Tape recordings from the Nixon Lavelle, White House shed new light on an old Nixon, controversy. and the White

House Tapes By Aloysius Casey and Patrick Casey

November 2006 issue of this magazine. However, not all of the facts were known until now. Hard evidence, from an unimpeach- able source, shows that Lavelle had unequivocal authorization from the highest civilian authority—President —to conduct so-called “preplanned strikes” in North Vietnam in February and March 1972. Equally hard evidence shows that senior military officials had approved earlier strikes of the same nature. These statements are based on re- cently released White House audio recordings of Oval Office conversa- tions as well as formerly classified Photo OkamotoR. Yoichi by AP photo by Harvey George

President Nixon (l) and Henry A. Kissinger huddle in the Oval Office. On Feb. 3, 1972, they met with Amb. Ellsworth F. Bunker (r), US envoy to Saigon. Nixon told Bunker, “He [Gen. Creighton Abrams, US commander in Vietnam] can hit SAM sites, period. OK? But he is not to do it with a public declaration.”

ir Force Gen. John D. Lavelle were never authorized. Congressional A in July 1971 assumed com- hearings arising from his case raised mand of all air operations in Vietnam. serious questions of encroachment by He was known in the Air Force as an the military upon the principle of civil honest, hard-working, and capable authority. Lavelle denied the allegations leader. Seven months later, however, until his death in 1979. Lavelle would be fired as a result of The case was complicated, a fact allegations that he had ordered bomb- made clear by John T. Correll’s expertly ing missions into North Vietnam which told article, “Lavelle,” published in the

86 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 deeply concerned over the mounting threat that the enemy’s integrated air defense network has posed against the B-52 force,” adding his conviction that “the enemy is more determined than ever to shoot down a B-52.” On Nov. 21, McCain sent another top-secret communiqué to Moorer, redoubling his effort to obtain more authority to bomb North Vietnamese targets. McCain made specific reference to the preplanned strikes previously au- thorized by Moorer himself. Moorer, in a top secret Nov. 28 response, sounded understanding, but the Pentagon still de- clined to grant additional authority. Another top official, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, visited the theater later in December. Lavelle met privately with the Pentagon chief in Saigon. At this meeting, Lavelle later Gen. John D. Lavelle (r) on July 29, 1971 accepts command of 7th Air Force from Gen. Lucius D. Clay Jr. Lavelle inherited strange rules of engagement. asserted, Laird “told me I should make a liberal interpretation of the rules of engagement in the field and not come JCS message traffic. We came across In 1968, North Vietnam’s surface-to- to Washington and ask him, under the these pieces of evidence while devel- air missiles were controlled by radar with political climate, to come out with an oping material for our book, Velocity: a high-pulse recurring frequency, which interpretation; I should make them in the Speed With Direction, a biography keyed an alarm in the USAF aircraft. By field and he would back me up.” of Gen. Jerome F. O’Malley, which late 1971, however, Hanoi had learned Lavelle said he conveyed this informa- will be published this summer by Air to “net” its long-range search radars tion to Abrams, and “ Abrams University Press. with the missile sites. These additional said he agreed with Secretary Laird.” The background of the Lavelle case sources of radar data allowed North By December 1971, US military is generally well-known. However, Vietnam to turn on SAM radar at the forces had strong evidence that North certain parts of it bear retelling. last second, giving US crews virtually Vietnam was preparing a massive con- The story begins with Lavelle’s arrival no warning. ventional attack on the South. Combat “in country.” At that time, the overall US Combat commanders believed it vital losses heightened Lavelle’s concern military commander in to let US aircraft defend themselves by about the operating rules and the effect was Army Gen. Creighton T. Abrams. attacking SAM sites and MiG airfields on his crews. On Dec. 18, the 432nd lost Responsibility for the air war in turn was rather than waiting for a SAM site to three aircraft to enemy action, two to delegated to Lavelle, who commanded launch a missile or a MiG to attack. ground fire and one to MiG attack. 7th Air Force. Lavelle had operational Communiqués from Abrams to the JCS Early in 1972, a strike into North control of USAF aircraft, control which in Washington sought authority to de- Vietnam raised anew the issue of was implemented by Maj. Gen. Alton D. stroy the MiG threat and recommended authority for preplanned protective Slay, his operations officer. Slay issued immediate strikes on Bai Thuong, Quan reaction strikes. A ground control orders to wings, including the 432nd Lang, and Vinh airfields. intercept radar at Moc Chau, used to Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, led by The JCS denied these requests, but control MiGs, was a threat as Photo OkamotoR. Yoichi by Col. Charles A. Gabriel and his vice urged commanders to make maximum it provided current information on commander, Col. Jerome F. O’Malley. use of authority allowable under exist- slow-moving US gunships. Abrams Lavelle inherited strange rules of ing ROE. personally authorized a preplanned engagement. In 1968, Washington sus- On Nov. 8, 1971, Adm. Thomas H. strike. US aircraft on Jan. 5 hit and pended bombing in North Vietnam to Moorer, the JCS Chairman, arrived disabled the Moc Chau site. induce Hanoi to talk peace. When he in Vietnam and personally approved When informed, the JCS took a came to the White House in 1969, Nixon a request from Lavelle to attack the dim view of the Moc Chau raid. The kept the policy, but USAF continued MiG airfield at Dong Hoi. Moorer even Chiefs, in a message to US command- intensive airborne reconnaissance of reviewed the bomb damage assessment ers, conceded “the logic” of the attack. the North, and fighter escorts were as- results that day, before departing Viet- “However,” they continued, “we are signed. The rules of engagement in late nam. Mission results also went to the constrained by the specific operating 1971 (and early 1972) prohibited US Pentagon. Instead of questioning the authorities as written.” warplanes from firing at targets in North mission, the JCS only suggested more US aircraft losses continued to mount. Vietnam unless US aircraft were either careful planning. On Jan. 17, 1972, the enemy hit two (1) fired at or (2) activated against by The situation continued to grow more AC-130 gunships, with much loss of life. enemy radar. In those cases, the escorts dire. In a top secret Nov. 12 message to Three days later, the 432nd TRW lost could carry out so-called “protective Moorer, Adm. John S. McCain Jr., head an RF-4C fighter. Accordingly, Lavelle reaction” strikes. of US Pacific Command, warned, “I am on Jan. 23 ordered another preplanned

AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 87 protective reaction strike, this one against Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, his na- knows or would say they didn’t fire?” Dong Hoi airfield. tional security advisor, sat down in the Kissinger, no doubt aware that any The strike was successful, but a miscue Oval Office with Ambassador Ellsworth leak of such an ROE change could cause within the 7th Air Force headquarters F. Bunker, the US envoy to Saigon. By an uproar in Congress and the public command post caused a major misunder- virtue of the setup of the military as- at large, wanted to keep it a secret. standing. On his return flight, the USAF sistance command in Vietnam, Bunker He asked Bunker, “Now, could they pilot radioed a report: “Expended all was in overall charge of all American stop from blabbing it at every bloody ordnance, the mission was successful, operations in Vietnam. briefing?” no enemy reaction.” Bunker was in Washington for a hear- Nixon also wanted secrecy, for a Lavelle, knowing enemy “reaction” ing on his renomination as ambassador. specific reason. He was only weeks was needed to justify every strike against At this particular meeting, though, he away from his historic Feb. 21-28 visit targets in the North, snapped at his spoke on behalf of Abrams, who was to China, and he didn’t want a last- director of operations, Slay: “We can’t seeking greater air strike authority. minute flare-up snarling his plan. This report ‘no reaction.’ ” The attacking Bunker began, “If we could get au- was clear from the context of his next pilot, Lavelle told Slay, “must report thority to, to bomb these SAM sites ... comment. reaction.” Now the authority is for bombing when, Nixon told Bunker: “I want you to Lavelle later contended he meant that when they fire at aircraft,” or “when the tell Abrams when you get back that a pilot should report “hostile radar” as radars locked on. The problem is, that he is to tell the military not to put out the enemy reaction, and that he earnestly that’s, that’s late to start attacking.” extensive briefings with regard to our believed that recording “hostile radar” Kissinger chimed in, evidently sup- military activities from now on—until complied with the ROE, since the netted porting a more aggressive stance. He sug- we get back from China.” enemy radar constituted an automatic gested that Nixon authorize US forces Then Nixon went to some length to de- “activation against” US aircraft. How- to strike any North Vietnamese SAM that scribe the new military dispensation. ever, Lavelle went on to say that he did had ever targeted a US aircraft. “You’ve worked out the authority,” not take care to explain this to Slay. He urged Nixon to “say Abrams can Nixon said to Bunker. “He [Abrams] Nor did Lavelle realize that the format hit any SAM site that has locked on, can hit SAM sites, period. OK? But of the official operations report for a mis- even if it is no longer locked on.” he is not to do it with a public decla- sion would not permit the simple entry A lengthy discussion ensued. Finally, ration. All right? And, if it does get of the term “hostile radar” or “hostile Nixon instructed Bunker to deliver to out, to the extent it does, he says it’s reaction” without supporting details. Abrams the following order: a protective reaction strike. He is to Slay told Gabriel and O’Malley, “You “He [Abrams] is to call all of these describe it as protective reaction. And must assume by General Lavelle’s di- things ‘protective reaction.’ Just call he doesn’t have to spell it out. They rection that you have reaction.” At sub- it protective reaction. All right? ... I struck, that’s all he needs, a SAM site. sequent preflight briefings, crews were am simply saying that we expand the A protective reaction strike against a told to record enemy “reaction,” whether definition of protective reaction to mean SAM site.” or not it happened. While most of the preventive reaction, to mean preventive As a result of the President’s words, missions caused real reaction—SAM, reaction where a SAM site is concerned. the US military now had authorization triple-A, or MiG fire—a few did not. On ... Just call it ordinary protective reac- from the highest level to attack certain those occasions, crews reported “hostile tion.” Then the President added, “Who North Vietnamese targets without the enemy fire” anyway. Eventually, this caused trouble. On Jan. 25, 1972, Sgt. Lonnie D. Franks, an airman in the intelligence division of the 432nd TRW, was tasked to debrief crew members returning from a mission. He routinely asked whether they had re- ceived hostile fire. The crew responded, “No, we didn’t, but we have to report According to Lavelle, that we did.” Franks objected, but two Pentagon chief Melvin R. Laird (l) urged “a superiors told him he was under orders liberal interpretation of to report enemy reaction. the rules.” Adm. Thomas Franks, troubled by this, reported H. Moorer (r), the JCS the incident to Sen. Harold E. Hughes Chairman, met Lavelle in Vietnam and personally (D-Iowa). This would produce military approved a Nov. 8, 1971 inquiries, Congressional hearings, and preplanned attack on the sacking of Lavelle. In time, every- Dong Hoi airfield. thing would become public. Unbeknownst at the time, however, the issue of granting additional strike authority was being discussed at the highest levels of the US government. The first such discussion began promptly at 10:53 on the morning of Feb. 3, 1972, in the White House. President

88 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 On March 21, Moorer dispatched an odd top secret message to 7th Air Force, warning that “the increased number of protective reaction strikes since Jan. 1, 1972 has attracted a considerable

Photo © Bettmann/Corbis amount of high-level interest here and is receiving increasing attention from the press.” Alexander M. Haig Jr., Moorer went on to underscore the when asked by Nixon on “extreme sensitivity” of this subject Sept. 15, 1972 whether the White House could and requested that all crews be “thor- do something to save oughly briefed that current authority Lavelle, said only, “I don’t permits protective reaction to be taken think so, sir. I’ve been only—repeat only—when enemy air watchin’ it.” defenses either fire at or activated against friendly forces.” On March 23, the Inspector General report found that “some missions had not been flown in accordance with the Rules of Engagement and that there were irregularities in the operational reports.” Lavelle, summoned to Washington, was instructed to go immediately to Ryan’s quarters. There, on March 26, the Chief preceding condition of an enemy threat went north. A first wave of US aircraft of Staff told Lavelle he could retire as a to aircraft. One would assume that struck the defending SAM sites and lieutenant general or take a new assign- Bunker, given his position, immediately another struck heavy gun emplacements ment in the grade of major general. would have forwarded the President’s north of the DMZ. Lavelle indicated he wished to speak instruction to US military authorities. The US command officials portrayed directly with either Laird or Secretary of However, the public record contains these as “protective reaction” strikes. the Air Force Robert C. Seamans Jr. The no direct evidence that this did or did They announced that the sole objective meeting concluded with an understand- not happen. was to strike positions in North Vietnam ing that Lavelle would meet with one Operating forces were not permit- that had previously fired on American of the two. Lavelle spent the following ted to make public disclosure of the airplanes. week at the Pentagon waiting in vain change. Indeed, the details of this Feb. On Feb. 25, USAF flew three more for an audience. Realizing he would 3, 1972 Nixon directive never became preplanned protective reaction missions not succeed in overturning the decision, public—ever. using 17 escort aircraft. These types of Lavelle agreed to retirement. Moorer confirmed this order with raids went on unabated for another week On March 30, North Vietnamese a top secret Feb. 7 communication to or so. The preplanned missions were forces stormed across the DMZ, put- commanders in Vietnam. The admiral flown on March 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8. ting all of their weight behind a mas- wrote: It was on March 8 that the letter sive conventional invasion intended to “To help minimize the possibility that from Franks finally reached the office be a knockout blow. Predictably, the the North Vietnamese build a military of Hughes. After ricocheting around US promptly abandoned the niceties capability within the DMZ [demilita- Capitol Hill and the Pentagon, it finally of “protective reaction.” On April 7, rized zone] for sudden strikes across landed with a thud on the desk of Gen. American forces received unrestricted the PMDL [provisional military de- John D. Ryan, the Air Force Chief of authority to bomb targets in the North, marcation line], you are authorized Staff. The Air Force inspector general and B-52s over the next month flew to conduct tactical air strikes into the was on an airplane to South Vietnam more than 700 missions over com- northern portion of the DMZ whenever the next day. munist territory. COMUSMACV [Abrams] determines Lavelle met right away with the in- Back in Washington, Ryan on April the North Vietnamese are using the area spector general. He withheld nothing. 7, 1972 released an Air Force statement in preparation for an attack southward. “You never go over North Vietnam saying Lavelle was retiring for “per- Public affairs guidance. No public an- that that system isn’t activated against sonal and health reasons.” Inevitably, nouncement of any kind will be made you,” said Lavelle, because the North however, the Lavelle matter leaked. with regard to these actions.” Vietnamese radar system was totally On June 10, 1972, Thus did the White House and the netted. The discovery of false reports reported that Lavelle was “demoted af- Joint Chiefs work in sync to conceal surprised him. However, as the person ter ordering repeated and unauthorized Nixon’s directive from the public. who gave the order “not to report ‘no bombing attacks of military targets in Soon, the Pentagon decided to mount reaction’ ” he assumed full responsibility North Vietnam.” another campaign of “limited duration” for the miscommunication. The House Armed Services Commit- strikes and on Feb. 16 announced orders This statement by Lavelle provided tee called Lavelle and Ryan to testify suspending any prestrike need for enemy significant protection for all those on June 12. Instead of ending the con- reaction. On that day, a reconnaissance officers below him in the chain of troversy, however, the House hearing aircraft and 14 escorting fighter-bombers command. sparked calls for a Senate inquiry. Sen.

AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 89 William Proxmire (D-Wis.) called for rap,” Nixon declared. “You see what his deputy national security advisor. courts-martial. Hughes announced that I mean?” Nixon, running for re-election, appar- he was planning to seek a full hearing The discussion eventually concludes ently felt frustration at his inability to on the matter before the Senate Armed with Nixon expressing anxiety about the correct the injustice he thought he was Services Committee. Senate hearing. “I want to keep it away witnessing in the daily Senate testimony At the White House, the issue of if I can,” the President says, “but I don’t on the Lavelle issue. Lavelle’s authority had become a point want to hurt an innocent man.” The President told Haig, “We’ve got of heated, behind-the-scenes discus- Three days later, on June 29, Nixon to be able to do something on this ah, sion. On Wednesday, June 14, in a squirmed at a televised news confer- this Lavelle.” nearly 29-minute Oval Office meeting ence. Asked about Lavelle’s preplanned Haig responded: “I don’t think so, between Nixon and Kissinger, the issue bombing, Nixon said, “It wasn’t au- sir. I’ve been watchin’ it.” of Lavelle came up repeatedly. thorized,” and thus “it was proper for The President said, “We told Laird The President began: “Let me ask him to be relieved and retired.” Yet he that, ‘If your guy Moorer isn’t sure if you about Lavelle. I was, I had it on my also said Lavelle attacked “only those it is protective reaction, that to protect list this morning. I just don’t want him military targets ... being used for firing yourselves, we would back you to the to be made a goat. We all know what on American planes.” hilt.’ [That’s] the way I look at it.” protective reaction is. This damn Laird.” In the period Sept. 11-28, 1972, For all that, the White House re- [Nixon evidently was responding in line the Senate Armed Services Commit- mained silent as the Senate hearings with the views of Kissinger, who blamed tee conducted hearings. At issue were progressed. Laird for the removal of Lavelle.] Lavelle’s planned retirement at the grade The Senate Armed Services Com- Then Kissinger said: “And he had of lieutenant general, matters relating mittee on Oct. 6, 1972 turned down him already removed by the time I even to authority for certain bombing mis- Lavelle’s nomination for retirement as learned about it.” sions, Abrams’ nomination to become a lieutenant general. The vote was 14 to Nixon asked, “Why did he even Army Chief of Staff, McCain’s planned two. Instead, Lavelle was retired at his remove him? You, you destroy a man’s retirement, and Moorer’s nomination for permanent rank of major general. career.” a second term as Chairman. More than two weeks later, Nixon was Kissinger did not answer the ques- Lavelle himself led off the testimony still upset about the Lavelle incident. tion, but rather took up a different topic. on Sept. 11, 1972, asserting unreservedly In an Oct. 23, 1972 meeting with Haig Nixon, however, interrupted: “Come that all of his actions were authorized in the Old Executive Office Building, back to Lavelle. I don’t want a man and taken to protect the lives of airmen Nixon unleashed a torrent of anger. persecuted for doing what he thought in his command. He rejected assertions “All of this G------crap about Lavelle,” was right. I just don’t want it done.” that he had exceeded his authority and said Nixon. “And I feel sorry for the Still, Nixon does not receive a sat- said that he had applied the rules of fellow, because you and I know we did isfactory answer from his national engagement as he had been urged to by tell him about protective reaction being, security advisor. The President con- the JCS. He described his understanding very generally—” tinued: that the enemy’s netted radar system au- “Very liberal,” Haig helpfully sug- “Can we do anything now to stop tomatically produced “reaction,” which gested. this damn thing or ... Why’d he even authorized use of force. “Yeh, very liberally, very liberally,” remove him?” He said that a commander is always said Nixon. “Remember, I said it was, “Lavelle was removed at the end of ultimately responsible for the con- if they, if they hit there, go back and hit March,” Kissinger noted. sequences his orders. “I have never it again. Go back and do it right. You “Because of this?” asked Nixon. suggested that the responsibility was don’t have to wait till they fire before “Yeh,” said Kissinger. other than my own,” he said. Lavelle you fire back. Remember I told Laird Nixon was furious: “Why the hell concluded: “Mr. Chairman, it is not that. And I meant it. Now Lavelle ap- did this happen? A decision of that pleasant to contemplate ending a long parently knew that, and received that magnitude, without— I should have and distinguished military career with at some time.” known about it, Henry. Because this is a catastrophic blemish on my record—a Six years after these events, Lavelle something we told— You remember: blemish for conscientiously doing the job spoke at some length for an oral his- We, we, we told Laird, ‘Keep pressure I was expected to do, and doing it with a tory project. “I did what was right,” he on there in March.’ ” minimum loss of American lives.” insisted. “I did what was authorized.” Nixon concludes: “Laird knows G-- On Sept. 13, 1972, Abrams testified Between Nov. 7, 1971 and March 9, ---- well, that ah, I told him, I said, ‘It’s that Lavelle “acted against the rules” 1972, US aircraft flew scores of strike protective reaction.’ He winks, he says, of engagement. Lavelle and Abrams, sorties. Of these, a total of just 28 ‘Oh, I understand.’ ” who always had worked well together documented missions, entailing about At 8:57 a.m. on June 26, 1972, Nixon in Vietnam, were now at odds on the 147 sorties, were identified as the un- and Kissinger once again took up the crucial issue of Lavelle’s “authority authorized “Lavelle Raids.” Lavelle problem in the Oval Office. to strike.” Now, it seems clear enough that even Nixon was recoiling from advice that Two days later, on Sept. 15, 1972, that tiny handful of flights also were he steer clear of any involvement in Nixon met in the Oval Office with Haig, authorized. ■ the forthcoming Senate inquiry into Lavelle’s actions. Lt. Gen. Aloysius G. Casey, USAF (Ret.), retired as the commander of Space Divi- “Frankly, Henry, I don’t feel right sion, Air Force Systems Command, in 1988. His son, Patrick A. Casey, is a trial at- about our pushing him into this thing torney with the firm Myers, Brier & Kelly, LLP, in Scranton, Pa. This is their first article and then, and then giving him a bad for Air Force Magazine.

90 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007