Canadian Public Policy

The Politics of Asymmetrical Federalism: Reconsidering the Role and Responsibilities of Ottawa Author(s): Kathy L. Brock Reviewed work(s): Source: Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Jun., 2008), pp. 143-161 Published by: University of Toronto Press on behalf of Canadian Public Policy Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25463605 . Accessed: 02/10/2012 16:46

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http://www.jstor.org The Politics of Asymmetrical

Federalism: Reconsidering the

Role and Responsibilities of Ottawa

Kathy L. Brock School of Policy Studies and Department of Political Studies Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario

Dans cet article, je soutiens que, s'il est souhaitable et meme n6cessaire que les diverses composantes de toute federation concluent des arrangements asymetriques, au Canada, depuis plusieurs ann6es, les empifctements du gouvernement federal sur les competences des provinces ont graduellement suscite un r6flexe protecteur dans les provinces, et que cela a entrain^ une multiplication des ententes reconnaissant les differences provinciales. Or, la nature et la diversity de ces ententes est en train de saper les notions de courtoisie, de bonne volonte et d'intercomprehension si essentielles k l'unite nationale. Pour eviter de poursuivre dans cette direction et de fragiliser ainsi les liens qui maintiennent lafederation, le gouvernement federal devrait revoir le role qu'il y joue. Le federalisme d'ouverture de Tactuel gouvernement conservateur constitue un debut dans ce processus de redefinition des roles et des responsabilifes des gouvernements federal et provinciaux ; toutefois, pour assurer l'avenir de lafederation, il faudra la mise en oeuvre de plus de mesures constructives et fondees sur des principes.

Mots eles :federalisme asymetrique, federalisme d'ouverture, relations intergouvernementales, partage des pouvoirs, responsabilites du gouvernement federal, competences provinciales, pouvoir de depenser

This article argues that while asymmetrical arrangements among the units of any federation are necessary and even desirable, federal encroachments on provincial jurisdiction in Canada over the past few decades have triggered a protective impulse in the provinces that has resulted in a multiplication of deals recognizing provincial differences. The nature and variety of such arrangements are undermining the sense of federal comity, goodwill, and understanding so critical to national unity. To avoid heading further down this trajectory and attenuating the bonds that hold the nation together, the federal government should reconsider its role in the federation. While the current Conservative government policy of open federalism begins this reconceptualization of federal and provincial roles and responsibilities, more constructive and principled

action is required.

Keywords: asymmetrical federalism, open federalism, intergovernmental relations, division of powers, federal responsibilities, provincial jurisdiction, spending power

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differences among the prov healthy. The remedy to this situation lies in under to ensure Accommodatinginces the survival of the Canadian standing how the changing role of the federal federation has been a longstanding feature of the government since the 1950s has contributed to this nation's history. Although the country has reached dissension and then rethinking the role of the fed of was points political crisis when its very existence eral government within the federation in light of in doubt, the Canadian nation has muddled through those reflections. Thus, the article begins by identi and survived. However, since the 1970s, the clashes fying the two conceptions of the means of among our governments have become more acute, implementing asymmetrical federalism that are in frequent, and bitter. On the constitutional front, ten conflict and noting the dangers inherent in the cur sions escalated from the 1971 Victoria Charter to rent situation where they vie for dominance. The the 1982 patriation of the constitution and entrench article then takes a brief and necessarily episodic ment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and excursion into history to offer examples of how the Freedoms, culminating in the constitutional wars evolving role of the federal government led to this fought in the late 1980s and early 1990s and, finally, period of aggravated intergovernmental tensions and in the 1995 Quebec Referendum that brought the caused the provinces to react to protect their juris country to the brink of national disunity. On the diction and to attempt to limit and direct federal intergovernmental side, relatively harmonious rela intrusions into their policy areas. The article con tions during the expansion of the welfare state began cludes by speculating on the way out of this to sour in the 1970s as the federal government be dilemma. While asymmetrical treatment of one or came more conscious of its perilous budget situation, more of the provinces might appear as a convenient and grew vitriolic when the federal government in political tool for national unity when a national com troduced unilateral cuts to transfers to the provinces mitment is forged, the current application of in the 1990s. Currently, even as our governments asymmetry is undermining the very sense of comity negotiate or sign national deals like the 2004 Health and reciprocal goodwill needed to sustain the union Accord, the Kyoto Agreement on the environment, in the longer term. The healthy future of the nation or the 2004 and 2007 agreements on equalization, does not rest on multiplying the degrees of asym tensions abound with provinces left offside or ve metry within the nation but instead on amodernized hemently objecting. Why are intergovernmental version of principled federalism. relations so tense at the summit level? Are we less able to accommodate provincial differences within the nation in recent decades than in the first half of Asymmetrical Federalism: Two Views its existence? Or are the means we have chosen to Collide accommodate differences actually exacerbating the tensions caused by those provincial differences in Federal systems in their most basic form tend to be stead of building bridges among the provinces and asymmetrical. Differences within a federation nationally? among the units may arise from geography, history, demographics, economic and fiscal realities, popu This article argues that while asymmetrical ar lation characteristics, culture, or other key rangements within the Canadian federation have characteristics specific to particular units (Milne been a critical factor inmaintaining national unity 2005). As a result, a certain degree of asymmetry in since Confederation, two conceptions of how pro policy is natural in any federation despite national vincial differences should be accommodated in goals or objectives, since implementation and inter nationwide deals are colliding and causing more pretation will depend on the differences in each tension among the units and between the federal province or region and on their special needs. Where government and the provinces than is necessary or asymmetry among the units is extreme, it may

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engender tensions particularly as it affects the abil with Ottawa inmany cases (Leo 2006; Sancton 2007, ity of each unit to exercise its constitutional 314-6). Differences like these tend to be accepted; responsibilities (Watts 1999, 65). However, for the comparisons among the provinces do not tend to most part both asymmetry and asymmetrical treat generate conflict or resentment unless they are mani ment of the various units of a federation are the fest in sharp contrasts in provincial abilities to lubricant of themachinery that keeps the nation roll provide for their citizens' well-being. ing along. In contrast to political asymmetry, constitutional Now, as Ron Watts has helpfully provided, two asymmetry refers to "the degree to which powers kinds of asymmetry may affect the operation of any assigned to regional units by the constitution of the federation. Political asymmetry "arises from the federation are not uniform (Watts 1999, 63)." In impact of cultural, economic, social and political many cases, the forms of asymmetry and associated conditions affecting the relative power, influence powers or policies are not contested. For example, and relations of different regional units with each the constitutional promise by Ottawa to Prince other and with the federal government (1999, 63)." Edward Island (PEI) to provide a link with themain So, for example, agreements abound between Ot land resulting first in a ferry and then in the tawa and the provinces that correspond to the Confederation Bridge was generally accepted by the different needs, assets, and abilities of the provinces other provinces and even trumpeted as an example to pursue public goods. At the level of government of national unity by the premier of New Brunswick, are operations, these agreements often not contested, notwithstanding the controversy it caused in PEI and different agreements often prove to be useful (Vance 2006, 18-27). In other areas, different pow models for other jurisdictions (Bakvis and Skogstad ers accorded the provinces under the constitution 2002, 14). The Quebec pension plan or income tax have generated bitter comparisons. For example, the collection scheme are both examples of asymmetri denial of control over natural resources to the west ern was a cause cal treatment of that province within national provinces root of western alienation agreements. Asymmetry may arise even within the and resulted in the 1930s Natural Resources Trans same allocation of jurisdiction. For example, the fer Act rendering the powers of those provinces allocation of provincial jurisdiction over education symmetrical to the original four (Gibbins and in the Constitution Act, 1867 is symmetrical, apply Arrison 1995, 10-12). Current restrictions on the ing to all provinces equally. Despite this similar control of the northern territories over natural re sources are constitutional treatment, Ontario, Quebec, and New generating similar resentments. Still,

foundland have had different school systems other forms of constitutional asymmetry are ac resulting from their pre-Confederation histories re cepted either wholeheartedly or begrudgingly as flected in their original terms of entry into essential to the operation of the provinces and Confederation and common law.Their powers to act nation. in this area are circumscribed by these political and constitutional differences. However, it has generally In its most recent (and reincarnated) usage in been viewed as within their purview to order their Canada, asymmetrical federalism refers to the dif school systems as they deem necessary, and even ferent treatment of particular provinces within the when Newfoundland altered its constitution in the Canadian federation whether constitutional or po 1990s to allow for changes in its education system, litical to offset their disabling differences (needs) the federal government acceded to its request. An or to enhance their natural assets. Where this dif other example would be provincial jurisdiction over ferential treatment has potentially become more local government?same power, different configu destructive to the federation involves the signing of rations in each province and different arrangements national agreements in critical policy areas.

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Asymmetry is being realized in two ways that em 2004a). While Quebec committed to the overall ob body fundamentally different visions of the nation jectives and general principles of the Health Accord, and its future operation. These two approaches are especially to the principles of a public health system captured in the 2004 Health Accord and the 2004 and to cooperation with the other governments on 2007 succession of agreements on equalization. The developing indicators of progress and sharing best September 2004 health care accord was heralded as practices and information, itmaintained control over a significant achievement that would set the param planning, organizing, and managing its health care eters of better health care for the next decade. services. The communique also contained an explicit Surprisingly, all of the provincial premiers signed non-derogation clause protecting Quebec's jurisdiction onto this deal that signalled increased intergovern (PMO 2004b). According to Tom Courchene (2004, mental cooperation in an area of primarily provincial 27), the federal government agreed orally to extend jurisdiction. In contrast, the October 2004 Equali ing the same arrangements to Alberta and British was zation Agreement controversial even at signing, Columbia and thus to any other province during the with one provincial premier (Newfoundland and final negotiations on the Health Accord. The under Labrador) storming out of the meetings and refus standing is that the other provinces could qualify for ing to sign, and other premiers questioning the the same deal as Quebec should they desire it?Que fairness of the deal for the "have not" provinces. bec is not singled out for special treatment but has Different in content as well as in temper of the pro merely taken advantage of an arrangement open to any cess, the two deals were similar in symbolizing a province. Further, the approach embraced in theHealth new period of asymmetrical federalism: the first Accord allowed Quebec latitude in implementing the (health) as part of its terms and the second (equali agreement but within parameters agreed upon by all zation) as a part of its aftermath. governments. Thus, the deal embraced provincial equality, national commitments to common goals and How do the two deals serve as contrasts in the standards, and flexibility for provinces. implementation of asymmetrical federalism? The 2004 Health Accord was announced in the form of By contrast, the 2004 agreement on equalization "a 10-year plan to strengthen health care" (PMO and territorial funding did not contain any special 2004a). In the agreement, which contained a sub conditions for particular provinces or peoples at the stantial rise in federal funding, the governments time of signing. The Prime Minister and all but one committed to a set of general principles and objec premier established the main features of a new tives as well as to specific guidelines thatwould lead equalization and territorial funding framework for to timely access to quality health care (PMO 2004a). the next five years including increased federal mon were However, two separate communiques attached ies in the 2004-2005 year, more stable future to the agreement. The second communique commit funding, and the creation of an independent panel ted the governments to working together to improve to review the equalization program. The payments Aboriginal health, recognizing the specificity and were designed to offset revenue differences in the special requirements of Aboriginal peoples in provinces and territories and to help them provide Canada. The first communique stated that "recog essential public services to Canadians on a roughly nizing that an asymmetrical federalism allows for comparable basis. Although the resulting treatment the existence of specific agreements for any is different according to provincial or territorial sta province," the first ministers agreed to a separate tus and to level of fiscal disparity (some provinces deal between the Quebec and federal governments are recipients, some are not), the formula applies to that would allow that province some flexibility in all equally and is, in thatway, symmetrical. Thus, like interpreting and implementing the agreement, in theHealth Accord, it embraces provincial equality but cluding different reporting arrangements (PMO also flexibility tomeet specific provincial needs.

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Unlike the Health Accord where asymmetrical ments. The asymmetrical arrangements introduced treatment of the provinces (Quebec among others) by the 2004 Equalization Agreement and subsequent is built into its terms, the asymmetry that has re accords were carried forward; as Alan Cairns has sulted from the Equalization Agreement occurred pointed out in his articles on "The Embedded State," subsequent to the signing of the agreement and is past policy entitlements are difficult to shake (1986, found in a succession of separate but related deals 1995). In this case, the equalization deals embody (PMO 2004c, 2005b, 2005c). Unlike in the health the philosophy that the provinces should engage in care deal where consensus was reached with accom a united front unless they can cut a better deal for modation of one province's strongly felt difference themselves?asymmetry becomes raw self-interest albeit in a way that was open to all, in the equaliza without serious concern for the effects on the na tion deal no consensus or accommodation was tion as a whole. And while these deals are not reached among all provinces, and one province was dissimilar to special deals with Quebec on pensions left offside, excluded. The previous move of the fed and income tax collection, the philosophy underly eral government away from a principled approach ing themultiplication of special deals with particular to equalization had removed the basis for consen provinces bodes ill for national unity. Instead of sus (Boadway 2006). Asymmetry arose almost three national deals that accommodate provincial differ months to the day after the Equalization Agreement ence within a common and agreed upon framework was signed when the Prime Minister announced an that builds a sense of belonging among the units of agreement in principle with the government of New the federation, there is only a semi-national deal that foundland and Labrador on offshore resource allows each province to serve its own good without revenues. The deal was intended to address the prov reference to the other units. Provincial self-interest ince's concerns, raised by the October 2004 or province-building, in the worst of the Black resource revenues agreement, "about offshore trig Cairns diagnostic, prevails (Cairns and Black 1966). gering reductions in equalization payments" (PMO 2005a). In a demonstration effect, the federal Therefore, two visions of asymmetry are realized government signed parallel deals with Nova Scotia in these deals. In the case of the Health Accord, pro and a further deal with Saskatchewan. It also in vincial equality is embraced: Quebec was accorded creased its financial support to Ontario over five special treatment that was understood as available years by $5.75 billion to counter that province's ar to all provinces should they avail themselves of that

gument that it contributes $23 billion more to treatment. In the case of the equalization agree confederation than it receives (McGuinty 2005; ments, provincial inequality was embraced: all PMO 2005c). Once one deal was signed, more were provinces were equal until one could cut a special demanded. Asymmetry came in the aftermath of the deal for itself. In the former vision, provinces are original agreement with special deals between the empowered and able to take advantage of agreed federal government and specific provinces to buy upon powers if they deem it necessary for the pub peace in the nation. No binding set of commitments lic good of their citizens. This understanding of undergirded the separate arrangements, unlike the asymmetry underlies the historic 1998 Calgary Dec Health Accord. laration as one provincial reaction against federal involvement in provincial jurisdiction. In the case The fragility and potential danger of this arrange of the vision captured by the equalization agree ment was demonstrated in the 2007 discussions on ments, the unified front of the provinces is subject equalization where the federal government was co to political opportunism with no common under erced into supplementing a reasonable deal on standing or principles governing what arrangements equalization based on a principled approach with may be negotiated, thus potentially creating a dem of these one a recognition previous provincial entitle onstration effect if province signs separate deal

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and at worst engendering provincial jealousies and COF, an interprovincial body of first ministers (thus competition while enacting checkerboard policies excluding the Prime Minister of Canada), was de where national agreement and principles are desir signed to promote interprovincial dialogue and able. This vision is the animating spirit of the alliances on issues of interest including health care, Council of the Federation created in 2003, a second internal trade, and the fiscal imbalance. Reminis response to federal intrusions into provincial areas cent of the Gang of Eight in the constitutional of responsibility. The two visions are competing and struggles leading to the patriation of the constitu colliding in a way that is potentially devastating for tion in 1982, the COF is intended to encourage a the national fabric. united provincial front that pre-empts federal action and drives the federal-provincial agenda in a direc A brief comparison of the spirits of the Calgary tion more favourable to the provinces. Of particular Declaration and the Council of the Federation fur interest to the provinces in forming the COF was ther illuminates the two different approaches to the need to stave off a federally imposed solution to asymmetry embedded in our intergovernmental re the vertical fiscal imbalance, defined as the situa lations. The 1998 Calgary Declaration was issued tion where one level of government has excess by the nine provinces outside of Quebec as an olive revenue tomeet its defined expenditures (in this case branch in the wake of the 1995 referendum on na Ottawa), while the other level has insufficient rev tional unity and Quebec secession. In recognition enue capacity to meet its jurisdictional of Quebec's distinct culture, language, and legal responsibilities (in this case the provinces). Pre system, the Calgary Declaration affirmed Quebec's sented as an empirically measurable concept by the "unique place within Canada." However, in a firm provinces and especially by Alberta, Quebec, and nod to the other provinces, it endorsed the principle Ontario, it ismore a "political and policy concept" that any special powers granted to one province must subject to change according to definitions of what be available to the other provinces. Reminiscent of is included (Lazar 2005,1, 3; Pratt 2005). The COF the original tax abatement deal between Ottawa and alliance of provinces encouraged provinces to the provinces in the 1950s, this formal position of engage in a united front unless a province could ob the provinces reflected the desire to accommodate tain a better deal for itself, as happened in the Quebec's desire to be recognized as distinct in the equalization talks of 2004. Subsequently, the COF interests of national unity but within a framework commissioned task force on the fiscal imbalance that recognizes provincial equality in practice. This provided the basis for the provinces to reject the view resonated with a public conditioned by the federal government's O'Brien commission report on Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to think the fiscal imbalance and for key provinces like New in terms of equal rights?in this case at the provin foundland and Labrador to argue for special cial level rather than at the individual level. Thus, accommodation in the 2007 discussions on equali the Calgary Declaration was more consistent with zation, the fiscal imbalance, and resource revenues.2 the spirit of the Constitution Act, 1982?especially the 7/50 amending formula and the embrace of And here a danger is exposed when the Health equality rights in the Charter of Rights and Accord is compared to the equalization arrange Freedoms?and the inclusive Charlottetown Accord, ments forged between 2004 and 2007 and when the than the Meech Lake Accord and its primary em Calgary Declaration is compared to the COF. The phasis on accommodating Quebec before the other Health Accord and the Calgary Declaration envision are provinces.1 standards that national achieved through nego tiations. If a province, like Quebec in the Health

In contrast, the Council of the Federation (COF) Accord arrangements, requires more autonomy or was created at the initiative of Quebec in 2003. The has specific needs, then it can forge a separate deal

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or but operating within the parameters set by the origi special treatment.When does equality prevail not? nal framework agreement. Under this arrangement, If some provinces continue to strive for national or citizens can be assured that comparable standards standards, shared commitments, equal treat will prevail throughout the country. Under the ment?and especially if they are contributors not equalization arrangements and the philosophy em recipients under equalization?they will resent the braced in the COF, no status quo is set as the provinces that break with this pattern and negotiate standard that ultimately governs arrangements special self-interested deals. So, for example, On forged by all of the actors. Each province may ne tario and Alberta, as key donors to the federation, gotiate its own arrangements that benefit its citizens are increasingly engaging in a form of beggar-thy without regard for the other provinces. No negotiated neighbour federalism, begrudging their contribu national framework with a promise of comparable tions to the national coffers rather than realizing the standards is achieved. While one part of the federa flow back to them of the benefits of the union (Brock tionmay gain, the whole is diminished and a sense of 2003).3 British Columbia, increasingly despondent national unity, with its companion value of mutual re with the federal government and its special arrange sponsibility for thewell-being of all Canadians, is lost. ments with other provinces, is distancing itself (Gibson 2002). Or in the example of Meech Lake Thus, there are important costs associated with and immigration given above, if provinces were to asymmetrical federalism when it becomes a series be denied a similar share of the immigration quota, of deals or the demonstration effect occurs. That is, they would resent the special treatment accorded once one jurisdiction has forged a deal giving itself Quebec. On the other side of these deals, provinces more powers or benefits, it can be assumed that other accustomed to special treatment under one vision of provinces will clamour for similar deals. Special asymmetry will resent future attempts to bind them to arrangements abound with no comparability and national standards or commitments under a vision of with the ills mentioned in the preceding paragraph. asymmetry that promotes diversity within unity. As Further, in some cases, the result is illogical. So, discussed in this article, this has happened with New for example, the Meech Lake Accord proposed en foundland, Saskatchewan, and Quebec. When trenching the federal government's agreement with expectations from the two deals collide, a sense of fed Quebec on immigration and extending similar agree eral comity is ultimately lost. ments to other jurisdictions. However, if the other provinces were to negotiate a similar share of im Second, false national deals are forged. Where migrants, then the totals would well exceed 100 there are no national commitments or agreed upon percent of the quota of new Canadians?a result just parameters for the accommodation of differences, not possible or sustainable. Such arrangements be can a deal be held to be national? Or, if national come unworkable. agreements must become so vague as to be mean ingless in order to win consensus among provinces There is an even greater danger when the two used to going it alone if their demands are not met, visions of asymmetrical federalism operate simul then do those deals have any intrinsic merit in terms taneously in the nation, though. Three problems are of national unity? The sense of common nationhood readily identifiable. First and foremost, the two vi is diminished by these deals. The centripetal force sions are likely to create and instill different modes becomes attenuated. In the end, there is no com of provincial behaviour thatmight have a seriously mon bond to hold the units together in times of destabilizing effect on government relations. One economic or other crisis. embraces the fundamental equality of the provinces and their equal right to be accommodated; the other Third, both visions of asymmetry reduce the com embraces inequality of treatment and the right to mitment of the provinces to the whole, increasing

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the centrifugal forces. If difference is privileged But there is a danger for Quebec more specifi above reasonably equal and reasonably fair treat cally if asymmetry is applied to it on the basis of its ment, then the provincial governments are unique culture, language, legal tradition, and herit encouraged to define the public good in local terms age. Instead of allowing for innovative arrangements rather than with reference to the national good. The that strike accommodations across common provin federal government, as the lone champion of the cial interests (e.g., Quebec and New Brunswick on national good, is likely to be drowned out in the bilingualism, or Quebec, Manitoba, and Saskatch cacophony of voices. Moreover, instead of genuinely ewan on the social economy), this logic of dualism seeking common ground and defining a future (Quebec versus the rest of Canada) suggests that together, the units of the federation are increasingly asymmetry should apply only in those areas of his encouraged to engage and define their relations in torically recognized specificity. The consequence self-interested terms. Shared expectations and reci may be that recognition of Quebec's difference is procity in the nation are the sacrifice. Gradually the tolerated in only narrowly defined areas that are his rationale for a common existence is eroded. When torically justified, and in other areas the version of shared expectations, reciprocity, a sense of federal asymmetry with provincial equality embraced in the comity, and a commitment to the national good are Calgary Declaration holds. In the first case, Que attenuated, the national glue loses its ability to bind. bec may find itself more constrained or frustrated within the federation, while the latter case results The question then becomes: If asymmetry widely in the ills outlined above. applied has such negative consequences, then why not confine constitutional or political asymmetry to So why not do away with asymmetry and avoid Quebec on the basis of its unique culture, legal tra the confusion and tensions? Impossible. Asymmetri dition, language, and history? After all, opting out cal federalism is a current reality. As stated at the of national deals involving social policy is a com outset of the paper, asymmetry is the oil that keeps mon strategy of Quebec governments (see Bakvis the machinery of federalism operating. The prob 2002; Graefe 2005; Noel 2000,44-5). The underly lem is not with asymmetry itself but rather with the ing reality is that without the ability to opt out of multiplication of asymmetrical arrangements in the particular intergovernmental deals with sufficient current era. As different arrangements embodying compensation, Quebec might just opt out of the fed two different and inconsistent views of federalism eration as almost happened in 1995. But unlike in multiply, intergovernmental tensions and resent the past, now the other provinces expect the oppor ments heighten and the bonds that unite the various tunity for similar arrangements to be extended to units are attenuated. Why are the governments clam them, thus undermining a sense of national purpose ouring for special deals with all the associated and common interest (Morton 2005, 6-9). Without dangers? Why is this perceived need for asymmetri this equal opportunity, a new degree of interprovin cal treatment so acute at this stage in our history cial resentment and passive hostility exists. To some despite the dangers to a country that has recently degree this is a result of the current rejection of the rescued itself from the brink of dissolution? The sim view that federalism is a product of Quebec's unique ple answer is that the need for special arrangements culture and heritage4 and a compact between two is driven largely by the federal government's en nations,5 in favour of asymmetry applied equally.6 croachment on provincial jurisdiction in recent years Moreover, to deny the equal participation of the as a means of reasserting its place within confed provinces in the creation of the federation and the eration. In the era of retrenchment and rights, it had federal system is to undermine the sense of a col sacrificed its ability to influence the direction of the lective national project?one that commits all parts nation, losing visibility and meaning for Canadians. equally to making it work. As it has attempted to regain this lost ground, it has

- Canadian Public Policy Analyse de politiques, vol. xxxiv, no. 2 2008 The Politics of Asymmetrical Federalism 151 chosen to fight the battle in provincial jurisdiction, ment was seen to have served the interests of the thus prompting a backlash from the provinces? nation well. Most citizens yearned for peace and Quebec first but with the other provinces following prosperity and looked to the federal government for closely?that manifests itself as a desire for more a new sense of security: witness the transfers of re asymmetrical arrangements to protect provincial sponsibility for unemployment insurance and autonomy. To understand this provincial reaction and pensions to the federal government, federal themeans out of the current morass, we need to take provincial cooperation in designing economic a brief excursion into Canadian political history policies that would spur the growth of corporate and focusing on the second half of the last century when border plant (but prosperous) Canada, federal federal intrusion into provincial jurisdiction gener provincial agreements on a more progressive tax ated this strong protective response. system and tax-sharing arrangements, the emphasis on federal defence and aeronautics spending, the at tachment to federal policies establishing Canada as Locating the Need for Asymmetry in the a police and then peace force in the world, and so Federal Government's Identity Search on (Russell 1993,62-70).

The origins of the current trend toward asymmetri By the 1960s, cracks in this centralizing com cal federalism lie within successive attempts by the placency were beginning to show. Canadians, like federal government tomeet the shifts in society and most citizens inWestern democracies, were begin in society's expectations of government. Both by ning to question the existence of elements of provincial invitation initially and by the federal imperialism and illegitimate authority within their government's need to justify itself to citizens, the borders, and no longer just in the developing world. federal government set itself on a course of increas In Canada these interrogations into our country's ing intrusion into provincial jurisdiction. While record were fuelled by reports of restrictions on citi federal assistance in expanding government services zenship rights of Aboriginal and Oriental Canadians, was at first welcomed and requested, the relation the internment of Japanese Canadians in the war, ship between the two levels of government became the restrictions on religious freedoms of the increasingly strained particularly since an increase Jehovah's Witnesses inQuebec, and other such per in federal dollars meant an increased federal desire ceived inequities (Berger 1981). Canadians were to set standards and define programs. This desire further prompted to question their political leader did not abate when the dollars did, though. This sec ship by the civil rights movements in the United tion tracks this shift in relations that then prompted States and the fight of Indians there for justice, the provinces to react and press for special arrange brought into people's living rooms with the advent ments to accommodate their diverse needs and of television, and the worldwide struggles against abilities. totalitarianism (Knopff 1989,36-8). Underlying this challenge to authority, though, was a certain inno Following the Depression of the 1930s and the cence and faith inWestern liberal democracies and Second World War, the legitimacy of the federal tructures. Hence, there was a reliance on human government was at an apex and the centralist pull rights codes and pressure on lawmakers tomake the was strong in federal-provincial relations. The De necessary changes to protect citizen rights.7 pression of the 1930s had impressed upon Canadians the need for national programs to ensure economic And challenges to federal authority were begin stability and security. In the war, Canadians had ning to emerge in the 1950s on the provincial front fought for the country and, while conscription had as well, even as centralization occurred. In 1952, proven contentious, by and large the federal govern Quebec had opted out of the tax rental agreements

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signed by the other provinces with Ottawa. In turn, expand the welfare state and state activities for the Ottawa reduced its taxes to avoid heavy "double betterment of Canadians. Citizens still looked to the taxation" of Quebec residents. However, when the federal government as a benevolent authority, proud next tax deal was signed in 1957, the tax abatement of Canada's role and recognition as a peacekeeper arrangement was formalized and applied to all internationally, especially as images of the US provinces (Simeon and Robinson 1990,146-7). This government's warlike actions abroad filled their deal embraced the idea of provincial equality and screens at home.9 On the international front, the end autonomy later embraced in the Calgary Declaration. of this trusting image was intimated by the domes However, the harmony attendant in relations was tic outcry attending Canadian inaction on the Biafran signified by the negotiation of equalization pay situation in 1968 (Nossal 1989,211-2). But at home, ments intended to supplement the transfers to poorer Canadians were generally comforted by the federal as provinces under the new taxation arrangements. The government's measures for peace and order even strength of the federal government and its ability to pockets of insurgence arose?no Kent State had reach into provincial jurisdiction were furthered by occurred here (see Cook 2006, 104-18). the series of conditional payments to the provinces in the 1950s and 1960s intended to sponsor and ex The 1970s witnessed the loss of this innocence pand programs within provincial jurisdiction. The and trust in government and between governments. provinces agreed to the federal spending power Watergate in the United States, the rise of the FLQ within their jurisdiction because the programs were in Quebec and promulgation of theWar Measures desired, federal conditions were loosely worded, the Act in Canada, and growing awareness and rejec intrusion was not coerced but agreed upon, and the tion of discriminatory policies all contributed to a programs strengthened the provincial governments creeping sense of citizen disillusionment and dis as well as the federal government (Simeon and trust of political authority (Cook 2006). This distrust Robinson 1990, 149-50). Ottawa had the resources was only heightened as government resources be and the provinces wanted the benefits while still came increasingly constrained, economic growth guarding their autonomy. slowed and spurted, and federal-provincial bicker ing over responsibilities and money increased The 1960s was a period of both contestation and (Simeon and Robinson 1990,213-4). Provinces, led affluence at societal and intergovernmental levels. by Quebec and Ontario, entered a period of expan The Canadian government responded to doubts about sion of programs and powers including venturing its legitimacy and to the desire of Canadians to be into the federal purview of foreign affairs. Indeed, lieve in their institutions with a series of measures. the provinces won the battle to be consulted on in Specifically, Canadian policies corresponded to a ternational negotiations in this period (Smiley 1987, new and growing sense of social justice fed first by 85). Further, they pressed Ottawa to shift from con the Camelot to the south and then, as Camelot dis ditional program funding to Established Programs on integrated, by the image of a more violent and Financing, moving from deals based program confrontational society marred by Vietnam, race ri costs to formulae based on population and gross ots, and state oppression: by 1968 the Canadian national product and from the conditional Canada federal government slogan of "A Just Society" cap Assistance Plan to less constrained block funding. tured the themes of these programs.8 Including a Even as Ottawa retreated from social programs, it commitment both to recognition of citizen rights and attempted to impose national conditions but was to an expansion of social programs, the policies re often blocked by provincial outcries (Stevenson areas sponded to needs at both the citizen and provincial 1989,169-70). Continuing to insert itself into levels. The federal and provincial governments en of provincial jurisdiction with programs like wage gaged in a still relatively harmonious endeavour to and price controls and the National Energy Policy,

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the federal government became more aggressive in The cumulative effect of the federal rollbacks and its relations with the provinces.10 the emphasis on citizen rights as limited entitlements in the shift from the 1970s through to the 1990s was As the two levels of government blamed each thatOttawa's role as a positive force in citizens' lives other for policy failures and the inability to assert became obscured. For example, the federal govern control over the economy, citizens began to ques ment's role as a funder of health and education tion the image of government as a vehicle of social programs was diminished in the public eye justice and to assert their rights in opposition to the (Stevenson 1989, 171-4). Offloading social pro state: witness the growing militancy and numbers grams and responsibilities to other governments and of social groups as well as the explosion of interest third sector agencies not only meant that the fed organizations by the end of the 1970s (Pross 1992, eral government was protected from criticisms for 65). Both to justify its role as a national govern cutbacks in services but also that it lost visibility ment in the face of the nationalist challenge (Evans and Shields 2000,17-20; Shields and Evans emanating from Quebec and as a legitimate repre 1998, 88-115). Provincial criticisms of the federal sentative of democratic values in the face of government for cuts in transfers encouraged a more challenges from citizen groups, the federal govern negative view of the federal government, reaching ment pressed for the adoption of the Canadian new heights with its unilateral change to the Canada Charter of Rights and Freedoms, inadvertently en Assistance Plan and introduction of the Canada trenching both this new sense of entitlement and Health and Social Transfer (CHST; combining mon opposition to the state in the citizen psyche and this ies for health, post-secondary education, and social tension with Quebec, left offside in the 1982 con programs) in 1996. The credibility of the federal stitutional deal, for the foreseeable future.11 government was further questioned as its ability to set and monitor national standards in these areas was The consequent skepticism of citizens and this challenged and limited (Boychuk 2003, 271-2; challenge to the legitimacy of the state contributed Maioni and Smith 2003, 305-9). Cutbacks in for to attempts by the federal government in the 1980s eign aid and defence spending began to engender and 1990s to justify its role within the federation, criticisms of Canada on the international front? often at the expense of intergovernmental harmony. Canadians could not even take solace any longer in Faced with dwindling sources of new revenues, the image of Canada as a benevolent actor in an in growing expectations for public services, and creasingly hostile world (Cohen 2003; Nossal mounting public debts and deficits, the federal 1998-99). The sensational failure of the constitu government shifted toward a more explicit rights tional attempts at strengthening national unity and agenda but one that was narrowly conceived. Rather expanding citizen rights, and the near loss of the than expanding programs and services as in themore country in the 1995 Quebec referendum, further affluent previous era, the federal government (as delegitimized the federal government in the eyes of well as provincial governments) began to target so Canadians.13 The effects of globalization on na cial programs to entitled recipients, limit its tional states only fed perceptions of the Canadian expenditures, and cut back on provincial transfers government as impotent and possibly unnecessary even in the crucial and explosive areas of health, (see, for example, Courchene 2001, 28-31). social services, and education starting in the 1986? 87 budget year but most drastically in the By the end of the 1990s, Ottawa realized the need mid-1990s.12 In return for accepting more respon to repair the damage to its reputation with Canadi sibility with less funding, the provinces began to ans. Realizing the emphasis Canadians placed on a sense develop stronger of ownership and independ the social safety net in a fair community as a key ence in these policy areas. unifying national characteristic,14 the federal

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government began to reassert itself in those policy in the area of health care, the federal government areas. Cash-strapped provinces were caught in the has set itself at odds with provinces like Alberta, bind of desiring federal assistance but resenting fed Quebec, and British Columbia that are experiment eral intrusion into policy areas under their jurisdiction ing with the contours of the system, by nixing and in which they had grown accustomed to acting movements toward a mixed public-private model of with less interference. A rights-conscious and health care delivery (Banting and Boadway 2004, individualist-oriented citizenry welcomed the 15-18). federal expansion of payments to individuals and institutions particularly in the area of education, In sum, as the federal government attempted to despite provincial cries of intrusion and despite the redefine its place within the hearts and minds of attached federal conditions.15 More money to the Canadians and justify its role as a national govern CHST in 1999 meant a more active federal role and ment, it has exacerbated federal-provincial tensions more rigid enforcement of national standards, such and triggered a protective impulse in the provinces. as federal policing of provincial contracting with Although the Harper government has begun to en private clinics to provide health services (Maioni gineer a federal retreat from provincial jurisdiction, 2007, 174). The same year, the federal government the damage has been done. Provincial distrust of attempted to reassert its leadership in the area of Ottawa is a fact of Canadian intergovernmental re social policy by pre-empting an interprovincial lations. With Ottawa increasingly occupying or agreement and using financial incentives to induce trying to exert control in their jurisdictions, is it any the provinces to sign a Social Union Framework wonder that the provinces (led by Quebec, Ontario, Agreement (SUFA). The Health Accord signed the Alberta and then the less affluent provinces) began following year ensured a federal presence in uphold to try to reassert their authority and call for special ing national objectives at the cost of a more stable arrangements thatmeet their local needs at the ex federal commitment to health care funding. And so it pense of national standards or a national sense of goes into the 2000s with further agreements on social shared norms? spending, child care, health, and other salient programs as well as further federal direct action on health care The important point here is that the current de research and post-secondary research and studies mand for asymmetrical federalism stems largely (Doern 2005, 3-19, esp. 8, 9-10). And although the from federal government encroachment on provin federal government under Stephen Harper's Conserva cial jurisdiction in the last half of the twentieth tives has announced an end to the deal-making in century as a means of reasserting its place within the new regime of open federalism, it has ensured a theminds of citizens. As its authority as an interna federal presence in the public's mind with its promise tional actor was diminished and as its legitimacy on to end wait-times for certain health care services? the domestic front was lost in the era of retrench another federal foray into provincial jurisdiction. ment and restraint, it began to seek ways to reaffirm its importance to Canadian citizens. And so it be In its quest for identity, the federal government gan to fight this battle on provincial ground by has shifted from promoting a just society to en attempting to increase its visibility in the more at trenching rights for citizens to circumscribing those tractive and immediate areas of health, education, rights especially in regard to program entitlements and social services with the negotiation and impo and, finally, to expanding its role in primarily pro sition of national standards. This federal intrusion vincial areas of jurisdiction such as health care, has prompted a backlash among the provinces, social programs, and education with strings attached. which manifests in a desire for more asymmetrical In so doing, the federal government has set itself on arrangements to protect provincial autonomy and a collision course with the provinces. Particularly ultimately to strengthen provincial economies and

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loyalties so that the provinces can prevent any fur government needs to retreat from provincial juris ther erosion of their powers and autonomy. But as diction in a responsible way, honouring previous the asymmetrical arrangements multiply, they col commitments until they can be changed to corres lide and a sense of national comity is eroded. As pond to the new relationship between Ottawa and explained in the previous section, fuzzy boundaries the provinces. Respect the division of powers set between the federal government and the provinces down in 1867 but as understood in the twenty-first make for unnecessarily complex and contentious ar century. Instead of attempting to define national rangements.What is theway out of this negative spiral? standards and objectives, and spending in provin The answer lies in a reconceptualization of the role of cial areas of jurisdiction, the federal government Ottawa in the federation?a reconceptualization that should withdraw where feasible. honours theConfederation deal but suitsmodern times. This prescription is similar to the idea of "Open Federalism" endorsed by the Conservative govern Toward Principled Federalism by ment under Prime Minister Harper. Under this Reconceptualizing Ottawa's Role policy, the federal government intended to focus on its core responsibilities, to respect provincial juris Asymmetry has been part of the federal deal in diction, and to engage in incremental change in Canada since inception. While specific provisions intergovernmental affairs proceeding only where were made in the constitution for the distinct nature consensus could be obtained (Macdonald 2006, 5 of Quebec, so too were special provisions made for 8).16 As part of its approach to restructuring other provinces. Further attempts to constitu federal-provincial relations, the federal government tionalize asymmetry have brought and will only proposed to address Quebec's "unique demands" but bring the dualistic vision of federalism into conflict to avoid one-off ad hoc deals. As Harper had prom with the competing vision of Canada as a federal ised in a public letter in December 2005, a state comprising ten equal provinces and three ter Conservative government would cooperate with the ritories, as the failure of theMeech Lake Accord in provinces to aid in the exercise of legitimate consti 1990 drove home. However, much more flexibility tutional jurisdiction, clarify the role of both levels is available to accommodate difference at both the of government in a new relationship, and resolve policy and fiscal levels provided that equal oppor the fiscal imbalance (Harper 2005). To date, the fed tunity of treatment is open to all the units. As this eral government's record on Open Federalism has paper has shown, the real danger arises when juris been questionable, starting with the continuation of diction is not respected and the federal government the deals on equalization and the accusation that the begins to encroach on provincial territory. Quebec federal government is attempting to impose its so reacts to protect its right to define and deliver its poli lution to the vertical fiscal imbalance on the cies, programs, and services to its public. The wealthier provinces. Indeed, the Saskatchewan government provinces push back and begrudge their contributions even initiated legal action against Ottawa on this to the well-being of the nation. And the smaller matter, (although its successor dropped the lawsuit). provinces call for extra protections. Tensions mount, The record of the Conservative federal government governments argue, and citizens become more disillu begs the question of whether a return to principled sioned. Federal comity threatens to dissolve. federalism is possible. This paper argues that it is, if the origins of the source of tension between the The answer lies in a return to a more principled two levels of government guide the solution. approach to federal-provincial relations and, in par ticular, to the role of the federal government. This Two stages are required to make this solution answer has two components. First, the federal work. First, as the Prime Minster foresaw, the federal

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government must find its justification as a govern combat role and more supportive of aid and assist ment and link with citizens primarily within its own ance (Noel, Therien, and Dallaire 2004). Thus, the areas of jurisdiction and not on provincial territory federal government could bridge opinion in Que of social programs, education, and health. However, bec and the rest of the country by reducing the this is only part of the answer. In forging these po military commitment inAfghanistan in 2009 but si sitions, the federal government must recapture the multaneously increasing its aid and assistance to that public goodwill that it lost from the 1970s into the country and playing primarily a non-combat role 1990s. Two examples will suffice to illustrate the after February 2009. If it were to expand its com careful construction its future role as a player in mitment in assistance to lower-income countries constructive, principled federalism must assume if generally and to reinvigorate the peacekeeping role this action is to be successful in both restoring the for our military, a Canadian desire for a more posi legitimacy of the federal government with Canadi tive international presence could be secured. Thus, ans and reinforcing the sense of pride in belonging by acting within its jurisdiction and responding to to Canada. the public desires, the federal government could both renew Canadian pride in our international image and The first example concerns the current NATO its own legitimacy with citizens. commitment to Afghanistan. In response to public pressure, emanating from Quebec foremost but more The second example pertains to culture, a prima recently from other parts of the nation, the federal rily provincial responsibility. The federal presence government has pledged to withdraw its troops from in this area should correspond to a principled di Afghanistan in February 2009 unless NATO en vide of responsibilities; that is, as envisioned in the hances its commitment and the other national parties Conservative concept of Open Federalism, the fed agree to a continued role there.While this commit eral government should respect provincial ment is a response to public criticism sharpened jurisdiction but cooperate with the provinces to en during the fall 2007 by-elections in Quebec, it ap able them to exercise their authority fully by pears more opportunistic and engineered to garner providing financial support. This means that while the Conservatives votes in that province than a ges the provinces would independently develop their ture based on a combination of principled federalism priorities and support their cultural industries as they and national unity. However, the federal govern deem appropriate, Ottawa should designate uncon ment's position could be strengthened by a careful ditional funds to the provinces to offset provincial redefinition of the country's role abroad. Over the differences and ensure a vibrant cultural life across past three decades, public opinion polls have indi the nation. However, there is an additional comple cated that support for foreign aid is consistently high mentary federal role carefully defined. The federal (75-80 percent) and that this support is firmer if government should promote Canadian literature, Canadians are made aware of the diminishing role culture, and film industries nationally and interna they have played as peacekeepers and sources of aid, tionally by highlighting achievements within the and if they believe that there is a benefit to Canada provinces. On a national level, this would facilitate (Wolfe and Mendhelsohn 2005).n Further, Cana the sharing of culture across provincial boundaries dians prefer assistance to aid (61 percent), and social groups. On an international level, itwould particularly where aid is conceived as inducing de mean promoting culture and the arts as engines of pendence in the recipient country, and they desire economic development.18 Further, the federal their government to have an active role internation government could reinvigorate the Canadian Broad ally (Noel, Therien, and Dallaire 2004; Wolfe and casting Corporation (CBC) as an engine of national Mendhelsohn 2005). Finally, opinion in Quebec is unity. Over the past two decades, reductions in fund more negative than in the rest of the nation toward a ing to the CBC have resulted in closures of

- Canadian Public Policy Analyse de politiques, vol. xxxiv, no. 2 2008 The Politics of Asymmetrical Federalism 157 provincial offices and a diminution of the role of governments. Equalization payments would con the CBC in provinces and regions, while the sepa tinue under a negotiated, principle-based formula. ration between the French and English branches of Any general transfers for social, education, and the CBC has increased. This balkanization of news health programs or other areas of provincial juris and culture increases the political and social divides diction should be regularized and rendered more among the provinces and regions rather than forging transparent. The federal government emerges as a a common pool of knowledge, familiarity across facilitator of solutions to difficult policy problems borders, and pride in our collective achievements. within these jurisdictions but without encroaching Ottawa needs to consider restoring a truly national on provincial autonomy and jurisdiction and pro broadcasting system with a strong base in the voking the public criticism by the provinces such a na provinces and regions of Canada to promote actions inspire. tional dialogue. Respect provincial jurisdiction, support provincial initiatives with federal funding Why would the federal government agree to this transferred to the provincial governments, but pro redefined role rather than continue to attempt to buy mote a collective national awareness and pride citizen loyalty by implementing federal programs exercised at home and abroad. within provincial jurisdiction as it has done in re cent years? As the Conservative policy of Open The second component of the re-engineered fed Federalism recognizes, Canadians want a political eral role in the federation would entail a rethinking system that operates with less friction and confron of the federal-provincial machinery. The federal role tation and more transparency and accountability. The in areas of primarily provincial jurisdiction like federal government would be recognized as a key health, education, and social policy has been largely actor in facilitating a new, more effective and re driven by the desire to set national standards while sponsive form of federalism. Further, the federal assisting the provinces. In these areas and others government would receive credit for facilitating more where national institutions and programs are desired provincial independence and innovation in critical to assist the provinces in serving their citizens, Ot areas of policy that affect citizens directly. Finally, the tawa and the provinces should seriously consider an federal government would have the room, the time, alternative mechanism. This body might be a nego and the will to become a player internationally. tiated and reformed COF with a federal presence or a new body with a governance structure similar to Canada Health Infoway, which involves intergovern Conclusion mental negotiation at the officials' level comprising rotating representatives from the provinces and fed In sum, the federal government only needs to look eral government.19 A permanent structure, regardless to its areas of jurisdiction to find a means of re more of its form, is likely to secure ongoing co asserting a strong presence domestically and operation and policy evolution. A key consideration rescuing our image on the international stage. In an would be whether any national standards should be era of citizen disillusionment with government and negotiated by the provinces and merely acceded to skepticism surrounding political authority, this re or vetoed by Ottawa. In addition, such a body would defined role might be a more effective means of simultaneously encourage experimentation within restoring democratic legitimacy than either tinker the provinces?a foundational promise of federal ing with institutions with no promise of effective ism?and dissemination of results across borders. change or continuing to bicker with the provinces. These new arrangements should not be construed as a reduced commitment to equalization or federal Asymmetry is natural to a federation, as Ron support for provincial programs defined by those Watts (1999) has so thoroughly documented. In

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4 Canada, history has taught us that formal constitu See, for example, Courchene (2004, 21). tional recognition of distinctiveness is less popular 5 See justifications for asymmetrical federalism based than asymmetry in fiscal and policy arrangements. on duality expressed byMcRoberts (1997), Milne (2005), Canadians are who understand the need pragmatists and Smith (2005). Smith, one among a number of for difference in practice. Arrangements designed scholars, also characterizes the founding fathers of Con to room for distinctiveness are provide Quebec's federation as "parliamentarians" and "reluctant justifiable and acceptable to the broader Canadian federalists" (2004, 41-54). public provided that an equal opportunity to take 6 See Seidle and Bishop (2005, 8-11). This broader advantage of similar arrangements is extended to the notion of asymmetry was captured in Sections 91 and 92 other provinces, even if the option is not exercised. of the constitution. By extending the same opportunity to However, if the federal continues government along all the provinces to pursue different goals within their the of itself further into trajectory embedding provin jurisdiction, the constitution provides for asymmetry in cial areas of it is to jurisdiction, likely only trigger practice. more demands for andmore hos special arrangements 7 For example, although a Bill of Rights was enacted tile reactions from the provinces thatwill undermine a inCanada in 1960, to federal areas of sense of collective and federal applying jurisdic goodwill comity. a tion, constitutionally entrenched Charter of Rights was not to come until 1982. Despite attempts in 1964-65 and Canadians have a residual desire to believe in 1967-70 to entrench rights in the constitution, many Ca their as humane, benevolent, and fair. Re country nadians still argued that the best protection of rights lay relations and the role structuring federal-provincial with parliament, not with the courts. See arguments by of the federal to build on government that image Premiers Lyon and Blakeney in Romanow, Whyte, and can only heighten the sense of national unity by Leeson (1984), and inCohen, Smith, andWarwick (1987, encouraging all Canadians to want to be a part of 72-3). However, by the 1970s and leading into the 1982 that dream. A dream we have all but lost. constitutional deal, most Canadians wanted protected rights according to Sheppard and Valpy (1982, ch. 7). 8 See, for example, the thinking underlying policies Notes beginning in the 1960s inAxworthy and Trudeau (1990).

9 Thank you to Jim Davies, Geoffrey Martin, Bob Young, For a discussion of the Canadian attachment to the Hale, and the reviewers of this for their Geoffrey journal image of peacekeeping versus the reality, see Ichikawa helpful comments on successive versions of this paper. (1979). 1 For a of and the distinction 10 summary public opinion Smiley characterizes this period as one of "intense between the Meech Lake and Charlottetown approaches and bitter conflict" in federal-provincial relations as the to as a distinct see Seidle acknowledging Quebec society, two levels of government vied for dominance even as they and Bishop (2005, 6-9). worked together to expand the welfare state and as rela 2 tions became more ideological (1987, 97-8). Key to this For a comparison of the federal government and pro period are inflation, rising energy prices, and labour un vincial (COF) commissions on equalization and the fiscal rest. However, Stevenson expands the sources of tension imbalance, see Boadway (2006) and St. Hilaire (2006). to include organizational interests, party conflicts, and 3 Ontario deliberately shifted away from its focus as a historical grievances (1989, 213, 177-234). within Confederation to a more leader self-interested, 11 Cairns studies the shift to a rights-based culture and parochial provincial approach under the Bob Rae NDP the effect of entrenching a Charter on the Canadian po government during the Charlottetown negotiations. This litical psyche (Williams 1995). approach has continued through the Harris Tories to the 12 McGuinty Liberal government, some would say to the For a discussion of the cuts in the 1980s, see Rice detriment of Canada as a whole. and Prince (1993, 381-416).

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13 See, for example, Brock (2003, 77-80); compare and R. Young. 2006. Open Federalism: Interpretations, McRoberts (1997, 191-276); and see Thomas (1997). Significance. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmen 14 tal Relations. Successive polls have captured this view. The im Berger, T. 1981. Fragile Freedoms. Toronto: Clarke-Irwin. portance of a strong social fabric to Canadians is captured Boadway, R. 2006. "Two Panels on Two Balances." Policy in Breton et al. (2004, 30-9). Options 27(7):40-45. 15 G.W. 2003. "Social Assistance and Canadian See for example, Bakvis's discussion of the reduc Boychuk, Federalism." In New Trends in Canadian tion of provincial transfers and the increase in funding to Federalism, ed. F. Rocher and M. Smith. ON: Canada Research Chairs, Canada Foundation for Innova Peterborough, Broadview Press. tion, and granting councils (2007, esp. 208-9). Brault, S. 2005. "The Arts and Culture as New Engines 16For a discussion of the federal of proposal Open of Economic and Social Development." Policy Options Federalism, see Banting et al. (2006). 26(3):56-60. 17 Breton, R., N.J. Hartmann, J.L. Lennards, and P. Reed. For a discussion of the hollowing out of our inter 2004. A Fragile Social Fabric? Fairness, Trust and national presence by the cumulative impact of cuts to the Commitment in Canada. Montreal and Kingston: armed forces, foreign service, and development assist McGill-Queen's University Press. ance budgets, see Nossal (2005). Brock, K.L. 2003. "Executive Federalism: Beggar Thy 18 For an innovative way of thinking about culture, citi Neighbour." In New Trends in Canadian Federalism,

zenship, and economic development, see Brault (2005). 2nd edition, ed. F. Rocher and M. Smith. Peterbor ON: Broadview Press. 19 ough, For a brief description of this institution, see Brock Brock, K.L. and J. Ronson. 2004. "Health Care Requires and Ronson (2004). Creative Solutions: Time for Creative Federalism."

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