june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents Al-Qa`ida in Iraq: Lessons from FEATURE ARTICLE the Mosul Security Operation 1 Al-Qa`ida in Iraq: Lessons from the By Michael Knights Mosul Security Operation By Michael Knights

Reports 5 Engaging Islamists in the West By Peter Mandaville 8 The Taliban Consolidate Control in Pakistan’s Tribal Regions By Muhammad Amir Rana 10 The Demise of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Southern Philippines By Zachary Abuza 13 When to Confront Mahdists: A Challenge for the U.S. Military By Reidar Visser 15 Constructing Takfir: From `Abdullah `Azzam to Djamel Zitouni By Shane Drennan 18 Iran’s Shi`a Reach Out to Mainstream Salafists By Alex Vatanka 21 A Global Counter-Insurgency Campaign AFP Plan for the War on Terror 2 By Colonel James H. Johnson, U.S. Army he demise of al-Qa`ida in Iraq incidents dropping by 85%. As the (AQI)1 has been heralded on a result of leadership targeting and the 23 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity number of occasions during the loss of safe havens, Multinational Force 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts T past five years, only to witness Iraq (MNF-I) spokesman Rear Admiral the movement adapt to survive by Patrick Driscoll characterized AQI and shifting to new safe havens. Following other insurgent groups in Mosul as the conclusion of the latest phase of being “off-balance and on the run.”3 Operation Za’ir al-Assad fi Sawlat al- Haqq (Lion’s Roar in Rightful Assault), Conversely, there is also a degree of or the Mosul security plan, the subject caution based on AQI’s proven tendency About the CTC Sentinel of al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s fortunes is once to relocate, lay low and reemerge in The Combating Terrorism Center is an again in the headlines. The 10-day a new area months later. A late May independent educational and research push by security forces into insurgent video recording released by the al- institution based in the Department of Social neighborhoods between May 10-20, Furqan Institute for Media Production, Sciences at the United States Military Academy, 2008, witnessed very low levels of the media production unit most closely West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses violence, with the number of recorded associated with the Islamic State of 4 the Center’s global network of scholars and Iraq or ISI umbrella movement, saw practitioners in order to understand and confront contemporary threats posed by 1 AQI has become a catch-all phrase used to describe any 2 This information was from a statement made by then terrorism and other forms of political violence. Sunni Arab diehard militant who has not integrated into Multinational Division North (MND-N) commander Ma- the Awakening (sahwa) movements or their associated jor General Mark Hertling. police auxiliary units, the so-called “Sons of Iraq.” For 3 Gerry J. Gilmore, “Al-Qaida in Iraq Is On the Run, The views expressed in this report are those of the purposes of this article, however, AQI refers to the Officials Say,” American Forces Press Service, May 27, the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, terrorist group that has been allied with and subordinate 2008. the Department of the Army, or any other agency 4 Since the inception of the ISI umbrella movement in Oc- of the U.S. Government. to al-Qa`ida since 2004. It is led by Abu Ayyub al-Masri (an Egyptian also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir). tober 2006, there have been strong indications that AQI

1 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 a spokesman claiming to represent ISI Mosul’s Importance that decade, including Abu Mus`ab in Ninawa Province warning that “until The center of gravity for the Sunni Arab al-Zarqawi’s people-moving networks now, we have not been engaged…because resistance has been inexorably shifting and the Ansar al-Islam movement. we are the ones who control the hour to northwards during the past year. Since 2003, the direct connection to start the initiative and we will choose Southern and western AQI operating Syria via Tal Afar and Sinjar means the time for retaliation or engagement.”5 areas have been seriously constrained that Mosul is a key hub in the northern The communiqué suggested that AQI by counter-insurgency approaches and “rat-line” bringing foreign volunteers elements had dispersed before the 10- the surge of forces developed by MNF-I. into Iraq via the al-Rabi’a area, which is day security push began and that the According to Olive Group’s databases, arguably the only fully functional line vast majority of arrests had fallen on Anbar Province saw reported incidents still processing significant numbers of the Iraqi population of Mosul instead of drop from 976 in January 2007 to foreign volunteers.10 AQI/ISI leaders. 158 in January 2008. Babil, likewise, witnessed a drop from 544 monthly As the capital of Ninawa Province, The true picture lies somewhere incidents in January 2007 to 180 one some consider Mosul as a new center of between these two images. The only year later. Baghdad is no longer the gravity for Sunnis in Iraq, with Sunni way to get closer to an accurate epicenter of the insurgency; in pre-surge Arabs representing approximately half assessment is to get into the weeds of March 2007, MNF-I estimated that 80% of its 1.4 million residents, the balance the Mosul security operation and to of the violence in Iraq occurred in the comprising approximately 500,000 blend street-level tactical data with the region within 19 miles of Baghdad. By Kurds and 200,000 Turkmen (Shi`a overarching strategic context of AQI’s January 2008, this figure had dropped and Sunni), Assyrian Christians and to around 25%. Iraq’s capital witnessed other groups. The ethnic tension caused a decline from 1,259 reported incidents by this diversity has worked in the “Within the north, the city in January 2007 to 425 incidents a year favor of takfiri groups because it has of Mosul has consistently later.7 constrained the development of sahwa and Sons of Iraq movements, at least been an area of strength Sunni Arab areas north of the capital until recently. Kurdish-dominated Iraqi for takfiri and Islamist- now contain a far larger share of violent Army forces garrison most areas, and incidents than Baghdad, Babil and Sunni fears of “reverse-Arabization” nationalist resistance Anbar. Yet, the most stubborn holdout (ethnic cleansing) by Kurdish forces groups in Iraq.” has been Ninawa, where incidents have proven particularly beneficial to actually increased from 463 per month takfiri elements all along the multi-ethnic in January 2007 to 685 per month swathe bordering the Kurdistan Regional in January 2008 and later to an all- Government zone. Furthermore, Mosul nationwide reverses and growing Iraqi time high of 747 incidents in February and its environs have seen a very sparse government sensitivity to the Sunni 2008.8 level of garrisoning by MNF-I troops Arab community’s needs. This article since early 2004, with large tracts of draws on a database of 5,984 geo-located Within the north, the city of Mosul has the city ceded to the insurgency for 12- incidents reported in Ninawa Province consistently been an area of strength for 18 months at a time.11 from April 2007 to April 2008, itself takfiri9 and Islamist-nationalist resistance a sub-set of a data set of more than groups in Iraq. Mosul is home to a high “Routine” AQI Activity in Mosul 100,000 geo-located incidents recorded proportion of the Saddam-era Iraqi It is worth examining the types of across the whole of Iraq during the last officer corps, and the post-war looting activity undertaken by AQI and similar 18 months.6 Geospatial intelligence of a number of major Ammunition movements in Ninawa Province during is then combined with MNF-I, Iraqi Supply Points in and around the city the last 12 months. Mosul sits at the and open source media reportage plus left the metropolitan area seeded with center of a number of conflict zones; to direct commentary from embedded thousands of tons of munitions. Mosul the west are Tal Afar and Sinjar, large reporters in Iraq. As always, the key was also a major center of Saddam’s towns strung along the takfiri “rat-line” to understanding a terrorist group is to “Return to Faith” campaign in the to Syria, as well as rural staging posts look closely at its actions. 1990s, and the city’s position astride that fan out from the main road into the roads headed toward Turkey and Syria desert along the border. To the south, is the dominant force within the ISI, which is notionally made it a transshipment point for takfiri a range of rural farming communities led by Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi (also known groups moving through Iraq during along the Tigris River is a crossroads as Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi), an Iraqi spokesman that the for takfiri elements moving up and U.S. government claims is a fictional figure designed to 7 These figures were derived from Olive Group’s data- down the river and interacting with give the movement an Iraqi face. base. other important AQI operating areas 5 Bushra Juhi, “Militant Group Warns of Mosul Retalia- 8 Ibid. such as Hawija; the Jazira desert areas tion,” Associated Press, May 27, 2008. 9 The term takfiri in this article refers to Sunni insurgent 6 The database is maintained by private security com- groups that justify violence against some Muslims and 10 Personal interview, U.S. military intelligence officer, pany Olive Group and represents information gained all non-Muslims because their religious beliefs are not May 2008. through more than 1,800 days of consecutive on-the- compatible with the group. Takfiri groups in Iraq include 11 See the March 2003 coverage provided by indepen- ground operations in Iraq. For more details, please con- al-Qa`ida in Iraq and its affiliates, plus Ansar al-Sunna/ dent embedded journalist Bill Roggio at The Long War tact [email protected]. Ansar al-Islam. Journal, available at www.longwarjournal.com.

2 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 around Lake Tharthar and stretching eastern Mosul. Western Mosul is old AQI Defensive Operations to the Syria border; the Saddam-era Arab Mosul and even though the city’s Many of the terrorist attacks in Mosul “presidential security triangle” cities ethnic and sectarian communities in 2007 were aimed at preventing the and towns in Salah al-Din province; are densely interwoven in almost all establishment of government institutions and the Hamrin mountain “switch-line” districts, the west is considered to in insurgent neighborhoods, typically (linking Hawija to Tuz Khurmatu and have a higher proportion of Sunni involving the murder of individual the Diyala River Valley). Arabs. In western Mosul, AQI and policemen or Iraqi Army personnel, other movements used the relative as well as the destruction of vehicle AQI plays a major role in seeking thinness of MNF-I presence in 2007 checkpoints or recruiting stations. As to maintain Mosul as a lawless to attempt to drive out non-Sunnis with most violent activity undertaken environment in which such movements from their neighborhoods, particularly by takfiri groups, intimidation is the can operate freely. According to MNF-I Christians and Shebaks, a community mechanism. This effort was kicked up and Iraqi military intelligence officers of Shi`a Kurds. In eastern Mosul and a notch when it became clear that the in Mosul, AQI and other takfiri groups in the government district west of the Iraqi government was planning a major behave differently in Mosul than they Tigris, AQI and other groups tend to security operation in Mosul. have in areas such as Anbar in the past; launch three to five suicide Vehicle- specifically, there has been notably less Borne Improvised Explosive Device It was the response of local takfiri and animus between takfiri elements and the (VBIED) attacks per month against Islamist-nationalist insurgent groups local Sunni Arab community and fewer provincial government, security forces to these actions that caused the spike attempts to impose Shari`a codes or take and particularly Kurdish political party of 747 reported incidents in Ninawa over leadership of communities from offices.12 Province in March 2008. A range of local Iraqis. Individual neighborhoods vehicle checkpoints were attacked bear the graffiti of multiple movements, Takfiri groups became major players in with suicide vest bombs. Large suicide including the Islamic State of Iraq and organized crime in western Mosul. In VBIED were employed to physically the Reform and Jihad Front (the Islamic addition to the usual AQI fundraising shatter new Combat Outposts. On Army in Iraq front movement). A activities such as ransoming kidnapped March 23, for instance, Combat Outpost complex mesh of affiliations means that people and reselling hijacked fuels Inman in western Mosul was breached Mosul’s muhalla (blocks), nahiya (sub- (gasoline, cooking gas and diesel) and by a suicide truck bomb loaded with districts) and qada’a (districts) are often an estimated 5,000-10,000 pounds shared between Ba`athist, Islamist- of homemade explosives. The dump nationalist and takfiri groups. There is “Once the government truck, armored against small-arms fire, considerable blurring between cells, and operation began, however, detonated mid-point in the facility, the most important feature connecting killing 13 Iraqi soldiers, wounding 42 individual attacks to specific groups is Mosul’s takfiri groups went and leaving a crater 15 feet deep and financial sponsorship of the action. largely passive, resulting 25 feet wide. Four other VBIEDs in the 2,000-5,000 pound range were Until preparation for the current in a reduction of reported used or discovered in Mosul in March security operation began, offensive incidents by 85%.” alone. Insurgents likewise breached the military activities sponsored by Riyadh Line—the berms built around manpower-lite funding heavy groups Mosul—with explosives on a number of such as AQI mainly focused on the Main occasions, sometimes seeding the gaps Supply Routes running through Mosul. consumer goods, AQI has become with IEDs to kill repair crews. On the On the west bank, military traffic on involved in considerably more eve of the Mosul security operation, Highway 1—the trucking road running complicated criminal endeavors in Iraqi Army troops foiled a suicide along the Tigris River all the way to al- Mosul. These schemes involve extorting VBIED attack against the 2nd Iraqi Army Rabi’a—has been a consistent target of hundreds of thousands of dollars from Division headquarters at the Ninawa roadside Improvised Explosive Device larger businesses ranging from soft Oprawi hotel.14 (IED) crews. On the eastern side, drink manufacturers to cell phone Highway 2 links Turkey to the Tigris companies by levying up to 20% of the Once the government operation began, River Valley cities and later Baghdad value of contracts as protection money. however, Mosul’s takfiri groups went and has also consistently been attacked Cell phone towers have been destroyed largely passive, resulting in a reduction by IED crews. With MNF-I units when vendors failed to pay sufficient of reported incidents by 85%.15 A tight relatively thin on the ground in 2007, bribes to takfiri elements. In real estate, curfew and driving ban and the berming sponsoring paid-for IED attacks on AQI insurgents stole 26 ledgers that strategic road systems remains the best contained the deeds to almost $90 For more details on the criminalization of AQI, see Mi- way of predictably acquiring targets million worth of property and then chael Knights, “Endangered Species - Al-Qaeda in Iraq 13 and a means by which AQI/ISI and resold them. Adapts to Survive,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 2008. other movements can “keep the flame of 14 The attacker drove a Volkswagen Passat, a common resistance alight.” 12 These figures were derived from Olive Group’s data- brand of car used by the Ba`athist regime to reward mili- base. tary service. Takfiri groups operate in somewhat 13 This information was according to Lieutenant Colonel 15 “Operation ‘Lion’s Roar’ Reduces Insurgent Attacks different ways in western Mosul and Eric Welsh, a U.S. Army battalion commander in Mosul. in Mosul,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 22, 2008.

3 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 of the city had an immediate effect on operation was underway or were The Petraeus strategy and the Iraqi the ability of takfiri groups to deploy largely based in outlying rural villages surge have made AQI/ISI leery of major car bombs, underlining the value to begin with. Indicators of migration to population centers. It is not in such a of mobility to such cells. Almost no a predominately rural-based movement movement’s nature to fight in an entirely suicide vest operations were launched have been visible for some time. AQI/ clandestine nature, and they tend to either, potentially pointing to a more ISI no longer stands and fights to seek operational spaces that they can general lack of available personnel for control urban terrain, although the control, if only for short periods of time. martyrdom operations. Although 125 movement certainly tried to prevent AQI would rather be a big fish in a small roadside IEDs were defused and 1.5 tons some neighborhoods from being pond; the alternative—a small fish in a of C4 and TNT were recovered during the penetrated by government forces in the big pond, classic urban terrorism—is May 10-20 period, roadside IED crews run-up to the Mosul operation. Whereas increasingly difficult to execute. were also largely ineffective in blunting the downscaling of local coalition force the Iraqi security operation, with a levels and AQI resurgence historically Constant relocation is one of the factors notable lack of effective attacks.16 followed security operations, the “Iraqi driving AQI/ISI to decentralize and surge” means Iraqi Army neighborhood dissolve into the broader pool of Iraqi- Leadership disruption probably also presence is more permanent. AQI/ISI led insurgent movements. Centralized played a role in the muted response. AQI/ are learning that urban populations control of funding is one of the defining ISI in Mosul had been under intensive cannot be controlled indefinitely and characteristics of AQI/ISI and a key attacks for months. According to MNF-I that city streets cannot be held against source of influence for the foreign spokesmen, the number of senior AQI Iraqi forces. leaders killed or captured in the months of October to December 2007 topped This is particularly true in Mosul, “AQI/ISI are learning that 130, including individuals from almost where the multiethnic neighborhoods urban populations cannot all levels of the organization, such as are difficult to operate in once security regional amirs; facilitators involved in forces have established a permanent be controlled indefinitely transporting leaders, foreign fighters or presence and can collect tip-offs from and that city streets cannot cash; and specialist cells involved in the the public. The government of Prime development and employment of suicide Minister Nuri al-Maliki has backed the be held against Iraqi car bombs and roadside IEDs.17 In early current Mosul operation with a range of forces.” 2008, another 30 leadership targets political concessions designed to swing were killed or captured in Mosul alone, the bulk of the Sunni Arab population in including eastern Mosul amir Ibrahim Mosul away from the insurgency. Senior Ahmad `Umar al-Sabawi, northeastern Kurdish figures have been removed leadership cadre of the movement. Mosul amir Ayyad Jassim Muhammad from the provincial council, the Ninawa The criminalization of the movement `Ali, and southeastern Mosul amir Abu Operations Center and the 2nd Iraqi combined with MNF-I attacks on Yasir al-Sa`udi. Halfway through the Army Division and have been replaced leadership and funding have loosened May 10-20 operation, a further 200 Tier with Sunni Arabs from Mosul families. the ties between the foreign amirs and 1 and Tier 2 AQI/ISI commanders were Provincial elections in November should their Iraqi foot soldiers, the latter of captured.18 On May 20, MNF-I reported further strengthen Sunni Arab influence which are often attracted by financial that the purported overall AQI amir of in provincial governance. Sahwa and Sons inducements. Mosul, `Abd al-Khaliq Awad Ismail al- of Iraq movements are being established, Sabawi, had been captured with his son and fast-track judicial proceedings are The picture that emerges is that of in Tikrit. increasing the pace at which Sunni males an organization that is moving away are released from government detention. from centralized control by a national The State of AQI/ISI Perhaps most importantly to the military amir, underlined by the reduction of The location of `Abd al-Khaliq al- families of Sunni Arab Mosul, there the reward offered for AQI/ISI leader Sabawi’s detention is an important is genuine anticipation that military Abu Ayyub al-Masri.20 Indeed, there pointer that AQI/ISI leadership had age males will again be able to take up are strong signs that the al-Qa`ida already left Mosul by the time the their traditional profession of service in leadership in Pakistan has deliberately locally-raised Iraqi Army units.19 In other sent seasoned fighters to bolster the 16 “125 Bombs Defused in Mosul,” Voices of Iraq, May 22, words, General David Petraeus’ surge foreign fighter element in the hope of 2008. strategy has finally returned to Mosul maintaining some measure of control 17 Figures conglomerated from U.S. Department of De- where the general initially tried many of over the organization; on March 2, fense briefings on al-Qa`ida in Iraq leadership targeting. its components during his tenure there in 2008, Rear Admiral Gregory Smith 18 “Security Improves in Iraq’s Ninevah Province, 2003-2004. noted that Abu Yasir al-Sa`udi and General Says,” American Forces Press Service, May 22, Hamdan al-Hajji, two Saudi amirs, were 2008. According to Ma. Gen. Mark Hertling, Tier 1 oper- drawn from the Afghanistan-Pakistan atives are operational leaders who finance operations or 19 Personal interviews, Mosul-based U.S. and Iraqi conflict zone to Mosul in November provide ideological guidance. Tier 2 operatives are “bat- military intelligence officials, May 2008. There are also 2007 by AQI commander Abu Ayyub al- talion commanders” commanding groups of 5-30 fight- a number of useful Mosul bloggers who report on local ers. Hertling described Tier 2 operatives as “the ones that views, such as “A Star from Mosul” at www.astarfrom- 20 Lennox Samuels, “Al Qaeda Nostra,” Newsweek, May put up IEDs, VBIEDs, sniper cells.” mosul.blogspot.com. 21, 2008.

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Masri.21 Foreigners stand out, however, Engaging Islamists in the and private funds mobilized to develop making imported leaders vulnerable to related outreach activities. The groups coalition attacks; Abu Yasir al-Sa`udi West identified as potential partners by and Hamdan al-Hajji, for example, were these efforts are telling in their own killed on February 27. By Peter Mandaville right. The RAND Corporation’s 2007 study Building Moderate Muslim Networks, for The “Iraqification” of AQI in recent years, U.S. national security example, recommends that the United Combined with a reduced flow of foreign policy orthodoxy has deemed it too States engage secular, liberal and neo- volunteers, decentralization could see far “out of the box” to suggest that traditional Sufi Muslims.2 Looking other Iraqi-led movements such as Ansar Islamist groups might have a role to more specifically at what this advice al-Sunna/Ansar al-Islam eclipsing AQI/ play in countering terrorist threats. ISI. It is not hard to imagine a declining According to this reasoning, even if role for the foreign elements of AQI, with movements such as the Egyptian Muslim “The default assumption international jihadists falling back into Brotherhood or its affiliates in other still appears to be that their more typical role of bankrolling countries have renounced violence or native elements of insurgent operations are not actively involved in fostering Islamism of any kind is to keep the flame of resistance alight. militancy, they still at some level share more likely to be part of According to this scenario, increasingly common ideological foundations with Iraqi- and foreign-led takfiri groups groups such as al-Qa`ida. For others, the problem rather than would use criminal fundraising to the historical ties between the Muslim a potential component finance insurgent operations long after Brotherhood movement and Hamas are any popular base for resistance had enough to rule out any possibility of of counter-terrorism eroded, with money greasing the wheels engaging the former given the latter’s solutions.” of the “professional resistance”—those use of violence in Israel and Palestine. Sunni Arab IED cells undertaking paid- Leaving aside the colossal error inherent for attacks throughout the Saddam-era in treating Hamas and al-Qa`ida as “presidential security triangle” formed by terrorist equivalents—unfortunately entails in the European context, one Beyji, Baghdad and Ramadi. a persistent theme in U.S. national finds in the RAND study an “approved security discourse in the aftermath list” of individual scholars without any Major General Mark Hertling and his Iraqi of 9/11—the default assumption still grassroots following and a set of mostly counterparts are confident that about half appears to be that Islamism of any kind marginal organizations espousing of the paid-for Tier 3 elements of AQI— is more likely to be part of the problem highly progressive interpretations of known as the “pipe swingers”—could rather than a potential component Islam that similarly lack any legitimacy be detached from terrorism by political of counter-terrorism solutions. It is within Muslim communities. Another and economic engagement.22 With the precisely this dogma that is in serious complication lies in the fact that some extension of the Petraeus doctrine to need of reexamination. of these groups, such as the United Mosul, the less committed insurgents are Kingdom’s Sufi Muslim Council, were finally being boiled away to reveal the What is needed is not necessarily an established with the blessing (and skeleton of the “professional resistance.” active partnership between Islamists sometimes the financial support) of In Mosul, as in the rest of Sunni Iraq, and counter-terrorism authorities; European governments, which in reducing this hardcore cadre and making instead, national security and counter- the current climate renders them the next major step-charge in improved terrorism policy must become more immediately suspect in the eyes of many security may take far longer than the comfortable with shades of gray in how Muslims. year-long “surge.” it approaches a Muslim world too often defined in terms of black and white Although there is nothing intrinsically 1 Dr. Michael Knights is Vice President of categories. wrong with the views and positions of Strategic Analysis and Assessments at Olive these groups—indeed, many of them are Group, a private security provider with almost The Fallacy of Focusing on Sufis intellectually sophisticated and highly 1,900 days of consecutive operations in Iraq, In searching for interlocutors and courageous, having expressed opinions and is also a research fellow at the Washington partners in the Muslim world, Western that make them targets of criticism Institute for Near East Policy. Dr. Knights has governments—and the United States in (and sometimes even threats) from been writing about internal security in Iraq particular—have expressed a preference ultra-conservative and radical Muslim since 1998 and is the author of three books and for doing business with what they call groups—the problem lies in their lack the editor of one anthology on Saddam-era and “moderate Muslims.” This has spawned of transformative capacity. There are post-war Iraq. something of a cottage industry, with at least three aspects to consider in this various think-tanks rushing to find last regard: 1. the groups designated as suitable candidates in the Muslim 21 See statement from Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, acceptable partners tend to be either world and millions of dollars in public Director of Communications, Deputy Spokesman, Multi- so new or so at odds with prevailing National Force Iraq, March 2, 2008. 22 This information is according to Maj. Gen. Mark 1 See, for example, Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, 2 Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Lowell H. Schwartz and Hertling, speaking at a Department of Defense news Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror Peter Sickle, Building Moderate Muslim Networks (Santa briefing in Iraq on June 9, 2008. (New York: Doubleday, 2005). Monica, CA: RAND, 2007).

5 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 sentiments within the community as by the government. Any Islamists still central to their political discourse, to possess neither a critical mass of involved in counter-terrorism efforts it serves primarily as a reference point followers nor any hope of developing would therefore have to be thoroughly for governing principles and legislation one in the near future; 2. the individuals and credibly independent and that rather than as a separate and exclusivist or groups in question often advocate means looking toward groups affiliated model of government. secularism and liberalism in an with the broad and diverse Muslim uncritical manner that leaves little room Brotherhood movement. Even if it is recognized that mainstream, to raise legitimate questions about how independent Islamists are likely to these norms and values are actually put Since its renunciation of violence in feature prominently in any sustainable into practice in the societies in which the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood political reform scenario, could there they live, particularly today vis-à-vis has evolved in ways that position it be a role for groups such as the Muslim questions of civil liberties and foreign well to harvest, organize and redeploy Brotherhood in counter-terrorism policy; 3. with particular reference to oppositional political sentiments. and national security efforts? Aside Sufi groups, the brotherhoods (turuq) Indeed, it is now conventional wisdom from a number of abiding ambiguities in question, while often apolitical and among analysts of political reform surrounding the Brotherhood’s embrace primarily focused on inward, spiritual in the Middle East that the Islamists of pluralism and democracy, several concerns, are hardly advocates of represent the only organized alternative key challenges relating more directly to pluralism and democracy in the Muslim- to most ruling regimes in the region. security also need to be addressed. Many majority countries in which they Their comparative advantage as operate; indeed, with regard to their potential agents of social change lies in “Islamist groups in the own internal governance practices, Sufi the fact that: 1. they are independent of brotherhoods are often among the more existing authoritarian governments and West need to emphasize authoritarian social structures to be consistently critical of the corruption, unequivocally—and most found in Islam. lack of accountability and failure to bring about meaningful democratic already do—that the Counter-Terrorism Role for Mainstream reform that characterize these regimes; politics of confrontation Islamist Groups? 2. they are able to draw on deep If Sufis and secular-liberal Muslims repositories of social capital residing in must occur within the are not the answer, could mainstream a vast array of voluntary and charitable parameters of the law.” Islamists play this role? The idea is, of networks and organizations at the course, not wholly new in and of itself. local and national levels; and 3. their The renunciation of violence in the late reputational power as consistent critics 1990s by imprisoned ideologues of al- of government injustice from within prominent Islamists such as Shaykh Jama`a al-Islamiyya (itself a radical an Islamic framework is unrivaled, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, undoubtedly the splinter from the main body of the stretching back some 80 years. leading intellectual figure within the Muslim Brotherhood movement) has contemporary Brotherhood movement, been a consistent reference point and It is precisely the issue of how Islam and, will continue to support Hamas and resource in the Egyptian government’s more specifically, the question of where argue that what they take to be the own recent counter-terrorism strategy. Shari`a and the need for an Islamic state group’s armed resistance against Similarly, the Saudi government has fit into the Brotherhood’s political vision Israeli occupation is justified, even been relying on Wahhabi clerics, some that have been chief sticking points for as they simultaneously condemn the of whom in the 1990s were either critics of the movement. The ideological jihadist movement and work to put al- active members in, or had strong current of the Muslim Brotherhood Qa`ida out of business. Furthermore, ties to, dissident Islamist groups in and its manifestation in the political given the extremely broad and diverse the kingdom, as a mainstay of its activities of affiliated parties and groups nature of the Muslim Brotherhood as recent efforts to deradicalize Salafi- throughout the Middle East (including an ideological movement, there is little jihadi detainees. The governments in the central body in Egypt) have doubt that among their affiliates and question claim enormous success in undergone significant transformations sympathizers there are still figures who these endeavors and there is anecdotal in recent years. While a full accounting act as fundraisers and financiers to evidence to suggest that some measure of this evolution is beyond the scope of groups currently classified as terrorist of impact has been felt. Yet there is also this article, most scholars of political entities. Such individuals, who should be good reason to question the efficacy reform in the Middle East (along with pursued and treated as the criminals they and sustainability of such an approach. many policy analysts) now take it as are, represent a fringe minority within a These are state-sponsored campaigns written that the Brotherhood movement movement whose core agenda has been mounted by two of the pro-Western has made a strategic commitment to undergoing significant transformation. governments most consistently cited in democratic principles.3 While Islam is To define the Brotherhood exclusively the complaints of Usama bin Ladin and or primarily in terms of their activities al-Qa`ida. The timing of the Islamists’ 3 See, for example, Amr Hamzawy, The Key to Arab Re- “conversion” from violence and the form: Moderate Islamists (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie En- mist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge careful management of their current dowment for International Peace, 2005); Carrie Wick- University Press, 2006); and Ray Baker, Islam Without activities by the state leaves them open ham, Mobilizing Islam (New York: Columbia University Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists (Cambridge, MA: Har- to the criticism of having been co-opted Press, 2002); Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Isla- vard University Press, 2006).

6 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 would therefore be akin to throwing relatively small in terms of their active and civil society trying to understand out an enormous baby with very little membership, have a stronger base of the multiple and complex layers of bathwater.4 legitimacy and more experience than Islamic radicalization. Some, such as most Muslim groups when it comes to the Centre for the Study of Terrorism Yet, what role could mainstream acting in the public sphere. Second, in London, set up by long-time Muslim Islamists such as the Muslim given the aversion within the younger Brotherhood stalwart Kamal Helbawy, Brotherhood and related groups actually generation of Western Muslims to have begun to formulate their own play in the realm of counter-terrorism? joining groups in favor of independent approaches to counter-terrorism. In an important article in Foreign Affairs, voices and individualized approaches Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke to religion, the idea is not to regard Conclusion make the case that the Brotherhood is Islamists as providing an alternative Although an active partnership essentially moderate in its orientation between Islamists and counter- and that its strategic agenda is today terrorism authorities is not necessary, broadly in line with Western interests.5 “Islamists need to resist it is important for counter-terrorism Islamist groups in the Brotherhood the temptation today to policy to recognize the nuances within mold already participate in democracy the Muslim world. It is also important promotion and political party capacity- turn inward in the name of to understand that the very act of building activities in the Middle East defending the community.” defining Muslim communities primarily and Southeast Asia funded through in relation to security and terrorism agencies such as the U.S. Agency for hampers communication and contributes International Development (USAID) and to tensions—meaning that it must be the National Endowment for Democracy mass movement to jihadism. Rather, the asked whether and when counter- (NED). That does not mean, however, division of labor that falls to Islamist- terrorism is the proper framework that the United States and its allies linked groups within Muslim public for outreach and engagement. In turn, should engage the Muslim Brotherhood space in the West has more to do with Islamists need to resist the temptation because when it comes to cooperation framing issues and organizing events today to turn inward in the name of on security issues, it is not entirely where these concerns are discussed and defending the community. When it clear what a “partnership” would debated. comes to concerns about civil liberties entail. What is envisaged, however, is around anti-terrorism legislation, a far more selective engagement with These are certainly not—nor should the war in Iraq, environmental groups and figures with strong ties to they be—forums designed to promote degradation, inequalities stemming Islamism but who, unlike the Muslim Western security goals, to encourage from globalization and the rights of Brotherhood in Egypt, are less directly Muslims to passively assimilate, or religious minorities, Muslims have subject to political pressures from to refrain from mobilizing politically the opportunity to forge relationships authoritarian regimes. around Islam. Indeed, much of the of solidarity with countless groups energy at such events is devoted to harsh beyond the boundaries of their own Engaging Islamist Groups Operating in the criticism of Western foreign policy and community. Looking at each other with West counter-terrorism efforts; however, greater nuance and overcoming past This is where Islamist-linked groups violence and subversive activity are not mutual suspicions and the fact that they in Europe and North America begin to among the offered solutions. Rather, will continue to disagree on a range of enter the picture in interesting ways, Islamist activists create a public sphere issues, Islamists and counter-terrorism particularly in today’s climate of in which the compatibility between practitioners are likely to find a more heightened concerns about “homegrown” Islam and prevailing Western norms is common alignment of interests than terrorism. Yet how might Islamists be not simply affirmed (as with secular- perhaps either of them anticipated. able to make a difference where other liberal Muslims) or rejected (as with groups cannot? First, unlike many of radicals and extremists)—both of which Dr. Peter Mandaville teaches political the neophyte Muslim groups that have are actually depoliticizing moves—but science and Islamic studies at George Mason sprung out of the “war on terrorism,” instead deliberated, contested and University, where he is also Co-Director of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i- agonistically negotiated. For their part, Center for Global Studies. He holds degrees Islami linked groups in the West (such however, Islamist groups in the West from the University of St. Andrews and the as the UK Islamic Mission, the Islamic need to emphasize unequivocally— University of Kent, and has also studied Forum Europe, the Muslim Association and most already do—that the politics at the American University in Cairo. Dr. of Britain, and, in the United States, of confrontation must occur within Mandaville has authored and edited several the Muslim American Society), while the parameters of the law. Finally, books, among them Global Political Islam Islamist activists in the West generally (2007) and Transnational Muslim Politics: 4 This is precisely the error committed by journalists have a much deeper and nuanced Reimagining the Umma (2001). Much of his Mark Hosenball and Mike Isikoff in their profile of the understanding of the “ecology”—both recent work, supported by the Pew Charitable Muslim Brotherhood for the 2007 PBS series, America at ideationally and in terms of social Trusts and the John D. and Catherine T. a Crossroads. relations—in which radical and violent MacArthur Foundation, has focused on the 5 Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate movements operate. In this regard, they comparative study of transnational Muslim Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs 86:2 (2007): pp. are important interlocutors and sources social movements and Islam in Europe. 107-121. of information for those in government

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The Taliban Consolidate It is clear that the Taliban movement 11 attacks. Although each of these local is gaining strength, and unless the Taliban groups have their own distinct Control in Pakistan’s Tribal government attempts to exploit some of structure and are independent in their Regions the movement’s internal divisions, it is respective areas of control, they are likely that the Taliban’s influence will bound together by pooling financial and By Muhammad Amir Rana encroach further into the settled areas human resources. of the North-West Frontier Province. pakistan’s local taliban have This local support base—held together consolidated their control over the Emergence of the Local Taliban by tribal affinities and ideological Federally Administered Tribal Areas The situation in the tribal areas did associations—allows the Taliban (FATA) and are now extending their not deteriorate overnight. During the leadership to entrench their movement influence toward the settled districts past seven years, the Taliban have into the masses and establish separate of the North-West Frontier Province moved strategically to gain increasing local Taliban cells, thus reducing the (NWFP). More than 50 Taliban control of the region. When al-Qa`ida organizational burden on the central affiliated groups are operating in FATA and Taliban remnants slipped into leadership and creating a strategic and its adjoining areas.1 In the settled Pakistan’s tribal areas after the fall of problem for the Pakistani military districts of the NWFP, 14 Taliban Afghanistan’s government in 2001, establishment since it is forced to target groups2 are trying to strengthen their they already had logistics support bases its “own” people. The Taliban encourage grip.3 The government’s consecutive set up in the form of madaaris (religious different tribes to form their own military operations and peace deals Taliban-affiliated militias. Initially, with the militants have not produced “The ‘local’ Taliban groups joining the Taliban were mostly the desired results, and the writ of the from the Wazir sub-tribes, which state is weakening in the tribal areas. are basically Pakistani made other tribes reluctant to join the Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, militia groups that share Taliban ranks since they feared Wazir whose leadership qualities were once domination;6 the Taliban, however, questioned by the Taliban supreme ideological beliefs and changed their strategy and gave other council,4 has recently not only won the goals with the former tribes equal status.7 As a result, now confidence of Mullah Omar, but has most tribes in FATA have their own emerged as the unanimous leader of the ruling Taliban regime in Taliban-affiliated militia. Taliban in Pakistan. His opponents— Afghanistan.” both outside and inside Taliban circles— Toward Talibanization fear his increasing influence and are too Until 2004, the main focus of the weak to oppose him. Even the FATA local Taliban was protecting foreign political administration and tribal elders schools), training camps and Islamic militants, recruitment for the war cannot afford to deny his authority in charity missions. They were also able in Afghanistan, military training North and South Waziristan. The same to count on sympathies from the local and counter-operations against the situation prevails in other agencies population. To maintain control in these Pakistani government. Baitullah of FATA, where Baitullah Mehsud’s areas, they exploited these sympathies Mehsud began enforcing Taliban-brand allies are enjoying similar powers. and distributed large sums of money Shari`a in South Waziristan in 2004. to establish their networks. When the He punished criminals, which made 1 As many as 40 groups have joined Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistani government deployed the him popular among common tribesmen Pakistan (TTP) headed by Baitullah Mehsud. Other ma- military into the region to stop their who welcomed an enforcement jor groups/leaders still maintaining their independent infiltration, al-Qa`ida and the Taliban mechanism. In his first peace deal with 8 integrity are Lashkar-i-Islami in Khyber Agency, Qari supreme council encouraged Pakistan’s the government in February 2005, he Gul Bahadar in North Waziristan, Maulvi Nazir in South local Taliban elements, with whom received assurances that he would be Waziristan, Dr. Ismail’s group in Bajaur Agency and lo- they had a long affiliation, to establish allowed to enforce Shari`a in the area in 5 cal militants in Dara Adam Khel. their militias. The “local” Taliban exchange for not sending his militants 2 The statistics are based on data collected by the Pak are basically Pakistani militia groups to Afghanistan. Although he did not Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) from field and media that share ideological beliefs and abide by the agreement, it helped the reports. goals with the former ruling Taliban Taliban move forward to establish 3 These groups are operating mainly in Mardan, Kohat, regime in Afghanistan; indeed, many their influence. Other Taliban fighters Dera Ismail Khan and Nowshera Districts of the NWFP. of the former regime’s leaders were followed the footsteps of Mehsud and Most of these groups have joined the TTP. Groups in the themselves based in Pakistan before formulated a four-point strategy to gain settled areas of the NWFP are mainly formed by the dif- they took control of Afghanistan. Most control over an area. During the first step ferent jihadist organizations and tribesmen who have of the local Taliban leaders—including of the strategy, they took action against roots in FATA. Baitullah Mehsud, Maulvi Faqir, Gul 4 After the assassination of Taliban leader Nek Muham- Bahadur, Mullah Nazir, among others— 6 Rana and Gunaratna, Al-Qaeda Fights Back: Inside Paki- mad in 2004, Baitullah took charge as operational com- were affiliated with the central Taliban stani Tribal Areas. mander, but the Taliban supreme council replaced him leadership even before the September 7 The Taliban now share responsibilities among tribes with Abdullah Mehsud. For details, see Muhammad to give the impression that all groups are equal under the Amir Rana and Rohan Gunaratna, Al-Qaeda Fights Back: 5 Jamsheed Baghwan, “Interview of Mullah Nazir,” Daily Taliban banner. Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas (Islamabad: PIPS, 2007). Express, May 13, 2007. 8 Dawn, February 22, 2005.

8 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 criminals and started collecting taxes These developments have allowed the 50% of their income (through taxes and through donations to speed up their Taliban to maintain influence in the donations) to a major “jihad fund.” The operations. Second, they killed or forced tribal areas. The significant strategic fund is used to sustain Taliban activities out influential tribal elders, whom they victory that established them as major in the tribal areas and in Afghanistan.17 knew could challenge their authority. players in the region, however, occurred According to anonymous sources based Third, they created a parallel judicial after they made a tactical change in in South Waziristan, these small groups, system to resolve disputes, dispensing their operations: they began kidnapping which are mostly operating in Mohmand, quick and decisive justice. Fourth, they security and state officials. Although Orakzai, Tank, Bannu and other settled organized their administration on a suicide attacks on security forces areas, are becoming involved in criminal non-tribal basis; they appointed trusted played a role in demoralizing security activities—especially ransoms, and men,9 irrespective of whether they personnel, the kidnapping strategy taxing transport and trade—to achieve belonged to a local tribe.10 elevated the Taliban into a position to negotiate with the government on their Their strategy eroded the traditional concept own terms and to foster the release of “As the Taliban’s of collective responsibility, which adversely arrested militants. Independent sources confidence grows, they are affected the political administration. Other estimate that the Taliban kidnapped actors who could create ideological or more then 1,000 security force personnel expanding their territorial tactical challenges for them were treated and state officials during 2007, and in control.” harshly, especially Non-Governmental return more than 500 militants were Organizations (NGO) and formal and released. Kidnappings are a major factor modern educational institutions. behind the ongoing peace talks between Today, these Taliban groups have the government and the Taliban. their financial goals. These same imposed a ban on NGOs, have targeted sources claimed that these groups also electronics shops and attacked schools, The Taliban’s Expanding Domain kidnap and ransom unpopular wealthy especially female institutions. During As the Taliban’s confidence grows, tribal elders and businessmen. they are expanding their territorial “Kidnappings are a major control. Today, they have established Threat of Infighting strongholds in Bajaur, Waziristan, Although Baitullah has emerged as a factor behind the ongoing Mohmand, Khyber and Orakzai Agencies powerful Taliban leader, many other peace talks between the in FATA, and in Swat, Dara Adam Khel, local Taliban groups have still not joined Tank, Bannu, Mardan, Lakki Marwat the TTP, especially Lashkar-i-Islami in government and the and Dera Ismail Khan in the NWFP. Khyber, Mullah Nazir’s tribal militia Taliban.” in South Waziristan and Gul Bahadar’s Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have militia in North Waziristan. provided shelter to small groups, which are working under the command of The TTP is trying to bring these groups January to May 2008, they attacked as Baitullah Mehsud.15 Mehsud is trying into its fold and is also threatening them many as 29 schools, of which 17 were to bond all of these groups under the of the consequences of refusal. They educational institutes for girls.11 From loyalty of Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s are particularly interested in Khyber 2006 until February 2007, the Taliban supreme leader. Every group that wants Agency, which is a resourceful area for killed 61 teachers,12 and 25 local and to join the TTP must take an oath of generating funds and is where Mangal foreign NGOs were forced to halt their commitment to Shari`a enforcement and Bagh, the leader of Lashkar-i-Islami, operations and return to Islamabad.13 loyalty to Mullah Omar.16 Through this has been strengthening his position Twenty-four alleged U.S. and Pakistani arrangement, Mehsud wins the favor of and wants to expand his network and government spies were killed during the the Taliban supreme council on the one influence to all of Khyber and the past six months.14 hand, and on the other hand establishes border areas, such as Hangu District his credibility, making it difficult for and Orakzai Agency. Anonymous 9 Khalid Aziz, “Impact of 9/11 War on Tribal Society,” groups to resist his leadership. His sources claim that the TTP assigned The News, June 1, 2008. strategy so far has been successful; he Haji Namdar, the chief of Amr bil Maroof 10 All of the area’s tribes are represented in the Taliban. is generating revenues in addition to wa Nahi Anil Munkar (Promotion of Virtue The Taliban use tribal identity to motivate people, but in human resources, the latter of which and Prevention of Vice) from Orakzai the administrative structure avoid emphasizing tribal he is using to support the insurgency in Agency to start a campaign to achieve connections as they consider these differences against Afghanistan. control over the area. To respond to the teachings of Islam. this threat, Mangal Bagh sent a suicide 11 This information is drawn from a PIPS database. The The TTP has imposed conditions on bomber to kill Haji Namdar, but Namdar figures were collected from media reports. all its affiliated groups to contribute 12 Massoud Ansari, “‘Jihad’ Against Female Education,” Newsline, March 2007. 15 For more on Tehrik-i-Taliban, see Hassan Abbas, “A 17 NWFP Governor Owais Ahmad Ghani claims that 13 “Taliban Warned NGOs to Leave or Face Consequenc- Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel 1:2 Baitullah is spending around three billion rupees annu- es,” Daily Islam, May 13, 2007. (2008). ally on procuring weapons, equipment, vehicles, treating 14 This information is drawn from a PIPS database. The 16 This information is drawn from interviews of sources wounded militants and supporting the families of killed figures were collected from media reports. in the tribal areas. militants. See Daily Times, May 30, 2008.

9 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 escaped.18 Local sources also argue that The Demise of the Abu Special Forces have rotated in and out if the TTP fails to consolidate control of the southern Philippines where they over competing factions, this will Sayyaf Group in the provide training and intelligence for encourage other small groups to revolt Southern Philippines their AFP counterparts. against it. By Zachary Abuza The capture and killing of several ASG Although the Taliban are rapidly leaders in 2002 actually had a backlash: increasing control in Pakistan’s since launching a major offensive Janjalani’s younger brother, Khadaffy, tribal areas, it may be the ideal time against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in consolidated a degree of power and to exacerbate the group’s internal August 2006, the Armed Forces of the re-oriented the group back toward its divisions to defuse or at least weaken Philippines (AFP) have dealt the group ideological principles. At the same their rising power and influence. The a number of crippling blows. While time, the members of the Indonesian- government, however, does not look members of the ASG are still at large, the dominated terrorist organization, serious in exploiting these rifts and is frequency and lethality of their attacks instead focusing on the strategy of peace have dropped precipitously since the deals, which may benefit the Taliban first quarter of 2007, when several top “Fleeing the authorities more since these deals allow them to commanders were killed. The ASG lack and short of funds, the gain guarantees for Shari`a enforcement any semblance of central leadership and for the continuation of the jihad in at this point. Indeed, their continued ASG is a diminished Afghanistan. existence seems to be more due to the terrorist threat.” AFP’s failings than to any concerted Muhammad Amir Rana is an expert on effort to regroup. Moreover, the ASG terrorism and regional strategic issues. appears short on financial resources He has served in senior positions in and has reverted back to spates of Jemaah Islamiyah, based in MILF prestigious English and Urdu newspapers kidnappings for ransom, effectively camps, established ties with the ASG. and research institutes. He has authored jettisoning what little ideological By 2003, all kidnappings had ceased, several books on the phenomenon of Islamic pretensions the group ever had. and starting in 2004 the ASG and JI had militancy. His book, A to Z of Jihad begun a new wave of terrorist bombings Organizations in Pakistan, is considered Background from Mindanao to Manila, prompting the first serious attempt to unfold the Formed in 1991 by a veteran of the several offensives by government jihadist organizations’ structures, Afghan jihad, Abdurrajak Janjalani, the forces. An AFP bombing of a MILF safe networks, internal affairs, disputes and ASG developed as a small-scale terrorist house in the Liguasan Marsh where internal divisions. Currently, he is serving organization committed to establishing several ASG and JI members were holed as director of the Pak Institute for Peace an Islamic state in the Sulu archipelago.1 up prompted the MILF to oust them.2 By Studies (PIPS), based in Islamabad, Yet, unlike the larger Moro National January 2005, top JI members Dulmatin Pakistan. PIPS is an independent, not- Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro and Umar Patek were based with the for-profit, non-governmental research Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the ASG in Jolo. and advocacy think-tank. An initiative of ASG was decidedly sectarian in its leading Pakistani scholars, researchers and killings. The group attacked churches Operation Ultimatum began in August journalists, PIPS conducts wide-ranging and kidnapped or killed Christian 2006 and continues to this day, research and analysis of political, social priests or missionaries. By 1996-1998, although the real operational tempo and religious conflicts that have a direct the group had been seriously degraded diminished by mid-2007. U.S. military bearing on both national and international with the loss of their al-Qa`ida advisors and analysts were surprised security. funding and the death of their leader, that the AFP was able to maintain the Abdurrajak. From 1996-2002, the Abu offensive on Jolo Island for as long Sayyaf were no more than a group of as they did. In all, eight battalions well-armed kidnappers, driven by profit of AFP and Philippine Marines were rather than ideological fervor. Although deployed. Five years of U.S. training they gained international notoriety in and assistance began to bear fruit and 2000-2001 with several high-profile for the first time joint inter-service raids and large-scale kidnappings on operations were showing real gains. In Philippine and Malaysian dive resorts, September 2006 and March 2007, two they remained a criminal threat. The top leaders, Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu 2001 hostage taking of an American Solaiman, were killed.3 Since then, the missionary couple and the beheading ASG has fallen into a tail spin. of another American citizen were the casus belli for the U.S. intervention in the southern Philippines. Since then, U.S. 2 “Istiada Bte Oemar Sovie Interview,” Philippine Na- tional Police, November 9, 2006. 1 For more, see Zachary Abuza, “Balik Terrorism: The 3 Zachary Abuza, “On the Defensive: Rebels Lose 18 “Khyber Agency, Suicide Attack in Mosque, 3 Killed, Return of the Abu Sayyaf,” Strategic Studies Institute Ground in the Southern Philippines,” Jane’s Intelligence 18 Injured,” Daily Jang, May 2, 2008. Monograph, September 1, 2005. Review, April 1, 2007.

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Current State of the ASG ASG operative was arrested en route facility in Zamboanga that killed three While a handful of press reports4 and to Manila where he was ordered to and wounded 18.12 What is all the analysts5 asserted that the ASG had stage diversionary attacks. The most more remarkable is that due to being appointed the Middle East-trained spectacular attack in the past year was constantly on the run, the ASG has been Yasser Igasan as their new leader, there the November 13, 2007 bombing-cum- unable to leverage the technical bomb- was no evidence to support this claim. assassination of Basilan Congressman making expertise of two JI operatives Igasan had been in Saudi Arabia since Wahab Akbar, a former member of the implicated in the 2002 Bali bombing— 2001 studying religion and fundraising ASG who had become an outspoken Dulmatin and Umar Patek—who have for Moro causes. An April 2008 press opponent against them.8 In February been with the ASG since early 2005. report from the Philippines later denied 2008, two suspected ASG operatives that Igasan had become the group’s were arrested in Davao Oriental with The AFP has engaged the ASG in a new chieftain, and Philippine security small number of fierce encounters. Two officials acknowledged that the ASG “What is more troubling is police were killed in Jolo in January “haven’t been able to come up with a 2008. At the end of that month, a single, influential leader who can unite that clashes with the ASG pitched battle in Tawi-Tawi led to the the different factions.”6 Some of the on Basilan, which had been death of Wahab Opao, as well as reports remaining ASG leaders still at large that JI operative Dulmatin was killed.13 include: clear of the ASG for several Although a body was later exhumed and years, are now drawing the DNA tested, U.S. officials have failed - Isnilon Totoni Hapilon, alias Salahuddin to conclude whether the body was in or Abu Mus`ab AFP into battles with the fact Dulmatin’s. Between February and - Radullan Sahiron, alias Kumander Putol MILF.” April, nearly 10 soldiers and marines - Umbra Abu Jumdail, alias Dr. Abu Pula were killed in clashes on Jolo. What is - Albader Parad more troubling is that clashes with the - Osman, alias Usman or Rizal ASG on Basilan, which had been clear - Gumbahali Jumdail an Indonesian JI member, Baihaqi. On of the ASG for several years, are now - Ustadz Hatta Haipe March 1, a homemade bomb ripped drawing the AFP into battles with the - Tahil Sali through a bar near an army base on Jolo, MILF, who maintain a camp in Tipo- - Abu Sofian wounding six people. In mid-April, two Tipo. In July 2007, 14 AFP were killed, - Suhod Tanadjalan, alias Kumander Suhod bombs fashioned from 60-millimeter 10 of whom were beheaded, when the and 81-millimeter mortar shells were ASG sought refuge in the MILF camp.14 The AFP asserted that Isnilon Hapilon detonated outside of a Catholic cathedral While the MILF admitted to killing was wounded in late April in a battle and cafe in Zamboanga, although no one the AFP in self-defense, they denied that killed his son.7 Hapilon, who has was injured.9 That same month, police that they were fighting alongside the a bounty from the U.S. government arrested an ASG operative in Quezon ASG, giving them sanctuary or that of up to $5 million, remains one of City, Alpaker Said (Abu Jandal), and they had beheaded the troops.15 On May the leading figures of the movement. charged him with the attack on Wahab 25, fighting again broke out between Although Radullan Sahiron remains Akbar. Police believed he was planning government forces and MILF and ASG at large, at 71-years-old and missing a a new series of attacks.10 There were combatants in Basilan, leaving six AFP limb the AFP no longer see him as an many other small bombings in central dead. Again, the MILF denied any ASG active leader. Umbra Abu Jumdail (Abu Mindanao in late 2007 and early 2008, presence.16 Pula) remains the second-most wanted but most have been attributed to hard figure, although Albadar Parad is often line elements of the MILF or the al- Re-Degeneration: Return to Kidnappings described as the group’s most violent Khobar extortion gang, not the ASG.11 Perhaps the most telling sign of the and dangerous commander. What is Nonetheless, the ASG is still able ASG’s current state is their degeneration clear is that there are distinct factions, to perpetrate lethal attacks, such as to kidnappings. While there were a and the ASG in no sense is a cohesive the May 29 bombing of an Air Force number of incidences in 2007, the tempo organization. has increased in the first half of 2008 8 Three others were killed and 12 wounded at the attack and money has become the primary Fleeing the authorities and short on the congress. See “Rep. Wahab Akbar, 2 Others Killed motive. In mid-January, a Roman of funds, the ASG is a diminished in Batasan Bomb Blast,” GMANews.tv, November 14, Catholic priest was killed in a botched terrorist threat. In September 2007, an 2007; Samira A. Gutoc, “From Sandals to Suits: Wahab kidnapping, while a teacher from the Akbar, the Rebel Turned Politician,” MindaNews.com, 4 Jim Gomez, “Militant May Lead Philippine Terrorists,” November 15, 2007. 12 “Bomb Kills Three Outside Philippine Air Base: Mili- Associated Press, March 3, 2007. 9 “Suspected al-Qaida Militants Bomb Cathedral, Bank tary,” Agence France-Presse, May 29, 2008. 5 See, for example, Taharudin Piang Ampatuan, “Abu in Zamboanga,” Sun Star, April 13, 2008. 13 “Dulmatin Died in May ‘07, Says Indon Prof,” ABS- Sayaf’s New Leader: Yasser Igasan The Religious Schol- 10 Joel Guinto, “Informant vs Abu Sayyaf Suspect Gets CBN News, February 21, 2008. ar,” RSIS Commentaries, July 9, 2007. P500,000 Reward,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 28, 14 “Militants Kill 14 Philippine Marines; Behead 10,” 6 “Abu Sayyaf Hit by Leadership, Funding Woes,” As- 2008. Agence France-Presse, July 11, 2007. sociated Press, April 4, 2008. 11 For more on al-Khobar, see Zachary Abuza, “Criminal 15 Joel Guinto, “AFP Files Protest vs MILF over Basi- 7 Joel Guinto, “Abu Sayyaf Leader Hapilon, Son Wound- Gangs in the Southern Philippines,” Jane’s Intelligence Di- lan Attack,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 26, 2008. ed—Military,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 1, 2008. gest, April 10, 2008. 16 Ibid.

11 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 parochial school was taken hostage. Part of the problem is that the of the Islamic Conference.23 The The teacher was released in late March operational tempo of the AFP is down government at first refused to attend after his family paid a 200,000 peso considerably from 2007, when 127 the talks, citing the ongoing peace ($4,880) ransom. In March, a South ASG were killed and 38 captured.21 The process with the MILF, and since then Korean and Filipino were abducted. In AFP has a tendency to not hold on to has attended but been non-committal. early April, ASG members kidnapped territory it has captured. In mid-April The parallel set of peace talks with the a Department of Education official and 2008, the Philippine Army disregarded MILF has stalled since the November several teachers. On April 10, ASG the ASG as a threat and withdrew a 2007 breakthrough on the issue of gunmen released seven persons they large number of their forces from Jolo, ancestral domain. In the end, the AFP abducted separately. On May 28, a leaving the bulk of operations with the and hardliners in the government have Filipino businessman in Zamboanga marines. refused to endorse what government was abducted.17 In all of these cases, the negotiators agreed on. Malaysia captives were released after ransoms A more cynical answer is that the AFP has since begun withdrawing their were paid, suggesting that the ASG is has little intention of finishing the job peacekeepers from Mindanao, and short of funds. since that would end the pipeline of cease-fire violations are increasing.24 U.S. training and military assistance, Frustration on the part of all the various What concerns Philippine officials most which would force the funds allocated Moro ethnic groups is palpable, and few about the trend is that the ASG seem to by the government in Manila to actually have any faith that the government ever be planning a new wave of high profile make it down to front-line troops. The negotiates in sincerity. kidnappings of tourists. On March 13, a suspected Indonesian member While all three groups have failed to of JI and ASG member were arrested “What concerns Philippine develop a common program or platform, on the resort island of Boracay, where officials most about the at the tactical level of autonomous field authorities assert they were “casing” commanders, there is considerable hotels and bars.18 Most recently, on trend is that the ASG seem cooperation. Although this has helped June 8 Ces Drilon, a popular senior to be planning a new wave keep the ASG alive, they are clearly a reporter for ABS-CBN, was kidnapped diminished threat. by suspected ASG militants; a ransom is of high-profile kidnappings being demanded for her release.19 of tourists.” Dr. Zachary Abuza, Professor of Political Science at Simmons College, specializes How Does the ASG Survive? in Southeast Asian politics and security Into the eighth year of U.S. training issues. He is a graduate of Trinity College and hundreds of millions of dollars in campaign against institutionalized and received his MALD and Ph.D. from the military aid, not to mention the bulk corruption in the AFP has not been Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He of USAID funding being concentrated as impressive. As the recent State is the author of a number of books, including in Sulu and Mindanao, why have the Department report on terrorism noted, Muslims, Politics and Violence in ASG not been finished off? The current “Limited financial resources, inadequate Indonesia (Routledge, 2006), Conspiracy order of battle only puts them at 300- salaries, corruption, low morale, of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern 400 people. Although the terrain is limited cooperation between police and Thailand and its Implications for very rugged, the AFP has considerable prosecutors, and other problems in law Southeast Asian Security (U.S. Institute intelligence being provided from the enforcement have hampered bringing of Peace, 2008) and Militant Islam in United States. People in Jolo, at first terrorists to justice.”22 Southeast Asia (Lynne Rienner, 2003). His resistant to the American presence, monograph, Balik Terrorism: The Return have been more receptive due to the Yet, the ASG is also the beneficiary of of the Abu Sayyaf Group, was published civic action and medical missions being a government that has never tried to by the U.S. Army War College’s Security conducted. More intelligence is coming establish a holistic solution for its Moro Studies Institute in 2005. A study of Jemaah from tips from the local community troubles, instead killing operatives Islamiyah’s overt strategy of engaging in who are increasingly tired of the ASG’s as they appear and implementing a social welfare and charitable works, Jemaah nihilism. Moreover, the United States divide and conquer policy toward the Islamiyah and the Inverse Triangle, is due to has provided more than $10 million three disparate rebel groups. In March be published in 2008. since 2001 for information leading to 2007, MNLF commanders in Jolo and arrests of ASG members.20 Zamboanga quit the peace process and attacked government forces. Habier 17 Al Jacinto, “Businessman Abducted in Zamboanga – Malik joined up with the ASG in Jolo, Reports,” GMANews.tv, May 27, 2008. in effect doubling their size, because 18 “Bali Bombing Suspect Held in Boracay resort,” Gulf the government had failed to implement News, March 27, 2008. the 1996 Tripoli Accords or attend the 19 “TV News Reporter, Crew Missing in Philippines,” Tripartite Talks with the Organization CNN, June 11, 2008. 23 “AFP Bares P1-M Bounty for Malik, Junks Ceasefire 20 Angelo L. Gutierrez, “US Spent Over $10M for Fili- 21 This data was provided in the State Department’s Call,” ABS-CBN, April 18, 2008. pino Tipsters vs Islamic Militants,” ABS-CBN, May 5, 2007 Philippine Country Report. 24 Sean Yoong, “Malaysia Blames RP for Stalled Peace 2008. 22 Ibid. Talks,” Associated Press, May 3, 2008.

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When to Confront It is likely that the Iraqi government government.5 In it, they deplore the will make similar requests for military accusations by government sources of Mahdists: A Challenge for assistance in the future. Before taking links to the Jund al-Sama’ movement the U.S. Military action against discontented Shi`a, and former Ba`athists. They present however, the U.S. armed forces should their movement as essentially a By Reidar Visser assess the relevant theological issues fundamentalist Shi`a one, critical of the and whether actual security risks are ulama, but focusing on a “return to the one of the most extraordinary uses of involved. sources,” “the holy books [the Qur’an], U.S. air power in Iraq took place on the traditions of the Prophet and the January 18 and 19, 2008, when Iraqi The Background of the Ahmad al-Hasan ‘heritage’ (turath) of the Shiites.” Their forces involved in armed confrontations Movement aim is to prepare for the return of the in Basra and Nasiriyya called in air Soon after the 2008 incident, the two Mahdi, “which has been promised both support and U.S. jets flew over the Mahdist groups became mixed up in in Islam, Christianity and Judaism.” As battlefields in a show of support. In the Western media. There is, however, an example of comparable haraka islahiyya itself, this kind of action may seem reason to believe that the cells that (reformist movements), they draw unremarkable; however, the identity of were targeted in 2008 had developed attention to the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the group targeted by the Iraqi forces quite independently of the Najaf group. the West. It is noteworthy that in this raises important questions about the Styling themselves as “followers of declaration they play down another type of “anti-terrorism” operations Ahmad al-Hasan al-Yamani,” the group theme that had been prominent in into which U.S. forces in Iraq are had a visible presence in Basra since at previous public pronouncements: the getting drawn. In this case, the focus supposed imminence of the return of of the offensive was a group whose the Mahdi, and the concomitant claims ideology sets it apart from followers of “This was not the first to a special, divine role for their leader, mainstream Shi’ism primarily because time U.S. forces have Ahmad al-Hasan, as the “guardian” of it believes the Hidden Imam—the Shi`a the Mahdi.6 leader who disappeared in 874 AD but backed up the Nuri al- who theoretically still holds all power Maliki government against As for the accusations of targeting the among the Shi`a—may be about to ulama, the group members admit that they appear.1 internal enemies who do not support the higher clergy among subscribe to unorthodox the Shi`a, but at the same time they offer This was not the first time U.S. a theoretically grounded explanation for forces have backed up the Nuri al- interpretations of Shi`a this. In their view, the standard Shi`a Maliki government against internal Islam.” practice of total surrender to a qualified enemies who subscribe to unorthodox cleric (mujtahid) in questions of Islamic interpretations of Shi`a Islam. One law is misguided. “Emulating a cleric” year earlier, in January 2007, a similar (taqlid), they say, is not wajib (obligatory), group had been targeted in the Najaf least 2005.3 In the subsequent period and the payment of religious taxes to area. In this prior confrontation, it remained active in Basra and the anyone other than the infallible imams hundreds of people lost their lives far south, gaining adherents among (of whom only the twelfth and hidden and scores were arrested. The Iraqi former Sadrists and religious students, one is still alive) would be wrong. government accused the “cult members” especially in Basra and Nasiriyya. In According to the group, rather than involved—also known as Jund al-Sama’ the wake of the 2007 clash in Najaf, consulting the ulama, the people should or the “Soldiers of Heaven”—of having the group vigorously distanced itself read the Qur’an for themselves in order planned an attack on Najaf in which from the Jund al-Sama’ group, claiming to “find out about the truth.” They ask: leading members of the clergy would they disagreed over interpretations of “Is this really deviation (inhiraf)?” The be liquidated. Independent researchers how and when the Hidden Imam would real reason for them being targeted, familiar with the (still undisclosed) reappear.4 in their view, is political, and they court records of the subsequent trial single out `Abd al-`Aziz al-Hakim of against the group, however, dismiss In a statement dating from around the Islamic Supreme Council for Iraq it as a farcical attempt to implicate January 19, 2008, which was accessible for having instigated the dispatch of a political enemies in criminal activity. for a few hours on the group’s website, special force from Baghdad to the south Once more, the group singled out by the www.almahdyoon.org, before it was to have them arrested. Iraqi government was characterized by closed down, the followers of Ahmad messianic beliefs related to the return al-Hasan gave their side of the story The rhetoric of the followers of Ahmad of the Hidden Imam, the Mahdi.2 behind the confrontation with the Iraqi al-Hasan clarifies why the leading Shi`a ulama may consider them a threat.

1 “Iraqi Troops Battle Messianic Cult in Southern Iraq, 3 An early, peaceful demonstration by this group was 5 Undated statement from www.almahdyoon.org. At Least 68 Killed,” Associated Press, January 19, 2008. covered by al-Manara on August 2, 2005. 6 The more assertive position is described for instance in 2 Ali Allawi, “Millenarianism, Mahdism and Terrorism: 4 Reidar Visser, “Ashura in Iraq: Enter Mahdism?” a statement by Ahmad al-Hasan dated 21 Rabi al-Thani The Case of Iraq,” presentation at The Jamestown Foun- January 29, 2007, available at www.historiae.org/mahd- 1426/May 30, 2005, published on www.almahdyooon. dation, October 9, 2007. ism.asp. org.

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The very fundament of power of the One competing interpretation of the Challenges for the U.S. Armed Forces Shi`a ulama is the dichotomy present appearance of Mahdist groups in The fundamental question today is what in Usuli Shi’ism (the main, orthodox contemporary Iraq that should be purpose the U.S. armed forces are serving branch of Shi’ism) which divides all rejected immediately is that of an by volunteering to adjudicate on these Shi`a into two categories: a tiny elite “Iranian conspiracy.” It is true that rivalries in the name of the “war on of clerics qualified to interpret the there are interesting parallels between terrorism.” The historical parallels suggest Islamic law (mujtahidun), and the vast the stronger emphasis on Mahdism in that this is first and foremost a theological majority of people unqualified in both countries in recent years. Yet, to dispute about the timing of the return of jurisprudential matters, called muqallids see Iranian hands behind groups like the Mahdi in which the stronger party (the because they have to “emulate” a Ahmad al-Hasan would be a mistake Iraqi government, under pressure to be mujtahid. This dichotomy crystallized in in two ways. In the first place, many seen as the upholder of orthodox Shi’ism the 18th century and has since proven of his followers come from some of and desperately trying to reach out to the remarkably durable. Any ideas about the most anti-Iranian circles in Shi`a higher-ranking clergy of Najaf) concocts “people going back to the sources Iraq, and Hasan himself has attacked inflated terrorism-related charges against themselves” (sometimes described as Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah a possible threat to the monopoly of the “neo-Akhbarism,” after the Akhbari Khamenei, much in the way he has established clergy. school which originally was the main attacked Grand Ayatollah Ali al- enemy of the Usulis) are seen as a direct Just as the Shi`a ulama in the 19th century challenge to it; it could potentially lead quite unscrupulously called on the Ottoman to conditions such as those seen in Sunni “The fundamental question state to deal with Shi`a dissenters by Islam, where the established clergy lost today is what purpose appealing to a language the Ottomans would control completely in the late 19th and understand (that of Sunni orthodoxy), the 20th centuries when a similar “back to the U.S. armed forces are Iraqi government seems to have no qualms the sources” trend became ascendant. serving by volunteering in enlisting U.S. support for combating Shi`a who dare challenge the orthodox Historical Parallels to adjudicate on these mainstream, again using language that The clearest historical parallel to what rivalries in the name of the would be familiar to the military power is currently going on inside Iraq’s whose services are sought (terrorism, or Shi`a community can be found in the ‘war on terrorism.’” al-Qa`ida involvement). Details about the situation in Iraq’s holy cities in the mid- recent operations against Iraqi Mahdists 19th century. In that period, numerous remain sketchy, but the timing (in both similar challenges against the monopoly cases during the Shi`a holy month of of the Usuli Shi`a clergy were launched: Sistani, and has specifically called for Muharram) strongly suggests that this Shaykhism, Babism and Baha’ism. his abdication.9 Second, this would was primarily an attempt by Shi`a leaders History shows that there were hardly overlook the considerable historical to enforce sectarian orthodoxy during any limits to what the orthodox ulama roots of Mahdism in the far south of Iraq. testing times. If similar requests for U.S. would do to fend off these challenges. Similar movements have mushroomed military help should materialize in the For example, in the 1820s, in an attempt in the south and the adjacent areas future—and reports out of Iraq suggest to have the founder of the Shaykhi school in Iran and the Arabian Peninsula for that there is no shortage of discontented (Ahmad al-Ahsa’i, who claimed to have centuries, starting with revolutionary Shi`a prepared to explore the Mahdist access to the Hidden Imam) executed movements and slave revolts in the option—it would be prudent for the U.S. or deported, Shi`a ulama contacted the early centuries of Islam, followed by the armed forces to sort out theological and Sunni authorities in Baghdad, alleging emergence of Mahdist principalities such security-related issues before the label of that the Shaykhi leader was guilty of as the Mushasha dynasty in the Iranian- “terrorism” is taken at face value. having cursed the three first caliphs (a Iraqi borderlands in the 15th century, and common Shi`a practice).7 Similarly, in culminating with the triad of Shaykhism, Dr. Reidar Visser is a Research Fellow at the 1846, when the Babi movement emerged Babism and Baha’ism in the 19th century— Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (and its leader presented claims to the first of which had its roots in the Shi`a in Oslo and editor of the Iraq website www. have privileged access to the Mahdi as areas of al-Hasa (in the eastern parts of historiae.org. His writings on the subject of a “gate” or bab, not entirely unlike the modern-day Saudi Arabia) and later gave federalism and regionalism in southern Iraq “guardian” role claimed by Ahmad al- birth to a substantial Shaykhi community and Iraqi nationalism among the Shi’ites Hasan), Najaf ulama showed no hesitancy in Basra that still exists today.10 include the monograph Basra, the Failed in facilitating his arrest and handing Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism him over to Ottoman authorities in in Southern Iraq (Transaction Publishers, Baghdad with a demand for the death 2006) and, edited with Gareth Stansfield, penalty.8 An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a 9 “Call Number Two,” undated message posted on a now Federal Democracy? (Columbia University defunct website. Press, 2007). Dr. Visser studied history 7 Meir Litvak, Shi‘i Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: 10 Sami al-Badri, Shubhat wa-rudud (Qom: al-Matba’a and comparative politics at the University The Ulama of Najaf and Karbala (Cambridge: Cambridge al-Shari`a, 2000), p. 543; Reidar Visser, Basra, the Failed of Bergen and received a Ph.D. in Middle University Press, 1998), p. 59. Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq Eastern Studies from the University of 8 Ibid., pp. 144-46. (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2005), pp. 27–30. Oxford.

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Constructing Takfir: accept takfir as necessary and the broader he eschewed a radical interpretation he is able to construct his definition of of Islam and jihad.11 While in the From `Abdullah `Azzam takfir. training camps of Afghanistan, `Azzam to Djamel Zitouni interacted with jihadist leaders from Dr. `Abdullah `Azzam around the globe as he continued By Shane Drennan `Abdullah `Azzam is considered to be espousing his messages of defense and the godfather of the Afghan jihad. His resistance. It was in this context that he on april 2, 2008, jihadist websites posted writings calling for the unification of produced his two most famous works an “open interview” with Dr. Ayman the umma through defensive jihad, and on jihad: Defence of Muslim Lands and Join the al-Zawahiri wherein the al-Qa`ida his Maktab al-Khidmat (Services Bureau), Caravan. leader fielded a number of often hostile created the organizational archetype for questions. The first, and arguably the the current manifestation of the global Definition of Takfir most important, concerned al-Qa`ida’s Salafi-jihad and al-Qa`ida specifically. `Azzam did not excommunicate invocation of takfir (excommunicating or Although `Azzam’s Salafi-jihadi ideology Muslims. For him, defending Muslim declaring a Muslim an apostate, which was considered radical by most lands from invasion by kuffar (infidels is punishable by death): academics, his eschatological grounding or nonbelievers) and uniting the umma made him relatively moderate compared Excuse me, Mr. Zawahiri, but to many of the jihadists4 who answered who is it who is killing with his invitation to Afghanistan,5 especially “A lack of formal religious Your Excellency’s blessing the regarding takfir. training will likely lead innocents in Baghdad, Morocco and Algeria? Do you consider the Religious Training a Salafi-jihadi leader to killing of women and children to `Azzam enveloped himself in Islam and accept takfir as a valid be Jihad?...Why have you—to this Shari`a throughout his entire life. Even day—not carried out any strike as a child he was considered “serious” and necessary doctrinal in Israel? Or is it easier to kill and “pious.”6 His higher education component…the less Muslims in the markets?1 focus was Shari`a, earning a bachelor’s7 and a master’s degree8 in Shari`a religious training a This article explores the correlation from Shari`a College at Damascus jihadist leader has, the between religious training and the University, and a Ph.D. in fiqh (Islamic construction of the definition of takfir jurisprudence) from the renowned al- greater his proclivity for leaders of Salafi-jihadi movements.2 Azhar University in Cairo.9 His level to excommunicate and This is established using four cases of of scholarly authority is rare among contemporary Salafi-jihadi leaders: Salafi-jihadis, especially those directly kill more categories of `Abdullah `Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, engaged in physical warfare.10 Muslims.” Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi and Djamel Zitouni. For each case, the individual’s `Azzam continued to self-reinforce level and type of religious training his radical Salafist views as a lecturer. and his most recent definition of takfir He taught at the University of Jordan was paramount, and takfir only served are outlined and analyzed.3 Overall, in Amman and lectured at Abdul Aziz to create fitna (division). His opinion of the evidence suggests that the less University in Saudi Arabia where takfiri jihadists suggests that a deficiency religiosity a jihadist leader has gained in formal training in Shari`a may via formal training, personal piety, 4 See, for example, `Abdullah `Azzam, Fi Dhilal Surat result in expansive violence through and/or the duration of his adherence to at-Tawbah (place, publisher and date unknown). Also see incorrect or incomplete understandings Salafist Islam, the more likely he is to Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (London: Penguin of Islam: “They, because of their lack of Books, 2006), p. 130. knowledge, are simply youth with much 1 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “The Open Meeting with Shaykh 5 For further commentary on how misunderstandings zeal, and the hearts of these youth were 12 Ayman al-Zawahiri,” al-Sahab, April 2, 2008. of Islam lead to extremist views, see Yusuf al-Qaradawi, made to follow their desires.” `Azzam’s 2 This article does not analyze the practical application Islamic Awakening: Between Rejection and Extremism Islamic training even trumped political of takfir by these individuals or their lieutenants. In prac- (Washington, D.C.: The International Institute of Islamic pressures of infighting among the 13 tice, takfir often varies from the definition created by the Thought, 1991). mujahidin in Afghanistan, essentially leader of an organization. 6 `Abdullah `Azzam, Defence of Muslim Lands (place, deriving an order of combat precedence 3 The most recent definition was chosen because such publisher and date unknown). from the scriptures placing jihad concepts are epistemologically constructed, resulting 7 Andrew McGregor, “Jihad and the Rifle Alone: ‘Abdul- against occupiers over reforming those 14 in definitional variations throughout one’s lifetime. For lah ‘Azzam and the Islamist Revolution,” Journal of Con- led astray from Islam. example, Kant discusses the construction of concepts flict Studies 23:2 (2003): pp. 92-113. through experience and the reconstruction of those con- 8 `Azzam, Defence of Muslim Lands. 11 Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc. (New York: Free Press, cepts once they are applied outside of the previous limits 9 McGregor, “Jihad and the Rifle Alone: ‘Abdullah ‘Az- 2001), p. 50, p. 55. of experience. For a full explanation of the construction zam and the Islamist Revolution,” pp. 92-113. 12 `Azzam, Fi Dhilal Surat at-Tawbah. of language and definitions, see Jerome Bruner, Acts of 10 While a number of Salafist scholars with credentials 13 Wright, The Looming Tower, pp. 131-137. Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, similar to `Azzam advocate jihad, none have physically 14 See `Azzam’s response to the question “Do we fight 1990). taken up arms themselves. alongside Muslims that are below acceptable levels of Is-

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Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri al-Zawahiri also often references or unavoidably.”25 Lastly, he considers Ayman al-Zawahiri, commonly referred Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Kathir to all Shi`a apostate and pejoratively to as al-Qa`ida’s second-in-command, give his writings a sense of timeless describes Shi`a Islam as “a religious is one of the most influential leaders jurisprudence.20 Since 1986, al-Zawahiri school based on excess and falsehood” of the current Salafi-jihadi movement. has been undoubtedly influenced by that has cooperated with the enemies of He has issued numerous communiqués other radical Salafi-jihadi ideologues Islam throughout history.26 Although concerning every front of the global (mostly within al-Qa`ida’s ranks) al-Zawahiri does consider a great Salafi-jihad and has campaigned to unify beginning with Sayyid Imam (Dr. Fadl) number of Muslims apostate, he is Salafi-jihadi movements worldwide and Dr. Ahmed el-Wed.21 His knowledge nevertheless selective in his definition of under the banner of al-Qa`ida.15 of historic Islamic rulings suggests that takfir compared to many jihadist leaders Recently, al-Zawahiri’s authority has al-Zawahiri has a good comprehension of less familiar (although for al-Zawahiri come under attack for al-Qa`ida’s fiqh through personal studies, although familiarity was gained informally) with expansive invocation of takfir.16 his neo-scripturalist hermeneutic the nuances of Islam, Shari`a and fiqh. approach has likely been prejudiced by Religious Training his combat surroundings. Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi Having no collegiate level religious Although Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi was training, al-Zawahiri’s understanding Definition of Takfir killed by U.S. forces in 2006, he remains of Islam is derived mostly from the Al-Zawahiri embraces takfir, but one of the most popular jihadist figures religiosity of his upbringing (much of maintains a relatively selective definition in contemporary history. During his few which was self-induced) and the ideas of it. He views the governments ruling years in Iraq, he amassed a force capable propagated within Islamist and jihadist over Muslim lands to be illegitimate and of controlling cities,27 engineered a organizations in which he has been apostate, to include civilian government sectarian clash that threatened a full- involved. Al-Zawahiri was raised in employees, security forces22 and any scale civil war28 and waged murder and a strict Muslim family in Egypt where persons collaborating or engaging with intimidation campaigns that continue he attended all of the daily prayers those entities.23 This is likely derived today. He is hated by most Iraqis and is at the local mosque. His adolescence from his personal historical hatred celebrated as a hero by much of the Salafi- was devoted to Islamic self-studies, for and experiences with the Egyptian jihadi community.29 Yet, for his fame, al- especially concerning fiqh and Qur’anic regime rather than an objective Zarqawi had one of the most latitudinal interpretation.17 Throughout his analysis of the situation through the and controversial definitions of takfir. education, he was not openly involved guidelines of fiqh. He also declared that in Islamist organizations; however, al- an organization, Islamist or not, which Religious Training Zawahiri confessed to being a founder participates in the political process is For the first 21 years of his life, al-Zarqawi and active member of a militant Islamist a transgressor,24 again derived from was nearly antithetical to his later cell with a violent takfiri bent as a teen18 personal differences with the Muslim jihadist self. Raised in the anti-Amman and maintained a covert affiliation with Brotherhood rather than an educated milieu of Zarqa,30 he was described as a similar groups thereafter. hermeneutic ruling. Al-Zawahiri tattooed delinquent who drank heavily, accepts a great deal of collateral damage experimented with drugs and was Several Islamists and jihadists informed in the form of “innocents,” stating, “we involved in criminal activity. Al- al-Zawahiri’s interpretation of Islam don’t kill innocents: in fact, we fight Zarqawi had no religious training until and Shari`a. Al-Zawahiri became those who kill innocents…it may be the he was 22 when he was ordered to a interested in the ideas of Sayyid Qutb case that during [targeting enemies], local mosque known for radicalism and as an adolescent and attributes much of an innocent might fall unintentionally his ideological development to Qutb’s 25 This was al-Zawahiri’s answer to the question quoted 19 writings. Typical of Salafi-jihadis, Zawahiri (Old Tappan, NJ: TLG Publications, 2006), pp. in the introduction of this essay. See al-Zawahiri, “The 47-53. Open Meeting with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri.” lamic education?” in `Azzam, Defence of Muslim Lands. 20 William McCants and Jarret Brachman, Militant Ide- 26 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al- 15 For example, in 2004 al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership ology Atlas (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Cen- Zarqawi,” July 9, 2005. was successful in incorporating the part of the militant ter, 2006), p. 13, pp. 261-274. 27 Tom Ricks, “Situation Called Dire in West Iraq,” Saudi Salafist movement and al-Zarqawi’s Jama`at al- 21 Conversations with these two individuals were likely Washington Post, September 11, 2006. Tawhid wal-Jihad under the al-Qa`ida name. Recently, the catalyst behind the expansion of al-Zawahiri’s defi- 28 Michael Howard, “Iraq Slips Towards Civil War After the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) nition of takfir. See Wright, The Looming Tower, pp. 122- Attack on Shia Shrine,” Guardian, September 11, 2006. has also changed their name in a formal allegiance to al- 126. 29 This is evidenced by the continued elation of his “her- Qa`ida. 22 For example, see al-Zawahiri’s discussion of the Iraqi oism” in jihadist forums, including a video game showing 16 For example, see al-Zawahiri, “The Open Meeting and Pakistani governments and security forces in Mans- his face beside Bin Ladin’s. See, for example, “Web Video with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri.” field, His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writ- Game Aim: ‘Kill’ Bush Characters,” CNN, September 18, 17 Montasser al-Zayyat, The Road to al-Qaeda: The Story ings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri, pp. 324-336. 2006. He was also recently featured in a series of jihad- of Bin Laden’s Right-Hand Man (London: Pluto Press, 23 U.S.A. v. Usama bin Laden et al., Southern District of ist cell phone videos released by al-Qa`ida media outlets. 2004), pp. 15-18. New York, 2001. See “Al-Qaeda Offers Cellphone Video Downloads,” USA 18 Ibid., pp. 42-46. 24 See al-Zawahiri’s numerous references to the Muslim Today, January 5, 2008. 19 See the section on Sayyid Qutb in Knights Under the Brotherhood throughout Knights Under the Prophet’s Ban- 30 Jean-Charles Brisard and Damien Martinez, Zarqawi: Prophet’s Banner, in Laura Mansfield, His Own Words: ner, in Mansfield, His Own Words: Translation and Analy- The New Face of al-Qaeda (New York: Other Press, 2005), Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al sis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri. pp. 6-9.

16 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 its relationship to the Afghan jihad.31 taught understanding of Islam and and therefore omitted from his media There, al-Zarqawi’s trajectory swung 180 jihad left al-Zarqawi to construct his constructed persona. The son of a chicken degrees and he became entrenched in own interpretation of Salafism and takfir farmer, Zitouni likely received only Salafism.32 within his combat environment. rudimentary formal religious training.41 Omar Sheikhi, a self-proclaimed Before setting out for Afghanistan Definition of Takfir GIA amir, described Zitouni’s Islamic in 1989, al-Zarqawi received a few The breadth of al-Zarqawi’s definition background as being “average.”42 He was months of religious indoctrination of takfir left few in his graces, likely undoubtedly inculcated with militant at al-Husayn Ben `Ali Mosque.33 In because his Islamic “education” was Islamist ideas during his short tenure Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi, like most wholly gained from takfiri ideologues and other “Afghan Arabs,” was taught self-studies in combat settings. Sunni “Longevity within the and further radicalized by a number politicians were excommunicated, as of Islamist scholars and ideologues were Sunni police and military, which he religion and extensive self including `Abdullah `Azzam, Abu considered “the eyes, ears and hands of studies of Shari`a outside Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Ayman the occupier.”38 Those collaborating with al-Zawahiri.34 He devoted his spare the government security apparatuses of a combat environment time to self studies of Salafi-jihadi and especially those working with has led to a more sermons and the Qur’an. In Jordan, U.S. forces were deemed traitors. after returning from Afghanistan, al- In towns controlled by al-Zarqawi’s ‘moderate’ interpretation Zarqawi continued his regimented forces in Iraq, anyone violating his of takfir.” self-studies (especially in prison35) organization’s interpretation of and strengthened his relationship Shari`a was excommunicated for their with al-Maqdisi.36 During his second transgressions.39 Lastly, al-Zarqawi trip in Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi was considered all Shi`a apostates.40 in prison for his involvement with the largely concerned with international Islamic Salvation Front (FIS),43 and operations and his training camp, an Djamel Zitouni further indoctrinated into the world of explosives and firearms training center, In the 1990s, Algeria witnessed an militant Islamism by Mustafa Bouyali, leaving little time for religious studies. extremely bloody civil war. The heart of the leader of the Algerian Armed Islamic In Iraq, al-Zarqawi was affiliated with the struggle was the Islamist opposition Movement.44 Zitouni’s religious training local Salafi-jihadi religious leaders in to the repressive incumbent government. and expertise was informed largely by addition to his continued contact with Djamel Zitouni led the Salafi-jihadi front the Afghan Arabs45 and he was further al-Maqdisi and al-Zawahiri,37 although (the Armed Islamic Group, or GIA) radicalized by the paranoid exclusivity his operational focus and tempo likely against the government from 1994 to characteristic of the GIA’s worldview. occupied most of his time. This self- 1996, continually increasing the target His reliance on the guidance of others set of apostates until the time of his with combat experience rather than 31 Brisard and Martinez, Zarqawi: The New Face of al- death. His brand of takfir was one of the institutional Shari`a education likely Qaeda, pp. 11-14. most inclusive definitions to date and allowed Zitouni to use Islam as an ex post 32 This type of radicalization, swinging from one ex- led to some of the grossest massacres of facto justification for operations rather treme to the other, is not uncommon. It is similar to the civilians in recent jihadist history. than an organizational determinant. effect of those having “found themselves” in a new reli- gion. For example, see Bernhard’s description of converts Religious Training Definition of Takfir in Brendan Bernhard, White Muslim: From L.A. to New Little is known of Zitouni’s religious Learned wholly in the context of an York...to Jihad? (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2006). scholarship, suggesting that his armed struggle, Zitouni likely molded For a broad review concerning the tendency of converts Islamic education was unimpressive his religion to fit his goals rather toward radicalism, see Thomas Robbins, Cults, Converts than his learned religion determining and Charisma: The Sociology of New Religious Movements 38 Nimrod Raphaeli, “‘The Sheikh of the Slaughterers’: his means; this allowed him to (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc., 1988). Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and the Al-Qa’ida Connection,” 33 Brisard and Martinez, Zarqawi: The New Face of al- Middle East Media Research Institute, July 1, 2005. 41 The only reported Islamic guidance Zitouni is report- Qaeda, pp. 11-14. 39 Examples of “transgressions” are women in public ed to have received came from readings of Shari`a with 34 Ibid., pp. 16-26. not wearing a hijab, shop owners selling Western music an unknown figure named Sherif Kouasmi. See Camille 35 Al-Zarqawi was sentenced to 15 years for his leader- and movies, and individuals selling or making alcohol. al-Tawil, “Lakhdaria Emir Reveals Secrets and Internal ship role in Bay`at al-Imam, a radical Salafist organiza- This information comes from the author’s interview of Liquidations of the Mountain, GIA Emir was Accused of tion aimed at overthrowing the monarchy in Jordan and Kevin Hutchinson, U.S. Marine Corps Explosives Ordi- Becoming Shiite After Some Elements Received Training establishing a Shari`a-based state. nance Disposal Sergeant, January 2005. Hutchinson was in Lebanon - Part III,” Dar al-Hayat, June 13, 2007. 36 Brisard and Martinez, Zarqawi: The New Face of al- part of the U.S. Marine force that retook Falluja in the fall 42 Ibid. Qaeda, pp. 33-41. of 2004. He relayed a detailed account by the Falluja resi- 43 Ibid. 37 Al-Zarqawi was warned and rebuked for his indis- dents of the enforcement of Shari`a there. 44 See the “Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA) Dossier,” criminate killings by both al-Zawahiri and al-Maqdisi. 40 “Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi: Collateral Killing of Mus- available from the Center for Policing Terrorism at www. See al-Zawahiri, “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi”; lims is Legitimate,” Middle East Media Research Insti- cpt-mi.org. and Nibras Kazimi, “A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: tute, June 7, 2005. It is interesting that al-Zarqawi open- 45 Evan Kohlmann, “Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi,” in Hillel Fradkin et al. eds., ly declared this in a Shi`a majority country, stating that The GIA, the GSPC and al-Qaida,” The NEFA Founda- Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 2 (2005): pp. 60-63. their “perfidy is engraved in the forehead of history.” tion, May 2007, pp. 2-3.

17 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 unapologetically kill thousands of and kill more categories of Muslims. Iran’s Shi`a Reach Out to Algerian Muslim civilians.46 Zitouni’s Longevity within the religion and concept of takfir eventually placed extensive self studies of Shari`a outside Mainstream Salafists the whole of Algerian society in one of a combat environment has led to a of two categories: GIA or apostate. more “moderate” interpretation of takfir. By Alex Vatanka Initially, government leaders, members Furthermore, individuals radicalized of the intelligentsia, government during jihad and having irreligious pasts the iranian state, politically and security forces, and collaborators were espouse extremely broad definitions spiritually led by Shi`a Ayatollah Ali determined “apostate.” Additionally, of takfir. Comparing al-Zarqawi and Khamenei, is publicly unwavering in anyone even tangentially employed Zitouni, al-Zarqawi’s personal interest its commitment to forge unity among by a state-affiliated institution was in Islam and Shari`a prior to his second Muslim countries. Tehran is again an apostate. Zitouni’s organization trip to Afghanistan versus Zitouni’s reaching out to Arab adherents of then declared all other organizations apparent sole interest in battle seems Salafism and Wahhabism, the historical (to include the FIS) illegitimate and to have given al-Zarqawi a slightly less antagonists of the Shi`a. Khamenei apostate. Having “proved” the GIA to encompassing definition of takfir. has declared the present Iranian year be the only legitimate movement, any (ending March 2009) as the Year of dissenters (and often those suspected This correlation between takfir and a National Unity and Islamic Solidarity. of dissention) were automatically lack of religious training challenges Iran’s rival for leadership in the Islamic excommunicated and killed. Finally, Salafi-jihadis’ claim to a nuanced and world, Saudi Arabia, is also emphasizing in light of the successful presidential veracious understanding of Islam. the necessity of religious dialogue. Two election in November 1995, Zitouni Given constant debate over the correct recent pan-Islamic conferences held in argued that the whole of Algerian construction and implementation of Tehran in May and in Mecca in June society “had left Islam” and should be takfir50 and noting the decline of several were aimed at lessening intra-Muslim considered apostate.47 movements due to their proclivity for differences, although in both instances killing Muslims,51 takfir is evidently an scant explicit measures to achieve this Conclusion existential determinant for Salafi-jihadi objective were produced. While there are rare instances of formally organizations. trained “pen jihadists” advocating In practice, Shi`a-majority Iran takfir,48 these cases suggest two general Shane Drennan is an analyst for the U.S. and its Arab Sunni neighbors are at trends regarding the relationship Navy. He is concurrently completing his best reluctant, and at worst unable, between religious training and takfir. master’s dissertation on Abu Mus`ab to agree on a path to religious First, a lack of formal religious training al-Suri’s “The Call for Global Islamic reconciliation between Islam’s two will likely lead a Salafi-jihadi leader Resistance” at the University of St. Andrews largest branches. Much of the recent to accept takfir as a valid and necessary in Scotland. Mr. Drennan was an Arabic publicized enthusiasm for dialogue doctrinal component. From the cases linguist in the U.S. Marine Corps in special among Islam’s various sects is above all examined, extensive formal religious operations and intelligence units with driven by political motivations aimed training has led to a rejection of takfir experience in Afghanistan (2001-2002) and at containing sectarian violence in the altogether.49 Second, the less religious Iraq (2003, 2005). He was also a terrorism Middle East. Genuine Islamic accord, training a jihadist leader has, the exercise specialist and a Red Team planner particularly among Shi`a and Sunnis, greater his proclivity to excommunicate and operator for the Department of Homeland would require the full backing of senior Security. His previous published works on religious authorities, but this has not been forthcoming. 46 Ibid., pp. 8-9. the global Salafi-jihad have been featured in 47 International Crisis Group, “Islamism, Violence, and Jane’s Intelligence Review. Salafists Travel to Iran Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page,” July 30, 2004, p. From May 4-6, 2008, the Iranian 14. This is an exaggerated form of Qutb’s declaration that authorities hosted some 850 Muslim the Muslim world has returned to jahiliyya, the state of clerics (ulama) and intellectuals from societal ignorance prior to the Prophet Muhammad’s 45 countries in Tehran for the 21st revelation of the Qur’an. annual Islamic Unity Conference.1 48 `Umar `Abd al-Rahman and Abu Qatada are two tak- The initiative had first been touted by firi “pen jihadis” having formal Islamic credentials. Even Iran’s foreign minister, Manouchehr as “pen jihadis,” these individuals seem to be exceptions 50 See Pakistani opinions of targeting the Pakistani mili- Mottaki, in December 2006 who then to the rule; to call Islamic Ph.D.s who espouse a takfiri tary and killing of Pakistani civilians in “Results of a New stated that “the Islamic Republic ideology a minority would be a gross understatement. Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Pakistan before of Iran has always called for unity Additionally, a comparison between “pen jihadis” and the February 18th Elections,” Terror Free Tomorrow, among Muslims.” Mottaki’s pledge combat leaders is difficult to make. “Pen jihadis” are able January 2008. Also, see responses to questions about was political and made on the back of to make conjecture absent any experience of physical ji- attacking civilians by those polled in Muslim countries accusations by Sunni states that the had and irrespective of practical application. in Steven Kull et al., “Muslim Public Opinion on U.S. summer 2006 war between Hizb Allah 49 Also of note is that `Azzam is the only leader of a Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda,” WorldPubli- and Lebanon was an Iranian and Shi`a Salafi-jihadi organization to have achieved a doctoral lev- cOpinion.org, April 24, 2007. el of Islamic training. While there are a few “pen jihadis” 51 For example, the GIA, al-Takfir wa’l-Hijra, and al- who espouse a takfiri cant, `Azzam is the only Ph.D. of Zarqawi’s organization are all victims of their extreme 1 “International Islamic Unity Conference Starts in Teh- Islam to have physically led an organization in battle. takfiri doctrines. ran,” Islamic Republic News Agency, May 4, 2008.

18 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 design to make inroads into the Arab Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran’s Husayn or Hasan, and Fatima al-Zahra, Sunni world. The 2006 war effectively president from 1989-1997, and presently the Prophet’s daughter. A number of hastened the deterioration in relations chairman of two of Iran’s most powerful Iranian Shi`a clergy have spoken against between Shi`a and Sunnis, the old-age political institutions—the Assembly of such trends, and warn that it effectively rift that had been violently rejuvenated Experts and the Expediency Council— amounts to kufr (disbelief), as in Islam following the fall of Saddam Hussein devoted his address to the gathering on no human being should be worshipped.6 in Iraq. As with previous pan-Muslim likely rewards Muslim countries could In relation to Sufism, or Islamic mystic gatherings in Tehran, the claim of garner if they overcame internal strife sects, the state views their unorthodox and isolated extremists.4 On May 9, and unregulated religious practices as “Much of the recent Rafsanjani continued the same line, by a challenge to the theocratic regime’s stating in a sermon that “the extremist monopoly on religious authority and publicized enthusiasm for Shi`a and Sunnis are separating two guidance, which it deems to basically dialogue among Islam’s important sections of the Muslim underpin its political legitimacy. world,” which is a “waste,” but that if various sects is above anything “disagreements in the Muslim Since 2006, for example, Iran has all driven by political world are increasing.” He then notably witnessed a number of government urged the Shi`a to rethink some of the crackdowns on Sufi orders, the first of motivations aimed at sect’s beliefs and practices, maintaining which occurred in the holy Shi`a city containing sectarian that unless re-examination first occurs of Qom in February 2006 when around among the Shi`a the gap with the Sunnis 200 people were hurt in clashes between violence in the Middle will only widen. “You can see how police, Islamist Basiji militias and Sufi East.” much Sunnis refer to the exaggerated disciples. Another Sufi place of worship statements in our books and traditions, belonging to the Nimatullahi order was and accordingly call us pagans,” he said. razed to the ground on November 11, “There are plenty of such statements,” 2007 in the western city of Boroujerd. the Iranian organizers was to provide and unless “corrective measures are Official media reported that the clashes a forum to generate debate among implemented the Sunnis will retain the came after adherents attacked a Shi`a Muslims of different sects and continue opinion that Shi`a are apostates because mosque whose clerics had been publicly to push for a charter on Islamic unity. they see their [Shi`a] imams as gods, condemning Sufism over the minaret According to Iran’s state-funded Press which is not the case.” Rafsanjani also loudspeakers.7 TV, the charter has already been signed urged Shi`a to refrain from “insulting by 2,000 Muslim scholars, a key facet [the] Prophet’s disciples, the four Others Issue an Anti-Shi`a Letter of which is the rejection of takfirism, caliphs and those who are regarded as Regardless of the nature of its a school of thought among hard line saints by Sunnis.”5 motivations, Iranian pleas for Islamic Sunnis that considers Shi’ism as heresy unity made little impression on some and sanctions violence against the Advancing the need to curtail of Saudi Arabia’s most senior Wahhabi latter.2 unorthodox Shi`a traditions and clerics. Twenty-two of them issued practices has been a constant feature of an anti-Shi`a statement on June 1 in The conference in Tehran was the theological debate in Iran, and pre- which they accused the Shi`a of abusing chaired by Ayatollah Mohammad Ali dates the present Islamist government Sunnis under their control. “If they Taskhiri, Iran’s director-general of that came to power in 1979. In recent [Shi`a] have a country, they humiliate the World Forum for the Proximity of years, however, the urgency has and exert control in their rule over Islamic Schools of Thought. Taskhiri, mounted, at least in the eyes of those Sunnis,” and specifically mentioned handpicked for the position by clergy who are loyal to the concept of conditions in Iran and Iraq. “They Ayatollah Khamenei, courted Salafist the Shi`a velayat-e faqih (Guardianship sow strife, corruption and destruction participation for the event and spoke of Jurisprudent) and the model of the of similar efforts having reduced Sunni Islamic Republic. This is due to the rise 6 Shi`a Muslims hold the following five people above “misunderstandings” of Shi`a beliefs of the popularity of Islamic mysticism all others: Prophet Muhammad, Fatima al-Zahra (his and practices and particularly in regard in Iran, and the emergence of Shi`a daughter), his son-in-law and cousin, `Ali, and his 3 to Pakistani Sunnis. At the event, no practices among some rural and poor grandsons Hasan and Husayn. See Vali Nasr, The Shia senior Salafist/Wahhabi clerics were urban communities in Iran that put Revival (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006). For an in- present, although there were Arab emphasis on revering Imams `Ali, teresting sermon on Sunni perceptions of Shi`a on this Salafist participants from countries matter, see Hojjat-ol Eslam Mehdi Daneshmand at www. such as Kuwait, the United Arab 4 “Criticizing the Extremism of the Islamic World,” youtube.com/watch?v=_HOvsFspC3M&. Danesh- Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Etemad’e Melli, May 5, 2008. mand decries some Shi`a practices that have emerged 5 See summary of speech by Voice of the Islamic Repub- in Iran, such as Shi`a ceremonial chanting that equates lic of Iran, Tehran, May 9, 2008. For a relatively recent Imam Husayn with Allah, suggesting that they amount Shi`a critique of the Wahhabi sect, see Hamid Algar, to kufr or the rejection of the oneness of Allah, and which 2 “Iran to Host Islamic Unity Conference,” Press TV, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (New York: Islamic Publica- enables Sunnis to represent Shi`a as heretics and justify May 4, 2008. tions International, 2002). Note that Algar makes an un- violence against them. 3 “Salafi Scholars Can Also Express Their Opinions in ambiguous distinction between “Salafism” and “Wahha- 7 “Iran’s Sufis in the Limelight,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Iran,” Fars News Agency, May 1, 2008. bism,” and it is the latter that is the target of his censure. Analyst, March 2008.

19 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 among Muslims and destabilize security Iranian media reported the ban on the case of the Mecca conference, the in Muslim countries…such as Yemen.”8 Saudi Shi`a attendance and also gave objective was officially more about The tone of the letter is not dissimilar to coverage to reports of three Shi`a Muslims reaching out to Jews and anti-Shi`a material found on extremist mosques and eight Shi`a clergy and Christians, somewhat fanciful given Salafist or jihadist websites that glorify community elders being arrested in the deep-seated intra-Muslim distrust and violence against Shi`a, or the 2007 Eastern Province of the country while while holding the conference in Mecca, statement of Ayman al-Zawahiri who the intra-faith conference was in session a city where non-Muslims are by law accused Iranian Shi`a leaders to be in Mecca.11 In spite of the malign Saudi banned. “intent on establishing certain [Islamic] ban, Iranian media by and large avoided concepts which nullify the intellects of any scatting of condemnation, perhaps Nevertheless, the recent Iranian their followers and prevent them from a reflection of Iranian appreciation that and Saudi attempts should not be understanding the Qur’an and Sunna, King Abdullah is engaged in a struggle dismissed. Both events had the backing except through [the Shi`a clergy’s] of his own with radical Wahhabi clergy of the highest echelons of powers in the interpretations and explanations.”9 and their sympathizers in the kingdom. respective states. Ayatollahs Khamenei Nonetheless, the intended political and Rafsanjani, often deemed as fierce While the tough worded letter was a mere message in Mecca was palpable. At rivals, judged the matter of intra- re-statement of a sentiment prevalent the opening ceremony, King Abdullah Islamic dialogue sufficiently worthy to among Saudi Wahhabis, it was issued walked into the conference hall with both rally behind it. King Abdullah, too, only three days before the opening of Rafsanjani, who later sat on the king’s has maintained the momentum for such an inter-faith dialogue conference held left on the center stage, interpreted by a dialogue in his kingdom despite often by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in Saudi media to signal that the Wahhabi stiff opposition, as seen in the anti- Islam’s holy city of Mecca between kingdom does not have a problem with Shi`a letter signed by the 22 Wahhabi June 4-7. Bringing together some 500 moderate Shi`a.12 clerics who sought to undermine him. Islamic scholars and academics, the Mecca-based Muslim World League Conclusion It is clear that political and not religious (MWL), which organized the event, had In the final analysis, in neither Tehran drivers have been the primary catalysts hoped the initiative would represent nor Mecca did the attendees produce in both instances, and both Iranian tangible action plans to facilitate Shi`a and Saudi Wahhabi clerical Shi`a-Sunni unity. This is a reflection establishments continue to contain “In the final analysis, in of the level of suspicion and doctrinal dangerously sectarian voices that will neither Tehran nor Mecca divide, which is exacerbated due to the prove stubborn in their views. Still, geopolitical rivalry of Iran and Sunni in an age when sectarian violence has did the attendees produce Arab states particularly since 2003.13 almost become the norm in various tangible action plans to At the same time as Saudi Shi`a were Middle Eastern arenas, from Iraq to effectively facing disfranchisement in Lebanon and from Pakistan to Yemen, facilitate Shi`a-Sunni relation to the Mecca conference, there the two leading Shi`a and Sunni states unity.” were reports of arrests of Sunni clergy in the world can ill afford to let others in Iran’s Kordestan and Balochistan take the initiative. provinces, and fear that the United Arab Emirates is financing the spread Alex Vatanka is the editor of Jane’s Islamic Saudi Arabia and King Abdullah in of Wahhabism in southern Iran. The Affairs Analyst and based in Washington, the West as forces of moderation in the Shi`a-Sunni gap is indeed real.14 In D.C. He is also an adjunct scholar at the Middle Islamic world. Still, and despite official East Institute, and an adjunct lecturer at the Saudis distancing themselves from June 5, 2008. U.S. Air Force Special Operations School. the letter, it, combined with the fact 11 “Closure of Shi`a Mosques and Arrest of Shi`a Clergy His current research focus is on Iran and that Saudi Arabia’s indigenous Shi`a in Saudi Arabia,” RajaNews.com, June 7, 2008. its relations with its neighbors, and his most minority were officially barred from the 12 “Saudis Launch Islamic Unity Drive,” BBC, June 4, recent publication was Ali Khamenei: Iran’s Mecca conference, somewhat lessened 2008. Most Powerful Man (Middle East Institute, the ability, if not the sincerity, of Saudi 13 Recently, Saudi Wahhabi scholar Ibn Jabarayn called February 2008). He is fluent in Farsi and 10 officials to reach out to the Shi`a. for the massacre of the Shi`a in a tape recording broad- holds a master’s degree in International cast on the internet. The exact edict is, “The blood of the Relations from the University of Essex in the 8 Donna Abu Nasr, “Saudi Clerics Criticize Shiites for rafezi [derogatory word for Shi`a] is halal [religiously United Kingdom. Destabilizing,” Associated Press, June 1, 2008. permissible].” 9 “Qaeda Video Taunts Bush, Iran, Shiites,” CNN, May 14 According to a report by the Iranian website www.as- 5, 2007. riran.com, UAE-based Salafists are providing cash and 10 Saudi officials barred not just the Shi`a, but all non- religious Salafist literature to ethnic Arab seafarers from Wahhabi sects. According to the pan-Arab newspaper Iran on visit to the UAE. The aim is to spread Salafism al-Quds al-Arabi, “Fatimide, Isma’ili, Shi’is or any non- in southern Iranian coastal areas, home to many ethnic www.mizannews.com reported that two Sunni clerics, Salafi Sunni citizens [were] excluded. The Arab Shi’i Arab Sunnis. According to www.jahannews.com, a Sun- Seifullah Hosseini, Friday prayer leader of Khatam al- participation was restricted to Shaykh Jawad al-Salihi ni cleric in Balochistan was also recently arrested on alle- Anbia mosque in Saqez, and Hossein Hosseini, Friday who lives outside Iraq, is opposed to the Iraqi Govern- gations of cooperating with the Iranian ethnic Baloch and prayer leader of Hamzeh mosque in Javan-roud in Kord- ment, and calls for its downfall.” See al-Quds al-Arabi, Sunni terrorist organization, Jund Allah. Meanwhile, estan, were arrested.

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A Global Counter- Proposed Campaign Framework U.S. government effort, to ensure that partner security forces, both regular Current Insurgency Campaign Conditions Information Operations: End State Erode Support for radical Islamic Ideology and irregular, have the will, capacity, US preserves an environment of Plan for the War on Terror Combat Operations political, and capability to effectively conduct ideological and economic freedom across operations to defeat radical Islamic Homeland Defense the globe.

By Colonel James H. Johnson, U.S. Army Partner nations organizations. The United States’ WMD/E Non-Proliferation govern their s Muslim Population ’ territories to partners have the cultural and historical prevent a resurgence of in 2003, the department of Defense Partner Nation Security Force Development radical Islamic understanding that, when coupled organizations.

approved the USSOCOM counter- Growing Hostile Actions of Radical and with U.S. government technology, Economic Development violent Islamic

Attitude of World ideology is terrorism campaign plan, which discredited in the intelligence, and training, will allow Radical Islamic Organizations & Networks Development of Global Infrastructure for Democracy eyes of the includes both direct and indirect actions world’s Muslims. them to execute operations within their to achieve the strategic objective of Lines of Operation borders that will defeat radical Islamic defeating radical Islamic organizations. Figure 1. Proposed Counter-insurgency Campaign Framework. organizations. The potential capability After reassessing the nature of the of U.S. partners to fight radical Islamic war and the enemy, it is now time The Seven LLOs organizations in their own territory to change the campaign plan from a The Combat Operations LLO has could make this line of operation the counter-terrorism framework to a been the main effort in the first six decisive military effort in the campaign global counter-insurgency framework. years of the war. Actions along this over time. Although written for the operational line of operation disrupt the ability level, FM 3-24 Counter-Insurgencies of radical Islamic organizations to The Economic Development LLO provides a useful method for developing operate effectively over time. These consists of those DoD actions, as a part a global counter-insurgency strategic actions focus on attacking the network of a larger interagency effort, which framework. FM 3-24 directs the use of infrastructure and leadership that stimulates partner nations’ economic Logical Lines of Operation (LLOs) in the provides the enemy global access and status in the global economy. Improving design of a counter-insurgency plan. connectivity. These actions attack the the economic conditions at the Commanders use LLOs to visualize, organizations and the resources they campaign’s decisive point—the world’s describe and direct operations when need to operate and survive over the Muslim population in contested areas— positional reference to enemy forces has long-term. Finally, actions along this will make radical Islamic organizations little relevance. A plan based on LLOs line of operation provide sufficient time less appealing to people who have unifies the efforts of joint, interagency, to allow the effects from the other lines no hope of a stable life. In this line of multinational and partner nation forces of operation. operation the DoD can assist in attacking toward a common purpose. Each LLO financial sources of support for radical represents a conceptual category along The Homeland Defense LLO consists Islamic organizations. Actions taken which agencies and partner nations of both offensive and defensive along this line of operation will identify intend to attack the insurgent/enemy actions taken by DoD and other U.S. the sources of support, the nature of strategy. This construct facilitates government agencies to deter the enemy support (active or tacit) and the means attacking the enemy strategy, not just from conducting future attacks against to deter those sources over time. the enemy forces. the U.S. or U.S. interests. Actions along this line protect the United The next line of effort is drawn from the Success requires careful coordination States’ strategic center of gravity and effort to advance democracies as outlined along all LLOs. Success also depends critical capabilities—U.S. national will, in the NSCT-06. The effort to develop upon the support of partner nation international legitimacy and the global global infrastructure for democracy institutions, and their ability to economy. As in the first LLO, actions consists of those DoD actions, as a provide basic services, economic along this line of operation will provide part of a larger U.S. government effort, opportunity, public order and security. sufficient time to allow the effects from that improve partner nations’ ability Military forces can compel obedience the other lines of operation. to govern in the framework of the rule and secure areas. They cannot by of law. This is not an effort to spread themselves achieve the decisive point The WMD/E Non-Proliferation LLO is American-style democracy throughout needed to resolve an insurgency. oriented directly on the enemy’s desires the world. This effort is focused on The proposed campaign framework to obtain WMD/E. This line of operation building partner nation legitimacy. is composed of seven LLOs: combat consists of those actions designed to Legitimacy cannot be bestowed by U.S. operations, homeland defense, WMD/E deny acquisition, development and/ actions. Legitimacy must be obtained non-proliferation, partner nation or use of WMD/E by radical Islamic by responsible actions of the partner security force development, economic organizations, and maintain capacity government. The U.S. supports partner development, development for global for consequence management. It will nations by assisting in providing a infrastructure for democracy, and also include those activities that serve to secure and stable environment in which information operations. deter the enemy from utilizing WMD/E regional governments can develop. against the U.S. and U.S. interests. The campaign framework’s overarching The development of partner nation effort will be Information Operations security forces consists of those actions LLO which is nested to the nation’s taken by DoD, in support of the larger Strategic Communications plan. This

21 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 effort is directly linked to the president’s in denying radical Islamic organizations on: 1. medical, dental, and veterinary War of Ideas as outlined in NSCT-06. of the resources they need to operate care for rural areas of a country; 2. This line of operation, as a part of a and survive; 3. provide a secure and construction of rudimentary surface larger interagency effort, will erode stable environment for culturally transportation systems; 3. well drilling legitimacy of radical Islamic ideology. and politically progressive Arab and construction of basic sanitation These actions focus on neutralizing the governments to govern, thus discrediting facilities; 4. rudimentary construction ability of radical Islamic organizations violent extremist ideology in the eyes of and repair of public facilities; and 5). to use an extremist interpretation of the world’s Muslims. Priority of effort mine detection and clearance. Islam to justify the use of terrorism in for FID and partnership operations pursuit of their aims; isolating violent should be in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Based upon this analysis, the mission extremist organizations from the then Jordan. statement and commander’s intent can populations that provide them freedom be articulated. These are nested with of action and resources; and diminishing the national policy and strategy. the underlying conditions to reduce “The United States’ the tacit and active support for violent challenge is to ensure that Mission extremists over time. Efforts should be When directed, the Department of focused on ideological vulnerabilities national power is used Defense in coordination with other exploiting Islamic fault lines between within a strategy that fits governmental agencies and coalition Sunni and Shi`a, the hypocrisy of partners conducts a global campaign terrorism as a religiously approved the nature of the war and to defeat radical Islamic organizations tactic and the enemy’s reliance on trust adversary ” and networks which use terrorism to within clandestine networks. achieve their goals in order to preserve the way of life of free and open societies, Six Key Objectives and create a global environment In the proposed campaign plan, the The U.S. was successful in shaping the unsupportive of extremist organizations U.S. will have six key objectives. These global environment during the Cold War which use terrorism. campaign objectives will provide the by assisting partner nations in their results necessary to achieve measures of internal security efforts. By supporting Commander’s Intent performance required for the specified Security Assistance Operations for Purpose: To preserve the way of life termination criteria. The campaign partner nations, the U.S. builds the of free and open societies, and create objectives are: necessary capability and capacity a global environment unsupportive for their security forces to function. of extremist organizations which use 1. Defeat radical Islamic organizations Security Assistance refers to the group terrorism. which are attacking the U.S. and its global of programs that support national interests. policies and objectives by providing Method: Our priority task is to defeat 2. Neutralize or contain other radical defense material, military training and radical Islamic organizations and extremist organizations which interfere other defense related support to foreign networks which use terrorism to achieve with U.S. efforts to defeat those who attack nations by grants, loans, credit, or cash their goals. This is achieved through the the U.S. and its global interests. sales. Priority for these efforts should simultaneous execution of the following 3. Block acquisition and/or use of WMD/E go to security forces in legitimate supporting key tasks: by radical Islamic organizations. partner nations in the Middle East, 4. Support Foreign Internal Defense efforts the Horn of Africa, Sub-Sahara Africa, 1. Defeat radical Islamic attacks against for partner nations. South Asia, Central Asia, and the Asian the U.S., its allies, and partners. 5. Support Security Assistance Operations Littoral. Programs will include, but 2. Isolate radical Islamic organizations for partner nations. are not limited to, Foreign Military from the resources needed to operate and 6. Support Humanitarian and Civic Sales, Foreign Military Financing, survive. (Resources: leadership, foot Assistance in contested regions. International Military Education and soldiers, safe havens, weapons, funds, Training, the Economic Support Fund, communications and movement, access A global counter-insurgency cannot and Arms Export Control-licensed to targets, and ideological support.) succeed without the success of partner commercial sales. The military can 3. Block WMD/E proliferation, and nations’ internal security forces. support these activities through recover/ eliminate uncontrolled These forces not only achieve tactical military training teams, maintenance materials. and operational successes against support personnel and training, and 4. Support and enable partner nations the enemy, but they provide strong other related activities. to counter radical Islamic terror legitimacy to their governments if they organizations. become respected institutions. Through Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 5. Secure state and non-state support Foreign Internal Defense (FID) efforts programs consist of assistance provided to counter radical Islamic terror with partner nations, the United States in conjunction with military operations organizations in coordination with can assist in the following ways: 1. defeat and exercises. By law, they are other U.S. government agencies and of radical Islamic organizations and authorized by the secretary of state, and partner nations. networks in partner nations; 2). secure planned and appropriated in the defense 6. Retain conditions that allow partner borders and transit zones thus assisting budget. These missions should focus nations to govern their territory

22 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 effectively and maintain a global anti- may appear counter-intuitive and A note attached to the body of the terrorist environment. challenge the dominant traditions of the soldier explained that the beheading was American way of war, but it appears to conducted by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan End State be the United States’ best strategy for in retaliation for the May 14 suspected The United States has preserved an success.3 U.S. airstrike on a target in Damadola. The environment of political, ideological note warned others against cooperating and economic freedom across the globe. Colonel Jim Johnson is an Infantry officer with authorities. – Daily Times, May 17 Partner nations govern their territories with 22 years of service. He is a recent to prevent a resurgence of violent graduate of the Naval War College. He May 16, 2008 (UNITED STATES): A U.S. extremist organizations. Radical and has operational experience in Afghanistan military judge hearing the case against violent Islamic ideology is discredited as a Brigade Operations Officer and has Salim Hamdan, a former driver for in the eyes of the world’s Muslims. completed two deployments to Iraq as an Usama bin Ladin and a detainee at This environment is measured by the Infantry Battalion Commander. Guantanamo Bay, ruled that the trial following Termination Criteria: should be postponed until mid-July * * * so that the Supreme Court can decide 1. Attacks against the U.S., its allies, and whether detainees at Guantanamo Bay partners are defeated or interdicted. can challenge their detentions in U.S. civil 2. Radical Islamic organizations are Recent Highlights in courts. – AP, May 16 incapable or unwilling to attack the Terrorist Activity U.S., its allies, or interests. May 16, 2008 (EUROPE): French, German 3. Key leaders of radical Islamic May 16, 2008 (GLOBAL): Usama bin and Dutch authorities arrested 10 Turkish organizations are killed or captured. Ladin released a new audio message on nationals on charges of financing the 4. Enemy organizations and networks Islamist internet forums, in which the Islamic Jihad Union, an Islamist group are denied possession of WMD/E. al-Qa`ida leader vowed to “continue our connected to al-Qa`ida. – Deutsche Press 5. Partner nations possess the capability struggle against the Israelis and their Agency, May 16 and capacity to counter radical Islamic allies.” The message, which was timed terror organizations within their for release with Israel’s 60th anniversary May 17, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A NATO territory—particularly in the Middle as an independent state, said that the Chinook helicopter that was carrying East, the Horn of Africa, Sub-Sahara Palestinian cause is “the core reason of Helmand Governor Golab Muhammad Africa, South Asia, Central Asia, and the war between our civilization and your Mangal was hit by ground fire while the Asian Littoral. civilizations [Western nations].” Bin flying near Musa Qala. The helicopter was 6. Partner nations possess the capability Ladin also claimed that the Palestinian forced to make an emergency landing due and capacity to secure their borders and cause was a critical factor behind the to a damaged rotor blade, but there were transit zones, to assist in denying enemy decisions of the September 11, 2001 no injuries. The governor was traveling to organizations the resources needed to hijackers “to fight for those subjected to Musa Qala in order to attend a ceremony. operate and survive. injustice and the oppressed.” – AP, May 16 – Reuters, May 17 7. Partner nations possess a secure and stable environment to discredit violent May 16, 2008 (SOMALIA): UN-sponsored May 17, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A bicycle extremist ideology in the eyes of the peace talks between Somalia’s Transitional bomb exploded in Kandahar, killing a world’s Muslims, and non-extremist Federal Government and opposition nine-year-old child and wounding four models of moderation within the Muslim forces ended without agreement. The people, three of whom were police. The world have popular, vocal support. talks are scheduled to resume on May 31. intended target was a police convoy – Garowe Online, May 16 traveling through the city. – Reuters, May The GWOT has the characteristics of an 17 insurgency: protracted, asymmetric and May 16, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A child ambiguous political mobilization to alter suicide bomber killed one Afghan soldier May 17, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Taliban 1 the balance of global power. Terrorism and injured two Canadian soldiers in Zhari militants released Pakistan’s envoy to 2 is a subset of this insurgency. The district of Kandahar Province. Because Afghanistan, Tariq Azizuddin, after United States’ challenge is to ensure the child approached soldiers with his holding him hostage since February 11. that national power is used within a arms in the air, there is the possibility In exchange for his release, press reports strategy that fits the nature of the war that his explosives were either detonated allege that the Pakistani government and adversary. The ends will not change remotely, or were set to detonate on a freed from prison more than 40 Taliban in a shift of strategy. What could change timer. – CTV.ca, May 16 fighters. According to one report, “The is the execution of a coherent theory of French news agency AFP quoted an victory. A counter-insurgency strategy May 16, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Authorities unidentified security official as saying the discovered the beheaded body of a ambassador was recovered late on May 1 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Coun- paramilitary soldier in Bajaur Agency. 16 from the custody of a local Taliban terinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat group just outside the Khyber tribal and Response (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies district in Pakistan. Other media reports Institute, 2004), p. 24. 3 Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strat- in Pakistan said the envoy had been freed 2 David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Jour- egy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? (Carlisle Bar- in Afghanistan.” – Reuters, May 17; RFE/RL, nal of Strategic Studies 28:4 (2005): p. 606. racks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), pp. 6-8. May 17

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May 17, 2008 (IRAQ): A female suicide May 19, 2008 (IRAQ): Iraqi officials government security forces. According bomber detonated her explosives in an claimed that they had arrested al-Qa`ida to one Taliban spokesman, “We have office of the Sons of Iraq in Ba`quba, in Iraq’s wali, or governor, for Mosul. The accepted to give up the armed struggle Diyala Province. One woman, along with suspect, identified as `Abd al-Khaliq because the government has agreed to the the bomber, was killed. - AFP, May 17 Awad Ismail al-Sabawi, was arrested in complete enforcement of the Sharia laws. Salah al-Din province. – AP, May 19 We are happy about the agreement but the May 17, 2008 (SOMALIA): Islamist fighters success of it depends on the conduct of the took control of the southern city of Jilib— May 19, 2008 (IRAQ): At least 11 Iraqi government, especially in enforcing the located 250 miles south of Mogadishu— police recruits were killed while traveling Sharia laws.” – International Herald Tribune, after defeating a government-supported in their minibus in the deserts of Ninawa May 22; AFP, May 22 militia group. – al-Jazira, May 17; AFP, May Province. Suspected Sunni gunmen 17 opened fire on the bus, killing everyone May 21, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): According inside. – AP, May 19 to a Philippine media industry official, May 18, 2008 (YEMEN): A Yemeni judge the Abu Sayyaf Group may be behind jailed Jabir al-Banna, an al-Qa`ida May 20, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): illegally copying Hollywood movies and operative, for an unspecified period of Waheed Ali, a British Muslim accused of selling them to Manila stores in order to time. The United States has a $5 million conspiring with the July 7, 2005 London raise funds. – AFP, May 21 reward on al-Banna’s capture, although bombers, told a court that he, along with the Yemeni government had until now the group’s leader Muhammad Sidique May 21, 2008 (SOMALIA): Ethiopian Prime refused to jail him even though his Khan, received training at a Taliban camp Minister Meles Zenawi pledged to keep whereabouts were known; he was allowed in Afghanistan in the summer of 2001. his country’s soldiers in Somalia until the to move around freely during his ongoing – Guardian, May 21 “jihadists” are defeated. – Reuters, May 21 trial, in which he is charged with plotting to blow up oil installations in 2006. – May 20, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A roadside May 21, 2008 (SOMALIA): Shaykh Hassan Washington Post, May 18 bomb exploded near a military truck Dahir Aweys, a former leader in Somalia’s in Kohat District, North-West Frontier now defunct Islamic Courts Union, told May 18, 2008 (GLOBAL): Usama bin Ladin Province. At least five soldiers were journalists that “it is important to expel released a new audio message—distinct wounded by the blast. – AP, May 20 the enemy from all areas. We don’t want a from his message of May 16—in which fight to the death. We don’t want to kill all he criticized Arab leaders for sacrificing May 20, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Suspected the Ethiopian soldiers. We want to save the Palestinians. According to Bin Ladin, Abu Sayyaf Group militants attacked and them. We want them to leave.” Aweys Arab leaders “sacrificed Palestine and killed two Philippine soldiers as they further explained that Somalia’s Islamist al-Aqsa to keep their crowns...They have were riding a motorcycle on their way opposition will “liberate Somalia from decided that peace with the Zionists is to Patikul in Sulu Province. – Philippine Ethiopia. Then we will form a government their strategic option, so damn their Inquirer, May 21 of national unity. We are all Muslims in decision.” He also spoke about Lebanese Somalia. We have no idea of secularism. Hizb Allah, criticizing the group for May 20, 2008 (SOMALIA): An explosion The people will place their trust in allowing UN peacekeepers into southern in Mogadishu killed three Ethiopian and religion.” – Guardian Unlimited, May 22 Lebanon “to protect the Jews.” – AP, May two Somali government soldiers. – Voice of 18 America, May 20 May 21, 2008 (JORDAN): A Jordanian military court sentenced eight al-Qa`ida- May 18, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A suicide May 21, 2008 (IRAQ): The acting linked operatives to life in prison for a bomber killed at least 11 people after commander of U.S. forces in the Middle 2004 plot to execute a chemical attack blowing himself up by a market situated East, Lieutenant General Martin on the U.S. Embassy, along with other near the gate of an army base in Mardan Dempsey, told the Associated Press that targets in the country. The 2004 plot District, North-West Frontier Province. “our forces and the Iraqi forces have was financed by then al-Qa`ida in Iraq Four soldiers guarding the entrance certainly disrupted al-Qaida, probably to leader Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, who gave to the base were among those killed. a level that we haven’t seen at any time the men $118,000 for the operation. In Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan took credit in my experience,” but warned that “they a previous trial in 2006, the men were for the operation, stating that it was “in can regenerate, and do from time to time.” sentenced to death, but an appeals court reaction to Damadola,” referring to the – AP, May 21 overturned that ruling. – AP, May 21 May 14 missile strike targeting their forces; Pakistan has accused the U.S.-led May 21, 2008 (PAKISTAN): The Pakistani May 21, 2008 (MOROCCO): Security coalition in Afghanistan for being behind government signed a deal with Taliban officials announced the arrest of 11 al- that attack. – Chicago Tribune, May 19; New militants that will lead to the withdrawal Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb suspects. York Times, May 19 of the Pakistani Army from Swat District The men allegedly trained at al-Qa`ida of the North-West Frontier Province. camps in Iraq and in North Africa. May 18, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide According to the deal, Shari`a will be According to a UPI report, “Moroccan bomber killed four civilians after he enforced in Swat and Tehrik-i-Taliban officials said the cell was plotting detonated his explosives at the main Pakistan (TTP) will be involved in securing attacks in the European Union and market in Musa Qala, Helmand Province. law and order in the district. In exchange, specifically a hotel in Belgium, though – CNN, May 18 TTP forces in Swat will cease attacks on officials in Brussels couldn’t confirm

24 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 the allegations.” One of the suspects is May 24, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Government May 27, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide car bomber a Moroccan who was living in Belgium. security forces confiscated 283 bags of detonated his explosives in Ninawa – UPI, May 21 explosive components allegedly belonging Province, killing six people and wounding to the Abu Sayyaf Group on Jolo Island in more than 40. – AFP, May 28 May 21, 2008 (NORTH AFRICA): Austrian the southern Philippines. Speaking about diplomats told reporters that “things are the recovered components, a military May 27, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban progressing” in attempts to secure the spokesman said, “With blasting caps, fighters killed nine policemen in an attack release of two Austrian tourists who were and the ammonium nitrate, which is the in Shorabak district, Kandahar Province. kidnapped by al-Qa`ida in the Islamic basic ingredient in the so-called fertilizer - Voice of America, May 27 Maghreb fighters while in Tunisia in bombs, it is obviously meant for a terrorist February. Authorities suspect that the action.” – Sun Star, May 26 May 27, 2008 (UNITED STATES): The U.S. group moved the hostages to Mali. – AFP, Treasury Department sanctioned four May 21 May 25, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): During a alleged leaders of Lashkar-i-Tayyaba day of fighting between the Philippine (LeT), an Islamist group fighting against May 22, 2008 (ISRAEL): A Palestinian military and Moro Islamic Liberation India for control of Kashmir. According suicide bomber detonated an explosives- Front (MILF) militants in the southern to the statement, LeT is a “dangerous al- laden truck at the Erez passenger Philippines, at least 17 Philippine Marines Qaida affiliate that has demonstrated its crossing, which connects the Gaza Strip were wounded and two MILF fighters willingness to murder innocent civilians.” with Israel. There were no casualties killed. The violence, which occurred in At least one of the named leaders, besides that of the bomber. – AP, May Tipo-Tipo on Basilan Island, was said to Muhammad Saeed, has since denied any 22 have also involved the Abu Sayyaf Group. involvement with LeT or al-Qa`ida. – AP, – AFP, May 25 May 28 May 22, 2008 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida ideologue Abu Yahya al-Libi released May 25, 2008 (SOMALIA): Islamist May 28, 2008 (THAILAND): Security forces a new video statement on Islamist web insurgents attacked a base of Ugandan killed three suspected Muslim militants forums in which he accused moderate peacekeepers in Mogadishu, sparking during a village search in Yala Province. Muslims of promoting Western ideas. a gun battle that left approximately 18 – Reuters, May 28 According to al-Libi, “The duty of the people dead, most of whom were civilians. Islamic nation is not to emulate the infidel – AFP, May 27 May 29, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A nations, nor to lick their boots nor satisfy suicide car bomber targeted a convoy them...nor even look for ways to coexist.” May 26, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide of international troops in Kabul, killing – AP, May 22 bomber attacked a military convoy in three Afghan civilians. – AP, May 28 Kandahar, killing a teenage civilian May 23, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): U.S.- and wounding four Canadian soldiers. May 29, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide car led soldiers launched an airstrike on an – Canwest News Service, May 25 bomber detonated his explosives amid a “extremist cell” in Garmser in Helmand group of police officers in a village near Province, leading to a few casualties and May 26, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber Mosul, leaving two policemen and one a number of arrests. The U.S. military driving a motorcycle blew himself up at a civilian dead. – AFP, May 29 released a statement claiming that the checkpoint controlled by Iraqi police and cell was involved in financing and arming guards from a local Awakening Council May 29, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber militants. – AFP, May 24 in Tarmiyah, Salah al-Din Province. The detonated his explosives in a group of blast killed four people, one of whom was police recruits in Sinjar, Ninawa Province, May 23, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Four a civilian. – AP, May 26 leaving at least 16 people dead. – AP, May Afghan Army soldiers and one civilian 29 child were killed after a suicide bomber May 26, 2008 (IRAQ): A roadside bomb attacked a military convoy in Khost killed one U.S. soldier in Salah al-Din May 29, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): A bomb Province. – Voice of America, May 23 Province. – AP, May 26 exploded outside Edwin Andrews Air Base in Zamboanga City in the southern May 24, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik-i- May 26, 2008 (PAKISTAN): The Pakistani Philippines, killing two people and Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader Baitullah government signed a peace deal with a injuring 19 others. Authorities are Mehsud pledged to continue carrying small Taliban militant group in Mohmand investigating whether the Abu Sayyaf out attacks against international forces Agency of the Federally Administered Group, or the Moro Islamic Liberation in Afghanistan despite a recently signed Tribal Areas. As part of the deal, the Front, was behind the cell phone Taliban peace deal with the Pakistani government released from detention an detonated bomb. The U.S. government is government. According to Mehsud, unknown number of militants, and the assisting with the investigation. – AP, May “Fighting between the Taliban and Taliban group, which is led by Umar 29; Philippine Inquirer, May 31 Pakistan is harming Islam and Pakistan” Khalid, pledged not to attack government and should cease immediately, but “jihad security forces. Baitullah Mehsud, the May 29, 2008 (YEMEN): A Yemeni in Afghanistan will continue.” – AP, May leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, government newspaper announced that 24 allegedly backed the deal. – AP, May 27; in the past few days security forces AP, May 28 have disrupted an 11-member al-Qa`ida cell in the capital. Of those detained,

25 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 six were Saudi Arabian and three were May 31, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide June 2 attack on the Danish Embassy Chadian. According to a government car bomber struck NATO forces in in Islamabad. The statement said that source that spoke with AFP, “The Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province, killing the attack was in retaliation for the Saudis are jihadists who originally two NATO soldiers. - AFP, May 31 republication of cartoons insulting wanted to go to Iraq but ended up the Prophet Muhammad in Danish coming to Yemen because of the strict May 31, 2008 (LEBANON): Lebanese troops newspapers. – al-Jazira, June 5 measures taken by authorities in their killed a man who was wearing a suicide country for monitoring the border with belt near the Palestinian refugee camp of June 4, 2008 (MOROCCO): Moroccan Iraq.” – AFP, May 29 `Ayn al-Hilwa. The authorities released security forces said that the leader of few details about the incident. – Voice of al-Qa`ida in Morocco, whose name May 30, 2008 (YEMEN): Rockets were America, May 31 they did not release, accidentally killed fired at an Aden oil refinery, yet they himself while working in his weapons failed to cause any damage. The al- June 1, 2008 (SOMALIA): Alleged Islamist workshop around the date of May 27. Qa`ida-linked Jund al-Yaman Brigades militants fired mortars at a plane carrying – UPI, June 4 later took credit for the operation in a Somali Transitional Federal Government statement posted on Islamist websites. President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad as it June 4, 2008 (ALGERIA): A suicide According to the statement, the purpose was about to take off from Mogadishu’s bomber detonated his explosives near of the attack was to prevent the Yemeni airport. There were no casualties. – CNN, a military facility on the outskirts government from supplying “fuel to the June 1 of Algiers, wounding five people. crusaders in their war on Islam.” – AFP, Approximately five minutes after the June 1 June 1, 2008 (SOMALIA): According to explosion, a homemade bomb exploded a press report, a new Islamic court has outside a café regularly frequented by May 30, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Canadian been established in Jowhar, the capital soldiers, injuring one person. – AFP, June and Afghan forces killed Mullah Tohr of Middle Shabelle region. The press 4; BBC, June 5 Agha, a mid-level Taliban commander in report states that “many Jowhar locals Zhari district of Kandahar Province. – The have reportedly filed disputes with the June 5, 2008 (ALGERIA): A roadside bomb Canadian Press, May 31 Islamic Court, including disagreements destroyed a vehicle carrying Algerian over land ownership.” – Garowe Online, soldiers in Boumerdes region, killing May 30, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): According June 1 six of them. Authorities believe Islamist to the Afghan Interior Ministry, Afghan militants were to blame. – AFP, June 8 and international forces recaptured the June 2, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide car district of Bakwa in Farah Province, bomber detonated his explosives near the June 5, 2008 (UNITED STATES): Al-Qa`ida killing more than 100 Taliban-affiliated provincial police headquarters in Mosul, commander Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, fighters in the process. – AFP, May 31 killing at least nine people, five of whom who is considered the “principal were policemen. – AP, June 3 architect” of the September 11, 2001 May 30, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Afghan attacks, appeared in a U.S. military court and international forces pushed the June 2, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A car bomb in Guantanamo Bay. – Bloomberg, June 5 Taliban out of Rashidan district of Ghazni exploded outside the Danish Embassy in Province. The Taliban had taken control Islamabad, killing six people including June 5, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide of the town only hours before. – Reuters, one Dane. Denmark’s Security and bomber charged at a NATO patrol in Qalat, May 30 Intelligence Service (PET) released Zabul Province, detonating his explosives a statement explaining, “It is PET’s but failing to injure any international May 30, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Authorities assessment that al-Qaeda or an al-Qaeda- troops. Four civilians, however, were arrested an Abu Sayyaf Group operative, related group likely is behind the attack.” wounded. – AFP, June 4 Naim Jabdali, with suspected links to al- – AP, June 3 Qa`ida on Basilan Island in the southern June 6, 2008 (UNITED STATES): A U.S. Philippines. – AHN, June 4 June 4, 2008 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida appeals court upheld the conviction of second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri American citizen Ahmed Abu Ali, who May 30, 2008 (AZERBAIJAN): Eighteen released a new audio statement in which was sentenced to 30 years in prison for men accused of having links with al- he called on Muslims to “break the Siege plotting to assassinate President George Qa`ida went on trial in Azerbaijan. of Gaza.” Al-Zawahiri said, “The sons W. Bush and conspiring with al-Qa`ida. The men were arrested in October and of the nation should break the shackles The appeals court also overturned Abu November 2007 and were found with of the treacherous regimes [Arab Ali’s sentence, declaring that it was machine guns, hand grenades, explosives governments in the Middle East] and too lenient and sent his case back for and pistols. – Reuters, May 30 move to wage jihad which has become resentencing. Abu Ali had appealed his a duty.” The video was released to mark conviction on the grounds that he had May 31, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber the anniversary of the 1967 Arab-Israeli been tortured into confessing by Saudi killed 10 people at a police checkpoint war. – AP, June 4 security services. – Reuters, June 6 in the town of Hit, Anbar Province. Six policemen were among those killed, June 4, 2008 (GLOBAL): An alleged June 6, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Authorities including the village’s chief of police. al-Qa`ida statement posted on an captured Sali Dungkal Alih, a member – AP, May 31 Islamist website claimed credit for the of the Abu Sayyaf Group who was

26 june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 allegedly responsible for the beheadings June 9, 2008 (SOMALIA): Somalia’s Osman, to 15 years in jail after being of 10 Philippine Marines in 2007. He was Transitional Federal Government and found guilty by a jury the previous day found on the island of Basilan. – Macau the oppositionist Alliance for the Re- for failing to provide information to the Daily Times, June 10 Liberation of Somalia reached a cease-fire authorities of Osman’s plan to detonate agreement. Islamist insurgents actively explosives on the London transportation June 6, 2008 (THAILAND): Thai fighting in Somalia, however, were not system on July 21, 2005. Girma was also authorities announced that they had party to the agreement. - Shabelle Media guilty of two other related crimes. She killed Alinsan Nikaji, an insurgent Network, June 11 was among a number of suspects, such as wanted for the killings of two Thai two of Girma’s siblings, to be found guilty marines in 2005. His death occurred June 10, 2008 (SOMALIA): Leading Somali for involvement in the incidents. - AFP, during a sizeable operation involving Islamist opposition leaders rejected the June 12 100 police and soldiers in the village of June 9 cease-fire that was agreed to by the Tanyong Limo, Narathiwat Province. Transitional Federal Government and the June 12, 2008 (UNITED STATES): The - AFP, June 6 Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia. U.S. Supreme Court ruled that inmates According to one journalist, the problem held at Guantanamo Bay have a right to June 7, 2008 (IRAQ): An Iraqi official told with the June 9 agreement “is that the deal challenge their detentions in U.S. courts. reporters that authorities had arrested was signed by just one splinter faction of - AFP, June 13 13 suspected members of al-Qa`ida who the Islamist movement, which briefly were planning suicide operations. During controlled much of Somalia in 2006. After June 12, 2008 (YEMEN): U.S. counter- the raids in the town of Hit in Anbar Ethiopian troops ousted the movement, terrorism official Kenneth Wainstein Province, 58 explosives belts were seized. many Islamist leaders went into hiding urged Yemeni President `Ali `Abdullah - Reuters, June 8 and the movement split into factions, Salih to release Jabir al-Banna and Jamal some open to negotiations, others dead al-Badawi—two al-Qa`ida suspects—into June 7, 2008 (ISRAEL): Israeli soldiers set against them.” - International Herald U.S. custody. - AP, June 12 killed a Palestinian militant as he was Tribune, June 10 planting a bomb near the border with the June 12, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A male Gaza Strip. - Voice of America, June 8 June 10, 2008 (SOMALIA): Islamist fighters suicide bomber disguised in a burqa was attacked a police station in Mogadishu, shot by authorities as he charged a police June 8, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide car in addition to the home of a district compound in Helmand Province. He failed bomber detonated his explosives near a commissioner. - Garowe Online, June 10 to detonate his explosives. - The Australian, patrol base in Kirkuk Province, killing June 12 one U.S. soldier and injuring 18 others. June 10, 2008 (MOROCCO): A Moroccan – Reuters, June 8; Times Online, June 8 court convicted 29 people who were June 12, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Suspected part of the “Tetouan cell” for plotting Abu Sayyaf Group fighters holding June 8, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Suspected terrorist attacks and supporting fighters three ABS-CBN employees hostage Taliban militants ambushed and killed in Iraq. The men, who were arrested in released cameraman Angelo Valderama. four policemen in Matani near Peshawar. January 2007, were accused of having Well-known reporter Ces Drilon and – AFP, June 9 links to al-Qa`ida, among other terrorist cameraman Jimmy Encarnacion are still organizations. They received sentences being held captive. - AP, June 13 June 8, 2008 (ALGERIA): Two bombs ranging from two to eight years, and two ripped through the town of Lakhdaria, of the 29 were convicted in absentia. – AP, June 12, 2008 (SOMALIA): Islamist fighters killing an estimated 12 people. Among the June 11 launched mortars at the Mogadishu dead were members of the security forces airport as President Abdullahi Yusuf along with a French engineer and his June 10, 2008 (LEBANON): The leader of Ahmad was preparing to board his driver. Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb Fatah al-Islam, Shaker Youssef al-Absi, plane. The president managed to fly off later claimed credit for the operation. released an audio recording warning that safely. Islamist fighters conducted a – AFP, June 8; AP, June 17 the time had come for revenge attacks, similar attack on June 1. - AP, June 12 and that suicide fighters were ready for June 8, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Prominent operations. The leader of the al-Qa`ida- June 12, 2008 (ISRAEL): Israeli soldiers killed television journalist Ces Drilon, her two inspired group remains at large, but is two Palestinian militants as they were person crew and a Muslim academic wanted by Lebanese authorities. - AP, June planting a bomb near the border with the were all kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf Group 10 Gaza Strip. - AP, June 12 fighters on Jolo Island in the southern Philippines. The ASG is demanding a June 11, 2008 (THAILAND): A roadside June 13, 2008 (IRAQ): Iraqi authorities ransom for their release. – AFP, June 10 bomb exploded at the entrance to a claimed that they killed Abu Bakr al- contested village in Pattani Province, Sa`udi, a Saudi national and alleged June 9, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A police wounding four soldiers. - The Nation, June senior al-Qa`ida in Iraq leader, in Anbar vehicle carrying recently freed Tehreek- 11 Province. Four of his aides were also e-Nafaz-e-Shariat- e-Mohammadi leader killed. - AFP, June 13 Sufi Muhammad was hit by a roadside June 12, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): A bomb, yet the leader was unharmed. judge sentenced Yeshi Girma, the partner June 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban – Dawn, June 9 of would-be suicide bomber Hussain fighters staged a coordinated attack on

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the Sarposa prison in Kandahar Province June 14, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): U.S.- CTC Sentinel Staff and managed to release approximately led forces killed 15 insurgents holed up in a 870 prisoners. The fighters first used farming compound in Kandahar Province. Editor-in-Chief a truck bomb to destroy the front gate - Reuters, June 15 Erich Marquardt of the facility, while a suicide bomber Senior Editor, CTC attacked the rear of the building. June 14, 2008 (UNITED ARAB EMIRATES): Fighters then stormed the prison, The British Embassy in Abu Dhabi Editorial Board releasing the inmates, of whom about posted a statement on its website warning Jarret Brachman, Ph.D. 390 were imprisoned Taliban. - Los Britons that the UAE faces “a high threat Director of Research, CTC Angeles Times, June 14; AP, June 15 of terrorism.” According to the statement, “We believe terrorists may be planning Brian Fishman June 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide to carry out attacks in the UAE. Attacks Senior Associate, CTC car bomber attacked a U.S. military could be indiscriminate and could happen convoy in Nangarhar Province. There at any time.” - Guardian, June 17 Assaf Moghadam, Ph.D. were conflicting accounts of casualties. Senior Associate, CTC - CBS News, June 13 June 15, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Afghan and international forces killed two Taliban James Forest, Ph.D. June 13, 2008 (UNITED STATES): The militants in Arghandab district of Zabul Director of Terrorism Studies, CTC U.S. Treasury Department froze the Province. - AFP, June 16 assets of the Revival of Islamic Heritage LTC(P) Joseph Felter, Ph.D. Society’s Kuwaiti headquarters. The June 15, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Afghan Director, CTC Islamic charity denied any al-Qa`ida President Hamid Karzai warned that he links. Its Afghanistan and Pakistan would send Afghan troops into Pakistan COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. offices suffered similar measures in to attack Taliban militants if they were Deputy Department Head 2002. - AFP, June 13 caught conducting cross-border raids. Department of Social Sciences (West Point) - Reuters, June 15 June 13, 2008 (UNITED STATES): Three COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. Ohio state residents were convicted Department Head of planning attacks on Americans Department of Social Sciences (West Point) overseas, including on U.S. soldiers in Iraq. The three men convicted by the GEN(R) John P. Abizaid Toledo federal court were Mohammad Distinguished Chair, CTC Amawi (a U.S. citizen), Marwan el-Hindi (a naturalized U.S. citizen) and Wassim Contact Mazlou (a legal permanent U.S. resident). Combating Terrorism Center According to a Reuters report, the men U.S. Military Academy “engaged in a conspiracy that involved 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall firearms training and instructions to West Point, NY 10996 build improvised explosive devices and Phone: (202) 425-8578 suicide bomb vests...They also sought Email: [email protected] to recruit others to participate in jihad Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ training, solicited funding for the training, and proposed sites for training * For Press Inquiries: (202) 425-8578 in firearms, explosives and hand-to- hand combat.” - Reuters, June 13 support The Combating Terrorism Center would June 13, 2008 (DENMARK): The head like to express its gratitude to its financial of Denmark’s Security and Intelligence supporters, for without their support and Service (PET) told reporters that al-Qa`ida shared vision of the Center products like the is “steering, training and planning...a CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you terror attack on Danish soil.” PET chief are interested in learning more about how Jakob Scharf said that today’s younger to support the Combating Terrorism Center, generation of militants “are better, more please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu/ dedicated and better trained.” - Reuters, support/ or call Wayne Richardson at West June 13 Point’s Association of Graduates at 845- 446-1553. June 14, 2008 (IRAQ): A female suicide bomber detonated her explosives near a The views expressed in this report are those of group of football fans in Diyala Province the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, celebrating Iraq’s win over China in a the Department of the Army, or any other agency World Cup qualifying game. Twenty-five of the U.S. Government. people were wounded. - AFP, June 14

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