1ST CANADIAN INFANTRY AND THE BATTLE FOR : A RECONSIDERATION OF AN INCOMPLETE HISTORICAL CONSENSUS

by

Grant N. Barry

B.A., University of New Brunswick, 2006

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the Graduate Academic Unit of History

Supervisors: Lee Windsor, Ph.D., History Marc Milner, Ph.D., History

Examining Board: Steven Turner, Ph.D., History David Charters, Ph.D., History Bill Kerr, Ph.D., Classics

This thesis is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK

April, 2008

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ii ABSTRACT

In July 1943 the Allies launched Operation Husky, the invasion of Axis-held ,

as part of a grand strategy to erode German Army combat strength in preparation for a

cross-channel invasion in 1944. Included in the invasion force was 1st Canadian Infantry

Division (1 CID), embarking upon the first protracted Canadian ground campaign of the

Second World War. The division fought its most intense battle of that campaign around the

town of Agira in the very centre of the island. This towering ancient mountaintop town was

a vital component to the main defence line erected by the Axis and stood squarely in front

of 1 CID's path of advance. For five days the Canadians clashed bitterly with German and

Italian units entrenched in positions that stretched several miles west of Agira. Through the

cooperation of infantry and armour, along with the careful and deliberate application of the

largest Canadian artillery and mortar fire-plan to date, Axis defenders were destroyed or

captured and the town occupied.

Most historians claim the battle for Agira was a tactical blunder. The existing

consensus suggests that the division was stopped by a numerically inferior enemy and that

a reliance on artillery actually caused the attack to fail. That interpretation comes from an under-appreciation of Axis strength by historians and a misunderstanding of the strategic

victory achieved by 1 CID. This thesis reveals that Axis formations actually enjoyed an

advantage in combat strength over the attacking Canadians and also received crucial reinforcements as the action continued. Those reinforcements influenced the battle

significantly and allowed for the decimation of large Axis units.

iii CONTENTS

DEDICATION ii

ABSTRACT iii

CONTENTS iv

ABBREVIATIONS v

LIST OF MAPS vi

INTRODUCTION 1

ONE - THE ALLIES' ROAD TO SICILY 5

TWO - THE LONG WAIT IS OVER 23

THREE-BATTLE INOCULATION 36

FOUR - RECONNAISSANCE AND DECIMATION 61

FIVE - BREAKING THROUGH 83

SLX - AGIRA: A DATED CONSENSUS 106

SEVEN - A SHATTERED FOE AND LESSONS LEARNED 120

MAPS 134

BIBLIOGRAPHY 138

CURRICULUM VITAE

iv ABBREVIATIONS

1CID 1st Canadian Infantry Division 1CIB 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade 2CIB 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade 3CIB 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade 48th HoC 48th Highlanders of Canada CCRCA Commander Corps of Royal Canadian Artillery CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff CO Commanding Officer CYR Carleton and York Regiment GOC General Officer Commanding HPER Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment JIC Joint Intelligence Committee (British) LER Loyal Edmonton Regiment NCO Non-Commissioned Officer PPCLI Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry R22eR Royal 22e Regiment RA Royal Artillery RCA Royal Canadian Artillery RCASC Royal Service Corps RCE Royal Canadian Engineers RCR Royal Canadian Regiment SHoC Seaforth Highlanders of Canada SLI Light Infantry WNSR West Nova Scotia Regiment

V LIST OF MAPS

MAPI: SICILY 134

MAP 2: VALGUARNERA TO THE SIMETO 135

MAP 3: THE BATTLE FOR AGIRA 136

MAP 4:231 BRIGADE OPERATIONS NEAR AGIRA 137

Vi 1 INTRODUCTION

On 10 July 1943 the Allies launched the invasion of Axis-held Sicily code-named

Operation Husky. Among the formations which assaulted the island was 1st Canadian

Infantry Division (1 CID). The well-trained and equipped division embarked upon the first period of prolonged combat for any formation of First Canadian Army during the Second

World War. Canadian ground forces fared extremely well in their inaugural campaign, wirining crucial battles and accolades from their veteran British counterparts. Oddly, historians have not considered their hard work and success with the same level of interest that formations fighting in other theatres of war traditionally receive. This is unfortunate because 1 CID conducted one of their most important operations of the war in Sicily while fighting to capture the town of Agira. Indeed, the struggle to crack Axis defences en route to this town was critically important not only for the division but for 15th Army Group in

Sicily and for the Allies' war effort as a whole.

While the discourse regarding the Canadians in Sicily is limited, historians have recognized the battle for Agira as an integral component of the campaign. Yet, generally their depictions of the offensive are misleading. In the absence of a comprehensive examination of the engagement, accounts of Agira oscillate between sparsely detailed sections of broad studies or focused investigations of only certain aspects of the five day action. These works have produced a consensus view that combat near Agira was at least a rebuff, if not a failure or defeat. The analysis and evidence that follows exhibits a strikingly different assessment of the battle.

A critical element of 1 CID's advance to Agira that is missing from the existing 2 historiography of events is a more accurate appreciation of enemy strength. The old consensus is built on the understanding that 1 and 2 Brigades faced a German delay position, held by approximately one battalion. The Canadian unit war diaries, radio logs and

intelligence summaries, however, indicate that the enemy's combat strength has been wholly underestimated. Earlier studies have missed or written off these enemy numbers and therefore misunderstood the entire battle.

Former conceptions of the enemy's size and the nature of his defences have led many historians to suggest that 1 CID's fight at Agira began with a sharp reverse, followed by a

second overwhelming advance and eventual victory. This study clarifies that the Canadians

actually waged a continuous and destructive series of attacks against a formidable, deep Axis

defence position that received a steady flow of reinforcements. Close examination of

infantry tactics employed, the use of supporting weapons and the application of the largest

Canadian artillery fire-plan of the campaign will refute old arguments that the division was

stopped by a smaller force. Claims that an over-dependence on heavy fire support crippled the formation's assault are also problematic. Several authors insist that artillery actually hampered operations on the ground. The findings here suggest otherwise. Those who argue that artillery stymied the initiative of Canadian infantry attempt to use the delay of 1 Brigade as an indication that guns and set-piece doctrine restricted the attack. Therefore, each phase of combat which occurred during the divisional advance will be considered in this work, in order to further reveal the depth of Axis defences and the effectiveness of 1 CID's assault.

Current battle narratives of the five day fight to Agira, which classify the opening phase of the assault as a defeat, often obscure the actualities of the latter stages by implying victory was accomplished with ease. This was hardly the case, as every yard of ground 3 leading to Agira was contested viciously by Axis defenders. A fuller insight on the second half of the attack will fill a void in the existing historiography and illustrate the prior role of

1 Brigade in setting the stage for a divisional victory. Although the main goal of this thesis is to provide a more comprehensive tactical record of this battle, the effects of the Canadian advance on Agira will also be discussed within their appropriate operational and strategic contexts.

Due to the fact that some historians have categorized Agira as a minor battle, little has been written of its operational importance or the many ways in which the Canadian victory achieved strategic goals for the Allies. The location of Agira made the town a key part of Axis defences in central Sicily and as it will be shown, by capturing this territory 1

CID placed intense pressure on the enemy's entire front. Not only did the fall of this town improve the Allies operational situation but the attritional nature of fighting was highly advantageous as well. During this engagement 1 CID succeeded in attaining Allied goals by destroying German manpower and also by gaining knowledge which helped to reshape doctrine and educate units training for later deployment. Though comprising only one division of an entire army group, the Canadian formation clearly executed the strategic policy built by the Allies at the start of 1943.

Only in recent years have historians truly begun to recognize this policy and the merits of the work of formations such as 1 CID. Traditionally historians have failed to acknowledge the important nexus between the development of Allied defensive doctrine during the desert war and the destruction of German fighting power thereafter. As a new school of historical thought has emerged and discerned the effectiveness and far-reaching strategic results of this combat standard, incomplete histories of misunderstood battles can 4 be reassessed. Significantly, newer works on the subject also place greater emphasis on the men involved in carrying out these aims at the tactical level. The Canadian attack on Agira is one example.

The opening chapter of this thesis provides an overview of the Allies' grand strategy and the foundations of Operation Husky, as determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. This is followed in Chapter Two by an examination of the political and military considerations which led 1 CID to become an integral part of the Husky invasion force. Chapter Three synthesizes the formation's first ten days of the campaign, beginning with 1 CID's landing on the Pachino Peninsula and finishing with the capture of -. A comprehensive analysis of the first two days of the attack on Agira forms the core of Chapter Four, while evidence dispels myths that the Canadians suffered a reverse and that enemy defences were held by numerically smaller forces. In Chapter Five this old consensus is refuted again as additional evidence shows how artillery played a vital and effective role in destroying enemy defences during three more days of combat. A sharp contrast to the preceding battle narrative is obvious in Chapter Six as the existing historiographical record of the fight for Agira is examined. Finally, Chapter

Seven reaffirms 1 CID's important role during Operation Husky and how the formation's success on the battlefield (especially during the battle for Agira) fit precisely into the strategic mold cast at the Casablanca Conference. 5

CHAPTER ONE

The Allies' Road to Sicily

For the present Germany can best be attacked through the medium of in the Mediterranean ... this can best be achieved with a policy directed against Sicily.

GENERAL ALAN BROOKE JANUARY 22, 1943

On 10 July 1943, as the Allies launched the invasion of Sicily code named Operation

Husky, 1st Canadian Infantry Division (1 CID) clawed their way onto the Axis-held island, beginning their first extensive ground campaign of the Second World War. Deception measures and a sudden storm masked the arrival of the American Seventh and British Eighth

Armies - the Canadian formation belonging to the latter - from Italian Coastal Defence

Divisions. Following their successful landings and consolidation of D-Day objectives 1 CID was joined by the Three Rivers Regiment of 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade for an inland drive toward central Sicily.1 An early pursuit of Axis units and subsequent action against enemy rearguards quickly developed into full scale battles as German divisions, bolstered by the remnants of the Italian Sixth Army, dug in atop the mountain peaks of central Sicily.

1 During combat in Sicily only the Three Rivers Regiment of 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade operated in unison with 1st Canadian Infantry Division. The Calgary and Ontario Regiments were placed under British command and spent much of the campaign acting as a defensive link between the flanks of XXX and XIII Corps, south of the Catania Plains. See: Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. L. Nicholson, Official History of The Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. II, The Canadians In Italy, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1956. 6

These engagements culminated with the largest deployment of Canadian strength to date from 24-28 July, between the towns of and Agira. There, Canadian forces decimated enemy units attempting to stop their advance.

The division's path to central Sicily traveled across broken and dusty roadways but it had actually been built upon the strategic goals of the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff

(CCS).2 The decisions made by Allied officials in January 1943, and how historians interpreted them, are central to understanding the mission of 1 CID. The Allied policy of continued offensive action in the Mediterranean theatre, as a means of destroying German fighting strength, was a complex but necessary strategy to adopt.

While combat in North Africa continued the CCS gathered at the Casablanca

Conference in January 1943 to discuss future operations following the Allies' seemingly inevitable victory on that continent. Since November 1942 Anglo-American forces had been clearing North Africa of hostile armies, by hammering Axis formations into an ever- shrinking bridgehead in Tunisia from both the east and west. Their efforts eventually culminated in the surrender of a quarter of a million Axis soldiers by 13 May 1943.3 Well before this day had arrived, the framework for subsequent offensive action needed to be decided upon as the scale of Allied military operations required a great deal of time to plan and prepare for.

Just as the North African Campaign was one piece of a larger strategic tapestry, so

2 The Combined Chiefs of Staff refers to the union of the respective British and American Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the purpose of constructing and guiding Allied global strategy during the Second World War. See: Carlo D'Este, World War II In The Mediterranean 1942-1945, Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, North Carolina. 3 Douglas Porch, The Path to Victory, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2004, p. 412. 7 too was the coming phase in ground operations. Unfortunately, as American military historian Carlo D'Este stated, "the Allies were seriously divided over future strategy in the

Mediterranean" and in the process of trying to weigh all possible options "some of the most contentious disagreements of the war were to occur."4 The United States had been entangled in the global conflict for slightly more than a year and were eager to defeat Germany in short order - only then could they turn their full attention to the Japanese threat in the Pacific. Led by the United States Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, American officials felt the best way to attain this end was by invading northwest Europe before German defensive superiority along the coast could be solidified. However, their British counterparts spent much of the Casablanca Conference dissuading them from committing irreplaceable men and valuable equipment to an operation they felt was surely doomed in mid-1943. At present, Germany was still too strong for the Allies to attempt a cross-channel invasion.

Operation Torch, the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa during November

1942, should have been proof enough that Allied armies were as yet unprepared for a thrust into northwest Europe. Historian Rick Atkinson concluded that "TORCH revealed profound shortcomings in leadership, tactics, equipment, martial elan, and common sense" among

Allied armies. Indeed the loss of over 1,500 casualties against Vichy soldiers during the initial assault could hardly be interpreted optimistically.5 If poorly-equipped French soldiers had inflicted such high casualties during their spirited defence, surely battle-hardened units of the German Army could mount a far costlier stand on the channel coast.

Only one month after the proceedings at Casablanca the disastrous reverse of the US

4 D'Este, World War IIIn The Mediterranean 1942-1945, p. 38. 5 Rick Atkinson, An Army At Dawn, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2002, p. 159. 8

Army at Kasserine Pass, Tunisia confirmed their fear of Allied, and especially American, unpreparedness. With more than 6,000 casualties suffered by US formations, the newly appointed commander-in-chief of ground forces, General Harold Alexander, announced that soldiers of this caliber would be "quite useless and play no useful part whatsoever" in the future invasion of Europe.6 Critical to Allied success against the Axis was the ability of their soldiers on the ground and it was apparent that doctrinal and technical refinement was needed prior to an assault across the channel.

In order to prepare the ranks of Allied armies and their officers for operations in

France more exposure to combat was necessary, so lessons could be drawn from the ever- changing battlefields of the war. The campaign in North Africa revealed marked differences in Allied conceptions of sound tactical doctrine and the actualities of rapid, mechanized combat in the field. Older military theories on conduct lacked a centralized system of control over artillery and combat strength was applied piece-meal on the battlefield rather than being concentrated in force.7 Championed by General Bernard Law Montgomery Commander of

British Eighth Army, the new concept of "bite and hold" warfare born in the African deserts was greatly changing the face of combat and had to be incorporated into Allied armies prior to the channel assault.8 Sicily provided a suitable testing ground for this doctrine to be

6 Atkinson, p. 377. 7 Porch, p. 299. 8 The "Bite and Hold" tactic reflected two vital characteristics of large-scale combat which were not properly addressed before late 1942. The first was the calculated application of Allied firepower, while the second was the necessity of commanders to fight within the limitations of their resources; rather than engage in open warfare advantageous to German armour and anti-tank guns, battles were now fought on Allied terms. Strength was massed for the assault in order to seize forward positions; a defensive posture was then taken in order to repel the inevitable counter-attack which German doctrine ensured. This prevented Allied armour and infantry from being destroyed during open, mobile combat. See: Porch; Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War To Be Won, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, United Sates, 2000. 9 integrated into additional Allied formations.

The use of divisions which had not seen combat by 1943 was a critical component of Operation Husky. Formations such as 1 CID were extensively trained but they were untested in the complicated principles of warfare emerging from the desert.9 During fighting in Sicily, Douglas Porch argues that Allied divisions "evidenced solid combat qualities and a capacity to learn which would prove extremely valuable in the Italian and Normandy campaigns."10 Along with tactics, a variety of new weapons and equipment were all given a thorough workout in Sicily and an ongoing education process thus brought other Allied divisions to the fore of newly developing standards before June 1944. Without these important steps toward doctrinal proficiency the assault on France was likely to falter. A number of other factors also had to be considered at the beginning of 1943 during the CCS conference.

Cementing their opposition to a cross-channel assault that year, the British Joint

Chiefs of Staff argued at Casablanca that the preconditions for a successful landing in northern France had not yet come to fruition. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet note that "The Battle of the Atlantic was not over; the Luftwaffe had yet to be defeated; the logistical infrastructure for the immediate support of the invasion did not exist; and Allied air forces were not capable of interdicting the landing area and preventing the Germans from moving rapidly against the invasion."11 Only in the Mediterranean, contends D'Este, "was there any immediate possibility of continuing the momentum that had begun in North

9 Major-General George Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, Vanwell Publishing Ltd., Ontario,1992, p. 150. 10 Porch, p. 446. 11 Murray and Millet, A War To Be Won, p. 299. 10

Africa."12 An even greater determinative factor was the actual strength of German forces that could respond to the Allies attempt at establishing a bridgehead in France.

Had they been able to overcome both German air and naval power in the English

Channel in 1943, the Allies' assault force still would have faced more than twice as many

enemy divisions capable of responding to the invasion within a two-week period. British

figures collected through the use of Ultra intelligence revealed that German strength in

France stood at 44 divisions, while seven more could be rushed from the Eastern Front in a

period of only 12-14 days.13 These figures should have immediately negated any thought

of assaulting the French coast in 1943. In order to successfully do so the following year

Germany had to be "worn down, bled, exhausted before it could be overwhelmed."14 By first

knocking Italy out of the war the bleeding of German combat strength could be achieved.

At the Casablanca Conference the British hypothesized that by placing extreme

pressure on Italy, the weaker Axis partner, Benito Mussolini's regime might fall. If Italy

crumbled Germany would be compelled to bear the burden of her former military obligations

by transferring divisions to the Mediterranean. American military historian Martin

Blumenson calculated that "Italian divisions performing occupational and coastal defense

duties in the Balkans and southern France" numbered more than thirty, in addition to those

12 D'Este, World War II In The Mediterranean 1942-1945, p. 39. 13 Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV, August 1942-September 1943, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1972, p. 252. Ultra was a form of British intelligence which originated through Anglo-French-Polish cooperation in the early stages of the war, as encrypted German wireless signals were intercepted and decoded. After Poland was overrun and France fell in 1940, the complicated work undertaken by cryptanalysts, intelligence agents, interpreters and mathematicians was conducted at Bletchley Park, London. Having first breached German cryptographic defences by cracking the Enigma cipher in the spring of 1940, valuable information was channeled to Allied planners with increasing regularity throughout the remainder of the war. See: Ralph Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1989. 14 Porch, p. 332. 11 defending the homeland.15 Fully aware of these statistics General Alan Brooke, Chief of the

Imperial General Staff, spent much of the Casablanca Conference persuading his American colleagues that a powerful assault against Italy and her armies was quite pertinent to victory over Germany. Brooke ensured the CCS that Germany was the primary target, but at present they could "best be attacked through the medium of Italy in the Mediterranean" or more specifically by invading Sicily.16 The British argument that Italy must be beaten in order to grind away German strength, thus facilitating a cross-channel invasion in 1944, was ultimately adopted by the CCS in January 1943.

The continuation of military action in the Mediterranean theatre was also designed to support Allied grand strategy through a variety of other channels. The immense buildup of enemy military power in the region forced Hitler to transfer additional units into the theatre and spread his troops thin, in order to guard against an invasion throughout much of southern Europe.17 This decision prevented the massing of a strategic reserve with which to meet an attack and was further exploited by Allied planners. Based on information collected through Ultra intelligence the Allies preyed on existing German anxieties concerning the defence of the Mediterranean, in order to conduct a complex deception program aimed at disrupting the Axis' already confusing strategic plans.18 Fearful of multiple landings and

15 Martin Blumenson, "Sicily and Italy: Why and What For?", Military Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1966, p. 64. 16 Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, eds., War Diaries 1939-1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 2001, p. 367. 17 Porch, p. 413. 18 On 30 April 1943 Operation Mincemeat was set in motion by the Allies. A British submarine released the body of "Major Martin" -ostensibly the victim of an air crash- into the sea off the coast of , complete with "classified documents" which suggested Greece and Sardinia were actual Allied objectives, while Sicily figured only as part of an elaborate cover plan. See: Bennett. 12 convinced that Sicily was not immediately threatened, Hitler ordered Sardinia, Corsica,

Greece and the Dodecanese Islands reinforced in May 1943, leaving the actual target vulnerable.19 When Sicilian defences were overrun on 10 July and the Italian Army started to break, their faltering pieces began to complete the complex strategic puzzle designed by the Allies.

Only fifteen days after Sicily was invaded Benito Mussolini's regime toppled and the already tenuous relationship between Italian and German troops disintegrated into uncertainty. Fearing a total collapse of his ally, Hitler immediately authorized the transfer of German divisions from France to Italy.20 In the days that followed the Italian Government and her army spiraled chaotically out of control and Germany quickly lost the support of dozens of divisions.21 Confirming the plans laid out by Brooke and the CCS, Hitler was forced to replace Italian losses with additional formations drawn from France and soon vital

German manpower and equipment was being destroyed in the Mediterranean. According to

John Strawson, Husky also secured Allied lines of communication and shipping through the

Mediterranean, rendering further service to preparations for the coming invasion of France.22

Consolidation of Sicily offered the Allies a multitude of airfields from which they were able to blanket the Mediterranean Sea with protective air cover, in conjunction with those already in operation on the island of Malta and in North Africa. This allowed shipping to resume through the Suez Canal en route to the Atlantic rather than continuing with the circuitous route around the African continent. As a direct result three to four million tonnes

19 Bennett, p. 222. 20 Martin Blumenson, Sicily: Whose Victory?, BaUantine Books Inc., New York, 1968, p. 110. 21 Porch, p. 417. 22 John Strawson, The Italian Campaign, Seeker and Warburg Ltd., London, 1987, p. 87. 13 of merchant shipping was freed for use elsewhere, much of that used to stockpile material in the for the cross-channel invasion slated for the summer of 1944.23

While Operation Husky led to nearly complete supremacy in the skies over the Mediterranean

Sea, it was the Allies previously restricted operational capacity in the air which had factored strongly in the decision to attack the island.

Husky proved to be a calculated strategic choice for follow-up operations to North

Africa, although the decision to specifically attack Sicily was also based on sound operational principles. While there was initial uncertainty among the ranks of the CCS whether Sicily or Sardinia should be seized, General Alan Brooke led the Allies to agreement. Noting the fact that Sicily rested nearer in proximity to both North Africa and the island of Malta than Sardinia did, greater fighter support could protect the amphibious landings. Likewise, faster maintenance of logistical infrastructures anchored on shipping turn-around could be achieved following the assault.24 While the location of the island was well suited to meet these operational requirements, historians have shown that it was certainly the strategic implications that factored most prominently in the final determination.

Early studies of Mediterranean operations in 1943 provide a basis for understanding

Allied strategy in its most rudimentary form. These histories reveal the important difference of opinion between the British and American Joint Chiefs of Staff and how this influenced the development of goals and planning. However, these works fail to identify critical factors which formed the foundations of the strategy cast at the Casablanca Conference. These factors included the Allies' intimate knowledge of their enemy's tendencies, strengths,

23 Murray and Millet, p. 303. 24 Danchev and Todman, p. 358. 14 weaknesses and fears. The official histories of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United

States all lack an understanding of this crucial element. This was because the Ultra intelligence responsible for uncovering many of these enemy characteristics remained a classified tool of the western powers as the Cold War evolved, and did not become public knowledge until several decades after the end of the Second World War.

The Ultra revelation had a profound impact on the way history of the Second World

War was written and understood, following its disclosure in the mid-1970s.25 Generally, this form of intelligence was incapable of delineating German long-term aims. However, Ultra successfully confirmed German trends and often unveiled tactical plans or clues for accurate speculation concerning developing operations, allowing the Allies to meet enemy threats and tailor their own strategic initiatives accordingly.26 Its most relevant offering to the discussion presented here suggests that Ultra set the precedent for Anglo-American policy in the

Mediterranean by confirming the almost certain failure which the Allies would face should they try a cross-channel invasion in 1943. Until Ultra became common knowledge associated with the discourse on Mediterranean policy no historian could be entirely certain how the Allies had formed their strategy. Only studies written after the mid-1970s exhibit a clear understanding of this singularly vital factor.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. L. Nicholson's Official History The Canadians In Italy

(1956) gives little more than a brief description of the path chosen by the CSS at Casablanca in January 1943. Nicholson suggests that American agreement toward Operation Husky was based primarily on the ease which troops based in North Africa could maintain momentum

25 Bennett, p. 405. 26 Ibid., p. 407. 15 against Axis forces in the greater region. He adds that because Allied shipping could be economized by securing the Mediterranean Sea lanes, American officials began to see the inherent value of the operation as a means of preparing for the cross-channel assault.27 Not surprisingly there is little analytical assessment of the choices made by the CCS. Standing as a junior partner - at least politically - in the western alliance, Canada had no representatives at Casablanca and in the postwar era the documentation of the role played by her military forces was the primary objective of the official history. Not until 1962 did an appraisal of the Casablanca decisions and their impact on the war appear.

In his monograph aptly titled Sicily (1962), British historian Hugh Pond alludes to

London's desire to break the Italian half of the Axis alliance from an early date. Pond shows that even in 1940 plans were conceived to invade Sicily with Operations Influx and Whipcord contemplated prior to the 1943 invasion code named Husky. The author confirms

Nicholson's earlier assertion that safe passage of shipping through the Mediterranean warranted operations to consolidate the island.28 Pond also strongly insists that at least some form of offensive action had to be undertaken in the Mediterranean, as "there could be no question of allowing this war theatre to stagnate with the troops standing idle."29 While Pond and Nicholson alluded to a Sicilian operation to facilitate Overlord, its importance as a piece of this larger plan did not become evident until several decades later, although in the mid-

1960s additional parts of the whole began to surface.

27 Nicholson, The Canadians In Italy, pp. 6-7. 28 Hugh Pond, Sicily, William Kimber and Co. Limited, London, 1962, p. 30. Pond argues that two million tonnes of Allied shipping could be made available by using the Mediterranean Sea lanes instead of sailing round the Cape of Good Hope. More recent histories suggest that the Mediterranean route would actually free between three and four million tonnes of shipping. See: Murray and Millet. 29Pond,p.31. 16

In the US Army's official volume on the Italian Campaign published in 1965, it is possible to discern what might be one of the first discussions on the development of Allied strategy in relation to the interconnectedness of combat theatres during the Second World

War. Lieutenant-Colonel Albert N. Garland, however, claims that in retrospect the results of the Casablanca Conference create an illusion of "an apparently consistent over-all Allied strategy for World War II in the Mediterranean."30 He alludes to the supposed framework as the expulsion of Axis armies from North Africa, the invasion of Sicily as a means for the elimination of Italy from the war and the containment and attrition of German forces in Italy

"as a prelude to the main attack across the English Channel into northwest Europe."31

Designed to facilitate the eventual launching of Operation Overlord, this framework was the exact strategic mold cast by the Allies according to later historians.

Garland argues that Allied policy in the Mediterranean was nothing more than an ad hoc series of decisions, their individual nature dictated by conditions at the time rather than a grand plan. The historian does agree that operations after those in North Africa were at least designed to protect sea lanes and intensify pressure on Italy. Confirmation of Husky as a means to knock Italy out of the war was never an immediate objective agreed upon by

Anglo-American planners, says Garland, but if the weaker Axis partner collapsed Germany would be forced to divert fifteen divisions to replace her ally's commitments.32

Three years later Martin Blumenson, another member of the US Official History team, argued in Sicily: Whose Victory? (1968) that the elimination of Italy from the Axis was

30 Lieutenant-Colonel Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, United States Army in World War II, Sicily and The Surrender of Italy, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1965, p. 1. 31 Ibid., p. 1. 32 Ibid., p. 17. 17 a primary concern of the Allies. He contends that by pushing Italy from the war Germany's position would be weakened and isolated, "making them more vulnerable to eventual defeat by cross-channel invasion."33 This follows an identical vein of thought included in the official history which cited a dispersal of German strength, subsequent to the collapse of

Italy, as a means of facilitating the Allies "re-entry into the Continent" by way of northwest

Europe.34 Blumenson also adds that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff acquiesced in

Operation Husky only because the campaign in North Africa was taking longer than anticipated, therefore nullifying any chance of crossing the channel in 1943.35

The official British series on grand strategy presents a far more compelling case for the invasion of Sicily. Michael Howard's Grand Strategy Volume 7F(1972) contends that in 1943 the only significant offensive capability still held by Germany was manifest in the ongoing U-boat campaign. The Royal Navy concluded that in 1942 the Allies lost approximately 7.8 million tonnes of shipping (81 percent of which was sunk by U-boats) though only 7 million tonnes were built.36 Howard wrote that in order to even amass the necessary resources in the United Kingdom for Overlord Allied shipping had to become more efficient - Mediterranean operations made this possible. The author acknowledged

American skepticism toward plans for Husky but also points to their satisfaction with the prospect of new airfields to strike deep into Germany from.37

Standing as a testament to Ultra's value, the British series on wartime intelligence

33 Blumenson, Sicily: Whose Victory?, p. 16. 34 Garland, pp. 6-7. 35 Blumenson, Sicily: Whose Victory?, p. 17. 36 Howard, p. 259. 37 Ibid., p. 243. 18 adds depth to the study of Operation Husky and its role in fulfilling Allied strategy. The second part of volume three, penned by F. H. Hinsley, further illustrates the leverage which

Ultra afforded the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in guiding Allied planning.

Effectively quashing any lingering support for a cross-channel invasion before 1944, the JIC proclaimed that such an effort in mid-1943 would meet great enemy resistance. Even if Italy were knocked from the war and Germany was on the defensive in the Mediterranean it was estimated that "41 divisions and 1,500 aircraft" could still oppose an Allied assault against northwest Europe.38 Beyond the analysis presented in these types of official histories, independent studies soon weighed the impact of Ultra on Allied decision making prior to

Operation Husky.

John Strawson forged one of the newer, more holistic analyses of events in the

Mediterranean theatre by paying close attention to their connection with Allied grand strategy. His perspective on operations against Italy and their overall significance was admittedly influenced by Ultra?9 In The Italian Campaign (1987) Strawson confirms that momentum and concentration of forces in North Africa acted as a significant catalyst for additional operations in the Mediterranean region. Based on Ultra revelations about German strength though, Strawson insists that an amphibious attack against the French coast could not be launched until "everything had been done to weaken the German capability there."40

In the late 1980s Carlo D'Este also rejected the conception that operations in North

Africa prevented an early riposte against northwest Europe. Bitter Victory (1988) reveals

38 F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in The Second World War, Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol. Ill, Pt. I, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1984, p. 69. 39 Strawson, p. 1. 40 Ibid., p. 30. 19

that a hasty return to France was undesirable and time had to be bought in order to carry out

a comprehensive attack across the channel. D'Este references the disastrous Dieppe Raid

of August 1942 as an affirmation that German strength on the channel coast was too strong

and that the Allies had yet to master the complex technique of amphibious warfare.41 The

author concludes that a northwest European invasion was impossible in 1943. Instead,

D'Este attests that continued attrition of German strength through additional practical combat

experience was needed to refine the capabilities of Allied formations. The fighting in Sicily

granted this opportunity.

John Strawson wrote that North Africa was a springboard from which the Allies were

able to dissipate, contain and grind down German combat strength in the Mediterranean.42

Nowhere is this fact more clear than in Ultra in The Mediterranean (1989), written by Ralph

Bennett - a former Ultra intelligence analyst himself. Maintaining the argument that fighting

in Sicily was designed to harness momentum gained in North Africa and tie down and

destroy German divisions, Bennett's study approaches this element of Allied strategy with

a special focus on their use of Ultra intelligence. He justifies the continuation of a

Mediterranean offensive by citing the confused and erroneous decisions made by the Axis

in response to the apparent threat against their southern flank, which in turn led to the

decimation of German fighting strength.43 This study is indicative of the new era of

historical examination which arose after the disclosure of British intelligence secrets.

Even more recently Williamson Murray and Allan Millet's Second World War

41 Carlo D'Este, Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, 1943, E. P. Dutton, New York, 1988, p. 19. 42 Strawson, p. 9. 43 Bennett, p. 221. 20 synthesis, A War To Be Won (2000), argues that an invasion of northwest Europe was likely to fail in 1943. The authors regard the British effort to maintain an effective combat presence in the Mediterranean as having been "entirely right." Murray and Millet argue that a channel assault in 1943 was doomed as both the skies above and the waters themselves were not firmly controlled by the Allies. They add that the strength of German armies alone could have easily overwhelmed an invasion force.44 Supported by statistical evidence brought to light by Ultra, historian Rick Atkinson reiterated this point soon after.

In An Army At Dawn (2002) Atkinson uses figures derived from Ultra intelligence to describe forecasted resistance against a channel assault in September 1943. Atkinson's findings suggest that Germany defended northwestern Europe with 46 divisions, held eleven in reserve on home soil and could easily have transferred seven additional formations from the Russian Front in only two weeks.45 The Allies could only stage 25 divisions in Great

Britain. As such, the author postulates that by knocking Italy out of the war first, Germany would be forced to compensate for the loss of 54 Italian divisions.46 Historian Douglas Porch also lauds the Allies implication of a grand strategy.

The Path To Victory (2004) is Porch's overview of the significance of the

Mediterranean Theatre of Operations on the whole and stands as a new historical bulwark against older, strategically detached, pve-Ultra interpretations of the reasons for launching

Operation Husky. Though not viewed as a "decisive theatre" by the author, he asserts that the Mediterranean was in fact a "pivotal theatre" which served as a vital prelude to a cross-

44 Murray and Millet, p. 299. 45 Atkinson, pp. 283-284. 46 Ibid., p. 284. 21 channel assault in 1944.47 Porch confirms the notion that an allied attack against northern

France in 1943 was likely to have failed and operations in the Mediterranean region made far greater sense for the Allies. In mid-1943 this was the only theatre, as expressed by Porch, in which the Allies were quickly gaining an almost uncontested air and naval supremacy, while the further employment of battle hardened divisions poised on the shores of North

Africa was an obvious desire.48

Porch claims that a 1943 invasion of northwest Europe would have required a herculean logistical effort to transfer much needed formations from North Africa to the

United Kingdom. In contrast, operations against Sicily were of a sound logistical nature as the majority of necessary combat strength was already in place to strike across the

Mediterranean Sea. The author also adds that ground combat was only practical against

German and Italian forces in this region.49 The invasion of Sicily truly began The Path To

Victory based on the assertions of this study. It offered the Allies incremental successes, valuable lessons and an opportunity to identify poor commanders and buy time to prepare more extensively for a cross-channel assault.

The discourse regarding Husky exhibits a recent consensus on the importance of the

operation as a means of facilitating the later invasion of northwest Europe and thus the total

Allied war effort against the Axis. Historians have laid to rest earlier American claims that the invasion of Sicily was part of a British attempt to avoid landing in France at all. Instead,

Carlo D'Este wrote that "Sicily laid the foundations and set the trends for the decisive battles

47 Porch, p. xii. 48 Ibid., p. 8. 49 Ibid., p. 368. 22 that followed in 1944," chief among them the invasion of Normandy.50 John Strawson wrote in reference to Sicily and Italy that "the real value of this essentially secondary theatre was that it contained enemy divisions which might have been more decisively employed elsewhere," particularly against an Allied invasion of France.51 Finally the magnitude of the strategic importance associated with this campaign is noted by Douglas Porch. He posits that

"the road from Dunkirk to Normandy traversed the Mediterranean" and his synthesis of events in 1943 particularly highlights the maturing process of Allied forces as a result.52

Among those forces to soon be employed in this grand strategic design for defeating

Germany was 1st Canadian Infantry Division.

50 D'Este, Bitter Victory, p. 20. 51 Strawson, p. 10. 52 Porch, p. 665. 23

CHAPTER TWO

The Long Wait Is Over

During the first week of June the unit was granted four days' leave. It was not called embarkation leave, and we were told it was nothing special—whieh fooled nobody.

LIEUTENANT FARLEY MO WAT HASTINGS AND PRINCE EDWARD REGIMENT

By 1943 First Canadian Army was woven tightly into the larger multi-national force arrayed against Germany. The problem was that although it was certain to play an important role in the invasion and liberation of northwest Europe, Canadian formations to date had been virtually starved of combat opportunities. In December 1941 two battalions were involved in the unsuccessful defence of Hong Kong and in August 1942 2nd Canadian

Infantry Division was bloodied in one day of action at Dieppe.53 A "serious lack of operational experience" throughout the entire Army warned of the dire need for action against the enemy.54 However, the current discourse outlining the addition of 1st Canadian

Infantry Division (1 CID) to 15th Army Group for Operation Husky suggests that battle

53 During 18 days of fightingi n December 1941 Canadian units suffered approximately 800 casualties while attempting to defend Hong Kong from the Japanese. In one deadly day of battle on the shores of Dieppe on 17 August 1942 2nd Canadian Infantry Division suffered 3367 casualties and lost 1946 men as prisoners of war. See: Colonel Charles P. Stacey, Official History of The Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. I, Six Years of War, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1966. 54 Dominick Graham, The Price of Command, Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, Toronto, 1993, p. 67. 24 experience was not the only factor which brought the Canadians to Sicily. National prestige and politics also drove this decision.

Both of these rationales for Canadian involvement were apparent early. Peter

Simonds outlined the military and political reasons for 1 CID's deployment in Maple Leaf

Up, Maple Leaf Down (1946). Simonds suggested that the prestige of the army was damaged by Operation Torch when American formations, with less training, went into action as

Canadians sat idle in the United Kingdom.55 The author saw the attachment of Canadian non-commissioned and regular officers to First British Army during operations in North

Africa as an admission that divisions were well trained though they lacked actual battle experience, "which is the main arbiter in war."56 Simonds concluded that the deployment of 1 CE) was necessary in order to gain practical knowledge and battle tested leaders, and to prevent Canada's fighting character from being further tarnished.

Ten years later the necessity of battle experience over politics was emphasized.

Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholson stated that "the argument for giving some of the Canadian formations large-scale battle experience before committing the Army as a whole to operations was sound."57 Nicholson's British counter-part, historian Brigadier C. J. C.

Molony, added that Canadian participation in active combat served as a political tool to

"answer to the demands of public opinion in Canada," that her troops should be fighting in

55 Peter Simonds, Maple Leaf Up, Maple Leaf Down, Island Press, New York, 1946, p. 47. 56 Ibid., p. 48. 57 Lieutenant-Colonel G. W: L. Nicholson, Official History of The Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. II, The Canadians In Italy, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1956, p. 21. 25

1943.58

Some time later in 1991, journalist Daniel Dancocks' popular narrative of Canadian operations during the Italian Campaign was published. The D-Day Dodgers traces the path of Canadian forces from their arrival in Britain in 1939 and depicts the national frustration born of long term inactivity. Dancocks illustrates that public opinion demanded the Army do more, and that some Great War veterans even labeled the Canadian sojourn in the United

Kingdom as "the greatest disgrace of the present war."59 Without delving deeply into the strategic context, Dancocks takes the view that these political considerations were the prime catalyst for 1 CID's move to the Mediterranean in 1943.

In 1996 William McAndrew, in Canadians and The Italian Campaign 1943-1945, returned the strategic necessity of Canadian battle experience to the fore of the historiography. McAndrew highlights the fact that four out of five divisions comprising the

Canadian Army had yet to see action by 1943 and only part of the 2nd Canadian Infantry

Division had fought at Dieppe.60 He also contends that though well-trained, Canadian units were missing out on important lessons which the rest of Allied armies were gaining from combat. This was especially the case, McAndrew added, when it came to conducting assault landings on defended beaches; something which needed to be learned, tested in Sicily and re-applied during the cross-channel invasion.61

Recently Brandey Barton posited in her 2006 article "Public Opinion and National

58 Brigadier C. J. C. Molony, The Mediterranean and The Middle East, Vol. V, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1973, p. 10. 59 Daniel G. Dancocks, The D-Day Dodgers, McClelland and Stewart Inc., Toronto, 1991, p. 18. 60 William McAndrew, Canadians and The Italian Campaign 1943-1945, Editions Art Global Inc., Montreal, 1996, p. 16. 61 Ibid,, p, 25, 26

Prestige" that Canada's participation in Operation Husky was less a military necessity than it was the result of political concerns associated with prestige."62 In contrast, however, John

Rickard suggested that Canadian formations were suffering from a lack of battle-hardened commanders.63 Although she regards the importance of battle experience as a requirement to the army's development, according to Barton, politics were the key factor that led to

Canadian deployment in Sicily. The author notes that the Minister of Defence, Colonel J.

L. Ralston, and the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart waged a strident campaign to change Prime Minister King's conviction that Canada could only avoid costly battlefield casualties during the war by remaining aloof from major operations.64

Barton concludes that in order to prevent Canadian prestige from being additionally damaged through the further inaction of her ground forces, at least some units had to be committed to battle in 1943.

The historiography has shown that by 1943 Canadian troops had gained little combat experience and people were quite upset with the effect this had on national prestige. Partly to assuage Canadian officials and citizens, though most importantly to meet the growing demands of Allied grand strategy, 1 CID took over the part previously assigned to 3rd British

Infantry Division for Operation Husky. On 24 April 1943 a hasty turn-over between the two formations, directed by a fully cooperative British staff, set the Canadians into their new role.65 While politics may not have been the primary driving force behind the switch of the

62 Brandey Barton, "Public Opinion and National Prestige", Canadian Military History, Vol. 15, No. 2, (Spring 2006), p. 23. 63 Captain John Nelson Rickard, McNaughton 's Dagger: The Raising, Training and Employment of the Canadian Army, 1939-1943, The University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, 2006, p. 155. 64 Barton, p. 25. 65 Nicholson, The Canadians In Italy, p. 28. 27 two formations, the political storm that began as Canadian soldiers sat idle in the United

Kingdom aided the army's cause.

Following Canada's declaration of war on Germany in September 1939 the first contingent of her citizen-soldiers began arriving overseas by December. Under the command of Lieutenant-General Andrew McNaughton 1 CID and her accompanying tank brigade suffered through their first winter in England, one which was the coldest on record in over forty years.66 Unaware that they would not see action until July of 1943, the men commenced an intense and what can perhaps be regarded as one of the most long-term periods of training undertaken by any division in the war. As France was overrun and the

Allies withdrew from continental Europe, 1 CID trained continually while maintaining a vigilant watch against a possible German invasion. With more than fifty percent of the men who enlisted in 1939 having no prior military service, individual, collective, unit and formation training was of the utmost importance.67 As days and months passed Canadian

Prime Minister William Lyon MacKenzie King was grateful that his troops were not taking heavy casualties on the battlefields of Europe.

King was well aware of the national schism that had been caused by the conscription crisis during the Great War. Fearful of a repetition during the current conflict, the Prime

Minister was "continuously concerned" about the military outlook of the war "and particularly about the prospect of the whole Canadian Army or a part of it going into action."68 Meanwhile, McNaughton was wary of the possible need to send a portion of

66 Dancocks, pp. 16-17. 67 Stacey, p.230. *8 J. W. Pickersgill, The MacKenzie King Record, Vol. I, 1939-1944, Press, Canada, 1960, p. 494. 28

Canadian forces into action, thus separating the formations he hoped to personally lead to

Berlin. Even as pressure mounted for Canadians to enter into combat, McNaughton

"vigorously resisted all such overtures."69 Between King's fear of casualties and his

general's opposition to dividing Canadian forces, in the early stages of the war the pair did

little to afford their soldiers a chance to fight.

In 1942, as the war raged on and Canadian soldiers stayed in Britain, military officials at home and abroad grew highly concerned over the fate of their forces and the citizenry also began to question the attitude of Parliament toward the conflict. At home the political repercussions of this inaction led agricultural and industrial groups to reconsider the merits of the Canadian Army's stay in Britain. Thousands of able-bodied men were sitting idly in the English countryside while understaffed industries in Canada churned out goods and equipment for the war.70 Canadians also grew dissatisfied with the effect this long sojourn was having on the prestigious reputation of the Canadian Army that had been born in the mud and trenches of the Great War.

Canadian officials appeared to be tarnishing the foundations of the national military past. Soldiers from Australia, India, New Zealand and South Africa were shedding blood for the cause, but not Canadians. Things were markedly different for other branches of the

Canadian Armed Forces. Dancocks wrote that "Canadian airmen defended Britain ... and now carried the war into the enemy's heartland, and Canadian sailors were helping to win the crucial Battle of The Atlantic."71 The effects on prestige worried Canada but greater

69 Simonds, p. 8. 70 Pickersgill, p. 498. 71 Dancocks, p. 16. 29 concerns began to surface.

Training constantly for two-and-a-half years was a double-edged sword. In one sense it seemed plausible that Canadian forces should have been ready and able to tackle any challenge the enemy could provide; in another, however, the second edge was growing dull.

The general inactivity, monotony of daily routine and the inherent difficulties that accompany life in a foreign country invariably began to lower the morale of Canadian soldiers.72 Even the most realistic training was no match for the incessant inactivity of the soldiers. William

McAndrew noted that a "rising incidence of psychological impairment" plagued the

Canadian overseas contingent, something that commanders felt could be rectified by having their troops enter into battle.73 Action was forthcoming though it proved far costlier than either King or McNaughton had imagined,

On 19 August 1942 the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division (less an infantry brigade), along with tanks from 14 Canadian Armoured Regiment (Calgary), participated in a raid on the French coast at Dieppe. The mission was supposed to swiftly gather intelligence and demonstrate the Allied ability to penetrate German defences. Canadian soldiers suffered heavily in the assault, sustaining a total of 3,367 killed, wounded or captured.74 It was the type of action that King most feared. Even so, with soldiers well into their third year in

England Colonel J. L. Ralston, Canada's Minster of Defence, continued to assure London that there should be no strings attached to Canadian participation whenever new

72 The situation as a whole was exhausting to soldiers but Britons made the stay for Canadian troops as comfortable as possible. Even during such low points in the war as the Battle of Britain, reading rooms, clubs and sports fields were made available to the Canadians, and cinema shows and concerts increased in availability. See: George R. Stevens, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 1919-1957, Vol. Ill, Southam Printing Company Limited, Canada, 1968. 73 McAndrew, Canadians and The Italian Campaign 1943-1945, p. 16. 74 Stacey, p. 387. 30

opportunities arose.75 The near-destruction of a division at Dieppe, however, had shaken

Canada and her leaders.

Valuable lessons were garnered from the excursion and, if nothing else, Dieppe

stiffened the resolve of the rest of the Canadian Army by sparking an intense desire to engage the enemy. Unfortunately the latter half of 1942 provided little opportunity for Canadians to participate in major ground operations in strength. There was faint hope in November when Canadian soldiers were sent to serve with First British Army in North Africa. Only

201 officers and 147 other ranks took part, but most of these men returned to their respective units with firsthand knowledge and experience. As the Canadian Official History makes

clear, "nothing can take the place of battle in the final molding of the efficient soldier."76 A

large-scale deployment of Canadian units failed to occur and McNaughton's men celebrated their fourth Christmas in England.

As the spring of 1943 neared Canadian anxiety bloomed feverishly. Even major training sessions such as Exercise Spartan could not act as substitute for real combat.77

Prime Minister King faced increasing pressure from the public and his ministers as

arguments concerning military preparedness and national prestige became too strong to

ignore. As Canadian historian Desmond Morton wrote, "politicians want agreement, not

75 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 22. 76 Stacey, p. 248. 77 Exercise Spartan was a ten division maneuver that saw General McNaughton command three corps in a beach assault on a 'hostile shore', in March 1943. The 'enemy' force consisted of four British Home Guard divisions. General Crerar's 1st Canadian Corps performed magnificently in the initial assault but problems in communications at 2nd Corps led General Sansom's armour to bog down while pushing beyond the beachhead. The ability of and potential for McNaughton to command in the field were seriously questioned following this episode. See: Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy; Rickard. 31 arguments, fromthei r officials."78 Colonel Ralston urged King to allow troops to take part in more serious and sizeable operations, citing the growing disgrace to Canadian honour.79

Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart echoed Ralston's sentiments wholeheartedly and further stressed the need to test men's leadership abilities through real operations. Lieutenant-

Colonel George Kitching, General Staff Officer of 1 CID, recorded that in 1943 the Allies had but one purpose as "all effort was co-ordinated to one end—the preparation for the great offensive across the Channel."80 King had at last come to realize the importance behind such arguments.

Fearful that in future operations an unprepared army might suffer a repeat of the

Dieppe Raid, and also that prolonged military inaction might lessen Canada's stature in world affairs, MacKenzie King had to act. Cabling British Prime Minister Winston

Churchill on 17 March 1943, King requested that consideration be given for the use of

Canadian troops in North Africa as soon as possible. Three days later Churchill replied that

"no further divisions were likely to be required" and that fully understanding the anxiety of

Canadian troops, he would be keeping them in mind for future operations.81 A second request was made and in April a conclusive response was received by the Canadian

Government. Following "polite preliminaries," on 23 April 1943 General Alan Brooke asked Lieutenant-General McNaughton if Canada could contribute an infantry division and an armoured brigade to operations based on Tunisia.82 The forthcoming reply was yes. The

78 Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada 4th Ed, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., Toronto, 1999, p.210. 79 Dancocks, pp. 18-19. 80 Kitching, p. 144. 81 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 25. 82 Morton, p. 210. 32

1 CID and 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade had become part of the assault force for Operation

Husky. Canadian soldiers were on the verge of entering into their first period of protracted combat during the Second World War.

The event marked a major turning point in the war for the nation as a whole, but more importantly it signaled a new phase of growth and development for the First Canadian Army.

Training to this point was "based on the drills learned form battle schools in Britain" and focused largely on "a battle of movement."83 Now 1 CID was ready to absorb the lessons of strong defence as a means to defeating the enemy, which had showed its worth in North

Africa and was fast becoming standard British doctrine. In turn, the lessons were to be channeled throughout the rest of the First Canadian Army.

In April 1943 Canadian Major-General Guy Granville Simonds had been sent to the

Tunisian front as an observer with Eighth British Army, in order to study the evolution of tactical doctrine in the field. Following Simonds' return from his two week stay with Eighth

Army he concluded that "the day of blitzkrieg was over because of the strength of the defence."84 The experience was vitally important to the whole army and specifically to 1

CID as Major-General Simonds became divisional commander following the untimely death of its former leader General Harry Salmon. There was hardly time for grieving.

Between the Canadian Government's agreement to Husky and the moment the men waded onto Sicily on 10 July 1943 a flurry of activity surrounded the formation. Intricate planning of the contingent's move from the United Kingdom was an elaborate and painstaking prerequisite to battle. Brigadier Howard Graham, commanding officer of 1

83 Kitching, p. 150. 84 Graham, The Price of Command, p. 68. 33

Brigade, recalled that the formations were extremely "fortunate in having the assistance of

British officers and substaff with experience in this type of operation," as their work greatly lessened the difficulties faced by the Canadian force.85 When one considers that Husky required over 26,000 Canadian soldiers to sail more than 2,000 kilometers, along with all the necessary equipment to land on a hostile shore and fight for several weeks, it is nearly impossible to fathom the complexity of this process.86

Training reached a feverish pitch as the mid-June embarkation date loomed closer.

This was intended not only to refresh troops but also to familiarize them with the latest equipment then only available to units entering combat. The infantry moved north to

Scotland where combined operations training tested the ranks and officers in "the whole spectrum of assault landings by sea on a hostile shore. It included the planning, assault, naval and air fire support and, after the landing, the problems of resupply across the beaches."87 Howard Mitchell, second-in-command of 2 Brigade's support company, explained that training was made exceptionally difficult by the reorganization and re- equipping of the Saskatoon Light Infantry, who were turned into three independent support groups. Mitchell attests that "all hell broke loose" when each unit trained for sixteen hours a day with new 4.2 inch mortars and 20mm Oerlikon Anti-Aircraft guns.88 Even at this late date much larger weapons and equipment were being welcomed into the division.

The troopers of Brigadier Wyman's armoured columns handed over their Canadian-

85 Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, Citizen and Soldier, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1987, p. 139. 86 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 39. 87 Kitching, p. 130. 88 Howard Mitchell, My War, Rosetown Publishing Company Ltd. Saskatchewan, 1978, pp. 68-69. 34 built Ram Tanks and acquired the more versatile Sherman, now standard in the

Mediterranean Theatre of Operations.89 At the same time the Royal Canadian Artillery

(RCA) was given more powerful guns. Nicholson wrote that although the division was thought to be in an acceptable state of combat preparedness for over three years, with active

service on the horizon "an almost complete change-over of equipment was found to be

necessary."90 Some of which included new barrels for all 25-pounders in the division, the

replacement of all two-wheel drive vehicles, wireless sets of the same type used in British

units, and finally, the lethal 17-pounder anti-tank gun was added for more efficient anti-

armour defence. Also the RCA gladly added to its order of battle the 142 Field Regiment

(self-propelled) and a battery of the 70 Medium Regiment from the Royal Artillery.91

Confident in their abilities and backed by new weapons and equipment, Canadian soldiers

sailed for a rendevous with the enemy.

A series of convoys carrying the Canadians to Sicily left the United Kingdom

between 19 and 28 June, all arriving with meticulous precision offshore of Malta on 8 July.

The lengthy trip was a far cry from a pleasure cruise as U-boats lurked in the ocean and men

continued physical training and daily lectures onboard, usually in less than favorable

accommodations. As campaign veteran described in his memoirs, ship life

during the voyage to Sicily saw days of frenzied activity. Lectures were given to the troops

on a variety of topics concerning the enemy and the terrain he held, reconnaissance photos

and relief maps were studied for innumerable hours, and the men practiced marching from

89 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p.33. 90 Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, T. H. Best Printing Company Ltd., Canada, 1972, p. 133. 91 Ibid., pp. 134-135. 35 their quarters to their assault landing craft in black out conditions.92 All this last minute preparation was essential. As night lifted over Sicily in the early hours of 10 July 1943,

Canadian soldiers cruised toward hostile shores with a high degree of skill and confidence.

Farley Mowat, And No Birds Sang, Farley Mowat Ltd., Toronto, 1975, pp. 47-48. 36

CHAPTER THREE

Battle Inoculation

Operation proceeded favourably for Allies and our troops landed at first light with little opposition.

1 CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE WAR DIARY, 10 JULY 1943

Operation Husky was the largest amphibious invasion launched against a hostile shore

to date during the Second World War. Allied 15th Army Group was commanded by General

Harold Alexander and comprised of Seventh American and Eighth British Army. These

forces landed in southeast Sicily, the former at Licata and along the Gulf of Gela, the latter

on the Pachino Peninsula and further north throughout the Gulf of Noto. Seaborne attacks

were preceded by airborne infiltrations aimed at disrupting enemy communications and

securing transport infrastructure such as the Ponte Grande south of Syracuse.93 As infantry

divisions came ashore, airfields and the ports of Licata and Syracuse were captured in order to create a firm base for continued operations. Following the consolidation of these crucial assets it was intended that Eighth Army attack northward along the coast, eventually seizing the city of , while Seventh Army protected the left flank of the British force.94 As

93 Carlo D'Este, Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, 1943, E. P. Dutton, New York, 1988, p. 229. 94 Douglas Porch, The Path to Victory, Farrar, Straus and Grioux, New York, 2004, p. 420. 37 part of Eighth Army, 1st Canadian Infantry Division (1 CID) was set to land on the western side of the Pachino Peninsula near the town of Maucini.

The Canadian landing area code named Bark West represented the far left flank of the

British XXX Corps front. The exception was a small beach further west where two Royal

Marine Commando units, under Canadian command, waded ashore to silence a coastal gun battery. The Canadian area was divided into sections known as Roger where 1 Brigade landed and Sugar where 2 Brigade came ashore. 1 Brigade's mission was to destroy beach defences and coastal guns, then continue inland to take the Pachino airfield and make contact with the 231 Malta Brigade to their right.95 2 Brigade was likewise ordered to clear beach defences, contact the British Commandos to their left and establish a covering position for the division to the northwest.96

Shortly after midnight 9-10 July the armada carrying 1 CID dropped anchor off the coast of Sicily. As dawn broke the landings "proceeded favourably" in both 1 and 2 Brigades sectors.97 Opposition on Canadian beaches was light and came mostly from "spasmodic and ineffective machine-gun fire" as the quick and forceful infantry assault, backed by naval guns, persuaded many members of the 206th Italian Coastal Division to surrender.98 Expected counter-attacks were almost wholly non-existent along the Canadian front and Italian prisoners were captured by the hundreds.

Two members of the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) were killed during a brief

95 Historical Section, Canadian Army General Staff, From Pachino To Ortona 1943, Canadian Military Headquarters, London, 1944, p. 30. 96 Ibid., p. 30. 97 War Diary 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade, 10 July 1943. 98 Strome Galloway, A Regiment at War, 2nd Edition, Strome Galloway, Canada, 1979, p. 72. 38 firefight with Italian soldiers guarding the Pachino airfield, but only on the far left of the 2

Brigade front was any appreciable resistance encountered. Here a detachment of the 168

Blackshirt Legion, armed with heavy support weapons, threatened to drive between the

Commandos and the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (Seaforths). However, an accurate shoot by the mortars of the Saskatoon Light Infantry (SLI) decided the affair." As their first day of combat ended advanced patrols of 1 CID penetrated several miles inland and stood poised to charge further west the next day.

The thrill and excitement of real combat after years of training in England spurred many men in their first actions. The following day the Canadians were introduced to other harsh realities of war, when Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese's XXX Corps began pushing northwest to take the Iblei Hills. As one veteran wrote "combat is not necessarily the hardest face of war" and what 1 CID endured during the push inland is a testament to this fact.100

The infantry "marched in dust and high temperatures because not more than a battalion at a time" could be lifted with motorized transport, as vehicles were a premium.101 Over 500 vehicles belonging to 1 CID had been sunk on 4-5 July as a result of three U-boat attacks against one of the convoys carrying the Canadians to Sicily.102 Strome Galloway, a company commander with the RCR, described the resultant first week of combat as a seemingly continual march along sun-scorched trails which exuded a choking dust that soon coated

99 Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. L. Nicholson, Official History of The Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. II, The Canadians In Italy, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1956, p. 71. 100 Farley Mowat, And No Birds Sang, Farley Mowat Ltd., Toronto, 1975, p. 78. 101 Dominick Graham, The Price of Command, Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, Toronto, 1993, p. 83. 102 Nicholson, The Canadians In Italy, p. 46. 39 everything and everyone.103 Given the nature of both the Sicilian climate and terrain, along with the pattern of early resistance by Axis troops, these conditions were the scourge of

Canadian soldiers.

Sicily leant itself favourably to defence and every member of 1 CID quickly realized how torturous the island was for those fighting an offensive battle. Topographically the island was skirted by narrow coastal plains and only in the Catania region did a significant area of flat ground exist inland. The rest of the island's interior was rugged and nearly impassable as undulating hills climbed higher, culminating with the jagged peaks and mountains of the central region. Therefore, fighting revolved around the dust-laden roadways and crucial transport junctions located in the ancient stone cities.104 The enemy knew well the restrictions imposed on the attacker and he hastily withdrew to improvised positions which overlooked the inevitable approach route of the Canadians.

By midnight 12-13 July 1 Brigade had passed northwest through Ispica, Modica and

Ragusa, and the vanguard of Canadian forces established a defensive position as far inland as the Giarratana region. The transport problem afflicting the division brought it to a near breaking point. Though not engaged in strenuous fighting, troops were still physically drained from endless marching under the searing, cloudless sky.105 In two and one-half days the men had fought their way onto the island, then marched nearly fifty miles while skirmishing at Italian outposts and roadblocks. Early actions netted over 1,000 Italian

103 Galloway, p. 73. 104 Field-Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, ElAlamein to the River Sangro, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery ofAlamein, K.G., Collins Publishing, London, First Printing 1946, p. 93. 105 Nicholson, The Canadians In Italy, p. 83 40 prisoners and a considerable amount of loot, including some serviceable vehicles.106 The ranks lay exhausted in ditches and on the hard ground, stupefied and waiting for their next move.107 Aware of the painful introduction to the semi-tropical heat that the Canadians were suffering and eager to prevent a logistical quagmire, General Montgomery halted his extreme left flank while vital manpower, supplies and vehicles caught up with the division.

Having only faced Italian units to date, Canadian soldiers were warned by their army commander that "they don't want to fight; but the Germans are tough, very tough opponents."108 The period of so called "bloodless warfare" was ending and harder combat against a more formidable opponent loomed on the horizon. The first encounter with

German units, however, was almost completely the result of chance.

When the Allies landed in Sicily the island was garrisoned by two German and four

Italian field divisions, along with six Italian coastal divisions. Historian Heinz Magenheimer contends that Germany's strategic paralysis following operations in North Africa, and her uncertainty regarding the fate of Sicily, led to a reliance on improvisation rather than planning during that campaign.109 As a result the Hermann GOring Division was stationed in the east and the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division stood guard in the west, neither functioning within the framework of a contingency plan designed to cope with an enemy invasion. General Harold Alexander likewise admitted that he lacked a solid plan of exploitation, as it would depend on "what the Germans did and how they used their

106 War Diary 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade, 13 July 1943. 107 Farley Mowat, The Regiment, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., Canada, 1955, p. 65 108 General B. L. Montgomery quoted in Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, Citizen and Soldier, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1987, p. 156. 109 Heinz Magenheimer, Hitler's War, F. A. Herbig Verlagsbuchhandlung GmbH, Munich, 1997, p. 215. 41 reserves."110 Therefore as German operations hastily developed so did those of the Allies.

As Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey's XIII Corps drove hard along the eastern coast, eventually consolidating Syracuse and Augusta in short order, German commanders realized the dire necessity of standing firm south of Mount Etna. Carlo D'Este accurately described the nearby city of Catania and the inland plains as "the most critical objective in

Sicily," because a British breakthrough there would leave the enemy "vulnerable to a double envelopment from east and west."111 Accordingly, units of the Hermann Goring Division began falling back to establish a main defence line along the Simeto River, south of the

Catania region.

With support from the remains of the Italian Livorno and Napoli Divisions, the groups began digging in while delay forces scattered even further south slowed the arrival of the British vanguard. British campaign historian Brigadier C. J. C. Molony conceded that even though the enemy had "no special master-plan; rather, chance and the reactions of competent commanders to the circumstances of an encounter battle" allowed German units to delay and subsequently frustrate the advance of XIII Corps.112 In fact by 15 July the fluidity on the eastern battlefield ended as there was already "a stiff German nucleus on the

Simeto's north bank and miscellaneous reinforcements were entering the Catania area."113

These included elements of the German 1st Parachute Division which had already begun to arrive on the Catania airfields as early as 12 July. With his thrust near the coast denied,

110 D'Este, Bitter Victory, p. 322. 111 Ibid., p. 316. 112 Brigadier C. J. C. Molony, The Mediterranean and The Middle East, Vol. V, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1973, p. 93. 113 Ibid., p. 102. 42

General Montgomery instead elected to mount pressure on the enemy's western flank.

Given their position on the left side of Leese' s XXX Corps, Major-General Simonds'

1 CID was assigned the role of striking deep into central Sicily, then pivoting east to charge into the side of German positions about the Catania Plains. After their much needed period of rest and refitting, Simonds' men were "ordered to resume their advance in a northwesterly direction on the night of 14-15 July." The advance was intended to unhinge the enemy's right "which rested in the hills about , a town on which centered the whole road system of central Sicily."114 The same night further efforts by Dempsey's XH1 Corps to cross the

Simeto River were thwarted as an Axis battle-group clung tenaciously along the north bank.

As Carlo D'Este explains, these improvised positions served as the first steps in the enemy's preparation of a main defence line stretching through central Sicily. German high command was aiming to hold a series of strong points essentially running from the coast south of Catania to the island's northern shores, "but this was still several days off and for the moment it was purely a case of improvisation."115 Regardless, it was working to stop the

British. A quick advance by the Canadians became all the more imperative as they fought north to Highway 124 and turned west, climbing into the mountains near Enna.

As 1 CID pushed ahead German intentions became more clear. Eighth Army intelligence reports indicated that as early as 19:00 10 July 15th Panzer Grenadier Division was traversing the island to take up a position beside the Hermann Goring Division in central

Sicily.116 Further reports stated on 14 July that it was apparent the enemy was abandoning

114 Historical Section, Pachino to Ortona, p.44. 115 D'Este, Bitter Victory, p. 373. 116 F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in The Second World War, Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol. Ill, Pt. I, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1984, p. 89. 43 western Sicily outright and the ever-stiffening front line in the east served as a tacit verification of this. German units consolidated their hold around Catania and the Gerbini airfields as an early skeleton of the main defence line came into existence. To prevent their own encirclement at the inland flank of the unfinished defence network, and to cover the arrival of the Grenadiers from the west, rearguards of the Hermann Goring Division commenced delaying actions along the island's lateral roadways to the south.117

These delays were typically enacted by quickly turning elevated villages and towns into temporary strong points. En route to Enna on 15 July, 1 CID arrived at such a position when they reached the town of Grammichele. Constructed in the 17th Century and situated

250 feet above Highway 124, its stone buildings and long fields of fire created an exceptional bastion to mount a delaying action from.118 Here Canadians and Germans met for the first time in Sicily.

Having underestimated the speed of the Canadian advance, units from the Hermann

Goring Division arrived in Grammichele only shortly before the Hastings and Prince Edward

Regiment (Hastings). The "brief but furious" encounter started at approximately 09:00 15

July when the vanguard of 1 Brigade came under steady artillery and machine-gun fire, once they had already arrived at the outskirts of town.119 Quickly leaping off the Sherman Tanks of 12 Canadian Armoured Regiment (Three Rivers) three companies of the Hastings enveloped the town in a pincer movement while a fourth provided a base of covering fire.

"By their impetuosity they were soon threatening the sole line of eventual withdrawal open

117 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 92. 1,8 Ibid., p. 89. 119 Daniel Dancocks, The D-Day Dodgers, McClelland and Stewart Inc., Toronto, 1991, pp. 51-52. 44 to the enemy."120 As quickly as the infantry had begun their attack on the town supporting arms also engaged the enemy. The Shermans destroyed several German tanks and artillery pieces while self-propelled guns of the 142 Field Regiment Royal Artillery leant effective fire support.121 The results were encouraging as Canadian soldiers experienced their first combat against the highly touted Germans.

The rapid movement of the infantry, along with the accompaniment of strong fire support, was so overwhelming that the survivors of the German rearguard fled when the perimeter of the town was breached. Excerpts from a German soldier's recovered diary dated

16 July describe the ferocity of the Canadian attack:

Yesterday was a day of horrors. Encircled and all but wiped out. None of my Company are left.... Surprised some infantry with heavy machine gun fire, but they kept coming, and we had to withdraw. Red patches on their tunics, they fight like devils ... Their tanks are enormous and their infantry keeps coming in spite of everything we do.122

Farley Mowat, a member of the Hastings' A Company, recorded that the enemy should have been able to hold the fortress quite easily, even against greater numbers.

Instead, the Hermann Goring Division retreated frantically and abandoned "seven artillery pieces, innumerable lighter weapons, six trucks in working order, four Mk. IV tanks

(some only slightly damaged) and-final disaster-their entire quartermaster's stores."123 Their failure to mount a significant delay against the Canadians meant that Grammichele was overrun before noon on 15 July. The Germans lost valuable equipment and left many of their

120 Mowat, The Regiment, pp. 73-74. 121 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 89. 122 War Diary Saskatoon Light Infantry, Appendix: Diary of A German Soldier, July 1943. 123 Mowat, The Regiment, p. 74. 45 ranks dead or dying in the dusty streets, all for a very minor delay in 1 CID's progress. Fully appreciating the success and especially the speed of the Canadian battle, General

Montgomery urged the corps commander to "drive the Canadians on hard," in hopes of

closing fast on the German flank near Enna.124

Following the action at Grammichele 2 Brigade renewed the advance toward Enna, quickly traveling twenty miles northwest until similar enemy defences were met. Moving northeast toward Enna, 15th Panzer Grenadier Division sent delay forces south on Highway

117 in an effort to slow 1 CJD before it could penetrate between the separated German

divisions. The town of , standing nearly 2400 feet in height, provided 2

Battalion 104 Panzer Grenadier Regiment and Italian soldiers from the Livorno Division

with an ideal location to wage a delay battle.125 Lieutenant-Colonel Jefferson's Loyal

Edmonton Regiment (Loyal Eddies) rolled toward town on the tanks of the Three Rivers

Regiment when they were halted by tremendous machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire at a

sharp bend in the road below Piazza Armerina at noon on 16 July.

The enemy held the town itself and manned positions in the hills astride Highway 117

three miles to the south. Without the aid of heavy guns until later in the day, the Loyal

Eddies hurriedly fought onto high ground on either side of the road by blasting German

machine-gun nests with their 3 inch mortars and anti-tank guns.126 As the Canadian battalion

pressed the attack, and threatened the flank of the enemy's position closer to town, resistance

melted away and the retreating grenadiers were steadily massaged by guns of the Royal

124 Hugh Pond, Sicily, William Kimber and Co. Limited, London, 1962, p. 170. 125 Historical Section, Pachino to Ortona, p. 45. 126 George Roy Stevens, A City Goes to War; History of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment (3 PPCLI), Charters Publishing. Co., Brampton, Ontario, 1964, p. 235. 46

Artillery still attached to the Canadian formation. Again, 1 CID had smashed through the hastily erected defences of a delay force and maintained a steady rate of progression toward

Enna, while "the Germans left a large number of dead on the field."127 On 17 July 3 Brigade renewed the advance as lack of progress by Dempsey's XIII Corps reinforced the need for an attacking posture on the far left of Eighth Army.

The distance from Piazza Armerina to Enna was 22 miles and approximately one third of the way there a side road branches north to Valguarnera. By defending this junction men of the 104 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, along with Italian soldiers, hoped to simultaneously prevent the Canadians from moving northwest on Enna or northeast toward

Valguarnera and the Catania Plains.128 As the British campaign history indicates General

Eberhard Rodt planned on making a determined stand at the Leonforte-Assoro massifs with

15th Panzer Grenadier Division, and also along Highway 121 which traveled east to

Adrano.129 By holding the Canadians south of these positions Rodt hoped to gain further time to prepare more calculated defences along the ridge and highway.

After a blown bridge and heavily cratered roads forced the Carleton and York

Regiment (CYR) to proceed on foot from a point four miles north of Piazza Armerina, they were swept by enemy fire south of the junction at the mountain pass known as the Portello

Grottacalada.130 Both the CYR and the Royal 22e Regiment (R22eR) were held at this point, leading Major-General Simonds to order a two brigade assault. 3 Brigade carried out a three-pronged attack against the pass which was supported by artillery while 1 Brigade made

127W.D.2CIB, 16 July 1943. 128 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 95. 129Molony,p. 113. 130 Robert W. Tooley, Invicta, New Ireland Press, Fredericton, 1989, p. 127. 47 a wide right flank toward town. When the main attack began on the morning of 18 July the

CYR swung east around the pass while the West Nova Scotia Regiment (WNSR) marched west in an effort to threaten German positions on Monte del Forma, located three-quarters of a mile from the pass.131 Having circumvented hostile positions through a wide northeast march B and D Companies of the Hastings, along with units of the RCR, created a distraction between Valguarnera and the main enemy positions at the road junction. Meanwhile, the remaining two Hastings companies established positions closer to the town itself.

Early on 18 July heavy fighting erupted as the Hastings, situated between the enemy's southern position and Valguarnera itself, opened fire on German columns traveling along the road below. Throughout the day confusion reigned as the enemy sent reinforcements down the road from the town and soldiers withdrawing from the onslaught of 3 Brigade's assault fled north, back toward Valguarnera. Consequently, when the Hastings' B and D Companies withdrew after expending much of their ammunition "there were more than a dozen vehicles of all types burning fiercely and surrounded by a satisfactory number of dead and wounded

Germans."132 The 48th Highlanders of Canada (Highlanders) later joined the fight south of

Valguarnera, assisting the other battalions of 1 Brigade in mopping up resistance that was bypassed during the early infiltration of the valley.

Meanwhile, Canadian and British artillery pounded the core of German strength located at the Monte del Forma feature and the Highway 117 intersection. Attacked for fourteen hours by the French-Canadian soldiers of theR22eR, and soon risking encirclement on two sides by the WNSR and the CYR, the enemy deserted the hill and intersection by

131 War Diary 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade, 18 July 1943. 132 Mowat, The Regiment, p. 78. 48 mid-afternoon.133 The battle for Valguarnera was the most formidable stance taken by

German units in front of 1 CID to date, yet it bought the 104 Panzer Grenadier Regiment little extra time to prepare defences at Leonforte and Assoro.

The additional time which the Grenadiers gained was paid for with lives, weapons and equipment which the enemy desperately needed. It was reported by soldiers of the

WNSR that scattered among the dead on Monte del Forma were more than thirty German machine guns.134 In "Death Valley" below Valguarnera the Hastings counted nearly two dozen German vehicles destroyed, 80 personnel killed, approximately 100 more wounded and 20 taken prisoner.135 After the battle 1 CID reported 300 German and Italian soldiers were captured and 240 were killed or wounded. Enemy losses eclipsed the relatively low casualties suffered by the division as 1 Brigade reported 30-40 and 3 Brigade 100.136 By nightfall on 18 July the Highlanders had occupied Valguarnera. As Kim Beattie recorded in the battalion's history, men were "being welded, and they were gaining experience, and confidence by the hour, especially confidence in each other."137 The same could be said of the entire division.

In little more than a week 1 CID made very important strides. Desmond Morton suggested that combat to date "was the kind of battle inoculation Canadian troops badly needed. An easy landing slowly built into bitter fighting against a resourceful German

Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, pp. 96-97. Thomas H. Raddall, West Novas, Thomas Raddall, Liverpool, Nova Scotia, 1947, p. 90. Mowat, The Regiment, p. 81. W. D. 1 CIB, 19 July 1943. Kim Beattie, Dileas, The 48th Highlanders of Canada, Toronto, 1957, p. 255. 49 rearguard."138 The division was learning many valuable combat lessons that were soon passed to the rest of First Canadian Army and their destruction of German units was a reflection of the larger Allied strategy built at Casablanca. Operationally 1 CID's efforts paid dividends too, as the capture of Valguarnera placed great pressure on the hinge of

German defences west of the Catania Plains.

As the history of the Loyal Eddies illustrates, the Germans had until this point

"retained their mobility" and enjoyed the luxury of choosing to fight only when and where they decided fit. Now the enemy "dare not retire by bounds, nor could they risk manoeuvres; they were obliged to fight where they stood" because Sicily had to be held.139 They chose to stand along defences anchored in central Sicily's rugged mountains on a line which ran from below the city of Catania, westward across ground hemmed by the River and

Highway 121. Near Enna the line swung north before terminating on the coast at San

Stefano. Since 16 July 15th Panzer Grenadier Division had been digging in along Highway

121, using every elevated peak and town to control the roads and countryside.140 Their positions were bolstered by the incorporation of full Italian units into German regimental groups. The arrival of a battalion from 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, which began moving to Sicily on 18 July, added further depth to these positions.141

By now German command had acknowledged the vital importance of propping up the Italian half of the Axis alliance. Maintaining a grip on northeast Sicily was a means of

138 Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada, 4th Edition, McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., Toronto, 1999, p. 210. 139 Stevens, A City Goes To War, pp. 239-240. 140 Pond, p. 171. ,41Molony,p.91. 50 fulfilling this end, as the downfall of the whole island might serve as an impetus for the collapse of Benito Mussolini's regime. Heinz Magenheimer explains that realizing the catastrophe the Reich would face should Italy and her military obligations to the Axis crumble, the strategic outlook of German high command had become more focused.142 A marked difference in German defence patterns was noted, with the nature of fighting in the

Canadian sector providing an obvious example.

As 1 CID moved from Valguarnera on 19 July to silence enemy gun positions just north of town, General Montgomery advised Generals Leese and Simonds of his new intentions on the British left. Resistance on the XJH Corps front to the right was so fierce that the British 50th Division near the coast began to assume a defensive role. The Canadian division in the far west was ordered to immediately advance on the Leonforte-Assoro position and to smash the enemy's grip on Highway 121.143 Montgomery wanted 1 CID to crash the enemy's defence line, rolling hostile forces back toward Adrano and the open ground below Mount Etna. The Hastings' intelligence officer declared "We must swing eastward now, you see. But first we have to crack the hinge of Jerry's defence line on the other side of the Dittaino. Here."144 "Here," along with the thrust of a finger onto a situation map indicated the towering massifs of Leonforte-Assoro.

Although the towns were physically separated both were operationally connected because they represented the lynchpin of German defences on Highway 121. When the

Canadians opened their assault against Leonforte-Assoro seventeen days of bitter fighting

142 Magenheimer, p. 218. 143 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 102. 144 Lieutenant "Battle" Cockin quoted in Farley Mowat, And No Birds Sang, p. 113. 51 began.145 No longer content to merely delay the Allies, the Germans fought tenaciously. As the history of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) recounts, the enemy intended to occupy his positions for as long as possible before the ground was "sold for an extortionate price in blood."146 Though the shape of combat was changing 1 CID continued to bleed German strength dry.

As a preliminary move to cracking the Leonforte-Assoro position Major-General

Simonds ordered 1 and 2 Brigades to lead the division across the Dittaino Valley, in order to gain bridgeheads below the ridge. Near midnight 19-20 July the Loyal Eddies began crossing the dry river bed near Highway 121 while the Highlanders carried out a similar operation five miles east, astride a secondary road leading to Assoro. By sunrise both battalions established bridgeheads for their respective brigades. Unfortunately, each were plagued continually during the day by accurate gun fire being directed from observation posts encamped on the saddle of terrain between the two towns.147 Beginning in the evening of 20

July both brigades made preparations and approach marches for their final assaults on

Leonforte-Assoro. For clarity each attack will be explained singularly, though both occurred simultaneously and as previously mentioned, each represented one part of a divisional assault. As Nicholson specifies in the Canadian Official History, "Assoro and Leonforte were two phases of the same battle; for the enemy had to hold the whole ridge, or withdraw from it altogether."148

145Molony,p. 118. 146 George Roy. Stevens, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 1919-1957, Vol. Ill, Southam Printing Company Limited, Canada, 1968, p.77. 147 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, pp. 102-103. 148 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 107. 52

As dusk settled on 20 July a specially formed assault company guided the Hastings cross country to the southeast corner of Monte Assoro. The newly appointed commander of the battalion, Major John Tweedsmuir, reckoned that only in a daring climb up the precipitous face of the mountain feature did a viable option exist for his unit's attack on the town.149 The road marking the southern approach, which the Highlanders had probed with patrols, was under direct observation by German mortars and artillery although this near-cliff was unlikely to be manned in strength.

As a diversionary measure guns of the Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA) pounded the

stretch of Highway 121 between Leonforte and Assoro for a period of four hours, drawing

German attention away from the Hastings' axis of advance and likewise masking the intentions of 2 Brigade in front of Leonforte. 15° In addition three universal carriers belonging to the Highlanders were sent scurrying up the main road toward Assoro and quickly retired

- as ordered - once fired upon by the enemy. By distraction, some luck and the determination of every man involved, the Hastings climbed to the heights above Assoro before the rising sun of 21 July revealed their presence. Scaling the jagged peaks while maintaining strict silence had been agonizing work, but "secure in their belief that Assoro was impregnable" the Panzer Grenadiers had unknowingly allowed their fortress to be infiltrated.151

The Hastings had achieved a complete tactical surprise and when the sun rose over the village they unleashed a storm of small arms fire into the Germans below. The heights

149 Mowat, The Regiment, p. 84. 150 Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, T. H. Best Printing Company Ltd., Canada, 1972, p. 148. 151 Mowat, And No Birds Sang, p. 122. 53 above town soon erupted as enemy artillery began ranging on the restricted Canadians and spirited counter-attacks by the Grenadiers challenged the position further.152 It was three miracles, suggests Daniel Dancocks, which prevented the destruction of the battalion and hastened the fall of Assoro on 21 July. Dissatisfied with the deplorable performance of wireless radios in the hilly ground surrounding Valguarnera, Major Tweedsmuir stressed the necessity of bringing along a cumbersome but more powerful No. 22 wireless set normally found in vehicles. Along with a telescope seized during the capture of a German observation post the second-in-command, Major Bert Kennedy, "a long-time militiaman who had trained in the artillery," called in much needed fire support throughout the day.153 With ammunition dwindling, the telescope, radio and expertise of Kennedy served as the Hastings' main lifeline throughout much of the battle.

The enemy's desire to cling to the western end of Highway 121 was obvious. Having regrouped in the afternoon as a lull in fighting prevailed, a battalion of Panzer Grenadiers later attacked the Canadian position following their own powerful artillery bombardment at sunset. The Hastings declared that the enemy surge was "halted and broken mainly by the massed fire of three regiments of our distant guns, called down upon them by Kennedy and that blessed radio set."154 Twice more the Grenadiers attempted to breach the Hastings' position but their efforts were stopped. Bolstered by the deadly shell fire from the RCA the battalion retained their tenuous grip on the heights into the night.

152 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 105. 153 Dancocks, pp. 64-6. Upon reaching the summit of Assoro, and hoisting himself over a final crest of stone, Private A. K. Long of Able Company encountered three German privates and an artillery sergeant, the only enemy resistance encountered on the southeast face of the mountain. The group was quickly subdued and their telescope collected for later use. See: Farley Mowat, And No Birds Sang. 154 Farley Mowat, And No Birds Sang, p. 133. 54

Confident the Germans in Assoro were still preoccupied with the threat to their east,

Brigadier Howard Graham ordered the Highlanders to begin climbing the southern approach route to carry the attack into the enemy's left flank as night fell on 21 July.155 Meanwhile, preparations were made to resupply the beleaguered unit on the heights above town. Near midnight two companies from the RCR set out along the same path which the Hastings had traveled the night before, in order to deliver much needed ammunition and rations to the battalion.156 At dawn on 22 July the Highlanders charged the village from the west and the re-supplied Hastings closed in from the east. With casualties mounting the Germans hurriedly withdrew.

Since the early hours of 21 July, when the Hastings opened fire on Assoro, Brigadier

Chris Vokes' 2 Brigade had been subjecting the defenders of Leonforte to an equally bloody greeting. Lieutenant-Colonel Bert Hoffmeister's Seaforths pushed beyond the bridgehead the Loyal Eddies forged across the Dittaino and ascended to within one mile of the southern edge of Leonforte by daybreak.157 Here the Seaforths were temporarily stalled by German demolition of the only bridge spanning a sharp ravine which guarded the final climb into the town. In the afternoon plans were made for Hoffmeister's men to attack across the escarpment and into Leonforte, during which time field engineers would construct a span over the ravine so supporting weapons could be driven forward. Unfortunately several shells from a preliminary artillery concentration fell short of the town and crashed into battalion headquarters of the Seaforths as they conducted their final orders-group. The unit suffered

155 Graham, Citizen and Soldier, p. 171. 156 George Roy Stevens, The Royal Canadian Regiment, Vol II, 1933-1966, London Print & Lithographing Co., London, Ontario, 1967, p. 77. 157 Historical Section, Pachino to Ortona, p. 49. 55 thirty casualties and Brigadier Vokes was forced to postpone operations until the evening when the Loyal Eddies led the attack.158

At 21:30 on 21 July two companies fromth e Loyal Eddies dropped into the ravine, clambered up its northern face and dashed across the broken road into town. Preceding their advance, the heavy mortars of the SLI bracketed the town for 45 minutes with high explosive and blanketed the streets with smoke. For 30 minutes the divisional artillery along with some medium British guns also pounded the town.'59 At the same time the Vickers machine- guns of the SLI peppered German soldiers trying to navigate the darkened streets in front of the hard charging Canadian infantry.160 Displaying their commitment and tenacity, men of the Seaforths let fly a hail of small arms and machine-gun bullets from their place on the southern edge of the ravine, suppressing enemy movement about the town. One of their companies also crept into position along the road leading north from the town in order to act as a stop against the retreating enemy.161 Largely due to such tremendous covering fire, the assault companies entered the town with little difficulty. The grenadiers holding Leonforte recovered from the initial onslaught, however, and a desperate battle exploded.

Inside the narrow and twisting streets of town Canadian and German soldiers clashed violently in the night. Communications broke down between the Loyal Eddies' battalion headquarters and their companies, as well as with 2 Brigade. Brigadier Vokes was forced to wait nervously through the night, quite certain that he had lost "a very able commander

Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 107. W. D. 2 CIB, 21 July 1943. Howard Mitchell, My War, Rosetown Publishing Company Ltd. Saskatchewan, 1978, p. 74. W.D.2CIB,21 July 1943. 56 and most of his battalion."162 Not content to relinquish possession of town, the Germans organized counter-attacks supported by armour, artillery and machine-guns. Time and again these assaults were stopped, though they succeeded in dispersing the Loyal Eddies throughout Leonforte.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jefferson organized his battalion headquarters and the scattered platoons of two companies, personally leading his men as they "cleared a group of buildings in the centre of town, killing many of the enemy in the process."163 From here a fortress position was established where the Loyal Eddies held out during the night. Although fighting deteriorated from company - to platoon - and even section-sized engagements,

Canadian soldiers continually annihilated German counter-attacks and successful wiped out enemy defences across town. Having infiltrated deep inside enemy territory for example, a portion of A Company destroyed multiple strong points and killed twenty-four Grenadiers.m

Meanwhile, the remaining Loyal Eddies, together with Royal Canadian Engineers, were fighting to link up with the companies cut off inside town.

While the battle raged inside Leonforte 3 Field Company Royal Canadian Engineers laboured to erect a span across the ravine. The men whom the Loyal Eddies' history later described as the "conspicuous heroes" of the night ignored continual enemy fire as they built a bridge which eventually permitted the movement of supporting weapons into town.165

Hours before this span was completed two six-pounder anti-tank guns of Major G. A.

Welsh's 90 Anti-Tank Battery were wrestled forward to protect the engineering party as it

162 Stevens, A City Goes to War, p. 238. 163 Historical Section, Pachino to Ortona, p. 50. 164 Stevens, A City Goes to War, p. 237. 165 Stevens, A City Goes to War, p. 238. 57 worked. With German armour and machine-guns situated on the outskirts of Leonforte and poised to attack the sappers working in the valley below, Welsh and Major Southern from the engineering party acted boldly. Each officer led mixed parties of Loyal Eddies and engineers against German armour and infantry. They first deterred the enemy from advancing then returned to destroy one tank, silence a machine-gun post and capture twenty prisoners.166 By 09:00 on 22 July the road to Leonforte was open. Hope was further restored as a small Italian boy arrived at brigade headquarters with a note scribbled by Lieutenant-

Colonel Jefferson.

An elated Brigadier Vokes assembled an assault force of tanks, anti-tank guns and infantry from the PPCLI to help the besieged battalion. Racing up the long hill from the ravine the column "fell like a whirlwind upon the German posts at the entrance to the town and won their immediate surrender."167 Contact was made with the embattled Loyal Eddies by 10:00 and reinforcements from the PPCLI began sweeping down the streets. Small units of Canadian soldiers attacked stubborn pockets of enemy resistance, yet even as they pushed forward enemy counter-attacks developed.

That morning a company-sized attack supported by five tanks threatened the

Canadians in Leonforte.168 Penetrating through the eastern edge of town the thrust was checked as the PPCLI tried to break through toward the 1 Brigade front. Confused and disconnected fighting continued although heavy losses were still inflicted on the enemy.

Private J. S. Cousins of the PPCLI even accounted personally for ten Germans killed as he

166 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, pp. 108-109. 167 Ibid., p. 109. 168 War Diary 1st Canadian Infantry Division, Intelligence Summary No. 5, 23 July. 58

singlehandedly decimated a pair of machine-gun posts with his Bren gun.169 While the

Germans were already withdrawing from Assoro by midday 22 July, in Leonforte brutal fighting lasted until 17:30 when the first serious blow against the Axis' main defence line was solidified.

In the struggle to break the lynch-pin of German defences Canadian rank and file acquitted themselves well once more. They responded to the enemy's first major defence battle with devastating vigor and elan. The same fighting spirit that carried the lone Bren gunner from the PPCLI evidently pervaded the division. Instead of holding on the Leonforte-

Assoro position indefinitely as planned, the strength of all three battalions of the 104 Panzer

Grenadier Regiment was so severely reduced that they quickly retired east toward Nissoria and Agira.

The so-called "first-class German formation" ordered to stand firm on the hinge of the central defences was battered almost beyond recognition.170 A fresh battalion from the

29th Panzer Grenadier Division was added to their order of battle and battalions of Italian

infantry from the Livorno and Aosta Divisions joined the formation near Nissoria and

Agira.171 The enemy's desperate attempt at rebuilding his formations verified Canadian efforts to breakdown German physical and material strength. The increasingly violent character of battle also confirmed the new nature of fighting in Sicily as the enemy

established his defences in greater depth.

Nicholson makes clear that German defensive posture on the Leonforte-Assoro

169 Stevens, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, p. 83. 170 Dancocks, p. 72. 171 W. D. 1 CID, Intelligence Summaries Nos. 6 and 7,26-28 July 1943. 59 feature differed dramatically from combat at Grammichele, Piazza Armerina and

Valguarnera. He suggested that the days of small-scale rearguard delaying actions were over because the enemy "had fought strenuously with all available resources" and for the first time employed "all three battalions of the 104 Panzer Grenadier Regiment as one tactical formation."172 A divisional intelligence summary compiled after the battle also verified these changes:

This resolute defence is something new. Hitherto the German rearguard has pulled stakes cleanly and retired some 8 or 10 miles to a new position. The fact that they are not voluntarily retiring from their latest strongpoint but are fighting for every yard of ground indicates we are nearing something like a serious defence zone. Beyond doubt they would have held Leonforte had they not been driven out of it.173

The ferocity and speed of 1 CID's attack made any possibility of the towns being held for the long-term a fleeting reality.

Severely mauled, the enemy was forced to retreat eastward along Highway 121 into the undulating ground between Nissoria and Agira. There the Germans had to stop the

Canadians or risk being cut in two. For 1 CID the task of pushing the enemy back toward the plains below Mount Etna became an exceedingly difficult venture. The cost in Canadian lives would be greater than casualties incurred in any single action during the campaign so far and the mettle of all ranks tested like never before. The battle for the few miles of dust and rock between Leonforte and the town of Agira was about to become the largest Canadian battle to date during the Second World War. It would also prove to be a decisive operational

172 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 112. 173 W. D. 1 CID, Intelligence Summary No. 5,23 July 1943. 60 victory for the Allies and an important example of the grand strategy created at Casablanca being put to work. 61

CHAPTER FOUR

Reconnaissance and Decimation

Casualties to the enemy were greater than those sustained by ourselves, which considering that they were in a commanding position, speaks well for the determination and coolness of our own troops.

HASTINGS AND PRINCE EDWARD REGIMENT WAR DIARY, 25 JULY 1943

As 1 * Canadian Infantry Division (1 CDD) was in the midst of breaking the Axis hold

on Leonforte-Assoro, it became bitterly clear to General Bernard Montgomery that Eighth

Army could not immediately penetrate enemy defences south of Catania. Montgomery

realized that a continuation of the assault on that front would only result in heavy casualties

that he could not afford.174 Accordingly, on 21 July, he ordered Lieutenant-General

Dempsey's XIII Corps and 51st Division of Lieutenant-General Leese's XXX Corps to

assume an aggressive defence posture. The Canadians, however, were "to continue without restraint directed on Adrano" to prevent the enemy from maintaining lateral communications

south of Mount Etna, and thus to hurry the collapse of the entire front.175

Major-General Simonds' orders for 1 CID called for the immediate capture of Agira

174 Field-Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, ElAlamein to the River Sangro, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery ofAlamein, K.G., Collins Publishing, London, First Printing 1946, p. 105. 175 Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. L. Nicholson, Official History of The Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. II, The Canadians In Italy, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1956, p. 118. 62 as a preliminary step to what became known as Operation Hardgate, the British assault on the main Axis defence line.176 Meanwhile, American Seventh Army developed operations to the north on Highway 120, conforming with directives laid out by 15th Army Group

Commander General Harold Alexander. Fighting from Petrailia to , the American axis

of advance ensured that a firm link existed between their forces and 1 CID, and also that pressure was maintained on the enemy's right flank.177 Before the assault on Agira began the

Canadians needed to reduce the Leonforte-Assoro position and move east toward the small town of Nissoria. At the same time, the 231 Malta Brigade had to advance from Raddusa to positions immediately south of Agira.

Brigadier Roy E. Urquhart's 231 Brigade pushed north from Raddusa on 19 July to positions three miles south of Agira. The Devonshire Regiment (Devons) established itself

left of the north-south road while the Dorsetshire Regiment (Dorsets) held positions on the

right. On 20 July the brigade came under Canadian command and was ordered by Major-

General Simonds to remain in position until 1 and 2 Canadian Infantry Brigades consolidated

Leonforte-Assoro, then reached ground immediately west of Agira.178 Patrols went forward

on the night of 20-21 July. After returning with prisoners the Dorsets reported that a

battalion from 34 Italian Infantry Regiment was guarding Agira, in conjunction with

elements of the Hermann Goring Division. To the southwest of town patrols from the

Devons also disclosed the presence of newly arrived infantry from 15 Regiment 29th Panzer

Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 118. Molony, p. 121. ; Major R. T. Gilchrist, Malta Strikes Back, Gale & Polden Ltd., Aldershot, England, 1945, p. 75. 63

Grenadier Division.179 With the terrain south of Agira heavily defended and well registered by enemy guns and mortars, it was necessary for 231 Brigade to establish a firm position before further advance was attempted.

On 21 July 1 CID's reserve moved east to form a secure base for 231 Brigade.

Brigadier M. H. S. Penhale's 3 Brigade traveled from Valguarnera to the area of Raddusa-

Agira Station, where the Hampshire Regiment (Hampshires) guarded against enemy

incursions to the Dittaino Valley. The Carleton and York Regiment (CYR) of 3 Brigade

crossed the dried river valley and relieved the Hampshires, enabling them to rejoin the rest

of 231 Brigade.180 On 22 July Major-General Simonds halted the vanguard of 3 Brigade -

the West Nova Scotia Regiment (WNSR) - approximately four miles east of Raddusa-Agira

Station near the town of Libertinia. The C YR deployed over territory reaching from the

crossing near Raddusa-Agira Station to an area three miles north of the Dittaino, while the

Royal 22e Regiment dug in around the same crossing, south of the dried watercourse.181 231

Brigade was ready operate north from their firm base and close the ring around Agira.

Preparations continued for the main Canadian advance against the town from the west.

The distance from Leonforte to Agira was approximately eight miles (as the crow

flies) and it was estimated that resistance between the towns would consist only of delay

forces. Experience dictated that the enemy preferred to establish his defences amongst the

stone hovels of Sicily' s mountaintop towns, therefore, Agira seemed the next logical bastion.

On the afternoon of 22 July Simonds outlined orders for 1 Brigade to make the approach to

179 Ibid., p. 76. 180 War Diary Carleton and York Regiment, 21 July 1943. 181 War Diary 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade, 22 July 1943. 64

Agira, led by one battalion and supported by the full weight of the Royal Canadian Artillery

(RCA).182 Only the community of Nissoria stood along Highway 121 but "because it was overlooked from the high ground to west and east" the town "was not expected to present a serious obstacle to the 1st Brigade's advance."183 While the Canadian battalion proceeded toward Agira from the west 231 Brigade would also threaten the town from the south, in accordance with plans laid out by Major-General Simonds.184

The 48th Highlanders of Canada (Highlanders) marched northeast from Assoro to secure the intersection formed by Highways 121 and 117 on the night of 22-23 July.185 The battalion quickly reached the crossroads east of Leonforte where they found neither the enemy nor advanced patrols from 2 Brigade, who were approaching from the west. The infantry edged forward and unknowingly passed under the muzzles of a German delay force

supported by tanks, which was concealed on a ridge south of the highway. During several hours of intense combat, sometimes at a range of only 25 yards, the Highlanders carefully fell back, reorganized and overpowered the grenadiers. Injuries were sustained by 11

Canadian soldiers but many enemy were killed and three dozen were captured.186

As a result of this action Major-General Simonds was forced to postpone the advance on Agira until 24 July. Accordingly, Brigadier Chris Vokes' 2 Brigade established a firm base about Leonforte while Penhale's 3 Brigade continued active and aggressive patrolling

182 War Diary 1st Canadian Infantry Division, Appendix: Instructions for Bde Gps Covering Period 18:00 hrs 22 July to 18:00 hrs 23 July, 22 July 1943. 183 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 121. 184 W. D. 1 CID, Appendix: Instructions 22-23 July. 185 War Diary 48th Highlanders of Canada, 22 July 1943. 186 Kim Beattie, Dileas, The 48th Highlanders of Canada, Toronto, 1957, pp. 274-275. 65 in the region south of the attached 231 Brigade.187 With the 142 (Self-Propelled) Field

Regiment Royal Artillery in support, Brigadier Urquhart's 231 Brigade was poised to move north on Agira once the Canadians pushed in fromth e west.188

On the night of 22-23 July 231 Brigade had crept closer to town. Following Major-

General Simonds' orders, Brigadier Urquhart instructed the Devons to capture a feature beside the road leading north to Agira known as Point 532 while the Dorsets were to take

Point 462, thus moving the British units one mile closer to town.189 As the sun rose on the morning of 23 July the battalions were firmly in place astride the road two miles south of town, after routing forward parties of German troops.190 Canadian battalions south of 231

Brigade continued patrolling.

By mid-afternoon on 23 July the WNSR discovered German observation posts and machine-gun nests which were quickly engaged and destroyed.191 Only a short time later, near 16:00, patrols took two German prisoners from the Hermann G8ring Division.192 Their capture lent truth to claims of Italian prisoners that this German formation was operating near

Agira and also began to reveal the depth of enemy defences about the town. By early evening the WNSR reported convoys and suspicious movement several miles to their front.

This was confirmed at 19:23 by the Royal 22e Regiment who "reported guns and motorized transport going north" toward the Agira- roadway.193 Though the convoy's

187 W. D. 1 CID, Appendix: Instructions 22-23 July. 188 W. D. 1 CID, 22 July 1943. 189 W. D. 1 CID, Appendix: Instructions 22-23 July. 190 Gilchrist, pp. 77-79. 191 W. D. 3 CIB, 23 July 1943. 192 W. D. West Nova Scotia Regiment, 23 July 1943. 193 W. D. 3 CIB, 23 July 1943. 66

destination was unknown it was probable that these troops were being sent to reinforce defences surrounding Agira.

Throughout 23 July while 231 Brigade maintained a vigilant post and 3 Brigade

patrolled through the Dittaino region, holding German attention in the south, the rest of 1

CID prepared to attack Agira from the west. To aid 1 Brigade the RCA along with regiments

from their British counterpart, backed by air support, would neutralize predetermined targets

between Nissoria and Agira.194 The guns of five field and two medium regiments would

supply the brunt of the power though a squadron of tanks from 12 Canadian Armoured

Regiment (Three Rivers) was also attached, in order to lend mobile firepower to the

assault.195 As a testament to the severity of the coming barrage the Royal Canadian Army

Service Corps reported on 23 July that 43 trucks were driving 20-22 hours a day, exclusively transporting 25-pounder ammunition to the front in preparation for the assault.196 As these

arrangements were made 1 Brigade readied for a battle with an enemy of unknown strength

at an undetermined location.

The existing historiography essentially credits 2 Battalion 104 Panzer Grenadier

Regiment with the protracted defence of Agira, as far west as Nissoria. In addition 1

Battalion 15 Panzer Grenadier Regiment is generally acknowledged as the force which protected the immediate approaches to Agira itself.197 Intelligence, however, revealed a far

greater depth to enemy defences, including significant numbers from the 104 Regiment's 1

194 Howard Graham, Citizen and Soldier, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1987, p. 174. 195 War Diary 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade, 23 July 1943. 196 War Diary Commander Royal Canadian Army Service Corps, 23 July 1943. 197 Nicholson, The Canadians In Italy, p. 131. 67 and 3 Battalions who had barely escaped the fighting at Leonforte.198 Although the Dorsets had already contacted troops from3 4 Italian Infantry Regiment, by 23 July it was noted that a battalion from 33 Italian Infantry Regiment was also in the Agira area. Furthermore, numerous 75mm guns fromth e 28 Italian Artillery Regiment, along with multiple troops of

20mm anti-aircraft guns were in place to provide substantial firepower to Axis defenders.

Several detachments from Italian mortar and anti-tank battalions were also present.199 Not only was the German defence nucleus beyond Nissoria greater than past histories have acknowledged but the integration of so many Italian units at the frontmad e enemy positions all the more formidable. After their impressive victory at Leonforte-Assoro though

Canadians walked with heads held high, and this was true of Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph

Crowe's Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) which led 1 Brigade toward Agira on 24 July.

While there can be no question that the ranks had faith in each other they also showed great confidence in the divisional plan, as evidenced by the battalion's war diary:

The feature [Agira] is deemed so important to gain that the Battalion, which is leading the Brigade will be supported by the complete Divisional Artillery, plus ninety bombers, plus more than a hundred fighter-bombers in close support. It is a set piece attack, with a timed artillery program, report lines, bells, train whistles and all the trimmings. The start line is three miles West of Nissoria... Reports have been fairly vague as to enemy dispositions, but it is felt that the support will be so overwhelming that resistance before Agira will be slight.200

At 15:00 24 July Canadian and British guns began to shower the enemy between

198 W. D. 1 CID, Intelligence Summary No. 6, 26 July 1943. 199 W. D. 1 CID, Intelligence Summary No. 5,23 July 1943. 200 War Diary Royal Canadian Regiment, 24 July 1943. After some delay Allied fighter-bombers arrived above Highway 121 to engage enemy positions but, due to a break in communications with the Royal Air Force, the scheduled attack by medium bombers never occurred. See: Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy. 68

Leonforte and Agira as the RCR marched east, trailing a creeping smoke barrage. Following closely behind the screen of smoke and high explosives C and D Companies moved through

Nissoria and battalion headquarters signaled 1 Brigade that everything was going well.

Nissoria was quickly cleared with the help of Vickers machine-guns from the Saskatoon

Light Infantry (SLI), who "provided some excellent fire support during the move through town."201 By 16:15 when the forward companies of the RCR emerged from Nissoria's streets they received a hostile reception from the machine-guns and mortars of the Axis. The

Germans and Italians were entrenched on a ridge one-half mile east of town and were backed by 15th Panzer Grenadier Division's artillery.202 It was apparent that the feature crossing

Highway 121 - code named Lion - was held in great strength.

Past conceptions of the battle for Agira are skewed because 1 Brigade is thought to have failed in breaking a delay position. In the regimental history of the Highlanders, Kim

Beattie wrote that the ridge immediately east of Nissoria witnessed 1 Brigade's "most bitter and fruitless fight in Sicily."203 The fighting was incredibly difficult, especially because no one expected the enemy to attempt a serious defence so far west of Agira. The efforts of 1

Brigade were hardly fruitless. As John Strawson indicated in The Italian Campaign,

"grinding down the Axis strength," especially that of the Germans, was the "proper strategic concept" employed by the Allies in 1943.204 Under very trying conditions 1 Brigade accomplished this with devastating results.

Sherman Tanks from the Three Rivers Regiment rumbled forward to help the RCR's

201 W. D. RCR, 24 July 1943. 202 W. D. 1 CIB, Radio Logs, 24 July 1943. 203 Kim Beattie, Dileas, The 48,h Highlanders of Canada, Toronto, 1957, p. 280. 204 John Strawson, The Italian Campaign, Seeker and Warburg Ltd., London, 1987, p. 9. 69

C Company near the edge of town, which was pinned down by heavy mortar fire.

Unfortunately, rugged terrain left the tanks absolutely road bound and enemy guns began to range on the vehicles rendering some immobile, blocking further advance.205 Although the lack of mobility hindered the entire squadron of Shermans, the Canadian tankers fought from the road and still managed to knock out a trio of Mark III tanks, destroy three heavy guns and kill numerous Axis infantry.206 The enemy's resolve was strong and stiff fighting quickly developed east of Nissoria.

Captain C. H. Lithgow led D Company of the RCR through a wide gully behind

Nissoria and up the ridge toward their objective, a small red casa less than 50 yards from the northern edge of Highway 121. Southeast of town C Company continued to exchange fire with the enemy. Both groups were soon shrouded in confusion as communications broke down because of "freak conditions which seriously restricted wireless reception."207 It was later noted in the RCR war diary that the "18 sets were out of range" and malfunctioning in the hilly country, causing the battalion's assault to disintegrate into wild skirmishes rather than a cohesive advance.208 To regain momentum at 17:00 Lieutenant-Colonel Crowe committed A and B Companies to a deep right flanking manouevre, bringing them to the enemy's secondary defence line (Tiger ridge) one mile further east.209 Some time later C

Company escaped the enemy's mortar fire on the forward slope of Lion ridge and crept

205 War Diary 12 Canadian Armoured Regiment (Three Rivers Regiment), Appendix: Captain W. T. Hunter's Report to Division, 25 July 1943. 206 War Diary 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade, 24 July 1943. 207 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 126. 208 W. D. RCR, Appendix: Part Played by D Company in Sicilian Campaign July 1943. 209 W. D. 1 CIB, 24 July 1943. 70 southeast to join A and B Companies at Tiger.210 Radio communications were still out and

Lieutenant-Colonel Crowe moved forward with signalers, attempting to contact at least part of his battalion.

Following the sound of battle the party pushed on until they encountered men atop the first ridge. Sadly these soldiers belonged to the enemy and German machine-guns tore into Crowe and his tactical headquarters party. Fire was returned even after most of the group sustained injuries and Lieutenant-Colonel Crowe died gallantly while leading from the front.211 Now bereft of their commanding officer and his instructions, the communications blackout and the dark of night began to isolate the forward companies of the RCR further.

Meanwhile, covered by accurate mortar fire, a company of Panzer Grenadiers counter-attacked Captain Lithgow's D Company at the red building north of the road, forcing their withdrawal back to Nissoria.212 The unit then reorganized with scattered elements of

A Company who had become separated during the previous flanking manouevre. This group unsuccessfully tried a second time to attack along the road toward Lion ridge but "the strength of the enemy position was unmistakable."213 The better part of the RCR was separated physically by Lion ridge and unable to call for fire support. Major-General

Simonds ordered the offensive maintained by a fresh battalion before first light on 25 July.

During this time the Hampshire Regiment (Hampshires) of 231 Brigade, in accordance with Simonds' orders, cut the north and east exits from Agira in anticipation of an attempted withdrawal by the enemy. From the Campanelli feature The battalion's B and

210 W. D. RCR, Appendix: C Company July 1943. 211 W. D. RCR, 24 July 1943. 212 Ibid. 213 Ibid. 71

A Companies overlooked the road north to Troina and Highway 121 to Regalbuto respectively, while C and D Companies overlooked the highway from hills southeast of the town.214 If 1 Brigade's attack did not succeed before first light the Hampshires would be

forced to withdraw into hiding, as their positions were void of any significant cover and

commanded by the town itself. With most of the RCR unaccounted for and out of radio

contact to the west the British battalion waited tensely as the revealing light of dawn drew

closer. Meanwhile, the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (Hastings) prepared to renew the Canadian attack.

The Hastings marched forward and exited the eastern end of Nissoria in the darkness

of early morning 25 July. Led by B Company, the battalion accidentally stumbled into

enemy positions but reacted quickly by wiping out machine-gun posts on the forward slope

of Lion ridge, "killing a number of Germans and capturing others."215 Climbing the hill with

A, B and C Companies abreast, and D Company providing covering fire, the Hastings

clashed bitterly against the enemy as Axis artillery and mortars crashed down. At 05:40 on

the morning of 25 July 1 Brigade radioed divisional headquarters with the following report:

"We are on ridge east of first town unable to get any further."216 The Canadians had met

tough enemy resistance.

East of Agira the Hampshires were having better luck. Twenty minutes after

Brigadier Graham's 1 Brigade notified division of their difficulties, Brigadier Urquhart's 231

Brigade reaffirmed their hold about the Campanelli feature, one mile behind Agira.217

2,4 Gilchrist, pp. 79-80. 215 War Diary Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, 25 July 1943. 216 W. D. 1 CIB, Radio Logs, 25 July 1943. 217 Ibid. 72

Shortly afterward radio communications between Canadian units failed once more. The

Hastings' second-in-command Major A. A. Kennedy raced to brigade headquarters to request immediate artillery support as the situation at the front grew hot. By now numerous machine-guns were stitching the Hastings and three German tanks dug in atop the ridge began hurling shells against the advancing infantry.218 Already injured himself, Major John

Tweedsmuir ordered his battalion to withdraw into Nissoria as daylight made their situation more precarious. Behind Agira the Hampshires' A and B Companies concealed themselves amongst the scrub and brush on the Campanelli feature north of Highway 121 while the rest of the battalion retired to the south.

For a second time the enemy retained his grip on the hills past Nissoria but his strength was rapidly depleting. Many historians are quick to highlight the casualties suffered by the Hastings (five officers and 75 other ranks killed, wounded and missing) in order to promote their theories that this was an abortive attack.219 Though unable to consolidate Lion ridge, or link up with the missing companies fromth e RCR, the Hastings' attack succeeded in destroying many hostile positions and decimating the enemy's combat strength. Historians have also neglected to mention that the war diary of the Hastings reveals "casualties to the enemy were greater than those sustained by ourselves, which considering that they were in a commanding position, speaks well for the determination and coolness of our own troops."220 Given the great pressure placed on the enemy's forward positions by the latest attack, the three forward companies from the RCR - though isolated from support - were

218 W. D. HPER, 25 My 1943. 219 Nicholson, The Canadian in Italy, p. 125 220 W. D. HPER, 25 July 1943. 73 granted the opportunity to inflict very heavy casualties on the enemy as well.

Following their circumvention of the enemy's most western defences the officers commanding the three forward companies of the RCR held a council of war to decide their next course of action. Captains Galloway, Hodson and Liddell determined that "having absolutely NO communication" with either battalion, brigade or their supporting artillery, and being one mile past Lion ridge, the units would take up defensive positions for the night of 24-25 July.221 William McAndrew laments that "ironically, the only element lacking for a clear victory was a clear mission for the three companies behind the Germans."222 In

Firepower, however, Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham wrote that "the efficiency of a command system is defined by the rapidity of the flow of information" and feedback from the front line is vital in creating fresh orders.223 Exactly how William McAndrew expected new orders to be developed and enacted upon remains unclear, given the fact that communications were non-existent and the commander of the RCR lay dead on the battlefield.

Daniel Dancocks thus notes that by evening no one knew what had become of the

RCR, though it was apparent that their "attack had not succeeded."224 This claim fails to consider the magnitude of the enemy's defence position, nor the achievements of the RCR.

While the Hastings attacked the enemy at Lion ridge, motorized transport carrying hostile forces began rolling westward from Agira along Highway 121. As three trucks carrying

221 W. D. RCR, 25 July 1943. 222 McAndrew, Canadians and The Italian Campaign, p. 55. 223 Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire-Power, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, England, 1982, p. 249. 224 Daniel G. Dancocks, The D-Day Dodgers, McClelland and Stewart Inc., Toronto, 1991, pp. 76- 77. 74

Grenadiers to the Lion position drove in front of the RCR on Tiger, C Company's No. 13 platoon opened fire and forced the vehicles from the road, killing most of the passengers.

Only moments later another pair of trucks and occupants met the same fate.225 Although the arrival of enemy tanks forced the platoon to withdraw, the devastation they alone had inflicted on the enemy likely exceeded the 47 casualties suffered by the battalion during the entire battle.226 Not only did the RCR discover that the enemy was receiving reinforcements, but they inflicted significant casualties on these troops who could have been employed decisively on the front line.

The same can be said of the Hastings' attack which caused many casualties to the enemy and garnered valuable information about Axis strength near Nissoria. The divisional intelligence staff confirmed at 08:53 25 July that two prisoners captured during the Hastings' assault belonged to the German 2 Light Anti-Aircraft Battalion, who were fighting in direct

support of the Panzer Grenadiers.227 According to later intelligence summaries two platoons of this battalion were operating in the vicinity of Nissoria, one with their 20mm cannons and the other using machine-guns as regular infantry.228 The German situation in front of the

Canadians was deteriorating but the enemy still possessed significant reserves and the ability to continue fighting. The Hampshires of 231 Brigade soon realized this fact.

Owing to the delays which 1 Brigade experienced near Nissoria, two forward companies of the Hampshires remained on the Campanelli feature northeast of Agira near dawn on 25 July. Though initially unnoticed by the Grenadiers in and about town, enemy

225 W. D. RCR, Appendix: C Company July 1943. 226 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 126. 227 W. D. 1 CIB, Radio Logs, 25 July 1943. 228 W. D. 1 CID, Intelligence Summary No. 6,26 July 1943. 75 patrols later approached the Hampshire positions, drawing firingan d leaving casualties.229

By mid-afternoon artillery began pounding the hills and shortly afterward a fierce counter­ attack was launched against the Hampshires' positions. During brutal fightinga t close range the British companies "held on among the vines and prickly pears until withdrawn on the evening of the 25th."230 Only hours later the battalion stole across Highway 121 and regained positions covering the north and east roads from Agira. To the west Major-General Simonds insisted that pressure be reapplied to the Axis positions blocking the way to Agira.

1 Brigade's attack was soon renewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Johnston's

Highlanders. During the late morning of 25 July daring patrols from the Highlanders probed enemy positions on Monte di Nissoria, the highest part of his defences northeast of town.

In one such action a patrol led by Captain Ian Wallace discovered a German party ensconced behind a boulder-strewn ridge. Wallace's men blasted the Germans with automatic and rifle fire, "killing four and returning with valuable information."231 Their findings revealed the position of German tanks dug in on the heights northeast of Nissoria and confirmed earlier reports of the presence of the 2 Light Anti-Aircraft Battalion as a Luftwaffe officer was shot dead during the action.232 This reiterated the fact that Lion ridge was held by more than a delay force and had likely been reinforced throughout the battle.

While the Highlander patrols were out, the missing units of the RCR returned to

229 Gilchrist, p. 80. ""Molony.p. 155. 231 War Diary 48th Highlanders of Canada, 25 July 1943. Corporal Charlie Male who took part in the patrol led by Captain Wallace suggests that figures appearing in the war diary were modest. Male asserts that the total was at least 10 Germans, 6 of whom were killed. See Kim Beattie, Dileas, The 48th Highlanders of Canada, Toronto, 1957. 232 Beattie, p. 283. 76

Nissoria by 11:00, after retracing their steps through a valley south of Highway 121. The units could not hold their positions during the coming attack as Brigadier Graham felt the supporting artillery would surely inflict serious injuries.233 After the Regimental Sergeant-

Major from the RCR returned to Nissoria with news of their positions, a carrier patrol was sent out and contact was made with the units to advise of this threat. William McAndrew argues that "if they could have been extricated, they could have also been reinforced."234 His assertion, however, is vague. Reinforcing the position would have amounted to backing uncertainty, because support weapons could not be wrestled into position and artillery fire- tasks could not be called for from the front due to the radio blackout.

McAndrew claims that a lack of rations was the only inconvenience suffered by the forward companies, yet he does not acknowledge that their position had rapidly grown untenable. Earlier in the night a German convoy retreated towards Agira in the face of aggressive patrolling by the RCR but had since returned. As dawn broke on 25 July the enemy "were able to overlook [the RCR's] position and inflict some casualties with mortar and machine-gun fire."235 They fought fiercely while isolated behind enemy lines, without

supporting weapons or contact with their own artillery, but a new attack by the Highlanders was necessary.

At 18:00 on 25 July the Highlanders set off toward the northern end of Lion ridge where Monte di Nissoria towered above the landscape. Perceiving this to be an enemy strong point the SLI plastered the rocky hillsides with fire from their 4.2 inch heavy mortars. Later

233 W. D. RCR, 25 July 1943. 234 William J. McAndrew,"Fire or Movement? Canadian Tactical Doctrine, Sicily -1943", Military Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 3, (1987), p. 144. 235 W.D. RCR, 25 July 1943. 77 reports indicated that the support group "evidently did a good job" as they had "inflicted a great number of casualties" on the defenders.236 While the Highlanders' A Company provided covering fire Major Don Banton's D Company trailed an artillery barrage toward the rocky shelf stretching north from Highway 121. If Banton reached the objective Captain

Bob Lyon's B Company would in turn move to their right, aiming at a slightly less-elevated part of the ridge. By scaling these heights the two companies would overlook the enemy strong-hold surrounding the red building and the northern edge of Highway 121.237 While under heavy fire from above, D Company reached the crest of the feature by scaling innumerable terraces shrouded in tangled vegetation. Suddenly enfilading machine-gun fire erupted to their left.

Captain Lyon's B Company was committed to the attack and attempted to swing round the left flank of Banton's men in order to overrun the lethal machine-guns. Mortars entrenched on the reverse slope of another ridge further north, which was thought to be unmanned, began to bracket the exposed companies. The barrels of four Mark IV tanks, which had repositioned themselves shortly before the Highlanders attacked, swung round and fired on the Canadians below.238 Just as the RCR and Hastings were cut off by wireless failure so too were the Highlanders, and at a critical juncture when they desperately needed additional support.

Tanks from the Three Rivers Regiment lobbed shells onto the rocky crest during the

Highlanders' initial climb but it was impossible for the steel giants to reach the summit and

236 War Diary Saskatoon Light Infantry, 25 July 1943. 237 Beattie, p. 284. 238 W. D. 1 CIB, Radio Logs, 25 July 1943. 78 provide close fire support. The difficulty in combating armour and guns, and the inherent advantage which the enemy enjoyed, was expressed by the 1 Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment.

The unit's war diary proclaimed that beyond Nissoria lay "poor country for anti-tank guns except defensively."239 The Highlanders, already without anti-armour assistance, soon suffered further complications in securing help. Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston's link to 1

Brigade was out, as was the artillery forward observation officer's radio connection with his

25-pounders.240 Even with the crippling effects of the radio blackout and the inability of anti­ tank gunners to lend close support, some of the Highlanders managed to reach their objective.

While the Highlanders' B and D Companies continued to fight near the crest of

Monte di Nissoria, C Company crashed against enemy positions closer to the highway.

Having attacked on the right of the earlier thrust, Captain Ian Wallace's unit intended to consolidate the ground near the ominous red building. They set out at 23:00 following a series of meandering goat paths leading out of the gully to the top of the ridge.241 Their arrival at the peak of the feature was welcomed by the blazing muzzles of a pair of Mark IV tanks which forced the men to ground just below the crest. Brigade headquarters suddenly received brief contact from the front when it was stated over radio that forward troops were on the objective "but having a very hard time."242 By early morning 26 July the enemy fled and Wallace's C Company began digging in on the ridge, though their stay was soon cut short.

239 W. D. 1st Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, 25 July 1943. 240 Beattie, p. 285. 241 Ibid., p. 290. 242 W. D. 1 CIB, Radio Logs, 25 July 1943. 79

By 07:00 25 July the Highlanders were winding their way back into the relative safety of Nissoria. Some historians, including Hugh Pond, have rather foolishly stated that "neither

Brigade nor Divisional headquarters would believe [C Company]," instead ordering Captain

Wallace's men to retire.243 The Highlanders' regimental history even concludes that brigade headquarters "would not put credence in the report that the area of major resistance around

Nissoria was clear."244 The decision to withdraw the Highlanders was derived from the situation on the entire front, not only in the area where Captain Wallace's unit had dug in.

Although resistance near the highway had been overcome, the situation north of C Company was highly unfavorable.

The enemy holding Monte di Nissoria enjoyed effective heavy support from tanks and

German and Italian guns. Unable to bring their own supporting arms to counter the enemy's firepower because of communication failures and extremely rough terrain, the Canadian soldiers below the ridge were stalked by the Grenadiers. Both Highland companies were forced to withdraw from Monte di Nissoria and as a result C Company was required to do the same, lest they remain in position with exposed flanks.245 The only reserve left in 1

Brigade was A Company of the Highlanders and exploitation was called off as 2 Brigade was still too far west to lend effective support if the enemy counter-attacked. East of Agira, the

Hampshires withdrew to safer positions south of Highway 121, pending a renewal of 1CID' s assault.

The opening phase of the battle for Agira is a complicated and misunderstood piece

243 Hugh Pond, Sicily, William Kimber and Co. Limited, London, 1962, p. 179. 244 Beattie, p. 292. 245 W.D. 48* Highlanders of Canada, 26 July 1943. 80 of Canadian military history. Historians and veterans alike have been critical of 1 Brigade's struggle immediately east of Nissoria, often classifying this part of 1 CID's operations as a defeat. Dominick Graham, Major-General Simonds' biographer, scoffed that Nissoria was a classic example of committing troops piecemeal and reinforcing failure.246 Kim Beattie suggested that "Nissoria had beaten each of the three battalions in turn."247 Finally,

Nicholson likewise categorized 1 Brigade's efforts near Nissoria as a reverse and called the later capture of Agira a victory won by 2 Brigade.248 These authors all fail to place this action into the larger divisional context, nor have they examined the high degree of success which 1 Brigade achieved while ravaging Axis units on Lion ridge.

The early stages of the battle have been labeled a defeat based on several reasons, not the least of which suggests that 1 Brigade's three attacks were identical.249 The set of battalion assaults were only identical because they wrought great destruction on the enemy and recovered information about Axis positions. William McAndrew argued that the initial assault by the RCR on the right flank of the battlefield failed because "relying on firepower seemed to induce a tactical outlook which restrained the initiative on which battlefield manoeuvre depends."250 However, the RCR's advance certainly was not hampered by their supporting artillery and historians generally recognize their success in flanking enemy positions. Further accusations by historian Hugh Pond which suggest that Brigadier Graham reinforced his first battalion' % failure, with "head-on war, using bludgeons; no finesse," are

246 Dominick Graham, The Price of Command, Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, Toronto, 1993, p. 96. 247 Beattie, p. 293. 248 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 122. 249 Farley Mowat, The Regiment, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., Canada, 1955, p. 98. 250 McAndrew, "Fire or Movement?", p. 144. 81 also suspect.251

As enemy strength on the ridge was undetermined 1 Brigade soldiers continued to probe for an opening along the entire front, in a number of different areas. The Hastings' attack was aimed south of Highway 121 as D Company from the RCR, the only company to have returned from battle with information at that point, had been checked north of the road.252 Afterward, Brigadier Graham committed the Highlanders against the extreme northern flank of the German-Italian position, once more attempting to break the enemy line in a different locality. As the Highlanders' left flank was pinned down C Company penetrated enemy lines closer to Highway 121, scouting and identifying the route which 2

Brigade would later use to break through the position.253 Without this crucial intelligence gathered by Brigadier Graham's men 2 Brigade would have had an equally difficult time penetrating Lion ridge.

The most disappointing aspect of the existing historiography regards 1 Brigade's efforts as a series of independent failures rather than inherently necessary steps toward 2

Brigade's later breakthrough to Agira. 1 Brigade's reconnaissance in force proved that the ridge east of Nissoria was not a delay position en route to Agira but the main Axis battle position itself. In fact, it was the most heavily defended position the Canadians encountered while fighting in Sicily, one which 1 Brigade succeeded in weakening before 2 Brigade waged their attack.

From the time the artillery barrage sounded the RCR's advance, until the last bullets

251 Pond, p. 178. 252 W. D. HPER, 25 July 1943. 253 W. D. 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade, Appendix: Letter From Brigadier Howard Graham to Brigadier Chris Yokes, 26 July 1943. 82 fired by the Highlanders echoed into the hills, 1 Brigade wreaked havoc on the Axis by locking them into a losing attritional battle. Though ground was not taken, the brigade stole lives, destroyed equipment and broke the enemy's morale. The Canadian formation itself did not leave the battlefield unscathed as 171 casualties were suffered.254 However, so much damage was inflicted on 2 Battalion 104 Panzer Grenadier Regiment that the entire 1

Battalion had to be rushed south from Nicosia on 26 July to fix the deteriorating front line.255

Likewise, a battalion from 28 Aosta Division was also brought from Nicosia in order to backfill the horribly perforated German-Italian front.256 Although 1 Brigade had lost the equivalent of less than two companies, it was glaringly obvious that Axis forces had been smashed apart when these two battalions were called to Nissoria. Geographically the

Canadians were no closer to Agira, but 1 Brigade built the foundations for a decisive victory by the division.

Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, pp. 125-126. W. D. 1 CID, Intelligence Summary No. 6, 26 July 1943. W. D. 1 CID, Intelligence Summary No. 7,28 July 1943. 83

CHAPTER FIVE

Breaking Through

For the first time the Germans were fleeing from their machine-gun positions leaving thousands of rounds of belted ammunition beside the guns.

1ST CANADIAN INFANTRY DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 7 WAR DIARY, 28 JULY 1943

Following the efforts of Brigadier Howard Graham's 1 Brigade in determining the

strength of the enemy on Lion ridge, it became obvious that the German-Italian position

received significant reinforcements in the midst of combat and stood as the main Axis battle

position guarding the town of Agira. Major-General Simonds ordered Brigadier Chris

Vokes' 2 Brigade forward to become the vanguard of 1st Canadian Infantry Division (1 CID),

thus relieving the exhausted battalions from 1 Brigade. Renewing the advance 2 Brigade

would attack with more infantry and supporting arms, along with an artillery barrage which

more than doubled the number of shells unleashed on the enemy duringl Brigade's artillery

shoot.257 Not only were Canadian and British gunners privy to new intelligence regarding enemy positions but the concentration of shells they fired was more dense than those shot in

support of 1 Brigade, because they landed in a more concentrated area. While they had a

257 Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. L. Nicholson, Official History of The Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. II, The Canadians In Italy, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1956, p. 129. 84 more powerful arsenal of weapons to fight with, Vokes' battalions would still have to overcome many of the same problems which 1 Brigade endured.

Though planning and supporting arms were better during 2 Brigade's attack the forthcoming results could have been achieved by Brigadier Graham's formation, had they known the positions and strength of the enemy in advance. Historians like William

McAndrew have perpetuated a belief that 1 Brigade was unable to complete its orders by describing 2 Brigade's victory as though it were a simple or routine procedure. The author wrote: "On the evening of the 26th the Patricia's followed the heaviest barrage that Canadian gunners had yet fired and took an intermediate ridgeline. The Seaforths went through and took the hills south of Agira. The Edmontons made a wide outflanking march to take the hills north of the town."258 The seemingly easy fight which McAndrew describes in mere sentences was far from the truth revealed on the battlefield. Instead, communication and navigational problems afflicted 2 Brigade's assault and further Axis reinforcements slipped into the front to stiffen enemy positions. The arrival of fresh enemy troops in the line following 1 Brigade's unrelenting assault was an unprecedented characteristic of fighting in

Sicily, as Axis units had only fought brief delay battles to date. Regardless, the fiery Chris

Vokes and his officers were not dismayed as they prepared their men for battle.

On 25 July, the day before their attack on Agira began, a Brigade Command

Conference was held at which time Brigade Major P. R. Bingham outlined measures for accomplishing goals in combat. Bingham suggested that "success in the attack, depends on aggressive action, with a very quick follow-up, both of our own supporting fire and the

258 William McAndrew, Canadians and The Italian Campaign 1943-1945, Editions Art Global Inc., Montreal, 1996, p. 55. 85 retreating enemy." He added that upon consolidation of an objective "patrols are to be sent out immediately to allow the enemy no respite."259 Bingham concluded by reminding the men of 2 Brigade that it was essential to "find the Hun, hit him and keeping hitting him."260

With the intelligence gathered by Brigadier Graham's units 2 Brigade would have an easier time adhering to Bingham's directives.

On the afternoon of 26 July Brigadier Graham wrote to his counterpart Chris Vokes and recounted his brigade's experience in combat beyond Nissoria, along with his appreciation of the current situation on the ground. Graham relayed information received by the 48th Highlanders of Canada (Highlanders) who indicated that the strongest hostile positions were further east than originally thought, as the enemy's defences stretched deep along the ridge behind Nissoria. He also noted that machine-gun posts had been difficult to destroy as German troops were seen moving their weapons to new positions during the battle.261 Graham added that artillery concentrations fired against Monte di Nissoria north of Highway 121 did not shake the enemy from his positions on the reverse slope of the feature. The Brigadier supported Colonel Ian Johnston's suggestion that a thrust down the right flank of the battlefield, where Highway 121 cut through a pass on the ridge, should provide the best opportunity for success.262 Due to the strength of Axis positions both

Simonds and Vokes immediately realized the need for a prominent role by artillery in the coming attack.

259 War Diary. 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade, Appendix: Brigade Major P. R. Bingham's Summary of Brigade Command's Conference, 25 July 1943. 260 W. D. 2 CIB, Appendix: Bingham, 25 July 1943. 261 W. D. 2 CIB, Appendix: Letter From Brigadier Howard Graham to Brigadier Chris Vokes, 26 July 1943. 262 Ibid. 86

Even as the Highlanders returned from the front on the morning of 25 July shells were already being amassed. The work of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps illustrated the intensity of the coming barrage as they transported over 30,000 shells to

Canadian and British guns.263 The war diary of the Royal Canadian Artillery's (RCA) 3 Field

Regiment also outlined the severity of the pending assault: "At 13:00 hours [26 July] 2

Canadian Infantry Brigade relieved 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade in and around Nissoria, and plans were made for a big attack to start at 20:00 hours. Orders were received by this regiment to dump 400 rounds per gun in preparation for the biggest barrage yet attempted by

Divisional Artillery."264 Although the artillery fired in support of 1 Brigade's attack has drawn criticism from historians, given the enemy's desperation to hold ground, it was obvious that more artillery was needed to blast Axis soldiers from their stronghold.

The concentrations during 1 Brigade's attack only struck a series of preselected targets, though a full creeping barrage would be fired during 2 Brigade's advance. As the

Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) war diary notes, "the artillery plan was for two minutes intense fire on the start line west of Nissoria, followed by a fifteen minute concentration, followed in turn by sixteen 100 yard lifts at three minute intervals," culminating near Tiger ridge.265 After this opening period of shelling the barrage would stop for twenty minutes, allowing the follow-on companies from the PPCLI to pass through Lion and advance in unison with the second phase of the fire-plan. At 21:30 Canadian and British artillery would resume their shelling of Axis territory beyond Lion before twelve more 100

263 War Diary Commander Royal Canadian Army Service Corps, 26 July 1943. 264 War Diary 3 Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, 26 July 1943. 265 War Diary Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, 26 July. 87 yard lifts carried a wall of destruction as far east as the reverse slope of Tiger?66 The fire- plan was impressive and certain to inflict many casualties but overall success depended on the work of the infantry.

The 2 Brigade assault was led by the PPCLI who were ordered to secure a firm base extending 2300 yards east of Nissoria. That meant pressing over Lion ridge, one-half mile behind the town, and moving onto Tiger ridge one mile further east.267 Upon completion the

Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (Seaforths) would fight forward to seize the Grizzly line of defence, directly west of Agira. Throughout the battle 2 Brigade would be supported by 90

Anti-Tank Battery, 54 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, 3 Field Company Royal Canadian

Engineers and C Squadron of the Three Rivers Regiment.268 As the two battalions fought toward Agira the Brigade's third unit was tasked with covering their left flank.

Since 24 July the Loyal Edmonton Regiment (Loyal Eddies) was actively patrolling the territory north of Nissoria between Highway 117 to the west and the Nicosia-Agira roadway to the east. As American Seventh Army formations gradually swung into a parallel advance with 1 CED, in order to attack Nicosia, "active liaison was carried out between the two forces" and a number of enemy targets were spotted and engaged by the RCA.269 The results were impressive. On 26 July, for example, ten enemy vehicles and one tank were destroyed on the Nicosia-Agira road and Canadian artillery forced the surrender of 90 Italians whom American forces corralled.270 Meanwhile, as 2 Brigade fought beyond Nissoria, 231

266 War Diary Commander Corps Royal Canadian Artillery, 26 July 1943. 267 W. D. 2 CIB, Appendix: The Battle for Agira, 29 July 1943. 268 Ibid. 269 War Diary Loyal Edmonton Regiment, 25 July 1943. 270 W. D. LER, 26 July 1943. 88

Brigade cut Highway 121 east of Agira once more.

As thousands of shells began screaming into enemy lines west of Agira on the evening of 26 July, the Hampshire Regiment (Hampshires) of 231 Brigade closed around the town. With great stealthiness the battalion gained Point 583 southeast of Agira and the

Campanelli feature one mile northeast of the town.271 From these positions machine-gun and rifle fire could be directed on the enemy should he try withdrawing north or east. Although

2 Brigade brought 1 CID physically closer to seizing Agira the Hampshires were unable to maintain their positions as dawn broke. On the morning of 27 July the Seaforths were contacted by the Hampshires who indicated that they "had been thrown back off the road on the east side of town."272 Had they witnessed the savage fighting which 2 Brigade endured

any misgivings toward the speed of the Canadians would have surely disappeared.

As the devastating artillery fire hammered the start line of the advance the PPCLI peered from Nissoria toward the menacing ridge which 1 Brigade had battered for two days prior. As shells carved a mile-wide path through the battlefield the Saskatoon Light Infantry

(SLI) joined the cacophony of the night. While their Vickers machine-guns hemmed the rising ground behind Nissoria the SLI's 4.2 inch mortars blanketed the area with high explosive and smoke as the infantry moved out.273 At 20:17 C and D Companies from the

PPCLI rushed forward when the barrage pounded toward Lion ridge. No sooner had they left the shelter of Nissoria's stone hovels when D Company, acting as the left flank of the advance, came under fire from three machine-guns situated to their right along the edge of

271 Major R. T. Gilchrist, Malta Strikes Back, Gale & Polden Ltd., Aldershot, England, 1945, p. 87. 272 War Diary Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 27 July 1943. 273 War Diary Saskatoon Light Infantry, 26 July 1943. 89 the highway. By 20:40 No. 17 Platoon from D Company destroyed one of the machine-gun nests and along with No. 18 Platoon reached their objective atop the ridge.274 To their right

C Company was advancing with equal speed.

The barrage was "reported by the infantry to be perfect" and in front of the PPCLI's

C Company this was quite evident.275 On the southern end of Lion ridge the infantry swept onto their objective in rapid fashion. "Here the enemy were so demoralized by the shelling" that 15 soldiers surrendered instantly while others were quickly persuaded by bayonet.

Further evidence of the potential opposition shattered by artillery was realized when nine light machine-guns were found abandoned by the enemy.276 The PPCLI reached their objectives in short order but the consolidation of these positions was hardly complete.

At 20:55 2 Brigade received a message from the PPCLI that their C and D Companies were on Lion. Thirty-five minutes later, however, No. 17 Platoon called for tank support as enemy anti-tank guns located on the ridge were firing into the flank of D Company.277 The

Grenadiers dominated the road beyond Nissoria with anti-tank and heavy machine-guns and the Shermans from the Three Rivers Regiment experienced much trouble trying to move forward.278 The PPCLI's anti-tank platoon, along with 17-pounders from K Troop of the 90

Battery, moved onto the ridge that evening in an effort to quell the threat but it was impossible to sight the guns in the dark without previous reconnaissance.279 While mortars

274 W. D. PPCLI, Appendix: The Battle For Agira, July 1943. 275 W. D. CCRCA, 26 July 1943. 276 W. D. PPCLI, Appendix: The Battle For Agira, July 1943. 277 Ibid. 278 W. D. 2 CIB, Appendix: The Battle for Agira, July 1943. 279 W. D. PPCLI, Appendix: Employment of The Anti-Tank Platoon in The Sicilian Campaign, July 1943. 90 and machine-guns harassed them, D Company was forced to dig in only 300 yards from the enemy as violent combat continued. C Company shared a similar experience as initially light resistance increased with the onset of night and "a spirited grenade and tommy-gun fight ensued."280 As the two units fought, A and B Companies plunged into battle behind the

Canadian barrage.

When the first two companies of the PPCLI reached the hills immediately beyond

Nissoria their supporting barrage paused for twenty minutes, allowing the latter two companies to continue through with the intention of advancing as the shelling commenced again. Unfortunately A and B Companies became lost in the dark, their barrage moved on and at 21:45 battalion reported the second phase of the attack was not going as well as the first.281 Although they had fallen behind the paralyzing effects of the artillery the PPCLI were undaunted as they charged ahead. Fighting on the right flank of the highway, B

Company was reported within 400 yards of Tiger at 22:00. Only ten minutes later the company had dashed another 100 yards and radioed that their assault was "proceeding well."282 As they closed the distance between them and the ridge, however, they met strong resistance.

The effects of the artillery on the Grenadiers holding Tiger ridge was comparable to the resultant destruction wrought upon Lion ridge shortly before. A captured German officer proclaimed that during his service in Poland, France, Russia and North Africa "he had never experienced a barrage like that." The same man added that the defenders of the second ridge

280 W. D. Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, Appendix: The Battle For Agira, July 1943. 281 W. D. 2 CYB, Radio Logs, 26 July 1943. 282 Ibid. 91 suffered 40 percent casualties due to the shelling and the survivors were still groggy even after the barrage had ceased.283 Ineffectiveness of the artillery was certainly not to blame for the tough resistance encountered at Tiger.

The difficulty of navigating through arduous terrain at night resulted in the PPCLI's

A and B Companies advance slowing and provided significant recovery time for Axis soldiers, many of whom were freshly inserted into the line. The enemy atop this ridge proved to be from several units aside from 104 Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Intelligence collected from prisoners indicated that German combat engineers from the 476 Regiment and forward infantry from 1 Battalion of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division were also holding the battered front.284 By now the state of 1 and 2 Battalions 104 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was growing perilous. Further efforts to fill gaps in the Axis lines were realized when Italians from 93 Infantry Regiment and 1 Sicilian Infantry Regiment were found at the front, presumably fighting under German command.285 Undeterred, the vastly outnumbered infantry from the PPCLI engaged the hostile units with extreme force.

As the PPCLI's C and D Companies hunted for concealed machine-guns around Lion ridge trouble emerged to their rear on Monte di Nissoria. A full company of Grenadiers with a number of attached Italian soldiers fired down from the heights, attempting to dislodge the battalion from Lion. Benefitting from a high percentage of automatic weapons, the enemy harassed the rear and flank of D Company as Italian artillery officers continued to direct

283 W. D. 2 CIB, Radio Logs, 27 July 1943. 284 Ibid. 285 Ibid. 92 shellfire onto the battlefield.286 Enduring these bitter attacks the PPCLI eventually cleared the ridge, allowing armoured support to roll forward. A troop of Three Rivers tanks churned through the darkness and took up positions north of Highway 121 on the reverse slope of

Lion. From here the tanks tolerated "intense hostile machine-gun fire" while they provided

"excellent support" to the infantry who battled in the valley below and on Tiger ridge itself.287 Optimistic reports returned fromth e front,thoug h the actual situation was obscure as broken radio traffic led confused and conflicting messages to be sent.

Brigadier Chris Vokes and his staff were unsure of the PPCLI's exact status on either of the two ridges but the Seaforths were on notice to move through Tiger once it was secured. Eager to maintain momentum Vokes "decided to commit the second battalion for the exploitation task in the hope that aggressive action would clear up the situation in the

PPCLI's area."288 Early on 27 July Lieutenant-Colonel Bert Hoffmeister's Seaforths started off toward Tiger and shortly thereafter came upon C and D Companies of the PPCLI, still fighting on Lion ridge.289 The Seaforths fought past Lion at 03:40 and reported that heavy machine-gun fire was slowing their approach to Tiger, which forward elements closed on one hour later.290 As they reached the second set of hills astride Highway 121 A Company of the

286 W. D. 3 Field Regiment, RCA, Appendix: Report on The Night of 26-27 July 1943 by Captain Blake H. M. Tedman, 28 July 1943. Captain Blake Tedman of 3 Field Regiment RCA was forward observation officer with the PPCLI on 26 July. That evening he tried to establish an observation post on Monte di Nissoria, some 600 yards north of the little red building and Highway 121. With no serviceable radio link to the PPCLI, and no information on enemy positions, Tedman trekked north, stumbling into a company of Grenadiers encamped on Monte di Nissoria. Though taken prisoner, Tedman was freed before 08:00 the next morning as a patrol fromth e Loyal Edmonton Regiment encountered the artillery captain and other prisoners being led north by German guards. 287 W. D. 2 CIB, Appendix: The Battle for Agira, July 1943. 288 Ibid. 289 War Diary Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 27 July 1943. 290 W. D. 2 CIB, Radio Logs, 27 July 1943. 93

Seaforths quickly became locked in bitter combat against enemy infantry backed by tanks and heavy guns.

With the last hours of darkness melting into dawn on 27 July the Seaforth's A

Company was pinned down near the southern edge of Highway 121, unable to destroy a trio of German tanks to their front.291 After gaining a foothold on the ridge A Company was joined on their right flank by the Seaforth's B Company and anti-tank guns were then wrestled up the road to eliminate German armour. At 06:00 a lone transmission was received by 2 Brigade which stated that the Seaforths were still on Tiger and in contact with the

PPCLI, but all units were progressing slowly due to heavy machine-gun fire.292 Still, the

PPCLI and Seaforths continued to break apart and grind down the enemy's fighting strength.

As the sun rose over Highway 121 the intensity of the battle and 2 Brigade's achievements became more apparent. Between the two ridges enemy dead lay scattered amongst discarded weapons, ammunition belts and unopened rations - the Germans were not expecting the Canadians before breakfast. Along the road German and Italian vehicles were abandoned and smashed by shells fromth e RCA. Among them was a Mark IV Tank with

"the turret blown right off and all the rubber burnt off the tracks and bogies."293 Groups of prisoners were escorted back to Nissoria which alluded to the success 2 Brigade was enjoying, even though radio contact with forward troops remained sporadic.

Brigadier Vokes did everything he could to direct the confused fighting, though radio failure made management of the battlefield quite challenging. Limited in options, messages

291 W. D. SHoC, 27 July 1943. 292 W. D. 2 CIB, Radio Logs, 27 July 1943. 293 W. D. SHoC, 27 July 1943. 94 were relayed to the Seaforths through A and B Companies of the PPCLI who were also engaging the enemy on Tiger ridge.A t 07:15 Vokes radioed the PPCLI booming: "Tell the

Seaforth of Canada to get cracking and you form a firm base behind him."294 Forward companies from each battalion did just that, aided greatly by the deliberate and stealthy work of the Three Rivers tanks which had taken up positions between Lion and Tiger during the night. The troop of Sherman Tanks remained quiet as dawn broke, then spotted and destroyed "enemy anti-tank guns and machine-guns as soon as they divulged their positions by firing."295 Artillery forward observation officers made their way to the front and coordinates were called in to decimate the enemy still clinging to the ridge. Well- orchestrated shoots continued throughout the day, ripping to pieces the meager remains of the 104 Panzer Grenadier Regiment and other Axis forces still encamped on the ridge.296

Through the cooperation of armour, guns and infantry, Tiger was firmly in Canadian hands by 11:00 27 July and 2 Brigade was two miles from Agira.

This offered the Seaforths an excellent vantage point to fire into the final line of resistance known as Grizzly, situated immediately west of the town's foothills. Small arms fire from the infantry whistled out and bullets from the Vickers machine-guns of the SLI slashed through the valley east of the Tiger position. Backed by the barrels of the Three

Rivers Shermans, the group quickly disabled four German tanks and a considerable number of vehicles, all while shooting down many enemy infantry caught in the open.297 The

Seaforth's artillery forward observation officer was kept busy arranging targets throughout

294 W. D. 2 CIB, Radio Logs, 27 July 1943. 295 W. D. 2 CIB, Appendix: The Battle for Agira, July 1943. 296 W. D. CCRCA, 27 July 1943. 297 W. D. 2 CIB, Appendix: The Battle for Agira, July 1943. 95 the day which landed very accurately, "scattering Germans like nine pins."298 As this destruction continued it was reported by captured prisoners that 1 Battalion 104 Panzer

Grenadier Regiment was wiped out. They added that 1 Battalion from29 th Panzer Grenadier

Division was ordered to fight until the last.299 Major-General Simonds ordered the attack on

Agira continued immediately, and while Vokes prepared to renew the main assault the Loyal

Eddies continued to harass and destroy enemy traffic north of Highway 121.

A platoon fromth e Loyal Eddies' D Company cut the road leading north to Nicosia on the afternoon of 26 July. By the time of 2 Brigade's consolidation of Tiger ridge on 27

July this force had used PIAT's and Hawkins grenades to destroy three tanks, four vehicles and a tank conveyor.300 Traffic on the road was so heavy that two platoons from C Company were sent to reinforce the position. When the assault on Grizzly began by mid-afternoon enemy movement on the road increased again and at 17:39 the Loyal Eddies' patrol reported hard fighting as they were attacked by German tanks. Three more were knocked out, though another four joined the battle and by 18:14 the hard-pressed patrol was ordered to withdraw.301 Soon the rest of the Loyal Eddies would join the assault on the Grizzly position, after the Seaforths started another thrust toward Agira.

The majority of those Germans from29 th Panzer Grenadier Division who remained west of Agira dug in along two equally menacing features. Monte Fronte, a box shaped plateau standing 300 feet tall, stretched 800 yards south of Highway 121 and provided the

298 W. D. SHoC, 27 July 1943. 299 W. D. 2 CIB, Radio Logs, 27 July 1943. 300 W. D. LER, 27 July 1943. The PI AT (Projectile Infantry Anti-Tank) was a hand held anti- armour weapon similar to an American Bazooka or the German Panzerfaust. 301 W. D. 2 CIB, Radio Logs, 27 July 1943. 96

Axis with a strong position to defend their left flank from. North of the road Cemetery Hill and Monte Crapuzza allowed the enemy to challenge thrusts coming from both the Nissoria and Nicosia roadways. Lieutenant-Colonel Hoffineister sent D Company of the Seaforths against the wooded hills on the left of Highway 121 while A Company moved cross country toward the Monte Fronte feature.302

A heavy concentration of shells made Grizzly tremble for fifteen minutes before

Hoffmeister's infantry advanced at 14:15.303 As they did two platoons of Vickers machine- guns from the SLI raked the defending Grenadiers and a platoon of 4.2 inch mortars lobbed bombs into the Grizzly positions.304 The Seaforth companies approached their objective south of the highway and were met by a wave of hostile fire, although it failed to stop the advance outright. Two troops of Sherman tanks from the Three Rivers Regiment accompanied the infantry and fired directly into the objective "causing great havoc among enemy machine-gun positions," allowing Canadian soldiers to continue under strong covering fire.305 The deadly response continued from the enemy's side of the battlefield and flanking manouevres were necessary to proceed.

Due to Monte Fronte's precipitous western face, Major Budge Bell-Irving elected to lead A Company of the Seaforths well to the south. Terraced vineyards and orchards west of the cliff were traversed by several sunken tracks which "produced excellent cover and allowed immediate and rapid progress."306 A Company's No. 8 Platoon then infiltrated to

302 W. D. SHoC, Appendix: The Battle of Grizzly Hill, July 1943. 303 War Diary 1 Field Regiment (Royal Canadian Horse Artillery), RCA, 27 July 1943. 304 W. D. SLI, 27 July 1943. 305 W. D. SHoC, 27 July 1943. 306 W. D. SHoC, Appendix: Grizzly Hill, July 1943. 97 the base of the hill and held the enemy's attention while the remainder of Bell-Irving's men continued to the southeast comer of the feature. The shooting by No. 8 Platoon was so effective that several men actually gained the top of the feature, destroying a machine-gun nest and taking two prisoners before retiring back down the cliff.307 The Seaforths reported good progress at 15:00 and their attack maintained excellent pressure on the enemy.308

Meanwhile, the rest of A Company hiked into the rear of the German position.

With complete tactical surprise A Company of the Seaforths scaled the unguarded southern end of Grizzly. Once atop, the infantry established a foothold along a rocky ridge which crossed the plateau diagonally, and around a casa that provided good protection. Bell-

Irving reported at 15:47 that his men had reached a position which directly overlooked the rest of the feature and the Grenadiers to their north.309 At 15:58 Canadian guns roared into action as artillery was brought down on the northern end of the plateau and a thirty minute concentration hammered the Grenadiers holding the ground.310 At 17:22 the Seaforths reported they were reorganizing on Grizzly and would hold it.311 For twenty-four hours A

Company had expended their resources and energy, causing their situation to grow dangerous. The enemy continued to lob mortar bombs onto the Canadians, although dusk brought relief from small arms and machine-gun fire. Radio communications broke off for good and A Company became isolated.

Although the beleaguered company faced a desperate situation, by early evening their

307 W. D. SHoC, Appendix: Grizzly Hill, July 1943. 308 W. D. SHoC, 27 July 1943. 309 W. D. 2 CIB, Radio Logs, 27 July 1943. 310 W. D. SHoC, 27 July 1943. 3,1 W. D. 2 CIB, Radio Logs, 27 July 1943. 98 efforts and those of the whole brigade were paying important dividends. 1 CID reported that by 18:00 27 July 100 of the enemy were dead and 200 wounded. In addition approximately

100 Italians and 40 Germans were captured.312 Answering A Company's last plea for reinforcements, Lieutenant-Colonel Hoffmeister ordered B and C Company of the Seaforths to the attack immediately. At 18:00 the two units rushed forward on universal carriers and proceeded through orchards and vineyards toward Monte Fronte.313 Meanwhile Hoffmeister ordered the withdrawal of D Company in the north.

As the Seaforth's attack ground to a halt short of the enemy infested hills which commanded Highway 121 from the north, Hoffmeister grew wary of stretching his battalion thin. "The situation became confused, but it was clear" that the Seaforths could not take both ends of Grizzly alone. Accordingly, Brigadier Vokes ordered the Loyal Eddies to capture the grave yard and hills northwest of Agira.314 At 19:00 the Loyal Eddies' A, B and D

Companies (minus one platoon) moved through Seaforth positions, readying for their attack

on the northern end of Grizzly?15 Shortly before their final approach began Brigadier Vokes notified the battalion that they would follow a full artillery concentration onto the features

at 21:00.316 At 20:50 the guns sounded the assault by blasting the western edge of Agira and the hills surrounding the graveyard.317 At approximately the same time the Panzer

Grenadiers south of Highway 121 counter-attacked the Seaforths atop Monte Fronte and

rained mortars onto the companies moving in from the west.

312 W. D. 2 CIB, Radio Logs, 27 July 1943. 313 W. D. SHoC, Appendix: The Part Played by B Company in The Sicilian Campaign, July 1943. 314 W. D. 2 CIB, 27 July, 1943. 315 W. D. LER, 27 July 1943. 316 W. D. 2 CIB, Radio Logs, 27 July 1943. 317 W. D. SHoC, 27 July 1943. 99

Having dismounted from their transport the Seaforth's B and C Companies crept forward in the dark toward the rocky crag in front of them. Heavy machine-gun and mortar fire from the top of the feature rang the alarm as the reinforcements attempted to reach A

Company. B Company returned fire but were pinned down in the rolling terrain west of

Monte Fronte at 20:20.318 From a small knoll southwest of Grizzly No. 15 Platoon of C

Company added to the hail of bullets being returned to the Grenadiers, hoping to cover the movement of No. 14 Platoon to the right of the feature.319 Unfortunately the latter group was unable to advance quickly due to heavy enemy machine-gun fire and very rough terrain, leaving A Company isolated still.

At midnight 27-28 July, the small casa held by the combined forces of A Company's

No. 8 and 9 Platoons was struck by a German counter-attack. Vicious mortar and machine- gun fire swept over the Seaforths and the Grenadiers moved closer, lobbing grenades across the plateau. "The company's limited supply of ammunition permitted only restricted defensive fire, but the Hun quickly shut up and went to bed."320 The battle along the

Seaforth's front began to quiet down but combat in the Loyal Eddies' sector escalated with extraordinary ferocity.

After attacking in two thrusts the Loyal Eddies became embroiled in bitter fighting that continued relentlessly until dawn on 28 July. With great ease A Company captured

Monte Crapuzza, some 700 yards north of Agira, as it was found to be unmanned by the enemy. To the south, however, B and D Companies had a far more difficult time clearing

318 W. D. SHoC, 27 July 1943. 319 W. D. SHoC, Appendix: The Part Played by C Company in The Sicilian Campaign, July 1943. 320 W. D. SHoC, Appendix: The Battle of Grizzly Hill, July 1943. 100 the cemetery. Here they found the enemy to be well armed with mortars, heavy machine- guns, rifle-grenades and great wealth of small arms.321 Just before 01:00 28 July 1 CID reported the capture of Italian 20mm anti-aircraft guns by the Loyal Eddies. This seemed to confirm earlier reports that part of the 28 Italian Artillery Regiment was also defending Agira and likewise explained the massive outpouring of fire from amongst the tombstones.322

Though contact between the Loyal Eddies and both their battalion and brigade was almost non-existent during the remainder of the action, brief notification was received at 02:30 that

indicated Canadian infantry had reached Agira's winding streets.323 This effort was beaten back by the Grenadiers inside the town as the battle for the cemetery continued unabated.

As the sun rose over the battlefield combat on the steep hills degenerated into savage hand to hand fighting. "It was not until the enemy were engaged with the bayonet," says the

Loyal Eddies' war diary, "that the situation began to clarify itself."324 While A Company

shot into the German flank B and D Companies made a last surge against the enemy between

05:30 - 06:00 on the morning of 28 July.325 The effort worked as the German party was routed and the few survivors fled.

Shortly before at 05:00, A Company of the Seaforths was hit by a strong mortar barrage and heavy fire from machine-guns and rifle-grenades. The combined force of No.

8 and 9 Platoons led by Lieutenant Harling displayed magnificent fortitude and fire discipline

321 W. D. LER, 28 July 1943. 522 W. D. 2 CIB, Radio Logs, 28 July 1943. 323 W. D. CCRCA, 28 July 1943. This brief excursion into the town by patrols from the Loyal Eddies was confirmed in radio communications between the battalion and 2 Brigade Headquarters at 08:50 28 July. 324 W. D. LER, 28 July 1943. 325 Ibid. 101 as they defended the casa against the assaulting Grenadiers. A hail of Mills grenades thrown by the Seaforths also proved most effective in beating back the assault.326 Having struggled through much of the night to reach A Company, Lieutenant McLean led No. 14 Platoon of

C Company onto the southern end of Monte Fronte at 05:45, just as the Seaforths began to counter-attack. Lieutenant Harling's force from A Company together with Lieutenant

McLean's platoon from C Company shattered the Grenadiers tenuous hold on Grizzly within fifteen minutes.327 The door to Agira was open.

The rest of the Seaforth's C and B Companies moved forward to consolidate Monte

Fronte and the Loyal Eddies did the same to the north. The Seaforth's A Company brought back a dozen prisoners from 1 Battalion 15 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, including "a medical orderly loaded down with ammunition."328 The German desire to stop the Canadian advance on Agira was tremendous, but ultimately the enemy was incapable of victory. The Seaforths and Loyal Eddies reported at 08:50 that both sections of Grizzly were firmly in their grasp.

They also reported that nearly all of the enemy were killed while the few survivors fled north and east.329 Adding to the earlier success of 1 Brigade, Vokes' formation tallied over 215 prisoners taken since their attack began on the evening of 26 July. It was highly likely that enemy's wounded totaled several hundred and the number of dead was already over 150, even without figures from the Loyal Eddies' sector.330 However, the town of Agira itself was not yet in Canadian hands.

326 W. D. SHoC, Appendix: Grizzly Hill, July 1943. 327 W. D. SHoC, Appendix: Grizzly Hill, July 1943. 328 W. D. SHoC, 28 July 1943. 329 Ibid. 330 W. D. 2 CIB, Radio Logs, 28 July 1943. 102

Shortly after 1 CID arrived at the western outskirts of town the 231 Brigade was on the move east of Agira. Both the Devonshire Regiment (Devons) and Dorsetshire Regiment

(Dorsets) were ordered to attack the Campanelli feature northeast of town so Highway 121 and the road north to Troina could be cut in the event of an attempted enemy withdrawal.

The Devons' C Company fared well in heavy fighting on the feature and reported that "more

Germans were killed than were taken prisoner."331 D Company of the Dorsets attacked on the right flank and achieved similarly effective results. Their assault was launched so quickly that 80 of the enemy surrendered almost immediately.332 With 231 Brigade firmly established near the exits, 2 Brigade was set to clear Agira of any last resistance.

After the consolidation of Grizzly Brigadier Vokes quickly "planned an attack supported by all available Artillery, and Mortars in the Brigade," to clear the towering collection of stone buildings.333 At 13:30 a forward observation officer from 1 Field

Regiment (Royal Canadian Horse Artillery) "who had entered the town by mistake came back and reported that he had seen no Germans," nor had he been fired upon.334 Patrols from

A Company of the PPCLI moved up to investigate and no enemy was discovered up to a point approximately half-way through town.335 Accordingly A and B Companies of the

PPCLI marched forward without the previously arranged artillery barrage. After advancing

300 yards through town the vanguard was hit by enemy machine-gun fire. So began fierce street fighting that lasted until nearly 19:00. The better part of the battalion was committed

331 Gilchrist, pp. 92-93. 332 Gilchrist, p. 93. 333 W. D. 2 CIB, 28 July 1943. 334 W. D. 2 CIB, Appendix: The Battle For Agira, July 1943. 335 W. D. PPCLI, Appendix: Street Fighting in Agira, July 1943. 103 to the engagement and when the situation was rectified the enemy had lost another 160 personnel killed, wounded and captured.336 The battle for Agira was over.

The struggle to crack the German-Italian hold on the ancient mountain town was the longest and most vicious fight 1 CID endured while in Sicily. War correspondent Lionel

Shapiro of the Montreal Gazette suggested it "was the most glittering victory of the

Canadians in the Sicilian campaign" and this is wholly evident when the state of those Axis units involved in the fighting is considered.337 Intelligence indicated that the 104 Panzer

Grenadier Regiment was nearly annihilated; a product of 1 CID's continual application of force and German desperation. After motorcycle dispatch riders and engineers from regimental headquarters were thrown into the line as infantry it was clear that nothing but stragglers remained from 104 Panzer Grenadier Regiment's 1 and 2 Battalions.338 The plight of all Axis units involved in the fighting against 1 CID was similar in nature and with respect to 2 Brigade's part in the battle, this was largely the result of devastating artillery support.

William McAndrew blamed 1 Brigade's supposed inability to break enemy defences on an over-dependance on artillery. As it has been shown, however, because of the numerical superiority of Axis units entrenched east of Nissoria, an even stronger concentration of artillery was necessary during 2 Brigade's attack. Only through the skillful application of such an intricate fire-plan could the infantry succeed in consolidating the three ridges between Nissoria and Agira. Ignored historically, the assault, as summarized in the war diary of 3 Field Regiment, was a great accomplishment for gunners and infantry alike:

336 Ibid. 337 W. D. Princess PPCLI, Appendix: Lionel Shapiro quoted in "The Red Patch," 29 July 1943. 338 War Diary 1st Canadian Infantry Division, Intelligence Summary No. 7,28 July 1943. 104

The barrage opened at 20:00 hours and was described as magnificent. The attack was a complete success and our infantry ended up in control of the high ground ... Enemy prisoners captured after the attack stated that the barrage was so terrific and our infantry followed so closely behind that they had had no alternative but to lay down their arms. They were shaken and demoralized.339

Both friend and foe were quick to pay additional tribute to the artillery.

Brigadier A. Bruce Matthews, commanding officer of 1 CID' s artillery, informed his regiments after the battle that:

Recent employment of Field and Medium Artillery on a Divisional basis has brought forward many complimentary remarks for the "Gunners" from all quarters. I would like Commanding Officers to assure that all ranks RCA and RA know that their support has been timely and effective and is greatly appreciated by the infantry. Referring particularly to the concentrations and barrages prior to the capture of AGIRA, [the] Commander [of] 30 Corps and GOC 1 Canadian Division have both expressed their admiration of application of fire under somewhat difficult circumstances.340

An Italian major captured during 2 Brigade's thrust toward Agira likewise exclaimed his amazement that 25-pounders had "wrought such damage and disaster," on his unit's position.341 Although 2 Brigade's attack clearly impressed those involved on both sides of the front line little interest has been shown by historians to date.

The role of 2 Brigade in the battle for Agira has been written off as a seemingly easy victory, though evidence has shown this was hardly the case. Of 2 Brigade's attack William

339 W. D. 3 Field Regiment, RCA, 26 July 1943. 340 W. D. 1 Field Regiment (RCHA), RCA, Appendix: Letter From Brigadier A. Bruce Matthews CCRCA to Commanding Officers, 31 July 1943. 341 W. D. 3 Field Regiment, RCA, Appendix: After Action Report by D Troop 77 Battery, July 1943. 105

McAndrew wrote: "Two of its battalions mounted a frontal assault, while a third moved wide."342 This incredibly brief description does little to assess the problems which the PPCLI faced in securing Lion and Tiger, nor does it explain how the Seaforths were required to help in order to consolidate the features. The intention here is not to criticize the efforts of the

PPCLI but instead to show that 2 Brigade's fight for Agira was not a walkover as the existing historiography suggests. Many of the same problems 1 Brigade dealt with were encountered by 2 Brigade as well. The difference is that some were avoided due to the hard work of the former as they set the stage for 1 CID's victory.

The Canadian triumph at Agira, as facts have exhibited, reflected the strategic goals of the Allies by destroying German military resources. Operationally, the fall of Agira set in motion an unstoppable advance against the western flank of enemy defences surrounding the Catania Plains. Brigadier Howard Graham recorded that the fight for this town was one of the "key battles in the task of relieving the British forces, who had been attempting to drive north along the eastern coast of Sicily to Catania."343 It is only fitting to quote the commander of 1 Brigade here as his formation played a vital role, along with its sister formation and 231 Malta Brigade, in grinding down German strength and hastening 1 CID's eastward advance.

342 William J. McAndrew,"Fire or Movement? Canadian Tactical Doctrine, Sicily -1943", Military Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 3, (1987), p. 144. 343 Howard Graham, Citizen and Soldier, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1987, p .177. 106

CHAPTER SIX

Agira: A Dated Consensus

[A failure] to follow the fire support closely enough was afterwards cited by Major-General Simonds as the fundamental cause of the reverses suffered by units of the Is1 Brigade in their attacks of Nissoria. ... I dispute that categorically.

BRIGADIER HOWARD D. GRAHAM CO. 1 CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

The consolidation of Agira was the largest Canadian battle of the war to date. As they had been during previous engagements throughout Sicily, enemy units intent on stopping 1 CID were ravaged and pushed closer to Adrano. German losses during the five- day battle were estimated at 325 killed, 430 captured and scores of others wounded.344 Italian units suffered heavily as innumerable men were killed and wounded, while 260 were captured. Canadian numbers were comparatively low as 1 and 2 Brigades reported 438 casualties.345 Rather than acknowledge these important figures, historians like William

McAndrew typically recount the battle of Agira by describing a reverse suffered by 1

Brigade, while their analysis of the following three days of combat is only sparsely

344 Hugh Pond, Sicily, William Kimber and Co. Limited, London, 1962, p. 183. 345 Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. L. Nicholson, Official History of The Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. II, The Canadians In Italy, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1956, p. 134. 107 detailed.346 As a result the total level of destruction wrought upon the enemy during the battle is overlooked, as is the performance of Canadian infantry, tankers and gunners.

Interestingly, one of the earliest accounts of the battle for Agira actually paid specific tribute to lCID's gunners. War correspondent Lionel S. B. Shapiro, a journalist for the

Montreal Gazette, began to pen They Left The Backdoor Open (1944) while traveling with

Eighth Army in Sicily. Shapiro proclaimed that because of the effectiveness of Canadian artillery Axis positions were decimated and survivors were left "green with vomit and jittery," leading many to surrender rather than fight.347 This commentary is one of the first works to support the tremendous Canadian fire-plan that in later years would draw criticism from historians.

Published the same year was the first official historical work outlining Canadian involvement in Operation Husky. From Pachino to Ortona (1944) was compiled by the

Historical Section of the General Staff, Canadian Military Headquarters in London and summarized the first six months of Canadian combat in Sicily and mainland Italy. This study displays a broad operational context by commenting on the priority of resources which

Canadian gunners enjoyed during the battle for Agira.348 The account also discusses the variety of reasons behind the division's initial inability to crack enemy defences beyond

Nissoria.

It is revealed that neither the speed of the artillery nor the supposed slowness of the

346 William McAndrew, Canadians and The Italian Campaign 1943-1945, Editions Art Global Inc., Montreal, 1996, p. 55. 347 Lionel S. B. Shapiro,77iey left The Back Door Open, The Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1944, p.64. 348 Historical Section, Canadian Army General Staff, From Pachino To Ortona 1943, Canadian Military Headquarters, London, 1944, pp. 55-56. 108 infantry could be faulted because enemy positions were eventually located at points contrary to those indicated by early intelligence reports.349 It is also noted that 1 CID "virtually cut to pieces" entire units of 15th and 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions, illustrating the effectiveness of Canadian arms during the battle.350 In the immediate post-war era other sources added to the history of 1 CID and the battle for Agira.

In 1945 the history of 231 Malta Brigade was written by Major R. T. Gilchrist, the brigade intelligence officer from 1941-1943. This British formation was under Major-

General Simonds' command during the assault on Agira and the narrative by Gilchrist explains his formation's role in the attack. Malta Strikes Back describes how the tightly knit flank created by the 231 Malta Brigade and 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade provided a firm base from which to launch attacks against Axis positions in the hills about Agira.351 Furthermore, the battle narrative details the heavy fighting which the formation endured throughout this operation.

In their effort to threaten the town and stymie a German retreat as 1 CID advanced from the west, 231 Brigade faced strong enemy resistance in the hills south and east of the city from 23-28 July. As Major Gilchrist recorded, the brigade was "suffering heavy casualties, especially among officers" but maintained much needed pressure against the enemy's southern flank and rearward areas east of town.352 The hard fighting was a clear indication of how necessary the frontal assault by the Canadians was. Not until the mid-

349 Ibid., p. 62. 350 Ibid., p. 62. 351 Major R. T. Gilchrist, Malta Strikes Back, Gale & Polden Ltd., Aldershot, England, 1945, p. 76. 352 Ibid., p. 78. 109

1950s did the next significant examination of the attack on this Axis bastion occur.

In 1955 Italian Campaign veteran Farley Mowat wrote the history of the Hastings and

Prince Edward Regiment (Hastings), titled quite simply The Regiment. The author's detailed

account of the Hastings' attempt to capture the enemy-held ridge immediately east of

Nissoria describes the "confused, savage and terrifying battle" through an explanation of

company and platoon-sized actions.353 Prior works on the subject did not depict the battle

in such a specific fashion nor did the official Canadian history.

The Canadians In Italy 1943-45 (1956) allows readers to comprehend the fighting

along Highway 121 through a concise battle narrative. This history shows how a change in

Axis defence patterns significantly influenced the shape of combat near Agira and how

"topography was in the enemy's favour," making the advance rather difficult.354

Understandably, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholson's study does not constitute a critical

assessment of officers and soldiers in action, as many still held positions in the Canadian

Army when this work was written. Coupled with the narrative from the official history

though, more opinionated regimental accounts began to question the nature of operations in

Sicily and the leadership of senior officers.

In Dileas, the history of the 48th Highlanders of Canada, the existing consensus

regarding 1 CID' s fight on Highway 121 is questioned. Author Kim Beattie argued that the

setbacks at Nissoria experienced by 1 Brigade were not the result of a failure to follow

artillery closely as Major-General Simonds suggested, but were instead caused by insufficient

Farley Mowat, The Regiment, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., Canada, 1955, p. 96. Nicholson, The Canadians In Italy, p. 13. 110 fire support.355 Similarly, Farley Mowat wrote that after Leonforte-Assoro officers were left dazzled by optimism. He offers that commanders assumed a heavier application of firepower, like the one eventually used to support 2 Brigade, would not be necessary to pry loose the enemy 'rearguards' near Nissoria.356 A distrust of high command is also held by

Beattie. The Highlander concluded that three identical attacks were made by the battalions of 1 Brigade because commanders were more concerned with speed than with absorbing the lessons dealt by the enemy on the ridge.357 Other factors had a considerable impact on the battle too, well beyond the decisions made by Canadian officers.

A seminal work on the topic of Operation Husky, Hugh Pond's monograph Sicily

(1962), spends a chapter examining the Canadian fight for control of Nissoria and Agira.

Like many others Pond states that "it was almost impossible even for the infantry to manoeuvre off the road, owing to the steep slopes and rocky hillsides, and for the tanks it was disastrous terrain."358 Unlike Beattie or Mowat the author refrains from criticizing the ranks or officers. Instead, Pond suggests that radio failure was a major factor which complicated the attack.359 Though Pond chose not to chastise any level of the military echelon, assigning blame was somewhat characteristic of regimental histories; in the 1960s three more were written.

In 1964 George. R. Stevens' A City Goes to War; History of the Loyal Edmonton

Regiment added to the understanding of small unit engagements and the extension of 1 CID's

355 Beattie, p. 294. 356 Mowat, The Regiment, p. 93. 357 Beattie, p. 279. 358 Pond, p. 173. 359 Ibid., p. 174. Ill flank during action near Nissoria and Agira. A comprehensive summary of the battalion's aggressive patrolling north of Highway 121, which lasted for two days before Agira fell, describes the level of destruction imposed on the enemy by a company-sized force.360 This account also helps illustrate the extent of Canadian operations between the Nissoria-Agira roadway and Highway 120 to the north where Seventh Army was advancing. Later studies by Stevens' refocused on the main Canadian thrust toward Agira though.

In The Royal Canadian Regiment, Vol II, 1933-1966 (1967) Stevens describes 1

Brigade's advance by suggesting that what Canadian officers had planned "was not a battle, but a walkover," where artillery would be ineffective over such a large area.361 Although years before Nicholson noted a change in enemy defence patterns because of the strength his positions were held with, Stevens expands on an important aspect of this trend. The author clarifies that "because an enemy preferred to hold high ground gave no assurance that he would not fight stubbornly on low ground."362 While this comment is no doubt aimed at the presumption by Canadian commanders that ground before Agira would not be held strongly, his assessment of artillery is notable.

Ironically, in reference to the capture of Lion ridge in Princess Patricia's Canadian

Light Infantry 1919-1957, Vol. Ill, Stevens wrote that Canadian artillery had so demoralized the enemy that many "either surrendered or fled."363 While leadership and the employment

360 George Roy Stevens, A City Goes to War; History of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment (3 PPCLI), Charters Publishing. Co., Brampton, Ontario, 1964, p. 240. 361 George Roy Stevens, The Royal Canadian Regiment, Vol II, 1933-1966, London Print & Lithographing Co., London, Ontario, 1967, p. 80. 362 Ibid., p. 80. 363 George Roy Stevens, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 1919-1957, Vol. Ill, Southam Printing Company Limited, Canada, 1968, p. 85. 112

of artillery were questioned in these histories, Stevens also blames equipment for complicating the Canadian attack. Though wireless radios worked well on flat or high ground, says Stevens, "was no guarantee that they would work well in the valleys."364

Rugged and hilly terrain has of course been a staple topic of other historical studies.

In The Mediterranean and The Middle East (1973), Brigadier C. J. C. Molony states that terrain more than anything shaped the battle for Agira as "the ground prevented wide deployment" and therefore "six Canadian battalions had been committed, in the early stages, one by one against stubborn defenders."365 This is an interesting statement and is likely a factor in so many interpretations classifying the assault as battalion-sized. It also points to the importance of individual regimental histories and memoirs in adding to the discourse on this action, because of the fact that battalions were often the vanguard of the divisional thrust.

Although by fate Farley Mowat did not participate in the Hastings' fight at Nissoria he quotes in his memoirs, And No Birds Sang (1975), a corporal from his own platoon who experienced the vicious fighting:

It was a bloody schlemozzle right from the start. The R.C.R.S were sent off down the road from Assoro with a squadron of tanks and ran into an ambush in some hills just beyond the next village—place called Nissoria. They lost a hell of a lot of men and a bunch of tanks, and any goddamn fool should have known after that those hills were held in strength, but we were ordered right on in there anyway. No reconnaissance, no artillery fire to soften things up, no tanks, no nothing—and it was pitch dark by then.366

This powerful description seems to be aimed at the "goddamn fools" orchestrating the battle.

364 Stevens, Royal Canadian Regiment, p. 81. 365 Brigadier C. J. C. Molony, The Mediterranean and The Middle East, Vol. V, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1973, pp. 155-56. 366 Farley Mowat, And No Birds Sang, Farley Mowat Ltd., Toronto, 1975, p. 137. 113

In The Regiment Mowat admitted that the engagements at Assoro and Nissoria were both "a buccaneering rush into the unknown" and the former had brought renown but the latter disaster.367 Twenty years later his perspective on the events is quite different. In his memoirs the author recorded that having watched 2 Brigade complete the assault beyond

Nissoria with the assistance of "massive artillery and tank support" and even air support, it was obvious that "somebody back there had belatedly learned a lesson."368 While memoirs like Mowat's analyze high command and elucidate sharp commentaries, others have contributed significantly to the discourse on Agira without criticizing the attack.

Without a regimental history and only a minute and broken collection of war diaries, the Saskatoon Light Infantry (SLI) is a unit which has received only minor attention in studies of 1 CID's operations in Sicily. My War, Howard Mitchell's memoirs, identify the role of the support battalion and certain aspects of their war which have often gone unnoticed in the pages of history. The account written by Mitchell, second-in-command of the mortar and machine-gun support group for 2 Brigade, offers a generally light-hearted narration of events by way of humorous anecdotes and fond recollections. His story also reveals how the

SLI played an active role in bolstering divisional artillery shoots against Axis positions on

Highway 121, by employing the power of their 4.2 inch mortars.369

In the Canadian Official History Nicholson only mentions the support battalion briefly, noting that as the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) attacked Lion ridge it was swept

Mowat, The Regiment, p. 99. Mowat, And No Birds Sang, p. 139. ' Howard Mitchell, My War, Rosetown Publishing Company Ltd. Saskatchewan, 1978, pp. 74- 75. 114 with machine-gun fire from the SLI.370 Clearly in situations other than the heavy barrages

Mitchell alluded to, the mortars and machine-guns of the SLI were an invaluable asset. As the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (Seaforths) advanced on Tiger ridge, for example,

Mitchell wrote that the SLI provided direct heavy mortar support and machine-guns later raked German positions as part of the attack on Grizzly ridge.371 Mitchell's memoirs reveal lesser known facts of the battle, but generally it is critical insight that develops a wider discourse on combat near Agira.

In the late 1980s questions concerning the division's battle were raised once more by

William McAndrew. By focusing on 1 Brigade's difficulties in clearing Lion ridge

McAndrew claimed that artillery created conditions which led to defeat. The author suggested that "firepower seemed to induce a tactical outlook which restrained the initiative on which battlefield manoeuvre depends," thus crippling the attack.372 The commanding officer of 1 Brigade was also critical of the artillery.

Brigadier Howard Graham stated in his memoirs, Citizen and Soldier (1987), that the problems at Nissoria were hardly the fault of the infantry but that of higher command. He contends that the fire-plan imposed upon the battle by Major-General Simonds was

"ridiculous" because it was based on wishful thinking and assumptions. Brigadier Graham recalled that "to shoot around the country in the hope of hitting something, and to time this shooting on the assumption that the people you want to support will be within one hundred

370 Nicholson, The Canadians In Italy, p. 126. 371 Mitchell, p. 74. 372 William J. McAndrew,"Fire or Movement? Canadian Tactical Doctrine, Sicily - 1943", Military Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 3, (1987), p. 144. 115 yards of the shells when they hit the ground, is nonsense."373 William McAndrew declared that Simonds should have instead advanced by manoeuvre and infiltration, which had achieved considerable success in earlier battles. The historian adds that Simonds was likely influenced by the priority of resources which his division now enjoyed, granting him the ability to rely more heavily on artillery.374 Though McAndrew sees this as an inherent restriction Brigadier Graham later concluded that in order to dislodge the Germans immediately beyond Nissoria, a fresh attack "with the support of the full Division Artillery and all available tanks" should have been planned.375 The debate surrounding the use of artillery which McAndrew influenced so greatly is also a focal point of histories that emerged in the 1990s.

The D-Day Dodgers (1991), written by journalist Daniel Dancocks, synthesizes

Canadian operations in both Sicily and mainland Italy, but the author still dissects important historical questions surrounding the combat experience of 1 CID on Highway 121. Much like McAndrew, Dancocks is highly critical of Major-General Simonds and his implementation of such a large fire-plan. He claims that at Nissoria "movement was sacrificed to firepower."376 Staff officers from the division have elaborated on this.

In Sicily Lieutenant-Colonel George Kitching, General Staff Officer of 1 CED, witnessed Simonds at his best and worst. In his 1992 memoirs Mud and Green Fields, he recalled that instead of considering an alternative method of employment for the guns when

1 Brigade did not break through enemy lines, "Guy Simonds criticized the infantry for not

373 Howard Graham, Citizen and Soldier, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1987, p. 174. 374 McAndrew, "Fire or Movement?", p. 144. 375 Graham, Citizen and Soldier, p. 176. 376 Dancocks, p. 81. 116 keeping with the artillery fire."377 Dominick Graham, Simonds' biographer, acknowledged that although the artillery concentrations at Nissoria "seemed excessive when the advance was led by a single battalion," the RCR did "precisely the right thing" by holding and flanking the enemy.378 The historian views the successful flanking manoeuvre by the RCR as an indication that artillery had performed its role and instead finds fault with Brigadier

Graham.

Simonds' biographer argues that by committing his battalions piece-meal, though also being struck by an unfortunate communications blackout, Brigadier Graham did not

"recognize and exploit success" which may have turned the battle in Canadian favour.379

Dancocks also concluded that radio failure severely hampered 1 Brigade's assault, yet he adds that in any case the "inflexibility of the battle plan was painfully apparent." The initiative of company commanders, according to the author, was stymied by their inability to move beyond report lines without receiving orders for a renewal of the advance.380 By

1996 William Mc Andrew refocused the discussion of Nissoria and Agira on the artillery.

McAndrew fueled the debate in Canadians and The Italian Campaign 1943-1945.

Quite typically, the historian confirms the importance of Sicilian topography in shaping the battle as he records that "defenders knew the ground firsthand, and German soldiers were exceptionally skilled at using it effectively. They covered approaches with machine-gun fire, wire obstacles, and mines that channelled anyone approaching into pre-selected killing

377 Major-General George Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, Vanwell Publishing Ltd., Ontario, 1992, p. 154. 378 Dominick Graham, The Price of Command, Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, Toronto, 1993, pp. 96-97. 379 Ibid., p. 97. 380 Dancocks, p. 76. 117 grounds."381 Rather than elaborating on the extent of these defences, McAndrew blames the dissolution of 1 Brigade's advance on the supporting barrage which passed one-half hour before soldiers arrived at enemy positions.382 Similar to Dominick Graham's notion that

Brigadier Graham failed to exploit success, McAndrew added that if the three forward companies of the RCR had been safely withdrawn then they could have just as easily been reinforced.383 A series of articles written on the sixtieth anniversary of the campaign in Sicily provided several reasons why the unit was not reinforced.

Historian Geoffrey Hayes noted in the article "Sixty Years On" that orders for the

RCR to withdraw "came after the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment had failed to push on to Agira." The unit had to fall back, contends Hayes, because plans were being made to send the 48th Highlanders of Canada forward with artillery support.384 Had the companies from the RCR stayed in their positions they would have been subjected to a bombardment by their own guns. "The Royal Canadian Regiment in Sicily" written by T. M. Powers, second-in-command of the battalion during the battle, concedes that Brigadier Graham likely erred on the side of caution because "when it was necessary to coordinate the further attack

... wireless communications began to break down."385 Withdrawal was a safer option than over-extending units, given the broken radio link to supporting arms. Historian Douglas

Delaney presents similar conclusions.

381 McAndrew, Canadians and The Italian Campaign 1943-45, p. 48. 382 Ibid., p. 55. 383 Ibid., p. 55. 384 Geoffrey Hayes, "The Canadians in Sicily: Sixty Years On", Canadian Military History, Vol. 12, No. 3, (Summer 2003), p. 15. 385 T. M. Powers, "The Royal Canadian Regiment in Sicily", Canadian Military History, Vol. 12, No. 3, (Summer 2003), p. 78. 118

Delaney notes in "Hoffineister in His Proving Ground Sicily, July-August 1943" that as 2 Brigade pressed the attack on 26 July a radio link between the Princess Patricia's

Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) and brigade headquarters failed. Communications were so

sporadic and inefficient that the Seaforths were committed to action without a proper appreciation of the situation they were actually marching into.386 What they soon discovered was objectives thought to have been reduced by the PPCLI were still hotly contested, thus preventing an immediate advance to a third ridge further east. It seems apparent that this was the kind of situation Brigadier Graham sought to avoid with 1 Brigade.

The existing historiography regarding 1CID' s bitter fight throughNissoria and Agira has brought attention to several critical parts of the battle. It can safely be stated that historians have recognized the deplorable performance of wireless radios throughout the division as a serious detriment to Canadian efforts. Likewise, it is evident that a certain

amount of disagreement exists in the interpretation of events by various participants. Lastly,

it is quite obvious that an ongoing debate surrounding the use of artillery during the battle has emerged. At the same time, however, past contributions to this discourse fail to address

other critical features of the battle.

A great deal of what has been recorded on the Canadian struggle to crack enemy defences at Nissoria and Agira focuses mainly on the supposed defeat of Brigadier Graham's formation and quickly glosses over the remainder of the battle fought by 2 Brigade. In the

second phase of operations tactics were used in the same manner, similar artillery support was increased and the same Canadian determination shown by all ranks. Comparatively, this

386 Douglas E. Delaney, "Hoffineister in His Proving Ground Sicily, July-August 1943", Canadian Military History, Vol. 12, No. 3, (Summer 2003), p. 23. 119 piece of the battle receives little attention. Perhaps this is because historians who so

vehemently argued that infantry attacks by 1 Brigade failed because they were restricted by

artillery, do not wish to undermine their claims when even more artillery played such a vital

role in ensuring the later success of 2 Brigade.

Regardless, it is apparent that a study which analyzes the battle in its entirety is a necessary addition to the old consensus regarding the Canadian action near Agira. The many elements of 1 CID's attack which authors have studied individually must be sewn together

in order to create a clearer narration of the battle. Additionally, the depth of Axis defences must also be recognized in order to establish a comprehensive description of the events and to show how the battle for Agira actually evolved. Furthermore, this will confirm 1 CID's contribution to 15th Army Group's operations in Sicily and the Allies strategic policy which

Husky was so closely associated with. 120

CHAPTER SEVEN

A Shattered Foe and Lessons Learned

The Canadian Division travelled farther in Sicily, and fought longer, than any division of the Eighth Army. They have had the hardest work of any division because they are always on the outer circle of the advance with the most frightful conditions and terrain to contend with.

GENERAL BERNARD LAW MONTGOMERY CO. BRITISH EIGHTH ARMY

1st Canadian Infantry Division's (1 CID) deployment on Operation Husky in July

1943 merits consideration because it was the first period of prolonged combat by any part of First Canadian Army to date during the Second World War. The formation began the campaign with the relatively minor task of guarding the left flank of Eighth Army, but as attempts by Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey's Xm Corps to break through the Catania

Plains failed 1 CID became the vanguard of British forces. After breaking 206th Italian

Coastal Division in the opening days of the campaign Canadian soldiers soon engaged veteran German divisions and eventually smashed through the Axis' main defence line at

Agira. On 3 August Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese, Commander of XXX Corps, wrote to 1 CID headquarters: "You then took up the fore-front of the Corps battle from Vizzini.

For three weeks, [at times] with the Malta Brigade under your command, you have fought 121

continuously against a stubborn German resistance, both by day and night."387 British

officers who eyed the Canadians carefully as they triumphed on the torturous battlefield near

Agira commented that "they have advanced several times through fire which would stop any

except the most crack units."388 Their ferocity and indomitable spirit remained as 1 CID

battled east through the Valley and along Highway 121 to the town of Adrano, before receiving a well earned rest in Eighth Army reserve on 7 August.

At the tactical level units from 1 CID functioned with exceptional speed and

efficiency by quickly destroying German defences throughout the island, affirming the value

of their extensive training earlier in the war. Operationally, the division helped set in motion the fall of the enemy's central defence network by smashing key Axis positions along

Highway 121, including those near Agira, Regalbuto and .389 In doing so 1 CID

significantly depleted German manpower and material. Officers and non-commissioned

officers also acquired knowledge of modern mechanized warfare that would help educate

Canadian formations training in the United Kingdom. Strangely, the battle for Agira, which

best confirmed Canadian tactical prowess, clearly exhibited Allied strategy and led to an

operational turning point in Sicily, has been severely neglected in the existing historiography

of the campaign.

The historical void surrounding the Canadian fight for Agira can be attributed to the

broad scope of current studies on the topic. Histories such as Nicholson's The Canadians

387 War Diary 1st Canadian Infantry Division, Appendix: Letter From Lieutenant-Generai Oliver Leese to Headquarters 1st Canadian Infantry Division, 3 August 1943. 388 War Diary Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, Appendix: The British United Press Correspondent, quoted in The Red Patch, 31 July 1943. 389 Brigadier C. J. C. Molony, The Mediterranean and The Middle East, Vol. V, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1973, p. 163. 122

in Italy or Dancocks' The D-Day Dodgers are important works but given their wider outline

of the campaign their analysis concerning Agira is limited and incomplete. Both accounts

fail to acknowledge the vital importance of 1 Brigade's role in helping to secure a divisional

victory and when Dancocks notes that "Nissoria was a minor action" it is immediately clear that the magnitude of this battle is lost on those who forged the old consensus.390 By misunderstanding Lion ridge as a delay line rather than the enemy's main battle position historians have perpetuated a belief that two separate attacks occurred instead of a concerted

divisional thrust. While these broad histories lend a misconstrued perspective to 1 CID's

fight on Highway 121, more focused accounts confuse the issue further.

Regimental histories and personal memoirs provide important details on specific

aspects of the battle but the foundations of their arguments are cast in a limited perspective.

The history of the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) for example, argues that commanders

did not prepare adequately for the fight at Lion ridge and "what they had planned was not a battle but a walkover."391 Author George Stevens neglects to discuss more fully the complex

details of the division's advance to contact which the RCR led, nor does he mention how

important the battalion's work in probing the main Axis position was. Likewise, 1 CID veteran Farley Mowat's memoirs characterize the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment's

(Hastings) fight beyond Nissoria as a slaughter brought on by ignorant commanders, who

only learned their lessons as 2 Brigade renewed the advance.392 The lesson (in other words the need for greater artillery support and employment of more infantry) and 2 Brigade's

390 Daniel G. Dancocks, The D-Day Dodgers, McClelland and Stewart Inc., Toronto, 1991, p. 80. 391 George Roy Stevens, The Royal Canadian Regiment, Vol II, 1933-1966, London Print & Lithographing Co., London, Ontario, 1967, p. 80. 392 Farley Mowat, And No Birds Sang, Farley Mowat Ltd., Toronto, 1975, p. 139. 123 breakthrough were only achieved due to 1 Brigade's reconnaissance work and softening up of what proved to be the enemy's primary defences.

Other histories are also clouded by a similar ignorance and underestimation of enemy strength at Lion ridge. Historian William McAndrew, in his 1987 article "Fire or

Movement?", commits precisely this error. The author argues that fire support restricted movement and once 1 Brigade's barrage passed Canadian soldiers were left to fight enemy infantry alone.393 This dependance on artillery, claims McAndrew, left 1 Brigade incapable of advancing beyond Lion ridge. Yet, the fact that Axis defences were actually held by a superior number of battalions supported by divisional artillery, armour, mortar detachments and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns is omitted by McAndrew. The immense depth and power of the enemy position was a critically important element of the battle, which has - until now

- been mostly excluded from historical studies.

Largely because the staff of 1 CID did not know where the enemy would stand after combat at Leonforte-Assoro and also due to his prior pattern of defence, historians failed to properly assess the strength of the Axis forces entrenched on Lion ridge. As it is most commonly reported, the old historical consensus on Agira regarded the ground as having been manned by "a German battle-group, based on 2nd Battalion, 104th Panzer Grenadier

Regiment."394 While it can be rightly assumed from this description that ancillary units were attached to the core infantry battalion, the extent to which this was true has been totally underestimated by historians.

393 William J. McAndrew,"Fire or Movement? Canadian Tactical Doctrine, Sicily -1943", Military Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 3, (1987), p. 143. 394Molony,p. 155. 124

The extensive backing which 2 Battalion received was not limited to support groups

and included a great deal of additional infantry. The fact that more than three battalions of

Italian infantry joined these defences is a striking and generally underappreciated feature of the battle for Agira. Early in the campaign General Bernard Montgomery told Canadian troops that "So far you have only met the Italians, and they don't want to fight."395 Historians

respected the veteran commander's assertions concerning Italians, adding that very few

"were in any way combat-worthy."396 An important distinction has generally been

overlooked though. The soldiers whom Montgomery referred belonged to Italian coastal

divisions which, according to the American campaign history, "could not be depended on."397

However, those standing between the Canadians and Agira belonged to Italian field divisions

which possessed superior equipment and weapons, had received better training and displayed

higher morale while fighting alongside crack German troops.

The presence of these Italian soldiers and their role in the defence of Agira is a

critical finding of this study. The resultant extent of Axis combat power blocking the

approaches to the town deserves greater consideration still. John Ellis contested that Allied

armies in Sicily enjoyed "a considerable margin of superiority" over their foe, which allowed them to march toward inevitable victories.398 The fight for Agira seriously challenges this

theory. In terms of the attack on the principal Axis defences between Nissoria and Agira 1

395 General B. L. Montgomery quoted in Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, Citizen and Soldier, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1987, p. 156. 396 John Ellis, Brute Force, Andre Deutsch Ltd., London, England, 1990, p. 307. 397 Lieutenant-Colonel Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, United States Army in World War II, Sicily and The Surrender of Italy, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1965, p. 308. 398 Ellis, p. 309. 125

CID deployed a force consisting of two infantry brigades and one armoured regiment, supported by divisional artillery.399 The enemy on the other hand, also fought with six battalions of infantry, armour, artillery, and a number of additional sub-units. Decades ago

Nicholson suggested that the enemy was "numerically inferior to the total force opposing him."400 The relative strength of forces belonging to both the Allies and Axis during this engagement was balanced though.

In addition, owing to the effects of local terrain on the deployment of Canadian infantry and armour, an argument can be made that the enemy enjoyed numerical superiority around Agira. Nicholson notes that "because the extremely rugged nature of the country prevented deployment on a large scale," Canadian battalions were essentially committed one at a time.401 The enemy was thus capable of engaging advancing infantry with a sizeable advantage. Therefore, what Daniel Dancocks describes as a "skillful defence" was actually a failed Axis attempt to stop a division advancing through preselected killing grounds, on a very narrow frontage.402 Instead, through the deliberate application of firepower, the aggressive work of tanks and the tireless efforts of the infantry, 1 and 2 Brigades overcame nearly insurmountable odds to destroy enemy defences and capture Agira.

At the tactical level 1 CID's consolidation of Highway 121 between Nissoria and

Agira is an excellent example of how Allied units operated without numerical superiority.

"The utterly disproportionate ratio of forces" which characterize Allied operations according

W. D. 1 CID, 26 July 1943. Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 134. Ibid., p. 134. Dancocks, p. 84. 126 to John Ellis, simply did not exist for 1 CID during this battle.403 Hard work and well- orchestrated attacks launched by the division led to a decisive victory in the mountains and served as a catalyst for the destruction of German static defences south of Mount Etna. After the fall of Agira not only the Canadians but their American and British counterparts broke through the enemy's main defences in several locations.

The importance of the Canadian's fight at Agira has been detailed but the far- reaching operational results of the division's victory are only sparingly noted in most campaign histories. The Canadian attack opened Operation Hardgate, Eighth Army's coordinated attack against the main defence line of the Axis; into which "all the German and

Italian mobile field formations had moved or were moving."404 On 21 July German commanders were explicitly ordered not to withdraw from their positions on this line "except under overwhelming pressure," in order to maintain a cohesive front.405 The staff of 1 CID reckoned that once Agira was taken from the enemy "the German right flank should loosen up and pull back," relieving pressuring in the American sector to the west.406

As a critical component of the enemy's defence network, Agira controlled

communications between their positions about Adrano and the western Catania Plains, and those anchored along Highway 120 and the north coast road. It was clear that the loss of the town seriously compromised the Axis ability to hold the line. On 29 July, one day after

Agira had fallen, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Commander in Chief of German forces in the Mediterranean, notified Hitler that resistance in Sicily could no longer be offered to

403 Ellis, p. 309. 404 Molony, p. 149. 405 Garland, p. 308. 406 W. D. 1 CID, Intelligence Summary No. 6,26 July 1943. 127 the uttermost.407 It seems Canadian achievements triggered the collapse of the entire line.

Conforming with Allied plans Seventh Army had been advancing since 20 July, eventually swinging onto Highway 120 in a parallel axis with 1 CID, and moved within

striking distance of Nicosia located ten miles northeast of Agira.408 As Agira fell on 28 July enemy units in Nicosia were left with an open flank facing 1 CID to their south and Seventh

Army rapidly captured the town as resistance melted away.409 While the Americans secured a firm base about the town and probed forward 1 CID drove a wedge further into the enemy, placing the same vulnerability on the town of Troina situated twenty miles east of Nicosia.

Troina, according to the American campaign history, "was the best place along Highway 120 that would serve as the continuation of the [main defence] line from Etna to the north coast."410 Thus 1 CID's attack on Agira had the effect of loosening the central and western

sections of the main battle line simultaneously. The results along the rest of the Allied front were similarly positive.

While 1 CID was fighting from Leonforte to Agira the greater part of Eighth Army

spent 23-29 July regrouping and refitting for their coming assault on Adrano. After the capture of Agira and the eviction of 15th Panzer Grenadier Division from Highway 121, the town of Adrano which was so vital to Axis defence plans south of Mount Etna, could now be attacked using the state roadway.411 Additionally on 29-30 July, 3 Canadian Infantry

Brigade consolidated the town of Catenanuova - located twelve miles southeast of Agira -

407 Molony, p. 164. 408 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 119. 409 Garland, pp. 314-315. 410 Ibid., p. 327. 411 Molony, p. 151. 128

securing a bridgehead for the newly arrived 78th British Division to drive on Adrano from.

With this and the all-important Agira bridgehead on Highway 121,78* British Division and

1 CID (with 231 Brigade still attached) were ready to launch the offensive toward Adrano

from the west and southwest of town respectively.412 The successful attack on the main Axis

defence line is one of 1 CED's direct contributions to Allied operations in Sicily.

It was also during this phase of combat that the strategic goals set at Casablanca in

January 1943 were achieved by the formation. Carlo D'Este claims that "the Sicily campaign

lacked strategic purpose" although he later acknowledges that 29,000 Germans were killed, wounded and captured during the fighting on the island.413 John Ellis wrote that on the whole fighting in Sicily "tied down a number of first-class German divisions that could have

been deployed ... in Normandy."414 1 CID was central to this effort by locking down

formations such as the Hermann Goring Division and 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, and

decimating their fighting strength.

Even in their first encounter at Grammichele on 15 July the Hastings severely routed

a larger Hermann Goring force, even though "the odds for victory were still overwhelmingly

on the side of the Germans."415 Over the course of the next week the towns and units

involved changed but the results repeated themselves. An intelligence summary issued on

23 July highlighted the division's combat effectiveness by describing the 104 Panzer

Grenadier Regiment as being in a serious condition, with the potential for an entire battalion

412 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 139. 413 Carlo D'Este, Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, 1943, E. P. Dutton, New York, 1988, p. 552. 4,4 Ellis, p. 289. 415 Farley Mowat, The Regiment, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., Canada, 1955, p. 72. 129 being disbanded or each being reduced to only three companies.416 When the enemy dug in firmly behind the town of Nissoria this process of attrition continued.

D'Este argues that this type of combat, "a needless, frontal battle of attrition," was detrimental to the Allies operation.417 In reality, this type of warfare, during the advance by

1 CID down Highway 121 from 24-28 July, fulfilled the Allies' goal of eroding German fighting strength in the Mediterranean. As 1 Brigade probed the main Axis defence position east of Nissoria they bled enemy units dry and forced him to send artillerymen, dispatch riders and engineers to the front. As the battle raged on 1 CID reported that nearly 50 percent of enemy prisoners taken belonged to 1 and 3 Battalions 104 Panzer Grenadier Regiment.418

Once 2 Brigade renewed the offensive intelligence summaries concluded that the enemy's

1 and 2 Battalions had a combined strength of only 350-400 men - before the third defence line west of Agira even broke.419 In the span of five days 1 CID completed the annihilation of a Panzer Grenadier Regiment which had begun at Leonforte, along with several supporting units which were attached - many of them Italian. The results on paper were quite obvious as whole platoons, companies and battalions were wiped from the Axis order of battle.

As enemy losses mounted in a physical sense, Canadian gains came on an intellectual plane through lessons which only actual combat could provide. Confirming this vital process, Nicholson suggested that "everyone had something to learn from the lessons which the fighting produced."420 By no means should this comment imply that 1 CID had a steep

4,6 W. D. 1 CID, Intelligence Summary No. 5,23 July 1943. 417 D'Este, Bitter Victory, p. 551. 418 W. D. 1 CID, Intelligence Summary No. 6, 26 July 1943. 419 W. D. 1 CID, Intelligence Summary No. 7, 28 July 1943. 420 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 176. 130 learning curve to ascend. Even during their first exchange of fire with German forces in

Sicily the infantry reacted quickly, because "they had been under fire in so many battle schemes, and had repeated the basic tactical manoeuvres so many times that now they automatically repeated them again."421 What Canadian soldiers realized in Sicily was how to overcome strange and irregular situations that could be encountered on a rugged and ever- changing battlefield.

Douglas Porch wrote that Allied divisions in Sicily displayed a formidable "capacity to learn which would prove extremely valuable" in future operations.422 This was quite true of 1 CID. General Bernard Montgomery summarized the Canadian's experience in Sicily during an interview with the Associated Press, by describing their operations as:

Simply wonderful-quite amazing. The Canadian Division travelled farther in Sicily, and fought longer, than any division of the Eighth Army. They have had the hardest work of any division because they are always on the outer circle of the advance with the most frightful conditions and terrain to contend with.423

Facing incredible odds, the officers and ranks of 1 CID learned many ways to improve upon their prior training, tactical doctrine and employment of weapons.

Synthesizing this new information and making it available to other Canadian formations training in the United Kingdom was essential. In a memorandum forwarded to all units attached to 1 CID on 13 August, General Staff Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel George

Kitching called for reports on minor tactical operations to be forwarded to divisional

421 Mowat, The Regiment, p. 73. 422 Douglas Porch, The Path to Victory, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2004, p. 446. 423 War Diary Loyal Edmonton Regiment, Appendix: Associated Press Despatch quoted in letter from Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar to Commanding Officers of I Canadian Corps, 8 August 1943. 131 headquarters without haste. Information concerning successful battles by company, platoon or equivalent forces were required "for the purposes of circulation and study by formations and units now training at home."424 Often in Sicily the vanguard of 1 CID was a single company and as one would expect, numerous instances occurred where platoons were embroiled in their own disconnected action. Kitching's letter continued by requesting documentation of "all types of operations in which units have recently been engaged," and additionally "the type of country, obstacles, planning and tactics employed."425 The men of the division learned a great deal from battles at Grammichele, Valguarnera and Leonforte-

Assoro, to name a few, but it was combat near Agira that produced the most important lessons of the campaign.

The fighting which engulfed Highway 121 was highly demanding of both man and machine, although the latter needed the most refinement. Lessons on the employment of various weapons and equipment, with specific reference to this battle, were thoroughly studied and subsequently passed throughout the rest of First Canadian Army.426 A Brigade

Commander's Conference on 30 July for example, judged that given recent difficulties of transporting and using certain arms due to rugged ground and night time operations, "bold use must be made of all supporting weapons; none will be considered a one-task weapon."427

These same conditions led to an examination of artillery support and radio use as well.

Commanders determined that timed artillery lifts in 100 yard increments would now

424 W. D. 1 CID, Appendix: Report on Minor Tactical Operations, 13 August 1943. 425 Ibid. 426 War Diary 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade, Appendix: Brigade Commanders Conference, 30 July 1943. 427 Ibid. 132 proceed in 4-5 minute intervals during operations conducted in the dark. If a delay in the shelling were necessary for follow-up units to pass through "the pause must not be less than

45 minutes at night."428 Having fought through mountainous valleys and undulating hills,

1 CID also noticed how the poor performance of No. 18 wireless sets seriously endangered infantry and restricted operations. Recommendations were soon made for the more powerful

No. 22 set to become the mainstay of brigade intercommunications.429 Thanks to these critical findings and in general because of their close combat against German formations, members of the division informed the rest of Canadian ground forces about the rigors of facing a veteran enemy in modern warfare.

Although the campaign in Sicily and Italy has stood in the shadow of events in northwest Europe the case has been made that without the former the latter may not have occurred with the now familiar results. The work of formations such as 1 CID in Sicily ensured that from 10 July 1943 onward Allied forces, both veteran and untried, would march to victory in the Mediterranean and European Theatres of War. The combat effectiveness of a division so new to battle was fittingly described by one war correspondent who wrote that the Canadians "extracted full and terrible vengeance from the German Army for losses sustained by their comrades" in their ill-fated raid on the French coast at Dieppe.430 Through their unrelenting destruction of German units, Canadian infantry, gunners and tankers guaranteed that the policy contrived during the Casablanca Conference was executed with great efficiency throughout operations in Sicily.

428 W. D. 2 CIB, Appendix: Conference, 30 July 1943. 429 Ibid. 430 W. D. PPCLI, Appendix: The Red Patch, 31 July 1943. 133

From their landing on the Pachino Peninsula, to their monumental battle near Agira and until their last shots were fired at Adrano, the men of 1 CID forged important lessons and built a lasting legacy for First Canadian Army. Lieutenant-Colonel George Kitching fondly recalled that "the fighting in Sicily showed the Canadian soldier at his best."431 Yet veterans and academics alike have left First Canadian Army's inaugural campaign of the Second

World War mired in uncertainty, because of an incomplete appreciation of events between

24-28 July. However, Agira should take its rightful place alongside such hallowed names as Ortona, Juno Beach and The Scheldt.

A new perspective on Nissoria and Agira will not change the events themselves but it should lead to a reconsideration of one of First Canadian Army's earliest and most influential battles during the war. It is unfortunate that historians called 1 Brigade's vital work a failure and that 2 Brigade's equally ferocious battle is described as though it were accomplished with ease.432 Neither argument is true nor is the crucial victory which

Canadian soldiers fought and died for deserving of such a description. The efforts of all members of the division during this action should be revered and as it was noted at the time,

"Exploits of Canadian infantry, artillery and tanks on this front are legion" and shall remain.433 It is only fitting that the cemetery in which Canadians lost during the bitter fighting throughout Sicily rest is located on a hill near the town of Agira, the scene of their deadliest and most important battle of the campaign.

431 Major-General George Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, Vanwell Publishing Ltd., Ontario, 1992, p. 150. 432 William J. McAndrew, Canadians and The Italian Campaign 1943-1945, Editions Art Global Inc., Montreal, 1996, p. 55. 433 W. D. PPCLI, Appendix: The Red Patch, 30 July 1943. 134

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MAP III f Sketch map of positions of231 Bde and GERMANS south ofAC/RA on the evening ofWi/uty/943

• 231 Bde Coy Posns EH German Defence Posns) rrom mteingence «£. 165 Fd Regt Bty Posns ™"Z.. German Gun Posns. ) sources acquired later BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Powers, T. M., "The Royal Canadian Regiment in Sicily", Canadian Military History, Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 2003, Wilfred Laurier University, Canada.

Shapiro, Lionel S. B.,They left The Back Door Open, The Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1944.

Simonds, Peter, Maple Leaf Up, Maple Leaf Down, Island Press, New York, 1946.

Strawson, John, The Italian Campaign, Seeker and Warburg Ltd., London, 1987.

Regimental Histories

Beattie, Kim, Dileas, The 48th Highlanders of Canada, Toronto, 1957.

Galloway, Strome, A Regiment at War, 2nd Edition, Strome Galloway, Canada, 1979.

Mowat, Farley, The Regiment, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., Canada, 1955.

Raddall, Thomas H., West Novas, Thomas Raddall, Liverpool, Nova Scotia, 1947.

Stevens, George Roy, A City Goes to War; History of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment (3 141

PPCLI), Charters Publishing. Co., Brampton, Ontario, 1964. Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 1919-1957, Vol. Ill, Southam Printing Company Limited, Canada, 1968. The Royal Canadian Regiment, Vol II, 1933-1966, London Print & Lithographing Co., London, Ontario, 1967.

Tooley, Robert W., Invicta, New Ireland Press, Fredericton, 1989.

Memoirs and Biographies

Alexander, Field-Marshall Harold Earl of Tunis, The Alexander Memoirs 1940-1945, Cassel & Company Ltd., London, 1961.

Bland, Larry I., Ed., The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. Ill, December 7, 1941- May 31, 1943, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1991.

Danchev, Alex and Todman, Daniel, eds., War Diaries 1939-1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 2001.

Graham, Dominick, The Price of Command, Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, Toronto, 1993.

Graham, Howard, Citizen and Soldier, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1987.

Hamilton, Nigel, Master of The Battlefield, Monty's War Years 1942-1944, McGraw Hill Book Company, United States, 1983.

Kesselring, Field-Marshall Albert, Kesselring A Soldier's Record, Greenwood Press Publishers, United States, 1953.

Kitching, Major-General George, Mud and Green Fields, Vanwell Publishing Ltd., Ontario, 1992.

Mitchell, Howard, My War, Rosetown Publishing Company Ltd. Saskatchewan, 1978.

Montgomery, Field-Marshal Sir Bernard Law, El Alamein to the River Sangro, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G., Collins Publishing, London, First Printing 1946.

Mowat, Farley, And No Birds Sang, Farley Mowat Ltd., Toronto, 1975.

Senger Und Etterlin, General Frido Von, Neither Fear Nor Hope, E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc., New York, 1964. The Mediterranean Theatre of Operations and Allied Strategy

Atkinson, Rick, An Army At Dawn, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2002.

Bennett, Ralph, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1989.

D'Este, Carlo, World War II In The Mediterranean 1942-1945, Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1990.

Murray, Williamson and Millet, Allan R., A War To Be Won, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, United Sates, 2000.

Porch, Douglas, The Path to Victory, Farrar, Straus and Grioux, New York, 2004.

Military Effectiveness

Bidwell, Shelford and Graham, Dominick, Fire-Power, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, England, 1982.

Ellis, John, Brute Force, Andre Deutsch Ltd., London, England, 1990.

Magenheimer, Heinz, Hitler's War, F. A. Herbig Verlagsbuchhandlung GmbH, Munich, 1997.

Other

Pickersgill, J. W., The Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 11939-1944, University of Toronto Press, Canada, 1960.

Rickard, Captain John Nelson, McNaughton 's Dagger: The Raising, Training and Employment of the Canadian Army, 1939-1943, The University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, 2006. CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME: Grant Nicholas Barry

EDUCATION: Bachelor of Arts, 1st Class Honours University of New Brunswick, 2006

HONOURS AND AWARDS: Ward Chipman Founder's Scholarship, 2002

Dean's List, University of New Brunswick, 2006

Gregg Center Research Bursary, 2007

University of New Brunswick Graduate Bursary, 2008