Resea r c h Outrjeach^ en g a g em en t Summer 2010 Volume XXIV, No. 2

Leading and Managing through Influence Challenges and Responses Dr. Raymond A. Shulstad, Brigadier General, USAF, Retired with Lt Col Richard D. Mael, USAF, Retired

The Role of Airpower in Active Missile Defense Col Mike Corbett, USAF, Retired Paul Zarchan

New Horizons Coalition Space Operations Lt Col Thomas G. Single, USAF

Beddown Options for Air National Guard C-27J Aircraft Supporting Domestic Response Col John Conway, USAF, Retired

Building an Offensive and Decisive PLAAF A Critical Review of Lt Gen Liu Yazhou’s The Centenary of the Air Force Guocheng Jiang

To Fly. F ight , and Win ... In Air . S pace, and Cyber space Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen Norton A. Schwartz

Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Stephen R. Lorenz http://www.af.mil Commander, Air University Lt Gen Allen G. Peck

Director, Air Force Research Institute Gen John A. Shaud, USAF. Retired

Chief, Professional Journals Lt Col Paul D. Berg

Deputy Chief, Professional Journals Maj Darren K. Stanford http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil Editor Capt Lori Katowich

Professional Staff Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Tammi K. Long, Editorial Assistant Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager

The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), Air Force Recurring Publication 10-1, published quarterly, http://www.au.af.mil is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness, Air and Space Power Journal and other matters o f national defense. The views and 155 N. Twining Street opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6026 of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, e-mail: [email protected] Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air Visit Air and Space Power Journal onlin University, or other agencies or departments of the US at http://www.airpower.au.af.mil. government.

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■ VOLUME XXIV. NO. 2 A Fill’ 10-1

Senior Leader Perspective

Leading and Managing through Influence I G Challenges and Responses Dr. Raymond A. Shulstad, Brigadier General, USAF, Retired with Lt Col Richard D. Mael, USAF, Retired

From the Editor

The A rt of Persuasion 8 18 Capt Lori Katowich, USAF, Editor

Features

The Role of Airpower in Active Missile Defense I 57 Col Mike Corbett, USAF, Retired Paul Zarchan The authors examine what airpower, as opposed to surface and space forces, brings to defense against the changing and growing threat of theater ballistic missiles. They consider whether combat air forces should have a primary role in this mission and whether the A ir Force can afford a new mission area . without jeopardizing its traditional core capabilities.

New Horizons I 72 Coalition Space Operations Lt Col Thomas G. Single, USAF The author analyzes inefficiencies in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghani- stan. arguing for the inclusion of robust coalition space operations Noting that coalition operations require the leveraging of all available resources, including critical enablers such as space capabilities, he promotes coalition space support teams as the most effective means of mitigating current challenges. Departments

20 Ricochets and Replies

23 Views & Analyses Should the United States Maintain the Nuclear T ria d ? ...... 23 Dr. A d a m B. Lowther Updating a Cold War Relic: Ensuring That the New Air Force Doctrine Document 3 Reflects Current Air Force Roles and Missions...... 30 Lt Col David K. Moeller, USAF Beddown Options for Air National Guard C-27J Aircraft: Supporting Domestic Response...... 35 Col John Conway, USAF, Retired Finishing Strong in Iraq: Why the Air Force Must Be the Last to Leave Operation Iraqi Freedom ...... 45 Lt Col William Jay Martin, USAF Colombia Can Teach Afghanistan (and the United States] How to Win ...... 52 Robert Haddick

85 Review Essay Building an Offensive and Decisive PLAAF: A Critical Review of Lt Gen Liu Yazhou's The Centenary of the Air F o r c e ...... 85 Guocheng Jiang

95 Book Reviews Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21 st C e ntury...... g5 P. W. Singer Reviewer: Wing Cdr John M. Shackell, RAF, Retired The International Politics of Space ...... 96 Michael Sheehan Reviewer: Lt Col Kevin M. Rhoades, USAF Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest O utla w ...... 97 Mark Bowden Reviewer: Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF The War: An Intimate History, 19 41 -19 45 ...... 98 Geoffrey C. Ward and Ken Burns Reviewer: Lt Col Daniel J. Simonsen, USAF The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of Thermonuclear W a r ...... 99 Sharon Ghamari-Thbrizi Reviewer: Col Joe McCue, USAF, Retired The Development of Propulsion Technology for U.S. Space-Launch Vehicles, 1926-1991 ...... 100 J. D. Hunl ey Reviewer: Capt Brent D. Ziarnick, USAFR Governing the American Lake: The US Defense and Administration of the Pacific, 1 9 45 -19 47 ...... 101 Hal M. Friedman Reviewer: Dr. John H. Barnhill In the Shadow of the Moon: A Challenging Journey to Tranquility, 19 6 5 -1 9 6 9 ...... 102 Francis French and Colin Burgess Reviewer: Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 Persian Gulf W a r ...... 103 Stephen A. Bourque and John W. Burdan III Reviewer: Maj Paul Niesen, USAF, Retired Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the C ities...... 104 Kendall D. Gott Reviewer: Capt Michael D. Kennedy, USAF Unknown Soldiers: Reliving World W ar II in E u ro p e ...... 105 Joseph E. Garland Reviewer: Dr. Donald A. MacCuish NATO's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1 9 9 8 -1 9 9 9 ...... 106 Dag Henriksen Reviewer: Maj Lisa Nemeth, USAF Reflections of an Air W a rrio r...... 107 Group Capt Arjun Subramaniam Reviewer: Dr. David R. Mets Hans-Joachim Marseille: An Illustrated Tribute to the Luftwaffe's "Star of Africa” ...... 107 Robert Tate Reviewer: Dr. Richard R. Muller Wan Race for Missile Defense Nigel Hey Reviewer: Maj Eric J. Kolb, USAF Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issue s...... Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, and Amy Richardson Reviewer: CSM James Clifford, USA, Retired Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art: Foundations for the Future ...... Intelligence Science Board Reviewer: Lt Col Christopher D. Harness, USAF

111 Mission Debrief Editorial Advisory Board

Gen John A. Shaud, PhD, USAF, Retired, A ir Force Research Institute Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired Dr. J. Douglas Beason (Senior Executive Service and Colonel, USAF, Retired), Air Force Space Command Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, Office o f the Chief of Staff. VS Army Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, US Naval Academy Lt Col Dave Mets, PhD, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus)

Board of Reviewers

Lt Col Eric Braganca. USAF Dr. Tbm Keaney Naval Air Station. Patuxent River Mary land Johns Hopkins University Dr. Kendall K. Broun Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired NANA Marshall Space Flight Center Department of Homeland Security Col Steven D. Carey. USAF, Retired Col Chris J. krisinger, USAF, Retired Daphne. Alabama Burke. Virginia Dr. Clay ton K. S. Chun Dr. Benjam in S. Lambeth US Army War College RAND Dr. Mark Clodfelter Mr. Douglas E. Lee National War College Air Force Space Command Dr. Conrad Crane Dr. Richard I. Lester Director. US Army Military History Institute taker Center for Professional Development Col Michael D. Davis, USAF Mr. Brent Marley Defense Attache Redstone Arsenal Mabama Col Dennis VI. Drew. ISAF. Retired Mr. Remy M. Mauduit USAF School of .Advanced Air and Spate Studies Air Force Research Institute ( professor emeritus) Col Phillip S. Meilingcr, USAF, Retired Vlaj t e n Charles J. Dunlap Jr.. USAF West Chicago, Illinois The Pentagon Dr. Daniel Moru-nsen Dr. Stephen Fought Air Force Research Institute USAF Air War College (professor emeritus) Dr. Richard R. Muller Col Richard L Fullerton. USAF USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies USAF Academy Dr. Bruce T. Murphy Lt Col Derrill T. Coldi/en. PhD. USAF, Retired Air University Westport Point, Massachusetts Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Col Mike C.uillut. t SAF, Retired r.mbrv-Riddle Aeronautical University Editor, Vruirgu Studies Quarterly Lt Col Brian S. Pinkston, USAF, MC, SI'S Air Tone Research Institute Tile Pentagon Dr. Juhn F. Cuilmurtin Jr. ( ol Bob Potter, I SAF, Retired Ohio Scale University Air Force Research Institute Dr. Am it Cupta Dr. Sun- Knthstrin USAF Air War College Colorado Spring* Science Center Project

Dr. (Irani T. Hammond 11 ( 111 Reagan L. Scliaupp, USAF t>ean. NATO l»rfeni:e Collegr Naval War Collegr Dr Dale I.. Hayden llr. Bam Sihneider Air Force Research Institute D im mi USA! Counterpml deration Center Dr. Thomas Hughes Prolessot, I SAF Air War College I SAF Sr hoot of Advanced Air and Spai r Studies ( ill Rii haul S/atranski, USAF, Retired Lt Col Jeffrey Hukill. I SAF, Retired Toffler Avsoi i.tlr» Atr Force Research Institute l.t tall Edward B. lumme, PhD. USAF, Retired Lt tail J. P. Ilu n rru ali l, I SAF. Retired Cy brrSpaec Operations Consulting LeMay Center for D im trine Development and Lduialton llr. Christopher II. loner (o i Mark V. Jeionrk, ISAF t nlversily ol Si Thomas The Pentagon Lt fail David A. Umphress, PhD. I'SAUR, Retired Col lohn iogrrst. USAF. Retired Auburn University Navarre. Florida Dr. Harold R. M inton Mr. C harles Tustin lu m p s I 'sAI School of Advanced Air and Space Studies USAF Air Command and Staff College

Summer 2010 | 5 Leading and Managing through Influence

Challenges and Responses

Dr. Raymond A. Shulstad, Brigadier General, USAF, Retired" with Lt Col Richard D. Mael, USAF, Retired

The key to successful leadership today is influence, not authority. —K e n Bl a nc ha r d

any experts, including Ken port the project. Similarly, in a joint envi- Blanchard, argue legitimately that ronment, the services have to rely on each M managing and leading are all about other, but their component commanders all influencing people to accomplish tasks and report to a joint force commander in charge objectives. Managing and leading through of the campaign. influence in the context used in this article When the project requires the support present some unique challenges due to the not only of inside functional organizations absence of direct, hierarchical authority but also of outside organizations with com- (i.e., not all of the people who need to be pletely different reporting chains, the chal- influenced work directly for the manager or leader). This type of challenge occurs natu- lenges become especially daunting. That is rally in a matrix organization, in which the environment I address in this article by project managers are supported by func- examining a case study o f the B-1B bomber tional-specialty experts (e.g., engineers, lo- nuclear-certification program that I led in gisticians, financiers, etc.) who may or may the early 1980s. Managing and leading in not be collocated with the project team. this complex environment require the same The challenge of managing and leading basic skills as successfully managing and through influence in this type of situation is leading in an environment where direct somewhat mitigated because the head of hierarchical authority exists.1 Attaining suc- the organization has directed that the proj- cess without direct, hierarchical authority ect be carried out, has placed the project demands much more time and attention on manager in charge to lead the effort, and enlisting commitment and support from has directed the functional leaders to sup-* both inside and outside the organization.

* I especially want to thank Lt Col Richard D. Mael. USAF. retired, my longtime professional colleague and close personal friend, for his extensive help in writing this article. Kick Mael, who served 21 years in the US Air Force, was a missile combat crew member and held program-management posi- tions in both the Air Force and Office of the Secretary o f Defense. He also participated in the Air Force Education with Industry Program with the Northrop Corporation and served on the staff of the Air Force Program Executive Office for Strategic Systems. Currently. Mr. Mael is a program manager with Booz Allen Hamilton.

6 I Air & Space Power Journal V Sen io r leader per spect ive

Skills in persuasion and negotiation also be- and schedule were defined in great detail in come much more important. a $20.5 billion program baseline that would First I briefly offer some background on deliver 100 B-lBs to the Air Force.'* Ulti- the B-l B and nuclear certification before mately the secretary of defense, president, describing the situation I taced when I ar- and Congress approved this baseline before rived at the B-l B System Program Office Rockwell, Boeing, General Electric, and AIL (SPO) in the summer of 1982. Then, I move Eaton received contracts in early 1982. on to a discussion of challenges faced and Several unique aspects of the B-l B are actions taken to address them. The result important to this case study. First, the pro- was one of die proudest achievements of gram’s baseline remained under tight con- my Air Force career—nuclear certification trol at the secretary of defense level —that of the B-l B 30 days before its initial opera- is, he approved all changes to requirements, tional capability (IOC) in September 1986, cost, and schedule. This stability, coupled exactly as required and as 1 had planned with leveraging the many years of work on four years earlier. Next, I summarize what l the B-l, resulted in a program of moderate consider the “golden nuggets" or best prac- risk that the government and contractors tices, along with keys to success in manag- could manage.s This, in turn, enabled an ing and leading through influence across aggressive schedule that included an IOC of organization lines and in the absence of September 1986 and delivery of all 100 hierarchical authority. Finally, I conclude bombers by May 1988. Th e schedule included with a few remarks that 1 hope will prove significant concurrency between develop- valuable to today’s leaders facing the chal- ment and production. The well-defined base- lenges of managing and leading in these line and moderate, manageable risk were kinds of complex environments.-' keys to obtaining congressional approval of a multiyear procurement that saved a sig- nificant amount of money bv securing gov- ernment commitment to buy most of the The B-1B Program Restarting the B-l program in 1981 was a cornerstone of President Reagan's campaign to rebuild America's national defense and to close the vulnerability gap (real or per- ceived) between the United States' and Soviet Union's military capabilities. The B-1B program enjoyed the highest national priority and un- precedented stability. It added modern offensive avi- onics by Boeing and defensive avionics by AIL Eaton to Rockwell's B-l airframe and General Elec- tric’s B-l engines, which had been devel- oped and flight-tested in the 1970s.’ Dur- i ng 1981 t h e pr o gr am' s r e q u i r e m e n t s , cost, 100 aircraft at the beginning of the program sus just providing engineering support to instead o f incrementally each year. project management. Second, the program's management ap- Extraordinarily successful, the B-1B pro- proach underwent extraordinary stream- gram reached its IOC and most other major lining to save time and cost and to reduce milestones on time and within budget. Rick oversight. From a program-management Mael attributed this success to detailed, up- standpoint, the B-l B system program direc- font cost estimating; firm baselining; multi- tor (SPD) reported directly to the secretary year procurement; and the SPO’s role as of the Air Force and secretary of defense, integrator. The B-lB’s programmatic suc- bypassing the normal oversight levels cess and rapid deployment provided time within Air Force Systems Command, Head- for the development and production of the quarters US Air Force, and staff offices B-2 stealth bomber without further widen- within the Office of the Secretary of De- ing the vulnerability gap. Finally, as a key fense. Because of reduced oversight, the Air element in the United States' strategic Force agreed to staff the B-1B program at force-modernization program, it played an about 200 people, about half the normal important role in bringing about the col- number for a program of this size and com- lapse of the Soviet Union and ending the plexity. In 1982 the management model for Cold War. In order to attain IOC, the B-1B sizable programs like the B-l B was a large needed nuclear certification. project-management organization that Before a weapon system can be loaded would manage different elements of the with nuclear weapons, stand alert, and program, supported by functional organiza- conduct nuclear missions, the secretary of tions in engineering, budget and program defense must authorize it to do so by sign- control, logistics, flight testing, safety, and ing the nuclear-safety rules recommended so forth. In contrast the B-1B project office by the secretary of the military service that was very small, and the functional organiza- would operate the weapon system. Prior to tions were expected not only to support signing, the secretary of defense also re- views a report certifying the safety and projects managed there, but also to provide compatibility of the weapon system from management of key elements of the pro- the secretary of energy, whose department gram. Nuclear certification was one of the designs, develops, and produces nuclear few aspects managed out of the project of- warheads. The secretary of defense's ap- fice because it required support from al- proval of the nuclear-safetv rules repre- most all SPO functional organizations and a sents the culmination of many years of number of outside agencies. analysis and testing to certify that the sys- Third, to save cost and streamline con- tem is mechanically and electrically com- tract management, the B-1B SPO assumed patible with the weapons and can operate responsibility for integrating the work of with and deliver nuclear weapons safely the four associate contractors, as it had on and accurately.8 the original B-l program. For the most part, Within the Department of Defense, the the B-1B SPO’s engineering organization SPD is responsible for all aspects of system managed this effort, using design reviews design, development, and production, in- and a detailed set of interface-control docu- cluding nuclear certification. Within the ments as well as associate contractor agree- program office, the SPD designates a nu- ments. Essentially, the government as- clear-certification program manager, di- sumed the role usually played by the prime rects SPO functional offices (engineering, contractor." The engineering organization's safety, test, logistics, etc.) to provide sup- leadership role offers a good example of port, and incorporates contractor support what I mean by functional organizations for the program in the appropriate con- assuming management responsibility ver- tracts. The SPO's nuclear-certification pro-

8 I Air <£ Space Power Journal gram manager gets interagency support for Situation and Status in the the program by forming a Project Officers’ Group (POG), which he chairs and which Summer of 1982 has representatives from the SPO func- 1 reported to the B-1B SPO in July 1982, tional offices, the program contractors, the about seven months after contract awards Department of Energy’s laboratories, the restarted the program. After meeting Maj major command that will operate the Gen William E. Thurman, the B-1B SPD, I weapon system, the service's flight-test or- checked in with Col Nick Fritz, the B-1B ganization, the service’s organization for director of projects and my new boss. He nuclear weapon safety, and the service’s introduced me to Capt Rick Mael, who, inspector general (IG) organization for nu- until I got there, was a one-man show, try- clear surety. The B-1B POG had o v e r 60 ing to work all aspects of the B-l B arma- members from a total of 14 organizations, ment system, including weapon launch- five of which were SPO functional organi- ers, weapon-loading support equipment, zations. The other nine included outside and nuclear certification. In short, he was agencies: two contractors (Rockwell and absolutely swamped and extremely glad Boeing), Strategic Air Command (SAC), Air to have a boss on board. 1 noticed the Force Weapons Laboratory', Air Force Flight small size of the office that he and I were Test Center, the Air Force IG's Directorate to share with another officer, so 1 asked of Nuclear Surety (DNS), and three Depart- him about the location o f the rest of my ment of Energy laboratories.9 team. He explained to me the SPO man- During the development of weapon sys- agement concept, which involved support tems, POG members work together to com- from functional-specialty experts in engi- plete required analyses and tests. Extensive neering, safety, logistics, and flight test- environmental and mechanical testing as- ing, who were in the SPO but not collo- sures that the nuclear weapon’s design cri- teria are never exceeded from the time it cated with us. leaves the weapons storage area until it Over the first couple of weeks, 1 walked reaches a target. Electrical testing certifies around the SPO, meeting all of the functional- that the weapon system's avionics can com- support members of the team. They all municate with the weapon’s arming system, seemed to have a general grasp o f the re- and dropping dummy weapons during quirements of nuclear certification and flight testing confirms that the weapon sys- their role in the process. In all cases, they tem can safely and effectively deliver the had functional bosses inside the SPO and weapon to target. In parallel with these ac- home-office bosses outside the SPO. None tivities, a nuclear-system safety study ana- of them had been designated to support lyzes all potential hazards and formulates nuclear certification full time. For example, safety rules for the nuclear weapon system. the four armament engineers were re- Among other things, this study must prove sponsible for overseeing development and beyond a shadow of doubt that the aircraft’s integration of the armament system and avionics cannot inadvertently arm and drop offensive avionics into the B-1B. Nuclear the weapon. Ultimately, the results of these certification was just a small, but important, studies, analyses, and tests flow up separate aspect of their total job. Although everyone and independent chains leading to the ser- seemed to understand the importance of vice secretary and secretary of energy, who nuclear certification and what they needed both must certify that nuclear weapons can to do, there was no plan with assigned ac- be safely and effectively included in the op- tions and accountability. erational capability before the secretary of With the help of engineering, Rick had defense signs the nuclear weapon system’s organized a POG and held a couple of safety rules. meetings, but not much more had hap-

Summer 2010 | 9 pened. I touched base with all of the non- that 1 would sort out the contractual dis- SPO members from outside agencies, in- connects. I pledged to get back to him in a cluding the contractors, and found much month or so with the cost and needed the same situation (i.e., awareness of re- contractual changes. quirements but little or no action). Our A few weeks later, I held my first POG Rockwell and Boeing contractor members meeting, in which 1 introduced myself, told me that nuclear certification was not presented the same briefing I had given under contract. That troubled me because General Thurman, and challenged the certification was absolutely essential, so I members to move beyond talking about found it hard to believe it could have been what they needed to do and actually do left out of the B-lB’s $20.5 billion baseline something. 1 told them that business as contracts. I would spend a great deal of usual would not be good enough to time over the next few months sorting out nuclear-certify the B-l B in time to support exactly what the contracts did and did not the IOC of September 1986; therefore, we include and fixing the disconnects. would operate in a different mode. Fi- About a month after I arrived, 1 briefed General Thurman on nuclear certifica- nally, 1 told them that we needed to de- tion, my requirements for obtaining it, velop a plan with all actions identified and my approach and strategy. 1 took Rick and assigned to someone, as well as a with me to the general's office for the schedule with which to monitor and man- briefing and found that his staff had in- age progress. We had three POG sub- vited some of the SPO's chief functional groups in place for safety, aircraft compat- experts. I told General Thurman that to ibility, and logistics. Moreover, a SPO succeed, I needed to have his support and functional expert served as chairman of commitment, sort out the contractual dis- the subgroups, but the groups had not yet connects, get our contractors on board, met. I broke the POG into the subgroups, develop a plan, and use the contractors directed them to spend the rest of the day and rest of the POG to execute the plan. I organizing, and told them to plan a meet- told him that the process normally takes ing within the next few weeks, after six to 10 years, but I could complete it in which they would lay out all of the ac- four years to support the B-l B’s IOC of tions in their area that needed to happen September 1986 by leveraging work done (and when) over the next four years in on the original B-l program, accelerating order to win nuclear certification not later some activities, and executing some ef- than August 1986, 30 days before the IOC forts in parallel rather than serially. date. I scheduled the next POG meeting When I finished. I got a big thumbs-up for about a month later, telling them that from General Thurman and his direction we would put together a comprehensive, to the functional experts to support me. It integrated plan at that meeting. could not have gone better until the very end when the chief of program control (the program's financial manager) told the Challenges and Responses general that nuclear certification had been scrubbed from the $20.5 billion base- I faced seven challenges critical to suc- line because its $50 million price tag was cess. In one form or another, leaders in too expensive. 1 told General Thurman “manage-and-lead-through-influence" situa- that the contractors had told me the same tions will face similar problems. For each thing but had not mentioned the cost. I one, I describe my response in terms of the then reiterated my briefing points that actions I took to meet it. Although these nuclear certification was not optional, challenges and my responses were not nec- that contractor support was essential, and essarily caused by the lack o f hierarchical

10 I Air & Space Power Journal Sy Sen io r leader Per spect ive

authority, the need to exert influence with- Challenge No. 2: hiking Charge out direct authority certainly shaped both. The need for a leader to step forward and take charge becomes even more important Challenge No. 1: Securing Commitment in the absence of hierarchical authority. From the beginning, I knew I had to ob- Without leadership to drive the team, there tain commitment to the goal of a nuclear- will be no teamwork or coordinated, cohe- certified B-1B weapon system from all 14 sive effort by individuals leading to real organizations comprising the POG, as well progress toward the goal. as its 60 members. Securing that commit- Although 1 lacked hierarchical author- ment was the key to attaining the coop- ity, General Thurman gave me all the au- eration needed to complete the work and thority l needed within the SPO by desig- reach the goal. Without that commitment, nating me the project leader and by I knew we would fail, so I put a great deal directing the functional offices to support of focus and priority into getting and me and the project. Similarly, the B-1B maintaining it. contractors viewed me as a key customer I had a great deal in my favor because and followed my direction and tasking. the B-1B program enjoyed the highest na- Outside the SPO and its two contractors, tional priority. People inside the SPO the remaining seven organizations had re- were excited to be working on it, as were sponsibilities in their regulations that dic- the people from outside organizations. 1 tated their roles and responsibilities in built on that excitement with a campaign support of nuclear certification. Conse- to educate POG members on nuclear cer- quently, both inside and outside the SPO, I tification as well as their leadership inside had all the authority I needed to exert in- and outside the SPO. However, 1 intended fluence. Although indirect and derived, the that my campaign go well beyond educa- authority was still more than sufficient. tion by designing it to persuade everyone Nevertheless, as I engaged the members of involved that, for the B-1B to reach IOC, the POG individually before my first POG nuclear certification was not an option meeting, I left no doubt in their minds that but an imperative. I began that campaign I was taking charge and assuming respon- with General Thurman and the leadership sibility for the project and expected their in the B-1B SPO, carried it to the POG, support. Not surprisingly, not only did I and then engaged the management chains meet no resistance but also the team in the nine outside agencies. Thus, I suc- seemed relieved that someone was assum- cessfully sold the requirement and ob- ing control because they knew that with- tained the needed commitment. But I did out leadership, they would fail. not simply declare success and go on to At the first POG meeting, 1 went well be- something else. Instead, I worked contin- yond just chairing the meeting by reinforc- ually to maintain the commitment. For ing the fact that I had authority. For example, example, about a year after we started, I I told the POG that we had four years to get persuaded General Thurman to chair a the job done and that business as usual one-day review bv senior leadership of would not get us there. I emphasized that the plan, status, issues, and key ongoing when we encountered problems, I was in- actions. Leaders from the SPO and all terested only in what we needed to do to nine outside agencies participated, ap- solve them —not in how tough it would be proved the POG's agenda, and recommit- to do so. Finally, I told them it was time to ted their agencies' support to the program stop talking about what we needed to do and plan. and to start doing those things.

Summer 2010 | 11 Challenge No. 3: Obtaining Cooperation because they tasked organizations to do and "teamwork their jobs or to coordinate with others in Securing commitment is essential but not doing their jobs. I made it very explicit that sufficient for a project such as nuclear certi- 1 didn't need action items to have fication, which demands cooperation and them do their jobs and coordinate—1 ex- pected them to do that! At each subse- teamwork across so many organizational quent meeting, I focused action items on boundaries. No simple formula exists for issues that needed resolution in order to getting the necessary degree of cooperation keep the project on schedule. and teamwork, but I believe that the follow- ing are key steps. First, the leader must define what Challenge No. 4: Opening the Lines of needs to be done, as well what the roles Communication and responsibilities are, in sufficient de- After securing commitment to reaching tail that it becomes clear that the support the goal and working together to do so, of multiple organizations is critical to car- the leader faces yet another challenge: rying out each task. I insisted that both opening lines of communication among the POG and its subgroup charters have all organizations at all levels. My ap- this level of detail. Once we had the plan, proach to this issue involved providing every task had not only a designated of- every POG member the telephone num- fice of primary responsibility but also of- ber and mailing address of all the other fices of collateral responsibility. When members. If we had had e-mail back in teams recognize that cooperation and the early 1980s, I would have provided teamwork are imperative, the members that also. The standard operating mode will respond by working together. for nuclear-certification POGs at that time Second, smaller groups tend to be more called for all communication to go effective than larger ones in fostering co- through the SPO or POG leadership, espe- operation and teamwork toward a com- cially if the communication involved in- mon goal, so I delegated most of the work teracting with or asking a program con- to the three subgroups, empowering tractor for something. I knew that I had them, as teams, to do the job. At every neither the staff nor the time to manage POG meeting, I had each POG subgroup communications, so I authorized and en- chairman report on his organization's ac- couraged every POG member to commu- tions, results, progress, and issues. After nicate directly with each other, including only one or two meetings, the subgroups our contractors. This rather revolutionary knew that I could tell the difference be- approach carried a degree of risk because tween activity and action, and that I ex- it could have led to substantive, unauthor- pected both results and progress. Because ized contract changes resulting in un- people want to do a good job and satisfy planned costs; nevertheless, 1 accepted their leaders, after I made my expecta- that risk because 1 viewed open commu- tions clear and told them I would inspect nications as essential and trusted our con- their progress regularly, I got what I tractors—another somewhat unprece- needed —teamwork, cooperation, and, dented approach. However, before 1 most important, results and progress! implemented this initiative, I engaged our At that first POG meeting I attended, I contractors, who operated on fixed-price did something that, in a very direct and contracts. I asked them never to say no to powerful way, reinforced this message. As a request for anything without consulting we went through the action items from me. If the request fell outside the scope of the first couple o f POG meetings held be- the contract, I told them that I would fore my arrival, I closed 20 of the 30 items have the request or contract modified. In-

12 I Air & Space Power Journal Sy Sen io r leader per spect ive

terestinglv, I never received an “out-of- their people's performance reports, I pro- contract-scope" claim from them after I vided written and verbal input to those fixed the contract disconnects. reports. 1 built up additional trust and re- Looking back to the early 1980s, we see spect by writing a number of award nomi- that communication itself presented a chal- nations for their people. lenge because there were no computers, Two illustrations reflect my efforts to Internet, or e-mail, as well as no videocon- build trust and respect in outside agen- ferencing or teleconferencing capabilities. cies. Traditionally, the operational user .All communication took place either face- (SAC in this case) and the acquisition or- to-face or by phone. So we spent consider- ganization have a strained relationship. able time managing by walking around, Users get frustrated because they feel that talking on the phone, and traveling to meet- their requirements are not being fully ings. Although those modes are somewhat met or because cost overruns and sched- inefficient, they benefited communication ule delays occur. Acquisition agencies get clarity and management effectiveness. frustrated because of requirement changes that affect design, cost, and schedule. Because the B-1B had a very de- Challenge .Vo. 5: Building Thist and Respect tailed and rigorous requirements baseline, Nothing is more important to effective many of these traditional problems were teamwork than building trust and respect. mitigated up front. General Thurman also For that reason, I focused a great deal of at- made SAC a voting member on the pro-

Nothing is more important to effective teamwork than building trust and respect.

tention on this area, as illustrated by the gram's configuration and baseline-control following examples. board. I emulated that arrangement in the First, within the SPO, I worked out a POG by making SAC a full member. If the couple of staffing rules with the func- command wanted something in the weap- tional offices. I insisted that they appoint ons-capability area, I never used the pro- to my project a chief functional-area ex- gram baseline as an excuse to say no. In- pert who would accept responsibility for stead, I had our contractors evaluate the providing functional support and respond request. If they could accommodate it to my tasking. I made clear that, beyond without affecting either the cost or sched- supplying a chief functional expert, staff- ing my project and other projects was ule, we incorporated the change. If the their responsibility and that I cared only request did affect either the cost or sched- about completing the job. I asked them to ule, we gave SAC the option of offering an consult me whenever a conflict arose over offset or elevating the proposed change to meeting their multiple staffing responsi- the program configuration and baseline- bilities, assuring them that we would ne- control board. In this way, we built trust gotiate a solution. Although I didn't sign and respect, accommodated many no-

Summer 2010 | 13 impact changes, and, to my knowledge, wrote a two-page trip report that went up never elevated a proposed change. the Air Force’s IG chain. Condensed into a The second example involved the Air short paragraph inserted in the IG’s weekly Force IG's DNS, who normally is not a activity report to the secretary of the Air member of the POG in order to preserve Force, the report quoted Lieutenant Colonel his independence. Traditionally, the DNS Shulstad as saying the B-1B would not reach received the minutes of POG meetings, at- its September 1986 IOC because it could not tended occasional meetings as an observer, attain nuclear certification in time. The and waited until near the end of the devel- condensed form did not mention my state- opment phase to begin an independent as- ment that we would not be doing business sessment of the nuclear-safety study and as usual. About a week later, General proposed safety rules. This approach sim- Thurman was blindsided by the secretary ply would not have worked with the B-1B o f the Air Force during a B-l B program because production had begun concur- review. Being responsible for blindsiding rently with development—an example of the boss is one of the quickest ways to what I meant when I said that business as end a career, but 1 survived when General usual would not suffice. I asked the DNS Thurman heard and validated the whole representative to become an involved ob- story; afterward, the Air Force IG apolo- server, requesting that he attend all POG gized to the secretary and General Thurman meetings and make his concerns and is- for the misinformation. He even let me

Every project encounters problems or barriers that must be resolved or overcome to move forward and achieve success.

sues known up front so that we could ad- retain the DNS as an involved observer in dress them and, hopefully, avoid costly de- the POG after I worked out some rules sign changes downstream. I even took the with the directorate that would prevent unprecedented step of inviting him to at- any recurrence of such miscommunica- tend some program engineering-design re- tion. As painful as this incident was at the views. I assured him that I understood and time, it contributed to building mutual respected his need for independence and trust and respect. that I knew we had no guarantees that DNS would not find a design flaw later dur- Challenge No. 6: Removing Harriers ing its independent assessment of the safety study. Every project encounters problems or barri- Opening up the POG for DNS participa- ers that must be resolved or overcome to tion and commenting that a husiness-as- move forward and achieve success. Identi- usual approach would not assure B-l B nu- fying these issues and working to resolve clear certification in time for the September them can prove especially difficult when 1986 IOC came back to haunt me. After my multiple agencies are involved and hierar- first POG meeting, the DNS representative chical authority is absent.

14 I Air & Space Power Journal V Sen io r leader Per spect ive

Almost immediately 1 realized that I organizations is critically important and es- had to fix the contractual disconnects to pecially challenging without hierarchical assure that we got the required level of authority. The key to meeting this problem support. Compounding this challenge was is implementing a participative planning the fact that many of the players who ne- approach that sets top-level milestones and gotiated the initial contracts on both the then delegates detailed planning to the government and contractor sides had level of execution. At that level, participants moved to other jobs. I did know, however, complete detailed planning by using a col- that both sides claimed that nuclear certi- laborative process involving all organiza- fication had been eliminated from the tions. At my first POG meeting, 1 set time baseline contracts because of its cost-an aside for the subgroups to begin the detailed estimated $50 million. planning process based on a few top-level Thanks to the planning effort discussed milestones. I asked that they meet prior to above, I had a good idea of what we my second meeting a month later, when we needed the contractors to do. Armed with examined and integrated all the required that knowledge, Rick Mael and I began a activities, assigned responsibilities, and de- painstakingly detailed fact-finding analy- termined the necessary time phasing. We sis of the baseline contract and contractor identified critical actions in both the lower- proposals for nuclear certification. With level subgroup plan and the top-level man- the help of the contractors and SPO func- agement schedule. Everyone left that sec- tional teammates, we found that most, but ond meeting with a clear understanding of not all, critical analyses and tests were what had to be done, by whom, with whose already in the baseline contract but not help, and by when. labeled nuclear certification per se. We 1 then shifted into a manage "perfor- also found that most of the government’s mance-to-the-plan" mode with monthly re- $50 million cost estimate was driven by views of subgroup progress and quarterly the assumed necessity of the dedicated reviews at the POG meetings. During these flight testing of weapons. We worked with reviews, we made adjustments as neces- the flight-test community to integrate sary, identified issues, and assigned action both captive-carry instrumented environ- items to resolve the issues and get back on mental testing of weapons and flight test- plan. Essentially, 1 used the plan to exercise ing of weapons delivery into the overall control and direct management functions, B-1B flight-test program. We did find that an important enabler when managing contractor support and participation in through influence! My replacement and the the POG and its subgroups had been elim- POG continued to use the plan in this way inated from the baseline contract and after I departed for a new assignment in needed to be covered. In the end, we ne- 1984; thus, the plan and my overall ap- gotiated contract changes with Rockwell proach survived a change of leadership and Boeing at a total cost of less than $5 about halfway through execution. million. After our briefing, General Thur- man directed that program-management reserve funds cover the $5 million. The B- Golden Nuggets 1 B baseline now explicitly incorporated nuclear certification. My responses to the seven challenges reflect both my strategy and leadership style that I used to direct the B-l B nuclear- Challenge lVo. 7: Building and Executing the Elan certification program. They also reflect an overarching commitment to mission accom- Building a comprehensive plan for a pro- plishment and ability to adapt leadership gram requiring support from a number of and management style to meet the practical

Summer 201D | 15 challenges of the complex situation I faced. in this complex environment must practice 1 had no prior experience in leading and sound management and effective leadership. managing through influence, yet the issues They must apply the basic management were clear from the beginning, and the ba- functions of organizing, planning, directing, sic framework of the strategy came together and controlling, but skills in persuasion and soon thereafter. The lessons I learned dur- negotiation become more important in the ing planning and execution are reflected in absence of hierarchical authority. my responses. Others can use my lessons Similarly, my responses to the challenges learned and approaches in any managing- discussed here reflect almost all of what I and-leading-through-influence environment. consider the essential elements of effective In generalized form, the following golden leadership: caring about people, setting the nuggets represent these best practices: vision and direction, communicating effec- 1. Secure and maintain commitment tively, embracing and instilling a positive through education and persuasion o f all attitude, staying proactive, and mentoring management layers in all organizations. and developing subordinates—even those who don't work directly for the leader.10 2. Thke charge through indirect, derived However, the involvement of multiple agen- sources of authority and exert influence. cies requires a more collegial, participative leadership style. 3. Obtain cooperation and teamwork by defining roles and responsibilities and Although the golden nuggets, manage- making expectations clear regarding ment, and leadership are all important for the need for action and progress. success, in the end the hard work of dedi- cated, talented, and empowered people 4. Open the lines of communication by makes the critical difference. I was very for- enabling all teammates to communi- tunate to have such a team on the B-1B cate with each other. nuclear-certification program. * 5. Build trust and respect through open, frank engagement and actions. Summary 6. Remove barriers to success with deter- mined collaborative effort, hard work, Managing a program or campaign that and negotiation when necessary. includes multiple organizations without hi- erarchical authority demands a manage- 7. Build and execute a comprehensive ment-and-leadership-through-influence ap- plan and use it to exercise direction proach. By examining a case study, I have and control. identified the best practices that can enable success in this kind of challenging environ- ment. I hope that others will benefit from Keys to Success what I learned and can apply that knowl- edge to become more effective managers In addition to applying the golden nug- and leaders in these kinds of complex envi- gets, individuals who wish to be successful ronments. ©

*1 want to acknowledge the.key members of the B-l B nuclear-certification team, whose dedication and hard work were instru- mental to the success we enjoyed: Earl Kelley (m y successor in the B-l B SPO); Johnny Davis ( B-l B SPO Safety); Tbm Roth, Ken Nelms, Jon Lowe, and Danny Lykins (B-I B SPO Engineering); Joe Hoerter (B-l B SPO Tfest); Jim Rau (B-l B Logistics); Chuck Witmack and Lynn Gulick (Rockwell); Hal Groves (Boeing); Phil Gannon (Air Force Flight Test Center); Bill Skadow (A ir Force Inspector General/ Directorate of Nuclear Surety); and Don Gluvna (Sandia Labs)

16 I Air & Space Power Journal Sy Sen io r leader per spect ive

Notes

1. Dr. Raymond A. Shulstad. Brigadier General, 5. The major exception to moderate risk was the USAF, Retired, “Perspectives on Leadership and Man- defensive avionics suite, something very technically agement,' Air and Space Power Journal 23. no. 2 challenging from the beginning. This risk was (Summer 2009): 11-18, http://www.airpower.au.af somewhat mitigated bv incrementally enhancing .mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/sum09/su m09.pdf. the defensive suite during aircraft production and 2. I asked Rick Mael to collaborate with me on by adding the ALCM, which provided a standoff ca- this article because of his unique perspective de- pability that would not require the B-1B to penetrate rived from being the only person in the B-1B SPO enemy defenses. who actually worked directly for me. Rick has re- 6. This model of having the government assume mained a professional colleague and close personal responsibility for integration was unprecedented in friend for the 28 years that have passed since I took aircraft acquisition programs; however, it had been charge of the B-1B nuclear-certification program. I successfully used for many years in intercontinental knew that I needed his help in getting the facts right ballistic missile programs, in w hich an engineering- after all this time and that his perspective as a support contractor—TRW —performed that role for trusted and respected subordinate would prove in- the government. valuable to balancing my views as a senior leader. 7. Maj Richard D. Mael, "B-1B: An Untold Success 3. Boeing's B-l B offensive avionics leveraged the Story,” research paper (Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces B-52 avionics-modernization program accomplished Staff College, 12 November 1986). as part of integrating air launched cruise missiles 8. Nuclear certification is governed by Depart- ( ALC.M) into the B-52. Similarlv AlL’s B-l B defensive ment o f Defense Directive 3150.2, DoD Nuclear avionics leveraged the significant flight testing of Weapon System Safety Program, 23 December 199f>, defensive systems on the B-l. sec. 4, "Policy,” http://ww w.dtic.mil/whs/directives/ 4. The initial baseline of $19.7 billion included both a conventional bomb capability and a nuclear eorres/pdf/315002p.pdf. weapon (bombs and short-range air-to-surface attack 9. W i t h i n the A i r Force, the I G ’s DNS , in o r d e r to missiles) capability. Soon after the awarding of ini- preserve its independence, participates in the POG tial contracts, S800 million was added to the base- as an observer rather than a member. line for integration of the ALCM, giving the B-1B a 10. Shulstad, “Perspectives on Leadership and standoff nuclear-delivery capability. Management," 13-15.

Dr. Raymond A. Shulstad, Brigadier General, USAF, Retired Dr. Shulstad (BS, University of Alabama; MS, PhD, Air Force Institute of Technology) is an independent consultant to industry and government for a broad range of topics, including organizational management and leadership, research and devel­ opment, and systems engineering and acquisition. In 2006 he retired as the senior vice president and general manager of MITRE's Center for Air Force Command and Control Systems. Prior to joining MITRE in 1999. he was the director of Strategic Planning for Surveillance and Battle Management Systems for Northrop Grumman Corporation. General Shulstad retired from the Air Force in 1994 after a distinguished 28-year career. His final assignments included vice-commander of the Aeronautical System Center at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio (1993-94). and vice-commander of the Electronic Systems Division, Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts (1991-93). His publications include Peace Is My Profession (National Defense University Press, 1986), a book that deals with the moral dimensions of US nuclear policy.

Summer 2010 | 17 The Art of Persuasion

Capt Lori Katowich, USAF, Editor

hroughout its history, Air and Space Consider alternate views and then focus Power journal (ASPj) has published your position. Simply put, do your research. a wide variety of articles—some Our most successful authors base their ar- relatively benign, others quite ticles on thorough research, taking into con- controversial.T All of our authors, however, sideration many sides of an argument. seek to persuade. Starting with an idea im- Without such consideration, any attempt to portant to them, they attempt to convey its persuade becomes only a rant. Viewing a significance to ASPf's readership, with vary- topic from many angles lends support to ing results. Many readers have already your position and enhances your under- made up their minds about a volatile sub- standing of interpretations that may starkly ject regardless of an article’s treatment of it, contrast with your own. You may even dis- but some may have no knowledge whatso- cover a better outcome than your initial as- ever of the topic at hand. As a prospective sumption. By addressing opposing posi- author, you may have thoughts to share on tions, you strengthen your credibility. a particular subject but don’t know where to Furthermore, careful consideration conveys start. Consider the following elements. to readers that you do not write instinc- Know your audience. Craft your writing tively or impulsively but that you proceed with the audience in mind. Not limited to from a firm foundation, arriving at your members of the US Air Force, ASPj’s diverse conclusion bv means of a logical progres- readership includes people in the Depart- sion based on fact. Not all readers will agree ment of Defense, other government agen- with you, and many may think that you cies, and academe, as well as their counter- simply lack a clear grasp of the situation. parts in foreign countries. All of them bring Exhaustive research will temper that view. their own biases and understanding to the Don’t antagonize the opposition. Rather journal There is no "right” presentation, yet than addressing philosophical allies, target the words you choose are important. readers who are neutral or even hostile to Use st mightfonvard language. For the sake your thesis. However, be aware that an of efficiency, homogeneous groups tend to overly aggressive approach will repulse the develop their own operating language, ones you want to win over. After all, people which, for example, may include abbrevia- under attack become defensive and fight tions and acronyms that have no meaning, back, ignoring 3'our reasoning—regardless or a completely different meaning, in other of its validity. Provoked readers, even contexts. By minimizing or simply explain- those who come to your subject without ing unique terms, you make your article strong opinions, may react by simply dis- more accessible. Straightforward language missing your remaining arguments. Pas- need not be boring or simplistic; neither is sionate writing is fine, but uncontrolled it necessarily condensed. The two accept- passion can be divisive. able, yet quite different, senses of the adjec- Use a logical approach to reach your con- tive biannual—twice a year or every two clusion. If you wish to win people to your years—illustrate the importance of using way of thinking, they must receive the mes- straightforward, precise language to reduce sage—specifically, by recognizing and ac- ambiguity and increase the chances that knowledging your thesis. Effective ASPj ar- readers will understand your message. ticles, which should address the operational

18 | Air & Space Power Journal Sy From the Editor

level of war, have followed a variety of doing so relegates the new information to structures: chronological, simple to com- filler and may damage your credibility. Of- plex, bottom to top, geographical, and so fer a substantive recommendation, not forth. In short, the organizational scheme something nebulous and essentially use- should fit the subject and the argument. less: "We should study this further." If Following a chaotic article is much like you’ve presented alternative outcomes, pick chasing squirrels: much effort rewarded by one and support your conclusion. Do the little sustenance. People are busy. If they facts call for implementation o f a new pro- have to work to follow your thinking, many gram? By whom? What would you do if you will put their time to better use. were "general for a day"? So what? You've laid out the facts, ana- Finally, give your article a title, but not lyzed them, and led your audience to a con- one of executive-summary length. Aim for clusion. Or have you? If you haven't an- 10 or fewer words. An eye-catching title can swered the question "so what?" do so now. persuade the audience to keep reading. In the conclusion, show your readers how We look forward to receiving your sub- the salient points coalesce. Do not make the missions. © mistake of introducing new material here;

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Summer 2010 I 19 We encourage you to e-mcul your comments to us at [email protected] We reserve the right to edit your remarks.

CHINA'S PERSPECTIVE ON HYBRID WARFARE AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IRREGULAR WARFARE With great interest, I read the article "Chi- I would like to commend the Honorable na’s Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence" by Robert Wilkie and Col John Jogerst, USAF, Sr Col Yao Yunzhu of the People's Libera- retired, for their excellent, thought-provok- tion Arm y (P L A ) o f China (W inter 2009, Air ing articles on hybrid warfare (“Hybrid War- and Space Power Joumal-Chinese; Spring fare: Something Old, Not Something New,” 2010, Air and Space Power Journal-English). Winter 2009) and irregular warfare (“Prepar- Researching Colonel Yao on the Internet, I ing for Irregular Warfare: The Future Ain’t learned that she was the first PLA service- What It Used to Be,” Winter 2009), respec- woman to earn a doctor's degree in military tively. In response to the shift from conven- science. When the published version of her tional warfare to hybrid warfare and irregu- doctoral dissertation “Post-World War II US lar warfare, both authors argue for the need Deterrence Theory and Policies” appeared, to improve the Air Force’s conventional ca- it reportedly represented the most compre- pabilities in support of counterinsurgency hensive analysis within China about US nu- (COIN). Although, as Jogerst observes, the clear strategy and deterrence theory. value of airpower in COIN is indisputable, I consider many of her statements in the Air Force continues to struggle in com- “China’s Perspective on Nuclear Deter- municating its role and contribution to the rence” quite important—for example, "Chi- joint tight in COIN. I agree with them and nese leaders mainly consider nuclear weap- recognize the Air Force’s communication ons a political instrument for employment struggle, but I am deeply concerned that at the level of grand strategy, not as a win- focusing on airpower's contribution to COIN will further divert national attention ning tool for military operations" (ASPJ- from strategies involving the use of air- English, p. 28) and “the basic logic o f Chi- power to achieve national objectives at na’s nuclear thinking conceives of nuclear much lower costs. weapons as a deterring, not a winning, in- Specifically, I have come to believe that strument against other such weapons" the national military strategy for the global (ASPJ-English, p. 29). war on terror is fundamentally flawed and As a reader concerned with China’s core should be challenged and revised. That interests, 1 highly appreciate ASPJ's publish- strategy today', as embodied in Iraq and Af- ing an article by an authentic Chinese strat- ghanistan, requires invading, occupying, egist who explains her military's strategy of stabilizing, and attempting to democratize nuclear deterrence. Reprinting this article nations that threaten our national interest in the other language editions of ASPJ would by supporting terrorism, seeking weapons help disseminate China's true nuclear per- of mass destruction, and so forth. This spective and policies, as well as its big- strategy requires the United States to de- power considerations regarding integrity ploy large numbers of ground forces to con- and responsibilities. Furthermore, doing so duct COIN operations until the host nation would help drive the discussion about the can carry the fight. As we have painfully so-called Chinese threat back onto the track learned, this takes many years—probably of rational and informed debate. decades. It also requires the United States to Hui Mai support corrupt governments viewed as US Jiangsu, China puppets that do not have the kind of public

20 | Air & Space Power Journal Sy RICOCHETS & REPLIES

support needed for long-term, democratic young Americans, and—worst of all —more self-governance. Of course, it has also fueled than likely fail. Changing course in no way hatred toward the United States in the Mus- implies that we have to lose the war on ter- lim world, resulting in an ever-increasing ror. For example, what if we invested a level of terrorism against us and our allies. 1 small fraction of the hundreds of billions of don't understand how we forgot the lessons dollars saved in improving our access to ac- of Vietnam or of Russia in Afghanistan. tionable, targetable intelligence? Then, as Now that the United States has spent more we have started doing in Pakistan, what if than eight years of failing to attain its objec- we used US airpower to kill those targets tives with this strategy, 1 was hoping that, until the nations involved become proactive rather than just focusing on how many and aggressive in killing them? more troops on the ground are necessary 1 know that these are complex, challeng- for COIN to succeed in Afghanistan, the ing times for our military and that there president would concentrate on the strategy are no easy solutions. 1 also know that it is itself. However, I was disappointed. important for the Air Force to support the I am especially disappointed that we con- joint fight. But the Air Force has capabili- tinue to ignore strategy options that would ties that, from a national perspective, may exploit the decisiveness of airpower. For ex- be more important than simply supporting ample, almost immediately after the 1986 COIN. We need to consider those capabili- air strike against Libya, Mu'ammar Gadhati ties in developing options for our national stopped his open sponsorship of terrorism, military strategy. later renouncing it completely and giving Brig Gen Raymond A. Shu Is tad, USAF, Retired up his ambitions to obtain nuclear weapons. Land O' Lakes, Florida I believe that such a strategy could have been equally effective in Iraq. For example, CYBERSPACE LEADERSHIP if we had put two or three cruise missiles on each of Saddam Hussein's more than 20 Gen Giulio Douhet once eloquently noted palaces, couldn't we have realized our ob- that "victory smiles upon those who antici- jective of toppling him or persuading him to pate changes in the character of war, not prove that Iraq had destroyed all of its upon those who wait to adapt themselves weapons of mass destruction? Isn’t there a after the changes have occurred." In "Cyber- chance that this strategy could have worked space Leadership: Towards New Culture, in Iraq and saved us hundreds of billions of Conduct, and Capabilities" (Fall 2009), Gen dollars, eight years of wearing out our Kevin Chilton writes that "the global cyber- troops on the ground in fruitless COIN op- space domain is where information is erations, and—most importantly—the lives moved today" (p. 6). Surveying the annals of thousands of brave, patriotic young of history, he then discusses the culture, Americans? Under this option, we would conduct, and capabilities that formerly or not have to struggle to defend the value of currently exist in the US military, drawing airpower—it would be obvious, as it was in parallels between those and the future of Libya in 1986 and in Operation Desert cyberspace leadership. According to Gen- Storm a few years later. eral Chilton, A number of high-level defense reviews If, as the adage states, the past truly is pro- are being conducted in parallel, but 1 have logue, a look back at lessons learned in the heard nothing to suggest that we are under- early days of military aviation may provide a taking a fresh, objective look at US national compelling paradigm for developing cyber- military policy and strategy. I hope I am space capabilities needed to address the chal- wrong because staying the present course lenges of today and tomorrow. How did we will take decades, cost hundreds of billions develop the capabilities of airpower for na- of dollars, result in the deaths of many tional security needs? What did we do right?

Summer 2010 | 21 What did we do wrong? And—the real ques- cause we have all of the information, so tion for today—how can we apply those les- let's stop trying to count, measure, and file sons learned in the field of airpower to our all of it. The hyperfocused, hyperlethal, ef- development of cyber power? (p. 6). fects-based cyberspace weapon of the future We certainly must learn the lessons of is the right piece of information at the right history (or be doomed to repeat them). time. This is the lesson we need to learn However, the Air Force’s cyber "speak” and the future we need to envision. seems more like a review or recitation of Maj Mark H. Jones Jr. history than innovative application of the Edwards AFB, California wisdom and judgment o f the air and space experts we claim to be. In a figurative sense, we are using rulers to measure the future of LEADERSHIP BY THE SOCRATIC METHOD the cyberspace domain and a chalkboard to draw a picture of what lies ahead. For ex- Maj Aaron Tucker’s article “Leadership by ample, General Chilton mentioned that it the Socratic Method" (Summer 2007) is very took him 45 days to determine the number well written and informative. As an Army of computers on our networks. Is this really aviator with 25 years of service, I found it the vital piece o f information that our stra- timely and very much on target. The So- tegic leadership requires to blaze a trail into cratic; method works well with adult learn- the wild blue cyberspace yonder? Similarly, ers. When considering the traits of an adult I recently heard a highly respected flight- learner (motivation, experience, degree of test professional—an engineering expert engagement, and application of the learned with countless }'ears of service—remark, skill), we can see that this method fits “Let so and so know that you are using a nicely with these characteristics by actively design of experiments [a type of statistical engaging the student in the learning pro- tool] in your planning, because we are cess. During flight instruction by either an tracking how often we use statistical tools.” actual instructor or aircraft commander, the Instead of using tools effectively to get the Socratic method has the learner asking job done, we are counting how many times questions in addition to displaying ability we use them. We are leveraging our tre- and skill. As Major Tucker mentions, "The mendous cyber capability to count things; student quickly learns that the instructor is Google does that much better than we can. there not to lecture (and unnecessarily in- We have failed to maximize the potential of crease the workload) but to serve as a cyberspace for global-information reach and sounding board for the student’s ideas and information-power projection; Twitter, You- actions” (p. 83). This process, combined Tube, and Facebook do that much better with traditional ground-school lectures, con- than we can. stitutes a well-rounded and effective We may not know what the cyberspace method of delivering information that en- future holds, but we should realize what it ables students to absorb instruction and is not. Cyberspace is not a high-definition learn by repetition, enforcement, and active picture of the battlespace on a big-screen participation. Please pass on my apprecia- television—we tend to lose sight of the for- tion to the author. est for the trees. Nor is it 200,000 hits on an CW4 Brian J. Martin, US Army Reserve Internet search engine. Information and Johns Hopkins University cyberspace supremacy will not occur be-

22 | Air <£ Space Power Journal V V ie w s & Analyses

Should the United States Maintain the Nuclear Triad?

Dr. Adam B. Low ther*

n the first week o f Pres. Barack Obama's mately lead to creation of a nuclear monad new administration, the White House before reaching total disarmament:' released his agenda, stating the policies I 1. Post-Cold War presidents have failed the president will pursue regarding the nu- to alter nuclear policy for the current clear arsenal. The agenda includes three security environment. foci: securing loose nuclear material from terrorists, strengthening the Nuclear Non- 2. Terrorism, not Russia, is the primary Proliferation Treaty, and moving toward a threat facing the United States. Nu- nuclear-free world.1 Pushing the president clear weapons do not deter terrorists. in the direction of a “world without nuclear weapons" are such paragons of past political 3. America’s advanced conventional ca- power as former senator Sam Nunn and for- pabilities can accomplish the same mer secretaries of state George Shultz and objectives as nuclear weapons. Henry Kissinger.- Adding a host of Washing- 4. As a signer of the Nuclear Non- ton's think-tank analysts to this list pro- Proliferation TVeatv, the United States duces a crescendo of voices calling for must move toward nuclear abolition. “global zero.” They challenge not only the current size of the arsenal but also the very 5. Only nuclear disarmament can over- need for a nuclear triad. Much of the recent come the threats of accidental detona- scholarship shows a clear preference for tion, miscalculation leading to nuclear moving to a monad composed solely of sub- war, and proliferation of nuclear marines armed with submarine-launched weapons and material. ballistic missiles (SLBM) until the United States ultimately disarms.1 6. The safest and most secure leg of the Some past and present members of the nuclear triad is the sea-based one. military leadership hold a view that supports Thus, it should become the sole deliv- the nuclear arsenal. Senior leaders have given ery platform for the nuclear arsenal.6 a number of public speeches and interviews Admittedly, each of these arguments has outlining what it will take to maintain and modernize the most advanced and secure some element of truth; they do not, how- nuclear arsenal in the world.-1 A key aspect ever, represent a complete understanding of of the general position held by supporters the strategic role played by nuclear weap- of the arsenal includes retaining the triad ons in ensuring the sovereignty of the and replacing aging platforms. United States or the specific contribution of In the ongoing debate over the appropri- each leg of the triad. Although each of the ate size and purpose of the nuclear arsenal, abolitionists’ arguments deserves a detailed abolitionists—clearly in the ascendency- refutation, a focus on the relevance of the make six basic arguments that would ulti- triad must suffice.

•The author is a military defense analyst with the Air Force Research Institute, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Summer 2010 | 23 Development of the Triad had declined to 347 total aircraft.” Today, nuclear-capable bombers account for about In 1947, the year the United States Air half of the Air Force's bomber fleet of 162 Force became an independent service, the aircraft.12 American military was attempting to de- A second leg became part of the nation’s velop sound tactical, operational, and strate- nuclear arsenal in 1959 with deployment of gic doctrine for the use o f nuclear weapons. the first six Atlas D ICBMs. Just three years Just two years earlier, a new and devastat- later, the first Minuteman I deployed. Not ing weapon had changed the face of war- until 1970 did America's ICBM force reach fare, but the full implications of the atom its peak with a mix of 1,054 Titan II and bomb were yet to be realized. In a flurry of Minuteman I, II, and III missiles—most of activity, the academic, military, and policy which carried three to 12 warheads. These communities undertook much writing and numbers remained constant until 1982.13 studying as the nation sought to understand Since then, the number of operationally de- nuclear weapons while also confronting the ployed ICBMs has steadily declined to its Soviet Union. As technology developed over current size of 450.M the following decades, the nation moved The addition of the Polaris SLBM in 1960 from depending on a fleet of long-range completed the triad. Like the other two bombers as the sole method of delivering legs, SLBMs waxed at the height of the Cold nuclear weapons (1945-59) to a nuclear War and waned as it ended. By 1967 the triad composed of bombers, intercontinental United States had deployed 656 SLBMs ballistic missiles (ICBM), and SLBMs.7 aboard 41 ballistic missile submarines During the 1950s, Pres. Dwight Eisenhower (SSBN). When the Soviet Union collapsed in believed that an American effort to main- December 1991, the sea leg of the triad re- tain conventional parity with the Soviet mained largely intact with 33 SSBNs carry- Union would destroy the US economy and ing 608 SLBMs.1* Today, however, only 14 bankrupt the federal treasury.” Thus, his Ohio-class submarines remain, each carry- administration turned to the nuclear arsenal ing 24 Trident II nuclear missiles. as a substitute for conventional parity. In Throughout the Cold War, the United the president’s view, the United States could States maintained a substantial inferiority effectively deter Soviet aggression by plac- in conventional military forces but enjoyed ing greater emphasis on nuclear weapons the protection of a sizable nuclear umbrella. in American national security policy. Com- As the Cold War progressed and American monly called the "New Look,” the presi- thinking about nuclear conflict developed, dent's emphasis on the growth of advanced "assured destruction" took precedence as nuclear weapons and delivery platforms led the approach of choice. Developed by to development of a large fleet of nuclear Thomas Schelling and others while he bombers and, by the end of the Eisenhower worked for the RAND Corporation in the administration, the nuclear triad." Com- 1960s, the concept o f assured destruction posed of three legs, the triad provides the purposefully left the United States vulner- United States with three distinct delivery able to a first strike, yet the nation main- platforms for nuclear weapons. tained a credible second-strike capability.u> The first and oldest leg includes the na- Although nuclear policy evolved through- tion’s long-range bombers and their payload out the Cold War, its essential nature re- of gravity bombs and air launched cruise mained much the same. Because o f the ex- missiles. At its apex in the early to mid- orbitant fiscal cost of building a large 1960s, Strategic A ir Command included underground industrial infrastructure, for more than 1,300 nuclear-capable bombers, example, the nation chose to accept the risk including 700 of the then-new B-52s.in By of an unprotected public—but only as long 1990 the nation’s long-range bomber fleet as it was defended by bombers standing at

24 | Air

Summer 2010 | 25 The Current Debate Abolitionists are willing to accept a submarine-based monad because they con- In an era dominated by nonstate actors sider submarines the most secure leg of the (terrorists, international criminal gangs, triad. These vessels also obviate the need and insurgents), rogue regimes, and rising for operationally deployed nuclear weapons powers, some members of the Air Force are on US soil. Supposedly, the absence of these asking whether the triad is still relevant or weapons would reduce the likelihood of a whether nuclear abolitionists are correct in counterforce strike against the homeland. suggesting that the United States adopt a Because these arguments seem reason- monad as the nation moves toward zero. able and each contains an element of truth, The answers to these questions deserve they have wide appeal. But if the United considerable attention. In short, however, States were to adopt a monad, the nation’s the triad is as relevant today as it was at the ability to deter current and future adversar- height o f the Cold War. Nevertheless, before ies would decline precipitously for four key offering a justification for maintaining the reasons. triad, one should explain the position of nu- clear abolitionists. The Counterview

The Abolitionists’ Position First, deterrence, the capstone of American foreign policy since the end of World War II, According to the most recent reports and relies on effectively making an adversary studies published by advocates of nuclear believe that the risks involved in changing abolition, the United States should initiate the status quo outweigh any potential re- complete disarmament by taking the fol- wards. To achieve effective deterrence, the lowing actions.Ji First, abolitionists desire to United States must have the capability and, remove the 76 remaining B-52H and 19 B-2 most importantly, credibility to create the bombers from nuclear-capable service.'1 By desired psychological effect. Moving to a maintaining an arsenal of 500-1,000 war- nuclear deterrence strategy that effectively heads, as abolitionists suggest, the United depends on a half dozen deployed sub- States no longer needs the bomber leg of marines undermines both capability and the triad. Additionally, the nation’s long- credibility. Contrary to the admonitions of range bombers are slow to reach their tar- abolitionists, adopting a monad sends a gets, cannot penetrate advanced antiair de- clear signal to America’s adversaries that fenses (with the exception of the B-2), and the nation does not value nuclear weapons are expensive to procure and maintain. to the degree it once did and will be more Second, abolitionists seek to dismantle reluctant to use a diminished arsenal in the the nation’s 450 ICBMs, which need expen- future. This emboldens adversaries and de- sive upgrades or replacement and present creases the confidence that US allies have the nation’s adversaries a target on Ameri- in the nation’s extended deterrence. can soil. Successful deterrence depends completely Third, abolitionists are willing to accept, upon simply and effectively communicat- for the near term, a nuclear deterrence ing desire and intent to allies and adversar- strategy that relies solely on a dozen Ohio- ies. Dramatically reducing the size of the class SSBNs (after downsizing from the arsenal and killing two legs of the triad, present 14), each armed with 24 Trident II while claiming that the United States re- SLBMs.-5 According to their strategy, the mains serious about nuclear deterrence, United States will maintain half of its would send a mixed signal. The historical SSBNs at sea at any given time while the record does not offer analogous examples ol other half is in port at one o f two desig- arms reductions leading to the maintenance nated submarine bases. of credibility. On the contrary, the Washing-

26 | Air <£ Space Power Journal S / VIEWS & ANALYSES

ton Naval Tteaty (1922), which limited the prove too costly for many potential prolif- tonnage of major world navies, may have erators. On the other hand, they increase played a key role in leading the Japanese to risks for an adversary by driving him to a attack Pearl Harbor.26 Admittedly, such strategy (counterforce) requiring the elimi- counterfactual claims are difficult to prove. nation of American ICBMs in an effort to Second, since signaling intent is a vital prevent a US counterstrike. Forcing an ad- aspect of successful deterrence, eliminating versary to strike the United States in or- the bomber leg of the triad would be a mis- der to eliminate its nuclear arsenal serves take. Designed to remain hidden from the as a strong deterrent when the enemy view of an adversary, ICBMs and SSBNs of- considers a nuclear attack. Moreover, fer no effective way of conveying American these missiles are the only leg of the triad resolve or an escalation de-escalation in that can hit any spot on the earth within posture, should an adversary move toward half an hour. conflict. The bomber fleet, however, effec- Fourth, should the United States adopt tively demonstrates resolve. For example, if the plan advocated by abolitionists, the na- an adversary were to openly challenge the tion’s adversaries would know full well that status quo, the president could order the half the nuclear arsenal would be in port at nation's B-52s and B-2s on alert, put them in any given time, vulnerable to destruction the air, and/or deploy them to forward by a single nuclear missile targeting each of bases. All o f these actions are visible signals the two designated nuclear submarine

The United States may soon face a real scenario in which two nuclear missiles and a half dozen torpedoes can destroy the entire operationally deployed strategic nuclear arsenal—something no American should desire.

of American intent, designed to lead to a bases. Contrary to what Americans are led de-escalation of tensions. Without question, to believe, Russia and China maintain ad- bombers are the most effective tool for vanced submarine-detection capabilities overtly demonstrating resolve. that may enable either nation to detect, A related point arises. Nuclear-capable track, and sink the half of the nuclear arse- bombers are one of the best tools for assur- nal (six submarines) at sea.- Moving to a ing allies that the United States remains submarine-based monad will also encour- committed to providing a credible extended age adversaries of the United States to focus deterrent. Neither ICBMs nor submarines technological development on advanced can provide a visible show of resolve in the sonar and torpedo technology. Doing so will face of danger. Deploying nuclear bombers simplify the calculation for an adversary to an ally's air base not only assures Ameri- seeking to neutralize the American arsenal. ca’s friends but also deters the nation’s foes. The United States may soon face a real Third, ICBMs offer two distinct benefits scenario in which two nuclear missiles and that a submarine force cannot replicate. On a half dozen torpedoes can destroy the en- the one hand, they raise the cost of entry tire operationally deployed strategic nu- into the nuclear club as a peer of the United clear arsenal—something no American States. ICBMs require expensive and ad- should desire. Redundancy, which the triad vanced missile technology, which may provides, offers a level of protection that a

Summer 2010 | 27 submarine-based nuclear arsenal would faces. With the nuclear club expanding and greatly diminish. likely to gain new members hostile to the Increasing American vulnerability and United States, weakening the nuclear triad decreasing American capability do not rep- is unwise. Doing so not only will under- resent a strategy for successful deterrence. mine American credibility lout also will As history demonstrates, deterrence works cause allies to doubt America’s commit- when the United States effectively con- ment to extended deterrence. This could vinces its adversaries that an attack on lead allies to pursue their own nuclear arse- America will fail to carry out the desired nals as a hedge against American weakness objectives and will invoke massive retalia- and perceived threats yet to materialize. tion. Any other approach to deterrence is Even though we Americans are gener- doomed to failure. ous, well-intentioned people, others do not Relying on what abolitionists refer to as necessarily wish us well. We would be wise “minimum deterrence" is a recipe for plac- to remember that fact. As the great Roman ing the American people at greater risk, not strategist Vegetius once wrote, “Si vis pacem less.2* Even though the United States will para bellum" (If you desire peace, prepare likely suffer a terrorist attack, it is certainly for war). Q not the most dangerous threat the nation Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Notes

1. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack abolitionist camp believe in nuclear abolition as a Obama,” Office of the Press Secretary, The White relevant and obtainable goal. See the Global Zero House, 5 April 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ Web site, http://www.globalzero.org; and Barack the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama Obama, "Remarks by the President at the United -In-Prague-As-Delivered. Nations Security Council Summit on Nuclear Non- 2. Ibid.; and George P. Shultz et al„ “Toward a Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament,” Office of Nuclear-Free World," Wall Street Journal, 15 January the Press Secretary, The White House, 24 September 2008, http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/ 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ SB120036422673589947. h t m 1. Remarks-By-The-President-At-the-UN-Security-Council 3. Ivo Daalder and Ian Lodal, “The Logic of Zero," -Sum mit-On-Nuelear-Non-Proliferation-And-Nuclear Foreign Affairs 87, no. 6 (November 2008): 80-95. -Disarmament. 4. Gen Kevin P. Chilton (remarks to the Strategic 6. For a detailed discussion of the arguments Weapons in the 21st Century Conference, Ronald made by nuclear abolitionists, see Adam Lowther, Reagan International TYade Center, Washington, DC, Challenging Nuclear Abolition, Research Paper 2009-4 31 January 2008); and Office of the Under Secretary (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Research Institute, Au- of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logis- gust 2009), http://www.afa.org/EdOp' 2010 Logic tics, Report o f the Defense Science Hoard Task Force on _of_Nuclear_Arsenal.pdf. Nuclear Deterrence Skills (Washington, DC: Office of 7. Douglas P. Lackey, Moral Principles and Nu- the Lender Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, clear Weapons (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, Tfechnologv, and Logistics, September 2008). 1986), 43. 5. W ith in the g ro u p b r o a d l y defin ed as n uclear 8. D oug las Kin n a rd , President Eisenhower and abolitionists are a number of varying opinions. Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics Some—such as Richard Branson and Queen Noor of (New York: Pergamon-Brassev’s, 1989), 1-25. Jordan, who ascribe to global zero—support a uni- 9. Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s Ncw-Look National lateral move by all nuclear powers to abolish nu- Security Policy, 1953-61 (New York: St. Martin's clear weapons. Others, such as Henry Kissinger and Press, 1996), 48-62. George Shultz, believe that slow and steady reduc- 10. Rebecca Grant, Return o f the Bomber: The tions are the proper approach. All parties within the Future of Long-Range Strike, Air Force Association

28 | Air Path toward Elim i- US Strategic Bomber Forces” (Washington, DC: Natu- nating Nuclear Weapons, Occasional Paper no. 7 ral Resources Defense Council, 2002), http://wxvxv (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists .nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb'da tab7.asp# ninety. and the Natural Resources Defense Council, April 12. *2009 USAF Almanac: The Air Force in Facts 2009), http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/Occasional and Figures,” Air Force Magazine 92, no. 5 (May Paper7.pdf; and Joint Working Group of the Ameri- 2009): 48. can Association for the Advancement of Science; 13. Natural Resources Defense Council, “Table of American Physical Society; and Center for Strategic US 1CBM Forces" (Washington, DC: Natural Resources and International Studies, Nuclear Weapons in 21st Defense Council, 2002), http://www.nrdc.org/ Century U.S. National Security (Washington, DC: nuclear.'nudb datab3.asp. AAAS, APS. and Center for Strategic and Interna- 14. “LGM-30G Minuteman III," fact sheet, US Air tional Studies, December 2008), http://www.aps Force. December 2009, http: www.af.mil/information/ .org/pol icy/reports/popa-reports/upload/nuclear factsheets factsheet.asp?id = 113. -weapons.PDF. 15. Natural Resources Defense Council, “Tible of 24. Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodbv, What US Ballistic Missile Submarine Forces” (Washington, Are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations for Re- DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2002), structuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces (Washington, hop: www.nrdc.org nuclear'nudb/databS.asp. DC: Arms Control Association, October 2007), 16. See Thomas C. Schelling, Anns and Influence http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/20071104 (New Haven, CT: Vale University Press, 1966). In this _Drell_Goodby_07_new.pdf. seminal work on coercion, Schelling lays out the 25. This is an acknowledgement by the more concepts that served as the rationale for Cold W'ar pragmatic members of the abolitionist camp that deterrence strategy. unilateral disarmament is not possible. See George 17. D a v i d S. Painter, The Cold War: An Interna- P. Shultz et al., "How to Protect Our Nuclear Deter- tional History (New York: Routledge, 1999); and Ste- rent," Wall Street Journal, 19 January 2010, http:// phen J. Cimbala, The Past and Future o f Nuclear De- online. vvsj.eom/article/SB10001424052748704152804 terrence (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 1998), 574628344282735008. htm 1. 11-12,23-25. 26. Had the Pacific fleet been as large as advo- 18. Charles Krauthammer, “Don't Cash the Peace cated by the Department of the Navy in the years Dividend," Time Magazine, 26 March 1990, http:// prior to 7 December 1941 and not constrained by an www.time.com time, magazine/article/0,9171 ai ms-limitation treaty, there is reason to believe that ,969672.00.html; and Keith B. Payne, The Great the Japanese would not have come to the conclusion American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice that a "knockout blow” was possible. from the Cold War to the Uventy-firsr Centunj (Fair- 27. Marcel van Leeuwen, "Russia Starts Ka-28 ASW fax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008), chap. 3. Deliveries to China," Aviation News, 11 October 2009, 19. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its http://wxm.aviationnews.eu/2009/10/ll/russia Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), chap. 5. -starts-ka-28-asw-de.liveries-to-c.hina/; and "Russian 20. Francis Fukuyama, “The End ol History?” Sonar Technology," Warfare, http://warfare.ru/ National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 4. ?linkid=2085&catid = 3.32 (accessed 29 January 2010). 21. Obama, “Remarks by President Barack 28. Kristensen, Norris, and Oelrich, From Coun- Obama.” terforce to Minimal Deterrence, 1-2. 22. Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (New York: Random House, 2005), 6.

Summer 2010 | 29 Updating a Cold War Relic Ensuring That the New Air Force Doctrine Document 3 Reflects Current Air Force Roles and Missions

Lt Col David K. Moeller, USAF“

The evolution of contingency operations, the rapid maturation of space and information warfare have transformed the effectiveness of air and space power.

-A ir Force Doctrine Document 1, A ir Force Basic Doctrine, 17 Novem ber 2003

he United States Air Force is at a forces in military operations."2 The key crossroads. In 2008 the secretary of term here is military operations. During T defense dismissed the secretary and much of the Air Force’s existence, it consid- chief of staff of the Air Force and raised ered such actions major contingency opera- questions about the service's commitment tions against an adversary possessing sig- to the US nuclear enterprise. Moreover, in nificant conventional and/or nuclear light of the current counterinsurgencies in military capability, an assumption that dic- Afghanistan and Iraq, the other military ser- tated the development of doctrine heavily vices and defense analysts have openly favoring the wartime application of air- questioned the need for a technologically power.3 However, since the end of the Cold advanced Air Force. Why have such actions War, the concept of military operations has and questions occurred? Why, specifically, grown to include missions such as humani- does the Air Force seem to be losing tarian assistance, disaster relief, counter- credibility with senior defense officials? insurgency, irregular warfare, and theater- One contributing factor could be that the security cooperation with partner nations. Air Force has not revised and updated its The Air Force has published doctrine for doctrine to provide guidance on operational- these mission areas, yet the capstone publi- level employment across the continuum of cation for its operations—Air Force Doc- military operations; instead, those docu- trine Document (AFDD) 2, Operations and ments continue to favor kinetic operations Organization, 3 April 2007—still reflects a during times of conflict. This bias tends to narrow focus on kinetic operations that does inhibit cross-domain integration of air, not represent how the service contributes space, and cyberspace capabilities, thus to the joint fight across the continuum of placing Air Force planners at a disadvantage military operations. when they design joint operations.1 Air During the process of updating and re- Force doctrine serves as “a statement of of- numbering AFDD 2 to AFDD 3, doctrine ficially sanctioned beliefs, warfighting prin- writers should revise the content to provide ciples, and terminology that describes and Airmen a true capstone document that ar- guides the proper use of air and space ticulates foundational air, space, and cvber

'Th e author is currently assigned to the 333rd Fighter Squadron at Seymour Johnson AFR. North Carolina A former instructor at the USAF Weapons School. Nellis AFB. Nevada, he is a graduate of the School ot Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

30 | Air & Space Power Journal concepts and offers guidance for operational- across the varying levels of warfare. Unfor- level planning and synchronization during tunately, we find little support for these joint operations. Expanding this document statements since the remainder of the chap- to accurately reflect the capabilities that air, ter narrowly examines the kinetic applica- space, and cyber forces bring to the wide tion of airpower during major conflicts, range of military operations will enhance drawing on examples from Operations Des- our understanding of Air Force roles and ert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. The chapter missions, provide planning guidance to concludes with a brief discussion of the em- operational-level staffs, and create a single- ployment of air and space power utilizing source reference document that addresses parallel, asymmetric operations during of- the relationship among air, space, and cyber- fensive military actions. space concepts, planning, and operations. Chapter 2 begins by declaring that “the overriding objective of any military force is to be prepared to conduct combat opera- What Does Air Force tions in support of national political objec- Doctrine Document 2 Say? tives—to conduct the nation’s wars.'"1 Even though many people may argue for a much AFDD 2, the capstone publication for more Clausewitzian objective —to support operational-level doctrine, includes guid- policy—and point out that conducting com- ance for "organizing, planning, and employ- bat operations is a point along a broader ing air and space forces at the operational continuum of state interaction, this opening level of conflict across the full range of mili- statement accurately lays the groundwork tary operations.”-1 Divided into eight chap- for the follow-on treatment of an effects- ters, it covers topics such as conducting op- based approach to operations (EBAO), the erations, commanding Air Force forces principal concern of the chapter. Framed (AFFOR), organizing air and space expedi- within a construct of inducing change in an tionary task forces, nesting the air and space adversary to achieve a desired outcome, the component within a joint force, and plan- well-balanced discussion of EBAO applies to ning for joint operations; it concludes by operations during both peace and conflict, discussing air and space operations centers setting a baseline for expanding the topic in and the AFFOR staff. This article confines chapter 6. itself to chapter 1, "An Introduction to Air and The second section of chapter 2 ad- Space Operations"; chapter 2, "Operations”; dresses air and space (but not cyberspace) and chapter 6, "Planning for Operations.” power across the range of military opera- Chapter 1 lays the foundation for under- tions. It includes an overarching discussion standing the nature o f air and space power of the need for air and space superiority be- by noting that it “arises from the use of le- fore and during offensive operations, devot- thal and nonlethal means by air and space ing just a small portion to air and space op- forces to achieve strategic, operational, and erations in other types of military actions. tactical objectives" and that “air and space Of note, other than a listing under the head- power has the ability to conduct operations ing "Crisis Response Operations," the sec- and impose effects across the entire theater, tion "Engagement, Cooperation, and Deter- wherever targets or target sets might be rence Operations" enumerates only general found.”s The chapter then describes how we examples of operations, without mentioning should categorize targets by the effects we noncombatant-evacuation operations, intend to produce as a result of engaging peacekeeping, or humanitarian assistance. them rather than by their physical location. The chapter concludes by briefly address- Such statements reveal that airpower in- ing the political dimension of smaller-scale tends to produce lethal and nonlethal ef- contingencies and the "Termination, Transi- fects throughout a theater of operations and tion, and Redeployment" of forces. Thus,

Summer 2010 | 31 the second section of chapter 2 provides only document enjoys support from 27 subordi- a general discussion and a listing of consid- nate two-series doctrine publications that erations. It omits the linkage between the comprise a compendium of operational- EBAO methodology presented in the first level guidance available to the planning part and the missions described in the latter staff.,i However, only limited guidance exists portion. Most of the chapter contains only a on synchronization of air, space, and cyber- roster of operations and no discussion spe- space activities, and the lack of information cific to air and space operations except those about a representative air campaign along a that occur during major kinetic campaigns. continuum of military operations detracts Chapter 6 contains an overview of the from the overall value of the document. In- joint planning process, with an emphasis on stead, AFDD 2 needs rewriting to supply

AFDD 2 needs rewriting to supply more accurate guidance to operational planners and to better portray the roles and functions of air, space, and cyberspace forces during a campaign.

joint operations. However, seven of its 24 more accurate guidance to operational plan- pages review Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, ners and to better portray the roles and Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006, functions of air, space, and cyberspace and 10 expand the discussion o f EBAO in forces during a campaign. chapter 2. In the remaining seven pages, which offer an overview of the joint air and space estimate process, AFDD 2 should pro- What Should Air Force vide guidance on synchronizing cross- Doctrine Document 3 Say? domain air, space, and cyberspace capabili- ties into a holistic air campaign plan. As The Air Force promulgates and teaches currently written, however, this chapter ex- doctiine as a common frame of reference amines three topics (planning processes, on the best way to prepare and employ effects-based planning, and the joint air and air and space forces. space estimate process) without clearly pre- —AFDD 1, A ir Force Basic Doctnnc. senting an architecture for linking or relat- 17 N o v e m b e r 2003 ing the processes to produce a joint air and space operations plan for theater opera- The current AFDD 2 "describes how the tions. Chapter 6 mentions AFDD 2-1, Air US Air Force organizes and employs air and Warfare, 22 January 2000, and AFDD 2-1.9, space power at the operational level across Targeting, 8 June 2006, thereby reinforcing the range of military operations."9 The doc- AFDD 2's concentration on kinetic opera- ument does not reach this lofty goal be- tions during major conflicts. cause of its focus on the kinetic application In sum, AFDD 2 fails to meet its stated of airpower during major conflicts. Further- objective of offering guidance for "organiz- more, it fails to develop the following foun- ing, planning and employing air and space dational doctrine statements: "air and space forces at the operational level of conflict power operates in ways that are fundamen- across the full range of military operations,” tally different from other forms of military mentioned above. At present, this baseline power”; "air and space forces can wrest the

32 | Air & Space Power Journal Sy Views & analyses

initiative . .. anticipate the enemy, and operations center since the supporting take advantage of tactical and operational two-series publications could address staff opportunities"; and “when employed ag- functions. The first section would also ad- gressively, air and space forces can conduc t dress the joint authorities that the joint operations aimed directly at accomplishing force commander could delegate to the the joint force commander's . . . objec- AFFOR commander. Such authorities tives.’’1" The rewrite, AFDD 3, should truly should include the joint force air compo- describe the employment ot air, space, and nent commander, area air defense com- cyberspace power across the continuum of mander, airspace control authority, and military operations by incorporating the space coordinating authority—all founda- “best practices" outlined in the 27 support- tional with regard to operational-level ing two-series publications. Ironically, the planning. Thus, this section of AFDD 3 Air Force already possesses a construct for would offer baseline guidance on how to a holistic capstone document with multiple organize and command AFFOR as well as supporting documents—the three-series integrate those forces into joint operations. publications." The second section would concentrate Highlighting Air Force tactics, tech- on guidance for planning full-spectrum niques, and procedures, this series serves as air, space, and cyberspace operations. Be- “tactics manuals" for employing the vast cause no Air Force doctrine manual dedi- majority of air and space platforms and cated to planning exists, the content of concepts. At the forefront of this series is a this section would resemble that of capstone document divided into three sec- JP 5-0 and JP 3-30, Command and Control tions, the first of which describes the funda- for Joint A ir Operations, 12 January 2010. mentals of airpower and the role of tactical This section would discuss three related command and control. From this baseline, topics: the joint operation planning pro- the document covers tactical mission plan- cess-air (JOPP-A); the phasing of Air ning.and mission-planner considerations Force operations across the continuum of using concepts taken from the supporting military operations from “phase zero" to three-series publications and designed to the postconflict environment; and spe- convey general information that tacticians cific operational-planning factors for op- need to understand fundamental planning erations currently defined by AFDD 2 as factors for carrying out the tactical mission. "smaller scale contingencies," "crisis re- The final section offers an overview of vari- sponse operations," and "engagement, ous topics such as space and information cooperation, and deterrence opera- operations. The three-series publications tions."’ ’ As previously mentioned, given succeed in providing tacticians a well- the absence of an Air Force doctrine organized, concise construct that explains manual dedicated to planning, the basic planning factors for tactical-level inte- JOPP-A material would give the reader gration augmented by detailed discussion in step-bv-step guidance. The information supporting publications. on phasing, though closely related to the A proposed construct for AFDD 3 would methodology of JP 5-0, would emphasize follow the same guidelines and include the planning of theater campaigns in- three separate sections, the first of which stead of major contingency operations. would present an overview of airpower Thus it would present air and space power and its relationship to joint forces. It would as a strategic asset able to generate the- retain topics such as commanding and or- ater effects ranging from deterring adver- ganizing AFFOR, given their overall consis- saries, through guaranteeing the security tency across the continuum of military op- of partner nations and conducting ki- erations, hut omit any mention of the netic operations against an adversary, to AFFOR staff as well as the air and space planning possible postconflict scenarios.

Summer 2010 | 33 Additionally, the second section would Conclusion build on the command relationships and authorities described in section one of This recommended construct should the proposed AFDD 3 to deliver guidance move AFDD 2 beyond its current deficien- on developing command relationships cies, transforming it into a document— and synchronizing requirements for the AFDD 3—that clearly links the foundational various authorities into an operational principles of air, space, and cyberspace; op- campaign or task force. erational-level planning; and employment. The third section should focus on op- This update is especially relevant since the erations, offering a concise, general over- concept of military operations continues to view o f the employment of air, space, encompass more than major contingency and cyber forces in specific mission ar- operations and since requirements for joint eas such as major combat operations, operational planning continue to increase counterinsurgencies, disaster relief, proportionally. We can leverage the Air space situational awareness, and cyber Force’s rich history of operations to design network defense. The format of this sec- AFDD 3 as a document relevant to today’s tion would draw on important informa- operational planners. As noted by AFDD 1, tion from supporting publications—such “doctrine shapes the manner in which the as AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, 22 January Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and sus- 2000, and AFDD 2-2, Space Operations, 27 tains its forces."1* Consequently, this cap- November 2006 —and therefore serve as a stone guidance document for planning and single-source reference for air, space, and employing air, space, and cyberspace forces cyberspace operations. Because this sec- at the operational level must include a ho- tion would rely heavily on the support- listic discussion that is relevant across the ing publications, extensive links should join it to the detailed information con- continuum of military operations. © tained within those publications. Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina

Notes

1. The author experienced this problem as a space. However, this omission underscores the need long-range planner for US Air Forces Central from to revise and update the document to reflect cross- 2008 to 2010. domain integration and planning o f air, space, and 2. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air cyberspace. Force Basic Doctrine, 17 No v e m b e r 2003, 3, http:// 8. The term tivo-series refers to the fact that each www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afddl.pdf. manual's designation begins with the number 2 3. For a comprehensive discussion of the devel- (e.g., 2-1, 2-2, etc). opment of Air Force doctrine, see Robert Frank 9. A F D D 2, Operations and Organization, [i|. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in 10. I b i d . , xi . the United States Air Force, 2 vols. (Maxwell AFB, AL: 11. The term three-series refers to the fact that Air University Press, 1980). each manual's designation begins with the number ■1. AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, 3 Ap ril 3 (e.g., 3-1, 3-2.28, 3-3.4, etc.). 2007, vii, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service 12. AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, 22-24, _pubs/afdd2.pdf. and 29. The 705th Training Squadron compiled a 5. Ibid., 1. "Commander’s Handbook for Joint Operation Plan- 6. Ibid., 13. ning Process-Air" that could be incorporated into 7. The publication date of AFDD 2 (3 April 2007) AFDD 2 planning discussions. may explain the absence of any discussion of cyber- 13. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 3.

34 | Air & Space Power Journal yy views & Analyses

Beddown Options for Air National Guard C-27J Aircraft Supporting Domestic Response

Col John Conway, USAF, Retired*

Disasters, by their very nature, occur locally-in communities very often far removed from Federal assets The elements of the homeland security enterprise geared toward responding to disasters are thus widely distributed. . . State, local, territorial, and tribal responders unU usually be the first official presence on the scene, while the Federal Government will provide support when effective response exceeds their capabilities. —Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, F ebru ary 2010

ebate regarding addition of the Joint rity role. In separate reports to be attached Cargo Aircraft (JCA) to the mili- to their versions of the FY 10 National De- tary’s inventory has spanned nu- fense Authorization Act, both the House merous years, and the program has endured Armed Services Committee (HASC) and the many revisions. Envisioned as a short-haul Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) asset designed to deliver supplies the “last directed the National Guard and Air Force tactical mile,” the JCA morphed from a joint to report on a C-27J basing plan within 120 aircraft into an Air Force-only platform that days of the act’s passage. The HASC’s report will reside solely in the Air National Guard contained concerns about the 12 C-27J bed- (ANG) as the C-27J.1 Its assignment to ANG downs previously earmarked for the Army units makes it a dual-role aircraft, used to National Guard and urged the Air Force to support civil authorities in domestic crises consider those locations for future C-27J in addition to fulfilling its combat role. basing. Language in the SASC report left the The National Defense Authorization Act door open for additional C-27J purchases, for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84, 28 referring to the currently budgeted number October 2009) included funding for the Air of 38 aircraft as a "floor" rather than a “ceil- Force to purchase the first eight of a pro- ing.” The SASC report also notes that any posed 38 C-27J aircraft for the ANG.2 Despite study regarding intratheater airlift must debate about the "correct” total number of also give "due consideration” to the contri- C-27Js to procure after this modest start, a bution of these systems to the homeland larger issue remains: where will we base security mission.3 Concerns remain about these aircraft, and how will the C-27J sup- whether 38 C-27Js represent a sufficient port its nascent homeland security mission? number for performing missions proposed Congress has weighed in on these issues for the aircraft.4 In a letter of 11 June 2009 with questions regarding beddowns and to the chairmen and ranking members of funding but has given only passing recogni- both the HASC and SASC, the Adjutants tion of the C-27J's potential homeland secu- General Association supported “fully fund-

•The author is a military defense analyst with the Air Force Research Institute. Maxwell AFB. Alabama.

Summer 2010 | 35 ing 78 aircraft for the JCA program," stating creased ratios of aircrews to aircraft since that doing so would "provide a critical capa- he believes that at least 16 of the 38 C-27Js bility to state emergency management and bought by the US Air Force will support homeland security missions."5 Regardless of wars abroad at any given time.7 Moreover, the correct number of C-27Js, the aircraft routinely deploying all four aircraft from seem destined to play a role in the burgeon- individual units will leave gaps in domestic- ing partnership between the Department of response capabilities. On the other hand, Defense (DOD) and Department of Home- deploying with only two aircraft per unit land Security (DHS). will demand a “rainbow" with another C-27J The Quadrennial Defense Review Report of unit to create a four-ship deployment. As- 2010 calls for increased ties between the suming that the six C-27J units will stand Federal Emergency Management Agency up at different times (depending on funding (FEMA) and National Guard, directing that and aircraft availability), merging airframes “the Department also will draw on existing from different ANG C-27J units will prove National Guard forces to build a Homeland difficult in the foreseeable future. Neverthe- Response Force ( HRF) in each of the ten less, none of the projected beddown locations Federal Emergency Management Agency . . . will affect the C-27J's overseas support mis- regions. These ten FIRFs will provide a re- sion. However, considering the dual role of gional response capability; focus on plan- the aircraft, C-27J basing decisions will af- ning, training and exercising; and forge fect how quickly and efficiently the aircraft strong links between the federal level and can fulfill their domestic-response mission. state and local authorities."" Although it Furthermore, the current ANG C-130 and does not specifically address the C-27J, the C-21 —“bridge aircraft" for the C-27J bed- report’s language clearly indicates that downs—do not provide sufficient tactical DOD planning for “homeland response" will airlift coverage in support of domestic mis- emphasize the FEMA regions. Given the sions across the country.8 This problem be- fact that most disasters will not rise to the comes obvious when one matches these lo- level of a national response like that for cations against the 10 FEMA regions (fig. 1). Hurricane Katrina, ensuring adequate tacti- FEMA Region X—including Alaska, Wash- cal airlift support for each FEMA region of- ington, Oregon, and Idaho—has an ANG fers a prudent way ahead to plan for contin- C-130 unit in Alaska but no assigned ANG gencies less severe than national disasters. tactical assets in the rest o f the region. Re- Doing so will also give state and local offi- gion VI (Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Ar- cials the opportunity to plan and exercise kansas, and Louisiana) receives support with tactical airlift assets. from only one ANG C-130 unit in Texas. In The ANG has announced plans to base a contrast, Region IV, the rest of the South- total of 24 C-27Js by placing four of them at eastern states (minus Virginia), has four each of six locations, but it has not decided ANG C-130 units. Other FEMA regions, par- where to place the remaining 14 aircraft. ticularly in the eastern half of the country, Given the announcement of the six bed- enjoy similar support from substantial num- down locations and the progress of bed- bers o f C-130s and C-21s. down planning, changing locations at this Creation of six ANG C-27J units will not late date would be unwise. However, utiliz- significantly improve support for domestic ing a squadron consisting of only four response, primarily due to their planned C-27Js as primary assigned aircraft (PAA) is beddown locations (fig. 2). C-27Js will re- not an optimal situation for both overseas place four C-21 units (located at Bradley employment and domestic use. Lt Gen International Airport, Connecticut; Hector Harry Wyatt, director of the ANG, has International Airport, North Dakota; W. K. stated that the low number of aircraft (38 Kellogg ANG Base, Michigan; and Mansfield instead of the projected 78) will require in- Lahm Airport, Ohio), making this a zero-

36 | Air <5 Space Power Journal V Views & Analyses

No Air Guard Airlift In Lower

Tactical Airlift Capacity

in Regions VI and VIII H h

★ ANG C-130 units (include one Guard/Reserve associate unit) (21) A ANG C-21 units (four)

Figure 1. Current beddown of ANG tactical airlift aircraft by FEMA region

No Air Guard Airlift

Region

. o

in Region VI P R

'A ' ANG C-130 units (Include one Guard/Reserve associate unit) (21) A ANG C-21 units (four) # Proposed ANG C-27 units (replace C-21s where collocated) (six)

Figure 2. Planned beddowns of ANG C-27J aircraft by FEMA region sum transfer of unit locations.4 A C-27J unit C-27Js continue the trend of overcapacity in will stand up in Meridian, Mississippi (re- some FEMA regions, particularly those lo- placing a KC-135 unit), in Region IV, which cated east of the Mississippi River (fig. 3).10 already has an abundance of ANG tactical However, with 14 C-27Js currently un- airlift assets. The other announced C-27J assigned to beddown locations, using some beddown at Martin State Airport, Maryland, of the Army Guard’s proposed beddown lo- is in Region III, which already has two ANG cations makes sense for FEMA support. T\vo C-130 units to support it. Against this back- options come to mind. drop, thoughtful placement of the 14 cur- rently unassigned C-27J aircraft can make a significant difference in airlift support for The Air National Guard C-27j: domestic emergencies. The Way Ahead Suggested options for basing the remain- ing 14 C-27Js in the initial buy depend upon One option would have the ANG bed the sole criterion of ANG tactical airlift sup- down four C-27Js at each of the six previ- port to FEMA. Again, basing of the aircraft ously identified ANG locations. The first in the continental United States has little eight aircraft would go to the 119th Wing at bearing on their overseas deployments. Hector International Airport in Fargo, Since the Army National Guard had al- North Dakota, and the 103rd Airlift Wing at ready planned for C-27J beddowns, the Bradley International Airport in Windsor ANG would be prudent to review those lo- Locks, Connecticut. The unit at Fargo, cations as well. However, the 12 previously which replaces the C-21 bridge unit there, proposed beddown locations for Army would augment FEMA Region VIII, cur-

Excess Guard Airlift . O Capacity m Regions IV and V

ANG C-130 units (include one Guard/Reserve associate unit) (21) ANG C-21 units (four) Proposed ANG C-27 units (replace C-21s where collocated) (six) Proposed Army National Guard C-27 boddowns (12)

Figure 3. Proposed beddown of Army National Guard tactical aircraft by FEMA region (added to the existing laydown of ANG tactical airlift aircraft)

38 | Air & Space Power Journal V Views & Analyses

rently served only by the C-130 unit at down four C-27Js each at the six previously Cheyenne, Wyoming, and a C-21 unit at identified ANG locations, as in option one. Buckley AFB, Colorado. Located near the Instead of placing 12 of the remaining 14 North Dakota-Minnesota border, the Fargo aircraft at these six units, the Guard would unit could also support Region V. The 103rd establish three new C-27J units (four PAAs .Airlift Wing, also a bridge-unit replacement, each) at three of the Army National Guard's would augment the lone ANG C-130 unit predesignated C-27J beddown locations. stationed in FEMA Region I." T\vo of the selected units—at Portland Inter- As planned, four C-27Js would go to each national Airport, Oregon, and Fairchild of the remaining four previously identified AFB, Washington—would support FEMA ANG beddown locations to complete the Region X, currently served by a lone ANG Guard’s initial plan for the first 24 C-27Js. C-130 unit in Alaska. The third C-27J unit, Based on the current number of 38 aircraft, located at March Air Reserve Base, Califor- the ANG should station two of them at its nia, would augment Region IX, currently Advanced Airlift Thctics Training Center served by only two ANG C-130 units. The (AATTC) at Rosecrans Memorial Airport, final two aircraft (o f the original 38) should Missouri, in order to develop specific tactics remain stationed at the AATTC in Missouri, and training for C-27J crews (see table 1). as proposed in option one, but should bed Finally, each of the six ANG C-27J units down before the last 12 in order to begin would be augmented by two additional C- training in innovative tactics for the previ- 27Js from the remaining 12 planes as these ous 24 aircraft and their aircrews (see table aircraft become available. When all 38 air- craft are on station, each of the six units 2). Beddown of the final 12 aircraft at these will have the ability to deploy a four-ship three Army National Guard locations will package overseas yet keep two aircraft at make the best use of remaining resources, home station for domestic use. supporting the western FEMA regions as Designed to create more units instead of well as taking advantage of the existing in- adding aircraft to units slated to receive the frastructure and trained personnel at the C-27J, option two would have the ANG bed Army Guard's former aviation units.

Table 1. Option one: C-27J beddown projections (six PAAs) (first 38 aircraft)

Aircraft Sequence Original Base New Base Remarks 1-4 Hector International Airport, North Same Supports FEMA Regions VIII and V Dakota 5-8 Bradley Airport, Connecticut Same Supports FEMA Region I

9-24* Meridian, Mississippi Same Supports FEMA Region IV

9-24* Mansfield Lahm Airport, Ohio Same Supports FEMA Region V

9-24* Martin State Airport, Maryland Same Supports FEMA Region III

9-24* W. K. Kellogg ANC Base, Michigan Same Supports FEMA Region V

25-26 Rosecrans ANC Base, Missouri Same C-27J AATTC

27-38 Two each at the first six bases above Same Units can deploy with four PAAs; two PAAs left for FEMA support

*Sund-up sequence to be determined

Summer 2010 | 39 Table 2. Option two: C-27J beddown projections (four PAAs) (first 38 aircraft)

Aircraft Sequence Original Base New Base Remarks 1-4 Hector International Airport, North Same Supports FEMA Regions VIII and V Dakota 5-8 Bradley Airport, Connecticut Same Supports FEMA Region 1

9- 24* Meridian, Mississippi Same Supports FEMA Region IV

9-24* Mansfield Lahm Airport, Ohio Same Supports FEMA Region V

9-24* Martin State Airport, Maryland Same Supports FEMA Region III

9-24* W. K. Kellogg ANG Base, Michigan Same Supports FEMA Region V

25-26 Rosecrans ANG Base, Missouri Same C-27J AATTC

27-38* March Air Reserve Base, California Same Original Army Guard beddown at March supports FEMA Region IX 27-38* Fairchild AFB, Washington Same Original Army Guard beddown at Fairchild supports FEMA Region X 27-38* Portland Army National Guard Base, Same Original Army Guard beddown at Portland Oregon supports FEMA Region X

'Stand-up sequence to be determined

Back to the Future: ously identified Army Guard locations will create overcapacity in some FEMA regions Some Other G27J Options at the expense of others, doing so would If Congress authorizes additional C-27Js make the best use of existing resources and in future years, the aircraft beddown loca- infrastructure at each location and allow tions may not be the same as the rest of the the Army Guard’s skilled aviation personnel original Army National Guard locations. to transition into the ANG. Missions could change, other ANG aircraft Using the model of four PAAs per squad- could retire and need replacing in order to ron for basing these aircraft would create keep established units open, or other un- up to 10 more C-27J units—one more unit foreseen circumstances might affect basing than the Army Guard’s original 12-unit plan decisions. Nevertheless, these previously (options one and two already include three identified locations can guide future C-27.J of the Army Guard locations). As the ANG basing decisions. adheres to the Army Guard’s plan for nine additional locations and before it equips A Look down the Rood: Acquisition FEMA regions with an abundance of air- craft, the ANG should take care to maintain and Beddown of the Next 40 C-27Js (Nine New Units, Four PAAs) a beddown sequence that satisfies regions that have the least airlift capability. Instead If the remaining 40 aircraft desired by the of adding a 10th C-27J unit at a new loca- ANG and the states’ adjutants general are tion, the Guard should apportion the re- eventually funded (for a total of 78 C-27Js), maining four aircraft to the AATTC, increas- Guard planners should take a pragmatic ing it to a six-PAA C-27J squadron and, in look at future beddown locations for them. effect, creating a "10th’’ squadron. Moreover, Although bedding down at all of the previ- adding more C-27Js to the AATTC should

40 | Air & Space Power Journal V Views & Analyses

occur earlier in the sequence than in previ- a dual role—combat airlift and disaster re- ous options. The fact that extra crews will sponse—and that only the ANG will operate require additional training capacity drives them under authority of the governors of the need for more airframes at the AATTC the several states, one can argue that the (see table 3). Sequencing of these aircraft DHS will benefit from DOD-procured air- takes into account only the needs of the craft without incurring any o f the attendant various FEMA regions and does not reflect costs. Despite instances of DHS-purchased any order of merit for any unit. equipment for military units (e.g., chemical- warfare protective equipment and chemical- biological detection gear), a strict proviso The “Coast Guard” Buy forbids use of such equipment for any pur- Although the FY 10 National Defense Au- pose other than supporting homeland secu- thorization Act has approved the initial rity—the direct antithesis of the DOD’s pur- C-27J purchase, many individuals have chases of dual-use equipment. For example, called for more than the projected number the ANG's C-27J and the venerable C-130 of aircraft (38); furthermore, additional air- can perform either DOD or DHS functions.12 craft buys beyond these 38 may materialize. A 2008 report from the Government Ac- One intriguing funding option involves the countability Office (GAO) noted a planning DHS budgeting for and obtaining additional and budgeting disconnect between the DOD C-27Js. Assuming that the aircraft will have and DHS: neither organization budgeted for

Table 3. Option three: C-27J beddown projections (follow-on buy of 40 aircraft) (four PAAs)

Aircraft Original Base

Sequence* (Army Guard Plan) New Base (ANG) Remarks 1-24 Austin-Bergstrom International Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Collocated with the 136th Airport, Texas Base, Fort Worth, Texas Airlift Wing (Texas ANG); supports Region VI 1-24 Bryant Army Airfield, Alaska/ Kulis ANG Base, Alaska/Guam Collocated with the 176th Guam** Wing, Alaska ANG 1-24 Quonset Point, Rhode Island Quonset State Airport, Rhode Collocated with the 143rd Island Airlift Wing; supports Region 1 1-24 Will Rogers Army National Will Rogers ANG Base. Supports FEMA Region VI Guard Base, Oklahoma Oklahoma 1-24 Springfield Airport, Missouri Springfield Airport, Missouri Should remain to support new Missouri National Guard construction initiative 1-24 Cecil Field, Florida Jacksonville ANG Base, Florida Supports Southern FEMA Region IV 2S-28 N/A Rosecrans ANG Base, Missouri Increases the AATTC squadron to six PAAs 29-40 Grissom joint Reserve Base, Fort Wayne ANG Base, Indiana Collocated with other Indiana Indiana ANG units; supports Region V 29-40 Standiford Field, Kentucky Standiford Field, Kentucky Supports Region IV

29-40 Robins AFB, Georgia Robins AFB, Georgia Supports Region IV

'Stand-up sequence to be determined "This Army Guard C-27 unit was slated to share its beddown location between Alaska and Guam.

Summer 2010 | 41 A C-27j Spartan practices air-dropping bundles during flight testing of the plane at Yuma Proving Ground. Arizona, in early 2009. In April, through Resource Management Decision 802, Defense Secretary Robert Gates moved the C-27J program and its related direct-support mission from the Army to the Air Force. unique military equipment to support its domestic-support mission: “Under an al- homeland security, mistakenly believing ternative approach modeled after the Coast that the other did so.1' This situation may Guard, DHS would have authority and would have stemmed trom failure to understand provide funding to the National Guard Bu- the roles of the nation's military in disaster reau to organize, train, and equip the Na- response and reluctance to earmark a piece tional Guard with unique capabilities for of equipment solely for that purpose in an civil support missions. The National Guard era of declining resources. Given the rela- would maintain its existing command and tive youth of the DHS—a department born control relationship for civil support opera- in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of tions” (emphasis added).14 Although the 11 September 2001 and still struggling to GAO report stopped short of endorsing this organize itself—this reluctance may be idea rather than the other two options, the understandable. However, acquisition of the concept is well worth exploring. C-27.J and its assignment solely to the ANG By using DHS funds to buy more C-2/Ji: with the expressed desire that it have a role earmarked only for domestic response (fol- in disaster response may prompt explora- lowing the "Coast Guard” model), we could tion of a funding initiative for more C-27Js acquire additional airframes without in- by the DHS. creasing the DOD’s procurement budget. The GAO report o f 2008 also used the The proposed beddown locations outlined term "Coast Guard Option" to describe one above would remain in effect, and these choice for equipping the National Guard for “DHS" aircraft would augment the inventory

42 | Air & Space Power Journal V Views & Analyses

of C-27J units as they became available. beddown locations will not have a bearing This method would free the DOD-procured on their in-theater combat roles, but an un- C-27Js to deploy in support of current op- wise choice of locations could affect domes- erations while maintaining a stable force of tic response. Furthermore, Congress should short-haul ANG aircraft at home. By law, revisit the original contracted purchase of DHS-procured equipment cannot be used 78 aircraft. The addition of 40 C-27Js would for any purpose other than homeland de- create a force large enough to fill both “last fense; therefore, we could utilize these air- mile" transportation needs in-theater and craft at any time and could augment them domestic-response operations without sacri- with other undeployed ANG C-27Js. The ficing one for the other. DHS would find it difficult to project a Since initial planning for the C-27J relied proper number of C-27Js to contemplate heavily on aviation assets of the Army Na- purchasing, but their current price (Con- tional Guard, we should capture that exper- gress allocated over $319 million for eight tise-following a suggestion by the HASC C-27Js in the FY 10 National Defense Au- report—as an "Army to Air Force” resource. thorization Act) would make such a buy a Just as "Blue to Green” transfers—from the serious investment for the department.15 Air Force to the Arm y—have become com- However, failure to weigh in on the pro- mon, so could the National Guard embrace curement of C-27Js could result in future "Green to Blue" transfers within its own ranks. deficiencies of short-haul airlift. This personnel initiative would go hand-in- hand with bedding down additional C-27Js Conclusion and at previously proposed Army Guard loca- tions that already host flight operations. Recommendations Merging Army aviation personnel with new National disasters on the order of a Hur- aircraft at their home stations could produce ricane Katrina are far less common than an operational unit in minimum time, save local or regional catastrophes. However, the resources, and bring a new perspective to post-Katrina relief efforts by the nation’s the Air Force’s short-haul airlift operations. armed forces proved that, when such events In terms of selecting among future fund- occur, they will respond with everything ing options, the DHS should consider bud- necessary—aircraft and all—when and where geting and procuring additional airframes needed. The availability of resources to earmarked exclusively for supporting do- transport personnel and equipment rapidly mestic disasters. By doing so, the depart- to the scene of disasters that fall short of a ment will break new ground in military national catastrophe, however, remains less support to civil operations and set a prec- certain. The C-27J can help in this regard. edent for other purchases of single-use mili- Current plans call for the purchase of tary equipment. The DHS will find this C-27Js in insufficient numbers to have a sig- transition difficult and costly—but neces- nificant impact on short-haul transporta- sary. The DOD and Air Force should part- tion, either overseas or domestically. The ner with the DHS to make this concept not fact that 14 C-27Js within the initial buy of only a reality but also a road map for future 38 are currently not earmarked for any cooperation. ANG unit compounds this problem. Acqui- Today, we often hear leaders at all levels sition of only 14 airframes for active duty is encouraging an "all in" approach to opera- not a viable alternative, nor does it appear tions. We should heed that call with regard that the active duty Air Force wishes to do to acquiring, utilizing, and basing the so. We should place these currently un- C-27J. O assigned aircraft at locations that would best support FEMA’s regional needs. Their Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Summer 2010 | 43 Notes

1. For a complete, albeit somewhat biased, re- 7. Amy Butler and David A. Fulghum, "Reduced view of the JCA deliberations, see "Joint Cargo Air- JCA Buy Calls for Higher Crew Ratio," Aviation Week, craft: VVe Have a W inner (?)" Defense Industry Daily, 30 July 2009, http://www.aviationweek.cpm/aw/ 23 April 2009, http://www.defenseindustrydaily generic/story_channel.jsp?channel = defense&id = .com/joint-cargo-aircraft-we-have-a-winner-03372/, news/C27J073009.xml&headline = Reduced%20JCA% 2. In addition to the $319,050 million for the first 20Buv%20Calls%20For%20Higher%20Crew%20Ratio. eight aircraft, another $9,353 million was made 8. Following the 2005 Base Realignment and Clo- available to the Air Force for JCA “Research, Devel- sure Commission's (BRAC) decisions, it was appar- opment, Tfest and Evaluation" in FY 10. National De- ent that some ANG units would have a multiyear fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H R 2047, hiatus between weapon systems as BRAC-directed Public Law 111-84, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 28 October realignments occurred ahead of the arrival of re- 2009, 553, 583, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi placement aircraft. These units received bridge air- -bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 1 U_cong_bills&'docid = craft in order to keep skilled cadres until assign- f: h2647enr.txt.pdf. ment of follow-on aircraft. See US Government 3. H o u s e , Joint Cargo Aircraft Force Structure Re- Accountability Office, M ilitary Base Closures: Man- quirements and Basing Plan; HASC. Committee Report to Accompany H.R. 2647 N DA A, 25 Ju n e 2009, 111th agement Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Cong., 1st sess., http://www.ngaus.org/NGAUS/files/ Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely Im- ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000005390/M ASC9620R plementation of Air National Guard Recommenda- eport%20on%20NDAA%20JCA%20Language.pdf; and tions, G A O Report 07-641 (W a sh in gto n , DC: GAO, Senate, SASC Report 111-35, to Accompany S. 1390, May 2007), 19, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ FY10 NDAA Joint Cargo Aircraft Language, 25 June d0764l.pdf. See also "C-21," fact sheet, US Air Force, 2009, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 31-32, http://www.ngaus http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/fact .org/NGAUS/files/ccLibrarvFiles/Filename/00000 sheet.asp?id = 88. 0005391 / S ASC%20Report%20.1C A%20 La n gu age%20 9. Mansfield Lahm's current C-130J inventory is NDAA.pdf. slated to convert to the C-21 in the fall of 2010. 4. Department of the Army and the Department 10. For example, utilization of all the proposed of the Air Force, memorandum of agreement, sub- Army Guard beddowns would give FEMA Region IV ject: Way Ahead for the Convergence of the Army eight tactical airlift units, and Region V (Minnesota, Future Cargo Aircraft (FCA) and the Air Force Light Wisconsin, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan) Cargo Aircraft (LCA) Programs, 16 June 2006, would have six. In contrast, Region VIII (Colorado, http://www.ngaus.org/NGAUS/files/ccLihraryFiles/ Wyoming, Utah, Montana, North Dakota, and South Filename/000000001623/JCA-MOA-(20JUN06).pdf. Dakota) would gain no new assets. Par.5.j.(3)(a) and (b ) call for 75 aircraft for the 11. For all of the ANG’s current beddown loca- Army and up to 70 for the Air Force. Debate contin- tions, see Airman Magazine: The Book, 2010 54, no. 3 ues regarding the correct number of aircraft. Is the (Marcli-April 2010): 11, http://www.airmanonline.af original 2007 purchase agreement to buy 78 C-27Js .mil/shared/ media/docu men t/AFD-100302-029.pdf. still valid? Should that number be 91, as suggested in 12. See US Government Accountability Office, a study by the Institute tor Defense Analyses? What Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support about the original decision to purchase 145 JCAs, as Missions May Depend on DOD's Implementation of detailed in the above memorandum of agreement? the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, GAO- 5. Adjutants General Association of the United States, to Hon. Carl Levin, Hon. Ike Skelton, Hon. 08-311 (Washington, DC: GAO, April 2008), table 2, p. John McCain, and Hon. John M. McHugh, letter, 11 18, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08311.pdf. June 2009, http://www.ngaus.org/NGAUS/files/ 13. For a detailed explanation, see ibid., 4. Equip- ccLibrarvFiles/Filename/000000005311/JCA%20 ment purchased for homeland security missions Memo%20(final J3.pdf. Fifty-three adjutants general with DHS funds cannot be used for other purposes, signed the letter. including war fighting; therefore, these DHS- 6. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense procured C-27s could not deploy. Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of De- 14. US Government Accountability Office, En- fense, February 2010), 19, http://www.defense.gov/ hanced National Guard Readiness, 23. qdr/images/QD R_as_of_12Febl0_1000.pdf. 15. "Joint Cargo Aircraft: We Have a Winner ( ?)"

44 | Air & Space Power Journal V views & Analyses

Finishing Strong in Iraq Why the Air Force Must Be the Last to Leave Operation Iraqi Freedom

Lt Col William Jay Martin, USAF*

If you can force your hean and nerve and sinew Tb serve your turn long after they are gone, And so hold on when there is nothing in you Except the Will which says to them: "Hold on!" —“If," Rudyard Kipling

f the virtues Kipling speaks about in support (CAS), and tactical air control par- his poem "If,” the United States Air ties (TACP) will be critical to America’s suc- OForce certainly has demonstrated a cess. Due to a strong gravitational pull from willingness to “hold on" in Iraq, “serving Operation Enduring Freedom for resources its] turn" long after everyone else has gone. and because o f doubts about airpower’s ef- This rang true after the 1991 Gulf War. In ficacy in a mostly nonkinetic environment, fact the Air Force never really left Iraq, the Air Force will have to show temperance carrying out Operations Northern and by maintaining a robust war-fighting capa- Southern Watch throughout the 1990s and bility until the completion of ground-force into the next decade, and then prepping the redeployment.2 battlefield for nearly two years prior to the What factors will compel the Air Force to invasion of 2003.' A sustained Air Force sustain a strong presence in Iraqi Freedom? presence will prove just as necessary in the First, airpower will have to uphold its cur- waning months of Operation Iraqi Freedom, rent role in the counterinsurgency fight. particularly during the drawdown of ground The Air Force already pays a hefty mort- forces. Therefore we must manage our ex- gage in Iraqi Freedom—multiple fighter and pectations, not assuming that airpower reconnaissance squadrons as well as other needs will decrease proportionally with miscellaneous aircraft, plus thousands of Army force strength or follow the same Airmen who perform myriad missions rang- timeline. Air Force planners must guard ing from planning to policing.3 Second, the against making “business decisions" when Army has assumed responsibility for Anbar they determine our force requirement for Province from the Marine Corps, so without the remainder of Iraqi Freedom, focusing Marine aviation, Army helicopters and Air instead on operational planning to drive Force fighters and reconnaissance aircraft those verdicts. Clearly airlift will have its must perform the same missions over all of predictable place in force redeployment, Iraq with fewer assets. These requirements but other enablers like intelligence, surveil- have stretched resources, necessitating lance, and reconnaissance fISR), close air some creativity to ensure reliable com-

*The author commanded the 82nd Expeditionary Air Support Operations Squadron, Camp Liberty, Iraq, from April 2009 to January 2010. Currently he is an air liaison officer assigned to Fort Riley, Kansas.

Summer 2010 | 45 mand, control, and communications over might require every bit of air support the long distances. Finally, 1SR, CAS, and TACP CFACC can provide. Couple that with a resources are essential to detecting the en- huge Iraqi battlespace, and Air Force re- emy and protecting convoys during the exo- sources in Iraqi Freedom suddenly begin dus o f 120,000 American forces and their to look scarce. For these reasons, a pre- equipment, which will undoubtedly draw cipitous withdrawal of aircraft and Air- enemy attacks.4 Consequently, the Air men is out of the question. Force must keep its withdrawal a half step Top commanders agree that aircraft and behind the Army's, sustaining its current Airmen are too important to overall mis- roles and commensurate force strength un- sion success to permit their hasty with- til the very last troops leave Iraqi soil.5 drawal. Lt Gen Charles Jacoby Jr., USA, commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, told Lt Gen Gilmary Hostage III, USAF, the The support role of airpower is usually CFACC, that when it comes to airpower in the most important and effective mission Iraqi Freedom, intelligence, air presence, in guerilla war. and response to troops in contact (TIC) are —James Corum and Wray Johnson, the most exigent airpower needs of ground Airpower in Small Wars commanders. The CFACC pledged his sup- port and, despite the demand for addi- Iraqi Freedom: The War We Have, tional resources in Afghanistan, resisted an early withdrawal of Battlefield Airmen as Not the War We Might Want or well as MC-12 and F-16 aircraft from Iraqi Wish to Have at a Later Time Freedom.8 Indeed, some individuals would err even further on the side of conserva- The current counterinsurgency in Iraqi tism, suggesting that the Air Force pres- Freedom demands specific airpower capa- ence should actually increase during the bilities and a substantial footprint of final phase of ground-force redeployment. Battlefield Airmen to carry out related Lt Gen Mike Short, USAF, retired, recom- support and liaison functions. Air compo- mended posturing Air Force forces in Iraqi nent missions in Iraqi Freedom are typi- Freedom to handle the most dangerous fied by ISR, CAS, and aerial electronic at- enemy course of action—one that features tack (AEA)." As of November 2009, assets a marked upswing in violence: "If we of the combined force air component spread ourselves too thin and Soldiers die commander (CFACC) flew at least a couple because they didn’t get air support when hundred hours of CAS, ISR, and AEA t h e y n e e d e d i t . . . t h a t w o u l d be a v e r y every week —substantially fewer than in bad headline for the Air Force.’"' Depend- the summer of 2009. However, the flying ing on tactical requirements in-theater, this has not appreciably decreased because concept of boosting Air Force presence fixed-wing air capabilities become more — may or may not occur, but for the time be- not less—important as ground combat ing, the Air Force will stay in full force, power shrinks. In relative terms, Air and for good reasons—not the least of Force support personnel should not re- which is intelligence gathering. deploy on the same timeline as Army bri- gade combat teams (BCT) when they leave the theater because there will still We think too small, like the frog at the be an enemy to observe, jam, and kill if bottom o f the well. He thinks the sky is necessary. Furthermore, the months only as big as the top o f the well. I f he ahead hold too many tactical uncertain- surfaced, he would have an entirely dif- ties. The seating of a new Iraqi govern- ferent view. ment could cause a spike in violence that —Mao TV.-tung

46 | Air & Space Power Journal V Views & Analyses

In Counterinsurgency, even as Iraqi security forces gradually as- sume full responsibility for maintaining Intelligence Is the peace. US forces often accompany Iraqi-led Name of the Game patrols, so as long as Americans are at risk, American aircraft should be available to The skies over Iraq are laden with ISR perform missions to mitigate that risk. aircraft, large and small, both manned and These missions include CAS even though remotely piloted. With all-seeing eyes and the kinetic fight in Iraqi Freedom is almost other sensors, they detect, collect, and proj- nonexistent. ect all manner of activity into Army tactical operations centers. War fighters rely heavily on full-motion video feeds provided by We Almost Never Drop a Bomb aerostats, tower-mounted cameras, and air- Anymore, so Why Keep Close craft to put eyes quickly onto hot spots Air Support Around? when violence occurs. Many of these assets belong to the Army, but CFACC assets are CAS is the CFACC’s primary means of still patrolling almost nonstop, providing providing the presence and TIC response nearly continuous coverage of specific in- that ground-force commanders deem in- terest areas and select lines of communica- dispensible.11 True, there are plenty of ar-

The skies over Iraq are laden with ISR aircraft, large and small, both manned and remotely piloted.

tions in hopes of detecting a chameleon-like guments against keeping CAS platforms in enemy. Although this persistent coverage the fight. For instance, TIC situations in rarely results in catching bad guys in the Iraqi Freedom are rarer now than ever, act, the data it provides becomes part of a and even when a TIC occurs, CAS is not body of evidence used to reconstruct events always the first or best means of handling forensically after an attack occurs. Simply it. Division commanders decide which as- stated, it is detective work, and its value of- set, if any, they will send to assist ground ten goes unrealized until the evidence leads forces under self-defense conditions. Air to the capture and arrest of the perpetra- weapons teams, which include Apache tors. Even the Joint Surveillance Thrget At- and Kiowa helicopters, are often the most tack Radar System, sometimes viewed as too strategic an asset to make a tactical con- practical choice because just about every tribution, has provided moving-target indi- BCT’s battlespace has them, and they can cator tracks connecting enemy rocket- respond quickly. Often, redirecting fixed- launch sites to safe houses. Like footprints wing CAS from its primary mission to a at a crime scene, they have led to the arrest TIC is cumbersome, especially consider- of several terrorists."' We have no reason to ing that the aircraft will probably never believe that this kind of support will cease, drop a bomb.

Summer 2010 | 47 Also, despite the permissiveness of the know when to stop flying and bring its rules of engagement for TICs, weapons Battlefield Airmen home. drops have become extremely rare, par- ticularly in urban areas. Ground com- manders hesitate to "go kinetic" with air- It is .. . Airmen who transform Imnks of power when the strategic consequences of metal, buckets of bolts, microprocessors, and circuitry into the Nation's war- collateral damage are unacceptable. Mak- fighting edge. ing matters worse, the longer we operate without pulling the trigger, the more diffi- —Gen T. Michael Moseley cult it becomes to go kinetic. In short, we’ve tied our own hands. However, as BCT battlespaces increase The Tactical Air Control Party: in size and their troop numbers shrink, The Army's Essential Link to the speed and range will become essential in responding to TICs. Fixed-wing CAS offers Combined Force Air Component the only viable option to quickly reach re- Commander's Airpower mote US patrols, training teams, or con- CFACC aircraft could not perform many voys under attack. More than likely, how- of their support roles without an adequate ever, such a scenario would take place number of TACPs embedded with Army months from now. units throughout Iraq.13 Because numer- Meanwhile, the Army must cope with ous Battlefield Airmen perform critical today's full-spectrum missions even as its land-based functions in every facet of size and combat power dwindle. Ground Iraqi Freedom, we will undoubtedly re- commanders face an awkward period of quire a sustained presence of TACPs until dissonance between their mission and the last US ground forces depart. This is a their force size in that they must fight particularly large pill to swallow for the today’s battle with tomorrow’s reduced Air Force, considering the fact that the strength. Combined Iraqi-US operations TACP career held is already stretched to still take place in all quadrants of Iraq, the limit and that Afghanistan still has a but BCTs will soon find themselves phys- large appetite for them. Granted, TACP ically unable to conduct full-spectrum numbers in Iraqi Freedom will slowly de- operations across their entire battle- crease as Army BCTS redeploy without space. Consequently, they will have to replacements, but they must always be either choose limited operations or tran- available as long as CAS remains an op- sition to a new mission—something not tion. The Army has unequivocally stated scheduled to occur until after the seating that it needs fixed-wing CAS to maintain of the new Iraqi government. In prepara- presence and TIC responsiveness.u Given tion for that choice, joint planning staffs the possibility—no matter how slight— must clearly define the roles and mis- that a CAS aircraft will drop ordnance in sions of advisory and assistance brigades close proximity to friendly forces, a TACP in order to determine the necessary na- will control those aircraft as required by ture and scope o f CFACC support. Un- joint directives. We hope we have cor- doubtedly, United States Forces-Iraq is rectly judged the numbers of TACPs we working feverishly to define the end will need, but recent experience casts state of Iraqi Freedom and initiate Opera- doubt on that assumption. tion New Dawn, signifying the "evolving The number of TACP personnel who relationship with the Government of must support Iraqi Freedom will largely Iraq.’’12 That is the only way the CFACC- be determined by the number of BCTS; and, by extension, the Air Force-will that is to say, fewer BCTS equal fewer

48 | Air & Space Power Journal Sy Views & analyses

joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC).1S As of December 2009, Iraq housed about 3.3 The pooling of most TACPs at brigade million pieces of US equipment, only a level has worked fine so far, but some small portion of which will remain with the Army units at the tactical level are reach- Iraqis as part of an authorized transfer out- ing a different conclusion. Specifically, as lined by Secretary of Defense Robert brigade battlespaces increase in size, Gates.--’ This daunting task will require a TACPs mav not have the necessary com- tremendous mobility effort by air, land, and munications range to control CAS in sup- sea, but the land movement will be the port of a distant battalion.16 Army bri- most dangerous. gades once content with pooling TACPs at What do we expect to happen as ground brigade level are realizing that some bat- forces leave? We can count on opportunis- talions will need a collocated TACP; other- tic attacks with improvised explosive de- wise, they may have no CAS capability at vices against US convoys, perpetrated by all. Both services assumed that fewer CAS insurgent groups seeking to claim a final sorties meant that TACPs could support small victory. To mitigate these inevitable an entire BCT by employing type-two con- strikes, the CFACC will have to maintain a trol from a brigade’s tactical operations robust CAS, ISR, and AEA capability that center.17 In truth this assumption might can watch over and protect convoys and not be practical because it would require staging areas. According to Vice Adm a combination of technical solutions, James Winnefeld, USN, director of strate- TACP task organization, and utilization of gic plans and policy for the Joint Staff, the Army’s joint fires observers (JFO).lfl A “We intend to continue the drawdown in a relatively new breed of fire-support Sol- manner that protects our military forces diers, JFOs receive training in the Air- and civilians, exercises good stewardship man's perspective and language of CAS, of the resources provided to us, does not thus creating more leverage on the battle- jeopardize the readiness of our military as field for air support to ground forces. 19 we reset and leaves a stable, secure and Undoubtedly, they will emerge as critical self-reliant Iraq as a long-term strategic players in the command and control of partner to the United States.”21 Doing so CAS in the waning months of Iraqi Free- will necessitate the continued participa- dom, especially as the Army commences tion of flying units, Battlefield Airmen, its large-scale redeployment —with con- and many other Air Force enablers, re- voys stretched out across remote high- sulting in a sustained Air Force presence ways headed for the Iraqi border. until the very end.

"The Long Road Home" Until evenj brow is soothed and evenj hand is held Until every song is swig and During fiscal year 2010, compliance with every battle won. Until everyone comes security agreements between the US and home. Iraqi governments mandates that approxi- mately 70,000 US Army, Navy, Air Force, -Motto ot the United Service Organizations and Marine Corps personnel depart Iraq and that an additional 50,000 redeploy by Conclusion the end of December 2011, for a total draw- down o f 120,000 personnel.2" To put this in Many factors will compel the Air Force perspective, a mere 23,000 troops re- to maintain a strong presence in Iraqi deployed between January and October Freedom at least until the end of Decem- 2009.* Relatively speaking, personnel are ber 2011, w hen all US fo rces are scheduled the easy part; equipment is the tough part. to be out of Iraq.2'1 Until then, airpower

Summer 2010 | 49 will have to uphold its current role in of TACP tasks, and utilization of Army counterinsurgency, do so across a vast JFOs. These solutions, critical to mission battlespace, and conduct protective over- success, will reduce potential US casualties watch of convoys during the redeploy- upon withdrawal. ment of ground forces and their equip- During the last two decades, Airmen ment. These tasks will demand have learned that they are often the first cooperation and expectation management in and last out of an operation, so it between the Air Force and the Army to should come as no surprise that the Air ensure a safe, orderly withdrawal and Force must stay in Iraq for the duration. conclusion to Iraqi Freedom. Airpower roles are inextricably linked to Wisely, the CFACC has already taken the ground commander's needs, and for steps to pace Air Force redeployment cor- the moment in Iraqi Freedom, air inte- rectly, yet planning staffs—particularly gration in the realms of CAS, ISR, and from the Air Force—must stay the course AEA is critical to America's success. Al- and resist the urge to shift manpower and though the "shooting war" in Afghanistan air assets from Iraq to Afghanistan too demands more resources—some of them quickly. The Army will have to take an ac- (such as TACPs) already in very short tive role in air integration as well, espe- supply—we must show restraint. As cially with regard to JFOs. As they attempt Kipling said, we must have the will to to provide air support to ground units hold on “long after [our turn]" and be the spread out over greater distances, both ser- last to leave. O vices will solve key challenges with a com- bination of technical solutions, organization Fort Riley, Kansas

Notes

1. Lt Gen Robert J. Elder Jr., USAF, retired, “Air- 24 July 2008), http://opencrs.com/document/ Mindedness: Confessions of an Airpower Advocate,” RS22449/2008-07-24/download/1006/; and Ann Be- Air and Space Power Journal 23, no. 3(Fall 2009): 11-18, lasco, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, CRS apj09/fal09/fal09.pdf. Report for Congress R40682 (Washington, DC: Con- 2. Sgt 1st Class Michael J. Carden, "Iraq Draw- gressional Research Sen ice, 2 July 2009), http:// down on Ttack, Policy Chief Says,” American Forces opencrs.eom/document/R40682/2009-07-02/down Press Service, 21 October 2009, http://www.defense load/101.3/. The CRS reports 13,050 Airmen sta- link.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id = 56339 (accessed tioned in Iraq (10,800 active duty, 1,200 Air National 17 November 2009). The phrase "completion ol Guard, and 1,050 A ir Force R e sen e) as o f June 2008. ground-force redeployment” refers to all remaining These figures include only Airmen serving on Iraqi US forces as defined by the president. Assuming that soil. They exclude the roughly 8,000 Airmen in the United States maintains some military-advisory Qatar and 2,000 in the United Arab Emirates (cited personnel in Iraq with a self-protection force, the in R40682) since they may also support Operation ground-force commander will have to define the end Enduring Freedom. Although the numbers have state in terms of numbers of troops. Depending on decreased since 2008, they remain significant. what the new government of Iraq decides regarding 4. Carden, "Iraq Drawdown on TYack." its future security cooperation, a sustained US Air 5. Although LIS Airmen are helping to rebuild Force presence is conceivable. the Iraqi Air Force, the author doubts that it will 3. JoAnne O’Brvant and Michael Waterhouse, have sufficient capacity to replace US airpower bv U.S. Forces in Iraq, CRS Report for Congress RS22449 2011. Pre sum ably, av ailab le Iraqi a irp o w e r will focus (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, on supporting Iraqi forces. In addition, US reliance

50 | Air & Space Power Journal V Views & Analyses

on Iraqi airpower to support US forces may not be 16. This depends on the quality of satellite com- politically feasible. munications and the remotely operated video- 6. A£A is used extensively for convoy protection. enhanced receiver, which allows TACPs to view sig- Although the Navy and Marine Corps are the pri- nals from the aircraft’s advanced targeting pod. mary providers of AEA, this enabler will remain the 17. "Type 2 control is used when the JTAC re- most valuable airpower contribution in Iraqi Free- quires control of individual attacks and any or all of dom. especially during ground-force redeployment. the following conditions exist: JTAC is unable to The availability of sufficient Navy, Marine, and Air visually acquire the attacking aircraft at weapons Force AEA to satisfy the Army's needs, given the size release, JTAC is unable to visually acquire the target, and number of convoys, remains uncertain. The and/or the attacking aircraft is unable to acquire timing and tactics of redeployment convoys will the mark/target prior to weapons release" (empha- have to adapt to AEA coverage and vice versa. sis in original). JP 3-09.3, Close A ir Support, xv. 7. Lt Gen Gilmarv Hostage 111, CFACC (remarks 18. Technical solutions suggested in this article to members of the 368th Expeditionary Air Support pertain primarily to communications. Several op- Operations Group staff, 24 August 2009). tions will improve reliable, long-range communica- 8. Ibid. tions. First, satellite communications can provide 9. Lt Gen Michael Short, USAF, retired, former position reporting and communicate with support- CFACC, interview by the author, 30 October 2009. ing aircraft, including those flying CAS. A second 10. Author's personal experience, Headquarters option involves installing ground-based repeater MND-B, Baghdad, Iraq, 2009. stations or, possibly, repeaters mounted on aero- 11. Hostage, remarks. stats; unfortunately, the latter are vulnerable to sab- 12. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to Gen otage by insurgents and to weather limitations (e.g., David H. Petraeus, commander, US Central Com- winds), which periodically require grounding the mand. m em orandum , 17 February 2010, http://a aerostats. A third option—airborne communication .abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/08144-09. pdf. repeaters such as roll-on, bevond-line-of-sight en- 13. A TACP is "a subordinate operational compo- hancement and the battlefield airborne communica- nent of a tactical air control system designed to pro- tions node—can surmount communications chal- vide air liaison to land forces and for the control of lenges posed by long distances and high terrain. A aircraft." Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Close Air fourth option calls for putting a JTAC in an airborne Support. 8 July 2009. GL-18, http://www.dtic.mil/ platform or including a forward air controller- doctrine/new_pubs/ jp3_09_3.pdf. lt includes US Air airborne in selected CAS formations. Ensuring com- Force members who communicate with most of the plete communications reliability would probably AEA and 1SR assets that perform missions for require using two or more of these options. ground commanders. The logical link between sky 19. "A JFO is a trained and certified Service and ground in an Army tactical operations center, member who can request, adjust, and control surface- these members become particularly valuable when to-surface fires, provide targeting information in air assets are rerolled to perform alternate missions. support of Type 2 and 3 CAS, and perform [terminal 14. Hostage, remarks. guidance operations). The JFO adds joint warfighting 15. Under the current task organization in Iraqi capability but cannot provide terminal attack control Freedom, most TACPs are pooled at the brigade during CAS operations. JFOs provide the capability to echelon and provide support to battalions on an as- exploit those opportunities that exist in the opera- needed basis. Consequently, the number of TACPs is tional environment where a trained observer could smaller than the one outlined in a memorandum of be used to efficiently support air delivered fires, agreement between the US Air Force and the US surface-to-surface fires, and facilitate targeting” (em - Army: "The USAF will provide a TACP to each US phasis in original). JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, 11-10. Army maneuver unit, corps through battalion, for 20. Carden, "Iraq Drawdown on Thick.” liaison and terminal control of CAS missions.” 21. Ibid. United States Army and the United States Air Force, 22. Ibid. subject: Army / Air Force Liaison Support, memo- 23. Ibid. randum o f agreement, 23 January 2008. 24. Ibid.

Summer 2010 | 51 Colombia Can Teach Afghanistan (and the United States) How to Win

Robert Haddick*

n 1 December 2009, Pres. Barack 171,600 by the end o f 2011 and 240,000 Obama revealed his new strategy within five years.5 Ofor Afghanistan.' After adding Ten years ago, Colombia faced a security 30,000 US Soldiers and Marines to the fight crisis in many ways worse than the one Af- in 2010, the president intends to begin with- ghanistan currently faces. But over the past drawing US forces in July 2011 and turning decade, Colombia has sharply reduced its responsibility tor security over to Afghanistan's murder and kidnapping rates, crushed the forces. Mr. Obama's plan calls for Afghanistan’s array of insurgent groups fighting against the army to be ready for this responsibility in government, demobilized the paramilitary 18 months. Yet, in spite of years of effort, groups that arose during the power vacuum Afghanistan’s security forces will struggle to of the 1990s, and significantly restored the meet this goal. In the recent battle for rule of law and presence of government Marja in Afghanistan’s Helmand province, throughout the country. US and British infantry had to lead the as- Over the past decade, with the assistance sault against the Taliban, a worrisome indi- of a team of US advisers, Colombia rebuilt cator of the Afghan army’s readiness.2 its army. In contrast to the current plan for Recent US government reports reached Afghanistan, Colombia focused on quality, troubling conclusions about Afghanistan’s not quantity. Its army and other security army. For example, 19 percent of the sol- forces have achieved impressive success diers in the Afghan army quit or desert against an insurgency in many ways similar each year.5 The Afghan army lacks compe- to Afghanistan’s. Meanwhile, despite the tent leadership at all levels as well as the assistance o f nearly 100,000 NATO soldiers ability to generate qualified leaders rapidly. and many billions of dollars spent on secu- Moreover, although the US government rity assistance, the situation in Afghanistan spent more than $5.6 billion in fiscal year seems to be deteriorating. 2009 on training and supporting Afghani- Afghan and US officials struggling to stan’s security forces, the number of Afghan build an effective Afghan army can learn battalions qualified to operate indepen- from Colombia’s success. This article ex- dently actually declined.4 In spite o f these plores the similarities and differences be- problems with Afghanistan’s existing army, tween the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Afghan and North Atlantic Tfeaty Organiza- Colombia, examines how Colombia reformed tion (NATO) officials want to accelerate its its security forces, and discusses how to expansion, from 97,000 troops currently to apply Colombia’s success to Afghanistan.

*A former US Marine Corps officer, the author is managing editor of Small Wars Journal, writes the "This Week at War” column for Foreign Policy, and writes on foreign policy and defense issues for The American, the journal o f the American Enterprise Institute

52 | Air & Space Power Journal V View s & A nalyses

gust 1996, a FARC force overran a C olom - Similarities and Differences bian army base in the Putumayo district, between the Insurgencies in killing and capturing more than 100 sol- Colombia and Afghanistan diers. In March 1998, FARC fighters annihi- lated the 52nd Counter-Guerilla Battalion, Counterinsurgency forces in Colombia considered at the time one of the army's and Afghanistan face several similar chal- elite units.13 lenges. First, rugged terrain in both coun- Obviously, some stark differences exist tries prorides locations for insurgents to between Colombia and Afghanistan. Colom- hide and limits the ground mobility of bia is a wealthier country, providing an in- counterinsurgent forces. Second, insurgents digenous base of income to pay for security in both Colombia and Afghanistan take ad- forces. As fractured as Colombia was in the vantage of cross-border sanctuaries and late 1990s, it had a history of effective cen- have financed their operations with narco- tral government. It also had experience trafficking. with the Western notion of the rule of law. At their worst, the two insurgent forces Afghanistan has little or no such history. had similar strengths. At their peak strengths More tangibly, although the Colombian (around 2001), the Revolutionary Armed government was either ineffective or cor- Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National rupt in the late 1990s, it at least had the Liberation Army (ELN) insurgent groups structures of army and police forces in could field a combined 21,500 fighters, about place. In 2002 the rebuilding of the Afghan 1.9 fighters for every 1,000 military-aged army started from zero.13 males in Colombia/ The upper estimate of Finally, the nature of international secu- the Taliban's current strength is 17,000, or rity assistance to the two countries is differ- 2.3 fighters for every 1,000 military-aged ent. Colombia has one ally: the United males in Afghanistan/ States. America limits its military assistance In the mid-to-late 1990s, the rule o f law to no more than 800 trainers, who are pro- in Colombia was minimal. In 1995 a quarter hibited from accompanying Colombian se- of Colombia's municipalities had no police/ curity forces on combat operations. Although In the late 1990s, Colombia's annual murder the United States' security assistance mission rate was 62 per 100,000—nearly 10 times in Colombia is one of its largest, it pales in that of the United States/ The police and size compared to the mission in Afghani- court systems were thoroughly corrupt, and stan. There, more than 40 countries will paramilitary militias formed in the absence provide close to 140,000 soldiers (in 2010), of state authority.10 Ernesto Samper, presi- who will execute a variety of military mis- dent of Colombia from 1994 to 1998, sions.15 But the most important difference is reached office in the employ of Colombia’s the Colombian army’s focus on quality, the drug cartels." In 2009, as a result o f the in- factor that best explains Colombia's success. surgency, 2,412 Afghan civilians were killed—about 8.5 per 100,000 Afghans.12 One could argue that in the late 1990s, Colom- How Colombia Fixed Its Army bia’s corruption, violence, and government ineffectiveness were worse than Afghani- Reform of Colombia's army began during stan’s today. Andres Pastrana's term as president (1998- At the end o f the 1990s, when Colombia’s 2002) and accelerated during Pres. Alvaro security situation was at its worst, the Co- Uribe’s tenure (2002-present).1'’ Three key lombian government lost nearly all ability reforms converted the Colombian army to counter insurgent forces. FARC military from an ineffective, garrison-bound band units willingly engaged the Colombian into an aggressive force that has crippled army in open conventional combat. In Au- the FARC and ELN.

Summer 2010 | 53 New Leadership Helicopters In 1998, at the urging of US officials, Pas- Finally, Colombia’s army and police ex- trana replaced the top three leaders in the panded their inventory of helicopters from army with new generals (Fernando Tapias, about 20 in 1998 to 255 by late 2008. Tb Jorge Enrique Mora, and Carlos Ospina) overcome Colombia’s mountainous and for- who were trained at US military schools and ested terrain, the army needed air mobility. who had extensive combat experience at Today, with extensive US support, the Co- the battalion and brigade levels.17 This new lombian army operates the world's third- trio then replaced their subordinate com- largest fleet of UH-60 Blackhawk assault manders who lacked aggressiveness in the helicopters.24 Colombia's helicopter fleet field. At this time, the Colombian army be- has made possible the army's offensive doc- gan to emphasize the selection and training trine against insurgent support areas. of better-quality noncommissioned officers As a result of these and other reforms, for the army's combat units.18 In his book A the Colombian army inflicted severe dam- Question of Command, Mark Moyar studies a age on the FARC and ELN. One study esti- variety of counterinsurgency campaigns, mated that, between 2002 and 2008, army asserting that leadership quality rather than attacks cut FARC offensive capabilities by campaign plans or tactics is the key to suc- 70 percent. By 2008 FARC military units, cess.18 Colombia’s performance against its which overwhelmed Colombian army bat- insurgents bolsters Moyar’s argument. talions in the 1990s, were unable to func- tion in units larger than squad size. Be- Reorgan ization tween 2006 and 2008, more than 3,000 FARC fighters deserted the organization. Beginning with the Pastrana administration FARC's remaining forces are believed to be and extending into Uribe's, Colombia reor- scattered, disorganized, and cut off from ganized its army into a mobile and highly their top-level leadership, which has fled skilled professional component; addition- into exile in Ecuador and Venezuela.25 ally, a draftee component formed for local security.20 Under the tutelage of trainers from US Army special forces, the profes- Colombia's Lessons sional component of the army established for Afghanistan numerous air-mobile, ranger, mountain- warfare, counterdrug, and special forces Officials charged with building Afghani- battalions.21 These units improved the army's stan's army can learn three lessons from overall effectiveness by specializing in spe- Colombia. cific tasks. Perhaps as important, Uribe fo- cused the draftee portion of the army on Quality Beats Quantity village defense. He created more than 600 Afghan and NATO officials seek to increase home-guard platoons, each composed of the size of the Afghan army from about about 40 soldiers stationed in their home- 100,000 troops to nearly a quarter o f a mil- towns, to provide basic security and collect lion.26 In Colombia, by contrast, a profes- intelligence on insurgent activity. These sional army of just 86,000 has crushed a platoons interdicted the movement of insur- large and stubborn insurgency, essentially gent units in the countryside and freed the pacifying a country almost twice the size of professional army for offensive operations.22 Afghanistan and almost as rugged. Assisted The Colombian army also increased spend- by no more than 800 US trainers (who do ing on logistics support and intelligence not accompany the Colombian army into analysis, activities supported by the US ad- combat), Colombia has focused on selecting visory team.28 quality leaders, training the noncommis-

54 | Air & Space Power Journal V Views & Analyses

sioned officer corps, and developing spe- Helicopters cialized rather than general-purpose combat Like Colombia, Afghanistan faces the chal- units within the professional portion of the lenge of finding and massing against insur- armv. In Afghanistan the goal is rapid ex- gent forces in difficult terrain. Colombia es- pansion of the army’s head count, regard- tablished a large helicopter force to bring less of whether the necessary leadership mobility to its highly trained professional structure exists to sustain this inciease. As a army and to evacuate casualties from the Soldier who spent his career in special op- battlefield. Instead of raising the Afghan erations, Gen Stanley McChrvstal, the top army’s head count, US military assistance commander in Afghanistan, is no doubt should emphasize this aspect of combat fully aware of the virtues of quality—a fact support. that makes this rapid growth in head count all the more puzzling. The lesson from Co- lombia is to freeze the expansion of Afghan- Lessons for the US Campaign istan's national army, emphasize soldier in Afghanistan quality and leadership development, and create specialized units for required secu- The United States could apply Colom- bia’s experience to its campaign in Afghani- rity tasks. stan. Most importantly, US military trainers should concentrate on constantly improv- Home Guard ing the quality, and not the size, of Afghani- A current problem with Afghanistan’s army stan’s 97,000-man national army. In addi- (and formerly a problem in Colombia) is tion, the Afghan army’s own training and the unwillingness of many soldiers to serve support establishment should bolster the far from their home villages and districts. district-level home-guard program rather Consequently, the Afghan national army than support continued expansion of the suffers from high absenteeism and deser- Afghan National Army. Lastly, the US secu- tion/7 As described above, President Uribe rity assistance program should expand Af- created home-guard platoons composed of ghanistan’s helicopter program. draftees who serve in their villages and de- Afghan and NATO campaign plans seek partments. Instead of expanding the size of rapid expansion of the Afghan army even the Afghan national army, the Afghan gov- though Afghanistan lacks effective leaders ernment should permit (and fund) district to staff this increase, the logistics system to and provincial governors to form such support it, or the helicopters to move it ef- home-guard units for local defense. Wardak fectively through Afghanistan’s vast and Province is experimenting with the some- rugged terrain. A decade ago, facing similar what similar Afghan Public Protection Pro- circumstances, Colombia’s leaders, assisted by a small team of US advisers, implemented gram.* Furthermore, in Nangarhar Prov- a different solution that put Colombians in ince, the US military is providing assistance the lead, and, with patience, achieved great directly to a large tribe that has turned success. US and Afghan officials should against the Taliban."' The US and Afghan learn from Colombia as they attempt to governments should use the results of these build an effective Afghan army. © experiments to improve and expand locally based units. Bethesda, Maryland

Summer 2010 | 55 Notes

1. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in book, 22 February 2010, https://www.cia.gov/library/ Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Af- publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (ac- ghanistan and Pakistan," Office of the Press Secre- cessed 4 March 2010). tary, The White House, 1 December 2009, http:// 8. DeShazo, Forman, and McLean, Countering www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks Threats to Security, 9. -president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan 9. Ibid. -and-pakistan (accessed 3 December 2009). 10. I b i d . 2. C. J. Chivers, “Marines Do Heavy Lifting As 11. Ibid., 8. Afghan Army Lags in Battle," New York Times, 20 12. Keith B. Richburg and Joshua Partlow, February 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/ "United Nations: In Deadliest Year for Afghan Civil- 21 /world/asia/21afghan.html?pagewanted = l£rref= ians, Taliban Did Most Damage," Washington Post, 14 world (accessed 2 March 2010). January 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ L Thom Shanker and Robert H. Cushman Jr., wp-dy n/content/article/2010/01 /13/AR201001130.3.378 "Reviews Raise Doubt on Training of Afghan Forces,” •html (accessed 30 January 2010); and Central Intel- New York Times, 5 November 2009, http://www ligence Agency, "Afghanistan." .nytimes.com '2009/11 /06/world/asia/06training 13. DeShazo, Forman, and McLean, Countering .html?pagewanted= l£r_r = 3&ref= world (accessed Threats to Security, 8. 10 J a n u a r y 2 0 1 0 ) . 14. K a t z m a n , Afghanistan, 46. 4. Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Thliban 15. Ibid., 43-44. Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, CRS Report for 16. DeShazo, Forman, and McLean, Countering Congress RL30588 (Washington, DC: Congressional Threats to Security, 12-14. Research Service, 30 December 2009), 7b, http:// 17. Ibi d. , 14. ww w. fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf (accessed 4 18. ibid., 12. March 2010); and Shanker and Cushman, "Reviews 19. M a r k Moy ar , A Question of Command: Counter- Raise Doubt." insurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven, CT: 5. Kathy Gannon, "Afghans Plan Dramatic Increase Yale University Press, 2009), 3. in Security Forces,” Associated Press, 20 January 20. DeShazo, Forman, and McLean, Countering 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ Threats to Security, 12-14, 20-21. content/article/2010/01/20/AR2010012000393.html 21. Ibid. (accessed 30 January 2010). 22. Ibid., 20-21. 6. Peter DeShazo, Johanna Mendelson Forman, 23. ibid., 23. and Phillip McLean, Countering Threats to Security 24. Ibid., 24. and Stability in a Failing State: Lessons from Colombia 25. Ibid., 24-25. (Washington, DC: Center lor Strategic and Inter- 26. Gannon, "Afghans Plan Dramatic Increase." national Studies, September 2009), 5-6, http://csis 27. Katzman, Afghanistan, 41. .org/files/ publication/090918_DeShazo. Countering 28. Ihid., 33. Threats_Web.pdf (accessed 18 October 2009); and 29. Dexter Filkins, "Afghan TVibe, Vowing to Central Intelligence Agency, "Colombia," in The Fight Taliban, to Get U.S. Aid in Return," New York World Factbook, 4 February 2010, https://www.cia Times, 27 Ja n u a ry 2010, http://wtvtv.nytimes.com/ .gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ 2010/01 /28/world/asia/28tribe. html?pagewanted = 1 co.html (accessed 4 March 2010). &ref=asia (accessed 30 January 2010). 7. Katzman, Afghanistan, 44; and Central Intel- ligence Agency, "Afghanistan," in The World Fact-

56 | Air & Space Power Journal The Role of Airpower in Active Missile Defense

Col Mike Corbett, USAF, Retired Paul Zarchan

allistic missile defense is a conten- missile (TBM) threat has also changed with tious issue. Some people consider it the evidence of new, dangerous capabilities Ban essential tool for modern security; on the horizon.* Given the new emphasis others believe that it diverts critical re- on capabilities against near-term regional sources from more pressing needs.' Ques- threats, perhaps now is a good time to reex- tions have continued to surface ever since amine the role that airpower might play in the first German V-2 missile fell on Europe this challenging mission area/ in 1944. During Pres. George W. Bush's ad- What is the proper role of airpower, and ministration, the military deployed an ini- what does it bring to active missile defense tial defensive capability against long-range that surface- and space-based forces do not? missiles and increased the numbers as well Should combat air forces have a primary as improved the quality of existing theater defenses.- However, the theater ballistic Corbett & Zarchan role in this mission area? Finally, can we vulnerable points and, perhaps most impor- undertake a new mission area without jeop- tantly, do so in a cost-effective manner. ardizing the traditional core capabilities of However, before we examine this concept, the combat air forces? we need to take a closer look at the threat. Besides the number of missiles produced and the number o f countries that have them, Air-Launched Hit-to-Kill is the threat really growing? To date, con- ventional (nonnuclear) TBMs have never This article describes a concept that constituted a militarily significant capability treats ballistic missiles in the same manner that could hold key assets at risk or prevent as conventional air-breathing threats, using the attainment of key objectives—although similar doctrine and many of the same they could penetrate most defenses.7 A nu- technologies employed by today's combat clear warhead changes the story, but we air forces. Known as Air-Launched Hit-to- could argue that deterrence works pretty Kill (ALHK), this concept employs small well against adversaries with enough capa- kinetic interceptors directed to targets bv a bility to develop nuclear weapons. So, is the staring infrared search and track system threat of TBMs really changing? (IRSTS). Initially fighters would carry the Indications suggest that it is. Countries interceptors, but unmanned combat air sys- such as Iran are building ballistic missile tems would eventually assume that task as arsenals and equipping them with precision- well. ALHK is not a new idea, but we and guidance capability.8 This is not a tremen- other individuals in the military, industry, dous technological jump, given access to and academia have worked to refine it into the global positioning system or an equiva- the concept presented here. This article ar- lent system. It becomes just a matter of pro- gues that airpower enables this distributed viding the warheads a means to navigate to operational concept and could enable the their targets, in many ways resembling the engagement o f most threat ballistic missiles way Joint Direct Attack Munitions work. in the boost, ascent (early midcourse), and The difference is that, instead of dropping terminal phases of their flight. them from an airplane, a TBM "tosses” in its Performance estimates offered here are warheads—but the last 15 seconds of flight based on unclassified threat models and time- would be very similar with both using aero- lines from the American Physical Society's dynamic forces to correct navigation errors. report on boost-phase intercept systems, We must also consider other guidance published in 2004.1 We used the society’s methods (antiradiation, laser illumination, models, incorporating them in a three- etc.) and decide whether any of these could degree-of-freedom, three-dimensional, end- also work with a ballistic-missile delivery to-end simulation of the entire intercept system. We believe that at some point, even process to generate the results contained mobile assets may be at risk to precision herein. This Monte Carlo simulation (i.e., attacks delivered by ballistic missiles. repeated simulation trials that produce sta- tistical performance projections) includes sensor noise; realistic predicted intercept- Consequences of an Adversary'.. point errors; and combat-proven guidance and filtering techniques that can be used to hit a Obtaining Precision-Guided target during its boost, ascent, or terminal Theater Ballistic Missiles phase of flight. This engagement simulation is an extension of the one originally pre- To better understand the importance of sented in a previous work." Our results to precision guidance, we should consider date indicate that the ALHK system concept how the German missile attacks on Ant- could engage ballistic missiles at their most werp could have changed the outcome of a

58 I Air & Space Power Journal The Role of Airpower in Active Missile Defense

critical battle during World War II, had such adversary can deny allied forces access to guidance been available. From the fall of ports and airfields. 1944 to the spring o f 1945, the A llied cam- We believe that the threat is really chang- paign depended upon an adequate flow of ing in ways that will affect how and where material into Europe, and Antwerp was one future battles will be fought. This growth in of die few ports available. Thwarted by the an adversary's capability comes not from Allies’ air superiority, the Germans turned mating ballistic delivery systems with to V-l and V-2 weapons to attack the port weapons of mass destruction but with preci- and slow the flow of Allied logistics. sion guidance, which, combined with an Over 1,700 V-2s and 4,000 V -ls targeted adversary's ability to attack key locations in the .Antwerp area during this period although mass, may significantly inhibit a future al- only about 30 percent reached the heart of lied force’s power projection options. the city.9 The attacks killed over 3,700 people, sank one ship, and constricted supply lines yet never put the port out of action. The A Closer Look at the Threat impact might have proven decisive had the Germans been able to target individual TBMs are difficult to locate and need not ships, docks, or warehouses when the Battle emit any exploitable signals prior to launch. of the Bulge hung in the balance. They can be hidden for long periods and The Thanh Hoa Bridge in Vietnam pro- then rolled out, erected, and launched with- vides a historical example of the transition out warning. Once the engine fires, the to weapons with precision guidance. For TBM becomes very visible and easily distin- o v e r six years, a total o f 871 US A i r Force guishable from other missiles encountered sorties dropped unguided bombs on the on the battlefield. Surface-to-air missiles ac- bridge but failed to close it. However, the celerate very quickly, their engines usually first operational application of laser-guided burn for less than 20 seconds, and they fol- bombs on 13 May 1972 resulted in direct low a somewhat erratic path as they guide hits on the supporting piers, dropping the toward their target.11 Ballistic missiles, on center span and closing the bridge.10 Al- the other hand, accelerate more slowly and though the US military has long understood their engines burn much longer. Those with the value of precision attack, to date we longer range (medium to intercontinental) have never been threatened by such a rise nearly vertically at first, taking as long strike. Precision-guided TBMs may change as a minute to climb through an altitude of that in the near future. 10 kilometers (km). Depending on their size Finally, we should consider an adver- and range, their engines may burn for more sary's ability to concentrate his attack at a than four minutes, and the missiles may have specific point and time. Timing multiple more than one stage. Some reach accelera- launches for simultaneous arrival is not dif- tion levels of 8 g’s to 15 g’s or more prior to ficult, and a sufficient number of ballistic burnout or staging.12 (See fig. 1 for a simula- missile launches can overwhelm any surface- tion of a single-stage generic intermediate based defense. Combining this ability to range ballistic missile's [IRBM] altitude and mass the attack (i.e., the simultaneous ar- acceleration profiles.) It is important to rival of many weapons, a capability now note that part of the axial acceleration of possessed bv some potential adversaries) the IRBM appears as a target maneuver to a with precision guidance would allow an ad- pursuing interceptor, and the amount of re- versary to overwhelm any surface-based quired interceptor acceleration to engage defense system and destroy its critical the target is related to the magnitude o f this tracking radars. The absence of sensors apparent target maneuver. eliminates a defensive system's ability to An interceptor capable of defeating such intercept ballistic missiles, after which the a threat during the boost phase must be

Summer 2010 I 59 Corbett & Zarchan

Figure 1. Generic IRBM acceleration as a function of altitude during the boost phase able to accelerate similarly within the envi- to the target, this ballistic period can last ronment where the intercept will occur. Be- many minutes and give defending aircraft low 35 km, TBM acceleration levels are still time to respond from regional ground-alert relatively low, but they grow quickly as the sites. In the case o f our generic IRBM (fig. threat consumes its fuel load. For intercepts 2), we see that the midcourse phase of flight above 50 km altitude, TBM accelerations starts at approximately 200 seconds and can exceed 5 g’s (fig. 1). The required in- ends at approximately 1,050 seconds, indi- crease in an interceptor’s acceleration rela- cating that the target’s flight path is highly tive to the threat depends upon the geometry predictable for about 14 minutes. of the engagement and the type of guidance The terminal phase of a ballistic missile’s used. Traditional proportional navigation flight begins when the descending warhead guidance demands that the interceptor have encounters the upper atmosphere at ap- a significant maneuver advantage over the proximately 80 km altitude. Although the threat (a ratio of three to one or greater). air is exceptionally thin at this point, it does However, we believe that optimized guid- exert a drag effect. Heating of heavy pieces ance can significantly reduce this maneu- begins, and light pieces such as chaff and ver margin, possibly to a fraction of the tar- decoy balloons fall back, each having identi- get’s acceleration capability.13 fiable signatures. As the descent continues, After the boost phase, the guided warhead the atmosphere becomes progressively will likely separate from the booster, and denser, and these effects increase. Heavy, defensive countermeasures such as decoys irregular objects such as fuel tanks begin to may also deploy. Unless a postboost system tumble and eventually break up. Bv 30 km applies thrust—either to correct boost-phase altitude, the air is dense enough for the con- navigation errors or compensate for a mov- trol surfaces on a cone-shaped warhead to ing target—the flight path will remain bal- effect small maneuvers to compensate for listic and highly predictable during this guidance errors or begin target homing. midcourse period. Depending on the range Everything that remains intact during this

60 I Air & Space Power Journal The Role of Air power in Active Missile Defense

Figure 2. Duration and altitude of a generic IRBM's trajectory during the midcourse phase period slows and starts to get very hot. By Although desirable, no single interceptor the time a warhead passes 15 km altitude, could engage all threats at any altitude from even the fastest warhead (one that has trav- the surface up. Interceptors designed for eled the longest distance) has slowed to less engagements in the atmosphere below 35 than five kilometers per second (km/sec) km altitude can use aerodynamic forces for and normally approaches its target from 20 maneuvering but must cope with higher degrees above the horizon or higher. This heating as velocities increase. We refer to final descent to the target from 15 km alti- these as lower-tier interceptors and show tude takes about 15 seconds, during which their performance based on a burnout ve- time aerodynamic forces enable the great- locity of 1.75 km/sec. Interceptors designed est maneuvering potential.u A simple com- for higher altitudes must use lateral rocket puter simulation, in which the ballistic co- thrust or thrust vectoring for maneuvering, efficient for several items is treated as a and the complex interaction with missile- constant, illustrates how these objects (bal- body aerodynamics creates adverse problems loons, tank, and reentry vehicle) traveling at altitudes below 50 km. These upper-tier at 3 km/sec decelerate as they enter the interceptors also need much higher veloci- atmosphere (fig. 3).15 Objects with the most ties but can avoid heating problems by per- drag (or smallest ballistic coefficient [)) have forming intercepts only above 50 km. We their peak decelerations at the higher alti- indicate their performance based on a burn- tudes. The figure indicates that the decel- out velocity of 3.5 km/sec. eration profiles of all objects are different Both upper- and lower-tier interceptors and that quantities related to the decelera- have advantages and disadvantages during tion may serve as useful discriminators. the terminal phase of flight. The upper-tier

Summer 2010 | 61 Corbett & Zarchan

Figure 3. Early peak decelerations for objects with the most drag (or lowest ballistic coefficient) systems would not have to cope with high using common air-launched interceptors deceleration levels, but having the agility and a common aircraft-carried sensor. Air- needed for upper-tier boost-phase engage- power applied to missile defense provides ments would enable them to maneuver rap- more than simply a platform that can get idly and intercept warheads as atmospheric close enough to the launch point to engage interaction revealed the countermeasures. in the boost or ascent phase, or respond fast Lower-tier interceptors might have to deal enough from ground alert to engage in the with much higher deceleration levels and terminal phase.11' Airpower applied to mis- might have a very narrow engagement zone, sile defense allows a commander to focus if any, against the longest-range threats. defensive capability with the same speed However, a very low minimum-engagement and flexibility commonly associated with altitude can permit a second shot if the first attack operations. Instead of utilizing a intercept attempt misses. fixed defensive deployment tied to station- ary radars, a commander could rapidly es- tablish or reinforce a defensive posture, What Airpower Can move aircraft forward to pursue boost or Bring to This Fight ascent engagements, or cover the move- ment of surface forces with a combat air Airpower enables a distributed opera- patrol providing terminal defense. tional concept that can engage the TBM In addition, launching an interceptor threat during the boost, ascent (early mid- missile above 12 km altitude has a signifi- course), and terminal phases of (light by cant impact on its performance. Although

62 I Air <5 Space Power Journal The Role of Airpower in Active Missile Defense a supersonic fighter may be traveling only threatening ballistic missiles during their 0.3 km sec, launching the interceptor mis- boost phase. Moreover, combat air patrols sile at an altitude above 90 percent of the operating in eastern Tlirkey could autono- atmosphere has the effect of reducing mously detect threats in their boost phase, aerodynamic drag on the missile and may engage them in their ascent phase, and sub- add over 1 km sec to the interceptor's sequently pass precise threat-tracking data burnout velocity. downstream for follow-on terminal engage- For example, based on engagement- ments. Assuming nominal times for detect- simulation results from previous works, a ing the launch, issuing the warning, scram- notional 3,000 km IRBM (figs. 4 and 5) bling, and climbing out, fighter aircraft on launched from northern Iran toward Rome ground alert at Aviano Air Base, Italy, would impact in approximately 17 minutes.17 would have sufficient time to scramble, ac- Strike or escort aircraft operating within quire, and track the threat, and then launch Iran could autonomously detect and engage an interceptor for a terminal-phase engage-

Summer 2010 | G3 Corbett & Zarchan

Ascent-Phase Intercept

Boost-Phase Intercept Terminal-Phase Intercept

Figure 5. Operational areas for aircraft using an upper-tier interceptor to defend Rome against an IRBM launched from Iran ment.;s The two figures represent opera- area. They can provide terminal defense for tional areas for an aircraft defending Rome a limited time at a port or airfield during against an IRBM launched from Iran —fig- deployment of a persistent surface-based ure 4 depicting the capability of a lower-tier system, or they can thin the wave of attack- interceptor and figure 5 representing the ing threats through boost-phase engagements operational area of an upper-tier intercep- during fighter-sweep operations. Finally, tor. We can see from figure 4 that the lower- but perhaps most importantly, we base this tier system will not have ascent-phase capa- bility against this category of threat. concept on the development of a small in- Each aircraft can operate autonomously terceptor that should cost less than the for boost- or ascent-phase engagements or threat it will attempt to engage, a character- as part of a network for terminal defense. istic that holds the promise of making air- Aircraft providing defense can be massed at power-based missile defense a cost-effective a particular point or distributed over a large concept.

64 I Air & Space Power Journal The Role of Airpower in Active Missile Defense

The Air-Launched Weapon celeration, and distance into its flight when the interceptor launches.-2 NCADE’s pro- What would these defensive weapons posed design also includes a lateral propul- look like? The size of the weapon is directly sive capability, which could enable some related to its maximum employment range. intercepts well above 35 km altitude. The air-launched interceptor must attain a The Air-Launched Hit-to-Kill concept high velocity so that it can quickly close the proposed by Lockheed Martin Missiles and distance to the predicted intercept point, Fire Control uses a Patriot Advanced Capa- yet retain the capability to maneuver to the bility 3 (PAC-3) missile as the interceptor.23 precise target location. It also requires suf- Equipped with an active radar seeker similar ficient lateral acceleration to actually hit to the AMRAAM’s, the PAC-3 is a larger mis- the target. A lower-tier interceptor may use sile and even faster than NCADE. However, aerodynamic forces for maneuvering; how- its greater length significantly complicates ever, any attempts by an interceptor to en- carrying it aboard aircraft and limits the gage at ranges greater than 150 km will re- number of missiles that any one aircraft sult in intercepts outside the atmosphere, could accommodate. However, this estab- thus requiring propulsive thrusters so that lished missile, currently in production, it could maneuver in response to guidance needs little modification to employ from an commands. Because maximum-range en- aircraft and has an excellent performance gagements in the boost phase require hit- record. ting the target near the end of that phase at Both the NCADE and Air-Launched Hit- the target’s greatest rate of acceleration, the to-Kill use the kinetic energy of the inter- interceptor must have significant maneu- cept as the kill mechanism and do not carry verability. However, we must address two an explosive warhead. Although designing principal areas of technical risk: exoatmo- an interceptor without a warhead may spheric maneuverability of the kill vehicle seem counterintuitive, the high closure ve- and ascent- terminal-phase discrimination, locities encountered in missile defense discussed later in greater detail. complicate proximity fuses and reduce the effectiveness of a blast warhead. Further, the kinetic energy of the interceptor mass Lower-Tier Systems at impact exceeds the chemical energy of an equivalent mass of TNT when the clo- The Net Centric Airborne Defense Ele- sure velocity exceeds 2.9 km/sec.24 ment (NCADE) proposed by Raytheon Mis- sile Systems is an interceptor roughly the size of today's advanced medium-range air- to-air missile (AMRAAM). Similar in shape Upper-Tier Systems to an AMRAAM, the two-stage NCADE lacks Development of an upper-tier system a warhead but has an infrared seeker.1'1 The involves two challenges: (1) building a seeker guided on and hit a boost-phase tar- kinetic-kill vehicle that can meet maneu- get in December 2007; subsequent testing verability and fuel requirements and (2) de- revealed significant capability in terminal veloping an aircraft sensor that has the dis- intercepts as well - Due to its large fuel-to- crimination capability for both ascent- and mass ratio, two stages, and very light guid- terminal-phase engagements. Long-range ance system, NCADE is potentially several performance requires a larger, faster missile times faster than an AMRAAM.-1 Such with a kill vehicle capable of enough exoat- speed allows it to close rapidly with a boost- mospheric maneuvering to hit a target ac- ing missile, giving it a maximum employ- celerating at 15g’s. Parametric analysis, ment range of about 150 km. How ever, that based on the engagement simulation dis- range depends upon the threat’s aspect, ac- cussed in other works, indicates that we

Summer 2010 | 65 Corbett & Zarchan should be able to build a 750 kilogram (kg) The Aircraft Sensor weapon that could reach a burnout velocity of at least 3.5 km/sec, retain sufficient fuel ALHK requires a precision tracking capa- to accelerate an additional 1.5 km/sec to 2 bility that w ill work at ranges out to 1,000 km/sec (also known as divert velocity), and km. Fighter aircraft can climb above clouds rapidly, so a passive infrared sensor be- accelerate laterally at greater than 10 g’s, comes a viable alternative to active radar. enabling it to hit medium-range, intermediate- Infrared sensors will provide angle informa- range, and intercontinental ballistic mis- tion only, but those angles are much more siles/ Design constraints on such a weapon precise than the ones measured by radar; would allow it to fit internally into either furthermore, active ranging data from ei- the F-35 or the Navy’s Unmanned Combat ther the fighter’s radar or laser ranging (an A ir System —moreover, F-15, F-16, or F-18 optional function built into the infrared sen- aircraft could carry it externally. sor) could probably be combined to make Upper-tier systems are expected to en- this a very precise tracking solution. If ex- gage only above 50 km in altitude, but this treme range or the target's characteristics is not a hard limit. However, the ability to make active ranging unavailable, stereo engage well above 50 km expands the boost- tracking by two sensors separated by phase envelope and provides intercept ca- roughly 100 km will provide sufficiently ac- pability during the ascent phase. The benefit curate track data for boost- and ascent- of engaging at altitudes as low as 50 km is phase engagements. much more important for terminal inter- Analysis has shown that a staring infra- red sensor with an aperture of about 15-20 cepts, during which the atmosphere re- centimeters could furnish the required per- duces the effectiveness of countermeasures. formance.2" That is, the sensor would closely Unfortunately, although we believe that resemble today’s Sniper and LITENING tar- such a system is feasible, no one has yet geting pods. In fact, we have demonstrated demonstrated the concept. Considering the the Sniper pod’s performance by tracking complications of insensitive munitions re- the ground missile defense (GMD) inter- quirements and the Navy’s desire to avoid ceptor throughout the entire boost phase hypergolic liquid fuels, the design challenge from two F-16s over Edwards AFB, Califor- becomes even greater.26 The needed exoat- nia, during the GMD flight test (FTG-05) out mospheric agility, constrained by these op- of Vandenberg AFB, California, in Decem- erational requirements, represents the first ber 2008.28 of two main technical risks for this concept. This IRSTS sensor must do more than Figures 6 and 7 depict sample boost- and just detect and track; it must also assist the ascent-phase operational areas for a 3.5 interceptor in discriminating between the km/sec interceptor employed against an warhead and other objects, such as de- IRBM from Iran threatening Rome. The coys—a process that is complicated by natu- ral debris as well as intentional counter- small squares depict possible points from measures. We doubt that either the IRSTS or which aircraft could successfully engage the interceptor seeker can do this individu- IRBMs by using a 3.5 km/sec interceptor. ally; rather, a successful intercept will de- Note that for a boost-phase intercept, the pend upon a contribution from each one. launch platform might have to operate in or However, past observations of missile tests very close to Iranian airspace. Alternatively, by similar systems give us reason to believe the aircraft’s operational area for upper-tier that it is possible. This discrimination capa- ascent-phase intercepts offers the possibility bility for ascent- and terminal-phase inter- of operating the launch platform well out- cepts represents the second of the two pri- side the borders of Iran. mary technical risks for this concept.

66 I Air & Space Power Journal The Role of Airpower in Active Missile Defense

Figure 6. Boost-phase operational area, assuming launch of a 3.5 km/sec interceptor 10 seconds after launch of the IRBM target

Size Matters, but Smaller Is Better cost o f the 1000th missile, and W, is the weight in pounds.29 Fleeman’s database in- The interesting thing about a missile’s cluded only weapons up to 1,500 kg, so ex- cost is its close relationship to the missile’s tending the formula to 25,000 kg is obvi- weight. Although it may seem obvious that ously questionable, but the historical large ones cost more than small ones, plot- relationship is that small missiles cost far ting all recent unit production costs for mis- less to produce than big ones. According to siles in relation to their weight more clearly his formula, a 500 kg interceptor would cost defines this—and even suggests a formula. 5.2 percent of a 25,000 kg interceptor (i.e., a Eugene Fleeman observes that as a first- ground-based midcourse defense intercep- order design consideration, production cost tor); thus, higher production rates are pos- is a function of weight. That is, C>00o ~ sible, a fact that also drives down unit costs. $6,100 W," ^ where C represents the unit Lower unit costs make more frequent test-

Summer 2010 | 67 Corbett & Zarchan

BLACK SEA.

CASPIAN SEA TURKEY

SAUDI ARABIA ERSIAI GULF

Figure 7. Ascent-phase operational area, assuming launch of a 3.5 km/sec interceptor 80 seconds after detection of the IRBM target and interception of target 270 seconds later (two minutes after IRBM burnout)

ing economically feasible, which in turn ALHK could engage most other ballistic drives up confidence in system perfor- missile threats as well. mance. But airpower provides the delivery A small interceptor launched from a platform, thereby enabling the small inter- stealthy fighter operating in or near con- ceptor and making ALHK possible. tested airspace can provide the same kine- matic performance as a much larger sur- face-based interceptor launched from well Summary outside that area. In most cases, boost- Many potential adversaries are pursuing phase intercepts will require operations in precision accuracy in the delivery systems the country where the IRBM launch occurs, of ballistic missiles. Using combat aircraft to thus calling for a low-observable platform. compete head to head with the United Ascent- and terminal-phase intercepts will States is not a viable option for most oppo- not require such platforms and should be nents, but a ballistic missile provides them compatible with fourth-generation fighters. an alternative delivery system that could A staring IRSTS can offer passive detection penetrate defenses. We contend that ALHK and tracking for a tiny fraction of the cost of can defeat IRBM threats in a cost-effective a surface-based radar and could be prolifer- manner. Although we have addressed only ated throughout the combat air forces of IRBM threats, other analysis has shown that both the United States and its allies. Tb-

68 I Air <5 Space Power Journal The Role of Airpower in Active Missile Defense gether, the small interceptor and the staring equipped with an IRSTS would have ascent- IRSTS comprise a survivable and highly and terminal-phase intercept capability flexible defensive capability that can frus- with both interceptors, and IOC for the trate an adversary’s planning and even pro- lower-tier could occur as early as 2015. IOC vide additional capabilities well beyond for the upper-tier interceptor could follow missile defense functions. For example, the in two to four years, assuming that a military could design the IRSTS to perform technology-development program soon long-range detection as well as tracking and addresses agility requirements. identification of air targets, and could de- In 2009 the US Air Force ch ief of staff sign the lower-tier interceptor to engage and the director of the Missile Defense those targets at very long ranges. Agency initiated a joint study of ALHK, Admittedly, this mission places a new de- which found the concept technically viable mand on combat aircraft. The mission re- and operationally feasible but deferred quirements of ground alert—and, in some major decisions until after a detailed cost- cases, airborne persistence—as well as the benefit analysis could be conducted.31 To possible penetration of defended airspace date, although the Air Force has taken the would impose a significant burden on to- lead on this concept, everyone involved re- day’s combat air forces. In the future, air- alizes that it will attain full capability only craft like the Navy’s proposed Unmanned as a joint system. The additional contribu- Combat Air System could have mission du- tion of carrier-based aviation with ALHK rations o f 100 hours and a very low radar could offer enhanced defensive flexibility to signature, thus addressing both the persis- a joint force commander, as well as even tence and penetration requirements.30 How- greater uncertainty to adversaries. ever, even if the Navy pursued initial opera- However, as with any new capability, tional capability (IOC) following the current aircraft-carrier demonstration program, this ALHK comes with a significant price tag. capability is still more than 10 years away. Opportunity costs and the impact on combat In the interim, fighters remain the primary flight operations demand thorough evalua- option. tion in conjunction with an examination of Fifth-generation fighters such as the F-35 possible enemy countermeasures. We must will bring with them all of the internal- model the resulting capability in a variety sensor capability necessary to support of future campaigns that consider a number boost-phase intercepts with both upper- and of potential technology developments by lower-tier interceptors. Our analysis indi- adversaries, and we must critically assess it cates that the F-35’s Distributed Aperture before making an acquisition decision. System could immediately detect and track However, as we ponder whether to pursue a boosting TBM, in any direction and at any this mission for the combat air forces, we elevation from the aircraft, given a clear also need to consider the long-term ramifi- line of sight. Fourth-generation fighters cations if we do not. ©

Notes

1. 1st Lt Alexi A. LeFevre, "A Strategic Conversa- Priority,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 2, no. 2 (Summer tion about National Missile Defense," Strategic Stud- 2008): 22-30, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/ ies Quarterly 2, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 117, http:// Summer/sessions.pdf. u-ww.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Winter/lefevre.pdf; and 2. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile De- Jeff Sessions, "Ballistic Missile Defense: A National fense Review Report (Washington DC: United States

Summer 2010 | 69 Corbett & Zarchan

Department of Defense, February 2010), 15-19, 14. Mantle, Missile Defense Equation, 371-81. http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/BMDR%20as%20of 15. The simulation is based on Zarchan, 7hctical %2026JAN10%200630_for%2Gweb.pdf. and Strategic Missile Guidance, 721-68. 3. George Jahn, “IAEA Fears Iran Making a War- 16. Dean A. Wilkening, "Airborne Boost-Phase head," Associated Press, 19 February' 2010, http:// Ballistic Missile Defense," Science and Global Secu- www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2010/ rity 12 (June 2004): 2, http://www.princeton.edu/ 02/19/iaea_fears_iran_making_a_warhead/. sgs/publications/sgs/pdf/12_l-2_wilkening.pdf. 4. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile De- 17. Zarchan, Ihctical and Strategic Missile Guid- fense Review Report, i. ance, 721-55. 5. David K. Barton et al., Report of the American 18. Thomas II. Kean et al., The 9/11 Commission Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Tl'.rrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, Technical Issues (College Park, MD: American Physical DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004), 20-27, Society, 5 October 2004), http://rmp.aps.org/pdf/ http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report RMP/v76/i3/pSl_l. .pdf. This document discusses the response times for 6. See Paul Zarchan, Ihctical and Strategic Missile fighters scrambled during the terrorist attacks of 11 Guidance, 5th ed. (Reston, VA: American Institute of September 2001 (9/11). Although the open literature Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2007), 721-68. refers to an immediate readiness posture of 15 minutes, 7. Thomas A. Keanev and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War alert fighters typically do much better. On 9/11 the Air Power Survey: Summary Report (Washington, DC: fighters from Otis Air National Guard Base, MA, were US Government Printing Office, 1993), 177, 179; and airborne in seven minutes, and the fighters from Freeman J. Dyson, Disturbing the. Universe (New York: Langley AFB, VA, were airborne in six minutes. Harper fir Row, 1979), 108, http://books.google.com/ 19. Michael Leal and Philip Pagliara, "NCADE: books.’id = RHzo.\leU2bxsC£rpg = PA 1Q8#PPA108,M 1. Air Launched Boost Phase Intercept Demonstrated" 8. Mohammad-Ali Massoumnia, Q-Guidance in (paper presented at the 2008 Multinational Ballistic Rotating Coordinates, AIAA-91-2784-CP (Reston, VA: Missile Defense Conference, Honolulu, 111, 10 Sep- American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, tember 2008), 3. (This document is available to the 1991). This paper, written by a faculty member of public from Raytheon.) the Department of Electrical Engineering, Sharif 20. Ibid., 8-12. University of Ttechnology, Tehran, Iran, indicates that 21. Ibid., 3. Iranians are familiar with 1CBM precision-guidance 22. Ibid., 7. techniques and are investigating their application 23. "Patriot PAC-3[/ALHK]," Deagel.com, http:// to short-range missiles. www.dcagel.com/ Ant i-Ballistic-Missiles/Patriot-PAC 9. Gregory P. Kennedy, Rockets, Missiles, and -3_a001152003.aspx. Spacecraft o f the National Air and Space Museum 24. Barton, Report of the American Physical Socieh/ (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, Study Group, 242. This document discusses the ac- 1983), 20-23. tual lethality necessary to defeat a warhead. For the 10. Eugene L. Fleeman, "Ttechnologies for Future comparison of kinetic energy to chemical energy, Precision Strike Missile Systems: Introduction/Over- see Richard A. Muller, Physics for Future Presidents: view,” in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Re- The Science behind the Headlines (New York: W. IV. search and Ttechnology Organization, Technologies Norton & Co., 2008), chap. 1. TNT has a chemical for Future Precision Strike Missile Systems, RTO Lec- energy of 4.18 kilojoules per kilogram. The kinetic ture Series, no. 221 (Neuilly-sur-Seine Cedex, France: energy equation (1/2 mass times the velocity North Atlantic TYeaty Organization, Research and squared) shows that one kilogram of interceptor Ttechnology Organization, 2000), http://handle.dtic mass yields 4.18 kilojoules of energy when the clo- •mil/100.2/A DA387602. sure velocity is 2.9 km/sec. 11. A Google search of "tactical surface to air 25. Zarchan, Ihctical and Strategic Missile Guid- missile burn times" yields a sampling of many tacti- ance, 291-316. cal missiles, all of which have burn times of less 26. Ashton Carter, undersecretary of defense tor than 20 seconds. acquisition, technology and logistics, to secretaries 12. Peter ,1. M an tl e , The Missile Defense Equation: of the military departments et al., memorandum, Factors for Decision Making (Reston, VA: American subject: Joint Insensitive Munitions Ttest Standards Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2004), 85-92. and Compliance Assessment, 1 February 2010. 13. Zarchan, Tactical and Strategic Missile Guid- 27. Barton, Report ot the American Physical Society ance, 143-61. Study Group, 192-97.

70 I Air & Space Power Journal The Role of Airpower in Active Missile Defense

28. Three F-16sof the 416th Test Flight Squadron, (Washington, DC: Center tor Strategic: and Budgetary Edwards AFB, CA, flew under contract to the Direc- Assessments, 2008), http://www.csbaonline.org/ tor, Advanced Tfechnology Weapons, Missile Detense 4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20080618.Range Agency, on 5 December 2008, observing the launch _Persistence_/R.20080618. Range_Persistence_.pdf. and entire boost phase of the ground-based mid- 31. Marina Malenic, “Companies Await MDA course defense interceptor out of Vandenberg AFB, Verdict on Air-Launched Hit-to-Kill Programs," De- CA, with Sniper targeting pods. fense Daily, 20 August 2009, http://8ndarticles.com/ 29. Eugene Fleeman, Tactical Missile Design, 2d p/articles/mi_6712/is_36_243/ai_n35676077/; and ed. (Reston. VA: American Institute of Aeronautics "DOD News Briefing with David Altwegg on Fiscal and Astronautics, 2006), 286. Year 2011 Budget for Missile Defense Agency," Global 30. Thomas P. Ehrhard and Robert O. Work, Secunhj.org, 1 February 2010, http://www.global Range. Persistence. Stealth, and Networking: The Case security.org/space/library/news/2010/space-100201 for a Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat A ir System -dod01.htm.

Col Mike Corbett, USAF, Retired Colonel Corbett (BS, Oregon State University; MS, Purdue University; MS, Auburn University-Montgomery) was the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) director for advanced technology weapons from 2006 through 2009, leading a small staff in supporc of kinetic- and directed-energy technology development for advanced ballistic missile defense systems. He led the Air-Launched Hit-to-Kill concept de­ velopment and the feasibility and engineering assessment of integrating PAC-3- derived interceptors with fighter aircraft. He also led the MDA's evaluation of the Net-Centric Airborne Defense Element, a congressionally directed program to develop a new missile defense interceptor using an existing air-to-air missile seeker. Colonel Corbett joined the MDA in 2005 following his retirement from the Air Force. His military experience included command positions at various levels within Air Combat Command and the Air National Guard, and over 5,000 hours in a variety of aircraft, predominantly fighters.

Paul Zarchan Mr. Zarchan (BSEE, City College of New York; MSEE, Columbia University) has more than 40 years of experience designing, analyzing, and evaluating missile- guidance systems. He has worked as principal engineer for Raytheon Missile Sys­ tems Division, has served as senior research engineer with the Israel Ministry of Defense, and was a principal member of the technical staff for C. S. Draper Labora­ tory. Currently a member of the technical staff at MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Mr. Zarchan is working on problems related to missile defense. He is the author of Tactical and Strategic Missile Guidance, fifth edition, an American Institute of Aero­ nautics and Astronautics (AIAA) text, and coauthor of Fundamentals of Kalman Filtering: A Practical Approach, third edition, another AIAA text. Mr. Zarchan is associate editor of the lournal of Guidance, Control and Dynamics.

Summer 2010 | 71 New Horizons Coalition Space Operations

Lt Col Thomas G. Single, USAF

o provide a current picture of space power in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in January 2009 the Joint Air Power Competence Centre published NATO Space Operations Assessment, which recommends 23 ways to improve NATO’s integra- tion of space into military operations.1 The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which faces significant challenges, exemplifies the need to con- duct coalition space operations. Performing combined and joint air, land, sea, and special operations, the ISAF finds itself in the early stages of integrating national space capabilities, critical enablers to operations that require the leveraging of all available resources. One means of integration involves establishing coalition space support teams (SST), but in order to conduct space operations with these teams, we must address matters of doctrine, presen- tation of forces, education, training, and equipment. This article offers some thoughts and recommendations for establishing coalition SSTfc. Historical Perspective cations, electro-optical, infrared, signals in- telligence, and electronic intelligence; they Operation Desert Storm is generally ac- should field an early warning system by cepted as the first space war even though 2020.10 Italy and Germany have also be- the military developed and used space ca- come players in the space defense sector, pabilities long before that conflict.2 To put Italy launching its first communications sat- these capabilities into historical perspective, ellite in 2001 and the first of four synthetic we need to go back to Vietnam and the Cold aperture radar (SAR) satellites in 2007." War. For example, Corona, the United States’ Germany launched a constellation of six first photo reconnaissance satellite system, SAR satellites from 2006 to 2008 and will operated from August 1960 to May 1972.' add another in 2010; moreover, it launched Also in 1960, the US Navy tested the five- five medium-resolution electro-optical satel- satellite Transit, the first satellite navigation lites in 2008.12 The Germans have also de- system, which could generate a naviga- veloped two communications satellites, one tional fix four to six times a day.-1 The first on orbit and the other scheduled for launch Missile Defense Alarm System satellite, de- in 2010.13 Other military satellite communi- signed to serve as a space-based early warn- cations (SATCOM) programs in Europe in- ing system for ballistic missile launches clude the United Kingdom's Skynet and from the Soviet Union, became operational Spain’s Hisdesat satellites. The European in 1963.5 Following that system was the De- Union’s Galileo program will provide a fense Support Program, developed to detect global positioning, navigation, and timing missile or spacecraft launches and nuclear (PNT) capability. Clearly, the Europeans explosions bv picking up infrared emis- have much to offer. sions. The Defense Meteorological Satellite In addition to technology and hardware, Program began providing cloud-cover infor- our coalition partners offer trained space mation in the mid-1960s, allowing more personnel. Many nations have studied our precise planning of air missions in Viet- space doctrine and are quickly catching up. nam.6 In 1970 the United States launched The French have set a goal of fostering a its first signals intelligence satellite.7 The military space culture across the European more commonly known global positioning Union. A French Joint Space Command will system first launched in 1978, reaching ini- likely stand up in the summer o f 2010—a tial operational capability in 1993.” Even major step forward.u In 2008 Germany an- though the United States has operated these nounced that it would establish a Space and other satellites for more than 50 years, Situational Awareness Center in Uedem, only recently did we fully integrate their Germany.'1’ The Royal Air Force has a Space capabilities into combat operations. Operations Coordination Centre in High Wycombe."’ Spain placed a European Union Satellite Centre in Torrejon.17 As the space Allied Space Capabilities capabilities of European nations continue to grow, the expertise of those countries will Our coalition partners can now employ a develop. Additionally, other states such as variety of space assets. France became the Japan, India, and Australia are acquiring third recognized space power, after the So- their own space capabilities. Integration of viet Union and the United States, when it such allied resources could allow the rapid launched its first satellite in 1965.” The reconstitution of lost capability, add capa- French now operate satellites for communi- bility, decrease revisit times, and so on. Al-

Summer 2010 | 73 Single lied space personnel offer strength through naissance (ISR), SATCOM, global PNT, diversity by bringing to the table a different tracking of friendly forces, space control, cultural perspective. Experts in their space environmental (weather) monitoring, and systems and organizations, they have differ- missile-warning capabilities. Generally ent understandings of and solutions to the speaking, these space capabilities emerged geopolitical environment. Although the because of their cost-effectiveness or be- United States would greatly benefit from cause the high ground of space represented increased partnerships with the growing the only feasible place for their employ- number of space personnel, this relation- ment. Current coalition operations require ship will demand changes to the way we vast amounts of communications, imagery, currently operate. intelligence, and information, which part- ner nations must share. The NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan faces challenges because the Why a Coalition Team? sharing of intelligence and information can- not always occur at a common classified or Coalition operations are not new. Nations unclassified level. Procedures for request- formed alliances to light the two world ing, tasking, processing, exploiting, and dis- wars, Korea, Vietnam, the Balkans, Iraq, seminating intelligence are difficult at best. and Afghanistan. War fighters in US Central Problems arise with regard to technology as Command’s area of operations conduct joint well as policy, data management, and shar- and combined operations. Nations such as ing. We must use all of our available re- Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Canada, sources optimally because the ISAF can Germany, Iraq, Italy, France, the Nether- greatly benefit from space capabilities. In- lands, and the United Kingdom all partici- formational seams, such as the inability to pate in flying operations with the United share a critical piece of intelligence, reduce States. In addition to providing interna- our operational effectiveness. Arguably our tional political support and sharing risks, operational paradigm must change in the resources, and costs, a coalition establishes space community. Because we fight as a legitimacy in the international community. coalition team, we must include space. A complex undertaking, modern warfare Products and services classified Tbp Secret includes diplomatic, political, social, eco- just a few years ago are now unclassified nomic, informational, and military aspects, and available from commercial companies. not to mention staggering costs that few na- Therefore, we should take a critical step to- tions can afford for an extended time. Our wards overcoming these challenges by inte- economies and governments have become grating the space capabilities of our coali- inexorably intertwined in the international tion partners. arena. Most importantly, sending troops The evolution of space integration in the afield requires political support both at United States can serve as a model for de- home and abroad. The benefits o f common veloping coalition space operations. As the security concerns, the dialogue and coop- United States cultivated space capabilities, eration essential to a coalition, and the it had to address integration, policy, doc- shared culture and understanding greatly trine, and the development of trained per- outweigh any day-to-day challenges. Un- sonnel. Doctrine has evolved over the doubtedly, nations will continue to organize years, training courses have emerged and themselves in coalitions to wage war. changed, and a space career field has ap- Unfortunately, NATO, the ISAF, and most peared. The United States now has a space nations have neither adequately addressed cadre with combat experience in Iraq and space as a domain nor fully leveraged space Afghanistan—a cadre mature enough to in- capabilities. Coalition forces need space- clude general officers who have spent most based intelligence, surveillance and recon- of their careers in space assignments. Pre-

74 I Air

T he most difficult problem the Air By the end of 2000, the Air Force had be- Forces faces in integrating space is how gun to integrate space personnel through- to create an air and space officer to out the combat air forces and ended the employ an air and space force. joint and Air Force SSTk. More recently the service established a position for the direc- —Lc Col Mark P. Jelonek, tor of space forces, who advises the com- Toward an Air and Space Force. 1999 bined force air component commander and Having space systems does not neces- coordinates space requirements and effects sarily mean that our war fighters are using for the theater. As part of the commander’s them; rather, we must integrate system ca- staff, the director must rely on the embed- pabilities into the tight. To develop a coali- ded space operators in the various AOC di- tion’s space capability, we would do well to visions and throughout the area of opera- learn lessons from the evolution of US tions to gather requests for effects and to space training and doctrine. For many integrate space into daily operations. This years, the United States struggled to inte- method has proven effective for operations grate and fully exploit highly classified and in US Central Command; however, the compartmented space systems. One solu- Army has not adopted the director’s doctri- tion entailed the establishment of space nal construct and continues to field SSTk. teams, much like coalition SSTk. US Space The Navy and Marine Corps have a small Command's joint SSTk, established in the number o f personnel with specialized ex- mid-1990s, and their associated component pertise in space operations, but neither ser- SSTs served theater commanders and joint vice fields space teams. task forces, making space capabilities under- Primarily, the Army integrates space by standable and useful for warfare.1" In 1995 means of its SST and the space support ele- the Air Force formed the 76th Space Opera- ment (SSE), the former a deployable team tions Squadron to assist air component of six Soldiers and the latter a smaller cell commanders' understanding and applica- of typically two or three personnel assigned tion of space capabilities in support of air to a brigade or division headquarters.23 operations.1" These Air Force SSTk, designed Army SSTk began deploying in 1995 to to support the air operations center (AOC) make space a part of ground operations.2” In and the tactical level of war, deployed to 1998 the A rm y established Functional Area assist in Operations Joint Endeavor, Deny 40 (FA-40) (a space operations officer) as a Flight, Desert Fox, Desert Thunder, and Al- mechanism for training and developing lied Force.-0 space specialists.2S Both the Army SST and

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SSE are responsible for coordinating space and Army doctrine in 2005, as well as hav- activities and synchronizing space mission- ing implemented Navy space policy in area activities throughout the operations 2005.26 NATO has been active as well, pub- and planning processes. lishing its doctrine document for air and These teams and elements, which have space operations in 2009.27 The European proven successful in Iraq and Afghanistan, Union published a space policy in 2007.28 continue their high deployment and opera- Australia, Great Britain, Holland, France, tions tempo. Embedding such space exper- Germany, and other nations are developing tise in the combined joint task force (CJTF) or have recently established national space structure ensures that space capabilities policy and doctrine. Unfortunately, no and effects are part of planning and that country has adequately captured the space- they support operations. Unfortunately, related realities of coalition operations in very few Air Force personnel have de- Afghanistan. An examination of questions ployed to integrate space into ground opera- about why US doctrine would have to change tions. The service must do a better job of to support coalition space operations lies placing these individuals with units that use beyond the scope of this article, but we space-based services. A more joint approach should address a few key points to under- would allow our forces to understand and stand what we need for coalition space make optimal use of space capabilities. teams. As other nations produce space ca- In terms of space, the fundamental doc- pabilities, personnel, and centers, US doc- trinal difference between the Air Force and trine will have to address the construct of Army is that the Air Force is primarily a those relationships and the means of inter- provider of capabilities while the Army is acting with them. For example, because the primarily a user. Coalition operations re- French now field a space team of three per- quire both providers and users. The Air Force sonnel to support their rapid-reaction forces established positions to command, control, and AOCs, we need to think in terms of de- and integrate space, whereas the Army veloping a common framework, definitions, fielded teams to exploit and utilize space- and mission areas.29 The following discus- based services. For example, to improve air- sion addresses concepts for establishing a land integration, the Air Force embeds air foundation for coalition space operations. liaison officers and tactical control parties— Current US and NATO space-mission experts on employing airpower—with Army areas include space-force enhancement, forces. They coordinate communications space control, space support, and force appli- and aircraft for precision air strikes. How- cation.*° These terms have been in use for ever, the Air Force has yet to establish some years now and need revising (except space-operations liaison officers for the pur- for space support, which is still applicable). pose of integrating its space capabilities into No longer simply an enhancement of our ground operations. As we look to the future operations, space has become a critical joint of conducting combined space planning and enabler. Space control is often confused operations, we must examine and modify with offensive counteroperations, which US space-integration models in order to ef- aim to dominate enemy airspace and pre- fectively include not only our other ser- vent the launch of air threats. The latter vices but also those of our allies. can include destroying the enemy’s air and It is important to understand established surface-to-air forces, interdicting his air op- space doctrine and to determine if we must erations, protecting air lines of communica- adapt it to guide the conduct of coalition tions, and establishing local military superi- space operations. The United States has the ority in air operations. *1 Additionally, other most developed space doctrine of any nations consider the term space control NATO nation, having updated its joint space much too aggressive and offensive in light doctrine in 2009, Air Force doctrine in 2006, of the intended peaceful use of space. No

7G I Air & Space Power Journal New Horizons

Table 1. Proposed mission areas for space operations

joint* Support Space Operations Counterspace Operations Space Support Operations Position, Navigation, and Timing Space Situational Awareness Launch and Range Operations Satellite Communications Offensive Counterspace Satellite Operations Intelligence, Surveillance, and Defensive Counterspace Command and Control of Space Reconnaissance Forces Missile Warning Operational Test and Evaluation Environmental Monitoring Space Professional Development Integration and Exploitation

The NATO term joint equates to the US term combined.

country wants to see US forces controlling only space professional development to space space. Similarly, other nations find the term suppon operations and omit force application, force application, which translates to weap- as mentioned above. onizing space, too politically sensitive and Drawing on these proposed mission ar- therefore unnecessary. The force-application eas, we can envision a notional structure mission makes other nations suspect that for a coalition space team (table 2). Sized the United States has secretly placed weap- appropriately for the assigned mission, ons in space; otherwise, why would we have teams would have expertise in ISR, PNT, doctrine for weapons that don't exist? Since SATCOM, missile warning, space situational those countries study our doctrine, we need awareness, offensive counterspace, and de- to be careful about the message it sends. fensive counterspace. Army SSTs and SSEs We need a new construct for US and have benefited from training and deploying NATO space-mission areas, including joint as integral units. Attempting to make these support space operations, counterspace op- teams multinational presents certain chal- erations, and space support operations lenges in terms of organizing, training, and (table 1). This construct would make the equipping forces. space-mission areas easier to understand and more accurately reflect actual opera- tions. For example, joint support space op- erations would include PNT, SATCOM, 1SR, Table 2. Composition of a typical space team missile warning, and environmental moni- toring because they all directly support Position Rank joint force operations. We should add one Space Coordination Element area not currently included in force en- Senior Space Operations Planner 0-5 hancement-integration and exploitation. Space Operations Planner 0-4 Some existing cross-functional programs in Space Support Team the space portfolio do not fit under a spe- Space Team Leader 0-4 cific capability area. Additionally, the ab- Operations Officer 0-3 sence of integration and exploitation in the Counterspace Operations Planner 0-3 or E-6 doctrine compromises any advocacy for Space Operations Planner 0-3 or E-6 funding or programs that we need most— Intelligence Analyst E-6 specifically, those that use space capabili- ties to support the joint war fighter. As dis- Information Systems Operator E-S cussed above, coalition space doctrine Space Support Element should not mention space control; counter- Senior Space Operations Officer 0-4 space is a better term. Finally, we need add Space Operations Officer 0-3

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Presentation of Forces current US Army structure for integrating space teams into land forces." Each compo- Using the proposed mission areas, we nent command (and regional command in have to consider how the United States the ISAF) should have a coalition SSE at should present its space forces in-theater. headquarters. Subordinate headquarters at Current US doctrine has Air Force person- the corps level would have a coalition SST. nel embedded in AOCs. The Army’s SSEs Since each service brings its own expertise are an integral part of its divisions, and and capabilities, the space teams/elements Army SSTk deploy to augment CJTFs when need joint manning. It is important to note needed. NATO doctrine addresses space op- that the number of teams and personnel erations only at a high level and does not depends on mission requirements and op- offer guidance on presenting space capabili- erations tempo. Team .size and composition ties or forces. '" Furthermore, US joint doc- should be scalable to meet operational trine only briefly addresses space in multi- needs. For example, perhaps only a single national operations." Since the beginning space officer, rather than a full space team, of operations in Afghanistan, we have had would suffice for coordination. no strategic plan to integrate space person- The second phase will call for integrating nel, but the ISAF is developing an architec- coalition partners (fig. 1). Team integrity, ture to make better use of space capabilities. training, and access to classified informa- At the NATO joint level, two space officers tion must become a consideration, and are assigned to the ISAF Joint Command, higher headquarters will include multi- including the chief of ISAF space opera- national personnel. The tactical level is the tions—the force’s senior space officer. At most difficult place to integrate such per- the regional level (which corresponds to the sonnel because they require detailed opera- service-component level in US doctrine), tional and system knowledge to perform Army SSTs are assigned to ISAF Regional their mission. Because formation of a multi- Commands East and South headquarters. national SSE or SST would prove difficult, US Marines in Regional Command South- this article recommends assignment of a west also have an assigned Army SST. Addi- national SSE to support its country’s forces. tional space personnel have been requested Some of the teams could be multinational, to support Regional Commands North and depending on bilateral or multilateral secu- West. Unfortunately, the ad hoc nature of rity arrangements. We must also address requests for space personnel over the past assigned space units, which fall under the eight years has resulted in confusing com- COMAFFOR as expeditionary space opera- mand relationships and, for some, organiza- tions squadrons. Even so, they could be tions lacking individuals with space expertise. assigned to other commanders or compo- Our experience in Afghanistan recom- nents. Due to the political and strategic mends the following two-phased construct nature o f space assets, these units would for integrating space into a multinational most likely have to report directly to their CJTF. Space must first find representation national authorities for guidance regard- at the US joint level, in J-3 (operations) and ing rules of engagement. The command J-5 (plans). Additionally, assuming the pres- relationships would be developed, based ence of a JFACC, we must continue to inte- on national direction and the mission. For grate space into the AOC because of the the most part, we have integrated mature center’s status as the command and control, space capabilities into daily operations planning, and execution node for air opera- and have normalized them. Intelligence tions. The JFACC, also tvpically the com- teams plan and execute the use of space- mander of Air Force forces (COMAFFOR), based ISR assets, and the communications should have space officers in A-3 (opera- team runs SATCOM. However, we still tions) and A-5 (plans). We can continue the need some space specialists in strategic-

78 I Air & Space Power Journal New Horizons

Figure 1. Structure of a notional combined joint task force

and operational-level positions. Conse- back to a space operations coordination quently, this example does not require a center (SpOCC). Typically, the CJTF com- director of space forces because of the full mander will designate a single focal point assimilation of space positions into the for space—logically, the JFACC and combat command structure.35 air operations center (CAOC). As the sup- ported multinational command, the CAOC would enjoy direct support from the coali- Space Support and Reachback tion SpOCC, which can serve as a virtual Soon after the start of the Schriever V coordination center since a designated lead war game of 2009, it became apparent that nation’s SpOCC would become the coalition an integrated force structure would facili- center. National SpOCCs can also directly tate coordination for coalition operations.36 support the coalition SpOCC. It would be This realization led to establishment of a wise for the CAOC to have arrangements CJTF-like organization and a combined with national SpOCCs for time-critical sup- space operations center construct. Building port. National space teams would have on this concept, we can think of designing a reachback via national command authori- notional space support architecture for a ties and support channels. For example, coalition (fig. 2). space personnel supporting operations in CJTF space forces must integrate effects US Central Command go the CAOC, which and support the mission, perhaps via reach- can then reach back to US Strategic Corn-

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Australian Space Operations oordination Center (SpOCC)

National Command Authorities

from national SpOCC

Figure 2. Notional space support architecture mand’s joint functional component com- Education and Training mander for space and the joint space opera- tions center. Often an afterthought, education and Coalition operations require some na- training are paramount to success. Too fre- tions to provide space capability, often both quently we have sent space operations per- military and commercial satellite services. sonnel into combat with inadequate experi- Consequently, each national SpOCC would ence and training. It is vital to properly have to maintain its own space picture and organize, train, and equip our space forces. Although the United States has made im- share some of that data with the coalition provements to develop space professionals, SpOCC to generate an integrated picture. we need specialists. During the last decade, Each SpOCC could serve as a central point space weapons officers have filled this role. of contact to access national space capabili- Because the position is adapting to focus ties. National command authorities would more on Air Force Space Command units maintain control of their national assets and because of the limited number of posi- while providing an agreed-upon space capa- tions, the Air Force needs to develop a track bility or service to coalition operations. Do- for personnel specializing in the integration ing so requires that we put in place agree- and exploitation o f space. Either the Army's ments today to begin developing guidance FA-40 program or the Air Force Space Weap- for security classification, interoperable in- ons Instructor Course can serve as models. formation networks, tasking and dissemina- Most nations have neither military space tion processes, and so on. Because this con- systems nor military space specialists, so struct will probably take years to develop, they must develop personnel with space we cannot afford to wait for a crisis to occur. expertise and establish a career specialty.

80 I Air & Space Power Journal New Horizons

Because coalition space teams require course that covers strategic space issues, trained personnel, partner nations must es- just as commanders and staffs would profit tablish training programs to develop special- from a course on military applications of ists who can integrate space into ground, space. NATO members should have access air. and sea operations. to such courses at a reasonable cost. Further- Before developing a specialty, we must more, at the more advanced level, the clearly understand the operational require- NATO school in Germany offers the only ments for space capabilities. Army Field operational planning course for space, Manual 3-14, Space Support to Army Opera- which attempts to teach staff officers and tions, May 2005, clearly defines the roles operational planners with little or no space and tasks o f an Army SST and a space op- background how to integrate space into the erations officer.37 We have high expectations operational planning process in just five for deployed space personnel, who must days—simply not enough time. Indeed, the know all o f the national space systems, ca- basic and advanced training that students pabilities, limitations, and supporting orga- need could take months. Without proper nizations; understand the CJTF's mission, education and training, we will continue to priorities, and operations; and then figure provide only adequate rather than optimal out how to integrate them into the planning support to our theater commanders. process. They must coordinate with a multi- tude of intelligence and space organiza- tions, monitor the status of space systems Equipment and Planning Tools for changes, determine possible effects on the theater, and track vulnerabilities and We can’t send our space warriors into the threats. Theater space officers may also per- fight without tools. For situational aware- form other classified duties. In a coalition ness, teams must have an integrated space environment, they will carry out these du- picture—including US, coalition, adversary, ties for other nations’ space assets and pro- and commercial space assets—similar to the cesses. After training and developing senior information about our land, sea, and air captains and majors to best support our forces. We must monitor and display system theater commanders, the Air Force must and network status and assess effects on the groom these officers for more advanced po- theater. Teams must have planning and co- sitions. Therefore, to meet the above re- ordination tools so they can share informa- quirements, we should organize a small tion at a common classification level in a cadre of US joint and allied space planners coalition environment. Chat programs, and liaison officers. e-mail, and phone networks must be inter- Several existing training programs can operable and allow sharing amongst coali- begin to address these needs. As one would tion nations. Computer systems should be suspect, the United States offers the majority capable of handling information up to at of space training. However, Canada, the least a Secret classification. (The removal of United Kingdom, France, and NATO also sources, means, and methods permits the have space courses. Selecting the best as- release of most intelligence information pects of each of them should enable us to and products.) In order to move forward, develop the requisite courses. Because joint we must produce fused intelligence prod- and allied commanders and operational ucts, and many nations must contribute to planners need a basic awareness of space that process. Most importantly, because all capabilities and limitations, staff colleges coalition forces must be aware of available and other advanced schools should include capabilities and products, the United States space familiarization in their curricula. should no longer confine itself to national Similarly, senior political and military lead- systems but begin operating on coalition ers would benefit from an executive space network systems.

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Space personnel also need certain types contribute orbital information, aircraft in- of equipment. Army SSTs, for example, have formation, and data to create an integrated their own deployable SATCOM terminals picture. Sadly, the current state of a coali- and computers with which they can obtain tion's space situational awareness is mini- or produce space products such as three- mal at best. dimensional visualizations, satellite-overflight reports, communication-interference re- ports, and imagery maps. Using satellite Conclusions connectivity, they can monitor the space During the past 15 years, the United environment, operational status of space States has experimented with, developed, vehicles, effects of solar weather, and other and fielded space forces to support theater space events. They also can serve as a pri- commanders. Capabilities and personnel mary missile-warning node. However, these have matured and have more jointness than, US teams are not ideally enabled for coali- before, but today's coalition operations de- tion operations because they cannot release mand that we better integrate space capa- many of their products to partner nations. bilities into the fight. Recently, some allied In addition to having an integrated space nations have developed their own space ca- picture, a coalition SST must be able to pro- pability. It is now time for the next step: duce satellite-overflight predictions, analyze coalition space operations. Thus, we must communications links, analyze and manage address doctrine, organization, command 1SR resources, assess threats, and conduct and control, education and training, equip- electronic warfare/countercommunications ment and tools, as well as our bilateral planning, as well as perform many other agreements for space cooperation, which do tasks. Hence, they need deployable SATCOM not suffice for coalition space operations. capability, not to mention information sys- Ongoing coalition operations in Kosovo, tems and software to support operations, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere motivate the latter including such products as the us to better integrate and use all available widely used Satellite Toolkit from Analytical space capabilities. Improving the way we Graphics, which can help coalition SSTfc do organize, train, and equip our forces will their jobs.38 Commanders cannot fight with- enhance the space effects available to joint out knowing the location and status of their and coalition war fighters. Space is for ev- aircraft, ships, and land forces at any given eryone, including our adversaries, so we time; consequently, coalition nations must mustn’t delay. O

Notes

1. The Joint Air Power Competence Centre was 7, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj established in 2005 as a Centre of Excellence to en- apj98/sum98/lambeth.pdf (ac c essed 17 February 2010). able NATO’s effective and efficient use of joint air 3. "Corona Facts,” National Reconnaissance Of- and space power. A think tank, the center offers in- fice, http://www.nro.gov/corona/facts.html (ac- dependent thought, analysis, and solutions at the cessed 17 February 2010). •1. Stanford University News Service, "A Brief His- strategic and operational levels. Maj Thomas Single, tory of Satellite Navigation," 13 June 1995, http: NATO Space Operations Assessment, rev. ed. (Kalkar, news.stanford.edu/pr/95/950613Arc5183.html (ac- Germany: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Janu- cessed 15 March 2010). ary 2009), 1—11. 5. Jeffrey Kichelson, “Space-Based Early Warning: 2. Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth, “The Synergy of Air From MIDAS to DSP to SHIRS,” National Security and Space," Airpower Journal 12, no. 2 ( S u m m e r 1998): Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 235, 9 Novcm-

82 I Air cS Space Power Journal New Horizons

ber 2007, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ Force, Space Situation Centre, Uedem, Germany, site NSAEBB235/index.htm (accessed 17 February 2010). visit by the author, August 2009. 6. Steven R. Strom and George Iwanaqa, "Over- 16. Tim Ripley, "UK Plans Opening of Space Op- view and History of the Defense Meteorological Sat- erations Co-ordination Centre," jane's Defence Weekly, ellite Program" Crosslink 6, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 11-15, 31 March 2008, http://www.janes.com/articles/ http: www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/ pdfs/ Janes-Defence-Weekly-2008/UK-plans-opening V6Nl.pdf (accessed 17 February 2010). -of-Space-Operations-Co-ordination-Centre.html (ac- 7. Maj A. Andronov, “American Geosynchronous cessed 16 April 2010). SIGINT Satellites" [trans. Allen Thomson), Zanibezhnoye 17. "European Union Satellite Centre,” http:// i>oyennoye obozreniye, no. 12 (1993): 37-43, http:// www.eusc.europa.eu/ (accessed 17 February 2010). www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/1993/ 18. CAPT George E. Slaven Jr., USN, "What the androan.htm (accessed 17 February 2010). Warfighter Should Know about Space: A Report on 8. 'Global Positioning System (GPS),’’JPL Mis- US Space Command Joint Space Support Teams," sion and Spacecraft Library, http://msl.jpl.nasa.gov/ research report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, Programs gps.html (accessed 17 February 2010). 1997), 8-10, http://handle.dtic.miI/100.2/ADA399180 9. "First Satellites Launched by Spacefaring Na- (accessed 8 April 2010); and U M D 38-2, Manpower tions," Space Today Online, hup://www.spacetoday and Organization: Space Support Team Operations, 2 .org Occurrences/OtherOccurrences.html (accessed January 1996, http://wxvw.fas.org/spp/military/ 17 February 2010). docops/usspac/md38_2.htm (accessed 17 February 10. Peter B. de Selding, "France Prepared to Go It 2010). Alone on Missile Warning System,” Space News, 19 19. The 76th Space Operations Squadron was February 2009, http://spacenews.com/archive/ redesignated the 76th Space Control Squadron in archive09/spirale_0216.html (accessed 17 February 2001. “76th Fighter Squadron (AFRC)” Air Force His- 2010). torical Research Agency, http://www.afhra.af.mil/ 11. "Sicral," Deagel.com, http://www.deagel.com/ factsheets/factsheet.asp ;’id = 13868 (accessed 16 C3ISTAR-Satellites/Sicral_a000214001.aspx (accessed April 2010); and Lt Col Tom Meade, "76th Space Op- 18 February 2010); and “COSMO-SkvMed,’’ Tfelespazio, erations Squadron," Space lac tics Bulletin 3, no. 1 http://www.telespazio.it/cosmo.html (accessed 18 (Winter 1995): 14. February 2010). 20. "The 76th Space Control Squadron," 23d Fly- 12. Germany launched five “SAR-Lupe" satellites ing Tiger Association, http://www.flvingtiger.org/ from 2006 to 2008. See “SAR-Lupe,” O H B System, files/squadrons/76th/nox\'.html (accessed 15 March http://www.ohb-system.de/sar-lupe-english.html 2010). (accessed 17 February' 2010). Germany also launched 21. Scott F. Large, "National Security Space Col- the TerraSAR-X satellite in 2007. The ThnDEM-X laboration as a National Defense Imperative,” High SAR satellite is scheduled lor launch in 2010. See Frontier 4, no. 4 (August 2008): 5, http://wxvw.afspc “TanDEM-X: A New High Resolution Interferometric .af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080826-020 SAR Mission,” DLR, http://mvw.dlr.de/hr/desktop .pdf (accessed 8 April 2010). default.aspx tabid-2317/3669_read-5488/ (accessed 22. Maj Jason Schramm, HQ AFSPC/A3TW, 18 February 2010); and “Launch 2008," RapidEye, interview by the author, 17 February 2010. http://www.rapideye.de/home/system/launch 23. US Army Field Manual (FM ) 3-14, Space Sup- -2008 index.html (accessed 18 February 2010). port to Army Operations, 18 May 2005, 1-16, C-2, 1 3. "SatComBw/ComSatBw-2," EADS Astrium, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-14.pdf http://www.astrium.eads.net/en/prog/satcombw (accessed 8 April 2010). -comsatbw2.html (accessed 16 April 2010). 24. Lewis Bernstein, "Army Space Support 14. Gerard Petitalot, "French MilSpace—The Next Thants: The Early Years, 1986-1998,” Army Space 10 Years" (presentation at MilSpace 2009 confer- journal 4, no. 1 (Winter 2005). ence. Paris, France, 28 April 2009), http://www.smi 25. Ibid., 1F-3F. -online.co.uk/event_media/programme.asp/is= 1 & 26. See Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Space Opera- ref=3058//day = 2 (see "Day 2,” “Host Nation Closing tions, 6 January 2009; Air Force Doctrine Document Address") (accessed 16 April 2010). (AFDD) 2-2, Space Operations, 27 Novem ber 2006; 15. “Sicherheit aus dem Weltall,” RP Online, 7 FM 3-14, Space Support to Army Operations, May February 2008, http://www.rp-online.de/niederr 2005; and OPNAVINST 5400.43, Navy Space Policy heinnord/kleve/nachrichten/kalkar/Sicherheit Implementation, 20 May 2005. -au.vdem-Weltall_aid_529941.html (accessed 18 Feb- 27. Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.3, Air and ruary 2010); and Col Hcrold Borst, German Air Space Operations, November 2009.

Summer 2010 | 83 Single

28. Council of the European Union, Presidency new_pubs/jpl_02.pdf. For an overview of air superi- Report on ESDPI European Security and Defense Policyj, ority as well as offensive and defensive counterair 18 June 2007, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/ operations, see .JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile pdf/en/07/st 10 stl0910.en07.pdf (accessed 8 April Threats, 5 February 2007, chap. 1, http://www.dtic 2010 ); and Council of the European Union, “4th .mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_01.pdf. Space Council Resolution on the European Space 32. AJP 3.3, A ir and Space Operations, chap. 6. Policy," 22 May 2007, http://mvw.gmes.info/pages 33. JP 3-14, Space Operations, IV-18 and V-10; and -principales/library/reference-docu ments/?no_cache JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, 7 March 2007, III- = l&download = ResoIution_EU_Space_Policy.pdf<&' 25/26. did = 65 (accessed 8 April 2010). 34. FM 3-14.10, Space Brigade Operations, October 29. Lt Col Gerard Brunei, French Air Force, Cen- 2007, chap. 2. tre of Analysis and Simulation for the Preparation 35. A F D D 2-2, Space Operations, describes the of Air Operations, NATO Space Course briefing, sub- position of director of space forces; JP 3-14, Space ject: French JFACC Organisation, November 2009. Operations, addresses space coordination authority; 30. AFDD 2-2, Space Operations, 4-5. and JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, 10 July 2001, 31. The United States defines space control as examines coordination authority. All three docu- “operations to ensure freedom of action in space for ments suggest that the director and space coordina- the US and its allies and, when directed, deny an tion authority are more appropriate for planning adversary freedom of action in space. The space than for combat operations. control mission area includes: operations conducted 36. Joseph D. Rouge and Dennis L. Danielson, to protect friendly space capabilities from attack, "Coalition Space Operations: Lessons Learned from interference, or unintentional hazards (defensive Schriever V Wargame,” High Frontier 5, no. 4 (August space control); operations to deny an adversary’s 2009): 28, https://newafpims.afnews.af.mil/shared/ use of space capabilities (offensive space control); media/document/AFD-090827-008.pdf (accessed 8 supported by the requisite current and predictive April 2010). knowledge of the space environment and the opera- 37. FM 3-14, Space Support to Army Operations, tional environment upon which space operations chap. 3 and appendixes C, D. depend (space situational awareness).” JP 1-02, De- 38. The author neither represents nor endorses partment o f Defense Dictionary of Military and Associ- this company. For information about products from ated 1Inns, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 31 Analytical Graphics, see http://wmv.agi.com. October 2009), 501, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/

Lt Col Thomas G. Single Lieutenant Colonel Single (BS, Worcester Polytechnic Institute; MBA, Regis Univer­ sity; MS, Air force Institute of Technology) is an air and space strategist at the Joint Air Power Competence Centre in Kalkar, Germany. He serves as the center's space operations subject-matter expert, responsible for developing air and space power for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and member nations. He is currently deployed to the International Security Assistance Force's Joint Command in Kabul, Afghanistan, as chief of that force's space operations. Lieucenant Colonel Single's operational experience includes ICBM, space, and air and space operations center weapon systems. He has also served as chief of theater support, Weapons and Tactics Branch, at Headquarters Air Force Space Command. He has partici­ pated and won several awards in joint and combined operations and exercises in the US Central Command, US European Command, and US Pacific Command areas of responsibility and has served in an array of space officer capacities. An internationally recognized expert, Lieutenant Colonel Single has served as an in­ vited guest speaker at numerous international events and has authored several articles on NATO and coalition space operations.

84 I Air & Space Power Journal V REVIEW ESSAY

Building an Offensive and Decisive PLAAF A Critical Review of Lt Gen Liu Yazhou’s The Centenary of the Air Force

Guocheng Jiang

n 1 October 2009. the People’s Re- the A ir Force (H £ which first ap- public of China celebrated its 60th peared in the early 2000s in Chinese and anniversary with all kinds of mod- then in 2008 in an English translation, O along with Liu’s other important articles.'1 em weaponry parading through and above Tiananmen Square in an unprecedented His monograph presents a number ot show of force. Soon after, China’s People’s unique views on the PLAAF’s effort to Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) also transform itself from a mere appendage of turned 60 on 11 November 2009 and the other services into its current status as launched its own series of celebrations. In a an independent service—views that afford media blitz featuring TV shows, newspapers, important insights for those who seek to and seminars, a number of renowned understand the PLAAF’s historical context. PLAAF strategists entered the spotlight to General Liu’s perspective on Chinese strate- talk about the PLAAF’s strategic past, pres- gic considerations has proven highly influ- ent, and future. Among them, Lt Gen Liu ential among elite PLAAF strategists who Yazhou was recognized by many members are helping shape the air force into a strate- of the Chinese audience as the "Douhet of gic force designed to perform independent, China," probably because of his reputation offensive, and decisive roles in future wars. as a daring forward thinker, a vehement This article distills the essence of General speaker, and a fascinating personality.1 Liu’s monograph and critically analyzes it Italian general Giulio Douhet advocated in order to provide a Western audience strategic bombing, but his book The Com- some insight into a highly regarded advo- mand of the Air proved so controversial that cate of Chinese airpower. it drew strong criticism from his military colleagues, many of whom interpreted it as Three Revolutions and Three Steps a theory of “total war." General Liu, in con- trast, has gathered strong support and has General Liu divides the development of profoundly influenced the Chinese air- military affairs into three revolutionary power community. In this sense, and to a stages. The first revolution occurred in the certain degree, to understand General Liu's nineteenth century, when navies ended thoughts is to understand the PLAAF. land armies' traditional dominance of wars. The general’s writing has established him The second revolution took place in World as China's preeminent airpower theorist. War II when Germany, although possessing On 10 November 2009, a special edition of tactically superior fighters and attack aircraft, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) publica- lost to an equally good but strategically ori- tion Military Weekly included an abbreviated ented British (and Allied) airpower force version of his monograph The Centenary of that developed an exceptional fleet of stra-

Summer 2010 | 85 tegic. bombers. The third revolution, which the war’ as the golden rule in modern war- started in the 1990s and continues today, is fare (p. 26). Liu notes that Douhet opposed particularly important to the world's air tasking the air force to support warfare on forces. As General Liu puts it, "Air battle- the ground, proposing instead that airpower fields have become the decisive battlefields; fight independent, offensive aerial warfare victories in the air have become the ulti- to “end a war before ground and naval mate victories."' This assertion, now rever- forces come into play” (p. 27). Liu acknowl- berating throughout most PLAAF capstone edges that during World War II, the Soviet documents such as Military Ideology of the Red Army contravened Douhet's ideas by Air Force, originated during the 1991 Gulf winning a number of decisive land victo- War when the PLAAF watched how the US ries, but he concludes that the Soviets de- Air Force conducted Operation Desert feated Germany because the Luftwaffe was Storm.1 By the time o f the 1999 Kosovo war forced to fight tactical air battles. In his and 2001 Afghan war, the P L A A F was seri- view, neither side fully appreciated the sig- ously contemplating its own future. These nificance of Douhet’s "absolute” command three wars dramatically and swiftly influ- of the air, so both o f them stuck to the enced the PLAAF's mind-set. Following a struggle for "relative” air command, thereby thorough study of all three, the PLAAF be- ceding the decisive role to the land cam- gan advocating the attainment of war objec- paigns. However, Liu asserts that the 1999 tives "through the sole use o f air strikes" (p. Kosovo war belatedly vindicated Douhet's 18). General Liu regards the three wars as air war theory. the three steps of the third revolution, per- Like many defenders of Douhet, General ceiving the Gulf War as mainly tactical, the Liu avoids commenting on the most contro- Kosovo war as evolving into a campaign- versial aspect of his writing, that is, crushing scale operation that pursued strategic goals, the will of the people by exposing civilian and the Afghan war as broadly strategic. populations to the terror of destruction- The general contends that, by weather- total war. In Western military circles, how- ing the three revolutions, the world's ma- ever, Douhet’s ideas about the will of the jor air forces have progressed from ancil- people have remained controversial for de- lary to decisive players in war. The PLAAF cades. Although Liu repeatedly cites the must therefore build its strategic capabili- Kosovo war and Operation Iraqi Freedom as ties in order to enter the top tier of air- proof of Douhet’s theory, some Western power nations. analysts point out that although the US-led air forces succeeded in the Kosovo war through a bombing campaign that achieved Douhet's Theory demoralizing effects on Belgrade's popu- lace, Iraqi Freedom's “shock-and-awe” air Douhet never exerted significant influ- campaign partially crushed Saddam Hussein’s ence on the PLAAF, long dominated by So- military but did not make much of an im- viet military doctrine, until the late 1980s pression on the Iraqis. Observing the on- when the revolution in military affairs that going wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western swept the world's leading militaries reached analysts argue that instead of destroying the China. Once rooted in Chinese soil, Douhet’s people’s will, the US military should win ideas flourished, just as the former Soviet the people’s minds. influence waned. Clearly, the US military has now adopted The second chapter of General Liu’s this view. For example, US Army general monograph analyzes Douhet's theories, William S. Wallace contends that, “as concentrating on the efficiency and effec- learned during operations following the tiveness of strategic bombing. He hails ’thunder run’ to Baghdad, today's conflict Douhet’s tenet "defeat in the air is defeat in involves a strong human element with op-

86 | Air & Space Power Journal V REVIEW ESSAY

erations conducted in and among the people." clear weapons still exists, the practicality of In recognition of this fact, Wallace states remote precision strike capabilities of con- that "conducting full-spectrum operations- ventional airpower has far exceeded that of simultaneous offensive, defensive, and sta- nuclear weapons, and as such, the former bility or civil-support operations-is a pri- can fully replace the latter as a primary mary' theme ot the 2008 manual [Field strategic choice."7 Another prominent PLA Manual 3-0, Operations]” (emphasis added).5 analyst, Sr Col Yao Yunzhu, points out that In his introduction to the updated version "studying the nuclear thinking of earlier of Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, hregu- Chinese leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng lar Warfare, Lt Gen Allen Peck, formerly in Xiaoping, we find that neither man consid- charge of US Air Force doctrine development, ered nuclear weapons usable on the battle- also pointed out that irregular warfare is a field in the same way as conventional full-spectrum war whose focus shifts from means. Moreover, neither believed that nu- defeating the enemy's military forces to clear wars could ever be fought and won in gaining support from the general population." a measured and controlled way.”* Under Both generals' remarks indicate that mod- this guidance, China’s military development ern wars are deviating from conventional in recent years has concentrated on patterns; thus, bombing alone can hardly strengthening its conventional strategic— achieve national objectives, total war is not rather than nuclear-deterrence and coun- the solution, and victory necessarily de- terdeterrence capabilities, with air force pends heavily upon “boots on the ground.” modernization as a huge priority. Putting these efforts under Liu’s lens, one may see that China is seriously preparing itself to Nuclear Threshold transcend the nuclear threshold “from the skies” (p. 29). Liu believes that as conven- General Liu insightfully relates airpower's tional airpower grows more formidable, nu- development to the concept of a nuclear clear deterrence becomes less relevant. threshold—the point in a conflict at which Globally, several incidents further support nuclear weapons would be used. He believes Liu’s argument: Israel's bombing of Syria's that the United States first erected the nu- suspected nuclear factory in 2007, the US clear threshold soon after the Hiroshima missile attack in 1998 on a Sudanese phar- and Nagasaki bombings, allowing neither maceutical plant that was allegedly produc- itself nor anyone else to cross over. Again, ing nerve gas agents, and Israel's threat to the United States first transcended this use preemptive air strikes against Iran's nu- threshold by means of conventional air- clear facilities. power weaponry. Modern air forces, with their speed, range, precision, and mobility, are powerful enough to deter adversaries or Great Wall bring formidable enemies to terms without threatening the use of nuclear weapons. As an airpower advocate, General Liu Characterizing the US air strike against Libya perceives China’s Great Wall from a unique in 1986 as the first battle to transcend the perspective. On the one hand, he sees it as nuclear threshold and "the embryonic model a human masterpiece and source of pride of wars that followed it,” Liu claims that “traces in Chinese architectural history. On the of all the characteristics of the new military other hand, he deems it a humiliation be- era are to be found in this battle" ( p. 30). cause this line of defense never succeeded This viewpoint is widely shared within in stopping invasions from the north. Liu the PLAAF. For example, according to Mili- derides France's Maginot Line, designed to tary Ideology of the Air Force, “In modem local halt a German assault, as another fiasco wars, although the risk o f employing nu- similar to the Great Wall. The only differ-

Summer 2010 | 87 ence is that the Great Wall was overcome by ot the air force, but also on comprehending land forces alone, and the Maginot Line by the essence of China as a major power. a combination of land and air forces in a three-dimensional battlespace. Liu goes on to interpret Japan’s offensive in the Pacific Borders of National Interests during World War II as one that intended to General Liu observes that in addition to establish, "in the words of Isoroku Yamamoto, protecting the national territory, national ‘an oceanic line of defense against the security has the more important function of United States,’ ” only to suffer a crushing protecting the national interests. The bor- blow from the sky (p. 35). He belittles the ders of a nation's territory are limited, but Iraqi defense line in the desert during the national interests have no bounds. With this first Gulf War as the last line of land de- definition in mind, he cautions that China fense, which proved totally helpless against should differentiate between defending its modern US airpower. Through citing and territorial borders and securing the borders comparing these historical lines of defense, of its national interests. The farther out the Liu highlights the significance of "the U.S. latter, the more secure the former, and the armed forces’ shattering of Saddam’s line of front line of security should extend wher- defense,” calling it a milestone that "marked ever a nation’s interests go. The United the obliteration from warfare of the tradi- States operates according to this principle, tional pattern of defense” in the unfolding and so should the rising China. Moreover, airpower era (p. 36). the United States has actively employed its Air Force wherever US strategic interests lie, so China should do the same by using Three Types of Air Forces the PLAAF to enforce its national objec- tives. Liu quotes the famous declaration of Along this line of reasoning, General Liu' Adm Dennis C. Blair, former commander of contends that physical lines of defense have US Pacific Command: “We respect the au- been rendered obsolete by airpower but that thority of the People’s Liberation Army on cognitive lines of defense can be penetrated their mainland, but we must make them only by cultivating a "perpetual [offensive] understand that the oceans and skies are spirit” (p. 37). Liu divides modern air forces ours” (p. 44). Liu then reiterates the ur- into three types—defensive, offensive, and gency of accelerating the PLAAF’s advance- both defensive and offensive. He argues ment: “The development of [China's] air that, currently, the PLAAF is the only ma- power is not something that is dispensable jor power evolving into the third type (de- or can be delayed” (p. 50). In another well- fensive and offensive), guided by China’s known monograph, The Grand National active defense strategy. However, recogniz- Strategy, Liu elaborates in much more detail ing that the core role o f airpower is offense, on how China should reshape the security he “maintainfs] that the heart of simultane- environment along its periphery.M ous offense/defense is offense. In other words, offense is the best defense” (p. 38). Liu believes that only an offensively ori- Aerial Combat ented air force matches the great-power sta- To General Liu, the Vietnam War was a tus o f China. Put differently, in its effort to watershed event during which US airpower achieve a strong ascendancy during the terminated the era of air-to-air combat. He twenty-first century, China must build of- observes that the last ace pilot was Capt fensive airpower to defend its expanding Steve Ritchie of the US Air Force, who shot interests. He assures us that this belief is down five MiGs during the Vietnam War. based not only on understanding the nature Modern warfare, he argues, no longer offers

88 | Air & Space Power Journal opportunities for pilots to shine as aerial founder of the People's Republic of China, gladiators. Aerial combat has almost disap- successfully theorized and practiced, Gen- peared since the advent of global strike ca- eral Liu argues that people’s war is essen- pabilities. The advance of science and tech- tially defensive, aimed at trading space for nology is quickly rendering single-role time, and is totally misaligned with the na- air-superiority fighter aircraft obsolete. Con- ture of modern war. People's war relies on sistent with tins trend, Liu finds that almost strategic depth and serves as a black hole all countries have stopped manufacturing that devours enemy military resources. To- fighter planes dedicated to air-to-air combat. day's war, however, is offensive and multi- Meanwhile, modern fighter-bombers, with dimensional, always striking from the sky all-weather fighting capabilities, are becom- first, defying and transcending traditional ing increasingly important. Liu cites the US notions of strategic depth. Tb prove this Air Force as a typical example of a force point, Liu cites a scene from the 1999 whose fighter-bombers now comprise the Kosovo war, in which "we heard an old Serb great majority of its fighter fleet. By com- praying, ‘God, if you pity the Serbians, have parison, China’s PLAAF appears to be the NATO [the North Atlantic TVeaty Organiza- exception, having only the H-6 as its strate- tion] come down. . . . [Let's] fight. . . on the gic bomber and the Q-5 as its attack-type ground, . . . win or lose' ’’ (p. 18). From nu- bomber. Noticing the contrast, Liu laments merous war reports, we now hear about that China “has continued to advance in the similar remarks made by Thliban fighters direction of aerial combats” (p. 42). Un- hiding in mountain caves. Liu concludes happy with the situation, he "maintain[s] that the main battlefield has moved up to that an air force should not merely be a the skies, "and, like it or not, the 'people' force of fighter planes," echoing Douhet’s can do nothing about [it]" (p. 44). view that, "'even a force of a defensive na- Liu adopts the somewhat radical position ture must set up a powerful contingent of of doubting that Mao’s theory of people's bombers'" (p. 40). war will regain popularity someday. Yet, soon Some analysts might dispute Liu's asser- after the initial publication of the general’s tion that the Vietnam War ended the era of monograph, the world witnessed the siege air-to-air combat by readily citing the same of Fallujah in Iraq and the Israeli-Hezbollah Bekaa Valley air battle o f 1982 that Liu uses war of 2006 in which the “people" mattered to prove the phaseout of aerial combat. In a great deal. Besides, in the emerging era of that battle, the Israeli Air Force, armed with cyber warfare, it is possible that civilians modern Airborne Warning and Control Sys- may turn themselves into hackers, launch- tem aircraft, not only destroyed all 19 Syr- ing attacks on everything in the opponent’s ian surface-to-air missile batteries and their virtual space. A Chinese author already en- radar sites, but also downed more than 80 visions such a scenario, seeing thousands, intercepting Syrian MiGs through aerial if not millions, of "phantom warriors” fight- combat. Although most Syrian fighters ing in this new type of "informationized were shot down before their pilots had a people’s war.’’11 chance to engage Israeli aircraft, the Bekaa Valley battle remains an example of post- Vietnam air-to-air combat. Manifestation of National Will General Liu asserts that there are two first-rate military powers in the world—the People's War United States and Israel—and that they Although almost all Chinese defense white share one striking trait: both favor and are papers stress the importance and relevance adept at the employment of airpower. Al- of “people's war,” which Mao Zedong, luding to the term “gunboat diplomacy," Liu

Summer 2010 | 89 describes the United States as conducting Like many Chinese military strategists, aerial diplomacy to bring the whole world Liu does not clearly differentiate between under the shadow o f its aircraft's wings. electronic operations taking place primarily The 1983 Grenada invasion, the 1989 sei- in the electromagnetic spectrum and infor- zure of Panama’s president Manuel Noriega, mation operations occurring mainly in the G u lf War o f 1991, and the 1999 Kosovo cyberspace. The characteristically Chinese war represent just a few such examples. Liu word "informationization,” which covers goes further, referring to the Israeli Air Force both domains, has remained popular in Chi- as the "guardian angel" of its country’s very nese military circles. Watching this informa- survival (pp. 45, 46). As an airpower strate- tionization of warfare taking shape, in gist, Liu agrees that Israel must maximize which airpower plays a major role, Liu as- the precision, speed, range, and lethality of serts that this ongoing technology revolu- its airpower to preclude protracted wars it tion occurs in three stages. First is transfor- cannot afford, citing Israel’s 1982 Bekaa Val- mation from ground-based command to airborne command and then to integrated ley aerial battle, the 1976 airport rescue in command enabled by airborne early warn- Entebbe, Uganda, and the 1981 bombing of ing systems. Next, remotely piloted aircraft Iraq's Osirak reactor as classic cases of air- conduct attack and bombing missions. The power enforcing national will. third stage, yet to come, will feature Web Liu observes that whenever incidents oc- confrontation and cyber warfare. Liu be- cur somewhere around the world, the first lieves that the decisive factor is the system- reaction of the United States is to send air- atization of different electronic technologies craft. Additionally, because air forces pos- into a distributive, yet coherent, network. sess “the greatest fighting strength in times This view is shared by PLA leadership. Ob- of war," Liu considers airpower "the most servers see that many recent major joint powerful deterrent at all other times and . . . exercises among PLA garrisons have fo- therefore the best tool for enforcing the na- cused on combat training encompassing tional will" (p. 46). He concludes that air networked system confrontations in both strikes not only fulfill military effects but the electromagnetic spectrum and cyber- also achieve national objectives—and that space. Witnessing cyber capability evolving airpower is used not merely to show military into a crucial enabler, Liu boldly forecasts might but to demonstrate national resolve. that as sophisticated conventional airpower capabilities powered by advanced informa- tion technology gradually render nuclear Electronic Warfare deterrence irrelevant, major powers with information superiority may create an "in- Although the Bekaa Valley battle was formation ’umbrella’ ” to replace the nuclear widely considered a sign of a new wave of umbrella (p. 53). This prophecy may bewil- technical revolution sweeping through the der analysts who view the nuclear umbrella airpower arena, it initially did not seem to provided bj' the United States to its Euro- alarm the PLAAF deeply. However, after pean and Asian allies primarily as a means observing unexplained, abnormal phenom- of discouraging these countries from de vel- ena in the sky along China’s southeastern oping and maintaining their own nuclear seaboard in 1994, the Chinese military sus- arsenals, and secondarily as part of extended pected that the United States had started deterrence. Therefore, if Liu’s prophecy is electronic warfare against China. General to come true, nuclear nonproliferation ef- Liu claims that, unbeknownst to China, US forts must have first reached a point close stealth bombers also may have entered Chi- to President Obama’s vision of a “world nese airspace. "The revolution has come!” without nuclear weapons."12 The United cries the general fp. 52). States is making serious efforts to establish

90 | Air <5 Space Power Journal "new, tailored, regional deterrence archi- lished by the United States, who, for example, tectures' which will ‘make possible a re- is already weary of watching China grab- duced role for nuclear weapons in our na- bing resources all over the world. Recogniz- tional security strategy."'11 Meanwhile, ing that most wars are fought for resources, information sharing between the United Liu bluntly points out that the United States States and its allies is indeed becoming "uses Tftiwan to seal off our access to mar- more critical for national and global secu- kets" and “intercepts our petroleum by rin'. But how and when such information means of the war in Afghanistan" (p. 49). sharing evolves into an umbrella function- What might happen if war erupted between ing like the current nuclear umbrella re- these two countries? General Liu predicts main to be seen. that such a war would definitely be aerial: “The enemy will not send a single soldier onto Chinese soil. Air strikes will decide High Frontiers our country’s fate and survival" (p. 23). Fur- General Liu points out that American ther, he expects this war would erase the history has featured constantly changing distinction between either front lines and frontiers, both horizontally and vertically. rear areas or forward resistance and in- After the 50th state joined the union, the depth defense; be omnidirectional, with United States continued to extend its exter- strikes coming from or beyond the horizon; nal frontiers as leader of the Western alli- be brief but with very heavy casualties; and ance. Now the United States has again taken be shrouded in an all-encompassing infor- the lead in extending the high frontier. The mation network. twentieth century saw the theory of sea Similarly, Liu envisages a war against power followed bv that of airpower. In the Thiwan as one fought in the sky. In view of twenty-first century, Liu anticipates that Taiwan’s strong airpower buildup, he sug- the theory and practice of space power will gests that the PLAAF should "(a) bear the surely prevail. Echoing James Oberg’s book brunt of the operation; (b) be prepared to Space Power Theory, Liu holds that whoever play the leading role in the war; and (c) be dominates space will dominate the world. able to conduct a frontal and independent Furthermore, by comparing the evolution war, or what we often refer to as ’going it all of aircraft with that of spacecraft, Liu pre- the way’ " (p. 25). The general asserts that dicts that loading kinetic and nonkinetic "we will have Thiwan if we have the skies" weapons onto space platforms is a logical (p. 24). line of thinking, “just as machine guns and When scrutinizing General Liu’s thinking aerial cannon were fitted onto aircraft at on a potential war against Taiwan, we should the outset of World War I" (p. 56). He sum- also take note of another of his in-depth marizes his points by saying that "space is monographs, The Issue o f Taiwan and Taiwan warfare’s ultimate vantage point . . . the ul- Independence, in which he characterizes a timate opportunity for all countries and all potential war across the Taiwan Strait as a armed forces" (p. 56). "civil war."H If this is the case, one may question whether Liu still insists on launch- War against China and ing air strikes that would be inherently deadly, inflict widespread destruction, and War against Taiwan risk civilian lives. Tb be sure, though, Gen- General Liu posits that the United States eral Liu assumes that modern air strikes are does not want to stop China from develop- surgical in nature, and he is vehemently ing; it only wants China to develop within “against rushing into armed conflict with the limits that America sets. War is a possi- Taiwan, especially armed conflict that bility if China oversteps the red line estab- causes indiscriminate destruction.'" ’

Summer 2010 | 91 Supporting Role versus US armed forces. The Soviet Red Army, having served as a role model and sup- Supported Role porter of the PLA ever since the latter's for- A strong advocate of independent air mation, now finds itself the object of its forces fighting independent wars, General Chinese "student’s" disapproval. The cur- Liu appears less concerned with airpower’s rent generation of PLAAF leaders, who supporting roles. Commenting on the Af- watched every detail of the Gulf War in awe, ghan war, he contends that "small units of pondered why the Americans were able to ground forces” are dispatched "merely in launch such spectacular air campaigns. the service of the air force's precision General Liu condenses his answer to three strikes" (p. 19). Readers might interpret this elements: adopting forward-thinking mili- observation as reducing the ground force’s tary strategy, emancipating the mind, and role to that of an embedded forward air con- employing science and technology. troller. However, they should bear in mind Favorable references to the US military that Liu’s monograph was published at a are abundant in The Centenary of the Air time when the proper balance between air- Force. Take, for example, Liu’s comment “As power’s supported and supporting roles was well as being our army's opponent, the U.S. a matter of debate within the US Air Force, Army is our army’s teacher" (p. 20). He which has since adapted its doctrine to the goes on to say that “the United States has battlefields in both Iraq and Afghanistan. alwaj's chosen its enemies on the basis of Emphasis has shifted from air strikes to for- the other countries' strengths rather than eign internal defense, combat support, sta- their intentions. China will qualify for being bility operations, and learning about the re- a friend of the United States only if it be- gional culture. Though the PLAAF watches comes an adversary the United States can- and follows its US counterpart closely, simi- not defeat” (p. 50), and that "our opponent lar discussions about supporting versus sup- is too strong, yet I have always believed ported roles rarely appear in published that living in the same times as today’s U.S. PLAAF sources. armed forces is the Chinese armed forces' Also notable is the reaction, or lack good fortune rather than their misfortune. thereof, from the PLAAF to the war be- We need the kind of great thinking exer- tween Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. This cised by the U.S. armed forces" (p. 57). Liu war drew broad attention within military does not hide his deep respect for the US circles worldwide and prompted some air- military, noting that “the U.S. armed forces, power advocates to wonder whether the though the most powerful, are the most 1999 Kosovo war, conducted solely from the crisis-conscious” (p. 22). He expresses this air, had become either the norm for future esteem philosophically, saying that "people wars or an exception. In contrast, General under umbrellas always fall behind those Liu, as well as many other PLAAF strate- who run in the rain” (p. 33)—implying that gists, continues to stress the importance of those countries strolling idly under um- airpower’s playing independent and deci- brellas will never catch up with the “crisis- sive roles in future wars. conscious” Americans, who forever run as if they were in heavy rain. Russian versus American Armed Forces Cost of War As with a number of articles and books Admiration is one thing, following suit is written by leading PLAAF strategists, quite another. General Liu, while applaud- throughout his monograph Liu disdains So- ing the wav the US Air Force launches of- viet (Russian) force structure and admires fensive attacks, talks very little about the

92 | Air <5 Space Power Journal V REVIEW ESSAY

cost of wars that no one other than the US considering his prominent status as a senior Air Force could afford to wage. He claims PLAAF officer who recently became the po- that air strikes are "a sort o f highly cost- litical commissar at PLA National Defense effective type of warfare for replacing ex- University, and considering the timing of pensive ground warfare" (p. 45). But ana- the republication of his monograph, there is lysts see that even a country as rich as the strong reason to believe that, to a large de- United States finds itself bogged down in gree, his views represent mainstream the lavish way it fights its current wars. The PLAAF thought. In his new position, Liu US Air Force is desperately searching for may readily extend his ideological influ- ways to reduce sorties, save fuel, and create ence to the other services through the uni- new and more cost-effective war-fighting versity forum. techniques. With China rising economically China is continuing its active defense and militarily but at the same time bur- policy and constantly rebalancing the de- dened bv so many bureaucratic, financial, fensive and offensive elements of the policy and technical obstacles, it remains to be equation. The world is witness to China's seen whether the PLAAF will be able to bal- gradual expansion of its defense periphery. ance its aspiration to fight in the US style All through this process, the PLAAF is play- with its actual ability to fight within its own ing a critical role on the offensive side of ways and means. the equation, and great strategic minds, such as Liu’s, are helping spearhead the process. In the years ahead, General Liu's Conclusion calls to accelerate the building of China's The Centenary of the Air Force presents strategic airpower to defend its expanding only General Liu's personal views—not the periphery will likely become more domi- official doctrine of the PLAAF. However, nant in PLA military affairs. ©

Notes

1. A search for (the Chinese name for 6. Lt Gen Allen G. Peck, “Doctrine Update: AFDD Liu Yazhou) in either Google or Baidu yields numer- 2-3, Irregular Warfare," Air and Space Power Journal- ous recent articles and blogs that crown Liu “Douhet Chinese 2, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 55. of China." 7. M i n Ze n g fu et al., Military Ideology of the Air 2. Chinese Law and Government, a bimonthly Force, 232. journal, published two booklets by General Liu: The 8. Sr Col Yao Yunzhu, "China's Perspective on Dilemmas and Prospects of China’s Military Modern- Nuclear Deterrence,” Air and Space Power Journal 24, ization and Air Power Strategy (Januarv-February no. 1 (Spring 2010): 28. 2008), and The Voice of a Fifth Generation Leader 9. Liu Yazhou, "The Grand National Strategy," (Nlarch-April 2007). Chinese Law and Government 40, no. 2 (March-April 3. Liu Yazhou, “The Centenary of the Air Force," 2007): 13-36. Chinese Law and Government A\, no. 1 (Januarv- 10. C1C Matthew M. Hurley, "The Bekaa Valley February 2008): 17. Hereafter, page references to this Air Battle, June 1982: Lessons Misleamed?" Airpower article are cited parenthetically in the text. Journal 3, no. 4 (W inter 1989): 60-70, http://www 4. Min Zengfu et al., Military Idcologi) of the Air .airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj89/ Force ( V V 'll-AU&'•$*.&) (Beijing: FLA Publishing win89/hurley.html. House, 2006), 394. 11. Luo Chyn-Bor, "The Chinese People’s War: 5. Gen William S. Wallace, “FM 3-0, Operations-. Theory, Application, and Its Significance in Modern The Army’s Blueprint,” Militartj Review 88, no. 2 Warfare," A ir and Space Power Journal-Chinese 3, no. (March-April 2008): 3, 4, http://usacac.army.mil/ 3 (Fall 2009): 85. CAC2/Military Review/Archives/ Engl ish/Military 12. Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Rev iew_20080430_a rt004. pd f. Barack Obama,” Office of the Press Secretary, The

Summer 2010 | 93 White House, 5 April 2009, http.*//www.vvhitehouse www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nucleanveapons/ .gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack articles/fact_sheet_2010_nuclear_posture_review. -Obama-ln-Prague-As-Delivered. 14. Liu Yazhou, "The Issue of Taiwan and Timvan 13. Kingston Reif and Chad O’Carroll, ‘Fact Independence," Chinese Law and Government 40, no. Sheet: 2010 Nuclear Posture Review," Center for 2 (March-April 2007): 56. Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 2010, http:// 15. Ibid. , 60.

Mr. Cuocheng Jiang Mr. Jiang (undergraduate diploma, Shanghai Institute of Foreign Languages, China; MA. Nanjing Normal University, China; MA. Johns Hopkins University. USA) is the editor of Air and Space Power lournal-Chinese. Prior to joining the Journal. Mr. Jiang worked a number of years in US publication and software industries as a language specialist and project manager. His earlier experience in China includes reporting, interpreting, teaching, and editing. He is the author of Cote to GATT (1993) and cotranslator of Dragon Fire (tw o volumes, 1995). Mr. Jiang has also w ritten several articles about the changing Chinese culture.

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94 | Air & Space Power Journal sy BOOK REVIEWS

m em b ers o f the m ilitary-robotics com m u n ity. Those experienced in this held understand that no robot can com plete all o f the required m is- sions. We currently have in service m any differ- ent robotic platforms, made by a range o f pro- ducers, that perform unsung, im portant duties each and every day. To be fair, Singer correctly states that his nam ed robotic platform s have al- ready kept servicem en out of harm ’s way and have undoubtedly saved m any lives. U n lik e Isaac A sim ov, w h ose ru les for robots prevented them from causing harm to humans, Singer confirm s that real robotic platforms of the near future have a vast array of missions, many o f wh ich can in flict great dam age upon an a d ver- sary. Singer points out that changing w ho fights

W ired for War: The Robotics Revolution and at the fundam ental level "transform s the very C o n flict in th e 21st C en tu ry by P. W. Singer. agent o f war” (p. 194). N o one can deny that post- Penguin Press (http: us.penguingroup.com ), human warfare is an intriguing thought. The 375 H udson Street, N ew York, N ew York psychology o f war m ay also change, and Singer 10014-3657, 2009, 400 pages, $29.95 (h ard - exam ines the effect o f losing m oral consider- cover). ISBN 1594201986. ations, w hen robotic w arriors in contact w ith the en em y and their distanced operators no longer Editor's Note This book appears on the 2010 A ir e x p e rie n c e fear, sh ock, o r an g e r (p . 262). W ith - Force Chief of Staffs Reading List out these m oral inputs, how do w e halt an ad- vance? Or how do entrenched forces conclude Wired for War is a world away from P. W. Singer's that to fight on is beyond reckless? How, indeed, previous book Children at War, in w h ich he p ro- posed w ays to halt such a h orrible practice. Th is can w e w in battles? Singer broadens his discussion a few pages latest venture, a study o f the use o f robotics in com bat, cou ld be taken as futuristic, w ith S in ger further on (p. 268). If technology aids overcon fi- enticing his readers to be swept up by the excite- dence and if nations have gone to w ar because o f m ent o f using advanced technology on and over overconfidence, then unm anned warfare could the b a ttlefield —or on and u nder water. T h e au- becom e a favored, regular option for those intent thor points out early on that m an y robot system s on conflict. We could see an increase in the are already w ork in g the b attlefield s o f today's num ber o f tactical engagem ents betw een tech- conflicts. F illin g a m arket need, th ey ap p ear in n ologica lly capable nations. Terrorist organ iza- ever-grow ing num bers that could equal those tions could also buy and use their own robotic operating in dom estic service and industry. m achines, and an y m ilitary plan n er w ill have to It w ou ld be w ro n g to say that this is a b ook factor in such use against our forces in the future. pu rely for the m ilitary read er althou gh this au di- S in ger describ es a ran ge o f robot capabilities, en ce w ill b en efit from the k n ow led ge con tain ed from those totally con trolled by an operator to w ithin its pages. T h e text is w ritten tor a broader preprogram m ed system s that operate by m eans readership, raising m any im portant m oral and o f artificial in telligen ce. W hat are the m oral im - ethical conundrum s that need to be addressed plications w h en tech n ologica lly advan ced na- and solved. For younger servicem en and tions use such system s to fight the enem y? A -women, who as children played with Transform - “sense o f m utuality” (p. 365) helps com m anders ers, this book am plifies what they already con sider m oral issues. As m an and m ach in e be- k n ow — that robotic platform s w ill play an in - com e m ore separated by distance and as robot creasingly im portan t part in future m ilitary op - system s are program m ed to function autono- erations. M ore sen ior m ilitary readers m ay w ell m ously, a danger exists that associated m oral learn that a new facet o f war is already fast ap- con sideration s w ill not get the atten tion th ey proaching, rem oving preconceived ideas of how need. Singer alludes to this (p. 366) but does not Soldiers should close w ith and kill the en em y . really develop his argument any further al- M y o n ly criticism con cern s S in ger’s p rop en - though it m erits greater discussion. If we can sity to concentrate on just a few com m ercial accept the notion that robot versus m an is on

Summer 2010 | 95 course to happen, then w e should be ready to fairs, as w ell as d o m estic stability and p rosp erity. debate the im p lication s o f such con fron tation s in But h u m an k in d ’s ab ility to ven tu re into space order to probe and understand the associated created a com p lex d ilem m a for its "p rop er” use. m oral im plication s. Optim ists view space as a global com m ons that W h en m a ch in es kill, w h at is the su p p o rtin g should be free from hum an divisiveness and ac- legality behind such actions? Singer tackles this cessible b y all. Pessim ists— and perhaps pragm a- aspect w ell (chap. 22), exposing the need for tists—on the other hand, predict that space even- lawyers to becom e an increasingly integral part tu ally w ill be pron e to w eapon ization , conflict, o f m ilitary operation s ( p. 327). T h e presence o f and other sorts o f misuse, as w ere land, sea, and law yers in forw ard op eratin g location s is n ow a air previously. These com peting views set the fact o f life in current operations. Increasing the stage for critical an alysis on the topic. T h e d iffer- use o f rem otely piloted lethal platform s m ay in g p ersp ectives also poin t out that space is in - well dem and space for lawyers alongside the extricably tied to politics in the rising tide o f glo- distanced cubicle warriors. b alization in the tw en ty-first cen tu ry. As the supporting technology o f robotics ex- The International Politics of Space provides pands and we m ake increasing use o f artificial readers an authoritative departure from previous intelligence, the conflicting ethics of using these analysts’ treatm ents o f the subject by exam ining platform s needs critical deliberation and assess- historical developm ents of national space pro- m ent. M aybe w e need to program robotic sys- gram s throu gh in tern ation al relation s and na- tem s with rules o f engagem ent that reflect the tional security lenses in order to glean lessons Law of Arm ed Conflict. Perhaps, Singer muses, ap p licab le to the con tin u ed m atu ration o f the we need to introduce a "hum an im pact state- space age. This analysis includes space policy, m ent" (p. 361) that addresses this new class o f doctrine, and technology as they relate to funda- "k illin g m ach in e," w ith its associated eth ics and m ental political m otives. Sheehan's conclusions p oten tial for social in frin gem en ts. are p ertin en t to to d a y’s co m p lex in tern ation al Wired for War is not just about the effect o f us- structure because there are direct and indirect in g robots in co n flict. It pain ts a far broa d er can - p olitical ou tcom es from space program s and vas o f how tech n o lo gy w ill cause us to qu estion their underlying policies that influence national and u ltim ately change our operatin g procedures. behavior in the ever-changing global balance of T h e book h igh ligh ts the n eed to u nderstand the pow er. Political and m ilitary leaders of the future m oral and eth ical im p lication s o f using such w ill face m an y ch allen ges vis-a-vis space, and weapons. Given that the use o f robotic system s inform ed consideration o f previous space poli- is already upon us, Singer raises a m yriad o f as- cies m ay help shape their decisions. sociated con cern s that m ilitary, political, and The book begins with a brief survey of major legal m inds need to address. political theories and then analyzes their rela- tionship to space policies during the space race Wing Cdr John M. Shackcll, RAF, Retired betw een the United States and Soviet Union and San A ntonin, Texas beyond. Sheehan’s work also includes chapters on the European Space A gen cy, India, China, the m ilita ry use o f space and its su pportin g doc- trine, space treaties and laws, and cooperative T h e In tern a tio n a l P o litics o f Space by M ichael efforts am ong various nations. Sheehan. Routledge (http://www.routledge Readers w ill fin d w ell-research ed analysis .com ), 270 M adison A ven u e, N e w York, N ew w ith su p p ortin g evid en ce illu m in atin g the m an y York 10016, 2007, 248 pages, $170.00 (h ard- political m otives for national and international cover), ISBN 978-0-414-39807-7; $43.95 (soft- space p olicies o f the past. T h e m ost im portan t o f cover), ISBN 978-0-415-39917-3. these include political equities in the form o f national prestige and propaganda, developm ent Distant heavens have captured hum an im agi- of indigenous science and technology, political nation for m illen n ia, but not u ntil just ov e r 50 in d ep en d en ce from frien d ly and rival space- years ago were m an-made objects—and, later, faring nations, and even rationale supporting m en and w om en —sent into space. Since then, the the m erits of each superpow er’s foundational world has becom e increasingly dependent on political ph ilosoph y. space p o w er fo r ev e ry d a y u tilities, m a n a gem en t Sheehan concludes that the public space poli- o f global com m erce, and national security af- cies o f m any nations are not necessarily the true

96 | Air & Space Power Journal \ y BOOK REVIEWS

underlying reason for pursuing a space program . The International Politics of Space achieves its Perhaps the m ost n oble of stated intentions— "to stated goal o f avoid in g analysis o f m ilitary uses benefit mankind through exploration”-gets o f space and its subset— w eaponization o f short shrift in favor of p u rely realist pursuits to space—in favor o f considering the larger political enhance one's ow n internal and external na- sign ifican ce o f the m ajor national space program s tional security at the expense o f one’s rivals. For around the w orld. By d oin g so, this volu m e con - instance, the USSR's strategy sought to achieve a tributes sign ifican tly to the body o f kn ow led ge list of “firsts” in order to quell public com m entary associated w ith the developm ent o f space policy. in the W est about the in feriority o f the S oviet A lth o u gh this is not th e fin al ep iso d e in th e re - technology base. Indeed, the Soviets had som e finem ent o f space policy, students and practitio- im pressive firsts, in clu d in g the first satellite, first ners alike w ill b en efit from Professor Sheehan's m am m al, first person, first w om an , and first extra- work as the space era m oves into its sixth de- veh icu lar a ctivity in space. C ru cially, N ikita cade. U n dou btedly, his com p reh en sive w ork w ill Khrushchev used these achievem ents to gain fuel additional and needed analysis o f space political clou t by extrap olatin g th em as p ro o f of p o lic y and its im p act on glob al p olitics. com m unism ’s ideological trium ph over capital- Lt Col Kevin M. Rhoades, USAF ism and dem ocracy. He did so for both internal Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and external audiences in order to consolidate Casteau, Belgium Soviet power within the union and around the world. On the other hand, the U nited States was surprised and m otivated out o f fear after the lau n ch o f Sputnik I in 1957. T h e n ear hysteria K illin g P ab lo: T h e H u n t fo r th e W o rld ’s that follow ed m ade the U nited States reassess G reatest O u tlaw b y M ark B ow den . A tlan tic its in itial con clu sion s about the state o f the M onthly Press/G rove Atlantic (http://www USSR's science-and-technology infrastructure .groveatlantic.com ), 841 Broadway, N ew York, and cap abilities. N e w York 10003, 2001, 296 pages. $20.00 A nother m ajor them e w oven through the (h ard cover), ISBN 0871137836. book is the natural tension associated with the developm ent o f booster and spacecraft tech- Mark Bowden, author of n ology. O b viou sly, these capabilities have natu- Black Hawk Down, has w ritten a gripping account o f the rise and ral m ilitary utility, bu t acq u irin g th em can run fall o f Pablo Escobar, the n otoriou s Colom b ian aground p olitica lly w h en con fron ted w ith the drug baron w hose ruthless "silver or lead" policy internationally recognized and prom ulgated con- placed him above the law. Escobar system ati- cept o f the space sanctuary. From a political per- cally corrupted governm ent officials by forcing spective, crossing—or even approaching—the in determ in ate thresh old betw een m ilitarizin g them either to accept his m oney (silver) or his space and w eaponizing space can cause political b u llets (lea d ). H is con trol o f coca in e profits fi- angst and public outcry. Sheehan’s exploration of nanced this corruption as w ell as his lavish life- this scen ario p rovid es valu able in sigh t as p er- style. Building public housing and soccer fields ceived through his look at the European Space for the poor in his h om etow n o f M ed ellin m ade Agency. him a local folk hero, but his crim es progres- The bibliography and endnotes contain all the sively tarnished his public image. In a possible m ajor au th oritative w orks on this topic such as allusion to Tom C lancy’s classic book o f 1989, Jam es Oberg, Bruce DeBlois, Everett Dolm an, Bowden refers to Escobar as "a clear and present and W alter M cD ou gall, as w ell as h istorically danger" (p. 59). im portant treaties, laws, and doctrine publica- M ore than an exciting crim e story, Killing tions. Th e result o f such com prehensive research Pablo probes the dark nexus am on g terrorists, is reflected in the depth o f analysis, which is un- organized criminals, and dem ocratic governm ents. like an y o th er as it pertain s to politics. C olom bian dru g cartels in itia lly h elp ed th eir D isappointingly, Sheehan som ew hat glosses g o vern m en t figh t gu errillas, bu t a sym b io tic rela- over powerful econom ic m otivations for and tionship later evolved betw een the cartels and against space program s as they relate to pow er gu errillas. To fight the cartels, the C olom b ia n politics, both glob a l and d om estic. "Tangible les- g o vern m en t b len d ed tradition al la w e n fo rce- sons are available, and this area needs further m ent w ith a desperate strategy o f fighting terror revelation. w ith terror. T h e go vern m en t in itially attem p ted

Summer 2010 | 97 law enforcem ent, but Escobar's "im prisonm ent" for another farcical prison term or sim ply van- from 1991 to 1992 p roved a h u m iliatin g farce ish. A fter an a gon izin g series o f failed raids, in- because he controlled the prison. His escape led cluding an abortive air strike on Escobar's elec- to a m assive m anhunt based on an altered gov- tron ically d eterm in ed location, the Search Block ernm ent strategy. Bowden contends that the Co- fin ally zeroed in on his cell ph on e and killed him . lom bian and US governm ents' new strategy was Today’s readers m ight see parallels betw een s im p ly to kill E scobar w h ile o ffic ia lly cla im in g this story and the w ar on terror. C olom b ia is not they m erely wanted to capture him. the only country that faces an unholy allian ce Bowden characterizes the m anhunt as a tar- b etw een terrorists and organ ized crim inals. T h e geted assassination, a troubling notion for two evo lvin g partnership b etw een C olom bian guer- dem ocratic governm ents ostensibly dedicated to rillas and drug traffickers is rem iniscent o f that the rule o f law. The Colom bian governm ent was now seen in Afghanistan, where m em bers of the unable to stop Escobar due to feckless politicians Thliban once fought opium growers but now and corrupt, in com p eten t p olice and m ilitary partner with them to finance their insurgency. officials. The US governm ent, eager to stifle the Efforts to fight such enem ies engender dilem - flow o f cocaine, was plagued with intense inter- m as for the U nited States. Bow den explains that agency com petition to gain bureaucratic advan- "k illin g Pablo w ou ld not en d cocain e exports to tage b y catch ing the outlaw . US officials m ay also the United States or even slow them dow n—every- have exploited a change in US presidential ad- body knew that—but the Am ericans had signed m inistrations to get aw ay with dubious covert on for this job b e lie v in g that it w as about som e- operation s b efore in com in g C lin ton adm inistration thing bigger. It was about dem ocracy, the rule o f officials fully understood what was happening (p. 195). T h e U n ited States secretly sen t m ilitary law , standing up fo r ju stice and civiliza tion " (pp. operatives and advanced electronic-surveillan ce 260-61). S im ilarly, k illin g a notorious terrorist gea r w h ile the C olom b ian s fo rm ed a special p o- m ay or m ay not affect the incidence o f terror- lice unit called the “Search Block" to track down ism , but A m erica n s still fight fo r the p rin cip les Escobar. The Search Block soon acquired a repu- that Bowden lists. Th e questionable governm ent tation for k illin g suspects rath er than arresting m eth ods used in C olom b ia m ay be an alogou s to them . E ven w orse, the author claim s that both ou r p olicies for d etain in g terrorists at G uanta- governm ents condoned a shadowy vigilante n am o Bay and the C entral In telligen ce A g e n c y ’s group called “Los Pepes” (a Spanish acronym for interrogation techniques. Joe Tfift, ch ief o f the "People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar”) that in- US Drug Enforcem ent Adm inistration's Bogota cluded criminals. Th e Search Block allegedly station, rep orted ly b elieved he had struck a fu n n eled in telligen ce in form ation from the Faustian bargain and "felt that to get Pablo th ey United States to Los Pepes m em bers, w ho m e- had sold th eir sou ls” (p. 268). H o p efu lly w e w ill th od ically m u rd ered m a n y p eop le thou ght to be not feel that w a y after the w ar on terror. associated with Escobar, decim ating his hench- Killing Pablo is based on extensive research - m en. Bowden thinks that US officials knew what in clu d in g in terview s and officia l docu m en ts Los Pepes was doing but concludes that "there sum m arized in a "Sources" section—that lends w ou ld alw ays be p ow erfu l, w ell-in ten tion ed m en credence to the author's provocative assertions. w h o b elieved that p rotectin g civiliza tion som e- Overall, the book tells an excellent story but tim es required forays into lawlessness” (p. 178). raises w orrisom e qu estions that w e w ill continue C yb er operations w ere vital to the m anhunt to confront for years to come. but difficult to perform. Escobar shuttled con- stantly betw een hideouts, so the Search Block Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF used US equ ipm ent to hom e in on his cell phone Maxwell AFB, Alabama w hen he called his son. Escobar knew that the authorities were eavesdropping, but “the gam e wasn't to avoid being overheard —that was im- possible—but to avoid being targeted" (p. 237). Th e W ar: A n Intim ate H istory, 1941-1945 bv To ensure that he kept m aking phone calls, the G eo ffrey C. W ard and Ken Burns. A lfred A. Colom bian and US governm ents used Escobar's K nopf (http://www.random house.com / w ife and ch ildren as bait, refu sin g to let th em knopf/hom e.pperl), 1745 Broadway, New flee C olom b ia out o f con cern that if Escobar’s York, N e w York 10019, 2007, 452 pages, $50.00 fa m ily fled to safety, he m igh t eith er su rren d er (h ardcover), ISBN 0307262839.

98 | Air & Space Power Journal 1 m ust poin t out, h ow ever, that the authors G eoffrey W ard and Ken Burns’s book The War give only sparse coverage to the air war, particu- An Intimate History. 1941-1945 accom panies the la rly in the Pacific theater. S ince th ey co n cen - Public Broadcasting Service’s very highly ac- trate on veterans from four towns, this lack o f claim ed 15-hour docum entary series of the sam e coverage cou ld be related to a vailab ility o f the name. The project of two award-winning authors d w in d lin g n u m ber o f such veterans. who have also made their mark as a historian V iew ers o f the televisio n d ocu m en tary w ill and a film producer, it captures A m erica ’s expe- en jo y the b ook as a w on d erfu l com p an ion to the rience in W orld War II by focusing on the per- series, and readers who have never seen the doc- sonal reflections o f close to 50 residents o f four u m en tary w ill en joy the book and w ant to w atch towns (Luverne, Minnesota; Sacramento, Califor- the televised version. The War is a m ust-read for nia; W aterbury, C on n ecticu t; and M obile, A la - readers w’ho wish to learn m ore about average bam a), using them to represent all Am ericans A m erica n s’ (i.e., th eir paren ts’ and gran dpar- who fought in the war. These individuals include en ts') person al triu m phs, tragedies, and W orld Soldiers, Sailors, A irm en , M arin es, fa cto ry w o rk - War II experiences. ers, Nisei (first-generation Japanese-Am ericans), A fro-A m erican s, w om en , and ch ildren . Lt Col Daniel J. Simonsen, USAF Arranged chronologically, the book begins on Louisiana Itch University Sunday morning, 7 Decem ber 1941, with the at- tack on Pearl Harbor and concludes in August 1945 w ith the en d o f World W ar II and the return o f Am erican m ilitary forces. By in clu din g p oi- The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The Intuitive gnant letters and quotations from servicem en Science o f Therm onuclear W ar by Sharon and their loved ones, Ward and Burns reveal the Gham ari-Thbrizi. H arvard University Press raw em otions o f the tim e and create a clear im - ( http://w w w .h u p .h arvard .ed u ), 79 G arden age o f Am erican life during the war. Rather than Street, Cam bridge, M assachusetts 02138, 2005, glorifying the war, the book paints a picture not 432 pages, $26.95 (h ardcover), ISBN o n ly o f personal determ in ation bu t also o f con fu - 0674017145. sion and horrid carnage. Several them es appear and reappear through- In The Worlds of Herman Kahn, author Sharon out The War. the h om e front's d eterm in ation to G ham ari-Tabrizi uses the life o f Herm an Kahn support the war and follow' events via newsreel, (1922-83) to address the effect that the potential radio, and newspaper; Am erican servicem en's use o f nuclear w eapons in a future w ar had upon overarching call to duty; and the cruel brutality American culture from the end of World War II o f the w-ar. A corollary o f the latter them e is the through the ea rly 1960s. M ore than just a biogra- desire o f Am erican servicem en to protect their phy o f Kahn, the book exam ines a w ide swath o f fam ilies from the horrors they experienced and defense and social issues that faced A m erica witnessed. Additionally, m any o f the book's in- du rin g the 1950s and early 1960s, w hen m an y terviewees discuss how they cam e to grips with people considered Kahn one o f the preem inent killin g and h ow th eir exp erien ces profou n d ly m ilitary (n u c lea r) strategists. M oreover, it has changed them . value for the general A ir Force history b u ff since Although the authors include a solid overview these early n u clear w eap on s w ere in itia lly as- o f the conduct o f the w ar and its battles, as w ell signed to the A ir Force to m anage and possibly as a theaterw ide perspective, the prim ary focus em ploy. Additionally, this study would prove or strength of the book rem ains the num erous valuable to individuals interested in various issues personal aspects, mentioned above. Other studies that Am erica had to confront because o f the in- do a good job o f conveying the experiences and fusion o f nuclear w eapon s into its m ilitary arsenal. em otions o f either the servicem en or the hom e A p h ysicist b y ed u cation and a sto ry telle r by front, but W ard and Burns excel in com b in in g vocation, Kahn began his professional career at the tw o. A lso im p ressive are the 394 illu stra- the R A N D C orp oration , w h ere he u tilized the tio n s / p h o t o g r a p h s a n d 21 m a p s , m o s t o f w h ic h I calcu lations o f early gam e th eory to craft m ili- had never seen before. Picture-researcher David tary strategy and think about the unthinkable, McMahon's high-quality photographs, along wfith nam ely, nuclear warfare. He later founded his th eir in sigh tfu l captions, co m p le m e n t th e poin ts own research organization, the Hudson Institute under discussion. (p. 19). Through these studies and subsequent

Summer 201Q | 99 lectures, he becam e a recognized, leading expert Th e D evelopm ent of Propulsion Technology

on the im p lication s o f nu clear war. Kahn pub- for U.S. Space-Launch Vehicles, 1926-

lished several works (e.g., On Thermonuclear War 1991 by J. D. Hunley. Texas A&M University [Princeton U n iversity Press, 1960] and Thinking Press Consortium (http://ww w .tam u.edu/ about the Unthinkable [H orizon Press, 1962]) that u press), Joh n H . L in d sey B u ilding, L ew is furthered his reputation as a nuclear-w ar theo- Street, 4354 TAM U , C ollege Station, Texas rist and made him a lecturer in high demand. As 77843-4354, 2007, 388 pages, $65.00 (hard- G h am ari-Th brizi describ es in so m e detail, Kahn's cover), ISBN 1585445886. glibness enlivened his lectures even though they som etim es had the unintended consequence of "A ctually, it is rocket scien ce!" A lm o st e v e ry alienating him from his audience and m arking space en gin eer has ow ned, at som e point, a him as som ething of a monster for even consid- T-shirt with that slogan adorned with a field of erin g the ration ality o f nu clear war. Fu rth er- equations, a rocket, or som e other space m otif. more, during form al briefings, he occasionally However, it never did seem quite . . . right. W hy' offended Air Force audiences with a casual or In his ex cellen t book, 25-year-veteran air and space flippant remark at their service’s expense. historian J. D. H unley argues that it’s wrong be- G iven the notoriety o f his published books cause there is no such thing as rocket science. Ai and lectures, it is no w onder that he is thought least not "rocket scien ce as a bo d y o f kn ow led ge to have inspired the character o f Dr. Strangelove, co m p lete and m ature en ou gh to a llow accurate who appears in the 1964 m ovie of the same predictions o f problem s’’ (p. 289). H unley spends name, directed by Stanley Kubrick. Indeed, Kahn this volu m e argu in g that the d evelop m en t o f spoke o f a "doom sday m achine” (p. 211) as a de- Am erican launch vehicles has been a process of terrent during the C old War, and S trangelove dis- engineering and not science, as well as catalog- cussed just such a w eapon, triggered by an acci- in g that d ev elo p m en t from the first ten uou s ex- dental nuclear strike at the end o f the m ovie. perim ents by Robert G oddard through the evolu - The Worlds of Hainan Kahn gives readers in- tion o f the space shuttle. His effort is the m ost terested in the Cold War added perspective by com prehensive general history o f the growth of addressing the developm ent and testing o f the Am erican rocketry w e're likely to see. atom ic and h ydrogen bom bs as w ell as the Hunley’s book is predominantly a managerial growth and role o f Strategic Air Com m and. It history o f the various rocket-developm ent pro- also covers the ensuing debate concerning pro- gram s, both m ilita ry and civilian . A lth ou gh he cu rem en t o f in tercon tin en tal ballistic m issiles does not delve into equations, H unley doesn't versus the need for intercontinental bom bers shy from explaining technical issues and how (B-52s) as the prim ary m eans o f deliverin g nu- they were conquered. He provides general chap- clear weapons. This author speaks to other is- ters on the refin em en t o f ballistic m issiles and sues o f that day as w e ll-th e concept o f and de- launch vehicles, and then focuses later chapters bate over civil preparedness, the em ploym en t o f on specific system s. Thankfully, H unley m ini- the Ground O bserver Corps (whose volunteers m izes the politics involved (norm ally the bread watched the skies for incom ing Soviet bom bers), and butter o f space histories) and concentrates and the use o f system s analysts as a m eans o f exclusively on the m anagers and engineers— evaluating the possible use o f nuclear w eapons those w ho built the rockets and got them to during W orld War III scenarios. w ork. Because of this decision, H u n ley’s book is A w orth w h ile read, The Worlds of Herman v e ry valu able to those w h o cu rren tly w ork in Kahn offers insights not o n ly into the life o f one rocket developm ent because it allows them to man and the role he played in crafting our na- understand the past and perform m ore effec- tion's nuclear-w eapon strategy du rin g the 1950s tively in the future. and 1960s, but also in to A m erica n p u blic reac- H u nley credits the success o f Am erica’s tions during the early Cold War years. Mr. Kahn launch vehicles to a num ber o f item s. Forem ost, p layed a sign ifican t role in sh apin g those reac- he lauds the "heterogeneous engineers” (m ore tions as he lectu red both civilia n and m ilitary properly term ed, perhaps, “technical m anag- audiences on the im plications o f the em ploy- ers”): m en like Gen Bernard Schriever, W ernher ment of nuclear weapons during a future war. von Braun, and other early leaders w ho not only understood the com plex engineering problem s Col Joe McCue, USAF, Retired associated w ith rocket advancem ent, but also Springfield, Virginia could com m unicate am ong m any different disci-

100 | Air <5 Space Power Journal V book reviews

Governing the Am erican Lake: The US De- plines and express the im portance o f space- fense and A dm inistration o f the Pacific, launch vehicles to the general public. W ithout 1945-1947 by Hal M. Friedman. Michigan these leaders, the funding so desperately needed State U niversity Press (http://ww w .m supress to establish a robust and effective space-launch .m su .edu ), S u ite 25, M a n ly M iles B u ilding, capability m igh t n ever have been available. 1405 South Harrison Road, East Lansing, Hunley also describes the unique balance of M ichigan 48823-5245, 2007, 320 pages, $64.95 interservice rivalry and inform ation sharing in (h ardcover), ISBN 0870137948. the early days o f the Cold War that m axim ized

the efficiency o f Am erican developm ent efforts. The title o f this book is provocative but mis- Parallel w ork by the A rm y , N a vy , and A ir Force leading, offerin g a com e-on su ggesting that drove com p etition that dram atically im p roved Am erican waters include the Pacific Ocean. A f- overall growth. At the sam e tim e, organizations ter all, the U nited States had just fought a bitter like the Rocket Propellant Inform ation A gen cy contest with an Asian pow er for dom inance of becam e vast clearinghouses open to all, lim iting the ocean, and by 1947 US policy m akers were overlap in exp en sive research. Iron ically, co m - concerned that another rival m ight challenge petition and collaboration w ere both hallm arks Am erican control. Th is w ork attem pts to show the divergent policy stances o f various com po- o f the m ost successful developm en t efforts. nents o f the Am erican governm ent as well as Finally, throughout the book, Hunley em pha- som e o f the disagreem ents within a given de- sizes that rockets w ere m ade to w ork — not on the partm ent. T h e affected players are the defen se chalkboard with elegant equations but in the elem ents—Navy, Arm y, and Air Force—as well workshop with the bending o f metal. Rocket sci- as the D epartm ents o f Interior and State. Each entists could not alw ays predict the problem s departm ent and service had its ow n agenda, con- that accom p an ied the b u ild in g o f a successful cerns, and internal disagreem ents over policy. launch vehicle; indeed, m ore times than they The author, Hal Friedman, arranges the text might wish to admit, engineers w ere forced to b y agen cy, treatin g the m ilita ry services first. As “fix” problem s by trial and error. O ften, w ithout he points out, the services faced com petition for understanding why it worked, the}' would fu n din g in an era o f rapid d em ob iliza tion and stum ble upon a configuration that solved a prob- sharp budget cuts. Each had to figure out how to lem (in an injector, com bustion chamber, etc.) m axim ize its advantage w hile offering a realistic that w as cau sin g a rock et to fail o r that w as caus- approach to defending som e portion of the Pa- in g the origin al problem . Perhaps w orriso m e to cific—obviously too large for the sm aller forces some, this fact is nevertheless a testam ent to the to handle com pletely. Issues included stationary defense (bases w ith ground forces) or m obile "steely-eved m issile m en" who built the US space defense (fleets and aircraft). A n oth er m atter program. concerned which parts o f the Pacific the United W hat can the A ir Force leader learn from this States would claim as its province. Though short book? That great m anagers can help great tech- on an sw ers, th e b ook d oes illu strate that the nicians flourish and do the im possible, and that p o licy rem ain ed n egotiable even as the C old W ar both are im perative to success. That jealou s began. In terior and State had d ifferen t issues, com p etition b etw een allies can spur co m p eti- th e fo rm e r w a n tin g to exten d its tradition al role tion, but that we shouldn't keep secrets because as overseer o f US possessions or m andates over- w e are all on the sam e team in the en d. T h a t not seas, and the latter wishing to avoid a situation every problem can be solved on a computer, and that could lead to a charge o f imperialism that we skimp on the flight-test program at our against the U n ited States. F riedm an brin gs out peril. And most important, especially in the these issues clearly. rocket business, that doing is o fte n th e o n ly w a y O n e can not say the sam e for the debates, in w h ich knounng can happen. how ever—or the resolution o f the matter. In- The Development of Propulsion Technology deed, these lacunae are what m ake the title m is- made m e proud to be an engineer, bu t... in the leadin g. Governing the American Lake has noth- en d . . . I still like m y shirt. ing to say about the actual adm inistration of any given part of the Pacific by any elem ent o f the Capt Brent D. Ziamick, USAFR A m erica n go vern m en t, civilia n or m ilitary. It Spaceport America, New Mexico doesn’t even effectively define the approach to

Summer 2Q10 | 101 adm inistration chosen by the governm ent for a sionals alike, French and Burgess recount the given territory. In effect, it is sim ply a descrip- challenges o f the G em ini and early Apollo tion o f correspondence betw een high-ranking programs, along with disappointing setbacks m ilitary and civilian officials, and, m ostly, p olicy and u ltim ate recovery in the Soviet huinan- paper after policy paper. We find out little about sp acefligh t program . T h e ir strong suit lies n ot so how a given paper was received and little about m uch in presenting new m aterial or a new inter- how policy developed, who changed it, and who pretation o f existin g in form ation but in p u llin g argued against or on b eh a lf o f a sp ecific position . together countless threads o f detail and w eaving Th e result is dry-bones reading, w ith the them into colorful descriptions o f events. reader left w ondering at the end w hy the author Furtherm ore, they keep readers' attention riv- bothered. Though w ell researched and ade- eted on the hum an dim ension o f the story be- quately written, as one would expect from an cause they know that is the essence o f history. academ ic with previous publications in the field, The authors achieve this hum an focus, albeit Governing the American Lake tails to address the p rim a rily on the astronauts and cosm onauts subject advertised by its title. On a positive note, them selves, by blending details from personal how ever, even the au thor ack n ow led ges that the correspondence and interview s with inform ation Pacific, is a com parative backwater for the United from pu blish ed sources. States in w orld affairs. Thus, a history o f its ad- Because they cover both A m erican and Soviet m inistration during the shift from a hot to cold hum an-spaceflight program s and because som e war is not vital. O nly experts need pick up this astronauts or cosm onauts w ent into space m ore w ork for m ore than a casual glance. Those seek- than once, French and Burgess occasionally in g a p olitical, m ilitary, o r d ip lo m a tic h istory o f struggle to balance the chronology and coverage the region during this period must look elsewhere. o f specific individuals. Near the end o f the third Dr. John H. Barnhill chapter, for exam ple, the authors unexpectedly Houston, Tbxas “fast forw ard " to Pete C on rad ’s p articip ation in the Skylab project but restore the narrative’s ch ron ological in tegrity w ith in a page or tw o. In the fou rth chapter, th ey shift abru ptly from

In th e S h a d o w o f th e M o o n : A C h a lle n g in g Apollo 1 and d evote 15 pages to th eir first exten -

J o u r n e y to TY a n q u ility , 1 9 6 5 -1969 by sive coverage o f Soviet activities. Although these Francis French and Colin Burgess. U niversity rather aw kw ard transitions m ight startle som e o f Nebraska Press (http://w w w .nebraskapress readers, they represent exceptions in an other- .unl.edu), 1111 Lincoln Mall, Lincoln, Ne- wise flow ing saga. braska 68588-0630, 2007, 448 pages, $29.95 No one should m ake the m istake o f thinking (h ard cover), ISBN 0803211287. that a book w ritten for a nonscholarly audience is devoid o f scholarly analysis. Through careful Authors Francis French and Colin Burgess exam ination o f evid en ce from various sources, h ave con tin u ed the ch ron ological n arration o f In the Shadow of the Moon dispels “m yths" associ- the Am erican and Soviet hum an-spaceflight pro- ated w ith the Apollo 7 mission : that all th ree as- grams, which they began earlier in 2007 with tronauts caught head colds and that the crew pu blication o f Into That Silent Sea. Trailhlazers of m utinied. Th e authors’ discussion o f how vari- the Space Era, 1961-1965. Now, the appearance ous spacecraft nam es and call signs originated, on bookstore shelves of In the Shadow of the as w ell as h ow officials w ith the N ational A ero- Moon sets the stage for additional volu m es cover- nautics and Space Administration (NASA) re- in g p ost-Apollo 11 activities. These two titles rep- acted to the astronauts’ choices, is both enter- resent a spectacular beginning for a series that taining and instructive. Perhaps the m ost the U niversity o f Nebraska Press has labeled thought-provoking bit o f analysis in this volum e Outward O dyssey: A People's H istory o f Space- pertains to the conclusion that Soviet Soyuz flight. Sim ply stated, they w het readers' appe- flights w ere "m ore m eaningful and beneficial to tites for the rest o f the story— the space shuttle, the long-term use o f space than those o f Ap ollo” space stations, Earth-orbiting robotic spacecraft, because Soyuz provided "the enduring w ork- and interplanetary missions. horse o f space travel" (p. 284). French and Burgess W ritin g in a style and at a gram m atical level dem onstrate how descriptive passages can con- ap p ealin g to gen eral read ers and space p rofes- vey sophisticated analytical points.

102 | Air & Space Power Journal Sy BOOK REVIEWS

into the battle or a sp ecific point. Stephen A. The most annoying features of this book, like Bourque is one such author. those o f its previously published com panion vol- T h e 1991 P ersia n G u lf War h as a lw a y s h e ld an ume, are the absence o f annotations and an in- elem ent of attraction for me. I enjoy historical dex. Perhaps the decision to dispense with these narratives o f units with w hich I've served or textual accoutrem ents reflects the publisher's have been associated, even if briefly. W hen 1 purposeful aim toward a broader, less scholarly saw that Bourque had coauthored The Road to audience. For academ icians, how ever, not kn ow - Safwan, featuring the history of the oldest and ing w here the authors obtained specific, possibly most decorated cavalry squadron in the US controversial, details poses problem s. Even those Army—the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (1/4 reading In the Shadow of the Moon at a less intel- Cav)—I had to read it. lectually rigorous level occasionally m ight be Bourque and coauthor John W. Burdan III curious about w here the authors picked up this offer an interesting, cavalry-centric presentation or that tidbit. Som e clues appear in the narrative o f the squadron before, during, and im m ediately itself, but m uch is left to the reader’s specula- after conflict in the first G u lf War, describing tion. Sim ilarly, if readers w ant to find w here four m ain operational phases (predeploym en t, Deke Slayton, Pete Conrad, Vladim ir Komarov, deploym ent, em ploym ent, and redeploym ent). or anyone else is m entioned in this book, they T h e y cred ib ly dep ict w arfare at the battalion or must thumb through it, page by page. squadron level and below by illustrating prob- Nonetheless, m ost m em bers o f the A ir Force lem s ch aracteristic o f such units. N ot o n ly do w e com m u n ity w ill fin d In the Shadow of the Moon learn the nam es of otherwise anonym ous driv- fascinating and easy to read. The accom plish- ers and troop leaders, but also w e learn about m ents o f Air Force test pilots w ho becam e N ASA the people them selves. The running narrative astronauts, from Gus G rissom and Buzz Aldrin to em p lo y ed b y the coauthors allow s us to get to Jam es Irw in and C h arlie D uke, can in still pride. know these m ain characters w ithout enduring Those who know m ore of the story can pause the tedium of a novel’s character developm ent. betw een chapters to rem em ber how countless, The Road to Safwan is not w ithout its prob- m ostly forgotten, Air Force officers, enlisted, and lem s, however. Bourque and Burdan have som e civilian person n el w ork in g on the grou n d sup- strong op in ion s about US A rm y d ecision s lea d - ported NASA’s Gem ini and Apollo programs, ing up to the w ar (e.g., their discussion about the th ereby h elp in g w in the race to the m oon. lack o f tanks organic to the squadron organiza- tion [pp. 22—24]). Th ou gh their points are illus- Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant trative, repeated m en tion o f these tangents Peterson AFB, Colorado proves distracting at tim es. Furtherm ore, the brief conclusion fails to expand on recurring them es or to propose solutions that could apply not o n ly to the larger US A rm y but also join t op - T h e R o a d to S a fw a n : T h e 1st S q u a d ro n , 4th erations. Such possible solutions include 1/4 Cavalry in the 1991 Persian Gulf War by Cav’s unique approach to the reduction of Stephen A. Bourque and John W. Burdan III. friendly-fire episodes and to platoon-level live- U niversity o f North Texas Press fhttp://web3 fire exercises for com bined ground cavalry and unt.edu untpress), 1155 Union Circle, no. scout w ea p on s team s (pp. 18-19). A lso, the coau - 311336, D en ton , Tfexas 76203-5017, 2007, 336 thors' retelling of squadron events does not ad- pages, S27.95 (h ardcover), ISBN 1574412329. dress the pros and cons o f using people on the ground versus rem ote technology. Lastly, the sm all We read historical accounts of battles and in- print found in most o f the com bat and operational dividual tales of bravery and heroism , but som e- m aps and graphics severely lim its th eir u seful- times we can t put them in perspective because ness; foldouts w ould have been m uch better. the stories lack presence; the author sim ply can- Despite its shortcom ings, this book is a solid not place us alongside the prim ary characters. review o f the squadron’s history in the first G ulf However, som e authors do very w ell at incorpo- War, following the troopers' problem s and tri- rating a sense o f involvem ent into their recount- u m ph s from in itial n o tifica tio n th rou gh th eir ing o f history. Som e even go a step or two fur- safe return h om e. Rather than con fron tin g droll ther, provid in g not o n ly a good accou nt but also dates and facts, w e com e to kn ow the squadron's som e “takeaways" that inspire us to dive further leadership, from the com m ander dow n to the

Summer 2010 | 103 troops. Adm ittedly, aside from affording readers portin g role to the in fan try as a m ob ile platform the opportunity to understand Arm y—specifi- to reduce enem y positions. cally, ca va lry — operations, A irm en w ill d iscover In chapter 2, which details the afterm ath of few "lessons learned” in this book. Nevertheless, the Tet o ffen sive and the retaking o f the city o f those o f us w ho have a nostalgic interest in the Hue during the Vietnam War, we find that US h istory o f arm ored cavalry w ill find The Road to M arin es relied on the M 48A3 and the M 50 to Safwari a pleasant read. p rovid e firep o w er and m obility. A t the tim e, n ei- th er the M arin e C orp s n or the A rm y o f the Re- Maj Paul Niesen, USAF, Retired public o f Vietnam had doctrine devoted to urban Scott AFB, Illinois w arfare. T h ou gh u tilized in a su pport role, arm or led lim ited advances on occasion. The battle dem on strated the ab ility o f arm ored forces to m ove under heavy fire and bring firepow er to B reaking the M old: T^nks in the Cities by the en e m y in urban terrain. K en dall D. G ott. C om b at Stu dies Institu te O peration Peace for Galilee and the Israeli Press (http://w w w -cgsc.arm y.m il/carl/ incursion into southern Lebanon, the subject of resources/csi/csi.asp), Fort Leavenw orth, the third chapter, n otes that the Israelis’ p rim ary Kansas 66027, 2006, 144 pages, $12.00 (soft- arm or consisted o f the M 60 and the M il3. U n- cover) (available from the G overnm ent Print- like the situation in the previous exam ples, the ing O ffice, http: V b ook store.gp o.gov), ISBN Israelis enjoyed specialized equipm ent and train- 0160762235. Available free at http://w w w in g in ad d ition to establish ed d octrin e regard in g -cgsc.arm y.m il/carl/download/csipubs/gott the use of armor. Overall, their tanks performed _tanks.pdf. w ell in Beirut bu t sim p ly w ere not design ed to fight in urban terrain. Inherent weaknesses in- In this book, Kendall Gott attem pts to exam - clu ded the in ab ility o f gun turrets to elevate to in e the a p p lication o f arm ored veh icles in urban reach rooftops and tank com m anders having to environm ents. At first glance, he seem s to offer fight with their hatches closed to avoid sniper fire. an in trigu in g su bject that has great poten tial as a Chapter 4 discusses the Russian invasion o f case stu dy o f utilizin g traditional tech n o lo gy to Chechnya, during which the hastily assem bled overcom e unconventional situations. This should and unprepared Russian A rm y—using the BMP-2, p rove in terestin g to an yon e fam iliar w ith the role T-80, and BTR-80—faced a determ ined Chechen airpow er has played in recent years in Iraq and regu lar arm y and h arden ed gu erilla fighters. A l- A fgh an istan , co n sid erin g that the strategy in though the Russians en joyed a distinct advantage these co n flicts em p h asizes a sym m etric w arfare n u m erica lly and tech n ologically, th ey w ere in stead o f a tradition al air cam p aign . G ott argu es routed by the Chechens, w ho used superior ur- for sp ecialized train in g and the use o f com b in ed ban tactics in taking advantage o f the narrow arm s at the low est tactical levels, pointing out traverse radius o f the m ain Russian battle tank that w hen tanks are properly em ployed (and w ell and p oor com m u n ication . supported by infantry) and operated by well- T h e fin al ch ap ter deals w ith the coalition trained personnel, they are highly successful. forces (A rm y, M arines, Navy', and A ir Force) and T h e book consists o f five case studies, ranging Iraqi ground forces as they advanced into Fallujah from W orld W ar II to O p era tion Iraqi F reedom : during Iraqi Freedom . The two main arm ored Aachen (1944), Hue (1968), Beirut (1984), Grozny vehicles of choice included the M l A2 and the (1995), and Fallujah (2004). Each chapter in- M 2A3, the form er follow ing the M arine advance cludes the background o f the conflict, a descrip- and p rovid in g direct fire support to the riflem en . tion o f the battle, and an analysis ("In Retro- B reakin g w ith tradition, a rm or actu ally led the spect”). The book also includes a brief introduc- assault into the city as the infantry' offered cover tion and a conclusion. and clea red bu ildin gs. In addition, the trailin g Chapter 1 describes the Germ an defense of allied Iraqi forces h eld captu red bu ildin gs to pre- the city o f Aach en against the A llied advance. vent flanking by the enem y. By this point in the A lthou gh A llied forces w ere not trained for ur- war, A m erica n s had b ecom e h igh ly p roficien t in ban combat, they ultim ately achieved success by urban warfare. com b in in g fire and m an eu ver. T h e m ain tanks Unfortunately, Breaking the Mold falls w ell used in the battle included the M4 Sherm an and short o f expectations. O rigin a lly w ritten as five the M IO T^nk D estroyer, the latter used in a sup- separate articles later thrown together, the book

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As soon as the reader thinks he knows the manages only a thin connection betw een them au th or’s particu lar w ay o f writin g, G arlan d adds in the form o f the app lication o f arm or in each a new twist by changing the style o f his gripping battle. Rather than em p h asizin g the author's narrative. H e dem on strates am azin g versa tility— m ain point, m ost o f the text s im p ly details th e for exam ple, sharing a poem he w rote and recorded specifics o f each battle. Due to the book's short in his journal (pp. 214-16) and then reverting to length, readers w ill not have to in vest too much the style to which I had becom e accustom ed. time discovering this for them selves. In ch apter 11, he talks about the com bat m o ve- Capt Michael D. Kennedy, USAF m ent of the I£rR Platoon from Rians to Livron, ______Yokota A ir Base, Japan France, when the 157th Regim ent—the platoon’s parent— m et the French Resistance, especially H enry Siaud and his two friends. At this point, the reader encounters “extensive excerpts" (15 U n k n o w n Soldiers: R e liv in g W orld W ar II in pages) ofSiaud’s mem oirs, which Garland trans- Europe by Joseph E. Garland. Protean Press/ lated him self. Fitting perfectly into the narrative, O pen Book System s (http:// ww w .protean they allow us to see things from the perspective press.com ), 37-J W histlestop M all, Rockport, o f the liberated. Massachusetts 01966, 2008, 528 pages, $29.95 For the rest o f the w artim e exploits of the I£rR (hardcover), ISBN 0962578037. Platoon, Garland integrates these m em oirs, thoughts from his notebook, and parts o f inter- I have read m ost of Joe Garland's books. This views he conducted m any years later with his one, however, is quite unlike anything else he w artim e buddies. His w eaving o f all these ele- has written. 1 knew that reviewing Unknown Sol- m ents together m akes the narrative m ore per- diers w ou ld be both in terestin g and a ch allen ge. 1 son al and in tim ate. I felt like I w as a m em b er o f began m y review with two questions in mind: his unit, h elp in g w in a w ar n obody w an ted and Who is Joe Garland of World War II? Is he ca- lib eratin g prison ers from th eir N azi captors. pable o f m eeting his usual high standards de- We see Garland's first use o f hum or during spite w riting in a com pletely different genre? his in-processing at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, I thought this book was going to be an auto- w h en he w as in terview ed and allow ed to ch oose biographical account of his experiences as a the arm of the Arm y in which he wished to m em b er o f the In telligen ce and R econnaissance serve. W ell, as an yon e w h o has been in the m ili- (I£rR) Platoon, Headquarters Com pany, 1st Bat- tary knows full well, recruits really don't have a talion, 157th In fan try R egim en t, 45th In fan try choice; the services just let them think they do. Division in W orld War II. It was—to a point. A fter Garland opts for m otorized infantry since riding he was injured and sent back to Italy, the narra- sounded better than walking; however, the A rm y tive becom es m ore like an oral history, told by rew ards him w ith a place in the infantry. his com rades. Mr. Garland em ploys quite an in- H e soon learn s that m o torized in fan try rea lly teresting style that runs throughout his account m eans tanks, a choice that doesn’t even rate as of I&R in the war. At appropriate points, he in- high as really bad because the chances o f sur- serts portions o f an actual en try from the unau- vival for the crew o f a hit tank lie som ew here thorized record he kept. He also includes b e tw e e n slim and n il. A t this po in t, h e co n clu d es sketches he drew or part o f an in terview he con- that "in exercising the one and only option o f my ducted w ith on e o f his bu ddies w h ile w ritin g the nascent career in the m ilitary I sw u n g from book. I also learn ed that W illie and Joe, Bill flunking pre-med at Harvard to flunking the first M auldin’s cartoon characters, w ere com posites lesson of survival out there: never volunteer" (p. o f Garland's com patriots in the 45th Division. 3). I really got a laugh out o f that typical N ew These enjoyable tidbits contribute a great deal to England humor. the narrative. Photographs o f buddies, interspersed Readers also learn about the sequence o f throughout the text in appropriate places, allow events along the Sele-Calore Corridor to Naples the reader to place a lace with a name. I found b etw een N o vem b er 1943 and January 1944, dur- m yself referring back to them every now and ing which time the front moved forward and again just so I could keep som eone's likeness in backward again and again. Here, Garland and his m y m em ory. This technique effectively brings buddies live in a cave that can only be described Mr. Garland’s experiences to life. as a decayin g, feral rabbit w arren.

Summer 2010 | 105 W hen I began this review, I said that, after hav- the "shock and awe" mind-set prevalent in the ing read a num ber o f Joe Garland's books, 1 won- A ir Force and then em ploys a sim ilar historical dered if he could m eet his customary high stan- lin e o f reason in g to dem on strate the US political dards. H e not on ly m et them but blew them aw ay! leadersh ip's b eliefs regardin g the lin kage o ffe r e e Those who want to know about the war in Italy to d ip lo m a cy . F in ally, startin g w ith the origin s should read this book. Those who want to experi- o f the Bosnia conflict in the early 1990s, he es- ence the liberation o f the French from a French tablishes a pattern o f political and m ilitary perspective should read this book. And those events that created only m inim al connection w h o w ant to see W orld W ar II through the eyes between the use of force and diplom acy as Al- o f an en listed in fan trym an and his bu ddies should lied Force began. read this book. T h e y w ill not be disappoin ted! In addition to noting NATO ’s lack o f coherent strategy, Dr. Henriksen exam ines principles of Dr. Donald A. MacCuish coercion to em phasize the necessity o f a link Maxwell AFB, Alabama between the use of force and diplomacy. Har- kening back to Alexander George and his con- cept of coercive diplom acy, the author dem on- strates how NATO 's lack o f an overall strategy N A T O 's G a m b le: C o m b in in g D ip lo m a c y an d caused the failure o f coercion prior to the con- A irp ow er in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998-1999 flict. A lth ou gh not fu lly develop ed , the discus- by Dag H enriksen. Naval Institute Press sion on coercion presents a strong rem inder to (h ttp: w w w .u sn i.org/n avalin stitu tepress/ m ilita ry profession als and diplom ats o f the n eed index.asp), 291 W ood Road, Annapolis, M ary- to k eep political goals in m in d w h en d esign in g land 21402-5034, 2007, 304 pages, $24.00 (soft- m ilita ry strategy and to establish links to those cover), ISBN 1591143586. goals—precisely the sort of connection m issing in N A T O . NATO's Gamble exam in es the N orth A tlan tic An airpower lecturer at the Royal Norwegian Treaty O rganization's (N A T O ) strategy for O pera- Air Force Academ y and a captain in the Royal tion A llied Force in Kosovo. M ore precisely, au- N orw egian A ir Force, H enriksen used his doc- thor Dag Henriksen argues that NATO had no toral thesis as the basis for NATO's Gamble. His strategy p rior to o r d u rin g the in itial stages o f study not only offers an interesting argum ent the conflict and that history, rather than events, but also presents perspectives from m ultiple gu id ed its actions. In ou tlin in g m atters relatin g NATO members, even during discussion of the to the operation, he highlights the transatlantic bipolar transatlantic divide. Furthermore, it con- differences in philosophy regarding the crisis, siders the view s o f m ilitary officers and d ip lo- illu strates h o w th e y affe c te d N A T O ’s action s, and m ats from m a n y N A T O n ation alities, in clu d in g p oin ts to th em as the u n d erly in g reason for the som e often m issing from or m inim ized in other lack o f a unified strategy on Kosovo. H enriksen books on the subject. This sort o f inclusiveness concludes that NATO stum bled into war in order p rovid es a w ell-rou n d ed accou nt from w hich to protect its cred ib ility w ith ou t an y overall even a read er q u ite fam iliar w ith K osovo w ill strategy—and that was NATO's gam ble. lik ely learn som eth in g new. Using a case-study form at, the author begins Although aspects o f this topic hold little m ys- his analysis w ith the op en in g days o f Allied tery for m any m em bers o f the Air Force com m u- Force by recounting the struggle between the nity, NATO's Gamble is nevertheless worthwhile. m ilitary and N A T O politician s o v e r the condu ct In ligh t o f cu rren t events, con ceptu alizin g m ili- o f the war. He paints a picture o f disagreem ent tary op eration s as su p p ortin g political strategy and confusion over all o f its aspects— targets, should h ave a fa m ilia r rin g for m ost readers. objectives, and pace of the w ar—and observes H ow ever, h arm on izin g both o f these elem en ts in h ow the m ilita ry w ou ld often h ear o f ch anges a coercive operation within the fram ework o f a through press conferen ces instead of NATO stan din g allian ce presents com plications that channels. By focusing on the ideological differ- e v e ry m ilita ry profession al m ust understand. ences betw een the m ilita ry and diplom ats, the This book provides a case study o f just such an rem ainder o f the book reveals how NATO ar- instance. rived at such a poin t. E stablish in g a fou n d ation for his argum ent, Dr. H en riksen uses the d evel- Maj Lisa Nemeth, 11SAF opm ent o f airpow er theory and history to show Foir Leai'cnworth. Kansas

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N ow here is a good book for the aspiring scholar-warrior who wishes to dedicate an eve- H a n s -J o a c h im M a rs e ille : A n Illu s tra te d TVib- ning to inform ative reading. W ritten by Group ute to the Luftw affe's "Star of Africa" by Capt (n ow A ir C om m od ore) A iju n Subram aniam Robert Tate. Schiffer Publishing (http://www of the Indian Air Force, Reflections o f an A ir War- .schifFerbooks.com /newschiffer), 4880 Low er rior brings together a potpourri o f previou sly Valley Road, Atglen, Pennsylvania 19310, published articles on a variety o f subjects inter- 2008, 224 pages, $49.95 (h ardcover), ISBN esting to the audience o f Air and Space Power 0764329405. Journal fASPf). T h e first section o f the b ook h olds particu lar L u ftw affe figh ter ace H ans-Joach im M arseille appeal for those who spend their working days is by any m easure a co m p ellin g figure. In a co m - on the fligh t lin e - b e th ey fly ers o r m ain tain ers. W ritten in an engaging way with a focus on lead- bat career lasting barely two years, he was cred- ership. these pieces are concerned w ith the safe ited w ith shooting dow n 158 British and C om - and effective running of a flying squadron. Not m on w ealth aircraft. M arseille’s repu tation was lim ited to the tech nical and operation al details en h a n ced b y his le g e n d a ry skill: his victo ries o f the work, they also deal w ith m orale, develop- required an average o f only 15 rounds of am m u- m en t o f air leaders, and qu ality-of-life issues. nition, and on m any occasions he scored m ul- Th e last o f the articles in this part addresses in a tiple “k ills’' in a sin gle sortie. A ll w h o saw h im in practical w a y the “Ethics and Values in M ilitary com bat agree that he was a phenom enal marks- Leadership.” m an, a u n iqu ely gifted pilot, and a gen u in e But Reflections is much m ore than just a hand- "character." He achieved most o f his success in book for squadron leaders. D isplaying a good the desert cam paign in North Africa, in m any acquaintance with the airpow er literature o f the ways a “clean" war far rem oved from the atroci- US A ir Force, the author includes a series o f ties o f the Eastern Front. By som e accounts, thoughtful chapters on that subject. O n e is about M arseille fou gh t his w ar w ith ch ivalry, p erson - a transition facing the Indian A ir Force in ligh t ally d eliverin g w ord o f the fate o f dow n ed A llied of the great growth of the country's economy, pilots to en em y airfields and refusing to fire at India's broadening set of concerns outside its enem y aviators floating helplessly in their para- borders, and the perceived need to m ove from a chutes. H e also seem ed to care little for National tactical force to o n e that also has a strategic ca- Socialist ideology, a fact reflected in his taste for pability H e con tin u es w ith a piece on the requ ire- sw ing m usic and his befriending a black m an. m ents to prepare for out-of-country operations F in ally, he died u n b eaten b y the e n e m y — w h ile and in this and other articles seem s convinced of b ailin g out o f a m alfu n ction in g aircraft, he was a convergence o f interests for both India and the struck b y the tailplan e. United States. Group Captain Subram aniam also Robert Tate, a retired Air Force officer and offers a short essay regard in g the g ro w in g p o w er current airline pilot, has drawn upon a lifelon g and changing strategy of China, which has som e fascination w ith M arseille to produ ce this la v- interests in com m on not only with India but also ish ly illu strated vo lu m e. Tate d o es not d u p lica te with other nations less obviously in harm ony the narrative inform ation contained in previous with his ow n country's interests. M arseille b iograp h ies and o ffers little treatm en t Reflections of an A ir Wamor provides useful insight from an in form ed , articulate, and w ell- of the ace’s early life or fam ily history. Kit her, read airman from another environm ent —insight he con cen trates on M a rseille’s N orth A frican useful for the audience o f ASPJ The only faults I service with fighter w ing Jagdgeschwader 27— noticed are the absence o f a glossary (som e o f his tactics, aerial victories, personal and profes- his acronym s are not com m on in the US Air sional qualities, and the assessm ents of those Force) and an index, but neither om ission is a who flew with and against him.

Summer 2010 | 107 Th e book’s graphic and production values are that w ill in terest students o f the Lu ftw affe, a m ajor part o f its appeal. Th e photograph selec- fighter tactics, and W orld War II. tion and reprodu ction are outstanding. Thte has tracked d o w n item s from pu blic and p rivate co l- Dr. Richard R. Muller lections worldwide, using them to docum ent Maxwell AFB, Alabama th orou gh ly M a rseille’s b rie f and spectacular ca- reer in North Africa. Especially striking are pho- tos o f a com bat-stressed, prem aturely aged 22- year-old M arseille, taken the d a y before his Th e Star W ars Enigm a: B ehind the Scenes o f death. Newspaper and magazine items, as well the Cold W ar Race for M issile D efense by as vintage postcards, dem onstrate h ow the G er- N igel H ey. Potom ac Books (h ttp://w w w m an propaganda m achine elevated aces like .p otom acb ook sin c.com ), 22841 Q u ick silver M arseille to celeb rity status. D rive, D ulles, V irgin ia 20166, 2006, 288 pages, W ith regard to faults, the b ook is not based on $22.36 (h ardcover), $15.16 (softcover), ISBN any m ajor new docum entary evidence. In fair- 1597970050. ness to Thte, som e o f this is unavoidable— M arseille h im self seem s to h ave left no w ritin gs. In today's in tern ation al stru ggle against terror- This consum m ate aerial tactician evidently ism and insurgency, the Cold War can som etim es never penned a tactics m anual or set of rules feel like ancient history. It was a com pletely dif- alon g the lin es o f the ''D icta," b y W orld W ar I ace ferent conflict o f near-perfect sym m etry that O sw ald Boelcke. In addition, the su rviving Luft- locked the globe in a strategic stalem ate—a stale- w a ffe records related to M arseille are fragm en - m ate threatened by Pres. Ronald Reagan’s an- tary. T h e au th or does draw in terestin g in form a- nouncem ent o f a plan to protect the United tion from som e o f Marseille's com rad es and States and its allies against a Soviet nuclear at- acquaintances although much of it com es from a tack w ithout h avin g to rely on the deterren t o f a co m p reh en s ive re v ie w o f En glish -lan gu age ac- counterstrike. In The Star Wars Enigma, Nigel counts and m em oirs. M ore focused editing o f the H ey provides a vivid historical account o f the book would have rem oved som e o f the repeti- politics and science that fueled President Reagan’s tive, verbatim use o f quoted m aterial from these vision o f a world free from the threat o f nuclear sources. M ore surprisingly, Tate does not refer to war. H e traces the Strategic D efense Initiative som e o f the standard sources on the subject, (SD I) from scientific theory and debate to its cre- m ost notably Karl G undelach’s classic history o f scendo as one o f the defin in g political issues at the Lu ftw affe in the M ed iterran ean . N eith er does the en d o f the C old War. he seem to have consulted British or Am erican The Star Wars Enigma attem pts to illu m in ate o fficia l sources, p u b lish ed o r un p u b lish ed . It two key questions surrounding President Reagan’s would be interesting to see what (for exam ple) SD L (1 ) Was a space-based shield from nuclear R oyal A ir Force air in telligen ce rep orted about attack tech n ologica lly possible? (2 ) D id it really M a rseille’s accom plish m en ts. m atter if it would work or not, or was the threat These criticism s aside, this book has m uch to o f “Star W ars” en ou gh to attain US p olitical ob jec- interest students o f aerial warfare. Tate offers a tives? H e}' cites scores o f scientists and adm inis- cogen t com m en tary on figh ter tactics, som e o f trative officials from both the United States and w h ich have ch an ged little sin ce M a rseille’s day. Soviet U nion w ho believed that such a system A lth ou gh the treatm en t o f Marseille is gen era lly was not possible in their generation. He also re- positive, Tate brin gs som e critical an alysis to veals that the Soviets had such high regard for bear on subjects ranging from the veracity o f Am erican ingenuity and technology, dem on- M a rseille’s victo ry tally to the lack o f strategic strated in the Manhattan and Apollo projects, success that accom panied the ace’s tactical ex- that th e y cou ld not risk ign orin g the threat o f an ploits. H e rejects the n otion that M a rseille’s suc- im p en etra b le n u clear sh ield o v e r th eir en em ies. cesses w ere the result of his being pitted against The book rightly does not attem pt to answer the inferior adversaries. Th e author also m akes first question; it sim ply shares the thoughts o f som e judicious and intriguing observations scientists and leaders w ho w ere there. The book about M arseille's association w ith the B erlin answers the second question in context. M any o f “counterculture" (such as it was) that enjoyed the author’s sources thought that the U nited States jazz m usic and flouted authority. On the whole, intended the SDI as a political tool to pressure Hans-Joachim Marseille is a w ell-con stru cted book the Soviet econ om y into collapse; others .saw it

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Summer 2010 | 109 team s; and (3 ) that decision m akers consult the niques and procedures, the status o f current in- study's list o f Arm y doctrinal recom m endations. terrogation training, and recom m endations for Preparing the Army for Stability Operations future research. Each author, handpicked by the serves as an excellent adjunct to A rm y Field In telligen ce S cien ce Board for his or h er particu- M an ual 3-07, Stability Operations, October lar expertise on the subject, boasts considerable 2008, and oth er do ctrin a l pu b lication s. H o w - doctoral-level experience in behavioral science, ever, unlike the actual doctrinal manuals, this psychology, neuroscience, and negotiation the- is n ot a h ow -to b ook on sta b ility op era tio n s but ory. The individual essays not only add substan- a breakdow n o f those operations as a system . tial valu e to the collection as a w h ole but also Non-Arm y readers m any find them selves feel- can stand alon e as a sou rce o f detailed in form a- ing left out, given the study's unabashedly tion on their particular subjects. A rm v-cen tric slant. H ow ever, co n sid erin g that Tw o m essages clearly resonate in each piece. e v e ry m ilita ry m em ber, no m a tter w hat ser- First, using torture to procure inform ation is in- vice, m ay o n e d ay pu rsue the sta b ility m ission effective, often produces erroneous data, and is as part o f a jo in t/ co m b in ed team , this book not w orth the political price paid b y a d em o - should find a wide audience. cratic governm ent. Second, we need much m ore research to discover efficient, accurate, and m or- CSM James Clifford, USA, Retired ally acceptable m eans o f interrogation. McDonough, Georgia Despite the existence o f an A rm y m anual that addresses interrogation tactics, techniques, and procedures, the book’s authors believe that m ost in terrogation sp ecialists learn p red o m in an tly from anecdotal advice and personal experi- e n c e - o n e o f the m ajor criticism s o f cu rren t in - Educing Inform ation: Interrogation: Science terrogation operations. Two essays explore train- an d A rt: F ou n d ation s fo r the Future, ing program s o f dom estic p olice forces as w ell as Phase 1 Report, b y the In telligen ce S cien ce program s in the U n ited K ingdom , the latter de- Board. C en ter for Strategic In telligen ce Re- scribed as anem ic and o f dubious worth to pro- search, N ational D efen se In telligen ce C ollege fessionals responsible for questioning crim inal Press (http: www.dia.mil/college press.htm ), suspects. C learly, such a program does not hold W ashington, DC 20340-5100, 2006, 339 pages the answer to the question under study. (h ardcover), ISBN 1932946179. A vailable free The m ost interesting part o f this collection from http: A vw tv.fas.org/irp/d n i/ed u cin g.pdf. deals w ith the in corporation o f negotiation theory' w ithin the process o f interrogation. V iew in g Everybody agrees that inform ation is power. such questioning as a series o f com plex negotia- In the glob al w ar on terror, a particu larly pas- tions opens up a robust and effective line of re- sionate, continuing debate concerns a specific search. This m ay represent the most prom ising form o f in form ation gath erin g: the in terrogation . avenue of approach for further im provem ent. O ne can express the essence o f that debate with D esign ed sp ecifica lly for in telligen ce profes- the question. W hat m eans o f securing important, sionals, Educing Infonnation has little valu e in tim e-sensitive inform ation from an uncoopera- and of itself to A ir Force readers unless they tive individual is both effective and acceptable? h ave direct resp on sib ility for in terrogation op- (Indeed, the single, subconscious them e found erations. P olitica lly, the b o ok is v e ry in terestin g throughout the book deals with what must be becau se it offers a glim p se into the in telligen ce done to prevent another Abu Ghraib.) M ore a c o m m u n ity ’s first reaction to the Abu G hraib call to action for the organized accum ulation o f crisis. An excellent first attem pt at addressing vital data than a rep osito ry o f co n crete answ ers, the m uch-debated interrogation question, it pro- Educing Information begins a laborious process to ceeds not so m uch b y p rovid in g gu idan ce as by address that question. setting the table for answers. Th e book consists o f a series o f 10 essays by nine authors, loosely organized into three sub- Lt Col Christopher D. Harness, USAF ject areas: an overview of interrogation tech- Maxwell AFB, Alabama

110 | Air & Space Power Journal w MISSION DEBRIEF

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Summer 2010 | 111 Subscription to the Air and Space Power Journal for People Not Affiliated with the Military or Government

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First Quarter Recommendations from General Schwartz

LeMay: The Life and Wars of General Curds LeMay, by Warren Kozak, traces the life of General LeMay, from his firebombing o f Tokyo and guardian- ship of the US nuclear arsenal in the Cold War to his frustrated career in gov- ernment and short-lived political run.

In the Grai>eyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan, by Seth Jones, provides a historical review of Soviet and US experiences in Afghanistan but also assesses Pakistan's role and potential in securing Afghanistan.

A History of Air Warfare, by John A. Olsen, is a comprehensive analysis, through a compilation of 16 essays from leading military writers, of the role that airpower has played in military conflicts during the last century.

Cyberdeterrence and Cybenvar, by Martin C. Libicki, addresses the differ- ences between cyberwar and war in other mediums, and describes ways that the United States could protect itself in the face of attack.

Other Books in This Year's Reading List

The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the M idst o f a Big One by David Kilcullen

Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century by P. W. Singer

On Nuclear Terrorism by Michael Levi

MacArthur's Airman: General George C. Kenney and the War in the Southwest Pacific by Thomas E. Griffith

A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon by Neil Sheehan

Daring Young Men: The Heroism and Triumph of the Berlin A irlift, June 1948 - May 1949 by Richard Reeves

7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century by Andrew Krepinevich

Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs by Ray Takeyh

Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade by Bill Emmott

for more information http://www.af.mil/information/csafreading/index.asp A A i RESEARCH OUTREACH'^ENGAGEM ENT Lorenz on Leadership Part 3 Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, USAF

Reenabling Air Force Command and Control for Twenty-first-Century Partnerships Lt Gen Philip Breedlove, USAF Maj Brian Tyler, USAF

Seeing the Whole Elephant Envisioning a Successful Light Attack Program for the US Air Force Lt Col Michael W. Pietrucha, USAF

Femme Fatale 2010 Lt Col Kristal L. Alfonso, USAF

Civilian Language Education in America How the Air Force and Academia Can Thrive Together Col John Conway, USAF, Retired

To Fly. F ig h t , and W in I n air . S pace, and Cyber space