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Iprisviewpoints 147 IPRIS Viewpoints JULY 2014 Prelude to a War: The Run-up to Israel’s Operation ‘Protective Edge’ BRUNO OLIVEIRA MARTINS* Aarhus University, Denmark Affiliated Researcher, Portuguese Institute of International Relation and Security (IPRIS) In 8 July 2014, Israel and Hamas entered another war rael initiated a large-scale operation in the occupied Pal- following weeks of escalating tension. On the night of 17 estinian territories in the West Bank, allegedly in search July, Israel initiated a ground operation in the Gaza Strip. for the teenagers or their bodies. In the course of this This is the first time Israel has invaded the territory since search, the Israeli forces caused six Palestinian deaths the Operation Cast Lead in December 2008 and January and detained dozens of people not connected to the orig- 2009. As these lines are being written, 21 July, the con- inal event, including Palestinian parliamentarians and flict has now evolved into a full-fledged war that already former detainees that had been previously released by caused more than five hundred casualties and thousands Israel in 2011. The dimension of the military response of injured on the Palestinians side, predominantly civil- – that impacted indiscriminately on the daily lives of ians. 25 Israeli soldiers died between 19 and 21 July in hundreds of Palestinians in the West Bank – and the lan- Gaza, adding up to one Israeli civilian and one military guage employed by Netanyahu’s government escalated that were killed in Israeli territory in the course of the the tensions in two ways: 1) they framed the broader Pal- first ten days of the conflict. In addition, a number of Is- estinian population as responsible for the abductions and raeli civilians have been injured. As a new war unfolds in killings, and accordingly 2) collectively punished them. Gaza with uncertain future prospects, it is already pos- For as regrettable and unacceptable the deaths of the sible to draw some lines about the context that made it three innocent Israeli teenagers have been, the Israeli possible. This article puts forward five arguments about response is hard to be framed within the limits of both the conflict’s background context that were decisive for the concept of self-defense and the principle of propor- shaping the course of current events. tionality. If Israel clearly has the right to defend itself and to respond to attacks against its internationally-recog- The abductions were not the reason for the war nized territory, such as the massive launch of rockets The great majority of commentators and analysts have from Gaza into Israel, it does not possess the same pre- mentioned the abduction and killing of three Israeli teen- rogative in the same terms in events occurred outside its agers in the West Bank earlier on 12 June as the factor territory. By responding to the abductions and killings of that originated the events that are now taking place in Gaza. Having named Hamas responsible for these ab- * I would like to thank Åsne Kalland Aarstad, Maria Louise Clausen and Paulo ductions and killings without advancing any evidence, Is- Gorjão for their comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this article. IPRIS Viewpoints PREludE to a WaR: ThE Run-uP to IsRaEl’s OPERaTIOn ‘ProtecTIVE EdgE’ | 2 three civilian Israelis which occurred in the West Bank by Special Envoy to the Middle East Martin Indyk to resign. inflicting six deaths on Palestinians and arresting dozens It is therefore not surprising that Netanyahu’s inflexibil- of them, Israel conducted a response that legally is more ity regarding the Palestinian conciliation made his gov- censurable that the events that ernment protest vehemently triggered it. The explanation when both the US and the EU for these actions is therefore In 8 July 2014, Israel and welcomed the new Palestin- to be found within the realm of ian unity agreement. politics, rather than within the hamas entered another In line with his conduct in legal domain. In other words, war following weeks many other occasions during the Israeli response to the his mandates as prime min- abductions was based on po- of escalating tension. ister, Netanyahu exhibited litical and strategic consider- unwillingness to accept con- ations and not on a particular On the night of 17 July, crete steps that would break interpretation of the law. the status quo and could al- Israel initiated a ground low progress toward a per- Netanyahu would not allow a manent solution for the con- Palestinian unity government operation in the gaza strip. flict. His government failed to The 2nd June 2014 marked an This is the first time Israel recognize that the Palestin- historical day in Palestine, ian unity government explic- when a new Palestinian unity has invaded the territory itly adhered to the three prin- government backed by Hamas ciples imposed by the Middle and Fatah was officially sworn since the Operation cast East Quartet (the US, the EU, in by President Mahmoud Ab- the UN and Russia) on the bas. Following years of fierce lead in december 2008 Palestinian side: 1) the recog- and bloody confrontation be- nition of the existence of the tween the two main factions of and January 2009. state of Israel; 2) the abid- the Palestinian political spec- as a new war unfolds in ance to previous agreements; trum, this unity government and 3) the renunciation to vio- was welcomed both by the US gaza with uncertain future lence as a means to achieving and by the EU because it con- goals.1 Moreover, as became stituted a fundamental and prospects, it is already explicit on the 2nd June, the concrete step towards one of new Palestinian unity govern- the main factors preventing possible to draw some ment had no minister belong- a permanent solution for the ing to Hamas. Despite this fa- Israeli-Palestinian conflict: lines about the context vorable setting, recognized by the rivalry between Hamas that made it possible. Israel’s closest international and Fatah. The reconciliation partners, Netanyahu’s cabi- between these two actors has This article puts forward net was unable to overcome been widely seen as conditio its resoluteness in sidelining sine qua non for the creation five arguments about the Hamas, whatever the costs of the Palestinian state and this position would bring. thus for enabling the practical conflict’s background viability of the two-state solu- El-Sisi’s Egypt works against tion. context that were decisive Hamas Yet, the Israeli government for shaping the course of In November 2012, the 8-day does not see this agreement Israeli operation ‘Pillar of De- from the same viewpoint. In current events. fense’ over Gaza ended with a line with its absolute refusal ceasefire brokered by Egypt. to recognize Hamas as a po- Then-President Mohamed litical player in the region, Israel did not accept a Pales- tinian government politically backed by the group. This 1 Speaking in Beirut in early June 2014, US Secretary of State John Kerry position had been made very clear earlier in April, when stated that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas “made clear the Israeli-Palestinian talks mediated by US Secretary that this new technocratic government is committed to the principles of non of State John Kerry were abandoned by Israel after nine violence, negotiations, recognizing the state of Israel, acceptance of the months of dialogue. The reason behind this move was previous agreements and the Quartet principles”. “Kerry: US to monitor Hamas-backed Palestinian unity government” (AFP via The Times of Israel, 4 the announcement of the Hamas-Fatah principle agree- June 2014). ment on 23 April. The failure of the talks, in turn, led US IPRIS Viewpoints PREludE to a WaR: ThE Run-uP to IsRaEl’s OPERaTIOn ‘ProtecTIVE EdgE’ | 3 Morsi, leading an islamist administration that empow- was created largely because of Hamas desperation and ered the Muslim Brotherhood, seemed to emerge from isolation.2 Not only did the relations with Egypt grow in- the conflict as a new regional leader after having man- creasingly hostile, but also its ties with both Syria and aged to balance a position that was accepted by Israel Iran have recently been damaged by Hamas’ reluctance and the Palestinians, but also by the international com- to provide explicit support to the Assad regime in Damas- munity. Less than two years later, the geopolitical equa- cus. This eventually led to the closure of its headquarters tion in the Middle East is now very different. The coup in the Syrian capital in 2013.3 that removed Morsi and his government from power in The international pressure on Hamas was reflected in its July 2013 brought the Egyptian support for Hamas down marginalization from the international efforts to contrib- together with it. Egypt’s President Abdul el-Sisi, in office ute to a permanent solution for the conflict. If one can ar- since the 24-26 May 2014 elections, has an agenda where gue that it was this pressure that led it to reach an agree- there is no room for the backing of islamist movements ment with the Fatah where the acceptance of the Quartet such as Hamas. Currently, Hamas is widely perceived as principles was stated, it can surely be said that better a terrorist organization by the government in Cairo. and more comprehensive solutions should have been Along these lines, it was expected that Hamas would not reached long time before. For this to have happened, the accept the ceasefire proposed by Egypt in 14 July. The international community should have creatively engaged ceasefire was announced to the international media al- with the ones who have been the governing authority in legedly without previous consultation with Hamas, a fact Gaza for almost a decade.
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