Byzantine Military Tactics in Syria and Mesopotamia in the Tenth Century
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Byzantine Military Tactics in Syria and Mesopotamia in the Tenth Century 5908_Theotokis.indd i 14/09/18 11:38 AM 5908_Theotokis.indd ii 14/09/18 11:38 AM BYZANTINE MILITARY TACTICS IN SYRIA AND MESOPOTAMIA IN THE TENTH CENTURY A Comparative Study Georgios Theotokis 5908_Theotokis.indd iii 14/09/18 11:38 AM Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK. We publish academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the humanities and social sciences, combining cutting-edge scholarship with high editorial and production values to produce academic works of lasting importance. For more information visit our website: edinburghuniversitypress.com © Georgios Theotokis, 2018 Edinburgh University Press Ltd The Tun – Holyrood Road 12 (2f) Jackson’s Entry Edinburgh EH8 8PJ Typeset in 11/ 13 JaghbUni Regular by IDSUK (DataConnection) Ltd, and printed and bound in Great Britain A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 1 4744 3103 3 (hardback) ISBN 978 1 4744 3105 7 (webready PDF) ISBN 978 1 4744 3106 4 (epub) The right of Georgios Theotokis to be identifi ed as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498). 5908_Theotokis.indd iv 14/09/18 11:38 AM Contents Acknowledgements vi List of Rulers vii Map 1 Anatolia and Upper Mesopotamia viii Map 2 Armenian Themes and Pri ncipalities ix Introduction 1 1 The ‘Grand Strategy’ of the Byzantine Empire 23 2 Byzantine and Arab Strategies and Campaigning Tactics in Cilicia and Anatolia (Eighth–Tenth Centuries) 52 3 The Empire’s Foreign Policy in the East and the Key Role of Armenia (c. 870–965) 69 4 The Byzantine View of their Enemies on the Battlefi eld: The Arabs 105 5 Methods of Transmission of (Military) Knowledge (I): Reconnaissance, Intelligence 128 6 Methods of Transmission of (Military) Knowledge (II): Espionage 147 7 Tactical Changes in the Byzantine Armies of the Tenth Century: Theory and Practice on the Battlefi elds of the East 192 8 Tactical Changes in the Byzantine Armies of the Tenth Century: Investigating the Root Causes 219 9 Byzantine–Arab Battles of the Tenth Century: Evidence of Innovation and Adaptation in the Chronicler Sources 236 10 Tactical Innovation and Adaptation in the Byzantine Army of the Tenth Century: The Study of the Battles 276 Summaries and Conclusions 298 Primary Bibliography 308 Secondary Bibliography 313 Index 341 5908_Theotokis.indd v 14/09/18 11:38 AM Acknowledgements This monograph has been eight years in the making, from the time it was fi rst conceived as an original idea while discussing over a glass of wine with colleagues from the University of Glasgow, during which time I was still struggling to fi nish my doctoral thesis, to the completion of the fi nal draft in the study cubicles of the National Library of Latvia in Riga. In this process of endless research, reading and writing, I benefi tted from the support of several institutions, most notably the Medieval Institute of the University of Notre Dame, which provided me with both an ideal work- ing environment and the fi nancial support to get my idea off the ground and develop it into a viable project. I am grateful to the late Olivia Remie Constable, Robert M. Conway Director of the Medieval Institute at the University of Notre Dame, who gave me this rare opportunity to work across the Atlantic. I also spent six fruitful months in the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter where, with the help and guidance of Professor Dionisius Agius, my monograph acquired its fi nal form. Finally, I am grateful to the three most important people of my life, my parents and my wife, who truly helped this ‘ship sail safely through stormy seas’ with their endless love and encouragement. Boğaziçi, February 2018 vi 5908_Theotokis.indd vi 14/09/18 11:38 AM Rulers Byzantine Emperors of the Macedonian Dynasty Basil I (867–86) Leo VI (886–912) Alexander (912–13) Romanus I Lecapenus (920–44) Constantine VII (913–59) Romanus II (959–63) Nicephorus II Phocas (963–9) John I Tzimiskes (969–73) Basil II (976–1025) Hamdanid Rulers of Mosul and Aleppo Hamdan ibn Hamdun Abu al-Hayjaʾ ʿAbdallah (Mosul 905–13, 914, 925–9) Abu al-Saraya Nasr (Mosul 929–34) Abu al-Ula Saʿid (Mosul 934–5) Abu Muhammad ‘Nasir ad-Dawla’ al-Hasan (Mosul 929, 934, 935–67) Abu al-Hasan ‘Sayf ad-Dawla’ (Aleppo 944–67) ‘Abu Taghlib’ Uddat ad-Dawla Fadlallah (Mosul 967–79) ‘Abu al-Maʿali’ Saʿad ad-Dawla Sharif I (Aleppo 967–91) vii 5908_Theotokis.indd vii 14/09/18 11:38 AM 5908_Theotokis.indd viii Map 1 Anatolia and Upper Mesopotamia (Tenth Century AD): Major Themes, Principalities and Towns 14/09/18 11:38 AM Armenian Themes and Principalities (Tenth Century) Map 2 5908_Theotokis.indd ix 14/09/18 11:38 AM 5908_Theotokis.indd x 14/09/18 11:38 AM Introduction Fas est et ab hoste doceri (It is right to learn, even from the enemy) —Ovid, Metamorphoses, 4.428 As a doctoral student, I was interested in the raids of the Norman dukes of southern Italy on the Byzantine provinces in the Balkans between 1081 and 1108. Foremost, I conducted a study of the military organisation of the Norman and Byzantine states in that period, their overall strategies and their military tactics on the battlefi eld. In that time, I had the chance to venture into the world of warfare in the eastern Mediterranean, from Italy and the Balkans to Asia Minor and the Middle East, examining the mili- tary organisation, tactics and strategies of the Byzantines and the Seljuk Turks, the Arabs of Egypt and the Crusaders. It was while studying battles in the same geographical area that I could identify the numerous tactical innovations and adaptations between different armies in their battle tactics after a pitched battle or a skirmish with the enemy. Therefore, a key ques- tion was quickly raised: can it be said that the general who shows the most willingness to adapt to the tactics of the enemy has signifi cantly better chances of winning the battle and, perhaps, even the war? Thus, the main aim of the present study is to examine in detail the way each state adapted to the strategies and tactics of its enemies in a specifi c operational theatre: the region that is bordered by Antioch and Aleppo to the south, Taron and Vaspourakan around Lake Van to the east, and the mountain ranges of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus to the north and west, between the second and third quarters of the tenth century. The period that I have chosen to study should be considered within the political context of the Byzantine wars of expansion that dominated the eastern frontiers of the empire for the best part of the tenth century. Since 927–8, when the threat from the Bulgarian tsar Symeon had disappeared, the empire’s foreign policy had already shifted to the preservation of a pro-Byzantine Armenia and the establishment of control over the strategic cantons of Taron and Vaspourakan, around Lake Van – an area that con- trolled the invasion routes into Byzantine Chaldea through north-eastern 1 5908_Theotokis.indd 1 14/09/18 11:38 AM Byzantine Military Tactics Anatolia.1 This period comes in complete contrast to the previous decades of incessant raiding in eastern and central Anatolia; the second and third quarters of the third century witnessed an increasingly aggressive Byzan- tine foreign policy during which the need for more professional units of heavy infantry and cavalry became pressing. If Armenia, however, was strategically far more important to the Byzantine government than Cilicia and Syria, then how can the empire’s extensive territorial gains in Cilicia in the third quarter of the tenth century be explained? It all comes down to the personal and political image of the Byzantine emperor as a sovereign chosen by God to protect His people. The strug- gle between the Emperor Constantine VII (945–59) and his successors and Sayf ad-Dawla of Aleppo (944–67) was titanic, and by the close of the 950s had escalated into an all-out confl ict where no one could afford (politically) to succumb. In the end, it was the vast resources Byzantium poured into the wars in the East that turned the tide in their favour by 962. After the conquest of Antioch seven years later, Nicephorus II Phocas (r. 963–9) wrecked the Emirate of Aleppo, swept away the bases for Arab raids in Anatolia and replaced them with an impregnable wall of Byzan- tine themes which was to withstand foreign invasions for another hundred years. After his death, the Emirate of Aleppo was to become a Byzantine dependency, thus enabling the Byzantines to come into direct contact with the Fatimids of Egypt, who held southern Palestine. As the title suggests, this is a comparative study of the military cultures that clashed in Cilicia, Syria and northern Mesopotamia in the tenth cen- tury. For the purposes of this comparison, I examine two pools of primary material: fi rst, the accounts of the largest and most important raids, sieges and pitched battles of this period, since they could have had a decisive outcome on the course of a campaign or even a war, through whatever information can be deduced from the contemporary historical accounts; second, the Byzantine and Arab military manuals, which, being prescrip- tive and not descriptive in nature, provide crucial information on how armies should have been organised and deployed in the battlefi eld up to the period when they were compiled, thus refl ecting decades and even centuries of experience in fi ghting.