Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited Author(S): Susan Hekman Source: Signs, Vol

Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited Author(s): Susan Hekman Source: Signs, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), pp. 341-365 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3175275 . Accessed: 26/03/2013 07:49

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This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:49:29 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Truthand Method: FeministStandpoint Theory Revisited

Susan Hekman

N 1983, THE PUBLICATION of NancyHartsock's Money, I Sex,and Powerchanged the landscape of feminist theory. The scope ofthe book aloneensures it a prominentplace in feministthought. It includesa comprehensivecritique of positivism, an indictmentof masculinisttheories of power,and evena textualanalysis of Greekmy- thology.The centralconcern of the book, however, and thesource of its lastinginfluence, is Hartsock's epistemological and methodological argument.Her goal is to definethe nature of thetruth claims that feminists advanceand to providea methodologicalgrounding that will validate thoseclaims. The methodshe definesis the feministstandpoint. Bor- rowingheavily from Marx, yet adapting her insights to herspecifically feministends, Hartsock claims that it is women'sunique standpoint in societythat provides the justification for the truth claims of feminism whilealso providingit witha methodwith which to analyzereality. In thesucceeding decade, feminist standpoint theory has becomea stapleof feministtheory. Nancy Hartsock's essay in SandraHarding and MerrillHintikka's pathbreaking book DiscoveringReality (1983) broughtthe concept to a philosophicalaudience. In a numberof influen- tial publications,Dorothy Smith developed a sociologicalmethod from the"standpoint of women." Harding featured feminist standpoint theory inher two important books on scienceand feminism. Patricia Hill Collins articulateda specifically black feminist standpoint. But in thelate 1980s andearly 1990s criticisms of the position mounted, and fewer discussions of it werepublished. Today the concept occupies a muchless prominent position.Particularly among younger feminist theorists, feminist standpointtheory is frequentlyregarded as a quaintrelic of feminism'sless sophisticatedpast. Several developments inthe late 1980s have led to this declininginfluence. First, the inspiration for feminist standpoint theory, Marxism,has been discreditedin both theoryand practice.Second, feministstandpoint theory appears to be at oddswith the issue that has

[Signs:Journal of Womenin Cultureand Society1997, vol. 22, no. 2] ? 1997 byThe Universityof Chicago.All rightsreserved. 0097-9740/97/2202-0003$01.00

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dominatedfeminist debate in the past decade: difference.Third, feminist standpointtheory appears to be opposed to two of the most significant influencesin recentfeminist theory: postmodernism and poststructural- ism.The Marxistroots of the theory seem to contradictwhat many define as the antimaterialismof postmodernism.For all of these reasons,the conclusion that feministstandpoint theory should be discardedseems obvious. I thinkthis conclusionis premature,that it is a mistaketo writeoff feministstandpoint theory too quickly.Feminist standpoint theory raises a centraland unavoidablequestion for feminist theory: How do we justify the truthof the feministclaim thatwomen have been and are oppressed? Feministstandpoint theory was initiallyformulated in the contextof Marxist politics.But fromthe outset,feminist standpoint theorists have recognizedthat feministpolitics demand a justificationfor the truth claims of feministtheory, that is, that feministpolitics are necessarily epistemological.Throughout the theory'sdevelopment, feminist standpoint theorists'quest fortruth and politicshas been shaped by two cen- tralunderstandings: that knowledge is situatedand perspectivaland that thereare multiplestandpoints from which knowledge is produced.As the theoryhas developed,feminist standpoint theorists have explored,first, how knowledgecan be situatedyet "true," and, second,how we can ac- knowledgedifference without obviating the possibilityof critiqueand thus a viable feministpolitics. Feministstandpoint theorists have an- sweredthese questions in a varietyof ways;many of theseanswers have been unsatisfactory;the theoryhas been frequentlyreformulated. In the course of theirarguments, however, these theoristshave made an indis- pensablecontribution to feministtheory. It is my contentionthat feminist standpoint theory represents the be- ginningof a paradigmshift in the conceptof knowledge,a shiftthat is transformingnot onlyfeminist theory but also epistemologyitself. What LorraineCode (1991) calls a "new mappingof the epistemicdomain" thatcharacterizes feminist theory owes muchto the articulationand developmentof feministstandpoint theory. Finally, I assertthat this theory remainscentral to contemporaryfeminism because thequestions it raises are crucialto the futuredevelopment of feministtheory and politics.Re- centlythere has been muchdiscussion among feminists of theparameters of a "politicsof difference."I believe that feminist standpoint theory has laid the groundworkfor such a politics by initiatingthe discussionof situatedknowledges.

I. Definingthe feministstandpoint In an articleoriginally published in Quest in 1975, Nancy Hartsock wrote: "At bottom feminismis a mode of analysis,a method of ap-

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This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:49:29 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TRUTH AND METHOD Hekman proachinglife and politics,rather than a set of politicalconclusions about the oppressionof women" (1981, 35). The power of feministmethod, she asserts,grows out of the factthat it enables us to connecteveryday lifewith the analysisof the social institutionsthat shape that life (36). This earlyarticle reveals the presupposition that defines her later formulation of thefeminist standpoint: the beliefthat feminism, while necessarily political, at the same time must be centrallyconcerned with method, truth,and epistemology.Feminism, for Hartsock, is about truthclaims and how we justifythem. But at thevery outset she refersto theissue that will complicateher search fortruth in a feministmode. She notes that the realityperceived by differentsegments of societyis varied.Thus, she concludes,"Feminism as a mode of analysisleads us to respectexperience and differences,to respectpeople enough to believethat they are in the best possible positionto make theirown revolution"(40). For Hartsock, activityis epistemology:women and men create their own realitiesthrough their different activities and experiences.If this werethe whole story,however, then both truth and realitywould be multiple,even "relative," and Hartsockis veryconcerned to avoid thisconclusion. When she presentsher theoryof the feministstandpoint in Money, Sex, and Power (1983c), this is the focus of her attention.She insists that "the concept of a standpointrests on the fact that thereare some perspectiveson societyfrom which, however well intentionedone may be, the real relationsof humans with each otherand with the natural world are not visible" (117). Hartsock'sgoal in the book is to definethe conceptof a standpointand applyit to the case of women. She outlines fivecriteria of a standpointthat she adapts fromMarx's theory(118). Two potentiallycontradictory definitions of realitystructure this discussion. First,in what todaywould be called a social constructionistargu- ment,Hartsock assertsthat materiallife structures and sets limitsto an understandingof social relations.It followsthat reality will be perceived differentlyas materialsituations differ. It also followsthat the dominant (ruling)group in societywill label its perspectiveas "real" and reject otherdefinitions. Second, Hartsock insiststhat while the rulinggroup's perceptionof realityis "partialand perverse,"that of the oppressed is not, that it exposes "real" relationsamong humans and is hence liberatory. Throughouther work Hartsock struggleswith the relationshipbetween thesetwo definitionsof reality.It constitutesa kindof faultline thatruns throughher articulationof the feministstandpoint. Although her formulation changesover the years, she continuesto maintainboth that reality is sociallyand materiallyconstructed and thatsome perceptionsof reality are partial,others true and liberatory. Furtheraspects of feministstandpoint theory emerge in Hartsock's well-knownarticle "The FeministStandpoint" (1983b). In this article Hartsock statesthat a specificallyfeminist historical materialism "might

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enable us to lay bare the laws of tendencywhich constitute the structure of patriarchyover time" (283). Her dualisticconcept of realitystructures this discussionas well. On the one hand, social constructionistthemes recurthroughout the argument:"I will sketchout a kindof ideal typeof the social relationsand world view characteristicof male and femaleac- tivityin orderto explorethe epistemologycontained in the institutional- ized sexual divisionof labor" (289). The feministstandpoint "expresses femaleexperience at a particulartime and place, locatedwithin a particular set of social relations"(303). Quicklyfollowing this, however, is the statementthat the feministstandpoint allows us to "go beneaththe sur- face of appearances to reveal the real but concealed social relations" (304). Her thesisis that "women'slives make available a particularand privilegedvantage point on male supremacy"(284). In this article Hartsock introducesan approach that will become closelyidentified with standpoint theory: object-relations theory. The in- troductionof thistheory highlights the tension inherent in herconcept of reality-in a sense wideningthe faultline in thatconcept. In her discussion Hartsockappeals to object-relationstheory to explainthe difference betweenthe male and female experiencesof the world (1983b, 296). Bringingobject-relations theory to bear on her Marxist assumptions, Hartsockargues that if material life structures consciousness, then women's relationallydefined existence structures a lifein which dichotomies are foreignand abstractmasculinity is exposed as partial and perverse (298-99). Implicitin Hartsock'sdiscussion is theassumption that object- relationstheory is an appropriateand usefuladdition to feministstand- pointtheory, not a major departure.In thecontext of hertheory it seems to fitnicely with the Marxist thesis that reality is sociallyconstructed and suppliesa needed genderedcomponent to thattheory. The incorporationof object-relationstheory, however, represents a major theoreticaldeparture in the developmentof standpointtheory. Femi- nist standpointtheory's identification with object-relationstheory has changedthe focusof the approachin two respects.First, object-relations theory,unlike Marxist theory,lacks a distinctionbetween socially con- structedand "true" reality.As feministtheorists in the 1980s discovered, object-relationstheory effectively jettisons the concept of objective reality. Some advocates of feministstandpoint theory see this as an advantage, othersas a disadvantage.But it becomesa problemthat must be continu- ally negotiated.Second, the incorporationof object-relationstheory fur- therproblematizes the issue of difference.What was merelya troubling issue in feministstandpoint theory is a major stumblingblock in object- relationstheory. In object-relationstheory the opposition between the experienceof men and the experienceof women is the centerpieceof the theory.The difficultyof theorizingdifferences among women and theva-

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This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:49:29 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TRUTH AND METHOD Hekman rietyof women's experiencesthat characterizesobject-relations theory now becomesa major problemin feministstandpoint theory as well.1 In theirperceptive discussion of the evolutionof poststructuralistand postmodernthought, Rosalind Coward and JohnEllis (1977) argue that thegroundwork for the discursiveconcept of thesubject that has become the new paradigmof subjectivityis alreadypresent in Marx's historically constitutedsubject. I would like to argue a similarthesis for the early definitionsof feministstandpoint theory, particularly that of Hartsock. To establishthis thesis I interpretHartsock's criteria for a standpointfrom the perspectiveof the work of one of the mostprominent representatives of what I call the new paradigmof knowledge-Michel Foucault. Hart- sock (1983c, 118) argues,first, that material life structures and setslimits to the understandingof social relations;second, that the rulingclass structuresthe materialrelations of a societyand hence its definitionof the "real"; and, third,that the visionavailable to oppressedgroups must be achievedthrough struggle. All of thistranslates nicely into Foucault's theory.First, his theoriesof sexuality,bio-power, the carceral society, and the evolutionof the Westernsubject provide detailed analyses of how material/sociallife structuresconsciousness. Second, one of Foucault's centralaims is to definehow and to what extenthegemonic discourses (what Hartsock calls the ideologyof the rulingclass) define"reality" in any givensociety. Third, he is centrallyconcerned with defining how sub- jugated knowledges (the vision of the oppressed) can be articulated (Foucault 1980, 82). But here the similarityends. Hartsock furtherclaims that the ruling group'svision is partialand perverseand thatthe vision of the oppressed exposes the "real" relationsamong humans. Foucault would counterthat all visions are "partial and perverse"in the sense that all knowledgeis necessarilyfrom some perspective;we mustspeak fromsomewhere and that somewhereis constitutiveof our knowledge.Most important,he would insistthat the vision of the oppressedis itselfanother discourse, not the apprehensionof "true" reality.It is undoubtedlya counterdis- course, a discoursethat seeks to break the hold of the hegemonicdis- course,but it is no closerto "reality"than the discourse it exposes. What it may be closerto, however,is a definitionof a less repressivesociety. It is my contentionthat the deconstructionof the concept of "true" realityis alreadyimplicit in Hartsock'sdefinition of the feministstand-

1 For an earlydiscussion of the problemof difference,see Hartsock 1983a. She argues thatin our societysome empiricaldifferences are reifiedinto an ontologicallysignificant "Difference"by the rulingclass. She assertsthat feminists should rejectthis construction of "Difference"and, rather,use empiricaldifferences as sourcesof creativityand power.I findthis to be an insightfuland usefuldiscussion of differencethat has been unfortunately neglectedin currentdiscussions.

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point,just as the deconstructionof thetranscendent subject was implicit in Marx's theoryof the social constructionof consciousness.If material life structuresconsciousness, if the differentexperiences of different groupscreate different realities, then this must hold forthe oppressedas well as the oppressor.Hartsock might reply that the oppressed'sconception of realityis truebecause it is based on a correctperception of material realitywhile that of the oppressoris false because it does not. But such an argumentbegs the question of how a correctperception of material realityis achieved. Ultimately,it must presupposethis realityas a given,as the standardby which truth and falsityare defined.Even in her early formulationsof feministstandpoint theory Hartsock is defensive about the accuracyof the oppressed/women'sconception of reality.The incorporationof object-relationstheory makes her defenseof thisposi- tioneven more difficult. If, as object-relationstheory claims, our relations withothers define our perceptions,then selecting one ofthese perceptions as "real" is instantlysuspect. But Hartsockalso realizesthe centrality of thispoint. Unless women'sstandpoint can be shownto be truer,a reflec- tion of realityitself, why bother with feminist analysis at all? One of Hartsock'smajor claims is thatwhile the discourse of the ruling class is ideological,that of the oppressedis not: it reflectsthe concrete realityof theirlives. An importantaspect of this claim is her assertion that the feministstandpoint is achieved,not given.The natureof their oppressionis not obvious to all women;it is onlythrough feminist analysis thatthe feminist standpoint can be articulated.What thiscomes down to is that although the feministstandpoint is discursivelyconstituted, the materialreality of women'slives on whichit is based is not. This im- portantdistinction is lost in muchsubsequent feminist standpoint theory. The beliefthat the standpoint(s)of womenresists the discursive constitu- tion thatdefines all "partialand perverse"perceptions of realityis a major themeof feministstandpoint theorists in the 1980s; it structuresthese theorists'efforts to definea distinctivemethod for feminist analysis. The dearest example of this beliefis the work of DorothySmith. In herinfluential essay "Women's Perspective as a Radical Critiqueof Sociol- ogy" (1987b), Smithposits a contrastbetween the categoriesof sociology and the everydaylife (what phenomenologistscall the lifeworld)of women. She argues that the categoriesof sociology and sociological methodembody what Hartsock calls "abstractmasculinity." For the sociologist,objectivity is definedas the separationbetween knower and known,removal from the situatednessof knowledge.This methodand thesecategories, she argues,obviate the experience of women,an experience that is always situated,relational, and engaged. Two conclusions follow fromthis. First,the lived realityof women'slives is absent from the domain of sociology;it is quite literallyinvisible to the sociologist.

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Second, the woman sociologistexperiences a bifurcatedconsciousness: the abstract,conceptual world she encountersas a sociologistversus her livedreality as a woman (1987b, 90). The goal of Smith'swork is to define a "reorganizedsociology" that would solve both of these problemsby foregroundingactual livedexperiences. Smithoutlines this reorganizedsociology, what she calls a sociology forwomen, in The EverydayWorld as Problematic(1987a). She defines the world of sociology as a conceptualworld divorcedfrom the lived, actual worldof everydayexperience. The world of women,in contrast,is "materialand local," theworld as we actuallyexperience it. These definitions lead Smithto her definitionof "women'sstandpoint" as the point outside textuallymediated discoursesin the actualityof everydaylives (1987a, 107). The standpointof women,she claims,is relatedto Marx's methodbut constitutesan improvementon it because it is "anchored" in the everydayworld (142). This methodconstitutes the "Copernicanshift in sociology" thatSmith is seeking(1979, 183). Smithis quite clear about what she is attemptingto do in her work; whethershe is successfulis anothermatter. She positsan absolutedichot- omy betweenabstract concepts on the one hand and livedreality on the other,indicts sociology for inhabitingthe conceptualworld of abstrac- tions,and advocates a move to the otherside of the dichotomy.One of the curious aspects of Smith'saccount is that,although it is inspiredby phenomenologicalmethod, it neverthelessdeparts from the phenomenol- ogist'sunderstanding of the natureof conceptformation and the role of conceptsin sociological analysis.Alfred Schutz (1967), whose theoryof the lifeworldis the originof Smith'sapproach, claims, like Smith,that sociological methodmust be rooted in the lived actualityof the social actors' reality(the lifeworld)and that the lived experiencesof social actorsmust form the basis of sociologicalmethod and concepts.But, unlike Smith,Schutz argues, first, that the social actors'world is constituted by theirconcepts and, second,that the sociologistalso employsconcepts in orderto studythat lifeworld.Schutz claims that the sociologyof the lifeworldthat he advocates is more "adequate" than positivistsociology because,unlike that sociology, it is rootedin theconcepts of social actors. But he also makes it clear thathis methodis itselfa complexconceptual apparatus with standards of truthand accuracy,that is, a discursive formation. At timesSmith seems to acknowledgethat she is, in fact,advocating a conceptualshift and not a shiftfrom concepts to reality.She asserts:"I am not suggesting,of course,that sociology can be done withoutknow- ing how to do it and thatwe approachour workwith a naive consciousness" (1979, 174). In an explicit referenceto Schutz, she claims that "as we evolve a discourseamong women, it crystallizesthe issues and

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concernsof those of us who got therefirst and have definedthe typesof statements,the relevances, the phenomenal universe, and theconventions that give it a social formindependent of the particularindividuals who are activein it" (1987a, 221). But theseare isolatedreferences. The over- all themeof her work is to denythat she is eitherstudying a conceptual reality(the world of thesocial actors)or fashioninga discourseand advo- catinga method.Her constantlyreiterated thesis is thather approachis superiorto "abstractsociology" because it is rootedin "an actual material setting,an actual local and particularplace in the world" (1979, 181). What she refusesto acknowledgeis thatthat "reality"is also discursivelyconstituted. To do so would be to abandon theneat dichotomy betweenabstract concepts and livedreality on whichher approach rests. Otherearly formulations of feministstandpoint theory reflect this dichotomybetween concepts and reality,specifically, the abstractworld of men and the concreteworld of women. Hilary Rose conceptualizesthe dichotomyin termsof the materialreality of women'slabor and abstract masculinistscience (1983, 1986); IrisYoung calls fora "feministhistori- cal materialism"rooted in "real social relations"(1980, 184-85); Mary O'Brien looks to the reproductiveprocess to providethe materialbasis for her social theory(1981); and Alison Jaggarappeals to an explicitly Marxist understandingof the epistemologicaladvantages of the op- pressedview of reality(1983). EvenJane Flax, who laterrepudiates any naiveconception of reality,argues that we need waysof thinkingthat can do justiceto our experience(1983). Despitetheir significant differences, all ofthese accounts share the con- victionthat the feministstandpoint is rooted in a "reality"that is the oppositeof the abstractconceptual world inhabitedby men,particularly the~men of the rulingclass, and that in this realitylies the truthof the human condition.There are threeproblems with this formulation. First, it assumes that the dichotomybetween concepts and realitycan be re- solved by embracingreality and rejectingconcepts. This strategyis self- defeating.The two elementsof thedichotomy are interdependent;to embrace one is to acknowledgethe epistemologicalvalidity of both sides of the dichotomy,not to solve the problemit poses. Second, it deniesthat the lifeworldis, like everyother human activity, discursively constituted. It is a discoursedistinct from that of abstractscience, but a discourse nonetheless.2Third, as both Schutzand Max Weberclearly realized, one can argue that sociological analysisshould begin with the actors' concepts and thatany otherapproach will miss the object of its study-the lifeworld-but thatthis requires a specificargument. Opposing concepts to realityis not an argumentand, furthermore,entails an epistemological fallacy.

2 See Grant1993 fora similarcritique.

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II. The challenge of difference:Redefining the feministstandpoint The originalformulations of feministstandpoint theory rest on two assumptions:that all knowledgeis located and situated,and thatone lo- cation,that of the standpointof women,is privilegedbecause it provides a vantagepoint that reveals the truthof social reality.It is mythesis that the deconstructionof this second assumptionis implicitin the firstand that as the theorydeveloped the problematicnature of the second as- sumptioncame to theforefront. Another way of puttingthis is thata new paradigmof knowledgewas implicitin the firstformulations of feminist standpointtheory, a definitionof knowledgeas situatedand perspectival, but that these firstformulations retained elements of the paradigm it was replacing. Epistemologistshave devotedmuch attentionto the conceptof "reality" in the past decade, offeringpowerful arguments against the notion of a given,preconceptual reality that grounds knowledge. The "linguistic turn"of twentieth-centuryphilosophy and theinfluence of hermeneutics, postmodernism,and poststructuralismhave all contributedto thepresent skepticismabout "reality."These speculationsare directlyrelevant to the evolutionof feministstandpoint theory, an approach initiallygrounded in just such a conceptof reality.But it was anotherdiscussion, the discussion of differencewithin the feministcommunity, that stimulated a reas- sessmentof feministstandpoint theory in thelate 1980s and early1990s. Originally,feminist standpoint theorists claimed that the standpointof womenoffers a privilegedvantage point for knowledge. But ifthe differences among women are taken seriouslyand we accept the conclusion that women occupy many differentstandpoints and thus inhabitmany realities,this thesis must be reexamined.The currentreevaluation of feminist standpointtheory is an attemptto reconstitutethe theoryfrom the perspectiveof difference.These discussionsfocus on two questionsthat are centralnot only to this approach but also to feministtheory itself. First,if, as we must,we acknowledgethat thereare manyrealities that women inhabit,how does this affectthe statusof the truthclaims that feministsadvance? Second, if we abandon a singleaxis of analysis,the standpointof women,and insteadtry to accommodatethe multiple,po- tentiallyinfinite standpoints of diversewomen, do we not also lose the analyticforce of our argument?Or, in otherwords, how manyaxes can our argumentsencompass before they slip intohopeless confusion?3 The political implicationsof these questions, furthermore,inform both of these arguments.If we abandon the monolithicconcept of "woman," what are the possibilitiesof a cohesivefeminist politics? The concernboth to accommodatedifference and preservethe analy- tic and politicalforce of feministtheory, specifically feminist standpoint 3 See Bordo 1990 fora cogentstatement of thisproblem.

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theory,is prominentin the recentwork of Nancy Hartsock.It is obvious thatHartsock cares verydeeply about theseissues. She is painfullyaware of the evils of racism,particularly within the women'smovement. She is also passionatelycommitted to feministsocial criticismas a forcefor social change and is determinednot to let forcessuch as postmodernism erode thatpotential. These concernsemerge forcefully in a 1987 article, "RethinkingModernism." The point of departurefor Hartsock'sargu- mentis thedifferences among women. She assertsthat we needto develop an understandingof differenceby creatinga politicsin whichpreviously marginalizedgroups can name themselvesand participatein definingthe termsthat structuretheir world (1987, 189). Centralto Hartsock'sar- gumentis theclaim thatunless we providea systematicunderstanding of the world,we will be unable to change it. The object of her polemicin thisand severalother recent articles is postmodernism.In thepast decade the issues of differenceand multiplicityhave come to be closelyidentified with postmodernism.Hartsock wants to rejectthis identification.She wantsto valorizedifference, to claim thatthe differencesamong women are significantboth theoreticallyand practically,while at the same time rejectingpostmodernism on thegrounds that it obviatesthe possibility of the systemicknowledge that is necessaryfor social change. Hartsock's effortsboth to valorize differenceand to retainat least some notionof realityand truth,of the "way theworld is," produce some odd results.In "RethinkingModernism," she significantlyalters the basic thesisof feministstandpoint theory by assertingthat althoughwomen are not a unitarygroup, white, ruling-class, Eurocentric men are (1987, 192). The rulingclass, now referredto as the "center,"is definedas uni- tary,while those on the periphery,the "others,"are definedas heteroge- neous. Hartsock'sargument is thatwe mustcreate a politicsthat lets the "others" into the center,a centerthat, she claims,will "obviously"look differentwhen occupied by women and men of color (201). Hartsock's solutionraises some troublingquestions. It positsa centerthat is hetero- geneous ratherthan homogeneous,but thissuggests that it maynot be a "center" at all. We mightalso ask whether,if the "others" have moved into the center,this move effectivelyeliminates the periphery.We can, I think,assume that Hartsock would not endorsea politicsin whichany groupwas marginalized.But it is difficultto retainthe conceptof "center,"as she does, withouta correspondingconcept of periphery.4 All of thesequestions could be quite easilyeliminated by abandoning the center/peripherydichotomy. But Hartsock is adamantlyopposed to thismove. Those of us who have been constitutedas "other,"she states,

4 BarOn 1993 offersan excellentaccount of the epistemological problems entailed by theclaim to epistemicprivilege and that of the center/margin dichotomy.

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This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:49:29 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TRUTH AND METHOD Hekman mustinsist on a world in whichwe are at the centerrather than the periphery.The postmoderns,she claims,who want to eliminatethe center, therebydeny us our rightof self-definition.She also claimsthat they deny us the rightto speak the truthabout our subjugation,obviating the very possibilityof knowledgeand truth.Informing all of Hartsock's recent work is a fundamentaldichotomy: either we have systemicknowledge of the way the world is or we have no knowledge,no truth,and no politics. For Hartsock,postmodernism represents the second termof thisdichot- omy (1990). I could argue,against Hartsock, that truth, knowledge, and politicsare possible withoutan absolutegrounding and that some post- modernwriters make this argumentquite persuasively.But I would like to examineHartsock's position from a differentangle. Her fearsfor the futureof feministanalysis are not unfounded.If, as she realizeswe must, feminismabandons thefeminist standpoint and, withit, the correct view of reality,then we are in dangerof abandoningthe whole point of feminist analysisand politics:revealing the oppressionof "women" and ar- guing for a less repressivesociety. If thereare multiplefeminist standpoints,then there must be multipletruths and multiplerealities. This is a difficultposition for those who want to changethe world accordingto a new image. I would argue thatHartsock has definedthe problemcorrectly but is pursuinga solution in the wrong direction.She wants to embrace the "situatedknowledges" that Haraway and othershave theorized,but she cannot accept the logical consequence of this position: that no perspective/standpointis epistemologically privileged. She wants to retaina notion of privilegedknowledge that can accommodate both diversity and locatedness.But her attemptsto achievethis goal are not successful. "Situatedknowledges," she claims,are "located in a particulartime and place. They are thereforepartial. They do not see everythingfrom no- where but theydo see some thingsfrom somewhere." Borrowing post- modernterminology, she refersto theknowledges produced from the var- ious subjectpositions of differentwomen as "the epistemologiesof these marked subjectivities."She then goes on to argue: "The strugglesthey representand express,if made self-conscious,can go beyondefforts at survivalto recognizethe centralityof systemicpower relations"(1989- 90, 28-30). What this formulationrequires is a sustainedargument for how such systemicknowledge is possible. But such an argumentis not forthcoming. Other feministstandpoint theorists have also attemptedto deal with the challengeof differenceand its implicationsfor the truthclaims of the feministstandpoint. Dorothy Smith (1990a, 1990b) gets around the problemof differenceby definitionalfiat: she defines"women's actually livedexperience" as a categorythat encompasses the diversity of women's

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lives and activities.She then opposes this categoryto the abstractcon- cepts of sociological analysis,contrasting the "ideological" categories of thesociologist to "what actuallyhappened"-the "primarynarrative" (1990a, 157). But the method that she derives fromthis dichotomy is flawedand incomplete.First, despite the unmistakableinfluence of Schutz'swork, Smithdoes not offerany argumentfor why the located knowledgeof womenis superiorto theabstract knowledge of the sociologist;this is assumedto be obvious. Second,despite frequent references to Foucault and his theoryof discourse,Smith refuses to identifythe women's standpointas a knowledge-producingdiscursive formation. She offersa detailed discussionof how the sociologist'sdiscursive formations constitutethe instrumentsof state power. At timesshe comes close to admittingthat the discourse that women have developedabout theirlived reality,a discoursethat includesconcepts such as rape, sexual harassment,and battery,is also constituted.But ultimatelyshe shiesaway from thisconclusion. Like Hartsock,she continuesto privilegethe standpoint of women because she assumesthat without such privilegingthe knowledge womenclaim loses its necessarygrounding. PatriciaHill Collins has a particularstake in theorizingdifference: she wantsto accountfor the unique standpointof black women. She defines herproblem in thecontext of the issue of difference:her goal, she states, is to articulatethe unique aspects of black women'sstandpoint without denyingthe differencesamong black women. She tackles this problem by claiming,following Hartsock, that the black feministstandpoint she articulates,although rooted in everydayexperiences, is constructedby the theoristswho reflecton that experience.One of the goals of her own theoryis to definethe commonexperiences of black womenthat consti- tutetheir unique standpoint(1989; 1990, 208-21). Collinsdeals withthe difficultissue of the truthstatus of the black feministstandpoint in an ambiguousway. In an earlyarticle she claims "objectivity"for the "outsiderwithin" status of blackwomen (1986, 15). In hermore recent work, however,Collins retreatsfrom this claim. In Black FeministThought she appeals to Donna Haraway'sconcept of standpointas themost valid and concludesthat "a Black women'sstandpoint is onlyone angle of vision," a "partialperspective" (1990, 234). But despiteher endorsement of Har- away's position,Collins is unwillingto embracethe fullimplications of situatedknowledge. She rejectsthe claim thatthe perspectiveof the op- pressedyields "absolute truth,"but she also rejects"relativism," which she definesas the claim thatall visionsare equal (1990, 235). Her final positionholds out some hope fora redefinedconcept of objectivity.She assertsthat black feministswho develop knowledgeclaims that can ac- commodateboth black feministepistemology and whitemasculinist epistemology"may have founda routeto the elusivegoal of generatingso-

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This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:49:29 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TRUTH AND METHOD Hekman called objectivegeneralizations that can stand as universaltruth." The ideas thatare validatedby differentstandpoints, she concludes,produce "the most objectivetruths" (1989, 773). Other than Haraway herself,the only prominentfeminist standpoint theoristto embracefully what Collins labels the "relativist"position is Sara Ruddick. CitingWittgenstein as her intellectualinfluence, Ruddick claims thatfeminism challenges the universalityimperative of masculine thinking(1989, 128). In herdiscussion of "MaternalThinking as a Femi- nistStandpoint," Ruddick appeals to bothHartsock and Foucault,appar- entlyseeing no contradictionbetween Hartsock's definition of the feminist standpointand Foucault's theoryof subjugatedknowledges (130). She concludes, "AlthoughI count myselfamong standpointtheorists, I do not take the finalstep that some appear to take of claimingfor one standpointa truththat is exhaustiveand absolute.... AlthoughI envi- sion a worldorganized by the values of caringlabor, I cannotidentify the grounds,reason, or god thatwould legitimatethat vision" (135).5 Ruddick'ssolution to the problemof differenceand privilegewould not satisfymany feminist theorists. Like Collins and Hartsock,few feminist theoristsare contentto definethe feministstandpoint as simplya "differentvoice" (or voices),one perspectiveamong many. The difficulties of redefiningfeminist standpoint theory in lightof the epistemological issues raised by differenceand the challengesto "reality"are most fully exploredin the work of Sandra Harding. In her influentialThe Science Question in Feminism (1986) Harding definesthree feministepiste- mologies: feministempiricism, feminist standpoint theory, and feminist postmodernism.Although sympatheticto standpointepistemologies, Harding is persuadedthat therecannot be one feministstandpoint; the situationsof women are too diverse.Yet she also sees problemswith the postmodernalternative. On her reading,postmodernism posits fractured identities,an apoliticalapproach, and therejection of anykind of knowledge thatresults in an absolute relativism.In this book, Harding avoids choosingone epistemologyover another by arguingfor the necessaryin- stabilityof feministtheories. Coherent theories in an incoherentworld, she concludes,are eithersilly, uninteresting, or oppressive(1986, 164). In WhoseScience? WhoseKnowledge? (1991), Hardingappears to re- verseher position by fashioninga coherenttheory for feministscience. The theoryshe offers,however, is a blend of diverseelements and thus continuesthe eclecticspirit of herearlier book. The aim of the book, she states,is not to resolveall tensionsand contradictionsbetween feminism and Westernscience but to "advance more usefulways for us to think

5 For otherrecent accounts of standpointtheory, see Winant1987; Aptheker1989; Stanleyand Wise 1990; and Campbell 1994.

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about and plan theirfuture encounters" (xi). Hardingdefines her position as "a postmoderniststandpoint approach that is neverthelesscommitted to rethinkingand revisingsome importantnotions fromconventional metatheoriesof science" (49). In the course of developingher approach, Harding offersboth a critiqueand a redefinitionof standpointtheory, developing"the logic of the standpointtheory in waysthat more vigor- ouslypull it awayfrom its modernist origins and moreclearly enable it to advance some postmodernistgoals" (106). For Harding,standpoint theoryis attractivebecause it offersan alternativeto a crucialand seemingly irresolvabledichotomy facing feminist theory: essentialism versus relativism. Her rejectionof one feministstandpoint avoids the dangerof essentialism;relativism is defeatedby her claim that we mustinsist on an objec- tivelocation-women's lives-for theplace whereresearch should begin (134-42). But as her theoryunfolds it becomesclear thatHarding does not so muchdeconstruct this dichotomy as locate herposition along the continuumit creates. The ubiquitous issue of relativismleads Harding to her most significantcontribution to standpointtheory: "strong objectivity." She be- gins by notingthat "althoughdiversity, pluralism, relativism, and difference have theirvaluable and politicaluses, embracingthem resolves the political-scientific-epistemologicalconflict to almost no one's satisfac- tion" (140). Standpointepistemologists, she argues,embrace historical- cultural-sociologicalrelativism while rejecting judgmental or epi- stemologicalrelativism (142). The "strongobjectivity" she advocates recognizesthe social situatednessof all knowledgebut also requires"a criticalevaluation to determinewhich social situationstend to generate themost objective knowledge claims" (142). It is significantthat Harding followstraditional standpoint epistemology in assumingthat the higher thelevel of oppression,the more objective the account: "It shouldbe clear that if it is beneficialto startresearch, scholarship and theoryin white women'ssituations, then we should be able to learneven more about the social and naturalorders if we startfrom the situationsof womenin de- valued and oppressedraces, classes and cultures"(179-80). Hardingargues for keeping the concept of objectivitydespite its historical associationswith masculinist science because of its "gloriousintellec- tual history"(160). The conceptof objectivityshe advocatesdeparts from themasculinist definition in thatit does not lay claimto "truebeliefs" or "transhistoricalprivilege." But it also retainsone importantaspect of that definition:"Starting research in women's lives leads to socially con- structedclaims that are less false-less partialand distorted-than are the (also sociallyconstructed) claims that result if one startsfrom the lives of men in the dominantgroups" (185). The "less false stories" Hard- ing advocatesmediate between transhistorical universals on theone hand

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This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:49:29 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TRUTH AND METHOD Hekman and absolute relativismon the other,forming a kind of middle ground betweenthe polaritiesof this dichotomy.Harding intendsthis middle ground to be a critiqueof postmodernand poststructuralistpositions. The postmodernists,Harding declares, assume that giving up on thegoal of tellingone truestory about realityentails giving up on tellingless false stories (187), a position that is unlikelyto satisfyfeminists' desire to know "how the world is" (304). Once more,I could argue that Harding,like Hartsock,misinterprets the postmoderndefinition of knowledgeand thatat least one "postmod- ern" writer,Foucault, is veryinterested in tellingstories that will resultin a less oppressivesocial order.But, again, I will take a differenttack in my criticism.Harding's reassessment of standpointtheory contains two seriousoversights. First, she arguesthat starting research from the reality of women'slives, preferably those of women who are also oppressedby race and class, will lead to a moreobjective account of social reality.Like Hartsock,Harding offers no argumentas to whythis is thecase. Particu- larlyfrom the vantagepoint of the 1990s, it is not enough simplyto assume that Marx got it righton such a crucial point. And, like Smith, Hardingdoes not acknowledgethat "the reality of women'slives" is itself a sociallyconstructed discursive formation. It is a discoursethat has been constructed,at least in part,by feministstandpoint theorists who define it as the ground of theirmethod. The fact that it is closely tied to the social actors' own conceptsand providesa counterto thehegemonic discourse of masculinistscience makes it no less a discourse.Feminist standpoint theorycan and, I argue,should be definedas a counterhegemonic discoursethat works to destabilizehegemonic discourse. But thiscan be achievedwithout denying that it is a discourseor accordingit epistemological privilege. Second, all of Harding'stalk of "less false stories,""less partial and perverseaccounts," and more "objective" researchnecessarily presup- poses a shared discourse-a metanarrative,even-that establishesstan- dards by which thesejudgments can be validated.Yet the centerpieceof Harding'scritique of masculinistscience is the denial of the possibilityof such a metanarrative.She seems to assume that when feministscholars offertheir "less false stories" theywill be universallyacknowledged as such. This assumptionfails both practicallyand theoretically.It seems abundantlyobvious that withinthe masculinistdiscourse of science the accounts of feministstandpoint theorists have not been judged "better" than conventionalscientific accounts. On the contrary,the scientifices- tablishmenthas devoted much effortto discreditingfeminist claims. Comparativestatements such as those Harding advances requireshared standardsof judgment;no such standardsbridge the gap betweenfemi- nist and masculinistscience. It is ironicthat Harding'spolemic against

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the metanarrativeof masculinistscience ultimatelyrelies on the recon- structionof a similarstandard for its validity.

III. Truths and methods: Toward a new paradigm When feministstandpoint theory emerged in the early 1980s, it ap- peared to be exactlywhat the feministmovement needed: a methodfor namingthe oppressionof womengrounded in thetruth of women'slives. Standpointtheory constituted a challengeto themasculinist definition of truthand methodembodied in modernWestern science and epistemology.It establishedan alternativevision of truthand, withit, hope fora less repressivesociety. But the theoreticaltensions implicit in the theory soon came to the forefront.The contradictionbetween social construc- tionistand absolutistconceptions of truththat characterizes Marx's the- orywere translatedinto feministstandpoint theory. As the theorydeveloped in thelate 1980s and early1990s questionsof how feministsshould theorizedifferences among women and the status of feminism'struth claims became impossibleto ignore-and equally impossibleto answer withinthe confinesof the originaltheory. I arguethat although it was conceivedas an alternativevision of truth and reality,this vision does not constitutethe theoreticallegacy of feministstandpoint theory. Throughout the second halfof the twentiethcen- turya paradigmshift has been underway in epistemology,a movement froman absolutist,subject-centered conception of truthto a conception of truthas situated,perspectival, and discursive.It is mycontention, first, thatfeminism was and continuesto be at the forefrontof thisparadigm shiftand, second,that feminist standpoint theory has contributedan im- portantdimension to thatshift within feminist theory. Because of thedu- alisticconception of truthand realitythat characterized its originalfor- mulation,feminist standpoint theory has had theeffect of problematizing absolutesand universals,focusing attention instead on thesituated, local, and communalconstitution of knowledge. Anotherway of puttingthis is thatin attemptingto interpretfeminist standpointtheory, we should look to Kuhn, not Marx. Feministstand- point theoryis part of an emergingparadigm of knowledgeand knowledge productionthat constitutesan epistemologicalbreak with modernism.Feminist standpoint theory defines knowledge as particularrather than universal;it jettisonsthe neutralobserver of modernistepistemol- ogy; it definessubjects as constructedby relationalforces rather than as transcendent.As feministstandpoint theory has developed,the original tensionbetween social constructionand universaltruth has dissolved.But it is significantthat this has been accomplished,not by privilegingone side of the dichotomy,but by deconstructingthe dichotomyitself. The

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This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:49:29 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TRUTH AND METHOD Hekman new paradigmof knowledgeof whichfeminist standpoint theory is a part involvesrejecting the definitionof knowledgeand truthas eitheruniver- sal or relativein favorof a conceptionof all knowledgeas situatedand discursive. This new paradigmof knowledgenecessarily defines a new approach to politics.Modernist epistemology defines politics in termsof the dichotomies thatinform it. Thus forthe modernist,politics must be grounded in absolute,universal principles and enacted by political agentsdefined as universalsubjects. Under the new paradigm,politics is definedas a local and situatedactivity undertaken by discursively constituted subjects. Political resistance,furthermore, is definedas challengingthe hege- monic discoursethat writesa particularscript for a certaincategory of subjects.Resistance is effectedby employingother discursive formations to oppose thatscript, not by appealingto universalsubjectivity or absolute principles. As a way of illustratingmy thesis that a new paradigmis emerging,it is usefulto look at the threeepistemic positions that Harding definesin her 1986 book. In the course of a decade the distinctionsbetween these categorieshave nearlycollapsed. Feministempiricism has been radically redefinedby epistemologistssuch as LynnHankinson Nelson and Helen Longino.Nelson (1990) providesa redefinitionof empiricismfrom a fem- inistperspective that conforms to what I call thenew paradigmof knowledge. Relyingon the work of W. V. Quine, Nelson definesan empiricism in which, as she puts it, the world matters,but scientificcommunities produce knowledge.Her principalthesis is thatit is not individualsbut communitieswho know.Nelson's empiricisminvolves evidence, but it is evidencedefined and constrainedby public standards,not data observed froman Archimedeanpoint by a neutralobserver.6 Longino offersa simi- lar argumentin Scienceas Social Knowledge(1990). She definesher position as "contextualempiricism," a view of science in which scientific knowledgeis sociallycreated and objectivityis a functionof community practices.It is significantthat both Nelson and Longino rejectwhat they call "relativism,"but theydo so by appealingto widelyshared but com- munal-that is, constructed-standardsof evidence. Harding herselfhas been instrumentalin blurringthe distinctionbe- tweenfeminist standpoint theory and feministpostmodernism with her advocacyof "a postmoderniststandpoint approach." The principaltheme of feministstandpoint theory, that knowledge is situatedin the material livesof social actors,has become the definitivecharacteristic not onlyof feministsinfluenced by postmodernism but of feministtheory as a whole. The major distinctionbetween postmodernism and standpointtheory, the

6 See Tuana 1991 fora compatibleanalysis of Nelson.

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claim of privilegedknowledge and one truereality, has been almost en- tirelyabandoned. Both Hartsockand Hardingradically modify the claim to privilegedknowledge. Ruddick abandons any claim to privileged knowledgeat all. Flax, an earlyproponent of the feministstandpoint, has enthusiasticallyembraced postmodernism and the multipletruths it entails.The notion of a feministstandpoint that is truerthan previous (male) ones, she now claims,rests on problematicand unexaminedas- sumptions(1990, 56).7 What thesetheorists are effectingis whatLorraine Code calls "remappingthe epistemicterrain into numerousfluid conver- sations" (1991, 309). What is significantabout thisremapping, however, is that for all of these theorists,defining reality as sociallyconstructed and multipledoes not obviatebut, rather, facilitates critical analysis. The feministtheorist who has done themost to definewhat I am call- ing the new paradigmof truthand methodis Donna Haraway.Her fa- mous essay "A Manifestofor Cyborgs," even though it does not mention feministstandpoint theory, can be read as an attemptto refashionthat theoryin lightof thechallenge to privilegedreality. Haraway asks, What would anotherpolitical myth for socialist feminism look like?What kind of politicscan embracefractured selves and stillbe effectiveand socialist feminist?(1990, 199). Implicitin thesequestions is the assumptionthat the "myth"of socialistfeminism-feminist standpoint theory-cannot be sustained and that feministsmust look for another.What is also implicitis that,for Haraway, what we mustlook foris not "truth"and "reality"but, rather, another story. "Women's experience," she claims,"is a fictionand a fact of the most crucial,political kind. Liberationrests on the constructionof consciousness,the imaginativeapprehension, of oppression,and so of possibility"(191). In an equally famousarticle, "Situated Knowledges," Haraway relates her position directlyto feministstandpoint theory: "There is no single feministstandpoint because our maps requiretoo manydimensions for that metaphorto groundour visions.But the feministstandpoint theorists'goal of an epistemologyand politicsof engaged,accountable po- sitioningremains eminently potent. The goal is betteraccounts of the world, that is, 'science"' (1988, 590). In this passage Haraway defines what I see as thecentral problem facing feminist theory today: given multiplestandpoints, the social constructionof "reality,"and thenecessity of an engagedpolitical position, how can we talk about "betteraccounts of the world," "less false stories"? And, indeed, how can we talk about accounts of the world at all if the multiplicityof standpointsis, quite literally,endless? In thepast severalyears, a numberof feministtheorists have triedto answerthese questions by articulatingwhat mightbe called

7 See also Hirschmann1992; and Bar On 1993.

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"quasi-universals."Martha Nussbaum (1992) and Susan Moller Okin (1994) have arguedfor a revivalof the notionof basic humanneeds and a commonhumanity on whichto groundethics and feministtheory. They argue,as anothertheorist puts it, that "successful coalitions and political action requirea substantialconcept of common humanitygrounded in an explicitnotion of humannature" (Kay 1994, 21). These authorsargue forwhat theycall a "rich" and historicallysituated concept of human nature.But implicitin thesearguments is the assumptionthat we need a concept of how the world reallyis, a metanarrativethat providesstan- dards forcross-cultural judgments, if we are to fashiona feminist,or any kind of,politics. In conclusion,I would like to suggestanother answer to these questions.The problemof constructinga viable methodfor feminist analysis, a methodthat also providesthe basis for a feministpolitics, is twofold. First,if we take themultiplicity of feministstandpoints to its logical conclusion,coherent analysis becomes impossible because we have too many axes of analysis.Ultimately, every woman is unique; ifwe analyzeeach in her uniqueness,systemic analysis is obviated. So is feministpolitics: we lose the abilityeven to speak for certaincategories of women. Second, if we acknowledgemultiple realities, multiple standpoints, how do we discriminateamong them?How do we selectthe perspectivesand stand- pointsthat are usefulto us, thatwill help us achieveour theoreticaland practicalgoals, or are we necessarilycondemned to the "absolute relativism" thatsome criticsfear? In discussingthe problemsof developinga methodfor feminist analysis,Jane Flax argues,"Any feminist standpoint will necessarilybe partial. Thinkingabout women may illuminatesome aspects of a societythat have been previouslysuppressed by the dominantview. But none of us can speak for 'woman' because no such person exists" (1990, 56). The problemhere, as Flax realizes,is not to replace the absolutismimplicit in the claim to the feministstandpoint with a relativisticstance but to deconstructthe dichotomy,to articulatea methodand, hence,a politics, groundedin a differentepistemology. I suggestthat the methodological tool thatmeets these requirements, a tool thatfits the methodological and epistemologicalneeds of feminismat this juncture,can be found in a sourcerarely employed in feministdiscussions: Weber's methodology and, specifically,his conceptof the ideal type.Weber's methodology has many advantagesfor the currentdebate over feministmethodology. Most fun- damentalis thathis approach presupposesthat social analysisis always undertakenby situated,engaged agents who live in a discursivelyconsti- tutedworld. Although a rangeof contemporarytheorists-most notably Foucault-share this presumption,Weber's position supplies threeele- mentsthat these contemporary approaches lack. First,Weber provides a

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detailedanalysis of the conceptualtool that can effectthis analysis:the ideal type.Second, he providesextensive examples of how thisconcept operatesin empiricalanalysis. Third, he developsan elaboratejustifica- tion forthe partialand circumscribedapproach he advocates. At the root of Weber'sconcept of the ideal typeis his claim that no aspect of social realitycan be apprehendedwithout presuppositions: "As soon as we attemptto reflectabout the way in whichlife confronts us in immediateconcrete situations, it presentsan infinitemultiplicity of suc- cessivelyand coexistentlyemerging and disappearingevents" (1949, 72). Weberargues that we bringorder to thismultiplicity by relying on values and, specifically,cultural values: "Order is broughtinto thischaos only on thecondition that in everycase onlya partof concretereality is inter- estingand significantto us, because onlyit is relatedto thecultural values withwhich we approachreality" (78; emphasisin original).The cultural values of a society,thus, impose an initialordering of the multiplicityof possiblemeanings that confront social actors.But Weber argues that values also structurethe meaningapprehension of the social scientist.It is the investigator'sindividual value choice that guides the selectionof a subject of analysis: "Withoutthe investigator'sevaluative ideas, there would be no principleof selectionof subject-matterand no meaningful knowledgeof the concretereality" (82). The resultof the investigator's choice is the conceptualtool thatWeber calls the "ideal type": "An ideal type is formedby the one-sidedaccentuation of one or more pointsof view and by the synthesisof a greatmany diffuse, discrete, more or less presentand occasionallyabsent concreteindividual phenomena, which are arrangedaccording to one-sidedlyemphasized viewpoints into a uni- fiedanalytic construct" (90; emphasisin original).8 For Weber,ideal typesare neitherhypotheses nor descriptionsof real- itybut "yardsticks"to which realitycan be compared;they are neither historicalreality nor "true reality"but are purelylimiting concepts or "utopias"; thepurpose of ideal typesis to providea meansof comparison withconcrete reality in orderto revealthe significance of thatreality (90- 93). This aspect of Weber'sconcept is crucial. We cannot justifyideal typesby claimingthat theyaccurately reproduce social reality.No concept can do that-all positionsare partialand perspectival.But neither can we justifyideal typeson the groundsthat they uncover the universal truthof social reality,that theyhave the statusof the universallaws of the natural sciences. Universallaws, Weber claims, can reveal nothing about what social scientistswant to explain:the meaning and significance of social reality.Unlike universallaws, ideal typescannot be refutedby contradictorycases; thediscovery of contradictorycases revealsthe irrele-

8 See Hekman1983, 1995.

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This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:49:29 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TRUTH AND METHOD Hekman vance of the conceptto theproblem at hand, not its "error"(1975, 190). The onlyjustification we can appeal to, Weberconcludes, is significance: an ideal typeis valid if it helps us understandsocial reality. Weber'sconcept of theideal typecan be usefulin explainingthe episte- mologicalstatus of feministresearch. First, it makes explicitthat no per- spectiveis total, all are partial; ideal typesare, in his words,one-sided. Knowledgeis alwayssituated in a particularlocality, the particular standpoint of theseparticular women. Second, it specifiesthat the subjectof any analysisis dictatedby the interestof the investigator.It is the values of feministresearchers and theirpolitical goals thathave motivatedthem to investigateissues like wife battery,rape, incest,and even the origins of patriarchyitself. In Webers terminology,what feministsocial science has accomplishedis to createa set of ideal typesthat allow us to "see" a differentsocial world. Carole Pateman's"sexual contract"(1988), Arlie Hochschild's "second shift"(1989), and Karen Sacks's "centerwoman" (1988) are but a few examples of this conceptual set. Third,the ideal typerests on the assumptionthat what the social researcherstudies, the activitiesand concepts of social actors, is already constituted;it is, in postmodernjargon, a discursiveformation that constitutes "reality" for thosewho participatein it. This is a crucialpoint for the critique of many versionsof feministstandpoint theory. Hartsock, Smith, and even,occa- sionally,Harding make the mistakeof assumingthat women's daily lives constitutea givenreality that provides the necessarygrounding for feministtheory. Weber's concept emphasizes that, like all otheraspects of social life,women's daily life is a realityconstituted by sharedconcepts. The epistemologyof Weber'sideal typealso providesan answerto the chargeof "absolute relativism"that many feminist theorists have raised. The problem is this: How do we convincenonfeminists that the ideal types of feministanalysis, concepts informedby the values of feminist researchers,are usefuland insightful?How do we constructan argument forthese ideal typesrather than forthe infinitevariety of conceptsthat is possible? Weber argues that thereis no metanarrativeto which we can appeal to justifyour value choices. Thus he would argue thatthe values that lead feministsto investigatethe workingsof patriarchycannot be shownto be "objectively"correct. But Weberdoes have an answerto this problem.Although he argues that values are necessarilyirreconcilable, he maintainsthat the logic of analysisitself rests on universalgrounds (1949, 58). His argumentis thatalthough we cannotagree that we should be studyinga particulartopic-this is a value choice-we can agree on whetherthe analysisis logical. I would not offerquite so optimistican answer.Webers neat separationbetween facts and values is unfeasible. Butthis need not be cause fordespair. Wittgenstein (1958) offersan argu- mentthat can be usefulhere. He assertsthat our societyis held together

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by certainbasic values and assumptionsthat constitute what he calls "a formof life";one of theseassumptions is a verybroadly based and loosely definedconcept of what constitutesa persuasiveargument. Because of the long-standingdomination of patriarchy,these assumptionsare masculinist;rationality, as manyfeminists have argued,is genderedmascu- line. But it does not follow that feministscannot use these masculinist assumptionsfor theirown purposes and, in so doing,transform them. We may not be able to persuadenonfeminists that the institutionsof pa- triarchyare evil and should be dismantled.But we may be, and indeed have been, able to persuadethem, through the use of skillfularguments, thatsexual harassment,marital rape, and wifebattery should be defined as crimes. I am not claimingthat the ideal typesolves all theepistemological and methodologicalproblems of feministtheory. I am claimingthat it is highlyappropriate to some of the problemsthat feministtheory is cur- rentlyconfronting, problems raised in largepart by the developmentand evolutionof feministstandpoint theory. The ideal typeemphasizes that thereis no metanarrative,either normative or methodological,to which we can appeal. Nor is therea truthabout social totalitythat is waitingto be discovered.But this does not mean that the systemicanalysis of the institutionsof patriarchyis necessarilyprecluded. Weber's ideal type makes it clear thatsocial analysisis a necessarilypolitical activity, undertaken by agentswho live in a world constitutedby languageand, hence, values. We engage in specificanalyses because we are committedto certain values. These values dictatethat certain analyses are trivialand others are important;all are not equal.9 It is our values, then,that save us fromthe "absoluterelativism" that the defenders of modernism so feared. Feministscannot prove their values to be theobjectively correct ones. On this point the postmodernsare correct:we live in a world devoid of a normativemetanarrative. But we can offerpersuasive arguments in defenseof our values and the politicsthey entail. Some of thesearguments will be persuasive:in the past decades feministshave been successfulin beginningto changethe parameters of patriarchaleconomic and political institutions.Other arguments will not be persuasive.10But by advancing both persuasiveand unpersuasivearguments, feminists are, in the pro- cess, changingthe normsof what constitutesan argument. I think that recastingfeminist standpoint theory in terms of the epistemologyof theideal typecan makea significantcontribution to con- temporaryfeminist theory. Such a recastingwould involvedefining the feministstandpoint as situatedand engagedknowledge, as a place from

9 Flax 1993 makes a similarargument. 10MacKinnon's antipornography argument (1987) is a notableexample.

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This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:49:29 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TRUTH AND METHOD Hekman whichfeminists can articulatea counterhegemonicdiscourse and argue fora lessrepressive society. Women speak from multiple standpoints, pro- ducingmultiple knowledges. But this does not prevent women from com- ingtogether to workfor specific political goals."t Feminists in the twenti- ethcentury have done precisely this and have, as a consequence,changed thelanguage game of politics. And, ultimately, this is thepoint of feministtheory.

Departmentof PoliticalScience Universityof Texas at Arlington

References

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'1 In a similarargument, Judith Grant asserts that political similarities can be culti- vatedto helpfeminists speak across suppressed differences (1993, 123).

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