DOCSLIB.ORG

Palestine in Egypt: from Solidarity to Fear to Common Struggle

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Palestine in Egypt: from Solidarity to Fear to Common Struggle FOKUS | 5/2014 Palestine in Egypt: From Solidarity to Fear to Common Struggle Stefanie Felsberger The argument goes that the conflict between economic, social and security problems. Sec- the Egyptian regime’s interests became ever Israelis and Palestinians is the source of most ondly, I argue that the role Palestine has played closer aligned with those of the Israeli state and social, economic, political and religious conflict in Egyptian politics in the last years is indicative with every accusation the regime positioned in the Middle East and that a solution to the of a convergence of interests of the current itself more firmly against the Palestinian people. conflict would therefore bring peace to the war- Egyptian regime, its supporters in the Gulf, the torn region. West and Israel. Thus, the old argument that Also events surrounding the Egyptian revoluti- fulfilling the Palestinian struggle for justice will on were closely informed by these geopolitical Today, any connection is being pushed to the solve many of the region’s problems holds more realities. The Palestinian struggle was for many margins: the official Saudi Arabian newspa- weight today than ever: the struggle for justice activists the one issue which politicized them per even claims “there is no more Israeli-Arab in Palestine cannot be achieved without a simul- and solidarity protests during the Second Intifa- conflict.”1 The Egyptian government started taneous fight for economic, social, political and da taught many protestors strategies and tools constructing a buffer zone on the Gaza border religious rights in the surrounding countries of mobilization.6 But criticizing Egypt’s policies without facing uproar. Egypt in general seems which tacitly condone or openly support Israel’s towards Israel had also been an enabling factor to have become fiercely anti-Palestinian and policies and atrocities. for the opposition as a whole.7 Furthermore, one during the latest round of Israeli aggression core demand of the uprising was dignity – per- against Gaza Arab governments merely showed Contextualizing Palestine in Egypt sonal but also collective dignity: meaning, the superficial support for Gaza;2 worse, also the Egyptian government was regarded as caring populations in the surrounding Arab states de- The position of the Egyptian state towards Pa- more about the needs of the United States and monstrated weak support. The question is why lestine has varied greatly – from vocal support Israel than for its own citizens. Liberating Egypt it seems that any solidarity with the Palestinians to anti-Palestinian propaganda. But regardless from these foreign pressures was also a moti- has disappeared in Arab states. of how the different Egyptian regimes have vator for demonstrators. The Egyptian regime portrayed Palestinians, Egyptians remained during and before the uprising continued to use Instead of accepting that there is no connection surprisingly supportive of Palestine and deeply Palestine to externalize threats: in January 2011 between the struggles of the Palestinians and antagonistic towards Israel.3 This indicates an the Alexandria Church bombing was blamed their Arab neighbours, I argue that these strug- instinctive feeling about connectedness of their on Hamas and later demonstrators on Tahrir gles are closely connected and that obscuring common fight. Square were denounced as Hamas agents and the link between them is a deliberate attempt to Palestinians.8 hide the common interests of those actors who Anti-Palestinian propaganda in Egypt was deny Palestinians’ their rights as well as those started under President Anwar al-Sadat after After Mohammed Morsi from the MB was elec- who suppress their neighbouring populations signing the Camp David peace accord with Is- ted President, the anti-Palestinian propaganda – and of course their international allies. These rael in 1978. Egypt became an ally of the US and grew more baseless and harmful: rumours were connections, common interests and the resul- Israel and replaced its pan-Arab ideology with spread that the stifling power cuts in Egypt ting convergence of the different emancipatory a fiercely chauvinist and anti-Palestinian Egypt- were caused by Morsi transferring too much struggles are what I address in this paper. I First nationalism.4 This trend only intensified electricity to Gaza. The allegation that Morsi specifically focus on Egypt, Israel, Gaza and the under Hosni Mubarak. Propaganda focused on cared more for Gaza than his own people was international as well as regional players. The Gaza and Hamas - painting them as dangerous used to question his patriotism and at the same interplay of these actors is exemplary of a wider enemy connected to the Muslim Brotherhood time to put blame on Gaza for causing electri- regional development. (MB). The accusation was spread that the city shortages. Furthermore, when in 2012 Brotherhood was planning a violent takeover sixteen Egyptian border guards were killed in I first explain the role Palestine has played in of Egypt just like Hamas had taken over Gaza an attack, many TV pundits – loyal to the ancien Egypt both during and before the Egyptian up- following their 2006 electoral victory. This fear- régime – instantly blamed Palestinian groups rising. I delineate how the Egyptian regime used mongering also provided Egypt with an excuse and Morsi for opening the Rafah border into Palestine both as tool to delegitimize dissent to intensify the cooperation with Israel and to Gaza.9 The attack was most likely committed by and criticism as well as to externalize blame for intensify the blockade of Gaza.5 Step-by-step another militant group in Sinai but blamed were 1 FOKUS | 5/2014 Palestinians who were subsequently prevented between Hamas and terrorism in Egypt compli- Especially, the PA’s close security cooperation from leaving Gaza. cates the actual challenge by Jihadist and extre- with the Israeli occupation forces is seen as mist groups in the Sinai.15 Sinai’s impoverished humiliating and infuriating, Palestinian leader Since Morsi was deposed by popular protests population is excluded from the tourist industry Mahmoud Abbas though called it a „sacred – where signs saying “death to Gaza” could be and has thus been forced to resort to trafficking duty.“25 This shows how even the PA has become seen –10 and the military, the demonization of drugs or smuggling through the tunnels.16 The engulfed in the alliance of status-quo forces and Palestinians has reached sickening levels. state does not tackle these problems but blames how choosing the PA as representative during Hamas for the insecurity and does nothing to negotiations served more American, European, Convergence alleviate the very real grievances of the locals. Israeli and Egyptian interests than anything Instead the state is further marginalizing them:17 else. Thus, the aim during ceasefire negotiations After having put the relation between Egypt recently, more than 1,156 families on the Gaza was to alleviate Gaza’s plight while without and Palestine into context, I argue that Egypt border have been forced out of their homes in making neither Israel look like the defeated has become part of an alliance which is moving order to make space for a 1 km wide buffer zone nor Hamas a victor.26 Granting Hamas a victory heaven and earth to take back every single right which is supposed to further isolate Gaza.18 could be interpreted as a victory for the Muslim and every shred of dignity wrestled from them Brotherhood – at least in the eyes of Egypt and during the Arab uprisings. This alliance consists The narrative of the fight against terrorism has Israel where every measure has been taken to mainly of Saudi-Arabia, the United Arab Emira- also enabled the recent atrocities in Gaza and confound the two.27 tes (UAE), Jordan, Egypt and Israel – all united Egypt’s official position during this operation by their common interest to stamp out the upri- has made obvious how decrepit the Egyptian The forces seeking to maintain the status- sings, which terrified them to the core, and the state has become: while the Israeli military was quo have thus come together to stifle every threat they posed to their hold over power and killing at least 2,189 Palestinians,19 the media challenge to their privileges and to suppress their privileges. The alignment of these actors’ was encouraging Israel to finish off Hamas.20 any popular challenge to their absolute hold on interests proves how closely connected popular At the same time Egypt’s allies were giving power. And it is especially the excuse of fighting struggles in the region have become. Thus, Israel the green light to go after Hamas.21 radical Islam or terrorism, which unifies Egypt, challenging the Egyptian government today Egypt though assumed its role as mediator Israel, the PA, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan and means challenging Israel, their regional counter- between the Palestinians and Israel, which was their European and American allies.28 In the past revolutionary partners and their American and increasingly difficult dueo t Egypt’s bias against the Arab states would have named Israel as the European allies. I shall explain why. Hamas. The best example hereof is the ceasefire existential threat to peace and security in the proposal Egypt put forward after consultation Middle East, but the country moved from being Shocked at how fast the US dropped Mubarak with Israel but without contacting Hamas.22 seen as threat to being regarded as essential when faced with a popular
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Examples of Iraq and Syria
    BearWorks MSU Graduate Theses Fall 2017 The Unraveling of the Nation-State in the Middle East: Examples of Iraq and Syria Zachary Kielp Missouri State University, [email protected] As with any intellectual project, the content and views expressed in this thesis may be considered objectionable by some readers. However, this student-scholar’s work has been judged to have academic value by the student’s thesis committee members trained in the discipline. The content and views expressed in this thesis are those of the student-scholar and are not endorsed by Missouri State University, its Graduate College, or its employees. Follow this and additional works at: https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Near and Middle Eastern Studies Commons Recommended Citation Kielp, Zachary, "The Unraveling of the Nation-State in the Middle East: Examples of Iraq and Syria" (2017). MSU Graduate Theses. 3225. https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/3225 This article or document was made available through BearWorks, the institutional repository of Missouri State University. The work contained in it may be protected by copyright and require permission of the copyright holder for reuse or redistribution. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE UNRAVELING OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: EXAMPLES OF IRAQ AND SYRIA A Masters Thesis Presented to The Graduate College of Missouri State University TEMPLATE In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Science, Defense and Strategic Studies By Zachary Kielp December 2017 Copyright 2017 by Zachary Kielp ii THE UNRAVELING OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: EXAMPLES OF IRAQ AND SYRIA Defense and Strategic Studies Missouri State University, December 2017 Master of Science Zachary Kielp ABSTRACT After the carnage of World War One and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire a new form of political organization was brought to the Middle East, the Nation-State.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkey and Pakistan's Foreign Policy Congruence
    DISCUSSION PAPER Turkey and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Congruence: A Co-orientation Analysis of Political Messaging Ravale Mohydin DISCUSSION PAPER Turkey and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Congruence: A Co-orientation Analysis of Political Messaging Ravale Mohydin Turkey and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Congruence: A Co-orientation Analysis of Political Messaging © TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WRITTEN BY Ravale Mohydin PUBLISHER TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE November 2020 TRT WORLD İSTANBUL AHMET ADNAN SAYGUN STREET NO:83 34347 ULUS, BEŞİKTAŞ İSTANBUL / TURKEY TRT WORLD LONDON PORTLAND HOUSE 4 GREAT PORTLAND STREET NO:4 LONDON / UNITED KINGDOM TRT WORLD WASHINGTON D.C. 1819 L STREET NW SUITE 700 20036 WASHINGTON DC www.trtworld.com researchcentre.trtworld.com The opinions expressed in this discussion paper represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the TRT World Research Centre. 4 Turkey and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Congruence: A Co-orientation Analysis of Political Messaging Introduction urkey and Pakistan have a The paper will first introduce the co-orientation longstanding relationship, model of communication and outline its evolu- dating back to even before tion that eventually explained how to measure 1947 when Turkey was the an individual’s or group’s congruence with an- second country to recognise other on a particular issue. Then, it will explain Pakistan’s sovereign status, its applicability in evaluating the relationship Tto when Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent between states and operationalise it by defining supported the Ottoman Empire as part of the the research methodology based on framing Khilafat Movement1.
    [Show full text]
  • Protest and State–Society Relations in the Middle East and North Africa
    SIPRI Policy Paper PROTEST AND STATE– 56 SOCIETY RELATIONS IN October 2020 THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA dylan o’driscoll, amal bourhrous, meray maddah and shivan fazil STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. GOVERNING BOARD Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Chair (Sweden) Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia) Espen Barth Eide (Norway) Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Dr Radha Kumar (India) Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra (Algeria) Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/United Kingdom) Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews (United States) DIRECTOR Dan Smith (United Kingdom) Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden Telephone: + 46 8 655 9700 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org Protest and State– Society Relations in the Middle East and North Africa SIPRI Policy Paper No. 56 dylan o’driscoll, amal bourhrous, meray maddah and shivan fazil October 2020 © SIPRI 2020 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of SIPRI or as expressly permitted by law. Contents Preface v Acknowledgements vi Summary vii Abbreviations ix 1. Introduction 1 Figure 1.1. Classification of countries in the Middle East and North Africa by 2 protest intensity 2. State–society relations in the Middle East and North Africa 5 Mass protests 5 Sporadic protests 16 Scarce protests 31 Highly suppressed protests 37 Figure 2.1.
    [Show full text]
  • Israeli–Palestinian Peacemaking January 2019 Middle East and North the Role of the Arab States Africa Programme
    Briefing Israeli–Palestinian Peacemaking January 2019 Middle East and North The Role of the Arab States Africa Programme Yossi Mekelberg Summary and Greg Shapland • The positions of several Arab states towards Israel have evolved greatly in the past 50 years. Four of these states in particular – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and (to a lesser extent) Jordan – could be influential in shaping the course of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. • In addition to Egypt and Jordan (which have signed peace treaties with Israel), Saudi Arabia and the UAE, among other Gulf states, now have extensive – albeit discreet – dealings with Israel. • This evolution has created a new situation in the region, with these Arab states now having considerable potential influence over the Israelis and Palestinians. It also has implications for US positions and policy. So far, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Jordan have chosen not to test what this influence could achieve. • One reason for the inactivity to date may be disenchantment with the Palestinians and their cause, including the inability of Palestinian leaders to unite to promote it. However, ignoring Palestinian concerns will not bring about a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which will continue to add to instability in the region. If Arab leaders see regional stability as being in their countries’ interests, they should be trying to shape any eventual peace plan advanced by the administration of US President Donald Trump in such a way that it forms a framework for negotiations that both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships can accept. Israeli–Palestinian Peacemaking: The Role of the Arab States Introduction This briefing forms part of the Chatham House project, ‘Israel–Palestine: Beyond the Stalemate’.
    [Show full text]
  • Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S
    Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy Updated May 19, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RS21534 SUMMARY RS21534 Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy May 19, 2021 The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic partner of the United States since 1980, when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its Kenneth Katzman facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since Specialist in Middle then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter terrorist groups and other regional threats. In Eastern Affairs January 2020, Oman’s longtime leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said, passed away and was succeeded by Haythim bin Tariq Al Said, a cousin selected by Oman’s royal family immediately upon Qaboos’s death. Sultan Haythim espouses policies similar to those of Qaboos and has not altered U.S.-Oman ties or Oman’s regional policies. During Qaboos’s reign (1970-2020), Oman generally avoided joining other countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates , Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional military interventions, instead seeking to mediate their resolution. Oman joined but did not contribute forces to the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, nor did it arm groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Asad’s regime. It opposed the June 2017 Saudi/UAE- led isolation of Qatar and had urged resolution of that rift before its resolution in January 2021.
    [Show full text]
  • Middle East Brief, No
    Judith and Sidney Swartz Director and Professor of Politics Islamists in Power and Women’s Rights: Shai Feldman Associate Director The Case of Tunisia Kristina Cherniahivsky Charles (Corky) Goodman Professor Carla B. Abdo-Katsipis of Middle East History and Associate Director for Research Naghmeh Sohrabi uch scholarship has been devoted to the question Myra and Robert Kraft Professor Mof Islamist governance, its compatibility with of Arab Politics Eva Bellin democracy, and its sociopolitical implications for women. Henry J. Leir Professor of the Some assert that Islamists cannot be in support of Economics of the Middle East democracy, and women who support democracy would not Nader Habibi support Islamists, as traditional Muslim law accords women Renée and Lester Crown Professor 1 of Modern Middle East Studies fewer rights than men. In the context of the 2010-11 Jasmine Pascal Menoret Revolution in Tunisia, many asked whether Tunisian Senior Fellows women would lose rights, particularly those concerning Abdel Monem Said Aly, PhD 2 Kanan Makiya personal status and family law, when the Islamist political party Ennahda won 41 percent of the votes in the 2011 Goldman Senior Fellow Khalil Shikaki, PhD Constituent Assembly elections and maintained a significant 3 Research Fellow proportion of seats in subsequent elections. Monica Marks David Siddhartha Patel, PhD elaborates on this concern, explaining that those opposed Marilyn and Terry Diamond to Ennahda believed that it would “wage a war against Junior Research Fellow Mohammed Masbah, PhD women’s rights, mandate the hijab, and enforce a separate Neubauer Junior Research Fellow sphere ethos aimed at returning Tunisia’s feminists back to Serra Hakyemez, PhD their kitchens.”4 Junior Research Fellows Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux, PhD This Brief argues that Ennahda’s inclusion in Tunisia’s government has had Ahmad Shokr, PhD a counterintuitive impact on gender-based progress in the country.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel's Apartheid Regime
    Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia Israeli Practices towards the Palestinian People and the Question of Apartheid Palestine and the Israeli Occupation, Issue No. 1 E/ESCWA/ECRI/2017/1 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) Israeli Practices towards the Palestinian People and the Question of Apartheid Palestine and the Israeli Occupation, Issue No. 1 United Nations Beirut, 2017 © 2017 United Nations All rights reserved worldwide Photocopies and reproductions of excerpts are allowed with proper credits. All queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), e-mail: [email protected]. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or its officials or Member States. The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Links contained in this publication are provided for the convenience of the reader and are correct at the time of issue. The United Nations takes no responsibility for the continued accuracy of that information or for the content of any external website. References have, wherever possible, been verified. Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.
    [Show full text]
  • READ Middle East Brief 101 (PDF)
    Judith and Sidney Swartz Director and Professor of Politics Repression and Protest in Saudi Arabia Shai Feldman Associate Director Kristina Cherniahivsky Pascal Menoret Charles (Corky) Goodman Professor of Middle East History and Associate Director for Research few months after 9/11, a Saudi prince working in Naghmeh Sohrabi A government declared during an interview: “We, who Senior Fellow studied in the West, are of course in favor of democracy. As a Abdel Monem Said Aly, PhD matter of fact, we are the only true democrats in this country. Goldman Senior Fellow Khalil Shikaki, PhD But if we give people the right to vote, who do you think they’ll elect? The Islamists. It is not that we don’t want to Myra and Robert Kraft Professor 1 of Arab Politics introduce democracy in Arabia—but would it be reasonable?” Eva Bellin Underlying this position is the assumption that Islamists Henry J. Leir Professor of the Economics of the Middle East are enemies of democracy, even if they use democratic Nader Habibi means to come to power. Perhaps unwittingly, however, the Sylvia K. Hassenfeld Professor prince was also acknowledging the Islamists’ legitimacy, of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies Kanan Makiya as well as the unpopularity of the royal family. The fear of Islamists disrupting Saudi politics has prompted very high Renée and Lester Crown Professor of Modern Middle East Studies levels of repression since the 1979 Iranian revolution and the Pascal Menoret occupation of the Mecca Grand Mosque by an armed Salafi Neubauer Junior Research Fellow group.2 In the past decades, dozens of thousands have been Richard A.
    [Show full text]
  • Reimagining US Strategy in the Middle East
    REIMAGININGR I A I I G U.S.S STRATEGYT A E Y IIN THET E MMIDDLED L EEASTS Sustainable Partnerships, Strategic Investments Dalia Dassa Kaye, Linda Robinson, Jeffrey Martini, Nathan Vest, Ashley L. Rhoades C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA958-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0662-0 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. 2021 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover composite design: Jessica Arana Image: wael alreweie / Getty Images Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Light at the End of Their Tunnels? Hamas & the Arab
    LIGHT AT THE END OF THEIR TUNNELS? HAMAS & THE ARAB UPRISINGS Middle East Report N°129 – 14 August 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. TWO SIDES OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS .................................................................... 1 A. A WEDDING IN CAIRO.................................................................................................................. 2 B. A FUNERAL IN DAMASCUS ........................................................................................................... 5 1. Balancing ..................................................................................................................................... 5 2. Mediation ..................................................................................................................................... 6 3. Confrontation ............................................................................................................................... 7 4. The crossfire................................................................................................................................. 8 5. Competing alliances ................................................................................................................... 10 C. WHAT IMPACT ON HAMAS? ......................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • I. the Middle East and North Africa: 2016 in Perspective Dan Smith
    armed conflict and instability in the middle east 75 I. The Middle East and North Africa: 2016 in perspective dan smith Introduction The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remained at the heart of global security concerns throughout 2016. Events in the region continued to have a major impact on neighbouring areas and on the world stage, while the influence and actions of outside powers in turn had a crucial impact on the region. Because of its strategic location and natural resource wealth in oil and gas, it is an arena in which external powers compete for power, both directly and through local alliances. The region’s strategic significance for world peace and security thus remains as great and as troubling as ever. No single factor can explain its seemingly chronic insecurity and persistent susceptibility to armed conflict. A variety of factors need to be understood and addressed to help the region achieve greater stability and security for its people. These factors include governance failures in most Arab countries and the anger and resentment this has provoked, which led to a surge of popu- lar mobilizations in 2011 that at the time seemed set to transform the Arab world. Other factors relate to the still-unfolding consequences of the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States-led coalition and the complex relations and rivalries between regional powers, most notably between Iran and Saudi Arabia. There is also an increasing tendency for the regional powers to intervene in the affairs of other countries in the region. In 2016 at least 7 of the 16 countries in the region used military force in combat on their own territory, and 11 on the territory of other countries (see table 3.1).
    [Show full text]
  • Islamism After the Arab Spring: Between the Islamic State and the Nation-State the Brookings Project on U.S
    Islamism after the Arab Spring: Between the Islamic State and the nation-state The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World U.S.-Islamic World Forum Papers 2015 January 2017 Shadi Hamid, William McCants, and Rashid Dar The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide in- novative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institu- tion, its management, or its other scholars. Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW independence and impact. Activities supported by its Washington, DC 20036 donors reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are not determined by any donation. www.brookings.edu/islamic-world STEERING n 2015, we returned to Doha for the views of the participants of the work- COMMITTEE the 12th annual U.S.-Islamic World ing groups or the Brookings Institution. MArtiN INDYK Forum. Co-convened annually by Select working group papers will be avail- Executive Ithe Brookings Project on U.S. Relations able on our website. Vice President with the Islamic World and the State of Brookings Qatar, the Forum is the premier inter- We would like to take this opportunity BRUCE JONES national gathering of leaders in govern- to thank the State of Qatar for its sup- Vice President ment, civil society, academia, business, port in convening the Forum with us.
    [Show full text]