THE CENTENARY OF ’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS

IDEAS AND PERSONALITIES THE CENTENARY OF LATVIA’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS

IDEAS AND PERSONALITIES THE CENTENARY OF LATVIA’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS IDEAS AND PERSONALITIES

The upcoming centennial of Latvia’s statehood provides an important occasion to reflect on the country’s international achievements and offer a self-critical look at what remains to be done. This publication identifies main currents in Latvia’s foreign policy thinking and the most remarkable individuals that contributed to shaping them. A team of local and foreign experts reviews key ideational trends in Latvia’s foreign policy during the Interwar period and today, as well as assesses the trajectories of thinking during the periods of exile and regaining independence.

Authors: Aldis Austers, Edijs Bošs, Raimonds Cerūzis, Mārtiņš Daugulis, Martyn Housden, Ivars Ījabs, Didzis Kļaviņš, Jordan T. Kuck, Andis Kudors, Andrejs Plakans, Diāna Potjomkina, Gunda Reire, Andris Sprūds, Valters Ščerbinskis, Jānis Taurēns

Editors: Diāna Potjomkina, Andris Sprūds, Valters Ščerbinskis Scientific reviewers:Ainārs Lerhis, Toms Rostoks

This project was made possible thanks to support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the of Latvia and the of the Republic of Latvia

The project was completed in cooperation with National Information Agency LETA

The respective authors are accountable for the content of individual articles. The opinions expressed by the authors should not be construed as representing those of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, project supporters or partners, other institutions or entities.

Cover design: Līga Rozentāle Layout: Oskars Stalidzāns from Latvian: Alise Krapāne, Jurijs Saveļjevs, Pāvels Smišļājevs English language editor (select chapters): Dillon J. Ramos

© Authors, 2016 ISBN 978-9934-567-00-1 © Translations: Alise Krapāne, Jurijs Saveļjevs, UDK 327(474.3)“19/20” Pāvels Smišļājevs, 2016 Ce565 © Cover design: Līga Rozentāle, 2016 © Layout: Oskars Stalidzāns, 2016 © Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2016 Contents

DIĀNA POTJOMKINA, ANDRIS SPRŪDS, VALTERS ŠČERBINSKIS Introduction ...... 7

1. FOREIGN POLICY CURRENTS OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD

JĀNIS TAURĒNS Westward Direction of Latvia’s Foreign Policy during the Interwar Period ...... 23

RAIMONDS CERŪZIS Eastward Direction of Latvia’s Foreign Policy during the Interwar Period ...... 37

VALTERS ŠČERBINSKIS The Baltic and Nordic Direction of Latvia’s Foreign Policy during the Interwar Period ...... 54

MARTYN HOUSDEN International Affairs and Latvia’s ...... 70

JORDAN T. KUCK Made in America: Kārlis Ulmanis and the Making of Pro-Americanism in Latvia, 1918–1940 ...... 85

2. FOREIGN POLICY CURRENTS DURING THE EXILE PERIOD AND THE AWAKENING

ANDREJS PLAKANS Western Latvian Exiles’ “Foreign Affairs” Ideas and Work ...... 103

EDIJS BOŠS Conceptualization of Foreign Policy during the Awakening Period . . . 124 3. FOREIGN POLICY CURRENTS IN MODERN LATVIA

GUNDA REIRE Latvia and Euro-Atlantic Identity ...... 143

ANDIS KUDORS The Eastern Direction in Latvia’s Foreign Policy ...... 169

DIDZIS KĻAVIŅŠ The Baltic Sea Region Current in Latvia’s Foreign Affairs ...... 188

ALDIS AUSTERS Latvia’s Economic Pragmatism – Business above All Else ...... 211

MĀRTIŅŠ DAUGULIS Normative Currents in Latvia – towards a Common Understanding . . 238

IVARS ĪJABS Centennial Experience and Prospects: Instead of Conclusions . . . . . 259

Selected Bibliography ...... 276

About the Authors ...... 281

Ideational Currents in Latvia’s Foreign Policy: Personalities ...... 286 Introduction

DIĀNA POTJOMKINA, ANDRIS SPRŪDS, VALTERS ŠČERBINSKIS

Latvia’s centenary is a wonderful reason to take stock of the country’s achievements – with pride in the many successes and a self-critical view on the things that remain to be done. This book, dedicated to foreign policy, serves exactly this purpose. This volume on the main ideas and personalities in Latvia’s foreign affairs, as well as the two planned volumes on main events of the centenary (2017) and on modern foreign policy (2018), will strengthen knowledge and understanding of Latvia in the international arena, drawing broader tendencies and revealing commonalities among the different stages in development of Latvia’s foreign policy thinking. The foreign policy of a country is shaped by several factors: individual personalities, ideas that prevail in a country’s society and international environment. To see the complete picture, we must review all three elements; however, even if we focus on just one of them, the others should be kept in mind. We have chosen exactly this approach to examine the brightest ideas and personalities over the centenary of Latvia’s foreign affairs. We identify and evaluate the main ideational currents, or streams, or tendencies in Latvia’s foreign policy thinking – ideas on Latvia’s place and role in the world and the practical foreign policy vectors that logically arise from these ideas – as well as main personalities who initiated and maintained thinking in these directions. Until now, the diverse ideas underlying Latvia’s foreign policy have not received necessary attention; they were mainly reduced to the choice between the West and the East. Similarly, personalities have been generally analyzed in the format of history books and biographical dictionaries (we specifically recommend the biographical dictionary Latvijas ārlietu dienesta darbinieki, 1918–19911). This book, integrating an overview of the development of Latvia’s foreign policy ideas with a broad review of the main personalities who were parts of the various foreign policy ideational currents, is the first such study in Latvia. In this volume, we pay special attention to ideas – creators and determiners of politics that are sometimes difficult to pin down, but also

7 long-lasting. In politics, ideas are simultaneously a limitation and an opportunity. They draw invisible borders that are difficult to transcend, but they also encourage thinking and action in a certain direction. However powerful policy-makers may be, they act not in seclusion, but in a certain ideational and political context – even when we speak of such a closed domain as foreign policy. Ideas are the force that moves practical policy forward. Even if a certain idea is not practicable at a certain point in time, it can continue to dwell in people’s minds and blossom again when it encounters fertile soil. Thus, one of the tasks of this book is to identify the main streams, ideational currents or tendencies in Latvia’s foreign affairs that have been present and persistent enough to create a framework for policy-makers. At the same time, we cannot forget about people who create and implement ideas. All ideas, including the ideational currents in Latvia’s foreign policy, are created and maintained by personalities. If a tendency is to be considered influential, it needs a group of like-minded supporters and preferably the support of broader society, if not to the specific idea, then at least to the general vector of it. At the same time, the most popular and daring foreign policy-makers and thinkers can, to an extent, influence public opinion and change the direction of the state’s foreign policy. We ought to consider the interaction between foreign and domestic politics; foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy. This can be seen in the case of Latvia, and the articles included in this volume demonstrate this eloquently. We should add, however, that Latvia’s foreign policy-making has not been influenced by homegrown personalities alone. The international context matters. In this volume, we only treat it in passing to keep focus, but the articles demonstrate how Latvia’s foreign policy thinking has been affected by world processes and certain foreign personalities.

What we study and how Once we have stated the ambitious goal – to contribute to the study of Latvia’s foreign policy by linking together ideas and personalities – how do we go about accomplishing it? In this volume, we focus not so much on the role of events and material factors as on ideas and personalities. Within the International Relations discipline, this approach is endorsed by social constructivists – theorists focusing on the primary role of ideas in politics. Similarly, in the studies on history of politics, personalities and the related

8 history of ideas have a traditionally significant role. Advocates of different ideas can differently interpret the same circumstances; different policy-makers and society groups have different, sometimes radically diverse, opinions on Latvia’s role on the international arena. If we want to research ideas, we can frequently see their manifestations in practical policies, for instance, visits and new alliances. Research of Latvia’s foreign policy has, until now, mainly focused on the analysis of main events and influencing factors, not so much on ideas. However, not all ideas gain practical influence; some of them can lie dormant for prolonged periods of time until they encounter a more favorable environment. If ideas experience pressure or other limitations, they can stay in the background or possibly enter “through other doors.” Thus, we should analyze ideas, especially the most persistent ones, to fully apprehend not only current events but also the potential for future change. Different groups inside a nation may have a different understanding of the state, its national interests, relations with other states and role in the world. These diverse ideas can be classified into more stable or less stable streams or currents. We are interested in the content of Latvia’s main foreign policy currents, whether or how it has changed over time, what sub-currents exist within each specific current and what different currents have in common. For instance, virtually all Latvia’s policy-makers have special interest in sovereignty and national independence, even if they have diverging views on the specific foreign policy measures that should be adopted to achieve this goal. Similarly, there are different views on how to best guarantee national security and prosperity. The Western and the regional current have much in common; nowadays, a related normative current has also become stronger. At the same time, there may be greater or lesser discrepancies within one current (for instance, the Eastern or Baltic one), that concern policies or approaches, such as relations with a specific partner or the best tactics for achieving overall goals.2 In essence, distinguishing between different streams is a rather subjective effort – we can identify a greater or smaller number of them depending on the chosen level of abstraction. The next section will deal with selection of currents in this specific case. By all means, this study deals with history of ideas rather than with history of practical policies (even though we also consider decisions and events that affected the appearance, and stability, of the ideas discussed here). A complete overview of the history of foreign policy ideas should encompass a broader range of personalities than merely politicians, diplomats and officials.

9 Many Latvia’s diplomats have achieved essentially impossible results in intense negotiations and have made excellent contributions to strengthening national foreign policy, but relatively few – considering their restricted functions – could change foreign policy thinking on the national level. Similarly, holding a political office may help one to initiate and promote new ideas, but does not in itself define how successful this process will be. Moreover, in a democratic state, officials do not enjoy complete domination over foreign policy; sometimes civil society may be more important in promoting a certain idea than the highest officialdom. Therefore, we should stress that the personalities included in this volume are considered most important exactly on account of their work at bringing in new trends and promoting existing ideas, and not so much of their rankings, abilities and work ethic, or results achieved in negotiations. We asked the authors to pay the same attention to civil society figures, entrepreneurs, journalists and experts as to politicians and diplomats who are directly involved in deciding on and implementing foreign policy. This approach has its strengths, though it can also be criticized. However, as we mentioned already, if we define importance by results achieved in making official foreign policy, there is already a wide array of other studies dedicated to key Latvian foreign policy figures. As we turn to analyzing personalities and ideational streams, one more important clarification is due. As we mentioned before, ideas do not have to be mutually exclusive, and even seemingly very different currents can have common features. Oftentimes, different vectors in foreign policy are mutually complementary, specifying and logically matching each other. The same personality can simultaneously promote various ideas without contradicting themselves, and thus belong to different streams all at once. Here, we should specifically mention the first Foreign Minister of independent Latvia, once also a Prime Minister, Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics, who not only was active in promoting Latvia’s cooperation with the other but also energetically developed relations with Western countries and attained Latvia’s admission to the League of Nations. Latvia’s history has also seen, for instance, politicians and thinkers who combined Eastern or Western orientation with economic pragmatism, or oscillated between the Western and Eastern direction (the next section discusses the currents in greater detail). Each of the authors explores a specific ideational current in Latvia’s foreign policy, focusing mainly on the history of ideas and the personalities who created and promoted these ideas. They also examine the circumstances

10 in which these ideas were born, and their subsequent fate: how these ideas developed, split or merged, at which points certain ideas dominated on the national scale or were relegated to the background. With some exceptions (Kārlis Ulmanis as the unique pro-American figure in Interwar Latvia), each article refers to several personalities who made a significant contribution to the development of a specific stream – insofar as they supported this specific current’s ideas. Obviously, not all personalities could be mentioned, especially the ones belonging to the nowadays prevalent Euro-Atlantic current. At the same time, we also asked authors to specifically highlight a few personalities that they consider crucial, showing what role an individual can play in foreign policy. While authors were asked to adhere to a similar structure, their individual judgments are one of the most interesting and thought-provoking features of this publication.

Main currents in Latvia’s foreign policy Previous research is relatively clear on the various tendencies in the foreign policy of Interwar Latvia, but modern Latvia’s foreign policy is frequently seen by both foreign and homegrown authors as bi-dimensional: a choice between “the East” and “the West,” a competition between two domineering discourses. Often, Latvia’s foreign policy is described as simply pro-Western.3 There is some reason in these conclusions, especially if we solely consider the rhetoric of Latvia’s : none of them have disavowed cooperation with the West, and while some officials have been relatively skeptical, this skepticism or open denial has not become a stable or popular tendency. However, this approach oversimplifies Latvia’s foreign policy and does not take into account the nuances distinguishing various pro-Western forces as well as manifestations of other streams. Our goal in this book is to move beyond the dichotomic juxtaposition between the East and the West and to show the full spectrum of tendencies in Latvia’s foreign policy, and to do this without falling into another extreme of identifying so many currents that they can barely be distinguished, with none of them being supported by more than a few personalities. Another question raised refers to the historic periodization of Latvian foreign policy. How persistent are the streams? To what extent do they change with passage of time? There is no universal answer to these questions; some foreign policy traits can survive for hundreds of years, while others surface but quickly disappear. In the case of Latvia, German and yet much longer

11 Soviet occupations were detrimental to foreign policy continuity, and so we decided not to look at the entire hundred years lap as a single period, but rather to divide it into four stages: • the Interwar period, lasting from the proclamation of the state in 1918 until the Soviet occupation in 1940, • the exile period from the moment of occupation in 1940 until the complete de facto restoration of national independence in 1991. We should add that in this volume, the government of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic is not analyzed, since under occupation the Latvian nation could not elect its representatives in fair elections and realize a foreign policy that would be independent from ; • the Awakening period from 1987 until the complete de facto restoration of national independence in 1991 – although an independent foreign policy body was not yet in existence on its territory, Latvia in this period already witnessed resurgence of foreign policy thought that was independent from the communist regime; • the modern period from 1991 until present. In both the Interwar and modern periods, we have identified five foreign policy currents per each. Five is a compromise between excessive particularization and simplified juxtaposition of the West and the East; although this number could be increased, we gave preference to a more concise structure. The title of each current reflects the foreign policy direction that is, in the eyes of this current, the main priority and / or normative ideal for Latvia. Some representatives of a current can focus on the benefits from practical cooperation with a country or region, regarding them as the best security guarantor or trade partner; others accentuate the values dimension, noting, for instance, that Latvian culture is Western in its deepest essence and this makes “return to ” both necessary and justified, or that the place of Latvia lies within the family of its closest neighbors – the Baltic and Nordic States. Yet others believe that both “values” and “interests” are in harmony. To cooperate with one region does not necessarily mean to reject cooperation with another, even if these seem mutually exclusive like the West and the East; many personalities included in this volume simultaneously gave excellent contribution to the development of several foreign policy directions. Foreign policy is complex, and, while independent thinkers may afford a one-sided perspective, decision-makers inevitably have to balance among different directions. What is important is the ultimate

12 choice in case of conflicting objectives – this is the criterion by which we define each specific current. In the Interwar period, we identify the following five currents: • Western current, which considered Latvia’s cooperation with Western European states and membership in the League of Nations to be the main priority and normative ideal. Miķelis Valters, the prominent statesman of free Latvia who was the first to advocate for Latvia’s impendence from , was already a Westerner. In our survey of independent experts,4 this current was considered prevailing in the Interwar period, although surpassing the Baltic / regional current only by a small margin. Jānis Taurēns in his chapter explains the historic development of the Western current and its key role in Latvia’s foreign policy. • Eastern current, which was oriented towards cooperation with Russia / , and in this volume, is discussed by Raimonds Cerūzis. It was not particularly influential in Interwar Latvia, as the surveyed experts also note, but proved rather persistent. The Eastern current was the only serious alternative to the Western current. Importantly, it highlights the sympathies and leanings towards the communist USSR shown by Latvia’s largest pre-coup political party – Latvian Social- Democratic Workers’ Party. Still, taking into account that the Social- Democrats only participated in the government once, this current had only inconsiderable influence on practical foreign policy. • Baltic or regional current, for which the main priority was cooperation with , , , to some extent , and/or broader integration in the Nordic Region. Lithuania and Estonia were Latvia’s closest partners, but, as this chapter’s author Valters Ščerbinskis notes, Finland was also unquestionably considered a Baltic state, and some thinkers considered closer cooperation with Sweden and other Nordic States. Baltic cooperation was developed as an immediate way to strengthen security since Western European states’ security guarantees were not considered fully reliable; economic and cultural dimensions were clearly secondary, although, as political opportunities disappeared in the 30s, cultural cooperation became increasingly important. This current played a remarkably important role in Latvia’s foreign policy during the Interwar period, and the surveyed experts ranked it second, immediately after the Western one.

13 • Pro-German current, where the Baltic Germans played an especially prominent role. Compared to the Western current, they had a rather different motivation and approach to cooperation with , which lost the First World War and was a potential aggressor from the Latvian point of view. The Baltic Germans’ influence was also sufficient to differentiate this as a separate current in foreign affairs of Interwar Latvia. (The majority of Baltic Germans left Latvia in 1939, and Germany’s place in Europe changed dramatically after the Second World War, so we do not talk about a separate pro-German current in Latvia’s modern foreign policy anymore. Now, cooperation with Germany is part of the general Western current.) In this volume, the pro-German current is analyzed by Martyn Housden, an expert on Baltic Germans. • Pro-American current, which considered cooperation with the of America as the main priority and normative ideal. In Interwar Latvia, this current was not fully developed (ranking last in the independent experts’ survey), with Kārlis Ulmanis as its virtually only representative. Nor did the U.S. engage in Europe as closely as today. In fact, the U.S. continued a very reluctant foreign policy towards Europe. This chapter differs from the others in this book with its relatively more narrow focus, but nonetheless we consider it an important and necessary element to the entire study – both because Jordan Kuck provides a valuable contribution to Latvia’s literature on Kārlis Ulmanis and because the Interwar period saw the inception of one of the most important tendencies in modern Latvia’s foreign policy. We should also take into account Ulmanis’s unique role in Latvia’s foreign affairs and domestic politics, since he could single-handedly influence many processes by concentrating power – as described by Kuck. In this period, we treat the pro-American current as separate from the Western one, because Latvia’s goals and tactics were quite different in both cases. The entireexile period is reviewed in one chapter. Although it is the longest among the periods identified here, and foreign policy thinking in exile has been remarkably rich and diverse, a more minute division would not be practical; thus, Andrejs Plakans’ article gives a broad, comprehensive overview of the exile’s work. In turn, Edijs Bošs turns to the Third Awakening, analyzing the great richness of foreign policy ideas that spread in these four tense years and, to a large extent, determined Latvia’s foreign policy after the renewal of independence.

14 We distinguish the following five currents in modern Latvia’s foreign policy: • Euro-Atlantic current has, undoubtedly, prevailed in the official foreign policy (90% of surveyed experts agree) and has received the most attention in research – despite not being the only current in Latvia’s foreign affairs, and, as Gunda Reire notes, not enjoying unanimous support in Latvia’s society. By “Euro-Atlanticism,” in this case, we understand support both to integration in the EU and NATO and to cooperation with individual Western states – for instance, Germany or the U.S. (although we still distinguish a separate regional current). While some foreign policy opinion-makers have preferred one or another partner, in general the EU, NATO and individual Western countries have not been distinguished in Latvia’s politics and discourse to the extent where this would create need for two separate chapters. • Eastern current in turn believes the main priority and normative ideal to be cooperation with Russia and, to some extent, with other countries of the former USSR, such as . In this current’s view, cooperation in the political, security, economic and cultural spheres with the East is productive. Sometimes it also stresses a common historical identity and, to an extent, linguistic and ethnical commonalities, or a similar values system (although the Eastern current is not solely a Russophones’ foreign policy choice, nor is it supported by the entire Latvian Russophone population). Different players use different definitions and accents as Andis Kudors shows in his article, analyzing the various sub-currents in Latvia’s Eastern foreign policy. Kudors’ article preserves focus by analyzing only Russia as the key partner in the eyes of Latvia’s Eastern current. The Eastern current has played a relatively subordinate role in official foreign policy, and relations with Russia have mainly been developed in the spirit of economic pragmatism, not considering political, security and cultural cooperation as an aim in itself. Nonetheless, this is not the least popular current, and after accession to the EU and NATO its importance has not diminished; according to the surveyed experts, the Eastern current is of medium importance in modern Latvian foreign policy. • Baltic or regional current, which considers cooperation with the rest of the Baltic States (in this period, Finland is not included in this category anymore), as well as broader integration in the Baltic Sea

15 Region, to be the priority. Also in this period, cooperation among the Baltic States has aroused especially high hopes at the moments when Western European states’ and U.S.’s guarantees were uncertain. In the modern period, Latvia has been able to obtain credible guarantees from Western European states, and the U.S. and NATO are considered primary guarantors of Latvia’s security, which stands in contrast with the Interwar period. As Didzis Kļaviņš demonstrates, Latvia in this period has been participating in very diverse regional mechanisms, among them some envisaging cooperation with the U.S. and Russia; however, cooperation among the Baltic States and with the Nordic States still has not realized its maximum potential. According to our experts’ survey, this current has been less popular in modern Latvia’s foreign policy compared to Euro-Atlanticism and economic pragmatism, but more popular than the normative stream. • Economic pragmatism, described here by Aldis Austers, considers the main priority and normative ideal to be economic cooperation with other countries that would benefit Latvia, regardless of these countries’ geography, regime, culture or other factors not related to welfare. Membership in the , NATO and other Western organizations is also considered subordinate to economic profitability. Of course, economic well-being is also an important goal for many advocates of Euro-Atlanticism and the Eastern current, so it is not possible to completely avoid overlap among chapters, but in their case prosperity goes hand in hand with other considerations such as security or identity. Economic pragmatism has played a much greater role in modern Latvia’s foreign policy compared to the Interwar period, especially in the last years, although, as Austers writes, “a comprehensive program of economic pragmatism has not yet been formulated neither at the academic nor at the political level.” • In turn, normative current, described by Mārtiņš Daugulis, focuses on internationally recognized norms and values such as human , , economic development and decreasing global inequality. Additionally, it highly values multilateral cooperation, including in the framework of the UN, and international law. Daugulis analyzes this current in conjunction with the internal development of Latvia itself. To some extent, it is postmodern, putting universal values above states’ sovereignty and national borders. In modern Latvia,

16 this current has not gained major popularity neither in official foreign policy nor in society. While rhetoric on the defense of universal values is popular, it is frequently used to affirm belonging to the Western community. In practice, as surveyed experts also confirmed, other, more tangible priorities tend to prevail in Latvia’s foreign policy; the normative current is rather supported by civil society organizations and independent experts than by policy-makers. However, it has been sufficiently distinct and consistent to merit a study. This brief insight already demonstrates that the currents partially overlap, and the next chapters will also show how individual personalities sometimes operate within several currents simultaneously. We should note that Latvia’s general pro-Western orientation has been very clear and persistent through virtually the entirety of Latvia’s independence. In the Interwar period, the general Western current was complemented by the Baltic current (even the key personalities overlapped), and there were also specific players who lobbied for cooperation with the U.S. and with Germany. Nowadays, the strong Euro-Atlantic current is complemented by the normative one, which advocates the universal values that are most popular in the West, and the Baltic/regional stream through which Latvia largely tries to become a more attractive member of the Western community. However, if we only glorify Latvia’s Western orientation, we will forget about other very important tendencies, and while the specific classification is to an extent subjective, all the currents identified here have significant nuances that justify analyzing them separately.

Personalities as developers of ideas This volume is interlaced with personalities – leaders, promoters of new ideas, agents of change from both governmental and non-governmental sectors. The majority of them appear in the main text of the chapters, in relation to the ideas they advocate. To complete this more general overview, we also asked the authors to select and describe in greater detail three personalities who, in their opinion, had an especially prominent role in the specific current. We should stress that the authors’ work is their own assessment; opinions on the role of specific personalities may differ, and, as mentioned already, the same personality can frequently be classified into several currents or streams simultaneously. The authors’ freedom to choose their currents’ key personalities is an important component of this project: on the one hand,

17 the book thus becomes more personal and appealing, on the other hand, the authors also are free to choose less known personalities from the specific current who, nonetheless, made an especially important contribution to the development of foreign policy thinking in a certain direction. Still, in order to provide a more general insight and lessen the subjectivity of evaluation, we also surveyed experts on Latvia’s foreign policy (independent from government institutions), asking them to provide opinions on key personalities. The table below summarizes experts’ responses on the three most important personalities in each period and current, comparing them to the opinions expressed by the authors of the chapters.

Interwar period, 1918–1940 Entire period (according Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics (almost unanimous to the experts, results in support), Kārlis Ulmanis, Vilhelms Munters descending order) Western current Author Jānis Taurēns: Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics, Vilhelms Munters, Jūlijs Feldmans Experts: Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics, Kārlis Ulmanis, Miķelis Valters Eastern current Author Raimonds Cerūzis: Fēlikss Cielēns, Pēteris Stučka, Jānis Pliekšāns () Experts: Fēlikss Cielēns, Fricis Menders, Pēteris Stučka Baltic / regional current Author Valters Ščerbinskis: Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics, Kārlis Ulmanis, Kārlis Zariņš Experts: Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics, Kārlis Ulmanis, Vilhelms Munters / Voldemārs Salnais / Kārlis Zariņš Pro-German current Author Martyn Housden: Pauls Šīmanis, Vilhelms Firkss, Erhards Krēgers Experts: Andrievs Niedra, Pauls Šīmanis, Arveds Bergs Pro-American current Author Jordan Kuck: Kārlis Ulmanis Experts: Kārlis Ulmanis, Alfrēds Bīlmanis, Ludvigs Sēja

Exile, 1940-1991 Entire period Author Andrejs Plakans: Kārlis Zariņš, Pēteris Lejiņš, Uldis Grava Experts: Kārlis Zariņš, Anatols Dinbergs, Alfrēds Bīlmanis

18 Awakening, 1987-1991 Entire period Author Edijs Bošs: , Jānis Jurkāns, Mavriks Vulfsons Experts: Dainis Īvāns, Jānis Jurkāns,

Modern period, 1991 – until present Entire period (according Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, Edgars Rinkēvičs, to the experts) Euro-Atlantic current Author Gunda Reire: Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, Dainis Īvāns, Experts: Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, Valdis Birkavs, Ojārs Ēriks Kalniņš Eastern current Author Andis Kudors: Tatjana Ždanoka, Nils Ušakovs, Experts: Nils Ušakovs, Jānis Jurkāns, Tatjana Ždanoka Baltic / regional current Author Didzis Kļaviņš: Valdis Birkavs, , Žaneta Ozoliņa Experts: Valdis Birkavs, Gunārs Meierovics, Georgs Andrejevs / Economic pragmatism Author Aldis Austers: Alberts Kauls, Aivars Lembergs, Valērijs Kargins Experts: Valdis Dombrovskis / Aivars Lembergs / Ainārs Šlesers / Andris Šķēle Normative current Author Mārtiņš Daugulis: Māris Gailis, Nils Muižnieks, Juris Jansons Experts: / Sandra Kalniete / Nils Muižnieks

As we see, there are personalities classified into several currents simultaneously, and there are similarities and differences between authors’ and other experts’ opinions. This is a good thing. The aim of this book is not to provide a final and indisputable classification of policy- and opinion- makers into isolated, permanent groups, but rather to ignite a quality debate on commonalities and differences among personalities who played an important role in Latvia’s foreign policy, and among the different foreign policy currents. We provide the foundation; the readers can make their own conclusions and assessments.

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19 While Latvia is sometimes termed a small state, our foreign policy thinking is rich, with a hundred years of history. During these years, diplomats, politicians and civil society activists have both preserved the priorities elaborated shortly after the proclamation of independence and developed Latvia’s foreign policy in new directions. This process has specially accelerated after accession to the EU and NATO in 2004, as Latvia is reaching to ever further horizons. The long-standing foreign policy dilemmas also persist. We hope that this book will encourage the reader to look critically at Latvia’s achievements and the tasks still to be completed, at the traditionally strong aspects of our foreign policy thinking and the directions still to be developed, and also that it will remind the reader about the many important and oftentimes many-sided personalities in the hundred years’ ’s foreign policy. The Latvian Institute of International Affairs is grateful to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia and the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia for their support of this publication, thus promoting independent, innovative thinking and debates on Latvia’s foreign policy.

Endnotes

1 Red. Ēriks Jēkabsons un Valters Ščerbinskis (Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhīvs, Latvijas Republikas Ārlietu ministrija, Latvijas Arhīvistu biedrība. Rīga, Zinātne, 2003). 2 See Henrik Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe ( and New York: Routledge, 1997). 3 Some examples: Žaneta Ozoliņa, red., Latvija pasaules politikā: iespējas un ierobežojumi, 2. izde- vums (Rīga: Latvijas Ārpolitikas izdevums, 2001); Jeremy W. Lamoreaux and David J. Galbreath, “The Baltic States As ‘Small States’: Negotiating The ‘East’ By Engaging The ‘West,’” Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 (2008); Gundar J. King and David E. McNabb, “Crossroads Dyna- mics in Foreign Policy: The Case of Latvia,”Problems of Post- Vol. 56, Iss. 3 (2009); Maili Vilson, “The Foreign Policy of the Baltic States and the Ukrainian Crisis: A Case of Europe- anization?,” New Perspectives Vol. 23, Iss. 2 (2015). 4 In September-October 2016, using an online platform, the survey was administered to foreign af- fairs experts independent from the government, including academics – experts on international relations and history, think tank representatives, journalists and civic activists. Its purpose was to complement the assessments provided by the authors of this book with independent, “external” insight. The Latvian Institute of International Affairs is grateful to all participants of the survey who found time to take part.

20 FOREIGN POLICY CURRENTS OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Westward Direction of Latvia’s Foreign Policy during the Interwar Period

JĀNIS TAURĒNS

Latvia within the international reality constructed by Western countries The foreign policy practiced by Latvia during the two decades that separated the World Wars is perhaps best described by late British historian John Hiden, who saw cooperation among the Baltic States as a glum and tragic story – after all, the foreign affairs and security policies of Latvia had failed to achieve their existential goal of maintaining the country’s independence. Even now, his view overshadows the positive achievements and the valuable experience gained during that time. The Westerly arm of Latvian had the task of securing a stable independence and protecting Latvia’s interests. The West was a cornerstone for Latvia’s foreign policy throughout the initial independence period. The countries that had won – Great Britain, France, the United States, – would set the tone in international affairs after the “Great War.” Latvia and the Baltics essentially emerged as thanks to the outcome of the war and the new political order, known as the Versailles System. Great Britain and France would play an enduring role in Latvia’s foreign policy and diplomacy. Reflecting on the West and its influence was not always a fixture of political thought in Latvia. The term “the West,” a counterpoint to “the East,” is largely a product of policy and realities: at that time the West would clearly lie within NATO and the European Economic Community. In other words, the West was on the other side of the Iron Curtain as a relatively homogeneous political and economic bloc. During the Interwar Period, however, such a divide would be less clear-cut than it was at the height of the Cold War or now. Germany was not a focal point for Latvian diplomacy precisely because it was not part of the West, and with Adolf Hitler’s ultimate

23 rise to power in 1933 this contrast grew greater than ever. Within the year, Germany withdrew from the League of Nations and was headed on a collision course with the West. Latvia’s political elite and general public were much closer to the West during the Interwar Period than they are now, after the country’s independence has been regained. Knowledge of foreign languages was much more widespread back in the day. Vilhelms Munters’ famous notebooks, preserved in the National Archive, were written in five languages. Latvia had what would be considered a contemporary market economy. Western democratic ideas fueled political development and civic thought. imported from the West. A number of top-tier Latvian diplomats had studied at universities throughout Western Europe, and social democratic leaders had become acquainted with the West as they sought refuge from imperial persecution. Latvian foreign policy and security policy had the mandate protecting and strengthening national sovereignty. Latvia had a natural interest in maintaining the Versailles- system that had been established after World War I. Latvia considered the major Western powers to be the main guarantors of its independence. One could say with a certain amount of caution that the importance of the West for Latvia’s diplomatic effort would decrease over time. Starting in the mid-1930s, the foreign policy and security situation of Latvia was analyzed in diplomatic circles from a more geopolitical, pragmatic vantage point, in the context of its geographic location between the USSR and Germany. Western countries did play a major role in Latvia’s foreign policy in the formative years of its statehood. They supported Latvian armed forces during the War of Independence. The Peace Conference of 1919 became a forum where the aspiring diplomats of Latvia, in particular Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics, acquired their first professional skills, had their first achievements and suffered their first disappointments as the Western nations began to prioritize the future fate of the former Russian Empire. As of 11 November 1918, British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour had declared the Interim National Council of Latvia a de facto independent body. For Latvia and its neighbors in the Baltics, the opinion of the West on war and peace with the Soviet regime was essential. Western representatives operated as mediators in the relationship that the Latvian national armed forces and neighboring Estonia had with the German army and the Landeswehr under the command of Rüdiger von der Golz, culminating

24 ZIGFRĪDS ANNA MEIEROVICS – a member and leader of the Latvian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia (1918–1924 and 1924–1925), Prime Minister (June 1921 – January 1923), one of the founders and foremost leaders of the Latvian Farmers’ Union. Architect of the de facto and de iure international recognition of Latvia, co-author of the military alliance of Latvia and Estonia (1923) and founder of the Latvian Foreign Service. Developer of major trends in Latvia’s foreign policy. Meierovics’ foreign Photo: portal of the Tukums Region policy was founded in a coherent orientation Municipality, www.tukums.lv towards the West and democratic values. To a large extent, the main focus for Latvian foreign policy was Great Britain. Arthur Balfour’s 11 November 1918 memorandum on de facto recognition of the Interim National Council of Latvia is widely considered the triumph of Meierovics’ diplomacy. His second success story was a series of visits to Western Europe, culminating in de iure recognition of Latvia at the 26 January 1921 session of the Supreme Council of Allied Powers. He was a proponent of the Baltic League and the architect of the 1923 military alliance between Latvia and Estonia. Achievements in the relationship with Bolshevik Soviet Russia, including the 11 August 1920 peace treaty. Historical literature praises Meierovics’ talent, “brilliance,” resilience in the face of competition and ability to pick capable cohorts. Among his greatest errors were “excessive faith and reliance on the [Western] Allied Powers” (Edgars Andersons) and an unfortunate November 1919 decision to declare war on Germany. Retrospective accounts of Meierovics’ personality hypothesize that he would not have allowed the establishment of an authoritarian regime, and possibly might have implemented a more successful foreign policy had he survived into the 1930s.

in the Armistice of Strazdumuiža. Other Westerners mediated Latvia’s national border issues: colonel Stephen George Talents, British commissar to the Baltic States, presided over the arbitration committee solving national border matters with Estonia, while James Young Simpson, a British diplomat, mediated similar issues with Lithuania. The West’s participation in shaping the independence of the Baltic States was both direct and essential. Once the territory of Latvia had been liberated, the stance of the West was crucial to a de iure recognition of Latvia and the other Baltic States on 26 January 1921, accepting them as members of the League of Nations in September 1921. Thede iure recognition at

25 the 26 January session of the Supreme Council of Allied Powers catalyzed recognition of Latvia’s independence in the international arena. According to Edgars Andersons, ten states had recognized Latvia one after another in the space of one month; by the end of the year, it was recognized by 17. In the latter half of the 20th century, Western countries grew less interested in the fate of the Baltics. Since the mid-1920s, Latvia had been hoping for a diplomatic arrangement that would resemble the 1925 Locarno Treaties and safeguard borders within Eastern Europe. In 1927, Social Democrat Minister of Foreign Affairs Fēlikss Cielēns developed an ambitious concept that would involve Great Britain and France as part of a treaty with the USSR and Germany; its outcome would guarantee independence and neutrality to Finland and the Baltic States. But by then, British interests barely reached beyond the Franco-German border. Latvia supported solutions for collective security that were emblematic of the Interwar Period: a generation of loud declarations, unrealistic non- aggression treaties and fruitless disarmament talks; even the League of Nations itself was a hallmark of the times. Latvia was a signatory to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which stipulated a refusal to wage war. However, these idealistic endeavors would ultimately fail. Latvia supported every effort as a benefit to the lesser states. Andersons had this to say about practical interstate cooperation: “The Baltic States supported each international cooperation campaign, wherever possible.” This included specialized international bodies, a number of international conventions and one-off ad hoc initiatives.1 Historians are essentially in consensus that, starting in the mid-1930s, diplomats in Latvia grew aware of the loss of interest and influence by its allies and the fact that the fate of the Baltic States was in their hands. The final time that they attracted any significant attention from the West was a tragic page in the countries’ history. Talks in spring and summer of 1939 between Great Britain, France and the revisionist Soviet Union laid bare the USSR’s desire to control the Baltic States and the contradictory stances of Western partners. The West did push back against Soviet efforts with dainty reservation clauses – by requesting a right to intervene should the Baltic States, in the opinion of the USSR, be prone to “indirect [German] aggression,” for instance. Latvian diplomats tried to make the great powers assure not just the Baltic nations’ independence (doubting which these countries considered unacceptable), but true neutrality. A popular slogan of the day warned against excluding the smaller states from the conversation – “nothing about

26 us without us.” We know now that the USSR would eventually secure from Germany’s “Third Reich” what it could not achieve with the West – support and acceptance for its occupation and annexation of the Baltic States.

Evolution of discourse and concepts Foreign policy was a nascent school of thought in Latvia during the Interwar Period. Then again, the rest of the world was also far from today’s foreign relations theory that flourished after the Second World War. Thoughts on foreign policy achievements are reflected in Foreign Ministers’ speeches and writings, letters of instruction, Latvian envoys’ conferences, debates during the Parliamentary Period and leaders’ speeches during the Authoritarian Period. It appears that, while analyzing the role of the West in the foreign policy of Latvia, Latvian diplomats perceived it as a given, a natural environment in which Latvian foreign policy is expressed – paying more attention to a geopolitical state of affairs at a specific place and time. Latvia had a lot of very specific objectives in the West. Early in its independence, the priorities were assistance during the War of Independence, diplomatic support, de iure recognition and accession to the League of Nations. Diplomats from Latvia were often perplexed by lack of understanding or awareness, a need to prove that Latvia was not Russia, that its independence was viable. Today’s Westernization of Latvia is understood as democratic reform, movement towards a market economy, establishment of the rule of law and implementation of human rights. A similar situation occurred during the Interwar Period, as instituting democracy, developing parliamentarianism and establishing a judicial state ipso facto brought Latvia closer to the West. Orators at the Constitutional Assembly that would adopt the Satversme often referred to the need for promoting democracy and protecting the rule of law. They knew the of the USA and Western European countries and were aware of the place that the emerging Satversme would take in this context. During a presidential debate, deputy Andrejs Petrevics compared presidential powers in Latvia and the United States of America claiming, “The will be a tiny, negligible actor in legal terms.” Rainis, having returned from Swiss exile, supported the broad rights of the public to a referendum. He was convinced that the referendum was a key institution to Switzerland’s welfare. Law historians point to the 1919 of the

27 democratic in Germany as underlying the wording of the Satversme, although opinions differ on how decisive it had actually been.2 The political elite in Latvia was aware that Westernization was necessary. The first government of Kārlis Ulmanis, formed by the newly elected Constitutional Assembly, noted in its declaration: “Latvia, being part of a chain of states that link the East and the West, will definitely lean towards the democratic policy of Western Europe and America. The fellowship of ideas and commonality of interest are the unshakable foundations for a genuine and amicable relationship between the nations.”3 Not everyone embraced Westernization, of course. In a 1926 public lecture, Rainis explained that European culture had two components – spirituality and materialism, of which it had slid so far into materialism as to be on the brink of oblivion. The famous poet and politician noted that the downfall of European culture had been evident before the First World War. To heal this ailment of Europe, Rainis prescribed the medicine of social justice, elevating industriousness as its principal conduit.4 Fēlikss Cielēns wrote an extended piece praising parliamentarism and democracy that accentuated not only the role played by citizenry but also the importance of the working class in achieving it. Cielēns theorized that civic society was greatest in the Western part of Europe, particularly in England, where “the citizenry is entitled to this honor, that it has struggled for centuries and ultimately established a contemporary parliamentary democracy.”5 Other social democrats blamed imperialism for causing World War I itself; they objected to militarism and the arms race. However, the wellspring of social democracy as an influential stream in Latvia’s politics had been the West and Germany. Since the War of Independence, the rhetoric of Latvian foreign policy had discussed a predisposition towards the West or a predisposition towards the Entente. It soon became clear, however, that the role Latvia would play in Western politics could not be substantial. Diplomats shifted to slogans that were oriented towards Latvians, which was not very pragmatic or constructive for foreign policy. Idealization of the West eventually brought Latvia disappointment. Eminent Latvian historian in exile Edgars Andersons noted that the country’s independence was predicated on the principles of democracy and national self-determination, which U.S. President Woodrow Wilson had declared in the aftermath of the First World War. The Baltic States had faith in the Allied Powers, which had fought in the name of nations’

28 freedom and democracy. “Baltic diplomats soon discovered, however, that the Allied Powers were not their allies after all,” Andersons observed bitterly.6 On 26 January 1921, allied powers adopted a decision recognizing Latvia de iure. On the following day, jubilant crowds gathered in the streets of Riga. It might have been the only time since the establishment of Latvian statehood that a foreign policy event sparked public emotion to such a degree. “… [G]overnment institutions stopped working, schools let their pupils go, shopkeepers closed their shops, and each house was decked in national flags and symbols as exalted residents of the capital crowded the streets in long processions with orchestras at the front, heading to the Allied Powers’ embassies,” wrote Valdības Vēstnesis.7 Nevertheless, moods are prone to change, and disappointment with the West became a reality during Constitutional Assembly debates, over delays with accession of Latvia to the League of Nations. Meierovics acknowledged that “The Allied Powers have been our first friends, and we shall respond to them in the spirit with which they have come to us.” In the same speech, he mentioned Latvia as a bridge connecting the West, Germany and Soviet Russia.8 Membership in the League of Nations was not far off, and public opinion continued to evolve. June 1923 was marked by the first of two conferences of Latvian ambassadors. The conference was held at a time when solving economic issues (including issues with the West) and formation of the Baltic League were highest on the agenda. An analysis of the conference’s contributions to working with the West reveals how decisive the West was at the time. It made a resolution acknowledging movement towards the League of Nations as a key principle and underscoring the need to strengthen ties with Great Britain. At the time, Latvia had unreasonably high hopes for Great Britain. In November 1923, Prime Minister Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics addressed the British government with questions about diplomatic and military assistance in the event of Russian aggression. Meierovics’ questions were motivated by a communist uprising the USSR had incited in Germany a month earlier. He had been overconfident in his expectations; Britain refused to undertake any obligations whatsoever. Latvia’s Westward orientation failed to deliver vital guarantees of security. Edgars Andersons described Meierovics’ policy as reliance on Western countries that at times bordered on naïveté. Shortly before his death in a car accident on 22 August 1925, Minister of Foreign Affairs Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics went on a month-long (29 June

29 until 31 July) tour of nine states that included the major Western powers. On his visits, he affirmed his faith in initiatives aimed at strengthening the Versailles System that the West had established – which in his opinion included the Geneva Protocol adopted by the League of Nations in 1924. The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes had a number of stipulations including “the principles of arbitration, disarmament and general mutual guarantees.”9 During the parliamentary democracy period, various political groups had differing perceptions of the West as a reality and as a concept. Those aligned more closely with the West included centrist political factions – the Farmers’ Union, the Democratic Centre – alongside Menshevik social democrats, some skeptical groups on the left and right, and the Social Democratic Workers’ Party of Latvia, which was the most influential oppositional party of the Parliamentary Period. Nearly every Latvian government, whether leaning left or right during the Parliamentary Period, as well as the authoritarian regime, would have to consider the Western powers, and hoped to involve them in facilitating the security situation in Latvia. Many projects proposed by Latvian politicians in order to increase security for Latvia and the Baltic States assumed guarantees from Western countries – but obtaining these guarantees would not prove realistic. As mentioned above, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Social Democrat Fēlikss Cielēns had counted on Western assurances with his “Eastern Locarno” plan. In 1935, Vilhelms Munters sought British and French commitments for his Eastern Pact proposal, a system of non-aggression and mutual assistance plans that would span the USSR, Germany, Poland and the Baltic States. It did not command interest from the West.10 For minorities, the Occident was revered as a role model, spearheading values that could safeguard the rights of these groups. Prominent Baltic German publicist Pauls Šīmanis wrote in 1937 that a single country could only prosper in harmony with Europe’s general prosperity, in the spirit of Western Christian moral law. On the other hand, society and diplomacy in Latvia expected minorities’ loyalty to Latvia in the foreign policy arena. Addressed to the Western press and not just the League of Nations, the complaints of Baltic Germans about their fortunes in Latvia were causing a certain degree of discontent. In 1933, Mordehajs Nuroks, a Jewish leader, took the floor in the Saeima and said that the situation for Jews in Latvia had been good during the Parliamentary Period, noting that Latvian Jews had always expressed admiration for the “fair treatment of our cultural

30 needs” in every international arena. Professor Aivars Stranga notes that the nationalist policies of Ulmanis’ regime did motivate some left-leaning Jews to sympathize more with the USSR, although for a large portion of Jews, the twenty years of independence would be “the happiest times they had had in Latvia for centuries.”11 From a foreign policy perspective, neither the USSR nor Nazi Germany would be friendly to Jews that were loyal to Latvia. Western were their only alternative. The West was not a value, ideal and government administration template for every foreign policy thinker in Latvia; some of them were rather superficial in their support. Right-leaning citizen Arveds Bergs wrote that the West was a counterweight to the loathsome Soviet Union. Radical nationalists felt wary of democracy in general. In the late 1920s, a dislike for democracy started to manifest itself within mainstream public opinion. Criticism of the West was a feature of the authoritarian regime. On 13 August 1934, in his landmark address to historians, Listen to the Footsteps of History, authoritarian Prime Minister Kārlis Ulmanis claimed that there was no reason to believe World War I had been decisive in birthing Latvia as a state. Latvia and the Latvian people, making their first steps as an independent nation, were still alien to Western politicians. Ulmanis declared that he had “the enormous trouble of explaining the what, the how and the where to men that should have known a few things about history.” In his testimony to Soviet authorities after arrest, he described England and France as egoistic states whose relationships with the Baltic States often came second to their relationships with Soviet Russia and its successor the USSR.12 In the summer of 1935, problems in Latvia’s foreign policy were mulled over at the 2nd conference of Latvian ambassadors. Appraisals of the significance of the West were then quite pessimistic. Jūlijs Feldmans, Latvian Ambassador to the League of Nations, published an article arguing for Baltic neutrality in the Tieslietu Ministrijas Vēstnesis. He championed a “neutralization” of the Baltic States as a unified whole. The cornerstone for this neutrality would be the interest that the USSR and Germany should have in maintaining a balance of power and the status quo (i.e. Baltic independence). Feldmans warned about the crumbling of the Versailles System, noting that Europe was undergoing substantial changes, the hegemony of the winning powers was at an end, and a “new, militarized Germany” had stepped into the political arena. However, he believed it crucial to honor the League of Nations and the obligations that Latvia had

31 JŪLIJS FELDMANS – professional Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and diplomat since 1919. Appointed representative of Latvia to the League of Nations in Geneva in 1930. Latvian charge d’affaires in the United States of America from 1950 until 1953. A foreign policy theoretician and believer in Baltic neutrality, he argued for this development ahead of actual change in Latvia’s official foreign policy. Although Feldmans believed that Latvia should exist as a neutral state, he had the pragmatic understanding that such an option would have to be Photo: Latvian State Historical created by Western powers. Baltic States’ neutrality Archives would not be feasible without international recognition, although it would need to stem from the countries’ innate ability and desire to defend themselves. Feldmans foresaw the downfall of the League of Nations and a return to a realistic balance of power in European politics. He ceaselessly fought for Latvia’s election to the Council of the League of Nations, although participation in the Council became a reality near the end of the League’s existence when some undignified decisions were being adopted. Latvia would gladly leave the Council to avoid the risky vote on excluding the USSR following its aggression against Finland. Feldmans continued to work for the diplomatic service of Latvia and defended its interests during the occupation as an ambassador to the USA. He helped establish the American Latvian Association and was actively involved in organizing its activities (1950–1951).

to this organization.13 Feldmans’ ideas were slightly ahead of his time – Latvia would adopt a semblance of neutrality in 1938, although despite the ambassador’s intention, there were no international guarantees and Latvia had little to gain from this move. The most famous thesis at the conference was that Latvia had two worst enemies: the Soviet Union and Germany. Yet speakers at the conference continued to reflect on a system of international relations dominated by the West. Vilhelms Munters spoke at the conference to share his opinion: the desire and ability of Britain and France to affect international events was hamstrung by issues with their respective domestic policies and economies – in other words, they had lost some of their global prestige. They were no longer attentive to Eastern Europe’s security concerns. Still, Latvian diplomacy never entirely abandoned its hope of involving the Western powers (at least as guarantors) in some sort of Eastern European security treaty. Gradually,

32 conceptual analysis of Latvia’s foreign policy inched towards the security situation Latvia had in the context of the USSR and Germany. Frequently cited is German historian Georg von Rauch: according to his account, Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vilhelms Munters had understood on his visit to the coronation ceremony of King George VI in May 1937 that no amount of diplomacy, no matter how brilliant, would help the Baltic States unless they faced the new reality of Nazi Germany.14 Importantly, this would place the moment of Munters’ greatest disappointment with the West in London. At his often-quoted address to the Chamber of Labour on 3 April 1938, Vilhelms Munters criticized the practical failures of the League of Nations and had little hope for it, despite noting that no better model for international cooperation had ever been invented by anyone. Over time, Latvia’s disillusionment with the West as a guarantor of its security progressed. In autumn 1938, the Baltic States refused to implement the guarantees in Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (which entailed collective sanctions against an aggressor), which their leaders communicated as movement towards a neutrality policy. However, modern historians describe this act as a waiver of the only international safeguard to their security. Both perceptions appear extreme – true, Latvia’s neutrality failed to meet the classical criteria – but then again, the entire system of international security was on the verge of collapse at the time. Nevertheless, the West never lost influence entirely. Negotiations between Great Britain, France and the USSR in the spring and summer of 1939 finally placed the fate of the Baltic States on the agenda. Contemporary discourse in Latvian diplomacy was that of proud independence and, according to Vilhelms Munters, cold forethought. Hopes for the West persevered even in the last days of Latvian foreign policy, when Britain and France were officially considered one of the belligerent blocs to which Latvia should maintain neutrality. As the USSR negotiated with Great Britain and France in the spring and summer of 1939, diplomats clung to these two countries, their devotion to the rule of law a semblance of protection from the USSR’s sphere of influence. In late May 1939, Munters urged British diplomats to deny the USSR’s obtrusive, perilous desire to “guarantee” Baltic independence despite their wishes; to have Great Britain decide on its own when “assistance” should be provided to the Baltic States.15 Kārlis Zariņš, Latvian ambassador to Britain (the most stable of the countries dragged into the Second World War), was delegated emergency

33 VILHELMS MUNTERS – professional employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1923. Served as manager of the Baltic States Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, director of the Administrative Legal Department and the Ministry’s Secretary-General. De facto acting Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1934, Minister of Foreign Affairs since July 1936. Munters’ foreign policy tragedy was the loss of independence for Latvia. His actions received sharp criticism, but in spite of it he was, if cynical, a defender and facilitator of the Western current. Photo: Latvian State Historical Munters considered himself an adherent of foreign Archives policy pragmatism; his concept of Latvian foreign policy was based on the idea of balance of power between the USSR and Germany, which in his opinion would benefit from the independence of the Baltic States. As a means to these ends, Munters sought non- aggression treaties with the USSR and Germany, that could be combined within a holistic security system with assurances from Western states. His greatest achievements were establishing the Baltic League and setting a common political roadmap for the Baltic States. In 1936, Munters supported the election of Latvia to the Council of the League of Nations. Munters’ foreign policy was characterized by a gradual loss of faith in Western countries, although as late as the summer of 1939 he pursued Western guarantees of security for Latvia, attempting to steer negotiations between three major powers for the benefit of the Baltic States. Munters was directly responsible for Latvia’s inability to mount an appropriate foreign policy response to the challenges of 1939 and 1940, including a refusal to even symbolically.

representation powers by the in 1940. He was given the assignment to “defend the interests of Latvia in good faith” and give binding orders to Latvian missions.16 Overall, the foreign policy of Latvia was dominated by the orientation toward the West. Firstly, it had played an essential role during the foundation and establishment of Latvian statehood. The West acted as a counterweight to the Russian Empire when defiance of the latter was existential to Latvia as a sovereign nation. Secondly, Latvia trusted the West to maintain the international order, security and institutions established following the First World War. Latvia was a status quo nation interested in peace and stability, and its foreign policy was focused on the winning powers – Great Britain

34 in particular. The League of Nations played a significant role in Latvian foreign policy as well. Latvia gave support to efforts in the 1920s that would solidify a new order, including the Kellogg-Briand Pact and disarmament initiatives. Latvia’s path to neutrality meant that the role of the West would be diminished, but it was never extinguished altogether. Thirdly, diplomats in Latvia hoped that Western states would participate in solutions for regional security. The numerous draft security pacts considered by Latvian diplomacy expected Western involvement as a counterbalance to regional powers – the USSR and Germany. It became crucial once both established themselves as “Latvia’s greatest enemies.” Western diplomacy should have been a template for a new normal European diplomacy benefitting the lesser states. The Western democratic system was a symbol of normalcy, an example for Latvia to follow. Even during its authoritarian period other alternatives would have been deadly for the fledgling state. Like today, leading Western-oriented players, by virtue of their government positions, were Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other high- ranking officials. Zigfrīds Meierovics, Fēlikss Cielēns, Vilhelms Munters and eventually Kārlis Ulmanis all took note of the West, whether as a matter of moral conviction or practical necessity. Their Westward lean was supported by centrist political factions and ethnic minorities.

Endnotes

1 Edgars Andersons, Latvijas vēsture 1920–1940. Ārpolitika I. [sējums] (Stokholma: , 1982), 380–381. 2 E.g. Romāns Apsītis et al., Latvijas tiesību vēsture (1914–2000) (Rīga: LU žurnāla “Latvijas Vēsture” fonds, 2000), 165–175. 3 Edgars Dunsdorfs, Kārļa Ulmaņa dzīve. Ceļinieks. Politiķis. Diktators. Moceklis (Rīga: Zinātne, 1992), 153. 4 “Jānis Rainis par Eiropas kultūru,” Balss, 1926. gada 14. jūnijs, 2. 5 Felikss Cielēns, “Politiskā demokrātija un tās nozīme strādnieku šķiras cīņā,” Jaunais Laiks, 1930, Nr. 2, 35. 6 Edgars Andersons, Latvijas vēsture 1920–1940. Ārpolitika I., 30. 7 Valdības Vēstnesis, 1921. gada 28. janvāris, 2. 8 Edgars Andersons. Latvijas vēsture 1920–1940. Ārpolitika I., 13, 28 i.a. 9 Ibid., 31, 41. 10 Inesis Feldmanis, Aivars Stranga, Jānis Taurēns un Antonijs Zunda, Latvijas ārpolitika un diplomātija 20. gadsimtā. 1. sējums (Rīga: Jumava, 2015), 370. 11 Aivars Stranga, Ebreji Baltijā. No ienākšanas pirmsākumiem līdz holokaustam, 14. gadsimts – 1945. gads (Rīga: LU žurnāla “Latvijas Vēsture” fonds, 2008), 439; Aivars Stranga. Ebreji un diktatūras Baltijā (1926–1940), Otrais, papildinātais izdevums (Rīga: Latvijas Universitātes Jūdaikas studiju centrs, 2002), 210.

35 12 Kārlis Ulmanis, “Klausaities vēstures soļos,” Latvijas Vēstures Institūta Žurnāls, 1937, Nr. 2, 170; Indulis Ronis un Artūrs Žvinklis, red., Kārlis Ulmanis trimdā un cietumā. Dokumenti un materiāli (Rīga: Latvijas Vēstures institūta apgāds, 1994), 394. 13 Jūlijs Feldmanis, “Baltijas valstu neutrālizācija,” Tieslietu Ministrijas Vēstnesis, 1935, Nr. 3., 636–639. 14 Georg von Rauch, The Baltic States. The Years of Independence. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 1917- 1940 (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 187–188. 15 Inesis Feldmanis, Aivars Stranga, Jānis Taurēns un Antonijs Zunda, Latvijas ārpolitika un diplomātija 20. gadsimtā. 1. sējums, 438–439. 16 “Ministru kabineta 1940. gada 17. maija ārkārtējās pilnvaras Latvijas sūtnim K.Zariņam” no Ēriks Jēkabsons un Valters Ščerbinskis, red., Latvijas ārlietu dienesta darbinieki 1918–1991. Biogrāfiskā vārdnīca (Rīga: Zinātne, 2003), 418–419.

36 Eastward Direction of Latvia’s Foreign Policy during the Interwar Period

RAIMONDS CERŪZIS

In the search of historic similarities Today, when hearing the words “Eastward direction of Latvia’s foreign policy,” the first thing we imagine are the international tensions caused by Russia. It clearly threatens the stability in the world and creates uncertainty in Latvia. Countries and nations, and especially their mentality, changes slowly. It is tempting to compare today’s reality to the nearly century of history, when the Bolshevik regime was formed next to us, on the ruins of the Russian Empire. Almost immediately after the proclamation of the Latvian state, the Red Army broke into the Eastern part of the country. Its aim was to establish a socialist system also in the territory inhabited by Latvians. One should be careful with searching and voicing similarities here. History is one of those sciences towards which usually no one is indifferent, and everyone is ready to give their own assessment of past developments, delight in them or condemn them. People usually do it led by their own subjective experience, but that is what does not allow understanding of the past properly. History does not tend to repeat itself literally, rather, it can be said that humans tend to act similarly in certain situations. Leopold von Ranke, the prominent 19th century German historian and founder of the science of history, once wrote: “Every stage in the history is set by God, and it does not matter what it will be later, because this era is important in itself, its very existence.”1 This means that the past events may not be assessed from today’s point of view. Also because it would be unfair to our ancestors, for they were guided by their best intentions at that time, and their actions must have seemed right for them. The Latvian foreign policy of the Interwar period certainly is not a success story. It is full of stress, danger, continuous searches for security, which ended with the worst possible failure – the loss of the state. As a result,

37 after the restoration of Latvia’s independence, there has been a lot of criticism towards the diplomacy exercised by the Latvian statesmen, especially towards the East. But we have been rather inactive in the attempts to put ourselves in the shoes of the founders of the Latvian state, Latvian diplomats and statesmen of the Interwar period. Just try to imagine being in their era, as if we were moved into the past without our historical experience! Thinking not only about Latvia’s relations with its Eastern neighbor, but also about Latvian foreign policy during the Interwar period as a whole, first of all one should remember that the Latvian state was being built completely from scratch, as a house in the middle of an empty field. The architects and builders of this house were Latvians, who had no diplomatic experience. Foreign policy and diplomacy at the time was still a distinctly aristocratic field, and it was the representatives of the upper society, often of noble origin, who used to engage in it. Today we live in the information age, when all the necessary news, including on the international situation and foreign policy are readily available, one should only collect and assess it. A common practice in today’s democratic environment is public opinion polling. It was not so during the Interwar period; the society obtained information about the international situation and the foreign policy mainly from the leading daily newspapers. In order to know and understand the events, one had to read them carefully and systematically. Moreover, the press could operate freely only until 1934; later it was strictly censored. That could be observed very clearly regarding presentation of information about Latvia’s relations with the totalitarian regimes in other countries (for example, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany). During the authoritarian regime of Kārlis Ulmanis, different opinions or discussions were not at all possible. Only the official government position was found in the information circulation. Public opinion surveys on matters topical to Latvia, including foreign policy, were not carried out even during the years of democracy, and such need was not seriously considered. After 1918, foreign policy remained an elitist activity, and many Latvian lawyers, officers, doctors, and philologists – Latvian intelligentsia – requalified themselves to engage in it. At that time, most of the people living in the countryside only started gaining their first experience in the school of politics, first, democratically selecting their representatives in their district, then nationally. In the fine issues of international politics and foreign policy, they held simplified views which

38 usually took the form of sympathies or antipathies towards Germans, , Englishmen, and other nations. People’s – voters’ involvement in the foreign policy was insignificant during the parliamentarism period, and during the authoritarian years – impossible.

Self-determination and the leftist political tradition What was the attitude in the Latvian society towards its Eastern neighbor during the first half of the 20th century? Was the big neighbor regarded with concern also at that time? Is it even possible to determine it? Knowing the experience of the Latvian society in the war against the Soviet Russia’s Red Army in 1918–1920, it is easy to answer with a clear confirmation – yes, there is information and it shows that the Eastern neighbor was feared; it was perceived as a threat to Latvia both by the elite and by the society as a whole. After the Bolshevik coup in October 1917, Russia had become a threat factor not only for all the non-Russian peoples who were trying to gain their sovereignty on the ruins of the Russian Empire, but also for the whole world. The main Bolshevik, or communist, ideologues, Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, were making grandiose plans for the communist victory march around the world, or the idea of ​​a so-called “permanent revolution,” as a result of which was to be introduced worldwide under the guidance of the working class. The whole world feared the Soviet Russia, above all because Russian communism wanted to destroy the social, economic and political system that had been forming for centuries and was the foundation for many countries. However, putting forward the fear of communism as the criterion for Latvian foreign policy would be the same as telling only half of the truth. After the World War I, the majority of the peoples and the states had not experienced the extreme leftist ideology, but were able to easily imagine the misery that could be brought by the communist-preached dictatorship of the proletariat and classless society. However, there were also nations who had gained the experience of the extreme leftist ideology and experienced its consequences. One such nation was Latvia. The leftist ideas of the (Jaunā strāva) and the Latvian social democracy that grew from it, were clearly realized in a form of the 1905–1906 Revolution: occupation of district boards, destruction of documents, burning of manors, and settling of scores with the officials. In this respect, the revolution was a typical

39 left-terrorist measure, the aim of which was to undermine the traditional order, to destroy its institutional supports. One should remember that the local society elite during the revolution were Germans and therefore the local German (Baltic Germans, Deutschbalten) nobility was the most vulnerable. It is thanks to the Baltic Germans that the view of Latvians as consumed revolutionaries began to spread not only in the Russian Empire, but also towards the West. For example, in the work of the well-known Baltic German historian Astaf von Transehe-Roseneck, remarkably named The Latvian Revolution,2 one can read that the revolution was provoked by a leftism mass psychosis, or, as he himself formulates: “a disease in the body of the Latvian people.”3 Namely, the leftist socialist movement in his opinion was the next stage of the national awakening. The ongoings of the Latvian revolution and the associations evoked by the works of Transehe-Roseneck were able to quickly take root in the local German community and elsewhere in Russia, and even in Germany creating lasting stereotypes about Latvians as destroyers of the existing tradition and order. Broad conservative circles in the Russian Empire, in the Baltics, and partly also in the German Empire were full of suspicion towards Latvians. The stigma of Latvian leftism remained during the years of the World WarI and could also be felt in the Interwar period. Are the views about Latvian leftism to be rejected as unfounded stereotypes or is there still some rationale for it? Let us look here on some specific, typical episodes of the past that could be observed in the early 20th century. First, we should take into account that the administration of the Russian Empire had a strong German influence. Baltic Germans, whose typical features were conservativism and anti-communism, stood out particularly. Morally ethical qualities, scrupulosity, conservatism, and loyalty to the emperor of Russia permitted the Germans to get high posts; the Baltic Germans were particularly good in diplomatic careers. Here a number of Foreign Ministers can be mentioned, the latter of which – Vladimir von Lamsdorf – held the post during the 1905 Revolution. Representatives of Baltic German families such as the Budbergs, Kotzebue, Lievens, Pahlens, Rosens, Sievers, and others, have served as Russia’s diplomats and secret counsellors. Furthermore, all of the Russian emperors’ wives since Paul I were German, and that, as is well known, plays a role! Consequently, the last Russian emperor Nicholas II was at least half German, and the Germanness of his wife Alexandra, daughter of the Grand Duke of Hesse-

40 Darmstadt, does not require further comment. Nevertheless, the impact of the conservative German community declined. Since the World War I, the Russian government implemented a number of repressive measures against the local Germans, blaming theem for supporting of the enemy (the German and Austro-Hungarian empire). German influence declined further during the 1917 civil revolution. Baltic Germans as the force that restrained leftism, was gradually excluded from power. This opened the door to free distribution of the leftist views. During the World War I, the most active part of the Latvian society were the conscripted into the Russian army. The majority of the Latvian society (around 60 %) were peasants, and majority of the peasants were without their own (landless) and without political power to influence the destiny of the territory. The riflemen were the typical representatives of this majority, thus – representatives of the dissatisfied majority. By the end of the World War I, the political mood of the Latvian society was confused, however, the equality and self-determination idea popularized by the leftist powers was clearly established. The leftist intellectuals were the first to realize that the future existence of the Latvian nation was possible only in the conditions of self-determination of the whole nation. They were the first to express freedom slogans, to develop definitions, concepts and projects, as well as promote abroad the idea of Latvia’s​​ sovereignty. In 1916, there were even two notable social democrats who developed plans in parallel for Latvia’s autonomy. One of the autonomy projects was developed by the prominent Latvian social democrat, later Foreign Minister, Fēlikss Cielēns, while in exile in Switzerland. This project was actively discussed by the socialists living in exile in Western Europe. Another, similar autonomy project was developed by his party member, Latvian Refugee Committee secretary, Kārlis Kurševics, while in exhile in Moscow, and it was discussed in Moscow by the Latvian refugee cultural office. Meanwhile also non- partisan intelligentsia representatives had begun popularizing these ideas. For example, the well-known Latvian writer Pāvils Rozītis, the author of well-known novel and film “Ceplis” (1928) and “Valmiera’s Boys” (1936), wrote: “Writers not only want Latvia to exist, but they also want it to have a cultural self-determination. “Free Latvia – in free Russia,” these words were first uttered by writers, and now they have become a motto for us all.”4 Later Rozītis together with Jānis Pliekšāns (Rainis) actively supported if not

41 JĀNIS KRIŠJĀNIS PLIEKŠĀNS (called RAINIS) – an internationally-known Latvian poet, playwright, translator, theater worker, social democratic journalist, politician, and statesman. Along with Pēteris Stučka, studied law at the University of St. Petersburg; one of the “New Current” leaders. Editor of the popular newspaper Dienas Lapa (1891–1895). After the Revolution of 1905, he went in exile to Switzerland. Rainis has made a significant contribution to development of and Latvian literary language. One of the most visible Photo: from the National Library representatives of the “New Current” movement – of Latvia, collection of historical predecessor of social democracy. Member of images “Zudusī Latvija” and collection of the Arts Reading the Constitutional Assembly and the first three Room Saeima terms representing the LSDWP. In 1922, he unsuccessfully ran for the office of Latvian President, took the loss painfully, accusing his party members of treachery. During the parliamentarism period, at the time of Marģers Skujnieks’1926–1928 leftist coalition government (1926–1928), along other social democrat delegated statesmen, became a minister – served as the Minister of Education. Tried to promote cultural and friendship ties with the USSR and Eastern Slavs. Rainis was an authority in Latvian culture, therefore his openness towards the Eastern neighbor probably had an even bigger impact in the Latvian society than the activities of other leftist politicians mentioned herein.

political, then at least cultural Latvia’s co-operation with the USSR; he also was the chairman of the “Association of Cultural Rapprochement with USSR Nations” in 1930–1937. We will return later to this association. It can be concluded that Transehe-Roseneck to a certain extent was right when he saw in the socialist movement a successor to the Awakening process. The keyword for self-determination efforts was “autonomy,” moreover, together with Russians, who since the awakening years were often considered as a counterforce to Germans and Germanisation. An article by the significant Latvian lawyer and later Latvian Bolshevik leader, Pēteris Stučka, in the social democrat newspaper Cīņa, in the spring of 1917, provides a good illustration of the Latvian leftist national perceptions: “... firstly, we stand for widely democratically managed Latvia – in , if not beyond – in Western European or Global democratic republic.”5 So leftist politicians contributed greatly to promotion of the ideas of Latvia’s self- determination and sovereignty idea. They were looking beyond the borders of

42 ethnic Latvia, and, as proved by the above quotation, they were making then popular plans for a global republic. “Utopia!” we would say today. No matter how tempting is this assessment, it is still wrong! At that time people did not have the experience that we have today. They believed in the imagined state of equality and justice, or at least used it as an argument in the fight with the old state regime.

Socialistic regime experience The World War I years, enlistment in the riflemen, and the creation of the Soviet Russia, all split off a significant part of Latvians from their homeland, who either voluntarily, or forced by circumstances, remained in Russia. A large part had a significant role in the Soviet Russia. Thus later, after the proclamation of Latvia’s independence, the Soviet Russia was not just a foreign country to Latvia – the fact that the regime of the neighboring country was made also by a contribution of own brethren, played an important role in the relations. Moreover, here one should note not only an abstract mass of “red” Latvian riflemen who guarded Lenin, but many individual personalities. In 1927, there were 12,000 Latvian communists registered in the Soviet Union. The number of communists among Russia’s Latvians accounted for 5–6 %. That is a lot if compared to the rest of the peoples and national groups of the Soviet Union. Latvians were present in many parts, from St. Petersburg to the Urals, and Russia’s Far East. It was even common in the Soviet Russia to call all non-Russians “Latvians.” There were significant Soviet officials of Latvian origin, such as Pēteris Stučka, the leader of the Soviet Latvia, creator of the USSR judicial system, chairman of the Supreme Court, and Jānis Rudzutaks, member of the CPSU Central Committee politburo. The staff of the Soviet security and repressive apparatus also had Latvians, for example, one of the founders and managers of the KGB, or Soviet secret service, Jēkabs Peterss, the creator of concentration camp (Gulag) systems, Eduards Bērziņš, etc. Latvians were active in Bolshevik propaganda, such as Gustavs Klucis, a well-known and respected Latvian artist, author of political posters praising Soviet power and communism. In 1918-1920, Latvian had a considerable influence also on the Soviet Russia’s foreign policy in general, and on relations with Latvia. This effect diminished later, and by 1938, all of the

43 PĒTERIS STUČKA was born in an intelligent teachers’ family. He acquired lawyer’s degree at St. Petersburg University, and was a well-known lawyer, politician and statesman. Stučka was one of the leaders of the New Current, editor of the leftist progressive newspaper Dienas Lapa (1888–1891, 1895–1897). In 1904, he became a participant of the LSDWP central committee. After the Revolution of 1905, as a lawyer he defended many Latvian revolutionaries. Married to Jānis Pliekšāns’ (Rainis) sister Dora. A committed and active defender of the Photo: from the collection of the idea of socialist state, leftist social democrat, later – a Museum of the Occupation of Bolshevik (communist). In 1918-1920, Stučka was Latvia the government leader of the Latvian Socialist Soviet Republic that was set up in Moscow, as well as the leader of the Communist Party of Latvia. Actively participated in the formation of Soviet Russia; in 1917, was People’s Commissar for Justice, and in 1918, the Soviet Russia’s representative at the Brest-Litovsk peace talks. After the fall of the Soviet regime under his leadership in Latvia and the ejection of the Red Army from the territory, from 1923 until his death, Stučka was the chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR, participated in creation of the USSR judicial system. His ashes are buried in the Kremlin Wall.

above mentioned had already been killed, except Pēteris Stučka, during the Great Terror within the framework of Latvian operations. The first blow to the leftist ideas in Latvia was the Pēteris Stučka-led Socialist regime introduction in Latvia in 1918–1920, which followed the Soviet Russia Red Army invasion. The people expected the Bolsheviks to introduce equality, democracy, and to finally allocate land to all the landless peasants. None of this happened. Instead, it was followed by the Red terror and misery. In a short time the Bolshevik popularity rapidly diminished, its former proponents, including many riflemen, switched over to the side of the defenders of the Latvian Republic and took part in Latvia’s liberation from the Red forces, later also from the Bermont army. Sentiments towards the Russian Soviet regime were no longer noticeable in Latvia. It was a time when the people could even joke about Bolsheviks. For example, a section dedicated to Soviet Russia began to appear in the satire magazine Svari on a regular basis. In one of them, the well-known satirist Juris Puriņš describes similarities between insects and communists, that is,

44 the only difference between bee communes and communist communes is the fact that “in a Bolshevik commune majority is drones, and worker bees are very rare, therefore honey is constantly in short supply in the hive,” while “ant community goes to war and to loot during the summer, but in winter, it settles down in the ground and fasts. Their milking cows are aphids, which they exploit and suck out. Our communists also go to loot and to war ...”6 However, anti-communism did not mean that Latvia became hostile to Russians. Phobias of nationalist character were rather an exception in Latvia, therefore an equal sign can not be put between anti-bolshevism and Russophobia. Latvia, along with Estonia, in the Interwar period was the positive example in the treatment of national minorities. The founders of the Latvian Republic had to take into consideration Latvian appreciation of leftist political ideas and traditional appreciation of Russians – the attitude that still held on from the awakening times of the 19th century. After the Latvian War of Independence it decreased significantly but did not disappear during the Interwar period. Here we must remember that the Latvian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (LSDWP) was one of the most popular political forces. Given that in all four of the parliamentarism period, the LSDWP was the largest faction – even the most popular. A characteristic of the social democrats was their friendly attitude towards the Eastern neighbor, for which they were criticized on a regular basis by centrist and right-wing forces of Saeima.

The Soviet Union’s advocates and opponents On 11 August 1920 Latvia and the Soviet Russia signed a Peace Treaty. Russia forever renounced the Latvian territory and was the first to recognize the Latvian state. This was the independent Latvia’s first international triumph that opened the door to general de iure recognition. With the Peace Treaty the Soviet Russia threat factor gradually receded. At this point, a lot more worry was caused by the widespread German revisionist plans that sought the renewal of the grandness of Germany and the German power. It is Germans and Germany that appear as a threat factor in the Interwar period’s press, diplomatic and secret police documents. Latvian politicians were responding especially sharply to the political activities of local Germans, often linked to anti-government plans. This issue was systematically discussed in the ; even at the last parliamentary session a few

45 hours before Kārlis Ulmanis’ coup on 15 May 1934, the deputies criticized the illegal Nazi gatherings of local Baltic Germans. Soviet Russia and later the Soviet Union never provoked such a systematic criticism that was earned by Germany and the Germans, including the locals. If we attempt to compare Latvia’s international situation today with the Interwar period, one of the conclusions would be this – what today in Latvian foreign policy is Russia, that was Germany then. The most salient similarities of the two countries are expressed in their dissatisfaction with the loss of superpower status, the plans for territory recovery and expansion, concerns about compatriots abroad, the German idea of the living​​ space for Germans (Lebensraum) and its very close equivalent in the modern Russian idea of the ​​Russian world (Русский мир). During the twenties, Latvia’s relations with the USSR slowly moved along an upward curve. It culminated on 12 July 1927 when Latvia signed Trade Agreement with the USSR. It is worth paying a closer look to this agreement not only because it was another important contract with the Eastern neighbor after the Peace Treaty of 11 August 1920. The agreement was signed during the times of still flourishing democracy; thus, it is openly described in the press and in Saeima parliamentary verbatim records, which are indispensable sources for understanding public attitudes. The agreement was concluded during the Marģers Skujenieks-led leftist coalition government, at the time when for the first time in Latvia’s history, many ministerial positions were assigned to the LSDWP. The social democrat Fēlikss Cielēns served as a Foreign Minister – he is one of the most well-known Latvian politicians, very knowledgeable of international politics and a foreign affairs expert. As once described by the emigration historian Uldis Ģērmanis – “impetuous and cultured Latvian politician.”7 Although the LSDWP attitude toward the Soviet communist ideology was negative, they felt some affinity toward the USSR, because of the proponents of ideologically close socialistic views living there. The social democrats wanted to balance Latvian foreign policy, to include the USSR in Latvian international communications system, thus in addition to the traditional partners in the West, to open also a foreign policy course towards the East. One of the most visible social democrat leaders and the last leader of the LSDWP before the 1934 coup, Fricis Menders was convinced that Latvia’s economic infrastructure had to used appropriately, because: “All the railways in the Baltic countries, i.e., in Estonia and Latvia, are for Russia, all the ports in Estonia and Latvia are for Russia,” and that is a prerequisite for the Baltics

46 FĒLIKSS CIELĒNS studied law at the University of St. Petersburg. Has been a Latvian public figure, activist, writer, politician, and statesman. Joined the LSDWP in 1904. An active member of the 1905 Revolution. Has written widely on international politics in various newspapers. As one of the most visible social democratic deputies, acted in the Constitutional Assembly and in all the Interwar period’s Saeimas. Together with the other members of the LSDWP, including Rainis, participated in the development of the . In Photo: Latvian State Historical 1926–1928, was the Foreign Minister in Marģers Archives Skujenieks leftist government. He has participated in the preparation and signing of Latvia-USSR Trade Agreement, which is the second most important agreement between the two countries after the Peace Treaty of 11 August 1920. Tried to balance Latvian foreign policy and to open it towards the East. Later he acted as an envoy to Paris. Because of the opposition to the authoritarian regime, his Latvian citizenship was revoked. During the German occupation, returned from Paris to Riga, participated in the Latvian Central Council that sought to restore independence of the country.

to become a component of the future “United Eastern European States.”8 Also, the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the head of its Baltic chapter, Vilhelms Munters (later to become Latvia’s last Foreign Minister of the period) were optimistic. They hoped that the Latvian example will be followed by the rest of the countries in the world, which had not entered into contracts with the Kremlin: “It should be admitted, in general, that the Latvia-USSR Trade Agreement is a step forward, not only in settling mutual, economic relations between the countries, but it will be useful ... also for other countries, and especially for the Baltic countries in their further negotiations with Soviet Russia.”9 The result of the economic cooperation was modest, and largely confined to the 2,500 freezer-wagons ordered by Moscow from the factory “Fēnikss,” for which Russia lacked the funds for settlement. Nevertheless, at that time Latvia showed itself internationally as a left- oriented Kremlin-friendly partner. Interestingly, the majority of the Saeima members, including even the traditionally strictly anti-communist Baltic German faction, supported co- operation with Russia. The cooperation with the USSR opponents were in the

47 minority. Among them was the well-known Latvian Orthodox archbishop, opponent of leftist political forces, Jānis Pommers, who said, from the Saeima rostrum, that the agreement “can cause huge political losses. Only when the Peace Treaty will be fulfilled, we will be able to trust the contractor – the other party”10 (Moscow defaulted on the contract provisions, including the return of valuable property). The well-known Latvian historian Aivars Stranga has aptly written about this agreement: “Moscow used the economy, similarly as it can also be observed today, for manipulation and reaching its foreign policy objectives.”11 Unbeatable USSR advocates in the Saeima, however, were the outlawed Latvian communists who, masking their true nature, united under the “Workers’ and Farmers’ party” and a numerically small faction with the same name. In the 3rd Saeima faction they had only 6 deputies, and in the (the last one in the Interwar period) – 7. This clearly demonstrated the low popularity of communist ideology in the society, receiving not more than 7 percent of the votes. When there were discussions about the Kremlin’s international policy and its efforts to economically manipulate countries, the leftist spokesmen always rushed to be the Kremlin’s advocates. For example, in the discussion on the State budget in 1931, one of the representatives, communist Jānis Balodis sought to justify the Kremlin’s international policy from the Saeima rostrum: “... currently it is in fashion to lay the blame for everything on Soviet Russia, for unemployment, for hunger, for the riots that so often happen in the capitalist world, and so on.”12 The fate later played a worst trick on him. At the end of 1931, when Balodis’ term expired, he moved to the USSR, but there he was accused of participation in a counter- revolutionary movement and in 1937 he was executed. His party member, writer and public figure Linards Laicens would experience a similar fate. In 1931, however, Laicens still managed to defend the Kremlin with the following words: “... the foreign policy of the working class ... is to defend the Soviet Union, to stand beside it, because the Soviet Union is a workers’ state and the only ... way out of the misery is with a united Union of World Workers Socialist Soviet Republic.”13 After a year, Laicens renounced his deputy mandate and emigrated to the USSR. By the end of 1938, he already had been shot in the country, which he so fervently praised. The Kremlin propaganda machinery had picked up speed, adherents were gained not only in Latvia. A gradual USSR victory parade in international politics had begun. On 18 May 1934 it was crowned by admission of the

48 former outcast state to the League of Nations, an international organization whose primary objective was the pursuit of peace. It could falsely appear that the USSR was not to be feared, and its foreign policy rhetoric was no longer militant, expansion-oriented. Unfortunately, when the USSR had become a member of the League of Nations, the development in Latvia had turned toward authoritarian direction, where most of the elite of the society, not to mention the general public, was completely detached from influencing foreign policy. Therefore it is not possible to precisely explore public attitude towards the Soviet Union; there are no such sources of the past. Unfortunately, also all the Latvian foreign policy developers of the authoritarian period had already passed away by the time of restoration of Latvia’s independence. The whole Latvian foreign policy to date has been reconstructed based on official documents and the state-controlled press information. After press censorship introduction on 15 May 1934, people in Latvia knew little about the USSR’s foreign policy plans; they were not openly discussed and evaluated. Only a few crumbs of information reached the press about the extensive repression happening in the neighboring country, including against the Latvians who had remained there. Public memory retained the press-created stereotypes of the parliamentarism period, where Latvian communists living in the Soviet Union were presented as living a carefree, inappropriately luxurious life contrasting with the surrounding misery. For example, in early thirties, Latvian press wrote that the former leader of Soviet Latvia, Pēteris Stučka in Moscow had “settled in strikingly comfortably ... His spouse rather resembles a Russian noblewoman ... Stučka was always well-provided for ... since his youth, he is accustomed to ... convenience and does not give it up even when the people are suffering the greatest economic difficulties, even hunger.”14 During authoritarianism such information was not published in Latvia any more. Although there were a lot of Latvians living in the neighboring country (in 1926, more than 150,000), Latvians living in the Soviet country generally did not directly affect the relationship with Latvia. They were not promoted into positions where they could come into contact with Latvia. Latvian historical sources provide evidence that the attitude of Latvian officials towards Latvian-Soviet functionaries depended on the political sympathies. While the right-wing forces (such as the Latvian Farmers Union) often were flatly against any contacts with Latvian-born communist functionaries, the social democrats often flirted with them. For example, Jānis Pliekšāns

49 (Rainis), writer, social democrat and member of the Saeima, in the fall of 1926 went to the USSR, visited where he made plans for cultural co- operation with the Slavs, even planned to go to Moscow (Kremlin) to visit there his sister, Dora Stučka. He did not wish, though, to see his former party member and brother-in-law, Pēteris Stučka. He did not want to see him for rather personal reasons, and also because he himself grandly dreamed of becoming the leader of not only Russia, but even the whole Europe. “I have to live up to 300 years, I need to get the Nobel Prize, I have to be the leading spirit of the world literature, I have to become the first ruler of Europe, the President of Latvia,” “Have to capture the Russians. I must capture the party,” so he wrote at that time.15 The Latvian government was not able, and in fact did not attempt, to use the Soviet Latvian diaspora in their favor. The only exception was the “Association of Cultural Rapprochement with USSR Nations” that was founded in Latvia in 1929, and whose first chair position was taken, by the way, by the Member of the Saeima, Rainis. Later Kārlis Ulmanis’ authoritarian regime unsuccessfully tried to use this organization as a means of communication with the Kremlin; in words of historian Bonifācijs Daukšts, it instead “... was used as a cover organization of Soviet special services,”16 and in 1939-1940 its members “... engaged in destruction process of their country and national culture.”17 Most Latvians who had wanted to, had returned home from the Soviet Union by mid-1920’s. Frequently they returned broke, but sometimes also wealthy having acquired wealth in Russia during turbulent times. An interesting example here is Kārlis Ozols, a Latvian diplomat, qualified engineer, chairman of Latvian re-evacuation commission, and envoy to Moscow. When on 3 May 1929, after almost six years spent as an envoy he returned to Riga, his property was stacked in several railway wagons and took up 34 luggage spaces. It turned out that the baggage consisted of gold and silver jewelry, antique items, icons, crosses, other sacred objects, 14–15th century engravings, hundreds of paintings without frames, it weighted several tons. “Enough to supply a whole museum!” indignant about Ozols’ luggage was Arkādijs Eglītis, a dedicated anti-communist, one of the most visible representatives of the New Farmers-Small Landowners Party. He accused Ozols of smuggling, initiated an investigation carried out by Martinsons, a judge who investigated particularly important cases. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs got involved in Ozols’ defense, and soon the judge found that no offense had taken place, only ethical deviation that

50 is outside the competence of the court.18 It was obvious that Ozols had cheaply purchased valuables for resale in Latvia and Western Europe. Also such people for a long time shaped Latvian foreign policy towards the East, including during the period when Latvia’s attitude towards the USSR was particularly friendly (i.e., during the Marģers Skujenieks’-created leftist coalition). Ozols’ personality is interesting also since he is one of the few Latvian diplomats who managed to publish his memories, including the impressions gained while serving as an envoy in our neighboring country. They are very colorful and illustrate well the situation in Soviet Russia at the beginning of the 1920s, as well as the attitudes of Latvian political elite towards its Eastern neighbor. Here is a small example: “There were red dirty rags hanging everywhere — the red flags, everywhere, as if symbolizing a union of dirtiness and blood, with which at that time whole Russia was filled ... Immediately we felt that we have not come to a renewed country, not to a nation that was awakening, but rather we found ourselves among starving, terrible and atrociously-minded people who could attack and tear us apart at any moment.”19 It happened so later – they did tear us apart! When Latvia was occupied, Ozols was deported to the USSR where he was sentenced to death for carrying out activities against the USSR and espionage. The same fate befell his successors appointed as envoys to Moscow, Jānis Seskis and Fricis Kociņš.

Conclusions. The Soviet Union and Germany – Latvia’s dangerous neighbors The Soviet Union began to tear apart Latvia and its statesmen in 1939, after having reconciled with Adolf Hitler-led Nazi Germany on 23 August, and even having established a friendship on 28 September, with a special agreement. On 5 October 1939, the Kremlin, under threat of war, forced Kārlis Ulmanis’ government to conclude the Mutual Assistance Treaty. As a result, the USSR established military bases in Latvia, the destruction process of the Latvian state began, culminating with Latvia’s incorporation into the Soviet Union on 5 August 1940. “Not pulling Latvia into war has been the main task of our foreign policy ... [The Treaty] strengthens peace and security according to the political realities which we have to take into account in the present circumstances,”20 in such a soothing manner Foreign Minister Vilhelms Munters explained in the press the government action

51 to the public. After that, the government began distinctly friendly, even exaggerated assurances of friendship and politeness to the Kremlin. For example, Kārlis Ulmanis congratulated the leadership of the USSR on the occasion of the anniversary of the Bolshevik coup of 22 October, with the following words: “In this historic day that is celebrated today by the USSR, please accept friendship assurance of myself and the whole nation.”21 In turn, the following month the USSR envoy in Riga, Ivan Zotov in his greeting to Vilhelms Munters on the occasion of the 21st anniversary of the Republic of Latvia, emphasized that this festive day, which “reflects the right to national self-determination proclaimed by the Great October Socialist Revolution,” has been supplemented with another act, which has “the greatest historical significance – the Mutual Assistance Treaty.” In his response letter Munters expresses gratitude and acknowledges that Zotov’s assessment “coincides with the Latvian government’s views.”22 Historians often ask, what can we learn from the history, how can we use it to our advantage. Tempus fugit – in an old maxim in Latin, it means that “time flies and everything changes,” but ... people’s habits remain the same. This, and not mystical, imaginary repetition of history, must be considered today, when thinking about Latvia’s relations with the neighbor to the East. Mentioned here are only a few of the public personalities whose activities are related with both the history of the Latvian state, and relations with the Soviet Russia (that is, the later USSR). The Eastern direction of the Interwar period in the Latvian foreign policy can be represented by many Latvian politicians, from the first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics, notable Latvian social democrats Fricis Menders and Fēlikss Cielēns, to the last Foreign Minister Vilhelms Munters and President Kārlis Ulmanis. All of them had to play an active role in building relations with the East. Soviet Russia and the later USSR was at the forefront of Latvian foreign policy and, as it emerged in the Latvian envoys’ second conference in 1935, Moscow, in the eyes of Latvian diplomats of that time, was as dangerous as . In view of the aspects of leftist political thinking that are presented in this article and that link Latvians with the history of Russia, the Eastern direction is represented by Pēteris Stučka, Jānis Pliekšāns (Rainis), and Fēlikss Cielēns. They are all former social democrats, who studied law at the University of St. Petersburg at the same time and who shared appreciation for the socialist state system.

52 Endnotes

1 Leopold von Ranke, Über die Epochen der neueren Geschichte. Vorträge dem Könige Maxmillian II. von Bayern im Herbst 1854 zu Berchtesgaden gehalten. Vortrag vom 25. September 1854. Historisch- kritische Ausgabe, Hersg. von Theodor Schieder und Helmut Berding (München, 1971), 60. 2 Astaf Transehe-Roseneck, Die Lettische Revolution. Mit einem Gleitwort von Theodor Schiemann (Berlin: Reimer. 1906), T.1, 153; 1908. T.2, 352. 3 Ibid, T.1, IV. 4 Pāvils Rozītis, “Salauzta gredzena lauzēji. Literāriskas piezīmes,” Līdums, 2016. gada 13. novembris. 5 Cīņa, 1917. gada 20. maijs. 6 Līvu Jurka [Juris Puriņš], “Komunisms dabā,” Svari, 1921. gada 19. augusts. 7 Uldis Ģērmanis, “Ārā no rūpēm un vergu darbiem,” Jaunā Gaita, No. 34, 1962, 34–36. 8 Fricis Menders. Austrumeiropas savienotās valstis kā Baltijas valstu nākotnes problems (Rīga: Saule, 1926), 32; “Saeimas Stenogrammas. 9. sesijas 35. sēde,” 1931. gada 3. jūlijs, 1299. sl. 9 “Latvijas un SPRS saimniecības līgums,” Valdības Vēstnesis, 1927. gada 10. augusts. 10 “Tirdzniecības līgums ar SPRS ratificēts,”Latvijas Kareivis, 1927. gada 27. oktobris. 11 Aivars Stranga, “Hitlers – Latvijas un PSRS “draudzības” veicinātājs,” Latvijas Avīze, 2012. gada 16. aprīlis; Aivars Stranga, “PSRS un Latvijas tirdzniecības līguma aizkulises,” Latvijas Avīze, 2010. gada 20. augusts. 12 “Saeimas Stenogrammas. 9. sesijas 11. sēde,” 1931. gada 19. maijs, 342. sl. 13 “Saeimas Stenogrammas. 9. sesijas 18. sēde,”1931. gada 2. jūlijs, 608. sl. 14 “Pēteris Stučka dzīvo kā buržujs,” Latgales Ziņas, 1930. gada 15. augusts. 15 Cited from: Dita Amoliņa, “Rainis. Latvijas valsts idejas “gals un sākums,”” Jurista Vārds, 2015. gada 17. novembris. 16 Bonifācijs Daukšts, Kulturālās tuvināšanās biedrība ar SPRS tautām (1929-1940) (Rīga: LU Aka- dēmiskais apgāds, 2012), 106. 17 Ibid, 113. 18 “Par bijušā sūtņa Maskavā Ozola rīcību noziedzīga nodarījuma notikuma noskaidrošanai (1929.g.),” Sevišķi svarīgu lietu izmeklēšanas tiesneša A.Martinsona iepriekšēja izmeklēšana, LVVA, 555. f., 40. l., 9., 94. lp. 19 Карлис Озолс, Мемуары посланника (Москва, Центрполиграф, 2015), 88. 20 “Ārlietu ministrs V. Munters preses pārstāvjiem paskaidroja,” Valdības Vēstnesis, 1939. gada 9. oktobris. 21 “Valsts prezidenta apsveikums,” Jaunākās Ziņas, 1939. gada 13. novembris. 22 “Ārvalstu apsveikumi Latvijai,” Rīts, 1939. gada 19. novembris.

53 The Baltic and Nordic Direction of Latvia’s Foreign Policy during the Interwar Period

VALTERS ŠČERBINSKIS

The establishment of the three Baltic States at the same time – in 1918 – was no coincidence. Two of the new countries – Latvia and Estonia – had a common centuries-long history, as well as the administrative borders in the Vidzeme Province. Although the history of Lithuania – especially several centuries earlier – had been considerably different, Latvians (as well as Estonians and Finns) never forgot the linguistic affinities. All three countries were located next to one another, were about the same size and had similar populations. However, the actual development of the independence of the Baltic States began only after they had proclaimed it. In 1920, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania signed peace agreements with Soviet Russia, thus formally ending the hostilities with the Russians. Independence was won with blood, and it was ensured, in particular in Latvia and Estonia, by the countries’ newly created armies. In 1921, all three countries (as well as the Democratic Republic of Georgia) finally gained firm control over their borders and received certificates ofde iure recognition from the Allied superpower victors of World War I. Thus, the country establishment stage could be considered completed successfully. Though important, the independence of Latvia and the other Baltic States was not ensured by soldiers on the battlefield alone. A major contribution to the establishment of Latvian independence was also made by the country’s foreign policy makers. It was already clear at the moment of the proclamation of independence that it would be very difficult to win and preserve the country’s independence without the support of friendly superpowers. Quite naturally, therefore, Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics, the first Foreign Affairs Minister of the Latvian Provisional Government, spent most of his time outside the country. In 1918, even before the proclamation of the independence of Latvia, Meierovics as the representative of the Latvian Temporary National Council

54 ZIGFRĪDS ANNA MEIEROVICS Although he lived a short life, Meierovics is known as the most significant Latvia’s foreign policy maker of the 1920s who had a major impact not just on the decision-making processes in Latvia, but also abroad. It should be noted in the Baltic stream context that Meierovics was an active promoter of regional cooperation and the very birth of the country. Together with his Estonian and Finnish colleagues, he was considered a creator of the Baltic League idea and its most outspoken and consistent implementer. Photo: Latvian State Historical Meierovics realized very well the importance of Archives Latvia’s Western foreign policy dimension and considered that Baltic – or even better, a broad and close Northern European – cooperation could facilitate the security and prosperity of Latvia.

went to London, where he received the British Foreign Minister Lord Arthur Balfour’s confirmation of British support of the Latvian efforts of self- determination a week before 18 November. This document is interpreted in different ways, but it is clear that with it London gave a clear message to Latvian politicians and the whole world that the builders of an independent Latvia had the support of Britain. This event symbolically marked the beginnings of Latvia’s foreign policy and clearly demonstrated Latvian foreign policy makers’ orientation. The British seemingly were the only ones interested and able to help against potential enemies – Germany and Bolshevik Soviet Russia. At the same time, at the end of 1918 and in 1919, the situation with foreign policy remained quite unclear. Great Britain and France, the victors of World War I, looked on the former Russian outskirts with hope to reanimate non-Bolshevik Russia. Soviet Russia itself was suffering from the raging Civil War, whereas Germany had lost the war. It was clear that the great powers were not ready to provide any guarantees to the new countries, especially because a couple of years remained until their legal recognition. However, the establishment of security and a long-term strategy for external policy at the time required immediate action. The most important task of the Provisional Government, and primarily, that of Foreign Minister Meierovics and the diplomatic representatives, was the search for support of great powers, such

55 as Great Britain and France. However, it was clear that direct and immediate safety during that time and later could be achieved through good, friendly relations with Latvia’s nearest neighbors. At first it seemed that there could be no obstacles for such a relationship. Thus, an integral part of the Provisional Government’s strategic objective, along with the conceptual inclusion into the Western world and its organized defense system, was a close and effective cooperation between the Baltic States. Which countries of the region during that time were regarded as the Baltic States? From the moment of the proclamation of Latvia, the Provisional Government launched very active cooperation, firstly, with Estonia and secondly, with Lithuania. Naturally, Estonia was the most predictable, and in many ways, the closest potential ally of Latvia. Lithuania also – or at least so it seemed at first – could pose no difficulties in building a long-term cooperation. At least in the beginning, in foreign policy until the mid-1920s (and in many areas also later), Finland was also unambiguously counted as a Baltic state. For example, in the newspapers of that time, the news from Helsinki was found in the Baltic States section. Other key examples of Finland’s Baltic identity were different unions which included neither the great powers nor Scandinavia (for example, the Baltic Student Association SELL formed its name with the first letters of Suomi, Eesti, Latvija, Lietuva), but joined the three small Baltic countries and Finland. The fact that Finland in the Interwar period was also a part of various Scandinavian organizations is by no means proof of the opposite: Scandinavia itself was often rhetorically linked to the Baltic region. During the establishment of the Baltic League, Poland would also be politically included into the Baltic States’ bloc; however, Poland was not considered a Baltic state, that is, a country similar to the three Eastern Baltic neighbors. Poland was too large, had significantly broader geopolitical interests and was included in Central Europe. The first official contacts between the Baltic States representatives are recorded during 1918. Finnish Foreign Affairs Department Head Rudolf Holsti’s “Baltic League” project application evidenced the planned close cooperation within the framework of the intended Baltic League. It was a memorandum to the Entente allies in November 1918. The memorandum was based on different essential common considerations: the protection against Russia and Germany was necessary, joint efforts were necessary to create democratic regimes, there were common economic interests based on more or less similar geographical conditions and there were common

56 religions ( and Catholicism). These new ideas about joining the newly-formed countries together in a union, a league, undoubtedly appealed to Meierovics. They opened the way both to hopes for securing the country’s independence and to the involvement in a close political and cultural cooperation with highly valued and potentially friendly Finland, which could serve as a bridge to similar links with Scandinavia. The close cooperation between the Baltic States’ Foreign Ministers continued in 1919 in Paris, where Finnish, as well as Estonian and Lithuanian, representatives took part in joint Baltic meetings. Latvians and Estonians played an especially important role in Baltic cooperation, particularly Foreign Ministers Meierovics and Ants Piip, as well as Jaan Poska, although the Finnish Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti’s contribution was also important. In 1919, the Baltic stream in Latvian foreign policy seemed a fully natural part of the realpolitik. The task of the Baltic States’ delegations to the Paris Peace Conference was to seek a beneficial settlement of Baltic foreign policy issues. Besides the important issue of the backstage activity of convincing politicians of the victor states in Baltic independence, much attention was devoted to informational work, trying to explain the Baltic States’ status both in political circles and in the press. Jānis Seskis, one of the delegation members who later went on to become a diplomat, noted in his memoirs that the Baltic States’ delegations held their joint meetings alternately in each delegation’s premises: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. “Quite a large consensus in all political matters was felt during the discussions,” Seskis stressed.1 Finnish, Ukrainian and Belarusian delegates also took part in the work of the Latvian and Baltic delegations; however, Ukrainian and Belarusian hopes for independence soon faded away. All the most active makers of the Baltic foreign policy stream saw the future of the Baltic States in close cooperation among the new countries (the so-called border countries) and their pronounced Anglophile orientation. Holsti had good contacts in the British Foreign Affairs Ministry, and his plans were also rooted in England’s anti-German policy, which included plans for the creation of the Baltic League already in 1918. It was exactly the Finnish Foreign Minister Holsti who wanted to expand the original Estonian offer for an individual union into the Entente Cordiale by including Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and perhaps also the Scandinavian countries in it. It should be noted, however, that the initiators of the joint Baltic policy were much less united by special illusions of the Baltic States’ spiritual closeness than by

57 pragmatic considerations. This is further supported by the fact that the British not only supported these efforts (the Baltic League) but also recommended their implementation. It should be emphasized that the British support for the Baltic League diminished over time as London shifted the accents of its policy in other directions. When analyzing the Baltic direction of Latvian foreign policy, several of its, so to speak, subdivisions could be singled out. They are the foreign policy combinations in which the realpolitik considerations intertwine with theoretical frameworks, as well as with political, military, historical, economic, cultural and linguistic concepts and their relations with approaches implemented by Riga. It should be noted that in Latvia, like in other small countries, the decision-making with regard to foreign policy was in the hands of a relatively small group of people. In the 1920s and 1930s, the reins of power at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs belonged with ministers and senior department officials. They usually were also the ones who formulated and implemented foreign policy tasks. During the democratic era, the President and Saeima’s Foreign Affairs Committee gave a small contribution to foreign policy thought. Both authorities, however, usually accepted the approaches and policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Traditionally, debates only started with regard to budgetary matters, i.e., on increasing or reducing the number of embassies. It should also be noted that the development and implementation of the Latvian strategies were affected by the decisions of the great powers, which sometimes had a quite direct impact on Baltic activities. After the coup, the dissolved Saeima’s participation in foreign policy ceased, and the circle of the foreign policy decision-makers narrowed even more. At the same time, there is no reason to say that the national foreign policy would have undergone any significant changes after 1934. This fact was clearly demonstrated by the lawyer and diplomat Kārlis Ducmanis in his post-coup theses about the future tasks of Latvia’s foreign policy. In his publications on a large scale uncommon to Latvia’s journalism of the time, Ducmanis theoretically and practically substantiated the possibilities for the transformation and improvement of practical diplomacy under an authoritative regime. He also paid considerable attention to objectives and orientation of foreign policy, highlighting their inalterability even after the transformations of 15 May 1934. Ducmanis’ approaches to Latvian foreign policy were based on three focal areas:

58 1) The support of the Baltic League concept in any form and in all circumstances, irrespective of whether a three-, four- or five-country participation is considered. From this focal area, he derived a close cooperation with the Scandinavian countries; 2) Commitment to the obligations taken and being a loyal member of the League of Nations; and 3) “Where possible, friendly, but in each case, correct and loyal, good relations with Soviet Russia.”2

Latvia and Estonia The first subdivision was associated with the military alliance between Latvia and Estonia. Although initially Latvian and Estonian military and political collaboration was only considered in a wider context of the Baltic region, it was clear from the very beginning that one country’s independence is closely related to events in the other country. While creating the Latvia’s armed forces, in 1919 Latvia’s Provisional Government to a large extent organized the liberation of the country from the enemies with the help of the Northern Latvian Brigade mobilised in Estonia. During the Battle of Cēsis, the Estonian army, which at the time was a significantly greater military force in the region than the Provisional Government’s units, proved itself as the most serious ally. It was not surprising that quite soon, immediately after the Independence War, on 1 November 1923, Latvia and Estonia entered into a defense union contract. This meant that was the nearest and clearest ally, as well as the main cooperation partner in foreign policy, which was exactly what most Latvia’s foreign policy decision-makers thought about it. Such status of Estonia was considered self-evident. At the same time, Latvia’s orientation towards Estonia as the friendliest and closest country was often overshadowed by minor conflicts and mutual mistrust and insults. As Jānis Seskis said in his political report to the Foreign Minister in April 1922, “Estonians must finally decide that either all the neighbors are bad or they themselves, the Estonians, aren’t so perfect a people as they think. General Laidoners said openly in Parliament that Estonia would be much closer to Finland if they themselves, i.e., the Estonians, wouldn’t have been so arrogant about Finland.”3 Until the very occupation of the Baltic States, messages full of suspicion about possible Estonian provocations were often found in the foreign affairs department’s

59 internal correspondence. In June 1939, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs carefully followed the course of presentations of Oskar Loorits, an Estonian philologist, researcher of Livs and a person considered unfriendly to Latvia, at the Finnish and Estonian National Science Congress in Helsinki. It was noted in the report that Loorits was invited to study the Latvian culture and open the Baltic Philology Department at the University of Helsinki and “there has been nothing unfriendly [to Latvia],”4 but the scientist’s activities were followed with close attention because there were concerns about Loorits’s provocative activity in the Liv society. Different disagreements, insignificant from today’s perspective, were covered by the Latvian and Estonian press of the time on a regular basis. Despite the spirit of the defense union, which Latvia’s politicians did not, in principle, dispute, a critical atmosphere and even malevolence did not indicate an atmosphere full of mutual trust and a promising long-term partnership. A clear example is a 10 December 1935 entry in the diary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretary General Vilhelms Munters. Even without a closer explanation of the events, the laconic text gives a sufficiently dramatic insight into the behind-the-scenes relations between the two countries:

“[Estonian diplomat] Laretei: the atmosphere after the polemic in the press [is] so bad that

1. Ducmanis [Latvia’s candidate to the position in the League of Nations] can’t be supported; 2. Nothing must be said about our candidacy; 3. [Chief of the General Staff of the Estonian army] Reek wants to return the orders [conferred on him by Latvia]; 4. The board of the [Estonian and Latvian] Rapprochement Association want to give up their posts.

We, as they say, falsify facts [apparently, this is about the Independence War Interpretations].

Estonians do not want gratitude. Now is not the time to talk about the monument [to the Estonian liberators of Latvia during the Independence War].

Reek is angry at [chief of staff of the Latvian army] Hartmanis with regard to [the Army Commander] Raštikis. He might have concealed from Reek. Told that it wasn’t opportune 2 days before arriving.”5

What’s more, on 27 August 1936, Ambassador Hugo Celmiņš in Berlin wrote to Minister Munters that “Latvia with its 2 medals [at the Berlin

60 Summer Olympics] is at a relatively good place, but the Estonian success (7 medals), like the trophy of Miltiades, ‘would not let us sleep.’ Incidentally, the acting Estonian Ambassador asked me during the race if we didn’t envy them. I replied that we were wholeheartedly glad of their success, as if they were our common.”6 Today, one could find those complex twists and turns of Latvian-Estonian relations in the 1920s’ and 1930s’ press reports in the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia at the Latvian State Historical Archives. The cooperation between the two countries was launched between 1918 and 1919, and it was successful. Thus, the military cooperation between Estonia and Latvia facilitated the expulsion of the countries’ foreign enemies and the defeat of the Latvian Provisional Government’s internal opponents. The Provisional Government’s jurisdiction over the territory of Latvia and the independence of Estonia were achieved as a result. The Estonian orientation seemed natural and desirable. Both countries followed similar principles in their foreign policies and had the same objectives. However, despite the significant benefits, 1919 left a legacy of unresolved border issues, as well as the Estonian resentment about the lack of appreciation of their achievements during the liberation of Latvia. In the following years, the aforementioned problems led to needlessly tense relations between the two countries and did not facilitate their rapprochement.

Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania The second subdivision is related to the cooperation of the three traditional Baltic States: Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. The orientation towards a closer partnership between the three Baltic States seemed to be as logical as Latvia and Estonia’s close cooperation. In the Interwar period, it would be difficult to find politicians who had fundamental objections to the facilitation of the Baltic cooperation. At the same time, one could observe a frequent change of political accents, economic competition, ’ ambitious and inconsiderate policy, as well as the great powers’ maneuvers in the foreign policy area, preventing the Baltic League from implementing its potential after signing the Entente treaty in Geneva in 1934. Although Baltic was promoted very actively on the societal level, including the implementation of the so-called Kindred Nations Policy, consisting of the activities for the rapprochement with linguistically close

61 KĀRLIS ULMANIS Although Ulmanis never regarded foreign policy as his priority as a politician, international developments and their background directly affected his day-to-day political activities. Like many other Latvia’s policy makers, Ulmanis considered a close cooperation between the three Baltic States as self-evident and natural. At the same time, his position was often affected by the economic considerations which were not always favorable for the three Baltic States’ mutual cooperation. Being a pragmatic man, Ulmanis paid Photo: University of Nebraska- little attention to the cultural factor which, in its Lincoln Archives and Special turn, was at the forefront for many Baltic and Nordic Collections rapprochement enthusiasts. The point of view of the professional politician, leader of many governments, and minister was largely based on the geographic conditions and policy shaped by the common history, which suggested the inevitability of the Baltic States’ close cooperation. It should be noted that Ulmanis was the most influential Latvia’s politician – especially after the 1934 coup, when he often individually adopted key decisions in the country’s development. It is also worth pointing out that Meierovics, as a keen promoter of the cooperation between the Baltic States, was a confidant of Ulmanis, and it was Ulmanis who directly promoted his career growth.

Lithuanians (Estonians had an even more aggressive “kindred” policy with respect to Finland), the practical diplomacy was often reduced to security and trade issues. There were also public organizations which pointed to the Balts’ (i.e., Latvians and Lithuanians) need to unite and facilitated the rapprochement with the “fraternal people” (up to the ideas of creating a single country) in different ways. However, these were and remained the voices of mainly the academic environment and some intellectuals’ circles. For example, a team of Latvians and Lithuanians made regular attempts to activate the rapprochement of Latvia and Lithuania; however, these organizations had a relatively small influence on national policies. Kārlis Ulmanis, the most powerful politician of the Interwar period, revealed his position in his books on the fundamental principles of shaping the life of the country, particularly its economy, shortly before the coup. He wrote that in order to ensure economic progress, “diplomatic and economic relations with foreign countries, a ‘watchful’ and active foreign policy, and a close cooperation with Estonia and Lithuania were necessary.”7 Ulmanis himself was not particularly active

62 in foreign policy; he represented those politicians who saw national foreign policy only as a tool for resolving particular practical issues. At the same time, even he stressed the importance of the Baltic States (particularly Estonia) for Latvia in his terse lines on foreign policy. Lithuania, in his view, was a Baltic State, a neighbor, and that defined its importance.

The Baltics and Finland The third subdivision dealt with the regional unity of the three Baltic States and Finland, as well as Poland, through the prism of political unity. So in this case, it was about the orientation towards the three Baltic States and Finland with or without Poland. As it has been said earlier, Finland could quite organically fit into the discourse about the Baltic States. There were no significant objections against Finland’s becoming a part of the union of the Baltic States in either of the countries. At the same time, Poland was quite different. Having a different history, deep geopolitical roots in Central Europe and the ambition of becoming a regional great power, as a potential ally of the Baltics seemed rather questionable. On the other hand, Finland’s participation in Baltic policy was visible as early as in 1919. Furthermore, it was not just passive participation. Finnish delegate Holsti’s gigantic plans even surpassed the Latvian delegation’s forecasts about Finland’s approximation to the Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian positions: “The Finns would want to maintain the best relations with Latvia. The Finnish policy now would be ententophilic and Finland would hope to establish good relations with Sweden soon. Dr. Holsti advocated the establishment of the Baltic League which would stand firmly for the Baltic States’ independence from Russia. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and, perhaps, Poland, and later also Sweden, , [and] would be members of the League. Dr. Holsti now hopes to personally start the corresponding negotiations with Sweden. The new Baltic States could harmonize their external policies, adopting a common monetary system, customs and railway taxes, etc. Holsti also doesn’t see any major obstacles in the circumstance that Latvia would meanwhile be recognized only de facto.”8 The next time when visions of the Baltic League with Finland as its member are found in sources is 9 August 1919, when the acting head of

63 Latvia’s delegation, Seskis, reported to Riga about a Lithuanian project of the confederation of the Baltic States having come to a stalemate. Estonians also supported the project and hoped that “Finland would be convinced as well.” Such plans existed in all three Baltic States; however, in Estonia they were explicitly based on the Finno-Ugric ethnic affinities, and in Lithuania, on political considerations. For example, during the Tartu Conference of the Baltic States on 30 September 1919, Estonian Prime Minister Otto Strandman found that the three Baltic States were “alliés,” but Finland – “associéé.”9 The idea of the Baltic League – in different versions with Finland and Poland – emerged out of three factors: firstly, the immediate interest of Britain’s and other countries’, for example, Poland’s, foreign policy makers; secondly, Meierovics’s, Piip’s and Holsti’s pragmatic anglophilism; and thirdly, ideals of small and in many ways kindred nations’ unions, which were rooted in the real foreign policy of the three Baltic States. Finland’s active participation in the regional cooperation was news to the new Latvia’s foreign policy makers. However, owing to the initiative of the Finnish and British, Latvia’s diplomats quickly believed in Helsinki’s interest. It must be said that up to the late 1920s, but most strongly pronounced until the mid-1920s, various discussions went on in society about the potential borders of the Baltic League and Latvian objectives. TheLatvijas Kareivis newspaper divided the potential states of the Union based on the principle of ethnicity: Scandinavians, Finns and Estonians, as well as Balts (including Old Prussia and Belarus).10 The social democrats initially proposed ideas about a union of five countries (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) stretching from the Arctic Ocean to Galicia, pointing out that Latvia then would be linked to Finland through Estonia. Fricis Menders, one of the leading social democrats, believed that the union had to grow beyond the Baltic States and, first of all, include Finland in its consultations.11 However, already after the social democrats’ 1919 Riga Conference and a reevaluation of Poland’s foreign policy, the social democrats’ position became significantly more moderate. Later, social democrats’ foreign policy rhetoric defined a special role for Moscow, although in 1919 and 1920, Meierovics, a politician from the Latvian Farmers’ Union (Latviešu zemnieku savienība), and Fēlikss Cielēns, a foreign affairs expert from the social democrats, worked hand in hand with regard to practical foreign policy. However, already in 1922, Cielēns wrote about the bankruptcy of Meierovics’ foreign policy and his “political speculations” and “political combinations” instead of creating

64 the economic realpolitik (and improving relations with Moscow). In 1928, Cielēns, being already the Foreign Affairs Minister, expressed his satisfaction with the fact that the Warsaw Accord – a union between Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Poland – failed to be implemented. In 1926, Menders, the party’s most outstanding left-wing politician, strongly criticized such plans of the Baltic League, which would not include the USSR as a member state. He believed that the political resolution on the support of the Latvian-Estonian union with a later involvement of Lithuania and Finland, which was adopted at the Baltic States’ Socialist Conference in June 1926, would also lead to the admission of Poland. According to him, the future of Latvia was to be found in the “incorporation of the Eastern European countries into a union” – including the USSR, of course.12 Fanatical anti-Polism and illusions regarding the friendship with Moscow, which was the Latvian left socialists’ position in the foreign policy during the early 1920s, made LSDWP particularly different, even from the other Baltic States’ socialists. After thede iure recognition of the independence of Latvia, the hopes associated with the creation of the Baltic League did not diminish. Two projects were seriously considered at the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Firstly, there was the so-called small version that included Finland, Estonia and Latvia. Ambassador Zariņš in Helsinki even wrote to the Foreign Affairs Minister in Riga on 6 May 1921, that if the Polish and Lithuanian conflict had not diminished but instead had worsened, it would be easier to “get” Finland into such a version of the union. The Foreign Affairs Ministry executives fully agreed to that point. It was considered that the Poles wanted a union with Romania, and then, perhaps, also with Finland, which would result in a situation where the “big” ones (i.e., Finns and Poles) would no longer take into account the “small” ones (the three Baltic States) and “will treat us as they see fit,i.e., protect us from the East [that is, Soviet Russia] as long as they see any use in it and let the East have us when it suits them.”13 The Foreign Affairs Ministry’s position was clear: the significance of such a union between the three countries (Finland, Estonia and Latvia) had to be reinforced at all costs by allocating the defining role to Finland. Secondly, an even smaller version was considered in Riga: individual military and political agreements between Finland and Latvia, as well as between Finland and Estonia. This version vividly depicted the Latvian foreign policy leaders’ delusions. No bilateral military and political agreements with Latvia were ever considered in Finland. The illusions of the

65 KĀRLIS ZARIŅŠ Born in 1879 and having lived in Petrograd during the World War I, the later prominent career diplomat Kārlis Zariņš joined the Foreign Affairs Service after the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. In the same year, he became a Resident Minister in Helsinki, and after the de iure recognition of Latvia in 1921, the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Finland. Even after leaving Helsinki, Zariņš continued to work in the Nordic countries. His next place of residence was Stockholm, but from 1930 Photo: Latvian State Historical to 1933 Zariņš continued his work in Tallinn (at the Archives same time, from 1931 to 1933, serving as an acting Foreign Affairs Minister). Afterwards, until his death in 1963, Zariņš was an Ambassador in London, the most important capital for Latvia’s Interwar diplomacy. Zariņš was a very important personality with regard to the Baltic and especially Nordic tendencies. Having come from Northern Vidzeme, he knew the , and therefore the Finnish language was not unknown to him either. This factor and also a deep affection towards his northern neighbors ensured that Zariņš vigorously promoted Latvia’s closer collaboration with, primarily, Finland and Estonia, and later also with Sweden throughout his active work in the 1920s. Sometimes, especially in the case of Finland, his diplomatic efforts were not rooted in the foreign policy reality, but they certainly had a significant impact on the understanding of what those countries were and what Latvia’s cooperation with them should be.

Finnish friendship and their views were largely promoted by the Ambassador Kārlis Zariņš. He wrote that in Finland and Estonia, “the fruit of alliance is ripe, and it could very easily happen that they’d get to implementing it one beautiful day.” Zariņš inadequately reflected the situation in Finland. “Since the Latvian political ‘stocks’ are highly valued in Finland, it wouldn’t be difficult to extend such an alliance also to Latvia. First, Riga and Revel governments would reach an agreement in that respect, and then they would do the same with Helsingfors. As previously mentioned, the grounds for such a combination are also prepared here.”14 The acquaintanceship with a community of Helsinki’s diplomats and intellectuals close and friendly to the Ambassador did not give grounds for a serious assessment of the situation.

66 The Baltics, Finland and Scandinavia The fourth direction included the extension to the North, but without Poland. These were the Baltic and Nordic orientation ideas. Generally, it is about the Swedish position and policy in its relations with the Baltics. After World War I and gaining its independence, Sweden, the most influential Scandinavian country in the real policy, did not make any significant efforts to get involved in Latvia’s politics. Kārlis Ieviņš, the head of the Latvian Information Bureau, wrote on 3 January 1920 that “of course, Sweden itself is of little importance to us, and maybe it wouldn’t pay off if Latvia spent its precious resources on propaganda here because the local community wouldn’t be easy to drag out of that germanophilism swamp in which it’s wallowing so eagerly.” Despite the fact that Stockholm’s reservedness was beyond any doubt, ideas of Swedish interest in a possible union with the Baltic States occasionally appeared in the press; however, these ideas were rather based on Latvia’s expectations than on reality. Rhetoric about common historical and geopolitical space was developed continuously. In 1919, these commonalities were analyzed in Latvijas Kareivis, one of the biggest newspapers of the time. Discussing the new countries, the authors of the article considered the association between Eastern Baltics and Scandinavia, using the Baltic Sea as a linking element, completely natural. However, already in the early 1920s, a highlighted reservedness of Scandinavia, including Sweden, with respect to the Baltic States motivated Riga to search for other ways of cooperation. There was no hope of creating a military and political union with the Scandinavian countries. Yet the desirability to develop a close collaboration with Stockholm in most diverse areas was still recognized. In order to describe the efforts for a closer association with the corresponding countries, the term “rapprochement” was used. Of course, the most active promoters of the Scandinavian stream were the Latvian ambassadors working in Scandinavian countries. It was especially during the Ambassador Kārlis Zariņš’ residency in Stockholm that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received reports about a “friendly and benevolent position toward the Baltic States” of various circles of Swedish society. Kārlis Zariņš even considered a boy scout delegation visit and the Association of Latvians in Sweden’s activity as a step in the direction of rapprochement. However, it cannot be denied that the continuity and development of rhetoric was promoted owing to the benevolence of certain Stockholm’s

67 politicians. Zariņš report clearly demonstrated the Swedish bi-directional foreign policy. Thus, he wrote in April 1927 that none of the Scandinavian countries wanted to speak “about any close military and political associations; rather, the Scandinavian countries carried out their disarmament on the account of these Eastern neighbors,” while at the same time, signs were noticeable in Sweden indicating their reluctance to ultimately fence themselves off from the Baltic States.15 Sweden’s symbolic relations with Latvia were also emphasized by King Gustav’s visit to Latvia in 1929. Enthusiastic and hopeful articles about Sweden appeared in the press – inevitable historical recollections in such cases. Although this visit had hardly any practical importance in real politics, it settled in public consciousness as an acknowledgement of friendship by the King of Sweden “himself.” In August 1929, Kārlis Zariņš wrote: “Whole volumes could be written on this subject, but some people might ask what exactly was really left after those visits that made Latvians so delighted? Perhaps, those people who expect tangible results immediately from everything might feel disappointed, but we must not forget that the rapprochement of the two peoples and countries cannot be achieved at one stroke – it takes time and continuous and persistent work. It could be said that with these visits, the foundation stone for the Swedish-Latvian collaboration and friendship has been laid. It is of great importance that with our sincerity, hard work, and abilities, we have been able to delight the cold Swedes. We surely have persuaded the Swedes that across the Baltic Sea, there live their hard-working and cultured fraternal people whose culture and working capacity are highly appreciated.”16 Before the visit, he reported to the President in April that the “rapprochement between Sweden, Latvia, and Estonia is taking strong steps forward.”17 A greater attention must not be paid to the fact that there were, in fact, no serious reasons for such visions in the regional policy, but to the fact that the Ambassador’s regular optimistic reports about the successful progress of the “rapprochement” helped maintain the idea in Riga that sometimes in a distant future, a military and political alliance would still be possible. The image of Sweden as a positive country was also largely utilized in the press.

Conclusions Latvia’s Baltic stream during the Interwar period had a lot of supporters. In general, each plan of a union of the Baltic States and their closest neighbors

68 would have received public support. The rapprochement with these countries was considered natural and desirable. However, despite the expectations of the Latvian foreign policy decision- makers and society, the reality proved more complex than wishful thinking. Although Latvia and Estonia entered into a defense union agreement, there was no mutual trust in their relations. The existence of a union of the three Baltic States also did not mean that possibilities with regard to regional cooperation were realized. If the allegations about a conspiracy by Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania against the USSR expressed in the Soviet occupants’ ultimatum in 1940 had proved to be true, we could also talk about some particular fruits of the Baltic State cooperation. Finland and the Nordic States had a special role in Riga’s foreign policy rhetoric. Both Finland and Sweden, as well as the other Nordic States, had very positive images in Latvia. There seemed to be no significant obstacles preventing the new of Latvia and Estonia and their societies to gradually get into the Northerners’ orbit. However, the realpolitik taught a bitter lesson. The Nordic States considered Latvia (and the other Baltic States) too unsafe and unstable.

Endnotes

1 Jānis Seskis, Latvijas valsts izcelšanās pasaules kara notikumu norisē. Atmiņas un apcerējumi (1914– 1921) (Rīga, 1990), 229. 2 Kārlis Ducmanis, “Jaunas iespējamības un jauni uzdevumi latvju diplomātijā,” Brīvā Zeme, 1934. gada 13. jūlijs, 14. augusts, 17. augusts; Kārlis Ducmanis, “Jaunā Latvija starptautiskā saimē un viņas diplomātijas uzdevumi,” Militārais Apskats, 1934, 7. nr. 3 LVVA, 2575. f., 11. apr., 11. l., 308. lp. 4 LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 2603. l., 5., 6. lp. 5 LVVA, 2630. f., 1. apr., 10. l., 24. lp. 6 LVVA, 1303. f., 1. apr., 81. l., 80., 81. lp. 7 Kārlis Ulmanis, Kas jādara un kā? (Rīga, 1933), 3. sēj. 8 “Ziņojums par Parīzes Miera konferences gaitu, pēc Latvijas delegācijas protokoliem par delegā- cijas un ārlietu ministra darbību,” 1919. gada 16.–31. maijs, 2575. f., 14. apr., 746c. l., 21. lp. 9 “Tērbatas konferences stenogrammas,” 1919. gada 30. septembris, LVVA, 1313. f., 1. apr., 20. l., 45. lp. 10 Latvijas Kareivis, 1920. gada 27. aprīlis. 11 Sociāldemokrāts, 1919. gada 12. septembris. 12 Fricis Menders, Austrum-Eiropas Savienotās valstis kā Baltijas valstu nākotnes problems (Rīga: Sau- le, 1926), 26. 13 LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 104. l., 39. lp. 14 LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 104. l., 28. lp. 15 LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 592. l., 286. lp. 16 LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 705. l., 131., 132. lp. 17 LVVA, 1303. f., 1. apr., 10644. l., 2. lp.

69 International Affairs and Latvia’s Baltic Germans

MARTYN HOUSDEN

The history of independent Latvia in 1918–40 is in the process of being re- examined and so the contribution of Latvia’s national minorities to the state is also ripe for review. Current knowledge suggests that Latvia’s foreign policy, in the first place, was created by the ethnic Latvian officials of the Latvian Foreign Ministry; so why should this book discuss Baltic Germans who were outsiders to the policy process? Baltic Germans were Latvia’s citizens who, on their own behalf, contributed to international affairs on national, European and even world stages. Although their influence on Riga’s foreign policy was not always easy to trace, certainly they exercised influence in Berlin (with the German Foreign Ministry) and Geneva (with the League of Nations). As such, Baltic Germans were an important element of the Latvian demos, which the government of the day had to take into account as it made all of its policies, including foreign policy.

Who were the Baltic Germans? From medieval times, German knights, missionaries and traders arrived in the Baltic region. Bringing no serfs with them, they formed an upper class which owned land, monopolised social power and relied on the local peoples for labour. The Baltic Germans retained their multiple privileges when the Baltic lands were absorbed by the Russian Empire during the eighteenth century. From this point, the Germans’ chivalrous orders (Ritterschaften) ruled the region loyally for the Tsars. Never more than 10 % of the region’s population, the Baltic Germans were always cosmopolitan. Their Ritterschaften embraced Estonia, Oesel, Livonia and . Education took them to Germany and Russia alike. Trade and imperial administration drew them across the Russian Empire wherever opportunity or duty dictated. Equally, over the centuries, waves of immigrants from the German heartland swelled the number of Germans in the region. Baltic Germans, then, comprised a social group that was always part of something bigger – and,

70 historically, its members always looked both East and West. In this connection, they also believed they were the inheritors of a “mission”: namely to promote “Western,” “civilising” values in the face of “Eastern,” “Asiatic” chaos.

Latvia’s independence and international networks The Baltic Germans did not fit easily within an independent Latvia. During the Interwar period they were described as anti-modern, exhibiting a pre-capitalist, pre-democratic mentality and subject to agrarian-corporatist thinking. As the Tsar’s former leadership caste, many felt little natural affinity with the small, new nation state. During the First World War and its aftermath, too many Baltic Germans had, first, co-operated with the German occupation and, later, worked with the Niedra government. For too long the post-war National Committee, made up of former Baltic German elites, refused to recognise an independent Latvian state. It is ironic, therefore, that the Baltic German Landeswehr played a signal role in liberating the new state’s territory when it stormed Riga on 22 May 1919, overthrowing the Bolshevik occupation. About a month later, however, the Landeswehr was itself prevented from advancing on Wenden by combined Latvian and Estonian forces. With the collapse of empire, everything changed for the Baltic Germans. Without the Tsar, increasingly they looked to Berlin for sponsorship. Tens of thousands emigrated to Germany where, amongst other things, some lobbied they government over its “Eastern policy” (Ostpolitik). The community that remained in Latvia was all but devastated by the twin processes of decolonisation and Latvian state-building. Previously, ethnic Germans had owned 57 % of agricultural land in Latvia, but agrarian reform removed 2.7 million hectares from them. German community property was confiscated as organisations were closed. The German community lost control of both the Jakobi Church and Riga Cathedral. In the terms of the post-war peace treaties, the Baltic Germans transitioned from being ruling elites to “national minorities.” The new status provided them with a modicum of international protection as guaranteed by the League of Nations. In return, the “minority” was expected to live loyally in its new home. Certainly many contemporary Germans believed the scale of the changes presented them with a grave crisis of material existence and identity, but at least a few progressive voices (most notably Paul Schiemann) urged constructive engagement with the new state. The minority was represented by

71 eight parliamentary deputies. At various times it provided Ministers of Finance and Justice. Furthermore, as the new state was in the process of forming itself, the German community put itself at the vanguard of framing its multi-ethnic structure by promoting autonomous education for national minorities as defined by the schooling legislation of 8 December 1919. Thanks to this, the number of ethnic German schools rose from 46 in January 1920 to 93 in January 1922. This educational project always had an international dimension because, as early as May 1920, the ethnic German Wolfgang Wachtsmuth travelled to Berlin to secure funding for his community’s schools. The impact on foreign affairs as delivered by Latvia’s Baltic Germans came not, therefore, from direct influence on policy-development in Riga’s Foreign Ministry but: first, by the way the community sought to construct itself autonomously within the new Latvian nation state; and second by the way subsequently it attempted to gain a distinctive and independent purchase in international affairs. It pursued the latter aim by more elaborate strategies than just capitalising on good connections with Germany’s Foreign Ministry. Latvia’s Germans were just one of a series of ethnic German minorities left scattered around Central and Eastern Europe after 1918. In 1922, ethnic German community leaders from Estonia (Ewald Ammende) and Romania (Rudolf Brandsch) attempted to bring these communities together in the Association of German National Minorities in Europe. During the 1920s, this was a peaceful organisation dedicated to promoting common ethnic German interests and the autonomous development of ethnic German culture. For Latvia’s German community, Paul Schiemann quickly carved out a leading position in the organisation. More ambitious still was the European Congress of Nationalities, which first met in Geneva in autumn 1925. Again the work of Ammende, the organisation provided a platform for all of Europe’s organised national minorities. In the event, most heavily represented were minorities from the states of Central and Eastern Europe which was home to the new and expanded states covered by post-war minority treaties administered by the League of Nations. The congress met in Geneva specifically to lobby the League. In time, it drew representatives from minority communities numbering as many as 40 million people. It was a considerable undertaking and ethnic Germans from Latvia, such as Schiemann and Baron Wilhelm Firks promoted their community’s values from its platform, as did several of Latvia’s Jewish community leaders.

72 BARON WILHELM FIRKS was co-presenter of a petition to the League of Nations in 1925 which ar- gued that land reform discriminated against the Bal- tic German minority. He was born in Kovno district in 1870 and went to school in Mitau before studying mining in , Spain and the Urals. Between 1911 and 1916 he owned the estate of Wattram in Livonia and came to believe that historic land ownership offered something fundamental to Baltic German identity. Personally, Firks was badly affected by agrarian Photo: Baltische Monatshefte reform. Thereafter, he was closely associated with (Ernst Plates: Riga, 1934), organisations promoting Baltic German agrarian collection of the National Library of Latvia interests. In independent Latvia, he was a leading figure in the Baltic German National Party, deputy leader of the German party fraction and a member of the National Committee. Firks’ traditional conservative always put him at odds with the rise of Nazism.

Between Riga and Berlin With their own autonomous community established inside Latvia, with the League of Nations offering some international guarantees for minority rights, and with networks of international political connections, it was natural that the Baltic German community influenced Latvia’s international situation in a number of ways.

Part of something bigger “For us [Baltic Germans], the German Reich certainly is much more than a large powerful neighbouring state. Above all, in the German Reich we see the heart of the entire great German nation. We Balts are just a tiny part of this and want to remain so.”1

The link between Latvia’s Baltic Germans and the German state could not be ignored by Riga’s policy-makers. For Baltic Germans, Germany was not just a nearby state, but a cultural community which they felt they belonged to, and to which they wanted to keep on belonging. The sentiment found some resonance in Berlin, with figures such as Prussian Minister of Culture Carl Becker recognising in 1919 that German foreign policy had to involve “policy towards Germandom abroad.” Unsurprisingly, therefore, following Wachtsmuth’s early success in acquiring funding for ethnic

73 PAUL SCHIEMANN was arguably the most im- portant Baltic German of the Interwar period. As well as practicing politics in Latvia, he also devel- oped theoretical ideas about the structure of mul- ti-ethnic states. His arguments maintained consist- ently that the German community should modernise. During the First World War, Schiemann served as an officer in the Russian Army. In 1917 he fled Bolshevism, but soon found himself at odds with the German occupation authorities in the Baltic on account of his liberal democratic ideas. Expelled Photo: State Archives of Latvia from the Baltic, he went to Berlin where, in 1918, he (collected by John Hiden) returned to his career as a journalist. That October, he co-authored a memorandum for Reich Chancellor Prince Max of Baden which demanded elected bodies for Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian territories. With peace, Schiemann returned to Riga. Here, he championed the Democratic Party, began editing Rigasche Rundschau, and also became a member of the National Assembly, the Constituent Assembly and the Saeima. Internationally he had excellent government connections in Berlin and also met the General Secretary of the League of Nations, Eric Drummond. Schiemann became a member of the Association of German National Minorities in Europe and the European Congress of Nationalities. Schiemann developed a particularly strong reputation as “the thinker” of the national minority movement. He developed a theory of the “anational state,” in which culture and politics should be separated. Then people could share territory based especially on common political requirements, whilst pursuing separate cultural lives according to each community’s national customs. As a democrat and a proponent of liberal tolerance, in the early 1930s Schiemann spoke out loudly against German National Socialism, criticising especially its anti-Semitism and general racism. As a result, soon he was sidelined in the Association of German National Groups in Europe, the European Congress of Nationalities and Rigasche Rundschau.

The anational state a. “Whoever has the will to belong to a national community does not need to belong to it racially and historically. By its very nature, the national community is a community of feeling.” b. “That the nation as a national community can have no relation to territory arises from the fact that it cannot be delimited definitively in territorial fashion. This is because every territorial delimitation has to exclude a smaller or larger part of the national community.”*

* Paul Schiemann, “Volksgemeinschaft und Staatsgemeinschaft,” Nation und Staat, September 1927.

74 German schools, subventions just kept on flowing from Berlin. Between 1923 and 1928, the German state financed roughly 25 % of the budget deficit run up by Latvia’s German schools. Nor were subventions limited to education. The Gustav Adolf Association supported church organisations while the Concordia Literary Organisation (actually a front for German government funding) subsidised Rigasche Rundschau. Owing to the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany’s support for ethnic Germans abroad always had to be delivered carefully and within limits; but even though only relatively small amounts of money were supplied, they were enough to enable Latvia’s Germans to consolidate their community. In terms of geo-strategy, Berlin wanted to build good relation with the so- called “borderland states” (Randstaaten) lying between it and Russia. In the future, perhaps they could be used as a “springboard” for trade with the massive Russian market. Latvia offered good possibilities in this connection because, not least, much of the state’s industry historically had been owned by ethnic Germans and operated closely with Germany’s own industry. No surprise, therefore, that between 1919 and 1930, the proportion of Latvia’s imports sourced from Germany never fell below the considerable figure of 39 %. In terms of trade and industry, Germany and Latvia were drawing close together at this time, and the Baltic Germans had to be included as part of the process. Furthermore, at this point Latvia’s Baltic Germans even wielded some influence on policy in Berlin. Paul Schiemann enjoyed some access to the corridors of power in the German Foreign Ministry and eventually met with Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann. Most likely under Schiemann’s influence, thereafter Stresemann produced a famous memorandum which recognised the significance of ethnic Germans to German trade policy, as well as recognising the importance of culturally autonomous social organisation for Europe’s national minorities.

The League of Nations: rights and petitions If their national identity gave Baltic Germans some purchase in Berlin, their status as a “national minority” ensured them a hearing in Geneva. National self-determination lay at the heart of the First World War’s peace treaties. It provided the justification for the dismantling of old Empires in favour of nation states. But what of the national minorities left in the new, smaller structures? The Allied Powers decided that such minorities should be

75 protected by a series of treaties and agreements entered into by the new and enlarged states of Central and Eastern Europe, with the League of Nations guaranteeing their implementation. The first such treaty was agreed by Poland on 28 June 1919. Latvia sought membership of the League on 14 May 1920. Like Poland, it was expected to subject its minority policy to international guarantee. The step, however, was unpopular with Latvia’s new political leaders because it implied giving up some state sovereignty to the League, promised international interference in Latvian domestic affairs and (since the Great Powers had signed no such treaties) spoke of unequal treatment of the League’s members. So although Latvia became a member of the League of Nations on 22 September 1921, its declaration about international minority protection was only made on 7 July 1923. It is important to note that the Baltic German community was not an integral part of Latvia’s negotiations with Geneva. Baltic Germans served only as commentators on the process and a pressure group attempting to influence events from the outside.

The Latvian view of international minority rights delivered to the League of Nations in 1922 “... as far as they [the principles of minority protection] have been clearly defined by the Treaties [ending the First World War], these general principles have always been observed by Latvia, which has moreover accorded better protection to Minorities than is the case in many other countries. The memorandum presented by the Latvian government to the League of Nations concerning Minorities is evidence of Latvia’s firm desire to continue to observe the general principles which she has accepted and also of her profound wish to contribute to the solidarity of all nations. I assure your Excellency that Latvia will always be glad to help in the establishment of a positive law for Minorities clearly drawn up and applicable to all countries, and guaranteed by the League of Nations.”2

The unwillingness of Latvian policy-makers to include minorities directly in discussions of the international guarantee of minority rights perhaps reflected how minority spokesmen had begun to use the League’s systems to put pressure on the new state through the presentation of petitions of complaint. As early as September 1921, Lucian Wolf (secretary to the Joint Foreign Committee of Jewish Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association) petitioned the League about anti-Semitism in Latvia. Latvian diplomats responded to the petition with gravity, but no procedures were actually changed within the country as a result of it. Four years later, Baron Firks and Manfred von Vegesack prepared another

76 petition about the treatment of ethnic German landowners as a result of agrarian reform. Two months later the Latvian government replied to the Firks-Vegesack petition, telling the League that agrarian reform was an absolute social necessity for the new state and that national minorities were not being discriminated against. Critical of the government’s position, Robert Cecil (League of Nations representative for the UK) observed that 96.5 % of the expropriated land had not belonged to ethnic Latvians and that persecution could not be turned into social reform by the use of clever words.

Cecil is not persuaded “Viscount CECIL thought that the [League of Nations] Committee was faced with a question of fact. It made very little difference what the Government had done with the expropriated land. There remained the fact that 96½ % had belonged to non-Latvians. Oppression could not be converted into a social reform by a mere change of name. It was evident that the Committee must further discuss the matter with the Latvian Government and, failing agreement, consult the Permanent Court.”3

The League found in favour of the petitioners and its officials were told to approach Riga to arrange compensation for former landowners. The Latvian government responded by emphasising that land reform was essential to the stability of Latvia and warned that changes to the status quo could encourage sympathy for communism. For their part, the Baltic German elites appeared ready both to take the issue to the Permanent International Court at The Hague and to use it for political ends. Given the difficult situation, the case was suspended, but never closed. Despite everything, however, compensation to former land owners remained minimal.

Schiemann discusses land reform with Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League of Nations, 27 February 1925 “I saw Dr. Schiemann, the leader of the German faction in the Latvian parliament today. He said that things on the whole were going quite well. There were now only two outstanding questions which were of considerable importance. 1. The first was the payment to be made for the land which had been expropriated. The German landowners quite understood the necessity of agrarian reform; but they felt that they ought to be given either an increased price for the land taken, or – and this was the best solution put forward – that they should be allowed to retain larger holdings than was the case at present.... I asked him how much had been offered by the law which had been proposed, but which had been defeated, owing to the German Minorities Party. He replied that all that had been suggested was a two-hundredth part of the real value.”4

77 The limits to Berlin’s support Although the Baltic Germans clearly spoke for themselves to the League of Nations, within Latvia, a perception endured that they were always prepared to promote Reich German interests. Such accusations came to the fore, for instance, in 1927 when Baltic German support for the Latvian-Russian Treaty was said to be in Berlin’s interest. Although such ways of thinking were evident in the Latvian press, they were too simple. Key Baltic German leaders in Latvia were prepared to build on the foundations of the new nation state. Both Firks and Schiemann understood well that the future of the Baltic Germans had to depend on co-operation with the Baltic peoples. Furthermore, despite the considerable mutual interest existing between the German state and Latvia’s Baltic Germans, in fact Berlin’s commitment to the group had distinct limits. Germany could not construct its foreign policy on a foundation provided by the Baltic Germans alone because they were not its final purpose. So although German state interests certainly did recognise the need to secure the welfare of Latvia’s Baltic Germans, more important still was the aim of the economic penetration of Eastern Europe. In this light, while Berlin wanted positive relations with Latvia’s German minority, even more important were good relations with the Latvian government. Likewise, when German Ambassador to Latvia (1923–28) Adolf Koester spoke of the need to bind Latvia to Germany, he was not just recommending benefits for the Baltic Germans, since his arguments contained more general economic, political and cultural ideas. In fact, Koester was explicit that the creation of a strong bond between the Baltics and the Reich called for co- operation between Baltic Germans and Latvians in order not to upset the achievement of bigger aims. German representatives in Riga understood well, therefore, that their policies towards the Baltic governments and the Baltic Germans had to move together as harmoniously as possible. On a more personal note, as a convinced social democrat Koester did not support hereditary landownership by the Baltic Germans (Bodenständigkeit) and was not terribly concerned if some German farmers in Latvia’s rural areas faced assimilation by the majority ethnic group.

Lobbying Berlin with Koester “We travelled together and I spent 3–4 days with him [Ambassador Koester] and Schiemann in Berlin. It wasn’t very easy for me to keep up with my colleagues who both rejoiced in a considerable lust for life and had a tremendous

78 capacity for consuming alcohol. We arrived at the ‘Russischen Hof’, opposite the Friedrichstrasse railway station. My expectation that we would pursue our affairs in the Foreign Ministry straight away on the day after our arrival proved not to be correct. For two or three days until late into the night we visited restaurants and all kinds of places of pleasure. Koester found acquaintances everywhere. He was thoroughly amusing and witty and filled with an indestructible vitality.”5

1930s: “Nationalismus überalles” Among the Baltic Germans, there were always people who disliked being termed a “minority.” For them, being labelled based on the number of members of their community de-valued the quality of the historic contribution they had made to the Baltic area. They wanted to be respected as a “national group.” The national pride sometimes associated with German heritage only increased throughout the 1930s as, first, Hitler approached political power and, then, began to build the Third Reich. His virulent politics crossed political borders to infect Europe’s ethnic Germans.

Germany for the Germans! Latvia for the Latvians! “Germany for the Germans! What a well-known sound for every politician in the East! Latvia for the Latvians! Poland for the Poles! Romania for the Romanians! Greater Serbia for the Serbs! It is the call to arms of ‘national’ economic policy across the whole of East and South East Europe! Economic autarky and nation state thinking are the foundations of this policy. A policy which threatens to bring a series of new states to the edge of economic breakdown through and lack of productivity.... A policy against which especially the German minorities at the Geneva nationalities congress have protested particularly forcibly and with good reason.”6

Some brave individuals stood firmly against Nazism. In 1932, Paul Schiemann gave a strongly anti-Nazi speech to the Association of German National Groups in Europe (renamed from the Association of German National Minorities in Europe). He denounced “the new nationalist wave” crashing across Europe from West to East which was damaging Baltic German youth. Unfortunately, fine words were not enough and Nazism found willing accomplices among Latvia’s Germans, especially Erhard Kroeger who led “the Movement.” In his memoirs, Kroeger denied “the Movement” (founded in 1933) took its orders from Berlin, but certainly during the 1930s he made connections with Reinhard Heydrich (Chief of the Reich Security Head Office) and Heinrich Himmler (Reich Leader of the SS). Although

79 older traditional conservative Baltic Germans generally remained sceptical about Hitler, as the Third Reich became stronger, so the appeal of “the Movement” grew.

New nationalist wave a. “This is the of contemporary Europe which has received a considerable boost from the obvious victory of nationalist thinking in the world war. The proclamation of the right to national self determination has given new theoretical foundations to the aim of creating an identity which brings together membership of the national group and membership of the state. The fight about national law, which we are called on to fight, has no other goal than, in consciousness of Mankind, to destroy the necessity of this identity.” b. “There is a new nationalist wave, which slowly but surely has crashed over this ideological moment and which now has transferred the idea of the powerful nation state into our region.”7

The Ulmanis coup took place on 15 May 1934 and quickly the new regime took steps to ban the Nazi movement and its newspaper, Rigaer Tageblatt. In 1936, leading Nazi sympathisers were arrested temporarily, but more general steps were also taken against the German community. Autonomous German schooling had been under political pressure since 1931 when Education Minister Ķēniņš began a quest to create a unified Latvian culture, but now more decisive steps were undertaken. In July 1934, the existing system of school autonomy was abolished and direct administration of German schools by the Ministry of Education was applied. Further laws followed which restricted the use of in the public sphere, limited the number of Germans able to practice law and made it difficult for Germans to buy land. At the same time, steps were taken to impose state ownership on private industry, with German and Jewish enterprises being nationalised with disproportionate enthusiasm. Once, Ulmanis commented that limiting Baltic German power was one of his most important tasks. More dramatically, Latvia’s Ambassador to Warsaw Ēķis once described to Foreign Minister Munters how Latvia’s Germans were a bridgehead for a foreign power and could be used to pressurise the Latvian state at home and abroad. For such Latvian figures, the anti-minority and specifically anti-Nazi measures of the 1930s were necessary steps for self defence. German figures, however, saw things differently. In spring 1936, German Ambassador to Riga Schack reported to Berlin about a “campaign of annihilation” against the German minority. When Munters met German Foreign Minister von Neurath in June 1936 he denied there was a

80 ERHARD KROEGER founded “the Movement.” He liaised with SS offices in Berlin and played a lead- ing role in organising the resettlement of the Baltic Germans to Warthegau in 1939–40. Kroeger was born in Riga on 24 March 1905. He matriculated from a German grammar school in Latvia before studying at universities in Germany and Riga. By the end of the 1920s, Kroeger had begun writing articles about the cultural mission of the ethnic Germans. He favoured some kind of Führer-principle over parliamentarianism and ideas like this brought him into conflict with the Photo: National Archives of Estonia traditional conservatives who headed Latvia’s Baltic German community. In 1933 he founded “the Movement” which aimed to build a national community based on principles of German socialism and under a united leadership. He took inspiration from Nietzsche’s philosophy. In June 1933, the Latvian state rejected the Movement’s application to be recognised as a political party and thereafter Krieger had to organise illegally. In March 1934, pressure was increased on Kroeger as the Saeima agreed the dismissal of all officials in key civic offices who belonged to the Movement. Two years later, Kroeger and some associates were arrested temporarily for pro-Nazi activities. Following the establishment of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle in Berlin in 1936, Kroeger intensified his contacts with government and Nazi Party offices in Germany, and stepped-up especially his youth work in Latvia. During late 1938, personnel changes at the head of Latvia’s German community which gave Kroeger a significant powerbase within it. Swiftly he was promoted toSS-Standartenführer in order to help organise the fateful resettlement action. In January 1940 he was appointed member of the Reichstag for Wartheland. During the Nazi attack on Russia, Kroeger led Einsatzkommando Nr. 6 in Einsatzgruppe C under SS-Brigadeführer Otto Rasch. Later he was involved with the Vlasov Army and in January 1945 was appointed SS-General. He died on 24 September 1987 without ever becoming a democrat.

policy directed specifically against Baltic Germans, but also complained that they kept on demanding special rights. Latvia’s new laws certainly sought to decrease ethnic German power in society, but the diplomatic interactions suggest the Ulmanis government wanted to avoid antagonising Berlin as much as possible during the process. The desire not to provoke Hitler became more marked in 1938. That March, German Foreign Ministry official von Mackensen told Latvian Ambassador Celmiņš that attacks on Baltic German economic life would have serious

81 consequences for German-Latvian relations. The warning was repeated by a German diplomat to Munters in May 1938. Then came the Munich Agreement at which point the burgeoning of Reich power in Central and Eastern Europe was clear for all (except perhaps some English statesmen) to see. Apparently Munich provoked a policy re-think in Riga, such that a German-Latvian trade agreement was concluded in November 1938 and some domestic anti-German initiatives were discontinued. But the framework for ethnic German politics was changing all the time, with the scope for independent action being supplanted. In 1933, the European Congress of Nationalities fell apart over the treatment of Jews in Germany. It was never the same again. Soon thereafter, Sudeten Germans seized control of the Association of German National Groups in Europe, sidelining the interests of “Germans abroad” (Auslanddeutschen) in favour of those of “borderland Germans” (Grenzlanddeutschen). Efforts to instrumentalise ethnic Germans for Berlin’s politics took a big step forwards in 1936 when the Ethnic German Central Agency (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle or VoMi) was established. With this step, the SS put itself at the vanguard of ethnic German politics. Corresponding to the new mood, late 1938 saw significant changes in the personalities leading the German national community in Latvia. The old guard of traditional conservative power- brokers was pushed aside and space was created for Kroeger and his acolytes. A few months later, on 19 April 1939, the leader of Latvia’s Baltic Germans, Alfred Intelmann, met with Ulmanis and requested autonomy for his community. This was, however, rejected since following the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia attitudes had once again changed within the Latvian government. The had issued its guarantee to Poland on 31 March 1939 and the step encouraged a feeling of assertiveness in the Latvian government. By this point, however, the time for discussion was all but past and Latvian views of Baltic Germans were all but irrelevant.

Resettlement Contacts between Erhard Kroeger and the VoMi were increasing all the time. In Autumn 1939 he was promoted to SS-Standartenführer and designated local leader of the resettlement of ethnic Germans from Latvia and Estonia to the German sphere of interest. Kroeger’s ascendancy reflected the secret clauses of the Hitler-Stalin Pact which allocated the Baltic States to a Soviet

82 sphere of interest. Apparently Kroeger contributed to the resettlement project, meeting Himmler in Zoppot on 25 September 1939 and advising that all Baltic Germans would be endangered by a Soviet occupation owing to the community’s historic anti-communism. Within two days, Hitler had decided to “return” all the Baltic Germans to the Reich. By this point, the German community was largely demoralised and most of its number agreed they had to leave their historic homeland. With this, the centuries’ long history of a community was brought to a close.

The decision “25.9.39 The goal of our journey was reached. The Kasino Hotel in Zoppot, the most lovely hotel of the Ostsee Baths was Führer HQ , the centre of the greatest military and political power in Europe. Security was not strict and Dr.Buchardt’s SS pass was good enough for us both.... Behind a glass door left ajar there was, in a side room, a roundtable discussion visibly in excited conversation. I recognised Adolf Hitler, beside him Himmler, then Keitel, Ribbentrop and others. We sat ourselves at one of the little tables and waited for what would happen to us. Soon Walter Schellenberg appeared, liaison officer with the Reichsführer-SS, and said Himmler had been told about me and that the discussion would still take place tonight.....”

“26.9.39 At around 10 o’clock I was invited by Heinrich Himmler to a second short discussion. The result was unequivocal: during the night Himmler had put the question of the Baltic Germans to the Führer and Reich Chancellor and had reported about our conversation. The Führer was basically in agreement with the evacuation of the whole of the Baltic German population but wanted the action to happen in agreement with the Soviet government....”8

Very few Baltic Germans failed to leave Latvia for Warthegau, but Paul Schiemann remained. During the Nazi occupation of the Second World War he was put under house arrest, but still managed to save a Jewish girl from the Holocaust. As a result, Israel honours him as one of the Righteous Among Nations.

Conclusion and wider questions National minorities have been described as both “disturbers of peace” and “bridges of understanding.” During the Interwar years, the Baltic Germans played both positive and negative roles in Latvia’s history, influencing foreign

83 affairs accordingly. Nonetheless, much scope remains for work to analyse more precisely and fully the group’s impact on foreign policy development. Not least, did Latvian politicians have any ideas about how best to use the Baltic German community as an asset for bridge-building with Germany? And what was the detail of Latvian government responses to the League of Nations’ minority protection system, both as it negotiated its declaration and as it responded to petitions? These are open questions. More generally, this discussion of foreign affairs has highlighted wider questions about the place of the Baltic Germans within independent Latvia. This essay has given the impression that pro-German action was really only undertaken by Latvian governments when it was necessary pragmatically. Hence the schooling legislation of 1919 was agreed when the state was still young and finding its way, likewise anti-German policy was only stopped in 1938-39 as a result of Hitler’s increasing power in Central and Eastern Europe. But did sympathy for Baltic Germans ever go beyond pragmatics in Latvian politics? Were German statesmen ever included in parliamentary coalitions for reasons other than just the game of building parliamentary majorities? Did Latvian voters ever support German political parties for reasons other than protesting against what Latvian parties were offering? And was there ever meaningful overlap between Baltic German and Latvian politicians in the field of ideas? To provide answers here, we await the necessary detailed research.

Endnotes

1 Wilhelm von Rüdiger, Aus dem letzten Kapitel deutsch-baltischer Geschichte in Lettland 1919–1945 (Eggenfelden: self published, 1954), p. 40. 2 A letter dated 17 January 1922 from Mr. Walters (Latvian delegate to the League of Nations) to Mr. Hymans (President of the Council), League of Nations Archive, United Nations Library, R 1666. R 41 / 18732 / 15782. 3 Meeting of League of Nations representatives from the UK, France and Sweden on 2 July 1923, League of Nations Archive, United Nations Library, Geneva, S 340, Minorities Committee. 4 League of Nations Archive, United Nations Library, Geneva, S 342 Minorities. 5 Wilhelm von Rüdiger, Aus dem letzten Kapitel deutsch-baltischer Geschichte in Lettland 1919–1945, 38. 6 Paul Schiemann, “Nationalismus II,” Rigasche Rundschau, 29 November 1930. 7 Paul Schiemann, “Die neue nationalistische Welle,” Nation und Staat, September 1932. 8 Erhard Kroeger, Der Auszug aus der alten Heimat (Tübingen: Verlag Deutschen Hochschul­lehrer- Zeitung, 1967).

84 Made in America: Kārlis Ulmanis and the Making of Pro-Americanism in Latvia, 1918–1940

JORDAN T. KUCK

Within the history of Latvian politics and foreign policy, few individuals loom as large as Kārlis Ulmanis. As a key agrarian-nationalist leader prior to Latvia’s independence, then as the first and later multi-term Prime Minister, and lastly as the “tautas Vadonis” in the years 1934–1940, Ulmanis did more than perhaps any other individual to shape Latvian politics and foreign policy between 1899, the year he entered public life with his speech at the First Congress of Latvian Farmers (Rīgas Latviešu biedrības lauksaimniecības kongress), and 1940, when he was deposed and deported following the invasion of Soviet Red Army forces. Specifically, Ulmanis was more pro- American with regard to foreign policy than any other Latvian statesmen, and therefore this chapter contributes to the volume an exclusive examination of the making of Ulmanis’ pro-Americanism. It is not surprising, given Ulmanis’s towering presence in Latvia’s history, that historians have devoted much attention to his policies. With regard to his foreign policy, in the past critics of Ulmanis have widely condemned him for perceived failures (including some bad business deals and investments), most noticeably for not somehow doing enough to protect Latvia’s independence amid the tumultuous geopolitical landscape of the 1930s. This chapter, taking a less traditional approach, offers a new and much-needed look at Ulmanis’s foreign policy. It argues that we should in fact give Ulmanis credit for recognizing early on the power of America – especially cultural “soft power” – even as the Americans themselves were still uncomfortable in projecting it. By this I mean that Ulmanis did not promote pro-Americanism in Latvia because he believed that the United States would militarily protect Latvia. This is obvious given the fact that there was no concerted effort to establish some sort of defensive pact. Rather, Ulmanis viewed a pro-American foreign

85 policy through a cultural lens, believing that any hope of a future military pact rested on the ability of Latvians to prove their self-worth and to cultivate cultural ties that might blossom someday into a full-fledged partnership. In short, since Ulmanis himself had traveled and lived in countries like Germany, Switzerland, and the United States, he understood very well that Latvians needed to combat any negative stereotypes and show the Western powers that they, too, were a modern, progressive nation worth working with and protecting. Ulmanis thus pursued cultural ties with the United States because he believed that the American socio-economic model was the most progressive. This made Ulmanis a remarkably unique European Prime Minister. In that age, most Europeans and European leaders looked to Germany and Italy, the Soviet Union, or perhaps to Great Britain, depending on one’s ideological and political preferences. Yet Ulmanis clearly believed that America was the model to emulate, that America was the future superpower with which Latvia needed to cultivate ties. True, it is undeniable that Ulmanis also borrowed much from the new “third way” model of transnational fascism developed in Italy and Germany, but he did so in a fascinating, though certainly controversial, way that sought to meld his penchant for America and American culture with what was politically astute and in vogue in Europe. In the end, though, when Latvia was faced with threats from the east, American leaders failed to come to the aid of Ulmanis and Latvians. To some extent this was true during the Latvian War of Independence and absolutely that was the case in 1939-40. However, that does not mean that Ulmanis’s pro-American foreign policy was a failure. On the contrary, it was a smashing success. By promoting American cultural institutions like 4-H (Mazpulki) and state fairs (Pļaujas svētki), Ulmanis was able to help the American leaders “discover” the cultural affinities between Latvians and Americans. Had the Second World War not come so soon, and had Ulmanis had more time to facilitate American-Latvian relations, those military guarantees of protection would have likely developed. As proof, one need not look any further than Article 5 of the NATO defensive alliance. This cultural component of Ulmanis’ foreign policy is not as well known, or perhaps even primarily unknown, and hence the main objective of this chapter is to flesh out more fully the hallmarks of and advantages gleaned from Ulmanis’ pro-American foreign policy.

86 The origins of Ulmanis’ pro-Americanism In telling this story, this chapter will also offer some new insights about Ulmanis. This claim might seem dubious at first, given all that has been written about him. However, even though Ulmanis remains arguably the most famous political figure in Latvian history, he is today still largely misunderstood or unknown. Mostly this is because Ulmanis was a notoriously private person. Apparently, even his colleagues who worked with him every day did not truly know him. For instance, Alfreds Bērziņš, a long- time political colleague of Ulmanis’ and the Minister of the Interior for much of the Ulmanis regime, noted in the introduction to his biography of Ulmanis that trying to understand Ulmanis the person is somewhat akin to looking into a house through a foggy window. One can discern certain things here and there, but the room in its entirety remains frustratingly obscure.1 Taking Bērziņš’s analogy further, I would argue that the foggiest window into Ulmanis’s personality and policies is the one that encloses the contents pertaining to his life in America. This is unfortunate, because it is the key window into Ulmanis the person and statesman. Though it is difficult to piece together the details, it is possible to gauge the impact of his life in America on his subsequent career. Indeed, as I argue in my other scholarly works, the key to understanding Ulmanis and his policies is to recognize that he viewed himself as a self-made man forged in America amid the troubles of living in political exile.2 To some extent, Ulmanis was as much a son of America as he was of his native Zemgale. Likewise, those professors and businessmen in America who helped Ulmanis succeed in a new country became just as much of a father figure as his own father, who died when Ulmanis was a child, or Hermanis Enzeliņš, about whom I will say more later on in this chapter. For me, there are, among many others, two great indicators of just how much Ulmanis retained his American identity and pedigree. First, Ulmanis was well known for having a sparsely decorated office. For example, it was said that his desk was spartanly uncluttered and otherwise unadorned, save for a bronze bust of his mother that he commissioned following her death. But most noteworthy for our discussion here is the fact that on the office walls, positioned very prominently, were the Latvian coat of arms and a pennant flag from his American alma mater, the University of Nebraska. To be sure, one of my favorite photos of Ulmanis was taken in the spring of 1936 when Ulmanis and William C. Bullitt, the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union,

87 Kārlis Ulmanis and Ambassador William Bullitt. Photo: University of Nebraska-Lincoln Archives and Special Collections

posed for the camera jointly holding the new pennant flag that the university chancellor had sent the prior month. The second indicator, and similarly telling, is the fact that for the regime’s much-touted celebration in December 1939 of Ulmanis’ forty years of public service Ulmanis chose to use, or at least signed off on the decision to publish, his faculty photo from the University of Nebraska. Ulmanis believed that he was, because of his American education and experiences, uniquely qualified to lead Latvians to a better future. Part of that belief and sense of mission was rooted in the geopolitical context of Latvia’s birth. With the disintegration of the once mighty empires of the region in the cauldron of the Great War, Latvians found themselves facing a choice with regard to the best path forward: do we look to the east, where the Bolsheviks had taken power and were preaching the promise of communism, or do we look to the west and adopt democracy and capitalism? The horrors and death of the Latvian War of Independence, prompted by the Bolshevik invasion in December 1918, answered that question for many. But in case it was not already clear enough to his fellow Latvians, Ulmanis painted the picture very clearly in his address to the Constituent Assembly on June 16,

88 1920. He declared, “Latvia, as a state bound between West and East, will definitely side with Western Europe and American democratic politics. An ideological connection and a coming together around mutual self-interest are the unshakable foundations for the truly friendly relations between Latvia and these states.”3 Ultimately, Ulmanis believed he alone was best positioned, given his unique life experiences, to place Latvia on these new ideological footings and henceforth cement ties with the West. Moreover, Ulmanis also saw himself as a unifier, as someone who could rally Latvians together through cultural initiatives and love of the Latvian nation. Ulmanis was generally not prone to self-reflection, but on one exceptional occasion Ulmanis opened up about this belief and his path to national leadership. This occasion was the speech he gave on 12 September 1937 in the Bērze schoolyard of his native Zemgale, where a belated sixtieth birthday celebration for him was being held. Perhaps the emotion of the celebration at his old school prompted him to engage in nostalgic memories of his younger days, for this speech proved to be one of the very few times that Ulmanis publically spoke about his personal life and intellectual development. What is learned from Ulmanis’s speech that day is that he was very much a product of the spirit of the times of his youth. In his recollections, he lamented that by his school days “the wonderful era of [national] awakening had more or less been forgotten,” and as a result “triviality and discord had begun.” Partly he thought this had happened because of the nation’s uncertain and divided response to Tsar Alexander III’s Russification policies. Even more significant, according to Ulmanis, was the importation of “foreign, one-sided teachings about class conflicts, class struggles, and class wars.” Ulmanis explained that during his student days in Jelgava he came to disagree with the message that “there is only one class; that there should be support for the factory workers in the cities while the others get nothing.” In contrast to this agenda, he said he arrived at the conclusion that “there is a need for people to fight for the nation, for nationhood, for the country, for unity, for the strength and force of the nation, for those tasks whose struggle-filled obtainment would bring benefits for everyone and would be a blessing for all.”4 In other words, Ulmanis decided that he wanted to devote himself to the betterment of the nation, to representing and furthering the interests of all people, but especially the rural population, who were, in his eyes, all too often ignored or overlooked in visions of the future.

89 Clearly he was, according to his own testimony, already interested in moving beyond class consciousness and class struggle even before moving to America, but his six plus years there further crystalized his support for a more inclusive culture and governmental system. Ulmanis, of course, ended up in America in the aftermath of spending six months in prison for his support of the 1905 Revolution. Given this conviction, Ulmanis reasoned that his career as an agricultural lecturer and writer might be over. He discussed this fear time and time again in his letters to Hermanis Enzeliņš, the Valmiera-based farmer and journalist with whom Ulmanis first established professional contact in 1899. It is through Ulmanis’ letters to Enzeliņš that we learn of his desire to move abroad. After considering a number of options and living briefly in Germany, Ulmanis informed Enzeliņš that a childhood friend was helping him organize a move to the New World. That childhood friend was Kārlis Klieģis. Klieģis, too, had gotten caught up in the 1905 Revolution, and in the aftermath he and his brother, Teodors, immigrated to the United States, where they were working on a farm in Nebraska. It just so happened that the farm was owned by Charles Warner, a state senator and one of the most famous politicians in Nebraska history. So immediately upon arriving in America, Ulmanis got a first-hand, up-close look at democratic politics in action. He also got help from Warner getting into the University of Nebraska, from where he received a degree in agriculture and animal husbandry in December 1908.5 Charles Warner remained a lifelong friend of Ulmanis’, so much so that he loaned him money to buy into a creamery business in Houston, Texas, a business which Ulmanis walked away from when he decided in 1913 to return home. The list of others who loaned Ulmanis money for that enterprise included two of his former professors at the University of Nebraska: A. L. Haecker and Howard R. Smith. Haecker and Smith not only aided Ulmanis on this occasion, but they helped him repeatedly, with another noteworthy incident being their recommendation to the dean of the college that Ulmanis be given a job as instructor of cheese-making. Ulmanis held that position for three academic semesters in 1909-10. The last of the noteworthy individuals who financially contributed to Ulmanis’ business was J. R. Roberts, the owner of Roberts Dairy. This dairy became the most well-known in the entire state, and Ulmanis played a leading role in its start, for Roberts hired him to serve as the creamery manager in 1910 and later also gave him the title of company Vice President. Ultimately, though, Ulmanis left that promising job in autumn 1911 to try his hand at running his own business in Texas.

90 Why are these American professional contacts of Ulmanis’ worth mentioning? They are worth discussing because they provided Ulmanis with experiences and opportunities that molded his identity and . To put it very simply, Ulmanis came to view himself as that most unique American product: the immigrant self-made man. To be sure, he did have much for which to be proud. Having arrived in America with little knowledge of English, in just over four years he managed to obtain a university degree, teach American students cheese-making, rise to vice president of a prominent local dairy company, co-own a business, and establish friendships with some of the most noteworthy and successful individuals in Lincoln, Nebraska. When his American experiences are summarized in this way, it is not difficult to see why Ulmanis embraced American culture and viewed himself as a self- made man. Part of the reason why Ulmanis saw himself in this way is because he came to embrace the “can-do” positivism of American culture, as opposed to what he saw as the traditional pessimism of Latvians derived from the centuries of being yoked under serfdom. Ulmanis commented many times to Enzeliņš about this stark contrast, and it is not an exaggeration to say that the primary reason why Ulmanis promoted American values in Latvia was to eradicate negative thought and self-doubt among the Latvian people. Ulmanis encountered this aspect of American culture through many mediums and venues, but most of all he was influenced by the writings of Orison Swett Marden and Ralph Waldo Trine, the agricultural journal Wallaces’ Farmer, by the agricultural youth organization called 4-H, and by his observations of and participation in the Nebraska State Fair. We will briefly discuss each of these in turn before then examining in the next section how Ulmanis encouraged pro-Americanism after returning home in 1913. Authors Marden and Trine were members of the so-called “New Thought Movement” that emerged in late-nineteenth-century America. Essentially, the works comprising this movement were self-help books that cultivated a hero-worship of the “self-made man.” More than likely, Ulmanis discovered the works of Marden and Trine while at the University of Nebraska, for Marden’s Pushing to the Front (1894) and Trine’s In Tune with the Infinite (1897) were both very popular in learned circles around the turn of the twentieth century. These books, in addition to his academic success, surely must have helped Ulmanis battle through the depression that he seemed to suffer from – one can see evidence of this in his letters to Enzeliņš – during

91 his first few months in Lincoln. In fact, an observer of Ulmanis’ later life noted that whenever Ulmanis faced a tough crisis, he turned for inspiration to Marden’s Pushing to the Front. Perhaps even more fascinating, it seems highly likely that one of the most ubiquitous slogans of Ulmanis’ authoritarian regime – “uz priekšu” (to the front, forward) – paid homage to Marden’s book. Given how much Ulmanis was inspired by Marden’s works in particular, it is not surprising that Latvian translations appeared in the 1920s and 1930s. There was yet one more publication, or in this case a periodical, which Ulmanis came to admire while in America, and which he continued to read for the rest of his life: Wallaces’ Farmer. This was a family farm-focused agricultural journal produced by the Henry C. Wallace family. Not only was the family famous for its journal, but the grandson, Henry A. Wallace, went on to establish one of the most prominent seed companies in the world, Pioneer (today DuPont Pioneer), before later serving as Secretary of Agriculture and then Vice President of the United States (1941–1945). As for the Wallace family’s farm journal, it was essentially a folksy self-help publication devoted to celebrating and improving rural, agricultural life. Though I have never uncovered archival documents proving the influence of Wallaces’ Farmer on Latvian periodicals, when one compares it to periodicals that the Ulmanis regime favored, such as Mazpulks, Vaditājs, Lauku Pastnieks, Sētā un Druvā, Sējējs, and others, then the influence seems obvious. There were no American cultural institutions that Ulmanis admired more than American 4-H and state fairs. 4-H (the name 4-H comes from the four “h-words” that the organization promotes: head, heart, hands, and health) is an agricultural youth organization whose roots go back to the mid- to-late 1890s in agricultural school clubs in the American Midwest. Most likely, Ulmanis first encountered the work of this organization while at the University of Nebraska. We know from his letters to Enzeliņš that Ulmanis got a first-hand look at the work and impact of 4-H while fulfilling duties at the Nebraska State Fair in September 1908. Thanks to his professors at the University of Nebraska, Ulmanis was appointed to work at the fair as a dairy expert and as the supervisor of the 4-H dairy cow competition. But before discussing 4-H, which became known in Latvia as Mazpulki, first I must give an overview of the state fair, for it had an enormous influence on the tradition of the Pļaujas svētki in the 1930s. Ulmanis was just as impressed with the state fair as he was with 4-H. What was novel about it is that while the main purpose of the fair was to

92 celebrate agriculture – the state’s main industry – it also highlighted other areas of advancement in local, state, and national life. For example, as part of the attractions for the 1910 fair, which Ulmanis more than likely attended, the organizers hired the Wright brothers, the first Americans to develop an airplane, at the steep cost of $10,000 to fly four flights per day for the duration of the fair. Ulmanis would later incorporate very popular airplane flyovers at the Pļaujas svētki, celebrations which I will say more about in the next section. Ulmanis also discovered how American democratic politics blended into these state fairs. Most notably, during the 1908 state fair where Ulmanis worked, the hometown hero William Jennings Bryan, who lived right there in Lincoln, Nebraska, gave a much-anticipated speech as part of his campaign for the White House. Bryan is not a well-known American historical figure in Latvia, and partly that is because he remains the only politician in American history to have won his party nomination three times but never won the presidency. However, at the time Ulmanis lived in Nebraska, Bryan was arguably the most famous and popular politician in America among the common people, and certainly he was a hero in Nebraska. What made him so beloved, and at times controversial, was his fiery support for the common man and family farmer and his fierce opposition to big banks and big business. He was also famous for his dramatic and captivating speeches. For instance, his speech at the 1896 Democratic national convention was so enthralling that it was reportedly met with an uncontrollable applause that lasted nearly half an hour. Although Bryan’s speech at the 1908 fair was more subdued than that most famous one in 1896, for Ulmanis the fanfare for Bryan and this first very up-close look at an American presidential candidate must have greatly influenced his later political career. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, it seems highly plausible – given the image that he would later build for himself as the Vadonis and Saimnieks of Latvia – that Ulmanis had aspirations of becoming a Latvian version of Bryan.6 It is clear in Ulmanis’ letters to Enzeliņš that he wanted to create something like the Nebraska State Fair back home.7 In particular, Ulmanis hoped to establish an event that would garner massive public turnout. He remarked in a letter to Enzeliņš that he could not believe that more than 110,000 people attended the state fair in Lincoln. Meanwhile, less than two months later Enzeliņš held an exhibition in Valmiera to celebrate the ten year anniversary of his agricultural society. The turnout for that event was only about fifty people. Upon hearing that low number and comparing it to the

93 recently completed Nebraska State Fair, Ulmanis commented to his friend, “What unbelievable apathy!”8 It was precisely that apathy and negativism that Ulmanis sought to overturn by creating two new American-influenced Latvian traditions: Mazpulki and the Pļaujas svētki.

Americanism in the Latvian countryside: Mazpulki and the Pļaujas Svētki Obviously Ulmanis’s pro-American policies took on many forms between the summer of 1913, when he returned to Vidzeme to help Enzeliņš with his work, and the early summer of 1940, when his public career came to a sudden and tragic end. Some of those policies involved formal diplomacy, especially during and after the Latvian War of Independence, as Ulmanis sought the support and aid of the U.S. government. Other pro-American policies came in the form of business ties and investments, including the ill-fated government investment in 1920 in the U.S.A. International Corporation.9 Yet, in terms of the impact on Latvia’s society and the lives of ordinary people, no aspects of Ulmanis’ pro-Americanism were as important or long-lasting in their influence as Mazpulki and the Pļaujas svētki. Based on his experiences with young 4-H students at the University of Nebraska and Nebraska State Fair, Ulmanis decided to establish a Latvian version of the organization—Mazpulki. However, early on he struggled to find support. Largely this was because the country had much recovery work to do following the devastating First World War and the subsequent Latvian War of Independence. Partly it was also because Ulmanis did not have sufficient time, given his other duties, to introduce fully to the public the idea of American 4-H. The turning point came in 1929 with the publication, on Ulmanis’s urging, of a Latvian of John Francis Case’s 1927 book Under the 4-H Flag. The Latvian version, titledZem baltzaļā karoga, appeared in 1929 and its popularity helped Ulmanis bring his plans to fruition: the very first Mazpulki club was founded in November 1929. According to the lead essay that Ulmanis wrote in 1931 for the first edition ofMazpulks , the official monthly periodical of Mazpulki, the purpose of the organization was to promote a general respect in society for agriculture and to encourage a general love for the land and the farm among Latvia’s youth. Moreover, Ulmanis encouraged the youth to show self-initiative by “collectively striving for and pursuing the achievement of high goals” so as in part to “slowly

94 break free from excessive rural diffidence and reticence among other people, especially foreigners.”10 In other words, this was an appeal to do away with the defeatist attitudes linked to centuries of serfdom and foreign occupation. This new form of Latvian nationalism, which was very much rooted in American culture, proved to be immensely popular with Latvia’s youth. In particular, Mazpulki became during the years of Ulmanis’ authoritarian rule the single most important cultural organization in Latvia, with more than 40,000 members by the summer of 1939. In fairness, part of the reason for its popularity stemmed from the fact that Ulmanis very much used the government to promote it, even serving as the Virsvadonis of the organization after the May 1934 coup. But mostly the youth joined because Mazpulki was exciting and fun: from summer camps to gardening competitions, trips abroad, and more—it was a thrill and an honor for the members to be part of such an important and transformative organization. Arguably the greatest event in the history of Mazpulki was the ten- year anniversary celebration that occurred in Rīga on 2-4 September 1939. Of course, the celebration was held a few months early in order to coincide with Ulmanis’ birthday, a date which took on more and more ideological importance during the period of authoritarian rule. Mostly, though, the celebration was intended both to mark a milestone and to serve as a way of further increasing the organization’s popularity and prominence, and especially among the parents of urban youth.11 In all, it brought together more than 20,000 members from all 1,085 clubs at a cost of more than 55,000 lats.12 Additionally, there were a substantial number of invited foreign guests, including 4-H leaders and members from the United States, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Lithuania and Estonia.13 Interestingly, leaders of youth organizations in Germany were also originally on the June 1939 invite list, but at some point that summer – and for reasons yet unknown, though most likely the heightened tensions over German actions in Eastern Europe had something to do with it – the Germans listed were boldly crossed out with a red pencil.14 As the list of invited guests intimates, this event was also held to show foreign dignitaries all of the progress being made in Latvia, and that Latvia was clearly part of the West. Indeed, one could argue that this event in September 1939 was one of the greatest international and diplomatic successes stemming from Ulmanis’ assertion to the Constitutional Assembly in June 1920 that Latvia must belong to the West. Most noteworthy for this chapter was the

95 presence of the American contingent. Just prior to Ulmanis’s much-anticipated speech to the more than 20,000 people gathered at Uzvaras laukums, the foreign dignitaries were recognized and awarded state honors. The American group was comprised of the former and current directors of 4-H, the vice- director, and a number of agronomists. Three of them were given the Order of Three Stars, 3rd class medal, an award that only one other foreign guest received. In return, the American guests had prearranged for Ulmanis to receive a specially designed anvil and gavel from the White House. The exchanging of these awards and gifts marked the high point of interactions between American 4-H and Mazpulki, but there were other noteworthy diplomatic events as well. For instance, in June 1936 the Latvian ambassador to the United States, Dr. Alfrēds Bīlmanis, was asked to give an address at the national 4-H meeting in Washington, D.C. He told delegates about Latvia and its history, but primarily his talk centered on the work of Mazpulki and Latvia’s connections with the United States. Afterwards, the 4-H contingent from Nebraska visited the Latvian embassy and sent to Ulmanis their greetings and wished him “the best of success in your important work.”15 Lastly, in all of the Mazpulki-related publications there were regular entries on American-Latvian connections. Some essays were penned by Latvians living in America who were participating in 4-H, while other essays were simply a topical look at parallels between American and Latvian life. The other major American-influenced cultural institution that Ulmanis inaugurated was the Pļaujas svētki. Generally speaking, the three Pļaujas svētki held in 1935, 1936, and 1937 were similar in character and purpose to what Ulmanis had observed at the Nebraska State Fair. Indeed, both events shared the goals of uniting rural and urban citizens, celebrating and promoting agriculture, crafting a political narrative of progress, and providing entertainment. As was the case with the Nebraska fair, the Pļaujas svētki typically lasted a week and were comprised of agricultural and industrial exhibits, livestock shows, competitions, amusements, etc. Additionally, just as politics was melded into the Nebraska fair, so, too, Ulmanis and other top government officials would arrive for the closing ceremonies of the Pļaujas svētki, where Ulmanis always delivered the much- publicized keynote speech. Despite these apparent foreign influences, in fact the idea of a harvest celebration was not new to Latvians. Rather, it had been a part of Latvian

96 rural culture for centuries. However, what made these Pļaujas svētki different from their ancient predecessor was that for the first time it was organized by the state and was intended for all citizens, not just those local, rural residents celebrating the end of harvest in their area. In terms of garnering the level of public turnout that Ulmanis had lamented about in 1908, the Pļaujas svētki were an incredible success. Based on my research, it can be said that the combined attendance at the closing ceremonies of the three Pļaujas svētki totaled at least 480,000 people, a statistic that speaks volumes about the public’s extremely positive response to this new Latvian tradition. Not only did such massive audiences provide Ulmanis and the regime with the ideal backdrop and platform to disseminate their ideological message of nationalism, positivism, and progress, but these events also brought in foreign guests. For instance, the Latvian press noted that the 1936 Pļaujas svētki was attended by guests and journalists from the United States, England, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, , Hungary, , Lithuania, Estonia, and the Soviet Union. Clearly the event was more than just a celebration of rural life. It was a public manifestation of the frame of mind, national unification, and cultural connections with the West that Ulmanis had long been encouraging.

Conclusion As a small nation stuck between giant powers, Latvians’ declaration of independence in November 1918 was a shocking and tremendous achievement. But the euphoria was tempered by the stark realization that Latvia’s path forward remained very uncertain and full of external threats. Kārlis Ulmanis was not alone in comprehending this situation, but he believed that the totality of his experiences and work made him uniquely able to guide Latvians through these troubled but exciting times. Ultimately, Ulmanis believed that the best way forward was to move beyond class divisions, to overcome the divide between the cities and countryside, and to unite around new cultural initiatives that in their very essence also promoted ties with much-needed allies in the West. In Ulmanis’ mind, at the top of that list was the United States of America. Ulmanis worked very hard to build connections with America, and he astutely understood better than most of his European contemporaries that cultural exchange was the preferred

97 diplomatic method in Washington D.C., for the Americans were not yet committed to “hard power” on the global stage. Critics will point out that Ulmanis’ pro-American foreign policies were a failure because Latvia lost its independence in 1939–40. Still others might scorn Ulmanis for abandoning his promise of unity and inclusiveness, as the years of authoritarian rule saw an upswing in persecution of ethnic minorities. Moreover, Ulmanis moved away from democracy and pure pro- Americanism and after 1934 also promoted closer ties with fascist Italy and Germany – though even here I would argue that Ulmanis wanted to emulate U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who himself took on quasi- dictatorial power, rather than Benito Mussolini or Adolf Hitler. All of these criticisms remain valid and fair to point out. However, in fairness to Ulmanis, we must also recognize his intentions and successes. Firstly, Ulmanis never believed that the United States would defend Latvia from outside aggression. There was no last-minute plea to Washington; rather, it seems that Ulmanis’ last trans-Atlantic correspondence was with an old friend in Lincoln, Nebraska. Ulmanis viewed foreign policy through a cultural lens, believing that shared values and culture would serve as the bedrock of future full-fledged partnerships (including military pacts). This was a good plan—indeed it has been the architectural blueprint of the European Union. Unfortunately, the Second World War came too soon for it to come to fruition in his lifetime. Secondly, this cultural foreign policy helped Ulmanis largely achieve what he set out to do domestically. He promised in 1920 to unite Latvians around a new, more inclusive political system and culture—one that had attributes that would bind them more fully with the West. While it is fair to say that ethnic minorities and political opponents were persecuted to some extent, nonetheless by 1939 Latvians were more united than they had been in 1918. Through his establishment of new cultural institutions like Mazpulki and the Pļaujas svētki, Ulmanis also helped Latvians overcome the negativism and pessimism that were hindering progress. Finally, one of the greatest paradoxes of Ulmanis’s leadership is that while he was unable to prevent Latvia’s occupation by foreign powers, he did help Latvians cultivate the frame of mind and intense unity needed to survive the Second World War and Soviet period. The legacy of Ulmanis’s cultural foreign policy also smoothed the transition back to independence, including the reemergence of Mazpulki, and provided the historical context

98 for the landmark diplomatic achievements of the twenty-first century. Indeed, were Ulmanis alive today, he would be very pleased about Latvians’ clear membership in the West and firm commitment to the European Union and NATO.

Endnotes

1 Alfreds Bērziņš, Kārlis Ulmanis: cilvēks un valstsvīrs, 2. iespiedums (Brooklyn: Grāmatu Draugs, 1974), 7. 2 Jordan T. Kuck, The Dictator without a Uniform: Kārlis Ulmanis, Agrarian Nationalism, Transnatio- nal Fascism, and Interwar Latvia (Ph.D. diss., University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 2014), “Rene- wed Latvia: A Case Study of the Transnational Fascism Model,” Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2013): 183–204. 3 As quoted in Edgars Dunsdorfs, Kārļa Ulmaņa dzīve: ceļinieks, politiķis, diktators, moceklis, reprint ed. (Rīga: Zinātne, 1992), 153. 4 For a transcript of Ulmanis’ 12 September 1937 speech, see “Mana dzīve: Vienības svētkos Bērz- muižā Prezidents runāja par savu dzīvi,” Rīts, 1937. gada 13. novembris. 5 For a detailed account of how Ulmanis ended up in America, see Jordan T. Kuck, The Dictator wit- hout a Uniform: Kārlis Ulmanis, Agrarian Nationalism, Transnational Fascism, and Interwar Latvia (Ph.D. diss., University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 2014). 6 Ibid. 7 See for example Ulmanis’s letter to Hermanis Enzeliņš dated 30.08.1908. 8 Kārlis Ulmanis, letter to Hermanis Enzeliņš, 10.11.1908. 9 See Ēriks Jēkabsons, “Zaudētie 450.000 dolāru: Latvijas valdības neveiksmīgais darījums ar fir- mu ‘U.S.A International Corporation’ 1920. gadā,” Latvijas Arhīvi, Nr. 3/4 (2015), 97–136. 10 Kārlis Ulmanis, “Mazpulku dalībniekiem,” Mazpulks, 1931. gada februāris. 11 LVVA, 1690. f., 4. apr., 1447. l., 181. lp. 12 LVVA, 1690. f., 4. apr., 1479. l., 123. lp. On the budget: LVVA, 1690. f., 4. apr., 1447. l., 55. lp. 13 LVVA, 4820. f., 4. apr., 1447. l., 70. lp.; LVVA, 1690. f., 4. apr., 1479. l., 107. lp; “20.000 jauniešu zvērests tēvzemei, tūkstoši karogu sveic Prezidentu,” Brīvā zeme, 1939. gada 4. septembris. For information on the organizing committee, see especially LVVA 1690. f., 4. apr., 1483. l. 14 LVVA, 1690. f., 4. apr., 1479. l., 114. lp. 15 “Amerikas mazpulku sveiciens Latvijas mazpulku virsvadonim,” Brīvā Zeme, 1936. gada 10. jūlijs.

99

FOREIGN POLICY CURRENTS DURING THE EXILE PERIOD AND THE AWAKENING

Western Latvian Exiles’ “Foreign Affairs” Ideas and Work

ANDREJS PLAKANS

Generally, “foreign affairs work” should be distinguished from “internal affairs work.” However, if we speak about the Western Latvian exiles after World War II, such a division becomes more problematic. Thinking about their essence, the exiles had since the very beginning (1944 to 1945) looked both directions: “inwards” – how to hold together and not lose the Latvian identity – and “outwards” – what they wanted from this foreign environment in which they were forced to live. Thus, the “foreign affairs work” of the Western exiles cannot be fully comprehended without the context of the “internal affairs.” It was already in 1948 when Kārlis Zariņš, Latvia’s Plenipotentiary Ambassador to the United Kingdom, announced the following: “[...] but the stern reality forces us to search for a new home in ever more distant corners of the world. In this new temporary home, however, we must preserve our strong faith and, at the same time, we must constantly prepare for the return to our real home, our fatherland.”1 According to the ambassador, the exiles’ mission was dual – to live decently in their “foreign home” and prepare for their return journey. Both parts of this dual mission had their own specificities: living “abroad” meant maintaining the Latvian identity (the internal affairs), while preparing for the return journey meant reminding everyone everywhere of the existence of the Free State of Latvia (the foreign affairs). This article deals with the development of this dual mission in the post-war decades in general terms. The concept of “foreign affairs” is generally used in the context of the mutual relations between internationally recognized and independent states. In all its aspects, it relates to the government-level activities of creating, monitoring, advancing and changing the relationships with other similar countries. If there exists an organized community of people called “country,” it will naturally have to deal with other similar communities by using an organized specialist “team” dedicated to furthering these “outward relations.” However, if we apply these words to the community commonly called the

103 “Western Latvian Exile,” the question will arise instantly: how might this community, which was not even organized as a country, have had any “foreign affairs”? During the last year of the World War II (1944–1945), approximately 175,000 Latvians left Latvia and did not return to their fatherland during the post-war years, continuing to live in the West, that is, “in exile” or “in a foreign home,” as they called it. The question becomes even more complicated if we relate it to the exiles’ self-awareness. The exile communities were permeated with many different ideas about their relations with the abandoned country, which both did and did not exist at the same time, that is, having disappeared from the world maps as the Republic of Latvia, it immediately reappeared as the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic. Many of the exiles believed that these changes would be temporary, the pre-war Republic of Latvia would be restored in the near future, and the Latvians living in the West would be able to return home.

The first stage, 1944–1955: identities without state Indeed, many Western powers never officially recognized the incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union, establishing the so-called “non-recognition policy” as early as in 1940.2 In the Western post-war international thinking, the Interwar Republic of Latvia continued to exist legally (de iure) but not in reality (de facto). This meant that the Latvian embassies with the ambassadors of the Interwar Latvian times could continue to operate in the major Western countries in a different status. The U.S. government expressed its position in different ways: for example, according to the U.S. legislation, all maps of Europe published in the U.S. and presenting the Baltic States as part of the USSR had to include a sentence informing that the United States did not recognize their current borders. Nevertheless, in the early post-war years, the Latvians living in the West felt the loss of their fatherland quite deeply and continued to count themselves as “refugees.” This of course corresponded with their everyday experiences and emotions: they had fled and remembered the escape traumas all too well. In 1945, the warfare ended, but the country was taken over by a foreign power. For most exiles, repatriation was unimaginable, but at the same time, their current status was unclear. Until the beginning of the 1950s, the majority (about 140,000) of the Latvians who had reached post-war Germany fell within the “displaced persons” category (DP; the “deepees”) and lived in separate camps (the displaced persons camps; DP camps), and therefore the

104 years from 1945 to about 1951 went into the Western Latvians’ history as the “deepee times” or “camp times.” These were also the years when the Western Latvian communities faced their first long-term segmentation because the history of those about 5,000 Latvians who, fleeing in boats across the Baltic Sea, came to neutral Sweden developed differently from that of the Latvians living in occupied Germany. The Swedish Latvians were also “refugees” and “exiles,” but not “deepees.” Life away from Latvia brought about changes in identity – some voluntary and some forced. During the postwar years, a panel of ambassadors designated by the last President of Latvia, Kārlis Ulmanis, and headed by Latvia’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom Kārlis Zariņš, made attempts to “represent” all Western Latvian exiles. These diplomats had not returned to Latvia after the 1940 occupation and annexation, and thus the difficult representative mission lay on their shoulders. The Panel instantly faced the undeniable fact that the Western Latvians were living in a dispersed way during the “DP camp times” – in about 300 DP camps across the western zones of Germany and, of course, in Sweden. In order to mitigate the consequences of the dispersion and promote a sense of community, the originators and promoters of the Western Latvian social ideas, being exiles themselves, had always highlighted the Latvian national identity as the main promoter of unity. The idea was simple: regardless of which part of Europe the refugees lived in, they all had to count themselves as belonging to the Latvian nation. The DP-camp Latvian organizations, such as the Latvian Central Committee (founded in 1945), helped achieve this goal. As a result of their actions, many “Little Latvias” emerged very soon in Esslingen, Wurzburg and elsewhere. The hope for a quick return to Latvia also helped a lot. In general, the thoughts about Latvia during the camp times were to be transferred from the rough daily life to the cultural realm: the exiles were deprived of the Latvian state institutions and territory, but many things that symbolized the former independence of Latvia – the Panel of Ambassadors, Western states’ “non-recognition policy,” personal memories, former statesmen among the exiles, rituals reminding of the existence of the Latvian culture, items of material culture taken along during the escape – all remained available to them. Whether all these things together would form a sufficiently strong counter-force against the results of the dispersion was a big unanswered question. In the meantime, the refugee organizations together with the Panel of Ambassadors had to fight an ever- growing number of practical issues all requiring prompt solution: the status

105 of the Latvian legionnaires, the disabled soldier care, camp organization and reorganization, food issues, family reunification, orphan issues, employment of refugees (especially men), finding and allocating premises for educational needs, religious care and improving the relations between camp residents and German civilians. The representatives of the Western powers and the United Nations, in whose hands the “refugee issue” had fallen, were ready to listen to the refugees on humanitarian issues, but were reluctant to talk about politics (including any “liberation policies”). All these problems required countless and repeated applications, petitions, meetings, and clarifications to “higher authorities,” often also interventions from such recognized Latvian representatives as the Ambassador to England Kārlis Zariņš. It turned out that the countermeasures against the further dispersion of the exiles were not enough to ensure against the Latvians’ positive feedback to the first emigration campaignsBalt Cygnet (1946) and Westward Ho (1947) organized by the United Kingdom representatives. To put it simply, the English were looking for labor in camps to recover from the years of war. The Latvians answered the calls. Likewise, a similar but smaller departure for Belgium also took place. These countries offered to accept several thousand Latvian refugees, but the refugee organizations came up with a warning: such a fragmented departure could only harm the Latvian common cause. When the systematic liquidation of the DP camps and the so-called “big dispersion” to overseas countries began in 1948 and 1949, these warnings sounded time and again in many different ways. In England, Ambassador Kārlis Zariņš emphasized the desirability for the refugees to emigrate to only a few major countries, if possible, and, respectively, stick together as close as possible. A fantastic idea appeared repeatedly here and there in different periodicals stating that all the DP-camp Latvians should acquire an uninhabited area somewhere in the world to live in and emigrate there as a community. In fact, the Latvian exiles did not even have a small chance of using their own emigration “model” and choosing where, how and when they could emigrate. The process of clearing the refugee camps was determined by the Western Allied administrations of the three German occupation zones in cooperation with the United Nations refugee organizations, such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the International Refugee Organization (IRO); the representatives of the restored German Federal Republic; governments of several host countries, which eventually determined how many and which “deepees” would be accepted above the immigration quotas in effect at the

106 time; and various non-governmental religious organizations, such as the Lutheran World Federation and the World Catholic Organization, which undertook the organization of the “guarantor” or “sponsor” networks in the new host countries. Latvian refugees in Germany were unable to affect the decisions of the “highest authorities”; they could only respond (or not respond) to offers. Given this rough context, the refugees’ main “foreign affairs” objective – the liberation of Latvia – had to be temporarily put on hold because the Western powers’ priority at the time was the restoration of post-war Western Germany. Within the refugee discourse, the hopes for a quick return were expressed quite frequently, yet they sounded less and less credible to realists’ ears. Although the Cold War had already begun and Western democracies had founded NATO in 1948 as a counter-force against the Soviet Union’s expansionism, no determination could be seen in these moves to force the USSR to withdraw from the Eastern European territories including the Baltic States. As the hopes for the return faded away, while the ideas of an independent Latvia remained as strong, one could come across “foreign affairs”-related thinking already in DP camp times as if that Interwar country still existed. The governments of the Western powers continued recognizing the independent Latvia’s representatives – i.e., the Panel of Ambassadors – covering their expenses from the Latvian gold reserves deposited in these countries during the pre-war times. Latvian communities continued using the Independent Latvia attributes – the red-white-red flag and the coat of arms – in their internal ceremonies and singing the National Anthem “God Bless Latvia.” It could be concluded that even before the “great dispersion,” the exiles’ national ways of thinking in this regard had begun to accept the de iure Latvia as the only significant definition of the country, at the same time considering the definition of the Soviet Republic of Latvia negligible. This imaginary, but actually lost Latvia endowed the earlier generations of exiles with creative force. Teachers of the elementary and secondary camp schools tried to pass the information about their lost homeland on to the younger generations. During that period of exile, many Latvians endeavored to live as though they were still moving across their lost country, although there were unpredictable foreign nations and foreign countries around them. This feeling of “the foreign” continued to affect the older generations of Latvians until the very end of the camps and even beyond those times. At the same time, the Panel of Ambassadors and the heads of different organizations, taking care of the “foreign affairs” of the Latvian exiles, regularly faced

107 KĀRLIS ZARIŅŠ (1879–1963) Born in the Ipiķi parish, died in London. Refugees and their organizations often turned for advice and assistance to Ambassador Kārlis Zariņš at the former embassy of the independent Latvia in London. It was not too long before Ambassador Zariņš started performing not only the traditional ambassador’s role as an authorized representative of Latvia, but also the role of a “public person” with regard to the refugees living in the West. Zariņš not only helped take care of the “foreign affairs” during these camps Photo: from the Archives of the years but also personally represented a symbol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, author “independent” Latvia for the refugees craving for a unknown symbol. Fluent in the necessary languages (mainly, English), he left the impression of himself among the camp newspaper readers as a man able to move among the leaders of superpowers as skillfully as on lectures in refugee camps and in elementary schools. In these circumstances, the presence of Ambassador Zariņš proved more or less reassuring. His articles and speeches aimed at the encouragement of refugees were much awaited in the camps, and they continued to come out even after the big departure from Europe. Zariņš’ speeches and articles maintain an optimistic mood; a conclusion also appears here and there stating that, as the exile continues, various negative changes emerge in Latvian thinking. After Kārlis Zariņš’ death in 1963 at the age of 84, the memorial articles devoted to him described him as a “Latvian public leader” and reminded that he conducted his post-war activities as a diplomat under the circumstances of the exile “when no government and independent country stood behind [his back].” Memorial articles on his life in the English exile community also noted that “he missed no exhibitions, concerts, performances or lectures although his years and doctor’s prescriptions urged for caution.”*

* Eduards Silkalns, red., Kārlis Zariņš. Mēs Būsim: runas un raksti 1947–1963, 180–181. the need to explain to their audiences what exactly they represented – a group of exiles or a non-existing country. This discord continued even when around 1950, the vast majority of the Latvian refugees, and for the time being, exiles, had emigrated from the European continent to new overseas host countries. However, the idea of the existence of Interwar Latvia and its restoration proved to be strong. At the founding congress of the American Latvian Association (ALA) in 1951, the first theses of the reports almost always included words “to restore the Latvian state independence” as the main objective. Similarly, in 1984, a local Melbourne Latvian attorney and a

108 public person argued in the Archīvs magazine published in Australia that “the Republic of Latvia still exists – not only in our desires, dreams, or feelings. It exists in the system of the international law. Its existence is recognized and confirmed in formal declarations by the democratic powers headed by the USA, England, Australia, and Canada.”3 Even forty years later, the continuity between pre-war Latvia and post-war de iure Latvia continued to exist not only on the idea, but also on the feeling level in the national thinking of many exiles.

The second stage, 1951–1970: a comprehensive dispersion Answering offers from different countries, the Latvians living in German refugee camps shaped the next stage of their exile themselves, deepening and widening the dispersion that only stabilized by the late 1950s. As a result, the “exile,” lacking strongly marked boundaries and a stable population, formed into a hard-to-define body. The “exile” was not a single place but consisted of many “colonies” or “parishes” of different size in approximately twenty countries on four continents, and each “colony” shaped its own unique microhistory. The later exile observers metaphorically described this collection of “colonies” as the “archipelago,” and a centrifugal effect was felt everywhere throughout it: adaptation to the given social environment, moving away from the Latvian identity and a subsequent moderate national identity. Countermeasures against that decentralization came from organizations that quickly emerged in the “colonies” having a sufficient number of active Latvians: examples included local organizations, dedicated organizations (e.g., scout and guide organizations), “national” organizations (e.g., the American Latvian Association), confessional congregations and the related events and branches of organizations founded in Europe (e.g., the Daugavas Vanagi organization) in the host countries. This organizations wave of the 1950s came along with different yet unanswered questions, and the main one was associated with “foreign affairs.” The “internal” role of these organizations was self-evident: Latvians had to hold together, the maintenance of the Latvian identity had to be promoted and everything had to be done to prevent the dispersion of the people. However, it could not be everything because the liberation of Latvia was also an important issue. The public activity required an “outward” movement. Such an idea was expressed at the American Latvian Association

109 founding congress in February 1951 when the independence-time Minister, Alfreds Bērziņš, urged the audience not to forget about the “foreign affairs” in his report: “Our political work must be directed outwards to join with organizations in other countries and inwards to join our own forces… We have often heard slogans which each of us can sign up for, but we haven’t always been able to implement them.”4 The idea formulated already during the DP camp times stating that liberation of Latvia and maintenance of the Latvian identity were two parts of the same mission, and therefore the entire community of the Latvian exiles must be involved in its implementation, was repeated at these and other similar debates in the early 1950s. Some dispersed Latvians continued to believe that “foreign affairs” could be delegated to the Panel of Ambassadors (i.e., foreign affairs experts), but the idea was unfeasible. Although the Panel of Ambassadors could informally participate in the life of the exiles, the ambassadors could not be politically active as public officials. This dilemma was described by Professor Pēteris Lejiņš, the first chairman of the American Latvian Association, in a memorial book of Latvia’s Ambassador to the USA Jūlijs Feldmanis (1889–1953): “As a diplomat, he [Feldmanis] represented his country at the United States government, but he was unable to interfere in the internal affairs of this country, for example, by beginning to organize its people because it could easily make him a persona non grata and as much easily affect the continued recognition of the free Latvia and the diplomatic relations. The international status of Latvia depended on free will of the great Western democracies. This couldn’t be put at risk.”5 If Western Latvians really wanted to manage their “foreign affairs,” the initiative had to come from the Latvian public organizations and not from the Panel of Ambassadors. Ambassadors in the host countries could perform various consular functions (e.g., renew the Latvian-time passports), participate in different festive events of their compatriots and personally “represent” the independent Latvia on various diplomatic events in the host countries. Since they “represented” the independent Latvia, they could not simultaneously “represent” both American Latvians and Latvians from other host countries. This, of course, raised the question of whether the Latvians living in new countries could have any “foreign affairs” which would be different from the “foreign affairs” of their host countries. An interesting answer was given by Ambassador Jūlijs Feldmanis at the ALA founding congress in 1951: “…the statutes must be written carefully. We are Latvians, and Latvia is our

110 number one priority. Here, under the American Eagle’s wing, we are guests. Wouldn’t it be out of place if we said that we only thought of ourselves?”6 In the early 1950s, this “Latvians-As-Guests” thinking could probably be correct, but a discord appeared when after several years in the U.S. and elsewhere, Latvians started voluntarily adopting the nationalities of their host countries. Could Latvia really be the “number one priority” under these circumstances, and how could the Latvians-citizens count themselves as “guests”? To sum it up, I have to admit that in this context, “foreign affairs” required a more detailed definition. The activity of the Latvian exile organizations had to include various kinds of “outward” orientation – i.e., the activity had to be directed at audiences and institutions not belonging to the exile communities. However, the activity could not be “national” in the normal sense of this word because both ALA and other Latvian organizations elsewhere remained “non-governmental.” Exiles were not living in some alternative “countries” although the documents of that time indicate that such belief was not uncommon among at least the first-generation exiles. Fortunately, as the Cold War progressed, no large-scale clashes or conflicts between the “foreign affairs” of the exiles and their host countries could take place at that stage because both sides had the same enemies: communism and, in particular, the Soviet Union. It turned out that the leaders of the U.S. “global” foreign affairs were very keen supporters of the anti-communist ideas. In 1953, the U.S. Congress, with a resolution, adopted the idea of “captive nations,” finding that a large number of countries, including the Baltic States, were being “oppressed” by communism and the USSR, and that the U.S. people must be informed of this fact with a special “Captive Nations Week.” This proclamation was signed into law in 1959 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The institutionalization of this week at the national level was an important milestone for many of the “foreign affairs” activities of the U.S. exiles in the coming decades. At the U.S. Congress, the week was celebrated with speeches by senators and congressmen; meetings and processions were organized to inform the public about the dangers posed by the “” and about the captivity of the Baltic States. This was also the moment when the Latvian organizations once again reminded their representatives in the U.S. political elite about the declaration of non-recognition of Latvia’s annexation (the Summer Welles Declaration) adopted by the U.S. in 1940, thereby restoring Latvia’s recognizability in the ever-changing political discussions of that big democracy.

111 The wave of Latvian self-organization across all host countries in the late 1950s brought about the emergence of quite a complex network of organizations, which was based on countless local Latvian organizations in all host countries. The “central” organizations in host countries consisted primarily of the local organization representatives and were therefore considered “umbrella organizations.” In 1956, another “umbrella organization,” the World Federation of Free Latvians (WFFL), was founded, in which all existing Latvian “central” organizations were represented. On the whole, WFFL was intended as the summa summarum of all the Latvian organizations because of its main task of “representing” all Latvians residing outside the territory of Latvia. As a matter of practice, however, it was quite difficult from the beginning because up until the 1970s, the WFFL chairmen were also the American Latvian Association chairmen (Pēteris Lejiņš, Uldis Grava and Ilgvars Spilners). It was considered that working in the interests of Latvians from all over the world would be more successful if the “global” Latvian organization (WFFL) and the largest “central” Latvian organization (ALA) were managed by the same people and, moreover, were located in the same place, namely, in the capital (Washington) of the leading country of the “free world” (the U.S.). Thus, the big self-organization wave of the 1950s resulted in the emergence of a basic structure of Latvian organizations within whose framework the Latvian “internal affairs” and “foreign affairs” activities continued up until the “exile” concept ceased to exist after September 1991. At this stage, the “foreign affairs” developed within the framework of the organization network in the form of a large number of relatively moderate activities aimed at drawing the host countries’ societies’ attention to the “Latvian Cause.” These projects became the core of Latvian organization “foreign affairs” and looked very much like the activities of the DP camp times. This conservative “foreign affairs” policy was consistent with the thoughtful natures of the main organization leaders of that time (e.g., Professor Pēteris Lejiņš) and their approaches to all issues. The activities included writing letters to politically powerful persons, submitting petitions, organizing processions with posters and – at the times of visits of Soviet Union leaders – , exhibitions about the “Terrible Year,” the Deportees Commemoration Day, as well as coordinating efforts of other Baltic and Eastern European activists. All these activities were permeated with reminders to listeners and viewers about the official policy of non-recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic States and the faultiness of the “coexistence

112 PĒTERIS LEJIŅŠ At the founding congress of the American Latvian Association in 1951, Pēteris Lejiņš was elected the organization’s first chairman of the board. Pēteris Lejiņš’ life story was quite different from the recent adventures of other U.S. newcomers. He arrived in the U.S. in 1934 as a holder of the Rockefeller Scholarship and earned a Doctor’s grade at the University of Chicago in 1937, then returned to Latvia and taught at the until the beginning of 1940, when he emigrated to Photo: from the Archives of the the U.S. The main leader of ALA and WFFL was World Federation of Free Latvians not a typical American Latvian post-war refugee because he had suffered neither “escape” nor the German DP camps. Congress delegates figured out that a very important part of the new organizations’ work at that point (in 1951) was “external” representation. A chairman was necessary who was fluent in English, had a higher education degree from a respectable American university, experience in another respectable American institution (in this case, also a university), and who was recognized in their profession. Lejiņš worked as the ALA board chairman from 1951 to 1970, and since 1956, also as the chairman of the World Federation of Free Latvians (also until 1970). As life in exile went on, these two posts made Lejiņš a “leader” of all exiled Latvians, though such claims were not felt in his management style. One had to understand different democratic systems of the host countries (in many places, parliamentary, in the U.S., a specific system of the “separation of power”), political formation (centralized and federal) and the various ways that the “interest” or “pressure” groups implemented their programs in these different systems. One also had to find ways of reassuring the critics “from below” talking about undemocratic behavior, failure to represent and consider all the viewpoints, a seeming inability to overcome assimilation and dispersion, and the “large” organizations’ fall into complacency. Lejiņš balanced management style quite often helped cool down heated debates at meetings and congresses, although later generations of activists sometimes regarded his approach to the Latvian matters as too conservative.

policy” and the “containment policy.” The so-called “Hungarian Revolution” of 1956 showed, however, that it was wrong to believe that the Cold War itself would bring any changes and would result in an eastward roll-back of the Soviet Union “Empire’s” European borders, thus liberating the Baltic States. Many years later, however, the researchers of the Latvian exile political activities described these first two decades (the 1950s through 1970s) as unsuccessful: “Overall, up until 1970, the campaigns organized by both

113 individuals and exile organizations in connection with various activities of the USSR were basically unsuccessful and only occasionally drew the general public’s attention… The period from the mid 1950s until the early 70s in the exiles’ political matters was a time of the search for more efficient forms of political work and, to some extent, a stagnation period.”7

The third stage, 1970–1985: change of generations and strategic turn During the second stage of the exile, its main distinctive feature – large dispersion – formed, as well as a strong network of organizations, and these processes continued into the next decades. A “public workers” tradition was also set up, with roots going back as far as the nineteenth-century Latvian First Awakening period. A select team of leaders soon appeared in all Western newly founded colonies who considered it a moral obligation to urge local compatriots to self-organize and devote all their free time to this cause. Given the circumstances of the dispersion, it was quite a difficult task because the newcomers everywhere adapted to the systems of Western values in which individualism and democracy played a major role. No one could be forced to participate in the “Latvian Cause.” In the same way, the “breadwinning” – often several jobs at once in the same family – took nearly all immigrants’ days, and the “public duties” had to be put off until the weekends or often simply bought off with membership payments. Already in the early 1950s, the editorial board of the Canadian Latvian newspaper Amerikas Latvietis expressed their concern in a leading article about the decadence of the “public service,” comparing it to the DP camp “golden times” (when the vast majority of Latvian refugees did not work for salary, of course). Young Latvian political scientist Jānis Peniķis in 1959 tried to estimate the number of “performers of the work”: “The number of Latvian exiles is slightly over one hundred thousand; the number of the performers of the work and their active supporters among them is… ten thousand? Twenty thousand? Of the latter number, the ones with sufficient knowledge, ability and will to turn the [main] intentions to reality are, in the best case, some hundreds.”8 This guess was later confirmed by Edgars Dunsdorfs’ researches in 1972. According to him, only about 250 “public workers” of the large number of exiles from all continents were occupying posts in organizations at that time.

114 After 1960, the network of Latvian organizations continued to function as a platform for “foreign affairs” activities, but always in relation to the “internal affairs” (such as subsidizing Latvian cultural events, supplementary school help, organizing festivals, etc.). Biographies of around two thirds of the leaders – the most active public workers – demonstrated both “Latvian- time” and “camp-time” experience. However, the generational changes naturally began to appear in these activists. For example, in the history published by the American Latvian Association in 1986, this new stretch of time in the organizations’ life appeared under the title “ALA under the leadership of the exile generation: towards the new horizons: 1970–1986” This generation consisted of the same “new Latvians” whom sociologist Juris Veidemanis, studying the Latvian colony in the U.S. city of Milwaukee during the late 1950s, described as being “well-blended with both cultures.” This generation of Latvians did not feel any need to distinguish sharply between “theirs” and “strangers” because their prolonged contact with their host countries’ cultures, institutions, and contemporaries had become part of their personal identity. In other words, they had successfully developed a balanced solution to the adaptation problem. It could also be said that a kind of “Americanization,” “Canadianization,” “Australianization,” “Swedization,” and “Germanization” took place. However, for many new Latvian “public workers,” this process obviously meant neither the withdrawal from the “Latvian Cause” nor any particular isolation from the host country societies. As for the USA and the American Latvian Association, it was noted in this organization’s self-portrayal of 1986 that the generational change “opened up the possibilities to bring in modern professional working methods and approaches suitable to the U.S. conditions into the Latvian organizations’ work and create a larger and better financial base.”9 Of course, a generational change could only take place in those Latvian organizations which had any “new generation” at all. Such generations were often “prepared” in youth branches, one of which was the American Latvian Youth Association (ALYA). This means that, in speaking about the “generational change,” one should not think about any sudden enormous turn in the life of the exiles, but about a long-term and relatively slow process. What happened in the American Latvian Association was not typical – it was rather a symbol of the process: after twenty years with ALA as the board chairman, Pēteris Lejiņš (born in 1909) resigned and was followed by Uldis Grava (born in 1938, in office between 1970 and 1972),

115 Ilgvars Spilners (born in 1925, in office between 1972 and 1975), and Ādolfs Lejiņš (born in 1927, in office between 1975 and 1977). Grava came to the U.S. at the age of 12, Spilners – at 25, and Lejiņš – at 22. The coming of younger leaders of the exile organizations marked a dilution in the influence of the “Latvians-As-Guests” way of thinking. Although this generation’s activists were also born in Latvia, and the Latvian identity continued to be a very important part of their personalities, new trends appeared in their views on the Latvian exiles’ “internal affairs” and “foreign affairs,” contrasting with more conservative views of the previous generation’s leaders. Firstly, the younger ones better than their predecessors understood the importance of the competition of ideas in the large Western mass democracies as well as the important role that the media industry had started to play in the creation of public opinion already in the 1960s. In his autobiography, the first “new” ALA and WFFL chairman, Uldis Grava (born in 1938), expressed it briefly and precisely: “Managing the WFFL, I realized that an event is only important if it is further covered by the press. If the world lacks informational description of an event, it might seem that it never happened at all.”10 Speaking about tactics, it meant that campaigns employing only polite moves and written reminders about the injustices of the past were not enough to draw the general public’s and politicians’ attention to the Latvians’ needs. In the 1960s and 1970s, a wide range of public groups like various minorities, women, and trade unions appeared in the Western societies, which, with the help of non-governmental organizations, claimed public sympathy and requested the correction of the errors of the past. If at the beginning of the Cold War, a leading position in the world of mass media-generated information was held by the communist regime’s atrocities, then twenty years later, the “victims” of the USSR’s expansion or the “captive nations” already had to compete for attention with the domestic “sufferer” groups that had hundreds of thousands of fans. To get the media’s attention, one had to take so-called “direct actions”– if not by directly confronting the authorities, then at least by committing acts of provocation in the media’s presence. In the case of Latvians, though, such “escapades” remained relatively moderate: activists would drip their blood on the USSR flag, arrive at international meetings uninvited and provoke arrests, lock themselves up to the fences of the embassies of foreign superpowers, hire ships to come close to the USSR international borders in the Baltic Sea. Such kinds of “political theatre” would be unimaginable in the 1950s.

116 Secondly, being and feeling completely equal in rights to the “natives,” the new generation’s activists knew instinctively that the numerical strength of voter groups and a continuous “pressure” in the corridors of power were more effective in the modern mass democracies than the role of some injustice from the moral aspect. Latvians could not offer any large number of voters in any of their host countries. Therefore, that number had to be increased by cooperating with activists from all Baltic States thus using a “regional” approach to “foreign affairs.” The United Baltic Appeal to the UN (BATUN), which was established in the late 1960s, demonstrated an increased activity in the 1970s, and a similar Baltic cooperation appeared also in the academic world along with the establishment of the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies (AABS) in 1968. With the help of AABS, a series of publications was issued in the 1970s about the Baltic States’ “foreign affairs” and their international legal situation. The cooperation was further facilitated by the fact that a common language, namely, English, was available to the new Western Balts. Thirdly, it was clear to the new generation of leaders that a strong element of realpolitik was established in the Western “big” politics in the 1950s with regard to the communist world, and it had not happened due to some back- room conspiracy or the reach of a “Hand of Moscow.” This “cohabitation” policy was ensured by both opponents’ nuclear arsenals, and this kind of a continuous “cold” confrontation even allowed such an experienced anti- communist as U.S. President Richard Nixon to visit the “red” Chinese dictator Mao Zedong in 1974, Nixon’s Foreign Affairs Adviser Henry Kissinger to formulate the détente policy with regard to the communist superpowers, and even Latvian-friendly and very conservative U.S. President Gerald Ford to sign the Helsinki Accords in 1975, which looked like an acknowledgement of Europe’s borders of the time to Eastern European eyes. The realpolitik was based on the idea that the world had to be accepted “as it is” and that “talks” could always and everywhere achieve more than some “bloody massacre.” That, among other things, strengthened the position of those exiles who believed that maintaining “cultural ties” with the Latvian SSR in a cautious way would be acceptable and desirable, and therefore this contradiction also began to subside among the Western Latvians in the 1970s. Fourthly, the new-generation public workers had generally reconciled with this kind of realpolitik, assuming, however, that it was possible to do many good things within that framework to the benefit of the independence

117 of Latvia. It had to be understood that the makers of the host countries’ “foreign politics” would always and everywhere first consider their national interests and not the liberation of some other country or wishes of that country’s former citizens. It could be considered, of course, as realpolitik’s shadow side: the decisions would be taken not on the basis of moral principles and bright ideals laid down in international treaties and declarations but on the basis of “national interests” (raison d’etat). This meant, fifthly, that the Western Latvian exiles’ political friends, allies, and supporters could in some cases turn out to be unpredictable in shaping “big politics.” The examples of such behavior could be England’s 1968 agreement with the Soviet Union regarding the pre-war Baltic States’ gold deposited in London, as well as fluctuations of the non-recognition policy of the incorporation of Latvia in Australia in 1974 and 1975, when the non- recognition policy was cancelled and then restored again. In all large Western democracies maintaining a two-party or multi-party political system, political forces could come to power as a result of regular elections which probably would not be explicitly hostile to the interests of the independence of Latvia but would still be ready to ignore them for the sake of improving relations with other superpowers and meeting their supporting voters’ requirements. Such was the “new world” of the 1970s in which the “Latvian Cause” risked becoming completely trivialized if the “strong stance” formulated in the DP- camp time documents in 1947 had continued to be kept. Sixthly, for the new-generation activists in all major host countries, an insurmountable problem concerning both “foreign affairs” and other areas, namely, the small number of responsible Latvians compared to that of the “natives,” had actually not changed much, and if it did, then for the worse. This fact was known to the new-generation leaders of organizations. However, the active core – those several hundred activists from all generations in all countries, for which the “Latvian Cause” was very important – was still there. One could also count on an impressive number of supporters who were willing to pay membership fees, take part in events and consider themselves Latvians. Yet, according to other statistics, the dilution of the Latvian identity also went on among Latvians. Linguists found out that the local languages became dominant in the new bilingual citizens of Latvian origin. Publishing houses reported that the readership of Latvian books, magazines and newspapers declined every year. Various commentaries on the Latvian exile’s internal and foreign policies showed that the majority

118 ULDIS GRAVA. If Kārlis Zariņš and Pēteris Lejiņš were both adults at the moment of becoming exiles, and they understood the tasks of the exile from that point of view, then there also were many Latvians who came to the post- war West as children or adolescents. The younger Latvians’ contacts with the people, institutions, languages and customs of their host countries from the very beginning Uldis Grava (right) with the U.S. President Gerald Ford. Official White House photo from were inevitably direct and close yet allowed the personal archives of Uldis Grava them to maintain as much close links with the Latvian identity. With the exile going on, a new generation of people came to take up the public positions in the Latvian society. Sociologist Veidemanis described them in the late 1950s as well-blended into both guest (Latvian) and host cultures. In terms of their daily life, it usually meant living “parallel” lives, as the first “new-generation” ALA and WFFL board chairman Uldis Grava, who took up these positions in the early 1970s, described it in his autobiography.* How the requirements of these two cultures were being combined depended on particular personality and circumstances. Large Latvian centers (such as , where Grava grew up) provided many great opportunities for getting involved into the Latvian life, at the same time making a successful career in the host society (in Grava’s case, in the U.S. media industry). As Grava writes, “As I came to America at the age of 12, the integration into the American society, which in general is very open, somehow passed me by.”** His “community” during his youth and a later period had been explicitly Latvian (also in terms of the language), which, however, was by no means an obstacle for winning his bread up until his retirement in U.S. journalism, which was, of course, entirely American (also in terms of the language). Grava’s involvement in the Latvian “public work” began early and became a part of his further life. With respect to the typology of the Latvian identity in exile, Grava’s success story was, however, one of many possible options because it was simply unachievable for many to maintain such bi-cultural balance with an incline towards the Latvian side, due to the high dispersion. The fact that Grava’s profession (“bread-winning job”) was something with the communication with a wide audience at its core later turned out to be very important for the public work of the Latvian exile because a successful pursuit of the “cause” of the liberation of Latvia – i.e., the exiles’ “foreign affairs” – in large Western democracies depended on maintaining contacts in the media world and the understanding of the Western media. The “Latvians-As-Guests” mentality no longer worked in this field; there was a need for confidence, internalization of equality of rights and arguing from the position of strength.

* Uldis Grava, Tālumā, bet ne svešumā (Rīga: Jumava, 2016), 90. ** Ibid., 46.

119 of the latest-generation exiles were rather guided by their host countries’ public opinions than by some special “Latvian” one. All these processes together could not yet be considered “assimilation” (asimilācija) or “ethnic transformation” (pārtautošanos) (concepts discussed by Edgars Dunsdorfs) but, perhaps, “accommodation” (pielāgošanās). Along with all these changes there came the inevitable fact that the most effective way of defending one’s own “policy” in the democratic systems, namely, the election of one’s “own people” to high political positions, proved to be unacceptable or unachievable for Latvians in all host countries. Perhaps it would have been too much to ask: to work effectively in the political systems of democratic countries and move “upward” to the state-level posts through the local parties would have meant to turn politics into a profession and be prepared to move the entire “Latvian Cause” aside at least due to the lack of time. It was something even the latest generations of Latvian professionals were not ready to do, and thus it meant at the third stage that the advancement of Latvian “foreign affairs” remained at the level of the “interest groups” or “pressure groups,” always and everywhere competing for instruments and resources with the Latvian “internal affairs.”

Conclusions The model of the past in which the Latvian post-war Western exiles are regarded from the beginning until the end as an integrated whole with specific and consistent “internal” and “foreign” policies does not really correspond with these emigrants’ development through the decades that are considered to be the most active period of the “exile.” In fact, the exiles had to respond in their general life and specifically in their “foreign affairs” approaches to many different changes in the relevant life contexts, as well as to the structural dispersal, which by the end of the 1950s turned into the Western exiles’ key feature. Thus, the exiles’ life and its tendencies were of a variable nature. The escape stage was followed by the start of the dispersion, i.e., life in the German refugee camps, as well as in Sweden. This initial dispersion after the “great departure” was followed by an extended dispersion, when the Western Latvians returned to “normal” life in around twenty countries on different continents. As a counter-measure against the dispersion, a strong and very successful self-organization of the exiles had been developing from the very beginning, which by the second half of the 1950s brought about the emergence of not only several hundred local

120 Latvian organizations, but also the “central” organizations in the main host countries and one global organization (WFFL) uniting all the Western Latvians. The main tasks of all large organizations were to maintain the Latvian identity (the “internal affairs”) and implement a strategy for the restoration of independence of the Republic of Latvia (the “foreign affairs”). In course of time, however, these tendencies later underwent changes. As the exile continued, the first task began to seem just as important as the second one because there came upsetting reports from all the “colonies” about the dilution of the Latvian identity in various ways. When the second-generation exile activists (“public workers”) started to appear in the management of the organizations, their predecessors’ strategic approach to “foreign affairs” seemed too sluggish to them. The new-generation leaders came to their host countries as children or adolescents and therefore received a secondary or higher education in the host country languages, thus developing a balanced and deep involvement in both home and host cultures, as well as self- confidence. They no longer felt like “guests” who would be encouraged to abstain from intervening in the “businesses” of their host society. They accepted the need to fight for the attention to the “Latvian Cause” not just in the corridors of power but also in the media worlds of the host countries as self-evident. This generation continued to promote the idea of the restoration of independence and remained at the helm of “foreign affairs” up until the Third Awakening.

Endnotes

1 Eduards Silkalns, red., Kārlis Zariņš. Mēs būsim: runas un raksti 1947–1963 (Melburna, Kārļa Za- riņa fonds, 1987), 8. 2 Sk. John Hiden, Vahur Made and David J. Smith, eds., The Baltic Question during the Cold War (London: Routledge, 2008), 45–55. 3 Bruno Albāts un Visvaldis V. Klīve, Amerikas Latviešu Apvienība 1951–1986 (Vašingtona: ALA apgāds, 1986), 202–203; Vilis Eglīte, “Tauta šai malā,” Archīvs No. 24, 1984, 54. 4 Bruno Albāts un Visvaldis V. Klīve, Amerikas Latviešu Apvienība 1951–1986, 190. 5 Jānis Kadilis, red., Jūlijs Feldmanis (Linkolnā, Nebraska: Vaidava, 1963), 13. 6 Bruno Albāts un Visvaldis V. Klīve, Amerikas Latviešu Apvienība 1951–1986, 188. 7 Eduards Bruno Deksnis un Kristīne Beķere, “Latviešu trimdas loma Latvijas neatkarības idejas uzturēšanā” no Tālavs Jundzis un Guntis Zemītis, red., Latvieši un Latvija. Trešais sējums (Rīga: Latvijas Zinātņu Akadēmija, 2013), 88–89. 8 Jānis Peniķis, “Darbs brīvībai un mūsu uzskati,” Jaunā Gaita, No. 22–23, 1959. 9 Bruno Albāts un Visvaldis V. Klīve, Amerikas Latviešu Apvienība 1951–1986, 89. 10 Uldis Grava, Tālumā, bet ne svešumā (Rīga: Jumava, 2016), 181.

121 Conceptualization of Foreign Policy during the Awakening Period

EDIJS BOŠS

This brief chapter on the development of foreign policy doctrines during the period of the Awakening has not been written to provide the reader with a chronological account of this complex time period, overflowing with sudden developments. Such information and its partial interpretation can be found in memoirs and collections of documents issued in this quarter century. The aim of this chapter also is not to list the politically legal nuances associated with the primary foreign policy goal of the Awakening period – to ensure international support for the restoration of the statehood of Latvia. The above could be valuable topics for new research. The goal of this article is the desire to identify, on a conceptual level, the development of the views of Latvia’s foreign policy- makers on the international processes and Latvia’s place in them. For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to explain up front what is to be understood by the term “foreign policy doctrine” in the context of this article. By a general definition, a “doctrine” is a set of the fundamental foreign policy views consisting of at least two elements: 1) assessment of the conditions of the international environment and 2) a vision on how the national fundamental interests – primarily security – can be best implemented in the relevant conditions of the international environment. To describe such foreign policy “doctrines” other terms may be used, such as “concept” or “strategy,” and they also may not be established in the official documentation. During the Awakening period in Latvia, the elements of the foreign policy doctrines are more often found in unstructured, even indirect ways, for example, in the statements of the persons involved in foreign policy formation and in the documents related to other policy areas. It should be noted that the Awakening is an atypical period for the foreign policy analysis. A significant part of the Latvian political elite of that time – the “” faction, for example, had almost thirty percent of the seats in the

122 parliament – was not engaged with construction of foreign policy in principle, given their opposition to Latvia’s statehood. Therefore, this article deals with the development of the foreign policy concepts within the political currents that insisted on – and achieved – the restoration of Latvia’s independence, as well as after the 1990 elections, delegated officials for the work in the core national foreign policy institutions of the renewed state – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Council.

The era of chaotic changes Looking from the distance one generation away, the Awakening period might seem eclectic in the history of Latvia’s foreign affairs ideas. Partly this can be explained with subjective factors. After decades of living under information scarcity conditions forced on by the Soviet regime, the traditions of foreign policy discussions were shallow. Furthermore, given the early stage of development of the party system and State administrative institutions, conceptualization of foreign policy was a highly personalized activity. It involved a very limited number of people, who often developed inter- personal conflicts. As once concluded by a deputy of the Supreme Council, Juris Bojārs, who himself also was one of the participants in this discussion: “Our foreign policy apparatus and our parliament in general is a personality apparatus and a personality parliament, thus the foreign policy takes place at the personality level, with those personalities being in competition.”1 The conceptual vagueness inherent in the Awakening period can also be explained by the characteristics of the era. The time of the Awakening was the “acceleration of history” period. In an extremely short period of time, in just a few years, so much happened, the changes were so rapid and fundamental that every idea, even the one incubated in the sharpest political mind, usually had only a brief period of validity. Intellectual fumbling can be seen in almost all of the testimonies of this period, not only in Latvia. Consternation could be seen also in the statements of the top international policy-makers and analyst judgments. Clearly, after the collapse of the bipolar international relations model of the Cold War, a “new order” was developing in the world in general and in Europe in particular. But what kind of order? Foreign policy doctrine refinement requires time, experience, and a more or less clear picture of the realities of the international environment of the era. At the end period of the Cold War, all these things were in short supply, just like sausages in a Soviet shop.

123 MAVRIKS VULFSONS. Professor, linguist, a long-time foreign policy commentator, articulator of historical injustices, inspirer of the independence movement – Mavriks Vulfsons was the most qualified of all the foreign policy thinkers of the Awakening period. However, given the ideological and personal conflicts that began to develop within the LTF, Vulfsons’ position – the Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman of the Supreme Council (1990–1991) – appeared more influential than it was in reality. Like for other high-caliber intellectuals Photo: Boriss Koļesņikovs / in many other parts in the world, the expertise Latvijas Vēstnesis accumulated in the Interwar and the Cold War period had limited applicability in conceptualization of the radically different post-Cold War world.

For example, comparing the early stage and the final stage of the Awakening period, the views about the Soviet power and regional influence had radically transformed. Similarly, radically changed were both the perception of the possibilities to restore Latvia’s statehood, and the analysis of what foreign policy baggage restrictions will have to be taken along when leaving the USSR. A lot of other things that seemed like geopolitical axioms, for example in 1987, had already gone up in smoke in 1990. The day before in October 1990, one of the most seasoned minds of political analysis of the Latvian Popular Front (Latvijas Tautas fronte, LTF), Mavriks Vulfsons, openly concluded only that “this event in some way is related to our future destiny.”2 What kind of power will be Germany, what role will it be playing in the post-cold war Europe? Not only to Vulfsons, but even to Francois Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher, this issue was confusing. How – and whether at all – will Americans see their role in the Eastern Europe after the Cold War? They shrugged. But perhaps the realpolitik tradition-based notions of vulnerability of small states near powerful neighbors in general will no longer be relevant? Indulis Bērziņš, another foreign policy mind of the LTF and a later Foreign Minister, briefly before the adoption of the declaration of 4 May 1990, said that the decision to renew the independence of Latvia “is expected from us by the whole Russia, the whole democratic Russia, the Russia that owns the future.”3 The ending period of the Cold War was characterized by waves of hope for a more peaceful and rational world. But, could a foreign policy doctrine be built on the vision of the “end of the history”?

124 Accommodation models to Moscow’s hegemony During the initial period of the Awakening, as the post-communist political currents were forming in Latvia, conceptualization of foreign policy issues happened in a very generalized manner. Not wanting to provoke repressions by the the Soviet conservative forces, the development of foreign policy views was subordinate to the fragmented, ongoing discussion of independence restoration possibilities. Hereto, most of the intellectual energy during this period was devoted not to the drafting of outlines for the future, but to studying the history censored by the Soviet regime. Such revolutionary, according to the Soviet standards, public discussions were in the favorable environment created by the conditions in the USSR. Shortly after assuming the post of the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, the unusually youthful initiated this fundamental process of transformation of the Soviet state. Among the reformist circles that had assumed the power in Kremlin, a conviction was shared that after the decades lived under the ideological dogma of the totalitarian communism, “everything is rotten” in the Soviet Union. The intention of the reforms was to instil new vitality in the weakened Soviet state, however “loosening of the screws” did not lead to restoration of the Soviet state, but to its dismantling. The weakness of the USSR was precisely one of the most important geo-political preconditions for the rebirth of Latvia as an independent state after spending half a century within the Soviet Union. In the second half of the 1980s, the initial goals of the Latvian political movements, formed outside of the Soviet power structure, still prudently defined within the frame of the socialist political correctness, were associated with the transformation of the USSR from a hyper-centralized state into a federation, or better yet, a confederation of actually independent republics. These signs of potentially obtainable autonomy levels, also contained elements of foreign policy doctrine. They were based on ideas about the unavoidable requirement to acommodate living within Moscow’s sphere of influence, even if it were possible to increase the internal political autonomy and to reduce the direct control of the “center” over Latvia. If the regional hegemony of the USSR seemed inevitable during this period, – and this notion, in various modifications, remained up to the full restoration of independence – then adapting to the power of Moscow

125 meant expressing the readiness to partly renounce the sovereignty in foreign policy. For example, in the memorandum of October 1987, the activists of the Helsinki-86 group called in accordance with the Soviet constitution to “emphasise more the independent status of the Republic of Latvia within the family of other republics.”4 A year later, as the more nationalistically- minded political currents arrived demanding to restore the independence of Latvia, the dimension of the foreign policy content in their statements was only slightly more noticeable. In the summer of 1988, the founders of the Latvian National Independence Movement (Latvijas Nacionālās neatkarības kustība, LNNK) declared as one of its goals the opposition of “any violence, militarism,” and the liberation of Latvia’s territory from nuclear weapons.5 In 1988, ispired by the ideas of the “reconstruction,” also “popular fronts” were founded in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The LTF, the Estonian Popular Front (Rahvarinne) and Sajūdis in Lithuania became the mass political movements during the years of the Awakening in the Baltic republics. The official original declarations which had the same content in all three republics, requested Soviet transformation within the federation, which would comply with the “true Leninist” principles of national self- determination.6 One of the authors of the idea to found the LTF, geographer Valdis Šteins, in the first congress of the LTF put it as “the establishment of the Confederation of Baltic socialist countries within the structure of the USSR.”7 After the Congress, the newly elected head of the LTF Dainis Īvāns explained that “there is no question of political independence, only about a republican sovereignty; ... which means that the Soviet Union would have only common diplomatic and defense structures.”7 As in the LNNK documents of 1988, so in the statements of the founders of the LTF, anti-militaristic themes could be seen, reminiscent of the non-aligned movement narrative of the Cold War period. The LTF policy planners declared at that time that they advocate “the disarmament and demilitarization of the society: support declaring the whole Baltic and Scandinavian region a nuclear-free zone,”9 imagining a future scenario in which the Baltic countries together with the Nordic countries form a region apart from superpower competition. There is little evidence that these visions came from the fundamental moral conviction based denial of militarism. “While we had riflemen, we had self-determination,” in the first congress of the LTF sarcastically stated lawyer Juris Bojārs, “it is from the moment there are no riflemen, there is also no

126 self-determination.”10 The theses on the “zone free of nuclear weapons” was a tactical pacifism, which occurred from the desire to experience the withdrawal of the Soviet military infrastructure from the territory of Latvia. The anti- military discourse development also was based on the objective awareness of own weakness against the overwhelming Soviet military capabilities. The Soviet troops were not going to be driven away from Latvia with weapons, and if so, then perhaps it was possible to find a way to distance oneselves from the force politics of the superpowers and to delegitimise the presence of the Soviet troops in Latvia. The pacifist euphemisms later disappeared from the vocabulary of the independence-supporting Latvia’s politicians as quickly as they had appeared. Still at the beginning of the summer of 1990, for example, the Foreign Minister of the LTF, Jānis Jurkāns hoped that “we will see the hour when the Baltic region will be demilitarized and there will be no talk of blocks, the war blocks.”11 However, already during 1991, the Latvian Armed Forces began to take shape, and also the desire to seek security guarantees for Latvia in the Western countries appeared immediately after the restoration of independence. A little later, shortly after the collapse of the USSR, in a classical manner of realpolitik, the longtime member of the LTF and the the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Council, Jānis Freimanis concluded: “In order to have peace, we must arm ourselves.”12

“Three small ” In addition to the initial caution about the form of the renewal of Latvia’s independence, there were components of two potentially far-reaching foreign policy visions in the statements of the independence-supporting politicians: the Baltic country collaboration, and “the Finnish example” for the development of political and military relations with Moscow. If the idea of the Baltic unity can be regarded as a foreign policy doctrine, then the Awakening period was at the high point of popularity for these views. “Being a member of the Latvian Popular Front means taking on a great responsibility not only about the fate of Latvia, but the whole Baltics, because strong Estonia and strong Lithuania are largely dependent on strong Latvia,” during the first congress of the LTF said the popular poet and future diplomat Jānis Peters. “Internally divided Latvia also means divided Baltics... Latvia must become the unifier of the three republics.”13 The documents of both first congresses of the LTF contained the thesis that the Front “supports the

127 development of political, economic, and cultural relations among the Baltic republics, as well as the countries of the Baltic Sea region.”14 In the coming years, ideas about the cooperation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia will develop further, even discussing the idea of a confederation model of the three countries. The the Baltic League project of the Interwar period was restored, and new trilateral institutions were established, such as the Baltic Assembly and the Baltic Council. Emotionally the high point of independence movement collaboration among the Baltic republics was the campaign in August 1989. When the government was established in 1990, the LTF-delegated Foreign Minister’s program contained the Baltic cooperation as priority number one. Jānis Jurkāns stated that it was the “the backbone of the foreign policy.”15 Sensing the intensification of the USSR’s internal centrifugal forces and seeing Moscow’s readiness to depart from its Cold War area of influence in the Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic caution in their statements during the Awakening period gradually decreased; furthermore, contact with foreign diplomats and journalists required a more detailed articulation of their views on foreign policy. The evolution of opinions and expressions can be observed in a succession of documentary evidence of this period. “Isn’t the example of Finland inspiring?” one of the organization’s activists, Jānis Rukšāns, asked rhetorically in the founding congress of the LTF. He thought that the USSR would benefit if “three friendly countries or their federation would emerge as their neighbours.”16 Until the actual restoration of independence in August 1991, the “neutrality” concept and “the Finnish example” became the key terms among the Baltic foreign policy thinkers; and furthermore, their cooperation during this period was so close that the knowledge developed in a peculiar process of cross-border intellectual cross- pollination. “If Moscow for a moment would forget its superpower ambitions, it would be happy itself to provide independence for the Balts,” at this time explained Tiit Made, one of the Rahvarinne leaders, in an interview with Swedish press. “Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania could create a great buffer zone between the East and the West. As the Soviet Union lost its intermediaries in Finland, , and Sweden, the Baltic countries could take on this role.”17 On 14 May 1989, the Baltic Assembly called on the international community to listen to the desire of the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian people to implement national self-determination and to achieve independence “in a neutral and demilitarized area.”18 In another interview, Western journalists

128 asked directly Romualdas Ozolas, one of the leaders of Sajūdis, whether an independent Lithuania would form a relationship with the Soviet Union after the Finnish model, that would mean a European domestic policy, while not provoking and respecting Moscow as a regional superpower, with all of the prerogatives resulting from that status. “The Finnish example? Yes, that would be acceptable, presumably it also is the only option,” reasoned Ozolas.19 In the summer of 1989, the LTF, in internal debates, came to an openly explicit goal of the restoration of Latvia’s independence, and the cautious theses of the USSR confederation models became outdated. One of the last influential activists of the LTF, who publicly theorized about this foreign policy independence without sovereignty as a possible scenario for Latvia, was the authoritative lawyer Ilmārs Bišers who later in LTF government became Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis’ deputy for contacts with Moscow. “In the world there are also arrangements of large and small countries cohabiting as associated countries. For example, the United States is associated with countries such as Puerto Rico and Micronesia,” Bišers wrote shortly before the second congress of the LTF in September 1989. “They have retained full internal autonomy, relegating to the U.S., on a contract basis, such functions as national defense, foreign affairs.”20 The overall essence of the strategic views of the LTF leaders in these years developed smoothly following the course of “neutrality” and “the Finnish model.” The foreign policy doctrine developed around the idea that the domestic autonomy of a small country can be achieved, Moscow’s interests non-withstanding, by strict adherence to a pledge to respect the USSR status as a regional superpower, accepting its strategic whims, and not even thinking of engaging in alliances that Moscow could perceive as threatening. In the summer of 1989, Īvāns spoke about the aim of completely restoring the independent Latvian state, which would have to reckon with the fact that the “military ties with Moscow would remain for a long time.”21 At the same time the LTF lawyers worked on the draft of the restorable Constitution, that contained an article defining that “Latvia is not a member of military- political unions.”22 The documents of the second LTF congress in the fall of 1989, clearly confirming the progress towards the full restoration of Latvia’s independence, as foreign policy doctrine elements, recommended radical demilitarization of Latvia, while providing that “the rules of the USSR Armed Forces deployment and the status of bases” will be determined in accordance with an international treaty.23

129 Despite a number of significant contradictions during this period between the polititians of the nationally-radical and the parliamentary wings regarding the tactics to restore the independence, the core of the strategic views inspired by the Finlandization example, was in fact the same for all. One of the leaders of the LNNK, Einars Repše, in the summer of 1989, in a private conversation with Swedish diplomats, spoke about the concept of the “three small Finlands” for the restoration of independence for the Baltic countries.24 In turn, the leader of the World Federation of Free Latvians (WFFL), Gunārs Meierovics, on behalf of the Latvian diaspora, in November 1989 sent a letter to the U.S. administration asking for the support to the Baltic struggle for independence, explaining that “neutral, demilitarized, independent Baltic countries would play an important role in the future of Europe.”25 At the same time, on 18 November 1989, an open letter was adopted in the name of the people, to the Presidents of the USSR and the U.S., expressing that the Baltic countries should regain “the status of full-fledged European countries and should become a friendly bridge between the East and the West.”26

“Three small Finlands” ... “return to Europe” After the Supreme Council elections in the spring of 1990, the foreign policy of the 4th May Declaration and of the establishment of the government of the independent Republic of Latvia, was partially institutionalized, forming the core of the officials responsible for this sector, in addition, the views began to be significantly affected by the experience of practical diplomacy. It would be helpful to divide the discussions on foreign policy during this period into tactical and strategic levels. The tactical foreign policy level – namely, the need to gain foreign support for the Baltic separation process from the USSR – in this period, took virtually all of the energy and brainpower of the foreign policy-makers of the resurgent Latvia. However, at the same time some conceptually more far-reaching aspects emerged in the formulation of policies. One of them was the “return to Europe.” Idealized and abstract, this argument was in fact present throughout the independence movement narrative. On the one hand, it focused all the ideas about the future realization of Latvia’s national interests. “Return to Europe” presumed both the solution for security problems by increasing the autonomy from Moscow, and showed the path towards prosperity, according to the Western standards, creating in Latvia an effective model of political and economic governance.

130 IVARS GODMANIS. Being the first Head of the Government (1990–1993) of the renewed Republic of Latvia was an unenviable job, especially given the unstable economic situation and the likelihood of armed aggression from the Soviet regime-defending conservative forces. Consequently, diplomacy was not Godmanis’ primary concern during the Awakening period, however, neither did he consider it proper to completely delegate foreign affairs to others. Godmanis participation in conceptualization of the “Finnish example” is visible, for exmple, Photo: Uldis Pāže, Chancellery in the Supreme Council debate in May 1990. A of the Saeima; copyright holder German journalist, after his visit to Latvia during the of the audiovisual material – Administration of the Saeima establishment of Godmanis government, reported that the new Latvia’s Prime Minister “explores the Finnish model when he is in a pessimistic mood, and explores the example of the Austrian neutrality when he is feeling optimistic.” The popularity of the “Finnish model” based foreign policy doctrine vanished soon after the restoration of complete independence.

On the other hand, the notions of what exactly is “Europe” and what is not, during these years were inevitably blurred. Will it be a “Europe from to Vladivostok,” including the Russia going in the direction of liberally democratic development? Built of what kind of cooperation mechanisms? Over which path the European integration will evolve? In the spring of 1990, in parallel with the German unification process, in the capitals of the European community the work on preparation of the Maastricht Treaty had begun, however, the outcome of this process was not yet predictable. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, later transformed into the OSCE, was predicted – as it turned out later, wrongly – to have a great future in the post-Cold War Europe. Will NATO become the same withering relic of the Cold War as the ? There were no answers to these questions, and could not be, and thereby there were also no prerequisites for the development of a detailed foreign policy doctrine. If there was no clarity what the international environment will be, it was also difficult to predict how to behave best in this environment. “We are building a common European house, and once the German issue will be resolved, once the Baltic issue will be resolved, the issue about NATO will dissappear,” reasoned Jānis Jurkāns, in the summer

131 JĀNIS JURKĀNS. The first Minister of Foreign Affairs (1990–1992) in Godmanis government, became the face of the diplomacy of the period of the Awakening. Although he had little experience in politics, being modern, resourceful, and with poise, his responsibilities included the practical development of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and relationship building towards the West, while diplomacy towards the East was to be managed by the LTF politicians who knew the Soviet corridors of power better, such as the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Latvia, Anatolijs Gorbunovs Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister Godmanis’ first deputy Ilmārs Bišers. Later, in the nineties, serving in an opposition party, Jurkāns continued to advocate the adjustment doctrine principles of the “Finnish model” for developing relations with Russia, and his approach was criticized by his oponents as being pro-Kremlin. But what in the nineties was evaluated as a questionable alternative, appeared to be the only option in the Awakening period.

of 1990. “I believe the time will come when all the European problems will be solved by a conference of collaboration and cooperation, that will be the main means.”27 In the Supreme Council debates before the adoption of the 4th May Declaration, Indulis Bērziņš, a representative of the LTF’s centrist view group, later a politician and a Minister of Foreign Affairs of the “,” said that currently a “new relationship between the European countries” was forming and, whatever Latvia will become, it must manage to “jump into this new European order.”28 A few days later, the head of the newly formed government, Ivars Godmanis spoke of the need to participate in the future “... also in all the European undertakings.”29 However, at the same time the tactical level of the foreign policy was developed in a sufficiently detailed form. A German journalist, after his visit to Latvia during the establishment of Godmanis government, reported that the new Latvian Prime Minister “explores the Finnish model when he is in a pessimistic mood, and explores the example of the Austrian neutrality when he is feeling optimistic.”30 In the government approval debate of the Supreme Council, Godmanis was already sketching out the doctrine of the “three small Finlands” in sufficient detail.

132 “[I]n the current situation, the concept of government operation should be based on the model of the Finnish example. I believe that by using the Finnish case, that demonstrates clearly and practically to the whole world and the USSR, the Republic of Latvia, together with Estonia and the Republic of Lithuania, could survive and develop as independent countries – subjects to the international law, while maintaining like Finland, special relationships with the USSR in the political, economic, military, and other areas. Apparently, the government would have to practically prove that the Republic of Latvia, specifically as an independent country, by maintaining a special relationship with the Soviet Union, has all the options to develop economically profitable relations to the benefit of both, with the USSR as its neighbor, as with other neighbors ... And the task of the Foreign Ministry is to find the right key and the right proportion to try to independently organize the foreign policy, however, realistically considering that it must be coordinated with the interests of the USSR superpower.”31

A broad consensus on this strategic concept was both in the centrist LTF, and the nationalist wings that later turned into ideological rival parties on the Latvian political scene. The representatives of the LNNK, Eduards Berklavs and Aleksandrs Kiršteins acknowledged the foreign policy program of the Godmanis government as “quite acceptable.”32 The opponents of the parliamentary road to independence were of similar views. The “Citizens’ Congress” resolution of April 1990 promised “to comply with the external security interests of the USSR and other countries.”33

Yalta-phobic motives The time period of less than a year and a half, between the adoption of the 4th May Declaration in the spring of 1990 and attainment of the full independence by the end of the summer of 1991, for the LTF government and the new foreign policy elite was a time of very intense accumulation of experience in practical diplomacy that inevitably influenced also their perceptions of Latvia’s opportunities to maneuver in international politics. On the tactical level of the foreign policy, the initial expectations of the Baltic independence movement leaders were associated with the fact that it would be possible to “internationalize” the issue of the restoration of independence, and the Western powers would become the “lawyers” for Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in their tough divorce proceedings with the USSR. However, these theoretical expectations quickly gave way to practical disappointment. Only individual Nordic countries, especially Denmark, Sweden, and , became such “lawyers” for the Baltic countries in a meaningful way. Despite

133 several decades of non-recognition policy, a very restrained position regading the Baltic issue was taken not only by Germany that was undergoing the process of reunification, but also by the United States. Imagining the future of the international system, the U.S. foreign policy- makers – like many others during this period – did not foresee and did not attempt to promote such a dramatic, complete collapse of the USSR, as this country experienced at the end of 1991.34 Their vision was based on the U.S. “containment” policy considerations, carried out during the Cold War, according to which rather than the Soviet Russia itself, the communist ideology-based expansionism of the regime was the crux of the problem. Consequently, Washington’s policy up to the last moments of the USSR existence was based on respect for this country undergoing a liberal transformation as a superpower of the future international system. With the communist ideology fading, eventually it might be possible to build a partnership as it was conceived at the beginning of the United Nations creation – the time before the United States and the Soviet Union became the ideological and geopolitical opposites of the Cold War. From the viewpoint of Washington during the years 1988–1991, this type of rational partnership was already developing and produced results, for example, the unprecedented level of international consensus on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the German unification process. Like the leaders of the most influential Western Europe countries, the U.S. President George W. Bush highly appreciated the opportunities created by the process of perestroika, and the USSR’s and Mikhail Gorbachev’s willingness to step back from the Soviet zone of influence in Eastern Europe. However, at the same time Gorbachev’s domestic political positions against the Soviet conservative powers were assessed as fragile, which in turn led to Washington’s unwillingness to radically confront Gorbachev on the Baltic issue. “We are a superpower, there are many factors that we must consider,” Bush explained in a private conversation with the Chairman of the Estonian Supreme Council, Arnold Rüütel. “I do not want to press Gorbachev in a corner where his only allies will remain only the army and the KGB.”35 From the Western powers, during this period, insistent requests sounded towards Moscow not to use violence in the rebellious Baltic countries. However, in terms of direct and meaningful support to the independence of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, the Western countries, until the last moment, retained the view that the liberation of the Baltic Republics cannot be forced on the Soviet Union despite the injustice of 1940, and the restoration of the statehood

134 should be negotiatiated between the Balts and Moscow themselves. Thus, in the end, complete restoration of independence of the Baltic countries turned out to depend not on the support of the strategic partners in the West, but on the domestic political turbulence that at the time ruled in Moscow. The Western powers began to recognize the full independence of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia after it was done by who, after the August 1991 coup in Moscow, had become the actual leader of Moscow replacing Mikhail Gorbachev. This disappointment in the early contacts with the Western powers enhanced something that could be called “Yalta-phobia” in the minds of Latvian foreign policy-makers. The “Yalta-phobia” or the fear that the statehood of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia can become a “bargaining chip” in the behind-the-scenes negotiations of the superpower leaders, had not just an emotional component, but also features of a strategic doctrine. It was based on the view that Latvia’s objectives cannot be achieved by establishing alliance relations with any of the Western powers and, similarly as in the Interwar period, the only alternatives are either a conditional “neutrality,” or co-operation models among the small countries in the region. These notions of the (im)possibility of alliances with the Western powers, particularly the United States, will radically change in the nineties, but during the final phase of the Awakening period, the “Yalta-phobic” instincts were very strong. Disappointment rhetoric was heard already in the second congress of the LTF. “For many years we have heard that most countries do not recognize the incorporation of the Baltic counties in the Soviet Union,” in October 1989 analyzed Edvīns Inkēns, a journalist active in the LTF foreign affairs. “But suddenly now, when we have decided on equating our de facto status to our de jure status, the response is such that it is disappointing. We are dealing with evasive, empty declarations and even a variety of attempts to silence us.”36 Sandra Kalniete in her memories about this period rhetorically asked: “Why couldn’t Latvia be an island? ... I wish the world would leave us alone once and for all.”37 Thus, in the summer of 1992, after the full restoration of independence, discussing the first foreign policy concept, there were several themes coming from the new political elite of Latvia. Some of these themes, such as the doctrine of Finlandization, were fading. The Finnish Cold War-era developed strategic adjustment model in the eyes of the Balts had lost its usefulness, given that the Soviet Union had collapsed and Moscow’s perspectives of regional impact no longer appeared so imminent. Furthermore, the Baltic countries, contrary to what was once carefully planned, had obtained liberation from the

135 Soviet Union without any assurance provided in the separation agreements relating to respecting Moscow’s “privileged zones of interest.” Consequently, in mid-1992, the Latvian foreign policy-makers’ ideas circled around the “European” and “Yalta-phobic” concepts. Jānis Jurkāns, while in his final months as Minister, verbalized the prevailing views of the independence movement’s centrist wing in the foreign relations sector, whose motto was to unite with Europe:

“If Europeans want to live a fully European life, if we want the Latvian people to acquire the basis of existence equivalent to the European nations, we must not irresponsibly stand aside. We must actively participate in the European affairs, even if we do not get quick economic benefits and security guarantees. Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers development of the communications with the European Community as its priority line of action ... [While] the main task in relations with Russia is to minimize Latvia’s political and economic dependence.”38

A part of the more nationalistically minded members of the Supreme Council already then proposed a more conservative and isolated strategic direction of foreign policy. Parliamentarian Aleksandrs Kiršteins rhetorically asked “do Latvians ... have to uncritically admire the Maastricht agreement, for even greater migration ...?”39 Parliamentarian Jānis Freimanis had very similar positions, saying that “we have to thoroughly think out the question of national identity, namely, what is our national identity really? Therefore, do the Maastricht documents fit us or not?”40 These national isolationist themes were alternating with the genuine “Yalta-phobia” that had arisen from the bitter experience of previous year in relations with the Western powers. “I want to remind everyone that the powers have always been developing their policy ... often without taking into account the interests and destinies of the small countries,” stated parliamentarian Ints Cālītis. “We see that these processes continue ... The geopolitical interests of the [super]powers ... may not always match with Latvia’s national interests, and indeed they will not.”41 The member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Māris Budovskis criticized Latvia’s diplomats for overly siding with the politics of the great powers as a result of which Latvia becomes “the barter in different superpower actions ... Therefore, [the solution] could be the integration with small countries.”42 The next Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs, in the summer of 1992, in his statements merged both the European, and the nationally-isolationist

136 perspective. Latvia, by regaining its independence, was already a part of Europe, however, in his opinion, listening uncritically to the ultraliberal human rights rhetoric coming from the West, could threaten Latvia’s full recovery as a national state. “... Compared to the time when ... Europe saw the Soviet Union as one of its greatest enemies ... now everything has drastically changed. ... Russia has declared that it is a democratic country. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has ceased to exist. And the Western Europe and the world are more interested in Russia as an eventually democratic country than the small Baltic countries.”43

Conclusion It is clear that the ideas of the policy-makers for the problems to be solved and the foreign policy of their era have both situational and common interest content. However, later analyzing these ideas, it can be difficult to distinguish the transitory from the permanent. Or is it at all possible to clearly distinguish between what is valid for specific historical conditions and the ideas, the use of which is potentially broader? Many of the foreign policy concepts of the Awakening period seemingly lost their relevance, even before the Awakening was over. As already mentioned, this can be explained by the rapidly changing conditions during this time period. The points of reference, as mounds in a swampy marsh under one’s feet, one after another were sinking here and emerging there. The beginning of the foreign policy doctrine of the Awakening period was based on the idea of the inevitability of Moscow’s regional hegemony, and by analyzing the Finnish Cold War experience, the foreign policy minds of the Awakening were trying to figure out how to adapt to this unfortunate reality of the international environment. The “Finnish model” also presumed refusal of the opportunities to engage in alliances aimed at balancing Moscow’s regional impact with the assistance of other major powers. As is known, in later years, this adaptation doctrine was discarded and a radically different doctrine was implemented, as Latvia established a “strategic partnership” with the U.S., and within this partnership, became a member of NATO. This was possible, because in addition to the collapse of the USSR, later in the 1990s the geopolitical landscape in Eastern Europe was again radically changed by the U.S. decision to fundamentally engage in the post-communism transformation of this region, and to make itself available for the establishment of the alliance relationship. However, during

137 the Awakening period, there were no indications of the likelihood of such a scenario, and thus the perceptions of what would be geopolitically possible for the future independent Latvia, were radically different. Also, the beginnings of the “European” idea in the Latvian foreign affairs discussion of the Awakening period on the one hand were clearly present, but on the other hand, it was a distant beacon wrapped in fog. It was not yet clear what will the European community be in the post-Cold War period. Not to mention the community enlargement towards the East, the Western European countries were still trying to understand how it will be possible to continue the integration processes after the reunification of Germany, as this “key” superstate was restoring impact potential in the Central and Eastern Europe. If there is a common interest message in the foreign policy history of the Awakening period, then it is to be formulated as a wish for Latvia to never find itself in the situation of such narrow foreign policy options. The international status Latvia acquired in the Post-Cold War period, and the increase of the maneuvering space in relations with Russia is not a given.

Endnotes

1 “1992. gada 2. jūnija sēdes stenogramma,” Latvijas Republikas Saeima, http://saeima.lv/steno/ AP_steno/1992/st_920602.htm 2 “1990. gada 2. oktobra sēdes stenogramma,” Latvijas Republikas Saeima, http://saeima.lv/steno/ AP_steno/1990/st_901002.htm 3 “Latvijas Republikas Augstākās Padomes pirmās sesijas 4. sēde 1990. gada 4. maijā,” Latvijas Re- publikas Saeima, http://saeima.lv/steno/AP_steno/1990/st_900504v.htm 4 “Latvijas cilvēktiesību aizstāvēšanas grupas Helsinki-86 memorands,” 1987. gada 2. oktobris, Histo- ria.lv, http://www.historia.lv/dokumenti/latvijas-cilvektiesibu-aizstavesanas-grupas-helsinki-86- memorands-2101987 5 “Latvijas Nacionālās neatkarības kustības (LNNK) padomes paziņojums par organizāci- jas mērķiem,” 1988. gada 10. jūlijs, Historia.lv, http://www.historia.lv/dokumenti/latvijas- nacionalas-neatkaribas-kustibas-lnnk-padomes-pazinojums-par-organizacijas-merkiem 6 Skat., piemēram, “Latvijas Tautas frontes programma,” punkts II-3, Padomju Jaunatne, 1988. gada 15. oktobris, http://www.barikadopedija.lv/raksti/387753 7 “Valdis Šteins. Speech at the 1st Congress of the LTF,” 1988. gada 8. oktobris, http://www.bari- kadopedija.lv/raksti/646983 8 „Transcript of the Press Conference Following the Founding Congress of the LTF,” LVA 2197.f.1v.a. 108.l.204.lp. 9 “Latvijas Tautas frontes programma,” article III-8. 10 “Juris Bojārs. Speech at the 1st Congress of the LTF,” 1988. gada 8. oktobris, Barikadopēdija, http://www.barikadopedija.lv/raksti/721789 11 “Latvijas Republikas Augstākās Padomes pirmās sesijas 11. sēde 1990. gada 22. maijā,” Latvijas Republikas Saeima, http://saeima.lv/steno/AP_steno/1990/st_900522.htm 12 “1992. gada 2. jūnija sēdes stenogramma,” Latvijas Republikas Saeima, http://saeima.lv/steno/ AP_steno/1992/st_920602.htm

138 13 “Jānis Peters. Speech at the 1st Congress of the LTF,” 1988. gada 8. oktobris, Barikadopēdija, http://www.barikadopedija.lv/raksti/687979 14 “Latvijas Tautas frontes programma,” article I-3; see also “Latvijas Tautas frontes programma. Projekts,” 1989. gada 14. septembris, http://www.barikadopedija.lv/raksti/377878 15 “Latvijas Republikas Augstākās Padomes pirmās sesijas 11. sēde 1990. gada 22. maijā.” 16 “Jānis Rukšāns. Speech at the 1st Congress of the LTF,” 1988. gada 8. oktobris, Barikadopēdija, http://www.barikadopedija.lv/raksti/368843 17 Tiit Made, „If Moscow Were to Give Estonia Its Freedom,” Svenska Dagbladet, 1989. gada 22. marts, 2 [FBIS-SOV-89-060, pp. 49–50]. 18 „Declaration of the Rights of Baltic Nations,” Baltic Assembly, Tallinn, 13-14 May 1989 (Tallinn: Valgus Publishers, 1989). 19 Romualdas Ozolas interview with La Vanguardia, 3 September 1989, 15 [FBIS-SOV-89-177, p. 44]. 20 Ilmārs Bišers, „Kurp ej, Tautas Fronte!” Padomju Jaunatne, 1989. gada 12. septembris, Barikado- pēdija, http://www.barikadopedija.lv/raksti/613718 21 Interview for Radio Stockholm, 22 July 1989 [FBIS-SOV-89-153, p. 76]. 22 Ints Upmacis un Egils Radziņš, „Latvijas Republikas konstitūcijas projekts,” Atmoda, 1989. gada 21. augusts. 23 “Latvijas Tautas frontes programma. Projekts.” 24 Larss Fredēns, Baltijas brīvības ceļs un Zviedrijas diplomātija (Rīga: Atēna, 2007), 221-2. 25 Meierovics’ letter, 13 November 1989 [LVA 2197. f. 1v. a.17. l. 321-2/323-4. lp.]. 26 “Latvijas tautas atklāta vēstule Mihailam Gorbačovam un Džordžam Bušam,” Padomju Jaunatne, 1989. gada 22. novembris, Barikadopēdija, http://www.barikadopedija.lv/raksti/673684 27 “Latvijas Republikas Augstākās Padomes pirmās sesijas 11. sēde 1990. gada 22. maijā.” 28 “Latvijas Republikas Augstākās Padomes pirmās sesijas 4. sēde 1990. gada 4. maijā.” 29 “Latvijas Republikas Augstākās Padomes pirmās sesijas 3. sēde 1990. gada 7. maijā,” Latvijas Re- publikas Saeima, http://saeima.lv/steno/AP_steno/1990/st_900507.htm 30 Carl Gustaf Strohm, “Fur Lettlands Freiheit,” Die Welt, 9 May 1990, 11. 31 “Latvijas Republikas Augstākās Padomes pirmās sesijas 3. sēde 1990. gada 7. maijā.” 32 “Latvijas Republikas Augstākās Padomes pirmās sesijas 11. sēde 1990. gada 22. maijā.” 33 “Joint Resolution,” April 30, 1990, LVA 2197. f. 1v. a.104. l. 190. lp. 34 For broader conceptualization of the Baltic states position in the U.S. strategy vis-à-vis Rus- sia, see Edijs Bošs, “A Strategic Appraisal of a Centenary of US-Latvian Relations: The Baltics in American Policy from Wilson to Obama” in Latvia and the United States: Revisiting a Strate- gic Partnership in a Transforming Environment, eds. Andris Sprūds and Diāna Potjomkina (Rīga: LIIA, 2016), 20–43. 35 Record of the conversation, “Ameerika Uhendriikide presidendi -i ja Eesti Vabariigi Ulemnoukogu esimehe Arnold Ruutli ning Valisminister kohtumine”, c. 29 March 1991, Igaunijas Ārlietu ministrijas arhīvs (folder “Minister. Komandeeringute aruanded 1990–1991. Memod kohtumistest mai ‘90 – dets ‘91”). 36 Materials of the 2nd Congress of the LTF, State Archives of Latvia, microfilm A-LVA-MP002. 37 Sandra Kalniete, Es lauzu. Tu lauzi. Mēs lauzām. Viņi lūza (Rīga: Jumava, 2000), http://kalniete. lv/ebooks/eslauzu/ 38 “1992. gada 2. jūnija sēdes stenogramma,” Latvijas Republikas Saeima, http://saeima.lv/steno/ AP_steno/1992/st_920602.htm 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid.

139

FOREIGN POLICY CURRENTS IN MODERN LATVIA

Latvia and Euro-Atlantic Identity

GUNDA REIRE

In the spring of 2016, when in a Eurobarometer study, European citizens were asked whether they feel like citizens of the European Union, almost 70 % of the Latvian population responded affirmatively (Figure 1). Within the European Union, this figure is average; at the same time, it is higher than in the British society, which in June voted to withdraw from the EU. However, it might be wise not to stop with this data and remember the proverb: “Just as one calls into the forest, so it echoes back.” In other words, in public opinion polls, the question asked is crucial, and it is possible to get completely different answers to the questions that appear to be very similar. As a proof of this is the sense of belonging of the Latvian society to different territorial units. In 2015, only 11 % of the society felt they belonged to the European Union, compared to other territorial units (Figure 2). What is it exactly that makes up the sense of belonging of the people, in other words – the sense of identity? Latvia’s road to the membership of the European Union and NATO has not been simple, but after 12 years of membership in these international organizations, questions should be asked whether the Latvian society has come to feel as belonging to the Euro-Atlantic family, what promotes and what prevents the formation of this feeling of belonging, as well as – what are the alternatives that those people see, who do not want to let such identity into their socio-political life. Likewise, it should be asked, how this vision of the Euro-Atlantic community has been shaped by politicians, diplomats and experts – people who both drive the public opinion, as well as implement the results in practice. The example of Latvia, from different aspects, proves the long-known truth in identity research, that the state participation in any international organizations or institutionalized groups of countries is not per se regarded as identity- and belonging-forming factor. On one hand, being under the yoke of the totalitarian Soviet occupation regime for 50 years did not make Latvia russified, or a state with lost national identity and language. On the other hand, the membership in the European Union is not being ardently supported

143 Figure 1. To what extent does this statement correspond or not to your own opinion: you are a citizen of the EU

1% 3% 1% 1% 3% 1% 0% 1% 0% 3% 2% 1% 1% 2% 0% 2% 1% 1% 2% 0% 2% 0% 0% 2% 2% 3% 0% 1% 1%

11% 18% 18% 21% 22% 22% 25% 27% 27% 30% 30% 32% 35% 37% 38% 50% 49% 49% 13% 18% 23% 24% 28% 29% 31% 33% 37% 42% 44%

88% 84% 81% 81% 79% 78% 78% 77% 75% 74% 74% 72% 72% 70% 70% 69% 69% 67% 67% 65% 65% 63% 62% 61% 56% 53% 50% 50% 50% Italy Malta Spain EU 28 Latvia France Ireland Poland Cyprus Austria Croatia Finland Estonia Sweden Belgium Slovakia Bulgaria Hungary Portugal Rumania Denmark Germany Lithuania Netherlands Luxembourg Yes No Don’t know Czezh Republic Czezh United Kingdom United

Source: Eurobarometer, spring 2015 data.

Figure 2. To what extent do you feel you belong to each of the territorial units?

60% 09.2008. 09.2009. 50% 09.2010. 52% 51% 50% 50% 49% 49% 09.2011. 48% 48% 48% 40% 47% 47% 45%

44% 44% 09.2012. 43% 42% 41% 40% 40% 39% 09.2013. 38% 37% 30% 36% 09.2014. 33% 09.2015. 20%

10% 12% 12% 11% 11% 9% 10% 8% 0% 7% Village/parish/ Region (Riga, Latvia European Union district/city Vidzeme, Kurzeme, Zemgale, )

Base: not less that 1000 in each survey Source: SKDS, 09.2008-09.2015.

144 as the only possible direction of our country’s foreign policy, nor as the basis of our identity-creation. Of course, consensus (although it is only apparent or driven by fear) is only possible in totalitarian regimes; democracy takes pride in diversity of opinions and freedom for political opinions. At the same time the question remains open: what belonging do Latvian residents feel, and what do they really want?

First steps – the ideals of the Awakening and the political course in its aftermath By stating that Latvia’s membership in the European Union and NATO was not simple, one should recall the variety of internal and external factors that did not make the public belonging to the West self-evident. Namely, although the events of the Awakening time passed under the slogan “For free Latvia,” extensive struggles were happening inside the political circles for what should be understood to be the free Latvia. It is no secret that during the independence struggle, for quite a long time, one of the ideas about the free Latvia was the concept of just a greater independence and autonomy within the USSR in a form of a special contract between Latvia and the USSR. This view was actively defended by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. Therefore, the first important foundation-stone in the European and Western identity of Latvia certainly was put in place by those leaders of the society who, during Awakening, did not think of politics as the art of compromise, but fundamentally sustained the public opinion that the only possible free Latvia as a fully sovereign state. It is impossible to overestimate the contribution of Dainis Īvāns to the preservation of Latvian national and Western self-awareness. 28 years later, his words, spoken on 18 November 1988 in an interview with Juris Kaža, still sound wise: “The sovereignty is only possible in connection with the implementation of economic independence. If the people will realize that its well-being depends on its own efforts, and the Latvian people have already shown it once – reconstructing the country that was about 90 % ruined, back to a European level – then as well as now, when people feel this independence, enthusiasm, and diligence, which is within the Latvian people, it will definitely help.” Now, when Latvia’s membership in the European Union is primarily related to the various financial and economic instruments, one must ask, what

145 DAINIS ĪVĀNS. Former Awakening activist and the first chairman of the Latvian Popular Front, one of the brightest leaders of Latvia’s struggle for independence. In 1980s, he became known by being published in the newspaper Literatūra un Māksla, later was the editor of the newspaper and, together with his like-minded peer Artūrs Snips advocated against construction of the new Daugava hydroelectric power station in Daugavpils, which would have far-reaching environmental and ethno- political consequences. The protests of 5 November Photo: from the personal archives 1987 against the construction of the hydroelectric of Dainis Īvāns power station in Daugavpils are considered to be the origins of the Third Awakening. He rose to his political peak at the time when from 1988 to 1990 he chaired the Latvian Popular Front. He was the newly elected Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council. As the Deputy of the Supreme Council, he voted on the Declaration “On the Restoration of Independence of the Republic of Latvia,” by which, on 4 May 1990, the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 15 February 1922, was restored. The sovereignty of the Republic of Latvia was restored, and the military aggression of the USSR of 17 June 1940 was declared an international crime. He has been a member of the Riga City Council, and has been awarded a 3rd Class Order of the Three Stars. Dainis Īvāns is a man who, with his idealism and belief in independent Latvia, has written his name in the history of Latvia. In order to bring his story to the younger generations, who have not experienced the struggles for the independence of Latvia, a documentary “Īvāns” has been produced,* the script for which is written by Nora Ikstena, and the director and camera operator is Andrejs Verhoustinskis. “The movie is a story about a human symbol of the recent history of Latvia who embodies all hope, idealism, disappointment, choices, compromises, wins and losses. Eventually, he finds strength within himself to return to his roots, rather than let grindstones of history crush him, to be more than just an accidental figure in the big plan of destiny.”**

* The movie is available at: http://www.ivansfilma.lv/ ** Māra Miķelsone and Agnija Antanoviča, “Kas ir Dainis Īvāns?” Ir.lv, 2015. gada 30. oktobris.

has gone wrong? What happened to the sense of economic independence, enthusiasm, and hard work, that Īvāns relied upon that builds a country? It appears that this cannot be answered with a single answer. There were a number of factors that had an impact: the privatization scandals of the

146 1990s, the survived banking and economic crises, the gap between society and the state, that is characteristic to all European countries, as well as the development path chosen by the European Union – overly bureaucratic, incomprehensible in detail to people. This led to a sense of estrangement, as sung by the band “Labvēlīgais tips” in their song popular in 2001: “Europe will not understand us, Europe will not know us.” However, “a log does not burn by itself,” and it would be hypocritical to blame politicians for everything. The 4th May commemorative coin, released by the , depicts Mother Latvia with a millstone on her shoulders. Symbolically, it shows that without an adequate level of self- confidence, enthusiasm, diligence and national awareness, freedom is a heavy burden. For Latvia as a Western country to be not only the borders, the flag, authorities, or a member of an international organization, but a society that manages itself, requires that every citizen has a wish to participate, and the policy-makers must ensure such engagement opportunities exist. Latvia’s Euro-Atlantic identity is not uniform. It has a political and a civic, as well as a cultural and a partisan component. Although today, when the public image of political parties is quite low, and praising some political party is at least risky, however, in the context of the Euro-Atlantic identity, a party that deserves its share of recognition is the first Latvian political party in power, which proudly referred to itself also as the first right-wing liberal party – the “Latvian Way” (Latvijas Ceļš). While other parties maneuvered, sought compromises and calculated the benefits of Western affiliation against the losses of Russian market opportunities, “Latvian Way,” along with their Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, consistently defended the idea of “Latvia as a highly developed European country, a safe, comfortable home of the Latvian people and the entire Latvian population.” At the same time, “Latvian Way” acknowledged only such integration within Europe that “would keep the Latvian individuality and would let it develop comprehensively.” These phrases, which are directly borrowed from the party’s pre-election program of 1995, include deep, Latvia’s Western affiliation related references. It is both an indirect passage and historical memory of Latvia as a developed European country in the Interwar period, and a strong position in search of reconciliation in the society and the need for integration, as well as seeing national identity in context with the European, while placing the national uniqueness above the other.

147 It would be no exaggeration to say that the second largest foundation- stone of the sense of the society in belonging to the family of the Western nations, has been laid by the “Latvian Way.”

Formation of European and Transatlantic identity In the 1990s, the European identity dominated the Transatlantic identity both within the demand of the society and within the political options. There are several reasons for that. After the end of the Cold War, NATO was in the process of transformation and was seeking its place in the common security architecture; in addition, the security situation of the Baltic countries and their regained independence was full of uncertainty, therefore the integration within the family of the North Atlantic Treaty countries was an objective more distant than negotiations on EU membership. This situation, full of uncertainties, was further complicated by the fact that Russian military troops were still stationed in the Baltic countries and that the Skrunda Soviet Radar Station was located within the territory of independent Latvia. It should also be considered that, at the beginning of the 1990s, the creation of a European security system was considered seriously, and high expectations were placed on the then European security organization – the Western European Union. Only with time, NATO proved again its importance in guaranteeing global and regional security, the European Union renounced formation of its unique security system, but the Western European Union became one of the few international organizations that has ended its operation itself due to inactivity. An additional reason for the low interest within the Latvian society in creation of the Transatlantic identity was the relationship with Russia. Although at the beginning of the 1990s, under the leadership of President Boris Yeltsin, Russia was forming a policy to overcome the hostile atmosphere in relations with the West, the post-Soviet space was already then regarded as a Russia’s area of influence, and the enlargement of NATO in this direction would be treated as a military challenge. This is evidenced by the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 1993, which emphasizes development of stable and close ties with the post-Soviet countries, faith in the integration potential of the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as resistance to positioning of any military objects in the post-Soviet

148 space by third parties. Valdis Birkavs, at the time Latvia’s Foreign Minister, has also pointed out Russia’s hostile attitude in 1997, in an interview with Latvijas Vēstnesis after his visit to the United Nations General Assembly’s 52nd session: “They believe that it threatens Russia’s security, that it is for Russia internally a very sensitive issue because the issue of the enlargement of NATO is heavily politicized. However, actually weighed arguments did not occur in our conversation – Russia does not want to see this enlargement, Russia is against the enlargement; they believe that in this way new dividing lines are created in Europe, that in this way certain polarization is created. [...] Not in our conversation, but in another moment, Yevgeny Primakov said that the only thing that he could not accept in the decision was that the Baltic countries were referred to in the decision. This means that Russia has already accepted the membership of the three invited countries in NATO, and that can’t be opposed. But Russia nevertheless believes that it is in principle against the enlargement, that enlargement is the biggest mistake. It is their opinion, their viewpoint from which they view further development of Russia, their internal affairs, global development and their foreign policy. They have a right to such an opinion. But they do not have the right to veto our desire to integrate into NATO.”1 NATO, in turn, seeking its place in the new security situation immediately after the fall of the Iron Curtain, did not risk with swift plans of admitting into this group the again independent, but problem-torn countries seeking their way to democracy. Nevertheless, the reason for the late formation process of the Transatlantic identity does not lie solely in Russia’s hostile attitude and the cautious approach of NATO. The Latvian policy makers also did not rush to announce our country’s desire to join NATO. In 1995, the President of Latvia, called on the parties elected in the 6th Saeima (the Parliament) to sign the “Declaration of the Political Parties of the 6th Saeima” where originally two key objectives were formulated – accession to the European Union and NATO. As noted by Valdis Birkavs: “As we had previously anticipated, the goal to join NATO was deleted from the Declaration, but everyone signed the Declaration in which integration into NATO was substituted by integration into the European security structures.” Despite the above-mentioned obstacles, in order to achieve Latvia’s membership in NATO, much has been done by the foreign friends of our country who saw this as Latvia’s only geopolitical road within the

149 VAIRA VĪĶE-FREIBERGA. Former President of Latvia (1999–2007), participated actively in the process of consolidation of the of the country and stood in favor of Latvia’s foreign policy interests, helping to involve Latvia in the European Union and NATO. Rapidly became the leader of the society and still enjoys high levels of popular support. As the President, she excelled with exceptional capability and perseverance. She notes: “I can be grateful to my previous training as an academic, because I had changed my host-country Photo: from the personal archives languages, the scientific areas, and had dealt with of Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga dainas* in my spare time. I was accustomed to and trained to manage immense intellectual loads and the ability to pick up a huge amount of information, to digest and understand it in a short period of time.”** In addition to her work in strengthening the Euro-Atlantic community, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga has also been the United Nations Special Envoy on UN reform (2005) and was the official candidate for the post of UN Secretary General from the Baltic countries (2006). Among other things, she advocated working, within the framework of the United Nations, on practical peace-building and peacekeeping in the world, ensuring the rights of all nations “to live in harmony with universal human values,” as well as to facilitate mutual contacts among people.*** After her presidency, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga continues to be active in the international arena: she has been the vice-chair of the Reflection group on the long- term future of the EU (2007-2010), chair of the European Commission High Level Expert Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism (2011), since 2009, the Eastern European representative at the Board of Directors of the Hague International Criminal Court Trust Fund for Victims, and the president of the .

* Daina or tautas dziesma is a traditional form of music or poetry from Latvia. ** In an interview especially for this publication. *** Valsts prezidenta preses dienests, “Valsts prezidente Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga ANO Ņujorkā: ..Jāveicina cilvēku savstarpējie kontakti, jo pasaules cilvēcība ir lielā mērā atkarīga no katra indivīda,” 2005. gada 6. jūnijs, Lvportals.lv, http://m.lvportals.lv/visi/preses-relizes? id=109722?show=coment

Transatlantic family. As one of the main foreign partners – defenders of the Latvian Transatlantic course – former President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga notes the President of the United States , “who was very insistent for the Russian troops to be removed from Latvia. The beginning of my presidency coincided with the end of his presidency, and Bill Clinton played an essential

150 role, in a way drawing the vector how our relations should develop with Russia in the future. He emphasized that there may be no presence of Russian troops in Latvia, something that the Boris Yeltsin still harbored hopes for. He resisted and asked for a promise that we will never be in NATO. Contrary to what some say, Clinton has never promised it.”2 She mentions George Bush Jr. as another of the most trusted friends of Latvia: “He had prepared his speech for the Riga Conference during the NATO Riga Summit.”3 “I want to make it go down in history as the Riga speech, and this is because you are my friend,” he whispered to me before stepping on the stage. He said in his speech then that the Americans will be there for us and will defend us, and that was very important. We could be absolutely sure that America is on our side, because other partners sometimes had doubts about some aspects.”4 Identity research emphasizes the process by which a society shapes its political identity by contrasting with other societies with different identities, thus separating itself from them and self-determining their views against ideological positions and interests of other societies. In this regard, the experience of the occupation, being located next to Russia, as well as the current pressure on the Baltic states in connection with the Russian-speaking

Desirable Latvia’s foreign policy orientation / speakers Question: “The society has different opinions on what should be the priorities for developing Latvia’s international relations. Some believe that, compared to the present situation, Latvia should dedicate more attention to developing relations with the Western states, but others – that the Eastern ones, including the republics located in the territory of the former USSR, should be accorded the priority. In your opinion, which states should Latvia’s policy-makers prioritize?”

60% 03.2008. 03.2010. 50% 03.2012. 53,7%

52,4% 03.2014.

40% 47,3% 03.2015. 03.2016. 40,2% 30% 40,8% 36,1% 31,1% 31,7% 31,9% 32,0% 30,9% 28,1%

20% 28,3% 27,3% 26,8% 25,4%

10% 19,5% 16,5%

0% Western countries Eastern countries, incl. Difficult to answer / those in the territory no response of the former USSR

Base: n= -600 in each of the surveys Source: SKDS, 03.2008.-03.2016.

151 issue played a major role in the formation of Western identity. However, even today there are significant differences in public opinion about the desired foreign policy course of Latvia, and they are marked by the line of linguistic affiliation. About a half of the Latvian-speaking community believes that the Latvian foreign policy should focus more on the Western countries. Slightly more than a half of the Russian-speaking population of Latvia believes that our country should be looking towards the Eastern countries, including those of the former Soviet Union. Two crucial conclusions result from this data. On the one hand, there is a clear division in the society on the issue of priority direction of the national foreign policy, and it certainly does not indicate a strongly rooted Euro-Atlantic identity and distorts a clear foreign policy course. On the other hand, although the choice of the Latvian-speaking population in favor of the West is more pronounced, the fact that it is only a half that thinks this way further reinforces the above conclusion. In addition, this dichotomous thinking – either the West or the East – is natural. In view of the identity formation by contrasting themselves to other societies, Latvia comes to a decision point. Committing in favor of the European Union and NATO, results in a stronger self-isolation from the

Desirable Latvia’s foreign policy orientation / Latvian language speakers Question: “The society has different opinions on what should be the priorities for developing Latvia’s international relations. Some believe that, compared to the present situation, Latvia should dedicate more attention to developing relations with the Western states, but others – that the Eastern ones, including the republics located in the territory of the former USSR, should be accorded the priority. In your opinion, which states should Latvia’s policy-makers prioritize?”

70% 03.2008. 60% 03.2010. 03.2012. 64,9%

50% 61,0% 03.2014. 58,2%

54,1% 03.2015. 50,6% 40% 49,5% 03.2016.

30% 32,1% 20% 31,3% 27,9% 25,7% 21,1% 22,5% 18,4%

10% 18,0% 18,0% 16,5% 16,0% 14,0% 0% Western countries Eastern countries, incl. Difficult to answer / those in the territory no response of the former USSR

Base: n= -600 in each of the surveys Source: SKDS, 03.2008.-03.2016.

152 outside – in this case, Russia. The mostly Russian-speakers who still have Soviet sentiment, live in the Russian information space and are directly exposed to the Russian anti-Western propaganda, express a wish to isolate and distance themselves from the negatively perceived Europe. This difference in public views is one of the greatest challenges of identity in modern Latvia. The idea, that was popular in the 1990s, of Latvia as a bridge between the West and the East, is still alive. However, it is not possible to live for long period of time on a bridge or under a bridge if one wishes to live a dignified life. The bridge must be crossed and a clear choice must be made in favor of one or the other party. Another idea that has been actively advocated, and still has great support in the society, is the unattainable vision of “Latvia as a Little Switzerland.” At the beginning of the 1990s, it was understood as an opportunity for Latvia to be not a bridge between the West and the East, not to be forced to choose between two sides of the bridge, but instead to become an internationally neutral country. The former Foreign Minister of Latvia, Valdis Birkavs shares his memories about the illusory nature of this idea: “The renewed independence created preconditions for the political powers that were just created in the struggle for the independence, to make a choice: The East, the West, neutrality. With rare exceptions, the general mood was clear – the West.”5 It should be admitted that, in view of the complexity of the international or military neutrality, and the complexity of country-specific cases, from the point of view of international relations, geopolitics, and socio-political development, such status is not possible in the case of Latvia. Previously this view was fed by the desire not to engage in other alliances, having just disentangled from the totalitarian grip. Today, this direction of neutrality has been abandoned, but the concept of “maximum independence of Latvia” is still current in the society today. From the democracy viewpoint and international relations theory, it could be argued for a long time, where in today’s globalised and interdependent world lie the borders of independence and sovereignty. It appears, however, that it is not political science or theoretical considerations that influence the minds of people, making half of the Latvian population believe that most important for the development of our country would be the preservation of maximum self-sufficiency and independence, and making the other half believe in closer integration with various Western organizations, including the European Union and NATO

153 Figure 3. Thinking about the development of Latvia, what, in your opinion, is more important?

Closer cooperation Maximum Latvia’s and integration in independence different international (i.e., preservation of structures, such as sovereignty) European Union, 48,2 % NATO 39,0 %

Undecided 12,8 %

Base: total respondents, n =1002 Source: SKDS, August 2016.

(Figure 3). Most likely, the former view consists of a mix of a low Euro- Atlantic affiliation, individual powerlessness and a feeling of little political influence, for a part of the society – bitter Soviet memories, while for the other part – sentiments with regard to the successor of the USSR, the Russian Federation. Returning to what Birkavs said, one should note the apparent gap between the visions of policy-makers and the public regarding the advancement of the foreign policy of Latvia. While the choice in favor of the Western direction was obvious to the policy-makers already in the early 1990s, in the eyes of the society, it still has not gained an overwhelming majority. There would be also no reason to blame the policy-makers for low activity. In preparing for membership of the European Union and NATO, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic service fully met their obligations, a Minister for Special Assignments for European Union Affairs, and the European Integration Bureau have been operating, and all the ministries have established special units to work with the European Union matters. Latvia has had extremely competent in foreign affairs Members of the – Inese Vaidere, Sandra Kalniete, Artis Pabriks, Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis, Georgs Andrejevs, Valdis Dombrovskis, Krišjānis Kariņš, Roberts Zīle, Aldis Kušķis; a major contribution to Latvia’s Western identity has been given by the European Commission Delegation in Latvia (before joining the European Union), the Representation of the European Commission in Latvia (after joining the

154 European Union), NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, and other institutions. The Foreign Affairs Committee and the European Affairs Committee of the Saeima are active, and there is an annual Foreign Affairs debate. Latvia has been the presiding country of the European Union, and both a NATO summit and the European Union’s Eastern Partnership summit have taken place there. However, despite the extensive governmental activities, the society still does not feel well-informed about the European Union and NATO issues. A good answer to this problem was once provided by the Head of the European Integration Bureau, Edvards Kušners, pointing to the subjective feeling that the government does not engage in dialogue with the society: “We, the European Integration Bureau, so far, have been primarily working with intermediaries in providing information. A range of cooperation partners has been established with whom we carry out the exchange of information. There is a radio broadcast, a project on television, and there are 32 regional information points in regional libraries. To a large extent, the sources of information or the originator of these activities have been government structures. When a person goes to a regional library, the thought does not cross his mind that government has been behind the creation of the information point. Listening to radio broadcasts, one possibly misses that the program is being made in collaboration with the Bureau.”6 Perhaps the answer to feeling uninformed is hidden also by the fact that the policy-makers have spoken about Latvia’s membership in the European Union and NATO from a functional point of view, and it is based on the fact that the fulfillment of criteria and adoption of legislation has been quite complex. However, as the result of such a functional approach, there are doubts in the society about the correctness of the foreign policy course.

Convincing partners and ourselves about our Euro-Atlantic affiliation In the case of Latvia, regarding the correctness of the Euro-Atlantic direction, not only our nation had to be convinced, but serious work had to be done also with the international partners. The range of questions was wide and very sensitive. First, it was the explanation of Latvia’s history in the broadest sense, from the persuasion of our European roots, to the Western value orientation of Latvian society. Secondly, the democratic maturity and

155 Euro-Atlantic affiliation of Latvia had to be addressed in regard with the new Citizenship Law and the amendments to the State Language Law. In many places in the West, the concept of “non-citizen” is still unclear, and without deeper knowledge of the history of occupation, simplistic conclusions are made about the sociopolitical processes in Latvia, including interethnic relations. Thirdly, from two sources at once – the Wiesenthal Centre and Russian officials – Latvia received attacks about resurgence of Nazism and lack of activity in punishment of war criminals. This slander from the Russian part continues to reach Latvia, usually in the form of resolutions of different international organizations, speaking about glorification of Nazism and often referring to 16 March Legionnaires commemorative events. Just as after the restoration of independence, also now Latvian Western-oriented politicians and experts do everything possible to explain the Nuremberg Tribunal findings about the Latvian Legion7 and reject any speculation about the glorification of Nazism in Latvia. Former President of Latvia Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, who kindly agreed to be interviewed for this publication, points out that the Jewish question, condemnation of anti-Semitism, and acknowledgement of Latvia’s efforts to punish Nazi war criminals, have been crucial for our country’s Western partners to begin looking at us as belonging to the Euro-Atlantic family. “At the time, Ephraim Zuroff of the Wiesenthal Center tried extremely hard to prove that the Latvian state does not want to properly complete the investigation of Nazi war crimes. This requires a small digression. Andrievs Ezergailis has written an article, in which he proves that the then Nazi-hunting among Ukrainians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, in the case of Latvia, was based on an offending fabrication composed by chekist Pauls Ducmanis. This was a clever tale, a lie from A to Z, which was passed to the U.S. authorities and politicians using all possible KGB means. These lies of Ducmanis were received as evidence and facts. In those countries where there was a lawsuit and evidence was demanded, as for example in Canada, all failed because there was no evidence. But the creation of noise and negative propaganda was exactly the reason why Ducmanis was commissioned to write such a book. This would also justify occupation of Latvia. This moment was crucial,” notes the former President. Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga emphasizes that, in the case of Latvia, it was extremely important for the Saeima to adopt the Law on the three types

156 of crime, which have no time limitation – war crimes, crimes against humanity, and participation in genocide. “Latvia is ready to prosecute such criminals any time, there is no limitation. That was a very important step,” she emphasizes during the interview. In resolving the myths, a number of factors have played essential role: personal relationships with the Jewish communities in Latvia, the operation of the Historians’ Commission, the President’s first visit to the UN, as well as many other visits, which included meetings with the Jewish community. “And at that time I had to participate almost as if in an interrogation, there were representatives of about 35 organizations present, who questioned me, and some even took the liberty of unjustified accusations. However, it must be understood that during the years of Soviet occupation, there were carefully created malignant and intentionally disseminated myths. It was not about whether or which Latvians have taken part in the genocide. That was well known. The debate was on whether Latvians as a nation have to assume collective guilt for the crimes of some of their fellow countrymen,” said Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga. Asked about the help of foreign friends in these efforts, she mentions her trip to to meet with Simon Wiesenthal as a particularly important step. Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga tells: “I had met with Zuroff several times and saw that this is a consumed man, for whom Nazi persecution had in fact become a career. Therefore, I went to see Wiesenthal, and we sincerely discussed the situation. I told him: “Yes, there have been collaborators, there have been criminals in the Latvian nation, but most of them have already died.” In any case, I wanted to convince him that it is not a collective guild of the nation, and he told me: “I have never thought that Latvians have a collective guilt in extermination of the Jews, that occurred in Latvia. I have always insisted on the fact that the responsible ones are those who took part in it. There is no such thing as a sense of collective guilt for a nation.” At the very end of the conversation, we hugged each other warmly, he wept, I wept, and we agreed that horrific things have taken place, and that neither he nor I would want them to repeat. I am ready to fight against murderers and executioners as much as he. If we can find them and provide the punishment they deserve, then he has my support for that. But it is unjust to belittle my people. And he said that such has certainly not been the aim of his Centre. The aim of his Centre has been finding the guilty individuals.” The former President reiterates during the conversation that she really appreciates this private meeting with Wiesenthal very highly. Likewise, in

157 Davos she has met Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Nobel laureate Eli Wiesel, who spoke about forgiveness and reconciliation, and also to her, this question seemed sufficiently serious and important. “Similarly, the President of Israel has visited Latvia, and I have been on an official visit to Israel. We became friends with these people and found a common language. I think the Jewish international community appreciated the fact that I wholeheartedly condemn crimes against humanity, I do not intend to justify them in any way, but it is not a sin of the whole nation,” Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga expressed her views strongly in the interview. Since early 1990s, the history of Latvia has been explained not only by politicians but also by diplomats, experts, and historians. This work is comparable to Sisyphus’ fate, who rolls a stone up a hill forever, because it is easier for people to perceive myths presented in a simplified manner of propaganda, rather then listening to reasoned, complex explanations, not consistent with former understanding of history. These efforts are all the more difficult by the fact that today’s societies are extremely vulnerable to ideology-driven language, or, as Franz Rosenzweig has put it – language is more than blood. The translator of Victor Klemperer’s bookLanguage of the Third Reich: LTI, former politician and fervent defender of the Euro-Atlantic course of Latvia, Helēna Demakova, writes in the afterword of the book: “Having protractedly been in an environment of contaminated language, into which a man is often thrown against his own will, he begins to think and act in accordance with the external clichés, which he has adopted.”8 Latvia on its Euro-Atlantic path had to face many tough struggles against “environment of contaminated language,” which determines a person’s thinking, political behavior, and in the case of Latvia, played a crucial role in proving its democratic maturity. However, this work has not been in vain. In 2004, it was clearly pointed out by the historian, professor Aivars Stranga, who himself has made a major contribution to the research and interpretation of Latvia’s history: “Two years ago, I was lecturing at Stanford on Latvian activities in the Holocaust, and there were a few individuals who were dissatisfied, as they believed that the Legion shot Jews. But now it is absolutely no longer perceived that all Latvians would be indescribable anti-Semites and shooters. In America, there has been a lot of progress in the research of Eastern Europe. Almost every day at Stanford, there was some event explaining, very correctly, for example, the genocide during Stalin’s time against Ukrainians or Crimean Tatars.”

158 In a democratic society, it is impossible to maintain a foreign policy course that has not developed responsiveness and has not been rooted in society. This statement has both a democratically philosophical and a practically political backing. Namely, democracy does not provide for the organization of state functions that would be narrowly defined by politicians or civil service, while the society would observe it, bewildered. Such decisions are not viable in a democracy. Furthermore, Latvia’s accession to the European Union was decided by the Latvian nation in the 2003 referendum, and it pointed to the practically political need for identity awareness. In light of the above described public sentiment, the role of the leader was important in strengthening Latvia’s Euro-Atlantic thought. The destiny of the leader, however, is not easy. As written by Edward Bernays in his famous 1928 book Propaganda, the political apathy of the average voter arises due to the fact that the politicians do not know how to reach people’s minds, they cannot dramatize themselves to meet people’s everyday needs. A machine is unable to generate public interest, while a leader, a fighter, a dictator can. In the saturated daily work, how can a leader be creative and not become a machine or a dictator? One of the most prominent leaders of Latvia, former President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga responds as follows: “The leaders are expected to lead, to go in front. However, if they start taking too much initiative or responsibility, then they are blamed for becoming tyrants, which they also often become. A leader has to walk along a knife’s edge because the society expects that the leader will not only represent and symbolize the Latvian state, as it is in the case of the parliamentary system of Latvia, but that the leader also drives and leads the society.” Asked about the main points that had to be raised to our society and to be convinced of, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga mentions that abroad, one had to contend with the fact that there were attempts to belittle our nation, and basically the same thing had happened also here in Latvia – “we had very active self-belittling. As if in the name of democracy, as if in the name of the openness of the press, the lack of self-confidence among Latvians was very pronounced. And another thought – that we are not as everybody else, as sung by Edgars Liepiņš.” She also mentions examples: “If, in the name of the Euro-Atlantic advancement it was said that we must improve our judicial system, then the answer was – well, we are like that, and there is nothing that can be done about it. In 1994, not yet as the President of Latvia, I gave a speech at the Spīdola Prize awards presentation. This speech abroad, on my

159 18 November tour, was received with ovation, but here, in Latvia, it was very unpopular. Afterwards, with rare but important exceptions, many turned their back because I was saying that the approach of “we are like that, and there is nothing that can be done about it” is not correct, and something has to be done.” Speaking about the widespread sense of powerlessness in the society, she also mentions other pretexts: “For example, there is nothing we can do about the justice system because we have insufficient courtrooms, we do not have this, we do not have that. We should get from point A to point B, but since we currently cannot get from A to Z, then, unfortunately, it is not possible to go at all. Or – if we change one element in the system, then we need to change also in many other places, and if there is so much to change, then at the end we are not able to change anything.” The former President concludes that this has been a very strong general mood among the people at all levels and in various forms, and she remembers her opposition to powerlessness, helplessness, and unwillingness as “a fight all over the front.”

Unpopular decisions in the name of the Euro-Atlantic advancement Latvia’s process of accession to the European Union required a public consensus on two fronts, simultaneously: both the identification with the Euro-Atlantic direction opposite the Eastern direction, as well as legislative changes and decisions that were seen as a precondition for starting negotiations with Latvia. To ensure this, there was a need for action, that in scientific literature is referred to as structural leadership (capacity for action or the use of resources that provides an incentive, a value, and concrete benefits) and ideological leadership (linked to awareness of the issues and insertion in a frame of specific political solutions). In 1999, one of the situations which pointed to a difficult choice between a decision that was popular in the society and a decision that was necessary for the state was related to the amendments to the State Language Law. The OSCE had specific objections to the amendments to the Law because they foresaw that the State regulates the use of languages in all enterprises, institutions, public organizations, including private, religious and cultural institutions. President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, pointing to the non- conformity of the amendments to the Law with the Constitution and Latvia’s international obligations, gave it to the Saeima for repeat consideration.

160 She describes the situation as follows: “Already in my very first days of the Presidency, I had to change the Language Law to bring it in line with the requirements of OSCE and the European Commission. I had to make crucial decisions that were very unpopular. The Saeima had adopted the amendments to the Law with a majority of 73 votes, however, I had to immediately oppose the constitutional majority and say – no, I am sending this law back and recommend reconsidering, because otherwise the Helsinki Summit will not invite us to start the negotiations on accession to the European Union. That was clearly told to us by our international friends. It should be noted that we have already been rejected once: In the Madrid Summit, Latvia was rejected but Estonia was accepted. We were told – with this Language Law, especially with the recent amendments, and the Citizenship Law, the European Union will not take you.” When assessing how wide or limited were the President’s possibilities to affect Latvia’s Euro-Atlantic advancement, she mentions that one aspect of the President’s power was to “constantly watch the Saeima very closely, to monitor and match it with general interest of the State, including in the way it is perceived from the point of view of our evaluators and observers. Throughout the time of my service, we were assessed, weighed, measured, and sifted through various sieves.” In the interview she admits that “in the process of accession to the European Union and NATO, our real value, in the eyes of others, hung by a thread.” However – “My decision to return the Language Law amendments was very unpopular among the people, but it had to be done. This means – one must be able to take the responsibility for what is in the public interest, in theory, even at the risk of losing one’s job, or at least a serious loss of popularity.” As the main issue, which was critical in the assessment of our readiness to join the European Union and NATO, the former President mentions the problem that “in the eyes of many we were an unstable country, where there are too many non-citizens.” It was even believed that ethnic riots may break out anytime soon in Latvia, something similar to what had already happened in the Balkans. Along with the amendments to the State Language Law, the second most important law, the adoption of which was considered to be the road map, first, to membership of the , and then – the European Union, was the Citizenship Law. Here, too, the opinions of the policy-makers and the public collided, and both sides were right. Namely, russification of

161 VALDIS DOMBROVSKIS. In 2014, he was elected a Member of the European Parliament, since November 2014 he serves as the Vice-President of the European Commission for the Euro and Social Dialogue. Since August 2016, he also serves as the European Commissioner for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union when the former Commissioner Jonathan Hill from Great Britain announced his resignation after the British referendum on the withdrawal from the European Union. He has been the Prime Minister in three Photo: from the personal archives governments (2009–2014) and the Minister of of Valdis Dombrovskis Finance (2002–2004), as well as the Member of the Saeima and the European Parliament. Valdis Dombrovskis was particularly active in promoting Latvia’s closer economic integration with the European Union. As he admitted, looking back on his work for overcoming the economic crisis, “[…] the well-known economist, P. Krugman, in December 2008, stated that “Latvia is the new Argentina,” emphasizing that national bankruptcy is inevitable. In the following years I encountered something like a distance dispute with P. Krugman. Latvia did not become “the new Argentina,” on the contrary – after just a few years, it was among the fastest growing economies in the EU.”* Together with Anders Åslund, Dombrovskis published a book How Latvia Came through the Financial Crisis (Peterson Institute for International , Washington DC, May 2011). Valdis Dombrovskis’ vision for the future of Latvia is as follows: “I see Latvia as a nationally strong country that has fully exercised its opportunities internationally, strengthening national impact and protecting it against external threats; a country that has made use of the opportunities offered by the membership in international organizations to raise the well-being in Latvia. To achieve this, there is a need for serious teamwork in the Saeima and the government, to firmly continue what has been started, successfully cooperating with Latvian representatives in international organizations, friends of our country, and partners around the world.”**

* Valdis Dombrovskis, “Latvijas ekonomiskā attīstība ES integrācijas ietekmē” in Kristīne Kozlova, ed., Atgriešanās Eiropā Latvijas prezidentu, premjerministru, ministru un diplomātu esejās, 284. ** http://www.valdisdombrovskis.lv/

the Latvian society, linguistic imperialism, and reduction of the Latvian proportion in society – all implemented during the Soviet occupation – led to the need to protect the Latvian language as the only . On the other hand, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, in the form of laws

162 Figure 4. Is your opinion on... very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative, or very negative? 31% 10% 27% 25% 37% 37% 37% 37% 35% 33% 33% 24% 28% 28% 26% 29% 42% 38% 34% 43% 43% 46% 30% 40% 13% 12% 11% 10% 12% 16% 14% 13% 15% 12% 20% 19% 16% 15% 11% 13% 16% 64% 24% 63% 63% 63% 11% 20% 60% 16% 13% 12% 57% 57% 56% 13% 55% 55% 52% 50% 50% 50% 49% 47% 47% 47% 44% 44% 42% 42% 41% 39% 07.2011. 07.2011. 07.2011. 07.2012. 07.2012. 07.2012. 07.2013. 07.2013. 07.2013. 07.2014. 07.2014. 07.2014. 07.2010. 07.2010. 07.2010. 08.2015. 08.2015. 08.2015. 07.2009. 07.2009. 07.2009. 07.2008. 07.2008. 07.2008.

European Union USA Russia

Positive Undecided Negative

Database: n= ~1000 in each of the surveys Source: SKDS, July 2008 – August 2015. and regulations, were expecting a confirmation that Latvia is a democratic country fully respecting human rights and not suppressing minorities in any way. The first attempt, in 1994, to adopt the law with the nationality quota system embedded was not accepted by the Council of Europe, and Russia contributed to inciting general dissatisfaction. When President Guntis Ulmanis returned the law to the Parliament for repeat consideration, the quota system was removed from it, thus opening Latvia’s road towards the Council of Europe. At the same time it also was the start of Latvia’s long road to the European Union. Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga emphasizes: “The status of the Latvian language as the only official language and the minority issue were very topical and, at that time, seemingly insurmountable and irresolvable for us. It was a constant struggle to prove that everything is being carried out in a fair manner and that it is not abnormal to require that people learn the official language of the country.”9 One of the most difficult challenges to the resilience of the Latvian society and to the Euro-Atlantic stability of our country was the

163 2008 financial and economic crisis, the ensuing Latvian request for an international loan and the overall political context. In 2009, after the fall of the government of Ivars Godmanis, the government was formed by the party “Jaunais Laiks” (“The New Era”) led by the all-time youngest Prime Minister in the history of Latvia, Valdis Dombrovskis. At that time, the press wrote about him as follows: “After leaving the comfortable and about two times better-paid position of the Member of the European Parliament, he agreed to lead the Latvian government. A journalist standing close to the government pointedly asked – did Dombrovskis understand at all that he was thrown on the rails in front of a crazy bankruptcy locomotive with broken brakes?”10 And yet, not only Dombrovskis managed to stop the bankruptcy locomotive and lead Latvia out of the crisis, but, in this painful process, he also managed to not only maintain the European orientation in the Latvian society, but also to increase it. This was reflected both in public opinion polls and in Latvia’s further steps of European practical integration. Dombrovskis’ saying “we spend more than we earn” has already become a classic. Hereto, these words during the crisis meant not stating of a fact, but it was the signal for the next measures for management of the crisis. By saying that the process was painful, it is understood to mean: the decision not to devalue the Lat, fiscal consolidation or massive austerity measures, agreement with international lenders that the state budget deficit that Latvia can afford is 10 % instead of 5 %, as it was signed by the former Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis, and general structural reforms. Perhaps Dombrovskis’ accomplishments in averting bankruptcy are not yet fully appreciated by the Latvian society, because after the “fat years,” it seems, no one believed that national bankruptcy could happen. However, it was a big surprise to the International Monetary Fund that deals with bankrupt economies every day. The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde, expressed her true enthusiasm for the implementation of the international loan program in Latvia, as follows: “It is a country where courageous people live. When the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund loan program was launched, we expected that it will be very complex and severe for the public. Thanks to the fact that your country’s leadership took the courage to explain the actual situation to the people, and also the fact that the society was ready to bravely take on the difficulties, the loan program was successfully completed. Your economy is back again on its feet, here is stability and opportunities for economic growth.

164 The rate of unemployment is decreasing. You are not only a beautiful country, but also a country with a population of very brave people.”11 By overcoming the crisis, not only Latvia’s European affiliation was strengthened, but also a platform was created for deeper integration – on 1 January 2014 Latvia joined the Eurozone as a full member. As noted by Valdis Dombrovskis, it happened six years later than previously planned: “The initial target date for euro adoption in Latvia – 1 January 2008 – remained at an aspirational level, as during the pre-crisis years, the inflation rate was significantly above the level specified by the Maastricht criteria. But at the beginning of the crisis, Latvia was unable to meet the budget deficit criterion. Compliance with the long-term interest rate criterion could not even be measured, as Latvia simply had no access to the international financial markets.”12 By joining the Eurozone, the same Latvia that a few years ago was considered as the weakest link of the European Union, became one of the European Union’s core countries. Within the dynamics of our national European identity it should be regarded not only as a great, but also, given the political context, an unusual or atypical achievement. Certainly, Valdis Dombrovskis did not achieve it on his own; under his leadership, it was achieved by the social partners, the private and the public sector, the whole society together. It appears that the society is not yet fully aware of this fact, and here it would appropriate to remember what Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga said about the tendency of self-belittling – instead of calling into question the Latvian success story, the Latvian society actually has a reason to feel strong and able to manage itself. As noted by Valdis Dombrovskis, joining the Eurozone also “obliges to actively participate and contribute to the most important Europe’s future-related matters. Latvia’s membership in the European Union is a historic opportunity to play an active role in shaping the future of Europe, but it is also Latvia’s responsibility for the future of Europe.”13

Conclusion Latvia’s membership in the European Union and NATO is referred to as the return to where we have come from, and where the Soviet occupation regime had violently split Latvia off from. National image is formed from two main parts – what other think about us and what we think about ourselves. To become members of the Euro-Atlantic family, it was both necessary to

165 demonstrate to our partners our national and democratic maturity, and to convince our own society about the correctness of the chosen foreign policy course. Crucially important but unpopular decisions have had to be adopted, and twisted history ghosts have had to be fought. In the process, Latvia has not only proved itself as a valuable and reliable Euro-Atlantic partner, but also has given its unique contribution to the common European vision of the history. Given that the post-war political division of Europe also drew a clear boundary between the historical explanation of the Western and the Eastern part, Latvia’s road to the European Union and NATO has also served as a way of creating joint European historical awareness. Legal expert Egils Levits has validly pointed out that “the clarity of the geopolitical location of one’s nation also pertains to the identity. It is not the same as the geographic location.”14 In other words, our identity as a mental concept is very important. Although policy-makers and experts have invested a lot for Latvia to become a member country of the European Union and NATO, the poor establishment of the Euro-Atlantic identity in the Latvian society is obvious. The reasons for that are several: the gap between the society and the power, sense of alienation, occupation experience and the resulting fear, as well as corruption scandals, and the banking and economic crises. However, a large part of that identity weakening, over the decades, has resulted from Russia’s efforts to destroy the international image of the Latvian state. Russia has made a huge effort to construct Latvia’s identity based on a fragmented sense of history, deformed memory politics, myths about Russia as a liberator of Latvia, Latvians as Nazi servants, politicization of the history, and comprehensive propaganda. All of the above aspects have led the Latvian population to a certain ambiguity about its geopolitical identity. But Russia likes weak democracies that lack uniformity in their national and Euro-Atlantic identity, because such circumstances allow different types of operations, including political and military. Therefore it appears that the work of political and societal leaders on Latvia’s integration in the European Union and NATO, in fact, is not finished. Following Latvia’s accession to the European Union and NATO, policy-makers and experts were looking for new foreign policy objectives and challenges, and they did not have to look very far: even in 2016, in view of the close links between domestic and foreign policies, one of the goals of foreign policy should be the strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic

166 identity of our society. On 18 November 2013, looking back at the history of Latvia’s independence, it was also pointed out by Dainis Īvāns: “By joining the European Union and NATO, Latvia has ensured itself with a greater level of security than ever before, but we must be aware that everything is fragile.”15 This situation had already been foreseen also by Edvards Kušners, who, even as far back as in 2002, said: “Knowing the Western experience, the public will never say that the amount of information is sufficient. Many people have the approach – what will be my benefit from joining the EU? I believe that the time has come to ask the question: what will be the benefit of it for the country? If we joined the European Union as a collection of individuals, not as a country, then probably it will also be that one will say that he has joined, and the other – that he has not. In fact it is a country that joins the European Union, and its primary interests are the social and economic interests.”16 The task of strengthening Latvia’s Euro-Atlantic identity is a priority. Also the researchers of the Washington, DC based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) have pointed it out in their latest publication The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Eastern and Central Europe.17 Latvia has to perceive seriously the observations that “Russian influence has become so pervasive that it has challenged national stability in certain countries as well as their Western orientation and Euro- Atlantic solidarity”18 and “the Russians have been engaged in a sustained campaign to recapture what Putin considers their rightful buffer in Eastern Europe, and to undermine not just NATO and the EU, but the entire democratic foundation of both institutions.”19 For the Euro-Atlantic identity to take deeper roots in Latvia, it requires contemporary work with the society that goes beyond the usual clarification of the European Union and NATO issues, and the bureaucratic and formal approach. In other words – it requires inspiration, persuasion, unification, and vision of a common future in the society: “Leaders … can conceive and articulate goals that lift people out of their petty preoccupations, carry them above the conflicts that tear a society apart, and unite them in pursuit of objectives worthy of their best efforts.”20

167 Endnotes

1 “Ārlietu ministrs Valdis Birkavs pēc vizītes Apvienoto Nāciju Organizācijas Ģenerālās asamblejas 52. sesijā Ņujorkā – “Latvijas Vēstnesim,”” Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1997. gada 1. oktobris. 2 In an interview especially for this publication. 3 See the speech here: “President Bush Discusses NATO Alliance During Visit to Latvia,” Presi- dent George W. Bush, Grand Hall, Latvia University, Riga, Latvia, 28 November 2006, U.S. De- partment of State, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/76986.htm 4 Interview especially for this publication. 5 Valdis Birkavs, “Pirmie izšķirošie gadi…,” 44. 6 Evija Cera, “ES stājas valsts, nevis indivīdi,” interview with the Head of the European Integration Bureau Edvards Kušners (republished from Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze), Providus, 2002. gada 3. aprī- lis, http://providus.lv/article/es-stajas-valsts-nevis-individi 7 The findings of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal (1 October 1946) contains a precise list of people who may be regarded as members of the criminal SS organization. The Tribunal has concluded that an exception should be made with regard to those persons who have been mobi- lized against their will and by force (as in the case of Latvia), and these persons have not commit- ted any war crimes. See more at Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Yale Law School, Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count.asp 8 Helēna Demakova, “Viktors Klemperers un valodas ideoloģizācijas pētniecība” in Viktors Klem- perers, LTI. Trešā Reiha valoda. Filologa piezīmes (Rīga: AGB, 2004), 285. 9 In an interview especially for this publication. 10 Otto Ozols, “Valdis Dombrovskis – premjers, kurš uzšķīlis gaismu tuneļa galā,” TVNET, 2012. gada 4. maijs, http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/viedokli/420345-valdis_dombrovskis_ premjers_kurs_uzskilis_gaismu_tunela_gala 11 In an interview to the Latvian Television broadcast “De facto,” 10 March 2012. 12 Valdis Dombrovskis, “Latvijas ekonomiskā attīstība ES integrācijas ietekmē” in Kristīne Kozlova, ed., Atgriešanās Eiropā Latvijas prezidentu, premjerministru, ministru un diplomātu esejās, 299. 13 Ibid, 304. 14 Egils Levits, “Par nacionālo identitāti un demokrātisku atmiņu politiku,” runa Cicero- na balvas saņemšanas sarīkojumā, 2011. gada 28. novembris, http://www.cicerons.lv/in- dex.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51:egils-levits-cicerona-balvas-laurets- 2011&catid=5:runas-2011&Itemid=22 15 Elīna Aupe, “Dainis Īvāns: Neviens mums neatkarību nav dāvinājis. Tā ir nopelnīta un izcīnīta,” intervija ar Daini Īvānu, Aprinkis.lv, 2013. gada 18. novembris, http://www.aprinkis.lv/sabiedri- ba/dzive-un-ticiba/item/14213-dainis-ivans-neviens-mums-neatkaribu-nav-davinajis-ta-ir-no- pelnita-un-izcinita 16 Evija Cera, “ES stājas valsts, nevis indivīdi.” 17 CSIS, The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Eastern and Central Europe, 13 October 2016, https://www.csis.org/analysis/kremlin-playbook?block1 18 Ibid. 19 John Walcott and Warren Strobel, “Russia Has ‘Playbook’ for Covert Influence in Eastern Euro- pe: Study,” , 13 October 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-security-usa- idUSKCN12D13Q 20 John W. Gardner, No Easy Victories (New York: Joanna Cotler Books, 1968), 5.

168 The Eastern Direction in Latvia’s Foreign Policy

ANDIS KUDORS

Twenty-five years have elapsed since Latvia regained independence in 1991. It is a major time frame that, in the run-up to the 100-year anniversary of the state’s history, prompts a look back into recent history and conclusions about the correct, or incorrect – as the case may be – foreign policy decisions that have been made. In the past quarter-century, Westward development vectors dominated Latvia’s foreign policy. This choice stems from the self- determination and values shared by most of its citizens and from pragmatic considerations about the shortest path to welfare and security. Meanwhile, part of our society has looked towards the East: Russia is a neighbor with plenty of energy sources and nuclear weapons, and an alternative symbol for internal development, an alternative focal point for regional integration. How might we rate the relationship between Latvia and Russia in the fall of 2016? The European Union is carrying on with sanctions against Russia due to its annexation of Crimea and military unrest in Eastern Ukraine. Moscow has implemented its measures in response, bearing down on Latvia’s food exports to Russia. Joint military exercise scenarios performed by Russian and Belarusian armed forces gear up for military activity in the Kaliningrad oblast and in the Baltic States. Canadian soldiers are prepping for regular military exercises in Latvia. The Latvian people have been inured to criticism from Russian representatives alleging of ethnic Russians in Latvia. A large segment of the population in Russia considers Latvia an enemy state, while others still refer to Riga and Jurmala as their preferred travel destinations. Cooperation among foreign ministers and ministers for industry is routine and matter-of-fact. Could things have gone any differently? This article looks for answers to this and several other questions. With our focus on the West, could we have developed a better relationship with Russia? What are the ideological tendencies and who are the key actors within the “Eastern (read: Russian!)” current of Latvia’s foreign policy? This article should not be treated as a classical study of foreign policy or foreign policy history, but more of an attempt to find

169 the signs of the times and shed light on the path we have trodden to where we stand today in our relationship with Russia. Please note that not all events in Latvian-Russian relations, and not all personalities involved in this segment of foreign policy, are addressed in this work due to its limited length and the author’s subjective choices. In addition, political scientists are allowed to work with public sources only. This article is composed in roughly chronological order, with some jumps back and forth in time to delineate the main currents of thought in Latvian foreign policy as regards Russia. Three of these currents are identified as starting points in the search for ideas. What follows is a description of relevant steps in improving relations with Russia. The first of these is the “ideological” current, connected with a desire to revive the principles of the “Russian space” concept. The second is the “Russia-pragmatic” attitude, characterized as “economy first, Russia is a good business partner.” The third is “Latvia-pragmatic,” with a similar slogan: “economy first, Russia is an acceptable business partner.” No strict lines are drawn between these currents, and they may overlap. Both the “ideological” and the “Russia- pragmatic” currents might discuss matters such as Russians and Russian- speaking residents in Russia. The word “pragmatic” in this article refers to a country’s material interests, as opposed to the word “normative,” an approach where issues such as democracy and human rights take center stage. A division of the “pragmatic” current into the “Latvian” and “Russian” sub-currents, represents the enduring ethnic divide in Latvian politics and the diverging perceptions of Latvia’s domestic policy among foreign policy thinkers. While some in the “Russian pragmatic” current are willing to undertake domestic policy changes in Latvia that would please Russia (e.g. citizenship or language legislation), supporters of the “Latvian pragmatic” view want a good neighborly relationship that brings economic benefits, but at no cost to domestic or foreign policy. Notably, some individuals would be hard to place in any one category. This article highlights three people that represent each of the three currents. In the “ideological” framework of “Russian space” facilitators, the most prominent figure is Tatjana Ždanoka, who, like active “Russian pragmatic” Nils Ušakovs, did not participate in official shaping of Latvia’s foreign policy but is active in shaping Latvian-Russian relations in practice. Former President Valdis Zatlers is a “Latvian pragmatic” politician whose visits to Russia exceed, in terms of both scale and significance, figures such as Aigars

170 Kalvītis, Jānis Jurkāns, Jānis Urbanovičs or Aivars Lembergs. We could of course subdivide the “Latvian pragmatic” group further, distinguishing the Presidents Guntis Ulmanis and Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, who had worked on a good neighborly relationship with Russia before Zatlers, although with fewer achievements. Not all supporters of maintaining foreign relations with Russia are guided by the same set of principles, not each of them has the same understanding of the advantages of this foreign policy vector. Likewise, not all of the politicians mentioned should be considered “pro-Kremlin,” i.e. taking a positive view of the domestic and foreign policies of modern Russia.

Army withdrawal and the restless nineties The path to securing the independence of Latvia began with an important step: on 29 August 1991, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia (SCRL) made an official request for the Soviet Union to withdraw its military personnel from Latvia. The SCRL decision was not enough, of course. Internationalization of the issue involved Sweden and the USA, which provided the Baltic States with invaluable support in getting rid of the occupation forces – at the time referred to as “support forces” for a number of reasons. Some of the politicians and diplomats in Latvia involved in facilitating the removal of the Russian army in one way or another were: Jānis Dinevičs (head of the delegation during talks), Mārtiņš Virsis (head of the delegation during talks from 3 August 1993 onward), Georgs Andrejevs (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Valdis Birkavs (Prime Minister), Guntis Ulmanis (Head of State) and Dainis Turlais (head of a group of defense experts). Negotiations for the withdrawal of armed forces of the USSR (initially) and Russia (subsequently) continued until the spring of 1994, when Republic of Latvia President Guntis Ulmanis and Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs signed an agreement on army withdrawal with Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on 30 April. The road that led to that point had been fraught with difficulty. Negotiations were tough; the Russian side would come to the table with more and more new demands. The Latvian delegation caved to Russian pressure and consented to 22,320 retired Russian Army personal staying in Latvia. As noted by Tālavs Jundzis, the actual figure was somewhere between 75 and 100 thousand, considering that most officers were living in Latvia with their families.1 According to Jundzis, the process of army withdrawal and its cost should be treated more as a lesson to Latvia than as a success story.2 If

171 instead of the principles on international law one adopts a realpolitik view, one might agree to some extent with Valdis Birkavs’ words – that it had been a small price to pay for an army withdrawal. However, essential provisions of international law (which would not have allowed Russia to have any demands; instead Russia, being the USSR’s legal successor, could have been forced to compensate environmental damage) were ignored. This was not just due to the pliability of the Latvian side, but to an extent also due to the stances of the U.S. and Sweden. Tālavs Jundzis comments on the events as follows: “Assistance from the USA and Sweden for withdrawal of Russian forces from Latvia was preoccupied with matters of timing and the problem with the Skrunda radar, overlooking the increasing demands of Russia to grant special rights to Russian-speaking residents of Latvia and provide social concessions to former military personnel.”3 Only once the Russian army had been withdrawn could Latvia define its core foreign policy priorities – joining NATO and the European Union – in the 1995 document adopted by the Saeima: “Latvijas ārpolitikas pamatvirzieni līdz 2005. gadam” (“Foreign Policy Priorities for Latvia until 2005”). The document also mentioned that “Latvia will maintain neighborly relations with Russia on the basis of international standards of law and observance of international obligations.”4 So, “neighborly relations” over “priority” or “strategic partnership.” The choice was logical – just a short time earlier, in 1993, an army tank shot at the Russian Parliament building in Moscow; democratization of the vast neighbor could only be hoped for. The search for a new identity among Russian citizens had not transpired in a more or less consensual public perception of the best-case development scenario for Russia. Even the diplomats led by Andrei Kozyrev, Russia’s liberal Foreign Minister, had taken time to criticize Latvia for discrimination against ethnic Russians, sparking renewed attention to the situation from international organizations. Unfortunately, the mentality of the Russian political elite and the aftermath of losing the status of the USSR as a superpower did not enable a perception of Latvia as a subject of international policy; instead, it appeared to be an object that would play a minor role in Russia’s foreign policy and mobilization of the local electorate. Aware that Latvia was slipping away from Moscow’s “gravitational field,” in 1997 Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin made their last attempt to keep the Baltic States in orbit by offering security guarantees, which Latvia declined. What followed was an effort by Russia to discredit Latvia with prejudiced interpretation of

172 how a retiree protest was dispersed in the center of Riga in 1998. Perhaps another reason for Russia’s sharp response had been its unsuccessful plan to co-own the Ventspils port. 1998 was a turning-point year: the role of Russia in Latvia’s foreign trade would never be the same. The crisis suffered by the financial sector in Russia forced Latvian businesses to shift their focus to European Union markets. Prospects of EU and NATO accession also soared. Žaneta Ozoliņa and Airis Rikveilis commented on the Russian reaction to Latvia in the 1995–1998 period as “the more success Latvia had in implementing EU and NATO integration policy, the more aggressive Russia’s rhetoric would become.”5 In addition to official Latvian foreign policy, which in the late 1990s developed along more westward vectors, there were more efforts to accentuate the significance of Russia. With the establishment of the Movement for Social Fairness and Equal Rights6 (later evolving into the Equal Rights party) in 1993 and the National Harmony Party7 (NHP) in 1994, it became clear that not all residents of Latvia, and therefore not all political parties, were in agreement about deemphasizing relations with Russia. The NHP and Equal Rights argued that Latvian-Russian relations could not be improved without a certain attitude to ethnic Russian residents of Latvia. This conviction is illustrated well by two quotes from Jānis Jurkāns: “Relations with Russia need to be improved, and we should start with our own sickness”8 and “Unless we change our attitude to the Russians that live here, we will not change our relationship with Russia.”9 Political forces that value cooperation with Russia have undergone two major consolidation phases. The first was the establishment of the For Human Rights in United Latvia party (FHRUL) in 1998, as the NHP formed a coalition with the Movement for Social Justice and Equal Rights and the Socialist Party of Latvia.10 The second was the establishment of the Harmony Center (HC) in 2005 as an alliance of the National Harmony Party, the New Center,11 and the Daugavpils Party.12 Both consolidation events occurred shortly before elections to the Saeima.

A new century and a new reality The efforts of representatives from the 1998 consolidation to increase recognition and affect the relationship with Russia culminated in the visit of four parliamentarians from the FHRUL bloc to Russia before the 2001

173 Latvian municipal elections. The Saeima deputies led by Jānis Jurkāns came to Moscow and met with representatives of the Russian President’s administration, government and parliament. The most important of these meetings was the one with Prime Minister Kasyanov, whom the Latvian parliamentarians assured that FHRUL would head the ruling coalition after the election, expecting support from the social democrats. The Russian side expressed its desire to sign several agreement packages with Latvia, combining matters of the economy and humane cooperation; in other words, if they were to conclude new economic partnership agreements, they would have to change the treatment of ethnic Russians living in Latvia! This visit was widely admonished in Latvia, most notably by President Vaira Vīķe- Freiberga who said: “It is entirely normal for parliamentarians to arrange meetings with friendly parties in other lands that share their political ideology; however, in international practice, it would be normal for a special delegation of parliamentarians from one state to pay a visit to another state’s Prime Minister, while individual representatives from the opposition would not have such an opportunity. Latvian parliamentarians recently went on an official visit to Russia and were not granted an audience with the Prime Minister.”13 The selective attitude of Russian authorities, meeting representatives of specific political powers while ignoring others, became apparent in later years as well. Such practices challenged the implementation of coordinated foreign policy by Latvia. ’s election to the presidency in 2000 began a shift in Russian regional processes. Although Latvia had not participated in the CIS (an “amicable divorce” project), Moscow’s desire to control neighboring countries still extended to the Baltics. Under Putin’s administration, integration of the CIS space became a priority for foreign policy, although the success of regional integration processes was mixed. A law on policy for ethnic Russians had been adopted in 1999, but in Putin’s time the policy assumed its current form and content. Under the guises of this ethnic policy, Latvia would be criticized more sharply than in the 1990s. Until establishment of the Harmony Center, Russia placed its hopes in the For Human Rights in United Latvia alliance. In 2002, its leader Jānis Jurkāns went to Moscow for a meeting with Vladimir Putin inside the Kremlin. Putin was willing to devote a short time to a discussion with Jurkāns because at the time the Kremlin still believed in his potential to become Prime Minister in Latvia, or at least part of a government coalition that would implement a

174 more Russia-friendly policy. After the meeting, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Jurkāns announced to journalists that the Russian President had a very good understanding of Latvia’s situation and knew how to improve the two countries’ relations. As with the 2001 parliamentarians’ visit to Russia, Jurkāns’ meeting with Putin in 2002 was denounced by colleagues. Prime Minister Andris Bērziņš asked Jānis Jurkāns on a television show why, after the meeting with the President of Russia, he had failed to meet with the Latvian Ambassador to Russia and the State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Jurkāns’ response included this justification: “[..] a week before the election, I have no desire whatsoever to report on my talk with Putin to the Minister of Foreign Affairs or to anyone else.”14 Putin expressed pleasure at the fact that there were politicians in Latvia who wanted to fully restore relations between the two countries. The state of these relations at the time was not full-fledged, with no open dialogue between the heads of state meeting in person. In a 2003 interview for Latvian Public Television channel LTV 1, when asked by a journalist what Russia’s policy was regarding the Baltic States, Sergei Karaganov, a political scientist close to Russian authorities, responded “there is no such policy.” One could agree in part – Russia did not have a well-developed long-term vision for Baltic relations. On the other hand, Latvia itself had little to speak of besides the wording of “good neighborly relations” for a long time, although there was a substantial difference between the stances communicated by the two nations. Firstly, in spite of whatever spin doctors in Russia would say, Latvia rarely lectured Russia on its issues with democracy on an official level; meanwhile, Russian deputies and high-ranking officials regularly pointed out how Latvia should live within Europe. Secondly, Latvia’s Presidents had been paying visits to Moscow and inviting their Russian colleagues to Latvia, yet no head of state or government of Russia has been to Latvia on an official visit since 1991. Former Latvia’s Ambassador to Russia Jānis Peters had this to say about the situation in 2010: “It’s not normal that, for 16 years [since 1994, when Guntis Ulmanis visited Russia], there has been no relationship at the highest state level to speak of.”15 Only former high-ranking officials (Prime Ministers Sergei Stepashin and Yevgeni Primakov, and ex-President Boris Yeltsin) had visited the Republic of Latvia. On the Latvian side, steps were taken to make “good neighborly relations” count for something. In 1999, President-elect Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga told journalists in Russia: “The Latvian people harbor friendly feelings towards

175 Russia. I do, in any case. Russia is our great neighbor and Latvia has done everything in its power to build a friendly relationship with Russia.”16 Unlike her other Baltic colleagues, the President participated in Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on 9 May 2005. Before her trip, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga explained to the international community the controversial significance of this date in the history of Latvia. Her initiative aggravated people in power in Russia, where victory in the Great Patriotic War had been critical to constructing a common social memory and shaping a national identity. This poses a crucial question – could Latvia, without compromising on its perception of 20th-century history, hope for an improvement in its relations with Russia?

Putin shaking Kalvītis’ hand In 2007, Latvian security policy expert Airis Rikveilis wrote that Latvian- Russian relations developed in the fashion of a clock pendulum, swinging ceaselessly back and forth between improvement and deterioration.17 As part of a professional visit to Russia on 26–28 March 2007, Prime Minister Aigars Kalvītis had signed an agreement regarding the state border between the two countries. This made the pendulum swing towards positive relations, if to a lesser extent than Latvia had hoped. Communication of representatives from the People’s Party with Russia was something new for the Russian side, a change in the tactic of cherry-picking partners from Latvia that were backed by ethnically Russian political forces; the political elite was finally talking to the ruling coalition. Eventual liquidation of the People’s Party put an end to this improvement swing of the pendulum, with a local example of Schroederization18: in 2015, Kalvītis assumed the position of CEO at Latvijas Gāze. He then said that he did not expect talks about the free market with Russia’s to be politicized because “after all, business interests are the main thing.”19 Yet nobody in Russia had doubts that Gazprom was running political errands for the Kremlin. Six years before this event, in 2009, Putin was shaking Kalvītis’ hand in Moscow as high-profile individuals and TV cameras looked on. The former Prime Minister’s comment on the handshake and three-hour private dinner with Putin: “For the first time in 15 years, a good relationship had formed between Latvia and Russia because we able to communicate with each other. So Putin invited me to a dinner with him last year. It didn’t happen because he needed something from a former – it happened

176 because I really had a good reputation in Russia: ‘a man of his word, we do what we promise’.”20 Kalvītis’ role in the signing of the border agreement at the Kremlin was acclaimed because Russia, at the time actively lobbying for visa-free travel with the EU, desperately needed to sort out its border situation. Those who dared to contest the legality of giving away Abrene were met with Putin’s promise of “a dead donkey’s ears” and nothing more… This is another key element to the dynamic of Latvian-Russian relations – yes, improvements are possible, provided Latvia takes the back seat on important matters. This phase of alignment between Kalvītis and Putin coincided with a change in European perception of Russia as a supplier of energy resources. In 2006, a dispute between Russia and Ukraine on matters of energy resource deliveries and transit made the European Union contemplate energy security and diversification of its resource suppliers. Latvia’s energy matters with Russia were intertwined with the activities of the Kontinental Hockey League (a Putin initiative) in Latvia. The symbolic dimension of this partnership is apparent in Rīgas Dinamo hockey club games at the Arēna Rīga venue, where the VIP booth was shared amicably, at various times, by natural gas company Itera Latvija CEO Juris Savickis, former Latvia’s President Guntis Ulmanis, former Prime Minister Aigars Kalvītis, then- Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis, then-President Andris Bērziņš etc. The economic argumentation for pursuing a better relationship has been a staple since 1991. Criticism was heard somewhat frequently regarding Latvia’s failure to leverage its geographic location in talks with neighboring Russia. In 2004, economist Vjačeslavs Dombrovskis and Alfs Vanags performed a gravitational model study that has not lost its relevance:21 it helped the researchers reveal that the “extraordinary latent potential” was more of an exaggeration. The two experts observed that, in spite of certain political rhetoric, the actual state of affairs indicated a normal economic relationship between Latvia and Russia, with no evidence for any sort of “missing trade.”22 The economic relationship is functioning normally; if we want more, Moscow will be asking for substantial political concessions.

From the Interfront to the “Russian space” In addition to the “pragmatic” trend, which accentuated the potential for economic gains from working with Russia, the relationship has been discussed in the categories of ethnos and culture. The idea of restoring the

177 dissolved USSR may still survive in the minds of the most loyal members of Russia’s Communist Party but contemporary foreign policy ideologues have brought up a more refined conceptual framework for integration of the CIS region – “Russian space.” One of the creators of this idea is Russian writer and culture expert Andrei Stolyarov, who in his article “The Russian Space” wrote that nation states were eroding and Russia should move with the times to discuss a transnational entity with boundaries that were cultural rather than geographic. Tatyana Poloskova, one of this ethnic policy’s facilitators in Russia, told the Izvestia newspaper that “the Russian state is faced not with a problem but with a gift, a dream – we have gained a diaspora; all that remains is to structure it.”23 In this context, Poloskova also noted in one of her writings that Tatjana Ždanoka deserved a monument for her desire to establish the Russian diaspora as a self-sufficient entity within the European Union. The possibilities granted by the European Parliament assist her “self- sufficiency.” In 2014, Ždanoka visited the Crimean peninsula, where she explained that the referendum on joining Russia had transpired democratically and without violations. For Russia’s propaganda, this is a great help: a European Parliament deputy legitimizes the referendum… Comfortable in her role as an international power broker, Ždanoka went to Syria with an EP delegation in 2016, where she met with President Bashar al Assad. Ždanoka regularly organized various activities to defend Russian rights in the European Parliament, aiming to convince bureaucrats and EP deputies that are being violated en masse. She is not alone in her work on undermining the reputation of the Latvian government. As part of a master class for students at the ’s School of Economics in the summer of 2007, former deputy director of the 2nd European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia Mikhail Demurin said that economic policy of cooperation with the Baltic States should be extended with political and informational tools. “And this entire complex of tools should aim at making Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania extremely uncomfortable partners for the European Union and NATO.”24 Today, Poloskova’s monument to Ždanoka is nowhere to be seen (so far), although the Kremlin has expressed praise for the former activist of the International Front of the Working People of Latvia achieving Russia’s foreign policy objectives. In 2009, Tatjana Ždanoka was awarded the Order of Friendship for her contribution to developing cultural ties with the Russian Federation.

178 TATJANA ŽDANOKA. Current political activities of Tatjana Ždanoka, the face of the Russia- centric “ideological” school of foreign diplomacy, are better understood in the context of her participation in the International Front of the Working People of Latvia (Interfront) in 1989. As part of the All- Latvia Social Salvation Committee, the Interfront was an active supporter of the August 1991 Putsch organized by the heads of USSR military institutions and powerful elites. The Interfront spoke out for maintaining the USSR; it was liquidated Photo: from the personal archives immediately after the failed 1991 coup. However, it of Tatjana Ždanoka remained “in spirit” in the work of Tatjana Ždanoka and similar activists. In 1993, Ždanoka became one of the leaders of the movement For Social Justice and Equal Rights. She has been prominently involved in the initiative of consolidating the “Russian space” ethnic policy. In 2003 and 2004, Tatjana Ždanoka supported the Russian School Defense Staff, which involved schoolchildren in protests delaying implementation of education reform in Latvia. European Parliament deputy since 2004. Ždanoka has established the European Russian Forum and is working to promote the ideas of Russian ethnic policy within the EU. Of note is Tatjana Ždanoka’s answer to the Diena newspaper regarding her participation in the USSR Restoration Congress in 2014: “This will not restore the USSR in its old form but rather, speaking in programming terms, as USSR 2.0.”

Ždanoka and like-minded politicians in Latvia (Vladimirs Buzajevs, Jakovs Pliners, as well as social activists Aleksandrs Gapoņenko and Vladimirs Lindermans) cannot affect Latvia’s foreign relations with Russia directly, but they do help create a “Russian space” that, in line with Russian foreign policy roadmaps, should expand the influence Russia has beyond its borders. Ždanoka’s engagement in “Russian space” consolidation activities indicates that her work has been an effort not to establish “more Latvia in Russia” but rather “more Russia in Latvia and Brussels.” Before the Harmony Center was established in 2005, Russian foreign policy actors hoped that such a stance would be sufficient for a Kremlin-backed faction to gain access to government in Latvia. Jānis Jurkāns’ meeting with Vladimir Putin mentioned in the previous section was a gesture of the Kremlin’s support for Tatjana Ždanoka’s campaigns because Jurkāns’ National Harmony Party was part of the For Human Rights in United Latvia

179 alliance. Over time, it became evident that sharp confrontation could not suffice in a bid for government, and in2006 the Kremlin chose to support a softer approach.

Nils Ušakovs and the decentralization of foreign policy Nils Ušakovs made his first overseas visit as mayor of the capital in September 2009. He came to Moscow welcomed by a vibrant proponent of ethnic Russian policy, then-mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov. The gesture is considered a step in a different direction from the foreign policy priorities of Latvia. If Tallinn and Vilnius appear too small for Riga, perhaps it would make sense to pay greater attention to some of its twenty-nine other sister cities, say, Stockholm or Warsaw? Harmony Center representatives usually explain this with a need to maintain economic relations between the neighboring state capitals. But are these truly economic? Active communication between Riga and Moscow started under Social Democratic Riga mayor Gundars Bojārs. When Yuri came to visit Riga in 2004, people protesting the education reform in Latvia gave him a T-shirt with their emblem. Luzhkov briefly placed the T-shirt to his chest – some would call this etiquette, others would argue politics. This is what Gundars Bojārs said back then: “Nineteen percent of Latvia’s economy is connected to transit and transportation. These areas are also linked to the Russian market, which appeals to Riga a great deal. These are our key interests in Moscow.”25 The mayor of Moscow did not stop at economic topics, commenting: “Moscow, like Russia, will help its people abroad. Once the Soviet Union collapsed, 45 million Russian speakers were stranded outside Russia, and they need help.”26 In 1998, as part of his “care” for compatriots overseas, Luzhkov had accused Latvian state authorities of genocide, comparing our state to Pol Pot’s Cambodia.27 Somehow this did not dissuade Luzhkov, having fallen into disfavor with President Putin by 2010, from seeking a residence permit in Latvia, of all places… Riga does not officially represent the state in relations with other countries, but things are different in Russia. The Moscow Department for External Economic and International Relations is engaged in more than the city’s economic affairs abroad. Its bylaws specify that the department provides participation in implementing state policy for compatriots abroad. The department also manages missions in foreign countries, the Houses

180 NILS UŠAKOVS started his political career in 2005 by joining the National Harmony Party. In November 2005, he became chairman of the newly established Harmony Center (HC). Mayor of Riga since 2009. Before the 2012 referendum, he supported the idea of establishing Russian as the second state language in Latvia. As mayor of Riga, Ušakovs actively worked with Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, a proponent of Russian ethnic policy. In 2011, the media released e-mail correspondence between Nils Ušakovs and Russian Embassy Photo: Riga City Council, employee Aleksandr Khapilov, who was suspected www.riga.lv of espionage in Latvia. Ušakovs sued kompromat. lv representative Leonīds Jākobsons over theft of e-mail communications; on 20 September 2016, the court vindicated Jākobsons. In relations with Russia, Nils Ušakovs underscores economic benefits, particularly in a partnership between the capitals Riga and Moscow. In a 2014 interview to independent Russian TV channel “Dozhd,” he said: “the best we can have at the moment is Vladimir Putin because even with him out of the picture, you would not have somebody like Navalny as president.”

of Moscow, which hold a variety of events, including those involved with Russia’s compatriot policy. In 2009, the Harmony Center led by Nils Ušakovs and Jānis Urbanovičs concluded a cooperation agreement with United Russia, the pro-Putin ruling party whose 2003 pathos-filled (as would behoove a dislodged superpower) manifesto stated: “At the end of last century, most of us perceived the collapse of the Soviet Union as a personal tragedy.” The Harmony Center failed to consider Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 to be a sufficient reason for terminating its agreement with the faction that bemoaned the fate of the USSR. In his 2014 TV interview to LNT’s 900 sekundes, Nils Ušakovs mentioned that implementing sanctions against Russia to stem its aggression in Ukraine was a mad idea. In 2016, Ušakovs expressed hopes for cancellation of European Union sanctions against Russia. On 2 August, Russian Vice Prime Minister Arkadi Dvorkovich came to Riga on an unofficial visit, meeting with the mayor of Riga and (away from journalists’ eyes) with three members of the Union of Greens and Farmers: Minister of Finance Dana Reizniece-Ozola, Minister of transportation and Minister

181 of Agriculture Jānis Dūklavs. The slogan “economy first” in relations with Russia moves both Russian-speaking and Latvian-speaking politicians in Latvia.

Good neighbors: Valdis Zatlers’ effort A major attempt by the “pragmatic” school to move towards a good neighborly relationship was the visit Valdis Zatlers paid to Russia in 2010. The visit was made possible owing to Russia’s desire to improve relations with the EU and the States, securing support for modernization in Russia, and Angela Merkel’s urging Dmitri Medvedev to improve relations with the Baltic peoples. But without Valdis Zatlers’s desire for positive change in Latvian-Russian affairs, it would not have happened. One of the signals to Russia was Zatlers’ participation in the 9 May 2010 celebration commemorating the end of World War II in Moscow. Zatlers did not take his history textbook with him, and so had a better outcome than Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga five years earlier. The website of the Chancery of the President of Latvia stated that Zatlers had put forward three core objectives in facilitating a relationship with Russia: conducting political dialogue at the highest level, promoting economic contact between Latvia and Russia and reducing tension in matters of divergent historic interpretations. On 19–21 December 2010, the President met with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. This was the first official visit of such profile in the entire history of Latvian-Russian relations. A number of bilateral agreements were signed and consensus was achieved on establishment of a joint Committee of Historians. For a while, it seemed that spring was in bloom… …Until 2012, when Zatlers’ hopes were dashed. Notable in this regard is the message published by the Russian Embassy to Latvia: “Since mid-2011, bilateral affairs started to cool; dissatisfaction grew when a coalition led by Valdis Dombrovskis was established in the 11th Saeima.”28 Back then the Harmony Center was excluded from the coalition, after coming very close to being included. Moscow’s embitterment implies that the Kremlin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia had hoped for the HC in government as much as the elected politicians themselves. We cannot say Valdis Zatlers had not done his best; he had promised to include the HC in the ruling coalition by saying “Only tanks could force us to overturn this decision.”29 Zatlers’ choice to include the HC in the ruling coalition was largely motivated by a

182 VALDIS ZATLERS. Valdis Zatlers was President of Latvia from 2007 to 2011. On 28 May 2011, Zatlers signed decree No. 2 On Initiating Dissolution of the Saeima. The same year, he became chairman of his own Zatlers and subsequently deputy in the 11th Saeima. Zatlers’ key political goals include reducing the influence of oligarchy on Latvian policy, improving relations between ethnic Latvians and minorities, and improving Latvian-Russian relations. In 2010, Zatlers went on an official visit to Russia, concluding a series of Photo: Chancery of the President bilateral agreements between Latvia and Russia, and of Latvia, www.president.lv meeting with state officials Vladimir Putin, Dmitri Medvedev, and Sergei Mironov. During the talks, Zatlers promised Russia support for liberalizing the visa regime with the EU. Valdis Zatlers’ visit to Russia was the most significant event in the relationship between Latvia and Russia since 1994. One of Zatlers’ most striking political declarations was related to his support for involving the Harmony Center in government during the 2011 coalition negotiations: “Since we have spent long hours discussing this with the board, and the board has had long talks with the deputies to the new Saeima – look, only tanks could force us to overturn this decision.” We can safely assume that Valdis Zatlers’ foreign policy regarding Russia would be different if Russia had been aggressive to Ukraine during his term as President. Therefore, Zatlers only represented the “Latvian pragmatic” aspect of Latvian-Russian relations during a certain brief period of time.

desire to diminish Aivars Lembergs’ impact in Latvia’s politics via the Union of Greens and Farmers. No tanks had been necessary; some political factions in Latvia were unwilling to work alongside partners of the United Russia party. What happened next looked like retribution. On 28 December 2011, the Russia Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a report On the Situation with Human Rights in Many Countries throughout the World. Besides expressing anxiety over issues with democracy in the United States and Great Britain, the report took time to shame Latvia as well. This was in the run-up to the 2012 “Russian space”-inspired referendum over Russian as a second state language in Latvia, for which Riga mayor Nils Ušakovs declared his support several days before people went to the polls. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held a press conference in Moscow on 18 January 2012, where he commented on the referendum: “I do not dare

183 assume the outcome of the referendum but what is important here is that people want to be heard. They want respect for their right to speak, their right to think, and to raise their children in their mother tongue.”30 Did the experienced Russian diplomat really think that without state language status, Russians in Latvia had problems “thinking Russian”? Latvia’s Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs responded to Lavrov’s comments: “People in Russia that worry about what is happening in Latvia are welcome to take a few moments of their free time to read the article of their presidential candidate Mr. Putin, in which he quite accurately states that in fact in the Russian Federation, matters concerned with national identity and statehood are grounded in language. Mr. Lavrov should take a closer look at what happens at home.”31 On 25 May 2012, Russia’s Ambassador to Latvia Aleksandr Veshnyakov said at the Baltic Forum that after Valdis Zatlers’ visit to Moscow he had really expected change in the relationship between the two countries. Like in the case of the U.S. and Russia, Riga and Moscow were also discussing a “reset” to Latvian-Russian relations. The Ambassador said that, despite the achievements, attitudes in Riga had changed in the past year and a half. The mention of the United States is notable: didn’t the U.S. wish to improve its relations with Russia as well?

Conclusion: why won’t Putin come over? Why has neither Boris Yeltsin nor Dmitri Medvedev or Vladimir Putin accepted the invitation to pay Latvia an official visit? The question is more important than might appear. In foreign affairs, both “doing” and “not doing” is an expression of policy. Although Russia has criticized Latvia since the early 1990s, alleging violations of the human rights of Russian-speaking residents, this cannot be considered a real reason for the tepid relationship between the two countries. Russia’s silence on the issue of ethnic Russians in Central Asia in the 1990s invalidates the primacy of this argument. Economic relations between Latvia and Russia have developed positively sooner than negatively overall. Even after joining NATO, Latvia does not pose any military threat to Russia. Latvia is a safe neighbor that pays for Russia’s natural gas diligently, and does not “challenge” Russia substantially on any international arena, mostly leaving normative (i.e. non-pragmatic) criticism over violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms up to Brussels. The situation changed after the illegal annexation of Crimea, of course, but

184 even before the war in Ukraine, a head of the Russian state could have come to Latvia, as have U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, as has German chancellor Angela Merkel. An official visit to Latvia by Vladimir Putin would communicate a certain degree of respect to the Latvian state, showing some desire on the part of Moscow to assist the Russians living there, if it does consider them to be discriminated against. Would a discussion in person not prove more effective than accusations from afar? Unfortunately, a large part of Russia’s Compatriots Policy is aimed not at helping Russian people integrate with their home countries, but at disrupting such integration. This is a policy of “silence” where economic relations work relatively well and no sanctions are imposed against Latvia over the ethnic issue despite populists in Russia frequently demanding them. Russia’s “out loud” policy for Latvia, meanwhile, is relegated to a minor role – a card to play in response to European institutions’ criticism over democratic problems in Russia. This is useful for mobilizing the Russian general public against the “hateful” neighbors by gathering around a “national leader.” What will Latvia do? Economic cooperation will continue despite Russian efforts to discredit us internationally; thus, a visit to Latvia is not considered necessary. Official Russia is often selective in its relations with Latvia, cherry picking discussion partners that support the political ideas of ethnic Russians living abroad. If any mainstream politician in Latvia (such as Valdis Zatlers) is to improve high-level relations, Latvia has to be willing to abandon fundamental state interests or to allow Moscow-backed politicians to govern its state. Starting with the withdrawal of the Russian army from Latvia, Russia routinely expressed demands that put Latvia on the defensive, requiring interests to be sacrificed to the larger neighbor. Russia’s response to the events of 2012 showed that Zatlers’ efforts to improve relations with Russia would have been more successful if the Harmony Center (whether with or without Alfrēds Rubiks’ socialists) had been accepted into the ruling coalition. If Latvia’s politicians have to keep worrying about Moscow’s response in the name of neighborly relations, then what respectful neighborly relations are there to speak of? Valdis Zatlers’ play and its outcome are significant to answering the question posed in the introduction to this article more precisely. So, could things have gone differently? Yes, they could – but only if Latvia ignored the international legal treatment of the institution of citizenship; if Latvia

185 rejected its desire to maintain the Latvian language for posterity; if Latvia declined to profess solidarity with states that work to maintain their own foreign policies of independence and attempt to escape the regional dominance of Moscow. Had it done so, Latvia would not be the state we envisioned as we stood on in 1991. Therefore, our current relations with our neighbor Russia are as good as they could have been. We cannot turn the tides of time and see what might have happened if FHRUL or HC politicians had been in government at key turning points. Would these actors have managed to implement the domestic policy changes that Moscow expected of them? This question remains unanswered. Another dimension of what could or should have been is concerned with possible political changes within Russia. We might assume that Latvia would have had an easier relationship with a democratic Russia, but hopes for democratization have changed radically during Vladimir Putin’s presidency. In the fall of 2016, Russian foreign affairs have reached a degree of aggressive rhetoric unprecedented since 1991. In this situation, we cannot expect substantial improvements in Latvia-Russia relations.

Endnotes

1 Tālavs Jundzis, “Krievijas karaspēka izvešana no Latvijas 1992-1994: diplomātiska uzvara vai po- litiska piekāpšanās?” LZA Vēstis, 2014, http://www.lza.lv/LZA_VestisA/68_3-4/1_Talavs%20 Jundzis_Krievias%20karaspeka%20izvesana.pdf 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 “Latvijas ārpolitikas pamatvirzieni līdz 2005. gadam,” http://www.mfa.gov.lv/arpolitika/ latvijas-arpolitikas-pamatvirzieni-lidz-2005-gadam 5 Žaneta Ozoliņa and Airis Rikveilis, “Latvian and Russian Foreign Policy: Bound by a Post-Soviet Heritage”, in Nils Muižnieks, ed., Latvian – Russian Relations: Domestic and International Dimen- sions (Rīga: Latvijas Universitāte, 2006), 89. 6 Prominent figures in this movement were Tatjana Ždanoka and Sergejs Dīmanis. 7 Party chairman – Jānis Jurkāns. 8 Nellija Ločmele, “Kreisajiem pieprasa paskaidrojumus par attiecībām ar Krieviju,”Diena , 1999. gada 3. marts, http://www.diena.lv/arhivs/kreisajiem-pieprasa-paskaidrojumus-par- attiecibam-ar-krieviju-10408632 9 “Duelis: Bērziņš–Jurkāns,” Diena, 2002. gada 3. oktobris, http://www.diena.lv/arhivs/duelis- berzins-jurkans-11470650 10 Party chairman from 1999 until 2015 – Alfrēds Rubiks. 11 Chaired by Sergejs Dolgopolovs. 12 Chaired by Vitālijs Azarevičs. 13 Roalds Liepkalns, “Krievija Jurkānam sola kaulēties par nepilsoņu tiesībām,” Diena, 2001. gada 20. februāris, http://www.diena.lv/arhivs/krievija-jurkanam-sola-kauleties-par-nepilsonu-tiesibam- 10945259 14 “Duelis: Bērziņš-Jurkāns.”

186 15 Uldis Rācenis, “Peters: Zatlera vizīte iezīmē aukstā kara beigas,” Diena, 2010. gada 22. decembris, http://www.diena.lv/sodien-laikraksta/peters-zatlera-vizite-iezime-auksta-kara-beigas-760942 16 “Krievija un Baltija – II,” Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1999. gada 5. oktobris, Nr. 325/327 (1785/1787)htt- ps://www.vestnesis.lv/ta/id/16165 17 Airis Rikveilis, “Latvijas – Krievijas attiecību 15 gadi: no optimisma līdz bezcerībai un atpakaļ”, from Žaneta Ozoliņa, ed., Latvija – Krievija – X (Rīga: Zinātne, Stratēģiskās analīzes komisija, 2007), 17. 18 “Schroederization” refers to major government positions by European politicians in businesses tied to Russia following their political careers, with Gerhard Schroeder being the prime example of this phenomenon. 19 ““Latvijas Gāzes” vadītāja amatā iecelts Aigars Kalvītis,” IR, 2015. gada 14. augusts, http://www. irlv.lv/2015/8/14/latvijas-gazes-vaditaja-amata-iecelts-aigars-kalvitis 20 Baiba Rulle, “Kalvītis: “Es nevienam neko sliktu neesmu izdarījis!””, Pietiek.com, 2010. gada 6. no- vembris, http://m.pietiek.com/raksti/kalvitis_es_nevienam_neko_sliktu_neesmu_izdarijis! 21 The gravitational model evaluates a large number of economic indicators of both states to look for missed opportunities in cross-border trade. 22 Nils Muižnieks, ed., Latvian – Russian Relations: Domestic and International Dimensions (Riga: LU, 2006), 107. 23 Andis Kudors, “Sagaidām “Krievu pasaules” cementētāju – Tatjanu Poloskovu!” DELFI, 2013. gada 22. marts, http://www.delfi.lv/news/comment/comment/andis-kudors-sagaidam- krievu-pasaules-cementetaju-tatjanu-poloskovu.d?id=43167264 24 M.V. Demurin’s master class “Прибалтика и европейская политика России: исто­рия вопроса, положение сегодня, взгляд в будущее,” 17th session of the Global Political Economy Club, 19 June 2007, GU-VSE. 25 Ivars Āboliņš, “Lužkovs Rīgā sola palīdzību tautiešiem,” Diena, 2004. gada 29. maijs, http://www. diena.lv/arhivs/luzkovs-riga-sola-palidzibu-tautiesiem-12027673 26 Ibid. 27 Nils Muižnieks, ed., Latvian – Russian Relations: Domestic and International Dimensions, 121. 28 “Krievijas un Latvijas attiecības,” Krievijas vēstniecība Latvijā, http://www.latvia.mid.ru/rus- lat_lat.html 29 “Zatlers: Mūs tikai ar tankiem var piespiest mainīt šo lēmumu,” Diena, 2011. gada 3. oktobris, http://www.diena.lv/latvija/politika/zatlers-mus-tikai-ar-tankiem-var-piespiest-mainit-so-lemu- mu-13906830 30 “Лавров прокомментировал проведение референдума по русскому языку в Латвии,” Взгляд, 18 января 2012, http://vz.ru/news/2012/1/18/554493.html 31 BNS, “Rinkēvičs mudina Lavrovu iepazīties ar Putina uzskatiem par valodas lomu nacionālajā identitātē,” 2012. gada 24. janvāris, http://nra.lv/latvija/politika/64637-rinkevics-mudina-lavro- vu-iepazities-ar-putina-uzskatiem-par-valodas-lomu-nacionalaja-identitate.htm

187 The Baltic Sea Region Stream in Latvia’s Foreign Affairs

DIDZIS KĻAVIŅŠ

2016 is a remarkable year for cooperation between the Baltics and the Nordic countries, not just because of Latvia’s presidency at the Baltic Assembly (BA), the Baltic Council of Ministers (BCM) and coordination of the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB-8) framework for regional cooperation, but also in light of the fact that twenty-five years have passed since Latvia and its neighbors Estonia and Lithuania regained independence. During this time, Latvia has joined the UN, OSCE, NATO, EU, OECD and other international organizations, and it has helped shape a multitude of cooperation formats in the Baltic Sea region. The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the EU’s Northern Dimension, BA, BCM and NB-8 are just part of the institutionalized cooperation models that have been created and developed with Latvia’s participation. A quarter of a century is a solid period of time to look back on and evaluate Latvia’s accomplishments. This article considers the development of the Baltic Sea region aspect and its hallmarks in Latvia’s foreign affairs over this period of time. Because of the abundance of data from such recent history, this article focuses on the most significant factors describing the Baltic Sea region stream in Latvia’s foreign relations.

Return to Europe Once the country regained independence, participation in international organizations and cooperation with other countries in the Baltic Sea region1 became a major foreign policy objective for Latvia. Considering the opportunities provided by the end of the Cold War and the unique geopolitical situation, integration with Western organizations became a major foreign policy goal. Supported and encouraged by Western Europe (especially by the Nordic countries), Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania exercised their options for growing closer to Europe after half a century of occupation. In the first few years of this new independence, national identities had the spotlight

188 and the public was preoccupied with a quick return to Europe; but this was not enough for Latvia to become integrated with major Western European political organizations and cooperation formats. It was high time to set clear political goals and objectives. Close relationships needed to be developed with allies abroad. Because this time of unprecedented change required the formation of a unified foreign affairs service (the only institution in the Republic of Latvia that had operated without interruption since the country’s establishment in 1918), it is bewildering how, with extremely limited human resources and experience, the political elite of Latvia and its foreign service activists were heard in the international arena. Our political goals and principles were voiced and received very soon, with some degree of difficulty. After some time, this culminated in practical work and accomplishments. Before discussing the role of Latvia in developing various formats of cooperation between the Baltic States and the Baltic Sea region and reviewing the various trends that manifested themselves within this context, two foreign individuals must be mentioned who were very important to restoring the independence of the Baltic countries.

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Hans Dietrich Genscher One of the most influential defenders of the Baltic peoples in the international space, active well before Latvia’s independence was restored, had been Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Denmark’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (1982–1993). In 1989, Ellemann-Jensen became an active supporter of the interests of residents of the Baltic republics; he was a prominent figure in shaping public thought in Denmark, a highly respected and influential politician in international circles. Jānis Jurkāns, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, recalls that Denmark was the champion of restoring the independence of the Baltic States, with Ellemann-Jensen being an especially active voice that was heard by the heads of state, politicians and diplomats elsewhere.2 Denmark was the first country to sign a memorandum of international cooperation with Latvia, before its independence was even declared. In February 1991, the first parliamentary delegation from Denmark arrived in Riga3 to affirm the legitimacy and continuity of relationships established in 1921.4 Denmark’s consistent support for the independence efforts of Latvia and its neighbors Estonia and Lithuania was noticed, of course, and condemned by the Soviet Union.5 Refusing to submit to threats from

189 Moscow, Ellemann-Jensen admitted that he had counted on such pushback. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark said that the right to live freely was fundamental, and neither Denmark nor the part of the world to which we belong will deny the existence of this right.6 Before Latvia was independent, Ellemann-Jensen had already played a significant role in facilitating a partnership between the Baltic States and the Nordic countries, establishing new international political institutions such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States. Hans Dietrich Genscher, former politician and long- term Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Federal Republic, is another foreign individual without whose active support the Baltics would have had more difficulty regaining independence and subsequently integrating with European entities. On 27 August 1991, Genscher announced that, if the Foreign Ministers of the three Baltic nations so wished, he would fight for the bonding of their countries with the European community. The GFR Minister stressed, “We shall support the Baltic States on their path towards Europe.”7 Like Ellemann-Jensen, Genscher was instrumental to the various formats of international political cooperation. These two foreign relations officials were able to leverage their more in-depth experience to convince and encourage representatives of other countries to help the Baltic peoples restore their independence.8

Unity of the Baltic States: myth or reality Having reclaimed its independence, Latvia prioritized development of cooperation with Estonia and Lithuania. One of the first projects in this vein was the Baltic Assembly, an idea crafted by Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia deputies, including Māris Budovskis and Aleksandrs Kiršteins. They initiated a meeting in Tallinn on 8 November 1991, where a decision was adopted to establish the BA in a consultative and coordinating capacity. Harking back to the Baltic League that had existed prior to the 1940 occupation, the BA was founded by people that were aware of historical errors and wanted to establish closer ties between the three countries as the first step on the road to Baltic parliamentary cooperation. While it might appear that the Baltic States would have been interested in such an institution from the beginning, parliamentary cooperation had a rough start. Māris Budovskis, one of the idea’s creators, recalls: “During the first working discussion in the fall of 1991, it took an enormous diplomatic effort

190 for us to have the Estonian delegation sign the Baltic Assembly convocation document. It ended with Marju Lauristin, head of Estonia’s working group, being ‘voted out’ of her national delegation. So it was quite a dramatic process.”9 At a time when the Baltic deputies did not share the same view on tri-state unity, discussing matters that would interest the Baltic States and synchronizing the attitudes of parliamentarians became the main goal of BA activities. On 13 June 1994, the Baltic Council of Ministers was founded in order to ensure continuity of cooperation among the executive governments. The operation of the BA and the BCM was not synchronized, until the commendable 2003 decision to amend the tripartite agreement and organize the BA presidency contemporaneously with the BCM. Just as important, a year later a protocol was signed that precisely defined the mechanisms for Baltic cooperation in both relationship formats. Since 2004, the activities of the BCM Cooperation Council (meetings of foreign ministers of the Baltic States) and the Baltic Council (a summit of the BA Presidium and the BCM Cooperation Council) have been synchronized. Furthermore, BCM reform in 2005 reduced the number of Committees of Senior Officials from eighteen to five: defense, energy, interior affairs, environment, and transport and communication. The three years of transformation, along with the priorities proposed by the BA and the BCM in the past two years, indicate that the two formats are capable of organizational change in order to provide parliamentarians and executive government officials focus on topical affairs and security challenges from Russia. Thus, in 2016, a secure Baltic region was defined as a priority, with an emphasis on the reinforcement of regional security, strategic communication and cybersecurity. Since the appointment of Jānis Jurkāns, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs after restoration of Latvia’s independence, on 22 May 1990, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been headed by eleven different politicians and diplomats. Throughout this period, cooperation among the Baltic States via the BA and the BCM has always been a political priority. Of course, each Foreign Minister has left a lasting imprint in the processes that facilitate Baltic unity, including integration of Latvia in Baltic Sea region entities. Among them, Sandra Kalniete, Valdis Birkavs, Artis Pabriks, Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis and Edgars Rinkēvičs have placed more emphasis in their speeches and messages on the significance of the Baltic States on every level.

191 For Kalniete and Kristovskis, the union was motivated more by political concerns and counteraction of Russia’s imperialist and aggressive foreign policy; Pabriks and Birkavs considered cooperation among the Baltic States as a matter of economics and promotion of cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. For instance, in 2007 Artis Pabriks and his former colleague Carl Bildt, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, wrote an article describing the Baltic Sea region as the most dynamic part of the world. According to the authors: “The Baltic Sea region can serve as a model and an example for other regions within Europe, proving that high economic performance on the front lines of globalization can go hand in hand with an exceptional environmental record and sustainable development.”10 In later years, Pabriks shifted some emphasis from promoting involvement of the Baltic States in regional partnership formats to focusing more on integration of the Baltic armed forces. Sandra Kalniete, having become a European Parliament deputy, brought attention to other matters, such as adopting the Common Agricultural Policy in line with Baltic interests. The most distinguished creator of new ideas for Baltic cooperation and Baltic Sea region opportunities, and subsequently of ways for the Baltic Sea region to become a major force within the EU, has been Valdis Birkavs, who shared his Amber Gateway idea with international society in late 1997. The concept involved a wide-ranging Baltic Sea region union for economic cooperation based on the CBSS, and would include the U.S. and Western European countries. In his speech at the Security and Welfare in the Baltic Region international conference, Birkavs noted: “The Amber Gateway is open in both directions, facilitating free trade between the East and the West, the North and the South. It is all-encompassing, it serves every country along these Nordic trade routes, regardless of whether they share a border in the Baltic Sea or not.”11 Aware that strategic ports and transit routes within the Baltic Sea could become more influential for global economic development, former Latvia’s ambassador to the United States Ojārs Ēriks Kalniņš commented that the Baltic States could quickly become one of the most successful regions for international trade globally.12 In an article published in late 1997, he wrote: “If we look for Latvia’s place in the 21st century, we should just look at the map. Latvia is at the centre of this region! Our ports are windows to the wide world – our ‘amber gateways’ to countries and cities worldwide – and to a bright future.”13 Looking back today, unfortunately, consistent support for this

192 VALDIS BIRKAVS, Dr.iur., former Prime Minister of the Republic of Latvia (1993–1994), became a Foreign Minister after the government deteriorated (1994–1999). In the time since Latvia’s independence was restored, he has been one of the most prominent politicians asserting the importance of closer cooperation among the Baltic States and the need to integrate more within the Baltic Sea region – particularly by reinforcing political, economic and social ties with the Nordic countries. The Saeima adopted the “Foreign Policy Priorities for Latvia until 2005,” with the Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs attachment “Concept for Foreign Policy of the Republic of Latvia,” developed under Birkavs’ management. Since 1995, the main scope of Latvian foreign policy has been determined by the country’s long-term interests, including further cooperation with Estonia, Lithuania and the Nordic countries. While Foreign Minister, speaking at the “Security and Welfare in the Baltic Region” conference held at the Latvian National Opera on 17 November 1997, Birkavs introduced his Amber Gateway concept to the general public. His idea was to establish a far-reaching economic union in the Baltic region: “the Amber Gateway is a network of mutually related markets, connected through their seaports and airports, developing thanks to free commerce and supported by democratic governments that share common views on peace, trade, and welfare. This is a concept for how we in the Baltic region will do business in the 21st century.”* His solution intended for the Amber Gateway to operate on the basis of the CBSS, involving the United States and major Western European powers. At the NB-8 summit meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Baltics and Nordic countries, held in Riga on 26 and 27 August 2010, the central topic was the NB8 Wise Men Report by Valdis Birkavs and former Defense Minister of Denmark Søren Gade, detailing Baltic-Nordic cooperation. The report evaluated prior cooperation and proposed new avenues for developing partnerships in foreign policy, use of joint diplomatic missions, facilitation of civic society, cybersecurity, defense and energy cooperation. In the last twenty-five years, many Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Latvia have asserted the importance of the Baltic Sea dimension to Latvia’s foreign relations but with few bold ideas or original proposals for encouraging practical cooperation among the countries on every level. Both the Amber Gateway concept and the Birkavs-Gade report exemplify how new ideas could strengthen the development of regionalism conceptually and sketch out new features for Latvia’s foreign policy development.

* “Mūsu un kaimiņu drošībai un labklājībai,” Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1997. gada 19. novembris, https://www.vestnesis.lv/ta/id/31003

193 idea has been insufficient for fleshing out the idea and incorporating it in other strategies, for making it function in practice. It should be mentioned here that in 2010, during a Nordic-Baltic (NB-8) summit of Foreign Ministers in Riga, one of the key items on the agenda was the NB8 Wise Men Report on cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic countries drafted by Valdis Birkavs and former Danish Defense Minister Søren Gade.14 The report, developed upon Latvia’s initiative, evaluated prior cooperation and made proposals for its development going forward in matters such as diplomacy and the environment. Some of its thirty-eight proposals are currently being implemented, and other parties are being “energized” for cooperation between the Baltics and the Nordic countries. Perhaps the most progress has occurred in security and defense of the Baltic States.15 When the Defense Ministers of the three Baltic countries signed a memorandum of agreement on tri-state cooperation in matters of defense on 2 June 1992, Latvia and its neighbors laid the groundwork for practical cooperation between land, air and sea forces (BALTRON). In 1999, a general military education institution was established – the Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL) – to offer military studies to Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and other nations. One of the motivations for making security capacity in the Baltics a priority early on was that EU and NATO accession was somewhat unrealistic at the time. Still, it is important to remember that a new foreign policy concept for Latvia prioritizing integration with the EU and NATO was adopted in April 1995. Although shaping a regional security and defense policy has been championed as a foreign affairs priority for the three Baltic States the entire time, talks about joining the EU and NATO, and closer integration with these entities, have received more attention. The year 2014 gave a significant impulse for closer defense cooperation among the Baltic nations and much more pragmatic developments in working with other NATO members. Perhaps the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia should have been considered a “wake-up call” for the Baltic States and Europe. The great resonance it initially sparked in Latvia and the West gradually died down. Despite the events in Georgia showing that armed conflict was not a thing of the past for Europe, no pragmatic initiatives followed for somehow strengthening defense in the Baltics. Even the Russian military exercises Zapad (West)

194 and Proriv (Breakthrough) were not substantial signals for revising defense partnerships in the Baltic States. A framework for military cooperation in the Baltics signed in 2013 emphasized defensive compatibility with Nordic countries (NORDEFCO) but did not inspire any considerable shifts in current Baltic activities and Nordic partnerships. The illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilization in Ukraine turned a new leaf for relations with Russia. It was a great loss, a tragedy for Ukraine and for Europe in general, and constituted a gross violation of international law. These events brought about closer cooperation between Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania in matters of security and protection and expanded the NATO’s presence in these countries. Latvia’s politicians, including Edgars Rinkēvičs, Artis Pabriks, Veiko Spolītis, Sandra Kalniete, Sarmīte Ēlerte, Atis Lejiņš, Inese Vaidere and Roberts Zīle, spoke out actively against Russia’s aggressive foreign policy and declared a need for the Baltics to work more closely in common matters of security. Another substantial step forward in responding to the challenges of the past few years has been the opening of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia, to counteract the official damaging propaganda of Russia and develop matters of strategic communication. Although for twenty-five years the three Baltic countries have set up high- level joint exercises and participated in international missions, one aspect lacking in cooperation was procurement. Following Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the situation has changed; Latvia and Lithuania have reached an agreement on defense procurement cooperation. Similarly, Baltic military cooperation has arisen in projects such as the Baltic Air Surveillance network (BALTNET), the Baltic Joint Battalion Unit (BALTFOR) and the Baltic Joint Training system (BALTTRAIN). One of the most interesting ideas that has emerged in recent years with regard to defense cooperation among the Baltic States stems from what former President of Latvia Andris Bērziņš said about the establishment of a united Baltic army. In the summer of 2013, President Bērziņš came forward with an announcement arguing the necessity of developing a smart defense principle that moves to a new level by working on a uniform armed forces structure and gradually transitions to a united army. Said Bērziņš: “If we talk about how our defense should be implemented, I believe we will have to change our approach entirely on a lot of issues. If the concept of the NATO is ‘smart defense,’ where instead of buying our aircraft in the Baltics

195 we use the assistance provided by other NATO states, I believe we have to move forward by doing something on the Baltic level for concentrating our military forces.”16 Talking specifically about the establishment of Baltic armed forces, Bērziņš posed a rhetorical question: “Why not do it together? How would it be bad? If aircraft can come from any country to protect the entire Baltic airspace, why don’t we also combine our own armed forces? I believe that it would substantially improve our defense capacities in the Baltic arena. All military officers in the Baltics are trained together, which is wonderful. This gives them a common level of education and a shared perception of current affairs.”17 Importantly, the President announced this proposal before Russia- backed fighters were fighting a war in Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula was illegally annexed to Russia. While the Ministers of Defense of Latvia and Estonia considered the idea itself to be interesting, shortly thereafter they offered a weighed explanation as to why it could not be implemented in practice. One of the main reasons mentioned was the fact that the degree of cooperation between the armed forces of the Baltic nations was already ahead of other NATO member states. According to Artis Pabriks, then Minister of Defense, focus should be not on closer cooperation but on integration. The Minister said that there were no examples in the world where several independent states would need a common army. Furthermore, Estonia, whose defense budget reaches 2 % of its GDP, is unlikely to wish to create a unified army with Latvia and Lithuania, which invest fewer funds in the armed forces.18 Estonian minister of defense Urmas Reinsalu and head of the National Defense Commission at the Estonian Parliament, Mati Raidma, showed that the current defense organization was optimal compared to any alternatives, and it would be too early to talk about a united army.19 After these announcements and reactions by the Ministers of Defense, discussions about creating a common Baltic army soon died down. Although on the surface it may appear that the Baltic States are unified in their foreign policy and harmonious in implementing various economic projects, in reality things have been much less smooth and clear-cut. Since the early 1990s, there have been controversies among the three states, including some matters where compromise is yet to be achieved. The border dispute between Estonia and Latvia, referred to as the “herring wars,” was one of the first times these nations failed to agree on mutually satisfactory provisions

196 ARTIS PABRIKS, Dr.sc.pol., is a political scientist, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia from 2004 until 2007 and Minister of Defense from 2010 until 2014. Over the past decade, he has actively shaped public opinion on foreign policy developments, including current affairs in the EU and the Baltic Sea region, encouraging closer defense cooperation among the Baltic States. Having become a Foreign Affairs Minister shortly after Latvia joined the EU, Pabriks established a much more personal dialogue with Nordic Foreign Ministers and politicians, enhancing cooperation Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Baltic Sea region states and informing a much more cohesive position at international organizations. On 30 May 2006, the approved the Latvia’s Foreign Policy Guidelines 2006–2010 developed under his supervision, which placed a strong emphasis on making the Baltic Sea region more competitive. As head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, Artis Pabriks regularly stressed the need to expand Baltic-Nordic cooperation in matters such as security, economy, energy independence, innovation, education and science. In 2007, when Latvia started its CBSS presidency, Pabriks talked about the necessity of maintaining focus in aspects of cooperation that would increase competitive performance and sustainable development in the region. By defining education, energy and civil defense as priorities for the CBSS presidency, he supported CBSS reform for regional economic growth. At the time, he observed that the Baltic Sea region could serve as an example to other European regions and become one of the most competitive globally. In support of the Baltic Sea dimension, Pabriks noted, “we are part of a ‘Europe of Regions.’ We are extremely certain that the Baltic Sea region can be a model and an example to other regions throughout Europe, proving that high economic performance and working on the front lines of globalization can go hand in hand with an exceptional environmental record and sustainable development.”* At the outset of his political career, Artis Pabriks emphasized the region’s economic and political potential; by the end of his term in government, the cooperation of the Baltic States in defense and the military became a priority.

* Artis Pabriks un Karls Bilts, “Baltijas jūras reģions – visdinamiskākais pasaulē,” Diena, 2007. gada 2. jūlijs, http://www.diena.lv/arhivs/baltijas-juras-regions-visdinamiskakais- pasaule-13178723

(concerning fishing rights within the Baltic Sea). Another dispute arose between Latvia and Lithuania over marine territories – mostly related to possible petroleum deposits. In addition, a highly-publicized project that took

197 a lot of time and gave no results was the Visagina Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Work on the Visagina NPP is on hold due to the unfavorable market situation for sale of nuclear energy. One of the most ambitious joint projects of the Baltic States in recent times is Rail Baltica, aimed at integrating them with the European railway network and creating a connection from Tallinn to Kaunas and on to the German railway network, slated for 2026. Importantly, Finland is also considering participation in Rail Baltica if it sees the project move from years of discussion to actual implementation. Its caution is reasonable, considering that the ambition to implement such a project has existed since the Baltics regained independence. For the first time, an idea for such a joint project was announced at the Pan-European Transport Conference in in 1991, reformulated with more definition in Crete (1994) and Helsinki (1997). Although agreements on including the new European-standard Rail Baltica line in the list of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) priority projects were concluded in 2004, by 2016 the countries involved have not done much beyond declarations, memorandums of understanding and development declarations. Just recently, on 30 September 2016, an agreement was signed on the provisions for financing and implementing the Rail Baltica project in the three Baltic capitals.20 Although Baiba Rubesa, chairman of the pan-Baltic joint venture AS “RB Rail,” admits that the agreement did not come about easily (the differing laws and legal processes of each state causing delay in commencing this EU international endeavor),21 a look back at history reveals that any disputes were grounded in a multitude of other concerns – for instance, the divergent views of Baltic State politicians on the railway route, or disagreement on appointing members of the board at AS “RB Rail.” Aware of the significance of the project, a number of Latvia’s officials, including Anrijs Matīss, Lolita Čigāne, Solvita Āboltiņa and Zanda Kalniņa-Lukaševica, have regularly expressed their support for the Rail Baltica project over the years, hoping for swift integration of Latvia into the European railway infrastructure. Besides, as mentioned by former Saeima Speaker Solvita Āboltiņa upon opening the 23rd session of the Baltic Assembly, the Baltic States have to be able to overcome their internal squabbles and agree about making Rail Baltica a reality because it is not just an economic issue, but an important geopolitical matter as well.22 One outspoken supporter of Rail Baltica is European Parliament deputy

198 Roberts Zīle, who initiated the establishment of the Friends of Rail Baltica at the EP, uniting representatives, officials and activists from the three countries who give appropriate political signals in national governments for starting Rail Baltica. Following Zīle’s initiative, on 13 May 2016, the sixteen Baltic deputies signed an open letter to the Prime Ministers and Ministers of Communication of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as well as the Communication Ministers of Poland and Finland, urging them not to delay initiation of the project, which could impair the likelihood of EU co- funding. The open letter was signed by Roberts Zīle, Krišjānis Kariņš and Artis Pabriks on behalf of Latvia.23 It is also notable that in 2016 the EP approved the report drafted by Roberts Zīle, European Conservatives and Reformists Group Executive at the Transport and Tourism Committee, regarding the technical, administrative and security regulation of the railway market. Dubbed the “Zīle–Matīss regulation,” it rebuffs social price dumping rhetoric in international transport, defining that the Baltic States’ company certification fees should stay in the Baltics.24 No doubt, in the coming years this project will show whether a Baltic union is anything more than a myth. While in the public space, the necessity of affirming the unity of the Baltic States with real work is often highlighted, this is a time where Rail Baltica will serve as a litmus test for the viability of this concept. According to Lolita Čigāne, chair of the Saeima European Affairs Committee: “The Rail Baltica high-speed railway project, which will connect the Baltic States with Western Europe, is set to become the boon of the century for the , but it is also crucial from the standpoint of regional unity and security.”25 When all is said and done, the truth is that twenty-five years is a long enough time to see that the union and regional identity of the Baltic States has not been established despite shared memories about the Awakening period, common achievements and the selfless efforts of the national movements (Latvian Popular Front, Rahvarinne in Estonia, and Sajūdis in Lithuania). For years, the Baltic stream in foreign affairs has blended cooperative and competitive tendencies. The competitive aspects have impaired creation of a more united model for Baltic cooperation. Although Latvian foreign policy thought was dominated by the concept of a Baltic union following restoration of independence, close cooperation was pushed aside on the road to joining the EU, as each of the three states devoted more attention to meeting the for its accession first and

199 foremost. Then-President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga noted: “The goal for Latvia is to initiate talks on each country’s ability to move forward at its own pace, depending on the Copenhagen criteria that determine each country’s readiness. We would not want an artificial grouping of the countries based on geopolitical considerations alone.”26 Overall, the idea of Baltic unity was weaker in the run-up to 2004. Valdis Birkavs’ Amber Gateway did not bring about closer partnerships within the Baltics either. The situation changed following the EU’s expansion and Latvia’s accession to NATO, as a coordinated, more unified position had to be established with the EU and NATO. Struck by the economic crisis, Latvia’s foreign policy thought was dominated by redoubled pragmatism in relations with Estonia and Lithuania, necessitating more weighed and synchronized operations in Baltic political formats due to budgetary constraints. The Baltic States vision was most recently affected by the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia and destabilization within Ukraine. Although, in terms of security, the cooperative dimension has always been strongest in the Baltic States, since 2014 it has been stronger and more animated. The stance expressed by Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs in the past few years affirms the continuing vector of stronger Baltic security, with more resources to be contributed to this end. Cooperation among the Baltic States in policy, economic, culture, research and innovation has been an enduring foreign relations priority for many years. At the same time, there have been few new ideas and initiatives for how to implement the “self-evident” goal of Baltic unity in major projects. Considering the historic experiences of the three states, their tight geographic clustering and unifying challenges to security, it is logical to look for ways of strengthening cooperation, new initiatives and, crucially, for appropriate, pragmatic fulfillment to these aims.

Engagement in Baltic Sea region cooperation formats With the shift in geopolitical circumstances, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania each have the opportunity for more active participation in international processes. Regional cooperation was one of the ways for Latvia to increase its impact and work more with other states. One of the most prominent organizations for cooperation in the Baltic Sea region is the Council of the Baltic Sea States, with eleven participants (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden),

200 founded in Copenhagen on 5-6 March 1992, upon the initiative of Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Hans Dietrich Genscher. The European Commission holds discussions in search for solutions to acute problems in the region. Since 1998, a permanent secretariat in Stockholm ensures operational continuity and analytical support for the rotating presidency of the CBSS, financed by all member states. Since establishment of the CBSS, projects such as Ars Baltica, BalticLab and EuroFaculty have been implemented that should assist the universities in the Baltic States to enhance their study programs and the qualifications of their graduates. In response to the latest challenges faced by the region, in 2014 the CBSS adopted its long-term priorities: regional identity, a sustainable and vibrant region and regional security. Valdis Birkavs has described Latvia’s participation in the CBSS as an opportunity to facilitate political and economic homogeneity in the Baltic Sea region, establishing a foundation for a common identity in the European context. Besides accentuating the advantages of the economic dimension of the CBSS, Birkavs has remarked on the opportunity to create a “common pan-Baltic macroeconomic identity.”27 Artis Pabriks has also noted the advantages of the CBSS, allowing closer cooperation between the Baltic States and the Nordic countries. Said Pabriks: “This orientation is natural for our country; as a matter of fact, we have no alternative.”28 Since Latvia regained independence, other top state officials have also looked to the CBSS and cooperation within the Baltic Sea region as a way to improve the region’s competitiveness, strengthen partnerships between the Baltics and the Nordic countries and emphasize the importance of innovation and research. A survey of the framework for cooperation within the Baltic Sea region necessitates focus on another format – the Northern Dimension (ND) initiative, approved as official EU policy in 1999 in order to create a common framework for promoting cooperation in Northern Europe. The Finnish government began implementing this initiative after the Luxemburg summit meeting in 1997. The ND involves European Union members, Russia, Norway and Iceland. The U.S. and Canada participate as observers. Belarus is not part of the ND but has spent years as a de facto party to the Environmental Partnership and the Transportation and Logistics partnership. The gains Latvia had from ND participation initially had to overcome a lot of doubt. Ventspils Mayor Aivars Lembergs and Minister of Economics Laimonis Strujevičs were two prominent officials who criticized its utility to Latvia, convinced that Finland was leveraging

201 the project to boost its transit infrastructure and economy. Aivars Lembergs repeatedly asserted the ND’s threat to transit via Latvia. In 1999, as a speaker at the international conference Investment in Energy in the Baltic Sea Region, he expressed sharp criticism of the ND project as Finland’s offer to “essentially close the current petroleum transit corridor in Latvia and build a new one to Finland. There is no other way to call this but a policy of economic isolation of Latvia.”29 No such criticism was heard in later years. A substantial impulse to the ND came as the EU expanded in 2004 to include ten new member states, the three Baltic countries among them. By 2006, the ND was headed for a revival, aiming to implement specific cooperation projects.30 Another format that boosted the competitive performance of economies in the Baltic Sea region is the Baltic Development Forum (BDF), established in November 1998 – again thanks to former Foreign Minister of Denmark Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. Although the BDF is a summit organization inspired by the Davos events in Switzerland, it has always served as a springboard for Latvia’s integration with the Baltic Sea region, particularly through cooperation with the Nordic countries on every level. Because the BDF aims to facilitate growth potential within the region by encouraging networking among political leaders and high-ranking state officials, entrepreneurs, researchers, media representatives and prominent cultural figures, the forum offers fertile ground to Latvia’s politicians and businesspeople who bring new proposals to the table for pan-Baltic cooperation. Officials, politicians and researchers from Latvia, including Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, Andris Piebalgs, Valdis Dombrovskis, Daniels Pavļuts, Žaneta Ozoliņa and Toms Rostoks, have actively engaged with BDF summits and activities, working towards regional cooperation at all levels. Former Prime Minister Einars Repše commented: “the BDF gives extensive opportunity to state, private sector and media representatives to facilitate a common platform for discussions on matters important for regional development, establishment of new contacts and partnerships.”31 The economic crisis of 2008 was a good example of how Latvia, despite reduced financial opportunity, was able to leverage the advantages of the Baltic Sea region and establish a much more pragmatic attitude to regional cooperation formats. Its contribution to strengthening regional cooperation since the early 1990s had left it with hefty foreign policy capital in a time of crisis and allowed it to sketch out a number of

202 new trends. Firstly, routine agenda items were coordinated much more earnestly among the Baltic States to accentuate economic cooperation. More emphasis was placed on consulting with other Baltic Sea countries ahead of EU and NATO sessions. Secondly, in October 2009, the Council of Europe adopted the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), cementing the successful cooperation among EU member states in the Baltic Sea region and the European Commission (EC). Latvia and Denmark were entrusted with coordinating energy policy matters at the EU level – this is one of the top priorities on the Strategic Action Plan of the EUSBSR and intends the implementation of a Baltic energy market interconnection plan. University of Latvia professors Žaneta Ozoliņa, Iveta Reinholde and Toms Rostoks got involved with informing the public about the benefits of the EU strategy for the Bank’s system. Thirdly, the informal regional framework of the NB-8 became much more consolidated and promoted exchange of opinion in new guises such as the NB-8+UK summit (Northern Future Forum) and the NB-8+Vyshegrad Group (with the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary).32 And fourthly, the 2003 Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (E-PINE) initiative (proposed by the U.S. and including the Nordic countries, the Baltics and the United states) is also a commendable format for successful discussion of political security concerns within the region. As regionalism becomes a contemporary trend in international policy, Latvia and its neighbors Estonia and Lithuania, the Nordic countries, as well as Russia, Poland and Germany, have created a variety of means and formats for governmental and non-governmental cooperation. While from the outside it may appear that the political organizations and cooperation formats established by Baltic Sea region countries indicate coordinated action, in practice the varying degrees of different countries’ interest for working together have been a major impediment to establishing a more cohesive and integrated Baltic Sea region – not to mention Russia, whose stance on the region has vacillated back and forth from disinterest or confusion to aggressive and unpredictable overtures. Although consolidation of the Baltic Sea region has given the smaller countries a possibility to balance out the interests of major Western European and Eastern European powers (Russia especially), the foreign policy perceptions of the different states have made a union of the lesser states within the region less than all-encompassing. Formats and initiatives such as the Eurofaculty, VASAB 2010, Via Baltica,

203 ŽANETA OZOLIŅA, Dr.paed., is a Political Science Department professor at the University of Latvia Faculty of Social Sciences and has led her department for many years. Since Latvia regained independence, Ozoliņa has contributed substantially to shaping the country’s foreign affairs and setting priorities, as well as formulating Latvia’s policy for involvement in Baltic Sea region organizations and international cooperation formats. She has participated in drafting a number of strategic development documents, including the Latvian Photo: from the personal archives Strategy for Operation within Baltic Sea Region of Žaneta Ozoliņa Organizations. As head of the Strategic Analysis Commission under the State President’s patronage, she revived discussions on Baltic Sea cooperation and future development scenarios. Ozoliņa has also been involved in organizing high-level international conferences and expert seminars, and has assisted with interdisciplinary studies on the future of the EU, the Baltic Sea region and the role Latvia would play. In her lectures, research and public speeches, she has accentuated the importance of the Baltic Sea region dimension (including the importance of Baltic-Nordic relations, economic competitiveness and cooperation in scientific projects) and the Baltic States aspect of foreign affairs. Žaneta Ozoliņa draws particular attention to cooperation between Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania in defense and security. Currently, she is the chair of the Foreign Policy Expert Council at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, scientific editor of theLatvijas Intereses Eiropas Savienībā journal and a member of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) think tank.

HELCOM, Baltic 21, the Visagina NPP, Rail Baltica and others speak to the varied ways in which countries of the Baltic Sea region have worked towards common goals. They reveal the shared needs and combined potential of the parties while also embodying the unique interests, and the willingness to compromise, of each individual state. No less important was bottom-up regionalization, establishing contacts between the representatives of public organizations and residents in neighboring states. Since the early 1990s, a number of cross-border partnership projects have become reality – although it would be a stretch to say that a rich and diverse variety of regional NGOs has emerged as a result. There are many questions regarding regional cooperation and their answers point to the unused potential in the Baltic Sea region. For

204 instance, assuming that Baltic countries’ interest in Nordic countries’ language, culture, everyday life and political developments has increased, do the public television channels in the Baltics often broadcast original shows and programming devoted to the current events in any of those five regional nations? Do the media in the Nordic countries regularly create and broadcast shows on the state of affairs in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, promoting the establishment of a shared Baltic-Nordic identity? Do students from the Nordic countries often use the study opportunities offered by Baltic colleges and universities? Has there been an increase among prospective students from the Nordic countries in the last five years, at least relative to those from the Eastern Partnership region or Central Asia? These are just a few of these questions. By answering them truthfully, one finds that there is still a lot to be done in order to consolidate the common identity of the Baltic States and the Nordic countries in practice. At the same time, it would be irresponsible to overlook the achievements so far in making Baltic-Nordic partnerships closer at all levels. Never before in history has the cooperation between the Baltic States and the Nordic countries been as strong as it is now.

Conclusions More than a decade ago, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen responded to a question about whether the loss of unity among the Baltic States should be considered a negative development (or perhaps a logical one), by saying it was self- evident that the three nations, who have so many differences between them, have done a lot to groom their respective individualities.33 Referring to the union of the Benelux, however, Ellemann-Jensen was hopeful that “someday Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia will come to the conclusion that it is only in their best interest to join forces as much as possible.”34 Now, ten years after the interview, his hope has not come to fruition. Projects such as the Visagina NPP, now temporarily shelved, and Rail Baltica, on the brink of its beginning for too many years, exemplify how much there is still to be done before the actions of the Baltic governments can be considered quick, decisive and united – in particular when implementing truly historic joint initiatives. Latvian EP deputy Roberts Zīle has noted that the delays Lithuanian railway “Lietuvos geležinkeliai” has had with signing the Rail Baltica agreement were overcome with some assistance from the European Commission and extra

205 pressure, cementing full-fledged involvement of each party in the project. But because implementation still awaits, Zīle expects that it “will not go too smoothly” in the future.35 This confirms that the foreign policy of Latvia, like those of its Estonian and Lithuanian neighbors, accentuates cooperation among the states; yet, when more attention is devoted to studying this aspect of foreign relations and doing practical things together, some disagreement is evident at various levels in Baltic cooperation. The political rhetoric of the Baltic States remains exceedingly individualistic, focused more on national uniqueness than common identities and interests. Now, we can marvel at Estonia’s economic breakthrough and support for IT and innovation. We also see Estonia’s desire to associate with the Nordic identity, owing to its shared cultural heritage with Finland. The words of certain Estonian politicians and top government officials betray a certain degree of skepticism about the Baltic identity. Estonian President Toomas Henrik Ilves has repeatedly admitted a critical attitude to anyone’s speaking on behalf of the Baltic States or referring to the notion of Baltic States’ shared identity. Lithuanians are not hesitant to accentuate historic relations with Poland and proximity to Central Europe. Such rhetoric has no doubt pushed Latvia’s politicians and Foreign Ministers, e.g. Valdis Birkavs, to seek close cooperation with the Scandinavian countries since the 1990s and to emphasize the need for regional cooperation wherein Latvia and the Baltic States would be central.36 TheAmber Gateway concept is largely related to development of cooperation formats within the Baltic Sea region and to accession of Latvia to the EU and NATO. In this regard, one may speak about the Baltic Sea region as a bridge towards working within these international bodies. The Baltic Sea region stream in Latvia’s foreign policy thought continues to transform in search of more pragmatic ways to promote regional cooperation and identity. In literature, the Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) are often referred to as the most politically integrated group of EU states. Like the Benelux countries, which had been motivated by external factors and threats during World War II, cooperation among the Baltic States also emerges and develops largely in response to geopolitical challenges in the region. Although Russia’s aggressive foreign policy is considered a complication for shaping a more united, dynamic and competitive Baltic Sea region, the interests of various regional countries in matters of policy, economy, society and

206 security should be considered together. In a situation where Russia acts in a manner that is aggressive and difficult to predict, these matters should take priority. It is important to understand how to promote cooperation among the Baltic States in a meaningful, practical way, to facilitate Baltic Sea region partnerships and close cooperation between the Baltics and the Nordic countries. Just as crucial is the issue of developing new joint projects with Poland and Germany – remarkably, Germany was among the first to initiate regional cooperation, proposing to establish the CBSS in 1992 together with Denmark. In the 1990s, it appeared that Germany would play a leading role in all regional concerns, although in terms of policy and security Germany has been less instrumental than Scandinavia. Cooperation in economy, culture and society is not enough, considering the region’s geography; Germany has to be involved actively in so-called matters ofhigh politics. In conclusion, the Baltic Sea region has been one of the definitive aspects of Latvian foreign policy thought. In the early years of new independence, involvement in Baltic Sea region formats was treated as an opportunity for returning to Europe politically, culturally and economically. The favorable attitude of the Nordic countries to the Baltics and the new formats for inter-governmental cooperation within the region provided Latvia more opportunities to be heard in the international arena; it also solidified the Nordic countries’ examples of good practice in shaping state government and the democratic state. From 1995, when Latvia’s definitive priority became EU and NATO integration, the idea of a regional dimension gradually shifted to the background. With the exception of some ideas and initiatives such as Valdis Birkavs Amber Gateway, engagement in regional formats and the idea of a Baltic union became a voice among many in foreign policy. Politicians’ statements about making the Baltic States and Nordic countries closer to one another and declarations about the need to promote cooperation among the Baltic States themselves had no coverage and were not followed through with practical activities. Since accession to the EU and NATO, the significance of the regional dimension in Latvian foreign policy thought increased, with substantial interest in the exchange of opinion and the coordination of stances on current foreign affairs. A much more pragmatic attitude to Latvia’s participation within regional formats emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis where, constrained by a lower budget, Latvia was forced to use the opportunities provided by regional formats with

207 more care and attention to the long-term view. It should also be emphasized that the illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine have necessitated a revision of previous work between the Baltic States and some contemplation of ways to strengthen them in matters of security and defense. For example, in the next few years, the forecast for this cooperation is one of further consolidation, spurned by unpredictable and aggressive policy of Russia; however, one cannot forecast such partnerships to be just as fruitful in other projects and sectors. The Rail Baltica joint project will likely serve as a litmus test for the Baltic union concept. So far, foreign threats and challenges, not joint initiatives and diverse projects, have been the strongest motivators for a closer cooperation among the Baltic States. While we can be sure that promoting cooperation among the Baltic States will remain a priority in Latvia’s foreign policy, not just in matters of defense but also in matters of economy, culture, innovation and research, we can hope that foreign affairs will highlight more original regional initiatives that can be conceptualized and implemented in practice through joint Baltic projects. With the perseverance and creativity of Latvia’s politicians, diplomats and public figures, such a unified Baltic cooperation model will provide more opportunities for successful development of innovative and ambitious projects within the Baltic Sea region.

Endnotes

1 The Baltic Sea region implies the Baltics (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia), the Nordic countries (Den- mark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Sweden), as well as Northern Germany, Northern Poland, and the Northwestern region of Russia. 2 Interview with Jānis Jurkāns, Riga, 14 July 2016. 3 Jānis Sīlis, “Rīgā ierodas Dānijas parlamentieši,” Diena, 1991. gada 13. janvāris. 4 “Rīgā ieradies Dānijas ārlietu ministrs,” Diena, 1991. gada 10. septembris. 5 Mikhail Gorbachev, who visited Norway and Sweden in June 1991, did not express the least bit of interest for visiting Denmark. At the time, arguments were heard for implementing measures in response to Denmark. From: LETA – “Baltija,” “Gorbačovs dusmojas uz Dāniju,” Jelgavas ziņotājs, 1991. gada 22. maijs. 6 Ibid. 7 “J.S. Genšera paziņojums. Brīvā Latvija: Apienotā “Londonas Avīze un Latvija,”” Diena, 1991. gada 2. septembris. 8 Interview with Jānis Jurkāns, Rīga, 14 July 2016. 9 “Baltijas asamblejai – 5,” Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1996. gada 8. novembris, https://www.vestnesis.lv/ta/ id/41199 10 Artis Pabriks and Karls Bilts, “Baltijas jūras reģions – visdinamiskākais pasaulē,” Diena, 2007. gada 2. jūlijs, http://www.diena.lv/arhivs/baltijas-juras-regions-visdinamiskakais-pasaule- 13178723

208 11 “Mūsu un kaimiņu drošībai un labklājībai,” Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1997. gada 19. novembris, https:// www.vestnesis.lv/ta/id/31003 12 “Latvijai – “Dzintara vārtus,”” Laiks, 1997. gada 27. decembris. 13 Ibid. 14 Valdis Birkavs and Søren Gade, NB8 Wise Men Report, August, 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/news/press-releases/2010/august/27-01/ 15 Ibid. 16 BNS, “Prezidents nākotnē pieļauj kopīgu Baltijas valstu armijas izveidi,” Lauku Avīze, 2013. gada 13. jūlijs, http://www.la.lv/prezidents-nakotne-pielauj-kopigu-baltijas-valstu-armijas-izveidi-2/ 17 Ibid. 18 “Pabriks vienotas Baltijas armijas izveidošanu atzīst par interesantu ideju, taču nerealizējamu,” Sargs.lv, 2013. gada 23. jūlijs, http://www.sargs.lv/Zinas/Latvija/2013/07/23-01.aspx 19 “Igaunijas ministrs skeptiski vērtē Bērziņa ideju par kopīgu Baltijas armiju,” Sargs.lv, 2013. gada 22. jūlijs, http://www.sargs.lv/Zinas/Baltija/2013/07/22-02.aspx 20 Lithuanian railway company “Lietuvos geležinkeliai” was the only one of the nine institutions in- volved in the project that signed the agreement on provisions for implementation and financing of Rail Baltica on 8 October. The reason for delays was related to a standing conflict between the joint partnership’s management and “Lietuvos geležinkeliai.” 21 LETA, “Rubesa: Vienošanās par Rail Baltica līgumu panākta, Baltijas valstīs to paraksta,” Diena, 2016. gada 30. septembris, http://www.diena.lv/raksts/latvija/zinas/rubesa-vienosanas-par-_ rail-baltica_-ligumu-panakta-baltijas-valstis-to-paraksta-papildinats-1607-14156335 22 Saeimas Preses dienests, “S.Āboltiņa Baltijas parlamentāriešiem: sadarbība enerģētikā un Rail Baltica projekts ir ne tikai ekonomisks, bet arī svarīgs ģeopolitisks jautājums,” Latvijas Repub- likas Saeima, 2013. gada 29. novembris, http://www.saeima.lv/lv/par-saeimu/saeimas-darbs/ saeimas-priekssedetaja-solvita-aboltina/saeimas-priekssedetajas-aktualitates-2 23 Members of the European Parliament, “Open Letter to the Governments of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Poland,” Brussels, 13 May 2016, http://www.robertszile.lv/wp-content/ uploads/2016/05/RZ-OpenLetter_LV_20160517.pdf 24 European Parliament – Latvian Information Bureau, “Latvijas eiroparlamentāriešu atskaite par 2. darba gadu, darbojoties EP komitejās,” 19 September 2016, http://www.europarl.lv/lv/jaunu- mi/2016_/septembris_jaunumi/latvijas-eiroparlament-riesu-atskaite-par-2.-darba-gadu-darbo- joties-ep-komitej-s.html 25 Saeimas Preses dienests, “Lolita Čigāne: dzelzceļa projekts “Rail Baltica” ir gadsimta ieguvums Latvijas ekonomikai,” Latvijas Republikas Saeima, 2016. gada 30. septembris, http://www.saei- ma.lv/lv/aktualitates/saeimas-zinas/25157-lolita-cigane-dzelzcela-projekts-rail-baltica-ir-gad- simta-ieguvums-latvijas-ekonomikai 26 “Intervija ar Latvijas Republikas prezidenti Vairu Vīķi-Freibergu,” Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1999. gada 26. oktobris, https://www.vestnesis.lv/ta/id/16680 27 Ainārs Dimants, “Latvijas prezidentūra pie Baltijas jūras,” Diena, 1997. gada 27. janvāris, http:// www.diena.lv/arhivs/latvijas-prezidentura-pie-baltijas-juras-10002267 28 Artis Pabriks, “Latvijas ārpolitika vienkāršotā redzējumā,” Diena, 1998. gada 24. augusts, http:// www.diena.lv/arhivs/latvijas-arpolitika-vienkarsota-redzejuma-10315383 29 Osvalds Zebris, “Lembergs atkārtoti kritizē Ziemeļu dimensijas projektu,” Diena, 1999. gada 8. aprīlis, http://www.diena.lv/arhivs/lembergs-atkartoti-kritize-ziemelu-dimensijas-projektu- 10426898 30 Considering that the Baltic Sea region is an EU priority in accordance with the October 2009 EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region adopted by the European Council, the ND projects confirm the necessity and importance of such an initiative. For Latvia, the ND is a valuable transnational platform for implementing certain cross-border and industrial partnership projects, involving Belarus and the North of Russia. The most significant frameworks for ND cooperation are the

209 ND Environmental Partnership, the ND Public Health and Public Welfare Partnership, the ND Transportation and Logistics Partnership, the ND Culture Partnership, the ND Institute and the ND Business council, which confirm the importance of the ND for shaping the identity of the Baltic Sea region. 31 “Rūpēs par Baltijas jūras tautu nākotni,” Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2003. gada 8. oktobris, https://www. vestnesis.lv/ta/id/79624 32 Didzis Kļaviņš, Toms Rostoks, and Žaneta Ozoliņa, “Foreign Policy ‘On the Cheap’: Latvia’s For- eign Policy Experience from the Economic Crisis,” Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 (2014), 10–12. 33 Edijs Bošs, TVNET/LTV Panorāma, ““100. pants.” Dānijas ārpolitikas biedrības vadītājs Ufe Elemans Jensens,” TVNET, 2005. gada 4. maijs, http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/ viedokli/293122-100_pants_danijas_arpolitikas_biedribas_vaditajs_ufe_elemans_jensens 34 Ibid. 35 LSM.LV ziņu redakcija, “Beidzot parakstīts līgums par “Rail Baltica” izpildes un finansēšanas nosacījumiem,” 2016. gada 8. oktobris, http://www.lsm.lv/lv/raksts/ekonomika/zinas/beidzot- parakstits-ligums-par-rail-baltica-izpildes-un-finansesanas-nosacijumiem.a204532/ 36 Daunis Auers, “Igaunija, Latvija un Lietuva Eiropa Savienībā. Vai Baltijas valstu sadarbība?” in Žaneta Ozoliņa, ed., Latvijas ārpolitika un “robežu paplašināšana” (Stratēģiskās analīzes komisija, Rīga: Zinātne, 2006), 50.

210 Latvia’s Economic Pragmatism – Business above All Else

ALDIS AUSTERS

Economic pragmatism is a political thought trend that brings to the forefront the issues of national economic development, subordinating other issues, including ideological ones, domestic, and foreign policy. Namely, according to economic pragmatism, foreign policy is to be formed, primarily, based on national economic interests; other aspects, such as integration in the European Union, NATO, and other Western organizations are to be assessed according to the potential contributions of the membership to the country’s economy. More specifically, (a) public spending in foreign policy, including expansion of the diplomatic mission network, has to be economically justified; (b) integration in any economic blocks, such as the European Union, cannot happen at the expense of weakening the relationship with alternative markets, such as Russia and other former USSR countries; (c) integration in associations of economically stronger countries should be commensurate with the country’s competitiveness of development, it should not jeopardize the socio-economic conditions of the people; and (d) moral foreign policy initiatives are permitted only to the extent that it does not jeopardize country’s external economic interests. In Latvia, the pragmatic thought trend has always had the most support among businessmen who, through various means of influence, often have been able to influence the decisions of political and governmental institutions according to their interests. So far, pragmatism has had sporadic character, and it cannot be regarded as a deliberately independent trend of political thought. There have been attempts to formulate Latvia’s pragmatic economic interests also at the academic level – here should be mentioned the thinking of professor Ervids Grinovskis, academician Pēteris Guļāns, and other economists – but still no comprehensive economic pragmatism program has been created neither on the academic, nor on the political level. Here applies the observation of the former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Valdis Birkavs that “a strong, analytical opposition [to the European

211 Union supporters] would have provided Latvia greater benefits than non- argumented cackling.”1 The vector of the economic pragmatism thinking in Latvia has been largely determined by the perception of the economic actors of how one or another initiative of the Latvian government will be responded to by the economically more important partner-countries. Such critical initiatives in the case of Latvia have been linked with Latvia’s geopolitical orientation towards the West, social cohesion and the rights of the Russian-speaking community, attitude towards countries that have limited democracy and violate human rights, attitude towards countries which have implemented aggression against third countries. It should be noted, however, that apart from the pragmatic businessmen and the political forces representing their interests, in Latvia there are also such political parties as the Latvian Socialist Party (successor of the prohibited Latvian Communist Party), “For Human Rights in a United Latvia,” and “Harmony,” which do not support the national Western course and promote closer relations with Russia, motivated by ideological and ethnic interests. As these forces are not interested primarily in economic issues, they are not to be considered economic pragmatists. From the commerce sector perspective, the economic groups that have most actively supported the direction of pragmatic foreign economic policy, are food manufacturers whose products have broader sales potential in the traditional markets in the East. Other sectors that have particular interests in the East, and will be discussed in this review, are transit and logistics business, as well as the financial sector.

Economic pragmatism and policy In the early years after the restoration of independence, after the collapse of the bipolar division of the world, Latvia’s leaders dealt with some difficulties to orient in the new world situation. After Russia had recognized Latvia’s statehood in August 1991, there was a euphoric feeling that Russia will be a reliable economic cooperation partner. In addition, the delay of the Western governments and international organizations to recognize Latvia contributed to doubts about Latvia’s prospect of integration into the Western world in the foreseeable future. The first Foreign Minister of the reestablished Latvia, Jānis Jurkāns described the trends of the

212 national foreign policy as simultaneous operation in both the Western and the Eastern direction.2 In his view, the ideal option for Latvia was demilitarization and neutrality. The first leader of the government, Ivars Godmanis, held similar views in May 1990, seeing Latvia’s relations with the USSR in an analogy with Finland’s relations, that is, Finlandization. Also the chief executive of the state, Anatolijs Gorbunovs insisted that Latvia has to implement its own specific geopolitical and cultural position, building a bridge between the East and the West.3 Latvia’s Western orientation was forming only gradually, as the opportunities towards the European Union were emerging more clearly, and the relations with Russia were worsening. This interaction between pragmatism and Western-liberal ideas is characterized well by the declarations on planned activities of the three Latvian Cabinets of the 1990s. Namely, those are Valdis Birkavs’ (1993–1994), Māris Gailis’ (1994–1995), and Vilis Krištopāns’ (1998–1999) governments, and more specifically – their positioning in the external economic activity. All the leaders of the three governments represented the same political force, the then-influential liberal and Western party “Latvian Way.”4 By comparing these declarations, it can be observed how the external economic thought has evolved in Latvia in the nineties. The focus of Birkavs’ government in 1993, judging by the declaration, was only on the issues of economic transformation. Integration into the European economic system is set as a long-term national economic strategy doctrine, with the end-goal of joining the European Union (then the European Community). At the same time the declaration says that in the initial period, Latvia has to play a role as an international mediator, with focus on development of trade, transportation, tourism, telecommunications, as well as stock exchange and banking systems. In addition, in a separate paragraph, it is noted that only such unification with Europe is to be supported that does not destroy the Latvian uniqueness, and that Latvia should remain open to other economic areas in the West, as well as in the East.5 Valdis Birkavs government was a coalition government of the liberal “Latvian Way” and the moderately conservative “Latvian Farmers’ Union” (LZS). The fact that the declaration does not talk about foreign policy, and foreign policy directions are defined form the viewpoint of economic interests, is very characteristic of that time. First, the party itself, since its creation, has sought to build close ties with certain emerging economic elite

213 groups. Second, the economic situation of Latvia was unenviable – due to the impact of the “shock therapy” and the transformation, economic collapse continued, and there were problems with the supply of raw materials from the East. Third, at the time there was still no confidence if, and when Russia will withdraw its military from Latvia. Therefore, in order not to annoy friends in Russia, including Boris Yeltsin, and to satisfy the concerns of the then- influential Soviet economic community, which had far greater impact on the Farmers’ Union than on the Latvian Way, such a pragmatic approach was chosen. It should be noted that Birkavs’ government was not long-lived: The conflicting interests of the Farmers’ Union the Latvian Way, which were built in the government declaration, soon turned into an open conflict and the coalition collapse in July 1994.6 The next government, chaired by Māris Gailis, was established soon after the resignation of Birkavs’ government. In contrast to Birkavs’ government, Gailis’ government was designed as a broad coalition government, whose core consisted of the Latvian Way and the parliamentarians who had left “Saskaņa Latvijai – atdzimšana tautsaimniecībai” and formed “Tautsaimnieku politiskā apvienība.” At the time of the approval of the government, the Russian army had already left Latvia, and therefore the question of strengthening country’s internal and external security was raised to the forefront of the government’s agenda. Regarding national foreign policy orientation, the language of the declaration was much clearer. Emphasis was placed on integration into European political, economic, and security structures as a prerequisite for the increase of living standards in Latvia, that hypothetically could even “ascend to the top ten of the world’s developed countries.” The government set possibly sooner accession to the European Council, and later to the European Union, as its goal. Like Birkavs’ government, also Gailis’ government declaration emphasized only such unification within Europe that would not eliminate Latvian uniqueness and would allow its comprehensive development. In relations with Russia, Gailis’ government brought to the forefront the normalization of this relationship, including economic relations.7 During Gailis’ government the Saeima approved the first Latvia’s foreign policy concept. Government’s desire was to give, in this way, an internationally clear signal of Latvia’s maintenance of consistent foreign policy course. The vote was held on 7 April 1995. The Foreign Minister at that time, Valdis Birkavs, under whose leadership the strategy was developed, recalls that the debate was unproductive, that, in

214 his opinion, showed unequivocal support of the majority of the Saeima to the basic orientation.8 However, there were also a few critical remarks in the debate, from some of the Latvian Way representatives. Ojārs Kehris, for example, criticized the lack of economic dimension in the foreign policy concept. He believed that in a situation where signals come about plans of diverting Russian oil exports away from Latvia, the task of the foreign policy should be to offer Russia and other CIS countries the best international transit routes from the East to the West.9 The election of the 6th Saeima, as expected, resulted in a fragmented Saeima (11 parties), and, according to Birkavs, “spotted like a woodpecker’s belly.” This created considerable difficulties in forming a government. At that time, several parties appeared on the political stage that corresponded to the economic pragmatism niche. As the first should be mentioned Alberts Kauls-created Latvian Unity Party (Latvijas Vienības partija) (won 8 seats), which brought together former chairmen of collective farms who insisted on preservation of collective farms and creation of close economic ties with Russia. The other force was the Democratic party “Saimnieks” (gained the most – 18 seats). The party emerged in the spring of 1995 by merging of the Democratic party and the party “Saimnieks.” It was a leftist party, which expressed support for greater state role in economy, banking sector regulation, subsidies to farmers and state-owned enterprises, and for increased pensions. The party also insisted on the need to significantly improve relations with Russia, that is the main market for Latvia’s products – hence the resulting party’s cautious attitude towards Latvia’s accession to the European Union and NATO.10 After unsuccessful attempts to create a center-left government, the populist forces actually split, relieving the work of center-right governments. Although the Latvian Way was not able to get a nomination of its representative for the post of prime minister, it, along with the coalition partners, still formed all the Cabinets in the 6th Saeima (led by Andris Šķēle un Gundars Krasts).11 Vilis Krištopāns government was formed immediately after the elections of the 7th Saeima, which took place in October 1998. In the 7th Saeima, six parties obtained mandates: three of the previous Saeima (Latvian Way, TB/ LNNK, Harmony (Saskaņa)) and three new political forces (the People’s Party (Tautas partija), the Latvian Union of Social Democrats, and the New Party (Jaunā partija)). The Union of Social Democrats was the party of

215 moderate Soviet era nomenclaturists and trade unions, while the People’s Party and the New Party were focused on business interests, and so, interests of capital. All three of the new parties supported Latvia’s progress towards the European Union, but each from its own point of view: the New Party and the social democrats insisted on equally active politics in Eastern and Western directions. However, while the New Party saw the importance in enhancing the role of national economic interests in the foreign policy, the social democrats saw importance in suspending privatization of the great state-owned enterprises and in the reconstruction of state monopolies. The People’s Party views were more rational and liberal at the same time – that is, active work toward implementing of liberal market economy reforms. Thus, the New Party can be considered the successor of the economic pragmatism tradition. Since the last time the government was formed by a Latvian Way representative, Latvia had been affected by several significant events. First, unlike Estonia, Latvia was not invited to start accession negotiations to the European Union. Second, in August 1998, Russia declared insolvency, which brought significant damage to the Latvian economy. Krištopāns government consisted of four forces: Latvian Way, TB/LNNK, Latvian Union of Social Democrats, and the New Party. The political and economic despair was reflected in the declaration of Krištopāns government, where in black and white it was written that “the Latvian government is aware that the accession to the European Union is the guarantee of survival of the Latvian people and the Latvian state.” At the same time the new government stood in favor of a more stable, mutual respect- and partnership-based neighborly relations with Russia, and the need for a fresh start in relations with Russia, free from historical and ideological bias.12 Krištopāns government operated until July 1999, so only half a year. Although its life was not long, it closed a specific foreign policy idea formation cycle: from the integration in the Western structures as an economic necessity, to the commitment at the identity level to be full members of the Western economic and political organizations. None of the succeeding Latvia’s governments have receded from this determination. For example, (representing the Greens and Farmers Union), in his address to the Saeima on 9 March 2004 before the vote on his Cabinet, warned not to misunderstand Euro-integration and not to shy away from supporting the growth of national capital, otherwise Latvia may become a colonial

216 state that allows its natural resources to be ruthlessly exploited. Emsis also noted that accession to the European Union does not mean that Latvia’s economic geography has to be limited only to the European continent. On the contrary – the membership in the European Union should be used for seeking economic partners in other parts of the world, and in this context, it is to think about opening of new embassies and strengthening representation of economic interests in already functioning embassies.13 Since 1999, the economic pragmatism “baton” carriers in the Saeima have replaced each other, just as it has happened in the liberal and European forces’ wing. In early 2000s, Ainārs Šlesers took the lead of the New Party. Later he transformed the party into the Latvian First Party, and then into the association “Latvian First Party/Latvian Way.” Along with his personal wealth, also the economic interests towards Russia were increasing. Similarly, also Andris Šķēle-led People’s Party, entangling in never-ending corruption scandals, gradually began to retreat from the earlier liberal settings, giving priority to cooperation with the East.14 Before the elections of the 10th Saeima, Šlesers and Šķēle joined forces to create the bloc “For good Latvia.” Finally, the Greens and Farmers Union, having regained new life after the 2002 elections, increasingly inclines toward cooperation with Russia. The party’s increasingly pragmatic mood is evidenced by its true leader Aivars Lembergs’ unfriendly statements toward the European Union and NATO, three Māris Kučinskis government officials’ (Greens and Farmers) behind the scenes talks with Russian officials on the lifting of export restrictions in the summer of 2016 and party members’ opposition to Latvia’s participation in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).15 The compilation of the parties representing economic pragmatism in various Saeima’s terms since the restoration of independence is shown in the table below.

217 Economic pragmatism representing political forces in the Saeima since 1993 Seats in Term Name of the Party Leader(-s) Saeima Democratic Center Party 5th Saeima 5 Aivars Kreituss “Saskaņa Latvijai – atdzimšana (1993–1995) 13 Jānis Jurkāns tautsaimniecībai” Democratic party “Saimnieks” 6th Saeima 18 Ziedonis Čevers Latvian Unity Party (Latvijas (1995–1998) 8 Alberts Kauls Vienības partija) 7th Saeima The New Party 8 Ainārs Šlesers (1998–2002) 8th Saeima Latvian First Party 10 Ainārs Šlesers (2002–2006) 9th Saeima Latvian First Party/Latvian Way 10 Ainārs Šlesers (2006–2010) 10th Saeima Party alliance “For a Good Ainārs Šlesers, 8 (2010–2011) Latvia” (Par Labu Latviju!) Andris Šķēle 11th Saeima Aivars Greens and Farmers Union 13 (2011–2014) Lembergs 12th Saeima Aivars Greens and Farmers Union 21 (2014–today) Lembergs

Naive pragmatism – Latvia, the “breadbasket” for the broad Russia Economic pragmatism was highly popular in the early years after regaining independence in 1991. It had a number of drivers. Firstly, the belief that even after the restoration of Latvia’s independence, the economic relations with Russia will remain at the former level, since “Russia will not be able to live without Latvia’s food and industrial products!” This belief was strengthened by the fact that in late 1980s Latvia was one of the most industrially developed regions of the USSR and, despite chronic shortages of food and industrial goods in local stores, many of the Soviet Union enterprises at that time were based in Latvia, producing goods not only for the broad Soviet market, but also for the USSR commonwealth countries. Close personal contact with the leaders of other USSR republics led to the conviction that, despite the radically changed political background, it will be possible to continue things as in the past – “raiding the Moscow hallways and securing the funds.”

218 Secondly, the Soviet economic legacy proved to be too heavy of a burden. The existing conditions had created an impression of insurmountable – at least in the coming decades – economic lag: the production capacity disproportionate for the local market, technological backwardness and unconformity with the Western competitive economy structure, producers’ dependence on subsidized supplies from the USSR republics and marketing, as well as the lack of knowledge of Western languages, combined with the declining economy. In these circumstances, the idea of integration with the West did not seem particularly reasonable. The chairman of the Latvian Popular Front, Dainis Īvāns, has described the situation of that time quite eloquently: “It did not even appear to us in our dreams that Latvia would ever be admitted to the European Union – nothing of the sort ever occurred to us.”16 Along with the collapse of the USSR, the developed scheme of raw material supply and the billing system also fell apart; that naturally led to the end of state-owned enterprises.17 The question was put on the agenda of how to reduce the dependence on the former USSR markets, and how to make the goods produced in our country desirable in the West and elsewhere.18 At that time, there were people like Alberts Kauls, who foresaw such consequences. Already in 1990, Kauls was concerned about the negative impact on Latvia’s economy that would occur from a too rapid secession from Russia. In his opinion, “declaring independence does not yet mean getting it,” especially if there is no consistent economic program: “from where are we going to get what we previously imported to Latvia from other republics,” and “what is to be done with our machine building, radio electronics and textile companies that can exist only by maintaining close economic ties with the Soviet Union?”19 An alternative economic program offered to keep the most important production companies in state ownership, to maintain the cooperative farms, and to maintain close economic ties with Russia and other Soviet republics. This program was initiated by Alberts Kauls, the chairman of the USSR- wide well-known agricultural firm “Ādaži” (“the most famous manager of the most famous large farm”20), and other so-called “red barons” – the chairmen of the largest Latvian collective farms, who initially gathered around the Latvian Agriculturists’ Union (Latvijas Lauksaimnieku savienība), but later joined Kauls’-created Unity Party. In problem solving, they confidently relied on the role of personal contacts, and, accustomed to the center’s subsidies, took too much risk – therefore they were not prepared for operation in open competition, and thus their agricultural firms went bankrupt one after

219 another soon after the collapse of the USSR. Additionally, as the supplies were interrupted, their prescription was to go to Moscow for the usual “fund raids,” but it turned out that capitalist relations prevailed also in other former Soviet republics, and it was no longer possible to access significant benefits in exchange for symbolic gifts, such as “fur, expensive drinks, and delicacies.” So to speak, the principle of “equal exchange” prevailed. Kauls believed in farmers’ cooperation, and therefore was faithful to the socialism idea. He believed that “Latvia’s conversion into a museum of the thirties” had to be avoided. Kauls admitted that greater economic independence and privatization was necessary, but also noted that “the privatization path of today is not what came into our lives in the beginning of the century,” and that it should be linked to “forms appropriate for today – joint stock companies, co-operative societies.” As the Latvian Minister of Agriculture in Andris Šķēle first government (1995–1997), Kauls was blunt in evaluating the situation in rural areas: “The extreme economic liberalism has contributed to economic anarchy, the capital reserves of the previous years are lost in the rural areas, production and social infrastructure has been destroyed.”21 Alberts Kauls in a sense was Andrievs Niedra’s counterpart. Although Kauls’ idol from the first free Latvia period was Ulmanis, his personality, thoughts, and destiny in many ways are similar to Andrievs Niedra’s. Niedra, too, was a pragmatist – though often called a conservative thinker and, unlike Kauls, not at all a socialism adherent. Niedra, like Kauls, was concerned about the unreasoned land reform in the name of “national justice” and the consequences of the excessively rapid and bold secession from Russia (the Soviet Union), because both of them believed that Latvia could not be economically successful in isolation from Russia. Moreover, Kauls, similarly to Niedra, was not a successful politician.22 In a newspaper interview in December 1990, Kauls noted that “the political situation in the republic should be described not only as tense, it clearly has distinctive characteristics, suggesting approaching confrontation, the consequences of which are not predictable. But in any event, they will not be favorable for the Latvian nation.”23 In terms of foreign policy, Kauls admitted that, in his opinion, Latvia had to remain a neutral country like Switzerland, because then “both the Eastern and Western money would flow here.”24 He also insisted that farmers should cooperate, and the government, together with the cooperatives, should plan

220 ALBERTS KAULS. In 1974, became the leader of the collective farm “Ādaži” and in 1986 – the manager of the agricultural firm “Ādaži.” In 1988 he was elected the chairman of the Latvian Council of Collective Farms. Was elected to the first Council of the Latvian Popular Front in 1988, as the Front was founded. In 1989 he was elected the chairman of the newly established Latvian Agriculturists’ Union (Latvijas Lauksaimnieku savienība), and led it until 1990. In 1989 Kauls became a deputy of the USSR Supreme Council, and in 1990 was appointed a member of the Photo: Boriss Koļesņikovs / USSR Presidential Advisory Council. Latvijas Vēstnesis In 1990 Kauls joined the reactionary All-Latvia Salvation Committee and was its co-chair (together with Alfrēds Rubiks). Kauls later regretted it and asked the Latvian people for their forgiveness on the Latvian television in 1991. Despite the ban of running in parliamentary and municipal elections, Kauls became politically active. Together with like-minded – mostly other former chairmen of collective farms – founded the Latvian Unity Party and was its chairman for the whole time the party was active.* The party gained 8 seats in the election of the 6th Saeima (in 1995), and Kauls became the Minister of Agriculture and Deputy Prime Minister. Due to intensified disputes with the head of the government on reform principles to be applied in agriculture, the Prime Minister requested Kauls to resign in May 1996. Shortly after the unsuccessful Saeima elections in 1997, the party ceased to exist; a part of the Unity Party members, who continued political activity, joined the Farmers’ Union or the Democratic party “Saimnieks.” Kauls is characterized by his contemporaries as an active and demanding manager, as a person who truly cared for land, property, cattle, and people,** but with a heavy character and one who did not recognize diplomatic moves.*** Kauls’ lack of good education is mentioned as one of his vulnerabilities; it was expressed in his inability to understand the developments in the early 1990s.****

* Alberts Kauls, Ēriks Hānbergs, Jānis Streičs, Aivars Andersons, Alberts Kauls triumfā un traģismā, 162. ** Ibid, 22–25. *** Ibid, 168. **** Ibid, 22–25.

the domestic consumption and seek external markets. Kauls also indicated that Latvia should become the financial and banking service center of the Baltic region, “which would serve the business world between the East and the West” and would provide the opportunity “to train highly qualified

221 people for the Eastern world,” meaning the former socialist countries. In this interview, Kauls also talked about the other direction, namely, transit services and all the related industries. In Kauls’ opinion, development of transit infrastructure would provide Latvia’s industry with a clear development path and hope for science. Latvia’s market is “the East-West, the West-East.”25 Alberts Kauls left politics in 1997, a year before Russia’s insolvency crisis. The crisis brought a heavy blow on Latvia’s food industry, which despite the difficulties in the early 1990s, had been able to regain Russia’s market. Following the crisis, producers tried to diversify exports, but Russia continued to be, and still is, one of the most significant Latvia’s food outlets, especially for the fishing industry products. Farmers and food manufacturers have spoken up in times of crises. The first time was related to Russia’s insolvency in 1997 that bore significant losses for Latvia’s food producers, when economic sanctions were imposed on Belarus in 2004, and on Russia in 2014. According to the debates in Saeima regarding providing moral support, for example, to the Chechen independence efforts, in support of Georgia against Russian aggression, and condemnation of Crimea’s illegal annexation by Russia ­­– food manufacturers and other pragmatists have voiced their concerns about the potential market loss due to deterioration of relations with Russia and Belarus. Indeed, if initially food producer group was dominated by representatives of traditional agricultural sectors: grain growers, dairy producers and meat processors, then in the latest years, at least judging by the intensity of opinions in mass media, it has been dominated by the fishing industry. This situation can be explained by the fact that the traditional agricultural sector, unlike the fishermen, receives significant financial support from the European Union. For example, at the time when sanctions are in place on Russia for its attack on Ukraine, Latvia’s fish processors insist that the foreign policy sector “does not irritate Russia outside the framework of the sanctions” and does not create unnecessary losses, even when it comes to the killing of civilians in Syria, rattling of nuclear weapons, and deployment of launch vehicles in Kaliningrad, on the Russia’s part.26 Apart from food industrialists, the market of Russia, Belarus and other CIS countries is essential also for Latvia’s pharmaceutical companies, such as “Grindeks” (Kirovs Lipmans) and “Olainfarm” (Valērijs Maligins), for cosmetics manufacturer “Dzintars” (Iļja Gerčikovs), and for many machine manufacturing firms. Common to all these companies is that their owners

222 or managers have a Soviet past, and their products have been popular in the Soviet period. Today, because of market considerations, these industries are vulnerable to deterioration of relations with Russia, for example, because of sanctions. Unlike transit, food import is not of strategic importance to Russia, therefore it is easily manipulated to achieve political ends, for example, food import bans due to sanitary and health requirements are typical for Russia. Attempts by Latvia’s enterprises to build manufacturing plants in Russia have not been particularly successful – as they themselves indicate, due to poor business environment.

Transit pragmatism and realpolitik – “the less we earn, the less money for Latvia”27 In the economics, and also in politics of the renewed Latvia, transit of different cargoes from the East to the West has had a very important role. Latvia’s transit corridor consists of three ports, which are connected to roads and railways, as well as two oil pipelines and one petroleum product main pipeline to Ventspils. There are nearly 85 thousand people employed in transit related industries, and in 2015 the turnover amounted to 841 million euros (3.4 percent of GDP).28 As acknowledged by experts, there is fierce competition among the ports: Latvia’s ports are competing with each other, and also with the ports of the neighboring countries – Estonia and Lithuania. Thus, in comparison with 1991, in 2015 the turnover of the cargo transitioning at Latvia’s ports has increased from 30 to 70 million tons, due mainly to sales growth at the Freeport of Riga. Meanwhile the turnover of Ventspils – the leading port of the 1990s – has remained constant at just over 20 million tons.29 The importance of the ice-free deep-water Port of Ventspils is linked to the infrastructure built during the Soviet times – oil pipelines and bulk cargo handling terminals; in 1988, seven percent of the Soviet Union’s oil exports were transported via Ventspils.30 The strategic importance of the Port of Ventspils in the economy of the renewed Latvia became clear already in 1990. The then head of government, Ivars Godmanis, quickly realized that it will not be possible to build Latvia’s economic independence, that is, to generate income in freely convertible currencies, neither from meat and dairy exports, nor from the large Soviet companies located in Latvia. Expectations were on the Port of Ventspils.

223 “You, the inhabitants of Ventspils, have to understand one thing – Ventspils is the most expensive, the most valuable place in Latvia. Your task – not to sell it too cheaply,” those were Godmanis’ words, addressed to the management of the city at the time when the port closure plans, for its environmental and health hazard, were still being considered in 1990.31 The Port of Ventspils met the expectations put on them. Oil and other freight continued to flow, Russia and Belarus were paying for port services, and valuable hard currency was flowing into the treasuries of both Ventspils and the Latvian government. As result of the privatization process, the assets of the Port of Ventspils fell into the hands of several port-related and city’s government-related persons. Most colorful and politically influential, of course, has been the mayor of Ventspils, millionaire Aivars Lembergs. Other public figures linked to the Port of Ventspils business are Oļegs Stepanovs, Jānis Blaževičs, Ojārs Berķis, Igors Skoks, Mamerts Vaivads, Valentīns Kokalis, and others. In 1996, the port company “Ventspils nafta” had become the largest oil transshipment terminal in Europe – it was accompanied by the belief of the managers of the port that “there is no real alternative to Ventspils for Russian oil and oil product exports,”32 and it had an impact on the Latvian political scene. At present, oil exports through the Port of Ventspils have practically stopped. There have been a number of reasons for that. First, as oil exports are one of Russia’s most important strategic sectors, it was not acceptable for Russia that one of the most important transshipment ports is located outside of its control, and – in Russia’s perception – in the territory of the union of hostile countries. The attempts of Russian companies, such as “Lukoil,” to acquire both the port and pipeline assets in 1996 and 1997 were not successful, both because Latvian state considered them as strategically important sites, and also because, through political influence, the port-related people lobbied their interests.33 Second, Russia was not satisfied with the high charges of port services and port operators’ requirement to sign agreements with offshore intermediary enterprises. Russian companies felt discriminated against in the Port of Ventspils. Such a state of affairs was followed by a quick response – Russia’s decision to develop domestic ports and to shift oil cargos through them. As a result, by the end of 2002 the oil transit pipeline was halted, and in 2008 – the diesel fuel transit as well. In addition, it is reported that Russia plans to fully stop oil exports through the Baltic States, including by rail, by 2018.

224 Consequently, with Russian oil cargo drying up, Ventspils and other ports had to think about attracting of other types of cargoes, as well as diversifying the regions from which to attract these cargos. To maintain the transiting volume, coal and other bulk cargo was arranged from Russia. However, around 2002, several factors appeared, which later significantly worsened the transit market position of Ventspils and Latvia. First, worsening of relations with the Russian oil suppliers led to the splitting of the Ventspils transit community into two opposing groups: Lembergs group, whose interests are represented by the Latvian Transit Business Association (LTBA) with Lembergs in the lead, and Lembergs’ dissenters (Olafs Berķis, Oļegs Stepanovs, Igors Skoks, and Genādijs Ševcovs), whose interests are represented by the “Baltic Association – Transport and Logistics” (BATL). Second, parallel to the Port of Ventspils operation, oil and solid cargo transit developed also through other ports, especially the Port of Riga. Influence in the port of Riga was gained by companies whose owners were associated with the Soviet security structures, military sector, or Soviet nomenclature. Most significant “Riga” personalities are Guntis Indriksons (“Skonto”), Aivars Gulbis (“SWH”), Jūlijs Krūmiņš (“Man-Tess”) and Vladimirs Komogorcevs (“Lat-East-West”). Riga has the advantage of being less than two hundred kilometers closer to the East than Ventspils, therefore less money is spent to move freight by rail. Third, with the decline of Russian cargo volumes, greater importance was given to Belarusian cargo, mainly fertilizers. Unfortunately, the decline of Russian cargo has weakened Latvia’s transit positions compared to Lithuania. At present, as prospective directions are mentioned reverse oil supplies to Belarussian and the Mažeikiai oil refineries and export of processed products, as well as fertilizer cargos from Russia. Cooperation is being developed with the Black Sea region, China, and Central Asian countries, bringing in containers intended for the Scandinavian region. The container train “Baltika- Tranzit” has been running regularly since 2003, linking the Baltic ports with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. This route is planned to be extended to China, staring in 2016.34 There is also work done to have civilian cargo replace NATO military cargo to Afghanistan, which was delivered via Latvia within the framework of the so-called Northern corridor. The transit business representatives’ treatment of Latvian foreign policy priorities has been dependent on the winds blowing from Russia and the Latvian public mood. For example, in 2003, when Russia cut oil supplies by

225 pipeline, Lembergs voiced support for the U.S. position for the settlement of Iraq crisis and pointed out that “Latvia as a potential NATO member should act in accordance with the U.S. and its allies position,” despite the fact that shortly before that he had called Russia as Latvia’s true friend and Ventspils – as the port of Russia.35 Beginning with 2005, Lembergs’ mood changed again, and in the future, NATO, the United States and, in particular, the international philanthropist and political activist George Soros became Lembergs’ objects of contempt and perceived conspiracy hatchers against Latvia, and him personally. Lembergs has emphasized that NATO is a threat to Latvia, and that the U.S. understands its declared strategic partnership with Latvia only in its personal interests; besides, it is the U.S. that is mainly interested in the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine.36 Similarly, Lembergs and allied politicians expressed their doubts about the usefulness of Latvia’s accession to the OECD, when the accession negotiations were approaching completion ­that, among other things, emphasized the need to limit money laundering in Latvia through state-owned enterprises and to improve the transparency of their operation. Lembergs is a charismatic personality, who implements his economic impact through a series of political forces, therefore his remarks can cause significant resonance in Latvia, as well as abroad. At the same time, it is difficult to distinguish in Lembergs’ statements, what are his true thoughts on the state of affairs, and what is empty rhetoric to attract public attention and to realize his political interests. It appears that one of the main problems of Latvia’s transit business in the recent years is the lack of cooperation between the various business factions. Mutual competition has led to battles in the political arena between departments, for example, traffic departments on the one hand and foreign affairs departments of the other. Different associations have different opinions, also different scope of operation. Some want to focus on the Belarusian fertilizer transport, others – on Russian freights. The already mentioned BATL wants Latvia to develop a common competitive offer (combined rail and port rate, that does not discriminate against the Port of Ventspils for its larger geographical distance involved), while the LTBA insists on maintaining free competition. Furthermore, according to the publications in the press, due to political intervention the Port of Ventspils has lost fertilizer cargo from Belarus in favor to Lithuania, moreover, this has happened because of the unreasonably high tariffs set by the Latvian state company “LDz Cargo,”37 and in circumstances where, according to the

226 AIVARS LEMBERGS, economist by training, has been active in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but in 1990 was elected to the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia as a representative of the Latvian Popular Front. He was among those who voted for Latvian declaration of independence on 4 May 1990. Awarded with the 3rd class Order of the Three Stars and the Commemorative Medal for Participants of the Barricades of 1991. Aivars Lembergs has been the Mayor of Ventspils since 1988. In 1994, he created a political organization “For Latvia and Ventspils” and was Photo: LETA, author: Ieva Čīka elected as its chairman. The party began cooperation with the Greens and Farmers Union (ZZS), its members were elected to the Saeima and joined several government coalitions. On 20 July 2006, before the elections of the 9th Saeima, the ZZS designated Lembergs as its candidate for the post of Prime Minister. In addition to political activities, he is engaged in business, and has been a member of private and public councils and corporate boards, mainly in transit- and port-related businesses. Since 1994, he is the President of the Latvian Transit Business Association, the Board Director of the Freeport of Ventspils, and President of the Basketball Club “Ventspils.” Lembergs is considered to be one of the richest people in Latvia and, alongside Andris Šķēle and Ainārs Šlesers, is known as one of the three influential Latvian “oligarchs”; for illegal activities, he stands accused of a number of felonies. Former President Valdis Zatlers characterizes Lembergs as an enthusiastic person who is always in a good mood, is not meticulous, has a fine sense of humor, but “at the right moment he gets rid of the bad ones.”*

* Valdis Zatlers, Kas es esmu (Rīga: Jumava, 2015), 320.

Latvian Foreign Ministry representatives, Latvia’s relations with Belarus are the “best at all levels.”38 New trends in Latvian transit business were brought by the former Minister of Transport, a millionaire and one of the oligarchs, Ainārs Šlesers, who in 2015 became a member of the board of the international (Latvian, Russian and Belarussian) rail transport consortium “Euro Trail Cargo Trail.” This company claims the region’s leading role in logistics and transport services. This claim is substantiated by the fact that Latvian, Belarussian, and Russian railway companies take part in this company, and Russia owns

227 an important part of the joint venture. Other influential businessmen and politicians, such as Andris Šķēle and Aivars Lembergs, also have “Euro Trail Cargo” interests. The new company will be at least nominally a competitor to the state-owned “LDz Cargo.” Moreover, Lembergs’ interest in this company also indicates that he is moving the center of his operations from Ventspils to the Freeport of Riga. In the “Baltic Forum,” held on 20 October 2016 Ainārs Šlesers urged not to become “hostages of sanctions” and to “show the world an example that Latvia and Russia can successfully cooperate in the field of transport and others.”39 Similarly, speaking about the correspondence of the Latvian foreign policy with transit interests, in the recent TV debate, Imants Sarmulis, a LTBA representative, stated that, in view of the fact that containerized cargo connection between China and Latvia can go only through Russia, there are times when it is “better to keep quiet” and that sometimes it is “better to think three times before speaking.” Sarmulis meant Foreign Minister’s condemnation of the Russian-backed aggression in Syria, launch vehicle deployment in Kaliningrad, and the rejection of the agreement with the U.S. on nuclear weapons plutonium recycling.40 However, observations testify that Sarmulis’ and also Šlesers’ remarks are political rhetoric, since, in spite of the cold political relations between Latvia and Russia, Russia is interested in resource transit through Latvia’s ports due to their advantageous situation. Moreover, as noted, the good relations between business people and part of the political elite of the two countries promote activity of Russian companies in Latvia.41 Also Aivars Lembergs himself has pointed out indirectly to such a state of affairs, noting that the biggest challenges in transit business come from the European Commission that “wants to introduce a series of levies on noise emissions for both ports and railways,” resulting in higher Latvian port services, compared with Russian ports.42

Financial pragmatism – “we are closer than Switzerland”43 Financial services – currency exchange at the beginning and, a little later, banking business – was one of the sectors which, despite the general economic decline, was developing very rapidly in the early 1990s in Latvia. The success in this field even gave a vision to the country’s elite that Latvia

228 could become the financial center of all the former USSR and major financial player between the West and the East, as Switzerland. To achieve this, in the politicians’ view, it was important to retain neutrality in foreign policy, to ensure free flow of capital across Latvia’s borders, and to maintain a supervisory regime friendly to banks (according to the principle of laissez faire, the bad banks will disappear through attrition). In the 1990s banks and exchange centers in Latvia were growing as “mushrooms after rain.” The Latvian Bank began to issue banking licenses in 1991, and in 1994 there were already 62 banks in Latvia – the largest number of banks ever operating in Latvia. Some banks were formed by transforming the Soviet state banks, such as “Latvijas Krājbanka,” others were formed anew, such as “Banka Baltija” and “Rīgas Komercbanka.” During this time, there were practically no foreign banks assets in Latvia – bank funds were locally sourced, and at the time the capital requirements were very low – in 1993, to establish a bank, just 100,000 lats was enough.44 Since 1990s Latvia’s banking system has undergone significant changes. In the aftermath of the banking crises (“Banka Baltija,” “Rīgas Komercbanka,” “Parex Banka,” “Latvijas Krājbanka”), “national” banks have practically disappeared in Latvia. According to the Bank of Latvia opinion, the 1990’s “liberal attitude towards the banking business was defined by the government’s desire for rapid economic development, that, in the emerging national development visions, was impossible without equally rapid growth of banks.”45 However, as admitted by the Bank of Latvia, in most cases the difficulties in banks were caused not by objective, but rather subjective reasons, dependent on banking activity – unprofessional management, inability to predict the evolution of the situation, dishonesty, and deliberate mismanagement of the bank assets.46 After the first banking crisis in 1995, the number of banks began to decline due to more stringent supervision, until in 2000 there were only 22 banks in Latvia. In the coming years, the number of banks gradually resumed increasing, also during the crisis years – mainly as the branches of foreign banks. From the point of view of banking assets, the sector reached the peak in 2008, when the assets of the banks were equivalent to 33 billion euros (135 percent of the GDP). The growth of the sector was particularly fast between 2004 and 2008, thanks to domestic lending. Following the crisis years, there was a slight decline in banking assets, but since 2012, the situation began to improve again. An important role in post-crisis banking

229 operation was played by foreign customers – the volume of foreign loans and securities purchased has doubled, while domestic lending has decreased. From the point of view of banking liabilities, the scene is a bit different. Since 2004, the Latvian banking sector has been dominated by deposits from abroad, reaching its peak in 2008, when 20.3 billion euros, or 61 percent of the total volume of deposits came from abroad. After the crisis, the amount of foreign deposits has decreased, while local deposits increased. In 2016, the amount of local and foreign deposits practically has leveled. The bloom of Latvia’s financial sector and the decline of local banks has been largely associated with one company – the industry flagship – joint-stock company “Parex banka” and its owners Valērijs Kargins and Viktors Krasovickis. The origins of “Parex banka” are linked to foreign tour organization and the associated foreign exchange transactions, even before the restoration of Latvia’s independence. Although exchange of the Soviet ruble to convertible currencies was strictly controlled in the USSR and for tourism purposes was made possible only to a very limited extent, Valērijs Kargins and Viktors Krasovickis already in Soviet times found a way to successfully bypass these constraints with the help of currency-intermediaries. Currency exchange was legalized in Latvia on 1 January 1991. Soon, with the introduction of a transitional currency – the Latvian ruble – the Bank of Latvia launched a free currency convertibility, which meant that by the double exchange path (Russian rubles to Latvian rubles, and Latvian rubles to convertible foreign currency) it was possible to freely exchange non-convertible currency of the Soviet republics into convertible currency. As a result of these reforms, Latvia began to develop as an important financial center for interstate settlements of the former USSR republics.47 Latvia was the only former Soviet republic where such operations were possible, in addition, there was absolutely no control over the origin of funds.48 “Parex” was the first enterprise that received a license from the Bank of Latvia to implement foreign exchange operations. The company’s performance was impressive – while others in the streets of Riga, exchanged currency worth only a few hundred dollars, “Parex” attracted currency worth many millions from all the republics of the USSR. As described by Kargins himself: “The process gained such scales that at times we were sending several money-stuffed planes a week ...,” in addition, “thousands of people in all corners of the Soviet Union were moving through our well- trodden path.”49 Success in business was followed by significant economic

230 and political influence – at the time when the Bank of Latvia began issuing the Latvian ruble, “Parex” practically had monopolized the currency market in Latvia and had the ability to dictate their own rules. Although initially the Bank of Latvia had denied a license to the Parex bank due to threats “to make the rate of Latvian ruble as low as the rate of Italian lira,” in 1992, it issued the license to the Parex bank in return for a promise to stick to the exchange rate of the Latvian ruble set by the Bank of Latvia. In the coming years, Parex bank successfully developed both in the market of Latvia and the markets of Latvia’s neighbors – Lithuania and Russia – despite the concussions of 1995 and 1998. “Parex” opened branch offices also in Germany and Switzerland. As Valērijs Kargins notes in his book: “Only ‘transitioners’ succeeded in drawing life forces outside [in the East] ... and the banking industry that was actively restoring the lost connections.” Kargins also notes that “the crisis of 1998 showed that those who overly concentrated their economic activity in Russia and Ukraine, did not succeed,” therefore “opportunities should be sought to integrate into the EU market, to join the club of the countries – creators of globalization processes.” In Kargins’ opinion, in 1995 he and Latvia were faced with a choice: to move towards Europe or fade in stagnation.50 At the same time he had found then that the bank’s development only in Latvian and Baltic markets is not possible and that it is necessary to advertise their services in Russia and the CIS countries. Kargins admits that alienation in political relations between Latvia and Russia was beneficial for merchants, because “here was a guarantee that the Balts will not provide an unfriendly state power with information on bank deposit secrets.” Kargins was convinced that Latvia will defend the banking industry because it is a source for national prosperity, and as a result “Russian people preferred to keep their money with us,” because it “seemed less dangerous than keeping it at home.” One can conclude from what Valērijs Kargins has written that “Parex” and other Latvian commercial banks, which worked in the CIS countries, appreciated Latvia’s participation in the European Union. The so-called European Union bank passport was a guarantee of good reputation in the East. This allowed the bankers to position Latvia as a “small and quiet country in Europe, where it is easy to make money” and where “the Eastern and Western capital has been meeting for centuries.” After all, belonging to the European Union allowed the commercial banks to present themselves not just as “we are closer than Switzerland,” but “we are already in Switzerland!”51

231 VALĒRIJS KARGINS. In 1989, together with Viktors Krasovickis bought a defunct Komsomol commercial entity Parex, that they transformed into a major tourism company in Latvia. In 1991, they opened in Riga the first currency exchange point in the USSR, and in 1992 – the commercial bank “Parex banka.” During the period from 1992 to the bank’s bankruptcy in 2008, Kargins was its President and Chairman of the Board, and Krasovickis – Vice President. On 20 November 1997, the Saeima decided to grant Kargins, for special merits, Latvian citizenship. On 29 September 1994, however, the Photo: LETA, author: Ieva Čīka Riga City Court held that Valērijs Kargins and Dina Gvozdeva were not citizens of the Republic of Latvia, since they illegally obtained Latvian citizens’ passports in 1993. For many years, Kargins was among the richest people of Latvia. When Parex bank encountered financial difficulties and was nationalized, he lost the position and the shares of the bank.

The 2008 crisis came as a misfortune and strongly shook the Latvian banking system. It is significant that many of the former Latvian government officials found work in the structures of “Parex,” for example, former high-ranking official of the Finance Ministry, later State Auditor, Inguna Sudraba, and former Attorney General Jānis Skrastiņš. “Parex” bank also was a generous contributor to political parties – practically there has been no significant political force to which “Parex” would not have donated. “Parex” bank was weakened by the fierce competition with Western banks in the Latvian market, which during 2005–2007 experienced a credit boom. As “Parex” had no parent bank to draw on the resources, it borrowed money from the international markets, and – as the crisis was approaching – on increasingly less favorable conditions, until access to loans was not possible at all. “Parex” bank went bankrupt in December 2008, and it was nationalized. Most of Latvia’s commercial banks today are the so-called niche or pocket banks – they continue providing their services to wealthy Latvian or foreign customers (following the concept of private banker). From the 24 banks, which in 2016 operated in Latvia, only five can be considered as banks which focus on universal banking services and a wide range of clientele. As already noted, for the bank owners Latvia’s membership in the

232 European Union and NATO was beneficial, but on the other hand, it was essential for them to maintain close ties with the former USSR countries. In general, according to the “right style”, bankers’ right behavior would be to refrain from active political involvement, but behind the scenes the owners of Latvian commercial banks have been quite active. Significant banks- related personalities, which in one way or another have been associated with political circles, have been Aleksandrs Lavents (“Banka Baltija”), Vladimirs Kuļiks (“Rīgas Komercbanka”), Valērijs Kargins (“Parex banka”), Oļegs Fiļs (“ABLV”) and Valērijs Belokoņs (“Baltic International Bank”). Some of these personalities have already served a sentence of imprisonment, some still have ongoing lawsuits, but some continue working. Latvia’s approaching membership in the OECD (accession took place in the summer of 2016) created serious disadvantages for Latvia’s niche bankers, namely, the OECD insisted on tightening banking supervision in the context of the fight against money laundering. Since the early 2000s, Latvia’s niche banks have been involved in a number of international scandals of illegally obtained money laundering.52 Complaints from the U.S. side about the involvement of Latvia’s banks in international money laundering schemes have been received several times – however, action from the Latvian supervising bodies has followed only in the cases when there were threats, for example, to disconnect Latvian banks from the international U.S. dollar billing systems, or to delay Latvia’s accession to the OECD.53 For lobbying their interests, the banks use the Latvian Association of Commercial Banks, the Latvian Chamber of Commerce, as well as the newly established think tank “Certus.”54

Conclusions Economic pragmatism ideas in Latvia, although popular, have never prevailed. Moreover, there are several trends and content interpretations of the pragmatic thought, and they vary, for example, depending on the sphere of activity of the persons involved (such as industry, transit, or finance) and the geographic location of interests (Russia, Belarus, or Central Asia). Despite the role of “the second plan,” in certain moments pragmatists have managed to “torpedo” one or the other political initiative. Recent examples are related to the Latvia’s intention to join the OECD and the related fight against money laundering and condemnation of Russia for its actions in Syria conflict and the agreement on the limitation of nuclear arsenal.

233 Economic relations with Russia have been complicated not so much by political factors as by competition for economic objects of mutual strategic importance. For example, Latvia’s transport infrastructure – railways, pipelines, and ports – were of strategic importance for Russia, therefore it sought to gain control over them. At the same time, these objects were classified as strategically important also in Latvia, and Russia’s potential control over them was seen as a security threat. Unlike Russia, Belarus has always been perceived in Latvia as a handy partner. Except for separate episodes, when Latvia tried to put pressure on Lukashenko’s regime, in general the relations with Belarus have been stable and cooperative. Latvia has never supported economic sanctions against this state, and especially after the conflict in Georgia, has valued highly the sovereignty of Belarus. Overall, the relationships between the Latvian and neighboring businessmen are good, much better than the official relations between the countries. In several episodes of interstate relations, for example, regarding removal of transit barriers and the border treaty between Latvia and Russia, business lobby has played a significant role.55 In the views of businessmen, transnational disputes mainly have been politically motivated and related to internal political developments, rather than to economic competition. Latvian and neighboring businessmen see themselves as partners and not as rivals. Speaking about existing obstacles for closer economic cooperation with Russia and Belarus, problems are caused, on the one hand, by destructive conflicts of politically influential economic groups in Latvia that hinder creation of a uniform policy for competitive transit services, and, on the other hand, by the disordered and unpredictable business environment of Latvia’s Eastern neighbors. “Russia is not to be understood with one’s mind,” has noted Lembergs.56 Clearly, Latvia has to make the best use of its natural advantages, including the geographical location between the East and the West, ice-free ports, and a relatively well-developed transport infrastructure. In the recent years, Latvia has achieved all the political objectives of its external policy, and created a significant economic contractual basis, covering practically all the countries of the world. At the same time the potential of Latvia’s economic development has not been fully exploited. We can discuss whether the economic development would have been more successful, based on considerations of pragmatism, but now that the political integration in the Western structures has been completed, the issue about the use of political impact for promotion of country’s economic development, has emerged naturally in the forefront.

234 In terms of future development, an important challenge in relations with Russia will be its self-isolation tendencies. This will make the country less dependent on importing products and services from abroad, including from Latvia, and, therefore, even less predictable. It is no secret that good business cooperation with Russia is possible only if there are good contacts with its political circles. Today the good relations of businessmen are based on the contacts established during the Soviet times. These contacts will disappear over generations. Nevertheless, some cross-cultural understanding will remain that presumably will allow Latvian businesses to maintain the current specific niche in the post-Soviet space. Finally, economic pragmatism ideas will certainly continue to exist in Latvia and, in view of the current significant challenges in Latvia’s economic development, very likely will even move to the forefront of the political agenda. In the near future, very intense discussions are expected among economic pragmatists, protectionism supporters, and liberal European forces about the preferred direction of Latvia’s economic development.

Endnotes

1 Valdis Birkavs, „Pirmie izšķirošie gadi: Krievijas armijas izvešana un Latvijas nonākšana Eiropas Savienības priekštelpā,” Atgriešanās Eiropā. Latvijas prezidentu, premjerministru, ministru un dip- lomātu esejās, ed. Kristīne Kozlova (Riga: Zinātne, 2016), 68. 2 Lato Lapsa, Sandris Metuzāls and Kristīne Jančevska, Mūsu Vēsture 1985–2005.I, 426. 3 Ibid, 427–428. 4 In the 5th, 6th and 7th Saeima, the “Latvian Way” was actually the ruling party because for ideologi- cal reasons, it was not possible to establish any government without it. At that time, this party had more prime ministers and ministerial portfolios than other parties. See Imants Mednis, Politiskās partijas “Latvijas ceļš” izveidošanās un darbība 20. gs. 90. gados, Daugavpils Universitātes Humani- tārās fakultātes XII Zinātnisko lasījumu materiāli, vēsture. VI sējums, I daļa (Daugavpils: Dau- gavpils Universitātes izdevniecība Saule, 2003), 122, 132. 5 See Valdis Birkavs address to the Saeima about the planned activities of his government, transcript of the 20 July 1993 extraordinary morning session of the 5th Saeima of the Repub- lic of Latvia, http://www.saeima.lv/steno/st_93/200793.html and „Valda Birkava valdī- bas deklarācija,” Delfi portal, 9 August 2006, http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/ valda-birkava-valdibas-deklaracija.d?id=15057886 6 The coalition was disrupted by the Farmers’ Union that left the government. The formal reason was the refusal of the Latvian Way to raise import tariffs on agricultural products. The real re- ason was to put pressure on the Latvian Way to limit its liberalism and to protect local producers’ interests. The Farmers’ Union later regretted this departure. See Māris Gailis,Varas tehnoloģijas (Riga: Jumava, 1997), 127. 7 Māris Gailis address at the 15 September 1994 session of the 5th Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, http://www.saeima.lv/steno/st_94/st1509.html 8 Valdis Birkavs, „Pirmie izšķirošie gadi: Krievijas armijas izvešana un Latvijas nonākšana Eiropas Savienības priekštelpā” no Atgriešanās Eiropā. Latvijas prezidentu, premjerministru, ministru un diplomātu esejās, 65–66.

235 9 Ojārs Kehris, transcript of the 7 April 1995 session of the 5th Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, http://www.saeima.lv/steno/st_955/st0704.html 10 Imants Mednis, Partiju laiku Latvijā (1988-2002) (Rīga: SIA Drukātava, 2007), 262–263. 11 Imants Mednis, Politiskās partijas “Latvijas ceļš” izveidošanās un darbība 20. gs. 90. gados, Daugav- pils Universitātes Humanitārās fakultātes XII Zinātnisko lasījumu materiāli, http://www.old.his- toria.lv/publikacijas/konf/daugp/012/1dala/mednis.htm 12 Declaration on Cabinet’s Planned Activities (Vilis Krištopāns Cabinet), published on 17 Febru- ary 2002, http://providus.lv/article/deklaracija-par-ministru-kabineta-iecereto-darbibu-vila- kristopana-valdiba 13 Indulis Emsis, transcript of the 9 March 2004 session of the Saeima, http://www.saeima.lv/ste- no/2002_8/st_040309/st0903.htm 14 The attitude of Andris Šķēle’s People’s Party and Ainārs Šlesers’ Latvia’s First Party towards the Georgia conflict can be seen in the Wikileaks leaked U.S. diplomatic reports. See Jānis Bērziņš, Wiki- Leaks. Nošaut nedrīkst apžēlot (Rīga: Kontinents, 2011), 36. 15 „ZZS apšauba nepieciešamību Latvijai iestāties OECD,” Baltic News Network, 2015. gada 2. no- vembris, http://bnn.lv/zzs-apsauba-nepieciesamibu-latvijai-ietaties-oecd-171345 16 Lato Lapsa, Sandris Metuzāls and Kristīne Jančevska, Mūsu Vēsture 1985-2005.I, 427. 17 Ibid, 282. 18 Ibid, 292. 19 Alberts Kauls, Ēriks Hānbergs, Jānis Streičs, Aivars Andersons, Alberts Kauls triumfā un traģismā (Rīga: Jumava, 2010), 118–119. 20 Ibid, 69. 21 Ibid, 217–218. 22 Ibid, 167–168 and 201. 23 Ibid, 196. 24 Ibid, 204. 25 Ibid, 225–232. 26 Juris Paiders, “Didzis Šmits: Zivrūpnieki pieprasa Rinkēviča atkāpšanos,” Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze, 19.09.2016., http://nra.lv/latvija/185329-didzis-smits-zivrupnieki-pieprasa-rinkevi- ca-atkapsanos.htm. 27 Bens Latkovskis, “Imants Sarmulis: Jo mazāk nopelnīsim, jo mazāk naudas Latvijai,” NRA, 2016. gada 2. maijs, http://nra.lv/latvija/171176-imants-sarmulis-jo-mazak-nopelnisim-jo-ma- zak-naudas-latvijai.htm 28 In 2015, the volume of cargo sent by sea was still dominated by petroleum products (37 percent), coal (30 percent), and container cargos (2 percent). Compared to the 1990s, oil is practically no longer shipped, and the volume of timber and scrap metal cargos has decreased significantly. By contrast, the turnover of dry chemical cargo was increasing until 2005 reaching 13 percent, but afterwards it has been changing, and in 2015, a significant drop (0.4 percent of total freight turn- over) was recorded. 29 To be accurate, the Port of Ventspils reached its cargo maximum – 36 million tons – in 1998. Then the volume gradually decreased to 22 million tons in 2015. 30 Lato Lapsa, Sandris Metuzāls, Kristīne Jančevska, Mūsu vēsture – 1985–2005.II (Rīga: Atēna, 2008), 203. 31 Ibid, 200. 32 Ibid, 216–217. 33 Victoria Panova, „Foreign Economic Policy of the Russian Federation: The Constraints and Op- portunities of the Baltic Dimension” in The Economic Presence of Russia and Belarus in the Baltic States: Risks and Opportunities, ed. Andris Sprūds (Riga: Latvian Institute of International Af- fairs, Centre for East European Policy Studies, Soros Foundation-Latvia, 2012), 55–56. 34 Latvijas Republikas Satiksmes ministrija, “Augulis Ķīnā pavada ceļā testa vilcienu no Ķīnas uz Latviju,” 2016. gada 20. oktobris, http://www.sam.gov.lv/?cat=8&art_id=6271

236 35 “Aivars Ozoliņš: Lembergs. Vējrāža intereses,” 2005. gada 6. septembris, http://apollo.tvnet.lv/ zinas/aivars-ozolins-lembergs-vejraza-intereses/314485 36 “Дипломаты, политологи и журналисты активно обсуждают события на Украине,” 2014. gada 16. aprīlis, https://www.1tv.ru/news/2014/04/16/48302-diplomaty_politologi_i_ zhurnalisty_aktivno_obsuzhdayut_sobytiya_na_ukraine, and “Lembergs redz NATO kā draudu, bet Krieviju – kā savu draugu,” 2014. gada 16. aprīlis, http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/ latvija/506322-lembergs_redz_nato_ka_draudu_bet_krieviju_ka_savu_draugu 37 Grigorijs Zubarevs, “Latvija piespiež Baltkrieviju pārorientēt savu tranzītu uz Krievijas os- tām,” 2012. gada 25. novembris, http://pietiek.com/raksti/latvija_piespiez_baltkrieviju_ parorientet_savu_tranzitu_uz_krievijas_ostam?nomob 38 Sandra Sondore-Kukule, “Vai Latvija var nonākt tranzīta izolācijā?,” video ieraksts, “Nacio- nālo interešu klubs,” 2016. gada 19. septembris, http://play24.lv/video/5670/vai-latvija- var-nonakt-tranzita-izolacija 39 TVNET/LETA, “Oligarhs Šlesers mudina nepamest Krieviju vienu pašu cīņā ar «Briseli un Va- šingtonu,” 2016. gada 22. oktobris, http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/viedokli/631201-oligarhs_sles- ers_mudina_nepamest_krieviju_vienu_pasu_cina_ar_briseli_un_vasingtonu 40 Imants Sarmulis, “Vai Latvija var nonākt tranzīta izolācijā?,” http://play24.lv/video/5670/ vai-latvija-var-nonakt-tranzita-izolacija 41 The Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), “The Russian-Latvian transit consortium,” 15 April 2015, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-04-15/russian-latvian-transit-consortium 42 Nozare.lv, “Ventspils tranzīta konfliktā zaudēts vismaz miljards ASV dolāru,” 2010. gada 8. janvāris. 43 Such a slogan was used in 1991 by currency exchange company Parex, later “Parex banka,” to ad- vertise their services in the former USSR republics. 44 The Bank of Finland study of 1993 indicates that the libertarian approach implemented in Latvia is not sustainable – in Latvia as a small society informal agreements behind the scenes are com- mon, as evidenced by the country-shattering financial scandals; therefore, according to the aut- hors’ opinion, for to Latvia to become a reputable financial center, it must significantly improve banking supervision and control. See Seija Lainela and Pekka Sutela, “Introducing New Curren- cies in the Baltic Countries,” Review of Economies in Transition, Bank of Finland, no. 8, 2003, 23. 45 Mārtiņš Bitāns and Vilnis Purviņš, “Latvijas tautsaimniecības attīstība (1990–2004),” Latvijas Bankai XC, 152. 46 Ibid, 155. 47 Ibid, 145, 152. 48 Seija Lainela and Pekka Sutela, “Introducing New Currencies in the Baltic Countries,” Review of Economies in Transition, Bank of Finland, no. 8, 2003, 22. 49 Valērijs Kargins, Nauda un cilvēki (Rīga: Atēna, 2005), 128. 50 Ibid, 173. 51 Nils Muižnieks, “The Latvian Economy – the Offshore Next Door” inManufacturing Enemy Ima- ges? Russian Media Portrayal of Latvia, ed. Nils Muižnieks (Academic Press of the University of Latvia, 2008), 155. 52 Evita Puriņa, “Banku lobijam piepulcējas arī eksministrs Dombrovskis,” Re:Baltica, http://www. rebaltica.lv/lv/petijumi/netira_nauda/a/1310/nerezidentu_banku_slepenie_ieroci.html 53 BNS, “Zakulis atstās FKTK priekšsēdētāja amatu,” 2016. gada 25. janvāris, http://www.latviannewsservice.lv/topic/1533/news/50681340/ 54 Sanita Jemberga, Evita Puriņa, “Zeme, kas turpina mazgāt,” Re:Baltica, 2016. gada 25. janvāris, http://www.rebaltica.lv/lv/petijumi/netira_nauda/a/1309/zeme_kas_joprojam_mazga_.html 55 Victoria Panova, “Foreign Economic Policy of the Russian Federation: The Constraints and Op- portunities of the Baltic Dimension,” 44. 56 Edijs Bošs, “Lukashenkonomy: Belarus’s Perilous “Third Way” Between Russia and the West” in The Economic Presence of Russia and Belarus in the Baltic States: Risks and Opportunities, 88.

237 Normative Streams in Latvia – towards a Common Understanding

MĀRTIŅŠ DAUGULIS

The normative development of Latvia is a little-studied issue, but in this case not because of researchers’ laziness or disinterest. Being aware that research institutes often follow the developments of practical politics, the author begins this article with quite an ambitious hypothesis: the normative development in Latvia is only on its way to ... development. The style of popular-science writing allows to come up with such a claim and, to the extent the size of the article permits speaking about such nuanced and extensive subjects, also to justify this hypothesis. Latvia’s 25 years of independence is an excellent point in time to stop for a moment and see how far we have evolved in each area, also to examine critically the areas that we as a country have not developed enough. The concept of normative development is interpreted in different ways. Firstly, legal minds understand national normative development as the national legal normative framework and construction of a state. Here appear such principles as good governance policies, civil service as a “servant,” approaches and aspects of better regulation, and of so called “internal democracy” aspects – namely, democracy in not only a constitutional form, but also democracy as a functional principle of operation in any stage of governance or its formation (for example, internal democracy of political parties, respect for democratic principles in the selection of civil servants, etc.). Speaking about normative development from this angle, the impact of foreign policy normative trends primarily has manifested through the state integration in the European Union – both during the pre-accession phase (defining what institutional “form” should be given to Latvia to enable it to initiate its accession path; and since 2004, taking over directly the Community rules and conduct practices). Such institutional normativism is the form and basis for each country, so that

238 within the framework of this form, a value system could develop for the country. Hence, we come to normative foreign policy as understood by international relations experts, or value normativism, which means development of a state within a certain values system of an international environment. In this perspective, normativism is understood as a national “moral obligation,” or what the state and its citizens should be in their attitudes, beliefs and manifestations, or more precisely, where it should aim – what are its goals as a state, a society, and as a part of civilization. The concept of civilization in this discourse is not uncommon – most invoked, when speaking in normativism terms, is Western civilization, and in the context of the United Nations – also civilization as a whole, taking into account the broad composition of the UN member states. Each hemisphere of the international system has its own insights on what is “proper normative development” – so, for example, in the case of the People’s Republic of China, normative categories are different than those of the West, which is based upon universal human rights and panacea of democracy – the PRC normativism puts emphasis on political/economic regime hybrids as a norm and diversity outside of unified understanding of democracy (for obvious reasons). But, coming back to the Western world, where also Latvia belongs, its normative standard as the development direction is currently defined by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, which have further evolved as Post-2015 targets. UN Millennium Goals already have a decade of history – in 2000, 191 (now – 193) UN member states adopted the Millennium Declaration, setting as the overall goal the reduction of the percentage of the world’s population living in poverty, by one half. Both the UN Member States and the international organizations (World Bank, OECD, and others) committed to improve the standard of living of the world’s population by implementation of the so called “Millennium Development Goals,” which include poverty reduction, provision of basic education, equal opportunities for men and women, reduction of child mortality, improvement of maternal health, limitation of preventable causes of death, ensuring environmental sustainability, and global cooperation and assistance to less developed countries.1 As indicated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Latvia’s thematic priorities in the Post-2015 framework are good governance, strengthening of rule of law and efficient institutions; promotion of gender equality;

239 sustainable and inclusive economic growth, employment and infrastructure; health promotion and accessibility of care services; education at all levels, universal and accessible to all; food security and sustainable agriculture; sustainable consumption and production; protection and restoration of terrestrial ecosystems, and stopping the loss of biodiversity.2 In addition to the UN Post-2015 goals, the human rights issue is a separate assessment vector in value normativism. As noted by Kofi Ata Annan, the former (seventh) UN Secretary-General – human rights must be included in all political decision-making and discussions at all the national political levels, since the concept of human rights and its development is essential not only for poor countries and their societies, but also for developed countries and their population.3 The development of human rights’ and general legal background is an important reference criterion to be taken into account when talking about the development of the country as well as its positioning in the international system. The two mentioned views of normativism – institutional normativism and value normativism (within which the human rights aspect is to be highlighted separately) are important not only to assess, where the Latvian state finds itself 25 years after regaining independence, how has it been impacted, positively or negatively, by foreign policy trends, and whether Latvia itself has influenced them, but also to be able to understand where Latvia could move further and to use its hidden potential in normative perspective. And there is a hidden potential here – although statistical reviews of sociological processes are always subject to interpretation and each provides a different view, in the leading democracy indexes (that in terms of criteria combine the elements of normative institutionalism and value institutionalism) Latvia is not only placed in the group of countries in which democracy is described as “incomplete,” but it also is placed consistently lower than Lithuania and Estonia.4 In addition, in all the normative assessment indexes, particularly significant is the growth rate by developing this sphere – even more so, historically the development of norms and values goes hand in hand with the development of economic prosperity, suggesting that, although it is not really separable from the process point of view, what comes first – economic well-being and then understanding of values, or first understanding of values – and then well-being; one thing is clear – economic prosperity and prosperous society in the Western world is inseparable from developed normative environment.5

240 Thus, in the following analysis, the author will look at institutional normativism’s meshing with foreign policy, and will separately look at the value normativism – outlining views, personalities, and decisions that could be considered as significant in finding Latvia’s place and role in the Western value system.

Institutional normativism in Latvia – from a governed state to public governance in the European context Looking in the rear view mirror of a quarter century, it is clearly possible to say that in the field of the normative institutionalism, Latvia has reached the public administration capacity of the developed Western European countries – in some areas, even surpassed – now Latvia is becoming an experience donor for developing countries in the field of public administration and administrative reforms.6 This raises the question, how, with such challenging starting positions after the collapse of the Soviet Union – transitioning to a different politico-economic system, facing daily crises of this transition, and the peculiarities of the “reform genre” as such – the Latvian state has come to where it is now? How, from a basically centrally managed state, we came to public administration with democratically dispersed centers of power, and a continuous, viable civil service that is able to enter and integrate into the Western structures? Of course, being aware of today’s problems in the public administration, at the same time one should recognize that those are challenges in all Western administrations – respectively, from today’s point of view, it is not possible to question the foundations or the choices of the civil service, that led to the creation of these foundations, as well as the value direction in which the administration is developing. At the same time, critically important is the question of how to develop and use institutional normativism, and what were the decisions that have given the greatest incentive for the development of the normatively institutional environment. David Lipton, in an International Monetary Fund report on transition and progress of the Central and Eastern European countries in 25-year perspective, indicates that by such starting positions, the success of any transitional process in any field and any country depends on four factors:

241 • Great people – those who made bold decisions, in fact, not knowing what effect they will produce, but relying on the experience of other countries and investing enough energy to explain the transition process and the role of the reforms. • Smart strategies – strategic laws and regulations that allow setting and implementing long-term goals, primarily in economics – liberalization of the markets, stabilization of the financial system, and implementation of privatization; as well as preparation of an appropriate normative framework and execution of the mentioned needs. • Magnet Europe – the desire to integrate into Western Europe in the broadest sense, as well as the need to change in order to integrate as a separate driver, serving as motivation for regulatory development. From a more cynical perspective, even implementing reforms at a given moment unacceptable to the public, the answer “This will help us to return to Europe!” could serve both as a bridge to effective consequences in the long term, and as a simple excuse for not knowing how to proceed properly during transitional periods. • External support – the post-Soviet countries’ capacity to reform the industry would not be possible without the help of foreign financial instruments. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, bilateral creditors and support by the European Union institutions (specifically, the “Phare” program) – asked for “security” for investment and loans, namely, a result of normative reforms. This phenomenon is not measurable; it would be possible, however, to discuss speculatively, what provided the greater benefit to post-Soviet countries – the financial resources for the reconstruction or the commitment to meet certain conditions to get these funds.7 In the context of political economy, Latvia’s economic choice to apply the so called “shock therapy” for the transition to capitalist economy without social continuity, also identified a specific characteristic of the normative development – the normative framework occurred “on demand” – in another words, the market liberalization took place before the creation of appropriate normative framework to control the consequences. Often as an opposite to this approach, is the so called gradualism – creation of the normative background before the market liberalization.8 This, in turn, was the reason

242 MĀRIS GAILIS’ career in public administration began in 1990, assuming the position as the Director General of the External Economic Relations Department in the Latvian Council of Ministers. In 1992, together with like-minded people, he took part in creating the political party “Latvian Way,” eventually becoming Prime Minister (1994–1995), and afterwards, Minister of Defense.* Gailis began the reforms in the institutional environment while serving as Reform Minister in Valdis Birkavs’ Cabinet (1993–1994), but, assessing the political Photo: Reinis Inkēns, rhetoric of the first phase of the reforms, the question Administration of the Saeima; of creating effective public administration was copyright holder of the audiovisual material – Administration of the maintained also when Gailis held the office of Prime Saeima Minister.

* Māris Gailis, Varas tehnoloģijas (Rīga: Jumava, 1997), 52.

why the institutional reforms, since beginning, have always been shadowed by the “failure to do” – the speed imposed by the economic reforms, determined the secondary importance of the country’s administrative reforms in the eyes of the political elite, requiring the public administration to “fight fires” and at the same time advancing the reform process – and as a result, Latvia’s regulatory institutional development was even more dependent on certain political initiatives, periodic enthusiasm, and external conditions. In terms of personalities and influences in this area, Māris Gailis should be mentioned first; his political leadership and initiative dominated in the starting phase of the public administration reform. This phase laid the groundwork for the modern public administration in Latvia – Ministry of State Reforms was set up, later also the State Civil Service Administration and School of Public Administration for management of the process of change and for training of personnel. It should also be noted that the Ministry of State Reforms was eliminated on 1 July 1995, transferring the functions to the Government Reform department of the State Chancellery and to the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development. Experts’ assessments of this step are contradictory. Also Gailis himself acknowledges that elimination of the Ministry of State

243 Reform was a premature step (Gailis eliminated it himself, becoming the Prime Minister).9 Looking at this aspect from today’s perspective, the elimination of the Ministry of State Reforms initiated the process of moving the normatively institutional concept, and the creation of an effective state apparatus from being a priority to becoming a “secondarity.” In the political agenda, there no longer appear ”quantum leap” initiatives in normatively institutional environment, but it is dominated by a reactive attitude towards challenges, and the role of “the only solution” is monopolized by “shortening ideology,” that is, reduction of the administrative staff (importantly, no other reform instruments were put in place that would be intensively focused on change and quality). The normative institutionalism “boom” during the time of Māris Gailis serving as Reform Minister is closely tied to the Latvian and European political context – primarily, the ideas expressed by right-wing parties. A number of authors consider the “Latvian Way” to be the “locomotive” of implementation of liberal socio-economic reforms in Latvia.10 It was part of all the governments of the 5th, 6th and 7th Saeimas, and it is important to mention that the “Latvian Way” genesis fully corresponded to Max Weber’s schematics – from an interest group to a political club, which, in turn, led to a political party.11 The “significance” of this indication lies specifically in the ideology and vision for the state, including the development of public administration, of the initial interest group, which resulted in fertile ground for Gailis’ reforms. Originally the self-established initiator group, composed mainly of members of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia, along with representatives of economic and cultural elite, created a club “Europe 21.” The members of the club initiated contacts with the leaders of the Latvian exile organizations, who wanted to participate in the Latvian political life. The World Federation of Free Latvians ensured the presence of Western democratic values in​​ the club also in the daily decision-making, while the “political ability” was provided by well-known politicians – Anatolijs Gorbunovs, Valdis Birkavs, Indulis Bērziņš, and others.12 Reliance on values largely determined the success of the “Latvian Way” in the pre-election competition, not campaigning against rival parties, but for a specific direction of Latvia. The priority of the political program of the “Latvian Way” was the rapid integration into the European structures, namely the European Union and NATO. The existence of such ultimate goals also provided

244 some systematic approach in decision-making regarding other issues.13 Of course, in a situation where daily economic problems must be addressed, decision-making that provides solutions only after a prolonged period of time, provokes criticism. Moreover, announcing reforms with a main goal to prepare the country for membership in international organizations, also is an easily arguable path, justified by the need to address the problems “here and now” rather than in an uncertain future that requires making changes.14 Nevertheless, strong political leadership, together with the government’s influence on the necessary areas for implementation of reforms, ensured undertaking and progress of the reforms. It was Valdis Birkavs-led government, in which Māris Gailis was the Reform Minister, that clearly began the road to the European Union. The fact that Valdis Birkavs later became the Foreign Minister in Māris Gailis Cabinet, made it possible to continue Latvia’s path of integration in Europe’s direction, although already then the first signs of weakening could be observed, the concept of normative development of institutional environment began to “walk off the stage.” However, it is probably Valdis Birkavs’ long- time service as the Foreign Minister that ensured the maximum possible “Europeanization” continuity according to its original plan. During the Awakening period, Birkavs was actively involved in the process of the judicial system democratization and public administration reform, consistently defended the need for Latvia’s integration in the European and Transatlantic structures. “Foreign policy. Here the key is to strengthen the Latvian state as a subject of international relations in the full sense of the word. It involves the re-inclusion of Latvia in the system of international relations, including, in the system of economic relations, and ensuring the security of the country in the international arena.”15 Moreover, Birkavs was the initiator to establish an independent Office of Human Rights, and he has devoted a lot of attention to the cooperation of the Baltic countries and the Baltic Sea countries. The next leap of Latvia’s institutional development occurs along with the country’s accession to the European Union in 2004, when the attention was focused on institutional meshing and experience transfer, with institutional reforms responding reactively to the European Union requirements. The period between the Birkavs and Māris Gailis initiation of normative institutionalism and joining the European Union, is described by experts as the “stage of searching for alternative solutions, but not finding them” because the initially selected public administration development direction

245 was criticized in the political circles. The alternatives offered by various political forces were not implemented, mainly due to the lack of coordinated and strategic vision. The period from July 1997 to December 1998 may be noted as a “restart moment,” when the Public Administration Reform Bureau was established that undertook monitoring of the State Civil Service Administration and the School of Public Administration. Subsequently, though, it was recognized as a legally complex and institutionally unfounded model.16 The previously mentioned need for a “restart” came from the institutional environment, but without a concrete political support and associated financial resources. Practical reforms could not continue, and the Public Administration Reform Bureau was forced to address the most pressing problems in the public administration, becoming to an extent the communicator for the entire civil service, including for crisis communication. An attempt to change this situation took place in the last chronological period of public administration reforms in the 1990s, namely, from January 1999 to December 1999. At this stage, the focus turned on the need for political leadership in public administration reforms, establishing the office of the Special Assignments Minister for State Administration and Local Government Reform. However, during the period from the establishment of a Reform Minister to the formation of the post of the Special Assignments Minister for State Administration and Local Government Reform, a large number of “systemic errors” accumulated, which had not been addressed during reform implementation, and that, of course, prevented further and more rapid development.17 Referring to the four “pillars” mentioned at the beginning of the article, which have held the transformation of post-Soviet countries – people, strategy, magnet Europe, and external support – the Valdis Birkavs and Māris Gailis factor has been closely linked to promotion of strategy, or governance vision. It was motivated by both the magnet of Europe and external support (for example, for the support of reforms in the previously mentioned first phase of public administration reforms, also the project “Phare” funding was secured, that meshed with Latvia’s approaching membership of the European Union). “Withdrawing from the system” the players – personalities, or initiators of normative institutionalism, unfortunately left in Latvia’s political environment a vacuum among public administration people with vision and passion, which is felt even today. While there are other key elements – strategies are developed, the attractiveness of Europe has already

246 been realized through the spill-over of European institutional practices to the Latvian institutions, also the external pressure and involvement of the EU and international financial institutions has played an important role18 – yet the public administration still is facing problems rooted in the unrealized vision for the civil service as an attractive, transparent job. Still, on the scale of development, public administration is the negative side of the gradation – it is to be “cut,” not developed; it loses to the private sector in the competition for staff, and also serves as an experiment field for inexperienced politician initiatives without strategic vision. The current European Union better regulation trend cannot be assessed as strong enough to become a political agenda element, and in the eyes of the electorate, as “a step for the politicians” to active work. Consequently, without political initiative, in the field of normative institutionalism, the principle of following external impulses is being implemented and, predictably, will continue to be implemented; here, however, one should remember that, being in a following mode, it not possible to come to the front of the convoy.

Value normativism in Latvia: quiet development, or – should values be discussed?​​ While in the case of institutional normativism, the initiatives of individual people and the impact of external stimuli have had crucial significance, in the case of value normativism, individual personalities are those who have maintained the issue of value normativism in the political or non- governmental rhetoric and discourse in some cases. In Latvia’s case, it is clearly not possible to talk about significant qualitative leaps in the field of human rights, but rather about a slow evolutionary development. In terms of human rights, the Republic of Latvia, already by restoring independence on 4 May 1990, joined 51 human rights documents. In turn, on 15 October 1998, a separate chapter, Chapter 8 – The Human Rights – was included in the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. Looking at a broader period, it can be concluded that the previously mentioned evolutionary development can be divided into several stages. First, it is the period from the restoration of independence until 1996, when the human rights situation in Latvia was given special attention. During this period, the human rights issue was a highly politicized concept, used extensively in Russia’s rhetoric with regard to minority rights in Latvia. As a result, in 1992, the UN Secretary-

247 General sent a group of experts on human rights to Latvia, which made sure that Latvian legislation and its implementation complies with the international human rights norms. Nevertheless, in the 47th plenary session of the UN General Assembly, Russian President Boris Yeltsin personally addressed the UN Secretary General to additionally include in the agenda of the session the issue on “massive human rights violations in Latvia and Estonia.” The Baltic diplomats managed, though, to change the title of the article in the agenda to – “the human rights situation in Latvia and Estonia.” Moreover, it was not included in the session as a separate issue; there was a resolution adopted on it. However, based on Latvia’s historical circumstances and arguments, in the 1993 UN Human Rights Commission’s session, the Russian delegation consented to the President’s report that the adopted resolution was not included in the Commission report as an official document. Russia’s political pressure within the framework of the UN did not relax, and in 1994, the UN Secretary-General decided to send a High Commissioner for Human Rights-led inspection to the Baltics, but the Baltic diplomatic corps, cooperating among themselves and with other representatives of Western countries, managed to avoid this visit. Accordingly, the decision to end reviewing the human rights situation in Latvia was adopted in 1996, at the 51st session of the UN General Assembly.19 This period of foreign policy pressure can be described in several ways – first, of course, it is positive that Latvia managed quickly to “step” from an environment with few rights to a legal environment. At the same time, the direct linking of the Russian-speaking rights to the human rights concept, has discredited the perception of the human rights concept as a whole. This has led to two negative effects: first, citizens’ in-depth awareness of human rights began taking shape only in the early 2000s. Second, with the political elite having achieved a solution of the Russian-speaker issue (at least recognition in the Western international environment of the accuracy of Latvia’s position), the human rights concept no longer specifically appears in the political rhetoric. At the same time, it is positive that since the late 1990s the concept of human rights increasingly appears in lawsuits as a universal justification, which means that conceptually people are becoming increasingly aware of the universalism of these rights. The period since 1997 should be mentioned as the next step, when the European Convention on Human Rights entered into force in Latvia. As noted by representatives of international human rights organizations,

248 the issues that come from Latvia to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) reveal a slow but consistent progress in respect for human rights – statistics show that since 1997, the ECHR has rejected about a half of the complaints after requesting clarification from the Latvian government, which means that the government has been able to convince the ECHR that there was no breach. Regarding the remaining cases since 1997, in which there have been human rights violations, the specificity of the infringement is changing – the ECHR points increasingly less to any major systemic problems affecting a particular Latvian law or its practice. For example, along with the adoption of the Criminal Law of the Republic of Latvia (adopted by the Saeima on 17 June 1998) the situation has greatly improved with regard to the respect of deadlines in the proceedings. Similarly, a positive view is taken of the national process arrangement regarding the conditions in prisons – here a stable judicial practice has been established under the auspices of the Administrative Court, allowing internal resolution of these issues, before they reach the ECHR.20 It should be noted that in this “quiet evolution” of rights, the best reference criterion for the sensitive issues’ spectrum are the substantive directions of the complaints submitted in the international and Latvian human rights organizations. Although they overlap, it is possible to identify five waves of complaints – the first is related to the citizenship and migration affairs; the second – to housing and tenants’ rights; the third – to complaints about pre-trial periods and the number of pending complaints in courts.21 The fourth wave is characterized by specification of human rights, as the character of complaints becomes more detailed and case-based, and no longer as systematic as in the first three waves (rights of children, forced medical treatment issues, etc.). To the fifth wave belong human rights linking with the understanding of the scope of human rights – social, economic, and cultural rights. In terms of personalities in the field of human rights normativism, definitely Nils Muižnieks, the Council of Europe (CoE) Commissioner for Human Rights since 2012, should be mentioned. The CoE Commissioner for Human Rights is responsible for raising awareness of human rights in accordance with the standards established by the Council of Europe, and within the mandate, carries out regular visits to all the member states of the Council of Europe. Nils Muižnieks’ recommendations to Latvia, always pointing also to the need for more active resolution of non-citizen

249 NILS MUIŽNIEKS has obtained a Ph.D. in political science at the University of California at Berkeley, U.S., specialized in the politics of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, comparative politics, international relations. He has served as the national coordinator of the UN Development Program, program director at the Soros Foundation- Latvia (1994–2001). From 1994 to 2002, Muižnieks chaired the Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies, has been also the Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration Affairs. Photo: Ernests Dinka, Chancellery In 2012, Muižnieks was elected the Commissioner of the Saeima; copyright holder for Human Rights of the Council of Europe.* of the audiovisual material – Administration of the Saeima “I understand the essence of integration as participation and cooperation. A non-integrated resident is one not having the skills or the desire to cooperate with others. Thus, the person is rather self- isolated. He does not know, he does not know how, he is not interested, he is passive. Citizens too can be non-integrated. Cooperation, participation, plus the strengthening of belonging to Latvia, the Latvian language as an important unifying factor, without which it is difficult to cooperate.”**

* Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for Human Rights, Biography, Council of Europe, htt ps:// www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/biography ** “Nils Muižnieks: Integrācija ir sadarbošanās,” Delfi, 2003. gada 4. novembris, htt p:// www.delfi.lv/archive/nils-muiznieks-integracija-ir-sadarbosanas.d?id=6702531

issues, have been widely discussed in society, showing that the rights issue is still politicized and the issue of the Russian-speaking minority (and recommendations for the resolution of it) are being heard primarily over other human rights spheres, which the CoE Commissioner for human Rights has also always touched, expressing recommendations for the development of the human rights environment. Muižnieks’ expressions have even been referred to as anti-governmental by the nationally conservative wing, but, distancing from the political aspect of the issue, overall, these expressions imply a normative view on engagement of all the groups as full members of the society, without elements of discrimination. As Nils Muižnieks currently is working on a new recommendation summary for Latvia, the recommendation to eliminate the possibility of non-citizen children to retain non-citizenship, has dominated the media and political discussion space –

250 overshadowing discussion of other issues, such as women’s rights (also in the context of the Istanbul Convention), children’s rights issues, and other. It just proves the consideration that the human rights issue as a question of values has been little-discussed in the society, and, as the discussion on these issues is initiated, it is reduced to the non-citizen issue, which is only a small part of the overall human rights problems. Nils Muižnieks’ status allows expressing these recommendations, positioned among other external impulses. Most likely, in an internal political discussion, Muižnieks’ considerations would be “removed from the discussion,” which allows to make a specific conclusion – probably it is his presence in the human rights current that comes “from outside,” that has allowed such active encouragement towards human rights development. Muižnieks being both a “local” and an “external” force, considering the specific context of the Latvian human rights perception, is the best possible solution. An important opinion in the Latvian human rights discourse and political rhetoric comes from the Ombudsman Office, established on 1 January 2007, with the entry into force of the Ombudsman Law (previously the National Human Rights Office operated in Latvia). The Saeima of Latvia elected Romāns Apsītis as the first Ombudsman on 1 March 2007. According to the law, the Ombudsman is a Saeima-elected official who oversees the adherence to the human rights and good governance principles. The Ombudsman is independent in his activities and is subject only to the law.22 Here in particular the current Ombudsman Juris Jansons should be noted, who in a way has promoted activation of the issue of human rights scope, emphasizing in the political agenda that social, economic and cultural rights should be considered also in preparation of the state budget, in health care reform issues, and other cases – directly addressing the presence of the human rights dimension alongside economic needs and benefits principles. Although the Ombudsman legally is not tied to foreign policy, Juris Jansons’ reasoning in actualization of human rights issues is associated with the use of international norms, including the UN principles mentioned at the beginning of the article. Consequently, Jansons serves to some extent as a guarantor for Latvia’s self-positioning in the international system in the field of human rights and other Western values, reminding that a country belonging to a specific value systems, must respect and adhere to these systems. To some extent, it depends on Juris Jansons’ activity that value and norm concepts

251 JURIS JANSONS, a lawyer and economist by training, has been the chairman of the board of the Health Insurance Fund of Riga (“Rīgas slimokase”), has worked for the Ministry of Regional Development and Local Government, has headed the Secretariat of the Special Assignments Minister for Electronic Government Affairs. In 2011, Jansons was elected the Ombudsman of the Republic of Latvia, and was reelected for a second term. “The underlying problem is poverty. Here we can talk also about education, the right to a Photo: Saeima; copyright holder safe environment ... We can talk about the fact of the audiovisual material – that the state guarantees a health care minimum, Administration of the Saeima but if we look at the situation in the context of the international framework regulations, with the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, then it clearly states that this minimum of public health is the highest level of physical and mental health. So, the question is no longer about how high the bar should be put in the health care system, but – how to ensure the highest level.”*

* Viktors Avotiņš, “Juris Jansons: Pamatproblēma ir nabadzība,” Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze, 2014. gada 3. decembris, http://nra.lv/latvija/130033-juris-jansons-pamatproblema-ir- nabadziba.htm

appear in the active politics. Of course, at the same time institutional evolution takes place in this area in response to the decisions of the ECHR and to other institutional cooperation, but it does not create a sufficiently stable value background at the times when political or foreign policy decisions must be adopted. In view of the aforementioned, the human rights issue in Latvia is directly related to the foreign policy processes, both in positive and in negative sense. The issue of the Russian-speaking minorities has “diverted attention” from the full spectrum of human rights; on the other hand, the ECHR (via verdicts) and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights have served for development of full understanding of human rights in the society. Unquestioningly important is the Ombudsman’s role in Latvia, who justifies his argumentation on human rights violations specifically with foreign examples and normative considerations. The use of the human rights, norms and values in everyday political rhetoric is closely linked to the

252 understanding of these concepts, and their consistent presence in adopting any new normative act or in a political decision. The same applies to the society – it can require policies based on universal human rights, only if it is aware of and understands the spectrum of these rights. From this perspective, any person who is positioned to provide an influential opinion to the political elite, as above-mentioned Nils Muižnieks and Juris Jansons, serve as a normative value trend. They oppose the discourse that it is sufficient to have a progressive development of institutions, taking over the experience and international norms, and that the human rights issue should be seen only in the political context of Russian-speaking minorities. To some extent, anyone who actualizes human rights issues in the political environment, initially has to face a backlash in the politically historical context – however, each such encounter changes the mentioned context. At the same time, looking at the situation from a slightly more critical point of view, the voices of value normativists are still considered as marginal, even if they are binding and impose an obligation to make changes. This means that it is the political environment where actualization of norm and value issue is needed, for Latvia to be fully ranked among the developed countries. Of course, looking at the 25 years of Latvia’s independence history through the lens of foreign policy, some bright examples can be found, when normative elements have appeared on the political and media agenda. At the same time, each time it has also demonstrated the fragmentarity of the ideas, and in a way, also Latvia’s tracking of modern (national interests-centered), not post-modern (human-centered) values. As an illustrative example is Latvia’s foreign and security policy positioning in the context of the Iraq war in 2003, when Latvia chose to support allies (namely, the U.S.) in a military attack without a UN resolution.23 The political elite had to decide whom to follow – a call by allies, a self-initiative, or a peaceful solution recommended by the UN as well as other European Union countries. The logic and the decision-making process by Latvian political elite for this phase is not well documented, thus, the motivation can be assessed only by the results. But the results indicate a high contradiction of values, moreover, not only within Latvia, but also in value collision between so called “new” and “old” European countries, where the collision axis was the choice – to support the United Nations or the United States. This was reflected in the 5 February 2003 announcement of the Latvia-co-proposed Vilnius Group24 indicating the desire to participate in the international coalition for Iraq’s disarmament

253 and seeking a tougher UN position, although not providing a single answer to what will happen if the UN acceptance is not received.25 In addition, Latvia expressed a similar approach also at the UN Security Council.26 The position of the Vilnius Group clearly marked a dividing line in Europe, including within the EU and NATO, because in the meantime other countries were still asking to extend the UN inspections in Iraq, rather than threaten it with military pressure, and protest actions were held against the war around the world, including in Latvia. Shortly after the beginning of the war, both the U.S. allies and the countries that were against the war, began to seek common solutions, and the tension in their relations eased, however, the Iraq war remained a symbol of the different perceptions of security of the “old” and the “new” Europe. In this case, in a direct and unambiguous manner Latvia showed adhering to the interests based in the support for allies rather than in the values system advocated by the United Nations. The mentioned dissent over values appeared widely in the rhetoric of media, opinion leaders and other political groups, in the context of the Iraq war and Latvia’s foreign policy choices. The political elite essentially made a choice in favor of the United States and not the EU (especially Germany and France), although this contradiction was not openly discussed. In turn, other players clearly spoke of the need “to maneuver between the fighting of two forces for influence”27; many emphasized the need to maintain a unified NATO, which also meant listening to the European allies, and therefore were against George W. Bush’s controversial rhetoric. More moderately minded Latvian media and other actors called for support to the U.S. operation with non-military contribution, such as sending to Iraq doctors and field engineers, since then “we will not annoy the European superpower.”28 In a series of protests participated the more radically-tuned Environmental Club (Vides aizsardzības klubs), Club 415, the Latvian National Front, whose reasoning was more national, but no longer contained the UN as a normative factor. In the public rhetoric, along with the previously mentioned vision of the political elite, the postmodern value dimension emerged – here appeared both individual politicians and non-governmental organizations. A variety of public actions were organized against the war: collection of signatures, pickets, music festivals (“No – to War” (Nē – karam) in Iecava and Vecpiebalga29), anti-war exhibitions. The movement “I am for peace” (Es esmu par mieru), which was supported by Linda Leen, Kaspars Dimiters, Elita Veidemane, and other public figures (Ēriks Stendzenieks was one

254 of the co-organizers), invited people to sign against the war and to bring photos of relatives to the Dome Cathedral, as well as organized collection of signatures on the Internet. On the first day, more than 8,300 people signed on the Internet against the war – and that was in distant 2003.30 Although the opinions about the motivation of the organizers of the protests may vary, they clearly gained broader public support. In these protests also appeared such arguments as the interests of the civilians in Iraq, adherence to the norms of the civilized world, peace and pacifism issues. Also, and not least, the possibilities to decide democratically in a democratic country, to support the war or the allies that “go to war.” The argument that the U.S. and the allies are acting unilaterally and selfishly, and with their unilateral actions undermine the importance of the international norms – the UN norms, while “the Baltic countries have a large debt of gratitude to the international law” and Latvia can count on this collective security system – also appears in the discussion in the “public order.”31

Conclusions Looking at the institutional and value normative development in Latvia – it is possible to conclude a number of important things: First, the normative development of a state is not possible without a certain internal political impulse or an inner voice, which constantly maintains the subject on the agenda. In those few cases when the political initiative has emerged, a rapid systemic progress could be observed, but as soon as the political focus declines, in Latvia, as a new country, institutional mechanisms are not yet stable enough to continue the development. Second, foreign policy impulses often are associated with the normative aspects (after all, the EU and NATO membership is what the society of Latvia often associates with legal requirements “from outside”). If the value system in the country has not developed internally, also the decisions in foreign policy are taken based on modernism, not postmodernism. Put in simpler language, the economics is superior to the rights and norms, and if it is so in domestic policy, then also the foreign policy is dominated by mercantile interests. Third, the national normative development issues are not minor. As shown by the Latvian history after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the most intense public discussions of foreign policy choices have been directly

255 in relation to the dialectic – economic (including security) benefits versus international norms. The Iraq war mentioned in the article is just one case among other, quieter cases, such as cooperation with the Belarusian government versus supporting the democratic opposition in Belarus; cooperation with the People’s Republic of China versus an official dialogue with the Tibetan spiritual leader, and others. In any case, when a need for normative action has emerged in foreign policy, but it has been ignored by the political elite, the concept of values as such has been discredited. As a result, the political elite, to some extent ignoring or keeping the issue of normativism outside the political agenda, undermine the development of this trend in Latvia. Finally, the issues on which the public and the political elite are facing ethical dilemmas, which in the mature Western world are solved by the help of strict value system, have not disappeared and will appear even more, as globalization continues. An example is the Syrian refugees issue in Europe, where the “old” European countries view this issue from a human rights perspective, while the post-Soviet countries – from the perspective of national interests. The two approaches should not be condemned, because each country and community has its own historically specific experience; it should be noted, however, that a certain correlation is observed – the higher the level of welfare in a state, the higher the values are developed. Moreover, political economists note that a moment may come when values begin to define the welfare development, and not vice versa – in other words, if the society and the political elite as a whole fail to adopt international normative directions, then higher and further prosperity is not attainable. It is not possible to direct the country’s foreign policy towards a common long-term cooperation, if the country is composed of fragmented and often blatantly contradictory interests. Normativism as a consolidating element is present, when a country has to overcome economic or political difficulties, locally or globally – however, if the normative issues are not a part of everyday political rhetoric, when a crisis comes, neither society, nor the government can suddenly begin to rely on values. Consequently, in order to achieve a normative trend that is worldly, norms-based, society-wide accepted, and with values – in the foreign policy, then its understanding and application has to be shaped first in domestic politics.

256 Endnotes

1 Latvijas Republikas Ārlietu ministrija, “Globālā attīstības politika,” 2016. gada 10. oktobris, http://www.mfa.gov.lv/arpolitika/attistibas-sadarbiba/globala-attistibas-politika 2 Ibid. 3 Kofi Atta Annan,In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol=A/59/2005 4 “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2015: Democracy in an Age of Anxiety,” 2015, http://www.yabiladi.com/img/content/EIU-Democracy-Index-2015.pdf 5 Interpretations of the democratic indexes and reports by time spans by country groups are avai- lable here: Democracy Barometer, http://www.democracybarometer.org/links_en.html 6 Valsts kancelejas preses relīze, “Latvija iepazīstinās Gruziju ar valsts pārvaldes reformu pieredzi,” Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2016. gada 13. septembris, http://m.lvportals.lv/visi/preses-relizes?id=281676 7 James Roaf, Ruben Atoyan, Bikas Joshi and Krzysztof Krogulski, 25 Years of Transition: Post- Communist Europe and the IMF, Regional Economic Issues Special Report (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2014/eur/eng/ pdf/erei_sr_102414.pdf 8 Anders Åslund, Building Capitalism: The Transformation of The Former Soviet Bloc (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002), 12. 9 Viktors Avotiņš, “Māris Gailis: Valsts pārvaldei jābūt servisa organizācijai,” Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze, 5 October 2016, http://nra.lv/latvija/187053-maris-gailis-valsts-parvaldei-jabut-servisa- organizacijai.htm 10 Valdis Blūzma u.c., Latvijas valsts atjaunošana 1986.–1993 (Rīga: LU žurnāla “Latvijas vesture” fonds, 1998), 406; Imants Mednis, Partiju laiki Latvijā (1998-2002) (Drukātava, 2007), 139. 11 Imants Mednis, Partiju laiki Latvijā (1998-2002), 140. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Anders Åslund, How Capitalism Was Built, Second Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 58. 15 Valdis Birkavs, Māris Gailis, “20 July 1993 extraordinary morning session of the 5th Saeima of the Republic of Latvia. Transcript,” Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, http://saeima.lv/webroot/ste- no/st_93/200793.html 16 “Informatīvais ziņojums “Par valsts funkciju dublēšanos un pārklāšanos”” (izskatīts Minis­tru ka- binetā 1998. gada 21. aprīlī). 17 Armands Kalniņš, “Pa valsts pārvaldes reformas kāpnēm – raksturojums un perspektīva. 1993.- 1998.gads,” Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1999. gada 7. aprīlis, https://www.vestnesis.lv/ta/id/23372 18 Tanel Kerikmäe and Archil Chochia, Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy (Springer International Publishing, 2016), 14. 19 Latvijas pastāvīgā pārstāvniecība Apvienoto Nāciju Organizācijā Ņujorkā, “Cilvēktiesības,” 2015. gada 16. marts, http://www.mfa.gov.lv/newyork/informacija-par-ano/ano-darbibas- virzieni/cilvektiesibas 20 “Latvijas pārstāve: ECT arvien retāk Latvijā saskata sistēmiskas cilvēktiesību problēmas,” in- tervija Leta.lv, 2015. gada 8. maijs, http://www.leta.lv/es/item/13378F38-5FA1-BB77-1DB9- A008F1270B01/jaunumi:interview/ 21 Ieva Leimane-Veldmeijere, “10 gadi ar cilvēktiesībām,” Providus, 2001. gada 12. decembris, http://providus.lv/article/10-gadi-ar-cilvektiesibam 22 Latvijas Republikas Tiesībsargs, “Tiesībsargs,” 2013. gada 3. janvāris, http://www.tiesibsargs.lv/ par-mums/tiesibsarga-institucija 23 See Sanita Jemberga, Aušra Radzevičūte and Kristaps Pētersons, “Baltijas atbalsts ASV – likum- sakarīgs,” Diena, 2003. gada 3. februāris. Interestingly, on February 6 this position was essentially

257 approved by the Saeima Iraqi opposition support group, see “Par Latvijas Saeimas Irākas opozīci- jas atbalsta grupas nostāju,” Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2003. gada 7. februāris, https://www.vestnesis.lv/ ta/id/71104 24 The Vilnius Group: , Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 25 “Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries,” 5 February 2003, Novinite.com, http://www.novi- nite.com/articles/19022/Statement+of+the+Vilnius+Group+Countries 26 „Latvijas Republikas vēstnieka ANO Ginta Jegermaņa uzruna ANO Drošības padomē 2003. gada 19. februārī,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia,http://www.mfa.gov.lv/arpolitika/ira - kas-krize/16958-latvijas-vestnieka-ano-ginta-jegermana-uzruna-ano-drosibas-padome; „Latvi- jas Republikas pastāvīgā pārstāvja Apvienoto Nāciju organizācijā Ginta Jegermaņa paziņojums Drošības padomē 2003. gada 12. martā,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia,http://www.mfa. gov.lv/aktualitates/zinas/16961-latvijas-republikas-pastaviga-parstavja-apvienoto-naciju-organi- zacija-ginta-jegermana-pazinojums-drosibas-padome-2003-gada-12-marta 27 Žanete Vegnere, „Irāka pret Eiropu,” Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze, 2003. gada 6. februāris. 28 „Gatavo praktisku palīdzību karam Irākā,” Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze, 2003. gada 19. marts. 29 Sandris Vanzovičs, „Novēlota pretkara akcija,” Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze, 2003. gada 11. aprīlis. 30 TVNET, “Pretkara akcijai “Es par mieru” milzīga atsaucība,” 2003. gada 28. februāris, htt p:// www.tvnet.lv/zinas/latvija/194308-pretkara_akcijai_es_par_mieru_milziga_atsauciba 31 Ineta Ziemele, „Irāka (2). Mazo valstu interese starptautiskajā tiesiskajā kārtībā,” Providus, 2003. gada 25. marts, http://providus.lv/article/iraka-2-mazo-valstu-interese-starptautiskaja- tiesiskaja-kartiba

258 Centennial Experience and Prospects: instead of Conclusions

IVARS ĪJABS

Latvia’s centennial of foreign affairs is an anniversary that deserves various dedications. It still deserves a large amount of historical research. How have important national decisions been made, what ideas led the decision-makers, and what restrictions were imposed by a particular historical situation? On these issues, there is still room for scientific discussion on a range of foreign policy decisions that defined the country’s future development – from the notorious “pact of mutual assistance” in 1939 to the Latvia-Russia border treaty in 2007, from the support to the “Baltic League” in 1934 up to participation in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq in 2003. However, in addition to academic research, the centenary of foreign affairs also serves as a basis for a wider reflection on continuity and disruptions in Latvia’s foreign policy in its first hundred years. After all, Latvia’s international destiny in the first hundred years has been very unsteady – from unexpected, even fantastic successes up to the actual loss of statehood. Therefore, if we are serious about the continuity of Latvia’s statehood, it is reasonable to examine the permanent and the variable in the first centenary of the state. This article will highlight a number of themes that, in the author’s opinion, have created the specific form of the Latvian foreign policy thinking in both periods of independent statehood. It will not be an account about specific foreign policy thinkers (that Latvians, let’s be honest, have not had many), but on the broader problems, which in a longer term determine the foreign policy discourse. A large part of them are typical for all the Central and Eastern European countries that emerged as nation-states on the map of Europe in the 20th century – such as long-term provision of national independence or collective security dilemmas. Others, on the contrary, are more narrow and more specific – for example, the internationalization of minority problems or regional cooperation. The end of the first centenary is always the beginning of the next centenary. That is why this review will not be limited solely to historical

259 parallels, but also will not refrain from a few provocations to our future foreign policy experts – solely for the sake of intellectual activation. If the reader will find a historical analogy or thesis exaggerated or grotesque enough to be criticized, rejected, and clarified, the goal of the article will be reached in full.

Foreign policy before foreign policy The fact that the Latvian state was proclaimed in 1918 does not mean that Latvia’s future politicians did not think about the relations between countries earlier. On the contrary, the Latvian national movement from its beginnings realized the foreign policy framework of its ambition. So it was when Andrejs Spāģis, in 1860 in Leipzig, published a brochure Free peasants’ state in Kurzeme, appealing in the name of Latvian peasants to the German public to influence the Baltic German attitude towards the “indigenous people” of the Baltic provinces.1 So it was, when Fricis Veinbergs, in the first Latvian political treatise Political thoughts from Latvia, in the name of Latvia’s autonomy appealed to the experience of the French Revolution;2 so it was when Andrejs Pumpurs’ passionate standing up for the Latvian case did not prevent him from heroic fighting in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–1878. Also the next socio-democratic mobilization wave in the Latvian society drew much attention to international relations. Although much of the discussion here happened in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, nevertheless, different Latvian autonomy projects were designed, being aware of the European and the international context. Both the left- and the right-oriented Latvian political thought, up to 1917, was dominated by the approach “a free Latvia within free Russia” in the sense of autonomy within the framework of a new, reformed Russia. However, this particular era was decisive for the development of Latvia’s foreign policy thinking. This was largely driven by the orientation towards modernization of the society – the market economy, development of national culture, and political freedoms which were supposed to be provided by a reformed empire. In the situation when Russia, idealized image of which had so far dominated the Latvian political perceptions, was dragged into a bloody civil war, the choice of the emerging political elite was obvious. It was an independent democratic republic, politically oriented towards the Entente countries. In other words, the establishers of the Latvian state were aware of their political

260 priorities, and as during the war the international situation was rapidly changing, they knew how to use it to their advantage. The regaining of independence in 1990/1991, of course, took place in very different circumstances. But also this time the foreign policy thought outpaced the actual regaining of the state. Many historical researchers sometimes tend to write the history “backwards,” that is, explaining the past events through the light of well known subsequent events, and attributing to people such ideas and motivations, which in no way could have come to their mind. Such an approach is quite problematic. Of course, no one could predict the August 1991 putsch and the subsequent implosion of the USSR. That is why a variety of alternatives were being evaluated in the Popular Front, the Supreme Council, and other institutions. Such alternatives, as Edijs Bošs’ described idea of “republican sovereignty, not political independence” today for some might seem as insufficiently radical and even naive. However, also here we are dealing with a foreign policy thought which prepared for the restoration of independence at the moment when it became politically possible. The leading foreign policy idea in Latvia at that time was: to recover the lost, and to return to civilized “normality” after half a century of imperial terror and imposed poverty.3 At that time, “normality” was represented by the word “Europe.” This vision of a return, that was first formulated during the Awakening, had a decisive influence on the Latvian foreign policy after the actual reestablishment of independence. Its brightest expression is the foreign policy emphasis on the continuity of the state, on the fact that a number of democratic countries did not recognize Latvia’s incorporation in the USSR, and on the criminal nature of the Soviet occupation. The question of how much of the Awakening time “return to Europe” vision had in common with the real Europe, can be for now set aside. In any case, something is illustrated by the fact that a percentage of the visible Awakening activists today have become Euroskeptics and opponents of EU integration.

A state to stay The most important work has to be done first. The most important component of the Latvian foreign policy thinking has been associated with ensuring the existence of the state. After the restoration of independence, the first adopted Latvia’s Foreign Policy Guidelines’ document (1995) called it

261 “the assurance of the independence irreversibility.”4 This theme, however, has been constantly present from the very beginning of the establishment of the state as the desire to firmly mark Latvia on the map of Europe. The new and the renewed legitimation of the statehood is therefore one of the cornerstones of the foreign policy thinking, which in different eras acquires different manifestations. Independent statehood, which in most Western European countries is perceived as self-evident, was not so in the case of the Baltic countries. Such foreign policy dominance in a way was logical both because among the European nation-states Latvia objectively belongs to the newest, and cannot boast with its statehood experience in the Middle Ages, and because the establishment of the Latvian State sometimes has been portrayed as a historical accident, as an “artificial” temporary arrangement that serves the interests of some superpower. The fierce battle over Latvia’s de iure recognition and admission to the League of Nations illustrates how widespread such attitude was during the period after the establishment of the Latvian state. Even the friendly United Kingdom, which, as is known, recognized Latvia de facto even before the proclamation of the state, later hesitated to recognize it as a full-fledged member of the international community. It is here that the first big diplomatic battles had to be won by Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics, the most visible Latvia’s diplomat during the first period of independence. The decision of both the Supreme Council of the Entente, and later also of the League of Nations to recognize Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia was related to the fact that, in the Bolshevistic Russia after the civil war, any favorable development for the Entente countries was no longer expected, for which the newly independent countries could potentially serve as an obstacle.5 From here arises also the slightly disdainful and negligent attitude towards the Baltic countries, which can be felt in the concepts of that time cordon sanitaire (Clemenceau) and, especially, “limitrophe” (or borderline, suburb) countries – the treatment that is always readjusted to the needs of the “great” foreign policy. Obviously, the Latvian diplomats and foreign policy makers responded in a sensitive manner to expressions of this treatment. It required therefore investing a lot of work to consolidate the image of Latvia as an independent subject of international relations in the minds of the European governments. Similar tasks, among others, had to be dealt with also during the restoration of the independence of the state during 1988-1991. Also during this period,

262 the demand for the Baltic independence was far from self-evident in many Western government and Foreign Ministries. Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga noted in her interview with Gunda Reire on her presidency (1999–2007): “Abroad we had to fight with the fact that our nation was being belittled.” Attitudes towards the Baltic countries were largely instrumental, subordinate to the relations with the USSR. The Balts could play a positive role – for example, as a litmus test for the democratization of the USSR, that would prevent it from slipping back into . They could also play a negative role, by excessive requirements, weakening “Gorby’s” positions and destabilizing the USSR overall situation. However, the independence of the Baltic countries as an independent principle, at that time in the West was supported by a minority (some of such outstanding personalities as Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Hans- Dietrich Genscher are described in detail in Didzis Kļaviņš’ chapter). One should not forget that the world-renowned event, the “Baltic Way” in 1989 was a proof of not only Baltic unity. It was also a reminder to the West, where in the atmosphere of annus mirabilis ruling that year, there was a lot of talk about a free Europe, “from Brest to Brest,” forgetting that also to the East of Belarus’ Brest there were occupied European countries that wanted freedom. It goes without saying that in such circumstances the need to emphasize Latvia’s independence and its “subjectiveness” in international relations moved to the center of Latvian foreign policy thinking. Any insinuations about a decisive role of external actors in the state-building and the restoration of independence had to be vigorously rejected. In this aspect Latvia is part of the already well-known Central and Eastern European tradition, where history most commonly serves as the main source of political legitimization.6 That is why an indispensable element of the Latvian foreign policy discourse during both independence periods was telling of history, showing the establishment of the Latvian state and the restoration of independence as a result of independent and organic development. The source of such development is found in Latvian desire for self-determination and rejection of external, totalitarian powers, and in no way can be reduced to strategies of external actors.7 Historical narrative has been an integral element of the Latvian public diplomacy in both independence periods. Miķelis Valters, one of the “founding fathers” of the independent Latvia, in the early 1920s wrote a number of books in German and French, telling the official historical narrative of Latvia and justifying the Latvian right to their own independent

263 statehood in a language understandable to Europeans.8 The story of the self-determination efforts of the Latvian people and the opposition to the Baltic German nobility here intertwine with the argument that the Latvians have always been Europeans and belong to the European cultural space. Historical narrative as the statehood legitimization instrument plays an important role also after the restoration of independence. Here great emphasis is placed on the illegal break of the Latvian statehood as the result of the Soviet occupation, emphasizing the continuity of the state not only as a state legal doctrine, but also as a political argument. That is why today the Occupation Museum has become an integral part of the protocol visits of top foreign officials. It tells visitors the overview of Latvia’s 20th century history, which highlights the totalitarian regime crimes as a necessary element in understanding the restored Latvian statehood and today’s politics. One may agree with Edijs Bošs who in his essay writes about “Yalta- phobia” as an essential feature of the Awakening period’s political mentality, that continues to be valid. It is about the fear of a situation when major powers agree behind closed doors about Latvia’s destiny, not allowing any decision-making options. True, such a “fear to be sold” was well known in the Latvian foreign policy discourse already well before Yalta. Furthermore, it was not just about Germany and the Soviet Union as the potential agreement partners. For example, as described by Valters Šcerbinskis, Latvia sometimes avoided participating in military alliances with Poland and Finland, which would allow these bigger countries to decide about Latvia without its own participation. Some expressions of concern might seem a bit exaggerated. For example, in 2014 a group of Latvian intellectuals in an open letter asked the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to acknowledge with the deployment of NATO bases in Latvia, that “a new-generation Molotov-Ribbentrop-type pact of betrayal will not be repeated.”9 It should be noted, however, that leaving Latvia “outside the door” when its fate is being decided, has been indeed the major traumatic experience of the 20th century. Therefore its topicality in the foreign policy discourse should not be surprising. Participation in international organizations is also perceived as a proof of Latvia’s ability to play in the highest political league. This need to legitimize itself as a full-fledged member of the international environment certainly has not only a foreign policy but also a domestic policy significance. It was so during the Interwar period when Latvia’s admission to the League of

264 Nations in 1921 was celebrated almost as a national holiday, and Vilhelms Munters’ becoming the Chairman of a session of the League of Nations in 1938 was widely appraised as a foreign policy achievement. It is so also today when, after the restoration of independence, by being admitted to the OECD on 1 July 2016, Latvia for the time being has exhausted the list of relevant organizations it still could join. In accordance with the requirements of statehood legitimization, participation in many organizations is sometimes seen as an end in itself rather than an instrument for achieving some foreign policy objectives. However, in combination with an emphasis on the historical experience, by participating in organizations Latvia manages to effectively convey to the Western world its foreign policy principle: “Once you sold us. Now we will do everything for you not to succeed at it as easily.”

Internationalization of the minorities issue Latvia, like most Central and Eastern European countries, has emerged on the world’s political map after the collapse of larger, imperial establishments. In the first case it was the Russian Empire, in the second – the USSR. There were many differences between those two formations, but they were not nation-states – that is, countries where power belongs to sovereign, politically and/or culturally more-or-less integrated people.10 In contrast, Latvia, that originally had been designed as a nation-state, on both occasions was confronted with the presence of a large, influential post-imperial minorities that have made their status in the Latvian state an international problem, thus significantly affecting also the foreign policy discourse. In the first period of independence, it is the Baltic German minority, which Martyn Housden describes in his great essay, and the Russian-speaking minority11 after the restoration of independence. In both cases, the minorities have had influential patrons outside Latvia’s borders (respectively – Germany and the Russian Federation), which tried by various means to influence Latvia’s politics in a direction favorable to them. Of course, the goals of these “patrons” regarding Latvia have been different in both cases. In both cases, however, we are dealing with revisionist players of the international environment who are unsatisfied with the existing political order. The special relationship that forms when post-imperial minorities in the newly formed nation-state gain the protection of the “ethnic homeland,” has already been described in research literature.12 In both cases, Latvia has had

265 to face extensive international defamation campaigns. It has been accused of “Bolshevik” attitude towards private property in the first case, and human rights of the USSR immigrants – in the second. It is possible to argue elsewhere about how well thought-out and intelligently organized has been the Interwar agrarian reform and Latvia’s modern integration policy. It is clear that in both cases, these policies also included elements of political revenge against the formerly dominant social strata. However, it should be stressed that from the foreign policy aspect, the powers have mainly used “their” clients, the minorities for purely instrumental purposes as leverage in the host country politics. The analogy of the Baltic German and Russian-speaking post-imperial minority role in Latvia’s foreign policy also has very clear boundaries. Baltic Germans regarded themselves, quite rightly, as natives and cultural elites of Latvia (more precisely, the Baltic provinces); the impact of the Russian- speaking minority today largely lies in the quantity. At the same time in both cases, Latvia’s foreign policy-makers have invested a lot of energy and imagination for resistance to minority issue internationalization. This also holds true for the 1920s when Latvia’s diplomats only with difficulty managed to avoid imposition of the special “minority clause” when being admitted to the League of Nations, as well as for the struggles of today’s Latvian national representatives with Russia over the rights of the Russian speakers, such as in the European Court of Human Rights.13 The concept of human rights arguably belongs to the most significant innovations of Latvia’s foreign policy discourse since the restoration of independence. Given that during the Cold War, Latvia was denied the possibility of independent foreign policy, the most important categories of international politics of that time, after the restoration of independence, had to be included and adapted fast, and that was not easy. Like in any other place, the human rights discourse in the context of Latvia had to be adapted to specific problems – first, to the status of the Soviet-time immigrants in Latvia after the restoration of independence. A number of questions had to be solved both about the extent of these rights, and their application to the specific situation. Nevertheless, the issue of human rights will continue to be important for Latvia. Today’s international politics is unimaginable without it – even despite the fact that the very concept of human rights is the subject of persistent politicization attempts.

266 Course to the West The East-West dimension in the Latvian foreign policy has been touched-on by a number of authors in this publication. It goes without saying that since its establishment, Latvia’s foreign policy has been dominated by the “Western” direction – no matter how differently it had been understood. By contrast, the “East” in fact is largely a euphemism for Russia in any of its incarnations – a variety of “White Russia” projects during the civil war, RSFSR, USSR, or, finally, the modern Russian Federation. It seems to be well underscored by Andis Kudors’ article included in this publication, which tightly ties the “Eastern direction” of Latvia’s politics to Latvia-Russia relations. In addition, one should consider that the Western stream characteristic to independent Latvia has been largely determined by the development trajectory of Russia in the 20th century – be it the Bolshevik revolution, the Stalinist terror of the 1930s, the occupation of the Baltic countries, the collapse of the USSR and Russia’s new geopolitical activism after 2008 and 2014. Latvia, whose territory at least since the 18th century has been within Russia’s sphere of interests, has closely followed the development of Russia in an effort to balance the difficult-to-forecast development of the neighboring country with the other partnerships in the West. Latvia as a new country that values highly ​​its independence, has the basis and the right to choose the partnerships that are able to ensure this independence most effectively. That is why Latvia’s course towards the West has been self-evident and inevitable. During the period of independence restoration this stream was further strengthened by the post-war “exile” political thought, which, as shown by Andrejs Plakans’ article, generally has been formed within the Western political context. At the same time, also in the modern context it is important to realize that the understanding of “the West” as the balancer of such relationship has changed considerably during the 20th century. Of course, the establishment of the Latvian state in 1918 was indeed supported by the West. At that time, by “the West” one understood the post-war Entente, first the Great Britain and France, and to a lesser extent – the United States. The main opponents of this “West” were Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia (later the USSR) – both revisionist and potentially totalitarian countries, between which the Baltics now were sandwiched. The “Western” involvement in the destiny of the Baltic countries at that time was limited. The principal Western player of

267 that time, the UK, had little interest in what was happening in the east of the Rhine river or, at best, east of Poland. Various European collective security solutions, such as the League of Nations, failed – also because the player with the fastest growing global influence, the United States, after the Versailles Peace Treaty deliberately distanced itself from participation in European politics. That is also why, as shown in Jordan Kuck’s article, American influence on Latvian politics was limited almost solely to Nebraska-schooled Kārlis Ulmanis’ cherished Mazpulki (4H equivalent) and harvest festivals. As a result, Latvia along with the other two Baltic countries, already in the 1930s was placed in an unenviable situation. The “Western” involvement was weak, and Latvia had to look for its place between the two revisionist, totalitarian forces on its own. Neutrality and the “Latvian orientation” that in early 1920s were discussed as realistic potions, now became a rhetorical formula for the loss of any maneuverability. This deadlock situation and disorientation is well illustrated by the fact that at the end of the 1930s, already at the beginning of the Second World War, the Soviet Union in Latvia was sometimes seen as a “lesser evil” compared to Hitler’s Germany. As Andrejs Skailis describes in his memoirs: “If we must get under a foreign hat, then better under the lice- filled Russian’s hat, rather than the proud German’s hat.”14 The situation after the restoration of independence, of course, was different. In 1991, when Latvia became a full member of the UN, “the West” was indeed consolidated. Here a role has been played by the Cold War and the U.S. involvement in European politics. A role has been played by different integration projects, such as NATO, the European Community (later – the EU), the Council of Europe and the CSCE (later – OSCE), that now allow to talk, more or less clearly, about democracy, free markets, and human rights as “European values.” Although Europe was still composed by nation-states, cooperation among these states took place in new quality, largely delegating the global security issues to Americans, and creating new, transnational cooperation structures. It goes without saying that in such circumstances, the newly independent Latvia chose belonging to such a structure as “the fastest way to prosperity and security” (Kudors’ chapter). What “the West” meant for Latvia during the Interwar period, is described in detail by Jānis Taurēns in his essay. He is right saying that “Latvia’s political elite and society during the Interwar period was much closer to the West than the elite and the society after the restoration of independence.” It is another aspect that this “Westernness” was mostly

268 of German origin, which certainly cannot be identified with the then Europeanness in general. This was reflected not only in the constitutional rights, which Latvia largely borrowed from the Weimar Republic, but also in the “Europeanness” that is found in Oswald Spengler’s bestselling The Decline of the West that at that time was widely read by Latvians. Here, in his dislike of the French and Anglo-American civilization, in a truly Nietzschean spirit he appealed to archaic, “Dionysian” instincts. Also Taurēns provides a detailed description of Kārlis Ulmanis regime’s critical attitude toward Great Britain and France, and the increasing consideration of the Nazi Germany interests, which makes one think about the applicability of the “Western” concept in the context of Latvia’s Interwar foreign policy. Involvement in the Euro-Atlantic area centered collective security organizations has always been a priority in the Latvian foreign policy, given the markedly asymmetrical Latvia’s relations with Russia. Of course, there have also been Russia-oriented foreign policy trends operating in Latvia. Here it would be appropriate to mention two influential left-wing parliamentarians in both independence periods – Fricis Menders and his Eastern European United States15 and Jānis Urbanovičs with Future Drafts.16 One should note, however, that the weight o this stream has always been directly dependent on Russia’s position. In situations when Russia is favorable, there may be a positive way forward in a mutually beneficial cooperation – as in 1927, when the leftist government managed to conclude a trade agreement with the USSR, or in the 1990s when there was much talk about Latvia as a “bridge” between Russia and the West. However, as Russia enters the phase of geopolitical activism and activates the Comintern or the “Russian world” rhetoric, the Russia-oriented trend in Latvian foreign policy rapidly loses all legitimacy. Appealing to “economic pragmatism” (see Aldis Austers’ chapter) is regarded as an offer to take risks with national security on behalf of questionable economic gains, and therefore is marginalized. As to Russia’s role in Latvia’s foreign policy discourse, it functions here as a sort of Lord Voldemort, “he who must not be named.” In efforts to articulate the relations with the big neighbor, most commonly selected are general formulations, bland phrases, to avoid naming the main source of concern. It would be wrong to think that it is based solely on the desire to speak diplomatically and to avoid Russia’s resentment. Its roots lie deeper: Latvia is located on the borderline of two foreign policy mentalities. On one hand, the EU’s political discourse is dominated by search for collaboration,

269 engagement, integration, shared values, and​​ dialogue discourse, in which there is no place for sharp confrontation and principled dissent (it may also be called “political correctness”). In contrast, the Russian foreign policy discourse is different – it is dominated by the rhetoric of national interests, external threats, strangers’ evil intentions, protection of “theirs,” superpower prestige and militarism. Latvia’s foreign policy discourse makers, in formulating their attitude towards Russia, therefore have to accept one of the following approaches: either to talk about cooperation prospects and common home in Europe, or to choose the approach of a “besieged fortress” and permanent threats. It seems that for now none of these perspectives fully meet the needs of Latvian foreign policy makers. Therefore, it is better not to name anybody. This evasiveness sometimes raises concerns that Latvia’s foreign policy does not have its own strategy towards relations with Russia. Slogans take the place of strategy – especially regarding the question of what realistic progress it wants to achieve in these important to Latvia relations, and what action for achieving these objectives would be required. Instead, decisions are mostly taken reactively, constantly looking back “over the shoulder” on the steps taken by other actors. An illustration for such concerns was provided by the agitation regarding Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich’s meeting with some of the members of the Latvian government in August 2016 – there was no consensus on the admissibility of this event at the level of the Cabinet. And there are other similar cases. These contradictions are also suggested by Andis Kudors in his article, in terms of changes in attitude of some top Latvian officials in various stages of their career.

Anticipating the promised development At the same time “the West” as a security policy orientation should not be confused with the West as belonging to a particular type of civilization. Those are related phenomena, however, tensions and even conflict can exist between them. Latvia was founded in 1918 as a “democratic state of justice, in which there may be no place for oppression or injustice” (Ulmanis).17 This statement implied understanding of an independent state where power is subject to the democratic control of the people, where the rights of all citizens are protected, and at the same time the focus is on social justice and workers’ interests. It was a country with protection of private property and capitalist economy,

270 which, along with the Latvian cultural dominance, also respected minorities, was open and involved in the political life of Europe. However, in the Interwar period in Europe such understanding of statehood for many seemed unacceptable. Growing popularity was gained by totalitarian alternatives: fascism, nazism, and communism, whose opponent was liberal democracy. In many places, including in Latvian society, the longing for a “strong hand” and state controlled economy prevailed. As a result, before the Second World War there was tremendous political and social regime diversity in the Western Europe – from parliamentary democracies to totalitarian dictatorships, from market economies to actual planned economies. At that time there was no “European standard” in terms of social order. Half a century later the situation was very different. Therefore, after the long isolation, Latvia had to be able to function in the new European conditions, which differed significantly from the Interwar period. The pre- war principles in Europe were: nationalism, protectionism, militarization of society; in today’s Europe – delegation of sovereignty, human rights, cross-border economic cooperation. The new conditions affected not only foreign policy in narrow sense, but also the domestic arrangement of the state and, in the longer term, also its political culture. Latvia’s desire to participate in the international organizations of the Western world was related to internal restructuring that had to be carried out with a view to be invited to participate. This holds true for the economic reforms of the 1990s, characterized by rather extensive privatization, rigid monetarism, and very limited social policy. It also applies to a variety of human rights and minority rights issues, as the prospects of admission to the EU and NATO made Latvia adapt to a variety of Western “conditionality” expressions.18 Celebrating its centenary, Latvia will have been a member of the European Union and NATO for fourteen years. Therefore the question already touched upon in Gunda Reire’s article is relevant: how legitimate in the eyes of the public is Latvia’s political affiliation to the Euro-Atlantic world? Reire’s conclusion that the Western choice of the country is not at all self-evident even among all the Latvians – not to mention the Latvian Russian-speakers, is really thought-provoking. Likewise, it is difficult to talk about any gradual changes in the situation for the benefit of the Western choice – even despite the escalation in the security situation since 2014. Latvia’s residents generally feel as Europeans and citizens of the EU. In several referendums Latvia’s citizens have expressed their support for the

271 Western choice and have voted for political forces that support the Euro- Atlantic integration. However, only less than half of the Latvian population agrees that the state should orient its foreign policy towards the West. This can cause problems in the future, given the relatively fragile situation of the EU itself and the rise of isolationist populism influence. What should foreign policy-makers conclude from this? First of all, such conclusions should not be dramatized. Public opinion, of course, is an important landmark of the foreign policy in a democratic society. However, it is certainly not the only landmark. Many important foreign policy decisions in the post-war Europe have been adopted despite the opposition of public opinion. One can recall for example the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany in early 1950s that paved the way for this country to NATO and, accordingly, to political stability, or, say, the U.S. support for Israel in some episodes of its existence. However, unpopular foreign policy is permitted only if it serves long-term strategic objectives according to public interests. Political action does not intend continuous tracking of public opinion polls and avoidance of any unpopular decisions. It intends leadership and effective work — even if this result should be visible to all only in the long term. It is worth focusing on the legitimacy of Latvian foreign policy issues precisely in this respect. Latvia, choosing strategic partnership with the West as a cornerstone of its foreign policy, has opted in favor of not only security, but also of a specific model of socio-economic development. This model is linked to democracy, free markets, scientific and technological progress based economy, growing overall well-being of the society, and social security. Such development perspective is fundamental to Latvia’s “Western choice.” It has been the “success story” of the postwar Europe that largely ensured its political stability. That is what changed Europe from a war-devastated continent into a significant object to be imitated, which many countries are still trying to approach. If we want to make the Western choice self-evident for the majority of the Latvian population, they actually have to feel the advantages resulting from this model – compared to different authoritarian and repressive alternatives. In this respect, country’s successful internal development is a prerequisite for an effective foreign policy, and the legitimacy issue of foreign policy is largely the legitimacy problem of the socio-economic model. Today there is much talk about “soft power” in the Latvian foreign policy discourse – mostly it is understood as simply propaganda – mostly Russian. Such an

272 explanation of the concept is very narrow because “soft power” includes not only propaganda, but, first of all the attractiveness of a socio-economic model with which the societies of other countries want to identify. Latvia’s foreign policy in this aspect has considerable potential. Although not all of the development path so far has been very successful, the development prospects of Latvia are generally better than those of most of the countries in our region – of course, only if these prospects will be utilized. This applies to attraction of investment, fight against corruption, education and innovation policy, as well as the socio-economic and cultural growth in general. The use of this potential is a tool to increase Latvia’s international profile and to clearly highlight its place in the Euro-Atlantic architecture. The events of 2014 have highlighted the issue of national defense capabilities and the allied ability to adequately respond to unforeseen security challenges in the Baltic countries. These are the tasks that Latvia and its allies need to address immediately. At the same time short-term tasks should not completely distract from the long-term strategy: by the use of foreign policy instruments, to make Latvia a success and developed country, whose belonging to the Euro-Atlantic region and the Western civilization is as self-evident as that of Sweden or Luxembourg. For the realization of this task, foreign policy has to work in close interaction with internal policies: both taking care of the representation of the interests of the Latvian society internationally, and clearly translating the positions of global and regional partners to Latvia’s domestic policy. In this respect, foreign affairs is an organic and an important part of Latvia’s policy, which must be closely integrated with the common national goals. Edgars Andersons cites Milda Salnā’s – Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics’ secretary’s – memories, in which she notes, regarding the first independence period that at that time “calf rearing and pig farming in Latvia was more popular than foreign policy,”19 which is largely explained by the social profile of the heads of state at that time. The question of whether such characteristics are as well pertinent to the present situation, one should judge for himself. In each case, the experience accumulated in 100 years shows that today’s Latvia simply cannot afford such attitude.

273 Recommendations: • Closer integration of foreign policy with country’s overall development priorities, as well as raising of the prestige and quality of the foreign policy debate among political decision-makers. The foreign policy debate in the Saeima is one of the steps already taken in this direction, while the deficit of qualitative discussion can be still felt. Among other things, it would also provide a constructive alternative to the various myths and conspiracy theories that dominate foreign policy issues in the public space of Latvia. • Analytical capacity building, dividing more clearly national strategy from ideology. The world has become too dynamic, and the future development scenarios – too different for decision-makers not to consider their future actions in various hypothetical future situations and instead rely solely on the solutions offered by partners. • Realization of Latvia’s “soft power” jointly with the common national development priorities, emphasizing the overall benefits for the Latvian society of the Euro-Atlantic integration. This would have not only a direct impact for increasing the country’s foreign policy profile, but also a reversible impact – for country’s socio-economic development stimulation.

Endnotes

1 Andrejs Spāģis, Die Zustände des freien Bauerstandes in Kurland nach dem Gesetz und nach dem Praxis im Lichte des modernen Rußlands, dargestellt von einem Patrioten (Leipzig, 1860). 2 Fricis Veinbergs, Politische Gedanken aus Lettland (Leipzig, 1885). 3 Daina Stukuls Eglitis, Imagining the Nation: History, Modernity, and Revolution in Latvia (Univer- sity Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002). 4 Latvijas Republikas Ārlietu ministrija, “Latvijas ārpolitikas pamatvirzieni līdz 2005. gadam,” http://www.mfa.gov.lv/arpolitika/latvijas-arpolitikas-pamatvirzieni-lidz-2005-gadam 5 Edgars Andersons, Latvijas vēsture 1920-1940, Ārpolitika I (Stokholma, Daugava: 1982), 57-71. 6 Vladimir Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Commu- nist Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). 7 Since 2011 this reasoning centers around the concept “valstsgriba” (will of a state) introduced by the EU Court of Justice judge, Egils Levits, see Konstitucionālo tiesību komisija, “Viedoklis “Par Latvijas valsts konstitucionālajiem pamatiem un neaizskaramo Satversmes kodolu,”” and Dina Gailīte, ed., Par Latvijas valsts konstitucionālajiem pamatiem un neaizskaramo Satversmes kodolu. Konstitucionālo tiesību komisijas viedoklis un materiāli (Rīga: Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2012), 27–155. 8 Michel Walters, Le Peuple Letton (Riga: Valters & Rapa, 1926); Michel Walters, Lettland, seine Entwicklung zum Staat und die baltischen Fragen (Rom: Walters, 1923); Michel Walters, Baltenge- danken und Baltenpolitik (Paris: Soc. gén. d’impr. et d’éd), 1926. 9 Liāna Langa et al., “Vēstule Merkelei Molotova-Ribentropa pakta 75. gadadienā,” Ir.lv, 2014. gada 13. augusts, http://www.irlv.lv/2014/8/13/vestule-merkelei-molotova-ribentropa- pakta-75-gadadiena

274 10 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, New Perspectives on the Past (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 11 Regarding this issue see Juris Rozenvalds, “Padomju mantojums un integracijas politikas attistiba kops neatkaribas atjaunosanas” in Nils Muižnieks, ed., Cik integrēta ir Latvijas sabiedrība. Sasnie- gumu, neveiksmju un izaicinajumu audits (Riga: LU Akademiskais apgads, 2010), 33–60. 12 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996). 13 Nils Muižnieks, “Latvian-Russian Memory Battles at the European Court of Human Rights” in Nils Muižnieks, ed., Geopolitics of History in Latvian-Russian Relations (Riga, University of Latvia Press), 219–238. 14 Andrejs Skailis, Pliks rakstnieks laikmetu vējos. Darbu izlase (Rīga, Likteņstāsti: 2009). 15 Fricis Menders, Austrumeiropas savienotās valstis kā Baltijas valstu nākotnes problems (Rīga, Saule: 1926). 16 Jānis Urbanovičs, Igors Jurgens un Juris Paiders, Nākotnes melnraksti I-IV (Rīga, Baltijas Forums, 2011–2016). 17 Latvijas valsts pasludināšana 18. novembrī 1918. g. Rakstu vainags H. J. sakopots (Rīga: Apgādniecī- ba “Astra,” 1918), 19. 18 Nida M. Gelazis, “The Effect of EU Conditionality on Citizenship Policies and the Protection of National Minorities in the Baltic States” in The Road to the European Union: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, eds. Vello Pettai and Jan Zielonka (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 46–74; Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Geoffrey Pridham, “Securing the Only Game in Town: The EU’s Political Conditionality and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Soviet Latvia,” Europe Asia Studies No. 61 (2009), 51–84. 19 Edgars Andersons, Latvijas vēsture 1920-1940. Ārpolitika I. [sējums] 27.

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All publications of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs are freely available online: www.liia.lv.

280 About the Authors

ALDIS AUSTERS is a researcher and lecturer with the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. He studied economics at Riga Technical University and international relations at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. Long-time employee of the Latvian Diplomatic Service, starting on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff and as a participant in talks on Latvia’s accession to the European Union, later as a representative of the Bank of Latvia at the EU. Also active in the non-governmental sector, has managed the network of Latvian diaspora organizations in Europe and served on the boards of various other organizations. His research interests span political economics, international economics, European integration and human migration.

As a journalist and researcher, EDIJS BOŠS has been writing on international policy for close to two decades. He graduated with a doctorate degree in international relations at Cambridge University, awarded for his dissertation on relations between the U.S. and the Baltics. He lectures courses on U.S. foreign policy and history of international relations at Riga Stradiņš University.

RAIMONDS CERŪZIS is an associate professor and leading researcher at the University of Latvia Faculty of History and Philosophy. Member of the scientific committee to review KGB documents. Doctorate degree in history (University of Latvia, 2003). Commented on international events on Latvijas Radio, created publications for the Latvian Institute to improve recognition of Latvia internationally. Author and editor in chief for various publications on the history of Latvia, author of numerous publications on Latvia’s Interwar history. Research interests: Baltic history in the 19th and 20th century, Baltic Germans, history of national minorities, history of ideology.

MĀRTIŅŠ DAUGULIS is a lecturer at the Riga Stradiņš University Faculty of European Studies, manager of the Policy and Political Communication, Policy and Government programs, research fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. Prior to employment with the RSU, he was an advisor

281 to a European Parliament member, worked at the Ministry of Economics Department for Coordination of European Union Cooperation. In addition to an academic career, Daugulis currently works for the LNT News Service as moderator of the 900” morning news broadcast and international policy analyst. His research area encompasses strategic and political communication, regulatory aspects of state development, international communication and policy. Daugulis is currently working on a doctorate degree with his dissertation on the strategic communications of the People’s Republic of China.

MARTYN HOUSDEN teaches modern history at the University of Bradford. He has many writings on the history of Germany, the League of Nations and Baltic Germans. His latest publication is On their own Behalf. Ewald Ammende, Europe’s National Minorities and the Campaign for Cultural Autonomy 1920–1936 (Rodopi, 2014). Currently studying the history of refugees, focusing particularly on the Baltic German community post-1945.

IVARS ĪJABS, Dr. sc. pol., is an associate professional at the University of Latvia Department of Political Science. His research interests include political theory, history of political ideas and inter-ethnic relations. Vice president of the Association for Advancing Baltic Studies (AABS) and member of the Presidential Committee for Improving the Regulatory Environment.

DIDZIS KĻAVIŅŠ is a Political Science Department guest lecturer at the University of Latvia Faculty of Social Sciences. He worked at the Department for Baltic, Nordic and Regional Cooperation and at the Office of American and Caribbean Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia. Earned a doctorate degree in 2015 with his dissertation Transformation of Foreign Ministries in the Baltics and Scandinavia 2004–2012. Kļaviņš was awarded a master’s degree in the Europaeum program at Leiden University, Sorbonne University, and Oxford University, and has broadened his expertise at the University of Wisconsin in the U.S., , Uppsala University and the University of . His research interests include transformation of diplomacy, and avenues of cooperation between the Baltic States and Scandinavia.

ANDIS KUDORS graduated from the University of Latvia Institute of Foreign Relations in 1996, where he studied international economics and international law. During the 2005-2011 period, Kudors worked towards a

282 bachelor’s degree at the University of Latvia Faculty of Social Sciences and a master’s degree in political science; he is currently studying for his doctorate degree in the same program. Since 2006, Kudors has been executive director and researcher at the Centre for Eastern European Policy Studies. His research interests concern Eastern European political processes, Russia’s foreign affairs including its diaspora policy and public diplomacy. Kudors is a member of the Foreign Policy Council at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a lecturer at the University of Latvia Faculty of Social Sciences. In late 2014 and early 2015, he conducted research for the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at the Kennan Institute in Washington, U.S., as a Fulbright Scholar.

JORDAN T. KUCK is an associate professor of history at the West Virginia Wesleyan College in Buckhannon. He graduated from the University of Nebraska summa cum laude in 2005 with a bachelor’s degree in history and political science. Kuck was captivated by the history of Latvia after staying here for a study exchange program in 2004. He graduated with a master’s degree from the University of Nebraska in 2007. His thesis, The Legacy of ‘Vadonis’ Ulmanis: Kārlis Ulmanis, Past, Present, and Future, was rated second best in the Master Papers category. In 2014, Kuck graduated the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, with his doctorate thesis The Dictator without a Uniform: Kārlis Ulmanis, Agrarian Nationalism, Transnational Fascism, and Interwar Latvia. Kuck’s publications include A Century of Sports at the University of Nebraska at Kearney (Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing, 2007), co-authored with Mark Ellis, and numerous articles in periodicals such as Fascism: The Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies and Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity.

ANDREJS PLAKANS is professor emeritus at the University of Iowa (U.S.). His latest book is A Concise History of the Baltic States (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) (translated into Russian: Краткая история стран Балтии, Vesь Mir, Moscow, 2016).

DIĀNA POTJOMKINA is a researcher at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs and a lecturer at Riga Stradiņš University. She has worked as a project manager and advisor for the European Movement – Latvia and as an expert for three opinions at the European Economic and Social Committee. Potjomkina received her bachelor’s and master’s degrees

283 cum laude at Riga Stradiņš University. She spent her 2015/2016 academic year at George Mason University in the United States as a guest researcher within the framework of the Fulbright Program. Main research interests: foreign policy of Latvia and Europeanization processes, relations with the U.S. and CIS/Eastern Partnership, foreign relations between the EU and the U.S., public involvement in decision-making.

GUNDA REIRE is the director of the Centre for International Studies and guest lecturer at the Riga Graduate School of Law. Combining academics and practical experience, she worked as deputy chairwoman of the Strategic Analysis Committee under the patronage of then-president Vaira Vīķe- Freiberga. She has managed the Saeima Spokesperson’s Service and advised several ministers. Reire’s research interests include international security, multilateral policy, Russian studies, global U.N. policy, and the maintenance of international peace. She has been a scientific editor and author of many publications concerning Latvian foreign policy, international peace and security.

ANDRIS SPRŪDS is director of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs and professor at Riga Stradiņš University. Sprūds has a master’s degree in the history of Central Europe from the Central European University in , an international affairs degree from the University of Latvia and a Ph.D. in political science from the Jagiellonian University (Krakow, Poland). He has been invited as a student and researcher to Columbia University, Johns Hopkins University, Oxford University, and Uppsala University, the International Affairs Institute in Norway, and the Japanese Energy Economy Institute. Sprūds’ core research topics are energy security and policy within the Baltic Sea region, post-Soviet domestic and international policy and Transatlantic relations.

VALTERS ŠČERBINSKIS is a Doctor of History and editor in chief of the National Encyclopedia. Long-time associate professor at Riga Stradiņš University Faculty of European Studies. Ščerbinskis has held courses in political science and political history, studied relations between Latvia and the Nordic countries during the Interwar Period (including his doctorate dissertation Finland in Latvian Foreign Policy 1918–1940) as well as Latvia’s domestic policy at the time. JĀNIS TAURĒNS has been an associate professor at the University of Latvia Department of History and Archeology since 2014. He is a member of the Latvia-Russia committee of historians (since 2012) and head researcher at the University of Latvia Philosophy and Sociology Institute (2010–2016). Editor of the University of Latvia Journal. History (since 2016). Co-author of 3-volume collective monograph Foreign Policy and Diplomacy of Latvia in the 20th Century. Research interests: history of Latvian foreign relations, political history of Latvia after regaining independence, contemporary Latvian historiography.

285 Ideational Currents in Latvia’s Foreign Policy: Personalities

Andris Ameriks Ansis Buševics Vilhelms Firkss Georgs Andrejevs Vladimirs Buzajevs Manfrēds fon Fēgezaks Romāns Apsītis Jānis Freimanis Gunārs Astra Ints Cālītis Uldis Augulis Juris Cālītis Māris Gailis Hugo Celmiņš Aleksandrs Gapoņenko Solvita Āboltiņa Fēlikss Cielēns Elīna Garanča Boriss Cilevičs Iļja Gerčikovs Antons Balodis Andris Gobiņš Jānis Balodis Jānis Čakste Ivars Godmanis Valērijs Belokoņs Lolita Čigāne Marija Golubeva Kārlis Berends Anatolijs Gorbunovs Argita Daudze Uldis Grava Arveds Bergs Helēna Demakova Ervids Grinovskis Olafs Berķis Anatols Dinbergs Frīdrihs Grosvalds Eduards Berklavs Jānis Dinevičs Pēteris Guļāns Alfreds Bērziņš Valdis Dombrovskis Aivars Gulbis Andris Bērziņš Vjačeslavs Dombrovskis (Ministru prezidents) Jānis Ducmanis Alvis Hermanis Andris Bērziņš Jānis Dūklavs (Valsts prezidents) Kārlis Ieviņš Indulis Bērziņš Arkādijs Eglītis Guntis Indriksons Alfreds Bīlmanis Indulis Emsis Edvīns Inkēns Valdis Birkavs Jānis Endzelīns Alfrēds Intelmanis Ilmārs Bišers Jānis Blaževičs Ludvigs Ēķis Dainis Īvāns Gundars Bojārs Sarmīte Ēlerte Juris Bojārs Juris Jansons Ivars Brīvers Jūlijs Feldmans Mariss Jansons Māris Budovskis Oļegs Fiļs Ilze Juhansone

* Names mentioned by book authors and interviewed experts listed in alphabetical order

286 Tālavs Jundzis Vilis Lācis Andris Piebalgs Jānis Jurkāns Linards Laicens Rihards Pīks Aleksandrs Lavents Andrejs Pildegovičs Artuss Kaimiņš Ādolfs Lejiņš Jānis Pliekšāns (Rainis) Sandra Kalniete Atis Lejiņš Jakovs Pliners Zanda Kalniņa- Pēteris Lejiņš Jānis Pommers Lukaševica Aivars Lembergs Andrejs Pumpurs Bruno Kalniņš Egils Levits Ojārs Ēriks Kalniņš Imants Lieģis Andris Razāns Pauls Kalniņš Roberts Liepiņš Iveta Reinholde Aigars Kalvītis Vladimirs Lindermans Dana Reizniece-Ozola Valērijs Kargins Kirovs Lipmans Einars Repše Krišjānis Kariņš Klāvs Lorencs Māris Riekstiņš Raita Karnīte Airis Rikveilis Alberts Kauls Valērijs Maligins Ilmārs Rimšēvičs Iveta Kažoka Vilis Māsēns Edgars Rinkēvičs Ojārs Kehris Vita Matīsa Jānis Ritenis Aleksandrs Kiršteins Anrijs Matīss Aivis Ronis Pauls Kļaviņš Zenta Mauriņa Toms Rostoks Fricis Kociņš Gunārs Meierovics Pāvils Rozītis Valentīns Kokalis Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics Baiba Rubesa Vladimirs Komogorcevs Fricis Menders Alfrēds Rubiks Ita Kozakeviča Nils Muižnieks Jānis Rukšāns Viktors Krasovickis Vilhelms Munters Gundars Krasts Voldemārs Salnais Erhards Krēgers Aina Nagobads-Ābola Alberts Sarkanis Gidons Krēmers Andrievs Niedra Ints Sarmulis Edgars Krieviņš Mordehajs Nuroks Juris Savickis Vilis Krištopāns Ludvigs Sēja Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis Mārtiņš Ņukša Jānis Seskis Jūlijs Krūmiņš Juris Sinka Māris Kučinskis Žaneta Ozoliņa Andrejs Skailis Vladimirs Kuļiks Kārlis Ozols Igors Skoks Kārlis Kurševics Jānis Skrastiņš Aldis Kušķis Artis Pabriks Marģers Skujenieks Edvards Kušners Vaira Paegle Andrejs Spāģis Valdis Pavlovskis Arnolds Spekke Atis Ķeniņš Daniels Pavļuts Ilgvars Spilners Ivars Ķezbers Jānis Peters Veiko Spolītis Andrejs Petrevics Andris Sprūds

287 Ēriks Stendzenieks Andris Teikmanis Fricis Veinbergs Oļegs Stepanovs Dainis Turlais Raimonds Vējonis Jānis Stradiņš Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga Aivars Stranga Guntis Ulmanis Andris Vilks Laimonis Strujevičs Kārlis Ulmanis Mārtiņš Virsis Pēteris Stučka Jānis Urbanovičs Vilis Vītols Inguna Sudraba Nils Ušakovs Oskars Voits Mavriks Vulfsons Genādijs Ševcovs Pauls Šīmanis Kārlis Zariņš Andris Šķēle Inese Vaidere Valdis Zatlers Ainārs Šlesers Mamerts Vaivads Ineta Ziemele Valdis Šteins Inese Vaivare Roberts Zīle Miķelis Valters Alfs Vanags Tatjana Ždanoka