DOCSLIB.ORG

Charlottetown Accord,Privy Council

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Charlottetown Accord,Privy Council Freedom of Religion The freedom of religion is one of the fundamental freedoms protected by section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[1] What is the legal impact of having this freedom? In other words, what does it allow me to do and what government action does it protect me from? According to the Supreme Court, the Charter protected freedom means that no one in Canada can be forced by the government to act in a way that is contrary to his or her religious views.[2] For example, the Supreme Court has determined that religious officials cannot be forced to perform same-sex marriages if doing so violates their religious beliefs.[3] In practice, having the freedom of religion means a person is allowed to entertain whatever religious beliefs he or she chooses.[4] Freedom of religion also allows a person to declare his or her religious beliefs “without fear of hindrance or reprisal,” and to worship, practice, and disseminate those beliefs.[5] The freedom of religion protects only “beliefs, convictions, and practices rooted in religion, as opposed to those that are secular, socially based or conscientiously held.”[6] What does the term “religion” mean in this legal context? “Religion,” according to the Supreme Court, “is about freely and deeply held personal convictions … connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally linked to one’s self-definition and spiritual fulfillment.”[7] It often “involves a particular and comprehensive system of faith and worship” and “the belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling power.”[8] What religious conduct is legally protected from government interference? A ‘trivial or insubstantial’ effect on a person’s ability to practice his or her religion will not constitute a breech of this freedom.[9] The freedom extends to protect against only non-trivial interference. Additionally, only practices that do not injure others are protected.[10] Beyond these thresholds, religious beliefs that are ‘sincerely held’ are protected from government infringement.[11] Sincerity can be assessed many ways, for example, by examining the claimant’s demeanour, his or her prior religious experience, and the relationship between prior religious experience and the belief currently held.[12] There is no objective inquiry into whether a belief conforms with established religious practice.[13] The freedom of religion is not contingent on whether a religion is being practiced ‘correctly’.[14] Are their any limitations on the freedom of religion? While freedom of religion is a fundamental freedom, it is not absolute: this freedom is subject to “reasonable limits” by the government as outlined in section 1of the Charter.[15] For example, the Alberta Government was allowed to impose a universal photo requirement for drivers licences even though this violated the religious freedom of Albertan Hutterites, whose religious beliefs prohibit them from having their photograph taken.[16] [1] Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 2, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. [2] R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 337, 18 DLR (4th) 321 [Big M Drug Mart]. [3] Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79 at para 60, [2004] 3 SCR 698. [4] Big M Drug Mart, supra note 2 at 336. [5] Ibid. [6] Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 at para 39, 2004 2 SCR 551 [Amselem]. [7] Ibid. [8] Ibid. [9] Ibid at para 58. See R v Jones, [1986] 2 SCR 284 at 313–14, 31 DLR (4th) 569. [10] Ibid. [11] Ibid at 42; See also Jose Woehrling, “L’obligation d’Accommodement Raisonnabe et L’adaptation de la Societe a la Diversite Religieuse” (1998) 43:2 McGill LJ 325. [12] See Re Civil Service Association of Ontario and Anderson et al, 60 DLR (3d) 397 at 399, 9 OR (2d) 341 (HC). [13] Amselem, supra note 6 at para 43. [14] Ibid at para 50: “In my view, the State is in no position to be, nor should it become, the arbiter of religious dogma. Accordingly, courts should avoid judicially interpreting and thus determining … the content of a subjective understanding of religious requirement, “obligation,” precept, “commandment,” custom or ritual”. [15] Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 1, s 1. [16] Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v Alberta, 2009 SCC 37 at para 104, 310 DLR (4th) 193. Charter Statements Charter Statements are documents prepared by the Minister of Justice upon the introduction of a new bill. They are a tool designed to reassure the public that the government has considered potential constitutional problems that may arise as a result of its proposed law. A Charter Statement notes the potential constitutional issues that the legislation may present, and how these issues could be justified. However, a Charter Statement itself will not explicitly say if a Charterright would be violated by a provision in the bill that is proposed. Under section 4.1.1 the Department of Justice Act, it is the responsibility of the Minister of Justice to ensure that bills introduced into Parliament comply with the Charter.[1]Charter Statements are one way of doing this. Therefore, to ensure that the public is aware that the government has taken its responsibility seriously, it has tabled Bill C-51 – An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and Department of Justice Act. This Bill states that Charter Statements will become mandatory for every piece of legislation introduced once it is passed. As stated by the current government, “[r]equiring the introduction of a Charter Statement for every new Government bill represents a new, more open and more transparent way of demonstrating respect for the Charter.”[2] The practice of identifying a bill’s constitutionality has manifested in different ways before the introduction of Bill C-51. Before the use of Charter Statements, Ministers presenting new bills gave their implicit approval of a new bill’s constitutionality. Academic James Kelly points out that “Charter vetting” has always been a mandatory practice, as “[a] department cannot submit a memorandum to cabinet unless the DOJ [Department of Justice] has assessed the risk of judicial invalidation and must certify its constitutionality.”[3] An Example of a Charter Statement: Bill C-45 Charter Statements are a separate document that accompanies a bill upon its introduction to the House of Commons. Every Charter Statement begins with an explanatory note, stating the purpose of a Charter Statement, which is the same for each bill. This note makes clear that the statement is not a comprehensive overview of Charter considerations, as bills see a number of amendments from their first reading in the House of Commons to their Royal Assent. It also identifies section 1 of the Charteras a balancing mechanism, noting that even though there may be a violation of the Charter in the proposed legislation, it may be one that can be justified by the government. Further, each CharterStatement makes a point of including that a Statement “isnot a legal opinion on the constitutionality of the Bill.”[4] Following this explanatory note is a brief explanation of the bill’s purpose, along with an overview of the Charter“engagements” the bill presents. For example, in Bill C-45, the Cannabis Act,potential engagements with the Charterare categorized by different topics the legislation addresses. Some of these include criminal offences created through the Bill, restrictions on promotion/packaging/labeling, and “ticketable offences and administrative monetary penalties”. Regarding criminal offences, the Statement identifies that these provisions could engage section 7 of the Charter, which deals with life, liberty, and security of person. The statement explains what section 7 of theCharter is, and that “[a]ny criminal prohibition that gives rise to the possibility of imprisonment engages the section 7 right[.]”[5]It also provides considerations that support the consistency of the provisions with the Charterthat potentially engage section 7, citing case law and explanation. Therefore, the Charter Statement points out that the criminal offences provisions in Bill C-45 may engage section 7 of the Charter, letting the public know that this is a possibility, not a certainty. In short the government has, as a matter of its accountability to the public, considered this possibility and nonetheless feels confident in tabling the Bill. [1]James B. Kelly, “Parliament and the Charter of Rights: An Unfinished Constitutional Revolution” Policy Options1 February 2007, online http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/the-charter-25/ parliament-and-the-charter-of-rights-an-unfinished- constitutional-revolution/[Parliament and the Charter of Rights] [2]Department of Justice Canada, “Cleaning up theCriminal Code, Clarifying and Strengthening Sexual Assault Law, and Respecting the Charter” Government of Canada 07 June 2017, online <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/06/clea ning_up_the_criminalcodeclarifyingandstrengtheningsexualassa.h tml> [3]Ibid. [4]Department of Justice, “Bill C-45: An Act respecting cannabis and to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Criminal Code and Other Acts” Government of Canada29 May 2017, online <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/pl/charter-charte/c45.ht ml> [5]Ibid. Property Rights Section 1(a) of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights (S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III) provides federal statutory recognition of “the right of the individual to … enjoyment of property”, and the right “not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law.” The right to property is also included under the fifth and fourteenth Amendments of the American Bill of Rights. However, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not provide constitutional protection for individual ‘property rights’. At the meetings of the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution and during Parliamentary debate on Bill C-60, Progressive Conservative MPs proposed that a right to “the enjoyment of property” be included under section 7 of the Charter.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Difficulty of Amending the Constitution of Canada
    Osgoode Hall Law Journal Volume 31 Issue 1 Volume 31, Number 1 (Spring 1993) Symposium: Towards the 21st Century Article 2 Canadian/Australian Legal Perspectives 1-1-1993 The Difficulty of Amending the Constitution of Canada Peter W. Hogg Osgoode Hall Law School of York University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Special Issue Article This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Citation Information Hogg, Peter W.. "The Difficulty of Amending the Constitution of Canada." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 31.1 (1993) : 41-61. https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol31/iss1/2 This Special Issue Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. The Difficulty of Amending the Constitution of Canada Abstract The Charlottetown Accord of 1992 was a set of proposals for amendments to the Constitution of Canada. These proposals were designed to achieve a national settlement of a variety of constitutional grievances, chiefly those arising from Quebec nationalism, western regionalism, and Aboriginal deprivation. The Accord was defeated in a national referendum. In the case of Quebec, the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord, following as it did on the defeat of the Meech Lake Accord, has made the option of secession relatively more attractive, but there are sound pragmatic reasons to hope that Quebec will not make that choice.
    [Show full text]
  • Charlottetown Accord
    Charlottetown Accord This article was written by a law student for the general public. Following the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990, a series of deliberations took place on the future of Confederation both within and outside of Quebec. In fact, there were four bodies empanelled to engage in these discussions – a parliamentary and an extra-parliamentary body within Quebec and a parliamentary and an extra-parliamentary body nationally. Specifically, within Quebec, there were the Allaire Committee (see Allaire Report) and the Belanger- Campeau Committee; and nationally, there were the Beaudoin- Edwards Committee and the Spicer Commission. These studies led to various reports including the federal documentShaping Canada’s Future Together. Subsequently, the federal government convened a series of five national conferences to discuss various aspects of this document. This, in turn, led to a federal report entitled A Renewed Canada. All of the foregoing culminated in negotiations among the federal government, the provincial governments (including Quebec in the latter stages of negotiations), the territorial governments and representatives from the Assembly of First Nations, the Native Council of Canada, the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada and the Métis National Council. These negotiations resulted in what is now referred to as the ‘Charlottetown Accord’. The Accord dealt with a number of constitutional issues. For example, regarding the division of legislative powers (see division of powers), it provided for exclusive provincial jurisdiction over forestry, mining and some other areas. It also required the federal government to conduct negotiations with the provinces in order to “harmonize” policy in such areas as telecommunications, labour development and training, regional development and immigration.
    [Show full text]
  • CONSTITUTION-MAKING AS INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS a Case Study of the 1980 Canadian Constitutional Negotiations Adam D
    CONSTITUTION-MAKING AS INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS A Case Study of the 1980 Canadian Constitutional Negotiations Adam D. McDonald1, University of Waterloo The Constitution Act, 1982 is a document that profoundly changed the Canadian political landscape. It brought home the highest law of the land; it provided Canadians a mechanism to change their Constitution; it created a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, entrenched within the Constitution, out of the reach of one government. Perhaps its most important legacies, however, are the seemingly permanent isolation of Quebec and the primacy of place in Canadian history it gave Pierre Trudeau. This paper will examine the constitutional history of Canada with a view to determining what made the 1980 negotiating sessions successful when the sessions that led to both the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accord were not. It is important, however, to note that the word “successful” is used in the sense that an agreement was reached. Unlike Meech and Charlottetown, the repatriated constitution did not have unanimity among the participants. The question that comes to mind is this: if the governments did not really agree in 1981, why was a Constitution ratified? More importantly, are there lessons that can be drawn from this agreement that can be applied to the failed accords of the Mulroney era? In order to complete this examination, the paper will be divided into two parts. In the first part, Canada’s constitutional story will be told. This is a necessary part of any examination of the constitutional negotiations, for without knowing what the players wanted historically, one cannot see what was changed by the 1980s.
    [Show full text]
  • The 1992 Charlottetown Accord & Referendum
    CANADA’S 1992 CHARLOTTETOWN CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORD: TESTING THE LIMITS OF ASYMMETRICAL FEDERALISM By Michael d. Behiels Department of History University of Ottawa Abstract.-Canada‘s 1992 Charlottetown Constitutional Accord represented a dramatic attempt to transform the Canadian federation which is based on formal symmetry, albeit with a limited recognition of some asymmetry, into an asymmetrical federal constitution recognizing Canada‘s three nations, French, British, and Aboriginal. Canadians were called up to embrace multinational federalism, one comprising both stateless and state-based nations exercising self-governance in a multilayered, highly asymmetrical federal system. This paper explores why a majority of Canadians, for a wide variety of very complex reasons, opted in the first-ever constitutional referendum in October 1992 to retain their existing federal system. This paper argues that the rejection of a formalized asymmetrical federation based on the theory of multinational federalism, while contributing to the severe political crisis that fueled the 1995 referendum on Quebec secession, marked the moment when Canadians finally became a fully sovereign people. Palacio de la Aljafería – Calle de los Diputados, s/n– 50004 ZARAGOZA Teléfono 976 28 97 15 - Fax 976 28 96 65 [email protected] INTRODUCTION The Charlottetown Consensus Report, rejected in a landmark constitutional referendum on 26 October 1992, entailed a profound clash between competing models of federalism: symmetrical versus asymmetrical, and bi-national versus multinational. (Cook, 1994, Appendix, 225-249) The Meech Lake Constitutional Accord, 1987-90, pitted two conceptions of a bi-national -- French-Canada and English Canada – federalism against one another. The established conception entailing a pan-Canadian French-English duality was challenged and overtaken by a territorial Quebec/Canada conception of duality.
    [Show full text]
  • Monday, September 28, 1998
    CANADA VOLUME 135 S NUMBER 127 S 1st SESSION S 36th PARLIAMENT OFFICIAL REPORT (HANSARD) Monday, September 28, 1998 Speaker: The Honourable Gilbert Parent CONTENTS (Table of Contents appears at back of this issue.) All parliamentary publications are available on the ``Parliamentary Internet Parlementaire'' at the following address: http://www.parl.gc.ca 8431 HOUSE OF COMMONS Monday, September 28, 1998 The House met at 11 a.m. how taxpayers feel on certain issues, for example, the credibility of political leaders in negotiating these types of deals. _______________ Even though it is taxpayer money that is used to find out what the taxpayers feel about particular situations, they are not being Prayers told. They are not being given the information. We have some _______________ serious problems with that. This is very reminiscent of what happened with Brian Mulroney in 1992 when the Tories refused to release the taxpayer-funded PRIVATE MEMBERS’ BUSINESS polls on Charlottetown. It begs the question of why this taxpayer money is being spent. Why are these polls being held back? Why D (1100 ) are we not being apprised of the situation? [English] It boils down to a few reasons. One of the things the government likes to say is that somehow this will taint federal-provincial CALGARY DECLARATION relations. That was decided in court by Judge Rothstein. I will get into the quotes in a minute. In that case there was a determination Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Ref.) moved: that the government did not have a legitimate case to deprive the That a Humble Address be presented to His Excellency praying that he will cause public of these documents.
    [Show full text]
  • The Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy Public Policy Paper Series
    The Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy Public Policy Paper Series The Death of Deference: National Policy-Making in the Aftermath of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords by Ian Peach September,2004 Public Policy Paper 26 $5.00; ISBN# 0-7731-0493-3 SIPP www.uregina.ca/sipp The Death of Deference: National Policy-Making in the Aftermath of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords SIPP Public Policy Paper No. 26 September 2004 Ian Peach* Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy Senior Fellow ISBN# 0-7731-0493-3 ISSN# 1702-7802 * This paper is based on presentations given at conferences in Regina and Edinburgh. The author would like to thank all of the staff and Fellows at the Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy and Tom McIntosh for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the presentations and the paper, and Ross Macnab of the Constitutional Law Branch of the Saskatchewan Department of Justice for kindly tracking down difficult-to-find case citations. Any errors or omissions that remain are strictly those of the author. It has been suggested that there has been a decline in Canadians’ traditional deference to elites in recent decades, and that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) is either a reflection of the decline in deference or a cause of it.1 Deference, however, seems not merely in decline; it is not “pining for the fjords”, as Monty Python would put it, but is “pushing up the daisies”. It is dead; it was a lingering death, one which lasted between June 1987 and June 1990, and the deathbed was the Meech Lake Accord.
    [Show full text]
  • Council of the Federation
    Constructive and Co-operative Federalism? A Series of Commentaries on the Council of the Federation Council of the Federation: An Idea Whose Time has Come J. Peter Meekison* Foreword In 2001 a Special Committee of the Quebec Canada’s Provincial and Territorial Premiers Liberal Party proposed the creation of a Council agreed in July 2003 to create a new Council of the of the Federation.1 Newly elected Quebec Federation to better manage their relations and ultimately to build a more constructive and Premier Jean Charest put this proposal, in cooperative relationship with the federal modified form, before the Annual Premiers government. The Council’s first meeting takes Conference in July 2003. The concept of place October 24, 2003 in Quebec hosted by establishing an institution such as the Council has Premier Jean Charest. been raised before in the context of constitutional reform, particularly in the period between the This initiative holds some significant promise 1976 Quebec election and the 1981 constitutional of establishing a renewed basis for more extensive patriation agreement. More recently the matter collaboration among governments in Canada, but was raised during the negotiations leading to the many details have yet to be worked out and several important issues arise that merit wider attention. 1992 Charlottetown Accord. The purpose of this paper is to examine its antecedents. Others The Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at writing in this series of articles on the Council of Queen’s University and the Institute for Research the Federation (Council) will comment in greater on Public Policy in Montreal are jointly publishing detail on the specifics of the Quebec proposal.
    [Show full text]
  • Public Opinion on Asymmetrical Federalism
    PUBLIC OPINION ON ASYMMETRICAL FEDERALISM: GROWING OPENNESS OR “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you CONTINUING AMBIGUITY? can make words mean so many different things.” F. Leslie Seidle Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland Centre for Research and Information on Canada and Institute for Research on Public Policy In politics, words can be used for good or ill; they can help clarify complex public policy Gina Bishop issues or baffle even well-informed citizens. At Centre for Research and Information on Canada different times and in different contexts, the expression ‘asymmetrical federalism’ has Foreword probably performed all of these functions and others. Some have used it to describe what they The federal Liberal Party’s 2004 general see as a strength of Canadian federalism, namely election platform heavily emphasized issues that that provinces are not identical in their history, are mainly subject to provincial competence circumstances and public policies. Others have under the constitution (e.g. health care, child used the term to express their opposition to the care, cities). Since the federal government lacks ‘special treatment’ they believe one province, the authority to implement detailed regulatory namely Quebec, seeks – or already receives - schemes in these areas, acting on these election within the federation. Still others claim that even commitments frequently requires federal- modest asymmetry, such as variation in provincial-territorial (FPT) agreements. intergovernmental agreements (as opposed to the A controversial question that arises when letter of the Constitution), violates the principle considering all intergovernmental agreements is of the equality of the provinces. whether they should treat all provinces and territories similarly or whether the agreements Largely because of the association with should be expected to differ from one Quebec, politicians and policy makers have province/territory to another.
    [Show full text]
  • Federalism-E
    FEDERALISM-E volume 10: 2009 ~Le journal de premier cycle sur le fédéralisme~ ~The undergraduate journal about federalism~ Royal Military College of Canada / Collège militaire royale du Canada In conjunction with / En collaboration avec Queen‘s University EDITORAL BOARD / COMITÉ D‘ÉDITION Juliana Trichilo Cina Alexandre Brassard Victoria Edwards Anonymous Others Victoria Kayser ADVISORY BOARD / CHAIRE DE SUPERVISION Christian Leuprecht Assistant Professor, Royal Military College of Canada / Professeur adjoint, Collège miliaire royale du Canada CHIEF EDITORS / ÉDITEURS EN CHEF Nick Deshpande Officer Cadet, Royal Military College of Canada Donovan Huppé Élève Officier, Collège militaire royale du Canada The authors retain the copyright for Les auteurs conservent le droit their work. d'auteur pour leur travail. INTERNET ACCESS / ACCÈS INTERNET This volume and previous volumes of Le présent et les précédents volumes Federalism-E are available online at: de Fédéralisme-E sont disponibles en ligne à: http://www.federalism-e.com/ FEDERALISM-E VOLUME 10 APRIL 2009 EDITORS NICHOLAS DESHPANDE 24122 O FFICER CADET , R O Y AL M I L I T AR Y C O L L E G E O F C ANADA DONOVAN HUPPÉ 24168 É LÈVE OFFICIER , C OLLÈGE MILITAIRE R O Y A L D U C A NADA C ONTENTS Intergovernmental Relations‘ Third Wheel: The Role of the Supreme Court in an Era of Collaborative Federalism 1 ALLISON O‘BEIRNE Constitutional Accords and National Discord: The Impact of Constitutional Reform on Canadian Unity 16 ERIC SNOW Striving to Maintain a Holistic Nation: Preventing Quebec
    [Show full text]
  • Factum of the Attorney General of Saskatchewan
    C.A.No. CACV3239 rN THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN IN THE MATTER OF THE GREENHOUSE GAS POLLUTION PRICING ACT, Bill C-74, Part V AND IN THE MATTER OF A REFERENCE BY THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL TO THE COURT OF APPEAL UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS ACT, 2012, ss 2012, c C-29.01. BETWEEN ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SASKATCHEWAN Party Pursuant to Section 4 of The Constitutional Questions Act, 2012 and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Intervener Pursuant to Section 5(2) of Tlte Constitutional Questions Act, 2012 and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO Intervener Pursuant to Section 6 of Tlte Constitutional Questions Act, 2012 FACTUM OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SASKATCHEWAN P. Mitch McAdam, Q.C. & Alan Jacobson Agents for the Attorney General of Saskatchewan 820 - 1874 Scarth Street REGINA SK S4P 4B3 INDEX PAGE PART 1 - Introduction 1 PART II - Jurisdiction 1 PART III - Summary of Facts 2 PART IV - Points in Issue 5 PART V - Argument 7 1. Recent Federalism Cases in the Supreme Court 7 2. Privy Council Cases on Federalism 10 3. Preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 11 4. Historial Evidence of Framers' Intention 11 5. Provincial Autonomy and Need for Uniformity in Federal Laws 13 6. Nova Scotia Interdelegation Case 17 7. Pith and Substance Analysis 18 8. Manitoba's Legal Opinion 20 9. Antithesis of Co-operative Federalism 21 10. Taxation or Regulatory Charge? 22 11. Section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867 26 PART VI - Relief Sought 28 PART VII - Authorities 29 APPENDIX "A" PART I - INTRODUCTION 1. This case is not about the risks posed to the country by climate change.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter Sixteen
    Ch a p t e r Si x t e e n National Unity Figure 16-1 Québec cartoonist Terry Mosher, also known as Aislin, drew this Figure 7-1cartoon In 1970, in 1990 Manitoba to show celebrated his opinion its 100th anniversary of enteringof the into way Confederation. constitutional As debates part of hadthat celebration, in 1971 a statueaffected (below) Canadian of Métis unity. leader Louis Riel was unveiled on the grounds of the Manitoba Legislature in Winnipeg. In the following years, controversies erupted over the statue; over Riel’s naked and contorted figure, and over the role Riel played in the time leading up to Manitoba’s entrance into Confederation and beyond. In 1995, the statue was removed from the grounds of the legislature to Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface and was replaced on the grounds of the legislature by another statue (left). The removal and replacement of the original statue caused a controversy of its own. Figure 16-2 In 1995, just days before Québec held a referendum on whether to separate from Canada, thousands of Canadians from across the country descended on Montréal to tell Québec that they wanted the province to stay united with Canada. image P7-39 460 CLUSTER 5 • Defining Contemporary Canada (1982 to present) • MHR How has the question of national unity influenced federalism, constitutional debate, and political change? To explore this essentialEssential question,Question, you you will will KEY TERMS • examine the issues,attempts events, to have and Québec people signthat theshaped Canadian the history ofConstitution
    [Show full text]
  • The Conventions of Constitutional Amendment in Canada
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School Boston College Law School Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School Boston College Law School Faculty Papers Winter 1-1-2016 The onC ventions of Constitutional Amendment in Canada Richard Albert Boston College Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons Recommended Citation Richard Albert. "The onC ventions of Constitutional Amendment in Canada." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 53, no.2 (2016): 399-441. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Conventions of Constitutional Amendment in Canada Abstract Commentators have suggested that the unsuccessful national referendum to ratify the 1992 Charlottetown Accord created an expectation of popular participation requiring national referendal consultation in major reforms to the Constitution of Canada. In this article, I inquire whether federal political actors are bound by a constitutional convention of national referendal consultation for formal amendments to the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada. Drawing from the Supreme Court of Canada’s Patriation Reference, I suggest that we cannot know whether federal political actors are bound by such a convention until they are confronted with the question whether or not to hold a national referendum in connection with a change to the Constitution’s basic structure.
    [Show full text]