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The Alliance: Parties and Leaders How successful was the Alliance? Was merger the right road to follow? Michael Meadowcroft puts the case against. It is still difficult to take a sufficiently dispassionate political and electoral damage. On occasion one relied – usually rewarded – on one’s tar- personal view of the seven-year period from the get audience reading between the lines. formation of the SDP to the two parties’ final votes The title of this essay emanates from my read- to merge. I still have very emotional feelings on how ing of the history of the period. The relation- ship between the two parties and their leaders much better it could have been, on how badly the was, to my mind, the most influential factor in Liberal Party qua party was treated, particularly in the way that the key events unfolded. I focus the early days, on whether or not, in retrospect, it on the political aspects of the Liberal leader, rather than his personality. I have always found would have been better – or even possible – to reject David Steel personable and easy to get on with. the Alliance root and branch, on the tactical naïvete Unusually for a politician, he does not appear of David Steel, on the eventual supineness of almost to harbour grudges. He also has a good sense of humour and likes jazz – what more could one all the Liberal Party’s negotiating team, and on ask! Alas, his relationship with the Liberal Party whether the final settlement really did represent a was always one-sided and, I believe, his political judgement was highly flawed. It is clear from compromise too far. his autobiography that Steel revelled in being If one had to deal with developments since somehow above the party debate. merger, I suspect that the difficulty of being less than dispassionate would be still more evi- dent. Suffice to say that an absence of com- The Grimond legacy ment does not indicate a weakening of resolve! marks my fortieth year as a member of In exploring these questions I am con- the Liberal Party, and to a larger extent than is scious of the excellence of Tony Greaves’ and often realised, one’s perception of the poten- Rachel Pitchford’s account of the merger ne- tial and the frustration of the Alliance years is gotiations. The very few quibbles that I have coloured by one’s experience of previous op- with their text will become apparent in due portunities and failures. The party of the course. Also, I have never been able to hide Grimond years was by no means as ‘Left-Lib- from, nor disavow, current views – even if I ertarian’ as Jo was. To a certain extent the in- wished to – as I have always found it difficult crease in support, and the byelection victories, to resist invitations to write for any journal in the – period rode on a social demo- or publisher aware of how easy it is to flatter cratic style, and an anti-Conservative appeal, me. Also I have always had a quaint belief in in places where Labour could not hope to win. the need for intellectual rigour and philo- In a curious reversal of the Steel years, the then sophic consistency in politics, without which leader was, at least in terms of philosophy and it is invariably difficult to accommodate the policy, more liberal than the party. Why else necessary tactical compromises. As a conse- would the then Young Liberals have felt the quence there are numerous texts extant which need to launch its excellent New Orbits series put on the record what I felt vital at the time. of pamphlets? The contrast with – is To be sure, there are weasel words therein; in salutary. politics one can never wholly shrink from the For me, at the time at party HQ as Local necessity to avoid every possible scintilla of Government Officer, the local elections journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 17 were a great shock. The party had tween leader and party, the Young romped home in council after coun- Liberals had continued their Liberal Leader versus party cil in May on the coat tails of odyssey into their ‘Red Guard’ pe- Those Liberals who committed the March Orpington byelection, riod, and were duly taken on pub- themselves to involvement in the winning seats in town after town, of- licly for their pains, with debilitat- party nationally – often at consider- ten with little or no organisation. In ing effects. able domestic, financial and electoral March the immense opportu- The relevance of this period to the cost – were not, with very few ex- nity of a possible gain from Labour Alliance years is threefold. First, the ceptions, wild revolutionaries deter- in Colne Valley presented itself and struggle to maintain the party’s lib- mined to embarrass the leadership was, I believe, tactically muffed. Even eral identity vis-à-vis its leader began at every opportunity. The much- maligned Liberal Party Council, for instance, spent far too much of its The failure of David Steel to extract time agonising over how to temper its policy leanings towards the ‘lead- sufficient political and electoral benefits ership’s’ position where the latter was from the Pact gave clear and adequate known or assumed, or how to present palpably different strategy notice that he was not going to be the decisions as being an example of tough leader determined to protect his party unity. Of course, from time to time, sometimes when goaded by the party in crucial negotiations. leader’s – and, by and large, the whole Parliamentary Party’s – ne- glect or criticism, the Party Council without such a timely byelection with Jeremy Thorpe, not with David went to the barricades but, in gen- boost we expected to repeat the Steel, and was a direct consequence eral, conscious of the retribution that successes. With a number of honour- of the lessons learned in the Grimond the electorate tends to wreak on able exceptions we dropped back in era. Second, the contrast between the party disunity, the party was remark- place after place. The palpable disap- response within the party to the ably well behaved – even when pro- pointment was followed by a number Thorpe-Heath talks in February voked. I am absolutely convinced of defections of sitting councillors and the Steel-Callaghan pact that had ‘the leadership’ chosen to and it was certainly clear to me that of is revealing. During the ’s, work with the Party Council (and to if Liberal officers and candidates did I was leader of the Leeds City Coun- a less public degree, the Party Ex- not possess at least some understand- cil Liberal Group and a national party ecutive), as some MPs did, includ- ing of liberal philosophy they were officer. When Jeremy Thorpe went to ing John Pardoe and, from time to liable to be wafted about by every Downing Street immediately after the time, David Penhaligon, rather than passing political breeze. Again, the February election, my tel- treating those who were, after all, comparison with the – period ephone, along with other regional Liberal colleagues with barely con- is, I believe, significant. and national colleagues’, was perma- cealed contempt, the gains in mu- Grimond was so personally at- nently occupied with irate and wor- tual trust and recognition would tractive and charismatic that, even ried Liberals appalled at what deal have had immense benefits during though he was invariably plain might be being contemplated. In the traumatic Alliance years. As ex- speaking, few members of the pub- , my recollection is that I had amples of what would have been lic, let alone many members of the three mildly concerned calls over the possible, one only has to look at the party, looked beyond the sound of Pact. It would have been impossible civilised debates and the acceptance what he was saying to the words to carry the party into a coalition of party consensus at the special as- themselves. In contrast, the Thorpe with the Conservatives in , what- semblies called to debate specific years were politically and organisa- ever the terms, but, despite perfectly crucial strategic issues. tionally horrendous, if at times justified fears as to its possible effect electorally successful. Labour’s deep on the party, the Lib-Lab Pact of unpopularity from and Heath’s – was generally accepted as Byelection candidates stolid leadership, particularly in Op- being a justified risk. Third, the fail- To take two key examples of the position, provided an unrivalled op- ure of David Steel to extract suffi- , frustration and, indeed, the lack of portunity which was simply dis- cient political and electoral benefits understanding of basic courtesy, one sipated and finally sunk in the po- from the Pact gave clear and ad- only has to examine the question of litically catastrophic entrails of the equate notice that he was not going the Alliance candidatures for the Thorpe trial. And whereas the to be the tough leader determined Croydon North-West and Crosby party was mired in the struggle to to protect his party in crucial nego- byelections. An astute Liberal Party present a semblance of unity be- tiations. 18 journal of liberal democrat history 18: spring 1998 leader, faced with the Croydon op- years early – was also present at to be curiously antipathetic to fight- portunity, and having a perfectly rea- Bradford. We were both outraged. ing Labour. sonable desire to secure the election Suffice to say that Anthony Hill gen- There certainly was at the time of an attractive SDP luminary, would erously accepted and supported a big difference between those Lib- have immediately consulted the ob- Shirley Williams at the byelection.

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