionislikelytoreduceneed scale. Over time,anEUambassadormakingenquirieswiththehostcountry’s The gatheringofthisinformationisalsolikelytobringimportantbenefits capabilities strong bilateral relations and wish to maintain detailed national reporting reporting national detailed maintain to wish and relations bilateral strong policy interests to be outside the EU framework, and/or where they have have they where and/or framework, EU the outside be to interests policy profile higher a has policy foreign national where interest Areas and countries in which Member States perceive some of their foreign foreign their of some perceive States Member which in countries and Areas countries third or interest, strong a take States Member which in Regions national little relatively have States Member which in areas Geographical departments couldbemaintained. example, bilateral trade sectionsandpolitical,cultural, anddefence material, perhapsfacilitatedby nationaldiplomatsontheground.For by theEEAScouldbecomplementedby country-specificpolitico-economic take theformofaresidentembassy. The moregeneral informationgathered wish toensureapermanentnationalpresence,althoughthisneednotalways functions may bedesired,aswellhighlevels ofstaffingandthehighest of regionaland/orroving ambassadors. opinions tohostgovernments, perhapssupplementedby theoccasionaluse position, theEuropeandiplomaticservicemightsufficetocommunicate be anattractive option. As nationalpoliciesarelikelytooverlap withtheEU developments inthecountriesquestion.RelianceonEEASwould then requirements arelimitedtogatheringgeneral informationabout often minimal.Intheseinstances,mostMemberStates’diplomatic . Here,theneedtomaintainapermanentdiplomaticrepresentationis . Intheseinstances,thefullspectrumofnationalembassy 83 . Here,MemberStatesmay in thefollowing terms: The intendedgeographical scopeoftheEEASnetwork couldbeexpressed Scenarios for determining thescope of thenetwork inthird countries useful symbiosiswithMemberStates’foreignservices. exploring thedifferentscenariosunderwhich theEEAScoulddevelop a These variations inMemberStates’diplomaticrequirementsjustify Maximalist versus minimalist The minimalist versus Maximalist A fulfil thatrolelocally). not have anembassyinathirdcountry, andreliesonotherswhich do,to presidencies (when aMemberStateholdingtherotatingEUPresidency does help tackle someoftheproblemscurrentlyassociatedwithlocal taking aconsistentdiplomaticapproach toallthirdcountries. This would retained intheReform Treaty (Art.188q),anditsmainadvantage liesin This arrangement was reflectedintheDraft Constitutional Treaty andis or specificEUforeignpolicy priorities. EU Delegations,irrespective ofpatternsnationaldiplomaticrepresentation the Unionwould seektotransform allcurrentCommissionDelegationsinto (eventually) have staffinallEUmissionsthirdcountries.Underthisoption, advantage, asthere hasbeenaspectacularincreaseinthenumberofsuch assuming theresponsibilitiesoflocalpresidency. This would beasignificant A dedicatedEUembassywould relieve MemberStatesoftheburden a fewMemberStatesarepresent. the mostpressingproblemsoflocalrepresentationin countries where only by individual MemberStates.EUembassieswould beestablishedtosolve on asystemofregionalhubsand/orfillinggapsinthe‘coverage’ provided minimalist States’ diplomaticcontactshasactuallydecreased. relationships separate andseparable fromthosesharedby all27 EUMember not increasedgreatlyinrecentyears: infact,thenumberofspecial number ofMemberStateswhich have ‘specialrelations’withthirdpartieshas level ofsecurityfornationalinformation.Itshould,however, benotedthatthe maximalist approach would meanlessuniversal missions,(perhaps)based approach isbasedonthepremisethatservicewill 84 43 November 2007 44 November 2007 number ofstatesinthethirdgroup,particularthose withthepotentially diplomatic capabilitiesamongsttheMemberStates outlined above. The This would reflecttheincreasing variance inforeignpolicy prioritiesand given thirdcountry. those which donotwish,orareunable,tohave arepresentation inany Member States’representation),theycouldoperate as‘subcontractors’ for implementation ofEUforeignpolicy (andarenotintendedtoreplace Although theUniondelegationsaretaskedwithadvancing the Role andfunctionof theUnionDelegations The third countrieswould bebasedonsubstantive foreignpolicy considerations. An alternative rationale forthedevelopment ofEUdiplomaticrepresentationin inorganic versus Organic represented atambassadorlevel. stories arelikelytobeinthirdcountrieswhere fewEUmembersare especially initsfirstyears ofoperation. For thisreason,thekeysuccess circumstances, itremainstobeseenhow effective theEEAScanbe, duplicating thework oftheircolleaguesinnationalembassies.Underthese embassies, EEASstaffinEUembassiesaremuch morelikelytorisk Conversely, inplaceswhere many MemberStatesmaintainresident have asmallstaff. this responsibilitycanbeoverwhelming, particularlyformissions thatonly local presidenciesover thepastfewyears andtheworkload associatedwith Conversely, the needed most. diplomatic services,which have establishedmissionswhere theywere This approach would mirrorthedevelopment ofexistingnational the basisofwhere theEUis‘deepening’itsforeignpolicy commitments. commitments, andtheestablishmentofmissionsisdeterminedon in theareaswhere italready has‘heavy’ CFSP/externalrelations decision accordingly. on asetnumberofmissionsitwants (orcanafford)andimplementsthis organic approach isbasedontheideathatEUestablishesmissions inorganic principle isthattheUniondecidesup-front 85 that couldbefollowed elsewhere ifdeemeddesirable. it would streamlineanumberofpractical issuesandproducea‘blueprint’ One oftheadvantages ofthisoptionover current co-location projectsisthat rationalise nationalforeignservices. ‘spokes’ ofaregionalembassy(thehub). This would contribute toefforts example, provide administrative supporttoaroving ambassadororasthe but would benefitfromitsinformationcapacityandlocalcontactsto,for number ofcases. These diplomatswould notbeformallypartoftheEEAS, national diplomatsfrominterestedMemberStatescouldbeusefulina Providing officespaceintheUnionDelegationsforalimitednumberof ground while takingadvantage oftheEUDelegations’activities. could helpcaterfortheirdesirealimiteddiplomaticpresenceonthe alternatives tohaving aresidentambassador. Inmany places,theEEAS embassies proliferated, butMemberStateshave alsoexploredvarious representation where possible.Notonlyhasthenumberofresident As outlinedabove, mostEUstatesprefertohave someformofnational third countriesamidstchanging foreignpolicy demands. opportunity toexplorenewapproaches tomaintainingarepresentationin One ofthekeyadvantages theEEASoffersforMemberStatesis Co-location co-location andsubcontraction. Two possibleoptionstostructurethiscooperation areadvanced here: diplomatic structures. help countriesseekingfurthercooperation betweennationalandEuropean representation thatthisgenerates begsthequestionofhow theEEAScould in which theypreviouslyhadlittleinterest. The pressurefordiplomatic had todevelop acertainamountof‘new’foreignpolicy towards countries virtually every regionintheworld, thesmallerEUstates,inparticular, have has increased.InresponsetotheexistenceofEU-definedpositionson harmonisation offoreignpoliciesandhave fewerdiplomatic resources By contrast, thenumberofcountrieswhich aremorereceptive togreater marginally over thelasttwo decades. greater logistical,humanandfinancialcapabilities,hasincreasedonly 86 45 November 2007 46 November 2007 diplomatic missionsintheearly21 practices, itprovides anopportunitytoreassesstheroleandfunctionof However, astheEEASisunencumberedby history, tradition orpast forms andpurposesofdiplomaticrepresentationinthirdcountries. Much oftheabove ispredicatedonthetraditional understandingofthe Finding theright model collectively throughEUforeignpolicy. foreign policy interestswhich extendbeyond thosealready pursued network inthirdcountries,and/ortaketheviewthattheydonothave states which faceresource constraints inrunninganextensive embassy that allows thelattertoactforthem. This arrangement islikelytoappeal representation inthirdcountriestoEUDelegationsby signinganagreement Alternatively, MemberStatescoulddecidetosubcontract their Subcontraction contractual basis. States withexcessembassyspacetoaccommodatetheEEASona circumstances ifthisoptionispursued.OnepossibilitymightbeforMember Commission Delegationswould bethemostappropriatebuildingsinall creative thinkingwould berequiredonthequestionofwhether thecurrent Not allthecurrentCommissionDelegationswillbelargeenough,and accommodate allthenationaldiplomatsinterestedinhaving abasethere. Potential pitfallscouldincludethelack ofspaceinUnionDelegationsto the EUDelegations. different ‘hosts’,butcouldbenefitfromstandardisedproceduresat third countrieswould nolongerhave toseekarrangements with Member Statesinterestedinco-locatingdiplomaticpersonnel for instance,todifferencesinadministrative andsecurity cultures. Many oftheseprojects are fraught with practical difficulties, relating, should theEEASorganiseitselfalonglinestraditionally associatedwith effectively conductedby outsourcing ittootherorganisations?Indeed, staff inthirdcountries?Mightconsular-type work, forexample,bemore information gathering/representationwithoutnecessarily having extensive so far:towhat extentcouldtheEEAS‘outsource’ anduseITforefficient Yet this,inturn,generates anumberofquestionsthathave notbeenraised 87 st century. .Inconsularaffairsthismay beadifferentmatter. Estonia,forexample,which doesnotmaintainanembassyin 3. For example,theUKandGermanrepresentationssharepremisesin Astana, Lima,QuitoandReykjavik; the 2. The representationcoefficientiscalculatedby dividing thesumofrepresentationsinonegeographic region 1. Endnotes Centre’s EUNeighbourhoodForum. ofBathandChairtheEuropeanPolicy University and ModernLanguages, ofEuropeanStudies Department Richard Whitman isProfessor ofPolitics, of Cambridge. University Studies, Centreof International Candidate, David RijksisaPh.D. significantly toputtingthefledgingEEASonrighttrack. Addressing, ifnotanswering infull,allthesequestionswillcontribute such transnational businessorganisations? organisation andrepresentationthatmightbeborrowed fromothercontexts diplomatic representationinthirdcountries? Are therealternative modelsof the Finnish EmbassyinNew Delhi. India, hasensuredrepresentationonconsularandtrade issuesin2005throughaconsulardiplomatbased Luxembourg inanumberofCentral Asian and African countries. UK andItalyinMinsk;theUK,Germany, France andtheNetherlandsin Almaty; andtheNetherlands between ‘new’and‘old’MemberStates. States, butisparticularlywell-suitedtogive a comparisonofthetrendsinglobalpatternsrepresentation information onthedistributionofembassieswithinageographic regionorwithinthetwo groupsofMember interpretation, therepresentationcoefficientisdenotedasapercentage. This percentage doesnotgive any every MemberStatewould have aresidentembassyinevery countryinthatregion. To facilitatethe This coefficientdenotestheactualdegreeof‘diplomaticstrength’comparedtotheoreticalsituationwhere per group(EU-10orEU-15)by theproductofnumberMemberStatesandreceiving states. 88 47 November 2007 48 November 2007 another inthisarea”. higher criteriaandwhich have mademorebindingcommitmentstoone epitomised by permanentstructuredcooperation amongthosewho “fulfil formal aspectssaw fairlyquick recognitionoftheneedforflexibility, The discussionsintheConvention ontheFutureofEuropemore formal thanothers. Flexibility intheESDPcontextappearsavariety ofways, somemore policy asamoregeneral goal. ‘flexible pragmatism’ whilst retainingtheideaofcloserintegration inforeign motivated todoso. The ESDPhasillustrated theneedforadegreeof not allMemberStateswereequallycapableofbecominginvolved or Policy (ESDP).InthecaseofESDP, infact,itwas recognisedearlyonthat for instance,fromthebriefhistoryofEuropeanSecurityandDefence The ideaofLiaisonGroupsisnotnewandhasacertainprovenance arising, apioneerfor theliaisonapproach?ESDP: which couldbemadeby usingLiaisonGroupsmorefrequently Keukeleire In thedebateabouthow toimprove theEU’s foreignpolicy, thecontribution Stephan and Duke Simon By Liaison Groups andEUforeign policy intergovernmental CommonForeign andSecurityPolicy (CFSP). wider Unionwhich hasasinglelegalpersonality, butastillpredominantly encourage andfosterflexibilitywillbecomeeven moreevidentinanever- across thedifferent‘pillars’ofUniongrows. Above all,awillingnessto will becomemoreapparentasthelistofchallenges thatrequireresponses The needforspecialisationandadivision oflabourinEUexternalrelations consensus –shouldnotbeoverlooked. course, thenecessarysafeguardstoensurethattheyoperate onthebasisof Reform Treaty, merelyrecognise domain. Inmostcasesthough,theConstitutional Treaty, andnow the The moregeneral stipulations onenhancedcooperation alsoapplyinthis have the necessarycapability. task toagroupofMemberStateswhich arewillingtoperformthisroleand 2 The Council may alsoentrusttheimplementationofa de facto de 89 developments intheESDP. 1 – with,of essential inthisrespect. collaboration onindustrialdefenceaspectsoftheEU’s work, hasproved Defence Agency (EDA), which startedoff in2004asarather looseforumof smaller onesareabletoprovide preciousniche capabilities. The European division oflabouramongtheMemberStates:asaresult,now even the These have beencomplementedby acertaindegreeofspecialisationand equipment, andtoaddresscapabilityshortfalls. common standards,toadoptvoluntarily bindingcodesrelatingtoarmsand At thesametime,increasingeffortshave beenmadetodefineandagree as theChairmanshipsofEUMilitaryCommitteeorStaff). and who wishtodoso,may occupy positionsofparticularresponsibility(such also ledtotacitrecognitionthatthosewho arecapableofcontributingmore, rapidly ininstitutionaltermsandpractical burden-sharingarrangements. Ithas much ofthewrangling goingoninotherEUinstitutions,theESDPhasevolved capabilities andnationalprioritieshasnotledtoanarchy. Instead,incontrast to Contrary tosomeexpectations,thefactthatMemberStateshave different of theCongoin2003–bulkforces. case withtheFrench leadinOperation Artemis intheDemocratic Republic undertake toprovide thenecessaryheadquartersfacilitiesand–aswas the in the‘framework nation’concept,whereby aparticularMemberStatewill The bestexampleofvoluntary, butdifferentiated, involvement canbefound individual administrative bodiesandagencies,alsovary. Contributions toindividual ESDPmissions,aswelltothestaffof contribution tomakegenerating thenecessarypersonnelandresources. so-called ‘battlegroups’,where itisuptoeach MemberStatetodecidewhat the ESDPalsodependsupondifferentiatedeffort,asincaseof When itcomestolessformalmodesofcooperation, theimplementationof on by thetypeofsolution-basedpragmatism demonstrated by themilitary The flexibility demonstrated in thecaseofESDPisundoubtedlyspurred more generally? transferable totheCFSPand,even beyond, toEUexternalrelations Are such formsofstandardisation,specialisationanddivision oflabour Applicability beyond ESDP 90 49 November 2007 50 November 2007 Secretariat have hadanimpactbothonthe close integration intovarious aspectsofDGE’s work intheCouncilGeneral Indeed, theinvolvement ofsecondeddiplomatsinthePolicy Unitandtheir CFSP and,moregenerally, onEUexternalrelations. military, policeandcivilian levels) hasaconfidence-buildingeffectonthe Moreover, theheavy involvement ofsecondednationalpersonnel(atthe that any such groupenjoys thesupportofallMemberStates. CFSP and,arguably, strengthenstheUnion’s focusandoutreach –provided the Congo,Iran orSomalia)confirmstheexistenceofsimilarpractices inthe ‘Contact Groups’(such as those on Afghanistan, theDemocratic Republicof and policeservices.However, thepresenceofnumerousinformalintra-EU have had alargelypositive effect,leadingtomore –notlessintegration. history oftheESDPsuggeststhatspecialisationand division oflabour thought-through distributionofrolesandfunctions. The relatively short for more–notlessspecialisation. They therefore demandacarefully creation ofaEuropeanExternal Action Service(EEAS),aremorelikelyto call Representative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs andSecurityPolicy, andthe The prospect oflegalpersonalityfortheUnion,advent ofaHigh General, includingtheCommission’s ExternalService. this isexactlywhat happensbetweenandwithinthevarious Directorates- fact, comenaturally to foreign policy may alsohave more general applicability. This ideashould,in Finally, theimplicationsofspecialisationanddivision oflabourinEuropean flexibility andbalancebetweencentralisation andre-nationalisation. of specialisationanddivision oflabourmay ensurethenecessarydegreeof bulwark againstpotential(re)nationalisation.Inbothcases,thevarious forms At thesametime,gradual ‘Europeanisation’ofnationaldiplomacy isa sensitivities aboutovert ‘Brusselisation’. well), willcontinuetoensureasenseofnationalownership andallay continued statusoftheCFSPasadistinctpillar(inReform Treaty as The increasingexercise ofnationalinfluenceinBrussels,alongsidethe consensus-building attheEuropeanlevel. and diplomatsthemselves, who arenow morekeenlyaware oftheneedfor beyond thetraditional remitoftheSecretariat,andonnationalofficials fonctionnaires 91 working inexternalrelations,since fonctionnaires , who have gone division ofrolesamonginstitutionsandcountriesparticipatinginthegroup, their internalactivities. There couldalsowellbefurtherspecialisationand Liaison Groupmemberswould agreeamongthemselves onhow tomanage Nations’ bodiesandinotherinternationalorganisations. Group; or, forinstance,inNew York, tocoordinatewith(andwithin)United places, such asinthethirdcountryorregiondealtwithby theLiaison meet inBrussels,butcouldalsoconvene andoperate inotherrelevant Diplomats fromtheparticipatingcountriesandinstitutionswould notonly military structuresorotherEUagenciesintheLiaisonGroup’s activities. The Councilmay alsodecidetoinvolve representatives ofthevarious represent aquintessentialtraining groundandlaboratory forthefutureEEAS. the Commission.Inprinciple,therefore,such agroupmightwellcometo Member States,theCouncil’s Policy UnitandDGE,relevant unitsfrom consist ofspecialiseddiplomatsorcivil servants fromtheparticipating At thediplomaticandadministrative levels, anEULiaisonGroupwould the areainquestionandattentionofinitialparticipantsevolve. Groups may alsochange over time,dependingonhow therequirementsof the overall EUapproach –andtheirown too.Membershipofsuch EULiaison and pooltheirnationaleffortstothatend,inorderbringadded-value to region orissue). They mustalsobeableandwillingtostepup,coordinate to supportEUengagementinaspecificforeignpolicy matter(acountry, time, todevote extra energy, attention,moneyandothernationalresources These MemberStateshave tobewillingandable,over alongerperiodof or Development Cooperation. issue; and,3)ifrelevant, thefutureCommissionerforNeighbourhoodPolicy commit themselves tointensifyingeffortsonaparticularforeignpolicy under his/herauthority);2)anumberofMemberStatesthatarewillingto Foreign Affairs andSecurityPolicy (oranEUSpecialRepresentative working Such groupswould consistof1)theHigh Representative oftheUnionfor EU institutionalframework. hypothetical EULiaisonGroup,aswellitseventual positionwithinthe in moredetailonthemembership,creationandpossiblefunctionsofa How canallthisbetranslated intopractice? Itmay beworthwhile todwell Liaison Groups inpractice 3 92 51 November 2007 52 November 2007 individual effortsandassetsofaLiaisonGroup’s members. and follow-up ofEUpolicy, andtheintensification poolingofthe done throughitssupportforthepreparation, elaboration, implementation and (pro)active commonpolicy onaspecificareaorissue. This would be special responsibilityfordeveloping amoreintensive, dynamic, coherent As suggestedintheESDParea,aLiaisonGroup’s functionwould betotake common policy (asisoftenthecasewithinternational‘ContactGroups’). intended preciselytohelpbridgethosedifferencesinordershapea Member Statesontheissueinquestion–unless,ofcourse,itscreationwas there werefundamentaldifferencesofinterestorapproach amongstEU of aparticularEULiaisonGroupwould even beruledoutincaseswhere as thiswillnotalways bepossible,desirable oruseful.Indeed,thecreation Finally, LiaisonGroupswould notbeestablishedfor credibility toactasamediatorinregion,adequatepeace-keepingforces). contacts withtheelitesinathirdcountry, economicsupportorleverage, other nationalassets(forexample,diplomaticormilitaryinfluence,close possess thecapabilitiestodosointermsofpersonnel,financialmeansand They have toacceptthecommitmentactinaconcertedway, andmust able tostrengthentheirengagement. In any case,thecountriesthatjoinLiaisonGroupsmustbebothwillingand from above, inotherwords, rather thanfrombelow. more extensive poolingandcoordinationoftheireffortsresources – need tointensifyandfocuspolicy onaparticularissue,andtopromote Liaison Groupwhen, atacertainmoment,someMemberStatesfeelthe But anotherpossibilityisthatpoliticalleaderswould decidetolaunch anEU some MemberStatesandtheEUinstitutions. closer interaction andcooperation betweendiplomatsandofficialsfrom a specificforeignpolicy matterwould gradually crystalliseonthebasisof needs, demandsandopportunities. This meansthatanEULiaisonGroupon and organicallyfrombelow, basedonpractical experienceandconcrete probably themostlogicalandnatural –istoestablishthemincrementally EU LiaisonGroupscanbecreatedinseveral ways. Onepossibility–and on thegiven areaorissue,dependingontheir competenceandexpertise. with different(setsof)actorsfocusingonspecificdimensionsofthepolicy 93 all foreign policy areas, ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ list ofpossibletasksforsuch groups: on thespecificneedsofareaorissue. What follows isanon-exhaustive An EULiaisonGroupcouldfulfilthisfunctionindifferentways, depending participate init. rights, obligationsandinterestsofthoseMemberStates which donot decisions adoptedinthecontextofthesetreaties,and thecompetences, treaties (including,ifratified, theReform Treaty), thelegislationandother Firstly, anEULiaisonGroup must respecttheprinciplesofcurrent be observed. the perimetersforitswork. To thisend,threemainsafeguardsshould within theUnion’s broaderinstitutional,legalandpolicy framework andtoset within theUnion,itisessentialtoclearlydefinepositionofLiaisonGroups foreign policy, andtodispeldistrustofadivision oflabourandspecialisation To ensurethatanEULiaisonGroupstrengthens–anddoesnotundermine Coherence andlegitimacy implementing any othertaskswhich theCouncilmay assigntothegroup. World Bank); UN agencies,theOrganisationforSecurityandCo-operation inEurope,the the areaoronissueatstake(otherthirdcountries,regionalorganisations, facilitating andenhancingcoordinationwithotherexternalactorsactive in specific problems; parties topromote,elaborate orproposeconcretesolutionsfor allowing theEUtomediateornegotiatemoreintensively withthird third countriesorregions; contributing tothebroadeningandintensificationofpoliticaldialoguewith or capabilities; policy domainswhere theUnionassuch haslittleornocompetence measures tofurthertheEUobjectives inthisareaorissue–particularly pooling groupmembers’effortsmoredecisively and/oradoptingnew national policiesoftheMemberStatesparticipatingingroup); dimensions ofhorizontalandvertical consistency (includingbetweenthe examining, proposingandenforcing measurestostrengthenthevarious EU decisionsrelatingtothisareaorissue; decisions, and/orinconcretising,implementingandensuringfollow-up on Representative) and/ortheCommissioninpreparing newEUinitiatives and supporting theCouncil,EEAS,HighRepresentative (orEUSpecial 94 53 November 2007 54 November 2007 a resemblancetothatofenhancedcooperation asappliedtoforeignpolicy. At firstsight,infact,theLiaisonGroupconceptoutlined inthispaperbears concept and‘enhancedcooperation’ asappliedtoforeignpolicy. any case,questionsariseabouttherelationshipbetweenLiaisonGroup the Reform Treaty inmind,itisnotwholly dependentuponitsadoption.In Although theconceptisdesignedwithpossiblechanges introducedby foreign policy issues. distilled intoLiaisonGroupswhich would work onabroadrange ofEU States. Furthermore,thevarious formsofflexibilityexaminedherecouldbe need toberefinedandmadesubjectagreementbetweentheEUMember damaging theconsensualbasisofany such action. These formsofflexibility cooperation have enabledtheEUtoactoninternationalstagewithout The ESDP’s record,althoughbrief,suggeststhatflexibleformsof collaboration thathave arisen,especiallyintheESDPcontext. This paperhasconsideredanumberofflexiblepractices andformsof Enhanced cooperation indisguise? delegations tobemorecloselyinvolved inEUforeignpolicy. inter-institutional wrangling, andallows therelevant inter-parliamentary the interplay withparliamentaryactorswithoutraising legaldisputesand The EULiaisonGroupcould,infact,provide aflexiblesettingwhich facilitates consideration. Specifichearingscouldalsobeenvisaged. takes theParliament’s resolutions,reportsandotherfindingsinto informed abouttheLiaisonGroup’s activities andthatthegroup,inturn, Parliament committeesandinter-parliamentary delegationsarethoroughly Thirdly, alltherelevant EUbodiesmustensurethatthecompetentEuropean principles andrestrictions. and thatitsfunctioningdoesnotruncountertotheabove-mentioned should ensurethattheyareregularlyinformedaboutthegroup’s activities policies towards theregionorissueinquestion. The relevant EUbodies scope andactivities should notundermine,orrival, existingcommon Liaison Grouphasbeencreatedtoaddress. This alsomeansthatthegroup’s policy-making processforthegeographic areaorpolicy issuethattheEU Secondly, allMemberStatesmustremainformallyinvolved inthegeneral 95 Europe (Bruges). andProfessorVisiting attheCollege of ofLeuven, at theUniversity Stephan Keukeleire isJeanMonnetProfessor inEuropeanForeign Policy Maastricht. Simon Duke isaProfessor ofPublic attheEuropeanInstitute Administration, that already existinsideandoutsidetheEUinstitutions. ‘enhanced cooperation’ properandthelooser‘clubs’contactgroups constituting apragmatic butstructuredintermediatesolutionbetween a systemofLiaisonGroupscouldmaterialiseinmuch lessformalway, thus cooperation canmeetandoverlap atsomepointinthefuture. At any rate, It remainstobeseenwhether theconceptsofLiaisonGroupsandenhanced specialisation anddivision oflabourinsuch groups. are already thesubjectofadynamic EUpolicy canalsoprofitfromthe Liaison Groupsisnotnecessarilyalast-resortmechanism: policy fieldsthat Last butnotleast,incontrast toenhancedcooperation, thesystemofEU common withintheUnion). only them(provided theyrespectthedecisionsandpoliciesagreedin powers, astheycanagreetogetheroninitiatives ormeasures which commit It alsoallows theparticipatingcountriestoactbeyond thelimitsofEU’s (nine intheReform Treaty) requiredfor‘enhancedcooperation’. and intricateprocedurestheminimumthresholdofeightMemberStates Group canbecreatedinamoreflexibleandinformalway, withoutthelong There are,however, alsosome majordifferences.For instance,aLiaison .For furtherdetails, seealso:StephanKeukeleire (2007) ‘EUCoreGroupsaftertheReform Treaty 3. The Reform Treaty now referstoCommonSecurityand DefencePolicy and notESDP. The current 2. The ideaof‘EULiaisonGroups’was firstlaunched by theBelgianMinisterofForeign Affairs KarelDeGucht 1. Endnotes Governance Studies Governance Specialization anddivision oflabourinEUforeignpolicy’, terminology will,however, beretainedforthesakeofclarity. negative connotation. Another possiblelabelforEUCoreCroupsis‘EUContactGroup’,butthis namehasaneven more with theexistingunderstandingofa'coreEurope'(which isoftenperceived asexcludingMemberStates). label ‘EULiaisonGroup’hastheadvantage over thelabel‘EUCoreGroup’sinceitavoids beingassociated (http://www.upi-fiia.fi/fin/tilaisuudet/menneet_tilaisuudet_2005/towards_greater_effect_and_appeal/). The in hisspeech ‘Towards greatereffectandappeal–StrengtheningEUforeignpolicy’ (Helsinki,27/10/2005) , http://www.ggs.kuleuven.be/publications/workingpapers/default.htm 96 Working Papers - Leuven Centre for Global Global for Centre Leuven - Papers Working – 55 November 2007 56 November 2007 Article 18(5)ofthe Treaty onEuropeanUnion(TEU),which states The legal foundation fortheirwork isaJoint Action based on Union anditsforeignpoliciesincrisisregions around theworld. EUSRs areappointedby theCouncilofMinisterstorepresent are atstake. defining theEU’s approach toregions andcountrieswhere Unioninterests include supportforpeace-andinstitution-building,assistancein management, buttheirmandateshave expandedover timeto The focusoftheEUSRs’work isonsecuritypolicy andcrisis they maketoCFSPandEUforeignpolicy atlarge. in 2005). This isasignofthegrowing importanceofthecontributionthat in 2002,SouthCaucasus2003,andCentral Asia, Sudan,andMoldova have beenadded(Macedoniaand Afghanistan in2001,Bosnia-Herzegovina To date,noneoftheEUSRs’mandateshave beenterminated,andnewones Political andSecurityCommittee(PSC). Representative fortheCommonForeign andSecurityPolicy (CFSP)andthe is alsonoteworthy thattheseEUSRsprecededthecreationofHigh management inCentral Africa, andconflictresolutionintheMiddleEast.It appointments reflectedtheEU’s long-standingengagementinconflict followed shortlyby theoneforMiddleEastPeace Process. These The firstEUSRwas nominatedfortheGreatLakesregioninMarch 1996, ground’ tohelpshapetheEU’s foreignandsecuritypolicy. 23 countriesorterritories,andprovided informationandexpertise‘fromthe The nineexistingEUSRshave representedtheUnioninnolessthan EEAS mightbedesigned. provides relevant lessonstobefedintotheupcomingdeliberations onhow the Action Service(EEAS).Nevertheless, theexperiencetheyhave accumulated preliminary exchanges concerning theestablishmentofEuropeanExternal in thecoverage ofEUforeignpolicy-making andoutput,letaloneinthe Grevi The work oftheEUSpecialRepresentativesGiovanni (EUSR)hasnotfiguredprominently and Adebahr Cornelius By for theEEAS? The EUSpecialRepresentatives: what lessons 97 ■ ■ ■ the EUSRs’work areofparticularrelevance: With aviewtosettingupthefutureEUforeignservice,threedimensionsof ministries theyhave mostlycomefromhasalsodifferedgreatly. months. The degreetowhich theyrelyforpractical helponthe national between Aldo Ajello’s fulldecadeintheGreatLakesregion,tojustafew Their tenureinofficemay vary (andhasindeedvaried) significantly, Commission, towhich theyareaccountableforbudgetarymatters. standpoint, however, theyhave CFSPadviser contracts withtheEuropean They are,therefore,aninstrumentoftheUnion’s CFSP. From alegal policy issues.” a SpecialRepresentative withamandate inrelationtoparticular that: “The Councilmay, whenever itdeemsnecessary, appoint world’s mosttroubledcountries andregions”. “are thevisibleexpressionofEU’s growing engagementinsomeofthe In thewords ofEUHighRepresentative forCFSPJavier Solana,the EUSRs overleaf shows. nine currently, covering theEU’s majorregions ofconcern,asthetable The numberofEUSRshasrisenfromtwo in1996andfour2001to scopePolicy: andvariety of mandates These threeaspectswillbeaddressedinturnthefollowing sections. security developments (the’eyes’ andthe‘ears’ofEU). provide theEUwithinformationandanalysisaboutrelevant politicaland help implementEUpolicies(a‘face’anda‘voice’ oftheUnion),and increasingly, withtheCommission,bothinfieldandat‘headquarters’; at the at the at the due tothelack ofearlierrolemodels. interpreting anddeveloping theirmandateswitharesults-orientedapproach geographical distributionandfunctionalremit; policy institutional EU policy-making EU level, thescopeandvariety oftheirmandates,bothinterms level, theirclosecooperation withtheCouncilbutalso, level, theirpragmatic, learning-by-doing style, 98 1 They represent theUnionand 57 November 2007 58 November 2007 information andintelligencetofuelEUforeignpolicy-making. lack informationfromthefield.Inotherwords, theyprovide ‘EU-made’ vast majority)which donothave extensive diplomaticnetworks abroadand The EUSRs’ contributionisespeciallyvalued by thoseMemberStates (the easier toachieve consensusoncommonpolicy guidelines. for deliberation andnegotiationinthesecommittees,which may makeit Council working groupsandthePSC. This helpsprovide alevel playing field effective CFSPby contributingtopolicy-making withregularreportstothe They alsoplay asignificantroleinthedevelopment ofastrongerandmore arrangements forcrisismanagementandresolution. (OSCE). Insodoing,EUSRscontributetosupportingmultilateral African Union,ortheOrganisationforSecurityandCooperation inEurope powers –andinternationalorganisationsliketheUnitedNations, actors –betheycountriessuch asRussia,theUnitedStatesorregional Moreover, theywork closelywiththerepresentatives ofotherinternational 28 July 2005 2005/558/CFSP,Joint Action Sudan 18 July 2005 2005/556/CFSP, Joint Action on cin20/6/FP R 23 March 2005 2005/265/CFSP, Joint Action SouthCaucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) 7 July 2003 Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP, Bosniaand Herzegovina 11 March 2002 Joint Action 2002/211/CFSP, Afghanistan 10 December2001 2001/875/CFSP, Joint Action Former Yugoslav RepublicofMacedonia 29 June 2001 Joint Action 2001/492/CFSP, MiddleEastPeace Process 25 November 1996 Geographical remit Joint Action 1996/676/CFSP, 25 March 1996 1996/250/CFSP,Joint Action First appointment Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda) Central Asia (Kazakhstan,Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova-Ukr African GreatLakesregion(DRCongo, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) epublic ofMoldova (includingthe 99 aine border) the geographic areascovered by anEUSR,(exceptCentral Asia To date,militaryand/orcivilian ESDPoperations have beendeployed inall EUSRs andESDP solutions tocomplexandmulti-dimensionalproblems. standing upfortheEU’s values andinterests,seekingcomprehensive conflict resolution,crisismanagement,tackling thenewsecuritythreatsand and humanrights)areemblematicofwhat EUforeignpolicy isallabout: representatives oftheHighRepresentative onnon-proliferation, terrorism Mr SolanahasarguedthattheEUSRs(togetherwiththreepersonal crisis managementandtoamoreintegrated EUforeignpolicy generally. thereby potentiallycontributing toacomprehensive EUapproach towards (ESDP), theEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy (ENP),andenlargementpolicy, work spanspolicy areassuch astheEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy view toenhancingthecoherenceofallEUinstrumentsinfield. Their Coordination isanotherimportantfunctionperformedby EUSRs,witha each partnercountry. contribution tofulfillingtheobjectives oftheENP Action Plansconcludedwith and implementedby theCommission,butEUSRscanmakeanimportant as wellIsrael andthePalestinian Territories. ItisaCommunity policy designed The ENPapplies tocountrieslikeMoldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, andGeorgia, EUSRs andENP overall effectiveness ofEUcrisismanagement. between ESDPmissionsandtheEUSRshas,onbalance,enhanced the ground. While cooperation hasnotalways beensmooth,theinterplay different ESDPactorswhen morethanonemissionhasbeendeployed on Increasingly, EUSRshave alsobeencalledupontocoordinatethework of local authorities. when needbe,canaddresssensitive politicalaspectsofESDPmissionswiththe mandated toprovide localpoliticalguidancetocivilian ESDPmissionsand, in thepursuitofsharedobjectives, withamutuallyreinforcing effect.EUSRsare ESDP operations andEUSRsareexpectedtoperformcomplementaryfunctions have beendeployed (except Aceh-Indonesia andIraq). has beenanappointedEUSRforallgeographic areaswhere ESDPoperations 100 2 ), andthere 59 November 2007 60 November 2007 Council, theCommissionandMemberStates–inall phases oftheirwork. The EUSRs are closelylinkedtoallthreemajorplayers inEUforeignpolicy –the cross-pillarInstitutions: cooperation community. be used,theEUSRisdouble-hattedasHighRepresentative fortheinternational in theBonnStatementofPeace ImplementationCouncil(PIC)may needto where securityconcernsaremoreprominentandthecoercive powers foreseen Interestingly, boththeseEUSRswearmorethanone‘hat’.InBosnia-Herzegovina, account forthedifferencesinconfigurations oftheEUSR’s post. reform path. The differentstageseach isatintheEUenlargementprocessalso between theEUSRandCommissioniscrucialtohelpthemstay onthe However, given thattransition isstillunderway inbothcountries,cooperation relevant theroleofCommissionand the the transition process,andthemorestablesecuritysituation, engagement isoneasingthetransition towards accession. The moreadvanced membership perspective andcandidatestatusrespectively, themainfocusofEU In countrieslikeBosnia-Herzegovina andMacedonia,which have anEU EUSRs andenlargement management andotheraspectsofsecuritysectorreforminMoldova. interplay betweentheEUSRteamandCommunityactorsonborder Commission officials,toaddresstheproblemoffrozenconflicts;and January 2007,involving theEUSRandhisteamanumberof include thefieldmissionwhich tookplaceacrosstheSouthCaucasusin Examples ofhow thishasfosteredconstructive cooperation inpractice overview ofallEUactivities, notablytherelevant aspectsoftheENP Action Plan. case ofMoldova, themandateofEUSRprovides thatheshouldmaintainan to assisttherelevant bodieswiththeimplementationofplanitself.In Action PlansforthethreecountriesofSouthCaucasusprovide fortheEUSR consultation tookplaceduringthenegotiationson Action Plans,andthe enhance respective prioritiesinthepursuit ofcommonobjectives. Mutual Commission andtheEUSRhave devisedoriginalformatsto cooperate and The experienceintheSouthCaucasusandMoldova shows thatthe double-hatted astheEUSR. 3 In Macedonia,theCommission’s HeadofDelegationhasbeen 101 less central thepositionofEUSR. exercised throughthesecond(CFSP)pillar. first (Community)pillarneedtobecombinedwiththe politicalleverage management indifficultareas. The economicincentives provided underthe essential forEUSRstomaximisetheimpactofEUforeign policy andcrisis Maintaining closecontactswithbothCommissionand MemberStatesis (Kazakhstan) andisnow duetobeheldonanannualbasis. of MissioninCentral Asia which tookplaceinautumn2006 Astana as requiringthemtosubmitjointreports,andthemeetingofallEUHeads national missions.Stepshave beentakentowards achieving thisgoal,such joint politicalassessmentandcommon That said,morecouldbedonetopromotetheexchange ofinformation, of Missionaswell. In thirdcountries,EUSRsholdregularmeetingswithMemberStates’Heads provide officespacefortravelling EUSRsandfortheiradvisers inthefield. Delegations areaprimarycontactfortheEUSRs. These Delegationsusually Brussels (allotherEUSRs),therespective HeadsoftheCommission Herzegovina, Macedonia,and Afghanistan) orflyintotheirregionfrom Whether theyarebasedintheircountryofresponsibility(Bosnia- have hadtobeovercome andmuch scopeisleftforimproving coordination. Commission andMemberStatesinthefield,althoughconsiderable obstacles There hasalsobeenprogressinfosteringcooperation betweenEUSRs,the policy-making acrossthedifferentpillarsofUnion. Commission participatesdirectlyinsomeofthem,enhancingjoint other things,toprovide EUSRswithregularpolicy inputandthe approach tocrisismanagement. These taskforces aresupposed,among EUSR teamshave beensetuptoensureamorecoherent andeffective including stafffromtheCouncilSecretariat,DGE,Policy Unit,andthe strategic guidancefromthePSC.Over thelastfewyears, regional taskforces EUSRs receive operational guidancefromtheHighRepresentative, and for thebudgetallocatedtheirmissions. Special Advisers forCFSP. As such, theyareresponsibletotheCommission appointed, theyconcludeacontract withtheCommissiontobecome Policy Unit,andtheEUPresidency onbehalfoftheMemberStates.Once involving theCouncilSecretariat,High Representative’s They arenominatedby theCouncilfollowing aselectionprocedure 102 démarches between theEUSRsand cabinet and 61 November 2007 62 November 2007 Brussels foreignpolicy machinery. importance oftheirmandates,didtheybecomemore integrated into the Only withtheincreaseintheirnumbersand,parallel, thegrowing disconnected fromtheinstitutionalmechanisms andstructuresinBrussels. Representative andthePSCwereintroduced,EUSRsstillsomewhat institutional void. Later, when CFSPinstitutionssuch as theHigh The firsttwo EUSRshadtoperform theirfunctionsinarelative political and of EUforeignpolicy. learning-by-doing approach thatissymptomaticoftheoverall advancement development. Instead,much ofthisdevelopment hasresultedfromthe Representatives nornationalspecialenvoys served asatemplatefortheir pre-existing model.NeithertheUnitedNation’s Secretary-General’s Special foreign serviceisthatEUSRswerenotdeveloped onthebasisofany A thirdreasonwhy theEUSRs’experiencecouldfeedintonewEU learning byEU logic: doing Representative oftheinternationalcommunity. Herzegovina, when thetimeisripeforclosingOfficeofHigh representation tothe African Unionand,over themedium-term,inBosnia- including double-hatting,couldbeappliedin Addis Ababa, attheEU consensus thatmoreintegrated formsofEUexternalrepresentation, positions willdependoncircumstances ontheground. There seemstobe in practice, althoughthespecificconfiguration offuturedouble-hatted The experienceinMacedoniahasshown thatsuch double-hattingcanwork programme forward. commitment toaddressresidualtensionsinthecountryandpushreform establishing adouble-hattedEUSRreflectedtheUnion’s strong political ESDP missiontobedeployed inacandidate country. Ontheother, entered intoin2005.Ontheonehand,itwas feltinappropriateforan and, second,inrecognitionofthenewstagetransition thecountry fewer opportunitiesforthirdpartiestoplay oneEUactoragainsttheother; achieve greatercoherencebetweenthefirst andsecondpillar, andprovide This innovation was introducedfortwo mainreasons:first,to fulfilling therolesofEUSRandHeadCommissionDelegation. which hasoccurredforthefirsttimeinMacedonia,withsameperson A particularinstanceofsuch cross-pillarcooperation isthe‘double-hatting’ 103 Second, EUSRscouldstillbeappointedwithinthenewserviceonan fall withintheremitofnewservice. tools. Their roleofrepresentation,reportingandcoordinationwillnaturally integrated UnionDelegations. As such, theycanberegardedastransitional Delegations ornot,willlargelybereplacedby theHeadsofnew, First, field-basedEUSRs,whether double-hattedastheHeadsofCommission ongoing debate. In thisrespect,two mainpointsareworth highlightinginrelationtothe in thenewEEAS. established progressively. Onthewhole, EUSRsarelikelytobesubsumed features oftheEEAS,which canhardlybeanticipatedandwillprobably the EUSRsinnewstructure. Their rolewilllargelydependontheprecise EEAS –itselfanunprecedentedundertakingandindefiningtheplaceof A certaindegreeofflexibilitywillsurelyberequiredinsettingupthe the formalarchitecture ofthenewservice. Pragmatism andpoliticalgoodsenseindailypractice willcountasmuch as be acentral featureofforeignpolicy-making underthenewEEAS. consensus-seeking amongMemberStates. This delicatebalancingactwill and initiative, regularexchanges with‘headquarters’inBrussels,and Member States. They needtostrikeabalancebetweentheirown autonomy Brussels institutionalmachinery andoftherespective positionsofthe success oftheirmissionsthattheydevelop anin-depthunderstandingofthe While theEUSRspioneerforeignpolicy abroad,itisvery importantforthe foreign policy-making. framing thework oftheEUSRsmorefirmlywithinwidersystemEU At theendof2006,importantinnovations wereintroducedtothiseffect, one oftwo baskets: basis withaviewtoaddressingspecificissueswhich may fall,essentially, in Representative mightwellbeovercome. the distinctionbetweenEUSRsandPersonal Representatives oftheHigh (such asnon-proliferation, newepidemicsandterrorism).From thisstandpoint, They could alsobeaskedtoaddressquestionsofahorizontal,functionalnature intervention ortosharpentheEUstrategic approach topivotal globalregions. EUSRs couldbemandated,astheyaretoday, totackle crisesrequiringurgent geographic and functional 104 . ad hoc ad 63 November 2007 64 November 2007 .SeethePICBonnconclusions,Bonn,10 December1997, Article XI.2. 3. EUBAM Moldova isnotanESDPmissionbutacrisismanagementworking invery closecooperation 2. Openingremarksby Javier Solana,SeminarwithEUSpecialRepresentatives, Brussels,29June 2005. 1. Endnotes Paris. Studies, Giovanni Grevi isSeniorResearch Fellow forSecurity attheEUInstitute Berlin. Relations, für Politik (DGAP)–theGermanCouncilonForeignAuswärtige Cornelius Adebahr isProgramme attheDeutscheGesellschaft Officer an internationalactorinitsown right. do nothave anembassyinagiven countryorregion,butalsofortheEUas information, intelligenceandanalysisnotonlyforthoseMemberStatesthat hallmarks ofEuropeanforeignpolicy. They alsoprovide valuable comprehensive crisismanagement,which isregardedasoneofthe The EUSpecialRepresentatives embody theUnion’s approach to regions, althoughalotisyet tobeachieved inthisrespect. engagement have contributedtoraising theUnion’s politicalprofileinthese the EU. The continuityoftheirpresenceandthevisibility than 20crisis-riddencountrieslocatedinregionsofmostdirectrelevance to The EUSRshave provided theUnionwitheffective representationinmore coherence atboththeinstitutionalandpolicy level. process ofestablishingtheEEAS,notablyinrelationtoquestion achievements, aswellthesystem’s shortcomings,shouldinformthe EUSRs have developed intoarelevant foreignpolicy tool. Their to theEU,andby gradually proving theirusefulnesstoMember States,the By enhancingthesynergybetweeninstrumentsandresources available Conclusion work oftheenvisaged EEAS,soastominimiseconfusionandavoid turfwars. Last butnotleast,thecreationofnewEUSRpostsshouldduplicate with therelevant EUSR. 105 could work toresolve potentialdisputesover theconflictinginterestsof develop a‘masterplan’forthecreationofnewservice.Such agroup European Parliament andselectedexternalexperts–couldbesetupto Member States,theCommissionandCouncilSecretariat, butalsothe To thisend,anadvisory group–includingnotonlyrepresentatives ofthe potential tensionshouldbeidentifiedanddiscussedat anearlystage. bureaucratic interestsandpoliticalviewsofthemainplayers, areasof To prevent theEEASfrombeingunderminedatoutsetby thediverse freeze, already revealed someareasofpotentialtension. Treaty andtheFrench andDutch referendawhich consignedittothedeep preparatory work in2004-05betweenthesigningofConstitutional different stagesintheimplementationprocess.Indeed,seven monthsof diplomatic action–awiderange ofsensitive questionsareboundtoariseat EU –andconflictingvisionsoftheconcreteshapescopecommon Given theexistenceofdifferentdiplomaticpatternsandpractices acrossthe relevant actors. creation oftheEEAShasbeenlefttosubsequentnegotiationsbetween This meansthatthetaskofaddressingmostintricatequestions relatedtothe those provisions intothenewReform Treaty withoutany significantchanges. and furthernegotiation,theIntergovernmental Conference(IGC)transferred The broadtermsoftheConstitutional Treaty leftampleroomforinterpretation Action Servicetosupporttheholderofthispost. European CommissionerforExternalRelations)andofa Representative fortheCommonForeign andSecurityPolicy andthe Affairs andSecurityPolicy (combiningthejobsofcurrentHigh creation ofthenewpostHighRepresentative oftheUnionforForeign represent amajorsteptowards amorecoherent EU‘foreignpolicy’: the The implementationoftwo innovations, inparticular, is expectedto external action. failed Constitutional Treaty, includingtheprovisions relatingtotheUnion’s The newReform Treaty takes ontheinstitutionalchanges containedinthe Maurer Andreas and Lieb Julia By of theEEAS: variables,The ‘how’ priorities, timelines 106 65 November 2007 66 November 2007 But where exactlydotheareasofpotentialtensionlie? of thesituationcouldbemadeinsmallcircles andclosedsessions. has been(successfully)completed. As in2004-05,however, afirst(re)assessment remain reluctanttoopentheEEASdossierbefore Treaty ratification process Representatives ofbothnationalgovernments andtheEUinstitutionswill diverging methodsandconceptsofEUforeignpolicy-making. are asomewhat unstablecompromisebetweendifferentandsometimes A clashofdiverging objectives isstillpossible,sincethe Treaty provisions vertical coherenceintheUnion’s externalrepresentationandaction. provides anopportunity, butnotacast-ironguarantee ofmorehorizontaland Common Foreign andSecurityPolicy proper, andnationalforeignpolicies– of itsthreekeyelements–theEuropeanCommunity’s externaldimension,the consistent andintegrated Europeanforeignpolicy. The expectedconsolidation There are,however, noguarantees thatthiswillresultinamorecoherent, the MemberStates.” Commission aswellstaffsecondedfromnationaldiplomaticservicesof departments oftheGeneral SecretariatoftheCounciland services oftheMemberStatesandshallcompriseofficialsfromrelevant Action Service. This serviceshallwork incooperation withthediplomatic mandate, theHighRepresentative shallbeassistedby aEuropeanExternal Article 13a-3oftheReform Treaty statesthat:“Infulfillinghisorher able torelyonthesupportofaqualitatively newbody. cornerstone andlinchpin oftheUnion’s new‘foreignpolicy’ andwillbe double-hatted HighRepresentative willbemandatedtoactasthe The treatyprovisions forestablishingtheEEASareclearononepoint: Towards aEuropean foreign service foreign policy andfacilitatetheimplementationofnewprovisions. 2009 –couldbeconsideredasameansbothtoenhancecurrentEuropean existing legalframework –which isboundtoremaininplaceuntilatleast At thesametime,measurestoimprove theUnion’s externalactionwithinthe coherent templatetodrive theprocess. main actorsatanearlystage,andhelptodraw upaviableroadmapand 107 agreed thentoestablishaservice Commission. According tothelastProgressReport(see Annex 2),itwas during the2004/2005negotiationsbetweenCouncilSecretariatand Preparations willhave tobeginonthebasisofpolitical with thequestionoffinancing,which hashardlybeenaddressedsofar). The institutionalarrangements arguablyrepresentthemostsensitive issue(along Institutional arrangements EEAS, theCouncilSecretariatandCommissionneeds tobeaddressed, Because ofthesepotentialconflicts,thequestion linksbetweenthe Directorate-General forExternalRelations(DGRELEX). (possibly includingthemilitarystructures),and theCommission’s duplication andbringtogetheratleasttheCouncil’s DGE,itsPolicy Unit remains vague onthispoint,mentioningonlyacommonwilltoavoid functional instrumentsofacommondiplomaticservice. The ProgressReport of EUforeignpolicy-making, andthequestionofcompetences service’s structuresandhierarchies. This alsoappliestotheoperational level development oftheEEAS,withimportantconsequencesfornew Clarification oftheinstitutionalconfiguration isessentialforthe national andbureaucratic interests. different understandingofEuropeanintegration andinpart,also,specific part, theMemberStatesaresplitalongvarious lines,reflectinginparttheir policy goals,encompassingthefullspectrumofEUcapabilities.For their small Policy Unitandenhancingitsown pivotal roleinformulatingforeign The CouncilSecretariatisfocusingonthedevelopment ofitscomparatively finding itselfbeingtransformed intoatechnical supportingbody. a combinedre-nationalisationofintegrated foreignpolicy structuresand network ofdelegations,fearssomekindintergovernmental ‘contamination’, The Commission,withitsspecialisedDirectorates-General andwidespread again asbothstrive topreserve theirrespective structuresandcompetences. concerning thepreciseinstitutionalsetting. This questionisexpectedtocomeup Yet thereisanevidentconflictbetweentheCommissionandCouncilSecretariat the CouncilandCommission”. unlike anything thathasgone before),andone“(…)withcloselinkstoboth “sui generis” “sui 108 (i.e. anewtypeofbody ‘acquis’ ‘acquis’ reached 67 November 2007 68 November 2007 European diplomatic Similarly, ifoneofthegoalsEEASisgradual creationofa adopted fortherotationofstaffwillbecrucial. institutions andnationalforeignministries. This iswhy themodalitiestobe administrative separation andhierarchy between theBrussels-basedEU emergence ofa‘core’and‘periphery’withintheEEAS;i.e.creeping Attention needstobefocusedinthepreparatory phaseonpreventing the members; nominationonmerit;andappropriateselectionprocedures. adequate representationandgeographical balance;equalstatusforall rotation ofstaff;noquotastogovern thenationalityofpersonnel,but rotation ofstaff. There isconsensusonlyonthefollowing points:regular The ProgressReportisalsovague onthequestionofsecondmentand Staff rotation andtraining Commission needtoengageinaprocessofmutual(internal)consultation. almost alltheCommission’s Directorates-General, theEEASand Given thattheUnion’s externalrelationsareanyway affectedby thework of be considered. relationship oreven asymbiosisbetweentheEEASandCommissionshould established throughanintensive interlocking ofrelatedpolicy areas,aclose policy cycle, thecoherenceofUnion’s externalactioncanonlybe Constitutional Treaty. Given thateven intheearlystagesofforeign bearing inmindtheprincipleofcoherence,onlybrieflyalludedto already adoptedfortheEuropeanSecurityandDefenceCollege. approved by MemberStates,noteven inthe‘virtual’anddecentralised format elaborated. To date,theideaofaEuropeanDiplomatic Academy hasnotbeen developed. Inthelongerterm,however, anintegrated conceptneedstobe In theshortterm,existingprogrammes andbilateral initiatives shouldbefurther foreign affairsanddiplomacy. Directorates-General tospreadthespecificknowledge and‘culture’of ministries. Additional effortsshouldalsobemadeinallCommission other foreignministrydepartmentsandinternationally-oriented specifically EU-relatedsectionsofnationalforeignministries,butalsoin level. Inotherwords, ‘Europeanisation’mustoccurnotonlyinthe and careerplanningwillbeessentialatboththenationalEuropean esprit de corps de esprit 109 , adegreeofstandardisationintraining The taskofelaborating such ascheme couldbegiven toan concentrate mindsonreaching asharedandmutuallybeneficialgoal. help resolve theobvious conflictsofinterestbetweenthevarious players and A convincing implementationscheme forthedevelopment oftheEEASwould A master planfor theEEAS effects inother, andmorepolitical,spheresofdiplomacy too. delivery couldopenupinterestingperspectives andgenerate spill-over would bewelcome.Inthiscontext,thefieldofconsularaffairsandvisa clarification ofthepossibleformscooperation andthedivision oflabour While asingletemplateapplicabletoallcaseshardlyseemsrealistic,some require “detailedexamination”. actions towards thirdparties,andtheProgress Reportindicatesthatitwill a crucialissue,asitwillhave animpactonfutureEuropean diplomatic upgraded EUDelegationsandnationalembassiesinthirdcountries. This is Another importantquestionconcernsthefuturerelationshipbetween departments –couldbeenvisaged. bilateral embassies–i.e.theintegration ofexpertsfromothergovernmental would have tobemembersoftheEEAS. A constellationsimilartothatof as an“integral partoftheEEAS”.However, notalltheDelegations’staff The 2005ProgressReportconceives ofthecurrentCommissionDelegations Delegations andbilateral embassies inevitably face. going wellbeyond theadministrative hurdlesthecreationofEEASwill urgency intothedrive to enhancetheEU’s effectiveness ontheworld stage, restricted circles ofBrussels-basedofficialsandinjectagreatersense of technical arrangements, butwould helpwidenthediscussionbeyond the It would notreplacethetechnical bodiesexpectedtonegotiateonthemore policy-making ininternationalaffairs. Parliament, andselectedexpertswithsomeexperienceofgovernment and Member States,theCommission,CouncilSecretariat,European development planfortheEEAS,shouldincluderepresentatives ofthe union. This newgroup,taskedwithputtingtogetheramulti-stage President Jacques Delorsin1989topreparetheroadmapformonetary group, arguablymodelledontheonesetupby formerCommission 110 ad hoc ad advisory 69 November 2007 70 November 2007 emerged inthisareasofar, itmay beappropriatetobeginformalisingthe private industryorany other source. While nomajorproblems have this Codewould forbidthemtakinginstructionsfromagovernment, all staffassignedtotheEEAS. As isthecasewithCommissionofficialstoday, common DiplomaticCodeofConductwhich would bebindingon During Phase1,consideration shouldalsobegiven toestablishinga for aminimumofthreetofive years. facilitating theirrapid insertionintotheEEAS,andsecondmentsshouldbe from theMemberStatesshouldthereforebedesignedwithaviewto and a‘periphery’ofsecondednationalofficials. Training periodsforofficials consist ofa‘core’officialsfromtheCommissionandCouncilSecretariat important toavoid theimpressionthatnewstructurewilleffectively In ordertosecureacceptanceoftheEEASinMemberStates,itwillbe policy administration. (more orlessdeliberate) formationofatwo- orthree-tierEUforeign be keypriorities.Morespecifically, itwillbeessentialtoprevent the the serviceandpreparingthemtowork togetherinacoherentmannerwould In thiscontext,offeringuniformtraining foralltheofficialsrotatinginto be assessed,streamlinedandmadeever morecompatiblewithoneanother. ‘foreign policy’. Existingcoordinationandcommunicationsystemsshould existing ‘branches’ thatcontributetotheelaboration andexecutionofEU to comeintoforce –theemphasisshouldbeoncoordinationof well suffice. administration. At thisstage,however, asimple‘mission statement’could operandi modus In This processcoulddedivided roughlyintothreephases. options andspecificrecommendations. but rather todevelop aflexiblestep-by-step scheme, includingalternative It shouldnotaimtoestablishthefinalshapeofEEASonceandforall, report couldbepresentedtotheEuropeanCouncilinfirsthalfof2008. Ahtisaari –who would give furtherauthoritytoitsproposals,andfinal Patten orformerFinnish PresidentandUnitedNationsmediatorMartti statesman’ ofthecalibreformerExternalRelationsCommissionerChris The groupcouldbechaired by arenowned personality–aEuropean‘elder Phase 1 Phase – tobeconcludedby 2009,when theReform Treaty isexpected of theEEASifgoalremainstoestablisha 111 sui generis sui consideration following theexperienceandassessmentmadeinPhase2,takinginto indicators forreaching ‘criticalmass’intheEEASwillhave beenestablished ‘Europeanised’, diplomaticcultureand of amulti-tierserviceandpromotingshared,increasingly (and outof)theEEAS:asystemaimedatbothpreventing thedevelopment incentives andrewards shouldalsobeadoptedforallofficialsrotatinginto In thiscontext,somesortofEU-widehomogeneoussystemcareer them instructions. EU level) which sendofficialstotheservice‘renounce’theirrightgive Council decisionwhereby theinstitutions(bothatMemberStateand rules andbudgeting–shouldoccur. A morerobustoptionwould beaformal a CodeofConduct,internalprocedures,linesaccountability, staff into aformalisedsetofproceduresfortheEEAS-training andrecruitment, Towards theendofthisthirdphase,some‘codification’previouspractice secondary law. and incrementalreformsonthebasisofexisting treatiesandrelated coherent andconsistentforeignpolicy throughpragmatic adaptations There are already someoptionsavailable thatcoulddeliver amore Progress within theexisting legalframework Phase 3 Phase By theendof the newEUbudgetpost-2013. also applytothefinancialunderpinningforEEASbeincorporated into common operating proceduresandstandards.Needlesstosay, thiswould subsequently, todevelop general aswellpolicy-, case-andregion-specific be subjecttoanevaluation agreedtoby alltheMember States;and, experiences ofcommonforeignrepresentationinthefield,which would then The goalofPhase2shouldbefortheEEAStocollectanumber ‘pilot representations’. an extentthattheEEAScouldbetestedandevaluated inselected of thenewHighRepresentative should have beendeveloped tosuch strategic coordinationcapacitiesundertheleadershipandresponsibility period covered by theEU’s current2007-13Financial Perspectives), the could beconcludedby 2015orshortlythereafter. Bythen,the two Phase 2 Phase rotations inthefledglingnewstructure. , inapproximately2012(towards theend ofthe 112 esprit de corps de esprit . 71 November 2007 72 November 2007 bilaterally, betweensome MemberStatesandtheCouncilSecretariat, The current practice ofexchanging personnel–between MemberStates administrative levels. decisions takenby bothCouncilandCommissionofficialsatdifferent be improved throughenhancedmutualinvolvement inproceduresand joint Press statementsand imminent operational implications. matters relevant forthepreparation ofdecisions,especiallythosewith well startcooperating onamoresystematicproductionofjointpapers Council SecretariatandDGRELEX,EUSpecialRepresentatives could policy’. CommissionDelegationsinthirdcountries,regionaldesksthe March 2006ReporttotheEuropeanCouncilona‘commonexternalenergy A promising,butrelatively isolated,precedentwas establishedwiththe further developed. by CouncilandCommissionbodiesofficialscould–shouldbe the Treaties, andisbadlyneeded.Inparticular, jointreportingandanalysis broader domainof‘foreignpolicy’ doesnotrequireany change to Improving existingreportingandanalyticalcapacitiesinthe be done. provisions oftheReform Treaty. Below areafewexamplesofhow thiscould the Union’s externalactionsandtofacilitatetheimplementation ofthenew In summary, theseoptionscouldbeconsideredasameansboth toimprove practical cooperation betweenMemberStates. arrangements; thedevelopment ofcommontraining structures;andbetter policy practices andstructures;improvements intermsofconsular European foreignpolicy; instrumentsforstreamliningestablishedEUforeign These includeinformalmeasuresforoptimisingtheday-to-day businessof the objective shouldbetospeakwithonevoice and,therefore,toproduce Whenever differentEUplayers areworking togetheronagiven policy issue, the samesubjectby two orthreeEUbodies. ending thecurrentsituationwhere separate declarations areoftenissuedon and therotatingEUPresidency shouldbebettercoordinated,withaviewto individual Commissioners,theOfficeofcurrentHighRepresentative statements. The reporting,analysisandgeneration ofstatements could 1 communiqués 113 on foreignpolicy issuesmadeby .Several reportsandpapersincludeavariety ofreformoptions:‘Stocktaking reportonmeasurestoincreasethe 1. Endnotes JuliaLiebworks inthesameResearch Unit. Wissenschaft undPolitik). (Stiftung andSecurity Affairs forInternational German Institute Andreas MaurerisHeadoftheResearch atthe UnitonEUIntegration crucial testinggroundforthefuturedevelopment oftheEEAS. must thereforebehandledwithcareandflexibility. Butitcouldprove a This isavery sensitive questioninbothinstitutionalandpoliticalterms, further intensifiedandextended. and plannedfortheUnion’s representationtothe African Union–couldbe This institutionalinnovation –already inplacetheRepublicofMacedonia representatives inthirdcountriesandregions relevant toEUforeignpolicy. Last, butcertainlynotleast,therecouldberecourseto‘double-hatted’ these examples. appropriate incentives offeredtoothers toencourage them follow staff secondmentscouldbelookedatascasesofbestpractice –and itself. Those countriesthathave gonefurthestindeveloping exchanges and more widespreaddiplomaticnetwork acrosstheUnionandwithinBrussels in individual Foreign Ministriesshouldnothamperthecreationofa be intensifiedandextended. The differingprioritiesandguidelines and throughsecondmentstoboththeCouncilCommission–could (16419/06); NonPaper oftheFinnish Presidency visibility ofEUexternalpoliciesandfuturework’, CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,8December2006 (8909/07); ‘Stocktaking Report ontheimplementationofmeasurestoincreaseefficiency, coherenceand effectiveness, coherenceandvisibilityofEU externalpolicies (COM(2006) 278final). World –SomePractical ProposalsforGreaterCoherence,Effectiveness and Visibility, 8June 2006 Journal C.30of10.02.07);CommunicationfromtheCommissiontoEuropeanCouncil,‘Europein consular protectionofUnioncitizensinthirdcountries’,28November 2006(COM(2006)712final–Official and visibilityofEUexternalpolicies’,July 2006;EuropeanCommission‘GreenPaper ondiplomaticand , , ‘Checklist ofmeasurestoincrease theefficiency, coherence 114 ’ , CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,13June 2007 73 November 2007 74 November 2007 component ofthe Treaty metwithfewobjections. Treaty, atnationallevel andintheEuropeanframework, the‘foreignaffairs’ They noted thatinthemany debateswhich tookplaceontheConstitutional real chance toimprove theeffectiveness ofEurope’s actionsintheworld. The Project Groupwas unanimousin consideringthatthisreformoffersa Improved effectiveness for European foreign policy issues stillneedtoberesolved. their Joint ProgressReportofJune 2005in Annex 2),provides abasis,many key conducted in2004-05by theHighRepresentative andtheCommission(see intensively forplanningthenewservice. Although thepreparatory work The ratification period,which islikelytolastabout12months,shouldbeused in June 2009). will enterintoforce in2009(beforetheelectionstoEuropeanParliament was signedthreeyears agoon29October2004)andthatthe Treaty would takeplacebeforetheendof2007(theConstitutional Treaty States. MembersoftheGroupexpressedhopethatsigningceremony The Reform Treaty stillhastobesigned,andthenratified by EUMember can beoperational. and political–remaintoberesolved beforethenewpersonandservice President andtheEuropeanExternalService,many questions–bothpractical provides basicguidelinesforthecreationofHighRepresentative/Vice- ‘new architecture’ requiresagreatdealofcarefulplanning. Although the Treaty In thefirstplace,GroupagreedthatimplementationofReform Treaty’s Need for goodplanning themes oftheGroup’s work. not representacommonviewpoint,theyillustrate anumberofconverging External Action ServiceinMay-July 2007. Although thesecontributionsdo views expressedby participants intheEPC’s ProjectGroupontheEuropean The precedingsectionsofthis Working Paper reflectsomeoftheideasand Avery Graham By and recommendations Towards aEuropean Foreign Service: conclusions 115 and afterconsultingtheParliament. majority vote intheCouncil,onaproposalfromEuropeanCommission the EuropeanParliament, while Communityaffairswillbedecidedby decided by MemberStatesunanimouslyintheCouncilofMinisters,without at thelevel ofdecision-making,where, normally, CFSPmatterswillbe Under thenew Treaty, thetwo pillarswillcontinuetoco-exist,particularly foreign policy. ‘supranational’ approach which underliestheCommunityinstrumentsof provides theframework fortheCommonForeign andSecurityPolicy andthe the distinctionwillremainbetween‘intergovernmental’ approach which the two ‘pillars’thatpresentlycharacterise theEU’s activity inforeignaffairs: It would bewrongtoimaginethatthisreformwilleliminatethedualityof radical transformation. ‘new architecture’ willbeanoccasionforpractical reform,not arrangements forEUforeignpolicy: theimplementationof The membersoftheGroupsharedarealisticapproach tothefuture A pragmatic approach direction ofasuper-state. vocabulary ofthenationstate,suggeststhatEUisdeveloping inthe improvement inthesensethatterm‘Minister’,borrowed fromthe from alinguisticpointofview(anditmakeshorribleacronym), itisan Affairs andSecurityPolicy”. While thenewnameisworse thantheoldone Foreign Affairs” becomes“HighRepresentative oftheUnionforForeign change ofname,notsubstance–isthatthetitle“UnionMinisterfor The onlychange thathasbeenmadeinthetextof Treaty –anditisa field offoreignaffairsarepractically identicaltothoseofitspredecessor. In lightofthis,itisnotsurprisingthattheprovisions ofthenew Treaty inthe deliver what citizenswant. improvement. This isanarea where institutionalreformcanhelptheEUto foreign affairs,andrecentglobaldevelopments have strengthenedthecasefor supported jointdecision-makingandactionby Europeansinthefieldof significant factor. OpinionpollsintheMemberStateshave consistently Netherlands, theprospectofanEUMinisterforForeign Affairs was nota Whatever thereasonsfor‘No’votes in thereferendainFrance andthe 116 75 November 2007 76 November 2007 in accordancewiththeEU’s budgetaryprocedures. to expressaview, particularlysincethenewservicewillhave tobesetup closely involved thanin2005,andtheEuropeanParliament willalso wish which theysuspendedinMay 2005. The MemberStatesshouldbemore Representative andtheEuropeanCommissionshouldresumework re-commence assoontheReform Treaty issigned. The High Preparation forthecreationofEuropeanExternal Action Serviceshould 1. Beginpreparations soon in apositiontoendorsethem. although notallitsmembers–particularlythosefromtheEUinstitutionswere points representaconvergence ofviewsamongmemberstheGroup, its work, therecommendationswhich canbemadeatthisstage. The following Against thisbackground, Iwas askedby theGrouptosummarise,inlightof Recommendations be anopportunitylost. draw thepillarsclosertogetherinamorecoherentframework. That would superficial rearrangement ofnamesandtitles,withoutaseriouseffortto So theimplementationofnewstructuresneedstobemorethana in situationswhere theycanexploitit. much interestedinunderstandingthedifferencebetweenpillars,except the EUtospeakwithonevoice andactmorecoherently;theyarenot decision-making. Ourpartnersintherestofworld generally want policy –thereisplentyofscopeformorecoherenceinEuropean Upstream anddownstream –thatisintheformationandexecutionof overall policy. different instrumentscomplementeach otherandformpartofacoherent remain, theobjectofreformistobringthemclosertogether, sothatthe make nodifferencetothefunctioningofEU. Although thepillarswill But, equally, itwould beanerrortosupposethatthenewarrangements will role oftheEuropeanParliament”. not give newpowers totheCommissioninitiatedecisions or increasethe British government iscorrectinsaying that“theprovisions covering CFSPdo In thissense,theDeclaration attached to the new Treaty obtainedby the 117 the newUnionDelegationsinnon-MemberStates. be drawn uptodefineitsfunctions,bothatheadquartersandinrelation provisions concerningtheEEASareimprecise. A missionstatementshould To functioncorrectly, anorganisationneedsaclearmandate.Butthe Treaty’s 6. Define thetasks Commission, andexecutethemmoreeffectively. it shouldassumeanumberoftaskspresentlyundertakenby Counciland a ‘thirdwheel’, addingtothecomplexityofBrusselsmachinery; instead, not beduplicatedintheCouncilandCommission). The EEASshouldnotbe institutions shouldbeavoided (forexample,itsgeographical ‘desks’should Duplication betweenthenewserviceandotherservicesofEU 5. Avoid duplication will beapre-requisiteforitssuccess. Satisfactory participationby MemberStatesas‘stakeholders’intheservice Commission) butalsofromMemberStates’own diplomaticservices. quality –notonlyfromtheEUinstitutions(theCouncilSecretariatand The newserviceshouldincludeadequatepersonnel–inquantity and 4. Includeadequate personnel objective ofcoherenceshouldbereflectedinthedesignEEAS. reason why theHighRepresentative/Vice-President hasa‘doublehat’,andthis (in theexecutionofpolicy andtherepresentationofUnion). That isthe both upstream(intheconceptionanddevelopment ofpolicy) anddownstream particularly atthedecision-makinglevel, itshouldbringthemclosertogether Although the Treaty willnoteliminatethetwo ‘pillars’ofEUforeignaffairs, 3. Make a reality of ‘double-hatting’ interim reportonthestateofpreparations duringthefirstsemesterof2008. High Representative andtheCommission Presidentshouldproducean this issueforEuropeancitizensandtheParliament’s interest. The should beadequateprovision fortransparency, inviewoftheimportance Although thiskindofpreparatory work cannotbeconductedinpublic,there 2. Provide information onprogress 118 77 November 2007 78 November 2007 Commission official. the EuropeanPolicy Centre’s Balkan Graham Avery isaSenior Adviser totheEuropeanPolicy CentreandChair of cooperation betweentheservicesofCouncilSecretariatandCommission. service comingintoexistenceshouldaccelerate (notdelay) better (with theCommunication‘Europein World’). The prospectofthenew example, onthelinesproposedby theEuropeanCommissioninJune 2006 already beundertakenby EUinstitutionsandMemberStatesnow –for To facilitatethecreationofnewservice,interimmeasuresshould 10. Take actionnow capacity fortraining inEuropeandiplomaticaffairs. should fullyunderstandtheEU.Oneofitsprioritiesbetocreatea diplomatic practice, andthosecomingfromnationaldiplomaticservices service comingfromtheEuropeaninstitutionsshouldfullyunderstand The newserviceshouldhave highprofessionalstandards:membersofthe 9. Give priorityto training kinds ofconsularactivity shouldbeconsidered. after thenewservicehasbeencreated,possibilityofassumingsome account ofexperienceacquiredandtheneedforadjustments.For example, EEAS todevelop smoothlyandgradually over aperiodoftime,taking The decisiononitscreationshouldincludeanevolutive clausetoallow the It willnot,however, beabletoperformallitspotentialtasksimmediately. 8. Provide for development Commission beginsitsmandate(which isscheduled forNovember 2009). process iscompletedsuccessfully),oratthelatestby thetimenext the Reform Treaty comesintoforce (inJanuary 2009,assumingtheratification The newserviceshouldbeready tobeginitsprincipalactivities themoment 7. Ensure commencement ontime 119 uoeFrm andaformerEuropean Europe Forum, implementation ofa(more)commonpolicy vis-à-vistheoutsideworld. competences andbureaucratic infighting,tothedetrimentofactual the comingmonthsfrombecomingaperiodofinternalconfrontationover for theestablishmentofEEASitself–inhopehelpingtoprevent In addition,itdraws uparoadmap,timelineandfewguidingprinciples existing toolsandnorms. effective conductof‘foreignpolicy’ ina27-strongUnionandbetteruseof and inthirdcountries;exploressomepossibleavenues forbothamore It examinesthecurrentstateofaffairs,bothatBrussels‘headquarters’ debate andofferingviablesolutions. provide ananalyticalbackground andafewideasaimedatframing the immediately afterthenew Treaty issigned,this Working Paper triesto With thenegotiationsover thepreciseshapeoflatter duetostart (EEAS) toassisthim. renamed) andtheestablishmentofaEuropeanExternal Action Service Foreign Affairs andSecurityPolicy (asthe“Foreign Minister”hasbeen appointment ofa‘double-hatted’HighRepresentative oftheUnionfor previously enshrinedintheill-fatedConstitutional Treaty, includingthe the EU’s “foreignpolicy”. Itbasicallyincludesalltherelevant provisions The Reform Treaty provides anewinstitutional framework fortheconductof Executive summary 120 79 November 2007 80 November 2007 David Rijks Eberhard Rhein EuropeanCommission Gerrard Quille Charlotta OzakiMacias European Policy Centre Marius Osswald Lucia Montanaro-Jankovski Antonio Missiroli Andreas Maurer CollegeofEurope,University ofLeuven Julia Lieb John Kotsopoulos Stephan Keukeleire EuropeanPolicy Centre Jolyon Howorth Sara Hagemann Giovanni Grevi Marie-Hélène Fandel Jutta Edthofer Peter Dun EgmontInstitute Simon Duke Szilvia Dora Philippe deSchoutheete Jacki Davis Cesira D'Aniello Elizabeth Collett Neil Campbell EuropeanUniversity Institute,Florence Fraser Cameron Breul Rainer Sven Biscop EuropeanPolicy Centre Xiana Barros-Garcia Graham Avery Amanda Akçakoca Cornelius Adebahr List of participants ‘Towards aEuropean Foreign Service’ Project Group Annex 1 European Policy Institute European Policy Centre Cambridge University European Policy Centre Security andDefence) European Parliament (Sub-Committeeon European Policy Centre Stiftung Wissenschaft undPolitik Stiftung Wissenschaft undPolitik European Policy Centre (K.U. Leuven) (K.U.C) Yale/IFRI EU InstituteforSecurityStudies Permanent Representationof Austria totheEU European Commission European InstituteofPublic Administration Permanent RepresentationofHungarytotheEU Council Secretariat European Policy Centre International CrisisGroup European Policy Centre Permanent RepresentationofGermany totheEU Egmont Institute Policy Studies Association European Policy Centre,and Trans-European Politikfür AuswärtigeGesellschaft Deutsche European Policy Centre 121 Cecilia Yuste Rojas Karel Van Hecke Richard Whitman Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik Philipe Willaert Dace Treij Sofie Thorin May-Britt Stumbaum Maria Strömvik Egmont Institute Permanent RepresentationofSpaintotheEU University ofBath Commission European Permanent RepresentationofLatviatotheEU European Policy Centre Swedish InstituteofInternational Affairs 122 81 November 2007 82 November 2007 adopted aresolutiononthissubject26May. on 11May, afterpreparation intherelevant Committees,andsubsequently 5. The EuropeanParliament alsohadadebateontheEEASinplenarysession paragraphs 14and15. orientations have emergedasaresultofthesediscussions,reflectedin the CouncilLegalServiceandCommissionservices. Somepreliminary Six meetingshave takenplaceonthebasisofanumberpapersdrawn upby questions, administrative functionsandthemanagementofUnionDelegations. technical aspects:thelegalstatusofEEAS,personnelissues,budgetary 4. Inparallel, discussionshave begunamongMemberStatesonanumberof these discussions. This reporthasbeendrawn uponthebasisofjointissuespaperand stocktaking ofthesebilateral meetingstookplaceinCOREPERon12May. 29 April, andalsosubsequentlywithRomaniaBulgaria. A collective then carriedoutbilateral meetingswithallMemberStatesbetween27and 3. The Presidency, togetherwiththeCouncilSecretariatandCommission, on 10March 2005. the basisforafirstroundofdiscussionswithMemberStatesinCOREPER President oftheCommissioncirculated ajointissuespaperwhich served as Commission aswelltheMemberStates. The HighRepresentative andthe undertaken by theSecretary-General/High Representative andthe preparatory work ontheEuropeanExternal Action Service(EEAS)was 2. Following thesignatureofConstitutional Treaty inOctober2004, Introduction Service foritsmeetinginJune 2005atthelatest. joint progressreportonpreparatory work ontheEuropeanExternal Action Secretary-General/High Representative andtheCommission topreparea 1. The EuropeanCouncilatitsmeetingon16-17December2004invited the the Commission by theSecretary-General/High Representative and 9 June2005:Joint Progress Report to theEuropean Council Annex 2 123 generis” far aspossible.Inthisrespect,therewas broadagreementthatthegeographical 9. MemberStatesagreedthattheduplicationoffunctions shouldbeavoided as Council Secretariatshouldbeincluded. also expressedinthisrespect. Views differedover whether Sitcenfromthe tended toviewthemilitarystaffaspartofservice,but somedoubtswere and oftheCommission(DGExternalRelations). A largebody ofopinion at leasttherelevant partsoftheCouncilSecretariat(DGEandPolicy Unit) with mostasaresultdrawing theconclusionthatEEASshouldconsistof majority ofMemberStatesliessomewhere betweenthesetwo positions, consensus thattrade policy shouldnotbeincluded). The viewofthe such asenlargement,neighbourhoodanddevelopment policy (thereisa whilst afewwould insteadpreferittohave abroadremitincludingareas States considerthattheEEASshouldberestrictedtocovering CFSP/ESDP, non-proliferation andrelationswiththeUN. A smallnumberofMember desks dealingwithissuessuch ashumanrights,counter-terrorism, with geographical deskscovering allregionsoftheworld andthematic comprise servicescurrentlydealingwithCFSP(includingCSDP),together to fulfilallhisresponsibilitieseffectively. ItsuggestedthattheEEASshould highlighted theneedtoensurethatdouble-hattedMinisterisequipped 8. OntheissueoforganisationEEAS,jointissuespaper conduct theCFSP/CSDPandtofulfilhisrepresentationalduties. relevant treatyprovisions. At thesametime,hemustbeinapositionto proposals, andtoensureoverall coherenceandconsistency, subjecttothe Commission. Hemusthave themeanstoshapeagenda,make the Ministerinhisvarious functions,includingthatof Vice-President ofthe 7. All MemberStatesunderlinedthatthepurposeofservicewas toassist this asanimportantfactorinminimisingduplicationandsaving costs. General SecretariatoftheCounciland/orCommission.Indeedsomesee Member States,theEEAScouldusesupportfunctionscarriedoutby the close linkstoboththeCouncilandCommission.For alargenumberof “institution”, butaserviceundertheauthorityofForeign Minister, with of thisapproach, which would meanthattheEEASwould notbeanew the CommissionindicatedthatEEASshouldbeaserviceof 6. The jointissuespaperfromtheHighRepresentative andthePresidentof The form andfunctionsof theEEAS nature. There isbroadconsensusamongMemberStatesinsupport 124 “sui 83 November 2007 84 November 2007 feeling was thatthedecisionshouldbetakenonan advanced inthejointissuespaper. As togroupswithmixedcompetences,the were opento,chairmanship by amemberoftheEEAS,inlinewithapproach or groupsworking closelywiththePSC,amajoritysaidtheycouldaccept,or continue tobechaired by therotatingPresidency. ConcerningpureCFSPgroups area ofexternalrelationsanddealingwithwhat arenow firstpillarmattersto 10. Many MemberStateswould prefertheCouncil’s preparatory bodiesinthe Council preparatory bodies their tasks. fields such astrade, development orenlargementsoastoallow themtofulfil not prevent theCommissionfromorganisingitsDirectorate-Generals inother General SecretariatoftheCouncilorCommission,even thoughthiswill and thematicdeskswithintheserviceshouldnotbeduplicatedeitherin Union DelegationsshouldbesharedwithMemberStates. from MemberStates.Itwas alsoproposedthatcertaincategoriesofreportsfrom Delegations shouldprovide logisticalandtechnical supportforhigh-level visits which would require somedetailedexamination.SomesuggestedthatUnion States supportedthis,althoughitwas recognisedthatthiswas acomplexissue on additionaltaskssuch asconsularprotectionandvisas. A majorityofMember 12. The jointissuespaperalsoraised theideathatUnionDelegations mighttake head ofmission)asamodelforthefuturefunctioningUnionDelegations. from differenthomeministries,yet allcollectively undertheauthorityof own embassiesorpermanentrepresentationstotheEU(composedofstaff services oftheCommission).Many MemberStatescitedtheexampleoftheir management offinancialassistancewould continuetocomefromthe members oftheEEAS(thosecovering specificpoliciessuch astrade and necessarily implythatallstaffworking intheDelegationswould needtobe representation oftheUnion.For mostMemberStatesthis does not provisions covering theinstitutionalresponsibilitiesforexternal of theEEAS.Moreover, thesearrangements willhave torespectthetreaty under theauthorityofForeign Minister, theyshouldbeanintegral part consequence oftheprovision oftheConstitutionaltreatywhich placesthem delegations shouldbecomethefutureUnionDelegations,andthatasa 11. There isbroadconsensusthattheexistingnetwork ofCommission Delegations 125 ad hoc ad basis. examination, buildingonthediscussionswhich have takenplacetodate. status, andotherpersonnelbudgetaryissuesrequiredfurther authorising officeroftheEEASaswellrelatedissueitsadministrative the budgetofUnion,roleMinisterinrelationtofunction 15. DelegationsagreedthattheimplicationsoffinancingEEASfor adequate geographical balance,whilst avoiding theintroductionofquotas. decisions. Almost alldelegationsunderlinedtheimportanceofguaranteeing should implyacentral rolefortheMinister, includinghisagreementonfinal EEAS tobebasedonmerit,withappropriateselectionprocedures. These 14. There was broadagreementontheneedfornominationofstaffto had thesamestatusandconditionsofemployment. agents rather thansecondednationalexpertstoensurethatallstaffintheEEAS all consideredthatpersonnelfromtheMemberStatesshouldbetemporary national diplomatsintheEEASandarange ofpositionsatalllevels. Nearly States underlinedtheimportanceforthemofhaving asufficientnumberof three sources (CouncilSecretariat,CommissionandMemberStates), it shouldbedefinedby its scope andfunctions. As itsstaffwillbedrawn from delegations expressedaviewontheoverall sizeoftheservice,consideringthat and organisationalquestionsthatrequirefurtheranalysis.Inthiscontext,few 13. The jointissuespaperhighlightedanumberofadministrative Personnel andbudgetary issues and afterobtainingtheconsentofCommission. Council shallactonthisproposalafterconsultingthe EuropeanParliament put forward aproposalforEuropeanDecisionestablishingtheEEAS. The work ontheEEAS.OnceConstitutionentersintoforce, theMinisterwill SG/HR, theCommissionandMemberStatesshall beginpreparatory or government have decidedthatfollowing itssignatureon 29October, the the settingupofaEuropeanExternal Action Service(EEAS).HeadsofState Vice-President oftheCommission(theMinister). The treatyalsoprovides for of aUnionMinisterforForeign Affairs who shallatthesametimebe innovations inthefieldofforeignaffairs.Itforeseescreationpost 1. The Constitutional Treaty (thetreaty)introducesimportantinstitutional Introduction Issues paperontheEuropean External ActionService 126 85 November 2007 86 November 2007 chairing the relevant configuration…” relevant the chairing of the Foreign Affairs configuration, shall fall to the member of the group the of member the to fall shall configuration, Affairs Foreign the of preparatory bodies of the various Council configurations, with the exception the with configurations, Council various the of bodies preparatory 3. Article 28ofthetreatygives theMinisteranumberoftasks: The roles of theMinister requested by theEuropean CouncilinDecember2004. the HRandCommissionforEuropeanCouncilinJune 2005,as Member Statesinthecontextofpreparation ofajointprogressreportfrom structure oftheEEAS.Itisintendedtoserve asthebasisforfirstdiscussionswith President oftheCommission,setsoutsomeissuesrelatingtotasksand 2. This paper, which ispresentedjointlyby theHighRepresentative andthe dealing withissuesgoingtotheForeign Affairs Council: Minister. The textofthedraft appliesthesamelogictoworking groups under article307ofthetreaty, willbechaired by arepresentative ofthe stipulates thatthePSC,whose roleintermsofCFSPandCSDPisdefined contained inaDeclaration oftheIGCconcerningarticle24treaty implies fundamentalchanges elsewhere intheorganisation. A draft Decision innovation. The replacementoftherotatingPresidency intheexternalfield 5. Giving thechair oftheForeign Affairs CounciltotheMinisterisamajor subject totheirrespective decision-makingprocesses. by coherentuseoftheresources oftheEUaswellby nationalinstruments, at EUlevel. Itisimportanttoensurethatonceadopted,apolicy isbacked up than EUmeans–,andalsoforCFSPotherinstrumentsofexternalaction own specificity. This istruefornationalmeans–which areinfactfarlarger and execution,thetreatymakesclearthatvarious instrumentsretaintheir and proposition,coordinationrepresentation.Intermsofdecision-making 4. The Ministerwillthushave importantresponsibilitiesintermsofinitiative CoordinatingotheraspectsoftheUnion’s externalactionwithin • BeingresponsiblewithintheCommissionforresponsibilitiesincumbenton • Ensuringtheconsistency oftheUnion'sexternalaction; • Presidingover theForeign Affairs Council; • ConductingtheUnion’s CommonForeign andSecurityPolicy (CFSP)and • the Commission. it inexternalrelations; Common SecurityandDefencePolicy (CSDP); 127 . “The chair of the of chair “The consistent” down by the European Council and ensure that the Union’s action is action Union’s the that ensure and Council European the by down elaborate the Union's external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid guidelines strategic of basis the on action external Union's the elaborate with thediplomaticservicesofMemberStatesandwill compriseofficials Secretariat (CGS)andtheCommission. The EEAS willwork in cooperation preclude himfromdrawing onotherserviceswithintheCouncilGeneral 10. The EEASwillassisttheMinisterinfulfilling hismandate. This doesnot The EEAS 9. Against thisbackground, anumberofprinciplesshouldberespected: Principles political orientationsoftheUnionwhich hewillhelptoshape. instruments atthedisposalofUnion,buttoensurecoherencewith 8. ItisnotthetaskofMinistertomanageallvarious externalaction representational roleintheseareas,includingthereplacementof Troika. he mustbeinapositiontoconducttheCFSP/CSDPandfulfilhis and consistency, subjecttotherelevant treatyprovisions. At thesametime, to shapetheagenda,makeproposals,andensureoverall coherence 7. For theMinistertobeablefulfilhismandate,hemusthave themeans external actionandbetweentheseitsotherpolicies. have toensureconsistency betweenthedifferentareasofUnion's Article 292-3,theCouncilandCommission,assistedby theMinister, Foreign Affairs Councilwillbeincharge notonlyofCFSPmatters,but that objective, asdescribedinparagraph 3.Itshouldbenotedthatthe external action. The creationofthepostMinisterismeanttocontribute 6. Itisimportanttoensureconsistency betweenthedifferentareasofEU Consistency andcoherence inexternal actions Coherenceandconsistency ofexternalaction. • Avoidance ofduplicationresponsibilitiesandestablishmentaclear • Strictcompliancewiththeprovisions ofthetreaty, includinginparticular • division oftasks; institutions laiddown by thetreaty(see Article 308); the applicationofproceduresandextentpowers ofthe , asstatedin Article 24-3.Moregenerally, inaccordancewith 128 “shall 87 November 2007 88 November 2007 of theauthorstreatytoforeseeaninnovative insertion ofaspecificlegalbasewithinthetreatyconfirmspoliticalwill staff secondedfromnationaldiplomaticservicesoftheMemberStates. The from therelevant departmentsoftheCGSandCommissionaswell international organisationssuch astheUN. such ashumanrights,counter-terrorism, non-proliferation andrelationswith 14. There shouldbesinglethematicdesks,located withintheEEAS,onissues to fulfiltheirtasks. fields such astrade, development orenlargementsoastoallow them prevent theCommissionfromorganisingitsDirectorate-Generals inother framework forrelationswithaparticularcountryorregion. This willnot Commission, shouldassisttheMinisterinshapingacoherentpolicy world. These desks,which shouldnotbeduplicatedeitherintheCGSor comprises geographical deskswhich cover allthecountries/regionsof and thePresidentofEuropeanCouncil. This requiresthattheEEAS briefing notonlytotheMinister, butalsototheotherCommissioners by thetreaty, theEEASmustbeabletoprovide unifiedpolicy advice and 13. Inordertoallow theMinistertoplay theroleshehasbeengiven assessments andevaluations directly. Minister willbeoneofitsmainclientsandmustabletoorder of theSITCEN,itslocationrequiresfurtherthought.Inany event, the all EUinstrumentsforcrisismanagement.Inviewofthemultiplefunctions by purelymilitarymeansandunderlinestheimportanceofbringingtogether European SecurityStrategy emphasisesthattoday’s threatscannotbetackled responsibilities, theMilitaryStaffshouldbeintegrated withintheEEAS. The that CSDPandcrisismanagementarepartoftheMinister’s core Council andtheCommissionshouldbeanintegral partoftheEEAS.Given CSDP), theservicespresentlyworking inthoseareasbothwithinthe 12. InviewoftheMinister'sparticularroleinconductingCFSP(including relations withtheCommissionandCGSservices. question inthisrespectconcernsthescopeofEEASandnatureits Minister isequippedtofulfilallhisresponsibilitieseffectively. The first 11. The organizationoftheEEASneedstoensurethatdouble-hatted or whether itshouldbepartly attached toeitherorboth. should beanautonomousservice,neitherintheCommissionnorCGS, the creationofanewintegrated service. The questionarisesastowhether this 129 sui generis sui solution, i.e. as theprovision ofotherservicestoMemberStates. delegations inconsularprotectionandpossiblythe issuingvisasaswell 19. Questionsrequiringfurtherthoughtincludethefuture roleoftheUnion Union delegation. EU bodiesinthirdcountriesshouldbeapartofsingle structure,i.e.the diplomatic missions.Itisimportanttomakesurethat all representatives of the authorityofHeadDelegation,asisruleinnational agriculture, transport andotherareas.Such personnelshouldbeunder from otherservicestocover issuessuch astrade, JHA,financialmatters, embassies, theUniondelegationscanincludepersonnelseconded financial management,shouldapplyaccordingly. As isthecasefornational concerning staffregulations,originandrecruitmentofpersonnel 296 inparticular),thedelegationsshouldformpartofEEASornot.Rules representation oftheEUasdescribedintreaty(see Articles 22,26and as towhether inviewofthevarious responsibilitiesintermsofexternal delegations willbeundertheauthorityofMinister. The questionarises delegations inthirdcountries.Under Article 328ofthetreaty, theUnion 18. A majorinnovation ofthetreatyisestablishmentUnion Union delegations into detailsatthisstage. protocol, security, press,andinformationtechnologies. Itistooearlytogo relations withtheEP. Itwillrequireinadditionsupportservicessuch as external relations,theEEASshouldcontainaserviceresponsiblefor 17. Inviewofthegrowing importanceoftheEuropeanParliament in however co-ordinatedby theMinisterinsideCommission. corresponding servicesintotheEEAS.Generally speakingtheseareasare their specificnature,thereisnoprimafaciecaseforintegrating the financial assistanceprogrammes, andtheenlargementnegotiations.Dueto development policy andhumanitarianassistance,managementofexternal 16. Beyond theseareasof external action,therearealsoareassuch astrade, between theEEASandservicesofCGS. significant externalprojection.Similarissuescouldariseover theinterface those primarilyresponsibleforthemanagementofinternalpolicieswith and theservicesofCommissionwithexternalresponsibilitiesincluding 15. Itwillbeimportanttoorganizeeffective consultationbetweentheEEAS 130 89 November 2007 90 November 2007 national diplomaticservices. These include: 20. QuestionsalsoariseconcerningtherelationshipbetweenEEASand just tolistafewgeneral questionsthatrequirefurtherwork: to belookedatwithrespectthefutureEAS. At thisstage,itmay beuseful 21. Itisprematuretotackle themany administrative questionsthatwillhave Administrative questions the MemberStates,tobepresentedatlatestJune EuropeanCouncil. a jointprogressreportonthepreparatory work, carriedoutby themselves and the Secretary-General/High Representative andtheCommissionwillprepare 22. InlinewiththeconclusionsofEuropeanCouncilDecember2004, Concluding remark Arrangements fortheHeadsofEUdelegationstochair allmeetingsof • Exchange ofinformationbetweentheEEASandnationaldiplomatic • How theEEAS,althoughdrawing onthreeseparate sources ofpersonnel, • How tomeettheadministrative costsoftheEEASincludingpayment ofstaff • How specificrequirementsoftheEEAScouldbereflectedin general • How theMinistercouldbeappointingauthority, responsiblefor • Heads ofMissionsEUMemberstatesinthirdcountries. services atheadquartersandinthirdcountries; could have asingle from theEUbudgetwithnecessarydegreeofmanagementautonomy. be subject; implementing rulesoftheStaffRegulations,towhich itsstaffwould three sources ofpersonnel(Council/Commission/MemberStates); the broadestpossiblegeographical basis,drawing asappropriateonthe recruitment onthebasisofmerit,while ensuringthatstaffarerecruitedon “tableau d'effectifs” “tableau 131 ; Policy, who shallchair theForeign Affairs Council,shallcontributethrough 1. The HighRepresentative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs andSecurity 13a TEU Article extent thatthisisconsistentwithparagraphs 2and3. the HighRepresentative shallbeboundby Commissionprocedurestothe responsibilities withintheCommission,andonlyfor these responsibilities, other aspectsoftheUnion'sexternalaction.Inexercising these responsibilities incumbentonitinexternalrelationsandforcoordinating action. HeorsheshallberesponsiblewithintheCommissionfor Commission. Heorsheshallensuretheconsistency oftheUnion'sexternal 4. The HighRepresentative shallbeoneofthe Vice-Presidents ofthe 3. The HighRepresentative shallpresideover theForeign Affairs Council. defence policy. by theCouncil. The sameshallapplytothecommonsecurityand the development ofthatpolicy, which heorsheshallcarry outasmandated security policy. Heorsheshallcontributeby hisorherproposalsto 2. The HighRepresentative shallconducttheUnion'scommonforeignand may endhisorhertermofofficeby thesameprocedure. of theUnionforForeign Affairs andSecurityPolicy. The EuropeanCouncil of thePresidentCommission,shallappointHighRepresentative 1. The EuropeanCouncil,actingby aqualifiedmajority, withtheagreement 9e TEU Article Policy/Vice-President of theEuropean Commission High Representative of theUnionfor Foreign Affairs andSecurity Amendments andnewinsertionstotheEC/EU Treaties. from theReform Treaty, October2007. These extracts concerningthe‘newarchitecture’ forforeignpolicy aretaken Extracts from Reform Treaty Annex 3 132 91 November 2007 92 November 2007 preceding theappointmentofHighRepresentative oftheUnionfor 1. The Conferencedeclaresthat,inthecourse ofthepreparatory work Lisbon on18/10/07) 9eofthe ad TreatyDeclaration Article onEuropeanUnion(adoptedin and SecurityPolicy. (…) representative oftheHighRepresentative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs (…) The ChairofthePolitical andSecurityCommitteeshall beheldby a of theCouncil concerning theEuropeanCouncildecisiononexercise ofthePresidency 9c(9)ofthe 3on Treaty 2ofDeclaration Article Article onEuropean Union Representative shallend. the termofofficememberhaving thesamenationalityasHigh the HighRepresentative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs andSecurityPolicy, end oftheirtermoffice.However, ontheday oftheappointment establishing theEuropeanCommunityshallremaininofficeuntil the Treaty amendingthe Treaty onEuropeanUnionandthe Treaty The membersoftheCommissioninofficeondateentryinto force of 5 article IV, Title Protocol No10on Transitional Provisions, management operations referredtoin Article 28.(…) Representative, thepoliticalcontrolandstrategic directionofthecrisis shall exercise, undertheresponsibilityofCouncilandHigh (…) Within thescopeofthisChapter, thePolitical andSecurityCommittee 25ofthe TEU amendedby 23 theReformTEU (formerarticle Article Treaty) international conferences. express theUnion'spositionininternationalorganisationsandat political dialoguewiththirdpartiesontheUnion'sbehalfandshall to thecommonforeignandsecuritypolicy. Heorsheshallconduct 2. The HighRepresentative shallrepresenttheUnionformattersrelating the EuropeanCouncilandCouncil. security policy andshallensureimplementationofthedecisionsadoptedby his orherproposalstowards thepreparation ofthecommon foreignand 133 on EuropeanUnionandthe Treaty establishingtheEuropeanCommunity The Conference declaresthat,assoonthe Treaty amendingthe Treaty 13aofthe 22on TreatyDeclaration Article onEuropeanUnion European Parliament andafterobtainingtheconsentofCommission. shall actonaproposalfromtheHighRepresentative afterconsultingthe Action Serviceshallbeestablishedby adecisionoftheCouncil. The Council Member States. The organisationandfunctioningoftheEuropeanExternal Commission aswellstaffsecondedfromnationaldiplomaticservicesofthe from relevant departmentsoftheGeneral SecretariatoftheCounciland with thediplomaticservicesofMemberStatesandshallcompriseofficials a EuropeanExternal Action Service. This serviceshallwork incooperation 3. Infulfillinghisorhermandate,theHighRepresentative shallbeassistedby 13a TEU Article European External ActionService Union's externalrepresentation.(…) other casesprovided forinthe Treaties, it[theCommission]shallensurethe 1. (…) With theexceptionofcommonforeignandsecuritypolicy, and 9d TEU Article Role of Commission inexternal representation with theprovisions of Articles 9dand9eofthe Treaty onEuropeanUnion. duration asthenextCommission,heorshewillbeappointedinaccordance term ofofficewillstartinNovember 2009atthesametimeandfor Representative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs andSecurityPolicy whose 2. Furthermore,theConferencerecallsthat,asregardsHigh appropriate contactswillbetakenwiththeEuropeanParliament. the endoftermofficeCommissioninonthatdate, transitional provisions andwhose termofofficewillbefrom that dateuntil 9e ofthe Treaty onEuropeanUnionand Article 5oftheProtocolon the Treaty establishingtheEuropeanCommunityinaccordancewith Article entry intoforce ofthe Treaty amendingthe Treaty onEuropeanUnionand Foreign Affairs andSecurityPolicy which isduetotakeplaceonthedateof 134 93 November 2007 94 November 2007 policy shallcover allareasofforeignpolicy andall questionsrelatingtothe 1. The Union'scompetenceinmattersof common foreignandsecurity 11 TEU Article Common Foreign andSecurityPolicy to theCouncil. Commission, forotherareasofexternalaction,may submitjointproposals Policy, fortheareaofcommonforeignandsecuritypolicy, andthe 2. The HighRepresentative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs andSecurity 10b TEU Article Joint proposals inthefieldof external affairs cooperate tothateffect. Foreign Affairs andSecurityPolicy, shallensurethatconsistency andshall the Commission,assistedby theHighRepresentative oftheUnionfor external actionandbetweentheseitsotherpolicies. The Counciland 3. (…) The Unionshallensureconsistency betweenthedifferentareasofits 10a TEU Article Consistency of external action in closecooperation withMemberStates'diplomaticandconsularmissions. Representative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs andSecurityPolicy. They shallact 2. UniondelegationsshallbeplacedundertheauthorityofHigh shall representtheUnion. 1. Uniondelegationsinthirdcountriesandatinternationalorganisations 188qECT Article Union Delegations States shouldbeginpreparatory work ontheEuropeanExternal Action Service. for thecommonforeignandsecuritypolicy, theCommissionandMember is signed,theSecretary-General oftheCouncil,HighRepresentative 135 provisions covering CFSPincludinginrelationtotheHighRepresentative of 11 ofthe Treaty onEuropeanUnion,,theConferenceunderlinesthat In additiontothespecificproceduresreferredinparagraph 1of Article policy No31concerningthecommonforeignandsecurity Declaration international peaceandsecurity. responsibility oftheSecurityCouncilanditsMembersformaintenance of theCharterUnitedNationsand,inparticular, by theprimary It stressesthattheEUanditsMemberStateswillremainboundby theprovisions security anddefencepolicy oftheMemberStates. Security andDefencePolicy donotprejudicethespecificcharacter ofthe The Conferencealsorecallsthattheprovisions governing theCommon representation inthirdcountriesandinternationalorganisations. for theformulationandconductoftheirforeignpolicy noroftheirnational not affecttheresponsibilitiesofMemberStates,astheycurrentlyexist, and SecurityPolicy andtheestablishmentofanExternal Action Service,do creation oftheofficeHighRepresentative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs Union covering theCommonForeign andSecurityPolicy, includingthe The Conferenceunderlinesthattheprovisions inthe Treaty onEuropean policy No30concerningthecommonforeignandsecurity Declaration of Article 240aofthe Treaty oftheFunctioningEuropeanUnion review thelegalityofcertaindecisionsasprovided forby thesecondparagraph of itsjurisdictiontomonitorthecompliancewith Article 25ofthis Treaty andto shall nothave jurisdictionwithrespecttotheseprovisions, withtheexception this areaisdefinedby the Treaties. The CourtofJustice oftheEuropeanUnion Treaties. The specificroleof theEuropeanParliament andoftheCommissionin Affairs andSecurityPolicy andby MemberStates,inaccordancewiththe shall beputintoeffectby the HighRepresentative oftheUnionforForeign of legislative actsshallbeexcluded. The commonforeignandsecuritypolicy acting unanimously, exceptwhere the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption shall bedefinedandimplementedby theEuropeanCounciland The commonforeignandsecuritypolicy issubjecttospecificprocedures.It policy thatmightleadtoacommondefence. Union's security, includingtheprogressive framing ofacommondefence 136 95 November 2007 96 November 2007 security anddefencepolicy oftheMemberStates. Security andDefencePolicy donotprejudicethespecificcharacter ofthe The Conferencealsorecallsthattheprovisions governing theCommon decisions nordotheyincreasetheroleofEuropeanParliament. and SecurityPolicy donotgive newpowers totheCommissioninitiate The Conferencealsonotesthattheprovisions covering theCommonForeign membership oftheSecurityCouncilUN. participation ininternationalorganisations,includingaMemberState's policy, itsnationaldiplomaticservice,relationswiththirdcountriesand Member Stateinrelationtotheformulationandconductofitsforeign will notaffecttheexistinglegalbasis,responsibilities,andpowers ofeach the UnionforForeign Affairs andSecurityPolicy andExternal Action Service 137 00-Cover-WP-17 24-05-2005 13:18 Page 1

Mission Statement

Graham Avery Antonio Missiroli Jolyon Howorth Anne-Marie Le Gloannec David Rijks Richard Whitman Simon Duke Stephan Keukeleire Cornelius Adebahr Giovanni Grevi Julia Lieb Andreas Maurer

November 2007

138 EU INTEGRATION & CITIZENSHIP With the support of the European Commission EUROPE IN THE WORLD Centre International de Formation Européenne INSTITUT EUROPEEN DES HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES

M.A. in Advanced European and International Studies

Does the European Union Need a Common Diplomatic Service?

Master thesis by Nataliya NEZNAMOVA

Supervisors: Claude NIGOUL Matthias JOPP

Academic Year 2006/2007

139

Contents

Introduction………………………………………………………………………...4 • The diplomatic service for the European Union: myth or reality?...... 4 • Questions raised and problems discussed in the thesis……………………...4 • Structure of the thesis………………………………………………………..5

I Historical Background and Institutional Framework of the Diplomatic Service………………………………………………………………………………8 1.1 Evolution of treaties and development of common foreign policy of the EU…..8 1.1.1. Maastricht Treaty introducing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)……………………………………………………………….8 1.1.2 Amsterdam and Nice Treaties and their contribution to the clarification of the CFSP………………………………………………………………...10 1.1.3 Competitive participation of the Council and the Commission in the forming of the EU common foreign policy………………………………...12 1.1.4 The unanimity in the decision-taking process: is it a drag on the way of reforms?...... 14 1.1.5 Recent enlargements of the EU: a challenge for the coordination of various policies in the pursuit of common objectives……………………...16 1.2. The current situation of the European diplomacy…………………………..…18 1.2.1 External representation……………………………………………....18 1.2.2 Internal management…………………………………………………23 1.2.3 European responsibilities of Foreign Ministries of the Member States……………………………………………………………….………27

II The idea of the creation of a common diplomatic service…………………...29 2.1 The project of the Constitutional Treaty.. ……………………………………..29 2.1.1 Creation of the diplomatic service and the post of Minister for Foreign Affaires….………………………………………………………………….30

140 2.1.2 The Establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS)..……………………………………………………………………32 2.2 Does the EU need a common diplomatic service……………………………...34 2.2.1 Pros and cons……………………………………………….………..34 2.2.2. Advantages of its creation...…………………………………………39 III Problems of the creation of the European diplomatic service..…………….44 3.1. Questions which arise with its creation……………………………………….45 3.1.1 The debate on its relationship with the Council and the Commission………………………………………………………………..46 3.1.2 What will be its structure?...... 48 3.1.3 The size of it………………………………………………………….50 3.1.4 How to obtain a closer coordination with the diplomatic services of the Member States?...... 52 3.1.5 Possible ways of responding to the problems………………….…….54 3.2. Impact on the EU external action and on the national diplomatic services…...57 3.2.1 Will it bring more coherence and efficiency?...... 58 3.2.2 EU as a single actor in the international arena……………………….59

Conclusion..……………………………………………………………………….62 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….64 Annex …………………………………..………………………………………….68

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INTRODUCTION

Since the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht in 1992 allowing the Member States to undertake common actions in foreign policy significant progress has been made in the European construction. Without doubt, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 was a hindrance on the way of reforms in the sphere of EU foreign policy, namely such innovation as establishment of a European External Action Service – a common diplomatic service of the European Union, bringing together staff from the Commission and the Council with national diplomats – was suspended after the French and Dutch No votes.

The idea of a common European diplomatic service and of the Minister for Foreign Affairs was not abandoned with the rejection of the EU Constitution, on the contrary, the future of Europe and its priorities are widely discussed nowadays.

The diplomatic service for the European Union: myth or reality?

One could assert that at present there is already a common European diplomacy arguing that there is a European political entity whose positions are represented at the international level by delegations and officials who defend its interests. Nevertheless, it seems to be a diplomacy without appropriately regulated embassies and without sufficient coordination with the national diplomatic services of the Member States. If one considers the importance of the EU external activities, it is difficult not to arrive at the conclusion that the diplomatic service for the European Union has ceased to be a myth and represents a tangible reality, some aspects of which, however, should be improved in order to make it compatible with the diplomacies of the Member States.

Questions raised and problems discussed in the thesis.

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Will the European Union speak as one or will there be 27 or more different actors within the Union, each with their own foreign policies, embassies and diplomatic services? How can the efficiency, coherence and visibility of the Union's external policies be improved?

The questions that will be raised in the present thesis include: - Does the EU need a common diplomatic service? - What are the advantages of its creation? - What connection will it have with the Commission and the Council? - How will it be coordinated with the diplomatic services of the Member States? - How will it be structured? - What impact will it have on the external action of the EU and the national diplomatic services?

The object of the present master thesis is to present the current situation of the external representation of the EU and to expound the gist of the current debate on the necessity of the creation of a common diplomatic service of the European Union presenting different views and sometimes contradictory statements, giving answers to the above-mentioned questions which are based on the positions of the EU institutions, European policy-makers, and experts on the EU’s external relations.

The problematic of the subject of the research is due to the fact that current proposals concerning the common diplomatic service are focused mainly on the idea of how to improve external representation of the European Union at the political level, while some aspects of the administrative dimension of the creation of the European diplomatic service are not well elaborated so far.

Structure of the thesis

The thesis comprises three parts:

143 • The first chapter gives an overview of the historical development and the institutional framework of the diplomatic service. It traces the evolution of the treaties which had a vital importance for the elaboration of a common external policy of the Union which finally led to the idea of the creation of the European External Action Service. • In the second chapter the project of the Constitutional Treaty is analysed, paying special attention to the role of the Minister for Foreign Affairs who will eventually be the head of the European External Action Service. As the idea itself merits detailed consideration and has become a subject of a spirited debate, main arguments for and against are presented and high emphasis is placed on the advantages of the establishment of the common diplomatic service for the EU and benefits for the Member States. • The third part is dedicated to a careful study of the problems that emerge with the creation of the above-mentioned service and possible ways of responding to a numerous questions connected with its institutional dimension, as well as the consequences it will have on the external action of the European Union and on the foreign policy of the Member States.

* * *

EU diplomacy and EU foreign policy are two terms that are used very often interchangeably, although there is a difference between them. While EU foreign policy is the substance of EU relations with third countries and international organizations and the goals it strives to achieve by those relations, EU diplomacy is a more specific term meaning the process of negotiations and political dialogue between the Union and third countries, which comprises a set of norms, rules and principles regularizing these negotiations and which have a common institutional basis1. On the other hand, there exists an interdependence of these notions as one can not speak of the establishment of an EU common diplomatic service without

1 Bátora J., “Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?”, Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy 87, The Hague, Clingendael Institute, July 2003

144 mentioning the CFSP and the EU external action, and vice versa it is impossible to conduct efficient foreign policy without having an effective instrument.

EU external action is another term which may add to the confusion. Contrary to what one might think, the CFSP does not constitute the whole of the Union’s external action; it is a wider concept which covers such policies as development policy, humanitarian aid, common trade policy, environment, and issues such as visa and asylum policy.

Diplomacy as an institution is challenged in the EU; its embodiment can be found in bilateral relations of the Member States, multilateral diplomatic profile of the Council and the Commission, and emerging capacity of the Union to conduct diplomatic relations with third countries. While the role of diplomats in the mediation of relations between the Member States at the bilateral and multilateral level within the EU is being redefined, diplomats acquire new responsibilities at the level of EU’s external relations. The EU copies prevailing structures and socialization procedures established in national diplomatic services, which would reduce the existing uncertainty as to what kind of an actor in the international diplomatic system the EU actually is. The fact that the EU is developing its own diplomatic structures makes allusion to the general pattern of a new state establishing its presence in the diplomatic system. What is new and interesting in this context is the fact that the EU is not a state, and still it is developing a legal personality, which creates expectations of the EU fulfilling particular roles on par with the roles fulfilled by the states.

Given the present dynamic of the European integration and institutional development of European polity, the master thesis cannot aspire to provide a definite answer to the question whether or not the EU needs a common diplomatic service, it would rather point at possible tendencies in the sphere of EU’s external representation and reveal the challenges the Union would have to face.

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I Historical Background and Institutional Framework of the Diplomatic Service. 1.1 Evolution of treaties and development of common foreign policy of the EU

Since the signing of the Treaties of Rome, European integration focussed more on economic aspects, like the creation of a common market, but with the passing of time they have acquired a political role which goes beyond the strictly economic sphere. Thus the ideas for cooperation in the field of foreign policy were already in evidence. For almost forty years of European construction the very wording "common foreign policy" was never mentioned in the Treaties. It was in October 1970 that the Member States of the European Community endeavoured to cooperate with each other in the matters concerning major international policy problems. Nevertheless, this was at intergovernmental level in the context of "European political cooperation". In 1986, the Single European Act formalised this intergovernmental cooperation without changing its nature or methods of operation. The change came at Maastricht where, for the first time, Member States inscribed in the Treaty the objectives of a "common foreign policy". The Treaty entered into force on 1 November 1993, and since that time the European Union uses its substantial international influence to protect and promote the interests of each Member States and the EU as a whole, expresses its position on armed conflicts, human rights, deals with transnational problems like environmental threats and any other subject connected to the fundamental principles and common values which form the basis of the European Union and which it is committed to defend.

1.1.1. Maastricht Treaty introducing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

A new stage in the European integration became possible with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 that created the European Union with a symbolic structure of three pillars corresponding to three main areas of EU policies:

146 European Communities (EC), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC).

The objectives of this second pillar of the Union are set out in Article 11 of the EU Treaty and are to be attained through specific legal instruments (namely common positions which require the Member States to implement national policies that comply with the position defined by the Union on a particular issue and joint actions which are operational actions by the Member States under the auspices of the CFSP), which have to be adopted unanimously in the Council. It is distinguished from the other pillars because of the way it operates, the need for Member State consensus in the decision-making procedures and its intergovernmental nature (unlike the traditional pillars of the Community, such as the single market and trade policy).

The Treaty introduces other institutional roles in the CFSP process, as there are a number of different actors who are involved in the elaboration and implementation of CFSP:

• The European Council defines the general principles and guidelines and decides on the common strategies by unanimity (Art. 13 of the TEU) and it functions as a role as the forum for political appeal.

• The Council of the European Union is responsible for taking the decisions necessary to frame and implement the CFSP and it makes recommendations of common strategies to the European Council.2

• The Presidency of the Council represents the Union in all matters related with the CFSP, especially carrying on the political dialogue with the third countries. In its missions it is supported by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the CFSP, accompanied by the European Commission. The Presidency can also be provided assistance by the member state that will hold the

2 The CFSP is dealt with by the General Affairs Council composed of the EU Foreign Ministers.

147 following presidency. These three actors are called troika. The Presidency is responsible for implementing the decisions taken in the frames of the CFSP (Art. 18 of the TEU)

• The European Commission “shall be fully associated with work in the area of the CFSP” (Art. 27 of the TEU), which is necessary to assure the coherence of the CFSP with the external economic relations, the cooperation in development and humanitarian aid as well as common trade policy in which the Commission plays an important role. It has the right to take second pillar initiatives (not exclusive) and it has (with the Council) to “oversee the consistency of external actions”.

• The European Parliament must be consulted with regard to the "key aspects and basic options" of the CFSP (Art.21 of the TEU); it gives opinions and may also make recommendations to the Council that is required to make regular reports to the Parliament.

The Member States of the European Union can make propositions to the Council; they also have to align their positions and coordinate their actions on the common foreign policy matters. Their national diplomatic services must cooperate in order to assure the respect and the implementation of the common positions and common actions.

1.1.2 Amsterdam and Nice Treaties and their contribution to the clarification of the CFSP

The provisions on the CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty which entered into force in 1999. An important decision in terms of improving the effectiveness and profile of the Union's foreign policy was the appointment of a High Representative for the CFSP. This position is currently held by Mr. Javier Solana Madariaga, who took up the post on 18 October 1999 for a period of five years that

148 was prolonged3. He assists the Council in foreign policy matters, through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of European policy decisions. He acts on behalf of the Council in conducting political dialogue with third parties and coordinates the EU Special Representatives.4

The Amsterdam Treaty spells out five fundamental objectives of CFSP:

• to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principle of the United Nations Charter ;

• to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;

• to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principle of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter , including those on external borders

• to promote international co-operation;

• to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Treaty also identifies several ways in which these objectives are to be pursued. Firstly, the European Council defines the principles and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy. Secondly, it decides on common strategies. These instruments set out overall policy guidelines for activities with individual countries. Each strategy specifies its objectives, its duration and the resources that will have to be provided by the EU and the Member States. So far there are Common strategies on Russia, Ukraine, Mediterranean and the Middle East Peace

3 At its inception, it was decided that the Secretary General of the Council would fill the position. This meant that the Secretary General at the time, Jürgen Trumpf was the first High Representative, although he would only serve a few months.

4 The European Union currently has nine Special Representatives (EUSRs) in different regions of the world. The EUSRs promote EU policies and interests in troubled regions and countries and play an active role in efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law.

149 Process. And thirdly, the General Affairs Council adopts joint actions and common positions which have to be respected by each member state. 5

Additionally, mechanisms for regular political dialogue with a whole range of third countries have been set up, usually with troika meetings at ministerial, senior officials and working group level, summits and in some cases, meetings with all Member States and the Commission at ministerial or senior officials’ level.

With the Treaty of Nice, which came into force on 1 February 2003, the appointment of the Secretary General of the Council/ High Representative for the CFSP, special representatives of the European Union is done by the qualified majority. Besides, it notably increases the areas which fall under qualified majority voting and enhances the role of the Political and Security Committee (PSC, or COPS) in crisis management operations.6

1.1.3 Competitive participation of the Council and the Commission in the forming of the EU common foreign policy

The second paragraph of Article 3(c) of the TEU was amended to include an obligation for the Council and the Commission to cooperate in order to ensure consistency in the external activities of the Union as a whole.

The European Council defines the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP as well as common strategies to be implemented by the EU. On the basis of those

5 Art. 15: “Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.”

6The COPS is mentioned in Article 25 of the Treaty on European Union and is set up on 22 January 2001.It is made up of the political directors of the Member States' foreign ministries. Its remit is:

to monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy; to contribute to the definition of policies; to monitor implementation of the Council's decisions.

150 guidelines the Council of Ministers adopts joint actions or common positions. The treaties also indicate that the function of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy is exercised by the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers, who assists the country holding the Presidency of the European Union in matters coming within the scope of the CFSP. When appropriate he conducts political dialogue with third parties, acting on behalf of the Council of Ministers, at the Request of the Presidency.

There are two broad contributions of the Commission to CFSP. First, the Commission plays a treaty-specific role in CFSP. The Treaty requires that the Commission be "fully associated" with the CFSP work, where it enjoys, along with Member States, a right of policy initiative, manages the CFSP budget line and brings to the CFSP debate the EC policy areas where it has a clearly defined role. Second, there is the Commission's role as external representative in all the European Community areas - this involves the Commission both in policy formulation in Brussels, and in the representation of EC interests throughout the world by means of its extensive network of delegations. The Commission, in its turn, may, as any Member State, refer to the Council any question relating to CFSP and may submit proposals to the Council - although it does not have the sole right to do so as in Community matters. The Commission may also, as any Member State, request the Presidency to convene an extraordinary Council meeting and make suggestions to the Policy Unit for work to be undertaken. The Commission also implements the CFSP budget (under the EC budget) including through appropriate financial proposals.

The Council and the Commission are jointly responsible for ensuring consistency of EU external activities as a whole, in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies.

To sum it up, the Common Foreign and Security Policy provides an exciting dimension to the overall work of the European Union. The institutions of the EU, including the Commission and the Council, are now involved in most of the traditional fields of international diplomacy.

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1.1.4 The unanimity in the decision-taking process: is it a drag on the way of reforms?

One of the main features of a decision - making process in the CFSP matters is the need for unanimity which is extremely complex and inflexible. The unanimity requirement means that if only one country dissents from a common position, the EU will fail to adopt a common position.

Paragraph 1 of the new Article 23 (J13) establishes the general rule that on CFSP matters, decisions should be taken by unanimity and constructive abstention: abstentions by Members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of decisions.

Paragraph 2 of the same article states that the Council shall act by qualified majority when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy, or when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position but only where a member of the Council does not declare beforehand that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority. In such cases, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.

While voting on the making of policy is to be by unanimity, voting on the appropriate means of implementing decisions is to be by qualified majority voting. This is highly significant for the effectiveness of CFSP.

One salient disadvantage to unanimity is the potential for decision-making to remain slow and ineffective if countries attempt to negotiate side-payments in other issue areas in return for assent over a common foreign policy position. So the

152 establishing of the decision-making procedures that are better geared to the needs of speed, effectiveness and credibility in Union action is the key problem, as it was underlined by Javier Solana: “Unanimity at twenty five (or more) on each and every CFSP issue will make decision-making very difficult. We need to seriously reflect on the possibility of enlarging the existing possibilities for majority voting while taking full account of the interests and specific situations of Member States. We should also reflect on the issue of constructive abstention and reinforced cooperation.”7

Some propositions have been made aimed at the relaxation of the unanimity rule in order to avoid the risk of deadlock:

A. Clarification of the function of abstention in CFSP decisions. Whether or not abstention stands in the way of unanimity under the CFSP has never been discussed by the Council. It may be asked whether Article J.11 of the TEU should be amended to establish clearly that abstention does not stand in the way of unanimity.

B. Introduction of a special "constructive abstention" arrangement: under this, abstention would not stand in the way of unanimity and would allow an abstaining Member State not to take part in implementing joint action, while still being required to show full political and financial solidarity.

C. Introduction of an opt-out: opting out would exempt a Member State not only from actually taking part in the implementation of action (as in the case of constructive abstention) but also from showing active solidarity and possibly financial solidarity; the Member State could not, however, prevent the Union's name from being used for the joint action or common position and it would have to refrain from behaving in any way which might conflict with the objectives of the action or detract from its effectiveness. 8

7 Javier Solana’s speech, “Shaping an effective EU foreign policy”, Brussels, 19 February 2002. 8 Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, CFSP Decision- making procedure, note No 24. Brussels, 24 April 1996

153 Consequently, to avoid the raised criticism of the CFSP as being ineffective, the Member States are encouraged to move beyond their national self-interests and think in a more “Communitarian” way in order to adopt a common standpoint even in difficult situations.

1.1.5 Recent enlargements of the EU: a challenge for the coordination of various policies in the pursuit of common objectives

The decision of the EU to expand its membership to the Northern, Central and Eastern European countries represents the largest and the most difficult plan in the Union’s history. The enlargement of 2004 took place against a background of complex political and economic changes in Europe and the international system. Nevertheless, it was the most well prepared comparing to other enlargements.9 The implications of all the enlargements are significant for the EU in terms of future stability of Europe.

A close examination of the final terms of the EU membership agreement involving Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) helps illustrate the intergovernmental character of the accession process. Some scholars (like Fierke and Wiener 1999; Schimmelfennig 2001; Sedelmeier 2001) have suggested that enlargement has been effectively driven by the constraints of collective identity and social norms, that is by a sense of “community values”. Recent intergovernmental approach (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003) that insists on the importance of national interests provides a more realistic assessment of the final impact of these agreements. As an analytic tool, the concept of the national interest is employed to describe, explain, or evaluate the sources of the adequacy of a nation’s foreign policy. As an instrument of political action, it serves as a means of denouncing or

9 Commission européenne, Élargissement de l’UE – 20 mythes et réalités au sujet de l’élargissement, Luxembourg: Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes, 2006

154 proposing policies. These two usages share a tendency to confine the intended meaning to what is best for a nation in foreign affairs.10

The analyst Hans Morgenthau emphasized in his realist theory of international politics that “the objectives of a foreign policy must be defined in terms of national interest.”11 But if every Member State is concerned only about its national interests, who is to say that the goal or act of the Union is contrary to that nation’s interest?

The foreign-policy goals that the EU sets for itself are considered to result from bargaining among the Member States. If some interests carry greater weight than others, it is assumed that the differences will be recognized and accounted for in the policy-making process.

It is important to notice that the accession process has been structured in such a way that it effectively favours Western interests over those of the CEE. Frequently, these interests are couched in terms that suggest the CEE countries, by adopting Western institutions as well as engaging in the policy-making, will be clear winners from the enlargement. On the whole, the potential for the new and old EU Member States will – in the long run - depend on their ability to manage the diverse interest of these many different states.12

In terms of the CFSP, with the recent enlargements it is tempting to predict that for the foreseeable future the process of enlargement will have a rather limited impact on the development of the common foreign and security policy. Yet such an assessment would be slightly misleading, in part because the enlargement process already has an impact on the new members, all of which are trying as hard as they can to be in line with EU mainstream positions. Compared to the socio-economic and symbolic dimension of membership, CFSP matters are of minor importance and are generally not allowed to disturb the negotiation process of enlargement. As

10 The definition is reproduced from the International encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, edited by David Sills, Robert Merton, Macmillan, 1968. 11 Hans J.Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2d.ed. revised and enlarged (New York: Knopf, 1954), p.528 12 David L. Ellison, Divide and Conquer: The EU enlargement’s Successful Conclusion? International Studies Review, March 2006, p.164

155 such the present round of enlargement of 2007 follows the pattern of previous enlargements in which foreign policy has been a non-issue. However, the logic of the telos of the membership does not last for ever. The central European states with stakes in the first round of enlargement (Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia) tried to influence the Ostpolitik of the EU, and Hungary and Slovenia additionally demonstrated a pronounced interest in the EU policy on the Balkans. So the CFSP, like international relations generally, will always be shaped by modern geopolitics.

1.2. The current situation of the European diplomacy

With the growing importance of the EU as an international actor (through the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the aid programmes) the issue of a better European Union representation in the world has taken on a new importance. This issue has not yet been examined in detail by scholars of European affairs. Little has been published about European Commission delegations or their precursors, some of which were set up as early as the mid-1950s. These offices were created to answer differing needs. Three situations come to mind: those countries with which association agreements had been signed (as in the case of the UK), countries involved in close information exchange, cooperation or competition with the European Communities/EU (as in the case of the United States), and those countries where control of aid programmes was required (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, at the beginning of the 1960s).

1.2.1. External representation

Having analyzed the evolution of treaties and their impact on the formation of the external policy of the European Union, it is appropriate to examine now the present day situation, paying special attention to the structure of the EU external activity and the actors involved.

156 First of all, it should be mentioned that the European Union does not have a legal personality; it is the European Communities that were recognized as legal entities and were given powers in the international sphere. Nowadays their external powers are extended to many areas, such as trade policy, associate countries and overseas territories, relations with other international organizations, research and technological development, environmental policy, education, vocational training and youth, culture, public health, trans-European networks, economic and monetary union, and development cooperation. Some of them are exclusive (e.g. common commercial policy), others are exercised by the Community in tandem with the Member States, which is a general rule.

The internal management of the Community external action is conducted by the institutions according to the supranational method, as it was mentioned in the previous paragraphs. The essential role is played by the Commission as it is responsible for the external representation of the Community and deals with implementing the agreements and managing the funding. The following DGs are involved in external relations: External relations, Trade, Development, Enlargement, Common External Relations Service, and Humanitarian Aid Office.

It is the Commission delegations that represent the EC externally, establishing and maintaining relations with third countries and international organizations in the Community sphere (mainly economic relations), as the CFSP matters are mainly the responsibility of the Presidency of the Council. The Presidency represents the Union (18.1 EU) together with the Commission (18.4 EU), it also has the assistance of the High Representative for the CFSP (18.3 EU) and if necessary, of the next Member State to hold the Presidency (18.4 EU). Besides, the Council may designate a special representative with a mandate in relation to a particular political issue (18.5 EU).

As regards Community policies, the delegations have the monopoly in representing the Community. No Member State, not even that of the Presidency, has the legal power to represent the EC or to speak on its behalf in the host state. When speaking

157 about the sphere of shared powers, there has to be a partnership between the Commission delegation and the missions of the Member States.13

These Commission delegations have expanded spectacularly, currently numbering 128, and have been fully accepted by third countries and international organisations, which have proceeded to open up their corresponding embassies in Brussels. The delegations have the rights, privileges and diplomatic immunities granted to the missions of the Member States according to diplomatic law, and the head of delegation has the diplomatic rank of Ambassador.

The delegations are not only responsible for managing commercial policy and development aid, but also for the political representation of the Community, which is recognized as a major player on the international stage.

In the functioning of the delegations some aspects remain vague, such as their legal status, their role and their relationship with other EU institutions, as well as a great confusion on what is actually represented: the EC or the EU. Frequently the delegation and its head in third countries are perceived by the public as representatives of the whole of the Union and even of Europe in general14. Basically, the Commission is only an institution of the Community, and does not have international legal personality. Besides, the delegations are formally answerable solely to the Commission, but in fact they have relations with the Council and the European Parliament, which permits them to fulfill a broader representation role on behalf of the Community as a whole, and that has become a source of the confusion.

The role of the delegations has always been very diverse, as has been the status of their staff: some were supposed to have a purely political and diplomatic role (a role

13 Galeote G., B. Becerril, “Towards a common European Diplomacy? Analysis of the European Parliament resolution on establishing a common diplomacy.” Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence, 2005

14 See “Diplomacy without a state: the external delegations of the European Commission”, Journal of European Public Policy, Glasgow, 1999, p.186-197

158 of representation and information as in the case of the US, the UK, Japan), while others were intended to have a more technical function (running the European Development Fund in the case of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States). Some of their staff were senior EC civil servants, others were hired by the Association Européenne de Coopération. Not until 1988 were these latter employed on the same footing as their EC colleagues. This development was the result of long battles between different institutional interests (Member States, European Parliament, Commission, DG VIII, DG I).

The Delegations of the Commission act in the interests of the European Union in 123 countries, and at five centres of international organisations (OECD, OSCE, UN, WTO). As defined by the treaties, their official role is: - to present, explain and implement EU policy; - to analyse and report on the policies and developments in the countries to which they are accredited; - to conduct negotiations in accordance with a given mandate; - to provide assistance for other institutions of the European Union such as High Representative of the EU for the CFSP/ Secretary General of the Council of the EU or the European Parliament. Besides, they support local presidencies of the Union. Hence the heads of delegations regularly take part in the troikas and assist the presidency.

Besides, there are currently nine EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) in different regions of the world who promote EU policies and interests and play an active role in efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law in the following regions: Afghanistan, the African Great Lakes Region, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia, the Republic of Macedonia, the Middle East, Moldova, the South Caucasus and Sudan. In addition, another EUSR is going to be appointed to Kosovo as part of the post-status arrangements. Some EU Special Representatives are resident in their country of activity while others are working on a traveling basis from Brussels.

159 Special Representatives of the European Union support the work of the EU High Representative for CFSP in the regions concerned. They play an important role in the development of a stronger and more effective EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and in the efforts of the European Union to become a more capable and coherent actor on the world stage.

There is one special case of a double-hatted EU Special Representative who is at the same time a EUSR and Head of a Commission delegation in the Republic of Macedonia, Erwan Fouéré. He reports to and is instructed by the Council on CFSP issues and is responsible to the Commission for areas of Community competence. The success of the “Skopje model” is recognized in the numerous reports of the House of Commons in the United Kingdom and the double-hatting proves to be “a practical, pragmatic and cost effective solution” to the specific requirements of that region15.

To understand better the present-day situation of the external representation of the Union, one needs to look into the original sources. In 1993 the Maastricht Treaty defined precisely the diplomatic framework of the EU giving political support for the change in the nature of the foreign policy governance in the Union: “The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission delegations in third countries and their representations to international organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented. They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in article 8c of the Treaty Establishing the European Community”.16

After the signing of the Treaty some changes were introduced within the Commission – responsibility for foreign policy were shifted from EPC unit in the Secretariat General to a new Directorate General DGIA within which a new

15 38th Report of the House of Commons, 8 February 2006. 16 Treaty on European Union; title V J.6.

160 Directorate was responsible for management of the Delegations and their staff within a framework of a “Unified External Service”.17

The status of the External Service was subject to some changes after “The Williamson Report” which recognized the necessity for the Commission to create a homogeneous body of diplomats serving overseas. The interest in the External Service getting deeper, the Santer Commission produced every year “communications” to the Council and the Parliament. These communications focused on the External Service management and development, covering many aspects such as its role, priorities and resources, as well as profound modifications to the network of the delegations and their activities.

Thus the debate on the necessity of the creation of the European common diplomatic service was launched, heated up in 2000 by an important resolution of the European Parliament proposing the establishment of a common European diplomacy and turning the Commission delegations into Community delegations accountable to Council and Parliament and making the External Service “a professional permanent Community Diplomatic Service”.18

1.2.2 Internal management

The European External Service has come a long way since the opening of the first diplomatic mission in London in late 1955 by the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, who was accredited to permanent diplomatic missions from a number of then non-EC European countries. In 1967 the treaty merging the executive institutions of the three European Communities (ECSC, EEC, Euratom) made a new single Commission take over the already existing delegations and in the course of the following decades set up delegations in all the major capitals and seats

17 It was created in 1994. The name is due to the fact that disjoint administrative elements were now brought together under one management umbrella. 18 European Parliament “Galeote Report”, EP Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy “Report on a Common Community Diplomacy” (2002/2006 [INI], A5-0210/2000).

161 of international organisations in the world. During the same period a network of delegates was created to implement co-operation and partnership agreements concluded with countries or groups of countries.

The Delegation has the full status of a diplomatic mission (it is granted diplomatic privileges and immunity as per the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations) and officially represents the European Commission in third countries. The Head of the Delegation is formally accredited as the official representative of the European Commission to the Government of the host country and is referred to as His Excellency, Ambassador. The staff working in the Delegations comprises about 4.900 officials, contractual staff and local agents. The management of the staff, the buildings and residences housing the Delegations, automobile park, information and telecommunications equipment, etc. centres in DG External Relations, Directorate K: External Service, in close contact with the Heads of Delegation and their Heads of Administration.

The Directorate is composed of nine units: RELEX/K-1 (responsible for coordination and programming of activities, human and budgetary resources), RELEX/K-2 (ex-post control), RELEX/K-3 (career of officials and contract agents), RELEX/K-4 (rights and obligations of officials and contract agents), RELEX/K-5 (local agents), RELEX/K-6 (the development of the External Service, exchanges with Member States, training, protocol and diplomatic questions), RELEX/K-7 (infrastructure), RELEX/K-8 (security), RELEX/K-9 (informatics).

As the importance of the delegations and the number of tasks conferred upon them grew, it became necessary to organise the management of the External Service in a more unified and integrated way so that the delegations could perform their tasks properly. With this end in view, the Commission decided to integrate all Delegation staff administratively in DG External Relations (with the exception of certain specialist staff seconded from other Directorate Generals, or from Member States or other EU institutions) by establishing a Unified External Service, a single management system for all its Delegations operating in third countries and with international organisations.

162 How the Commission delegations are managed internally can be shown on the example of the EC delegation in the United States of America, one of the biggest one. Recognizing the importance of the support of the US government for European integration, the first information office was opened in Washington, DC in 1954. Seventeen years were needed for it to become a Delegation with full diplomatic privileges and immunities. The Head of Delegation was accorded full ambassadorial status not earlier than in 1990. The Delegation represents the European Commission in its dealings with the US Government for all matters within EU competence or purview. It reports on US developments to headquarters in Brussels and acts as a liaison with other international institutions in Washington, DC.

A close examination of the structure of the delegation staff allows to single out the following key figures and sections:

• Head of Delegation (Ambassador); • Deputy Head of Delegation; • Administration Section (Admin), responsible for provision of support services for the Delegation staff, building and residences through the authorized allocation of budgetary resources, liaising with appropriate authorities in the European Commission and the US (including the US State Department) on all protocol and administrative matters related to EU officials. • Economic and Financial Affairs, which monitors and assesses US economic performance and liaises with the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Multilateral Development Banks in areas of interest to the EU. • Food Safety, Health and Consumer Affairs, which maintains close contact with the US Administration, US Congress, industry and consumers in the above- mentioned areas. • Political and Development section, which follows all aspects of the New Transatlantic Agenda and maintains close contacts with the US Administration and Congress on foreign policy. Further, this section serves as liaison between the EU and the US in the development assistance area, covering cooperation with the US

163 Government, the International Financial Institutions, the Organization of American States and a broad range of Washington-based NGOs and think tanks. • Press and Public Diplomacy, with the crucial task of enhancing awareness of the European Union in the United States. It produces and distributes information materials, maintains the Delegation’s website, organizes speaking tours and deals with public inquiries. The section also maintains close contact with all US media; produces EU News Releases; provides the media with information and analyses of EU developments, positions and statistics. • Science, Technology and Education, which maintains close contact with the US authorities at the Federal and State levels, research universities, national laboratories and the high tech industry. It processes information for the European Commission services in Brussels, Luxembourg and the JRC Institutes pertaining to trends in science, technology and education. • Trade and Agriculture. This section monitors trade and regulatory developments in the US, including agriculture. • Transport, Energy, Environment and Nuclear Matters, monitoring and analysing US political, economic and regulatory developments in these areas19.

It is important to note that the Delegation of the European Commission does not deal with consular matters (such as passports) or other issues that have traditionally been handled by the Member State embassies, consulates, trade commissioners or national tourism offices directly concerned.

The presented internal structure is the common model of the EC delegations, although in many countries the size of it is much more modest and the number of tasks and responsibilities is less important. For instance, the delegation to Chile is currently a mid-sized one with close to 30 employees; its tasks include following the EU-Chile Association Agreement which involves trade, political dialogue and co-operation.

Thus, the Delegation of the European Commission is a fully-fledged diplomatic mission and has the task to officially represent the European Commission in the

19 The official site of the EC delegation to the US: www.eurunion.org

164 country. The Delegation deals closely with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States. It serves as a venue for meetings and press conferences that involve the EU as a whole, acts as the contact point for joint cultural initiatives, and offers the Member States resources for specific information, such as EU market access to third countries. It particularly works closely with the Member State holding the EU Presidency.

1.2.3 European responsibilities of Foreign Ministries of the Member States.

The membership of the countries in the EU defines to a considerable degree the work at the national Ministries for Foreign Affairs. This affects almost all the Ministry’s areas of responsibility; officials at all levels are engaged in EU work and both the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the country’s capital and its missions abroad, including the Permanent Representation of the Member State to the EU in Brussels, are involved.

In daily activities, European aspects touch on almost all Foreign Ministry’s areas of responsibility, from work on bilateral relations (between the Member State and other countries) to the shaping of security policy or development assistance policy. These aspects may include any political contacts of the EU, like those with Africa or Latin America, where all the Member States give their opinions, or they may include EU statements in the United Nations on human rights in a particular country, where the Member States contribute their views. They may also apply to the cooperation on consular affairs existing between EU member countries, i.e. the assistance given to the nationals of a Member State abroad, where, as Union citizens, they can obtain aid from the embassy of another member country in places where the country has no embassy of its own.

Officials at all levels, appointed state secretaries and ministers are involved in the process and they try to ensure the efficiency of the Ministry’s EU work. Although

165 initial contacts are often made at official high level, very often contacts taken by political appointees are preferable as per the principle of the subsidiarity.

EU work is undertaken in the capital of the Member State, in Brussels and at the various missions abroad. In simple terms, this means that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs lays down the policy and the missions abroad convey messages and reactions between the Member State and the government of the country of operations or the international organisation. The Permanent Representation of the Member State to the EU in Brussels represents the Government of the Member State in the EU. Officials both from the Member State and those in Brussels participate in EU meetings, discussions of the issues taking place between the national government, Brussels and the missions abroad. Work pertaining to the European Union varies depending on the country of operations, particularly when the country is a member of the EU as opposed to a non-EU member.

So the Ministry of Foreign Affairs usually is the central coordinating institution for EU issues in a Member State. The ministry coordinates development and implementation of EU related issues and analyzes the country’s priorities in the EU. In cooperation with Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepares Prime Minister's participation in European Councils and other EU meetings as well as prepares proposals for development of the Member country’s EU related policy.

166 II The idea of the creation of a common diplomatic service.

Respecting the existing institutional balance, the most outstanding innovation of the EU Constitutional Treaty in the matter of foreign policy is the creation of the post of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the European Union and a common diplomatic service under his authority.

2.1 The project of the Constitutional Treaty

In the beginning of the twenty first century, it became clear for a large number of European leaders that the EU required a re-foundation and renovation. From an initial agenda that included the distribution of competencies, simplification and the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Convention on the Future of Europe produced a fully-fledged proposal for a Constitution for Europe. Italian and Irish Presidencies had led the negotiation and final approval of this document. In October 2004, the Heads of State or Government of the 25 Member States and the 3 candidate countries signed the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe which then needed to be ratified by all the Member States of the enlarged Union.

In May and June 2005 the French and Dutch voters rejected the Treaty in referenda. The failure of the constitution to win popular support in these two countries caused some other countries to postpone or halt their ratification procedures. Had it been ratified, the treaty would have come into force on 1 November 2006.

Now the Constitution is on hold and it has a highly uncertain future. After some period of reflection several options presented themselves. The first one is to try to resurrect the existing treaty with only minor additions and amendments without changing the substantial part of it. But another option of a “Mini-treaty”, proposed by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy and echoed by the Italian Prime Minister and former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi, has drawn much more attention of the European leaders. It consists in taking up about two-thirds of novelties from the Constitution that were not critical issues during the failed

167 referenda in France and the Netherlands. This “cherry-picking” in the matters concerning the foreign policy favours the creation of Minister for Foreign Affairs and replacing unanimity by qualified majority.

John Palmer, Political Director of the European Policy Centre in Brussels, predicted that there would have to be another treaty and this would be needed two or three years after the negative results of the French and Dutch referenda.20 Whether the European Union will have sooner or later its constitution and if yes what changes it will bring is not known yet, but the fact that the initial project had some innovations that should be retained and should be taken into consideration while elaborating a new treaty raises no doubts.

2.1.1 Creation of the post of Minister for Foreign Affaires

One of the main innovations of the Constitutional Treaty was introduction of the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs by merging the functions of the High Representative for the CFSP and the External Relations Commissioner (Article I- 28) with the purpose to make the European Union's external action more effective and coherent, as he would become in effect the voice of the Union’s common foreign and security policy. His role consists in conducting the CFSP and ESDP, using all instruments at his disposal.

However, the Minister for Foreign Affairs will not have sole charge of the Union’s external representation. The Constitution specifically assigns the task of representing the Union to the Commission, except for CFSP issues. Article I-22 of the Constitution provides that the President of the European Council, as well as preparing and chairing the work of the European Councils, is responsible at his level for ensuring the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its CFSP, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Constitution does not, nevertheless, go into detail about how these functions

20 BBC News website, 6 June 2005.

168 are to be divided between the European Council President and the Foreign Affairs Minister, leaving their respective roles for institutional practice to decide.

The “double-hatted” Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission and the Council’s representative for the CFSP, is appointed by the European Council by qualified majority with the agreement of the President of the Commission. He will have a right of initiative in foreign policy matters and implement that policy under mandate from the Council of Ministers.

The responsibilities of the Minister for Foreign Affairs will be: - to represent the EU in matters concerning the CFSP, - to conduct political dialogue on the EU’s behalf, - to coordinate different aspects of external actions and to ensure the consistency between the areas of external action and EU’s other policies21, - to express the Union’s position in international organizations and at international conferences, - to coordinate Member States’ action in international forum (Art. III- 305), and - to be the head of the Union’s special representatives who are appointed and mandated by the Council of Ministers to deal with specific policy issues (Art.III-302)

21 The necessity of the coordination of activities between the Commission and the Council of Ministers is mentioned in the Article III-292. The Commission also argues that “unsatisfactory coordination between different policies means that the EU loses potential leverage internationally”, see COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION to the European Council of June 2006 “Europe in the World — Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility”

169 2.1.2 The Establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS).

Besides the above-mentioned functions, the Minister for Foreign Affairs will be in charge of a diplomatic service with delegations in almost 125 countries around the world. The Constitution provides for a European External Action Service to be set up to assist the Minister in his or her functions (Article III-296).

This service will be established by a decision of the Council of Ministers, after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission, and will be placed under the authority of the Foreign Affairs Minister. It will be composed of officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers and of the Commission and staff seconded from national diplomatic services.

The staff of the Union's delegations operating in third countries and within international organisations will be provided from this joint service. Additional necessary arrangements for establishing the European External Action Service will be made once the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is signed.

At present, after the negative French and Dutch votes on the Constitutional Treaty, it has not been done and a number of disputes arose between Council, Commission and Parliament, as well as between big and small Member States. The moot points include the following aspects:

• First of all, the issue of the institutional setup. Commission and Parliament demand a strong connection of the European External Action service to the Commission and are supported by the Secretary-General on this issue. The Parliament aims to strengthen its grip on Foreign and Security Policy. The Member States support an agency separate from Commission and Council which leans close to the existing working structures dealing with Foreign Policies in the Council. Even a totally independent structure like the current Translation Service is discussed.

170 • As far as the funding is concerned, the budget size will not differ much from the budget of the External Service of the Commission. But if the EEAS is integrated into the Commission, he would have to be financed from the Budget of the Commission as well. If there is no institutional integration into the Commission, the Council would have to establish a separate budget for the EEAS. • The question of the institutional reforms. Up to now the presidency of the Council rotates through the member states every six month. The Constitutional Treaty intended to create a Council presidency with the electoral period of 30 months. It is unclear how such a change will shape the work of the European External Action Service. Up to now the Council working groups on Foreign Affairs are chaired by a representative from the presiding Member State. Especially the small Member States want to keep that position to gain or keep influence on the common foreign and security policy. • Without a doubt the EEAS will concentrate on the CFSP issues. Yet many other policy areas overlap with the CFSP, like the Terrorism Prevention (from the field of Internal Affairs) or Trade Policies (from the field of Economic Affairs). It is to be expected that the Commission will still handle these policy areas if mandated by the Council, but the EEAS will assist in the coordination of these policies. • The major problem is the relation to diplomatic service of Member States. At the moment, the diplomatic services of the Member States carry out a number of important functions and it is unclear whether in the long run the EEAS will take over some of these functions, such as the issue of visas.

The future European Foreign Service, compared to the size of the diplomatic services of the Member States, will be relatively small and will dispose of a comparably low budget; nonetheless it should not be underestimated. The various disputes show that there is a need to rebalance the power structure of the European institutions. Especially the Parliament is gaining influence and has recently manifested it, to take the example of the rejection of the agreement on the EU Financial Framework for 2007-2013 in January 2006. The compromise on the European External Action Service will indicate how the power has shifted between the institutions. To establish the EEAS through an Interinstitutional Agreement would be the most practical solution, but also the most problematic one.

171 2.2 Does the EU need a common diplomatic service?

Before exposing the quintessence of the current debate on the necessity of the creation of a common European diplomatic service, it should be underlined that the eventual establishment of the above-mentioned service together with the introduction of the post of the Minister for Foreign Affairs has for an object to assure coherence, efficiency and visibility of the EU external action.

2.2.1 Pros and cons

• Differences in the attitudes and expectations of the Member States

The origin of the faction can be traced back to the Constitutional Treaty that explicitly says that “the service shall work in co-operation with the diplomatic services of the Member States.” Some of the Member States, indeed, expect that some time later with the development of the common diplomatic service it may be possible for the EEAS to take over some of the representative and analytical functions currently fulfilled by their own expensive and over-stretched diplomatic services. Big Member States such as the United Kingdom and France are less sanguine. They view the European common service on the contrary, in some cases, as a potential rival to their national diplomacies. Although in a number of countries, like in the United Kingdom, ironically, this suspicion co-exists, with a more positive view of the External Service as a possible instrument to counterbalance the increasing external profile of the European Commission. The British Foreign Secretary observed that “you find all sorts of odd bods from the European Union running all sorts of odd offices around the world and it would be a good thing if arrangements for the European External Service gave us more control than we have at the moment”.22 The “odd bods” running “odd offices around the world” are a

22 “A European Diplomatic Service?” European Policy Brief, the Federal Trust for Education and Research, January 2006, Issue 20

172 major element of the general debate concerning the future work of the common diplomatic service. 23

• How will the European foreign policy be defined then? The issue that has provoked lively debates is whether a new common diplomatic service will be able to cover the areas of the CFSP and trade as well as the areas of aid, technical assistance and humanitarian intervention, and what kind of interaction there will be. One of the questions that arise is, for instance, should representation of interests and humanitarian intervention be treated separately or should these two aspects of diplomatic service be integrated into one solid and coherent EU foreign policy. The point of view of the High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana was expressed in his speech to the European Council; he underlined that “the challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments such as European Development Fund… Our objective should be to create synergy through a more coherent and comprehensive approach. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agenda”.24

The same opinion is shared by many Commissioners who back up a similar coherent and comprehensive institutional approach, although opposed by partisans of the separation of responsibilities within the Relex family of DGs, like Chris Patten, former Relex commissioner.

In general, the dominant opinion is that the creation of a common diplomatic service of the European Union, which is supposed to link together the European Community aspects with the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy, will contribute to a better consistency and coherence of the Union’s external policies as a whole.

23 Cf. Romano Prodi asking the question “Who will do what?” in his speech in Strasbourg, 13 May 2003. 24 Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe In A Better World”, speech to the European Council, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003.

173 • Addressing the problem of weakness in current institutions. The EU and its Member States have not been able to translate their massive diplomatic resources into comparable international influence due to a lack of effective coordination between policy and action. Although some of this influence deficit can be attributed to the understandable attachment of Member States to their national interests, the end result is that the EU and hence its members “seriously under-perform” in the international arena.25

The weak point is that the competences are not clear-cut between the EU institutions. The Union’s external relations are handled by a wide range of bodies, a fact that results in its public face something being shared by a multitude of actors which creates confusion first of all for the actors involved and for third countries. Functionally, EU foreign affairs are unified, but institutionally there is a great segmentation. Even within the European Commission there is no leading commissioner for international relations, as the Relex Commissioner is an equal with the Commissioner for Enlargement, Trade, Development, and EuropeAid. The Commissioners have legal competences that put them beyond the authority of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Policy and even beyond the authority of the European Council.

The establishment of a common diplomatic service can help to eliminate the inefficiency in the area of the Union’s external action. To maximise the EU’s potential influence and effectiveness, the common diplomatic service will have to be structured so that it can continuously focus on promoting the coordination of its activities with those of the Member States while at the same time ensuring that all of the EU’s external action programs are in line with the Union’s foreign policy priorities. Likewise, and especially given recent and coming enlargements, the European external service will have to accommodate the continuing need for the inwardly focused functions of EU diplomacy, that is, the use to which EU foreign policy is put as an instrument of, and alternative to traditional bilateral relations between Member States. In this respect the function of the European foreign service

25 Steven Everts, “Shaping a credible EU foreign policy”, CER, May 2002

174 ‘as a catalyst for different national positions, facilitating dialogue, and providing a platform for building consensus’ is of vital importance.26

The proposed common Foreign Service should provide a central point for the administration of the EU’s external relations. But there are some “ifs” to make it possible for the EU to achieve its goals in the field of the foreign policy: the Union will have its external relations concentrated and administered in one place if the Minister for Foreign Affairs disposes of clear lines of administrative and budgetary authority for the service, if the service itself has a tailor-made structure independent of any alternate power structures and if it has a recognised and accepted legitimacy within the EU.

• The control of the future EU diplomatic service There is an open debate over the institutional implications of the EEAS which is taking place between the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. The differences between the three main interested parties were aired in public at hearings in the European Parliament on 15 March 2005 and have also been expressed in internal Commission and Council documents. 1. The position of the European Parliament. Elmar Brok, a German MEP and chair of the influential Foreign Affairs Committee of the EP, expressed his concerns about the emergence of a “super administration” operating without a link to the Commission and has proposed that the Service should be fully integrated into the staff structure27. The EP Constitutional Affairs Committee called for the planned EU diplomatic service to be subject to scrutiny by the European Parliament rather than being entirely in the hands of EU governments. On 10 May 2005 MEPs approved a motion for a resolution by Jo Leinen (PES) on the European diplomatic service in which they call for the preservation of the "Community model" in the EU's external relations.

26 Grevi G., Cameron F., Towards an EU Foreign Service, 2005. 27 Elmar Brok has written a report on behalf of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) on setting up an EEAS. The Committee adopted a resolution, a midterm report, on 21 April, 2005. The European Parliament adopted this midterm report on 26 May, 2005.

175 2. The Council, represented by Jim Cloos, an official in the Council General Secretariat, recommended the establishment of a new service between the

Commission’s structure and the Council’s secretariat without setting up a different body. The Commission's powers on trade, development and humanitarian assistance do not need to be integrated in the EEAS, according to Mr. Cloos, who concluded that this was not a case "for intergovernamentalising the Community aspects of external relations".28 3. The Commission. Graham Avery, director at the DG RELEX, stressed the need to avoid duplication of existing Commission responsibilities, which leaves open the question of whether the EEAS should assume no, partial or extensive responsibilities for external trade, development and assistance policy or enlargement-related issues. Other important issues, such as the manner in which staff are recruited into the Service, the relationship of the EEAS to the current External Action Service of the Commission (the 128 delegations overseas), the extent to which the crisis management aspects of the Union’s work should be represented and the budgetary arrangements, all remain open.

The points of mutual consent comprise: • Acknowledgement of the need for an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs and the accompanying EEAS. It is worth noting that the disagreements are primarily about the institutional design and specific duties of the European diplomatic service. • Non-replacement of the national diplomatic services. It is clear that the EU Member States will play a vigorous role in the EEAS through officials seconded from the national diplomatic services who will form part of the Service’s staff; if anything, their role will actually be enhanced compared to the current arrangements. In spite of this many of the functions currently exercised by national diplomatic services fall outside the EEAS’s likely remit (such as trade promotion or the protection of national political, economic and cultural interests). It is also worth noting that the EEAS is, by definition, an external service and will not therefore

28 EP News Report, 17 March 2005

176 have a role in bilateral relations within the EU or the formulation of national EU policies. • The EEAS as a part of the constitutional package, which means that the eventual establishment of the EEAS and the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs is closely connected with other changes brought by the Constitutional Treaty, such as the introduction of the Foreign Affairs Council, changes to the Presidency, the introduction of the President of the European Council as well as more general changes in decision-making. In short, it is difficult to see how a fully effective Minister and EEAS could be created out of the context in which the constitutional treaty places them. Although it is also argued that the EEAS might come into being anyway by intergovernmental agreement.

2.2.2. Advantages of its creation

• Consular affaires One of the challenges the European Union has to face is the national visa arrangements in the European space with no inner borders. On the grounds of the Schengen Agreement the nationals of third countries can get a visa to go to France and then move easily throughout Europe and go to Italy or Germany if they wish so. The question arises: what is the use of having so many different embassies granting visas to different EU countries if at the end of the day people will move freely within the EU? The Commission leads serious discussions on the future of the European visa service and probability of the creation of the European consular and visa agency under the common diplomatic service which will help to reduce the staff needed in consular departments of foreign ministries, interior ministries and embassies abroad. To illustrate, France and Great Britain has both their embassies in Bangladesh, with staff numbering forty and sixty people respectively; so all in all there are one hundred people working in such a small country. The rationality of the Commission idea is evident.

• Global presence of the 27

177 One thing to remember, the EU diplomatic service is designed not as a replacement for, but as a complement to the national diplomatic services. Hence national diplomats will be deeply involved in the EU external service, which will improve mutual expertise and give the Member States direct influence over EU relations with third parties. Moreover, it is interesting from the strategic and geopolitical point of view as the smaller Member States through association with EU embassies will have an opportunity to effectively increase their global presence. For example, whereas the United Kingdom has twenty-six embassies within the European Union alone, Malta has only eighteen bilateral embassies world wide.

• Administrative arrangements Besides, it is attractive financially as many Member States have to face budget cuts of foreign ministries and to reduce costs of maintaining their network of embassies abroad, so joint EU embassies will be a good solution of the financial problem and it will allow small Member States to be represented in the countries where they do not have their own embassies at present as they can not afford to keep them. All large countries in the European Union have embassies in almost all countries and representations to international organizations like the United Nations. The smaller EU Members have fewer embassies and rely more on the services of consulates. Often an embassy in a country coordinates relations to several countries in the region. For instance, the Scandinavian countries have coordinated their Foreign Service and share their embassy buildings – but internally all countries still have their own administration and are functionally separated.

Pooling embassies will thus be helpful for achieving greater coordination between the Member States’ external activities and will be a great relief for many of them, especially those with modest financial means.

• Big Member States versus small Member States. For all the Member States a common European diplomatic service could provide an opportunity to establish a more coherent foreign policy and save resources that could be spend otherwise. If, for instance, the issuing of visas is executed by the EEAS, then the national embassies could focus more on the political, cultural and

178 economic ties between the Member States and third countries. This is a significant succour especially for small countries.

The advantages for the larger member states are not as clear. For Germany it would provide an opportunity to influence France and UK’s politics in the Security Council. Yet it is unlikely that in a case of dispute, Great Britain and France would let their position be based on the German position. Here arises the question of what a common diplomatic service will provide to the big Member States. Without a doubt the proportion of diplomats from these three member states inside the service will be high. Working in the EEAS will be radically different from working in national diplomatic services. The joint EU embassies will receive different information and have different contacts abroad then the national diplomatic services. If the big (and the small) member states adequately train the diplomats working in the EEAS, ensure their connection to the national diplomatic services and commit themselves to a real information flow, the common diplomatic service could provide a perspective that none of the national services can provide.

• Assurance of consistency of the EU representation. If we take for example one policy area, Common Foreign and Security Policy, the representation of the CFSP matters falls under the responsibilities of the Presidency. In Brussels even the smaller state can manage the presidency role, but when it comes to the representation abroad, it can be faced with the problem of not having its embassy in a particular country. In this case the presidency role falls to another Member State with a resident ambassador, which creates certain confusion for third countries although legally the presidency is represented but there is a clear lack of consistency of the EU representation. The Commission, according to Brian Hocking and David Spence29, is the only consistent element in the representation of troika. Its extensive network of delegations abroad allows it to cope with its external relations role both in the Community sphere and in CFSP. The High Representative Javier Solana has a team of policy advisors (Policy Unit), but as the number of them is limited, there has been resort to special envoys and special representatives. Still

29 Hocking B., Spence D., “Towards a European Diplomatic System?”, Clingendael Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, 2005

179 the problem of the coherence and consistency of the EU representation is not solved as yet.

• “One telephone number for Europe” The creation of a common diplomatic service will be an answer to Henry Kissinger’s question asked some thirty years ago what number he could dial to speak to Europe. It is true that at that time the Member States, although united, did not have a common service responsible for representing the Union and defending the EU’s interests abroad. Now with the establishment of such service the EU’s external relations will no longer be handled by a wide range of bodies which creates a “cacophony of voices”.30

• Strengthening of the EU’s role as a global partner for development. The EU is the biggest donor providing around fifty-five per cent of the world's development assistance which goes to more than 150 countries and focuses on the global challenges of the twenty-first century: tackling poverty, promoting democracy and security, social equity, economic prosperity, and environmental sustainability.

In the time being, the responsibility for the implementation of assistance is shared between: • the Commission DG EuropeAid, responsible for the transforming political commitments into concrete results in the fight to eradicate poverty and to promote peace, human rights and sustainable development throughout the world; • the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), which provides food, medical supplies, water purification systems, shelter and other essential items to disaster victims around the world; • the EU's Development Directorate General, which has as its mandate to enhance EU international aid policies in all developing countries worldwide. It provides policy guidance on development policy and oversees the programming of

30 Jean Asselborn, “The European Union as an External actor”, 2005.

180 aid in the ACP countries (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) and the EU's Overseas Countries and Territories.

The European diplomatic service is supposed to be a liaison between the European Union and third countries in the development assistance area as well, covering cooperation with other government agencies, international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and a broad range of NGOs and think-tanks. The eventual establishment of the Union’s external service will facilitate this work by providing information from all over the world, helping to identify areas of common interest, negotiating with needy countries, and organizing formal visits of EU officials. Besides, a close cooperation with Member States’ national diplomatic networks will contribute to increase to efficiency of EU assistant programmes, as development is a task that is shared between the European Union and its Member States.

The objective is to reinforce the profile, significance and impact of Europe’s development aid including that of the Member States, to bring about more efficient interaction among donors within the framework of an effective international aid architecture.

181 III PROBLEMS OF THE CREATION OF THE EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Problems of the establishment of the EU common diplomatic service are of different nature: economic, political and administrative.

The economic difficulties are connected with the initial budget allocation. The budget funds of the national foreign ministries are limited and they have to be spent rationally on the increasing needs of the diplomatic networks of the Member States abroad. The difficulties to convince the public opinion and national parliaments of the importance of the missions of the national diplomatic services have a negative impact on the budgetary considerations. In this context of the budget constraint, the creation of the common European diplomatic service will entail an increase in the national diplomatic staff that will be needed for a common external service. Sooner or later, some reorganisation of the national diplomatic networks will be needed.

The political challenge the Union has to face is the complexity of its composition. The diversity of the cultures of administrations and great difference in the financial and human resources of the diplomatic services of twenty-seven Member States represent a complicated problem for the establishment of the common European diplomatic service. On the other hand, it can be considered as a means to reinforce the coherence and to promote cooperation with the old and new Member States.

When speaking of the administrative problems, it makes allusion to the public management as any change in the political process provokes reluctance and resistance on the part of some Member States, who are uncertain about the stability of the labour market, possibility of job creation, and new methods development. More specifically, as to the common diplomatic service, this uncertainty concerns individual management of career. But taking into account the mobility and versatility of the diplomatic work, the change in the strict sense of the word is not something to refrain from. Hence it will contribute to the diversity of the work and will promote further detachment.

182

1.1. Questions which arise with its creation

Javier Solana was quite clear when expressing his position towards the problem of the composition of a future European diplomatic service in October 2002 in Brussels in his address to the External Action working group of the Convention. He stated that “pragmatic pooling of resources would allow us to find better ways of using the vast resources available (national ministries of foreign affairs, Member State embassies, the Commission services and delegations) for the collective goals of European foreign policy. Bringing together high quality national diplomats on secondment from the capitals with permanent officials in the Council secretariat and the Commission allows for an invaluable exchange of ideas, information and trust. Such pragmatic pooling of resources offers the potential to develop a "European Foreign Ministry" at a pace and in a manner that the Member States feel comfortable with”.31

In his speech the High Representative for the CFSP made allusion to a European Foreign Ministry but it was not specified when and how this Ministry will be created. This gave rise to some reflections and discussions, stimulated by his phrase that the European Foreign Ministry must be established by common consent of all the Member States. The result was the general agreement on some aspects.

Firstly, the European External Action Service will be composed by officials of the DG RELEX, officials of the Council Secretariat and staff from national diplomatic services of the Member States.

Secondly, concerning its institutional attachment, it is the Minister for Foreign Affairs who will be in charge of this service.

And finally, another important aspect is that the European Union will get a legal personality that will allow it to have its own delegations or embassies on the basis

31 Solana’s address to the External Action working group of the Convention, 15 October 2002.

183 of the Commission delegations plus a certain number of officials of the Commission, Council Secretariat and national diplomatic services.

All the thorny questions about its relationship with the Council and the Commission, its size, structure and terms of its establishment are still in the air and are open for discussion.

3.1.1 The debate on its relationship with the Council and the Commission.

The necessity and importance of a clear breakdown in the competences of the EU institutions in order to know who is accountable politically and institutionally for action undertaken in the field of the international relations was underlined in Romano Prodi’s speech on the legislative programme.32 It is desirable for the administration serving the new Minister to be organised in a clear and simple way with a transparent hierarchy headed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. In order to avoid conflicts and overlapping with the other administrations dealing with the Union's external action, the President of the Commission has suggested that the European External Action Service should form an integral part of the Commission's departments, at least from the administrative point of view. His arguments were first of all to guarantee the coherence of the EU external action, to make optimum use of knowledge and resources, and to avoid intergovernmental replica. If the system is to be properly effective, the Union's Foreign Minister must take his or her decisions in agreement with the President of the Commission. This means there will be some interaction between Community and intergovernmental aspects in foreign policy, keeping in mind that the President of the Commission also sits on the European Council.

“The Foreign Minister will therefore need to work closely with the College and in particular with the President of the Commission and must have the backing of a

32 Romano Prodi, speech 03/242. Strasbourg, May 13, 2003.

184 genuine European diplomatic service. This structure must be linked administratively with the Commission in order to work together with the other Commission departments. The Union’s external representation will thus be truly unitary and able to utilize Community and intergovernmental instruments effectively, and this will give us the international influence and role we should have.”33

According to the European Commission, the future European diplomatic service should not be separated from other EU institutions as it will allow a close cooperation with them while undertaking external actions. Besides, it is difficult not to acknowledge the necessity of this cooperation and to create a diplomatic service institutionally separated from other Commission departments and the Secretariat of the Council when it was already decided for the Minister for Foreign Affairs to be one of the Vice-presidents of the Commission. By the same logic, the European Commission advocates that the EU delegations should be included in the future common diplomatic service and continue to be administratively dependent on the Commission for financial and practical reasons.

If compared to the Member States’ point of view, one can easily see some discrepancies in position. As an example, Germany and France in the Franco- German contribution to the European Convention on the institutional structure of the Union have claimed that “the European minister of foreign affairs relies on the support of a European diplomatic service in which the Commission’s directorate- general works together with a foreign policy unit which has to be created. This includes the foreign policy services of the Council’s secretariat and is strengthened by civil servants sent by the member States and the Commission. The European diplomatic service is working in close liaison with the diplomatic services of the

33 Romano Prodi, speech 03/274, “Ahead of the Thessaloniki European Council”, European Parliament, Strasbourg, June 4, 2003.

185 Member States. This set-up would provide a framework within which a European diplomatic service could emerge.”34

In Great Britain the position was clearly expressed by Lord Bowness who opined that “although member states, the Commission and the Council all have their own role in external relations, the European Union itself has a growing and wide responsibility on the international scene, but even if the objectives are clear, implementation falls to different parties. The three must therefore work together to ensure that whenever possible there is a unified global presence.”35

It is worth noting the evidence of Director-General for External Relations in the Council Robert Cooper, who stated that there are three people to fulfill the EU's “laudable ambition to speak with one voice - the Presidency, the High Representative and the Commissioner”.36

For certain, the final outcome will be determined by the institutional attachment of the European diplomatic service to the double-hatted Minister for Foreign Affairs who will combine the functions of the High Representative for the CFSP and Vice- president of the Commission.

3.1.2 What will be its structure?

At present, there are two possible ways of responding to the question of its organization and composition. The first one suggests that the European diplomatic service should be incorporated into the Commission or the Secretariat of the Council. In this case, a significant reorganization of these two latter bodies would need to take place. On the other hand (and that is the second possible solution) if the

34 Franco-German contribution to the European Convention on the institutional structure of the Union, Paris and Berlin 15.01.2003

35 Europe in the World, EUC Report: 8 February 2006, House of Lords debates.

36 Quoted from the 48th Report of the Committee on European Union “Improved cooperation and coherence in EU external relations”, 7 November 2006.

186 common diplomatic service were to be established autonomously of the Commission or the Council, some duplication of staff already engaged in the Commission and Council would be the inevitable consequence.

The situation is further complicated by the discrepancy in present staffing levels between the institutions. The Commission has over 3000 staff members working in the three DGs most directly engaged in foreign affairs, while the Council has only 225 equivalent staff, admittedly supplemented by a further 140 working on the Military Staff.

There are three main approaches widely discussed for the structure of the European diplomatic service: • The first one incorporates only the Foreign Affairs Directorate from the Council Secretariat and the Directorate General dealing with external relations from the Commission. The drawback of this approach is that with such limited staff the Service will be quite weak to ensure coherence and consistency of the EU foreign policies. • Another approach advocates that all officials dealing with the EU external relations from the Council to the Commission seconded by the officials representing the Union in third countries should be brought together in the common diplomatic service. Definitely, there would be no lack of resources, but it is far from being easy to supervise all its activities even for the EU Foreign Minister. • The third approach is influenced by the Constitutional Treaty which stipulates that the External Service shall not only comprise “officials from the relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission” but also “staff seconded from national diplomatic service of the member states”. How many such staff should be detached to the common diplomatic service, how long they should work for the Service, whether their terms of employment should be the same as those for Council and Commission officials are obviously crucial and controversial questions, with obvious implications for the identity and political culture of the Service. The Treaty places the EU external delegations under the authority of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. On the contrary,

187 there is no mentioning in the Constitution of whether their staff should be drawn from the External Service.

There are today more than one hundred twenty such delegations reporting directly to the Commission and the Council. If the Foreign Minister of the European Union eventually takes over the permanent chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Council, it would be logical that the external delegations controlled by the Foreign Minister should take on the work relating to CFSP in third countries. Until now, much of this work has been carried out by the national delegations of the country holding the rotating Presidency in the Council. It is definitely a heavy load for small countries, of which they would like to get rid. The larger Member States have an absolutely contrary point of view; some of them remain at least hesitant before the prospect of reinforcing the autonomous role of the European delegations.

The High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso between March and June 2005 made some progress on finding consensual solutions among the Member States on some important issues dealing with the future common diplomatic service and its internal structure.37 The great majority of Member States considered a unique status for the European diplomatic service under the authority of the Foreign Minister, with close links to both the Council and the Commission. Most of the Member States agreed with the organisation of the Service proposed by Solana and Barroso, which consisted in including in it the services dealing with CFSP in the Commission (DG RELEX) and in the Council (Policy Unit, DG-E and Military Staff), and to set up within its internal structure both geographical and thematic desks.

3.1.3 The size of it.

The question of the size of a future common diplomatic service of the EU has two possible answers. The first one is a version of a minimalist model. Placed under the authority of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, it can be just a body of diplomats

37 See “A European Diplomatic Service?”, European Policy Brief, the Federal Trust for Education and Research, January 2006, Issue 20.

188 forming official EU delegations, answerable to the Commission and the Council, and the size of this “Minister’s agency” will be unpretentious in the beginning but constantly growing and developing, as was always the historical evidence of the European integration. But even in the minimalist model, for the sake of coherence and consistency, it will be essential to establish the headquarters of a new common diplomatic service which can bring together both policy development, residing primarily in the Council, and implementation capabilities, currently in the Commission. Logically, it will be impossible to manage the EEAS exclusively through the Commission, so decisions on the future staffing, training, budget and priorities will need to be made with the approval of the Council to suit its purposes and priorities.

Another probable way of the creation of the EU diplomatic service may be the establishment of a European Foreign Ministry with a more considerable material resources and staff, who had been specially trained for the service in an EU Diplomatic Academy. In this case, the creation of such a service will require the creation of a new institution, and taking into account a usual bureaucratic system of any institution, we can just imagine the grandeur of this project. The European Parliament provides more accurate information on the composition of the European Foreign Ministry: “The Union Embassies would be made up of the Commission delegation and the delegations of the Member States that wished to be present in the third country. In this way, the national missions would maintain, within the framework of the Union Embassy, their legal personality, being available to provide their country with the appropriate services, while the interests of the Member States that did not consider it necessary to assign their own mission would be represented by the Union Embassy. In order to establish these embassies it would be necessary to identify the priorities of the Member States and of the Union, it being particularly appropriate to open them in those countries in which the majority of the Member States do not have diplomatic representation”. 38

38 Quoted from Galeote, Towards a Common European Diplomacy? Analysis on the European Parliament Resolution on Establishing a Common Diplomacy (A5-0210/2000), 2001.

189 Even if no definite answer has been given to this question so far, one can suppose that the service will take the form of a flexible and mobile body developing into a more institutionalized structure staffed with professional diplomats, experts on the EU foreign policy.

3.1.4 How to obtain a closer coordination with the diplomatic services of the member states?

The need for better cooperation and coordination between the Member States, the Commission and the Council has been a recurrent theme of many reports on the EU foreign policy. Fortunately, there are areas in which the coordination, at least between the Commission and the Council, is improving. For example, Erwan Fouéré argued that his double-hatted role as EU Special Representative and Head of Commission Delegation for Macedonia had led to closer working relationships between those Commission and Council officials responsible for providing him with instructions. More generally, Robert Cooper argued that relations between the Commission and the Council Secretariat "work on a practical, day-to-day level extremely well."39

As to the coordination with the Member States, the Commission admits that the result of an unsatisfactory coordination will be that the EU will lose potential leverage internationally, both politically and economically. Despite progress with improving coordination, there is considerable scope to bring together different instruments and assets between the EU institutions and the Member States. Whilst recognising the need for increased coordination and cooperation, the first question to ask must be how successful the Commission's proposals are likely to be in achieving that aim.

A lot of attempts have been made to encourage a closer relations with the national diplomatic services through different methods, like organizing courses for national

39 Both E. Fouéré and R.Cooper are quoted from the 48th Report of the Committee on European Union “Improved cooperation and coherence in EU external relations”, 7 November 2006

190 diplomats, establishing regular contacts between the officials responsible for managing the external service and their counterparts in the national foreign ministries, and arranging for a certain number of diplomats from the Member States to work through the partnership programmes for the RELEX DGs and in the Commission delegations.40

The willingness of the Member States to endorse further cooperation will also be essential to the success of the EU's external relations, as there is only a limited amount of what the institutions can do without an overall agreement by all the Member States for this or that aspect of foreign policy. Coherence and solidarity among member states was pointed out by Javier Solana in his address to the external action working group of the Convention: “Ultimately our effectiveness as a global actor will depend on the willingness of member States to share analysis and set joint priorities. It also depends on their commitment to act together, and above all to share the burden fairly. Burden-sharing can take different forms: member States that may not be able to contribute much in terms of military capabilities, can still bring a lot in terms of finance, refugees, development aid.”41

Article 20 of the Maastricht Treaty stipulates that the delegations and the diplomatic missions of the Member States must cooperate to assure the respect and the implementation of the common positions and common actions adopted by the Council.

Furthermore, the Constitutional Treaty had for an object to establish the European External Action Service to work in the cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States.

At the Gymnich Meeting in Evian in September 2000 the French Foreign Minister launched a project aiming at the improving of the efficiency of the EU external

40 Not all of these attempts were successful, as the diplomatic services of some Member States, which are obliged by the partnership programme to bear the salary costs, have indicated that they did not have enough resources to fund their diplomats to work outside their own service. 41 Javier Solana, “To the External Action Working Group of the Convention”, Brussels, 15 October 2002.

191 action, starting with the reinforcement of the cooperation between the EU embassies and the Commission delegations in third countries. To this end the following measures has been taken: firstly, Political and Security Committee adopted guidelines in this field, and secondly, General Affairs and External Relations Council approved on the 22nd of January 2001 general orientations for the reinforcement of the operational coordination between the heads of European missions in the sphere of the external aid. Since then, the General Affairs Council discusses every year the possible ways of improving the coordination with national diplomatic services of the Member States.

3.1.5 Possible ways of responding to the problems.

The deliberations of the ten Working Groups in the Convention42 concerned the question of the adaptation of the existing institutions and procedures in the Union to the changing reality and the proposals concerning the future common diplomatic service. The main recommendations of the Working Groups on External Action may be summarised as:

• There should be a better definition of principles and objectives;

• The role of High Representative/Secretary General and Commissioner for External Relations should be merged into that of a "European External Representative" (EER). The EER should be appointed by the Council, receive direct mandates from the Council for CFSP issues, and enjoy the (shared) right of initiative. The EER should also be full Commission member, preferably a Vice-President, and replace the current Troika;

• A specific External Action Council should be established (distinct from the current General Affairs and External Relations Council which considers both horizontal issues as well as external relations);

• A focal point should be established for External Relations in the Commission and one joint service (European External Action Service) should be established;

42 See the Final Report of the Convention’s Working Group (VII) on External Action, CONV 459/02

192 • An EU Diplomatic Academy and diplomatic service should be established;

• New instrument should be created. Specifically, a joint initiative could be forwarded by EER and the Commission;

• Maximum use of Qualified Majority Voting should be made by European Council agreeing unanimously to extend its use in CFSP.

One of the interesting points is that during the work of the European Convention it was intended to establish a diplomatic school of the European Union that would provide education for the officials who would join the European diplomatic service (DG RELEX officials, Council Secretariat officials and staff seconded from the diplomatic services of the Member States) and the national diplomats charged with the Community affairs. The objective of the subsequent training proposals and the revised career structure was to “develop a culture of diplomatic service”43. These reforms to the External Service of the EU were widely supported by the Member States. More recent reforms featured the deconcentration and decentralisation of its External Service. In 2000 the European Parliament contributed to the debate by calling for a “professional, permanent Community diplomatic service”44, to which the creation of an EU diplomatic training academy was central. So the education was generally recognized as an indispensable integrating part of a good functioning of the institution. Nevertheless, bearing in mind financial restrictions and the initial cost of the establishment of the EU common diplomatic service, the creation of the EU diplomatic school was not a foreground task of the Member States.

Under the circumstances, it seems more feasible to heighten the role of the national diplomatic schools integrating modules on European studies into the curriculum. At the same time the theoretical part of the studies should entail, if needed, the arrangements to work in the EU institutions or delegations abroad. The idea is that all the national diplomats must have a good knowledge of European external affairs and the education in this field should not be reserved for the solely European diplomats.

43 Ibid. 44 The resolution on establishing a common diplomacy adopted by the European Parliament on 5 September 2000 (A5-0210/2000)

193 Another perspective is the reorganisation of the national diplomatic networks which has two dimensions: the internal management of the human resources and the structure of the national diplomatic networks.

The foreign ministries of the Member States of the European Union are involved in the deep reflection on this reorganisation which takes into account the peculiarities of each governmental structure and each diplomatic service in terms of their traditions as well as in terms of the organisation of the diplomatic services abroad. The lion’s share of the work was focused on the internal management of the human resources in order to face the difficulties that might be caused by the establishment of the common diplomatic service and hence to pave the way for a new “Europeanized” external action. It should be mentioned, however, that the reforms in the internal management of the human resources will be introduced in the short run while the reorganisation of the national diplomatic networks is not done at one stroke and it is a time-consuming procedure. It must be done progressively and in coordination, refraining from copying the existent structures and driven by a new international context.

Moreover, one should remember that the structure of the national diplomatic networks is determined by the traditions in the administration of the Member State and its strategic objectives: either promotion of the values and defense of its interests on the global scale or concentration on a certain geographical zone or on some issues of its interest.

The necessity of a closer coordination between the diplomatic services of the Member States and a new common external action service requires a better information management. Consequently, a direct communication between national foreign ministries and the European diplomatic service should play a key role.

With all this going on, the establishment of the common diplomatic service does not mean that the bilateral embassies will disappear. They can be turned into places of coordination and management of the foreign policies of the Member States. Even the preparations of the European Council meeting take place in the national capitals

194 as well as some decisions are made in the course of direct negotiations, which underlines the increasing importance of the national embassies.

3.2. Impact on the EU external action and on the national diplomatic services

The impact on Member States’ foreign ministries is a challenging issue as the attitude towards a common diplomatic service differs from one state to another. Some states would prefer not to charge the European External Affairs Service with many responsibilities thus keeping it relatively weak and avoiding competition with national diplomatic services, while others have already begun to vie for getting influence in whatever structures of external representation emerges through the common diplomatic service.

The national diplomatic systems have a changing character that turns on developments at two interconnected levels:

1. At the first one there is an inner organization of the ministry and its place within the governmental structure. At this level the establishment of the European diplomatic service will just strengthen the coordination within Member State international policy processes, reinforcing the relationship with other domestic departments involved in managing the European diplomacy and with central coordinating units. Else, there is a real human resources implication. Once the European diplomatic service offered the perspective of additional post and career opportunities, it would certainly have an impact on the career patterns within the national diplomatic services.45

2. At the second level there is a network of diplomatic representation maintained by the foreign ministry abroad. The patterns of representation are affected by resource constraints combined with the appearance of new ways of

45 Hocking B., Spence D. “Towards a European Diplomatic System?”, Clingendael Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, 2005.

195 communication. Even if pooling of embassies seems to provide a solution, it invites caution as it ends up being, as David Spence puts it, “sharing premises” rather than “shared representation”.46 What we can observe is that the development of the network of Member States’representation is influenced by their international involvement and the creation of the European diplomatic service can help to avoid a variable geometry of representation as each state will be equally represented under the EU flag.

3.2.1 Will it bring more coherence and efficiency?

The system of political cooperation has been critised for not being more effective as it has performed particularly weakly at times of international crises. At the same time, the level of cooperation between member states that has been achieved on more routine matters of foreign policy is surprisingly high. Still the need for more coherence, visibility and effectiveness is one of the main issues. The factors that will contribute to a better representation of the EU and will help to increase effectiveness of the Union’s external action include reinforcing “public diplomacy”47 in order to explain and promote EU’s policies and models, improving accountability and visibility by a higher level of involvement of the EP and national parliaments, better cooperation between EU institutions and Member States through national diplomatic training schemes, double-hatting of the EUSRs and Heads of delegations, developing cooperation between Member States in the area of consular assistance, exchange of personnel with diplomatic services of the Member states etc48. The EEAS is supposed to face these challenges and deal with many issues aiming at the promotion of the coherence and visibility of the EU’s external action, although it is far from being evident that it will be an answer to all the questions of a greater coherence and effectiveness of the EU’s actions at the global scale.

46 Ibid. 47 Compare the citizens’ awareness of one of the issues of EU’s external action in the graph 2 (p.70) 48 Communication from the Commission to the European Council, “Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility”, 10325/06

196 3.2.2 EU as a single actor in the international arena

The Convention’s mandate, provided for in the Laeken Declaration49, included the study aimed at solving the problem of how to improve the performance of the Union on the international scene and to make of it “a power…to change the course of world affairs in a way which is to the benefit of all”50. The debate in the Convention reflected on the successes and the failures of the past and on the shortfalls of existing structures and procedures.

On the one hand, the synergy developed by the High Representative, Javier Solana, and the Commissioner in charge of External Relations (RELEX), Chris Patten, was recognised and considered a positive basis to overcome inter-institutional barriers, although things have not always gone as smoothly at a lower bureaucratic level. On the other hand, the limitations of intergovernmental cooperation in promoting strategic thinking, proactive decision-making and coherent action, were denounced by a large majority of the Convention’s members. A diagnosis of EU shortcomings in this domain was almost consensual, but the prognosis and certainly the prescription highlighted divergences between its members.

The Working Group on ‘External Action’, headed by Jean Luc Dehaene, convened at the end of September 2002 to examine and propose solutions on ways of enhancing the performance of the Union on the global stage. On 15 October, Javier Solana presented a list of pre-requisites for effective action in foreign and security policy. Notably these included continuity, quick reaction, coherence and solidarity among Member States, along with the political will to tackle sensitive issues in the EU framework, and the need for a clear division of competences and responsibilities between the European institutions. Interestingly, on the latter point, Solana spoke against the fusion of the functions of the High Representative and of

49 The Laeken Declaration laid down three main goals: • a better division and definition of EU competences, • simplification of the EU’s legal instruments and action, • and lastly, more democracy, transparency and efficiency in the Union. The basic aim is to assert the values that guide the Union, define the citizen’s fundamental rights and duties and clarify the relationship between Member States within the Union. 50 CONV 6/02

197 the Commissioner in charge of External Relations, explaining that it would add confusion and would not bring additional synergies. Instead, efficiency and coherence would be undermined by a conflict of interest whereby the post-holder would have to gain the trust of foreign ministers in the Council while also be bound by collegial rules and loyalties within the Commission.51

Besides, it was argued that if no changes in the area of the European foreign policy and common diplomatic service are made by the Member States and the European institutions, the EU would continue separate representation for the Community and the Union. This would reduce the effectiveness of the Union and may lead to frustration on the part of third parties. There is a risk that the Union’s goal stated in the Treaties to assert its identity on the international scene will not be advanced. In addition, a continuation of the status quo may also lead to constant inter-pillar turf battles between the Commission and the Council. The welcome improvements that have already been undertaken in the Commission’s External Service may be slowed down. So it is evident that some changes are needed, especially know that one can clearly observe that the former division between Community and intergovernmental competences in external relations has been obliterated.

President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso emphasized another aspect of the European presence on the international stage, namely assuming the Union’s global responsibilities as expected by EU international partners. According to him, the EU can have greater impact by acting collectively, rather than as a sum of its component parts and he believes the Commission presents very constructive and concrete proposals to strengthen the Union’s role as a global actor in the Communication “Europe in the World: Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility”52 . The communication makes proposals to enable the Union to define a strong sense of collective purpose and to develop new ways of working to ensure the maximisation of EU leverage and influence in

51 See CONV 342/02.

52 Commission Press Release “EU External Action: Commission presents proposals to strengthen the Union’s role as a global actor”, 8 June 2006.

19860 international affairs, and it ensures that political will is backed by the necessary policy instruments.

Taking into account all that has been studied and analysed, we can come to a conclusion that the European Union has all necessary assets to create a common diplomatic service but there is still a big question mark on the phrase “a single actor” on the international stage. It is not a coincidence that the foreign and security policy that Europe pursues is called “common” and not “single”. Indeed, the twenty seven sovereign States which make up the policy maintain their own role on the international scene. Whether it will be always like that nobody knows, but this is one of the reasons why the European Union's external action is sometimes difficult to understand and explain as it goes beyond the traditional concept of foreign policy.

199 CONCLUSION

In the course of the European integration the shift from economic aspects to political cooperation entailed the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy which provides an exciting dimension to the overall work of the European Union. The institutions of the EU, including the Commission and the Council, are now involved in most of the traditional fields of international diplomacy. The EU has become a global actor who has a substantial international influence used to protect and promote the interests of its Member States. The Union expresses its position on armed conflicts, human rights, deals with transnational problems like environmental threats and is engaged in many aid programmes.

With the growing importance of the EU on the international scale the issue of a better European Union representation in the world has taken on a new importance. Now the essential role is played by the Commission which is responsible for the external representation of the Community. The Commission delegations have been fully accepted by third countries and international organisations, they have the rights, privileges and diplomatic immunities granted to the missions of the Member States according to diplomatic law, and the head of delegation has the diplomatic rank of Ambassador.

The proposition of the European Parliament to turn the Commission delegations into Community delegations accountable to Council and Parliament and to make the External Service a professional permanent Community Diplomatic Service, thus establishing a common European diplomacy, provoked a wide debate, main issues of which is its institutional attachment, the relationship it will have with the Commission and the Council, its internal structure, composition and size, as well as the ability to coordinate its activities with the Member States.

The Commission’s standpoint on the creation of the common diplomatic service of the EU consists in the following: it should not be detached from other EU institutions and it should carry out its activities in close cooperation with all the Commission services.

200

From the Member States’ point of view, the establishment of the European diplomatic service should not much alter the existing institutional balance in the sphere of external action. All the Member States of the European Union are to introduce reforms, especially concerning the management of human resources, in order to adapt the national diplomatic services to a new common service. Solidarity among the Member States, coherence of their actions, their willingness to set joint priorities, their commitment to act together are the factors that will determine the success of the common diplomatic service and, more generally, the effectiveness of the EU as a global actor.

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Regelsberger E., “The EU’s system of external representation”, Instituto Affari Internazionali, 2003.

Sobrino Heredia J.M., “Hacia una mayor visibilidad internacional de la UE: el ministro de los asuntos exteriores”, Europa Euskadi, №181, 2005.

Stringer K.D., “The Visa Dimension of Diplomacy”, Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, № 91, The Hague, Clingendael Institute, March 2004

Official documents:

European Parliament, The resolution on establishing a common diplomacy, 5 September 2000 (A5-0210/2000)

European Parliament “Galeote Report”, EP Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy “Report on a Common Community Diplomacy” (2002/2006 [INI], A5-0210/2000).

European Parliament resolution on the institutional aspects of the European External Action Service (26/5/2005)

Draft Report on the institutional aspects of setting up a "European External Action Service", 22/2/2005, 2004/2207 (INI)

Communication from the Commission to the European Council on “Europe in the World - Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility”, 10325/06

The 48th Report of the Committee on European Union “Improved cooperation and coherence in EU external relations”, 7 November 2006.

203

Final Report of the Convention’s Working Group (VII) on External Action, CONV 459/02

The Future of the European Union, Laeken declaration, 15 December 2001.

The European Council: Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 12/13 December 2003.

The European Council: Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 25/26 March 2004.

The European Council: Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 14/15 December 2006.

Speeches:

Prodi R., “A project for Europe”, Strasbourg, 13 May 2003.

Prodi R., “Planning our work until the end of the term and the Convention”, speech 03/242. Strasbourg, May 13, 2003.

Prodi R., speech 03/274, “Ahead of the Thessaloniki European Council”, European Parliament, Strasbourg, June 4, 2003.

Sarkozy N., speech to the Friends of Europe Foundation, Brussels, 8 September 2006.

Solana J., “Shaping an effective EU foreign policy”, Brussels, 19 February 2002

Solana J., “To the External Action Working Group of the Convention”, Brussels, 15 October 2002.

Solana J., “A Secure Europe In A Better World”, speech to the European Council, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003.

Personal interviews:

Telephone interview with Erwan Fouéré, EU Special Representative and Head of Commission delegation in Macedonia, 7 May 2007.

Interview with David Spence, First Councilor, EC delegation to Geneva, 27 April 2007.

Internet Sources:

Auswärtiges Amt. EEAS http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Europa/Aussenpolitik/EAD.html

Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Europe in the World, http://www.ceps.be

204

Centre for European Reform. EU Foreign Policy. http://www.cer.org.uk/foreign_pol_new/index_foreign_pol_new.html

Convention and CFSP http://www.euractiv.com/fr/avenir-europe/convention-pesc/article-120071

European Commission. Better Representation of the EU. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/delegations/reform/ip02_987.htm

Council of the European Union http://www.consilium.europa.eu

205 ANNEX

Abbreviations and acronyms

ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific countries AFCO Committee on Constitutional Affairs BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CEE Central and Eastern Europe CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy DG RELEX Directorate-General External Relations EC European Communities ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EEAS European External Action Service EEC European Economic Community EER European External Representative EU European Union Euratom European Atomic Energy Community EP European Parliament ESDP European Security and Defense Policy EUSRs Special Representatives of the European Union HR High Representative MEP Member of the European Parliament NGO Non-governmental organisation OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe PES Party of European Socialists PJCC Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters PSC/ COPS Political and Security Committee TEU Treaty on European Union UN United Nations US United States of America WTO World Trade Organisation

206

Graph 1: The EU Member States’ diplomatic and consular missions abroad.

Austria Belgium Bulgaria 400 Cyprus Czech Republic 350 Denmark Estonia Finland 300 France Germany 250 Greece Hungary 200 Ireland Italy Latvia 150 Lithuania Luxembourg 100 Malta Netherlands Poland 50 Portugal Romania 0 Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden United Kingdom

Source: own compilation. Data from the homepages of the Member States’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs and embassies and consulates at www.embassyworld.com, www.embassiesabroad.com, www.embassypages.com. The information may not be completely accurate due to different forms of representations.

207

Graph 2: EU citizens’ awareness of the fact that the Constitutional Treaty provides for the creation of the position of an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs and a common diplomatic service (in %).

Greece Slovenia Belgium 70 Germany Austria 60 Finland Luxembourg 50 Cyprus Italy 40 Malta EU25 Denmark 30 Hungary Lithuania 20 United Kingdom Czech Republic 10 Slovakia France 0 Sweden Poland Spain Netherlands Latvia Portugal Estonia Ireland

Source: Own compilation. Data on the opinion poll from Eurobarometer, the Draft European Constitution, Fieldwork: 2-28 November 2004, face to face interviews EU25: 24786.

208

DISCUSSION PAPERS IN DIPLOMACY

Towards a European Diplomatic System?

Brian Hocking and David Spence

Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’

ISSN 1569-2981

209

DISCUSSION PAPERS IN DIPLOMACY

Editor: Dominic Kelly, University of Warwick Managing Editor: Jan Melissen, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ and Antwerp University

Desk top publishing: Ellen Henskes

Editorial Board

Karin Aggestam, Lund University Geoff Berridge, University of Leicester Rik Coolsaet, University of Ghent Erik Goldstein, Boston University Alan Henrikson, Tufts University Donna Lee, Birmingham University Spencer Mawby, University of Nottingham Paul Sharp, University of Minnesota Duluth

© Brian Hocking and David Spence 2005 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy, or transmission of this publication, or part thereof in excess of one paragraph (other than as a PDF file at the discretion of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael) may be made without the written permission of the author.

210 TOWARDS A EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC SYSTEM?

Brian Hocking and David Spence

As studies of the management of European Union (EU) external policy demonstrate, the processes accompanying the adaptation of Member State foreign ministries to greater levels of integration are coloured by the interaction between an emerging European diplomacy and nationally generated international policy.1 But the signing of the European Convention in 2004 has posed these complexities in a starker form than hitherto. The purpose of this paper is to a) summarise how a proto–European diplomatic system has developed; b) outline what is being proposed in the new Constitution; and c) consider the implications of these developments both for the conduct of EU international policy as well as Member State diplomatic systems. The Constitution for Europe is to be put before national publics in referenda before its mooted implementation in 2007. Since one of the major developments in the Constitution involves a European Foreign Minister as Vice–President of the European Commission and a European External Action Service (EEAS), this clearly has considerable significance for the role and development of national foreign ministries. But of equal significance there is the issue of how national administrative arrangements affect those at the European level. Consular affairs are but one of the latest examples of a foreign (and interior) ministry function gradually being ‘Europeanised’.2 Some national administrations are even reflecting on whether the time is now ripe for national development aid to be channelled through new European arrangements. And they are all pondering the implications of the new constitution’s arrangements. Similar discussions are taking place within the Commission. The scope for the new External Action Service to cover CFSP, trade, aid, technical assistance and humanitarian interventions demands new thinking on interaction within the Relex family of DGs. This new thinking is not confined to administrative arrangements. It goes to the heart of how foreign policy is to be defined; whether, for example, humanitarian intervention stands apart from the representation of interests or forms part of a new view of the coherence of EU policies. The High Representative for

1) See, for example, B. Hocking and D. Spence, Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats, (Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, reprinted edition, forthcoming 2005). 2) For a discussion of this two–way process see P. Mair, ‘The Europeanisation Dimension’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2004.

211 1 CFSP, Javier Solana, has been clear in his views on the issue of the scope of future institutional arrangements:

The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments such as the European Development fund…Our objective should be to create synergy through a more coherent and comprehensive approach. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agenda.3

Likewise, some Commissioners in the Prodi Commission also advocated a similar coherent and comprehensive institutional approach – although former Relex commissioner Chris Patten noticeably refrained from advocating a firm line on potential administrative arrangements. Solana has already been nominated as the first holder of the post of Foreign Minister for Europe and Commission vice–president. He will chair meetings of foreign ministers of the EU twenty–five and, with the Commission delegations at his disposal – restructured into the EEAS he will lead what might have the makings of a European Foreign Ministry, complete with diplomatic service.4 Thus, the Commission’s external relations directorates and its delegations outside the EU are set to form the major administrative component of a new European diplomatic system. This heralds a series of reforms to complete an ongoing process by which the Commission’s team of international project managers has already become a quasi–diplomatic service. This process is a laboratory for students of modern diplomacy. It is not only the result of the European integration process, the spill–over from administrative, budgetary and project management tasks in the field of aid and technical assistance abroad to ‘high politics’, but also a telling reflection of major adaptations to the notions of representation and diplomacy in the international relations of the 21st century. The key issues are the form the EEAS will take and what embellishments to existing structures, rules and procedures for external relations will be developed – not only after the implementation of the Constitution, but – thanks to a declaration on the Constitution – as EU Member States move

3) Javier Solana, EU High Representative for The Common Foreign And Security Policy, ‘A Secure Europe In A Better World’, speech to the European Council, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003. 4) S. Duke, A Foreign Minister for the EU: but Where’s the Ministry?, Clingendael Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, No 89, (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2003).

2 212 towards its ratification.5 Several phases of reform over fifty years have prepared the Commission’s delegations, through incremental change, for the challenges involved. Will the Commission’s existing structures form the core of the new system of European diplomatic representation? Or will the Commission’s delegations and external relations Directorates–General be relegated to a purely trade, aid and technical assistance role, while the political running is made by others – staff from the Council Secretariat and Member State foreign ministries? The answer will depend on the roles the EEAS will fulfil and the functions the Commission and the Member State foreign ministries retain.

Developing the Commission’s international role

Understanding the future shape of European diplomacy (defined both in its broader and more specific, EU, contexts) requires us to appreciate how it has developed and the roles that the Commission and the Member States have played in fashioning what is a complex, multilayered process. Furthermore, the European arena has to be seen in the light of broader changes which diplomacy is experiencing at the global level. The challenges posed by resource constraints set against the enhanced demands imposed on diplomatic systems in the post–11 September 2001 environment resonate with diplomats and policy makers in many settings. But in a sense, the Commission, in discharging its external policy tasks, is familiar with adaptations to the shifting demands of internally and externally generated change. Indeed, it has come to assume what Bruter claims to be a unique style of public diplomacy characterised by the role assumed by the delegations in many, if not all, arenas.6 The Commission’s evolution as an external policy actor has matched both the expansion of Community competence and the growing economic and political weight of the EU itself. But the problem has been which European institution could play the role of representative of the EU. Legally, there was no difficulty as the Commission represented the EU if the policy area fell within first pillar competence. Thus, the EU’s membership of the G8

5) Declaration 24: ‘as soon as the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is signed, the Secretary–General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, the Commission and the Member States should begin preparatory work on the European External Action Service’. The signing took place on 29th October 2004. 6) M. Bruter, ‘Diplomacy without a state: the external delegations of the European Commission’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 1999, pp. 183– 205.

213 3 gave the Commission the representative role, since most of the subject matter of G8 meetings fell within Community competence. The Presidency was not represented at G8 officials’ meetings, though G8 summits were attended by the prime minister of the state holding the Presidency.7 Likewise, for representative functions in Brussels, there was no problem for the Commission in fulfilling its role, since that was where the Commission’s headquarters and staff were located. In CFSP representation is the Presidency’s preserve. While the smaller Member States can manage presidency roles in Brussels, when it comes to representation abroad, they are frequently faced with a situation where they have no embassies and the presidency role falls to another Member State with a resident ambassador. In legal terms, the presidency is represented, but the fact is that confusion reigns in the minds of foreign interlocutors and there is a clear lack of consistency in EU representation. As for the Commission, abroad its extensive network of delegations allows it to discharge its external relations role in the Community sphere and in CFSP, where it forms a permanent part of troikas, whereas the ‘Presidency’ has to be represented by another state. This was a problem that the appointment of Solana as High Representative was intended, at least in part, to remedy. But Solana was a virtual one man band. His team of skilled policy advisors, the Policy Unit, were also Brussels–based and there were not enough of them to perform an effective role abroad. Increasingly, there has been resort to special envoys (for regions such as the Great Lakes or the Middle East) and special representatives (for terrorism or WMD, for example). But the Commission remains the only consistent element in the fluctuating institutional representation of ‘troikas’. Thus the importance of the Commission’s External Service within the newly emerging diplomatic framework is apparent. But the intention for the Commission to be an international actor dates back to the Monnet era, so it has taken 50 years of slow evolution for the Commission’s policy role to become so crucial. In 2004, before enlargement,8 there were Commission delegations accredited to 126 countries and 5 international organisations, thus ranking the Commission’s diplomatic representations approximately fourth when compared with the size of geographic spread of Member State representation outside the EU (see Appendix 1). But, the Commission’s ability to play a more important role has suffered greatly from the unwillingness of EU governments to create a satisfactory EU institutional

7) Significantly, as the agenda of the G8 became more political after 9/11 and the discussions focused increasingly on CFSP competence (weapons of mass destruction, counter–terrorism etc) the Commission’s role became gradually anomalous. 8) After enlargement delegations in the ten new member states were transformed into information offices on a par with the 20 existing offices in the member states.

4 214 response to the growing demand for more decidedly European and less national policies. As senior officials of the Council have argued, the EU states have been markedly unsuccessful in co–ordinating their foreign policy positions on matters of common interest when the issues have been controversial.9 And even the EU's relations with strategic partners such as Russia and the United States have been hampered by a lack of coherence and forcefulness. The Commission is not responsible for this. On the contrary, it is seen by many in the outside world as the natural focus for diplomatic relations with the EU, even where this role falls to what has hitherto been the revolving presidency. The Commission has suffered from the scepticism of governments and publics alike, however, and it carries a large measure of responsibility for its failure to punch according to its weight. In following the maxim that discretion is the better part of valour, it failed signally to engage in advocacy and public diplomacy activities commensurate with its abilities and potential. And there is a generally recognised failure on the part of the Commission to capitalise on the respect afforded it by many in the international arena, notably the approximately 170 states accredited to the EU in the shape of the European Commission president in Brussels. Furthermore, many international non–governmental organisations look to the Commission for inspiration – both in terms of ideas and the considerable financial resources the Commission devotes to them in the exercise of their own activities.

Developing EU foreign policy capabilities

The 1980s saw the growth of the EU as an international actor with a consequent expansion of the foreign policy–making capabilities of the Commission and, of course, an expansion of the external delegation network, notably new delegations in the Mediterranean, Asia and Latin America, reflecting the Iberian enlargement of 1986. In political cooperation (EPC, the fore–runner of CFSP), Member States were beginning to rely on the Delegations’ unique expertise in EC policy, its institutional memory and the fact that the Commission was the only stable element in the fluctuating constellation of troikas. In trade relations, Member State officials had an essential support role to the Commission’s negotiators, and they looked to the Commission to solve everyday trade disputes. The conception, implementation and monitoring of development cooperation depended

9) B. Crowe, ‘A Common European Foreign Policy After Iraq?’, in M. Holland, Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years, (Continuum: 2004, 2nd edition), and R. Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, (London: Atlantic: 2003).

215 5 critically on Delegation staff. As for public diplomacy, the ‘mission to explain’ begun in Washington in 1954 was now needed everywhere. The status of the delegations varied greatly, from the missions in ACP countries with their mainly contracted staff and modest political profile, to the Washington delegation, now a fully accredited diplomatic mission. There were two major areas that were problematic for the Commission, however; the staffing issues involved in the expansion of Commission tasks from development to technical assistance in countries in transition and the issue of diplomatic professionalism. From 1986 onwards Heads of Commission Delegations became intimately involved in sensitive and confidential matters with their Member State colleagues on the spot, but a problem was that despite their professional competence, heads of delegation rarely achieved the full confidence of their EU ambassadorial colleagues. This was not merely a question of diplomats in local posts either mistrusting their Commission colleagues or simply not understanding the changing nature of the EU foreign policy game. The Commission’s overall role in international diplomacy itself was frequently contested. In the early days of EPC in Brussels, the then European Correspondent summed up the almost hostile environment surrounding the Commission’s participation in the foreign policy process:

the foreign policy establishments of all member states, confidently reposing on their long–standing traditions of state diplomacy, were at best inclined to treat the Commission with the high courtesy of condescension.10

In time, this ‘condescension’ gave way, he added, to what might be termed ‘nervous respect’, largely due to the Commission’s ever–present participation in CFSP and in troikas and the fact that the Commission is legally the formal external representative of the European Community. Through its delegations outside the EU, it had become a focus for policy–making towards the EU in capitals worldwide. But there were a number of internal administrative inconsistencies underlined in a 1982 Commission report on the external competence of the Community drawn up by Adrian Fortescue, a former UK Career diplomat and subsequent Director–General for Justice and Home Affairs. This noted that the Commission had an emergent foreign service whose role and needs were comparable to those of Member State embassies. After 1989 when the fall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the prospect of a new wave of accession states led to a diplomatic

10) S. Nuttall, ‘The Commission: the Struggle for Legitimacy’, in C. Hill, The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, (London: Routledge 1996).

6 216 expansion unprecedented in the history of foreign services, the Western Economic Summit decision, at President Delors’ instigation, to entrust the Commission with the coordination of aid to Poland and Hungary engendered a new phase of Commission expansion. This included its overall workload, its role as technical assistant in the management of peaceful change from command to market economies and the new roles of its delegations. This was the start of a conceptual shift from an External Service purely composed of project managers to an emerging diplomatic service. The resulting agenda for the Commission’s External Service was complex. New Delegations were opening at an average of five every year in the 1980’s, as the former ‘Eastern and Central Europe’ began to open up. The Commission needed large numbers of personnel to staff them. By 1988, the Commission’s 89 missions in six continents meant the External Service had achieved a truly global presence. The number of Brussels based officials serving in Delegations rose from 165 to 440, while local staff numbers reached 1440. Thus, by 1990, the establishment of a permanent external service staff and the upgrade to diplomatic status of Commission Delegations had created a qualitatively different service. With most delegations considered full diplomatic missions by their host countries and most of the Heads of Delegation accredited at Head of State rather than foreign minister level, their credentials signed by the President of the Commission, the delegations were a firm feature within the international diplomatic community. Heads of Delegation had the rank and courtesy title of Ambassador, though the Commission was at pains to ensure heads of delegation made no formal claim to ambassadorial status for fear of rousing animosity within Member State foreign services. In 1993 the Maastricht Treaty (the TEU) created a more precisely defined diplomatic framework than that of the Single European Act. New legal provisions gave political support for the change in the nature of foreign policy governance in the EU:

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and their representations to international organisations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented. They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in article 8c of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.11

11) Treaty on European Union; title V J.6.

217 7 To mark the change, in 1993, the Delors Commission shifted responsibility for foreign policy from the EPC unit in the Secretariat General to a new Directorate General, ‘DGIA’. Under Director–General Günter Burghardt (later Head of the Commission Delegation in Washington), relations with third countries became more effective and coherent. One of the first managerial innovations was the withdrawal of responsibility for Delegation staff from the Commission’s general administration and personnel directorate general, DG IX, and the creation of a Directorate within DG1A responsible for management of the Delegations and their staff within the framework of a ‘Unified External Service’, created in 1994 and so called because hitherto disparate administrative elements were now brought under one management umbrella. The next logical step was the creation of a unified management structure for the External Service, as the Fortescue Report had advocated. The year 1996 heralded significant change in the status of the External Service. David Williamson, then Secretary–General of the Commission, produced a key document in 1996 on the professionalisation of this ‘unified’ External Service. The ‘Williamson Report’ recognised the need for the Commission to develop a homogeneous body of people willing to serve overseas as part of a life–long diplomatic career. Its key recommendations included the obligation of all officials working in the external relations field to serve abroad and a commitment to a specific career development structure involving alternate spells abroad and in head office and professional (including diplomatic) training. Staff had now to recognise that their future advancement depended on their willingness to be mobile. Reflecting this new level of interest in the External Service, the Santer Commission produced new policy documents in the form of ‘communications’ to the Council and Parliament every year. The communications covered all aspects of External Service management and development, including its role, priorities and resources and substantial modifications to the Delegation network and its operations. Meanwhile, outside the Commission think tanks and academics were discussing the Commission’s potential diplomatic profile. In the discussions in the IGC of 1996 the Belgians actually proposed that the Member States’ diplomatic resources should be fully utilised in a joint approach with the Commission acting as a catalyst and coordinator. But their proposal was to no avail. The Treaty of Amsterdam did not amend the Maastricht text. But, it did strengthen CFSP by creating the post of High Representative and creating the ESDP, which put crisis management, conflict prevention and security issues formally on the EU agenda. The Commission had long worked in all the new areas, though responsibilities were scattered not only throughout the Relex family, but also throughout the Commission. A new CFSP directorate was created in DGIA, (now renamed ‘DG RELEX’). Commission

8 218 Delegations became involved with HR Solana’s numerous missions around the world, sending him the political reports hitherto reserved for Commissioners, and playing an important support role for him and the various EU Special Envoys increasingly appointed by the Council. The European Parliament also passed an important resolution in 2000, proposing the establishment of a common European diplomacy. This included a call for a new College of European diplomacy to train professionals from both the EU institutions and Member States in both Community policies and diplomatic methods, enhanced diplomatic training provision for Commission Delegation staff, turning the Commission’s Delegations into Community Delegations accountable to Council and Parliament and turning the External Service into ‘a professional, permanent Community Diplomatic Service’.12

Post 2000: Nice, the Prodi Commission and Management Reform

When the Prodi Commission took office in 1999 a main priority was overall reform of the Commission’s management systems. It had been a bleak time for the Commission and there needed to be clear evidence of commitment to modernisation. The consequent ambitious transformation of management culture across the Commission involved the first real overhaul of resource management the Commission had ever seen. The Commission immediately rationalised the central services with the result that the new Directorates– General RELEX and Trade were housed in one building with their Commissioners and could focus, in principle, on coordinating policy and programming in their respective areas. A new DG, EuropeAid, was created to manage external aid and technical assistance. Before long, some of its key staff moved to the delegations, as the Commission began a radical programme aimed at improving the quality and delivery of aid and technical assistance programmes and embarked on a far–reaching adjustment of responsibilities between headquarters and the delegations known as ‘deconcentration’.13 Significantly, as Member States everywhere were reducing staff in embassies, the Commission was thus expanding its resources in delegations. Over time there was a major redeployment of staff from headquarters to the 76

12) European Parliament ‘Galeote Report’, EP Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy ‘Report on a Common Community Diplomacy’ (2000/2006 [INI], A5–0210/2000). 13) See ‘The Development of the ‘External Service’’ (COM (2001) 381 of 3 July 2001). It is worth noting that deconcentration had already taken place to delegations in countries covered by the PHARE programme in 1998.

219 9 Delegations in developing countries, which receive via the EU countries more than half the total aid given by the international community. In addition, new Delegations opened in Malaysia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal and Paraguay and greater use was made of contracted specialists placed in Delegation offices. The new policies had a profound effect on staff. Heads of Delegation with little or no resource management experience found themselves charged overnight with the implications of full deconcentration of responsibility for implementation of assistance programmes to the field and at the same time, the delegations were increasingly tasked with foreign policy management in addition to their traditional assistance role. By 2005, work on the coherence and efficiency of external relations management structures and policy–making was well underway and a major effort was made to convert the rudimentary training of external service staff into a comprehensive programme of training for all aspects of external relations and diplomacy.

An EU Minister for Foreign Affairs and EEAS: the impact on the Commission

When Javier Solana becomes EU Minister for foreign affairs and takes over the existing mandate of the Commissioner for external relations (until November 2004 Chris Patten and, since then, Benita Ferro–Waldner) he will represent the Union at the appropriate level, while Heads of EU Delegations will provide the same function in states to which they are accredited. However, the Constitution adds intriguingly that ‘the Commission will ensure the Union’s external representation with the exception of the CFSP, and other cases provided for in the treaty’ (e.g. the Euro). Presumably, therefore, in matters where competence is mixed, representation in the field will be undertaken by the Commission Head of Delegation and the Presidency ambassador – where one exists. Importantly, however, the emphasis is on a coordinated approach. The new Vice–President will also have a joint service, composed of staff currently working in the Commission, the European Council secretariat and national diplomatic services in the Member States. The Commission’s Delegations will therefore add to current tasks a lead role in implementing the CFSP itself and its coordination with all other aspects of EU policy. If the Delegations also replace the rotating EU presidency in the host country and as such become responsible for coordination with Member State embassies, this would involve far–reaching changes in the political role and management culture of the External Service, effectively transforming it into a foreign

10 220 service of the EU as a whole and posing fundamental questions for the role of national foreign ministries, embassies and diplomatic staff. In the light of this, what are the implications of these developments for the management of EU external relations in the Commission? Clearly, there are no foregone conclusions as to how these new arrangements will translate into practice and there are many competing views regarding the nature of the resulting EU competences and how they will be reflected in institutional structures. To take one example, it might be argued that consular affairs could, in time, become a EU responsibility on the grounds that the Schengen arrangements make purely national visa arrangements in the EU meaningless. Consequently, there might well be room for a European consular and visa policy – even an agency – and a system based on integrated national consular administrations, at home and abroad. And as visa matters and legal proposals in the area are increasingly the subject of Commission–led discussions, it would make sense to view the Commission (or a Commission run agency) and the new EU delegations as a suitable focus and locus for the delivery of visa policy and, indeed, visas themselves. There is also logic in the idea of an EU consular service dispensing with national visa delivery services altogether and thus simplifying, even reducing, the staffing needed in consular departments of foreign ministries, interior ministries and embassies abroad. Such a development would concern these ministries at headquarters and in the national embassies, just as they are concerns of the RELEX family of DGs and the Commission delegations. The potential consequences of the proposed arrangements are numerous but barely understood outside the EU, where confusion as to which institution represents which interest is still frequently underlined. Solana, in his new role, is likely to bring with him his existing key staff from the Council and the creation of an EU Foreign Minister and a common EEAS indicate that the chances are good for making EU foreign policy more professional and consistent, and relations with its partners more stable and predictable. At the same time, there are apprehensions as to the effect that the new Service will have on the current structure and organisation of the RELEX services and on foreign ministries in Member States. Setting these uncertainties aside, not surprisingly, the Commission has welcomed these developments. Yet, many in the Commission fear that the Commission’s RELEX family and External Service may be relegated to trade and external aid administration, with Member States and the Council providing the (political) heads of EU Delegations and the Commission retaining Counsellor posts with specific technical (first pillar) competence. Thus, whatever happens to the RELEX Services in Brussels, the Commission’s Delegations are concerned. As they cease to exist in their present form, evolving into Union Delegations, their staff provided from the European External Action Service, they could be

221 11 divided into a political section headed by an ambassador representing the European Union, with overall responsibility for EU policy and for the coordination of Member State embassies in the host country, reflecting Solana’s CFSP role. The political top jobs may not go to Commission staff. But in 2005 it is early days to predict precisely the future patterns of roles and relationships. Preparatory discussions in COREPER have led to many issues on which Member States need to reflect further, and where divergences of view are already emerging. Until the Convention is ratified, it is likely that a twinned system will reflect the double–hatted duties of the foreign minister. The future pattern is likely to be a co–located joint service based on the existing Commission services and delegations, the Council services and Member State diplomats on secondment. In terms of representation, the model might be similar to the decision–making process for trade issues, where the trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson speaks and negotiates on behalf of the Union under a mandate from the Council. On this model, where the Foreign Affairs Council agrees a common policy, the EU Foreign Minister would be the policy advocate and simultaneously responsible for implementation. Just as Mandelson speaks on trade on a mandate from the Council and Solana represents the Union in the Quartet on the Middle East, so could all future foreign representation be covered. Heads of Commission Delegations (rebaptised EU Delegations) would play a similar role at their level abroad. True, as first pillar purists might fear, this could mean that the Foreign Minister will gain responsibility for at least part of EC/Commission external competences, thus obliging the Commission and the Council to review current first and second pillar external relations instruments and procedures – not only in terms of policy–making staff but also in terms of the practical (and financial) management of policy. The legal niceties involved in the conflicting management arrangements in first and second pillar business actually structure financial and personnel resources.

The EEAS and foreign ministries

What will be the impact on Member State foreign ministries? The picture poses equally challenging questions. Attitudes within foreign ministries undoubtedly differ. Some states will want to keep the new EEAS weak, in order to avoid competition with national foreign ministries. This could be achieved by keeping the existing structures loosely coordinated, with the only change being the appointment of a foreign minister. However, it is interesting to see that Member States have begun to jockey for positions in whatever structures of external representation emerges through the EEAS. In a speech

12 222 to French ambassadors gathered in Paris in 2004, Foreign Minister (and former Commissioner) Barnier opined that:

en mutualisant leurs actions et leurs initiatives, et d’abord dans nos réseaux consulaires, tous les pays européens se donnent une capacité d’intervention bien supérieure à leurs contributions nationales isolées….la frontière entre l’interne et l’externe n’a plus guère de sens….la mise en place d’un service diplomatique européen ne rend que plus urgente notre préparation…..et l’exigence, pour vous,…..de renforcer vos relations de travail sur le terrain avec les délégués de la Commission Européenne.14

But the changing character and organisation of national diplomatic systems turns on developments at two interlinked levels. The first relates to the organisation of the ministry at the centre and its relationships with other parts of the governmental structure. The second level comprises the patterns of diplomatic representation that the ministry maintains in pursuit of its overall objectives. Looking at the first of these, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the development of the EEAS will do anything other than reinforce the emphasis placed on the importance of coordination within Member State international policy processes. This has two key foci: the relationship with other departments which are increasingly involved in managing their own European (and international) diplomacy, and with central coordinating units such as those located in prime ministerial offices. As John Dickie’s study of UK foreign policy–making argues, the Foreign Office has to engage in a continual process of selling its value as a key component in the management of European policy to sometimes–sceptical ‘domestic’ departments.15 Furthermore, it seems inevitable that the development of the EEAS will serve to enhance the intense introspection that all Member State foreign ministries have engaged in over the last decade or so. Although not an EU Member State, the proposition that the Norwegian foreign ministry might be considerably scaled down and relocated as a ‘Bureau of Foreign Affairs’ within the prime minister’s office, coordinating the external affairs section of each ministry, might well appeal to some Member States in the changing EU diplomatic environment.16

14) M. Barnier, quoted in Le Figaro, 27 August 2004. 15) J. Dickie, The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works, (London: Tauris, 2004), p. 230. 16) J. Moses and T. Knutsen, Globalization and the Reorganization of Foreign Affairs’ Ministries, Clingendael Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, No 80, (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2002).

223 13 It is, of course the case that foreign ministries, as with all bureaucratic entities, are repositories of vested interests and will not necessarily respond positively to changes that might flow logically from this new environment. However, there are real and legitimate human resource implications for diplomatic services implicit in the changes set out in the Constitution, ones on which Member State diplomatic services are currently reflecting. For example, whilst the proposed EEAS offers the prospect of additional postings and career development, how would secondment of a national diplomat to an EU delegation affect career patterns within the home diplomatic service? What kind of training would the new structures demand and who should provide it – the much discussed, but yet to be established, European Diplomatic Academy? Failure to deal with such issues could have a major impact on the success of any arrangements associated with the EEAS. The second level of concern relates to patterns of representation – another area to which all diplomatic services have devoted much attention in recent years. To a considerable degree, this reflects the impact of resource constraints combined with the opportunities for new modes of representation offered by the communications and information technology revolution. Experiments in various forms of representation are as familiar in Europe as outside it and there has, for example, been much discussion of co–location of missions. The relative lack of success of such experiments combined with some misapprehension as to what is actually involved (sharing premises rather than ‘shared representation’) invites caution. What is not in doubt, however, is the enhanced scope – underwritten by treaty requirements – for enhanced cooperation between Member State missions and the Delegations. There is now a recognisable and distinct European interest, and this needs to be articulated, defended and advocated abroad – a task that Member States and the Commission share. This is underscored by the fact that as competence in many economic, social and political areas has shifted from the national to the EU arena, so external representation of the resulting interests has evolved, enhancing the Commission’s role. Moreover, diplomatic responsibilities increasingly cut across the pillars. CFSP and ESDP often require the addition of first pillar policies and thus a high degree of Commission involvement in a variety of areas such as humanitarian aid, nuclear issues, terrorism and sanctions. Of course, the Presidency has hitherto been responsible for taking the lead in second pillar matters, but there is a complicating factor here. First, most of the time, and even more so in a Europe of twenty–five or more Member States, the majority of presidencies simply do not have a presence in most capitals around the world, so presidency tasks fall to others. Consider, therefore, the difficulty of EU states not represented in contributing to informed EU policy–making. There is unevenness in the burden of

14 224 coordinating work which falls on the larger Member States. In Rangoon, for example, there are four EU Member State missions: France, Germany, the UK and Italy. This places a great strain on them as they are required to undertake an extensive coordination role even when not holding the presidency. Being able to hand over this work to an EU delegation would come as a considerable relief, quite apart from ending the disadvantage of the ‘presidency’ role in that country hardly ever falling to the ‘presidency country’. What is most likely to develop in this context is a ‘variable geometry’ of representation as Member States refashion their networks of representation influenced by a combination of international involvement, perceptions of need and the dictates of diminishing resources. Undoubtedly, some may conclude that the cost of 25 separate diplomatic services maintaining posts around the world bears no relation to the added value that they confer as compared to single EU embassies with shared consular facilities and pooled administrative and training facilities. One MEP has even argued that in her country (the Netherlands), a quarter of the 150 embassies and consulates could be dispensed with.17 These arguments are familiar, not least from the above–mentioned European Parliament resolution of September 2000 advocating improved coordination and sharing of facilities between Commission delegations and Member State missions.18

Conclusion

Three evolutionary strands characterise the responses of Member State diplomatic systems to the environments in which they operate: that relating to the development of the European project itself; the responses of the state to the pressures associated with globalisation and regionalisation and, thirdly, the adaptive strategies adopted by specific foreign ministries. The Commission’s own modes of external relations’ management have been determined by pragmatic adaptation in response to internally and externally driven change. The emergence of the EEAS represents a significant step in two interlinked evolutionary processes in foreign policy management: in

17) Telegraaf 2004. ‘Kwart van Nederlandse ambassades kan weg’ 1st Nov. 2004, interview with MEP Lousewies van der Laan. 18) G. Galeote Quecedo and B. Becerril Atienza, ‘Towards a common European diplomacy? Analysis of the European Parliament resolution on establishing a common diplomacy’, Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Europeas, Universidad San Pablo–CEU, 2001.

225 15 Brussels on the one hand and in Member State capitals on the other. Indeed, the two are inextricably entwined. Inevitably, the shape of things to come is hazy, but it is possible to detect the contours of the immediate to medium term landscape.19 First, EU Member States will want to maintain some form of international presence and, therefore the machinery to sustain this. Second, they will do so in varying degrees and forms. Variable geometry in terms of representational networks will become more apparent and these will include a continuing redefinition of what needs to be done where and by whom. Thus for some, especially smaller Member States, EU Delegations will offer attractive opportunities to rationalise representation and even for large states with extensive diplomatic presence, the possibility of transferring the task of coordination associated with the presidency to Delegations might be welcomed. Beyond this, however, there is the real prospect of specific functions being transferred to the European level – such as consular affairs and, conceivably in the future, international aid. The limits to such processes will be found in the extent to which cooperative arrangements are viewed as cutting across the perceived requirements of an unambiguous national presence in specific locations – for purposes of public and commercial diplomacy, for example. A third consequence of the emerging environment will be to alter the career landscape for EU Member State diplomats. The most sought after posts in foreign services remain the important ambassadorial posts, rather than high–level functions in the Ministry. Now that CFSP and ESDP have become core business for foreign ministry staff, whether at home or serving abroad, their permanent partners in policy– making are the diplomats from other Member States and Commission officials. Consequently, the proposed External Action Service is set to offer diplomats additional potential for postings and career development. But as noted earlier, this poses human resource issues in terms of career structures and training needs. If EU foreign policy–making is at a cross–roads, a key question is whether there exists a zero–sum relationship between Member State foreign ministries and their 35,000 staff on the one hand and the more than five thousand

19) Alternative views are already proliferating. See G. Grevi, D. Manca, and G. Quille, ‘The EU Foreign Minister: Beyond Double–Hatting’, and A. Maurer, and A. Reichel, ‘A Three–Phase Plan for the European External Action Service’, The International Spectator, Vol. XI, No. 1, Jan–March 2005. Also G. Grevi and F. Cameron, Towards an EU Foreign Service, EPC (Brussels) Issue Paper No. 29, and D. Spence, ‘The Commission’s External Service’, in D. Spence (ed.), The European Commission, (Harper, 2005).

16 226 Commission staff involved in external relations on the other. How to establish appropriate management structures for the EEAS and the shape of future relations between the EEAS and national diplomatic services are key issues. The sharing of representational roles between Commission Delegations, soon to be called Union Delegations, and Member State embassies, most of which are not present in all the countries in which the Commission has delegations, needs to be defined. Indeed, this issue alone poses many questions about the advantages of sharing embassy facilities or of seconding national diplomats to Union delegations to play both national and European roles. The emergence of an intelligent synthesis between the proprietary attitudes to foreign policy– making of Member State foreign services on the one hand and the supranational leanings of the Commission on the other will be crucial for the future of both national and European diplomatic structures as they redefine their roles and relationships.

227 17 APPENDIX 1

‘FOREIGN MINISTRIES AT HOME AND ABROAD’ – EXPLANATORY NOTES

Sources:

The data are from varying years between 2000 and 2005, though figures for Poland are from 1998, and figures for the number of ‘local staff’ for Ireland and Japan are from 1999. Data are derived from several sources including: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) websites and annual reports, Statistical Yearbooks, written and oral replies from MFAs, OECD Sigma reports, European Council document 1731/6/00 (Solana report to the European Council at Evian). Data for US diplomatic staff are from testimonies by senior State Department officials Joseph E. Kelley at the US General Accounting Office on 6 April 1995 and by Grant S. Green Jr. in Congress on 1 May 2002.

Definitions:

The ‘number of embassies’ includes states’ permanent missions, delegations and representations to international organisations, as well as High Commissions (the name for embassies of the United Kingdom in Commonwealth countries). Roving Ambassadors are ambassadors that perform their duties abroad, but are based in their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Roving ambassadors are classed as Non–resident Ambassadors and are not counted as ‘embassies’, though they are included in overall ‘staff’ figures. The number of consulates does not include honorary consulates, consular agencies and trade representations (e.g. to Taiwan), though it is possible that some overall figures include such representations. Consular departments within embassies are considered part of the embassy and not counted separately.

Caveats:

The ‘local staff’ and ‘MFA staff and local staff total’ figures are not precise, because national figures for ‘local staff’ are either missing (denoted with an 228 asterisk) or unreliable. An approximate figure for total ‘local staff’ could be 47.766 and an approximate figure for ‘MFA and local staff total’ could be 103.430, but these figures are guesstimates. High consular representation of some member states is partly attributable to specific national inward immigration issues. Efforts were made to verify that MFAs used the above–mentioned definitions when providing their figures, but this was not always possible. Minor fluctuations in data due to different definitions must therefore be taken into account. Some member states include trade and development functions in their MFA, while others have separate ministries. Some include culture and trade promotion officers as embassy/consular staff, while others do not. European Commission representations (information offices) in the EU are not included, since they do not provide the same diplomatic functions as Commission Delegations outside the EU. Comparisons between the number of Commission Delegations ‘abroad’ (i.e. outside the EU) and Member State embassies must take this into account. For example, whereas Malta has only eighteen bilateral embassies world wide, the UK has twenty–four within the EU alone. Commission staff figures include staff in DGs RELEX, DEV, TRADE, AIDCO AND ECHO.

229 FOREIGN MINISTRIES AND COMMISSION DELEGATIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD

MFA Staff in MFA Staff and Local MFA Staff Total MFA Staff in Capital Local Staff Number of Embassies Number of Consulates Embassies Staff Total

Austria 1.314 561 753 620 1.934 86 15 Belgium 1.800 1.400 400 1.800 3.600 86 15 Cyprus 250 160 90 290 540 44 5 Czech Republic 2.200 780 1.420 610 2.810 98 28 Denmark 1.270 1.000 270 900 2.170 75 20 Estonia 600 370 230 90 690 36 4 Finland 2.590 950 1.640 970 3.560 83 7 France 9.400 4.000 5.400 14.300 23.700 182 110 Germany 6.700 2.200 4.500 4.800 11.500 157 58 Greece 2.500 1.000 1.500 320 2.820 87 59 Hungary 2.000 1.000 1.000 * * 82 28 Italy 5.300 2.500 2.800 2.250 7.550 130 114 Ireland 980 490 490 276 1.256 43 7 Latvia 640 360 280 80 720 60 4 Lithuania 620 340 280 250 870 42 9 Luxembourg 180 90 90 160 340 24 2 Malta 200 120 80 * * 18 150 Netherlands 3.210 1.970 1240 1.580 4.790 126 28 Portugal 950 400 550 1.840 2.790 76 50 Poland 1.800 650 1.150 * * 106 51 Slovenia 560 310 250 230 790 67 10 Slovakia 750 500 250 * * 72 11 Spain 2.500 1.500 1.000 3.200 5.700 136 67 Sweden 1.450 900 550 1.000 2.450 91 11 United Kingdom 5.900 3.500 2.400 10.000 15.900 163 70

EU 25 55.664 27.051 28.613 47.766 103.430 2170 933 230

Commission 3.250 2.260 990 3.765 7.015 123 N/A Council Secretariat 100 80 20 0 100 2 N/A

For comparison: US 44.500 25.600 18.900 18.900 63.400 170 63 Japan 5.290 2.070 3.220 4.894 10.184 139 79

Note that Commission figures include DGs Relex, Trade, Dev, Aidco and Echo

The EU Foreign Ministry

and Union Embassies

Laura Rayner

June 2005

231

First published in 2005 by

The Foreign Policy Centre 49 Chalton Street London NW1 1HY UNITED KINGDOM

Email: [email protected]

ISBN-13: 978 1 903558 71 8 ISBN-10: 1 903558 71 9

232 About the Author

Laura Rayner is an information specialist in foreign affairs and defence currently on leave from the Information and Research Service of the Australian Parliamentary Library. She has a Bachelor of Arts majoring in politics and history, Graduate Diplomas in librarianship and archives administration, and a Master of Defence Studies from the University of New South Wales, for which she was awarded the Petro Fedorczenko Defence Studies Prize in 1998. In 2003 she was awarded a Centenary Medal for service to the Australian Parliament.

Her publications for the Australian Parliamentary Library include Upside, Downside: ANZUS after fifty years (with Gary Brown); Media under fire: reporting conflict in Iraq (with Sarah Miskin and Maria Lalic); Conscientious Objection to Australian Military Service (with Moira Coombs) and Australia’s maritime strategy in the 21st Century (with Alex Tewes and Kelly Kavanaugh). In 2000 she was seconded as secretary to the Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly’s Select Committee on Government Contracting and Procurement Processes for the writing of its Report on government contracting and procurement processes in the Australian Capital Territory.

233

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Dr Greg Austin and Richard Gowan of the Foreign Policy Centre and David Spence, First Counsellor in the European Commission’s Delegation to the UN Organisations in Geneva, for their comments on drafts of this paper.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the Foreign Policy Centre.

Laura Rayner is an information specialist in foreign affairs and defence currently on leave from the Information and Research Service, Parliamentary Library, Department of Parliamentary Services, Canberra, Australia. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and should not be attributed to the Information and Research Service.

234

About the European Constitution Project

This pamphlet is the third in the Foreign Policy Centre’s European Constitution project which is built around seminars, lectures, publications, media contributions and larger conferences on the subject. The project has been set up in response to the decision by the 25 EU Member States to subject the draft Constitutional Treaty to a process of ratification either by national parliaments or by country-wide referenda.

Other pamphlets in the project published in this project:

THE REFERENDUM BATTLE Mark Gill, Simon Atkinson and Roger Mortimore September 2004

This, the first comprehensive study of British public opinion towards the EU constitution, found that a majority of Britons remain open to persuasion on whether the UK should sign up to the constitutional treaty, despite the headline figures showing a strong lead for the No camp.

FOREIGN MINISTER OF EUROPE Sir Brian Crowe (with preface by Javier Solana) January 2005

The creation of an EU Foreign Minister is one of the most innovative proposals of Europe’s proposed new constitution; yet there is still very little understanding of what the position would entail and what challenges the new minister would face. In this paper, Sir Brian Crowe, former Director General for External and for Politico-Military Affairs in the EU Council of Ministers, argues that empowering a new EU Foreign Minister is crucial for putting flesh on the bones of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Fundamental changes are needed if the EU is to develop the capability for coordinated, effective, and rapid action.

235

About the Foreign Policy Centre

The Foreign Policy Centre is a leading European think tank launched under the patronage of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair to develop a vision of a fair and rule-based world order. We develop and disseminate innovative policy ideas which promote:

• Effective multilateral solutions to global problems • Democratic and well-governed states as the foundation of order and development • Partnerships with the private sector to deliver public goods • Support for progressive policy through effective public diplomacy • Inclusive definitions of citizenship to underpin internationalist policies.

The Foreign Policy Centre has produced a range of seminal publications by key thinkers on subjects ranging from the future of Europe and international security to identity and the role of non-state actors in policymaking. They include After Multiculturalism by Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, The Post-Modern State and the World Order by Robert Cooper, Network Europe and Public Diplomacy by Mark Leonard, The Beijing Consensus by Joshua Cooper Ramo, Trading Identities by Wally Olins and Pre-empting Nuclear Terrorism by Amitai Etzioni.

The Centre runs a rich and varied events programme which allows people from business, government, NGOs, think-tanks, lobby groups and academia to interact with speakers who include Prime Ministers, Presidents, Nobel Prize laureates, global corporate leaders, activists, media executives and cultural entrepreneurs from around the world. For more information, please visit www.fpc.org.uk

236 Preface

With the French and Dutch referenda on the draft Constitutional Treaty each producing a resounding ‘No’, the proposal in the draft to set up a new European External Action Service (EEAS), or Foreign Ministry of Europe, may appear to some observers to be pretty much dead in the water. Nothing could be further from the truth. While the politics of European integration are going to get much hotter in the coming two years than at any time since 1993, the problems that caused the European Council to support the creation of new EEAS will not go away simply because the draft Constitutional Treaty is under threat. They were there before the talk of a Constitution emerged as strongly as it did three or four years ago, and they will be every bit as important in spite of the problems with ratification of the draft treaty.

The Foreign Policy Centre commissioned Laura Rayner to write this paper. Her brief, as a specialist in public policy from the Australian Parliamentary Library, was to examine the issues associated with the creation of a new European External Action Service from a first principles perspective. The FPC commissioned Ms Rayner because we were looking for a pamphlet that would not be prejudiced by entrenched views of the EU institutions. We wanted a fresh look at what was needed and how to get there without any heed to vested interests and without any influence from long-standing relationships with particular officials.

Over several months, Ms Rayner conducted her research and a number of interviews with specialists in European affairs. This pamphlet is the result of her original work, augmented by comment from specialists both inside and outside the FPC.

The draft has already elucidated interest from a number of senior officials. While to insiders, much of the pamphlet may seem self- evident, Ms Rayner lays out the rather large number of issues involved, and the dilemmas, with considerable care. This pamphlet will not need to be read in its entirety by specialists, but officials involved in the process of establishing the new EEAS should note its conclusions. Their value lies not just in their logic but also in the unambiguous disinterest of the author in any pre-judged outcome of her research.

237

Another virtue of this analysis is that it addresses not just the headquarters issues, but also the questions around the necessary transformation of existing Community delegations into fully fledged embassies of the Union. As Ms Rayner suggests, this transformation dictates a deeper level of reform in the headquarters than many might have contemplated had they not taken the ‘embassy’ issue into account. Another strength of the analysis is that it looks at administrative issues, especially with regard to staffing and training, and again the result is to suggest a deeper level of reform than many may have contemplated.

Ultimately, Ms Rayner comes down in favour of a ‘minimalist’ HQ for the new EEAS, but the use of the term should not disguise the sea- change in organisational culture that will be involved, especially in the Commission and in the delegations. Part of this transformation will be a fairly profound restructuring of the relationship between the foreign ministries and embassies of member states on the one hand and, on the other, the EEAS HQ and embassies of the Union.

Greg Austin Director of Research Foreign Policy Centre

1 June 2005

238 Executive Summary

The European Union (EU) is creating a new foreign service, and associated embassy network, to support its ambitions to a global foreign and security policy. The work picked up momentum in connection with the evolution of the draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, which provides for the new post of EU Foreign Minister. The ratification of the Treaty will be hotly contested in 2005 and possibly into 2006, but even if the treaty is not ratified, there are good reasons and enough of a legal basis for the EU to press ahead with some form of revamped foreign service and revitalised embassy network of the sort foreshadowed in the draft Treaty.

In establishing the new foreign service, unofficially called for now the European External Action Service (EEAS), there are three main issues to address: an imbalance of power and finance between the Secretariat of the European Council and the European Commission; a lack of coordination between member states’ bilateral policies and those of EU institutions; and weak coordination among the three main EU institutions with a role in foreign policy (the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament). There is also a lack of accountability for some aspects of European foreign policy because of attenuated lines of authority (the Commission often implements Council decisions) and because of the relatively weak committee system in the European Parliament.

Regardless of the outcome of the ratification processes for the Constitutional Treaty, the EU should proceed with appointment of an EU ‘foreign minister’ by providing for the High Representative for CFSP to hold simultaneously the post of Vice President of the Commission and Commissioner for External Relations. This is the only way that a new EEAS can be effective. The EU must then give this ‘Union Minister of Foreign Affairs’ (UMFA) clear lines of administrative and budgetary authority for the EEAS.

The establishment of the new EEAS should be aimed at more than a clean up of current messy arrangements and its design should not be constrained by existing institutional structures or bureaucratic traditions where these hamper its ability to support decisive and effective EU action. But there is one big obstacle. The Commission

iii

239 has a legal identity that distinguishes it from the Council and its subsidiary organs, like the proposed EEAS. Yet for many reasons, it is inconceivable that the EEAS can be formed without considerable intrusion of Commission structures, procedures and personnel. The marriage of the separate Council and Commission functions in one effective EEAS bureaucracy will therefore demand considerable political effort at the highest levels over a very long time. And it will be a marriage in which ‘divorce’ is inconceivable. The EEAS will need to progressively build its legitimacy within the EU institutions and with member states.

Headquarters

A number of different models for the EEAS structure have already been proposed. While the most likely choice for a structure in the first instance will probably be a version of a minimalist model, the initial EEAS structure and concept should have the flexibility to absorb progressively more functions and more layers of complexity. But even in the minimalist model, for the sake of coherence and consistency, it will be essential to establish a new EEAS headquarters which can bring together both policy development (residing primarily in the Council) and implementation capabilities (residing largely in the Commission). It will be impossible, both legally and logically, to manage the EEAS exclusively through the Commission. Decisions on the future staffing, training, budget and priorities will need to be made with the imprimatur of the Council to suit Council purposes and priorities.

The delegations

Since the formation of the EU in 1992 and the subsequent expansion of EU international identities into the security and police realms, the previously existing EC delegations have taken on, both de jure and de facto, a new legal personality as EU embassies. This emerging legal personality of the delegations as new EU ‘embassies’ has conferred progressively wider responsibilities (‘powers’) on the heads of mission than those nominally held by the heads of Commission delegations. Yet, without additional personnel and financial resources, the delegations will not be able to transform themselves (‘graduate’) to the ‘embassy’ status needed to implement core EU external functions not currently included in

240 Commission competences. There will need to be very clear lines of authority (legal and functional) between the EEAS headquarters and the embassies/delegations, the more so if a minimalist option is pursued and not all policy areas are devolved to posts.

The new status of EU ‘embassies’ will not make the bilateral embassies of Member States redundant, but there will be important questions of rationalisation and economies that present themselves to national governments. EU member states must take this opportunity to redirect scarce national foreign ministry resources to high priority national interests and transfer the common EU ‘foreign policy’ progressively to new EU embassies (as has already occurred with trade negotiations). On consular support, while some have argued for the new EEAS to operate in this area, such work would be an unnecessary distraction from the core business of EU ‘embassies’ and would be impractical from a domestic political standpoint.

Budget

The EEAS budget will have different conditions for its control depending on whether funds are for Council or Commission activities, but the UMFA would have authority over both because of his/her simultaneous appointment as Vice President of the Commission. Co-financing through an ‘inter-institutional’ budget would complicate both administration and oversight, but it should not lessen transparency in the budget, nor the role of the European Parliament in budget oversight.

Staffing

The EEAS should have a flexible staffing structure which should not be frozen into two different functional streams just because the UMFA wears two hats. An individual diplomat can simultaneously represent the Council and the Commission without any difficulty as readily as a ‘Commission’ employee. There should be no attempt to assign a fixed ratio between the three likely sources of personnel (Council, Commission, or Member State). Officials’ ability to move easily between and within Council and Commission functions, between the headquarters and the ‘embassies’/delegations, and between the EEAS and the Council and the Commission will be vital

241 for the development of an effective organisation. Staff mobility could help to build cohesion between the EEAS and Commission units involved in external policy. Encouragement should be given to Council staff and the diplomats of member countries to participate in job rotations to the EEAS headquarters and the ‘embassies’/delegations.

Integrating the posting of diplomats from Member States to the EEAS, especially to delegations, into their career paths should also be encouraged. Officers from Member States should be seconded under similar terms as currently apply to national experts seconded to the Commission, especially with regard to not taking instruction from their national governments while on secondment. It is important that individual jobs do not have national flags attached to them and the merit principle should apply to the selection of Member States’ diplomats and experts for positions in the EEAS.

Training

The EU needs to provide EEAS officers and seconded national diplomats and experts with training to create a common culture and an esprit de corps. Training could be at a new diplomatic academy but there are a number of courses provided by the Commission and at various academic institutions which might be adapted to the needs of the new service. Other levels of training should also be provided in-house, for instance distance education using the internet. Special emphasis will also have to be given to training ‘embassy’/delegation staff to cover their wider responsibilities.

Review

The EU should make a commitment to institute an independent review of the new structure after it has been in operation for at least two years. This review, an audit of its performance, should examine all aspects of the EEAS, including its working relationships with EU institutions and other stakeholders. On the basis of the findings of the review the EU should decide whether the functions of the EEAS should be expanded. The process and results of the review should be public.

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Next Steps for Brussels

How fast and how far should the EEAS develop? An ambitious structure and timetable might circumvent wasteful inter-institutional infighting or duplication but could have an unnecessarily negative impact on the politics associated with further ‘constitutional’ reform. Too cautious an approach risks not achieving the new levels of effectiveness demanded by EU ambitions and aspirations. Unfortunately but realistically, the EEAS is unlikely to spring to life fully formed at an appointed date, but rather, given the traditions of the EU, the new EEAS will evolve over time, gradually accumulating both recognition and power.

The very least that the EU should plan for in the first instance would be an EEAS which amalgamates the Directorate General External Relations and the Policy Unit from the Council with DG RELEX (and the current External Service) from the Commission, with the clear understanding that this structure is not set in concrete. There would need to be agreement that this initial EEAS should have the flexibility to absorb other external action functions from the Commission over time.

Next Steps for Britain and other Member States

The reforms mooted for the foreign affairs and security institutions of the EU in Brussels and in the field should not proceed without commensurate reform and re-shaping of national foreign and defence ministries. In an era of expanding responsibilities for foreign and defence ministries and shrinking or static resource allocations to them by national governments, the opportunity for economies and reprioritisation at home presented by reform of the EU’s central institutions should not be passed up. Britain must shave away those staff posts and policy areas in London and in its own embassies that are adequately covered by Brussels or its delegations under CFSP.

Britain must use its Presidency of the EU to vigorously shape the reforms of the EU foreign and security policy apparatus in Brussels and abroad. Britain should look to publish a Green paper on reform of EU CFSP institutions to strengthen their legitimacy among a Euro- sceptic electorate.

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244

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION...... 1 AN EEAS WITHOUT A RATIFIED CONSTITUTION?...... 2 WEAKNESSES IN CURRENT INSTITUTIONS ...... 4 HOW THE EEAS SHOULD ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS ...... 6 THE HEADQUARTERS: EUROPE’S MFA ...... 8 A MINIMALIST HQ ...... 9 A MAXIMALIST HQ ...... 10 TEAM RELEX ...... 11 OTHER INTEGRATION MODELS ...... 12 SOLANA/BARROSO PLAN ...... 13 THE COUNCIL SECRETARIAT ...... 13 INSTITUTIONAL POSITIONING OF THE HQ...... 14 REMNANTS OF THE PILLARS ...... 16 RECOMMENDED: A NEW, MINIMALIST HQ...... 16 EU EMBASSIES ...... 17 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EU EMBASSIES AND BRUSSELS ...... 20 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MEMBER STATE EMBASSIES AND EU EMBASSIES ...... 22 CONSULAR FUNCTIONS ...... 25 ADMINISTRATION OF THE EEAS ...... 27 BUDGET...... 27 STAFFING...... 28 TRAINING ...... 30 REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE EEAS...... 31 CONCLUSION ...... 31 RECOMMENDATIONS...... 33

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 36

245 246

Introduction

Nothing destroys authority so much as the unequal and untimely interchange of power, pressed too far and relaxed too much. Francis Bacon

The great secret of power is never to will to do more than you can accomplish. Henrik Ibsen

With the entry into force in 1993 of the Maastricht Treaty, the Member States of the European Union (EU) committed themselves to establishing a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). A decade on, as part of the evolution of a CFSP, the EU member states agreed that this process would benefit from establishing a new post of EU foreign minister, to supplant the existing post of High Representative for CFSP.1 This decision was included in the EU’s Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (the Constitution), signed in October 2004.2 The draft provided for the office of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs (UMFA) and a European External Action Service (EEAS) to assist the UMFA. These provisions of the treaty can and should be implemented even if the processes of ratification in EU member states derail the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty (see next section).

1 The key accords in the area of EU foreign policy are the Treaty establishing the European Union (TEU), better known as the Treaty of Maastricht, of 1992, which provided for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and the Treaty of Amsterdam, October 1997, which amended the TEU and which gave much more concrete form to the CFSP. Subsequent official statements which have interpreted the treaties on CFSP include the Conclusions of the European Councils in Cologne, June 1999, in Helsinki, December 1999, in Feira, June 2000 and the Treaty of Nice, December 2000. The EU has regularly issued consolidated versions of the various treaties establishing the European Community and the TEU. All of these treaties remain in force regardless of the process of ratification of the draft Constitutional Treaty. 2 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004. Article III-197 (3): ‘In fulfilling his or her mandate, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States.’

247 2 Laura Rayner

A previous publication of the Foreign Policy Centre dealt with the role of the new Foreign Minister.3 The object of this pamphlet is to examine the impact of the proposed new arrangements for an EEAS on the EU’s international policy, specifically to look at the role and structure of the new service. The paper will discuss possible options for the structure of the EEAS headquarters, as well as the role of European delegations. Relationships between the field and headquarters elements of the new EEAS, and between EU missions and the missions of Member States will also be discussed. Finally, staffing and budget matters will be examined. The Treaty deals only briefly with the structure and role of the EEAS. While some see this brevity as posing more questions than answers on the role and structure of the EEAS, it actually presents quite an opportunity to apply a first principles approach in developing the role and structure.4 An EEAS without a ratified Constitution?

On 29 May 2005, the French electorate rejected the draft Constitutional Treaty, with 55 per cent of voters saying no. The Netherlands followed on 1 June with 61.6% of voters rejecting the Treaty. This definitely represents a shock to the ratification process, but does not necessarily mean the end of it. By then, national ratification processes in 9 countries, representing 48.6 per cent of the EU population had said yes. The possibility of some countries saying no was foreshadowed in the draft Treaty itself, and the decision by the European Council on whether to continue the ratification process in the light of such votes was foreshadowed for October 2006.

The foundations of EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP) were laid down in earlier treaties, especially the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that created the EU. These numerous treaties, like the institutions created in their wake, such as the High Representative for CFSP or the EU Military Staff, will continue in existence even if the constitutional Treaty is never ratified.

3 Crowe, 2005. 4 The role of the UMFA has been described as ‘somewhat confusing’ and that of the EEAS as ‘similarly opaque’. Duke, 2004, p5.

248 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 3

The Maastricht Treaty, amended by the Treaty of Nice, already calls upon the Commission and the Council ‘to provide coherence in all the Union’s external policy measures encompassed within its foreign, security, economic, and development policies’ and ‘to work together to that end’.5 For this reason, ratification of the Constitution would not be needed for the establishment of a joint body which merged Council and Commission representational assets (such as the Commission’s delegations and the Council’s two liaison offices at the UN in New York and Geneva). The European Council can establish an EEAS without the Constitutional Treaty being ratified. In light of the possibility of the ratification process failing, it has been argued that ratification of the EEAS element of the Treaty ‘would probably not be needed, as an IIA [interinstitutional agreement] is likely to be sufficient to establish the EAS’, although ‘a shift of power to the EU would not be possible’ if an IIA was the method used. Likewise an IIA could allow the High Representative to also be Vice President of the Commission as long as ‘the existing power balance between the institutions is preserved’.6 Since Member States stipulated that preparatory work on the EEAS should begin when the Constitution was signed in 2004, prior to national ratification, they clearly see both virtue and necessity in it independently of the fate of the Constitutional Treaty.7

While ‘No’ votes in referenda on the Constitution could lead to doubts on the viability of the EEAS, the problems it is designed to address will not disappear (see next section).8 For the purpose of this paper it has be assumed that the establishment of the EEAS will occur regardless of the outcome of the national referenda.

The EU should set a deadline of the end of 2007 for final agreement on the establishment of an EEAS, regardless of the outcome of the Constitutional ratification processes. To act so decisively and immediately may be counter intuitive to the EU’s preferred method of staggered evolution, and may appear to run against public opinion

5 European Parliament, 2005b, pp3-4. 6 Kurpas, 2005, pp.5-6 7 Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 2004. Kurpas, 2005, pp.5-6 8 For a detailed description of the current institutional arrangements see International Crisis Group, 2005, pp 12-21.

249 4 Laura Rayner which rejected ratification of the draft Treaty, but the opportunity for a fresh start given by the debates about the Constitution is too good to be missed. Most importantly, if the ratification does fail, the promise of reform in the Brussels institutions would be one way to help rebuild public support for the EU. In its Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2005, the UK should take a robust line to this effect.

Weaknesses in current institutions?

There is weak foreign policy coordination between Member States and the EU, and within the EU between its three pillars.9 The EU and its Member States have not been able to translate their massive diplomatic resources into comparable international influence due to a lack of effective coordination between policy and action. Although some of this influence deficit can be attributed to the understandable attachment of Member States to ‘national freedom of manoeuvre’, the end result is that the EU and hence its members ‘seriously under-perform’ in the international arena.10 While the EU has been a strong actor in soft areas of policy (where there are few costs), such as declaring sanctions on Burma, it has experienced fragmentation of its policies toward Russia, China and the USA (the harder areas of policy). The visible exception to this general observation has been policy toward the Balkans, where the EU has shown remarkable effectiveness and a remarkable capacity to learn from mistakes and to adjust. Most importantly, in the past five years at least, the EU has shown itself to be an effective leader of international community policy in the Balkans.

The lines of authority among the many external relations actors in the EU are too attenuated. The EU’s external relations are handled by a wide range of bodies, a fact that results in its public face ‘sometimes being lost in a cacophony of voices’.11 While EU

9 The EU and its Member States do not lack foreign policy resources. Backed by its economic clout, the EU has a wide range of foreign policy instruments at its disposal. For example, the EU and Member States provide 50 per cent of the world’s official development assistance. Between them, they have huge resources of diplomatic staff and diplomatic missions, far outnumbering those of the US. See Council of the European Union, 2000, p2. 10 Everts, 2002, p26. 11 Duke, 2003a, p20.

250 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 5 foreign affairs are ‘functionally unified’, EU foreign policies are also ‘characterised by a remarkable institutional fragmentation’.12 For example, within the Commission, there is no ‘lead’ commissioner for foreign relations. The Commissioner for External Relations is an equal with the Commissioners for Development, Trade and Enlargement. The Commissioners have legal competences that put them beyond the authority of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Policy and even beyond the authority of the European Council. There is arguably still no good come-back to Henry Kissinger’s famous quip that there is no ‘telephone number’ for Europe.

The imbalances of power and of financial resources between the Council and the Commission can paralyse the EU’s potential for external action. Externally, the EU has been ‘doing’ foreign policy for decades in the form of activities under the jurisdiction of the Commission, such as development cooperation, technical assistance, trade, environmental, visa and asylum policy. As a result, the bulk of the current resources used in EU external relations belong to the European Commission. At its most basic, this translates as the Commission having over 3,000 staff members working in external relations jobs, while the Council which deals with the CFSP has less than 200 in external affairs fields.13 Commission external policies are underpinned by a budget of about 100 billion euros annually while the Council has about 40 million euros to spend annually, mostly on crisis management in the Balkans.14 In the broader sense, this imbalance between the Council (without much of a budget to influence anything) and the Commission (with a budget directed overwhelmingly to long term programs), means that the EU’s potential for more effective external reach in crisis situations is poor.15

There is not enough transparency or accountability in EU foreign policy. EU foreign policy has not lent itself to transparency. Although the European Parliament (EP) has an important role

12 Stetter, 2004, pp726, 728. 13 Cameron, 2004. 14 Patten, 2003. 15 Grevi, Manca and Quille, 2004, p.13. The authors make the point that the Commission does have limited flexibility in its implementation instruments in the case of the small Rapid Reaction Mechanism and the potential of the much bigger Africa focussed African Peace facility.

251 6 Laura Rayner relating to the Commission’s activities (co-decision powers for the Community budget), it has limited powers regarding CFSP. The President of the Council is merely required to consult the parliament on CFSP and to ensure that its views are taken into account. The Council currently reports annually to the EP on the main aspects of CFSP (including financial), but the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy (AFET) has complained that the Council merely submits a descriptive list of CFSP activities already undertaken, and the Parliament does not consider itself adequately consulted as required under the Treaty on European Union.16 How the EEAS should address these problems

The establishment of the EEAS should do more than eliminate the ‘overlapping, inefficiency, and wasteful use of resources in the area of the Union’s external action’.17 Faced with its recent enlargement, the events in Iraq, the challenges from global terrorism and from US foreign policy, the EU needs to develop a robust and efficient diplomatic service, with international legitimacy either to support the new EU Foreign Minister or simply to advance evolving EU security and foreign policy interests. At this point, it is worth recalling that for some twelve years now, since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has assumed a complex and demanding foreign and security mission. This was outlined in the 1992 Treaty as follows:

to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders; to promote international cooperation;

16 European Parliament, 2005a, p.5-6. 17 European Parliament, 2005b, p.5.

252 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 7

to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

To maximise the EU’s potential influence and effectiveness, the EEAS will have to be structured so that it can continuously focus on maximising the coordination of its activities with those of the Member States while at the same time ensuring that all of the EU’s external action programs are coordinated with the Union’s foreign policy priorities.18

Likewise, and especially given current and future enlargements, the EEAS will have to accommodate the continuing need for the inwardly focussed functions of EU diplomacy, that is, the use to which EU foreign policy is put as an instrument of, framework for, and alternative to traditional bilateral relations between Member States.19 In this respect the function of the EEAS ‘as a catalyst for different national positions, facilitating dialogue, and providing a platform for building consensus’ is of vital importance.20

The proposed EEAS should provide a focal point for the administration of the EU’s external relations. This can only be achieved if the UMFA is given clear lines of administrative and budgetary authority for the EEAS, and if the EEAS has a viable structure independent of any alternate power structures (and a recognised and accepted legitimacy within the EU).

If the UMFA is to simultaneously hold the position of Vice-President of the Commission, in an attempt to unify ‘in the same hand all the instruments of external action of the Union’, there could easily be tension between him/her on the one hand and, on the other, either the President of the European Council, responsible for external representation of the Union, or the President of the Commission, who might ‘feel frustrated at the loss of voice in external relations’.21 Such tensions could undermine the EU’s ability to achieve coherence and consistency in its external relations. This seems to present ‘a conflict between two perfectly contradictory wills’.22 But in

18 Everts, 2002, p.47. 19 Keukeleire, 2003, p.32 20 Grevi and Cameron, 2005, p.18. 21 Maurer, 2003, p.19; Duke, 2003a, p.20. 22 Maurer, 2003, p.19.

253 8 Laura Rayner practice, the degree to which the marriage of the two separate functions in one EEAS bureaucracy is achieved successfully will be limited only by a lack of political will on the part of the major actors to make it happen. The excellent record of cooperation between Javier Solana as High Representative for CFSP and Chris Patten as Commissioner for External Relations has set a standard in this regard.

In designing the new EEAS, the EU should avoid structures or bureaucratic traditions which might hamper the UMFA’s ability to act decisively and effectively.

The EEAS should be accountable through the UMFA to the European Parliament (EP) and beyond to the European electors. The EEAS should be focussing on more than just efficiency and effectiveness. It must learn to communicate EU policy through effective public diplomacy, both abroad and at home. Public support for EU external action is one of the EU’s ‘good news stories’ and such support should be repaid and encouraged through accountability and transparency in external action. This itself will pay dividends, as coherence and consistency can be fostered through accountability in an open forum such as the EP. Strengthening public accountability to the EP will assist other levels of accountability for EU external relations, namely accountability to national parliaments and to EU citizens generally. The Headquarters: Europe’s MFA

What shape should the headquarters of the EEAS take? For the sake of coherence and consistency, no matter which model is chosen for the EEAS, it is important that both policy development and implementation capabilities are brought together, and that the EEAS has the full range of necessary corporate facilities.23 The draft Constitutional Treaty says the EEAS will comprise relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States (Article III-296). Thus, the draft Constitutional Treaty is seeking to break down the old barriers and imbalances between the Council and the Commission so that the

23 Maurer and Reichel, 2004, p3.

254 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 9 new UMFA would have enough intellectual oversight and control of foreign policy to ensure coherence and consistency. This section of the report looks at various approaches to shaping the headquarters of the new EEAS.

A minimalist HQ

The least that could be done toward the establishment of the headquarters for the new EEAS (a minimalist approach) would be to amalgamate the Directorate-General (DG) External Relations from the Council Secretariat with DG RELEX from the Commission (including the current external service).24 Since RELEX staff are not trained across the full functions of EU CFSP, particularly security policy, the amalgamation would probably need to be facilitated by secondment of a reasonable number of senior diplomats (up to 100) from Member States (and a reduction of generalist staff from RELEX). There would need to be a plan for the progressive introduction of senior ambassador-level staff from member states to replace those senior RELEX staff whose experience has been largely administrative or Brussels-based.

This approach would leave the Commission directorates-general for Trade, Enlargement and Development outside the EEAS, but would bring EuropeAid (now under the direct responsibility of the External Relations Commissioner) into the HQ.25

In practice, it could be difficult for the UMFA, assisted by such a minimalist EEAS, to exercise enough influence to ensure consistency and coherence in the EU’s external relations if substantial external action elements stayed outside his direct authority. There is also the question of the relationship between such groups and the EEAS. Having EuropeAid and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) on opposite sides of an EEAS fence could create unnecessary barriers between them to the detriment of their individual and mutual effectiveness.

The success of such a minimalist approach would depend on the ability of the UMFA (relying on the quality of the senior staff in the

24 Duke, 2004, p5. 25 International Crisis Group, 2005, p15. The question of whether the EU’s delegations will form part of the EEAS is discussed later in the pamphlet.

255 10 Laura Rayner new merged HQ) to coordinate its work with that of the other external relations bodies in the Commission. The UMFA would have to rely on the authority of his/her post as Vice President of the Commission to achieve the necessary coherence and consistency in EU external policy.

Any more minimalist approaches are not likely to be practicable. One variant, described as ‘purely “input-oriented”’, could centre on a simple transformation of the Council Secretariat’s external relations directorate-general (DG) into the new HQ. This would consist of ‘Solana’s political staff enhanced by the analysis capabilities of the Commission’, with the actual implementation of EU external action staying largely within the Commission.26 This continued split between ‘thinkers’ and ‘doers’ would cause problems in an organisation as complex as the EU, especially in response to crisis management situations where reaction times would inevitably be delayed by the institutional barrier. It would also fail to recognise that EU foreign and security policies have already developed well beyond the legal and political remit of the Commission.

Another, even more minimalist variant could be a ‘virtual EEAS’, where no new body is created at all, leaving all external action bodies where they are now (that is, under their relevant Commissioners and within the Secretariat to the Council), but with their output being strongly coordinated by a small staff directly accountable to the UMFA. However, such a ‘virtual EEAS’ would suffer problems of influence and authority despite the UMFA having a tangible role in both the Council and the Commission.

A maximalist HQ

A more ambitious concept for the HQ would ‘incorporate all of the policy units from the Council Secretariat, all of the external action DGs from the Community, the Union Delegations as well as EuropeAid and ECHO’.27 There are examples of national foreign ministries which include trade and overseas development assistance functions within a broader ministerial umbrella, headed by separate

26 Maurer and Reichel, 2004, p.3. 27 Duke, 2004, p. 5.

256 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 11 ministers, albeit junior at least in status (if not actually answerable) to the foreign minister.

Such an arrangement involving the UMFA as Commissioner for External Relations would have to affect the role of other external action Commissioners (trade, enlargement, development, and humanitarian assistance). As all Commissioners are supposed to be equal, it is difficult to envisage them being subordinated to one of their peers, even if he/she is a Vice President, although one commentator has suggested that as a Vice President, the UMFA ‘should be able to bang heads together’ to ensure that trade, development and environmental policies and technical assistance efforts were not ‘pursued in contradiction to overall EU goals’.28

A maximalist EEAS HQ on this model would be inconceivable without ‘junior ministers’ since it would be a huge organisation, almost certainly too large and diverse for one person alone to manage.29 It would certainly risk weakening the Commission, relegating what was left of it ‘to the rank of an “internal market secretariat”’.30 Although to put a positive spin on this variant, it could be argued that taking external relations out of the Commission would enable it to concentrate on internal matters.

Team Relex

An acceptable solution might be for Commissioners to be part of a ‘Team RELEX’ in which they remain in charge of the work of their Directorates General, (the staff of which could be part of the EEAS) but accept co-ordination from the UMFA. This is similar to the model which has been described as formalising the informal current concept of ‘Famille RELEX’ to include: from the Commission, DGs for External Relations, Trade, Development and Enlargement, the EuropeAid Co-operation Office, and ECHO; and from the Council Secretariat, the Policy Unit, the Situation Centre and the External Relations Directorate of the Council Secretariat with staff to assist UMFA to chair the Foreign Affairs Council.31 Under this model the UMFA would be ‘père de famille’ of the service with direct

28 Cameron, 2004, p.4. 29 Crowe, 2005, p.7 30 European Parliament, 2005b p.9 31 European Commission, 2003

257 12 Laura Rayner responsibility for those parts covering CFSP issues, while working with and helping to coordinate the work of his/her fellow Commissioners who would retain responsibility for current external actions and policies of the Community. However, the degree of coordination necessary to ensure coherence and consistency might be difficult to negotiate. The existing trade, development and enlargement Commissioners would doubtless consider that they have been functioning quite well without the benefit of such ‘paternal’ coordination.32

Other integration models

There are other variants − ‘middle ways’ − which might be considered. One would be to integrate the geographic desks in all EU central bodies (except the Commission’s DG Trade). This would merge the ‘whole External Relations and Politico-Military Affairs DG, the Policy Unit and probably the Military Staff’, the geographical divisions (‘desks’) of RELEX, the desks of DG Enlargement (Western Balkans, Turkey, Romania and Bulgarian desks) and DG Development’s Africa desks.33 This proposal raises a number of difficult questions. For example, should relations with accession countries or possible accession countries be treated as external relations, or should they enjoy a different, ‘special’ relationship with the EU? While it is not in the remit of this paper to debate the status of enlargement countries, other commentators have suggested that DG Enlargement should deal with countries actually entering the accession process, and that all others, including possible future candidate countries, should come under the EEAS.34

A second variant might be to integrate DG Development into the EEAS but leave DG Enlargement and DG Trade untouched. As a large share of responsibility for development aid has devolved to the delegations which are to come under the authority of the UMFA, it would be logical for the relevant policy areas in both the Council and the Commission to move to the EEAS. But this is a ‘Catch 22’ situation, for while development aid is ‘a major foreign policy tool’ which the UMFA should have at his/her disposal, so is trade.35 This

32 Allen, 2005, p.4. 33 Crowe, 2005, p.7 34 Grevi and Cameron, 2005, p.14 35 Grevi and Cameron, 2005, p.14

258 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 13 model could weaken the link between trade and development aid − the twin pillars of EU development policy. One way around this problem might be another form of integration − leaving the management of trade, development and enlargement out of the EEAS, but making the EEAS ‘directly responsible for conducting external ‘political’ relations with third countries’.36 However, if this resulted in policy areas being split from implementation, it would not only threaten coherence and consistency, but could also hamper the EU’s goal of being able to make a timely and flexible response to fast moving events.

Solana/Barroso Plan

The High Representative and the President of the Commission are reportedly developing an ‘integrationist’ model which seeks to apply the principle of ‘no duplication of desks’ in either the Council or the Commission. The plan reportedly seeks to merge all CFSP and ESDP areas in both the Commission and the Council, including not just geographical desks but also thematic desks (human rights, non- proliferation, counter-terrorism). Under this Solana/Barroso model, the Commission would keep its discrete trade, development, enlargement and humanitarian assistance competencies in discrete DGs.37

The Council Secretariat

The discussions above have concentrated mainly on the Commission and rather less on the Council Secretariat. The Constitution lists only two configurations of the Council of Ministers, the General Affairs Council and the Foreign Affairs Council with others to follow as decided by the European Council. It seems logical to assume that, with the UMFA being the chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, even if a minimalist approach is adopted, all of the parts of the current Council Secretariat dealing with the relevant external relations areas will go to the HQ of the EEAS. Those areas within Directorate General E of the Council Secretariat which cover enlargement, development and trade would become the UMFA’s instrument of coordination with the matching external action areas

36 Grevi and Cameron, 2005, p.13 37 Allen, 2005.

259 14 Laura Rayner which stayed in the Commission. It must be assumed that the remainder of the current Secretariat would then form the core of the General Secretariat which the Constitution proposes will assist the European Council (Article III-344) and its President. But would this mean that the General Secretariat would not have a role in assisting the Council on any external action area, or would there be a need for some duplication of desks between the General Secretariat and the EEAS HQ?

Institutional positioning of the HQ

The other important matter regarding the headquarters of the EEAS relates to its institutional positioning. Should the EEAS be part of the Commission or the Council, or will it exist in both, or in neither (that is, outside both as a separate body)? There is no specific Constitutional provision for the existence of an independent body separate from both the Council and the Commission, but the Constitution is equally silent on the location of the EEAS within the existing arrangement although Article I-26 of the Constitution appears to assume that external relations responsibilities will remain within the Commission.38

Some member states such as Britain view the UMFA and the new EEAS as instruments which will afford them greater control over the external actions of the Commission, and see the EEAS as ‘working to the Council of Ministers primarily’.39 Javier Solana’s current aim seems to be to create an autonomous EEAS which is ‘distinct from both the Council and the Commission’.40 Recent legal advice from the Council to the Member States reportedly says that ‘the EEAS cannot be created as a “normal service” inside one of the institutions. Although the EEAS could be totally autonomous of the Commission or the Council, in practice that would mean it duplicated tasks of support and administrative management’.41 However, to avoid duplication in an autonomous body it might be feasible for the EEAS to establish certain support services essential to its core

38 Article I-26 says in part ‘With the exception of common foreign and security policy, and other cases provided for in the Constitution, it [the Commission] shall ensure the Union’s external representation’. 39 Allen, 2005. 40 Allen, 2005. 41 Cronin, 2005.

260 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 15 business (such as a media unit) within its structure and outsource others (such as human resource management) to the Commission under a service level agreement.

Fear that a separate body will become too independent is evident in a draft report of the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs which suggests that the EEAS ‘should be fully incorporated, especially for logistical, administrative, and budget purposes, within the Commission’s staff structure so as to ensure that no organisationally independent body or agency is set up largely out of reach of political control’.42 Under this model, the EEAS would be placed under a legal obligation to implement decisions of each competent institution. However, it would be difficult if not impossible to incorporate military elements (i.e. the European Military Staff and possibly military personnel from the Situation Centre) into an EEAS which existed fully within the Commission.43 If military staff were left out of the EEAS, they would still have to come under the UMFA who has the responsibility for co-ordinating the military and civilian aspects of tasks such as peacekeeping missions (Article III-309). The UMFA would have to ensure that any such separation did not place barriers between the civil and military crisis response elements.

As regards the power of the EP over external relations, the draft Constitution ostensibly increases the EP’s influence over the entire budget by removing the distinction between compulsory and non- compulsory expenditure, although it has lost the right to have a final say regarding non-compulsory expenditure. The EP has also improved its position a little under the draft Constitution in that it will hold a debate on CFSP twice a year and thus it is likely that the EP will ask the Council to deliver two reports per annum instead of just one.44 This will only be an improvement if the Council provides Parliament with sufficient information in time to allow it to discharge its duties, for instance, if the EP is given prospective input as well as retrospective oversight. The Solana/Barroso paper of early 2005 reportedly refers to a unit within the EEAS which would be

42 European Parliament, 2005b p.5. 43 Mahony, 2005. 44 Maurer, Kietz, and Volkel, 2005, p.11.

261 16 Laura Rayner responsible for maintaining relations with the EP given its ‘“growing importance” in external relations’.45

Remnants of the pillars

Although the draft Constitutional Treaty has ostensibly discarded the pillar structure in foreign affairs, the text consistently reinforces the division between CFSP and non-CFSP external relations, assigning the UMFA and the Commission different roles in relation to them. (Each mention of the Commission in relation to external action specifically refers to the UMFA wearing his/her Vice President’s hat.) CFSP remains tied to the Council and non-CFSP external relations remain the province of the Commission. To ensure that the UMFA is effective in both roles, it could be argued that he/she should have the EEAS HQ and staff embedded in both the Council and in the Commission, rather than it standing outside either one or the other, or both, thus returning to the idea of the ‘virtual EEAS’ discussed above. But it is unlikely that the EEAS could become a coherent whole if it were split in this way.

With the CFSP related staff on the Council side numbering less than 200 and the Commission staff in the thousands, and with the first proposed UMFA being the former High Representative in the Council, it might seem natural that the UMFA would continue to be closer to former Council staff and functions than to any EEAS staff and functions coming from or staying inside the Commission. Even with the best intentions on the UMFA’s part, there would still be suspicions that this was so. As to the UMFA’s loyalties, the UK Minister for Europe has stated that the UK wants to have the UMFA sitting in the Commission ‘because we want that person to have some say over how the Commission’s budget is spent, but on policy decisions it must be clear there is only one master, as it were, and that is the Council of Ministers’.46

Recommended: A New, Minimalist HQ

The EU should take the chance it has been given and start afresh with a new structure, separate from both the Commission and the

45 Allen, 2005. 46 United Kingdom, 2003.

262 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 17

Council. The most sensible choice in the first instance would probably be a version of the minimalist model, but really, that is the easy part of the exercise. The difficult question is deciding what should be the final aim – a maximalist structure, or if not, how to get independent minded Commissioners to accept coordination in a collegiate situation. Whatever the shape of the EEAS, a separate structure will be more amenable to change and growth as required. EU Embassies

Since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the diplomatic missions of the European Community, called ‘delegations’ and managed by the Commission, and the staff of those missions have been undergoing legal, functional and political transitions that have been little remarked either within the EU or outside it.47 While the draft Constitutional Treaty has been widely hailed as establishing for the first time an independent legal personality for the EU, this view is not sustainable. The Treaty of the European Union itself (the Maastricht Treaty) asserts such an identity, and the diplomatic recognition accorded the EU institutions since then by states is clear evidence that under international law the EU has a legal personality independent of the outcome of the ratification processes.

Thus, the delegations in third countries and at international organisations already represent the EU in a variety of formal and informal ways. Heads of delegations however are not yet the equivalent of the ambassadors of a sovereign state, such as France, in that as accredited representatives of the European Commission, they do not have plenipotentiary powers relating to the whole EU in the same way that accredited ambassadors do in relation to

47 The Commission has over 120 delegations around the world. Since these have developed out of the Commission, they have traditionally played a much greater role in advancing Community interests (such as trade agreements) than wider EU interests (such as CFSP). A ‘Reform of the Management of External Assistance’ launched in 2000 to make radical improvements to the speed, quality and profile of EU external aid meant that the delegations received more authority and led to a transfer of personnel from EuropeAid to the delegations, which have increased from around 900 officials to over 3,000. The Commission has developed new recruitment mechanisms to bring in more diplomatic professionals. Since early 2001, heads of delegation have been expected to take a more active role in conflict prevention and crisis management. See International Crisis Group, 2005. Also see Spence, 2005a.

263 18 Laura Rayner representing their state as a whole.48 This evolution will come and heads of EU embassies will need to be empowered to speak for the EU as a whole, not just on Community issues, but also on CFSP and other matters. As heads of mission will represent the EU under the authority of the UMFA, they can be expected to supplant the role of country-specific special representatives of the High Representative for CFSP. There will be no need for country-specific special representatives where an EU delegation is present, as long as the head of mission and its staff are appropriately trained and competent in CFSP functions.

Coupled with the extra responsibilities now given to the delegations following devolution of greater control over external assistance to them, the task of representing the whole EU will increase the workload of heads of EU missions and their staff. Under the draft Constitution EU delegations have a role in contributing to the implementation of the rights of European citizens in third countries (Article III-306), and with greater international legitimacy this role could increase. Additionally, if the EU expects to increase its international role, especially in conflict prevention, the delegations will have to play an even greater part in helping to ensure decisions and actions are complied with and implemented. The draft Constitution tasks delegations with stepping up their cooperation with the missions of Member States in third countries and at international organisations in the exchange of information and the carrying out of joint assessments (Article III-306).

New responsibilities should be matched with extra resources.49 In comparison with other large donors the Commission is now operating one of the most devolved external assistance systems, but it is still at the lower end of ratio of staff to amount of euros managed.50 Even the staff increases resulting from devolution have been insufficient to cope with the additional demands of that new

48 However, by 1990 most EC delegations were accredited as full diplomatic missions by their host countries and most heads of delegation were accredited at head of state rather than foreign minister level with the rank and courtesy title of ambassador. Spence, 2005a 49 Even extra resourcing can bring its own problems - the transfer of staff from ECHO to the delegations increased staff numbers in the field causing at the very least accommodation problems. International Crisis Group 2005, p.13. 50 Commission of the European Communities, 2004, p.17.

264 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 19 policy which is very human resource intensive.51 This indicates that without additional resources being given or transferred to the delegations, expectations for the role of delegations might be higher than can be met realistically, in the short to medium term at least; and if delegations were expected to meet higher performance expectations without appropriate resources their current core functions could suffer. It would seem sensible to consider a phased approach – not giving all heads of delegations plenipotentiary powers until resources that enable them to undertake the full range of activities are in place, in the style of the phased devolution process. In planning for increased staffing levels to cope with new CFSP roles, consideration will also have to be given to the appropriateness of engaging local staff in what could be increasingly sensitive work. This is just one area in which seconded national diplomats - good political officers with relevant experience - could be used appropriately and relatively quickly, after relevant EU training.

It has been suggested that the Council and the Member States might have a say in the appointment of heads of delegations and in the composition of delegations.52 As they will be representing the EU as a whole and given the position of UMFA vis à vis the Council, this would seem reasonable. There has also been a call for involvement by the European Parliament’s committees in confirming heads of delegations, as well as for heads of delegations being accountable to them.53 While a role for the EP in confirming appointments is feasible, heads of delegations will have to have a direct line of administrative accountability to the UMFA that involvement of the EP would unduly complicate. But to whom will heads of delegations report? Ostensibly they will report to the UMFA since the delegations come under his authority, but with plenipotentiary powers should their reporting be aimed further up the EU hierarchy, to the Foreign Affairs Council, to the European Council as a whole, or to the President of the Council, elected by the heads of state of the Member States and with responsibilities to represent the EU in foreign affairs? Or to both the Presidents of the Council and the Commission for whom the delegations do so much work? As this could undermine the UMFA’s authority and role, and as the UMFA has been given authority over the delegations, the most sensible

51 Frederiksen, Jonal and Baser, Heather, 2004, p.8. 52 Duke, 2003b, pp.12-13. 53 European Parliament 2005b, p.6.

265 20 Laura Rayner approach would be to have heads of delegations report directly to the UMFA who, in the final analysis, is himself answerable at some level to each of the other institutions.

The relationship between EU Embassies and Brussels

The relationship between Brussels and the delegations is still developing after devolution of powers in the development area to the delegations. Both before and after ratification further uncertainty will affect the way the Union’s external action functions. Headquarters functional units with responsibilities in external relations will at first concern themselves with whether they will be part of the EEAS, and then all those affected, inside and outside the EEAS will have to adapt themselves to the new status quo. A long, staged process of EEAS evolution will have the potential of drawing out this unsettling period. As the devolution process has demonstrated, the EEAS headquarters will have to act in a supporting role towards the delegations, providing training and guidelines in the new tasks. A lengthy period of uncertainty about their own future could undermine the ability of headquarters staff to provide the necessary support to delegations. The opposite will also have to occur, delegations will have to support visiting headquarters officials. While the Commission claims that delegations have played an important support role for the SG/HR, the British Foreign Minister has commented that the Commission sought to block cooperation with the SG/HR and that there was ‘a lack of cooperation with him from Commission officials when he went abroad’.54

While the Constitution places the delegations under the authority of the UMFA, it does not explicitly state that they should form part of the EEAS. However, a foreign service could not function without ‘the fused roles of capitals and missions abroad’, and a mere requirement to ensure coherence and consistency might not be enough to bridge the gap.55 Indeed, it is difficult to see how the goal of greater coherence and consistency would be served by the delegations not being part of the EEAS.

54 European Commission, 2004b, p.43; United Kingdom, 2005. 55 Spence, 2005a.

266 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 21

Common sense says that the delegations should form a substantial part of the EEAS and logic says that they will be a central part of it, however, it is not clear where they will sit within it. The present position of the delegations within the External Services Directorate under DG RELEX will not reflect the whole-of-EU representation role they will have – a potential conflict if DG RELEX continues to be the responsibility of a Commissioner even though the main business of the delegations will still be on behalf of the Commission. Given the UMFA’s authority over the EEAS, would it be feasible to have the delegations as part of the EEAS but remaining administratively within the Commission under a Commissioner? The suggestion that UMFA ‘should have at least one Commission deputy (the obvious candidate being the present External Relations Commissioner) to take the management of his Commission empire off his shoulders’, is a sensible one but may not entirely solve the problem and might be in conflict with the system of equality between Commissioners.56 For the Commission this situation might be solved by trading some lessening of collegiate equality to keep the delegations administratively within the Commission. While a Commission deputy might help with the administrative load, could all new CFSP tasks/functions carried out by the delegations come under the authority of the Commission?

Unless there are clear lines of authority between headquarters and the delegations, the latter, now representing the whole EU, might find themselves answerable to a greater number of headquarters elements. Nor is it clear whether all delegation staff will come under the direct authority of the UMFA. For instance, if the minimalist option for the headquarters element is adopted and DG Development stays under its own Commissioner, those delegations with major responsibilities for development will have a large number of staff in a similar position to those non-foreign affairs officers (defence, immigration, law enforcement etc) posted to national embassies. They will operate under the authority of the head of the delegation, but will also be answerable to their ‘home’ departments. Delegations with a large staff from DG Development might therefore appear to sit uncomfortably within the EEAS. Alternatively, if all delegation staff come under the authority of the UMFA and belong to the EEAS, those dealing with areas which remain under separate

56 Crowe, 2005, p.7.

267 22 Laura Rayner

Commissioners will presumably also be accountable to them. The balance of functions at different delegations could prove difficult to reconcile with both the institutional balance and the ‘ownership’ of the delegations. In fact, looked at from the point of view of the ‘sharp end’ of EU external action, i.e. the work of the delegations, the most obvious and sensible structure for the EEAS would incorporate all of the external relations directorates and functional units from the Commission and the Council.

If EU delegations receive full recognition at other international organisations, such as the UN, the delegations might have a greater role in co-ordinating the EU’s position with those of Member States on a wider range of issues, although Member States on the UN Security Council are already obliged to defend the positions and interests of the Union, and Member States and the Commission already hold more than a thousand internal EU coordination meetings each year to prepare and finalise EU positions.57 However, even if the role of the EU delegations is no greater it could be more delicate if the EU attempts to flex the muscles of its legal personality on CFSP matters to a greater extent than it previously has in international fora.

Aspects of the relationship between the EEAS headquarters and EEAS delegations related to staffing will be discussed below.

Relationships between Member State embassies and EU Embassies

Under the Constitution EU delegations are to act in close cooperation with the diplomatic and consular missions of Member States. As should be the practice at present, EU delegations will cooperate with the missions of Member States in the efficient provision of development assistance and aid, for instance, ensuring that there is minimal duplication of effort between Member States and with the EU. This cooperation and coordination will have to be in concert with the coordination activities of the EEAS headquarters and the Member States in Brussels. Member States might already agree on basic aims and priorities, and in theory they might have accepted the need for a coordinated European approach, but in

57 European Commission, 2001.

268 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 23 reality the result often has been less effective than could have been achieved because of a lack of coordination. If it exists, coordination of aid programs ‘is mostly on the technical level, while the political dimension is often ignored’.58 EU delegations and the EEAS headquarters will have to continuously promote and emphasise coordination between the policies and actions of Member States and the EU’s own actions in third countries and international fora. And, as stated above, EU missions would have an increased role in coordinating activities with Member States’ missions in CFSP.

The impact of the new Constitution on the role of embassies has the potential to be greatest for embassies of small to medium sized Member States. With the UMFA conducting CFSP and the EU’s delegations representing the whole EU, embassies of Member States will no longer have the responsibilities attached to the increased role that they had when their state held the rotating presidency of the Council. Small to medium Member States might find that losing this regular responsibility will cause them to rethink the resources they had previously put into representation in third countries. For instance, the Presidency of the Council and the responsibilities linked to European Political Cooperation (the forerunner to CFSP) were associated with the ‘more than doubling’ of the number of Irish missions overseas, ‘from 20 in 1970 to 50 in 1997’.59 However, even when not taking the lead as the embassy of the member state holding the Presidency of the Council, embassies of the smaller EU Member States saw their workload, and their prestige, increase. Portuguese embassies were ‘seen not only as embassies of an isolated, small country but also as the representatives of an EU member, their work increased significantly, both in quantity…and in quality, dealing on a daily basis with issues that in a purely bi-lateral context would have been ignored or given little attention’.60

58 Everts, 2002, p.46. 59 Tonra, 2002, pp.157-158. 60 Correia, 2002, p.205.

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The missions of larger states might be less likely to be affected.61 In the case of Britain, it is likely that a shift to ‘a full blown European diplomatic service’ will be ‘stoutly resisted’. Britain has ‘gone along with an increasing concentration of CFSP activity in Brussels’, but it has previously wanted to keep control of CFSP in the Council of Ministers rather than in the Commission’s external service.62 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has also made it clear that commercial work, immigration control and some aspects of political work would have to remain under separate national control.63 Although Britain does share embassy accommodation with Germany in Reykjavic, it keeps its own separate and secure areas. And while the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has suggested that in the future it might consider extending sharing to include sharing staff and functions in countries where the FCO’s resources are limited, it is hard to imagine larger Member States, such as Britain, accepting wholesale, a proposal for one European ‘house’ in each third country which would house both the Union delegation and each of the bilateral missions of Member States represented.64 Apart from the issue of national sovereignty and how this would play domestically, there is a great deal of national prestige involved in embassies, especially for former colonial powers who often have special relationships with their former colonies which they might consider would be damaged by such an approach. But while a negative view could see this as a question of saving resources versus saving face, the new status of EU ‘embassies’ should be treated as an opportunity by Member States to redirect scarce national foreign ministry resources to high priority national interests and transfer the common EU ‘foreign policy’ progressively to new EU embassies such as has already happened with trade negotiations. For instance,

61 However, the rotating presidency can have some impact on the workloads of even the larger states, for instance there are only four member states represented in Rangoon:, France, Germany, Britain and Italy who are thus ‘required to undertake an extensive coordination role even when not holding the Presidency.’ Handing this coordination role over to an EU delegation ‘would come as a considerable relief.’ Hocking and Spence 2005, p.299 62 Allen, 2002, p.267. 63 Allen, 2002, p.267. 64 United Kingdom 2004, p.21. However, Britain does share accommodation with Germany in Quito, with the EU Commission, Germany and France in Dar es Salaam, with the France and Germany in Almaty and with Italy in Minsk; OECD, 2002, p.1-80. The proposal referred to the Commission delegations. An attempt to encourage Member States to establish a joint embassy in Abuja, Nigeria had only limited success. Spence, 2005a.

270 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 25

Britain could use the opportunity to shave away those staff posts and policy areas in London and in its own embassies that are adequately covered by Brussels or its delegations under CFSP.

While the new status of the EU delegations will shift at least some of the focus of CFSP activity away from the embassies of the smaller Member States especially, the EU will still need the co-operation and input of the embassies of Member States large and small. It cannot move ahead of or away from Member States especially in CFSP matters. Despite warnings of the possible demise of national embassies, the new status of EU delegations will not make European diplomacy or even CFSP a one horse race, nor will delegations make the bilateral embassies of Member States redundant.65 In the case of representation at international bodies for which statehood is a requirement for membership, such as the UN, EU ‘embassies’ might inherit the full recognition already accorded the Commission’s delegations, but since the EU is not a ‘state party’, its ‘embassies’ to those organisations will continue to rely heavily on Member States’ cooperation to ensure the EU’s voice is heard.

Consular functions

Consular work is the most visible and direct aspect of foreign policy work in the service of a country’s people, and can thus have a high profile in domestic politics, especially when things go wrong for citizens abroad. The suggestion that the EU move towards the establishment of common consular and visa services will not be acceptable to all members, especially those Member States who have many citizens travelling or working abroad.66 However, it is conceivable that in the future, as EU missions evolve into embassies, Member States might consider requesting that EU delegations assume consular and other roles for them and for their citizens in some countries where the Member States no longer want to retain separate national representations and no other Member State can fill the role. This would assume that EU delegations were recognised by the host country for this purpose and appropriately staffed and resourced. Ireland has already discussed the possibility of co-location with Commission delegations in third countries where

65 Hannan, 2005. 66 Cameron, 2004, p.4.

271 26 Laura Rayner

Ireland is without diplomatic representation, but the status of such co-located officials on the diplomatic list of host countries has proven to be ‘a crucial difficulty’.67

EU delegations would have to be staffed to perform consular and other duties which could include a range of responsibilities, some quite complex and made even more so by the number of languages potentially involved. If delegations were to undertake the consular functions of national embassies this could include: issuing replacements for lost or stolen passports; legalisation and certification of documents; repatriating EU nationals during political upheavals or natural disasters; assisting in medical emergencies; and in the case of arrest of EU citizens, supervising fair treatment, assisting in retaining legal counsel and visiting EU nationals held in detention.68

The EU and Member States would have to come to an agreement regarding the level of service that the EU was to provide and a number of tough decisions would have to be made. While the level of service could differ for each location, would it be the same service for all EU citizens, or would it be acceptable for some Member States to be willing to pay for a higher level of service for their nationals, and would their nationals thus be given a higher priority for service? Agreements between the EU and Member States would have to include some method of cost recovery as the administrative costs involved could be substantial, and moneys owed by individuals for such things as emergency travel or repatriation of deceased remains would have to be recovered somehow, with predictably bad publicity for the EU.69 The processing of visas for the Schengen states is one area which could benefit from a joint consular approach to discourage applicants from ‘visa-hopping’, seeking out the most lenient embassies in order to get entry into a Member State which

67 Tonra, 2002, p.158. 68 Consular work of this type is already provided for in Article 20 of the EC Treaty. European Parliament 2005b, p.6. 69 As the UK experience shows, consular activities can be very extensive and resource intensive. In 1999/2000 the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office spent 740 staff years on consular work of which only 84 were in the UK. The cost of consular work in that period was around £49.1 million. Embassy staff provided consular assistance to over 45,000 British travellers; issued or amended 382,463 full British passports; issued 10,074 emergency passports; registered 6,650 births and 400 deaths; and made 6,938 prison visits. See United Kingdom, 2000, p.12.

272 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 27 has already rejected them.70 However, this could be done by cooperation between the states, standardising interpretation of the visa rules, etc., rather than by creating an EU consular service. All in all, consular work would be an unnecessary distraction from what the EU’s delegations should be focussing on - the core business of developing and maintaining relations with third countries in the areas of trade, development aid, humanitarian assistance, and the development of crisis response capabilities. Administration of the EEAS

The analysis above on the evolution of the HQ and embassies of the new EEAS needs to be considered alongside a number of administrative issues. These were foreshadowed to some extent in earlier discussion, but are sufficiently influential to warrant further separate treatment under four headings: budget, staffing, training, and review.

Budget

There is, as yet, no link between plans for the EEAS and the 2007/13 budget. How the EEAS is to be financed will depend on its structure and whether it is phased in over time or fully established as soon as possible. It will also depend on the balance of power between the institutions because it is not just the structure which is to be funded, but also the programs and activities for which it is responsible. The UMFA needs to be given authority over the EEAS’s budget without which his/her ability to conduct CFSP and ensure and be responsible for the coordination of external action especially for those areas which are transferred into the EEAS would be severely compromised. Currently it seems that, if the EEAS is to be staffed and funded from the EU budget, and not directly by Member States, funds will have to come from existing EU resources.71 Those funds will come with different conditions for their expenditure depending on whether they are for intergovernmental or Community functions. Such co-financing would create an inter-institutional budget complicating both administration and oversight, but it should

70 Everts, 2002, p.57. 71 United Kingdom, 2005.

273 28 Laura Rayner not lessen transparency in the budget, nor the role of the European Parliament in budget oversight.72

Staffing

The new EEAS will have responsibilities under both the Council and the Commission and it will comprise officials from both, as well as from Member States, although in what ratio is not stated in the Constitution. The mix of staff will depend, like the budget, on the makeup of the EEAS. However, as there are less than 200 Council officers working in external affairs jobs, it is unlikely that an equal division between the three components will work. Nor should there be an arbitrary ratio imposed, as no matter where the EEAS is positioned, to ensure its success as an organisation its aim should be to make the differences in the origin of its staff mean as little as possible in the new structure. To achieve this it appears that it would be better if officials were transferred into the EEAS rather than detached from their parent institutions as legal advice reportedly provided to Member States by the legal service of the Council makes the point if staff are detached from their parent institutions rather than transferred to the new body, officials will keep ‘their rights and obligations to their parent institutions (Council or the Commission)’, whereas transferring staff to the EEAS would mean ‘a uniform statute applicable to all officials’.73

Although ‘the distinction between common foreign and security policy and the other aspects of EU external action still determines the respective roles of the institutions and the procedures that apply’, the UMFA’s supporting organisation should not be frozen into two different functional streams just because he/she has two separate functions.74 In fact, just as the UMFA is expected to ‘wear two hats’, as long as legal obligations are met there is no reason why individual EEAS officers could not perform both functions.

The staffing structure will need to be flexible to accommodate the development of the EEAS. Officials’ ability to move easily between and within Council and Commission functions, between the

72 The European Court of Auditors was critical of the management of CFSP finance by both the Council and the Commission. European Court of Auditors, 2001. 73 Cronin, 2005 74 European Commission 2004a.

274 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 29 headquarters and the delegations, and between the EEAS and the Council and the Commission will be vital for the development of an effective organisation. This will be especially the case if the EEAS does not include all the external action directorates of the Commission, in which case staff mobility could bridge gaps between the EEAS and non-EEAS external action sections, helping to ensure cohesion and thus coherence in output. The introduction of new Staff Regulations on 1 May 2004 is a good foundation, but further encouragement should be given to staff to participate in job rotations.

While it appears unlikely that financial incentives for Brussels staff to move to delegations either would be forthcoming from the European Parliament and Member States, or would be enough to encourage staff to take up postings especially where living conditions are difficult, there are other incentives which could be considered. For instance, the current ‘requirement’ that Commission staff go on a posting abroad after a maximum of six years in Brussels can be avoided. This ‘requirement’ could be strengthened by insisting that officers gain field experience before promotion to management level.75 Integrating the postings for diplomats from Member States to the EEAS, especially to delegations, into the career paths of Member States’ diplomatic corps should also be encouraged.

The extent of the contribution by Member States of officers to staff the EEAS is unclear, as is whether this will be determined by size of population. The contribution from Member States should not just be diplomats from their foreign services, but should also include experts from other ministries, such as health, environment, etc. All officers from Member States should be seconded under the similar terms as currently apply to national experts seconded to the Commission as regards not taking instruction from national governments while on secondment. However, it would be preferable for national experts to be employed as temporary agents if that would ensure that they would be ‘subject to uniform rules (on salary, benefits and immunities)’ rather than as detached national experts with consequent disparities in remuneration between them and EU staff.76

75 Frederiksen, and Baser, 2004, p.9. 76 Cronin, 2005.

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Concern has been expressed that larger states which are not wholly in favour of the new institution might leave their allotted positions vacant to intentionally weaken the EEAS.77 To discourage the possibility of this, strict limits will have to be set on the length of time positions can be held vacant before another Member State is invited to put forward applicants. No matter which method is used to determine the final number of diplomats from Member States, it is important that individual jobs do not have national flags attached to them. As is the case with the secondment of national experts by the Commission, geographic and gender balance and the principle of equal opportunity should be taken into account, but the merit principal should apply to the selection of Member States’ diplomats and experts for positions in the EEAS.

Training

There have been suggestions that the EU needs a European diplomatic academy which could train both Union officials and officials from Member States.78 Common training for EU officials and national diplomats should engender ‘common diplomatic practice and culture’ as well as creating cohorts of multi-state diplomats both within the EU and across the range of Member States and even including student diplomats from third countries.79 This would be the foundation of a strong network throughout their careers. The participation of diplomats from Member States and from third countries is important in ensuring a global focus. In the case of diplomats and national experts seconded to the EEAS from Member States, acquiring a working knowledge of the EU and an appreciation of its diplomatic culture will be important in ensuring that they are effective in their new roles. Consolidating such training on one campus could provide economies of scale, as well as enhancing an EU esprit de corps. But there is also an argument for decentralised training, at a number of institutions of higher learning throughout the EU which exposes students to the benefits of a broader range of learning experiences, academics, and non-EU

77 Maurer, and Reichel, 2004, p.6. 78 European Parliament 2005b, p.6. 79 Monar, 2000, p.2. The proposal for a diplomatic academy was downgraded to a European Diplomatic Programme five of which have been run for young diplomats from the foreign services for Member States the Commission and the Council Secretariat.

276 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 31 students (especially if taken outside the EU diplomat’s own country), and which allows the institutions and academics involved to retain their independence.

There are other levels of diplomatic training, for instance courses currently provided by the Commission, which might be adapted to specifically target the needs of the new EEAS. Training should be available to EEAS staff, both in-house and externally, for example, distance education courses for delegation staff via the Internet. In- house EEAS training modules provided in residential accommodation should aim to engender an esprit de corps for all levels of staff minimising geographic and institutional divides. Special emphasis will have to be given to training for staff posted to or employed by delegations to cover their wider responsibilities. This is in addition to the ‘continuing need for training’ identified in the audit report on the devolution of aid management.80

Review and Evaluation of the EEAS

The EU should make a commitment to institute an independent review of the new structure after it has been in operation for at least two years. This review, an audit of its performance, should examine all aspects of the EEAS, including its working relationships with other EU institutions such as the Commission and the EP. On the basis of the findings of the review the EU should decide when the functions of the EEAS should be expanded. The process and the results of the review should be public. Conclusion

How fast and how far can or should the EEAS develop? On the one hand, there is an argument for the EU and Member States taking the opportunity that a ratified treaty will give them to start afresh, building an EEAS that is as extensive as the treaty allows, and putting a maximalist EEAS in place as quickly and decisively as is practical. This would have the advantage of getting the pain of reform over with quickly while circumventing some of the inevitable wasteful inter-institutional infighting and jockeying for position that a

80 European Court of Auditors, 2005, p.5.

277 32 Laura Rayner long drawn out process would encourage. On the negative side, media reporting of plans for the swift implementation of an extensive organisation might have a detrimental impact in the countries which are holding referenda on the ratification of the Constitution. There has already been negative comment in the media on pre-ratification planning being carried out at the behest of the Council, with claims that ‘the EU is launching a fully fledged foreign service without any legal basis’.81 While any form of EEAS will be opposed by some, the announcement of plans for an extensive EU foreign service could be used by those opposing the Treaty to argue against its ratification. This is no reason for EU citizens not to be kept informed of pre- ratification planning, but it would be a shame if the plan which aims to give greater coherence and consistency to EU external action – an area which generally enjoys widespread public support – became a pawn in the wider constitutional debate.

On the other hand, there is an argument for change to be phased in over a number of years, taking until 2015 for the EEAS to reach a ‘critical mass’ and based on a master plan which commits all the actors to an agreed goal.82 Alternatively, the EEAS could be allowed to evolve not to a completely set plan, but through ‘a gradual process based on mutual trust and a growing fund of expertise and shared experience’.83 Both of these latter methods might have the advantage of preventing the EEAS from losing credibility during its early development phase due to unrealistic and unmet expectations but there is a danger in delaying the implementation of change. Old habits die hard, especially if they are allowed to linger, and a lengthy evolution which resulted in unseemly turf wars would weaken both the EU and its ability to undertake effective external action.84

It would be a waste of the potential power of the EU could if the role and structure of a future EEAS were determined by the need to accommodate the current EU institutional and bureaucratic status quo. Neither should the effectiveness of a gradually evolving EEAS have to depend on the personality of the UMFA. It would put the whole concept of coherence in jeopardy if successful external

81 Hannan, 2005. 82 Maurer and Reichel, 2004, p.6. 83 European Parliament, 2005b, p.5. 84 EU turf wars are not unknown, especially between the Commission and the Council, see Spence, 2005b.

278 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 33 relations and actions depended on the superhuman efforts of a so- called ‘Patana’ figure to bridge the gap between the old pillars and bring the inconsistencies inherent in current EU arrangements under control.85

Unfortunately, but realistically, the EEAS is unlikely to spring to life fully formed at an appointed date, but rather, given the traditions of the EU, the new EEAS will evolve over time, gradually accumulating both recognition and power. The very least that the EU should plan for in the first instance would be the minimalist option, i.e. beginning with an EEAS which consists of the Directorate General External Relations and the Policy Unit from the Council side with DG RELEX and the current External Service from the Commission including the delegations, with the clear understanding that this structure is not set in concrete. This option would combine policy and operations from both sides and its success would be a good foundation from which to eventually extend the responsibilities of the UMFA and the EEAS.

The positive aspect of a process of gradual development of the EEAS lies in the EU’s own history. The EU’s success as a body ensuring peace and prosperity within its own borders has been based on the incremental accumulation of trust and the equally gradual evolution of its institutions. The question is how long should the next evolution be allowed to take? Or more precisely, how long can the EU and the Member States afford to let it take? Recommendations

1. Even if Member States fail to ratify the Constitutional Treaty, they should establish some form of external action service which combines Council and Commission functions and which is designed to address the EU’s problems in foreign policy.

2. In designing the new EEAS the EU should not be constrained by current bureaucratic and administrative arrangements.

85 Cameron, 2004. Cameron points out that, despite the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana and Commissioner Chris Patten arguing against it, ‘the Convention came down in favour of a ‘Patana’ figure who it is hoped will embody both pillars in his persona’. Hope is not a strong foundation on which to build.

279 34 Laura Rayner

3. In structuring the EEAS the EU should aim to eliminate all duplication of external relations functions within its institutions.

4. The UMFA should be given clear lines of administrative and budgetary authority and responsibility for the EEAS.

5. The EEAS, through the UMFA, should be accountable to the European Parliament.

6. Initially the EEAS should consist of at least the Directorate General External Relations and the Policy Unit from the Council side with DG RELEX and the current External Service from the Commission, including the delegations, with the flexibility to absorb other external action functions from the Commission over time.

7. The EU should ensure that any expansion in the role of EU delegations should be matched with appropriate increases in staffing and resources.

8. As EU delegations will represent the EU as a whole, appointment of heads of EU delegations should be made by the UMFA in consultation with the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament.

9. Normal consular services should not be part of the role of delegations which should focus on relations with third countries and on the EU’s core business – trade, development aid, humanitarian assistance and conflict/crisis response.

10. The European Parliament should be furnished with all necessary information to carry out oversight of the budget of all of the EU’s external action.

11. There should not be an arbitrary institutional ratio imposed on the EEAS’s staffing mix.

12. The EEAS should aim to have a flexible staffing structure to maximise the contributions of its staff.

280 The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies 35

13. Staff rotations within the EEAS including its delegations, and between it and the rest of the EU and Member States should be widely encouraged.

14. Consideration should be given to the establishment of an EU diplomatic academy to train EU staff, officers from Member States and from third countries.

15. Training opportunities for staff at all levels and in all locations should be pursued and resourced.

16. The EU should make a commitment to institute an independent review of the new structure after it has been in operation for at least two years.

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OECD (2002). Development Assistance Committee. (2002) Development Cooperation Review: European Community, 2002. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/1/1935386.pdf Patten, Chris (2003). Europe in the World: CFSP & its relation to development. Address by Chris Patten, European Commissioner for External Relations to the Overseas Development Institute, 7 November 2003. http://www.odi.org.uk/speeches/edc_2010/patten.pdf Spence, David (2005a) ‘The Commission’s External Service’, chapter in The European Commission. London, John Harper, forthcoming August 2005. Spence, David (2005b). ‘The Commission and the Council in CFSP’, chapter in The European Commission. London, John Harper, forthcoming August 2005. Stetter, Stephan (2004). ‘Cross-pillar politics: functional unity and institutional fragmentation of EU foreign policies’ Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 11 no. 4, August 2004. Tonra, Ben (2002). ‘Ireland’, Chapter 9 in Hocking, Brian and Spence, David (eds) Foreign Ministries of the European Union: Integrating Diplomats. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp.157-158. Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004). Official Journal of the European Union. C 310, Vol. 47, 16 December 2004. http://europa.eu.int/eur- lex/lex/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML United Kingdom (2000). Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Consular work: Annual Review 2000. London, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, July 2000, p.2. http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/report2000.pdf United Kingdom (2003). Parliament. House of Commons. Minutes of Evidence. Oral evidence taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday 28 October 2003. Mr Denis McShane, Minister of State for Europe. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmfa ff/1233/3102806.htm United Kingdom (2004). Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Consular Directorate. In partnership: delivering high quality consular service. Strategy 2004-2007. [London] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, July 2004. http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/KFile/ConsularStrategy0804.pdf

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United Kingdom (2005). Parliament. House of Commons. Minutes of evidence taken before Foreign Affairs Committee. Developments in the European Union: European Council 17-17 December 2004. HC 110 – i. Corrected transcript of oral evidence of The Hon Jack Straw 6 December 2004. (The transcript is not yet an approved formal record of the proceedings and neither witnesses nor Members have had an opportunity to correct the record) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmf aff/c110-i/c11002.htm http://www.parliament.the-stationery- office.co.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmfaff/110/4120603.htm

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Also available from the Foreign Policy Centre:

FOREIGN MINISTER OF EUROPE Brian Crowe February 2005 £4.95

RESCUING THE STATE: EUROPE’S NEXT CHALLENGE Malcolm Chalmers April 2005

If the European Union has begun to develop a strategic identity outside its borders, it is rooted in the reconstruction of countries affected by government crisis or state collapse. From the early 1990s, the need to respond to the break-up of Yugoslavia and its associated wars has been a driving force in the evolution of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Today, the EU has primary responsibility for both the security and economic reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina – and it likely to play an equally prominent role in Kosovo in the years ahead. Beyond the Balkans, European funds have contributed to state-building in Palestine and governance projects worldwide.

NEW TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT Richard Youngs May 2005

Engagement is central to the European Union’s philosophy of external relations. Its approach to authoritarian and troubled states

288 43 centres on neither isolation nor confrontation, but the gradual transformation of their values and regimes. In the 1990s, the EU succeeded in guiding its eastern neighbours from Communism to accession. Today, it faces a new set of challenges to its east and south, and the future of EU enlargement is unclear – can the Union continue to engage and transform states in its region? And could it raise engagement from a regional to a global strategy?

EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM: EUROPE, REGIONAL SECURITY AND A REVITALISED UN Espen Barth Eide December 2004

There is currently intense debate on both the future of the UN and the EU’s prospects as a strategic actor. This collection of essays brings together arguments about the two organisations – and urges Europe to take the lead in making the UN more effective and legitimate.

THE 1989 CHINA ARMS BAN: PUTTING EUROPE’S POSITION TO CONGRESS Greg Austin April 2005 £4.95

The EU plan, agreed in December 2004, to lift its only arms control regime targeted exclusively at China has provoked strong opposition from the USA, Japan and several European parliaments. The question now is whether the EU can defend its position and face down international pressure, especially the clear threat of retaliation from a hostile US Congress.

The ‘strength of feeling’ among critics of lifting the embargo arises from lack of familiarity with Chinese decision-making toward Taiwan or human rights, or deliberate mis-representation of the facts. The author argues for the launch of a more robust public diplomacy campaign to convince the US that lifting the ban is important for a number of positive strategic reasons as it is inconsequential in terms of possible changes to Chinese policy on Taiwan or human rights.

289

UK PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF EU LEGISLATION Sir Digby Jones April 2005 £4.95

Half of all UK legislation which imposes burdens on businesses originates from the European Union. This figure will continue to grow as new and different policy fields are drawn into the area of European competence. Yet, given the depth of involvement of the EU in the UK’s regulatory regime, the British public are surprisingly ignorant about the EU, its policies and institutions – and many MPs do not follow events across the Channel. As a result, measures affecting millions of people and cost millions of pounds pass through UK formalities whilst barely causing a ripple. In this paper, Sir Digby Jones identifies four key principles for reform and argues that such reforms are needed to keep the British public informed on how the European Union really operates.

AN AFRICAN AL-JAZEERA?: MASS MEDIA AND THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE Philip Fiske de Gouveia May 2005 £4.95

A new momentum is building behind development efforts in Africa. The work of the UK Commission for Africa, for example, appears to be symptomatic of a renewed global interest in the world’s poorest continent. But while debate continues about how best to assist progress in Africa, one potential factor in the ‘African renaissance’ receives less attention than most: the media. Historically, the media has played a fundamental role in democratisation and economic growth across the world, yet its significance is routinely downplayed by development strategists. Taking his lead from the success of trans-national media like Al-Jazeera, the author examines how the media might contribute to much needed change across the African continent. What role could the media play as part of political and economic advances in Africa? Can and should Africa shrug off its perceived information dependence on the West? Should the creation of an indigenous pan-African broadcaster be a development priority?

290 45

PUTIN AND THE PRESS: THE REVIVAL OF SOVIET-STYLE PROPAGANDA Oleg Panfilov June 2005 £4.95

The re-emergence of the traditions of Soviet propaganda since 2000 represents a new era for the Russian media and domestic policy. This development has been facilitated by the dominance of Soviet- era journalists, trained to consider propaganda and counter- propaganda as important parts of state ideology. The widespread presence in government posts of Putin’s former KGB and FSB colleagues has also fostered this revival of Soviet-style propaganda, perpetuating the belief that it remains essential for Russian society to be dependent on regular dosages of manipulated information for Russia, and the reign of President Putin, to endure.

This pamphlet, by one of the most courageous of post-Soviet journalists, is a stinging indictment of the passivity of the mass media in Russia in the face of the re-emergence of Soviet-style propaganda techniques and administrative direction.

BRITISH PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE AGE OF ‘SCHISMS’ Mark Leonard, Andrew Small with Martin Rose February 2005 £9.95

The war in Iraq has had a seismic impact on international perceptions of Britain and British foreign policy, yet there is a big contrast between the cacophony of debate in the United States on the political and diplomatic fall-out of Iraq for US grand strategy, and the relative lack of public and political debate about how UK public diplomacy needs to change to reflect these new realities. In this book, the authors argue that a major rethink is needed in the approach taken to public diplomacy to respond to these shifts. Neither a redeployment of old Cold War propaganda tools, nor the 1990s variant of Cool Britannia will do. Instead, there should be a new set of trust-building practices that address the gaps in worldview and significant public opinion challenges that exist in our relationships with key allies, major new powers and the rest of the developing world.

291

CHINA GOES GLOBAL Yongjin Zhang April 2005

EUROPEAN CIVIC CITIZENSHIP AND INCLUSION INDEX Andrew Geddes and Jan Niessen March 2005

INDIA AS A NEW GLOBAL LEADER Prasenjit Basu, Brahma Chellaney, Parag Khanna and Sunil Khilnani February 2005

PRE-EMPTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM IN A NEW GLOBAL ORDER Amitai Etzioni October 2004

ENERGY EMPIRE: OIL, GAS AND RUSSIA’S REVIVAL Fiona Hill September 2004

THE BEIJING CONSENSUS Joshua Cooper Ramo Spring 2004

MORAL BRITANNIA? Evaluating the Ethical Dimension in Labour’s Foreign Policy Nicholas J Wheeler and Tim Dunne April 2004

Also available from the Foreign Policy Centre: Individual publications can be ordered from Central Books, 99 Wallis Road, London, E9 5LN Tel: +44 (0) 845 458 9910 Fax: +44 (0) 845 458 9912 Email: [email protected] (post and package charge applies)

To read online go to www.fpc.org.uk/publications

292

Ultimi dossier del Servizio Studi

XVI LEGISLATURA

Schede di lettura Disegno di legge A.S. n. 585 8 Conversione in legge del decreto-legge 16 maggio 2008, n. 85, recante disposizioni urgenti per l'adeguamento delle strutture di Governo in applicazione dell'articolo 1, commi 376 e 377, della legge 24 dicembre 2007, n. 244

Schede di lettura Disegno di legge A.S. n. 692 “Conversione in legge del decreto-legge 9 23 maggio 2008, n. 92, recante misure urgenti in materia di sicurezza pubblica”

Schede di lettura Disegno di legge A.S. n. 714 “Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del 10 decreto-legge 8 aprile 2008, n. 59, recante disposizioni urgenti per l’attuazione di obblighi comunitari e l’esecuzione di sentenze della Corte di giustizia delle Comunità europee”

Schede di lettura Disegno di legge A.S. n. 735 "Conversione in legge del decreto-legge 3 giugno 11 2008, n. 97, recante disposizioni urgenti in materia di monitoraggio e trasparenza dei meccanismi di allocazione della spesa pubblica, nonché in materia fiscale e di proroga di termini"

Testo a fronte Testi a fronte dei disegni di legge AA.SS. nn. 7, 52, 146, in materia di farmaci 12 orfani e malattie rare

Schede di lettura Disegno di legge A.S. n. 4-B “Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del 13 decreto-legge 23 aprile 2008, n. 80, recante misure urgenti per assicurare il pubblico servizio di trasporto aereo”

Schede di lettura Disegno di legge A.S. n. 692 “Conversione in legge del decreto-legge 23 maggio 14 2008, n. 92, recante misure urgenti in materia di sicurezza pubblica” Il testo con le modifiche approvate in sede referente

Dossier L'immigrazione in quattro paesi dell'Unione Europea: ingressi legali e 15 immigrazione clandestina

Schede di lettura Disegni di legge AA.SS. nn. 414 e 507 Prevenzione delle frodi nei settori del 16 credito al consumo, dei pagamenti dilazionati e differiti e nel settore assicurativo

17 Dossier Il contenzioso Stato-Regioni: dati quantitativi Schede di lettura Disegni di legge A.A.SS. nn. 733, 242, 391 e 583 in materia di sicurezza 18 pubblica

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