When to Confront Mahdists: a Challenge for the U.S. Military

JUNE 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 7 When to Confront It is likely that the Iraqi government government.5 In it, they deplore the will make similar requests for military accusations by government sources of Mahdists: A Challenge for assistance in the future. Before taking links to the Jund al-Sama’ movement the U.S. Military action against discontented Shià, and former Baàthists. They present however, the U.S. armed forces should their movement as essentially a By Reidar Visser assess the relevant theological issues fundamentalist Shià one, critical of the and whether actual security risks are ulama, but focusing on a “return to the one of the most extraordinary uses of involved. sources,” “the holy books [the Qur’an], U.S. air power in Iraq took place on the traditions of the Prophet and the January 18 and 19, 2008, when Iraqi The Background of the Ahmad al-Hasan ‘heritage’ (turath) of the Shiites.” Their forces involved in armed confrontations Movement aim is to prepare for the return of the in Basra and Nasiriyya called in air Soon after the 2008 incident, the two Mahdi, “which has been promised both support and U.S. jets flew over the Mahdist groups became mixed up in in Islam, Christianity and Judaism.” As battlefields in a show of support. In the Western media. There is, however, an example of comparable haraka islahiyya itself, this kind of action may seem reason to believe that the cells that (reformist movements), they draw unremarkable; however, the identity of were targeted in 2008 had developed attention to the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the group targeted by the Iraqi forces quite independently of the Najaf group. the West. It is noteworthy that in this raises important questions about the Styling themselves as “followers of declaration they play down another type of “anti-terrorism” operations Ahmad al-Hasan al-Yamani,” the group theme that had been prominent in into which U.S. forces in Iraq are had a visible presence in Basra since at previous public pronouncements: the getting drawn. In this case, the focus least 2005.3 In the subsequent period supposed imminence of the return of of the offensive was a group whose it remained active in Basra and the the Mahdi, and the concomitant claims ideology sets it apart from followers of to a special, divine role for their leader, mainstream Shi’ism primarily because Ahmad al-Hasan, as the “guardian” of it believes the Hidden Imam—the Shià “This was not the first the Mahdi.6 leader who disappeared in 874 AD but time U.S. forces have who theoretically still holds all power As for the accusations of targeting the among the Shià—may be about to backed up the Nuri al- ulama, the group members admit that they appear.1 Maliki government against do not support the higher clergy among the Shià, but at the same time they offer This was not the first time U.S. internal enemies who a theoretically grounded explanation for forces have backed up the Nuri al- subscribe to unorthodox this. In their view, the standard Shià Maliki government against internal practice of total surrender to a qualified enemies who subscribe to unorthodox interpretations of Shià cleric (mujtahid) in questions of Islamic interpretations of Shià Islam. One Islam.” law is misguided. “Emulating a cleric” year earlier, in January 2007, a similar (taqlid), they say, is not wajib (obligatory), group had been targeted in the Najaf and the payment of religious taxes to area. In this prior confrontation, anyone other than the infallible imams hundreds of people lost their lives far south, gaining adherents among (of whom only the twelfth and hidden and scores were arrested. The Iraqi former Sadrists and religious students, one is still alive) would be wrong. government accused the “cult members” especially in Basra and Nasiriyya. In According to the group, rather than involved—also known as Jund al-Sama’ the wake of the 2007 clash in Najaf, consulting the ulama, the people should or the “Soldiers of Heaven”—of having the group vigorously distanced itself read the Qur’an for themselves in order planned an attack on Najaf in which from the Jund al-Sama’ group, claiming to “find out about the truth.” They ask: leading members of the clergy would they disagreed over interpretations of “Is this really deviation (inhiraf)?” The be liquidated. Independent researchers how and when the Hidden Imam would real reason for them being targeted, familiar with the (still undisclosed) reappear.4 in their view, is political, and they court records of the subsequent trial single out Àbd al-Àziz al-Hakim of against the group, however, dismiss In a statement dating from around the Islamic Supreme Council for Iraq it as a farcical attempt to implicate January 19, 2008, which was accessible for having instigated the dispatch of a political enemies in criminal activity. for a few hours on the group’s website, special force from Baghdad to the south Once more, the group singled out by the www.almahdyoon.org, before it was to have them arrested. Iraqi government was characterized by closed down, the followers of Ahmad messianic beliefs related to the return al-Hasan gave their side of the story The rhetoric of the followers of Ahmad of the Hidden Imam, the Mahdi.2 behind the confrontation with the Iraqi al-Hasan clarifies why the leading Shià ulama may consider them a threat. 1 “Iraqi Troops Battle Messianic Cult in Southern Iraq, 3 An early, peaceful demonstration by this group was 5 Undated statement from www.almahdyoon.org. At Least 68 Killed,” Associated Press, January 19, 2008. covered by al-Manara on August 2, 2005. 6 The more assertive position is described for instance in 2 Ali Allawi, “Millenarianism, Mahdism and Terrorism: 4 Reidar Visser, “Ashura in Iraq: Enter Mahdism?” a statement by Ahmad al-Hasan dated 21 Rabi al-Thani The Case of Iraq,” presentation at The Jamestown Foun- January 29, 2007, available at www.historiae.org/mahd- 1426/May 30, 2005, published on www.almahdyooon. dation, October 9, 2007. ism.asp. org. JUNE 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 7 The very fundament of power of the One competing interpretation of the Just as the Shià ulama in the 19th century Shià ulama is the dichotomy present appearance of Mahdist groups in quite unscrupulously called on the Ottoman in Usuli Shi’ism (the main, orthodox contemporary Iraq that should be state to deal with Shià dissenters by branch of Shi’ism) which divides all rejected immediately is that of an appealing to a language the Ottomans would Shià into two categories: a tiny elite “Iranian conspiracy.” It is true that understand (that of Sunni orthodoxy), the of clerics qualified to interpret the there are interesting parallels between Iraqi government seems to have no qualms Islamic law (mujtahidun), and the vast the stronger emphasis on Mahdism in in enlisting U.S. support for combating majority of people unqualified in both countries in recent years. Yet, to Shià who dare challenge the orthodox jurisprudential matters, called muqallids see Iranian hands behind groups like mainstream, again using language that because they have to “emulate” a Ahmad al-Hasan would be a mistake would be familiar to the military power mujtahid. This dichotomy crystallized in in two ways. In the first place, many whose services are sought (terrorism, or the 18th century and has since proven of his followers come from some of al-Qaìda involvement). Details about the remarkably durable. Any ideas about the most anti-Iranian circles in Shià recent operations against Iraqi Mahdists “people going back to the sources Iraq, and Hasan himself has attacked remain sketchy, but the timing (in both themselves” (sometimes described as Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah cases during the Shià holy month of “neo-Akhbarism,” after the Akhbari Khamenei, much in the way he has Muharram) strongly suggests that this school which originally was the main attacked Grand Ayatollah Ali al- was primarily an attempt by Shià leaders enemy of the Usulis) are seen as a direct Sistani, and has specifically called for to enforce sectarian orthodoxy during challenge to it; it could potentially lead his abdication.9 Second, this would testing times. If similar requests for U.S. to conditions such as those seen in Sunni overlook the considerable historical military help should materialize in the Islam, where the established clergy lost roots of Mahdism in the far south of Iraq. future—and reports out of Iraq suggest control completely in the late 19th and Similar movements have mushroomed that there is no shortage of discontented 20th centuries when a similar “back to in the south and the adjacent areas Shià prepared to explore the Mahdist the sources” trend became ascendant. in Iran and the Arabian Peninsula for option—it would be prudent for the U.S. centuries, starting with revolutionary armed forces to sort out theological and Historical Parallels movements and slave revolts in the security-related issues before the label of The clearest historical parallel to what early centuries of Islam, followed by the “terrorism” is taken at face value. is currently going on inside Iraq’s emergence of Mahdist principalities such Shià community can be found in the as the Mushasha dynasty in the Iranian- Dr. Reidar Visser is a Research Fellow at the situation in Iraq’s holy cities in the mid- Iraqi borderlands in the 15th century, and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 19th century. In that period, numerous culminating with the triad of Shaykhism, in Oslo and editor of the Iraq website www.

Load more