1ST CANADIAN INFANTRY DIVISION AND THE BATTLE FOR AGIRA: A RECONSIDERATION OF AN INCOMPLETE HISTORICAL CONSENSUS by Grant N. Barry B.A., University of New Brunswick, 2006 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Graduate Academic Unit of History Supervisors: Lee Windsor, Ph.D., History Marc Milner, Ph.D., History Examining Board: Steven Turner, Ph.D., History David Charters, Ph.D., History Bill Kerr, Ph.D., Classics This thesis is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK April, 2008 ©Grant N.Barry, 2008 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington OttawaONK1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-63781-4 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-63781-4 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non­ support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. 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While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis. 1+1 Canada For family, friends and strangers who have served in the Canadian Armed Forces. ii ABSTRACT In July 1943 the Allies launched Operation Husky, the invasion of Axis-held Sicily, as part of a grand strategy to erode German Army combat strength in preparation for a cross-channel invasion in 1944. Included in the invasion force was 1st Canadian Infantry Division (1 CID), embarking upon the first protracted Canadian ground campaign of the Second World War. The division fought its most intense battle of that campaign around the town of Agira in the very centre of the island. This towering ancient mountaintop town was a vital component to the main defence line erected by the Axis and stood squarely in front of 1 CID's path of advance. For five days the Canadians clashed bitterly with German and Italian units entrenched in positions that stretched several miles west of Agira. Through the cooperation of infantry and armour, along with the careful and deliberate application of the largest Canadian artillery and mortar fire-plan to date, Axis defenders were destroyed or captured and the town occupied. Most historians claim the battle for Agira was a tactical blunder. The existing consensus suggests that the division was stopped by a numerically inferior enemy and that a reliance on artillery actually caused the attack to fail. That interpretation comes from an under-appreciation of Axis strength by historians and a misunderstanding of the strategic victory achieved by 1 CID. This thesis reveals that Axis formations actually enjoyed an advantage in combat strength over the attacking Canadians and also received crucial reinforcements as the action continued. Those reinforcements influenced the battle significantly and allowed for the decimation of large Axis units. iii CONTENTS DEDICATION ii ABSTRACT iii CONTENTS iv ABBREVIATIONS v LIST OF MAPS vi INTRODUCTION 1 ONE - THE ALLIES' ROAD TO SICILY 5 TWO - THE LONG WAIT IS OVER 23 THREE-BATTLE INOCULATION 36 FOUR - RECONNAISSANCE AND DECIMATION 61 FIVE - BREAKING THROUGH 83 SLX - AGIRA: A DATED CONSENSUS 106 SEVEN - A SHATTERED FOE AND LESSONS LEARNED 120 MAPS 134 BIBLIOGRAPHY 138 CURRICULUM VITAE iv ABBREVIATIONS 1CID 1st Canadian Infantry Division 1CIB 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade 2CIB 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade 3CIB 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade 48th HoC 48th Highlanders of Canada CCRCA Commander Corps of Royal Canadian Artillery CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff CO Commanding Officer CYR Carleton and York Regiment GOC General Officer Commanding HPER Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment JIC Joint Intelligence Committee (British) LER Loyal Edmonton Regiment NCO Non-Commissioned Officer PPCLI Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry R22eR Royal 22e Regiment RA Royal Artillery RCA Royal Canadian Artillery RCASC Royal Canadian Army Service Corps RCE Royal Canadian Engineers RCR Royal Canadian Regiment SHoC Seaforth Highlanders of Canada SLI Saskatoon Light Infantry WNSR West Nova Scotia Regiment V LIST OF MAPS MAPI: SICILY 134 MAP 2: VALGUARNERA TO THE SIMETO 135 MAP 3: THE BATTLE FOR AGIRA 136 MAP 4:231 BRIGADE OPERATIONS NEAR AGIRA 137 Vi 1 INTRODUCTION On 10 July 1943 the Allies launched the invasion of Axis-held Sicily code-named Operation Husky. Among the formations which assaulted the island was 1st Canadian Infantry Division (1 CID). The well-trained and equipped division embarked upon the first period of prolonged combat for any formation of First Canadian Army during the Second World War. Canadian ground forces fared extremely well in their inaugural campaign, wirining crucial battles and accolades from their veteran British counterparts. Oddly, historians have not considered their hard work and success with the same level of interest that formations fighting in other theatres of war traditionally receive. This is unfortunate because 1 CID conducted one of their most important operations of the war in Sicily while fighting to capture the town of Agira. Indeed, the struggle to crack Axis defences en route to this town was critically important not only for the division but for 15th Army Group in Sicily and for the Allies' war effort as a whole. While the discourse regarding the Canadians in Sicily is limited, historians have recognized the battle for Agira as an integral component of the campaign. Yet, generally their depictions of the offensive are misleading. In the absence of a comprehensive examination of the engagement, accounts of Agira oscillate between sparsely detailed sections of broad studies or focused investigations of only certain aspects of the five day action. These works have produced a consensus view that combat near Agira was at least a rebuff, if not a failure or defeat. The analysis and evidence that follows exhibits a strikingly different assessment of the battle. A critical element of 1 CID's advance to Agira that is missing from the existing 2 historiography of events is a more accurate appreciation of enemy strength. The old consensus is built on the understanding that 1 and 2 Brigades faced a German delay position, held by approximately one battalion. The Canadian unit war diaries, radio logs and intelligence summaries, however, indicate that the enemy's combat strength has been wholly underestimated. Earlier studies have missed or written off these enemy numbers and therefore misunderstood the entire battle. Former conceptions of the enemy's size and the nature of his defences have led many historians to suggest that 1 CID's fight at Agira began with a sharp reverse, followed by a second overwhelming advance and eventual victory. This study clarifies that the Canadians actually waged a continuous and destructive series of attacks against a formidable, deep Axis defence position that received a steady flow of reinforcements. Close examination of infantry tactics employed, the use of supporting weapons and the application of the largest Canadian artillery fire-plan of the campaign will refute old arguments that the division was stopped by a smaller force. Claims that an over-dependence on heavy fire support crippled the formation's assault are also problematic. Several authors insist that artillery actually hampered operations on the ground. The findings here suggest otherwise. Those who argue that artillery stymied the initiative of Canadian infantry attempt to use the delay of 1 Brigade as an indication that guns and set-piece doctrine restricted the attack. Therefore, each phase of combat which occurred during the divisional advance will be considered in this work, in order to further reveal the depth of Axis defences and the effectiveness of 1 CID's assault. Current battle narratives of the five day fight to Agira, which classify the opening phase of the assault as a defeat, often obscure the actualities of the latter stages by implying victory was accomplished with ease. This was hardly the case, as every yard of ground 3 leading to Agira was contested viciously by Axis defenders. A fuller insight on the second half of the attack will fill a void in the existing historiography and illustrate the prior role of 1 Brigade in setting the stage for a divisional victory. Although the main goal of this thesis is to provide a more comprehensive tactical record of this battle, the effects of the Canadian advance on Agira will also be discussed within their appropriate operational and strategic contexts. Due to the fact that some historians have categorized Agira as a minor battle, little has been written of its operational importance or the many ways in which the Canadian victory achieved strategic goals for the Allies.