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A KONRAD-ADENAUER-SIFTUNG PUBLICATION January 2021 Lutz Feldt and Patrick Hébrard | January 2021 1 Copyright © 2021 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, dis- tributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of the publishers, except in the case of brief quota- tions embodied in critical reviews and certain other non-commercial uses permitted by copyright law. ISBN 978-1-7774289-1-4 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Canada Office Suite 303, 8 York Street Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1N 5S6 [email protected] Photo credit: Annie Spratt | Unsplash 2 RUSSIA’S AND CHINA’S APPROACHES TO THE ARCTIC: Threats or challenges for the global community? About the authors Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt joined the German Navy in 1965. He was com- missioned in 1968. Sea duty assignments for 13 years with leadership functions on all command levels, including two tours as a commanding officer, provided a wide experience at sea with emphasis on operations, communication and electronic warfare. Shore duty assignments in naval staffs, the Federal Ministry of Defense, in NATO as Assistant Chief of Staff Operations and Logistic. He became Commander Military Dis- trict Coast, a national joined command, Commander in Chief of the German Fleet and Commander in Chief of Naval Staff in Bonn and Berlin. He retired in 2006, after having served in the Armed Forces for 41 years. Since then, Vice Admiral Feldt has taken over several posts of honor: he became President of the German Maritime Institute un- til 2012, he was the President of EuroDefense Germany until 2017, he has been contracted by the European Commission for the Instrument for Stability – Critical Maritime Routes. From 2009 to 2010 he was contracted by the European Defense Agency (EDA) as a member of the Wise Pen Team, working on the topic of maritime surveillance and mar- itime security. Another study for EDA about European Naval Capabili- ties has been completed in June 2012. He is now a director of Wise Pens International Limited and is engaged by the EDA, the European Com- mission and several other institutions, dealing with the whole spectrum of maritime safety, security and defense matters. In this period he was involved in several Arctic studies and conferences. Besides these topics he has given several lectures about leadership responsibilities and the interaction between military and political leaders. Lutz Feldt and Patrick Hébrard | January 2021 3 Vice Admiral Patrick Hébrard was born in Saigon in December 1949. He joined the French Navy as a naval aviator. He commanded a squadron of Super Étendard, a DDG and an aircraft carrier. Ashore, he has been the Chief of the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle’s Project, before be- ing committed to the Joint Staff successively as the Chief of the French Joint Operational Centre, DCDS Ops and Inspector of Operations and Territorial Defence. During this period of eight years, he visited forces engaged in Timor, Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean, the Balkans, Leb- anon, Chad and Ivory Coast. He was promoted Vice-admiral in Sep- tember 2004 and retired in December 2007. Vice Admiral Hébrard is now a consultant in strategy and crisis management. Since 2009, he has been contracted by the EDA as a member of the Wise Pen Team, later Wisepens International. He also published articles and studies on Mar- itime Affairs and Strategy, among them the Arctic, China as a polar power and China’s maritime strategy. He is an Associate Fellow of the Foundation for Strategic Research, a board member of Eurodefense-Fr and the Institute of High Defence Studies. He is a regular speaker at various seminars and symposia. 4 RUSSIA’S AND CHINA’S APPROACHES TO THE ARCTIC: Threats or challenges for the global community? At a glance • Russia and China are driven by domestic political pressure and the desire to be recognised as global players. • Both states acknowledge mutual interests in the Arctic region – Russia’s development of its country’s northern regions, China for the exploitation of its resources, and new lines of and military col- laboration. • Russia will utilize its chairmanship of the Arctic Council to increase its influence by offering scientific programs by way of door openers and intends to cooperate with foreign scientific institutions. Scientific diplomacy has so far proved successful for both Russia and China. • Cooperation between Russia and China will enable each country to counterbalance the US-led western powers and influence with respect to strategic affairs and international law for as long as the entente continues. • Russia and China will continue being both Janus-faced with respect to international law and in executing a military show of force. Lutz Feldt and Patrick Hébrard | January 2021 5 En un coup d’œil • La Russie et la Chine sont poussées par la pression politique intérieure et le désir d’être reconnues comme des acteurs mondiaux. • Les deux États reconnaissent des intérêts mutuels dans la région arctique : le développement par la Russie des régions septentrionales de son pays, la Chine pour l’exploitation de ses ressources et de nouvelles lignes de collaboration militaire. • La Russie profitera de sa présidence du Conseil de l’Arctique pour accroître son influence en proposant des programmes scientifiques en guise d’ouverture de portes et a l’intention de coopérer avec des institutions scientifiques étrangères. La diplomatie scientifique a jusqu’à présent fait ses preuves tant pour la Russie que pour la Chine. • La coopération entre la Russie et la Chine permettra à chaque pays de faire contrepoids aux puissances occidentales dirigées par les États- Unis et d’exercer une influence en matière d’affaires stratégiques et de droit international tant que l’entente se poursuivra. • La Russie et la Chine continueront d’être toutes les deux face à face en ce qui concerne le droit international et l’exécution d’une démonstration de force militaire. 6 RUSSIA’S AND CHINA’S APPROACHES TO THE ARCTIC: Threats or challenges for the global community? Table of contents 3 About the authors 5 At a glance 6 En un coup d’œil 11 Abstract 13 Introduction PART ONE: Russia (Lutz Feldt) 16 1 Introduction 18 1.1 Russia’s old and new interests in the Arctic: Which of these interests has been driving Russia since 2014? 19 1.2 The Arctic is an ocean 20 1.3 Who’s who in the Arctic? 22 1.4 The Arctic is not homogenous 24 1.5 Russia’s path from 2009 to 2020 26 2 The present study will begin with a different concern of crucial importance: the nuclear issue 28 2.1 Russian submarines and icebreakers 30 2.2 Russia updates maps of radioactive debris sunk in the Arctic: “The Maritime Executive, 21 July 2020” 34 3 Russia’s military ambitions and capabilities 36 3.1 Russia in 2010 and beyond 37 3.2 Russia issued a national security strategy in May 2009, as approved by President Medvedev, for the period between 2009 to 2020 Lutz Feldt and Patrick Hébrard | January 2021 7 38 3.3 The Federal Security Bureau (FSB) will assume a primary role 41 3.4 Economic development, energy production and the use of the Northern Sea Route constitute the Russian government’s priorities 42 3.5 A sidestep to the Baltic Sea 44 3.6 Security and defence, twins and overlapping responsibilities 3.6.1 The Russian Army 3.6.2 The Russian Air force 3.6.3 The Russian Navy: The northern and Pacific fleets 3.6.4 Russia as soft and hard power actor in the Arctic 3.6.5 Russia’s security concerns: United States and NATO 3.6.6 An ambiguous role: NATO in the Arctic 3.6.7 NATO, including the United States, Canada and the European Union are responding to Russia’s new policy 3.6.8 Russia’s military modernisation and its impact on the Arctic region 3.6.9 Russia and the Pacific 3.6.10 Russia’s military position in the Western region of the Arctic Ocean and ashore 3.6.11 Russia’s possible options 64 4 Economy: the absolute priority for Russia 65 4.1 The Northern Sea Route and the North West Passage 66 4.2 Indigenous peoples, international agreements 69 4.3 Trade routes 71 4.4 Yamal Peninsula 8 RUSSIA’S AND CHINA’S APPROACHES TO THE ARCTIC: Threats or challenges for the global community? 74 4.5 Legal aspects for NSR and NWP 77 4.6 Part III of UNCLOS: “Straits Used for International Navigation” and innocent passage 79 4.7 The Northern Sea Route (NSR) 82 4.8 Climate change, melting ice, the people and safe navigation through the NSR 82 4.9 The key issues are oil, gas and transport: the balance between economy and ecology 84 4.10 Permafrost 89 5 Conclusion PART TWO: China (Patrick Hébrard) 92 Introduction 94 1 China’s Arctic Approach 94 1.1 The Research Gateway 96 1.2 The Economic Gateway 98 1.3 The Governance Gateway 101 2 The 2018 White Paper 104 2.1 Beyond Words 107 2.2 An Arctic Strategy: Part of a Global Maritime Strategy 109 3 China’s New Steps in the Arctic 109 3.1 Deepening Scientific Research 3.1.1 Organization of China’s polar research 3.1.2 China’s Arctic expeditions 3.1.3 Satellites 116 3.2 China’s Arctic Research Relations 3.2.1 Canada 3.2.2 Denmark 3.2.3 Finland 3.2.4 Iceland 3.2.5 Norway Lutz Feldt and Patrick Hébrard | January 2021 9 3.2.6 Russia 3.2.7 Sweden 3.2.8 The United States 121 3.3 Rational Utilization of Arctic Resources 3.3.1 Arctic shipping routes 3.3.2 The Belt and Road Initiative and the Arctic 3.3.3 Oil, gas and mineral resources 3.3.4 Fisheries 3.3.5 Tourism 3.3.6 Conclusion 137 3.4 Law-based Governance 3.4.1 The Svalbard Treaty 3.4.2 Freedom of navigation 3.4.3 Extension of the continental shelf 141 3.5 International Cooperation 3.5.1 China and Arctic governance 3.5.2 Relations with the Arctic states 144 3.6 Maintaining a Peaceful, Secure and Stable Arctic Order 149 4 Conclusion 151 Conclusion: Russia and China: a common deal 156 Endnotes 10 RUSSIA’S AND CHINA’S APPROACHES TO THE ARCTIC: Threats or challenges for the global community? Abstract According to statements by the media and the public, Russia and China are currently the most visible actors in the Arctic.