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Lavelle, Nixon, and the White House Tapes A Tape recordings from the Nixon Lavelle, White House shed new light on an old Nixon, controversy. and the White House Tapes By Aloysius Casey and Patrick Casey November 2006 issue of this magazine. However, not all of the facts were known until now. Hard evidence, from an unimpeach- able source, shows that Lavelle had unequivocal authorization from the highest civilian authority—President Richard Nixon—to conduct so-called “preplanned strikes” in North Vietnam in February and March 1972. Equally hard evidence shows that senior military officials had approved earlier strikes of the same nature. These statements are based on re- cently released White House audio recordings of Oval Office conversa- tions as well as formerly classified Photo OkamotoR. Yoichi by AP photo by Harvey George President Nixon (l) and Henry A. Kissinger huddle in the Oval Office. On Feb. 3, 1972, they met with Amb. Ellsworth F. Bunker (r), US envoy to Saigon. Nixon told Bunker, “He [Gen. Creighton Abrams, US commander in Vietnam] can hit SAM sites, period. OK? But he is not to do it with a public declaration.” ir Force Gen. John D. Lavelle were never authorized. Congressional A in July 1971 assumed com- hearings arising from his case raised mand of all air operations in Vietnam. serious questions of encroachment by He was known in the Air Force as an the military upon the principle of civil honest, hard-working, and capable authority. Lavelle denied the allegations leader. Seven months later, however, until his death in 1979. Lavelle would be fired as a result of The case was complicated, a fact allegations that he had ordered bomb- made clear by John T. Correll’s expertly ing missions into North Vietnam which told article, “Lavelle,” published in the 86 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 deeply concerned over the mounting threat that the enemy’s integrated air defense network has posed against the B-52 force,” adding his conviction that “the enemy is more determined than ever to shoot down a B-52.” On Nov. 21, McCain sent another top-secret communiqué to Moorer, redoubling his effort to obtain more authority to bomb North Vietnamese targets. McCain made specific reference to the preplanned strikes previously au- thorized by Moorer himself. Moorer, in a top secret Nov. 28 response, sounded understanding, but the Pentagon still de- clined to grant additional authority. Another top official, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, visited the theater later in December. Lavelle met privately with the Pentagon chief in Saigon. At this meeting, Lavelle later Gen. John D. Lavelle (r) on July 29, 1971 accepts command of 7th Air Force from Gen. Lucius D. Clay Jr. Lavelle inherited strange rules of engagement. asserted, Laird “told me I should make a liberal interpretation of the rules of engagement in the field and not come JCS message traffic. We came across In 1968, North Vietnam’s surface-to- to Washington and ask him, under the these pieces of evidence while devel- air missiles were controlled by radar with political climate, to come out with an oping material for our book, Velocity: a high-pulse recurring frequency, which interpretation; I should make them in the Speed With Direction, a biography keyed an alarm in the USAF aircraft. By field and he would back me up.” of Gen. Jerome F. O’Malley, which late 1971, however, Hanoi had learned Lavelle said he conveyed this informa- will be published this summer by Air to “net” its long-range search radars tion to Abrams, and “General Abrams University Press. with the missile sites. These additional said he agreed with Secretary Laird.” The background of the Lavelle case sources of radar data allowed North By December 1971, US military is generally well-known. However, Vietnam to turn on SAM radar at the forces had strong evidence that North certain parts of it bear retelling. last second, giving US crews virtually Vietnam was preparing a massive con- The story begins with Lavelle’s arrival no warning. ventional attack on the South. Combat “in country.” At that time, the overall US Combat commanders believed it vital losses heightened Lavelle’s concern military commander in South Vietnam to let US aircraft defend themselves by about the operating rules and the effect was Army Gen. Creighton T. Abrams. attacking SAM sites and MiG airfields on his crews. On Dec. 18, the 432nd lost Responsibility for the air war in turn was rather than waiting for a SAM site to three aircraft to enemy action, two to delegated to Lavelle, who commanded launch a missile or a MiG to attack. ground fire and one to MiG attack. 7th Air Force. Lavelle had operational Communiqués from Abrams to the JCS Early in 1972, a strike into North control of USAF aircraft, control which in Washington sought authority to de- Vietnam raised anew the issue of was implemented by Maj. Gen. Alton D. stroy the MiG threat and recommended authority for preplanned protective Slay, his operations officer. Slay issued immediate strikes on Bai Thuong, Quan reaction strikes. A ground control orders to wings, including the 432nd Lang, and Vinh airfields. intercept radar at Moc Chau, used to Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, led by The JCS denied these requests, but control MiGs, was a major threat as Photo OkamotoR. Yoichi by Col. Charles A. Gabriel and his vice urged commanders to make maximum it provided current information on commander, Col. Jerome F. O’Malley. use of authority allowable under exist- slow-moving US gunships. Abrams Lavelle inherited strange rules of ing ROE. personally authorized a preplanned engagement. In 1968, Washington sus- On Nov. 8, 1971, Adm. Thomas H. strike. US aircraft on Jan. 5 hit and pended bombing in North Vietnam to Moorer, the JCS Chairman, arrived disabled the Moc Chau site. induce Hanoi to talk peace. When he in Vietnam and personally approved When informed, the JCS took a came to the White House in 1969, Nixon a request from Lavelle to attack the dim view of the Moc Chau raid. The kept the policy, but USAF continued MiG airfield at Dong Hoi. Moorer even Chiefs, in a message to US command- intensive airborne reconnaissance of reviewed the bomb damage assessment ers, conceded “the logic” of the attack. the North, and fighter escorts were as- results that day, before departing Viet- “However,” they continued, “we are signed. The rules of engagement in late nam. Mission results also went to the constrained by the specific operating 1971 (and early 1972) prohibited US Pentagon. Instead of questioning the authorities as written.” warplanes from firing at targets in North mission, the JCS only suggested more US aircraft losses continued to mount. Vietnam unless US aircraft were either careful planning. On Jan. 17, 1972, the enemy hit two (1) fired at or (2) activated against by The situation continued to grow more AC-130 gunships, with much loss of life. enemy radar. In those cases, the escorts dire. In a top secret Nov. 12 message to Three days later, the 432nd TRW lost could carry out so-called “protective Moorer, Adm. John S. McCain Jr., head an RF-4C fighter. Accordingly, Lavelle reaction” strikes. of US Pacific Command, warned, “I am on Jan. 23 ordered another preplanned AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 87 protective reaction strike, this one against Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, his na- knows or would say they didn’t fire?” Dong Hoi airfield. tional security advisor, sat down in the Kissinger, no doubt aware that any The strike was successful, but a miscue Oval Office with Ambassador Ellsworth leak of such an ROE change could cause within the 7th Air Force headquarters F. Bunker, the US envoy to Saigon. By an uproar in Congress and the public command post caused a major misunder- virtue of the setup of the military as- at large, wanted to keep it a secret. standing. On his return flight, the USAF sistance command in Vietnam, Bunker He asked Bunker, “Now, could they pilot radioed a report: “Expended all was in overall charge of all American stop from blabbing it at every bloody ordnance, the mission was successful, operations in Vietnam. briefing?” no enemy reaction.” Bunker was in Washington for a hear- Nixon also wanted secrecy, for a Lavelle, knowing enemy “reaction” ing on his renomination as ambassador. specific reason. He was only weeks was needed to justify every strike against At this particular meeting, though, he away from his historic Feb. 21-28 visit targets in the North, snapped at his spoke on behalf of Abrams, who was to China, and he didn’t want a last- director of operations, Slay: “We can’t seeking greater air strike authority. minute flare-up snarling his plan. This report ‘no reaction.’ ” The attacking Bunker began, “If we could get au- was clear from the context of his next pilot, Lavelle told Slay, “must report thority to, to bomb these SAM sites ... comment. reaction.” Now the authority is for bombing when, Nixon told Bunker: “I want you to Lavelle later contended he meant that when they fire at aircraft,” or “when the tell Abrams when you get back that a pilot should report “hostile radar” as radars locked on. The problem is, that he is to tell the military not to put out the enemy reaction, and that he earnestly that’s, that’s late to start attacking.” extensive briefings with regard to our believed that recording “hostile radar” Kissinger chimed in, evidently sup- military activities from now on—until complied with the ROE, since the netted porting a more aggressive stance. He sug- we get back from China.” enemy radar constituted an automatic gested that Nixon authorize US forces Then Nixon went to some length to de- “activation against” US aircraft.
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