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When to Confront It is likely that the Iraqi government government.5 In it, they deplore the will make similar requests for military accusations by government sources of Mahdists: A Challenge for assistance in the future. Before taking links to the Jund al-Sama’ movement the U.S. Military action against discontented Shi`a, and former Ba`athists. They present however, the U.S. armed forces should their movement as essentially a By Reidar Visser assess the relevant theological issues fundamentalist Shi`a one, critical of the and whether actual security risks are , but focusing on a “return to the one of the most extraordinary uses of involved. sources,” “the holy books [the Qur’an], U.S. air power in took place on the traditions of the Prophet and the January 18 and 19, 2008, when Iraqi The Background of the Ahmad al-Hasan ‘heritage’ (turath) of the Shiites.” Their forces involved in armed confrontations Movement aim is to prepare for the return of the in and Nasiriyya called in air Soon after the 2008 incident, the two , “which has been promised both support and U.S. jets flew over the Mahdist groups became mixed up in in , Christianity and Judaism.” As battlefields in a show of support. In the Western media. There is, however, an example of comparable haraka islahiyya itself, this kind of action may seem reason to believe that the cells that (reformist movements), they draw unremarkable; however, the identity of were targeted in 2008 had developed attention to the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the group targeted by the Iraqi forces quite independently of the group. the West. It is noteworthy that in this raises important questions about the Styling themselves as “followers of declaration they play down another type of “anti-terrorism” operations Ahmad al-Hasan al-Yamani,” the group theme that had been prominent in into which U.S. forces in Iraq are had a visible presence in Basra since at previous public pronouncements: the getting drawn. In this case, the focus least 2005.3 In the subsequent period supposed imminence of the return of of the offensive was a group whose it remained active in Basra and the the Mahdi, and the concomitant claims ideology sets it apart from followers of to a special, divine role for their leader, mainstream Shi’ism primarily because Ahmad al-Hasan, as the “guardian” of it believes the Hidden —the Shi`a “This was not the first the Mahdi.6 leader who disappeared in 874 AD but time U.S. forces have who theoretically still holds all power As for the accusations of targeting the among the Shi`a—may be about to backed up the Nuri al- ulama, the group members admit that they appear.1 government against do not support the higher clergy among the Shi`a, but at the same time they offer This was not the first time U.S. internal enemies who a theoretically grounded explanation for forces have backed up the Nuri al- subscribe to unorthodox this. In their view, the standard Shi`a Maliki government against internal practice of total surrender to a qualified enemies who subscribe to unorthodox interpretations of Shi`a cleric (mujtahid) in questions of Islamic interpretations of Shi`a Islam. One Islam.” law is misguided. “Emulating a cleric” year earlier, in January 2007, a similar (), they say, is not wajib (obligatory), group had been targeted in the Najaf and the payment of religious taxes to area. In this prior confrontation, anyone other than the infallible hundreds of people lost their lives far south, gaining adherents among (of whom only the twelfth and hidden and scores were arrested. The Iraqi former Sadrists and religious students, one is still alive) would be wrong. government accused the “ members” especially in Basra and Nasiriyya. In According to the group, rather than involved—also known as Jund al-Sama’ the wake of the 2007 clash in Najaf, consulting the ulama, the people should or the “Soldiers of ”—of having the group vigorously distanced itself read the Qur’an for themselves in order planned an attack on Najaf in which from the Jund al-Sama’ group, claiming to “find out about the truth.” They ask: leading members of the clergy would they disagreed over interpretations of “Is this really deviation (inhiraf)?” The be liquidated. Independent researchers how and when the Hidden Imam would real reason for them being targeted, familiar with the (still undisclosed) reappear.4 in their view, is political, and they court records of the subsequent trial single out `Abd al-`Aziz al-Hakim of against the group, however, dismiss In a statement dating from around the Islamic Supreme Council for Iraq it as a farcical attempt to implicate January 19, 2008, which was accessible for having instigated the dispatch of a political enemies in criminal activity. for a few hours on the group’s website, special force from Baghdad to the south Once more, the group singled out by the www.almahdyoon.org, before it was to have them arrested. Iraqi government was characterized by closed down, the followers of Ahmad messianic beliefs related to the return al-Hasan gave their side of the story The rhetoric of the followers of Ahmad of the Hidden Imam, the Mahdi.2 behind the confrontation with the Iraqi al-Hasan clarifies why the leading Shi`a ulama may consider them a threat.

1 “Iraqi Troops Battle Messianic Cult in Southern Iraq, 3 An early, peaceful demonstration by this group was 5 Undated statement from www.almahdyoon.org. At Least 68 Killed,” Associated Press, January 19, 2008. covered by al-Manara on August 2, 2005. 6 The more assertive position is described for instance in 2 Allawi, “Millenarianism, and Terrorism: 4 Reidar Visser, “ in Iraq: Enter Mahdism?” a statement by Ahmad al-Hasan dated 21 Rabi al-Thani The Case of Iraq,” presentation at The Jamestown Foun- January 29, 2007, available at www.historiae.org/mahd- 1426/May 30, 2005, published on www.almahdyooon. dation, October 9, 2007. ism.asp. org. june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7

The very fundament of power of the One competing interpretation of the Just as the Shi`a ulama in the 19th century Shi`a ulama is the dichotomy present appearance of Mahdist groups in quite unscrupulously called on the Ottoman in Shi’ism (the main, orthodox contemporary Iraq that should be state to deal with Shi`a dissenters by branch of Shi’ism) which divides all rejected immediately is that of an appealing to a language the Ottomans would Shi`a into two categories: a tiny elite “Iranian conspiracy.” It is true that understand (that of Sunni orthodoxy), the of clerics qualified to interpret the there are interesting parallels between Iraqi government seems to have no qualms Islamic law (mujtahidun), and the vast the stronger emphasis on Mahdism in in enlisting U.S. support for combating majority of people unqualified in both countries in recent years. Yet, to Shi`a who dare challenge the orthodox jurisprudential matters, called muqallids see Iranian hands behind groups like mainstream, again using language that because they have to “emulate” a Ahmad al-Hasan would be a mistake would be familiar to the military power mujtahid. This dichotomy crystallized in in two ways. In the first place, many whose services are sought (terrorism, or the 18th century and has since proven of his followers come from some of al-Qa`ida involvement). Details about the remarkably durable. Any ideas about the most anti-Iranian circles in Shi`a recent operations against Iraqi Mahdists “people going back to the sources Iraq, and Hasan himself has attacked remain sketchy, but the timing (in both themselves” (sometimes described as Iranian Supreme Leader cases during the Shi`a holy month of “neo-Akhbarism,” after the Khamenei, much in the way he has Muharram) strongly suggests that this school which originally was the main attacked Grand Ayatollah Ali al- was primarily an attempt by Shi`a leaders enemy of the ) are seen as a direct Sistani, and has specifically called for to enforce sectarian orthodoxy during challenge to it; it could potentially lead his abdication.9 Second, this would testing times. If similar requests for U.S. to conditions such as those seen in Sunni overlook the considerable historical military help should materialize in the Islam, where the established clergy lost roots of Mahdism in the far south of Iraq. future—and reports out of Iraq suggest control completely in the late 19th and Similar movements have mushroomed that there is no shortage of discontented 20th centuries when a similar “back to in the south and the adjacent areas Shi`a prepared to explore the Mahdist the sources” trend became ascendant. in and the Arabian Peninsula for option—it would be prudent for the U.S. centuries, starting with revolutionary armed forces to sort out theological and Historical Parallels movements and slave revolts in the security-related issues before the label of The clearest historical parallel to what early centuries of Islam, followed by the “terrorism” is taken at face value. is currently going on inside Iraq’s emergence of Mahdist principalities such Shi`a community can be found in the as the Mushasha dynasty in the Iranian- Dr. Reidar Visser is a Research Fellow at the situation in Iraq’s holy cities in the mid- Iraqi borderlands in the 15th century, and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 19th century. In that period, numerous culminating with the triad of , in Oslo and editor of the Iraq website www. similar challenges against the monopoly Babism and Baha’ism in the 19th century— historiae.org. His writings on the subject of of the Usuli Shi`a clergy were launched: the first of which had its roots in the Shi`a federalism and regionalism in southern Iraq Shaykhism, Babism and Baha’ism. areas of al-Hasa (in the eastern parts of and among the Shi’ites History shows that there were hardly modern-day ) and later gave include the monograph Basra, the Failed any limits to what the orthodox ulama birth to a substantial Shaykhi community Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism would do to fend off these challenges. in Basra that still exists today.10 in Southern Iraq (Transaction Publishers, For example, in the 1820s, in an attempt 2006) and, edited with Gareth Stansfield, to have the founder of the Shaykhi school Challenges for the U.S. Armed Forces An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a (Ahmad al-Ahsa’i, who claimed to have The fundamental question today is what Federal Democracy? (Columbia University access to the Hidden Imam) executed purpose the U.S. armed forces are serving Press, 2007). Dr. Visser studied history or deported, Shi`a ulama contacted the by volunteering to adjudicate on these and comparative politics at the University Sunni authorities in Baghdad, alleging rivalries in the name of the “war on of Bergen and received a Ph.D. in Middle that the Shaykhi leader was guilty of terrorism.” The historical parallels suggest Eastern Studies from the University of having cursed the three first caliphs (a that this is first and foremost a theological Oxford. common Shi`a practice).7 Similarly, in dispute about the timing of the return of 1846, when the Babi movement emerged the Mahdi in which the stronger party (the (and its leader presented claims to Iraqi government, under pressure to be have privileged access to the Mahdi as seen as the upholder of orthodox Shi’ism a “gate” or , not entirely unlike the and desperately trying to reach out to the “guardian” role claimed by Ahmad al- higher-ranking clergy of Najaf) concocts Hasan), Najaf ulama showed no hesitancy inflated terrorism-related charges against in facilitating his arrest and handing a possible threat to the monopoly of the him over to Ottoman authorities in established clergy. Baghdad with a demand for the death penalty.8 9 “Call Number Two,” undated message posted on a now defunct website. 7 Meir Litvak, Shi‘i Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: 10 Sami al-Badri, Shubhat wa-rudud (: al-Matba’a The Ulama of Najaf and (Cambridge: Cambridge al-Shari`a, 2000), p. 543; Reidar Visser, Basra, the Failed University Press, 1998), p. 59. Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq 8 Ibid., pp. 144-46. (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2005), pp. 27–30.